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8--11
author ht
date Fri, 20 Jun 2008 22:45:42 +0000
parents a2740f999f93
children 12bf78db6b31
files summa/bilingual/FP_ii.xml summa/bilingual/FP_ii_Q8-11.pdf
diffstat 2 files changed, 2591 insertions(+), 536 deletions(-) [+]
line wrap: on
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--- a/summa/bilingual/FP_ii.xml	Thu Jun 05 08:46:54 2008 +0000
+++ b/summa/bilingual/FP_ii.xml	Fri Jun 20 22:45:42 2008 +0000
@@ -4322,31 +4322,27 @@
 
 			 </div4>
 		  </div3>
-<!-- merged down to here -->
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q8" next="FP_Q8_A1" prev="FP_Q7_A4" progress="1.04%" n="vii" title="Question. 8 - THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)">
 			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8-p0.1">Question 8. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
 
 			 
 
 			 <div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8-p2"> Since it evidently belongs to the infinite to be present everywhere, and in all things, we now consider whether this belongs to God; and concerning this there arise four points of inquiry:</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8-p3"> (1) Whether God is in all things?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8-p4"> (2) Whether God is everywhere?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8-p5"> (3) Whether God is everywhere by essence, power, and presence?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8-p6"> (4) Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?</p>
 </div>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 pr."><a name="28528"><span class="ref">[28528]
+I&ordf; q. 8 pr.</span></a> Quia vero infinito convenire videtur
+quod ubique et in omnibus sit, considerandum est utrum hoc Deo
+conveniat. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum Deus sit
+in omnibus rebus. Secundo, utrum Deus sit ubique. Tertio, utrum
+Deus sit ubique per essentiam et potentiam et praesentiam. Quarto,
+utrum esse ubique sit proprium Dei.</p>
+</div>
 
 <div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1" next="FP_Q8_A2" prev="FP_Q8" progress="1.04%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether God is in all things?">
 <h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p0.1">Whether God is in all things?</h4>
@@ -4354,45 +4350,168 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not in all things. For what is above all things is not in all things. But God is above all, according to the Psalm (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.112.4" parsed="vul|Ps|112|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p2.1" passage="Ps. 112:4">Ps. 112:4</scripRef>), "The Lord is high above all nations," etc. Therefore God is not in all things.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is in anything is thereby contained. Now God is not contained by things, but rather does He contain them. Therefore God is not in things but things are rather in Him. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 20), that "in Him things are, rather than He is in any place."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more powerful an agent is, the more extended is its action. But God is the most powerful of all agents. Therefore His action can extend to things which are far removed from Him; nor is it necessary that He should be in all things.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the demons are beings. But God is not in the demons; for there is no fellowship between light and darkness (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Cor.6.14" parsed="vul|2Cor|6|14|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p5.1" passage="2 Cor. 6:14">2 Cor. 6:14</scripRef>). Therefore God is not in all things.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p6"><b>On the contrary,</b> A thing is wherever it operates. But God operates in all things, according to<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.26.12" parsed="vul|Isa|26|12|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p6.1" passage=" Is. 26:12, "> Is. 26:12, </scripRef> "Lord . . . Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us." Therefore God is in all things.</p>
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
+not in all things. For what is above all things is not in all
+things. But God is above all, according to the Psalm (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.112.4" parsed="vul|Ps|112|4|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p2.1"
+passage="Ps. 112:4">Ps. 112:4</scripRef>), "The Lord is high above all
+nations," etc. Therefore God is not in all things.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28529"><span class=
+"ref">[28529] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit in omnibus rebus. Quod enim
+est supra omnia, non est in omnibus rebus. Sed Deus est supra
+omnia, secundum illud Psalmi, <i>excelsus super omnes gentes
+dominus,</i> et cetera. Ergo Deus non est in omnibus rebus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is in
+anything is thereby contained. Now God is not contained by things, but
+rather does He contain them. Therefore God is not in things but things
+are rather in Him. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 20),
+that "in Him things are, rather than He is in any place."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28530"><span class=
+"ref">[28530] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod
+est in aliquo, continetur ab eo. Sed Deus non continetur a rebus,
+sed magis continet res. Ergo Deus non est in rebus, sed magis res
+sunt in eo. Unde Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest.,
+dicit quod <i>in ipso potius sunt omnia, quam ipse alicubi</i>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more
+powerful an agent is, the more extended is its action. But God is the
+most powerful of all agents. Therefore His action can extend to things
+which are far removed from Him; nor is it necessary that He should be
+in all things.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28531"><span class=
+"ref">[28531] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quanto
+aliquod agens est virtuosius, tanto ad magis distans eius actio
+procedit. Sed Deus est virtuosissimum agens. Ergo eius actio
+pertingere potest ad ea etiam quae ab ipso distant, nec oportet
+quod sit in omnibus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the demons
+are beings. But God is not in the demons; for there is no fellowship
+between light and darkness (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Cor.6.14"
+parsed="vul|2Cor|6|14|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p5.1" passage="2
+Cor. 6:14">2 Cor. 6:14</scripRef>). Therefore God is not in all
+things.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="28532"><span class=
+"ref">[28532] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+Daemones res aliquae sunt. Nec tamen Deus est in Daemonibus, non
+enim est conventio lucis ad tenebras, ut dicitur II ad Cor. VI.
+Ergo Deus non est in omnibus rebus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p6"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> A thing is wherever it operates. But God operates in
+all things, according to<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.26.12"
+parsed="vul|Isa|26|12|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p6.1" passage="
+Is. 26:12, "> Is. 26:12, </scripRef> "Lord . . . Thou hast wrought all
+our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us." Therefore God is in all things.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28533"><span class=
+"ref">[28533] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+ubicumque operatur aliquid, ibi est. Sed Deus operatur in omnibus,
+secundum illud Isaiae XXVI, <i>omnia opera nostra operatus es in
+nobis, domine</i>. Ergo Deus est in omnibus rebus.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon which it works. For an agent must be joined to that wherein it acts immediately and touch it by its power; hence it is proved in Phys. vii that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Now since God is very being by His own essence, created being must be His proper effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now God
   causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as they are preserved in being; as light is caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing has being, God must be present to it, according to its mode of being. But being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all things since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as was shown above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Hence
   it must be that God is in all things, and innermostly.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is above all things by the excellence of His nature; nevertheless, He is in all things as the cause of the being of all things; as was shown above in this article.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although corporeal things are said to be in another as in that which contains them, nevertheless, spiritual things contain those things in which they are; as the soul contains the body. Hence also God is in things containing them; nevertheless, by a certain similitude to corporeal things, it is said that all things are in God; inasmuch as they are contained by Him.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No action of an agent, however powerful it may be, acts at a distance, except through a medium. But it belongs to the great power of God that He acts immediately in all things. Hence nothing is distant from Him, as if it could be without God in itself. But things are said to be distant from God by the unlikeness to Him in nature or grace; as also He is above all by the excellence of His own nature.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the demons there is their nature which is from God, and also the deformity of sin which is not from Him; therefore, it is not to be absolutely conceded that God is in the demons, except with the addition, "inasmuch as they are beings." But in things not deformed in their nature, we must say absolutely that God is.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 co."><a name="28534"><span class=
+"ref">[28534] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod Deus est in omnibus rebus, non quidem sicut pars essentiae,
+vel sicut accidens, sed sicut agens adest ei in quod agit. Oportet
+enim omne agens coniungi ei in quod immediate agit, et sua virtute
+illud contingere, unde in VII Physic. probatur quod motum et movens
+oportet esse simul. Cum autem Deus sit ipsum esse per suam
+essentiam, oportet quod esse creatum sit proprius effectus eius;
+sicut ignire est proprius effectus ignis. Hunc autem effectum
+causat Deus in rebus, non solum quando primo esse incipiunt, sed
+quandiu in esse conservantur; sicut lumen causatur in aere a sole
+quandiu aer illuminatus manet. Quandiu igitur res habet esse,
+tandiu oportet quod Deus adsit ei, secundum modum quo esse habet.
+Esse autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet, et quod
+profundius omnibus inest, cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in
+re sunt, ut ex supra dictis patet. Unde oportet quod Deus sit in
+omnibus rebus, et intime.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p8"><b>Reply
+to Objection 1:</b> God is above all things by the excellence of His
+nature; nevertheless, He is in all things as the cause of the being of
+all things; as was shown above in this article.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28535"><span class=
+"ref">[28535] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod Deus est supra omnia per excellentiam suae naturae,
+et tamen est in omnibus rebus, ut causans omnium esse, ut supra
+dictum est.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p9"><b>Reply
+to Objection 2:</b> Although corporeal things are said to be in
+another as in that which contains them, nevertheless, spiritual things
+contain those things in which they are; as the soul contains the
+body. Hence also God is in things containing them; nevertheless, by a
+certain similitude to corporeal things, it is said that all things are
+in God; inasmuch as they are contained by Him.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28536"><span class=
+"ref">[28536] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, licet corporalia dicantur esse in aliquo sicut in
+continente, tamen spiritualia continent ea in quibus sunt, sicut
+anima continet corpus. Unde et Deus est in rebus sicut continens
+res. Tamen, per quandam similitudinem corporalium, dicuntur omnia
+esse in Deo, inquantum continentur ab ipso.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No action
+of an agent, however powerful it may be, acts at a distance, except
+through a medium. But it belongs to the great power of God that He
+acts immediately in all things. Hence nothing is distant from Him, as
+if it could be without God in itself. But things are said to be
+distant from God by the unlikeness to Him in nature or grace; as also
+He is above all by the excellence of His own nature.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28537"><span class=
+"ref">[28537] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+quod nullius agentis, quantumcumque virtuosi, actio procedit ad
+aliquid distans, nisi inquantum in illud per media agit. Hoc autem
+ad maximam virtutem Dei pertinet, quod immediate in omnibus agit.
+Unde nihil est distans ab eo, quasi in se illud Deum non habeat.
+Dicuntur tamen res distare a Deo per dissimilitudinem naturae vel
+gratiae, sicut et ipse est super omnia per excellentiam suae
+naturae.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A1-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the
+demons there is their nature which is from God, and also the deformity
+of sin which is not from Him; therefore, it is not to be absolutely
+conceded that God is in the demons, except with the addition,
+"inasmuch as they are beings." But in things not deformed in their
+nature, we must say absolutely that God is.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="28538"><span class=
+"ref">[28538] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
+quod in Daemonibus intelligitur et natura, quae est a Deo, et
+deformitas culpae, quae non est ab ipso. Et ideo non est absolute
+concedendum quod Deus sit in Daemonibus, sed cum hac additione,
+inquantum sunt res quaedam. In rebus autem quae nominant naturam
+non deformatam, absolute dicendum est Deum esse.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -4406,39 +4525,162 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not everywhere. For to be everywhere means to be in every place. But to be in every place does not belong to God, to Whom it does not belong to be in place at all; for "incorporeal things," as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), "are not in a place." Therefore God is not everywhere.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the relation of time to succession is the same as the relation of place to permanence. But one indivisible part of action or movement cannot exist in different times; therefore neither can one indivisible part in the genus of permanent things be in every place. Now the divine being is not successive but permanent. Therefore God is not in many places; and thus He is not everywhere.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is wholly in any one place is not in part elsewhere. But if God is in any one place He is all there; for He has no parts. No part of Him then is elsewhere; and therefore God is not everywhere.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "I fill heaven and earth." (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.23.24" parsed="vul|Jer|23|24|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p5.1" passage="Jer. 23:24">Jer. 23:24</scripRef>).</p>
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
+not everywhere. For to be everywhere means to be in every place. But
+to be in every place does not belong to God, to Whom it does not
+belong to be in place at all; for "incorporeal things," as Boethius
+says (De Hebdom.), "are not in a place." Therefore God is not
+everywhere.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28539"><span class=
+"ref">[28539] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit ubique. Esse enim ubique
+significat esse in omni loco. Sed esse in omni loco non convenit
+Deo, cui non convenit esse in loco, nam incorporalia, ut dicit
+Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., non sunt in loco. Ergo Deus non est
+ubique.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the relation
+of time to succession is the same as the relation of place to
+permanence. But one indivisible part of action or movement cannot
+exist in different times; therefore neither can one indivisible part
+in the genus of permanent things be in every place. Now the divine
+being is not successive but permanent. Therefore God is not in many
+places; and thus He is not everywhere.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28540"><span class=
+"ref">[28540] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
+se habet tempus ad successiva, ita se habet locus ad permanentia.
+Sed unum indivisibile actionis vel motus, non potest esse in
+diversis temporibus. Ergo nec unum indivisibile in genere rerum
+permanentium, potest esse in omnibus locis. Esse autem divinum non
+est successivum, sed permanens. Ergo Deus non est in pluribus
+locis. Et ita non est ubique.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is
+wholly in any one place is not in part elsewhere. But if God is in any
+one place He is all there; for He has no parts. No part of Him then is
+elsewhere; and therefore God is not everywhere.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28541"><span class=
+"ref">[28541] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod
+est totum alicubi, nihil eius est extra locum illum. Sed Deus, si
+est in aliquo loco, totus est ibi, non enim habet partes. Ergo
+nihil eius est extra locum illum. Ergo Deus non est ubique.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p5"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> It is written, "I fill heaven and earth." (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.23.24" parsed="vul|Jer|23|24|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p5.1"
+passage="Jer. 23:24">Jer. 23:24</scripRef>).</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28542"><span class=
+"ref">[28542] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur Ierem. XXIII, <i>caelum et terram ego impleo</i>.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Since place is a thing, to be in place can be understood in a twofold sense; either by way of other things---i.e. as one thing is said to be in another no matter how; and thus the accidents of a place are in place; or by a way proper to place; and thus things placed are in a place. Now in both these senses, in some way God is in every place; and this is to be everywhere. First, as He is in all things giving them being, power and operation; so He is in every
-  place as giving it existence and locative power. Again, things placed are in place, inasmuch as they fill place; and God fills every place; not, indeed, like a body, for a body is said to fill place inasmuch as it excludes the co-presence of another body; whereas by God being in a place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed, by the very fact that He gives being to the things that fill every place, He Himself fills every place.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Incorporeal things are in place not by contact of dimensive quantity, as bodies are but by contact of power.</p>
+  place as giving it existence and locative power. Again, things
+placed are in place, inasmuch as they fill place; and God fills every
+place; not, indeed, like a body, for a body is said to fill place
+inasmuch as it excludes the co-presence of another body; whereas by
+God being in a place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed,
+by the very fact that He gives being to the things that fill every
+place, He Himself fills every place.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 2 co."><a name="28543"><span class=
+"ref">[28543] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod, cum locus sit res quaedam, esse aliquid in loco potest
+intelligi dupliciter, vel per modum aliarum rerum, idest sicut
+dicitur aliquid esse in aliis rebus quocumque modo, sicut
+accidentia loci sunt in loco; vel per modum proprium loci, sicut
+locata sunt in loco. Utroque autem modo, secundum aliquid, Deus est
+in omni loco, quod est esse ubique. Primo quidem, sicut est in
+omnibus rebus, ut dans eis esse et virtutem et operationem, sic
+enim est in omni loco, ut dans ei esse et virtutem locativam. Item,
+locata sunt in loco inquantum replent locum, et Deus omnem locum
+replet. Non sicut corpus, corpus enim dicitur replere locum,
+inquantum non compatitur secum aliud corpus; sed per hoc quod Deus
+est in aliquo loco, non excluditur quin alia sint ibi, imo per hoc
+replet omnia loca, quod dat esse omnibus locatis, quae replent
+omnia loca.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p7"><b>Reply
+to Objection 1:</b> Incorporeal things are in place not by contact of
+dimensive quantity, as bodies are but by contact of power.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28544"><span class=
+"ref">[28544] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod incorporalia non sunt in loco per contactum
+quantitatis dimensivae, sicut corpora, sed per contactum
+virtutis.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The indivisible is twofold. One is the term of the continuous; as a point in permanent things, and as a moment in succession; and this kind of the indivisible in permanent things, forasmuch as it has a determinate site, cannot be in many parts of place, or in many places; likewise the indivisible of action or movement, forasmuch as it has a determinate order in movement or action, cannot be in many parts of time. Another kind of the indivisible is
-  outside of the whole genus of the continuous; and in this way incorporeal substances, like God, angel and soul, are called indivisible. Such a kind of indivisible does not belong to the continuous, as a part of it, but as touching it by its power; hence, according as its power can extend itself to one or to many, to a small thing, or to a great one, in this way it is in one or in many places, and in a small or large place.</p>
+  outside of the whole genus of the continuous; and in this way
+incorporeal substances, like God, angel and soul, are called
+indivisible. Such a kind of indivisible does not belong to the
+continuous, as a part of it, but as touching it by its power; hence,
+according as its power can extend itself to one or to many, to a small
+thing, or to a great one, in this way it is in one or in many places,
+and in a small or large place.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28545"><span class=
+"ref">[28545] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod indivisibile est duplex. Unum quod est terminus
+continui, ut punctus in permanentibus, et momentum in successivis.
+Et huiusmodi indivisibile, in permanentibus, quia habet
+determinatum situm, non potest esse in pluribus partibus loci, vel
+in pluribus locis, et similiter indivisibile actionis vel motus,
+quia habet determinatum ordinem in motu vel actione, non potest
+esse in pluribus partibus temporis. Aliud autem indivisibile est,
+quod est extra totum genus continui, et hoc modo substantiae
+incorporeae, ut Deus, Angelus et anima, dicuntur esse
+indivisibiles. Tale igitur indivisibile non applicatur ad continuum
+sicut aliquid eius, sed inquantum contingit illud sua virtute. Unde
+secundum quod virtus sua se potest extendere ad unum vel multa, ad
+parvum vel magnum, secundum hoc est in uno vel pluribus locis, et
+in loco parvo vel magno.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A whole is so called with reference to its parts. Now part is twofold: viz. a part of the essence, as the form and the matter are called parts of the composite, while genus and difference are called parts of species. There is also part of quantity into which any quantity is divided. What therefore is whole in any place by totality of quantity, cannot be outside of that place, because the quantity of anything placed is commensurate to the quantity of
   the place; and hence there is no totality of quantity without totality of place. But totality of essence is not commensurate to the totality of place. Hence it is not necessary for that which is whole by totality of essence in a thing, not to be at all outside of it. This appears also in accidental forms which have accidental quantity; as an example, whiteness is whole in each part of the surface if we speak of its totality of essence; because according to the perfect idea of its species it is
-  found to exist in every part of the surface. But if its totality be considered according to quantity which it has accidentally, then it is not whole in every part of the surface. On the other hand, incorporeal substances have no totality either of themselves or accidentally, except in reference to the perfect idea of their essence. Hence, as the soul is whole in every part of the body, so is God whole in all things and in each one.</p>
+  found to exist in every part of the surface. But if its totality be
+considered according to quantity which it has accidentally, then it is
+not whole in every part of the surface. On the other hand, incorporeal
+substances have no totality either of themselves or accidentally,
+except in reference to the perfect idea of their essence. Hence, as
+the soul is whole in every part of the body, so is God whole in all
+things and in each one.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28546"><span class=
+"ref">[28546] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+quod totum dicitur respectu partium. Est autem duplex pars,
+scilicet pars essentiae, ut forma et materia dicuntur partes
+compositi, et genus et differentia partes speciei; et etiam pars
+quantitatis, in quam scilicet dividitur aliqua quantitas. Quod ergo
+est totum in aliquo loco totalitate quantitatis, non potest esse
+extra locum illum, quia quantitas locati commensuratur quantitati
+loci, unde non est totalitas quantitatis, si non sit totalitas
+loci. Sed totalitas essentiae non commensuratur totalitati loci.
+Unde non oportet quod illud quod est totum totalitate essentiae in
+aliquo, nullo modo sit extra illud. Sicut apparet etiam in formis
+accidentalibus, quae secundum accidens quantitatem habent, albedo
+enim est tota in qualibet parte superficiei, si accipiatur
+totalitas essentiae, quia secundum perfectam rationem suae speciei
+invenitur in qualibet parte superficiei, si autem accipiatur
+totalitas secundum quantitatem, quam habet per accidens, sic non
+est tota in qualibet parte superficiei. In substantiis autem
+incorporeis non est totalitas, nec per se nec per accidens, nisi
+secundum perfectam rationem essentiae. Et ideo, sicut anima est
+tota in qualibet parte corporis, ita Deus totus est in omnibus et
+singulis.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -4452,61 +4694,233 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the mode of God's existence in all things is not properly described by way of essence, presence and power. For what is by essence in anything, is in it essentially. But God is not essentially in things; for He does not belong to the essence of anything. Therefore it ought not to be said that God is in things by essence, presence and power.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to be present in anything means not to be absent from it. Now this is the meaning of God being in things by His essence, that He is not absent from anything. Therefore the presence of God in all things by essence and presence means the same thing. Therefore it is superfluous to say that God is present in things by His essence, presence and power.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as God by His power is the principle of all things, so He is the same likewise by His knowledge and will. But it is not said that He is in things by knowledge and will. Therefore neither is He present by His power.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as grace is a perfection added to the substance of a thing, so many other perfections are likewise added. Therefore if God is said to be in certain persons in a special way by grace, it seems that according to every perfection there ought to be a special mode of God's existence in things.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p6"><b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on the Canticle of Canticles (5) says that, "God by a common mode is in all things by His presence, power and substance; still He is said to be present more familiarly in some by grace" [*The quotation is from St. Gregory, (Hom. viii in Ezech.)].</p>
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the
+mode of God's existence in all things is not properly described by way
+of essence, presence and power. For what is by essence in anything, is
+in it essentially. But God is not essentially in things; for He does
+not belong to the essence of anything. Therefore it ought not to be
+said that God is in things by essence, presence and power.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28547"><span class=
+"ref">[28547] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod male assignentur modi existendi Deum in
+rebus, cum dicitur quod Deus est in omnibus rebus per essentiam,
+potentiam et praesentiam. Id enim per essentiam est in aliquo, quod
+essentialiter est in eo. Deus autem non est essentialiter in rebus,
+non enim est de essentia alicuius rei. Ergo non debet dici quod
+Deus sit in rebus per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to be
+present in anything means not to be absent from it. Now this is the
+meaning of God being in things by His essence, that He is not absent
+from anything. Therefore the presence of God in all things by essence
+and presence means the same thing. Therefore it is superfluous to say
+that God is present in things by His essence, presence and power.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28548"><span class=
+"ref">[28548] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, hoc
+est esse praesentem alicui rei, scilicet non deesse illi. Sed hoc
+est Deum esse per essentiam in rebus, scilicet non deesse alicui
+rei. Ergo idem est esse Deum in omnibus per essentiam et
+praesentiam. Superfluum ergo fuit dicere quod Deus sit in rebus per
+essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as God by
+His power is the principle of all things, so He is the same likewise
+by His knowledge and will. But it is not said that He is in things by
+knowledge and will. Therefore neither is He present by His power.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28549"><span class=
+"ref">[28549] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
+Deus est principium omnium rerum per suam potentiam, ita per
+scientiam et voluntatem. Sed non dicitur Deus esse in rebus per
+scientiam et voluntatem. Ergo nec per potentiam.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as grace is
+a perfection added to the substance of a thing, so many other
+perfections are likewise added. Therefore if God is said to be in
+certain persons in a special way by grace, it seems that according to
+every perfection there ought to be a special mode of God's existence
+in things.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="28550"><span class=
+"ref">[28550] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
+gratia est quaedam perfectio superaddita substantiae rei, ita
+multae sunt aliae perfectiones superadditae. Si ergo Deus dicitur
+esse speciali modo in quibusdam per gratiam, videtur quod secundum
+quamlibet perfectionem debeat accipi specialis modus essendi Deum
+in rebus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p6"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> A gloss on the Canticle of Canticles (5) says that,
+"God by a common mode is in all things by His presence, power and
+substance; still He is said to be present more familiarly in some by
+grace" [*The quotation is from St. Gregory, (Hom. viii in
+Ezech.)].</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28551"><span class=
+"ref">[28551] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod Gregorius dicit, super Cant. Cantic., quod <i>Deus communi
+modo est in omnibus rebus praesentia, potentia et substantia, tamen
+familiari modo dicitur esse in aliquibus per gratiam</i>.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things created by Him; in another way he is in things as the object of operation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations of the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and the thing desired in the one desiring. In this second way God is especially in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually or
   habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this prerogative by grace, as will be shown later <a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q12">(Q[12])</a>. He is said to be thus in the saints by grace.</p>
 </div>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 co."><a name="28552"><span class=
+"ref">[28552] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod Deus dicitur esse in re aliqua dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum
+causae agentis, et sic est in omnibus rebus creatis ab ipso. Alio
+modo, sicut obiectum operationis est in operante, quod proprium est
+in operationibus animae, secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente,
+et desideratum in desiderante. Hoc igitur secundo modo, Deus
+specialiter est in rationali creatura, quae cognoscit et diligit
+illum actu vel habitu. Et quia hoc habet rationalis creatura per
+gratiam, ut infra patebit, dicitur esse hoc modo in sanctis per
+gratiam.</p>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p8"> But how He is in other things created by Him, may be considered from human affairs. A king, for example, is said to be in the whole kingdom by his power, although he is not everywhere present. Again a thing is said to be by its presence in other things which are subject to its inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who nevertheless may not be in substance in every part of the house. Lastly, a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that
-  place in which its substance may be. Now there were some (the Manichees) who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were subject to the divine power; but that visible and corporeal things were subject to the power of a contrary principle. Therefore against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His power.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p9"> But others, though they believed that all things were subject to the divine power, still did not allow that divine providence extended to these inferior bodies, and in the person of these it is said, "He walketh about the poles of the heavens; and He doth not consider our things [*Vulg.: 'He doth not consider . . . and He walketh,' etc.]" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Job.22.14" parsed="vul|Job|22|14|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p9.1" passage="Job 22:14">Job 22:14</scripRef>). Against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His presence.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p10"> Further, others said that, although all things are subject to God's providence, still all things are not immediately created by God; but that He immediately created the first creatures, and these created the others. Against these it is necessary to say that He is in all things by His essence.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p11"> Therefore, God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things are subject to His power; He is by His presence in all things, as all things are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His essence, inasmuch as He is present to all as the cause of their being.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to be in all things by essence, not indeed by the essence of the things themselves, as if He were of their essence; but by His own essence; because His substance is present to all things as the cause of their being.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing can be said to be present to another, when in its sight, though the thing may be distant in substance, as was shown in this article; and therefore two modes of presence are necessary; viz. by essence and by presence.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p14"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Knowledge and will require that the thing known should be in the one who knows, and the thing willed in the one who wills. Hence by knowledge and will things are more truly in God than God in things. But power is the principle of acting on another; hence by power the agent is related and applied to an external thing; thus by power an agent may be said to be present to another.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p15"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> No other perfection, except grace, added to substance, renders God present in anything as the object known and loved; therefore only grace constitutes a special mode of God's existence in things. There is, however, another special mode of God's existence in man by union, which will be treated of in its own place (TP).</p>
+  place in which its substance may be. Now there were some (the
+Manichees) who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were subject
+to the divine power; but that visible and corporeal things were
+subject to the power of a contrary principle. Therefore against these
+it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His power.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la">In rebus vero aliis ab ipso creatis quomodo sit,
+considerandum est ex his quae in rebus humanis esse dicuntur. Rex
+enim dicitur esse in toto regno suo per suam potentiam, licet non
+sit ubique praesens. Per praesentiam vero suam, dicitur aliquid
+esse in omnibus quae in prospectu ipsius sunt; sicut omnia quae
+sunt in aliqua domo, dicuntur esse praesentia alicui, qui tamen non
+est secundum substantiam suam in qualibet parte domus. Secundum
+vero substantiam vel essentiam, dicitur aliquid esse in loco in quo
+eius substantia habetur. Fuerunt ergo aliqui, scilicet Manichaei,
+qui dixerunt divinae potestati subiecta spiritualia esse et
+incorporalia, visibilia vero et corporalia subiecta esse dicebant
+potestati principii contrarii. Contra hos ergo oportet dicere quod
+Deus sit in omnibus per potentiam suam.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p9"> But
+others, though they believed that all things were subject to the
+divine power, still did not allow that divine providence extended to
+these inferior bodies, and in the person of these it is said, "He
+walketh about the poles of the heavens; and He doth not consider our
+things [*Vulg.: 'He doth not consider . . . and He walketh,' etc.]"
+(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Job.22.14" parsed="vul|Job|22|14|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p9.1" passage="Job 22:14">Job
+22:14</scripRef>). Against these it is necessary to say that God is in
+all things by His presence.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la">Fuerunt vero alii, qui
+licet crederent omnia esse subiecta divinae potentiae, tamen
+providentiam divinam usque ad haec inferiora corpora non
+extendebant, ex quorum persona dicitur Iob XXII, <i>circa cardines
+caeli perambulat, nec nostra considerat</i>. Et contra hos oportuit
+dicere quod sit in omnibus per suam praesentiam.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p10">
+Further, others said that, although all things are subject to God's
+providence, still all things are not immediately created by God; but
+that He immediately created the first creatures, and these created the
+others. Against these it is necessary to say that He is in all things
+by His essence.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la">Fuerunt vero alii,
+qui licet dicerent omnia ad Dei providentiam pertinere, tamen
+posuerunt omnia non immediate esse a Deo creata, sed quod immediate
+creavit primas creaturas, et illae creaverunt alias. Et contra hos
+oportet dicere quod sit in omnibus per essentiam.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p11">
+Therefore, God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things
+are subject to His power; He is by His presence in all things, as all
+things are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His
+essence, inasmuch as He is present to all as the cause of their
+being.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la">Sic ergo est in
+omnibus per potentiam, inquantum omnia eius potestati subduntur.
+Est per praesentiam in omnibus, inquantum omnia nuda sunt et aperta
+oculis eius. Est in omnibus per essentiam, inquantum adest omnibus
+ut causa essendi, sicut dictum est.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said
+to be in all things by essence, not indeed by the essence of the
+things themselves, as if He were of their essence; but by His own
+essence; because His substance is present to all things as the cause
+of their being.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28553"><span class=
+"ref">[28553] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod Deus dicitur esse in omnibus per essentiam, non
+quidem rerum, quasi sit de essentia earum, sed per essentiam suam,
+quia substantia sua adest omnibus ut causa essendi, sicut dictum
+est.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing can
+be said to be present to another, when in its sight, though the thing
+may be distant in substance, as was shown in this article; and
+therefore two modes of presence are necessary; viz. by essence and by
+presence.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28554"><span class=
+"ref">[28554] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod aliquid potest dici praesens alicui, inquantum
+subiacet eius conspectui, quod tamen distat ab eo secundum suam
+substantiam, ut dictum est. Et ideo oportuit duos modos poni,
+scilicet per essentiam, et praesentiam.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p14"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Knowledge
+and will require that the thing known should be in the one who knows,
+and the thing willed in the one who wills. Hence by knowledge and will
+things are more truly in God than God in things. But power is the
+principle of acting on another; hence by power the agent is related
+and applied to an external thing; thus by power an agent may be said
+to be present to another.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28555"><span class=
+"ref">[28555] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+quod de ratione scientiae et voluntatis est, quod scitum sit in
+sciente, et volitum in volente, unde secundum scientiam et
+voluntatem, magis res sunt in Deo, quam Deus in rebus. Sed de
+ratione potentiae est, quod sit principium agendi in aliud, unde
+secundum potentiam agens comparatur et applicatur rei exteriori. Et
+sic per potentiam potest dici agens esse in altero.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A3-p15"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> No other
+perfection, except grace, added to substance, renders God present in
+anything as the object known and loved; therefore only grace
+constitutes a special mode of God's existence in things. There is,
+however, another special mode of God's existence in man by union,
+which will be treated of in its own place (TP).</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="28556"><span class=
+"ref">[28556] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
+quod nulla alia perfectio superaddita substantiae, facit Deum esse
+in aliquo sicut obiectum cognitum et amatum, nisi gratia, et ideo
+sola gratia facit singularem modum essendi Deum in rebus. Est autem
+alius singularis modus essendi Deum in homine per unionem, de quo
+modo suo loco agetur.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -4520,62 +4934,219 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. For the universal, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i), is everywhere, and always; primary matter also, since it is in all bodies, is everywhere. But neither of these is God, as appears from what is said above <a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3">(Q[3])</a>. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, number is in things numbered. But the whole universe is constituted in number, as appears from the Book of Wisdom (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.21" parsed="vul|Wis|11|21|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p3.1" passage="Wis. 11:21">Wis. 11:21</scripRef>). Therefore there is some number which is in the whole universe, and is thus everywhere.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the universe is a kind of "whole perfect body" (Coel. et Mund. i). But the whole universe is everywhere, because there is no place outside it. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if any body were infinite, no place would exist outside of it, and so it would be everywhere. Therefore to be everywhere does not appear to belong to God alone.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p6"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the soul, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), is "whole in the whole body, and whole in every one of its parts." Therefore if there was only one animal in the world, its soul would be everywhere; and thus to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p7"><b>Objection 6:</b> Further, as Augustine says (<scripRef id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p7.1" passage="Ep. 137">Ep. 137</scripRef>), "The soul feels where it sees, and lives where it feels, and is where it lives." But the soul sees as it were everywhere: for in a succession of glances it comprehends the entire space of the heavens in its sight. Therefore the soul is everywhere.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p8"><b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Who dares to call the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all things, and everywhere, and always is, which assuredly belongs to the divinity alone?"</p>
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be
+everywhere does not belong to God alone. For the universal, according
+to the Philosopher (Poster. i), is everywhere, and always; primary
+matter also, since it is in all bodies, is everywhere. But neither of
+these is God, as appears from what is said above <a xml:link="simple"
+shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p2.1"
+href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3">(Q[3])</a>. Therefore to be everywhere does not
+belong to God alone.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28557"><span class=
+"ref">[28557] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod esse ubique non sit proprium Dei.
+Universale enim, secundum philosophum, est ubique et semper,
+materia etiam prima, cum sit in omnibus corporibus, est ubique.
+Neutrum autem horum est Deus, ut ex praemissis patet. Ergo esse
+ubique non est proprium Dei.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, number is in
+things numbered. But the whole universe is constituted in number, as
+appears from the Book of Wisdom (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.21" parsed="vul|Wis|11|21|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p3.1"
+passage="Wis. 11:21">Wis. 11:21</scripRef>). Therefore there is some
+number which is in the whole universe, and is thus everywhere.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28558"><span class=
+"ref">[28558] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+numerus est in numeratis. Sed totum universum est constitutum in
+numero, ut patet Sap. XI. Ergo aliquis numerus est, qui est in toto
+universo, et ita ubique.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the universe
+is a kind of "whole perfect body" (Coel. et Mund. i). But the whole
+universe is everywhere, because there is no place outside
+it. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28559"><span class=
+"ref">[28559] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, totum
+universum est quoddam totum corpus perfectum, ut dicitur in I caeli
+et mundi. Sed totum universum est ubique, quia extra ipsum nullus
+locus est. Non ergo solus Deus est ubique.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if any body
+were infinite, no place would exist outside of it, and so it would be
+everywhere. Therefore to be everywhere does not appear to belong to
+God alone.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="28560"><span class=
+"ref">[28560] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, si
+aliquod corpus esset infinitum, nullus locus esset extra ipsum.
+Ergo esset ubique. Et sic, esse ubique non videtur proprium
+Dei.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p6"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the soul, as
+Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), is "whole in the whole body, and
+whole in every one of its parts." Therefore if there was only one
+animal in the world, its soul would be everywhere; and thus to be
+everywhere does not belong to God alone.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="28561"><span class=
+"ref">[28561] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> <i>Praeterea,
+anima</i>, ut dicit Augustinus, in VI de Trin., <i>est tota in toto
+corpore, et tota in qualibet eius parte</i>. Si ergo non esset in
+mundo nisi unum solum animal, anima eius esset ubique. Et sic, esse
+ubique non est proprium Dei.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p7"><b>Objection 6:</b> Further, as Augustine
+says (<scripRef id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p7.1"
+passage="Ep. 137">Ep. 137</scripRef>), "The soul feels where it sees,
+and lives where it feels, and is where it lives." But the soul sees as
+it were everywhere: for in a succession of glances it comprehends the
+entire space of the heavens in its sight. Therefore the soul is
+everywhere.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 6"><a name="28562"><span class=
+"ref">[28562] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 4 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, ut
+Augustinus dicit in epistola ad Volusianum, <i>anima ubi videt, ibi
+sentit; et ubi sentit, ibi vivit; et ubi vivit, ibi est</i>. Sed
+anima videt quasi ubique, quia successive videt etiam totum caelum.
+Ergo anima est ubique.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p8"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Who dares to
+call the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all things, and everywhere, and
+always is, which assuredly belongs to the divinity alone?"</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28563"><span class=
+"ref">[28563] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod Ambrosius dicit, in libro de spiritu sancto, <i>quis audeat
+creaturam dicere spiritum sanctum, qui in omnibus et ubique et
+semper est; quod utique divinitatis est proprium?</i></p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p9"><b>I answer that,</b> To be everywhere primarily and absolutely, is proper to God. Now to be everywhere primarily is said of that which in its whole self is everywhere; for if a thing were everywhere according to its parts in different places, it would not be primarily everywhere, forasmuch as what belongs to anything according to part does not belong to it primarily; thus if a man has white teeth, whiteness belongs primarily not to the man but to his teeth. But a thing is
   everywhere absolutely when it does not belong to it to be everywhere accidentally, that is, merely on some supposition; as a grain of millet would be everywhere, supposing that no other body existed. It belongs therefore to a thing to be everywhere absolutely when, on any supposition, it must be everywhere; and this properly belongs to God alone. For whatever number of places be supposed, even if an infinite number be supposed besides what already exist, it would be necessary that God should be
-  in all of them; for nothing can exist except by Him. Therefore to be everywhere primarily and absolutely belongs to God and is proper to Him: because whatever number of places be supposed to exist, God must be in all of them, not as to a part of Him, but as to His very self.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The universal, and also primary matter are indeed everywhere; but not according to the same mode of existence.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Number, since it is an accident, does not, of itself, exist in place, but accidentally; neither is the whole but only part of it in each of the things numbered; hence it does not follow that it is primarily and absolutely everywhere.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The whole body of the universe is everywhere, but not primarily; forasmuch as it is not wholly in each place, but according to its parts; nor again is it everywhere absolutely, because, supposing that other places existed besides itself, it would not be in them.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> If an infinite body existed, it would be everywhere; but according to its parts.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p14"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Were there one animal only, its soul would be everywhere primarily indeed, but only accidentally.</p>
+  in all of them; for nothing can exist except by Him. Therefore to be
+everywhere primarily and absolutely belongs to God and is proper to
+Him: because whatever number of places be supposed to exist, God must
+be in all of them, not as to a part of Him, but as to His very
+self.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 co."><a name="28564"><span class=
+"ref">[28564] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod esse ubique primo et per se, est proprium Dei. Dico autem esse
+ubique primo, quod secundum se totum est ubique. Si quid enim esset
+ubique, secundum diversas partes in diversis locis existens, non
+esset primo ubique, quia quod convenit alicui ratione partis suae,
+non convenit ei primo; sicut si homo est albus dente, albedo non
+convenit primo homini, sed denti. Esse autem ubique per se dico id
+cui non convenit esse ubique per accidens, propter aliquam
+suppositionem factam, quia sic granum milii esset ubique, supposito
+quod nullum aliud corpus esset. Per se igitur convenit esse ubique
+alicui, quando tale est quod, qualibet positione facta, sequitur
+illud esse ubique. Et hoc proprie convenit Deo. Quia quotcumque
+loca ponantur, etiam si ponerentur infinita praeter ista quae sunt,
+oporteret in omnibus esse Deum, quia nihil potest esse nisi per
+ipsum. Sic igitur esse ubique primo et per se convenit Deo, et est
+proprium eius, quia quotcumque loca ponantur, oportet quod in
+quolibet sit Deus, non secundum partem, sed secundum seipsum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The
+universal, and also primary matter are indeed everywhere; but not
+according to the same mode of existence.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28565"><span class=
+"ref">[28565] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod universale et materia prima sunt quidem ubique, sed
+non secundum idem esse.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Number,
+since it is an accident, does not, of itself, exist in place, but
+accidentally; neither is the whole but only part of it in each of the
+things numbered; hence it does not follow that it is primarily and
+absolutely everywhere.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28566"><span class=
+"ref">[28566] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod numerus, cum sit accidens, non est per se sed per
+accidens, in loco. Nec est totus in quolibet numeratorum, sed
+secundum partem. Et sic non sequitur quod sit primo et per se
+ubique.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The whole
+body of the universe is everywhere, but not primarily; forasmuch as it
+is not wholly in each place, but according to its parts; nor again is
+it everywhere absolutely, because, supposing that other places existed
+besides itself, it would not be in them.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28567"><span class=
+"ref">[28567] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+quod totum corpus universi est ubique, sed non primo, quia non
+totum est in quolibet loco, sed secundum suas partes. Nec iterum
+per se, quia si ponerentur aliqua alia loca, non esset in eis.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> If an
+infinite body existed, it would be everywhere; but according to its
+parts.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="28568"><span class=
+"ref">[28568] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
+quod, si esset corpus infinitum, esset ubique; sed secundum suas
+partes.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p14"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Were there
+one animal only, its soul would be everywhere primarily indeed, but
+only accidentally.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="28569"><span class=
+"ref">[28569] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum
+quod, si esset unum solum animal, anima eius esset ubique primo
+quidem, sed per accidens.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A4-p15"><b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> When it is said that the soul sees anywhere, this can be taken in two senses. In one sense the adverb "anywhere" determines the act of seeing on the part of the object; and in this sense it is true that while it sees the heavens, it sees in the heavens; and in the same way it feels in the heavens; but it does not follow that it lives or exists in the heavens, because to live and to exist do not import an act passing to an exterior object. In another
-  sense it can be understood according as the adverb determines the act of the seer, as proceeding from the seer; and thus it is true that where the soul feels and sees, there it is, and there it lives according to this mode of speaking; and thus it does not follow that it is everywhere.</p>
+  sense it can be understood according as the adverb determines the
+act of the seer, as proceeding from the seer; and thus it is true that
+where the soul feels and sees, there it is, and there it lives
+according to this mode of speaking; and thus it does not follow that
+it is everywhere.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 6"><a name="28570"><span class=
+"ref">[28570] I&ordf; q. 8 a. 4 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum
+quod, cum dicitur anima alicubi videre, potest intelligi
+dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod hoc adverbium alicubi
+determinat actum videndi ex parte obiecti. Et sic verum est quod,
+dum caelum videt, in caelo videt, et eadem ratione in caelo sentit.
+Non tamen sequitur quod in caelo vivat vel sit, quia vivere et esse
+non important actum transeuntem in exterius obiectum. Alio modo
+potest intelligi secundum quod adverbium determinat actum videntis,
+secundum quod exit a vidente. Et sic verum est quod anima ubi
+sentit et videt, ibi est et vivit, secundum istum modum loquendi.
+Et ita non sequitur quod sit ubique.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -4590,16 +5161,18 @@
 			 
 
 			 <div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9-p2"> We next consider God's immutability, and His eternity following on His immutability. On the immutability of God there are two points of inquiry:</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9-p3"> (1) Whether God is altogether immutable?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9-p4"> (2) Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?</p>
 </div>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 pr."><a name="28571"><span class="ref">[28571]
+I&ordf; q. 9 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de
+immutabilitate et aeternitate divina, quae immutabilitatem
+consequitur. Circa immutabilitatem vero quaeruntur duo. Primo,
+utrum Deus sit omnino immutabilis. Secundo, utrum esse immutabile
+sit proprium Dei.</p>
+</div>
 
 <div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1" next="FP_Q9_A2" prev="FP_Q9" progress="1.17%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether God is altogether immutable?">
 <h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p0.1">Whether God is altogether immutable?</h4>
@@ -4607,38 +5180,155 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not altogether immutable. For whatever moves itself is in some way mutable. But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit viii, 20), "The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by time, nor by place." Therefore God is in some way mutable.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said of Wisdom, that "it is more mobile than all things active [Vulg.'mobilior']" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.7.24" parsed="vul|Wis|7|24|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p3.1" passage="Wis. 7:24">Wis. 7:24</scripRef>). But God is wisdom itself; therefore God is movable.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to approach and to recede signify movement. But these are said of God in Scripture, "Draw nigh to God and He will draw nigh to you" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jas.4.8" parsed="vul|Jas|4|8|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p4.1" passage="James 4:8">James 4:8</scripRef>). Therefore God is mutable.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "I am the Lord, and I change not" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Mal.3.6" parsed="vul|Mal|3|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p5.1" passage="Malachi 3:6">Malachi 3:6</scripRef>).</p>
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is
+not altogether immutable. For whatever moves itself is in some way
+mutable. But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit viii, 20), "The Creator
+Spirit moves Himself neither by time, nor by place." Therefore God is
+in some way mutable.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28572"><span class=
+"ref">[28572] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit omnino immutabilis. Quidquid
+enim movet seipsum, est aliquo modo mutabile. Sed, sicut dicit
+Augustinus, VIII super Genesim ad litteram, <i>spiritus creator
+movet se nec per tempus nec per locum</i>. Ergo Deus est aliquo
+modo mutabilis.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said
+of Wisdom, that "it is more mobile than all things active
+[Vulg.'mobilior']" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.7.24"
+parsed="vul|Wis|7|24|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p3.1"
+passage="Wis. 7:24">Wis. 7:24</scripRef>). But God is wisdom itself;
+therefore God is movable.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28573"><span class=
+"ref">[28573] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Sap.
+VII dicitur de sapientia quod est <i>mobilior omnibus
+mobilibus</i>. Sed Deus est ipsa sapientia. Ergo Deus est
+mobilis.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to approach
+and to recede signify movement. But these are said of God in
+Scripture, "Draw nigh to God and He will draw nigh to you" (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:Jas.4.8" parsed="vul|Jas|4|8|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p4.1" passage="James 4:8">James
+4:8</scripRef>). Therefore God is mutable.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28574"><span class=
+"ref">[28574] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+appropinquari et elongari motum significant. Huiusmodi autem
+dicuntur de Deo in Scriptura, Iac. IV, <i>appropinquate Deo, et
+appropinquabit vobis</i>. Ergo Deus est mutabilis.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p5"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> It is written, "I am the Lord, and I change not"
+(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Mal.3.6" parsed="vul|Mal|3|6|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p5.1" passage="Malachi 3:6">Malachi
+3:6</scripRef>).</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28575"><span class=
+"ref">[28575] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur Malach. III, <i>ego Deus, et non mutor</i>.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> From what precedes, it is shown that God is altogether immutable. First, because it was shown above that there is some first being, whom we call God; and that this first being must be pure act, without the admixture of any potentiality, for the reason that, absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality. Hence it is evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable.
   Secondly, because everything which is moved, remains as it was in part, and passes away in part; as what is moved from whiteness to blackness, remains the same as to substance; thus in everything which is moved, there is some kind of composition to be found. But it has been shown above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7">Q[3], A[7]</a>) that in God there is no composition, for He is altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that God cannot be moved. Thirdly, because everything which is moved acquires something
-  by its movement, and attains to what it had not attained previously. But since God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all the plenitude of perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything new, nor extend Himself to anything whereto He was not extended previously. Hence movement in no way belongs to Him. So, some of the ancients, constrained, as it were, by the truth, decided that the first principle was immovable.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine there speaks in a similar way to Plato, who said that the first mover moves Himself; calling every operation a movement, even as the acts of understanding, and willing, and loving, are called movements. Therefore because God understands and loves Himself, in that respect they said that God moves Himself, not, however, as movement and change belong to a thing existing in potentiality, as we now speak of change and movement.</p>
+  by its movement, and attains to what it had not attained
+previously. But since God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all
+the plenitude of perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything
+new, nor extend Himself to anything whereto He was not extended
+previously. Hence movement in no way belongs to Him. So, some of the
+ancients, constrained, as it were, by the truth, decided that the
+first principle was immovable.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 1 co."><a name="28576"><span class=
+"ref">[28576] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod ex praemissis ostenditur Deum esse omnino immutabilem. Primo
+quidem, quia supra ostensum est esse aliquod primum ens, quod Deum
+dicimus, et quod huiusmodi primum ens oportet esse purum actum
+absque permixtione alicuius potentiae, eo quod potentia simpliciter
+est posterior actu. Omne autem quod quocumque modo mutatur, est
+aliquo modo in potentia. Ex quo patet quod impossibile est Deum
+aliquo modo mutari. Secundo, quia omne quod movetur, quantum ad
+aliquid manet, et quantum ad aliquid transit, sicut quod movetur de
+albedine in nigredinem, manet secundum substantiam. Et sic in omni
+eo quod movetur, attenditur aliqua compositio. Ostensum est autem
+supra quod in Deo nulla est compositio, sed est omnino simplex.
+Unde manifestum est quod Deus moveri non potest. Tertio, quia omne
+quod movetur, motu suo aliquid acquirit, et pertingit ad illud ad
+quod prius non pertingebat. Deus autem, cum sit infinitus,
+comprehendens in se omnem plenitudinem perfectionis totius esse,
+non potest aliquid acquirere, nec extendere se in aliquid ad quod
+prius non pertingebat. Unde nullo modo sibi competit motus. Et inde
+est quod quidam antiquorum, quasi ab ipsa veritate coacti,
+posuerunt primum principium esse immobile.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p7"><b>Reply
+to Objection 1:</b> Augustine there speaks in a similar way to Plato,
+who said that the first mover moves Himself; calling every operation a
+movement, even as the acts of understanding, and willing, and loving,
+are called movements. Therefore because God understands and loves
+Himself, in that respect they said that God moves Himself, not,
+however, as movement and change belong to a thing existing in
+potentiality, as we now speak of change and movement.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28577"><span class=
+"ref">[28577] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur secundum modum quo Plato
+dicebat primum movens movere seipsum, omnem operationem nominans
+motum; secundum quod etiam ipsum intelligere et velle et amare
+motus quidam dicuntur. Quia ergo Deus intelligit et amat seipsum,
+secundum hoc dixerunt quod Deus movet seipsum, non autem secundum
+quod motus et mutatio est existentis in potentia, ut nunc loquimur
+de mutatione et motu.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Wisdom is called mobile by way of similitude, according as it diffuses its likeness even to the outermost of things; for nothing can exist which does not proceed from the divine wisdom by way of some kind of imitation, as from the first effective and formal principle; as also works of art proceed from the wisdom of the artist. And so in the same way, inasmuch as the similitude of the divine wisdom proceeds in degrees from the highest things, which
-  participate more fully of its likeness, to the lowest things which participate of it in a lesser degree, there is said to be a kind of procession and movement of the divine wisdom to things; as when we say that the sun proceeds to the earth, inasmuch as the ray of light touches the earth. In this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. i) expounds the matter, that every procession of the divine manifestation comes to us from the movement of the Father of light.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These things are said of God in Scripture metaphorically. For as the sun is said to enter a house, or to go out, according as its rays reach the house, so God is said to approach to us, or to recede from us, when we receive the influx of His goodness, or decline from Him.</p>
+  participate more fully of its likeness, to the lowest things which
+participate of it in a lesser degree, there is said to be a kind of
+procession and movement of the divine wisdom to things; as when we say
+that the sun proceeds to the earth, inasmuch as the ray of light
+touches the earth. In this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. i) expounds the
+matter, that every procession of the divine manifestation comes to us
+from the movement of the Father of light.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28578"><span class=
+"ref">[28578] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod sapientia dicitur mobilis esse similitudinarie,
+secundum quod suam similitudinem diffundit usque ad ultima rerum.
+Nihil enim esse potest, quod non procedat a divina sapientia per
+quandam imitationem, sicut a primo principio effectivo et formali;
+prout etiam artificiata procedunt a sapientia artificis. Sic igitur
+inquantum similitudo divinae sapientiae gradatim procedit a
+supremis, quae magis participant de eius similitudine, usque ad
+infima rerum, quae minus participant dicitur esse quidam processus
+et motus divinae sapientiae in res, sicut si dicamus solem
+procedere usque ad terram, inquantum radius luminis eius usque ad
+terram pertingit. Et hoc modo exponit Dionysius, cap. I Cael.
+Hier., dicens quod <i>omnis processus divinae manifestationis venit
+ad nos a patre luminum moto</i>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1-p9"><b>Reply
+to Objection 3:</b> These things are said of God in Scripture
+metaphorically. For as the sun is said to enter a house, or to go out,
+according as its rays reach the house, so God is said to approach to
+us, or to recede from us, when we receive the influx of His goodness,
+or decline from Him.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28579"><span class=
+"ref">[28579] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+quod huiusmodi dicuntur de Deo in Scripturis metaphorice. Sicut
+enim dicitur sol intrare domum vel exire, inquantum radius eius
+pertingit ad domum; sic dicitur Deus appropinquare ad nos vel
+recedere a nobis, inquantum percipimus influentiam bonitatis
+ipsius, vel ab eo deficimus.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -4652,19 +5342,62 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be immutable does not belong to God alone. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that "matter is in everything which is moved." But, according to some, certain created substances, as angels and souls, have not matter. Therefore to be immutable does not belong to God alone.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything in motion moves to some end. What therefore has already attained its ultimate end, is not in motion. But some creatures have already attained to their ultimate end; as all the blessed in heaven. Therefore some creatures are immovable.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything which is mutable is variable. But forms are invariable; for it is said (Sex Princip. i) that "form is essence consisting of the simple and invariable." Therefore it does not belong to God alone to be immutable.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. i), "God alone is immutable; and whatever things He has made, being from nothing, are mutable."</p>
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be
+immutable does not belong to God alone. For the Philosopher says
+(Metaph. ii) that "matter is in everything which is moved." But,
+according to some, certain created substances, as angels and souls,
+have not matter. Therefore to be immutable does not belong to God
+alone.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28580"><span class=
+"ref">[28580] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod esse immutabile non sit proprium Dei.
+Dicit enim philosophus, in II Metaphys., quod materia est in omni
+eo quod movetur. Sed substantiae quaedam creatae, sicut Angeli et
+animae, non habent materiam, ut quibusdam videtur. Ergo esse
+immutabile non est proprium Dei.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything
+in motion moves to some end. What therefore has already attained its
+ultimate end, is not in motion. But some creatures have already
+attained to their ultimate end; as all the blessed in
+heaven. Therefore some creatures are immovable.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28581"><span class=
+"ref">[28581] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
+quod movetur, movetur propter aliquem finem, quod ergo iam pervenit
+ad ultimum finem, non movetur. Sed quaedam creaturae iam
+pervenerunt ad ultimum finem, sicut omnes beati. Ergo aliquae
+creaturae sunt immobiles.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything
+which is mutable is variable. But forms are invariable; for it is said
+(Sex Princip. i) that "form is essence consisting of the simple and
+invariable." Therefore it does not belong to God alone to be
+immutable.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28582"><span class=
+"ref">[28582] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
+quod est mutabile, est variabile. Sed formae sunt invariabiles,
+dicitur enim in libro sex principiorum, quod <i>forma est simplici
+et invariabili essentia consistens</i>. Ergo non est solius Dei
+proprium esse immutabile.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p5"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. i), "God alone is
+immutable; and whatever things He has made, being from nothing, are
+mutable."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28583"><span class=
+"ref">[28583] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de natura boni, <i>solus Deus
+immutabilis est; quae autem fecit, quia ex nihilo sunt, mutabilia
+sunt</i>.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
@@ -4672,6 +5405,25 @@
   depends on the will of God, so likewise it depends on His will that things should be preserved; for He does not preserve them otherwise than by ever giving them existence; hence if He took away His action from them, all things would be reduced to nothing, as appears from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12). Therefore as it was in the Creator's power to produce them before they existed in themselves, so likewise it is in the Creator's power when they exist in themselves to bring them to nothing. In
   this way therefore, by the power of another---namely, of God---they are mutable, inasmuch as they are producible from nothing by Him, and are by Him reducible from existence to non-existence.</p>
 </div>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 2 co."><a name="28584"><span class=
+"ref">[28584] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod solus Deus est omnino immutabilis, omnis autem creatura aliquo
+modo est mutabilis. Sciendum est enim quod mutabile potest aliquid
+dici dupliciter, uno modo, per potentiam quae in ipso est; alio
+modo, per potentiam quae in altero est. Omnes enim creaturae,
+antequam essent, non erant possibiles esse per aliquam potentiam
+creatam, cum nullum creatum sit aeternum, sed per solam potentiam
+divinam, inquantum Deus poterat eas in esse producere. Sicut autem
+ex voluntate Dei dependet quod res in esse producit, ita ex
+voluntate eius dependet quod res in esse conservat, non enim aliter
+eas in esse conservat, quam semper eis esse dando; unde si suam
+actionem eis subtraheret, omnia in nihilum redigerentur, ut patet
+per Augustinum, IV super Gen. ad Litt. Sicut igitur in potentia
+creatoris fuit ut res essent, antequam essent in seipsis, ita in
+potentia creatoris est, postquam sunt in seipsis, ut non sint. Sic
+igitur per potentiam quae est in altero, scilicet in Deo, sunt
+mutabiles, inquantum ab ipso ex nihilo potuerunt produci in esse,
+et de esse possunt reduci in non esse.</p>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p7"> If, however, a thing is called mutable by a power in itself, thus also in some manner every creature is mutable. For every creature has a twofold power, active and passive; and I call that power passive which enables anything to attain its perfection either in being, or in attaining to its end. Now if the mutability of a thing be considered according to its power for being, in that way all creatures are not mutable, but those only in which what is potential in them is consistent
@@ -4679,24 +5431,103 @@
   then the privation of such an accident cannot coexist with the subject. Hence the subject cannot be changed as regards that kind of accident; as, for example, snow cannot be made black. Now in the celestial bodies matter is not consistent with privation of form, because the form perfects the whole potentiality of the matter; therefore these bodies are not mutable as to substantial being, but only as to locality, because the subject is consistent with privation of this or that place. On the
   other hand incorporeal substances, being subsistent forms which, although with respect to their own existence are as potentiality to act, are not consistent with the privation of this act; forasmuch as existence is consequent upon form, and nothing corrupts except it lose its form. Hence in the form itself there is no power to non-existence; and so these kinds of substances are immutable and invariable as regards their existence. Wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "intellectual
   created substances are pure from generation and from every variation, as also are incorporeal and immaterial substances." Still, there remains in them a twofold mutability: one as regards their potentiality to their end; and in that way there is in them a mutability according to choice from good to evil, as Damascene says (De Fide ii, 3,4); the other as regards place, inasmuch as by their finite power they attain to certain fresh places---which cannot be said of God, who by His infinity fills
-  all places, as was shown above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2">Q[8], A[2]</a>).</p>
+  all places, as was shown above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q8.FP_Q8_A2">Q[8],
+A[2]</a>).</p>
+<p xml:lang="la">Si autem dicatur aliquid
+mutabile per potentiam in ipso existentem, sic etiam aliquo modo
+omnis creatura est mutabilis. Est enim in creatura duplex potentia,
+scilicet activa et passiva. Dico autem potentiam passivam, secundum
+quam aliquid assequi potest suam perfectionem, vel in essendo vel
+in consequendo finem. Si igitur attendatur mutabilitas rei secundum
+potentiam ad esse, sic non in omnibus creaturis est mutabilitas,
+sed in illis solum in quibus illud quod est possibile in eis,
+potest stare cum non esse. Unde in corporibus inferioribus est
+mutabilitas et secundum esse substantiale, quia materia eorum
+potest esse cum privatione formae substantialis ipsorum, et quantum
+ad esse accidentale, si subiectum compatiatur secum privationem
+accidentis; sicut hoc subiectum, homo, compatitur secum non album,
+et ideo potest mutari de albo in non album. Si vero sit tale
+accidens quod consequatur principia essentialia subiecti, privatio
+illius accidentis non potest stare cum subiecto, unde subiectum non
+potest mutari secundum illud accidens, sicut nix non potest fieri
+nigra. In corporibus vero caelestibus, materia non compatitur secum
+privationem formae, quia forma perficit totam potentialitatem
+materiae, et ideo non sunt mutabilia secundum esse substantiale;
+sed secundum esse locale, quia subiectum compatitur secum
+privationem huius loci vel illius. Substantiae vero incorporeae,
+quia sunt ipsae formae subsistentes, quae tamen se habent ad esse
+ipsarum sicut potentia ad actum, non compatiuntur secum privationem
+huius actus, quia esse consequitur formam, et nihil corrumpitur
+nisi per hoc quod amittit formam. Unde in ipsa forma non est
+potentia ad non esse, et ideo huiusmodi substantiae sunt
+immutabiles et invariabiles secundum esse. Et hoc est quod dicit
+Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>substantiae intellectuales
+creatae mundae sunt a generatione et ab omni variatione, sicut
+incorporales et immateriales</i>. Sed tamen remanet in eis duplex
+mutabilitas. Una secundum quod sunt in potentia ad finem, et sic
+est in eis mutabilitas secundum electionem de bono in malum, ut
+Damascenus dicit. Alia secundum locum, inquantum virtute sua finita
+possunt attingere quaedam loca quae prius non attingebant, quod de
+Deo dici non potest, qui sua infinitate omnia loca replet, ut supra
+dictum est.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p8"> Thus in every creature there is a potentiality to change either as regards substantial being as in the case of things corruptible; or as regards locality only, as in the case of the celestial bodies; or as regards the order to their end, and the application of their powers to divers objects, as in the case with the angels; and universally all creatures generally are mutable by the power of the Creator, in Whose power is their existence and non-existence. Hence since God is in
-  none of these ways mutable, it belongs to Him alone to be altogether immutable.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection proceeds from mutability as regards substantial or accidental being; for philosophers treated of such movement.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good angels, besides their natural endowment of immutability of being, have also immutability of election by divine power; nevertheless there remains in them mutability as regards place.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Forms are called invariable, forasmuch as they cannot be subjects of variation; but they are subject to variation because by them their subject is variable. Hence it is clear that they vary in so far as they are; for they are not called beings as though they were the subject of being, but because through them something has being.</p>
+  none of these ways mutable, it belongs to Him alone to be altogether
+immutable.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la">Sic igitur in omni creatura est potentia ad mutationem,
+vel secundum esse substantiale, sicut corpora corruptibilia; vel
+secundum esse locale tantum, sicut corpora caelestia, vel secundum
+ordinem ad finem et applicationem virtutis ad diversa, sicut in
+Angelis. Et universaliter omnes creaturae communiter sunt mutabiles
+secundum potentiam creantis, in cuius potestate est esse et non
+esse earum. Unde, cum Deus nullo istorum modorum sit mutabilis,
+proprium eius est omnino immutabilem esse.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p9"><b>Reply
+to Objection 1:</b> This objection proceeds from mutability as regards
+substantial or accidental being; for philosophers treated of such
+movement.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28585"><span class=
+"ref">[28585] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de eo quod est mutabile
+secundum esse substantiale vel accidentale, de tali enim motu
+philosophi tractaverunt.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good
+angels, besides their natural endowment of immutability of being, have
+also immutability of election by divine power; nevertheless there
+remains in them mutability as regards place.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28586"><span class=
+"ref">[28586] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod Angeli boni, supra immutabilitatem essendi, quae
+competit eis secundum naturam, habent immutabilitatem electionis ex
+divina virtute, tamen remanet in eis mutabilitas secundum
+locum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Forms are
+called invariable, forasmuch as they cannot be subjects of variation;
+but they are subject to variation because by them their subject is
+variable. Hence it is clear that they vary in so far as they are; for
+they are not called beings as though they were the subject of being,
+but because through them something has being.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 9 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28587"><span class=
+"ref">[28587] I&ordf; q. 9 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
+quod formae dicuntur invariabiles, quia non possunt esse subiectum
+variationis, subiiciuntur tamen variationi, inquantum subiectum
+secundum eas variatur. Unde patet quod secundum quod sunt, sic
+variantur, non enim dicuntur entia quasi sint subiectum essendi,
+sed quia eis aliquid est.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -4713,93 +5544,248 @@
 			 
 
 			 <div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10-p2"> We must now consider the eternity of God, concerning which arise six points of inquiry:</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10-p3"> (1) What is eternity?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10-p4"> (2) Whether God is eternal?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10-p5"> (3) Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10-p6"> (4) Whether eternity differs from time?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10-p7"> (5) The difference of aeviternity, as there is one time, and one eternity?</p>
 </div>
-
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 pr."><a name="28588"><span class="ref">[28588]
+I&ordf; q. 10 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de aeternitate. Et
+circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, quid sit aeternitas. Secundo,
+utrum Deus sit aeternus. Tertio, utrum esse aeternum sit proprium
+Dei. Quarto, utrum aeternitas differat a tempore. Quinto, de
+differentia aevi et temporis. Sexto, utrum sit unum aevum tantum,
+sicut est unum tempus et una aeternitas.</p>
+</div>
 <div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1" next="FP_Q10_A2" prev="FP_Q10" progress="1.24%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether this is a good definition of eternity, “The simultaneously-whole  and perfect possession of interminable life”?">
 <h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p0.1">Whether this is a good definition of eternity, "The simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life"?</h4>
 
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the definition of eternity given by Boethius (De Consol. v) is not a good one: "Eternity is the simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life." For the word "interminable" is a negative one. But negation only belongs to what is defective, and this does not belong to eternity. Therefore in the definition of eternity the word "interminable" ought not to be found.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, eternity signifies a certain kind of duration. But duration regards existence rather than life. Therefore the word "life" ought not to come into the definition of eternity; but rather the word "existence."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a whole is what has parts. But this is alien to eternity which is simple. Therefore it is improperly said to be "whole."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Many days cannot occur together, nor can many times exist all at once. But in eternity, days and times are in the plural, for it is said, "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Mic.5.2" parsed="vul|Mic|5|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p5.1" passage="Micah 5:2">Micah 5:2</scripRef>); and also it is said, "According to the revelation of the mystery hidden from eternity" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.16.25" parsed="vul|Rom|16|25|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p5.2" passage="Rom. 16:25">Rom. 16:25</scripRef>). Therefore eternity is not omni-simultaneous.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p6"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the whole and the perfect are the same thing. Supposing, therefore, that it is "whole," it is superfluously described as "perfect."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p7"><b>Objection 6:</b> Further, duration does not imply "possession." But eternity is a kind of duration. Therefore eternity is not possession.</p>
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the
+definition of eternity given by Boethius (De Consol. v) is not a good
+one: "Eternity is the simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of
+interminable life." For the word "interminable" is a negative one. But
+negation only belongs to what is defective, and this does not belong
+to eternity. Therefore in the definition of eternity the word
+"interminable" ought not to be found.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28589"><span class=
+"ref">[28589] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod non sit conveniens definitio aeternitatis,
+quam Boetius ponit V de consolatione, dicens quod <i>aeternitas est
+interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio</i>.
+Interminabile enim negative dicitur. Sed negatio non est de ratione
+nisi eorum quae sunt deficientia, quod aeternitati non competit.
+Ergo in definitione aeternitatis non debet poni interminabile.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, eternity
+signifies a certain kind of duration. But duration regards existence
+rather than life. Therefore the word "life" ought not to come into the
+definition of eternity; but rather the word "existence."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28590"><span class=
+"ref">[28590] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+aeternitas durationem quandam significat. Duratio autem magis
+respicit esse quam vitam. Ergo non debuit poni in definitione
+aeternitatis vita, sed magis esse.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a whole is
+what has parts. But this is alien to eternity which is
+simple. Therefore it is improperly said to be "whole."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28591"><span class=
+"ref">[28591] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, totum
+dicitur quod habet partes. Hoc autem aeternitati non convenit, cum
+sit simplex. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur tota.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Many days cannot
+occur together, nor can many times exist all at once. But in eternity,
+days and times are in the plural, for it is said, "His going forth is
+from the beginning, from the days of eternity" (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:Mic.5.2" parsed="vul|Mic|5|2|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p5.1" passage="Micah 5:2">Micah
+5:2</scripRef>); and also it is said, "According to the revelation of
+the mystery hidden from eternity" (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.16.25" parsed="vul|Rom|16|25|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p5.2"
+passage="Rom. 16:25">Rom. 16:25</scripRef>). Therefore eternity is not
+omni-simultaneous.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="28592"><span class=
+"ref">[28592] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+plures dies non possunt esse simul, nec plura tempora. Sed in
+aeternitate pluraliter dicuntur dies et tempora, dicitur enim
+Micheae V, <i>egressus eius ab initio, a diebus aeternitatis</i>;
+et ad Rom., XVI cap., <i>secundum revelationem mysterii temporibus
+aeternis taciti</i>. Ergo aeternitas non est tota simul.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p6"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the whole
+and the perfect are the same thing. Supposing, therefore, that it is
+"whole," it is superfluously described as "perfect."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="28593"><span class=
+"ref">[28593] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, totum
+et perfectum sunt idem. Posito igitur quod sit tota, superflue
+additur quod sit perfecta.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p7"><b>Objection 6:</b> Further, duration
+does not imply "possession." But eternity is a kind of
+duration. Therefore eternity is not possession.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 6"><a name="28594"><span class=
+"ref">[28594] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 1 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea,
+possessio ad durationem non pertinet. Aeternitas autem quaedam
+duratio est. Ergo aeternitas non est possessio.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p8"><b>I answer that,</b> As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way of compound things, so must we reach to the knowledge of eternity by means of time, which is nothing but the numbering of movement by "before" and "after." For since succession occurs in every movement, and one part comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and after in movement, makes us apprehend time, which is nothing else but the measure of before and after in movement. Now in a thing bereft
-  of movement, which is always the same, there is no before or after. As therefore the idea of time consists in the numbering of before and after in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity of what is outside of movement, consists the idea of eternity.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p9"> Further, those things are said to be measured by time which have a beginning and an end in time, because in everything which is moved there is a beginning, and there is an end. But as whatever is wholly immutable can have no succession, so it has no beginning, and no end.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p10"> Thus eternity is known from two sources: first, because what is eternal is interminable---that is, has no beginning nor end (that is, no term either way); secondly, because eternity has no succession, being simultaneously whole.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Simple things are usually defined by way of negation; as "a point is that which has no parts." Yet this is not to be taken as if the negation belonged to their essence, but because our intellect which first apprehends compound things, cannot attain to the knowledge of simple things except by removing the opposite.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What is truly eternal, is not only being, but also living; and life extends to operation, which is not true of being. Now the protraction of duration seems to belong to operation rather than to being; hence time is the numbering of movement.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Eternity is called whole, not because it has parts, but because it is wanting in nothing.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p14"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As God, although incorporeal, is named in Scripture metaphorically by corporeal names, so eternity though simultaneously whole, is called by names implying time and succession.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p15"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Two things are to be considered in time: time itself, which is successive; and the "now" of time, which is imperfect. Hence the expression "simultaneously-whole" is used to remove the idea of time, and the word "perfect" is used to exclude the "now" of time.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p16"><b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Whatever is possessed, is held firmly and quietly; therefore to designate the immutability and permanence of eternity, we use the word "possession."</p>
+  of movement, which is always the same, there is no before or
+after. As therefore the idea of time consists in the numbering of
+before and after in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of the
+uniformity of what is outside of movement, consists the idea of
+eternity.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 co."><a name="28595"><span class=
+"ref">[28595] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod, sicut in cognitionem simplicium oportet nos venire per
+composita, ita in cognitionem aeternitatis oportet nos venire per
+tempus; quod nihil aliud est quam numerus motus secundum prius et
+posterius. Cum enim in quolibet motu sit successio, et una pars
+post alteram, ex hoc quod numeramus prius et posterius in motu,
+apprehendimus tempus; quod nihil aliud est quam numerus prioris et
+posterioris in motu. In eo autem quod caret motu, et semper eodem
+modo se habet, non est accipere prius et posterius. Sicut igitur
+ratio temporis consistit in numeratione prioris et posterioris in
+motu, ita in apprehensione uniformitatis eius quod est omnino extra
+motum, consistit ratio aeternitatis.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p9">
+Further, those things are said to be measured by time which have a
+beginning and an end in time, because in everything which is moved
+there is a beginning, and there is an end. But as whatever is wholly
+immutable can have no succession, so it has no beginning, and no
+end.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la">Item, ea dicuntur tempore
+mensurari, quae principium et finem habent in tempore, ut dicitur
+in IV Physic., et hoc ideo, quia in omni eo quod movetur est
+accipere aliquod principium et aliquem finem. Quod vero est omnino
+immutabile, sicut nec successionem, ita nec principium aut finem
+habere potest.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p10"> Thus
+eternity is known from two sources: first, because what is eternal is
+interminable---that is, has no beginning nor end (that is, no term
+either way); secondly, because eternity has no succession, being
+simultaneously whole.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la">Sic ergo ex duobus notificatur aeternitas. Primo, ex
+hoc quod id quod est in aeternitate, est interminabile, idest
+principio et fine carens (ut terminus ad utrumque referatur).
+Secundo, per hoc quod ipsa aeternitas successione caret, tota simul
+existens.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Simple
+things are usually defined by way of negation; as "a point is that
+which has no parts." Yet this is not to be taken as if the negation
+belonged to their essence, but because our intellect which first
+apprehends compound things, cannot attain to the knowledge of simple
+things except by removing the opposite.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28596"><span class=
+"ref">[28596] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod simplicia consueverunt per negationem definiri, sicut
+punctus est cuius pars non est. Quod non ideo est, quod negatio sit
+de essentia eorum, sed quia intellectus noster, qui primo
+apprehendit composita, in cognitionem simplicium pervenire non
+potest, nisi per remotionem compositionis.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What is
+truly eternal, is not only being, but also living; and life extends to
+operation, which is not true of being. Now the protraction of duration
+seems to belong to operation rather than to being; hence time is the
+numbering of movement.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28597"><span class=
+"ref">[28597] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod illud quod est vere aeternum, non solum est ens, sed
+vivens, et ipsum vivere se extendit quodammodo ad operationem, non
+autem esse. Protensio autem durationis videtur attendi secundum
+operationem, magis quam secundum esse, unde et tempus est numerus
+motus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Eternity
+is called whole, not because it has parts, but because it is wanting
+in nothing.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28598"><span class=
+"ref">[28598] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod aeternitas dicitur tota, non quia habet partes, sed
+inquantum nihil ei deest.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p14"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As God,
+although incorporeal, is named in Scripture metaphorically by
+corporeal names, so eternity though simultaneously whole, is called by
+names implying time and succession.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="28599"><span class=
+"ref">[28599] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod, sicut Deus, cum sit incorporeus, nominibus rerum
+corporalium metaphorice in Scripturis nominatur, sic aeternitas,
+tota simul existens, nominibus temporalibus successivis.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p15"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Two
+things are to be considered in time: time itself, which is successive;
+and the "now" of time, which is imperfect. Hence the expression
+"simultaneously-whole" is used to remove the idea of time, and the
+word "perfect" is used to exclude the "now" of time.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="28600"><span class=
+"ref">[28600] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
+dicendum quod in tempore est duo considerare, scilicet ipsum
+tempus, quod est successivum; et nunc temporis, quod est
+imperfectum. Dicit ergo tota simul, ad removendum tempus, et
+perfecta, ad excludendum nunc temporis.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A1-p16"><b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Whatever
+is possessed, is held firmly and quietly; therefore to designate the
+immutability and permanence of eternity, we use the word
+"possession."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 6"><a name="28601"><span class=
+"ref">[28601] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 1 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum
+quod illud quod possidetur, firmiter et quiete habetur. Ad
+designandam ergo immutabilitatem et indeficientiam aeternitatis,
+usus est nomine possessionis.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -4813,45 +5799,162 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not eternal. For nothing made can be predicated of God; for Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "The now that flows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity;" and Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 28) "that God is the author of eternity." Therefore God is not eternal.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is before eternity, and after eternity, is not measured by eternity. But, as Aristotle says (De Causis), "God is before eternity and He is after eternity": for it is written that "the Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond [*Douay: 'for ever and ever']" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Exod.15.18" parsed="vul|Exod|15|18|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p3.1" passage="Ex. 15:18">Ex. 15:18</scripRef>). Therefore to be eternal does not belong to God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, eternity is a kind of measure. But to be measured belongs not to God. Therefore it does not belong to Him to be eternal.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in eternity, there is no present, past or future, since it is simultaneously whole; as was said in the preceding article. But words denoting present, past and future time are applied to God in Scripture. Therefore God is not eternal.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p6"><b>On the contrary,</b> Athanasius says in his Creed: "The Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea of time follows movement, as appears from the preceding article. Hence, as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity; whereas, no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own being. Now God is His own uniform being; and hence as He is His own essence, so He is His own eternity.</p>
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God
+is not eternal. For nothing made can be predicated of God; for
+Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "The now that flows away makes time,
+the now that stands still makes eternity;" and Augustine says
+(Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 28) "that God is the author of eternity."
+Therefore God is not eternal.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28602"><span class=
+"ref">[28602] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit aeternus. Nihil enim factum
+potest dici de Deo. Sed aeternitas est aliquid factum, dicit enim
+Boetius quod <i>nunc fluens facit tempus, nunc stans facit
+aeternitatem</i>; et Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium
+quaest., quod Deus est auctor aeternitatis. Ergo Deus non est
+aeternus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is
+before eternity, and after eternity, is not measured by eternity. But,
+as Aristotle says (De Causis), "God is before eternity and He is after
+eternity": for it is written that "the Lord shall reign for eternity,
+and beyond [*Douay: 'for ever and ever']" (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:Exod.15.18" parsed="vul|Exod|15|18|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p3.1"
+passage="Ex. 15:18">Ex. 15:18</scripRef>). Therefore to be eternal
+does not belong to God.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28603"><span class=
+"ref">[28603] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod
+est ante aeternitatem et post aeternitatem, non mensuratur
+aeternitate. Sed Deus est ante aeternitatem, ut dicitur in libro de
+causis, et post aeternitatem; dicitur enim Exod. XV, quod
+<i>dominus regnabit in aeternum et ultra</i>. Ergo esse aeternum
+non convenit Deo.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, eternity
+is a kind of measure. But to be measured belongs not to God. Therefore
+it does not belong to Him to be eternal.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28604"><span class=
+"ref">[28604] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+aeternitas mensura quaedam est. Sed Deo non convenit esse
+mensuratum. Ergo non competit ei esse aeternum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in
+eternity, there is no present, past or future, since it is
+simultaneously whole; as was said in the preceding article. But words
+denoting present, past and future time are applied to God in
+Scripture. Therefore God is not eternal.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="28605"><span class=
+"ref">[28605] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in
+aeternitate non est praesens, praeteritum vel futurum cum sit tota
+simul, ut dictum est. Sed de Deo dicuntur in Scripturis verba
+praesentis temporis, praeteriti vel futuri. Ergo Deus non est
+aeternus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p6"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> Athanasius says in his Creed: "The Father is
+eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28606"><span class=
+"ref">[28606] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit Athanasius, <i>aeternus pater, aeternus filius, aeternus
+spiritus sanctus</i>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p7"><b>I
+answer that,</b> The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the
+idea of time follows movement, as appears from the preceding
+article. Hence, as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to
+Him to be eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity;
+whereas, no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own
+being. Now God is His own uniform being; and hence as He is His own
+essence, so He is His own eternity.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 co."><a name="28607"><span class=
+"ref">[28607] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod ratio aeternitatis consequitur immutabilitatem, sicut ratio
+temporis consequitur motum, ut ex dictis patet. Unde, cum Deus sit
+maxime immutabilis, sibi maxime competit esse aeternum. Nec solum
+est aeternus, sed est sua aeternitas, cum tamen nulla alia res sit
+sua duratio, quia non est suum esse. Deus autem est suum esse
+uniforme, unde, sicut est sua essentia, ita est sua aeternitas.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The "now" that stands still, is said to make eternity according to our apprehension. As the apprehension of time is caused in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the "now," so the apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending the "now" standing still. When Augustine says that "God is the author of eternity," this is to be understood of participated eternity. For God communicates His eternity to some in the same way as He
   communicates His immutability.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28608"><span class=
+"ref">[28608] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod nunc stans dicitur facere aeternitatem, secundum
+nostram apprehensionem. Sicut enim causatur in nobis apprehensio
+temporis, eo quod apprehendimus fluxum ipsius nunc, ita causatur in
+nobis apprehensio aeternitatis, inquantum apprehendimus nunc stans.
+Quod autem dicit Augustinus, quod <i>Deus est auctor
+aeternitatis</i>, intelligitur de aeternitate participata, eo enim
+modo communicat Deus suam aeternitatem aliquibus, quo et suam
+immutabilitatem.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From this appears the answer to the Second Objection. For God is said to be before eternity, according as it is shared by immaterial substances. Hence, also, in the same book, it is said that "intelligence is equal to eternity." In the words of Exodus, "The Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond," eternity stands for age, as another rendering has it. Thus it is said that the Lord will reign beyond eternity, inasmuch as He endures beyond every age,
-  i.e. beyond every kind of duration. For age is nothing more than the period of each thing, as is said in the book De Coelo i. Or to reign beyond eternity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were conceived to exist for ever, as the movement of the heavens according to some philosophers, then God would still reign beyond, inasmuch as His reign is simultaneously whole.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Eternity is nothing else but God Himself. Hence God is not called eternal, as if He were in any way measured; but the idea of measurement is there taken according to the apprehension of our mind alone.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Words denoting different times are applied to God, because His eternity includes all times; not as if He Himself were altered through present, past and future.</p>
+  i.e. beyond every kind of duration. For age is nothing more than the
+period of each thing, as is said in the book De Coelo i. Or to reign
+beyond eternity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were
+conceived to exist for ever, as the movement of the heavens according
+to some philosophers, then God would still reign beyond, inasmuch as
+His reign is simultaneously whole.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28609"><span class=
+"ref">[28609] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc patet
+solutio ad secundum. Nam Deus dicitur esse ante aeternitatem, prout
+participatur a substantiis immaterialibus. Unde et ibidem dicitur,
+quod <i>intelligentia parificatur aeternitati</i>. Quod autem
+dicitur in Exodo, <i>dominus regnabit in aeternum et ultra</i>
+sciendum quod aeternum accipitur ibi pro saeculo, sicut habet alia
+translatio. Sic igitur dicitur quod regnabit ultra aeternum, quia
+durat ultra quodcumque saeculum, idest ultra quamcumque durationem
+datam, nihil est enim aliud saeculum quam periodus cuiuslibet rei,
+ut dicitur in libro I de caelo. Vel dicitur etiam ultra aeternum
+regnare, quia, si etiam aliquid aliud semper esset (ut motus caeli
+secundum quosdam philosophos), tamen Deus ultra regnat, inquantum
+eius regnum est totum simul.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Eternity
+is nothing else but God Himself. Hence God is not called eternal, as
+if He were in any way measured; but the idea of measurement is there
+taken according to the apprehension of our mind alone.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28610"><span class=
+"ref">[28610] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod aeternitas non est aliud quam ipse Deus. Unde non
+dicitur Deus aeternus, quasi sit aliquo modo mensuratus, sed
+accipitur ibi ratio mensurae secundum apprehensionem nostram
+tantum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Words
+denoting different times are applied to God, because His eternity
+includes all times; not as if He Himself were altered through present,
+past and future.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="28611"><span class=
+"ref">[28611] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod verba diversorum temporum attribuuntur Deo, inquantum
+eius aeternitas omnia tempora includit, non quod ipse varietur per
+praesens, praeteritum et futurum.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -4865,37 +5968,145 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that it does not belong to God alone to be eternal. For it is written that "those who instruct many to justice," shall be "as stars unto perpetual eternities [*Douay: 'for all eternity']" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Dan.12.3" parsed="vul|Dan|12|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p2.1" passage="Dan. 12:3">Dan. 12:3</scripRef>). Now if God alone were eternal, there could not be many eternities. Therefore God alone is not the only eternal.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written "Depart, ye cursed into eternal [Douay: 'everlasting'] fire" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.25.41" parsed="vul|Matt|25|41|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p3.1" passage="Mat. 25:41">Mat. 25:41</scripRef>). Therefore God is not the only eternal.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every necessary thing is eternal. But there are many necessary things; as, for instance, all principles of demonstration and all demonstrative propositions. Therefore God is not the only eternal.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome says (Ep. ad Damasum. xv) that "God is the only one who has no beginning." Now whatever has a beginning, is not eternal. Therefore God is the only one eternal.</p>
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that it
+does not belong to God alone to be eternal. For it is written that
+"those who instruct many to justice," shall be "as stars unto
+perpetual eternities [*Douay: 'for all eternity']" (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:Dan.12.3" parsed="vul|Dan|12|3|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p2.1"
+passage="Dan. 12:3">Dan. 12:3</scripRef>). Now if God alone were
+eternal, there could not be many eternities. Therefore God alone is
+not the only eternal.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28612"><span class=
+"ref">[28612] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod esse aeternum non sit soli Deo proprium.
+Dicitur enim Danielis XII, quod <i>qui ad iustitiam erudiunt
+plurimos, erunt quasi stellae in perpetuas aeternitates</i>. Non
+autem essent plures aeternitates, si solus Deus esset aeternus. Non
+igitur solus Deus est aeternus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is
+written "Depart, ye cursed into eternal [Douay: 'everlasting'] fire"
+(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.25.41" parsed="vul|Matt|25|41|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p3.1"
+passage="Mat. 25:41">Mat. 25:41</scripRef>). Therefore God is not the
+only eternal.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28613"><span class=
+"ref">[28613] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Matth. XXV dicitur, <i>ite, maledicti, in ignem aeternum</i>. Non
+igitur solus Deus est aeternus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every
+necessary thing is eternal. But there are many necessary things; as,
+for instance, all principles of demonstration and all demonstrative
+propositions. Therefore God is not the only eternal.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28614"><span class=
+"ref">[28614] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
+necessarium est aeternum. Sed multa sunt necessaria; sicut omnia
+principia demonstrationis, et omnes propositiones demonstrativae.
+Ergo non solus Deus est aeternus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p5"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> Jerome says (Ep. ad Damasum. xv) that "God is the
+only one who has no beginning." Now whatever has a beginning, is not
+eternal. Therefore God is the only one eternal.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28615"><span class=
+"ref">[28615] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit Hieronymus, ad Marcellam, <i>Deus solus est qui exordium
+non habet</i>. Quidquid autem exordium habet, non est aeternum.
+Solus ergo Deus est aeternus.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone, because eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability from Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is said of the earth, "it standeth for ever"
   (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eccl.1.4" parsed="vul|Eccl|1|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p6.2" passage="Eccles. 1:4">Eccles. 1:4</scripRef>). Again, some things are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their duration, although they are in nature corruptible; thus (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.75.5" parsed="vul|Ps|75|5|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p6.3" passage="Ps. 75:5">Ps. 75:5</scripRef>) the hills are called "eternal" and we read "of the fruits of the eternal hills." (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Deut.33.15" parsed="vul|Deut|33|15|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p6.4" passage="Dt. 33:15">Dt. 33:15</scripRef>). Some again, share more fully than others in the nature of eternity, inasmuch as they possess unchangeableness either in being or further still in operation; like the angels, and
-  the blessed, who enjoy the Word, because "as regards that vision of the Word, no changing thoughts exist in the Saints," as Augustine says (De Trin. xv). Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life; according to that text, "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God," etc. (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.17.3" parsed="vul|John|17|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p6.5" passage="Jn. 17:3">Jn. 17:3</scripRef>).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are said to be many eternities, accordingly as many share in eternity, by the contemplation of God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fire of hell is called eternal, only because it never ends. Still, there is change in the pains of the lost, according to the words "To extreme heat they will pass from snowy waters" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Job.24.19" parsed="vul|Job|24|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p8.1" passage="Job 24:19">Job 24:19</scripRef>). Hence in hell true eternity does not exist, but rather time; according to the text of the Psalm "Their time will be for ever" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.80.16" parsed="vul|Ps|80|16|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p8.2" passage="Ps. 80:16">Ps. 80:16</scripRef>).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Necessary means a certain mode of truth; and truth, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi), is in the mind. Therefore in this sense the true and necessary are eternal, because they are in the eternal mind, which is the divine intellect alone; hence it does not follow that anything beside God is eternal.</p>
+  the blessed, who enjoy the Word, because "as regards that vision of
+the Word, no changing thoughts exist in the Saints," as Augustine says
+(De Trin. xv). Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life;
+according to that text, "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee
+the only true God," etc. (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.17.3"
+parsed="vul|John|17|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p6.5"
+passage="Jn. 17:3">Jn. 17:3</scripRef>).</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 3 co."><a name="28616"><span class=
+"ref">[28616] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod aeternitas vere et proprie in solo Deo est. Quia aeternitas
+immutabilitatem consequitur, ut ex dictis patet. Solus autem Deus
+est omnino immutabilis, ut est superius ostensum. Secundum tamen
+quod aliqua ab ipso immutabilitatem percipiunt, secundum hoc aliqua
+eius aeternitatem participant. Quaedam ergo quantum ad hoc
+immutabilitatem sortiuntur a Deo, quod nunquam esse desinunt, et
+secundum hoc dicitur Eccle. I de terra, quod in aeternum stat.
+Quaedam etiam aeterna in Scripturis dicuntur propter diuturnitatem
+durationis, licet corruptibilia sint, sicut in Psalmo dicuntur
+montes aeterni; et Deuter. XXXIII etiam dicitur, de pomis collium
+aeternorum. Quaedam autem amplius participant de ratione
+aeternitatis, inquantum habent intransmutabilitatem vel secundum
+esse, vel ulterius secundum operationem, sicut Angeli et beati, qui
+verbo fruuntur, quia quantum ad illam visionem verbi, non sunt in
+sanctis volubiles cogitationes, ut dicit Augustinus, XV de Trin.
+Unde et videntes Deum dicuntur habere vitam aeternam, secundum
+illud Ioann. XVII, <i>haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant</i> et
+cetera.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are
+said to be many eternities, accordingly as many share in eternity, by
+the contemplation of God.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28617"><span class=
+"ref">[28617] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod dicuntur multae aeternitates, secundum quod sunt
+multi participantes aeternitatem ex ipsa Dei contemplatione.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fire
+of hell is called eternal, only because it never ends. Still, there is
+change in the pains of the lost, according to the words "To extreme
+heat they will pass from snowy waters" (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:Job.24.19" parsed="vul|Job|24|19|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p8.1" passage="Job 24:19">Job
+24:19</scripRef>). Hence in hell true eternity does not exist, but
+rather time; according to the text of the Psalm "Their time will be
+for ever" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.80.16"
+parsed="vul|Ps|80|16|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p8.2"
+passage="Ps. 80:16">Ps. 80:16</scripRef>).</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28618"><span class=
+"ref">[28618] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ignis Inferni dicitur aeternus propter
+interminabilitatem tantum. Est tamen in poenis eorum transmutatio,
+secundum illud Iob XXIV, <i>ad nimium calorem transibunt ab aquis
+nivium</i>. Unde in Inferno non est vera aeternitas, sed magis
+tempus; secundum illud Psalmi, <i>erit tempus eorum in
+saecula</i>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Necessary
+means a certain mode of truth; and truth, according to the Philosopher
+(Metaph. vi), is in the mind. Therefore in this sense the true and
+necessary are eternal, because they are in the eternal mind, which is
+the divine intellect alone; hence it does not follow that anything
+beside God is eternal.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28619"><span class=
+"ref">[28619] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod necessarium significat quendam modum veritatis. Verum
+autem, secundum philosophum, VI Metaphys., est in intellectu.
+Secundum hoc igitur vera et necessaria sunt aeterna, quia sunt in
+intellectu aeterno, qui est intellectus divinus solus. Unde non
+sequitur quod aliquid extra Deum sit aeternum.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -4910,44 +6121,156 @@
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that eternity does not differ from time. For two measures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part of the other; for instance two days or two hours cannot be together; nevertheless, we may say that a day or an hour are together, considering hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur together, each of which imports a certain measure of duration. Since therefore eternity is not a part of time, forasmuch as eternity exceeds time, and
-  includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity, and is not a different thing from eternity.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv), the "now" of time remains the same in the whole of time. But the nature of eternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the whole space of time. Therefore eternity is the "now" of time. But the "now" of time is not substantially different from time. Therefore eternity is not substantially different from time.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the measure of the first movement is the measure of every movement, as said in Phys. iv, it thus appears that the measure of the first being is that of every being. But eternity is the measure of the first being---that is, of the divine being. Therefore eternity is the measure of every being. But the being of things corruptible is measured by time. Time therefore is either eternity or is a part of eternity.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> Eternity is simultaneously whole. But time has a "before" and an "after." Therefore time and eternity are not the same thing.</p>
+  includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity, and is not a
+different thing from eternity.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28620"><span class=
+"ref">[28620] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod aeternitas non sit aliud a tempore.
+Impossibile est enim duas esse mensuras durationis simul, nisi una
+sit pars alterius, non enim sunt simul duo dies vel duae horae; sed
+dies et hora sunt simul, quia hora est pars diei. Sed aeternitas et
+tempus sunt simul, quorum utrumque mensuram quandam durationis
+importat. Cum igitur aeternitas non sit pars temporis, quia
+aeternitas excedit tempus et includit ipsum; videtur quod tempus
+sit pars aeternitatis, et non aliud ab aeternitate.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according
+to the Philosopher (Phys. iv), the "now" of time remains the same in
+the whole of time. But the nature of eternity seems to be that it is
+the same indivisible thing in the whole space of time. Therefore
+eternity is the "now" of time. But the "now" of time is not
+substantially different from time. Therefore eternity is not
+substantially different from time.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28621"><span class=
+"ref">[28621] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+secundum philosophum in IV Physic., nunc temporis manet idem in
+toto tempore. Sed hoc videtur constituere rationem aeternitatis,
+quod sit idem indivisibiliter se habens in toto decursu temporis.
+Ergo aeternitas est nunc temporis. Sed nunc temporis non est aliud
+secundum substantiam a tempore. Ergo aeternitas non est aliud
+secundum substantiam a tempore.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the
+measure of the first movement is the measure of every movement, as
+said in Phys. iv, it thus appears that the measure of the first being
+is that of every being. But eternity is the measure of the first
+being---that is, of the divine being. Therefore eternity is the
+measure of every being. But the being of things corruptible is
+measured by time. Time therefore is either eternity or is a part of
+eternity.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28622"><span class=
+"ref">[28622] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
+mensura primi motus est mensura omnium motuum, ut dicitur in IV
+Physic., ita videtur quod mensura primi esse sit mensura omnis
+esse. Sed aeternitas est mensura primi esse, quod est esse divinum.
+Ergo aeternitas est mensura omnis esse. Sed esse rerum
+corruptibilium mensuratur tempore. Ergo tempus vel est aeternitas,
+vel aliquid aeternitatis.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4-p5"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> Eternity is simultaneously whole. But time has a
+"before" and an "after." Therefore time and eternity are not the same
+thing.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28623"><span class=
+"ref">[28623] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod aeternitas est tota simul, in tempore autem est prius et
+posterius. Ergo tempus et aeternitas non sunt idem.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same. Some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor an end; whereas time has a beginning and an end. This, however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute difference because, granted that time always was and always will be, according to the idea of those who think the movement of the heavens goes on for ever, there would yet remain a difference between eternity
   and time, as Boethius says (De Consol. v), arising from the fact that eternity is simultaneously whole; which cannot be applied to time: for eternity is the measure of a permanent being; while time is a measure of movement. Supposing, however, that the aforesaid difference be considered on the part of the things measured, and not as regards the measures, then there is some reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is measured by time which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if the movement of
-  the heavens lasted always, time would not be of its measure as regards the whole of its duration, since the infinite is not measurable; but it would be the measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning and end in time.</p>
+  the heavens lasted always, time would not be of its measure as
+regards the whole of its duration, since the infinite is not
+measurable; but it would be the measure of that part of its revolution
+which has beginning and end in time.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 4 co."><a name="28624"><span class=
+"ref">[28624] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod manifestum est tempus et aeternitatem non esse idem. Sed huius
+diversitatis rationem quidam assignaverunt ex hoc quod aeternitas
+caret principio et fine, tempus autem habet principium et finem.
+Sed haec est differentia per accidens, et non per se. Quia dato
+quod tempus semper fuerit et semper futurum sit, secundum
+positionem eorum qui motum caeli ponunt sempiternum, adhuc
+remanebit differentia inter aeternitatem et tempus, ut dicit
+Boetius in libro de Consolat., ex hoc quod aeternitas est tota
+simul, quod tempori non convenit, quia aeternitas est mensura esse
+permanentis, tempus vero est mensura motus. Si tamen praedicta
+differentia attendatur quantum ad mensurata, et non quantum ad
+mensuras, sic habet aliquam rationem, quia solum illud mensuratur
+tempore, quod habet principium et finem in tempore, ut dicitur in
+IV Physic. Unde si motus caeli semper duraret, tempus non
+mensuraret ipsum secundum suam totam durationem, cum infinitum non
+sit mensurabile; sed mensuraret quamlibet circulationem, quae habet
+principium et finem in tempore.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4-p7"> Another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in themselves, if we consider the end and the beginning as potentialities; because, granted also that time always goes on, yet it is possible to note in time both the beginning and the end, by considering its parts: thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year; which cannot be applied to eternity. Still these differences follow upon the essential and primary differences, that eternity is
   simultaneously whole, but that time is not so.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Such a reason would be a valid one if time and eternity were the same kind of measure; but this is seen not to be the case when we consider those things of which the respective measures are time and eternity.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la">Potest tamen et aliam rationem
+habere ex parte istarum mensurarum, si accipiatur finis et
+principium in potentia. Quia etiam dato quod tempus semper duret,
+tamen possibile est signare in tempore et principium et finem,
+accipiendo aliquas partes ipsius, sicut dicimus principium et finem
+diei vel anni, quod non contingit in aeternitate. Sed tamen istae
+differentiae consequuntur eam quae est per se et primo,
+differentiam, per hoc quod aeternitas est tota simul, non autem
+tempus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Such a
+reason would be a valid one if time and eternity were the same kind of
+measure; but this is seen not to be the case when we consider those
+things of which the respective measures are time and eternity.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28625"><span class=
+"ref">[28625] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si tempus et aeternitas essent
+mensurae unius generis, quod patet esse falsum, ex his quorum est
+tempus et aeternitas mensura.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The "now" of time is the same as regards its subject in the whole course of time, but it differs in aspect; for inasmuch as time corresponds to movement, its "now" corresponds to what is movable; and the thing movable has the same one subject in all time, but differs in aspect a being here and there; and such alteration is movement. Likewise the flow of the "now" as alternating in aspect is time. But eternity remains the same according to both subject
-  and aspect; and hence eternity is not the same as the "now" of time.</p>
+  and aspect; and hence eternity is not the same as the "now" of
+time.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28626"><span class=
+"ref">[28626] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod nunc temporis est idem subiecto in toto tempore, sed
+differens ratione, eo quod, sicut tempus respondet motui, ita nunc
+temporis respondet mobili; mobile autem est idem subiecto in toto
+decursu temporis, sed differens ratione, inquantum est hic et ibi.
+Et ista alternatio est motus. Similiter fluxus ipsius nunc,
+secundum quod alternatur ratione, est tempus. Aeternitas autem
+manet eadem et subiecto et ratione. Unde aeternitas non est idem
+quod nunc temporis.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A4-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As eternity is the proper measure of permanent being, so time is the proper measure of movement; and hence, according as any being recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to change, it recedes from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore the being of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured by eternity, but by time; for time measures not only things actually changed, but also things changeable; hence it not only
-  measures movement but it also measures repose, which belongs to whatever is naturally movable, but is not actually in motion.</p>
+  measures movement but it also measures repose, which belongs to
+whatever is naturally movable, but is not actually in motion.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28627"><span class=
+"ref">[28627] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, sicut aeternitas est propria mensura ipsius esse,
+ita tempus est propria mensura motus. Unde secundum quod aliquod
+esse recedit a permanentia essendi et subditur transmutationi,
+secundum hoc recedit ab aeternitate et subditur tempori. Esse ergo
+rerum corruptibilium, quia est transmutabile, non mensuratur
+aeternitate, sed tempore. Tempus enim mensurat non solum quae
+transmutantur in actu, sed quae sunt transmutabilia. Unde non solum
+mensurat motum, sed etiam quietem; quae est eius quod natum est
+moveri, et non movetur.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -4961,28 +6284,96 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that aeviternity is the same as time. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23), that "God moves the spiritual through time." But aeviternity is said to be the measure of spiritual substances. Therefore time is the same as aeviternity.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is essential to time to have "before" and "after"; but it is essential to eternity to be simultaneously whole, as was shown above in the first article. Now aeviternity is not eternity; for it is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Sir.1.1" parsed="vul|Sir|1|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p3.1" passage="Ecclus. 1:1">Ecclus. 1:1</scripRef>) that eternal "Wisdom is before age." Therefore it is not simultaneously whole but has "before" and "after"; and thus it is the same as time.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if there is no "before" and "after" in aeviternity, it follows that in aeviternal things there is no difference between being, having been, or going to be. Since then it is impossible for aeviternal things not to have been, it follows that it is impossible for them not to be in the future; which is false, since God can reduce them to nothing.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, since the duration of aeviternal things is infinite as to subsequent duration, if aeviternity is simultaneously whole, it follows that some creature is actually infinite; which is impossible. Therefore aeviternity does not differ from time.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p6"><b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iii) "Who commandest time to be separate from aeviternity."</p>
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that
+aeviternity is the same as time. For Augustine says (Gen. ad
+lit. viii, 20,22,23), that "God moves the spiritual through time." But
+aeviternity is said to be the measure of spiritual
+substances. Therefore time is the same as aeviternity.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28628"><span class=
+"ref">[28628] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod aevum non sit aliud a tempore. Dicit enim
+Augustinus, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., quod <i>Deus movet creaturam
+spiritualem per tempus</i>. Sed aevum dicitur esse mensura
+spiritualium substantiarum. Ergo tempus non differt ab aevo.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is
+essential to time to have "before" and "after"; but it is essential to
+eternity to be simultaneously whole, as was shown above in the first
+article. Now aeviternity is not eternity; for it is written (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:Sir.1.1" parsed="vul|Sir|1|1|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p3.1"
+passage="Ecclus. 1:1">Ecclus. 1:1</scripRef>) that eternal "Wisdom is
+before age." Therefore it is not simultaneously whole but has "before"
+and "after"; and thus it is the same as time.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28629"><span class=
+"ref">[28629] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, de
+ratione temporis est quod habeat prius et posterius, de ratione
+vero aeternitatis est quod sit tota simul, ut dictum est. Sed aevum
+non est aeternitas, dicitur enim Eccli. I, quod sapientia aeterna
+est ante aevum. Ergo non est totum simul, sed habet prius et
+posterius, et ita est tempus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if there
+is no "before" and "after" in aeviternity, it follows that in
+aeviternal things there is no difference between being, having been,
+or going to be. Since then it is impossible for aeviternal things not
+to have been, it follows that it is impossible for them not to be in
+the future; which is false, since God can reduce them to nothing.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="28630"><span class=
+"ref">[28630] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si in
+aevo non est prius et posterius, sequitur quod in aeviternis non
+differat esse vel fuisse vel futurum esse. Cum igitur sit
+impossibile aeviterna non fuisse, sequitur quod impossibile sit ea
+non futura esse. Quod falsum est, cum Deus possit ea reducere in
+nihilum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, since the
+duration of aeviternal things is infinite as to subsequent duration,
+if aeviternity is simultaneously whole, it follows that some creature
+is actually infinite; which is impossible. Therefore aeviternity does
+not differ from time.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="28631"><span class=
+"ref">[28631] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, cum
+duratio aeviternorum sit infinita ex parte post, si aevum sit totum
+simul, sequitur quod aliquod creatum sit infinitum in actu, quod
+est impossibile. Non igitur aevum differt a tempore.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p6"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iii) "Who commandest time
+to be separate from aeviternity."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28632"><span class=
+"ref">[28632] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit Boetius, <i>qui tempus ab aevo ire iubes</i>.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> Aeviternity differs from time, and from eternity, as the mean between them both. This difference is explained by some to consist in the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor end, aeviternity, a beginning but no end, and time both beginning and end. This difference, however, is but an accidental one, as was shown above, in the preceding article; because even if aeviternal things had always been, and would always be, as some think, and even if they
-  might sometimes fail to be, which is possible to God to allow; even granted this, aeviternity would still be distinguished from eternity, and from time.</p>
+  might sometimes fail to be, which is possible to God to allow; even
+granted this, aeviternity would still be distinguished from eternity,
+and from time.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 co."><a name="28633"><span class=
+"ref">[28633] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod aevum differt a tempore et ab aeternitate, sicut medium
+existens inter illa. Sed horum differentiam aliqui sic assignant,
+dicentes quod aeternitas principio et fine caret; aevum habet
+principium, sed non finem; tempus autem habet principium et finem.
+Sed haec differentia est per accidens, sicut supra dictum est, quia
+si etiam semper aeviterna fuissent et semper futura essent, ut
+aliqui ponunt; vel etiam si quandoque deficerent, quod Deo
+possibile esset, adhuc aevum distingueretur ab aeternitate et
+tempore.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
@@ -4991,24 +6382,110 @@
   as is clear from Phys. iv. Therefore the fact that an aeviternal thing is neither inveterate, nor subject to innovation, comes from its changelessness; and consequently its measure does not contain "before" and "after." We say then that since eternity is the measure of a permanent being, in so far as anything recedes from permanence of being, it recedes from eternity. Now some things recede from permanence of being, so that their being is subject to change, or consists in change; and these
   things are measured by time, as are all movements, and also the being of all things corruptible. But others recede less from permanence of being, forasmuch as their being neither consists in change, nor is the subject of change; nevertheless they have change annexed to them either actually or potentially. This appears in the heavenly bodies, the substantial being of which is unchangeable; and yet with unchangeable being they have changeableness of place. The same applies to the angels, who have
   an unchangeable being as regards their nature with changeableness as regards choice; moreover they have changeableness of intelligence, of affections and of places in their own degree. Therefore these are measured by aeviternity which is a mean between eternity and time. But the being that is measured by eternity is not changeable, nor is it annexed to change. In this way time has "before" and "after"; aeviternity in itself has no "before" and "after," which can, however, be annexed to it;
-  while eternity has neither "before" nor "after," nor is it compatible with such at all.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Spiritual creatures as regards successive affections and intelligences are measured by time. Hence also Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23) that to be moved through time, is to be moved by affections. But as regards their nature they are measured by aeviternity; whereas as regards the vision of glory, they have a share of eternity.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Aeviternity is simultaneously whole; yet it is not eternity, because "before" and "after" are compatible with it.</p>
+  while eternity has neither "before" nor "after," nor is it
+compatible with such at all.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la">Alii vero assignant differentiam inter haec tria, per hoc
+quod aeternitas non habet prius et posterius; tempus autem habet
+prius et posterius cum innovatione et veteratione; aevum habet
+prius et posterius sine innovatione et veteratione. Sed haec
+positio implicat contradictoria. Quod quidem manifeste apparet, si
+innovatio et veteratio referantur ad ipsam mensuram. Cum enim prius
+et posterius durationis non possint esse simul, si aevum habet
+prius et posterius, oportet quod, priore parte aevi recedente,
+posterior de novo adveniat, et sic erit innovatio in ipso aevo,
+sicut in tempore. Si vero referantur ad mensurata, adhuc sequitur
+inconveniens. Ex hoc enim res temporalis inveteratur tempore, quod
+habet esse transmutabile, et ex transmutabilitate mensurati, est
+prius et posterius in mensura, ut patet ex IV Physic. Si igitur
+ipsum aeviternum non sit inveterabile nec innovabile, hoc erit quia
+esse eius est intransmutabile. Mensura ergo eius non habebit prius
+et posterius. Est ergo dicendum quod, cum aeternitas sit mensura
+esse permanentis, secundum quod aliquid recedit a permanentia
+essendi, secundum hoc recedit ab aeternitate. Quaedam autem sic
+recedunt a permanentia essendi, quod esse eorum est subiectum
+transmutationis, vel in transmutatione consistit, et huiusmodi
+mensurantur tempore; sicut omnis motus, et etiam esse omnium
+corruptibilium. Quaedam vero recedunt minus a permanentia essendi,
+quia esse eorum nec in transmutatione consistit, nec est subiectum
+transmutationis, tamen habent transmutationem adiunctam, vel in
+actu vel in potentia. Sicut patet in corporibus caelestibus, quorum
+esse substantiale est intransmutabile; tamen esse intransmutabile
+habent cum transmutabilitate secundum locum. Et similiter patet de
+Angelis, quod habent esse intransmutabile cum transmutabilitate
+secundum electionem, quantum ad eorum naturam pertinet; et cum
+transmutabilitate intelligentiarum et affectionum, et locorum suo
+modo. Et ideo huiusmodi mensurantur aevo, quod est medium inter
+aeternitatem et tempus. Esse autem quod mensurat aeternitas, nec
+est mutabile, nec mutabilitati adiunctum. Sic ergo tempus habet
+prius et posterius, aevum autem non habet in se prius et posterius,
+sed ei coniungi possunt, aeternitas autem non habet prius neque
+posterius, neque ea compatitur.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Spiritual
+creatures as regards successive affections and intelligences are
+measured by time. Hence also Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii,
+20,22,23) that to be moved through time, is to be moved by
+affections. But as regards their nature they are measured by
+aeviternity; whereas as regards the vision of glory, they have a share
+of eternity.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28634"><span class=
+"ref">[28634] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod creaturae spirituales, quantum ad affectiones et
+intelligentias, in quibus est successio, mensurantur tempore. Unde
+et Augustinus ibidem dicit quod per tempus moveri, est per
+affectiones moveri. Quantum vero ad eorum esse naturale,
+mensurantur aevo. Sed quantum ad visionem gloriae, participant
+aeternitatem.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b>
+Aeviternity is simultaneously whole; yet it is not eternity, because
+"before" and "after" are compatible with it.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28635"><span class=
+"ref">[28635] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod aevum est totum simul, non tamen est aeternitas, quia
+compatitur secum prius et posterius.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the very being of an angel considered absolutely, there is no difference of past and future, but only as regards accidental change. Now to say that an angel was, or is, or will be, is to be taken in a different sense according to the acceptation of our intellect, which apprehends the angelic existence by comparison with different parts of time. But when we say that an angel is, or was, we suppose something, which being supposed, its opposite is not
-  subject to the divine power. Whereas when we say he will be, we do not as yet suppose anything. Hence, since the existence and non-existence of an angel considered absolutely is subject to the divine power, God can make the existence of an angel not future; but He cannot cause him not to be while he is, or not to have been, after he has been.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The duration of aeviternity is infinite, forasmuch as it is not finished by time. Hence, there is no incongruity in saying that a creature is infinite, inasmuch as it is not ended by any other creature.</p>
+  subject to the divine power. Whereas when we say he will be, we do
+not as yet suppose anything. Hence, since the existence and
+non-existence of an angel considered absolutely is subject to the
+divine power, God can make the existence of an angel not future; but
+He cannot cause him not to be while he is, or not to have been, after
+he has been.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="28636"><span class=
+"ref">[28636] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod in ipso esse Angeli in se considerato, non est
+differentia praeteriti et futuri, sed solum secundum adiunctas
+mutationes. Sed quod dicimus Angelum esse vel fuisse vel futurum
+esse, differt secundum acceptionem intellectus nostri, qui accipit
+esse Angeli per comparationem ad diversas partes temporis. Et cum
+dicit Angelum esse vel fuisse, supponit aliquid cum quo eius
+oppositum non subditur divinae potentiae, cum vero dicit futurum
+esse, nondum supponit aliquid. Unde, cum esse et non esse Angeli
+subsit divinae potentiae, absolute considerando, potest Deus facere
+quod esse Angeli non sit futurum, tamen non potest facere quod non
+sit dum est, vel quod non fuerit postquam fuit.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A5-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The
+duration of aeviternity is infinite, forasmuch as it is not finished
+by time. Hence, there is no incongruity in saying that a creature is
+infinite, inasmuch as it is not ended by any other creature.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="28637"><span class=
+"ref">[28637] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod duratio aevi est infinita, quia non finitur tempore.
+Sic autem esse aliquod creatum infinitum, quod non finiatur quodam
+alio, non est inconveniens.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -5022,56 +6499,203 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is not only one aeviternity; for it is written in the apocryphal books of Esdras: "Majesty and power of ages are with Thee, O Lord."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different genera have different measures. But some aeviternal things belong to the corporeal genus, as the heavenly bodies; and others are spiritual substances, as are the angels. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since aeviternity is a term of duration, where there is one aeviternity, there is also one duration. But not all aeviternal things have one duration, for some begin to exist after others; as appears in the case especially of human souls. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, things not dependent on each other do not seem to have one measure of duration; for there appears to be one time for all temporal things; since the first movement, measured by time, is in some way the cause of all movement. But aeviternal things do not depend on each other, for one angel is not the cause of another angel. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p6"><b>On the contrary,</b> Aeviternity is a more simple thing than time, and is nearer to eternity. But time is one only. Therefore much more is aeviternity one only.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some say there is only one aeviternity; others that there are many aeviternities. Which of these is true, may be considered from the cause why time is one; for we can rise from corporeal things to the knowledge of spiritual things.</p>
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there
+is not only one aeviternity; for it is written in the apocryphal books
+of Esdras: "Majesty and power of ages are with Thee, O Lord."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28638"><span class=
+"ref">[28638] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod non sit tantum unum aevum. Dicitur enim in
+apocryphis Esdrae, <i>maiestas et potestas aevorum est apud te,
+domine</i>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different
+genera have different measures. But some aeviternal things belong to
+the corporeal genus, as the heavenly bodies; and others are spiritual
+substances, as are the angels. Therefore there is not only one
+aeviternity.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28639"><span class=
+"ref">[28639] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+diversorum generum diversae sunt mensurae. Sed quaedam aeviterna
+sunt in genere corporalium, scilicet corpora caelestia, quaedam
+vero sunt spirituales substantiae, scilicet Angeli. Non ergo est
+unum aevum tantum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since
+aeviternity is a term of duration, where there is one aeviternity,
+there is also one duration. But not all aeviternal things have one
+duration, for some begin to exist after others; as appears in the case
+especially of human souls. Therefore there is not only one
+aeviternity.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="28640"><span class=
+"ref">[28640] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, cum
+aevum sit nomen durationis, quorum est unum aevum, est una duratio.
+Sed non omnium aeviternorum est una duratio, quia quaedam post alia
+esse incipiunt, ut maxime patet in animabus humanis. Non est ergo
+unum aevum tantum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, things not
+dependent on each other do not seem to have one measure of duration;
+for there appears to be one time for all temporal things; since the
+first movement, measured by time, is in some way the cause of all
+movement. But aeviternal things do not depend on each other, for one
+angel is not the cause of another angel. Therefore there is not only
+one aeviternity.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 arg. 4"><a name="28641"><span class=
+"ref">[28641] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 6 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, ea
+quae non dependent ab invicem, non videntur habere unam mensuram
+durationis, propter hoc enim omnium temporalium videtur esse unum
+tempus, quia omnium motuum quodammodo causa est primus motus, qui
+prius tempore mensuratur. Sed aeviterna non dependent ab invicem,
+quia unus Angelus non est causa alterius. Non ergo est unum aevum
+tantum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p6"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> Aeviternity is a more simple thing than time, and is
+nearer to eternity. But time is one only. Therefore much more is
+aeviternity one only.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28642"><span class=
+"ref">[28642] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, aevum
+est simplicius tempore, et propinquius se habens ad aeternitatem.
+Sed tempus est unum tantum. Ergo multo magis aevum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p7"><b>I
+answer that,</b> A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some say
+there is only one aeviternity; others that there are many
+aeviternities. Which of these is true, may be considered from the
+cause why time is one; for we can rise from corporeal things to the
+knowledge of spiritual things.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 co."><a name="28643"><span class=
+"ref">[28643] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod circa hoc est duplex opinio, quidam enim dicunt quod est unum
+aevum tantum; quidam quod multa. Quid autem horum verius sit,
+oportet considerare ex causa unitatis temporis, in cognitionem enim
+spiritualium per corporalia devenimus.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p8"> Now some say that there is only one time for temporal things, forasmuch as one number exists for all things numbered; as time is a number, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv). This, however, is not a sufficient reason; because time is not a number abstracted from the thing numbered, but existing in the thing numbered; otherwise it would not be continuous; for ten ells of cloth are continuous not by reason of the number, but by reason of the thing numbered. Now number as it
   exists in the thing numbered, is not the same for all; but it is different for different things. Hence, others assert that the unity of eternity as the principle of all duration is the cause of the unity of time. Thus all durations are one in that view, in the light of their principle, but are many in the light of the diversity of things receiving duration from the influx of the first principle. On the other hand others assign primary matter as the cause why time is one; as it is the first
   subject of movement, the measure of which is time. Neither of these reasons, however, is sufficient; forasmuch as things which are one in principle, or in subject, especially if distant, are not one absolutely, but accidentally. Therefore the true reason why time is one, is to be found in the oneness of the first movement by which, since it is most simple, all other movements are measured. Therefore time is referred to that movement, not only as a measure is to the thing measured, but also as
-  accident is to subject; and thus receives unity from it. Whereas to other movements it is compared only as the measure is to the thing measured. Hence it is not multiplied by their multitude, because by one separate measure many things can be measured.</p>
+  accident is to subject; and thus receives unity from it. Whereas to
+other movements it is compared only as the measure is to the thing
+measured. Hence it is not multiplied by their multitude, because by
+one separate measure many things can be measured.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la">Dicunt autem quidam esse
+unum tempus omnium temporalium, propter hoc quod est unus numerus
+omnium numeratorum, cum tempus sit numerus, secundum philosophum.
+Sed hoc non sufficit, quia tempus non est numerus ut abstractus
+extra numeratum, sed ut in numerato existens, alioquin non esset
+continuus; quia decem ulnae panni continuitatem habent, non ex
+numero, sed ex numerato. Numerus autem in numerato existens non est
+idem omnium, sed diversus diversorum. Unde alii assignant causam
+unitatis temporis ex unitate aeternitatis, quae est principium
+omnis durationis. Et sic, omnes durationes sunt unum, si
+consideretur earum principium, sunt vero multae, si consideretur
+diversitas eorum quae recipiunt durationem ex influxu primi
+principii. Alii vero assignant causam unitatis temporis ex parte
+materiae primae, quae est primum subiectum motus, cuius mensura est
+tempus. Sed neutra assignatio sufficiens videtur, quia ea quae sunt
+unum principio vel subiecto, et maxime remoto, non sunt unum
+simpliciter sed secundum quid. Est ergo ratio unitatis temporis,
+unitas primi motus, secundum quem, cum sit simplicissimus, omnes
+alii mensurantur, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sic ergo tempus ad
+illum motum comparatur non solum ut mensura ad mensuratum, sed
+etiam ut accidens ad subiectum; et sic ab eo recipit unitatem. Ad
+alios autem motus comparatur solum ut mensura ad mensuratum. Unde
+secundum eorum multitudinem non multiplicatur, quia una mensura
+separata multa mensurari possunt.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p9"> This being established, we must observe that a twofold opinion existed concerning spiritual substances. Some said that all proceeded from God in a certain equality, as Origen said (Peri Archon. i); or at least many of them, as some others thought. Others said that all spiritual substances proceeded from God in a certain degree and order; and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. x) seems to have thought so, when he said that among spiritual substances there are the first, the middle and the
   last; even in one order of angels. Now according to the first opinion, it must be said that there are many aeviternities as there are many aeviternal things of first degree. But according to the second opinion, it would be necessary to say that there is one aeviternity only; because since each thing is measured by the most simple element of its genus, it must be that the existence of all aeviternal things should be measured by the existence of the first aeviternal thing, which is all the more
-  simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore because the second opinion is truer, as will be shown later (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p9.1" href="#FP.v.FP_Q47.FP_Q47_A2">Q[47], A[2]</a>); we concede at present that there is only one aeviternity.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Aeviternity is sometimes taken for age, that is, a space of a thing's duration; and thus we say many aeviternities when we mean ages.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the heavenly bodies and spiritual things differ in the genus of their nature, still they agree in having a changeless being, and are thus measured by aeviternity.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All temporal things did not begin together; nevertheless there is one time for all of them, by reason of the first measured by time; and thus all aeviternal things have one aeviternity by reason of the first, though all did not begin together.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> For things to be measured by one, it is not necessary that the one should be the cause of all, but that it be more simple than the rest.</p>
+  simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore because the second
+opinion is truer, as will be shown later (<a xml:link="simple"
+shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p9.1"
+href="#FP.v.FP_Q47.FP_Q47_A2">Q[47], A[2]</a>); we concede at present
+that there is only one aeviternity.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la">Hoc igitur habito, sciendum quod
+de substantiis spiritualibus duplex fuit opinio. Quidam enim
+dixerunt quod omnes processerunt a Deo in quadam aequalitate, ut
+Origenes dixit; vel etiam multae earum, ut quidam posuerunt. Alii
+vero dixerunt quod omnes substantiae spirituales processerunt a Deo
+quodam gradu et ordine et hoc videtur sentire Dionysius, qui dicit,
+cap. X Cael. Hier., quod inter substantias spirituales sunt primae,
+mediae et ultimae, etiam in uno ordine Angelorum. Secundum igitur
+primam opinionem, necesse est dicere quod sunt plura aeva, secundum
+quod sunt plura aeviterna prima aequalia. Secundum autem secundam
+opinionem, oportet dicere quod sit unum aevum tantum, quia, cum
+unumquodque mensuretur simplicissimo sui generis, ut dicitur in X
+Metaphys., oportet quod esse omnium aeviternorum mensuretur esse
+primi aeviterni, quod tanto est simplicius, quanto prius. Et quia
+secunda opinio verior est, ut infra ostendetur, concedimus ad
+praesens unum esse aevum tantum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b>
+Aeviternity is sometimes taken for age, that is, a space of a thing's
+duration; and thus we say many aeviternities when we mean ages.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28644"><span class=
+"ref">[28644] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod aevum aliquando accipitur pro saeculo, quod est
+periodus durationis alicuius rei, et sic dicuntur multa aeva, sicut
+multa saecula.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although
+the heavenly bodies and spiritual things differ in the genus of their
+nature, still they agree in having a changeless being, and are thus
+measured by aeviternity.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28645"><span class=
+"ref">[28645] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, licet corpora caelestia et spiritualia differant in
+genere naturae, tamen conveniunt in hoc, quod habent esse
+intransmutabile. Et sic mensurantur aevo.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All
+temporal things did not begin together; nevertheless there is one time
+for all of them, by reason of the first measured by time; and thus all
+aeviternal things have one aeviternity by reason of the first, though
+all did not begin together.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="28646"><span class=
+"ref">[28646] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod nec omnia temporalia simul incipiunt, et tamen omnium
+est unum tempus, propter primum quod mensuratur tempore. Et sic
+omnia aeviterna habent unum aevum propter primum, etiam si non
+omnia simul incipiant.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A6-p13"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> For
+things to be measured by one, it is not necessary that the one should
+be the cause of all, but that it be more simple than the rest.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 10 a. 6 ad 4"><a name="28647"><span class=
+"ref">[28647] I&ordf; q. 10 a. 6 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod ad hoc quod aliqua mensurentur per aliquod unum, non
+requiritur quod illud unum sit causa omnium eorum; sed quod sit
+simplicius.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -5086,66 +6710,171 @@
 			 
 
 			 <div class="bilingual">
+<div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11-p2"> After the foregoing, we consider the divine unity; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11-p3"> (1) Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11-p4"> (2) Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11-p5"> (3) Whether God is one?</p>
-</div>
-
-			 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11-p6"> (4) Whether He is in the highest degree one?</p>
 </div>
-
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 pr."><a name="28648"><span class="ref">[28648]
+I&ordf; q. 11 pr.</span></a> Post praemissa, considerandum est de
+divina unitate. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum unum
+addat aliquid supra ens. Secundo, utrum opponantur unum et multa.
+Tertio, utrum Deus sit unus. Quarto, utrum sit maxime unus.</p>
+</div>
 <div4 id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1" next="FP_Q11_A2" prev="FP_Q11" progress="1.42%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether “one” adds anything to “being”?">
 <h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1-p0.1">Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?</h4>
 
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that "one" adds something to "being." For everything is in a determinate genus by addition to being, which penetrates all "genera." But "one" is a determinate genus, for it is the principle of number, which is a species of quantity. Therefore "one" adds something to "being."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what divides a thing common to all, is an addition to it. But "being" is divided by "one" and by "many." Therefore "one" is an addition to "being."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if "one" is not an addition to "being," "one" and "being" must have the same meaning. But it would be nugatory to call "being" by the name of "being"; therefore it would be equally so to call being "one." Now this is false. Therefore "one" is an addition to "being."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 5, ult.): "Nothing which exists is not in some way one," which would be false if "one" were an addition to "being," in the sense of limiting it. Therefore "one" is not an addition to "being."</p>
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that "one"
+adds something to "being." For everything is in a determinate genus by
+addition to being, which penetrates all "genera." But "one" is a
+determinate genus, for it is the principle of number, which is a
+species of quantity. Therefore "one" adds something to "being."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28649"><span class=
+"ref">[28649] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod unum addat aliquid supra ens. Omne enim
+quod est in aliquo genere determinato, se habet ex additione ad
+ens, quod circuit omnia genera. Sed unum est in genere determinato,
+est enim principium numeri, qui est species quantitatis. Ergo unum
+addit aliquid supra ens.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what
+divides a thing common to all, is an addition to it. But "being" is
+divided by "one" and by "many." Therefore "one" is an addition to
+"being."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28650"><span class=
+"ref">[28650] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod
+dividit aliquod commune, se habet ex additione ad illud. Sed ens
+dividitur per unum et multa. Ergo unum addit aliquid supra ens.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if "one"
+is not an addition to "being," "one" and "being" must have the same
+meaning. But it would be nugatory to call "being" by the name of
+"being"; therefore it would be equally so to call being "one." Now
+this is false. Therefore "one" is an addition to "being."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28651"><span class=
+"ref">[28651] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
+unum non addit supra ens, idem esset dicere unum et ens. Sed
+nugatorie dicitur ens ens. Ergo nugatio esset dicere ens unum, quod
+falsum est. Addit igitur unum supra ens.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1-p5"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 5, ult.): "Nothing which
+exists is not in some way one," which would be false if "one" were an
+addition to "being," in the sense of limiting it. Therefore "one" is
+not an addition to "being."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28652"><span class=
+"ref">[28652] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit Dionysius, ult. cap. de Div. Nom., <i>nihil est
+existentium non participans uno</i>, quod non esset, si unum
+adderet supra ens quod contraheret ipsum. Ergo unum non habet se ex
+additione ad ens.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> "One" does not add any reality to "being"; but is only a negation of division; for "one" means undivided "being." This is the very reason why "one" is the same as "being." Now every being is either simple or compound. But what is simple is undivided, both actually and potentially. Whereas what is compound, has not being whilst its parts are divided, but after they make up and compose it. Hence it is manifest that the being of anything consists in undivision;
-  and hence it is that everything guards its unity as it guards its being.</p>
+  and hence it is that everything guards its unity as it guards its
+being.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 1 co."><a name="28653"><span class=
+"ref">[28653] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod unum non addit supra ens rem aliquam, sed tantum negationem
+divisionis, unum enim nihil aliud significat quam ens indivisum. Et
+ex hoc ipso apparet quod unum convertitur cum ente. Nam omne ens
+aut est simplex, aut compositum. Quod autem est simplex, est
+indivisum et actu et potentia. Quod autem est compositum, non habet
+esse quandiu partes eius sunt divisae, sed postquam constituunt et
+componunt ipsum compositum. Unde manifestum est quod esse
+cuiuslibet rei consistit in indivisione. Et inde est quod
+unumquodque, sicut custodit suum esse, ita custodit suam
+unitatem.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some, thinking that the "one" convertible with "being" is the same as the "one" which is the principle of number, were divided into contrary opinions. Pythagoras and Plato, seeing that the "one" convertible with "being" did not add any reality to "being," but signified the substance of "being" as undivided, thought that the same applied to the "one" which is the principle of number. And because number is composed of unities, they thought that numbers
   were the substances of all things. Avicenna, however, on the contrary, considering that "one" which is the principle of number, added a reality to the substance of "being" (otherwise number made of unities would not be a species of quantity), thought that the "one" convertible with "being" added a reality to the substance of beings; as "white" to "man." This, however, is manifestly false, inasmuch as each thing is "one" by its substance. For if a thing were "one" by anything else but by its
-  substance, since this again would be "one," supposing it were again "one" by another thing, we should be driven on to infinity. Hence we must adhere to the former statement; therefore we must say that the "one" which is convertible with "being," does not add a reality to being; but that the "one" which is the principle of number, does add a reality to "being," belonging to the genus of quantity.</p>
+  substance, since this again would be "one," supposing it were again
+"one" by another thing, we should be driven on to infinity. Hence we
+must adhere to the former statement; therefore we must say that the
+"one" which is convertible with "being," does not add a reality to
+being; but that the "one" which is the principle of number, does add a
+reality to "being," belonging to the genus of quantity.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28654"><span class=
+"ref">[28654] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum igitur
+dicendum quod quidam, putantes idem esse unum quod convertitur cum
+ente, et quod est principium numeri, divisi sunt in contrarias
+positiones. Pythagoras enim et Plato, videntes quod unum quod
+convertitur cum ente, non addit aliquam rem supra ens, sed
+significat substantiam entis prout est indivisa, existimaverunt sic
+se habere de uno quod est principium numeri. Et quia numerus
+componitur ex unitatibus, crediderunt quod numeri essent
+substantiae omnium rerum. E contrario autem Avicenna, considerans
+quod unum quod est principium numeri, addit aliquam rem supra
+substantiam entis (alias numerus ex unitatibus compositus non esset
+species quantitatis), credidit quod unum quod convertitur cum ente,
+addat rem aliquam supra substantiam entis, sicut album supra
+hominem. Sed hoc manifeste falsum est, quia quaelibet res est una
+per suam substantiam. Si enim per aliquid aliud esset una quaelibet
+res, cum illud iterum sit unum, si esset iterum unum per aliquid
+aliud, esset abire in infinitum. Unde standum est in primo. Sic
+igitur dicendum est quod unum quod convertitur cum ente, non addit
+aliquam rem supra ens, sed unum quod est principium numeri, addit
+aliquid supra ens, ad genus quantitatis pertinens.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There is nothing to prevent a thing which in one way is divided, from being another way undivided; as what is divided in number, may be undivided in species; thus it may be that a thing is in one way "one," and in another way "many." Still, if it is absolutely undivided, either because it is so according to what belongs to its essence, though it may be divided as regards what is outside its essence, as what is one in subject may have many accidents;
   or because it is undivided actually, and divided potentially, as what is "one" in the whole, and is "many" in parts; in such a case a thing will be "one" absolutely and "many" accidentally. On the other hand, if it be undivided accidentally, and divided absolutely, as if it were divided in essence and undivided in idea or in principle or cause, it will be "many" absolutely and "one" accidentally; as what are "many" in number and "one" in species or "one" in principle. Hence in that way, being
   is divided by "one" and by "many"; as it were by "one" absolutely and by "many" accidentally. For multitude itself would not be contained under "being," unless it were in some way contained under "one." Thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. cap. ult.) that "there is no kind of multitude that is not in a way one. But what are many in their parts, are one in their whole; and what are many in accidents, are one in subject; and what are many in number, are one in species; and what are many in species, are
-  one in genus; and what are many in processions, are one in principle."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It does not follow that it is nugatory to say "being" is "one"; forasmuch as "one" adds an idea to "being."</p>
+  one in genus; and what are many in processions, are one in
+principle."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28655"><span class=
+"ref">[28655] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod nihil prohibet id quod est uno modo divisum, esse
+alio modo indivisum; sicut quod est divisum numero, est indivisum
+secundum speciem, et sic contingit aliquid esse uno modo unum, alio
+modo multa. Sed tamen si sit indivisum simpliciter; vel quia est
+indivisum secundum id quod pertinet ad essentiam rei, licet sit
+divisum quantum ad ea quae sunt extra essentiam rei, sicut quod est
+unum subiecto et multa secundum accidentia; vel quia est indivisum
+in actu, et divisum in potentia, sicut quod est unum toto et multa
+secundum partes, huiusmodi erit unum simpliciter, et multa secundum
+quid. Si vero aliquid e converso sit indivisum secundum quid, et
+divisum simpliciter; utpote quia est divisum secundum essentiam, et
+indivisum secundum rationem, vel secundum principium sive causam,
+erit multa simpliciter, et unum secundum quid; ut quae sunt multa
+numero et unum specie, vel unum principio. Sic igitur ens dividitur
+per unum et multa, quasi per unum simpliciter, et multa secundum
+quid. Nam et ipsa multitudo non contineretur sub ente, nisi
+contineretur aliquo modo sub uno. Dicit enim Dionysius, ult. cap.
+de Div. Nom., quod <i>non est multitudo non participans uno, sed
+quae sunt multa partibus, sunt unum toto; et quae sunt multa
+accidentibus, sunt unum subiecto; et quae sunt multa numero, sunt
+unum specie; et quae sunt speciebus multa, sunt unum genere; et
+quae sunt multa processibus, sunt unum principio</i>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A1-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It does
+not follow that it is nugatory to say "being" is "one"; forasmuch as
+"one" adds an idea to "being."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28656"><span class=
+"ref">[28656] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ideo non est nugatio cum dicitur ens unum, quia unum
+addit aliquid secundum rationem supra ens.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -5159,48 +6888,184 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that "one" and "many" are not mutually opposed. For no opposite thing is predicated of its opposite. But every "multitude" is in a certain way "one," as appears from the preceding article. Therefore "one" is not opposed to "multitude."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no opposite thing is constituted by its opposite. But "multitude" is constituted by "one." Therefore it is not opposed to "multitude."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "one" is opposed to "one." But the idea of "few" is opposed to "many." Therefore "one" is not opposed to "many."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if "one" is opposed to "multitude," it is opposed as the undivided is to the divided; and is thus opposed to it as privation is to habit. But this appears to be incongruous; because it would follow that "one" comes after "multitude," and is defined by it; whereas, on the contrary, "multitude" is defined by "one." Hence there would be a vicious circle in the definition; which is inadmissible. Therefore "one" and "many" are not opposed.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p6"><b>On the contrary,</b> Things which are opposed in idea, are themselves opposed to each other. But the idea of "one" consists in indivisibility; and the idea of "multitude" contains division. Therefore "one" and "many" are opposed to each other.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p7"><b>I answer that,</b> "One" is opposed to "many," but in various ways. The "one" which is the principle of number is opposed to "multitude" which is number, as the measure is to the thing measured. For "one" implies the idea of a primary measure; and number is "multitude" measured by "one," as is clear from Metaph. x. But the "one" which convertible with "being" is opposed to "multitude" by way of privation; as the undivided is to the thing divided.</p>
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that "one"
+and "many" are not mutually opposed. For no opposite thing is
+predicated of its opposite. But every "multitude" is in a certain way
+"one," as appears from the preceding article. Therefore "one" is not
+opposed to "multitude."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28657"><span class=
+"ref">[28657] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod unum et multa non opponantur. Nullum enim
+oppositum praedicatur de suo opposito. Sed omnis multitudo est
+quodammodo unum, ut ex praedictis patet. Ergo unum non opponitur
+multitudini.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no
+opposite thing is constituted by its opposite. But "multitude" is
+constituted by "one." Therefore it is not opposed to "multitude."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28658"><span class=
+"ref">[28658] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+nullum oppositum constituitur ex suo opposito. Sed unum constituit
+multitudinem. Ergo non opponitur multitudini.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "one" is
+opposed to "one." But the idea of "few" is opposed to "many."
+Therefore "one" is not opposed to "many."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28659"><span class=
+"ref">[28659] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, unum
+uni est oppositum. Sed multo opponitur paucum. Ergo non opponitur
+ei unum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p5"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if "one"
+is opposed to "multitude," it is opposed as the undivided is to the
+divided; and is thus opposed to it as privation is to habit. But this
+appears to be incongruous; because it would follow that "one" comes
+after "multitude," and is defined by it; whereas, on the contrary,
+"multitude" is defined by "one." Hence there would be a vicious circle
+in the definition; which is inadmissible. Therefore "one" and "many"
+are not opposed.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="28660"><span class=
+"ref">[28660] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, si
+unum opponitur multitudini, opponitur ei sicut indivisum diviso, et
+sic opponetur ei ut privatio habitui. Hoc autem videtur
+inconveniens, quia sequeretur quod unum sit posterius multitudine,
+et definiatur per eam; cum tamen multitudo definiatur per unum.
+Unde erit circulus in definitione, quod est inconveniens. Non ergo
+unum et multa sunt opposita.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p6"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> Things which are opposed in idea, are themselves
+opposed to each other. But the idea of "one" consists in
+indivisibility; and the idea of "multitude" contains
+division. Therefore "one" and "many" are opposed to each other.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28661"><span class=
+"ref">[28661] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+quorum rationes sunt oppositae, ipsa sunt opposita. Sed ratio unius
+consistit in indivisibilitate, ratio vero multitudinis divisionem
+continet. Ergo unum et multa sunt opposita.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p7"><b>I
+answer that,</b> "One" is opposed to "many," but in various ways. The
+"one" which is the principle of number is opposed to "multitude" which
+is number, as the measure is to the thing measured. For "one" implies
+the idea of a primary measure; and number is "multitude" measured by
+"one," as is clear from Metaph. x. But the "one" which convertible
+with "being" is opposed to "multitude" by way of privation; as the
+undivided is to the thing divided.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 co."><a name="28662"><span class=
+"ref">[28662] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod unum opponitur multis, sed diversimode. Nam unum quod est
+principium numeri, opponitur multitudini quae est numerus, ut
+mensura mensurato, unum enim habet rationem primae mensurae, et
+numerus est multitudo mensurata per unum, ut patet ex X Metaphys.
+Unum vero quod convertitur cum ente, opponitur multitudini per
+modum privationis, ut indivisum diviso.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> No privation entirely takes away the being of a thing, inasmuch as privation means "negation in the subject," according to the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Nevertheless every privation takes away some being; and so in being, by reason of its universality, the privation of being has its foundation in being; which is not the case in privations of special forms, as of sight, or of whiteness and the like. And what applies to being applies also to one and
   to good, which are convertible with being, for the privation of good is founded in some good; likewise the removal of unity is founded in some one thing. Hence it happens that multitude is some one thing; and evil is some good thing, and non-being is some kind of being. Nevertheless, opposite is not predicated of opposite; forasmuch as one is absolute, and the other is relative; for what is relative being (as a potentiality) is non-being absolutely, i.e. actually; or what is absolute being in
-  the genus of substance is non-being relatively as regards some accidental being. In the same way, what is relatively good is absolutely bad, or vice versa; likewise what is absolutely "one" is relatively "many," and vice versa.</p>
+  the genus of substance is non-being relatively as regards some
+accidental being. In the same way, what is relatively good is
+absolutely bad, or vice versa; likewise what is absolutely "one" is
+relatively "many," and vice versa.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28663"><span class=
+"ref">[28663] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod nulla privatio tollit totaliter esse, quia privatio
+est negatio in subiecto, secundum philosophum. Sed tamen omnis
+privatio tollit aliquod esse. Et ideo in ente, ratione suae
+communitatis, accidit quod privatio entis fundatur in ente, quod
+non accidit in privationibus formarum specialium, ut visus vel
+albedinis, vel alicuius huiusmodi. Et sicut est de ente, ita est de
+uno et bono, quae convertuntur cum ente, nam privatio boni fundatur
+in aliquo bono, et similiter remotio unitatis fundatur in aliquo
+uno. Et exinde contingit quod multitudo est quoddam unum, et malum
+est quoddam bonum, et non ens est quoddam ens. Non tamen oppositum
+praedicatur de opposito, quia alterum horum est simpliciter, et
+alterum secundum quid. Quod enim secundum quid est ens, ut in
+potentia, est non ens simpliciter, idest actu, vel quod est ens
+simpliciter in genere substantiae, est non ens secundum quid,
+quantum ad aliquod esse accidentale. Similiter ergo quod est bonum
+secundum quid, est malum simpliciter; vel e converso. Et similiter
+quod est unum simpliciter, est multa secundum quid; et e
+converso.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A "whole" is twofold. In one sense it is homogeneous, composed of like parts; in another sense it is heterogeneous, composed of dissimilar parts. Now in every homogeneous whole, the whole is made up of parts having the form of the whole; as, for instance, every part of water is water; and such is the constitution of a continuous thing made up of its parts. In every heterogeneous whole, however, every part is wanting in the form belonging to the whole;
   as, for instance, no part of a house is a house, nor is any part of a man a man. Now multitude is such a kind of a whole. Therefore inasmuch as its part has not the form of the multitude, the latter is composed of unities, as a house is composed of not houses; not, indeed, as if unities constituted multitude so far as they are undivided, in which way they are opposed to multitude; but so far as they have being, as also the parts of a house make up the house by the fact that they are beings, not
   by the fact that they are not houses.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "Many" is taken in two ways: absolutely, and in that sense it is opposed to "one"; in another way as importing some kind of excess, in which sense it is opposed to "few"; hence in the first sense two are many but not in the second sense.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28664"><span class=
+"ref">[28664] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod duplex est totum, quoddam homogeneum, quod componitur
+ex similibus partibus; quoddam vero heterogeneum, quod componitur
+ex dissimilibus partibus. In quolibet autem toto homogeneo, totum
+constituitur ex partibus habentibus formam totius, sicut quaelibet
+pars aquae est aqua, et talis est constitutio continui ex suis
+partibus. In quolibet autem toto heterogeneo, quaelibet pars caret
+forma totius, nulla enim pars domus est domus, nec aliqua pars
+hominis est homo. Et tale totum est multitudo. Inquantum ergo pars
+eius non habet formam multitudinis, componitur multitudo ex
+unitatibus, sicut domus ex non domibus, non quod unitates
+constituant multitudinem secundum id quod habent de ratione
+indivisionis, prout opponuntur multitudini; sed secundum hoc quod
+habent de entitate, sicut et partes domus constituunt domum per hoc
+quod sunt quaedam corpora, non per hoc quod sunt non domus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "Many" is
+taken in two ways: absolutely, and in that sense it is opposed to
+"one"; in another way as importing some kind of excess, in which sense
+it is opposed to "few"; hence in the first sense two are many but not
+in the second sense.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28665"><span class=
+"ref">[28665] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod multum accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo, absolute, et
+sic opponitur uni. Alio modo, secundum quod importat excessum
+quendam, et sic opponitur pauco. Unde primo modo duo sunt multa;
+non autem secundo.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> "One" is opposed to "many" privatively, inasmuch as the idea of "many" involves division. Hence division must be prior to unity, not absolutely in itself, but according to our way of apprehension. For we apprehend simple things by compound things; and hence we define a point to be, "what has no part," or "the beginning of a line." "Multitude" also, in idea, follows on "one"; because we do not understand divided things to convey the idea of multitude
-  except by the fact that we attribute unity to every part. Hence "one" is placed in the definition of "multitude"; but "multitude" is not placed in the definition of "one." But division comes to be understood from the very negation of being: so what first comes to mind is being; secondly, that this being is not that being, and thus we apprehend division as a consequence; thirdly, comes the notion of one; fourthly, the notion of multitude.</p>
+  except by the fact that we attribute unity to every part. Hence
+"one" is placed in the definition of "multitude"; but "multitude" is
+not placed in the definition of "one." But division comes to be
+understood from the very negation of being: so what first comes to
+mind is being; secondly, that this being is not that being, and thus
+we apprehend division as a consequence; thirdly, comes the notion of
+one; fourthly, the notion of multitude.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="28666"><span class=
+"ref">[28666] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod unum opponitur privative multis, inquantum in ratione
+multorum est quod sint divisa. Unde oportet quod divisio sit prius
+unitate, non simpliciter, sed secundum rationem nostrae
+apprehensionis. Apprehendimus enim simplicia per composita, unde
+definimus punctum, cuius pars non est, vel principium lineae. Sed
+multitudo, etiam secundum rationem, consequenter se habet ad unum,
+quia divisa non intelligimus habere rationem multitudinis, nisi per
+hoc quod utrique divisorum attribuimus unitatem. Unde unum ponitur
+in definitione multitudinis, non autem multitudo in definitione
+unius. Sed divisio cadit in intellectu ex ipsa negatione entis. Ita
+quod primo cadit in intellectu ens; secundo, quod hoc ens non est
+illud ens, et sic secundo apprehendimus divisionem; tertio, unum;
+quarto, multitudinem.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -5214,39 +7079,136 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not one. For it is written "For there be many gods and many lords" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Cor.8.5" parsed="vul|1Cor|8|5|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p2.1" passage="1 Cor. 8:5">1 Cor. 8:5</scripRef>).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "One," as the principle of number, cannot be predicated of God, since quantity is not predicated of God; likewise, neither can "one" which is convertible with "being" be predicated of God, because it imports privation, and every privation is an imperfection, which cannot apply to God. Therefore God is not one.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p4"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Deut.6.4" parsed="vul|Deut|6|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p4.1" passage="Dt. 6:4">Dt. 6:4</scripRef>).</p>
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God
+is not one. For it is written "For there be many gods and many lords"
+(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Cor.8.5" parsed="vul|1Cor|8|5|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p2.1" passage="1 Cor. 8:5">1
+Cor. 8:5</scripRef>).</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28667"><span class=
+"ref">[28667] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit unus. Dicitur enim I ad Cor.
+VIII, <i>siquidem sunt dii multi et domini multi</i>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "One," as
+the principle of number, cannot be predicated of God, since quantity
+is not predicated of God; likewise, neither can "one" which is
+convertible with "being" be predicated of God, because it imports
+privation, and every privation is an imperfection, which cannot apply
+to God. Therefore God is not one.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28668"><span class=
+"ref">[28668] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, unum
+quod est principium numeri, non potest praedicari de Deo, cum nulla
+quantitas de Deo praedicetur. Similiter nec unum quod convertitur
+cum ente, quia importat privationem, et omnis privatio imperfectio
+est, quae Deo non competit. Non est igitur dicendum quod Deus sit
+unus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p4"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> It is written "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is
+one Lord" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Deut.6.4"
+parsed="vul|Deut|6|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p4.1"
+passage="Dt. 6:4">Dt. 6:4</scripRef>).</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28669"><span class=
+"ref">[28669] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur Deut. VI, <i>audi, Israel, dominus Deus tuus unus
+est</i>.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p5"><b>I answer that,</b> It can be shown from these three sources that God is one. First from His simplicity. For it is manifest that the reason why any singular thing is "this particular thing" is because it cannot be communicated to many: since that whereby Socrates is a man, can be communicated to many; whereas, what makes him this particular man, is only communicable to one. Therefore, if Socrates were a man by what makes him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many
-  Socrates, so there could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs to God alone; for God Himself is His own nature, as was shown above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A3">Q[3], A[3]</a>). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He is this God. Impossible is it therefore that many Gods should exist.</p>
+  Socrates, so there could not in that way be many men. Now this
+belongs to God alone; for God Himself is His own nature, as was shown
+above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A3">Q[3],
+A[3]</a>). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He is this
+God. Impossible is it therefore that many Gods should exist.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 3 co."><a name="28670"><span class=
+"ref">[28670] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod Deum esse unum, ex tribus demonstratur. Primo quidem ex eius
+simplicitate. Manifestum est enim quod illud unde aliquod singulare
+est hoc aliquid, nullo modo est multis communicabile. Illud enim
+unde Socrates est homo, multis communicari potest, sed id unde est
+hic homo, non potest communicari nisi uni tantum. Si ergo Socrates
+per id esset homo, per quod est hic homo, sicut non possunt esse
+plures Socrates, ita non possent esse plures homines. Hoc autem
+convenit Deo, nam ipse Deus est sua natura, ut supra ostensum est.
+Secundum igitur idem est Deus, et hic Deus. Impossibile est igitur
+esse plures deos.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p6"> Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it was shown above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that God comprehends in Himself the whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would necessarily differ from each other. Something therefore would belong to one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation, one of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one of them would be without it. So it is impossible
-  for many gods to exist. Hence also the ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by truth, when they asserted an infinite principle, asserted likewise that there was only one such principle.</p>
+  for many gods to exist. Hence also the ancient philosophers,
+constrained as it were by truth, when they asserted an infinite
+principle, asserted likewise that there was only one such
+principle.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la">Secundo vero, ex infinitate eius perfectionis.
+Ostensum est enim supra quod Deus comprehendit in se totam
+perfectionem essendi. Si ergo essent plures dii, oporteret eos
+differre. Aliquid ergo conveniret uni, quod non alteri. Et si hoc
+esset privatio, non esset simpliciter perfectus, si autem hoc esset
+perfectio, alteri eorum deesset. Impossibile est ergo esse plures
+deos. Unde et antiqui philosophi, quasi ab ipsa coacti veritate,
+ponentes principium infinitum, posuerunt unum tantum principium.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p7"> Thirdly, this is shown from the unity of the world. For all things that exist are seen to be ordered to each other since some serve others. But things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same order, unless they are ordered thereto by one. For many are reduced into one order by one better than by many: because one is the "per se" cause of one, and many are only the accidental cause of one, inasmuch as they are in some way one. Since therefore what is first is most perfect,
-  and is so "per se" and not accidentally, it must be that the first which reduces all into one order should be only one. And this one is God.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gods are called many by the error of some who worshipped many deities, thinking as they did that the planets and other stars were gods, and also the separate parts of the world. Hence the Apostle adds: "Our God is one," etc.</p>
+  and is so "per se" and not accidentally, it must be that the first
+which reduces all into one order should be only one. And this one is
+God.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la">Tertio, ab unitate mundi. Omnia enim quae sunt, inveniuntur esse
+ordinata ad invicem, dum quaedam quibusdam deserviunt. Quae autem
+diversa sunt, in unum ordinem non convenirent, nisi ab aliquo uno
+ordinarentur. Melius enim multa reducuntur in unum ordinem per
+unum, quam per multa, quia per se unius unum est causa, et multa
+non sunt causa unius nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet sunt
+aliquo modo unum. Cum igitur illud quod est primum, sit
+perfectissimum et per se, non per accidens, oportet quod primum
+reducens omnia in unum ordinem, sit unum tantum. Et hoc est
+Deus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gods are
+called many by the error of some who worshipped many deities, thinking
+as they did that the planets and other stars were gods, and also the
+separate parts of the world. Hence the Apostle adds: "Our God is one,"
+etc.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28671"><span class=
+"ref">[28671] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod dicuntur dii multi secundum errorem quorundam qui
+multos deos colebant, existimantes planetas et alias stellas esse
+deos, vel etiam singulas partes mundi. Unde subdit, <i>nobis autem
+unus Deus,</i> et cetera.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "One" which is the principle of number is not predicated of God, but only of material things. For "one" the principle of number belongs to the "genus" of mathematics, which are material in being, and abstracted from matter only in idea. But "one" which is convertible with being is a metaphysical entity and does not depend on matter in its being. And although in God there is no privation, still, according to the mode of our apprehension, He is known to
-  us by way only of privation and remotion. Thus there is no reason why a certain kind of privation should not be predicated of God; for instance, that He is incorporeal and infinite; and in the same way it is said of God that He is one.</p>
+  us by way only of privation and remotion. Thus there is no reason
+why a certain kind of privation should not be predicated of God; for
+instance, that He is incorporeal and infinite; and in the same way it
+is said of God that He is one.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28672"><span class=
+"ref">[28672] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod unum secundum quod est principium numeri, non
+praedicatur de Deo; sed solum de his quae habent esse in materia.
+Unum enim quod est principium numeri, est de genere mathematicorum;
+quae habent esse in materia, sed sunt secundum rationem a materia
+abstracta. Unum vero quod convertitur cum ente, est quoddam
+metaphysicum, quod secundum esse non dependet a materia. Et licet
+in Deo non sit aliqua privatio, tamen, secundum modum
+apprehensionis nostrae, non cognoscitur a nobis nisi per modum
+privationis et remotionis. Et sic nihil prohibet aliqua privative
+dicta de Deo praedicari; sicut quod est incorporeus, infinitus. Et
+similiter de Deo dicitur quod sit unus.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -5260,36 +7222,129 @@
 
 
 <div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not supremely "one." For "one" is so called from the privation of division. But privation cannot be greater or less. Therefore God is not more "one" than other things which are called "one."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing seems to be more indivisible than what is actually and potentially indivisible; such as a point and unity. But a thing is said to be more "one" according as it is indivisible. Therefore God is not more "one" than unity is "one" and a point is "one."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is essentially good is supremely good. Therefore what is essentially "one" is supremely "one." But every being is essentially "one," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv). Therefore every being is supremely "one"; and therefore God is not "one" more than any other being is "one."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p5"><b>On the contrary,</b> Bernard says (De Consid. v): "Among all things called one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds the first place."</p>
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p2"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God
+is not supremely "one." For "one" is so called from the privation of
+division. But privation cannot be greater or less. Therefore God is
+not more "one" than other things which are called "one."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28673"><span class=
+"ref">[28673] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit maxime unus. Unum enim
+dicitur secundum privationem divisionis. Sed privatio non recipit
+magis et minus. Ergo Deus non dicitur magis unus quam alia quae
+sunt unum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p3"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing
+seems to be more indivisible than what is actually and potentially
+indivisible; such as a point and unity. But a thing is said to be more
+"one" according as it is indivisible. Therefore God is not more "one"
+than unity is "one" and a point is "one."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28674"><span class=
+"ref">[28674] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nihil
+videtur esse magis indivisibile quam id quod est indivisibile actu
+et potentia, cuiusmodi est punctus et unitas. Sed intantum dicitur
+aliquid magis unum, inquantum est indivisibile. Ergo Deus non est
+magis unum quam unitas et punctus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p4"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is
+essentially good is supremely good. Therefore what is essentially
+"one" is supremely "one." But every being is essentially "one," as the
+Philosopher says (Metaph. iv). Therefore every being is supremely
+"one"; and therefore God is not "one" more than any other being is
+"one."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28675"><span class=
+"ref">[28675] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod
+est per essentiam bonum, est maxime bonum, ergo quod est per
+essentiam suam unum, est maxime unum. Sed omne ens est unum per
+suam essentiam, ut patet per philosophum in IV Metaphys. Ergo omne
+ens est maxime unum. Deus igitur non est magis unum quam alia
+entia.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p5"><b>On
+the contrary,</b> Bernard says (De Consid. v): "Among all things
+called one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds the first
+place."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28676"><span class=
+"ref">[28676] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit Bernardus, quod <i>inter omnia quae unum dicuntur, arcem
+tenet unitas divinae Trinitatis</i>.</p>
 </div>
 
 <div class="bilingual">
 <p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p6"><b>I answer that,</b> Since "one" is an undivided being, if anything is supremely "one" it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided. Now both of these belong to God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch as His being is not determined by any nature to which it is adjoined; since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is divided neither actually nor potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether
-  simple, as was shown above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Hence it is manifest that God is "one" in the supreme degree.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although privation considered in itself is not susceptive of more or less, still according as its opposite is subject to more or less, privation also can be considered itself in the light of more and less. Therefore according as a thing is more divided, or is divisible, either less or not at all, in the degree it is called more, or less, or supremely, "one."</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A point and unity which is the principle of number, are not supremely being, inasmuch as they have being only in some subject. Hence neither of them can be supremely "one." For as a subject cannot be supremely "one," because of the difference within it of accident and subject, so neither can an accident.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="bilingual">
-<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no" id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although every being is "one" by its substance, still every such substance is not equally the cause of unity; for the substance of some things is compound and of others simple.</p>
+  simple, as was shown above (<a xml:link="simple" shape="rect"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7">Q[3],
+A[7]</a>). Hence it is manifest that God is "one" in the supreme
+degree.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 4 co."><a name="28677"><span class=
+"ref">[28677] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod, cum unum sit ens indivisum, ad hoc quod aliquid sit maxime
+unum, oportet quod sit et maxime ens et maxime indivisum. Utrumque
+autem competit Deo. Est enim maxime ens, inquantum est non habens
+aliquod esse determinatum per aliquam naturam cui adveniat, sed est
+ipsum esse subsistens, omnibus modis indeterminatum. Est autem
+maxime indivisum, inquantum neque dividitur actu neque potentia,
+secundum quemcunque modum divisionis, cum sit omnibus modis
+simplex, ut supra ostensum est. Unde manifestum est quod Deus est
+maxime unus.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p7"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although
+privation considered in itself is not susceptive of more or less,
+still according as its opposite is subject to more or less, privation
+also can be considered itself in the light of more and less. Therefore
+according as a thing is more divided, or is divisible, either less or
+not at all, in the degree it is called more, or less, or supremely,
+"one."</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28678"><span class=
+"ref">[28678] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod, licet privatio secundum se non recipiat magis et
+minus, tamen secundum quod eius oppositum recipit magis et minus,
+etiam ipsa privativa dicuntur secundum magis et minus. Secundum
+igitur quod aliquid est magis divisum vel divisibile, vel minus,
+vel nullo modo, secundum hoc aliquid dicitur magis et minus vel
+maxime unum.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A point
+and unity which is the principle of number, are not supremely being,
+inasmuch as they have being only in some subject. Hence neither of
+them can be supremely "one." For as a subject cannot be supremely
+"one," because of the difference within it of accident and subject, so
+neither can an accident.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28679"><span class=
+"ref">[28679] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod punctus et unitas quae est principium numeri, non
+sunt maxime entia, cum non habeant esse nisi in subiecto aliquo.
+Unde neutrum eorum est maxime unum. Sicut enim subiectum non est
+maxime unum, propter diversitatem accidentis et subiecti, ita nec
+accidens.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="bilingual">
+<p xml:lang="en" shownumber="no"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A4-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although
+every being is "one" by its substance, still every such substance is
+not equally the cause of unity; for the substance of some things is
+compound and of others simple.</p>
+<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 11 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28680"><span class=
+"ref">[28680] I&ordf; q. 11 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, licet omne ens sit unum per suam substantiam, non
+tamen se habet aequaliter substantia cuiuslibet ad causandam
+unitatem, quia substantia quorundam est ex multis composita,
+quorundam vero non.</p>
 </div>
 
 
@@ -5297,7 +7352,7 @@
 
 			 </div4>
 		  </div3>
-
+<!-- merged down to here -->
 <div3 id="FP.ii.FP_Q12" next="FP_Q12_A1" prev="FP_Q11_A4" progress="1.53%" n="xi" title="Question. 12 - HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)">
 			 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q12-p0.1">Question 12. HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)</h3>
 
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