# HG changeset patch # User ht # Date 1526556575 14400 # Node ID 484143400026c1580d3f330d6651b32ed717718f # Parent 798f529b9767ac259067d3ba513a2306599ef4ae paris diff -r 798f529b9767 -r 484143400026 tlw_god.txt --- a/tlw_god.txt Wed Apr 11 14:33:28 2018 -0400 +++ b/tlw_god.txt Thu May 17 07:29:35 2018 -0400 @@ -72,11 +72,120 @@ which too often seems to mean that they aren't commited to much of anything in particular, or at least not for very long. -* Shortt does, it seems to me, also sometimes "put the rabbit into the hat."  For example, he asserts that there are "moral truths."  Really?  According to what or whom?  I happen to agree with his (essentially Thomistic) views on what is "good," but how does that make it "true?"  I think the jury is very much out on the question of whether humans "tend to the good," and I think it is equally plausible to think that the "moral truths" for humans are the result of how our brains have evolved, and no more evidence of a particular creator than the choice of wolves and dolphins to cooperate when hunting.  I have the same concern about some of his other distinctions, e.g. between "notes" and "music."  I do not find it at all hard to believe that visual and auditory responses to particular harmonies are entirely the product of natural selection.  +Nonetheless the moral relativism issue is, as I think we've discussed +before, a very real vulnerability for any movement _at all_ away from +saying "mine is the one true faith and the rest are all just +_wrong_". For my money MacIntyre comes closer than anyone else to +solving that problem (ref. _Whose Justice, Which Rationality_), but +it's a tricky argument he makes, and even he, I gather, at least +implicitly admitted as much by moving in to Merton's old monastery +towards the end of his life. + +> Shortt does, it seems to me, also sometimes "put the rabbit into the +> hat."  For example, he asserts that there are "moral truths."  +> Really?  According to what or whom?  I happen to agree with his +> (essentially Thomistic) views on what is "good," but how does that +> make it "true?"  I think the jury is very much out on the question +> of whether humans "tend to the good," and I think it is equally +> plausible to think that the "moral truths" for humans are the result +> of how our brains have evolved, and no more evidence of a particular +> creator than the choice of wolves and dolphins to cooperate when +> hunting. + +I tend to agree that Aquinas's story here is just assumed as obvious, +rather than argued. I take that story to be roughly that the created +world is by definition good, because it is God's creation, and that +all there is in the world tends towards its own proper way of being. +'Bad' things happen in the natural world because different kinds of +beings' proper way of being conflict (consider the lion and the +antelope, or even clouds and plants). (This is all Aristotle so far, +I believe). It follows for Aquinas that (human) evil is always a +falling short, the result of either defect or mistaken understanding +of what one's own proper way of being is. On this account because God +_is_ supreme unqualified Good, union with God is (again, by +definition, tautologously) humankind's ultimate proper way of being, +achieved only in this life by saints, but available to all after +death. + +Insofar as that story is not self-evidently true to most contemporary +folk, including me, where we look for certainty about the good, the +moral, I guess I have two qualitatively different approaches to that. +One is intensely practical/personal, derived from what I see in the +lives of people I know. The relevant Quaker saying, always used as an +introduction to our version of a eulogy, is: "The grace of God as +shown forth in the life of [the deceased]". I'll pick this up in more +detail lower down. + +The other is MacIntyre's appeal, referred to above, to a hypothetical +eventual convergence of persons of good will, wide experience and +great familiarity between them with all available strands of +philosophy and theology, resulting from an extended exercise in +classical dialectic. Like I said, tricky... + +> I have the same concern about some of his other distinctions, +> e.g. between "notes" and "music."  I do not find it at all hard to +> believe that visual and auditory responses to particular harmonies +> are entirely the product of natural selection.  -* I don't doubt that Shortt is correct when he says, near the beginning, that the reader cannot be persuaded into belief.  (I also love the reference to Kierkegaard, though he does not mention the Great Gray Goose.)  But you can see the quandary in which that leaves someone like me:  if one can only understand Christianity by "living it," how can one decide whether to choose to live that life?  I have often said to both of you, I think, that it would be wonderful have faith -- I'm one of the people Hawking identified as being "afraid of the dark" but couldn't turn that fear into belief.  But while I have often found elements of religious belief and practice to be interesting and even comforting (in the sense of being part of a community), I have never been able to overcome my view that, at its heart, Christianity is based upon belief in a particular event that, in my firmly held view, simply did not occur. -I have notes on virtually every page, and I look forward to future discussion (perhaps over some excellent Port which I seem to have around). -With thanks and love,Tom +[Bother -- I meant to bring the book with me, not having gotten all +the way through it myself, but failed to do so, and haven't gotten to +whatever he has to say about notes vs. music. As a fiddle player, I +do occasionally perplex myself by trying to explain the difference +between a tune and a melody (all country dance music consists of +tunes, but only a relatively small number of them are melodies: +_Scotland the Brave_, for one, I guess, _Kind Robin_ another (although +maybe that's only in Barbara Bousma's collection in a waltz medley, so +doesn't really count) -- a related question, but not quite the _same_ +one.] + +> * I don't doubt that Shortt is correct when he says, near the +> beginning, that the reader cannot be persuaded into belief.  (I also +> love the reference to Kierkegaard, though he does not mention the +> Great Gray Goose.)  But you can see the quandary in which that +> leaves someone like me:  if one can only understand Christianity by +> "living it," how can one decide whether to choose to live that +> life?  I have often said to both of you, I think, that it would be +> wonderful [to] have faith -- I'm one of the people Hawking identified as +> being "afraid of the dark" but couldn't turn that fear into belief.  +> But while I have often found elements of religious belief and +> practice to be interesting and even comforting (in the sense of +> being part of a community), I have never been able to overcome my +> view that, at its heart, Christianity is based upon belief in a +> particular event that, in my firmly held view, simply did not occur. + +Hmm. I'm not sure I agree with him there, if only because I like to +think that I arrived where I am by a not wholly irrational path, +albeit a pretty convoluted one. + +I'm not sure I can express this clearly, to say nothing of +compellingly, in less than a monograph, but I'll see what I can do. +It's all about grace. [Note 1: What follows is something which I +think Catharine and I have found we pretty much agree on, despite +arriving at it via quite different routes.] [Note 2: However for me, +but I think _not_ for Catharine, nothing in what follows should be +taken to imply that what I'm talking about could not have arisen +"entirely [as] the product of natural selection" and/or its +sociological analogues.] [Note 3: No, not social Darwinism...] + +Both observation and introspection suggest a real qualitative +distinction between us humans and most if not all other species, +alongside, possible in part dependent on, but not the same as our +distinct status as language users. Aristotle and Aquinas (and of +course many others) label this as a distinction between our animal +nature and our rational nature, where the latter is equated with, +shall we say, 'ensoulment'. Ensoulment is where, for Aquinas, grace +comes in. Rather in the same (unsatisfactory to you, as you've +already stated) way that with respect to the "something rather than +nothing" question 'God' seems to be just a name for the answer, so +'grace' is at minimum a name for (the Heideggerian version of) the +'how ought I to live me life' question, that is, 'how is it that we +are the kind of being whose being is an issue for itself'. + +> I have notes on virtually every page, and I look forward to future +> discussion (perhaps over some excellent Port which I seem to have +> around). + +> With thanks and love,Tom ht