--- a/summa/bilingual/FP_ii_13-18.html	Thu Jul 23 17:25:59 2009 +0000
+++ b/summa/bilingual/FP_ii_13-18.html	Mon Sep 28 13:32:29 2009 +0000
@@ -2131,17 +2131,79 @@
   as devised by himself, from the fact that he understands that he understands it, he thereby understands the type or idea of the house. Now not only does God understand many things by His essence, but He also understands that He understands many things by His essence. And this means that He understands the several types of things; or that many ideas are in His intellect as understood by Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Such relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are caused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect comparing its own essence with these things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in created things, but in God. Yet they are not real relations, such as those whereby the Persons are distinguished, but relations understood by God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3" next="FP_Q16" prev="FP_Q15_A2" progress="2.92%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p0.1">Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would follow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God. Therefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be, nor have been, as has been said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p3.1" href="#FP_Q15_A9" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>. But of such things there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): "Acts of the divine will are the determining and effective types of things." Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knows primary matter, of which there can be no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is certain that God knows not only species, but also genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are not ideas of these, according to Plato's teaching, who first taught ideas, as Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore there are not ideas in God of all things known by Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But God has the proper types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas of all things known by Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold office, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the principle of the making of things, it may be called an "exemplar," and belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of knowledge, it is properly called a "type," and may belong to speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect to
   everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a principle of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God, even though they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows according to their proper type, in so far as they are known by Him in a speculative manner.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil is known by God not through its own type, but through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God, neither in so far as an idea is an "exemplar" nor as a "type."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God has no practical knowledge, except virtually, of things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with respect to these there is no idea in God in so far as idea signifies an "exemplar" but only in so far as it denotes a "type."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a concause with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God; but not apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in itself can neither exist, nor be known.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species, in so far as idea denotes an "exemplar"; for genus cannot exist except in some species. The same is the case with those accidents that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the subject, have their special idea. For an architect produces through the form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it;
   whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such as painting, or any other such thing, are produced through some other form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea than that of species; both because particular things are individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated and the concause with the idea; and because the intention of nature regards the species, and produces individuals only that in them the species may be preserved.
-  However, divine providence extends not merely to species; but to individuals as will be shown later (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p11.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[22], A[3]</a> ).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16" next="FP_Q16_A1" prev="FP_Q15_A3" progress="2.95%" n="xv" title="Question. 16 - OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)">
+  However, divine providence extends not merely to species; but to
+individuals as will be shown later (<a
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p11.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3"
+shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[22], A[3]</a> ).</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16" next="FP_Q16_A1" prev="FP_Q15_A3" progress="2.95%" n="xv" title="Question. 16 - OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)">
 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p0.1">Question 16. OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p2" shownumber="no"> Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration of the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth. About this there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) On the comparison of the true to being.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) On the comparison of the true to the good.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p7" shownumber="no"> (5) Whether God is truth?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p8" shownumber="no"> (6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p9" shownumber="no"> (7) On the eternity of truth.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p10" shownumber="no"> (8) On the unchangeableness of truth.</p>
-</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 pr."><a name="29048"><span class="ref">[29048]
+I&ordf; q. 16 pr.</span></a> Quoniam autem scientia verorum est,
+post considerationem scientiae Dei, de veritate inquirendum est.
+Circa quam quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum veritas sit in re, vel
+tantum in intellectu. Secundo, utrum sit tantum in intellectu
+componente et dividente. Tertio, de comparatione veri ad ens.
+Quarto, de comparatione veri ad bonum. Quinto, utrum Deus sit
+veritas. Sexto, utrum omnia sint vera veritate una, vel pluribus.
+Septimo, de aeternitate veritatis. Octavo, de incommutabilitate
+ipsius.</p></div></div>
 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" next="FP_Q16_A2" prev="FP_Q16" progress="2.95%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether truth resides only in the intellect?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p0.1">Whether truth resides only in the intellect?</h4>
 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns this definition of truth, "That is true which is seen"; since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, "That is true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing and able to know," for hence it would follow that nothing would be true,
-  unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: "That is true which is." It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and not in the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If, then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except in so far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true is so. Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as seen by different persons at the same time.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "that, on account of which a thing is so, is itself more so," as is evident from the Philosopher (Poster. i). But it is from the fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is true or false, as the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam. iii). Therefore truth resides rather in things than in the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), " The true and the false reside not in things, but in the intellect."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+  unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: "That
+is true which is." It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and
+not in the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29049"><span class=
+"ref">[29049] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod veritas non sit tantum in intellectu, sed
+magis in rebus. Augustinus enim, in libro Soliloq., reprobat hanc
+notificationem veri, verum est id quod videtur, quia secundum hoc,
+lapides qui sunt in abditissimo terrae sinu, non essent veri
+lapides, quia non videntur. Reprobat etiam istam, verum est quod
+ita se habet ut videtur cognitori, si velit et possit cognoscere,
+quia secundum hoc sequeretur quod nihil esset verum, si nullus
+posset cognoscere. Et definit sic verum, verum est id quod est. Et
+sic videtur quod veritas sit in rebus, et non in intellectu.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p3"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is true, is true
+by reason of truth. If, then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing
+will be true except in so far as it is understood. But this is the
+error of the ancient philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be
+true is so. Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as
+seen by different persons at the same time.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29050"><span class=
+"ref">[29050] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+quidquid est verum, veritate verum est. Si igitur veritas est in
+intellectu solo, nihil erit verum nisi secundum quod intelligitur,
+quod est error antiquorum philosophorum, qui dicebant omne quod
+videtur, esse verum. Ad quod sequitur contradictoria simul esse
+vera, cum contradictoria simul a diversis vera esse videantur.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p4"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "that, on account of
+which a thing is so, is itself more so," as is evident from the
+Philosopher (Poster. i). But it is from the fact that a thing is or is
+not, that our thought or word is true or false, as the Philosopher
+teaches (Praedicam. iii). Therefore truth resides rather in things
+than in the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29051"><span class=
+"ref">[29051] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> <i>Praeterea,
+propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis</i>, ut patet I Poster.
+<i>Sed ex eo quod res est vel non est, est opinio vel oratio vera
+vel falsa</i>, secundum philosophum in praedicamentis. Ergo veritas
+magis est in rebus quam in intellectu.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p5"
+shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says
+(Metaph. vi), " The true and the false reside not in things, but in
+the intellect."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29052"><span class=
+"ref">[29052] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod philosophus dicit, VI Metaphys., quod <i>verum et falsum non
+sunt in rebus, sed in intellectu</i>.</p></div></div>
 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As the good denotes that towards which the appetite tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends towards the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely good, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect,
   namely true, is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is related to the appetite---and hence the aspect of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far as the appetite is called good if its object is good; so, since the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood is said to be
@@ -2149,51 +2211,861 @@
   intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so far as they express the likeness of the species that are in the divine mind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to a stone, according to the preconception in the divine intellect. Thus, then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things according as they are related to the intellect as their principle. Consequently there are various definitions of truth. Augustine says (De Vera
   Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is;" and Hilary says (De Trin. v) that "Truth makes being clear and evident" and this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as they are related to the intellect, we have Augustine's definition (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is a supreme likeness without any unlikeness to a principle": also Anselm's definition (De Verit. xii), "Truth is rightness, perceptible by the mind alone";
   for that is right which is in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna's definition (Metaph. viii, 6), "The truth of each thing is a property of the essence which is immutably attached to it." The definition that "Truth is the equation of thought and thing" is applicable to it under either aspect.</p>
-</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking about the truth of things, and excludes from the notion of this truth, relation to our intellect; for what is accidental is excluded from every definition.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 1 co."><a name="29053"><span class=
+"ref">[29053] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod, sicut bonum nominat id in quod tendit appetitus, ita verum
+nominat id in quod tendit intellectus. Hoc autem distat inter
+appetitum et intellectum, sive quamcumque cognitionem, quia
+cognitio est secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente, appetitus
+autem est secundum quod appetens inclinatur in ipsam rem appetitam.
+Et sic terminus appetitus, quod est bonum, est in re appetibili,
+sed terminus cognitionis, quod est verum, est in ipso intellectu.
+Sicut autem bonum est in re, inquantum habet ordinem ad appetitum;
+et propter hoc ratio bonitatis derivatur a re appetibili in
+appetitum, secundum quod appetitus dicitur bonus, prout est boni,
+ita, cum verum sit in intellectu secundum quod conformatur rei
+intellectae, necesse est quod ratio veri ab intellectu ad rem
+intellectam derivetur, ut res etiam intellecta vera dicatur,
+secundum quod habet aliquem ordinem ad intellectum. Res autem
+intellecta ad intellectum aliquem potest habere ordinem vel per se,
+vel per accidens. Per se quidem habet ordinem ad intellectum a quo
+dependet secundum suum esse, per accidens autem ad intellectum a
+quo cognoscibilis est. Sicut si dicamus quod domus comparatur ad
+intellectum artificis per se, per accidens autem comparatur ad
+intellectum a quo non dependet. Iudicium autem de re non sumitur
+secundum id quod inest ei per accidens, sed secundum id quod inest
+ei per se. Unde unaquaeque res dicitur vera absolute, secundum
+ordinem ad intellectum a quo dependet. Et inde est quod res
+artificiales dicuntur verae per ordinem ad intellectum nostrum,
+dicitur enim domus vera, quae assequitur similitudinem formae quae
+est in mente artificis; et dicitur oratio vera, inquantum est
+signum intellectus veri. Et similiter res naturales dicuntur esse
+verae, secundum quod assequuntur similitudinem specierum quae sunt
+in mente divina, dicitur enim verus lapis, qui assequitur propriam
+lapidis naturam, secundum praeconceptionem intellectus divini. Sic
+ergo veritas principaliter est in intellectu; secundario vero in
+rebus, secundum quod comparantur ad intellectum ut ad principium.
+Et secundum hoc, veritas diversimode notificatur. Nam Augustinus,
+in libro de vera Relig., dicit quod <i>veritas est, qua ostenditur
+id quod est</i>. Et Hilarius dicit quod <i>verum est declarativum
+aut manifestativum esse</i>. Et hoc pertinet ad veritatem secundum
+quod est in intellectu. Ad veritatem autem rei secundum ordinem ad
+intellectum, pertinet definitio Augustini in libro de vera Relig.,
+<i>veritas est summa similitudo principii, quae sine ulla
+dissimilitudine est</i>. Et quaedam definitio Anselmi, <i>veritas
+est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis</i>; nam rectum est, quod
+principio concordat. Et quaedam definitio Avicennae, <i>veritas
+uniuscuiusque rei est proprietas sui esse quod stabilitum est
+ei</i>. Quod autem dicitur quod veritas est adaequatio rei et
+intellectus potest ad utrumque pertinere.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p8"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking
+about the truth of things, and excludes from the notion of this truth,
+relation to our intellect; for what is accidental is excluded from
+every definition.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29054"><span class=
+"ref">[29054] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de veritate rei; et excludit a
+ratione huius veritatis, comparationem ad intellectum nostrum. Nam
+id quod est per accidens, ab unaquaque definitione excluditur.</p></div></div>
 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The ancient philosophers held that the species of natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they were compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to our intellect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph. iv). Such, however, do not follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their
-  relation to the divine intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+  relation to the divine intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
+float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29055"><span class=
+"ref">[29055] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod antiqui philosophi species rerum naturalium non
+dicebant procedere ab aliquo intellectu, sed eas provenire a casu,
+et quia considerabant quod verum importat comparationem ad
+intellectum, cogebantur veritatem rerum constituere in ordine ad
+intellectum nostrum. Ex quo inconvenientia sequebantur quae
+philosophus prosequitur in IV Metaphys. Quae quidem inconvenientia
+non accidunt, si ponamus veritatem rerum consistere in comparatione
+ad intellectum divinum.</p></div></div>
 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing, yet it is not necessary that truth should be there primarily, any more than that health should be primarily in medicine, rather than in the animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not its health, is the cause of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the same way, the being of the thing, not its truth, is the cause of truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a thought
-  or a word is true "from the fact that a thing is, not because a thing is true."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+  or a word is true "from the fact that a thing is, not because a
+thing is true."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29056"><span class=
+"ref">[29056] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, licet veritas intellectus nostri a re causetur, non
+tamen oportet quod in re per prius inveniatur ratio veritatis,
+sicut neque in medicina per prius invenitur ratio sanitatis quam in
+animali; virtus enim medicinae, non sanitas eius, causat sanitatem,
+cum non sit agens univocum. Et similiter esse rei, non veritas
+eius, causat veritatem intellectus. Unde philosophus dicit quod
+opinio et oratio vera est <i>ex eo quod res est, non ex eo quod res
+vera est</i>.</p></div></div>
 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2" next="FP_Q16_A3" prev="FP_Q16_A1" progress="2.99%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p0.1">Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?</h4>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that as the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible objects, so is the intellect as regards "what a thing is." Now composition and division are neither in the senses nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is." Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isaac says in his book On Definitions that truth is the equation of thought and thing. Now just as the intellect with regard to complex things can be equated to things, so also with regard to simple things; and this is true also of sense apprehending a thing as it is. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi) that with regard to simple things and "what a thing is," truth is "found neither in the intellect nor in things."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p2"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth does not
+reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. For the
+Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that as the senses are always true as
+regards their proper sensible objects, so is the intellect as regards
+"what a thing is." Now composition and division are neither in the
+senses nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is." Therefore truth
+does not reside only in the intellect composing and
+dividing.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29057"><span class=
+"ref">[29057] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod veritas non sit solum in intellectu
+componente et dividente. Dicit enim philosophus, in III de anima,
+quod sicut sensus propriorum sensibilium semper veri sunt, ita et
+intellectus eius quod quid est. Sed compositio et divisio non est
+neque in sensu, neque in intellectu cognoscente quod quid est. Ergo
+veritas non solum est in compositione et divisione intellectus.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p3"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isaac says in his book On
+Definitions that truth is the equation of thought and thing. Now just
+as the intellect with regard to complex things can be equated to
+things, so also with regard to simple things; and this is true also of
+sense apprehending a thing as it is. Therefore truth does not reside
+only in the intellect composing and dividing.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29058"><span class=
+"ref">[29058] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Isaac
+dicit, in libro de definitionibus, quod veritas est adaequatio rei
+et intellectus. Sed sicut intellectus complexorum potest adaequari
+rebus, ita intellectus incomplexorum, et etiam sensus sentiens rem
+ut est. Ergo veritas non est solum in compositione et divisione
+intellectus.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p4"
+shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says
+(Metaph. vi) that with regard to simple things and "what a thing is,"
+truth is "found neither in the intellect nor in things."</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29059"><span class=
+"ref">[29059] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit philosophus, in VI Metaphys., quod circa simplicia et
+quod quid est non est veritas, nec in intellectu neque in
+rebus.</p></div></div>
 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect, in the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has the form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing, must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the thing known, this being its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the conformity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity is to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For
   although sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the comparison which exists between the thing seen and that which itself apprehends concerning it. But the intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of a thing "what a thing is." When, however, it judges that a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing, then first it knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and dividing:
   for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes from the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by the predicate: and this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing, as is also the intellect, when it knows "what a thing is"; but it does not thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like manner the case with complex or non-complex words. Truth therefore may be in the senses, or in the intellect knowing "what a thing is," as in anything that is true; yet not as the
   thing known in the knower, which is implied by the word "truth"; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as known. Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect composing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p6" shownumber="no"> And thus the Objections given are solved.</p>
-</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3" next="FP_Q16_A4" prev="FP_Q16_A2" progress="3.01%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether the true and being are convertible terms?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p0.1">Whether the true and being are convertible terms?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>; but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not convertible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being; for it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not. Therefore the true and being are not convertible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are not convertible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the same disposition of things in being and in truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, so far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in De Anima iii that "the soul is in some manner all things," through the senses and the intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the true. But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true adds relation to the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said before <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. But the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. It may, however, be said that being also is in the things and in the
-  intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in idea.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be known; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable. Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be
-  apprehended also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object with being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility is not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by understanding being.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4" next="FP_Q16_A5" prev="FP_Q16_A3" progress="3.03%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether good is logically prior to the true?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p0.1">Whether good is logically prior to the true?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For what is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from Phys. i. But the good is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the good is logically prior to the true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect composing and dividing as said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[2])</a>. But that which is in things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is logically prior to the true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from Ethic. iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind. Therefore the good is prior to the true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> What is in more things is prior logically. But the true is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in mathematics. Therefore the true is prior to good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Although the good and the true are convertible with being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two reasons. First, because the true is more closely related to being than is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately; while the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident
-  from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the true regards knowledge, but the good regards the appetite, the true must be prior in idea to the good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will and the intellect mutually include one another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the intellect to understand. So then, among things directed to the object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the intellect; and conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas in the order of intelligible things the converse of the case. From the
-  fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good is prior in the order of things desirable; but not that it is prior absolutely.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing is prior logically in so far as it is prior to the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself; secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly, it apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being is first, that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to "life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has been said that truth exists in other things <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. Whereas the truth of "justice" is found in man as he
-  fulfills his duty to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in general.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5" next="FP_Q16_A6" prev="FP_Q16_A4" progress="3.05%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether God is truth?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p0.1">Whether God is truth?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the intellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition and division. Therefore in Him there is not truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxvi) is a "likeness to the principle." But in God there is no likeness to a principle. Therefore in God there is not truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the first cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause of all being; and His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is truth in God, all truth will be from Him. But it is true that someone sins. Therefore this will be from God; which is evidently false.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord says, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.14.6" parsed="vul|John|14|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p5.1" passage="Jn. 14:6">Jn. 14:6</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>, truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things according as they have being conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of every other intellect, and He Himself is His
+</div></div>
+<div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 2 co."><a name="29060"><span class=
+"ref">[29060] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod verum, sicut dictum est, secundum sui primam rationem est in
+intellectu. Cum autem omnis res sit vera secundum quod habet
+propriam formam naturae suae, necesse est quod intellectus,
+inquantum est cognoscens, sit verus inquantum habet similitudinem
+rei cognitae, quae est forma eius inquantum est cognoscens. Et
+propter hoc per conformitatem intellectus et rei veritas definitur.
+Unde conformitatem istam cognoscere, est cognoscere veritatem. Hanc
+autem nullo modo sensus cognoscit, licet enim visus habeat
+similitudinem visibilis, non tamen cognoscit comparationem quae est
+inter rem visam et id quod ipse apprehendit de ea. Intellectus
+autem conformitatem sui ad rem intelligibilem cognoscere potest,
+sed tamen non apprehendit eam secundum quod cognoscit de aliquo
+quod quid est; sed quando iudicat rem ita se habere sicut est forma
+quam de re apprehendit, tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum. Et hoc
+facit componendo et dividendo, nam in omni propositione aliquam
+formam significatam per praedicatum, vel applicat alicui rei
+significatae per subiectum, vel removet ab ea. Et ideo bene
+invenitur quod sensus est verus de aliqua re, vel intellectus
+cognoscendo quod quid est, sed non quod cognoscat aut dicat verum.
+Et similiter est de vocibus complexis aut incomplexis. Veritas
+quidem igitur potest esse in sensu, vel in intellectu cognoscente
+quod quid est, ut in quadam re vera, non autem ut cognitum in
+cognoscente, quod importat nomen veri; perfectio enim intellectus
+est verum ut cognitum. Et ideo, proprie loquendo, veritas est in
+intellectu componente et dividente, non autem in sensu, neque in
+intellectu cognoscente quod quid est.</p><p title="I q. 16 a. 2 ad arg."><a name="29061"><span class=
+"ref">[29061] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 2 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc
+patet solutio ad obiecta.</p></div></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3" next="FP_Q16_A4"
+prev="FP_Q16_A2" progress="3.01%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether
+the true and being are convertible terms?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p0.1">Whether the true and being are
+convertible terms?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
+style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
+seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For the true
+resides properly in the intellect, as stated <a
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1"
+shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>; but being is properly in
+things. Therefore they are not convertible.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29062"><span class=
+"ref">[29062] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod verum et ens non convertantur. Verum enim
+est proprie in intellectu, ut dictum est. Ens autem proprie est in
+rebus. Ergo non convertuntur.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
+margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p3"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which extends to
+being and not-being is not convertible with being. But the true
+extends to being and not-being; for it is true that what is, is; and
+that what is not, is not. Therefore the true and being are not
+convertible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29063"><span class=
+"ref">[29063] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id
+quod se extendit ad ens et non ens, non convertitur cum ente. Sed
+verum se extendit ad ens et non ens, nam verum est quod est esse,
+et quod non est non esse. Ergo verum et ens non
+convertuntur.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
+Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority and
+posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true appears to be
+prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of
+the true. Therefore it seems they are not convertible.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29064"><span class=
+"ref">[29064] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quae
+se habent secundum prius et posterius, non videntur converti. Sed
+verum videtur prius esse quam ens, nam ens non intelligitur nisi
+sub ratione veri. Ergo videtur quod non sint
+convertibilia.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b>
+the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the same disposition
+of things in being and in truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
+float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29065"><span class=
+"ref">[29065] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit philosophus, II Metaphys., quod eadem est dispositio
+rerum in esse et veritate.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
+margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I
+answer that,</b> As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth
+is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, so
+far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in De Anima iii that "the
+soul is in some manner all things," through the senses and the
+intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the
+true. But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true
+adds relation to the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
+float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 3 co."><a name="29066"><span class=
+"ref">[29066] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod, sicut bonum habet rationem appetibilis, ita verum habet
+ordinem ad cognitionem. Unumquodque autem inquantum habet de esse,
+intantum est cognoscibile. Et propter hoc dicitur in III de anima,
+quod anima est quodammodo omnia secundum sensum et intellectum. Et
+ideo, sicut bonum convertitur cum ente, ita et verum. Sed tamen,
+sicut bonum addit rationem appetibilis supra ens, ita et verum
+comparationem ad intellectum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said before <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. But the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. It may, however, be said that being also is in the things and in the
+  intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in things;
+and this is so because truth and being differ in idea.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29067"><span class=
+"ref">[29067] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod verum est in rebus et in intellectu, ut dictum est.
+Verum autem quod est in rebus, convertitur cum ente secundum
+substantiam. Sed verum quod est in intellectu, convertitur cum
+ente, ut manifestativum cum manifestato. Hoc enim est de ratione
+veri, ut dictum est. Quamvis posset dici quod etiam ens est in
+rebus et in intellectu, sicut et verum; licet verum principaliter
+in intellectu, ens vero principaliter in rebus. Et hoc accidit
+propter hoc, quod verum et ens differunt ratione.</p></div></div><div
+style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
+left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p8"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not-being has nothing in
+itself whereby it can be known; yet it is known in so far as the
+intellect renders it knowable. Hence the true is based on being,
+inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being, apprehended, that
+is, by reason.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29068"><span class=
+"ref">[29068] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod non ens non habet in se unde cognoscatur, sed
+cognoscitur inquantum intellectus facit illud cognoscibile. Unde
+verum fundatur in ente, inquantum non ens est quoddam ens rationis,
+apprehensum scilicet a ratione.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be
+  apprehended also; since being is included in the idea of the
+true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object with
+being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is
+intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility is
+not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true
+is not understood by understanding being.</p></div><div style="width:
+45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29069"><span class=
+"ref">[29069] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, cum dicitur quod ens non potest apprehendi sine
+ratione veri, hoc potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo, ita quod
+non apprehendatur ens, nisi ratio veri assequatur apprehensionem
+entis. Et sic locutio habet veritatem. Alio modo posset sic
+intelligi, quod ens non posset apprehendi, nisi apprehenderetur
+ratio veri. Et hoc falsum est. Sed verum non potest apprehendi,
+nisi apprehendatur ratio entis, quia ens cadit in ratione veri. Et
+est simile sicut si comparemus intelligibile ad ens. Non enim
+potest intelligi ens, quin ens sit intelligibile, sed tamen potest
+intelligi ens, ita quod non intelligatur eius intelligibilitas. Et
+similiter ens intellectum est verum, non tamen intelligendo ens,
+intelligitur verum.</p></div></div></div><div
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4" next="FP_Q16_A5" prev="FP_Q16_A3"
+progress="3.03%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether good is logically
+prior to the true?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p0.1">Whether good is logically prior to
+the true?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
+style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
+seems that good is logically prior to the true. For what is more
+universal is logically prior, as is evident from Phys. i. But the good
+is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind of good,
+namely, of the intellect. Therefore the good is logically prior to the
+true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29070"><span class=
+"ref">[29070] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam
+verum. Quod enim est universalius, secundum rationem prius est, ut
+patet ex I Physic. Sed bonum est universalius quam verum, nam verum
+est quoddam bonum, scilicet intellectus. Ergo bonum prius est
+secundum rationem quam verum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
+margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p3"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is in things, but
+the true in the intellect composing and dividing as said above <a
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2"
+shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[2])</a>. But that which is in things
+is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is
+logically prior to the true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29071"><span class=
+"ref">[29071] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, bonum
+est in rebus, verum autem in compositione et divisione intellectus,
+ut dictum est. Sed ea quae sunt in re, sunt priora his quae sunt in
+intellectu. Ergo prius est secundum rationem bonum quam
+verum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
+style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
+Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from Ethic. iv. But
+virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine says (De
+Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind. Therefore the
+good is prior to the true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29072"><span class=
+"ref">[29072] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+veritas est quaedam species virtutis, ut patet in IV Ethic. Sed
+virtus continetur sub bono, est enim bona qualitas mentis, ut dicit
+Augustinus. Ergo bonum est prius quam verum.</p></div></div><div
+style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
+left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p5"
+shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> What is in more things is
+prior logically. But the true is in some things wherein good is not,
+as, for instance, in mathematics. Therefore the true is prior to
+good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29073"><span class=
+"ref">[29073] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, quod
+est in pluribus, est prius secundum rationem. Sed verum est in
+quibusdam in quibus non est bonum, scilicet in mathematicis. Ergo
+verum est prius quam bonum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Although the good and the true are convertible with being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two reasons. First, because the true is more closely related to being than is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately; while the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident
+  from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence,
+since the true regards knowledge, but the good regards the appetite,
+the true must be prior in idea to the good.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 4 co."><a name="29074"><span class=
+"ref">[29074] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod, licet bonum et verum supposito convertantur cum ente, tamen
+ratione differunt. Et secundum hoc verum, absolute loquendo, prius
+est quam bonum. Quod ex duobus apparet. Primo quidem ex hoc, quod
+verum propinquius se habet ad ens, quod est prius, quam bonum. Nam
+verum respicit ipsum esse simpliciter et immediate, ratio autem
+boni consequitur esse, secundum quod est aliquo modo perfectum; sic
+enim appetibile est. Secundo apparet ex hoc, quod cognitio
+naturaliter praecedit appetitum. Unde, cum verum respiciat
+cognitionem, bonum autem appetitum, prius erit verum quam bonum
+secundum rationem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will and the intellect mutually include one another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the intellect to understand. So then, among things directed to the object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the intellect; and conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas in the order of intelligible things the converse of the case. From the
+  fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the
+good is prior in the order of things desirable; but not that it is
+prior absolutely.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29075"><span class=
+"ref">[29075] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod voluntas et intellectus mutuo se includunt, nam
+intellectus intelligit voluntatem, et voluntas vult intellectum
+intelligere. Sic ergo inter illa quae ordinantur ad obiectum
+voluntatis, continentur etiam ea quae sunt intellectus; et e
+converso. Unde in ordine appetibilium, bonum se habet ut
+universale, et verum ut particulare, in ordine autem
+intelligibilium est e converso. Ex hoc ergo quod verum est quoddam
+bonum, sequitur quod bonum sit prius in ordine appetibilium, non
+autem quod sit prius simpliciter.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
+both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
+to Objection 2:</b> A thing is prior logically in so far as it is
+prior to the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being
+itself; secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and
+thirdly, it apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being
+is first, that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though
+good is in things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29076"><span class=
+"ref">[29076] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod secundum hoc est aliquid prius ratione, quod prius
+cadit in intellectu. Intellectus autem per prius apprehendit ipsum
+ens; et secundario apprehendit se intelligere ens; et tertio
+apprehendit se appetere ens. Unde primo est ratio entis, secundo
+ratio veri, tertio ratio boni, licet bonum sit in rebus.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to "life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has been said that truth exists in other things <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. Whereas the truth of "justice" is found in man as he
+  fulfills his duty to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we
+cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in
+general.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29077"><span class=
+"ref">[29077] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod virtus quae dicitur veritas, non est veritas
+communis, sed quaedam veritas secundum quam homo in dictis et
+factis ostendit se ut est. Veritas autem vitae dicitur
+particulariter, secundum quod homo in vita sua implet illud ad quod
+ordinatur per intellectum divinum, sicut etiam dictum est veritatem
+esse in ceteris rebus. Veritas autem iustitiae est secundum quod
+homo servat id quod debet alteri secundum ordinem legum. Unde ex
+his particularibus veritatibus non est procedendum ad veritatem
+communem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5" next="FP_Q16_A6" prev="FP_Q16_A4" progress="3.05%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether God is truth?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p0.1">Whether God is truth?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the intellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition and division. Therefore in Him there is not truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxvi) is a "likeness to the principle." But in God there is no likeness to a principle. Therefore in God there is not truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the first cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause of all being; and His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is truth in God, all truth will be from Him. But it is true that someone sins. Therefore this will be from God; which is evidently false.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord says, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.14.6" parsed="vul|John|14|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p5.1" passage="Jn. 14:6">Jn. 14:6</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>, truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things according as they have being conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of every other intellect, and He Himself is His
   own existence and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but that He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although in the divine intellect there is neither composition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He judges of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is truth in His intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The truth of our intellect is according to its conformity with its principle, that is to say, to the things from which it receives knowledge. The truth also of things is according to their conformity with their principle, namely, the divine intellect. Now this cannot be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless perhaps in so far as truth is appropriated to the Son, Who has a principle. But if we speak of divine truth in its essence, we cannot
-  understand this unless the affirmative must be resolved into the negative, as when one says: "the Father is of Himself, because He is not from another." Similarly, the divine truth can be called a "likeness to the principle," inasmuch as His existence is not dissimilar to His intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not-being and privation have no truth of themselves, but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all apprehension of the intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that exists in the statement---"that a person commits fornication is true"---is entirely from God. But to argue, "Therefore that this person fornicates is from God", is a fallacy of Accident.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6" next="FP_Q16_A7" prev="FP_Q16_A5" progress="3.07%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p0.1">Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is only one truth, according to which all things are true. For according to Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1), "nothing is greater than the mind of man, except God." Now truth is greater than the mind of man; otherwise the mind would be the judge of truth: whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth, and not according to its own measure. Therefore God alone is truth. Therefore there is no other truth but God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Anselm says (De Verit. xiv), that, "as is the relation of time to temporal things, so is that of truth to true things." But there is only one time for all temporal things. Therefore there is only one truth, by which all things are true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> it is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.11.2" parsed="vul|Ps|11|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p4.1" passage="Ps. 11:2">Ps. 11:2</scripRef>), "Truths are decayed from among the children of men."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is one, and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must consider that when anything is predicated of many things univocally, it is found in each of them according to its proper nature; as animal is found in each species of animal. But when anything is predicated of many things analogically, it is found in only one of them according to its proper nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So
+  understand this unless the affirmative must be resolved into the
+negative, as when one says: "the Father is of Himself, because He is
+not from another." Similarly, the divine truth can be called a
+"likeness to the principle," inasmuch as His existence is not
+dissimilar to His intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
+style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
+3:</b> Not-being and privation have no truth of themselves, but only
+in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all apprehension of the
+intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that exists in the
+statement---"that a person commits fornication is true"---is entirely
+from God. But to argue, "Therefore that this person fornicates is from
+God", is a fallacy of Accident.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
+float: right"/></div></div>
+<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6" next="FP_Q16_A7" prev="FP_Q16_A5"
+progress="3.07%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether there is only one
+truth, according to which all things are true?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p0.1">Whether there is only one truth,
+according to which all things are true?</h4><div style="clear: both;
+margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p2"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is only one
+truth, according to which all things are true. For according to
+Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1), "nothing is greater than the mind of man,
+except God." Now truth is greater than the mind of man; otherwise the
+mind would be the judge of truth: whereas in fact it judges all things
+according to truth, and not according to its own measure. Therefore
+God alone is truth. Therefore there is no other truth but
+God.</p></div>
+<div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="29086"><span class=
+"ref">[29086] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod una sola sit veritas, secundum quam omnia
+sunt vera. Quia, secundum Augustinum, nihil est maius mente humana,
+nisi Deus. Sed veritas est maior mente humana, alioquin mens
+iudicaret de veritate; nunc autem omnia iudicat secundum veritatem,
+et non secundum seipsam. Ergo solus Deus est veritas. Ergo non est
+alia veritas quam Deus.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
+margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p3"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Anselm says (De
+Verit. xiv), that, "as is the relation of time to temporal things, so
+is that of truth to true things." But there is only one time for all
+temporal things. Therefore there is only one truth, by which all
+things are true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="29087"><span class=
+"ref">[29087] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Anselmus dicit, in libro de veritate, quod sicut tempus se habet ad
+temporalia, ita veritas ad res veras. Sed unum est tempus omnium
+temporalium. Ergo una est veritas, qua omnia vera
+sunt.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
+style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b>
+it is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.11.2"
+parsed="vul|Ps|11|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p4.1"
+passage="Ps. 11:2">Ps. 11:2</scripRef>), "Truths are decayed from
+among the children of men."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 6 s. c."><a name="29088"><span class=
+"ref">[29088] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod in Psalmo XI dicitur, <i>diminutae sunt veritates a filiis
+hominum</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is one, and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must consider that when anything is predicated of many things univocally, it is found in each of them according to its proper nature; as animal is found in each species of animal. But when anything is predicated of many things analogically, it is found in only one of them according to its proper nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So
   healthiness is predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is only in the animal; but from the health of the animal, medicine is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and urine is called healthy, in so far as it indicates health. And although health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something whereby the one causes, and the other indicates health. Now we have said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a> that truth resides primarily in the
   intellect; and secondarily in things, according as they are related to the divine intellect. If therefore we speak of truth, as it exists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many truths in many created intellects; and even in one and the same intellect, according to the number of things known. Whence a gloss on<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.11.2" parsed="vul|Ps|11|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p5.2" passage=" Ps. 11:2, "> Ps. 11:2, </scripRef> "Truths are decayed from among the children of men," says: "As from one man's face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror,
-  so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth." But if we speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are true by one primary truth; to which each one is assimilated according to its own entity. And thus, although the essences or forms of things are many, yet the truth of the divine intellect is one, in conformity to which all things are said to be true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The soul does not judge of things according to any kind of truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it is reflected in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first principles of the understanding. It follows, therefore, that the primary truth is greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth, which resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not simply, but in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even as
-  science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it is true that nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul, except God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The saying of Anselm is correct in so far as things are said to be true by their relation to the divine intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7" next="FP_Q16_A8" prev="FP_Q16_A6" progress="3.10%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether created truth is eternal?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p0.1">Whether created truth is eternal?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) "Nothing is more eternal than the nature of a circle, and that two added to three make five." But the truth of these is a created truth. Therefore created truth is eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals are always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore is truth, which is the most universal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it was always true that what is true in the present was to be in the future. But as the truth of a proposition regarding the present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition regarding the future. Therefore some created truth is eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal. But the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end; for if their truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true that truth was not, and true, of course, by reason of truth; so that truth was before it began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that truth has an end, it follows that it is after it has ceased to be, for it will still be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is
-  eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> God alone is eternal, as laid down before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[10], A[3]</a>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself: but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable truth, according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on account of any truth residing in the enunciation, as though in a subject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health within it but
-  from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it has been already said that things are called true from the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal. Now because only the divine intellect is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else but God is eternal; since the truth of the divine intellect is God Himself, as shown already <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[5])</a>.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and three make five, have eternity in the mind of God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That something is always and everywhere, can be understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of extension to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of all distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be everywhere
-  and always, in so far as universals are independent of place and time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are eternal, except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which now is, was future, before it (actually) was; because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the cause were removed, that thing's coming to be was not future. But the first cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was always true that what now is would be, except in so far as its future being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone is such a cause.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal, but it had a beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was not true to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason of the divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now to say that that truth did not then exist: and this is true only by reason of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not by
-  reason of any truth in the things. For this is truth concerning not-being; and not-being has not truth of itself, but only so far as our intellect apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did not exist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being as preceding its being.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8" next="FP_Q17" prev="FP_Q16_A7" progress="3.13%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether truth is immutable?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p0.1">Whether truth is immutable?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that "Truth and mind do not rank as equals, otherwise truth would be mutable, as the mind is."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as primary matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains after all generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change; for after every change it is true to say that a thing is, or is not. Therefore truth is immutable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the truth of an enunciation changes, it changes mostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus change. For truth, according to Anselm (De Verit. viii), "is a certain rightness" in so far as a thing answers to that which is in the divine mind concerning it. But this proposition that "Socrates sits", receives from the divine mind the signification that Socrates does sit; and it has the same signification even though he does not sit.
-  Therefore the truth of the proposition in no way changes.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, where there is the same cause, there is the same effect. But the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three propositions, "Socrates sits, will sit, sat." Therefore the truth of each is the same. But one or other of these must be the true one. Therefore the truth of these propositions remains immutable; and for the same reason that of any other.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.11.2" parsed="vul|Ps|11|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p6.1" passage="Ps. 11:2">Ps. 11:2</scripRef>),"Truths are decayed from among the children of men."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect, as said before <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>; but things are called true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be regarded from the point of view of the intellect, the truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness, through change in one of the two extremes. Hence in
+  so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth." But if we
+speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are true by one
+primary truth; to which each one is assimilated according to its own
+entity. And thus, although the essences or forms of things are many,
+yet the truth of the divine intellect is one, in conformity to which
+all things are said to be true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
+float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 6 co."><a name="29089"><span class=
+"ref">[29089] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod quodammodo una est veritas, qua omnia sunt vera, et quodammodo
+non. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod, quando aliquid
+praedicatur univoce de multis, illud in quolibet eorum secundum
+propriam rationem invenitur, sicut animal in qualibet specie
+animalis. Sed quando aliquid dicitur analogice de multis, illud
+invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum, a quo
+alia denominantur. Sicut sanum dicitur de animali et urina et
+medicina, non quod sanitas sit nisi in animali tantum, sed a
+sanitate animalis denominatur medicina sana, inquantum est illius
+sanitatis effectiva, et urina, inquantum est illius sanitatis
+significativa. Et quamvis sanitas non sit in medicina neque in
+urina, tamen in utroque est aliquid per quod hoc quidem facit,
+illud autem significat sanitatem. Dictum est autem quod veritas per
+prius est in intellectu, et per posterius in rebus, secundum quod
+ordinantur ad intellectum divinum. Si ergo loquamur de veritate
+prout existit in intellectu, secundum propriam rationem, sic in
+multis intellectibus creatis sunt multae veritates; etiam in uno et
+eodem intellectu, secundum plura cognita. Unde dicit Glossa super
+illud Psalmi XI, <i>diminutae sunt veritates a filiis hominum</i>
+etc., quod sicut ab una facie hominis resultant plures
+similitudines in speculo, sic ab una veritate divina resultant
+plures veritates. Si vero loquamur de veritate secundum quod est in
+rebus, sic omnes sunt verae una prima veritate, cui unumquodque
+assimilatur secundum suam entitatem. Et sic, licet plures sint
+essentiae vel formae rerum, tamen una est veritas divini
+intellectus, secundum quam omnes res denominantur verae.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The soul does not judge of things according to any kind of truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it is reflected in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first principles of the understanding. It follows, therefore, that the primary truth is greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth, which resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not simply, but in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even as
+  science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it is true that
+nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul, except
+God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="29090"><span class=
+"ref">[29090] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod anima non secundum quamcumque veritatem iudicat de
+rebus omnibus; sed secundum veritatem primam, inquantum resultat in
+ea sicut in speculo, secundum prima intelligibilia. Unde sequitur
+quod veritas prima sit maior anima. Et tamen etiam veritas creata,
+quae est in intellectu nostro, est maior anima, non simpliciter,
+sed secundum quid, inquantum est perfectio eius; sicut etiam
+scientia posset dici maior anima. Sed verum est quod nihil
+subsistens est maius mente rationali, nisi Deus.</p></div></div><div
+style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
+left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p7"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The saying of Anselm is
+correct in so far as things are said to be true by their relation to
+the divine intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="29091"><span class=
+"ref">[29091] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod dictum Anselmi veritatem habet, secundum quod res
+dicuntur verae per comparationem ad intellectum
+divinum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7"
+next="FP_Q16_A8" prev="FP_Q16_A6" progress="3.10%" n="vii"
+title="Article. 7 - Whether created truth is eternal?"><h4
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p0.1">Whether created truth
+is eternal?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
+style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
+seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says (De
+Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) "Nothing is more eternal than the nature of a
+circle, and that two added to three make five." But the truth of these
+is a created truth. Therefore created truth is eternal.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="29092"><span class=
+"ref">[29092] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod veritas creata sit aeterna. Dicit enim
+Augustinus, in libro de libero arbitrio, quod nihil est magis
+aeternum quam ratio circuli, et duo et tria esse quinque. Sed horum
+veritas est veritas creata. Ergo veritas creata est
+aeterna.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
+Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals are always
+and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore is truth,
+which is the most universal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="29093"><span class=
+"ref">[29093] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
+quod est semper, est aeternum. Sed universalia sunt ubique et
+semper. Ergo sunt aeterna. Ergo et verum, quod est maxime
+universale.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
+Further, it was always true that what is true in the present was to be
+in the future. But as the truth of a proposition regarding the present
+is a created truth, so is that of a proposition regarding the
+future. Therefore some created truth is eternal.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="29094"><span class=
+"ref">[29094] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, id
+quod est verum in praesenti, semper fuit verum esse futurum. Sed
+sicut veritas propositionis de praesenti est veritas creata, ita
+veritas propositionis de futuro. Ergo aliqua veritas creata est
+aeterna.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal. But the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end; for if their truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true that truth was not, and true, of course, by reason of truth; so that truth was before it began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that truth has an end, it follows that it is after it has ceased to be, for it will still be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is
+  eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="29095"><span class=
+"ref">[29095] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, omne
+quod caret principio et fine, est aeternum. Sed veritas
+enuntiabilium caret principio et fine. Quia, si veritas incoepit
+cum ante non esset, verum erat veritatem non esse, et utique aliqua
+veritate verum erat, et sic veritas erat antequam inciperet. Et
+similiter si ponatur veritatem habere finem, sequitur quod sit
+postquam desierit, verum enim erit veritatem non esse. Ergo veritas
+est aeterna.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b>
+God alone is eternal, as laid down before (<a
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3"
+shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[10], A[3]</a>).</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 7 s. c."><a name="29096"><span class=
+"ref">[29096] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod solus Deus est aeternus, ut supra habitum est.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself: but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable truth, according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on account of any truth residing in the enunciation, as though in a subject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health within it but
+  from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it
+has been already said that things are called true from the truth of
+the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be
+eternal. Now because only the divine intellect is eternal, in it alone
+truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else
+but God is eternal; since the truth of the divine intellect is God
+Himself, as shown already <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p7.1"
+href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5" shape="rect"
+xml:link="simple">(A[5])</a>.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 7 co."><a name="29097"><span class=
+"ref">[29097] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod veritas enuntiabilium non est aliud quam veritas intellectus.
+Enuntiabile enim et est in intellectu, et est in voce. Secundum
+autem quod est in intellectu, habet per se veritatem. Sed secundum
+quod est in voce, dicitur verum enuntiabile, secundum quod
+significat aliquam veritatem intellectus; non propter aliquam
+veritatem in enuntiabili existentem sicut in subiecto. Sicut urina
+dicitur sana, non a sanitate quae in ipsa sit, sed a sanitate
+animalis, quam significat. Similiter etiam supra dictum est quod
+res denominantur verae a veritate intellectus. Unde si nullus
+intellectus esset aeternus, nulla veritas esset aeterna. Sed quia
+solus intellectus divinus est aeternus, in ipso solo veritas
+aeternitatem habet. Nec propter hoc sequitur quod aliquid aliud sit
+aeternum quam Deus, quia veritas intellectus divini est ipse Deus,
+ut supra ostensum est.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
+margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
+to Objection 1:</b> The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and
+three make five, have eternity in the mind of God.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="29098"><span class=
+"ref">[29098] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod ratio circuli, et duo et tria esse quinque, habent
+aeternitatem in mente divina.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That something is always and everywhere, can be understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of extension to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of all distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be everywhere
+  and always, in so far as universals are independent of place and
+time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are eternal,
+except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="29099"><span class=
+"ref">[29099] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod aliquid esse semper et ubique, potest intelligi
+dupliciter. Uno modo, quia habet in se unde se extendat ad omne
+tempus et ad omnem locum, sicut Deo competit esse ubique et semper.
+Alio modo, quia non habet in se quo determinetur ad aliquem locum
+vel tempus, sicut materia prima dicitur esse una, non quia habet
+unam formam, sicut homo est unus ab unitate unius formae, sed per
+remotionem omnium formarum distinguentium. Et per hunc modum,
+quodlibet universale dicitur esse ubique et semper, inquantum
+universalia abstrahunt ab hic et nunc. Sed ex hoc non sequitur ea
+esse aeterna, nisi in intellectu, si quis sit
+aeternus.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
+3:</b> That which now is, was future, before it (actually) was;
+because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the cause were
+removed, that thing's coming to be was not future. But the first cause
+is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was always true
+that what now is would be, except in so far as its future being was in
+the sempiternal cause; and God alone is such a cause.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="29100"><span class=
+"ref">[29100] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod illud quod nunc est, ex eo futurum fuit antequam
+esset, quia in causa sua erat ut fieret. Unde, sublata causa, non
+esset futurum illud fieri. Sola autem causa prima est aeterna. Unde
+ex hoc non sequitur quod ea quae sunt, semper fuerit verum ea esse
+futura, nisi quatenus in causa sempiterna fuit ut essent futura.
+Quae quidem causa solus Deus est.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal, but it had a beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was not true to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason of the divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now to say that that truth did not then exist: and this is true only by reason of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not by
+  reason of any truth in the things. For this is truth concerning
+not-being; and not-being has not truth of itself, but only so far as
+our intellect apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did
+not exist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being as preceding its
+being.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la"
+title="I q. 16 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="29101"><span class=
+"ref">[29101] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod, quia intellectus noster non est aeternus, nec
+veritas enuntiabilium quae a nobis formantur, est aeterna, sed
+quandoque incoepit. Et antequam huiusmodi veritas esset, non erat
+verum dicere veritatem talem non esse, nisi ab intellectu divino,
+in quo solum veritas est aeterna. Sed nunc verum est dicere
+veritatem tunc non fuisse. Quod quidem non est verum nisi veritate
+quae nunc est in intellectu nostro, non autem per aliquam veritatem
+ex parte rei. Quia ista est veritas de non ente; non ens autem non
+habet ex se ut sit verum, sed solummodo ex intellectu apprehendente
+ipsum. Unde intantum est verum dicere veritatem non fuisse,
+inquantum apprehendimus non esse ipsius ut praecedens esse
+eius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8"
+next="FP_Q17" prev="FP_Q16_A7" progress="3.13%" n="viii"
+title="Article. 8 - Whether truth is immutable?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p0.1">Whether truth is immutable?</h4><div
+style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
+left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p2"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth is
+immutable. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that "Truth and
+mind do not rank as equals, otherwise truth would be mutable, as the
+mind is."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="29102"><span class=
+"ref">[29102] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod veritas sit immutabilis. Dicit enim
+Augustinus, in libro II de libero arbitrio, quod veritas non est
+aequalis menti, quia esset mutabilis, sicut et
+mens.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
+style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
+Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as primary
+matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains after all
+generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change; for
+after every change it is true to say that a thing is, or is
+not. Therefore truth is immutable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
+float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="29103"><span class=
+"ref">[29103] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id
+quod remanet post omnem mutationem, est immutabile, sicut prima
+materia est ingenita et incorruptibilis, quia remanet post omnem
+generationem et corruptionem. Sed veritas remanet post omnem
+mutationem, quia post omnem mutationem verum est dicere esse vel
+non esse. Ergo veritas est immutabilis.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the truth of an enunciation changes, it changes mostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus change. For truth, according to Anselm (De Verit. viii), "is a certain rightness" in so far as a thing answers to that which is in the divine mind concerning it. But this proposition that "Socrates sits", receives from the divine mind the signification that Socrates does sit; and it has the same signification even though he does not sit.
+  Therefore the truth of the proposition in no way
+changes.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="29104"><span class=
+"ref">[29104] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
+veritas enuntiationis mutatur, maxime mutatur ad mutationem rei.
+Sed sic non mutatur. Veritas enim, secundum Anselmum, est rectitudo
+quaedam, inquantum aliquid implet id quod est de ipso in mente
+divina. Haec autem propositio, Socrates sedet, accipit a mente
+divina ut significet Socratem sedere, quod significat etiam eo non
+sedente. Ergo veritas propositionis nullo modo
+mutatur.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b>
+Further, where there is the same cause, there is the same effect. But
+the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three propositions,
+"Socrates sits, will sit, sat." Therefore the truth of each is the
+same. But one or other of these must be the true one. Therefore the
+truth of these propositions remains immutable; and for the same reason
+that of any other.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="29105"><span class=
+"ref">[29105] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, ubi
+est eadem causa, et idem effectus. Sed eadem res est causa
+veritatis harum trium propositionum Socrates sedet, sedebit, et
+sedit. Ergo eadem est harum veritas. Sed oportet quod alterum horum
+sit verum. Ergo veritas harum propositionum immutabiliter manet. Et
+eadem ratione cuiuslibet alterius propositionis.</p></div></div><div
+style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
+left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p6"
+shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.11.2" parsed="vul|Ps|11|2|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p6.1"
+passage="Ps. 11:2">Ps. 11:2</scripRef>),"Truths are decayed from among
+the children of men."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 s. c."><a name="29106"><span class=
+"ref">[29106] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur in Psalmo XI, <i>diminutae sunt veritates a filiis
+hominum</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect, as said before <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>; but things are called true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be regarded from the point of view of the intellect, the truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness, through change in one of the two extremes. Hence in
   one way truth varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing which in itself has not changed, and in another way, when the thing is changed, but not the opinion; and in either way there can be a change from true to false. If, then, there is an intellect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and the knowledge of which nothing can escape, in this is immutable truth. Now such is the divine intellect, as is clear from what has been said
-  before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Hence the truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But the truth of our intellect is mutable; not because it is itself the subject of change, but in so far as our intellect changes from truth to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable. Whereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether immutable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of divine truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The true and being are convertible terms. Hence just as being is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but accidentally, in so far as this being or that is corrupted or generated, as is said in Phys. i, so does truth change, not so as that no truth remains, but because that truth does not remain which was before.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but it said to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates the truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore
-  this proposition, "Socrates sits," is true, as long as he is sitting, both with the truth of the thing, in so far as the expression is significative, and with the truth of signification, in so far as it signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the first truth remains, but the second is changed.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of the truth of the proposition, "Socrates sits," has not the same meaning when Socrates sits, after he sits, and before he sits. Hence the truth which results, varies, and is variously signified by these propositions concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not follow, though one of the three propositions is true, that the same truth remains invariable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q17" next="FP_Q17_A1" prev="FP_Q16_A8" progress="3.16%" n="xvi" title="Question. 17 - CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)">
+  before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p7.2"
+href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14],
+A[15]</a>). Hence the truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But
+the truth of our intellect is mutable; not because it is itself the
+subject of change, but in so far as our intellect changes from truth
+to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable. Whereas the truth of
+the divine intellect is that according to which natural things are
+said to be true, and this is altogether immutable.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 co."><a name="29107"><span class=
+"ref">[29107] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod, sicut supra dictum est, veritas proprie est in solo
+intellectu, res autem dicuntur verae a veritate quae est in aliquo
+intellectu. Unde mutabilitas veritatis consideranda est circa
+intellectum. Cuius quidem veritas in hoc consistit, quod habeat
+conformitatem ad res intellectas. Quae quidem conformitas variari
+potest dupliciter, sicut et quaelibet alia similitudo, ex mutatione
+alterius extremi. Unde uno modo variatur veritas ex parte
+intellectus, ex eo quod de re eodem modo se habente aliquis aliam
+opinionem accipit, alio modo si, opinione eadem manente, res
+mutetur. Et utroque modo fit mutatio de vero in falsum. Si ergo sit
+aliquis intellectus in quo non possit esse alternatio opinionum,
+vel cuius acceptionem non potest subterfugere res aliqua, in eo est
+immutabilis veritas. Talis autem est intellectus divinus, ut ex
+superioribus patet. Unde veritas divini intellectus est
+immutabilis. Veritas autem intellectus nostri mutabilis est. Non
+quod ipsa sit subiectum mutationis, sed inquantum intellectus
+noster mutatur de veritate in falsitatem; sic enim formae mutabiles
+dici possunt. Veritas autem intellectus divini est secundum quam
+res naturales dicuntur verae, quae est omnino
+immutabilis.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
+1:</b> Augustine is speaking of divine truth.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="29108"><span class=
+"ref">[29108] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de veritate
+divina.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
+style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
+2:</b> The true and being are convertible terms. Hence just as being
+is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but accidentally, in so far
+as this being or that is corrupted or generated, as is said in
+Phys. i, so does truth change, not so as that no truth remains, but
+because that truth does not remain which was before.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="29109"><span class=
+"ref">[29109] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod verum et ens sunt convertibilia. Unde, sicut ens non
+generatur neque corrumpitur per se, sed per accidens, inquantum hoc
+vel illud ens corrumpitur vel generatur, ut dicitur in I Physic.;
+ita veritas mutatur, non quod nulla veritas remaneat, sed quia non
+remanet illa veritas quae prius erat.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but it said to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates the truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore
+  this proposition, "Socrates sits," is true, as long as he is
+sitting, both with the truth of the thing, in so far as the expression
+is significative, and with the truth of signification, in so far as it
+signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the first truth
+remains, but the second is changed.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
+float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="29110"><span class=
+"ref">[29110] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod propositio non solum habet veritatem sicut res aliae
+veritatem habere dicuntur, inquantum implent id quod de eis est
+ordinatum ab intellectu divino; sed dicitur habere veritatem quodam
+speciali modo, inquantum significat veritatem intellectus. Quae
+quidem consistit in conformitate intellectus et rei. Qua quidem
+subtracta, mutatur veritas opinionis, et per consequens veritas
+propositionis. Sic igitur haec propositio, Socrates sedet, eo
+sedente vera est et veritate rei, inquantum est quaedam vox
+significativa; et veritate significationis, inquantum significat
+opinionem veram. Socrate vero surgente, remanet prima veritas, sed
+mutatur secunda.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
+4:</b> The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of the truth of the
+proposition, "Socrates sits," has not the same meaning when Socrates
+sits, after he sits, and before he sits. Hence the truth which
+results, varies, and is variously signified by these propositions
+concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not follow, though
+one of the three propositions is true, that the same truth remains
+invariable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="29111"><span class=
+"ref">[29111] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod sessio Socratis, quae est causa veritatis huius
+propositionis, Socrates sedet, non eodem modo se habet dum Socrates
+sedet, et postquam sederit, et antequam sederet. Unde et veritas ab
+hoc causata, diversimode se habet; et diversimode significatur
+propositionibus de praesenti, praeterito et futuro. Unde non
+sequitur quod, licet altera trium propositionum sit vera, quod
+eadem veritas invariabilis maneat.</p></div></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q17" next="FP_Q17_A1" prev="FP_Q16_A8" progress="3.16%" n="xvi" title="Question. 17 - CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)">
 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p0.1">Question 17. CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p2" shownumber="no"> We next consider falsity. About this four points of inquiry arise:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether falsity exists in things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether it exists in the sense?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether it exists in the intellect?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Concerning the opposition of the true and the false.</p>
-</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 pr."><a name="29112"><span class="ref">[29112]
+I&ordf; q. 17 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de falsitate. Et
+circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum falsitas sit in rebus.
+Secundo, utrum sit in sensu. Tertio, utrum sit in intellectu.
+Quarto, de oppositione veri et falsi.</p></div></div>
 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1" next="FP_Q17_A2" prev="FP_Q17" progress="3.16%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether falsity exists in things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p0.1">Whether falsity exists in things?</h4>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), "If the true is that which is, it will be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may appear to the contrary."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, false is derived from "fallere" [to deceive]. But things do not deceive; for, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33), they show nothing but their own species. Therefore the false is not found in things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the true is said to exist in things by conformity to the divine intellect, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(Q[16])</a>. But everything, in so far as it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true without admixture of falsity; and thus nothing is false.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 34): "Every body is a true body and a false unity: for it imitates unity without being unity." But everything imitates the divine unity yet falls short of it. Therefore in all things falsity exists.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+										      float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), "If the true is that which is, it will be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may appear to the contrary."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29113"><span class=
+"ref">[29113] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod falsitas non sit in rebus. Dicit enim
+Augustinus, in libro Soliloq., <i>si verum est id quod est, falsum
+non esse uspiam concludetur, quovis repugnante</i>.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p3"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, false is derived from
+"fallere" [to deceive]. But things do not deceive; for, as Augustine
+says (De Vera Relig. 33), they show nothing but their own
+species. Therefore the false is not found in things.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29114"><span class=
+"ref">[29114] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+falsum dicitur a fallendo. Sed res non fallunt, ut dicit Augustinus
+in libro de vera Relig., <i>quia non ostendunt aliud quam suam
+speciem</i>. Ergo falsum in rebus non invenitur.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p4"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the true is said to exist
+in things by conformity to the divine intellect, as stated above <a
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16" shape="rect"
+xml:link="simple">(Q[16])</a>. But everything, in so far as it exists,
+imitates God. Therefore everything is true without admixture of
+falsity; and thus nothing is false.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
+float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29115"><span class=
+"ref">[29115] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, verum
+dicitur in rebus per comparationem ad intellectum divinum, ut supra
+dictum est. Sed quaelibet res, inquantum est, imitatur Deum. Ergo
+quaelibet res vera est, absque falsitate. Et sic nulla res est
+falsa.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p5"
+shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vera
+Relig. 34): "Every body is a true body and a false unity: for it
+imitates unity without being unity." But everything imitates the
+divine unity yet falls short of it. Therefore in all things falsity
+exists.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29116"><span class=
+"ref">[29116] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., quod <i>omne corpus
+est verum corpus et falsa unitas</i>; quia imitatur unitatem, et
+non est unitas. Sed quaelibet res imitatur divinam bonitatem, et ab
+ea deficit. Ergo in omnibus rebus est falsitas.</p></div></div>
 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since true and false are opposed, and since opposites stand in relation to the same thing, we must needs seek falsity, where primarily we find truth; that is to say, in the intellect. Now, in things, neither truth nor falsity exists, except in relation to the intellect. And since every thing is denominated simply by what belongs to it "per se," but is denominated relatively by what belongs to it accidentally; a thing indeed may be called false simply when
   compared with the intellect on which it depends, and to which it is compared "per se" but may be called false relatively as directed to another intellect, to which it is compared accidentally. Now natural things depend on the divine intellect, as artificial things on the human. Wherefore artificial things are said to be false simply and in themselves, in so far as they fall short of the form of the art; whence a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if it falls short of the proper
@@ -2202,31 +3074,252 @@
   Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34). So, too, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 10): "The true tragedian is a false Hector": even as, on the contrary, anything can be called true, in regard to that which is becoming to it. In another way a thing can be called false, by way of cause---and thus a thing is said to be false that naturally begets a false opinion. And whereas it is innate in us to judge things by external appearances, since our knowledge takes its rise from sense, which principally and
   naturally deals with external accidents, therefore those external accidents, which resemble things other than themselves, are said to be false with respect to those things; thus gall is falsely honey; and tin, false gold. Regarding this, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6): "We call those things false that appear to our apprehension like the true:" and the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34): "Things are called false that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not, or what they are not." In this
   way a man is called false as delighting in false opinions or words, and not because he can invent them; for in this way many wise and learned persons might be called false, as stated in Metaph. v, 34.</p>
-</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing compared with the intellect is said to be true in respect to what it is; and false in respect to what it is not. Hence, "The true tragedian is a false Hector," as stated in Soliloq. ii, 6. As, therefore, in things that are is found a certain non-being, so in things that are is found a degree of falseness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things do not deceive by their own nature, but by accident. For they give occasion to falsity, by the likeness they bear to things which they actually are not.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 1 co."><a name="29117"><span class=
+"ref">[29117] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod, cum verum et falsum opponantur; opposita autem sunt circa
+idem; necesse est ut ibi prius quaeratur falsitas, ubi primo
+veritas invenitur, hoc est in intellectu. In rebus autem neque
+veritas neque falsitas est, nisi per ordinem ad intellectum. Et
+quia unumquodque secundum id quod convenit ei per se, simpliciter
+nominatur; secundum autem id quod convenit ei per accidens, non
+nominatur nisi secundum quid; res quidem simpliciter falsa dici
+posset per comparationem ad intellectum a quo dependet, cui
+comparatur per se; in ordine autem ad alium intellectum, cui
+comparatur per accidens, non posset dici falsa nisi secundum quid.
+Dependent autem ab intellectu divino res naturales, sicut ab
+intellectu humano res artificiales. Dicuntur igitur res
+artificiales falsae simpliciter et secundum se, inquantum deficiunt
+a forma artis, unde dicitur aliquis artifex opus falsum facere,
+quando deficit ab operatione artis. Sic autem in rebus
+dependentibus a Deo, falsitas inveniri non potest per comparationem
+ad intellectum divinum, cum quidquid in rebus accidit, ex
+ordinatione divini intellectus procedat, nisi forte in voluntariis
+agentibus tantum, in quorum potestate est subducere se ab
+ordinatione divini intellectus; in quo malum culpae consistit,
+secundum quod ipsa peccata falsitates et mendacia dicuntur in
+Scripturis, secundum illud Psalmi IV, <i>ut quid diligitis
+vanitatem et quaeritis mendacium?</i> Sicut per oppositum operatio
+virtuosa veritas vitae nominatur, inquantum subditur ordini divini
+intellectus; sicut dicitur Ioan. III, <i>qui facit veritatem, venit
+ad lucem</i>. Sed per ordinem ad intellectum nostrum, ad quem
+comparantur res naturales per accidens, possunt dici falsae, non
+simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo,
+secundum rationem significati, ut dicatur illud esse falsum in
+rebus, quod significatur vel repraesentatur oratione vel intellectu
+falso. Secundum quem modum quaelibet res potest dici esse falsa,
+quantum ad id quod ei non inest, sicut si dicamus diametrum esse
+falsum commensurabile, ut dicit philosophus in V Metaphys.; et
+sicut dicit Augustinus, in libro Soliloq., quod <i>tragoedus est
+falsus Hector</i>. Sicut e contrario potest unumquodque dici verum,
+secundum id quod competit ei. Alio modo, per modum causae. Et sic
+dicitur res esse falsa, quae nata est facere de se opinionem
+falsam. Et quia innatum est nobis per ea quae exterius apparent de
+rebus iudicare, eo quod nostra cognitio a sensu ortum habet, qui
+primo et per se est exteriorum accidentium; ideo ea quae in
+exterioribus accidentibus habent similitudinem aliarum rerum,
+dicuntur esse falsa secundum illas res; sicut fel est falsum mel,
+et stannum est falsum argentum. Et secundum hoc dicit Augustinus,
+in libro Soliloq., quod <i>eas res falsas nominamus, quae
+verisimilia apprehendimus</i>. Et philosophus dicit, in V
+Metaphys., quod <i>falsa dicuntur quaecumque apta nata sunt
+apparere aut qualia non sunt, aut quae non sunt</i>. Et per hunc
+modum etiam dicitur homo falsus, inquantum est amativus falsarum
+opinionum vel locutionum. Non autem ex hoc quod potest eas
+confingere, quia sic etiam sapientes et scientes falsi dicerentur,
+ut dicitur in V Metaphys.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p9"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing compared with the
+intellect is said to be true in respect to what it is; and false in
+respect to what it is not. Hence, "The true tragedian is a false
+Hector," as stated in Soliloq. ii, 6. As, therefore, in things that
+are is found a certain non-being, so in things that are is found a
+degree of falseness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29118"><span class=
+"ref">[29118] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod res comparata ad intellectum, secundum id quod est,
+dicitur vera, secundum id quod non est, dicitur falsa. <i>Unde
+verus tragoedus est falsus Hector</i>, ut dicitur in II Soliloq.
+Sicut igitur in his quae sunt, invenitur quoddam non esse; ita in
+his quae sunt, invenitur quaedam ratio falsitatis.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p10"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things do not deceive by
+their own nature, but by accident. For they give occasion to falsity,
+by the likeness they bear to things which they actually are
+not.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29119"><span class=
+"ref">[29119] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod res per se non fallunt, sed per accidens. Dant enim
+occasionem falsitatis, eo quod similitudinem eorum gerunt, quorum
+non habent existentiam.</p></div></div>
 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things are said to be false, not as compared with the divine intellect, in which case they would be false simply, but as compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only relatively.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p12" shownumber="no"> To the argument which is urged on the contrary, likeness or defective representation does not involve the idea of falsity except in so far as it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always said to be false, because it resembles another thing; but only when the resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not in any one case, but in the majority of instances.</p>
-</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29120"><span class=
+"ref">[29120] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod per comparationem ad intellectum divinum non dicuntur
+res falsae, quod esset eas esse falsas simpliciter, sed per
+comparationem ad intellectum nostrum, quod est eas esse falsas
+secundum quid.</p><p title="I q. 17 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="29121"><span class=
+"ref">[29121] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum, quod
+in oppositum obiicitur, dicendum quod similitudo vel repraesentatio
+deficiens non inducit rationem falsitatis, nisi inquantum praestat
+occasionem falsae opinionis. Unde non ubicumque est similitudo,
+dicitur res falsa, sed ubicumque est talis similitudo, quae nata
+est facere opinionem falsam, non cuicumque, sed ut in pluribus.</p></div></div>
 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2" next="FP_Q17_A3" prev="FP_Q17_A1" progress="3.20%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether there is falsity in the senses?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p0.1">Whether there is falsity in the senses?</h4>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that falsity is not in the senses. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33): "If all the bodily senses report as they are affected, I do not know what more we can require from them." Thus it seems that we are not deceived by the senses; and therefore that falsity is not in them.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 24) that falsity is not proper to the senses, but to the imagination.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in non-complex things there is neither true nor false, but in complex things only. But affirmation and negation do not belong to the senses. Therefore in the senses there is no falsity.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6), "It appears that the senses entrap us into error by their deceptive similitudes."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p2"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that falsity is not in
+the senses. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33): "If all the bodily
+senses report as they are affected, I do not know what more we can
+require from them." Thus it seems that we are not deceived by the
+senses; and therefore that falsity is not in them.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29122"><span class=
+"ref">[29122] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod in sensu non sit falsitas. Dicit enim
+Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., <i>si omnes corporis sensus
+ita nuntiant ut afficiuntur, quid ab eis amplius exigere debemus,
+ignoro</i>. Et sic videtur quod ex sensibus non fallamur. Et sic
+falsitas in sensu non est.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p3"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says
+(Metaph. iv, 24) that falsity is not proper to the senses, but to the
+imagination.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29123"><span class=
+"ref">[29123] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+philosophus dicit, in IV Metaphys., quod <i>falsitas non est
+propria sensui, sed phantasiae</i>.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p4"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in non-complex things
+there is neither true nor false, but in complex things only. But
+affirmation and negation do not belong to the senses. Therefore in the
+senses there is no falsity.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29124"><span class=
+"ref">[29124] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in
+incomplexis non est verum nec falsum, sed solum in complexis. Sed
+componere et dividere non pertinet ad sensum. Ergo in sensu non est
+falsitas.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p5"
+shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Soliloq. ii,
+6), "It appears that the senses entrap us into error by their
+deceptive similitudes."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29125"><span class=
+"ref">[29125] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit Augustinus, in libro Soliloq., <i>apparet nos in omnibus
+sensibus similitudine lenocinante falli</i>.</p></div></div>
 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as truth is in them. Now truth is not in them in such a way as that the senses know truth, but in so far as they apprehend sensible things truly, as said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[16], A[2]</a>), and this takes place through the senses apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that falsity exists in the senses through their apprehending or judging things to be otherwise than they really
   are.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p7" shownumber="no"> The knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the existence of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness of a thing can exist in the senses in three ways. In the first way, primarily and of its own nature, as in sight there is the likeness of colors, and of other sensible objects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature, though not primarily; as in sight there is the likeness of shape, size, and of other sensible objects common to more than one sense. Thirdly,
   neither primarily nor of its own nature, but accidentally, as in sight, there is the likeness of a man, not as man, but in so far as it is accidental to the colored object to be a man.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p8" shownumber="no"> Sense, then, has no false knowledge about its proper objects, except accidentally and rarely, and then, because of the unsound organ it does not receive the sensible form rightly; just as other passive subjects because of their indisposition receive defectively the impressions of the agent. Hence, for instance, it happens that on account of an unhealthy tongue sweet seems bitter to a sick person. But as to common objects of sense, and accidental objects, even a rightly disposed
   sense may have a false judgment, because it is referred to them not directly, but accidentally, or as a consequence of being directed to other things.</p>
-</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The affection of sense is its sensation itself. Hence, from the fact that sense reports as it is affected, it follows that we are not deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we experience sensation. Since, however, sense is sometimes affected erroneously of that object, it follows that it sometimes reports erroneously of that object; and thus we are deceived by sense about the object, but not about the fact of sensation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 2 co."><a name="29126"><span class=
+"ref">[29126] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod falsitas non est quaerenda in sensu, nisi sicut ibi est
+veritas. Veritas autem non sic est in sensu, ut sensus cognoscat
+veritatem; sed inquantum veram apprehensionem habet de
+sensibilibus, ut supra dictum est. Quod quidem contingit eo quod
+apprehendit res ut sunt. Unde contingit falsitatem esse in sensu,
+ex hoc quod apprehendit vel iudicat res aliter quam sint. Sic autem
+se habet ad cognoscendum res, inquantum similitudo rerum est in
+sensu. Similitudo autem alicuius rei est in sensu tripliciter. Uno
+modo, primo et per se; sicut in visu est similitudo colorum et
+aliorum propriorum sensibilium. Alio modo, per se, sed non primo;
+sicut in visu est similitudo figurae vel magnitudinis, et aliorum
+communium sensibilium. Tertio modo, nec primo nec per se, sed per
+accidens; sicut in visu est similitudo hominis, non inquantum est
+homo, sed inquantum huic colorato accidit esse hominem. Et circa
+propria sensibilia sensus non habet falsam cognitionem, nisi per
+accidens, et ut in paucioribus, ex eo scilicet quod, propter
+indispositionem organi, non convenienter recipit formam sensibilem,
+sicut et alia passiva, propter suam indispositionem, deficienter
+recipiunt impressionem agentium. Et inde est quod, propter
+corruptionem linguae, infirmis dulcia amara esse videntur. De
+sensibilibus vero communibus et per accidens, potest esse falsum
+iudicium etiam in sensu recte disposito, quia sensus non directe
+refertur ad illa, sed per accidens, vel ex consequenti, inquantum
+refertur ad alia.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p9"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The affection of sense is
+its sensation itself. Hence, from the fact that sense reports as it is
+affected, it follows that we are not deceived in the judgment by which
+we judge that we experience sensation. Since, however, sense is
+sometimes affected erroneously of that object, it follows that it
+sometimes reports erroneously of that object; and thus we are deceived
+by sense about the object, but not about the fact of
+sensation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29127"><span class=
+"ref">[29127] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod sensum affici, est ipsum eius sentire. Unde per hoc
+quod sensus ita nuntiant sicut afficiuntur, sequitur quod non
+decipiamur in iudicio quo iudicamus nos sentire aliquid. Sed ex eo
+quod sensus aliter afficitur interdum quam res sit, sequitur quod
+nuntiet nobis aliquando rem aliter quam sit. Et ex hoc fallimur per
+sensum circa rem, non circa ipsum sentire.</p></div></div>
 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Falsity is said not to be proper to sense, since sense is not deceived as to its proper object. Hence in another translation it is said more plainly, "Sense, about its proper object, is never false." Falsity is attributed to the imagination, as it represents the likeness of something even in its absence. Hence, when anyone perceives the likeness of a thing as if it were the thing itself, falsity results from such an apprehension; and for this reason
-  the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34) that shadows, pictures, and dreams are said to be false inasmuch as they convey the likeness of things that are not present in substance.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument proves that the false is not in the sense, as in that which knows the true and the false.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+  the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34) that shadows, pictures, and
+dreams are said to be false inasmuch as they convey the likeness of
+things that are not present in substance.</p></div><div style="width:
+45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29128"><span class=
+"ref">[29128] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod falsitas dicitur non esse propria sensui, quia non
+decipitur circa proprium obiectum. Unde in alia translatione
+planius dicitur, quod <i>sensus proprii sensibilis falsus non
+est</i>. Phantasiae autem attribuitur falsitas, quia repraesentat
+similitudinem rei etiam absentis; unde quando aliquis convertitur
+ad similitudinem rei tanquam ad rem ipsam, provenit ex tali
+apprehensione falsitas. Unde etiam philosophus, in V Metaphys.,
+dicit quod umbrae et picturae et somnia dicuntur falsa, inquantum
+non subsunt res quarum habent similitudinem.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p11"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument proves that
+the false is not in the sense, as in that which knows the true and the
+false.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la"
+title="I q. 17 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29129"><span class=
+"ref">[29129] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ratio illa procedit, quod falsitas non sit in sensu
+sicut in cognoscente verum et falsum.</p></div></div>
 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3" next="FP_Q17_A4" prev="FP_Q17_A2" progress="3.22%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether falsity is in the intellect?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p0.1">Whether falsity is in the intellect?</h4>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that falsity is not in the intellect. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 32), "Everyone who is deceived, understands not that in which he is deceived." But falsity is said to exist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived therein. Therefore falsity does not exist in the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 51) that the intellect is always right. Therefore there is no falsity in the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in De Anima iii, 21,[22] that "where there is composition of objects understood, there is truth and falsehood." But such composition is in the intellect. Therefore truth and falsehood exist in the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p2"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that falsity is not in
+the intellect. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 32), "Everyone who is
+deceived, understands not that in which he is deceived." But falsity
+is said to exist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived
+therein. Therefore falsity does not exist in the
+intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29130"><span class=
+"ref">[29130] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod falsitas non sit in intellectu. Dicit enim
+Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>omnis qui
+fallitur, id in quo fallitur, non intelligit</i>. Sed falsum
+dicitur esse in aliqua cognitione, secundum quod per eam fallimur.
+Ergo in intellectu non est falsitas.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p3"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De
+Anima iii, 51) that the intellect is always right. Therefore there is
+no falsity in the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29131"><span class=
+"ref">[29131] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod intellectus semper est
+rectus. Non ergo in intellectu est falsitas.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p4"
+shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in De Anima iii,
+21,[22] that "where there is composition of objects understood, there
+is truth and falsehood." But such composition is in the
+intellect. Therefore truth and falsehood exist in the
+intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29132"><span class=
+"ref">[29132] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur in III de anima, quod <i>ubi compositio intellectuum
+est, ibi verum et falsum est</i>. Sed compositio intellectuum est
+in intellectu. Ergo verum et falsum est in intellectu.</p></div></div>
 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Just as a thing has being by its proper form, so the knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known. Hence, as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs to them by their form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent qualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail to be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in knowledge of the thing with the likeness of which it is informed; but may fail
   with regard to something consequent upon that form, or accidental thereto. For it has been said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[2])</a> that sight is not deceived in its proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent to that object; or about accidental objects of sense. Now as the sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so is the intellect by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither the
@@ -2234,42 +3327,525 @@
   exist in the intellect not only because the intellect is conscious of that knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas in sense falsity does not exist as known, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p5.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[2])</a>.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p6" shownumber="no"> But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs also accidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of a thing, in so far as composition of the intellect is mixed up in it. This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying to one thing the definition proper to another; as that of a circle to a man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is false of another.
   In another way, by composing a definition of parts which are mutually exclusive. For thus the definition is not only false of the thing, but false in itself. A definition such as " a reasonable four-footed animal" would be of this kind, and the intellect false in making it; for such a statement as "some reasonable animals are four-footed" is false in itself. For this reason the intellect cannot be false in its knowledge of simple essences; but it is either true, or it understands nothing at
   all.</p>
-</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because the essence of a thing is the proper object of the intellect, we are properly said to understand a thing when we reduce it to its essence, and judge of it thereby; as takes place in demonstrations, in which there is no falsity. In this sense Augustine's words must be understood, "that he who is deceived, understands not that wherein he is deceived;" and not in the sense that no one is ever deceived in any operation of the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellect is always right as regards first principles; since it is not deceived about them for the same reason that it is not deceived about what a thing is. For self-known principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are understood, from the fact that the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4" next="FP_Q18" prev="FP_Q17_A3" progress="3.25%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether true and false are contraries?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p0.1">Whether true and false are contraries?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that true and false are not contraries. For true and false are opposed, as that which is to that which is not; for "truth," as Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 5), "is that which is." But that which is and that which is not are not opposed as contraries. Therefore true and false are not contrary things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one of two contraries is not in the other. But falsity is in truth, because, as Augustine says, (Soliloq. ii, 10), "A tragedian would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true tragedian." Therefore true and false are not contraries.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in God there is no contrariety, for "nothing is contrary to the Divine Substance," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 2). But falsity is opposed to God, for an idol is called in Scripture a lie, "They have laid hold on lying" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.8.5" parsed="vul|Jer|8|5|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p4.1" passage="Jer. 8:5">Jer. 8:5</scripRef>), that is to say, "an idol," as a gloss says. Therefore false and true are not contraries.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Peri Herm. ii), that a false opinion is contrary to a true one.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as some have said, as affirmation and negation. In proof of which it must be considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines any subject, and can therefore be said of being as of not-being, for instance not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation asserts nothing, whereas it determines its subject, for it is "negation in a subject," as stated in Metaph. iv, 4: v. 27; for blindness is not said
-  except of one whose nature it is to see. Contraries, however, both assert something and determine the subject, for blackness is a species of color. Falsity asserts something, for a thing is false, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 27), inasmuch as something is said or seems to be something that it is not, or not to be what it really is. For as truth implies an adequate apprehension of a thing, so falsity implies the contrary. Hence it is clear that true and false are contraries.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> What is in things is the truth of the thing; but what is apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth primarily resides. Hence the false is that which is not as apprehended. To apprehend being, and not-being, implies contrariety; for, as the Philosopher proves (Peri Herm. ii), the contrary of this statement "God is good," is, "God is not good."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Falsity is not founded in the truth which is contrary to it, just as evil is not founded in the good which is contrary to it, but in that which is its proper subject. This happens in either, because true and good are universals, and convertible with being. Hence, as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a being, so every evil is founded in some good, and every falsity in some truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Because contraries, and opposites by way of privation, are by nature about one and the same thing, therefore there is nothing contrary to God, considered in Himself, either with respect to His goodness or His truth, for in His intellect there can be nothing false. But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for the false opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true. So idols are called lies, opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch as the false
-  opinion concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the divine unity.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18" next="FP_Q18_A1" prev="FP_Q17_A4" progress="3.28%" n="xvii" title="Question. 18 - THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)">
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 3 co."><a name="29133"><span class=
+"ref">[29133] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod, sicut res habet esse per propriam formam, ita virtus
+cognoscitiva habet cognoscere per similitudinem rei cognitae. Unde,
+sicut res naturalis non deficit ab esse quod sibi competit secundum
+suam formam, potest autem deficere ab aliquibus accidentalibus vel
+consequentibus; sicut homo ab hoc quod est habere duos pedes, non
+autem ab hoc quod est esse hominem, ita virtus cognoscitiva non
+deficit in cognoscendo respectu illius rei cuius similitudine
+informatur; potest autem deficere circa aliquid consequens ad
+ipsam, vel accidens ei. Sicut est dictum quod visus non decipitur
+circa sensibile proprium, sed circa sensibilia communia, quae
+consequenter se habent ad illud, et circa sensibilia per accidens.
+Sicut autem sensus informatur directe similitudine propriorum
+sensibilium, ita intellectus informatur similitudine quidditatis
+rei. Unde circa quod quid est intellectus non decipitur, sicut
+neque sensus circa sensibilia propria. In componendo vero vel
+dividendo potest decipi, dum attribuit rei cuius quidditatem
+intelligit, aliquid quod eam non consequitur, vel quod ei
+opponitur. Sic enim se habet intellectus ad iudicandum de
+huiusmodi, sicut sensus ad iudicandum de sensibilibus communibus
+vel per accidens. Hac tamen differentia servata, quae supra circa
+veritatem dicta est, quod falsitas in intellectu esse potest, non
+solum quia cognitio intellectus falsa est, sed quia intellectus eam
+cognoscit, sicut et veritatem, in sensu autem falsitas non est ut
+cognita, ut dictum est. Quia vero falsitas intellectus per se solum
+circa compositionem intellectus est, per accidens etiam in
+operatione intellectus qua cognoscit quod quid est, potest esse
+falsitas, inquantum ibi compositio intellectus admiscetur. Quod
+potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod intellectus
+definitionem unius attribuit alteri; ut si definitionem circuli
+attribuat homini. Unde definitio unius rei est falsa de altera.
+Alio modo, secundum quod partes definitionis componit ad invicem,
+quae simul sociari non possunt, sic enim definitio non est solum
+falsa respectu alicuius rei, sed est falsa in se. Ut si formet
+talem definitionem, animal rationale quadrupes, falsus est
+intellectus sic definiendo, propterea quod falsus est in formando
+hanc compositionem, aliquod animal rationale est quadrupes. Et
+propter hoc, in cognoscendo quidditates simplices non potest esse
+intellectus falsus, sed vel est verus, vel totaliter nihil
+intelligit.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p7"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because the essence of a
+thing is the proper object of the intellect, we are properly said to
+understand a thing when we reduce it to its essence, and judge of it
+thereby; as takes place in demonstrations, in which there is no
+falsity. In this sense Augustine's words must be understood, "that he
+who is deceived, understands not that wherein he is deceived;" and not
+in the sense that no one is ever deceived in any operation of the
+intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29134"><span class=
+"ref">[29134] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod, quia quidditas rei est proprium obiectum
+intellectus, propter hoc tunc proprie dicimur aliquid intelligere,
+quando, reducentes illud in quod quid est, sic de eo iudicamus,
+sicut accidit in demonstrationibus, in quibus non est falsitas. Et
+hoc modo intelligitur verbum Augustini, quod omnis qui fallitur,
+non intelligit id in quo fallitur, non autem ita, quod in nulla
+operatione intellectus aliquis fallatur.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p8"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellect is always
+right as regards first principles; since it is not deceived about them
+for the same reason that it is not deceived about what a thing is. For
+self-known principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are
+understood, from the fact that the predicate is contained in the
+definition of the subject.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29135"><span class=
+"ref">[29135] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod intellectus semper est rectus, secundum quod
+intellectus est principiorum, circa quae non decipitur, ex eadem
+causa qua non decipitur circa quod quid est. Nam principia per se
+nota sunt illa quae statim, intellectis terminis, cognoscuntur, ex
+eo quod praedicatum ponitur in definitione subiecti.</p></div></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4" next="FP_Q18" prev="FP_Q17_A3"
+progress="3.25%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether true and false are
+contraries?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p0.1">Whether true and false are
+contraries?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
+style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
+seems that true and false are not contraries. For true and false are
+opposed, as that which is to that which is not; for "truth," as
+Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 5), "is that which is." But that which is
+and that which is not are not opposed as contraries. Therefore true
+and false are not contrary things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
+float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29136"><span class=
+"ref">[29136] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod verum et falsum non sint contraria. Verum
+enim et falsum opponuntur sicut quod est et quod non est, <i>nam
+verum est id quod est</i>, ut dicit Augustinus. Sed quod est et
+quod non est, non opponuntur ut contraria. Ergo verum et falsum non
+sunt contraria.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
+Further, one of two contraries is not in the other. But falsity is in
+truth, because, as Augustine says, (Soliloq. ii, 10), "A tragedian
+would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true tragedian."
+Therefore true and false are not contraries.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29137"><span class=
+"ref">[29137] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, unum
+contrariorum non est in alio. Sed falsum est in vero, quia, sicut
+dicit Augustinus in libro Soliloq., <i>tragoedus non esset falsus
+Hector, si non esset verus tragoedus</i>. Ergo verum et falsum non
+sunt contraria.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
+Further, in God there is no contrariety, for "nothing is contrary to
+the Divine Substance," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 2). But
+falsity is opposed to God, for an idol is called in Scripture a lie,
+"They have laid hold on lying" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.8.5"
+parsed="vul|Jer|8|5|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p4.1"
+passage="Jer. 8:5">Jer. 8:5</scripRef>), that is to say, "an idol," as
+a gloss says. Therefore false and true are not
+contraries.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29138"><span class=
+"ref">[29138] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in
+Deo non est contrarietas aliqua, nihil enim divinae substantiae est
+contrarium, ut dicit Augustinus, XII de Civit. Dei. Sed Deo
+opponitur falsitas, nam idolum in Scriptura mendacium nominatur,
+Ierem. VIII, <i>apprehenderunt mendacium</i>; Glossa, <i>idest
+idola</i>. Ergo verum et falsum non sunt
+contraria.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b>
+The Philosopher says (Peri Herm. ii), that a false opinion is contrary
+to a true one.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29139"><span class=
+"ref">[29139] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit philosophus, in II Periherm., ponit enim falsam
+opinionem verae contrariam.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as some have said, as affirmation and negation. In proof of which it must be considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines any subject, and can therefore be said of being as of not-being, for instance not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation asserts nothing, whereas it determines its subject, for it is "negation in a subject," as stated in Metaph. iv, 4: v. 27; for blindness is not said
+  except of one whose nature it is to see. Contraries, however, both
+assert something and determine the subject, for blackness is a species
+of color. Falsity asserts something, for a thing is false, as the
+Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 27), inasmuch as something is said or
+seems to be something that it is not, or not to be what it really
+is. For as truth implies an adequate apprehension of a thing, so
+falsity implies the contrary. Hence it is clear that true and false
+are contraries.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 4 co."><a name="29140"><span class=
+"ref">[29140] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod verum et falsum opponuntur ut contraria, et non sicut
+affirmatio et negatio, ut quidam dixerunt. Ad cuius evidentiam,
+sciendum est quod negatio neque ponit aliquid, neque determinat
+sibi aliquod subiectum. Et propter hoc, potest dici tam de ente
+quam de non ente; sicut non videns, et non sedens. Privatio autem
+non ponit aliquid, sed determinat sibi subiectum. Est enim negatio
+in subiecto, ut dicitur IV Metaphys., caecum enim non dicitur nisi
+de eo quod est natum videre. Contrarium vero et aliquid ponit, et
+subiectum determinat, nigrum enim est aliqua species coloris.
+Falsum autem aliquid ponit. Est enim falsum, ut dicit philosophus,
+IV Metaphys., ex eo quod dicitur vel videtur aliquid esse quod non
+est, vel non esse quod est. Sicut enim verum ponit acceptionem
+adaequatam rei, ita falsum acceptionem rei non adaequatam. Unde
+manifestum est quod verum et falsum sunt
+contraria.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
+1:</b> What is in things is the truth of the thing; but what is
+apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth primarily
+resides. Hence the false is that which is not as apprehended. To
+apprehend being, and not-being, implies contrariety; for, as the
+Philosopher proves (Peri Herm. ii), the contrary of this statement
+"God is good," is, "God is not good."</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
+float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29141"><span class=
+"ref">[29141] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod id quod est in rebus, est veritas rei sed id quod est
+ut apprehensum, est verum intellectus, in quo primo est veritas.
+Unde et falsum est id quod non est ut apprehensum. Apprehendere
+autem esse et non esse, contrarietatem habet, sicut probat
+philosophus, in II Periherm., quod huic opinioni, bonum est bonum,
+contraria est, bonum non est bonum.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
+both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
+to Objection 2:</b> Falsity is not founded in the truth which is
+contrary to it, just as evil is not founded in the good which is
+contrary to it, but in that which is its proper subject. This happens
+in either, because true and good are universals, and convertible with
+being. Hence, as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a
+being, so every evil is founded in some good, and every falsity in
+some truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29142"><span class=
+"ref">[29142] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod falsum non fundatur in vero sibi contrario, sicut nec
+malum in bono sibi contrario; sed in eo quod sibi subiicitur. Et
+hoc ideo in utroque accidit, quia verum et bonum communia sunt, et
+convertuntur cum ente, unde, sicut omnis privatio fundatur in
+subiecto quod est ens, ita omne malum fundatur in aliquo bono, et
+omne falsum in aliquo vero.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Because contraries, and opposites by way of privation, are by nature about one and the same thing, therefore there is nothing contrary to God, considered in Himself, either with respect to His goodness or His truth, for in His intellect there can be nothing false. But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for the false opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true. So idols are called lies, opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch as the false
+  opinion concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the
+divine unity.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29143"><span class=
+"ref">[29143] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, quia contraria et opposita privative nata sunt fieri
+circa idem, ideo Deo, prout in se consideratur, non est aliquid
+contrarium, neque ratione suae bonitatis, neque ratione suae
+veritatis, quia in intellectu eius non potest esse falsitas aliqua.
+Sed in apprehensione nostra habet aliquid contrarium, nam verae
+opinioni de ipso contrariatur falsa opinio. Et sic idola mendacia
+dicuntur opposita veritati divinae, inquantum falsa opinio de
+idolis contrariatur verae opinioni de unitate
+Dei.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18" next="FP_Q18_A1" prev="FP_Q17_A4" progress="3.28%" n="xvii" title="Question. 18 - THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)">
 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p0.1">Question 18. THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p2" shownumber="no"> Since to understand belongs to living beings, after considering the divine knowledge and intellect, we must consider the divine life. About this, four points of inquiry arise:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) To whom does it belong to live?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) What is life?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether life is properly attributed to God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether all things in God are life?</p>
-</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1" next="FP_Q18_A2" prev="FP_Q18" progress="3.28%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether to live belongs to all natural things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p0.1">Whether to live belongs to all natural things?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to live belongs to all natural things. For the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 1) that "Movement is like a kind of life possessed by all things existing in nature." But all natural things participate in movement. Therefore all natural things partake of life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, plants are said to live, inasmuch as they in themselves a principle of movement of growth and decay. But local movement is naturally more perfect than, and prior to, movement of growth and decay, as the Philosopher shows (Phys. viii, 56,57). Since then, all natural bodies have in themselves some principle of local movement, it seems that all natural bodies live.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, amongst natural bodies the elements are the less perfect. Yet life is attributed to them, for we speak of "living waters." Much more, therefore, have other natural bodies life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vi, 1) that "The last echo of life is heard in the plants," whereby it is inferred that their life is life in its lowest degree. But inanimate bodies are inferior to plants. Therefore they have not life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We can gather to what things life belongs, and to what it does not, from such things as manifestly possess life. Now life manifestly belongs to animals, for it said in De Vegetab. i [*De Plantis i, 1] that in animals life is manifest. We must, therefore, distinguish living from lifeless things, by comparing them to that by reason of which animals are said to live: and this it is in which life is manifested first and remains last. We say then that an animal
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 18 pr."><a name="29144"><span class="ref">[29144]
+I&ordf; q. 18 pr.</span></a> Quoniam autem intelligere viventium
+est, post considerationem de scientia et intellectu divino,
+considerandum est de vita ipsius. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.
+Primo, quorum sit vivere. Secundo, quid sit vita. Tertio, utrum
+vita Deo conveniat. Quarto, utrum omnia in Deo sint vita.</p></div></div>
+<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1" next="FP_Q18_A2" prev="FP_Q18"
+progress="3.28%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether to live belongs to
+all natural things?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p0.1">Whether to live belongs to all
+natural things?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p2"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to live belongs to
+all natural things. For the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 1) that
+"Movement is like a kind of life possessed by all things existing in
+nature." But all natural things participate in movement. Therefore all
+natural things partake of life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
+float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29145"><span class=
+"ref">[29145] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod omnium rerum naturalium sit vivere. Dicit
+enim philosophus, in VIII Physic., quod motus est ut vita quaedam
+natura existentibus omnibus. Sed omnes res naturales participant
+motum. Ergo omnes res naturales participant vitam.</p></div></div><div
+style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
+left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p3"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, plants are said to live,
+inasmuch as they in themselves a principle of movement of growth and
+decay. But local movement is naturally more perfect than, and prior
+to, movement of growth and decay, as the Philosopher shows
+(Phys. viii, 56,57). Since then, all natural bodies have in themselves
+some principle of local movement, it seems that all natural bodies
+live.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29146"><span class=
+"ref">[29146] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+plantae dicuntur vivere, inquantum habent in seipsis principium
+motus augmenti et decrementi. Sed motus localis est perfectior et
+prior secundum naturam quam motus augmenti et decrementi, ut
+probatur in VIII Physic. Cum igitur omnia corpora naturalia habeant
+aliquod principium motus localis, videtur quod omnia corpora
+naturalia vivant.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
+Further, amongst natural bodies the elements are the less perfect. Yet
+life is attributed to them, for we speak of "living waters." Much
+more, therefore, have other natural bodies life.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29147"><span class=
+"ref">[29147] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, inter
+corpora naturalia imperfectiora sunt elementa. Sed eis attribuitur
+vita, dicuntur enim aquae vivae. Ergo multo magis alia corpora
+naturalia vitam habent.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
+margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the
+contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vi, 1) that "The last echo of
+life is heard in the plants," whereby it is inferred that their life
+is life in its lowest degree. But inanimate bodies are inferior to
+plants. Therefore they have not life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
+float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29148"><span class=
+"ref">[29148] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit Dionysius, VI cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>plantae
+secundum ultimam resonantiam vitae habent vivere</i>, ex quo potest
+accipi quod ultimum gradum vitae obtinent plantae. Sed corpora
+inanimata sunt infra plantas. Ergo eorum non est vivere.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We can gather to what things life belongs, and to what it does not, from such things as manifestly possess life. Now life manifestly belongs to animals, for it said in De Vegetab. i [*De Plantis i, 1] that in animals life is manifest. We must, therefore, distinguish living from lifeless things, by comparing them to that by reason of which animals are said to live: and this it is in which life is manifested first and remains last. We say then that an animal
   begins to live when it begins to move of itself: and as long as such movement appears in it, so long as it is considered to be alive. When it no longer has any movement of itself, but is only moved by another power, then its life is said to fail, and the animal to be dead. Whereby it is clear that those things are properly called living that move themselves by some kind of movement, whether it be movement properly so called, as the act of an imperfect being, i.e. of a thing in potentiality, is
-  called movement; or movement in a more general sense, as when said of the act of a perfect thing, as understanding and feeling are called movement. Accordingly all things are said to be alive that determine themselves to movement or operation of any kind: whereas those things that cannot by their nature do so, cannot be called living, unless by a similitude.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Philosopher may be understood either of the first movement, namely, that of the celestial bodies, or of the movement in its general sense. In either way is movement called the life, as it were, of natural bodies, speaking by a similitude, and not attributing it to them as their property. The movement of the heavens is in the universe of corporeal natures as the movement of the heart, whereby life is preserved, is in animals.
-  Similarly also every natural movement in respect to natural things has a certain similitude to the operations of life. Hence, if the whole corporeal universe were one animal, so that its movement came from an "intrinsic moving force," as some in fact have held, in that case movement would really be the life of all natural bodies.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To bodies, whether heavy or light, movement does not belong, except in so far as they are displaced from their natural conditions, and are out of their proper place; for when they are in the place that is proper and natural to them, then they are at rest. Plants and other living things move with vital movement, in accordance with the disposition of their nature, but not by approaching thereto, or by receding from it, for in so far as they recede from
-  such movement, so far do they recede from their natural disposition. Heavy and light bodies are moved by an extrinsic force, either generating them and giving them form, or removing obstacles from their way. They do not therefore move themselves, as do living bodies.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Waters are called living that have a continuous current: for standing waters, that are not connected with a continually flowing source, are called dead, as in cisterns and ponds. This is merely a similitude, inasmuch as the movement they are seen to possess makes them look as if they were alive. Yet this is not life in them in its real sense, since this movement of theirs is not from themselves but from the cause that generates them. The same is the
-  case with the movement of other heavy and light bodies.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2" next="FP_Q18_A3" prev="FP_Q18_A1" progress="3.31%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether life is an operation?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p0.1">Whether life is an operation?</h4>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is an operation. For nothing is divided except into parts of the same genus. But life is divided by certain operations, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 13), who distinguishes four kinds of life, namely, nourishment, sensation, local movement and understanding. Therefore life is an operation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the active life is said to be different from the contemplative. But the contemplative is only distinguished from the active by certain operations. Therefore life is an operation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to know God is an operation. But this is life, as is clear from the words of<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.18.3" parsed="vul|John|18|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p4.1" passage=" Jn. 18:3, "> Jn. 18:3, </scripRef> "Now this is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God." Therefore life is an operation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 37), "In living things, to live is to be."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+  called movement; or movement in a more general sense, as when said
+of the act of a perfect thing, as understanding and feeling are called
+movement. Accordingly all things are said to be alive that determine
+themselves to movement or operation of any kind: whereas those things
+that cannot by their nature do so, cannot be called living, unless by
+a similitude.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 1 co."><a name="29149"><span class=
+"ref">[29149] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod ex his quae manifeste vivunt, accipere possumus quorum sit
+vivere, et quorum non sit vivere. Vivere autem manifeste animalibus
+convenit, dicitur enim in libro de vegetabilibus, quod <i>vita in
+animalibus manifesta est</i>. Unde secundum illud oportet
+distinguere viventia a non viventibus secundum quod animalia
+dicuntur vivere. Hoc autem est in quo primo manifestatur vita, et
+in quo ultimo remanet. Primo autem dicimus animal vivere, quando
+incipit ex se motum habere; et tandiu iudicatur animal vivere,
+quandiu talis motus in eo apparet; quando vero iam ex se non habet
+aliquem motum, sed movetur tantum ab alio tunc dicitur animal
+mortuum, per defectum vitae. Ex quo patet quod illa proprie sunt
+viventia, quae seipsa secundum aliquam speciem motus movent; sive
+accipiatur motus proprie, sicut motus dicitur actus imperfecti,
+idest existentis in potentia; sive motus accipiatur communiter,
+prout motus dicitur actus perfecti, prout intelligere et sentire
+dicitur moveri, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ut sic viventia
+dicantur quaecumque se agunt ad motum vel operationem aliquam, ea
+vero in quorum natura non est ut se agant ad aliquem motum vel
+operationem, viventia dici non possunt, nisi per aliquam
+similitudinem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Philosopher may be understood either of the first movement, namely, that of the celestial bodies, or of the movement in its general sense. In either way is movement called the life, as it were, of natural bodies, speaking by a similitude, and not attributing it to them as their property. The movement of the heavens is in the universe of corporeal natures as the movement of the heart, whereby life is preserved, is in animals.
+  Similarly also every natural movement in respect to natural things
+has a certain similitude to the operations of life. Hence, if the
+whole corporeal universe were one animal, so that its movement came
+from an "intrinsic moving force," as some in fact have held, in that
+case movement would really be the life of all natural
+bodies.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29150"><span class=
+"ref">[29150] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod verbum illud philosophi potest intelligi vel de motu
+primo, scilicet corporum caelestium; vel de motu communiter. Et
+utroque modo motus dicitur quasi vita corporum naturalium, per
+similitudinem; et non per proprietatem. Nam motus caeli est in
+universo corporalium naturarum, sicut motus cordis in animali, quo
+conservatur vita. Similiter etiam quicumque motus naturalis hoc
+modo se habet ad res naturales, ut quaedam similitudo vitalis
+operationis. Unde, si totum universum corporale esset unum animal,
+ita quod iste motus esset a movente intrinseco, ut quidam
+posuerunt, sequeretur quod motus esset vita omnium naturalium
+corporum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To bodies, whether heavy or light, movement does not belong, except in so far as they are displaced from their natural conditions, and are out of their proper place; for when they are in the place that is proper and natural to them, then they are at rest. Plants and other living things move with vital movement, in accordance with the disposition of their nature, but not by approaching thereto, or by receding from it, for in so far as they recede from
+  such movement, so far do they recede from their natural
+disposition. Heavy and light bodies are moved by an extrinsic force,
+either generating them and giving them form, or removing obstacles
+from their way. They do not therefore move themselves, as do living
+bodies.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29151"><span class=
+"ref">[29151] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod corporibus gravibus et levibus non competit moveri,
+nisi secundum quod sunt extra dispositionem suae naturae, utpote
+cum sunt extra locum proprium, cum enim sunt in loco proprio et
+naturali, quiescunt. Sed plantae et aliae res viventes moventur
+motu vitali, secundum hoc quod sunt in sua dispositione naturali,
+non autem in accedendo ad eam vel in recedendo ab ea, imo secundum
+quod recedunt a tali motu, recedunt a naturali dispositione. Et
+praeterea, corpora gravia et levia moventur a motore extrinseco,
+vel generante, qui dat formam, vel removente prohibens, ut dicitur
+in VIII Physic., et ita non movent seipsa, sicut corpora
+viventia.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Waters are called living that have a continuous current: for standing waters, that are not connected with a continually flowing source, are called dead, as in cisterns and ponds. This is merely a similitude, inasmuch as the movement they are seen to possess makes them look as if they were alive. Yet this is not life in them in its real sense, since this movement of theirs is not from themselves but from the cause that generates them. The same is the
+  case with the movement of other heavy and light
+bodies.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 18 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29152"><span class=
+"ref">[29152] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod aquae vivae dicuntur, quae habent continuum fluxum,
+aquae enim stantes, quae non continuantur ad principium continue
+fluens, dicuntur mortuae, ut aquae cisternarum et lacunarum. Et hoc
+dicitur per similitudinem, inquantum enim videntur se movere,
+habent similitudinem vitae. Sed tamen non est in eis vera ratio
+vitae, quia hunc motum non habent a seipsis, sed a causa generante
+eas; sicut accidit circa motum aliorum gravium et levium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2" next="FP_Q18_A3" prev="FP_Q18_A1" progress="3.31%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether life is an operation?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p0.1">Whether life is an operation?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p2"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is an
+operation. For nothing is divided except into parts of the same
+genus. But life is divided by certain operations, as is clear from the
+Philosopher (De Anima ii, 13), who distinguishes four kinds of life,
+namely, nourishment, sensation, local movement and
+understanding. Therefore life is an operation.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29153"><span class=
+"ref">[29153] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod vita sit quaedam operatio. Nihil enim
+dividitur nisi per ea quae sunt sui generis. Sed vivere dividitur
+per operationes quasdam, ut patet per philosophum in II libro de
+anima, qui distinguit vivere per quatuor, scilicet alimento uti,
+sentire, moveri secundum locum, et intelligere. Ergo vita est
+operatio quaedam.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p3"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the active life is said
+to be different from the contemplative. But the contemplative is only
+distinguished from the active by certain operations. Therefore life is
+an operation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29154"><span class=
+"ref">[29154] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, vita
+activa dicitur alia esse a contemplativa. Sed contemplativi ab
+activis non diversificantur nisi secundum operationes quasdam. Ergo
+vita est quaedam operatio.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p4"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to know God is an
+operation. But this is life, as is clear from the words of<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:John.18.3" parsed="vul|John|18|3|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p4.1" passage=" Jn. 18:3, "> Jn. 18:3,
+</scripRef> "Now this is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the
+only true God." Therefore life is an operation.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29155"><span class=
+"ref">[29155] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+cognoscere Deum est operatio quaedam. Haec autem est vita, ut patet
+per illud Ioan. XVII, <i>haec est autem vita aeterna, ut cognoscant
+te solum verum Deum</i>. Ergo vita est operatio.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p5"
+shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima
+ii, 37), "In living things, to live is to be."</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29156"><span class=
+"ref">[29156] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit philosophus, in II de anima, <i>vivere viventibus est
+esse</i>.</p></div></div>
 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[17], A[3]</a>), our intellect, which takes cognizance of the essence of a thing as its proper object, gains knowledge from sense, of which the proper objects are external accidents. Hence from external appearances we come to the knowledge of the essence of things. And because we name a thing in accordance with our knowledge of it, as is clear from what has already been said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[1]</a>), so from external properties names are often imposed to signify essences. Hence such names are sometimes taken strictly to denote the essence itself, the signification of which is their principal object; but sometimes, and less strictly, to denote the properties by reason of which they are imposed. And so we see that the word "body" is used to denote a genus of substances from the fact of their possessing three dimensions: and is sometimes taken to denote the
   dimensions themselves; in which sense body is said to be a species of quantity. The same must be said of life. The name is given from a certain external appearance, namely, self-movement, yet not precisely to signify this, but rather a substance to which self-movement and the application of itself to any kind of operation, belong naturally. To live, accordingly, is nothing else than to exist in this or that nature; and life signifies this, though in the abstract, just as the word "running"
   denotes "to run" in the abstract.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p7" shownumber="no"> Hence "living" is not an accidental but an essential predicate. Sometimes, however, life is used less properly for the operations from which its name is taken, and thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is principally to sense or to understand.</p>
-</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 2 co."><a name="29157"><span class=
+"ref">[29157] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod, sicut ex dictis patet, intellectus noster, qui proprie est
+cognoscitivus quidditatis rei ut proprii obiecti, accipit a sensu,
+cuius propria obiecta sunt accidentia exteriora. Et inde est quod
+ex his quae exterius apparent de re, devenimus ad cognoscendam
+essentiam rei. Et quia sic nominamus aliquid sicut cognoscimus
+illud, ut ex supradictis patet, inde est quod plerumque a
+proprietatibus exterioribus imponuntur nomina ad significandas
+essentias rerum. Unde huiusmodi nomina quandoque accipiuntur
+proprie pro ipsis essentiis rerum, ad quas significandas
+principaliter sunt imposita, aliquando autem sumuntur pro
+proprietatibus a quibus imponuntur, et hoc minus proprie. Sicut
+patet quod hoc nomen corpus impositum est ad significandum quoddam
+genus substantiarum, ex eo quod in eis inveniuntur tres
+dimensiones, et ideo aliquando ponitur hoc nomen corpus ad
+significandas tres dimensiones, secundum quod corpus ponitur
+species quantitatis. Sic ergo dicendum est et de vita. Nam vitae
+nomen sumitur ex quodam exterius apparenti circa rem, quod est
+movere seipsum, non tamen est impositum hoc nomen ad hoc
+significandum, sed ad significandam substantiam cui convenit
+secundum suam naturam movere seipsam, vel agere se quocumque modo
+ad operationem. Et secundum hoc, vivere nihil aliud est quam esse
+in tali natura, et vita significat hoc ipsum, sed in abstracto;
+sicut hoc nomen cursus significat ipsum currere in abstracto. Unde
+vivum non est praedicatum accidentale, sed substantiale. Quandoque
+tamen vita sumitur minus proprie pro operationibus vitae, a quibus
+nomen vitae assumitur; sicut dicit philosophus, IX Ethic., quod
+<i>vivere principaliter est sentire vel intelligere</i>.</p></div></div>
 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher here takes "to live" to mean an operation of life. Or it would be better to say that sensation and intelligence and the like, are sometimes taken for the operations, sometimes for the existence itself of the operator. For he says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is to sense or to understand---in other words, to have a nature capable of sensation or understanding. Thus, then, he distinguishes life by the four operations mentioned. For in
-  this lower world there are four kinds of living things. It is the nature of some to be capable of nothing more than taking nourishment, and, as a consequence, of growing and generating. Others are able, in addition, to sense, as we see in the case of shellfish and other animals without movement. Others have the further power of moving from place to place, as perfect animals, such as quadrupeds, and birds, and so on. Others, as man, have the still higher faculty of understanding.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+  this lower world there are four kinds of living things. It is the
+nature of some to be capable of nothing more than taking nourishment,
+and, as a consequence, of growing and generating. Others are able, in
+addition, to sense, as we see in the case of shellfish and other
+animals without movement. Others have the further power of moving from
+place to place, as perfect animals, such as quadrupeds, and birds, and
+so on. Others, as man, have the still higher faculty of
+understanding.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29158"><span class=
+"ref">[29158] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod philosophus ibi accipit vivere pro operatione vitae.
+Vel dicendum est melius, quod sentire et intelligere, et huiusmodi,
+quandoque sumuntur pro quibusdam operationibus; quandoque autem pro
+ipso esse sic operantium. Dicitur enim IX Ethic., quod <i>esse est
+sentire vel intelligere</i>, idest habere naturam ad sentiendum vel
+intelligendum. Et hoc modo distinguit philosophus vivere per illa
+quatuor. Nam in istis inferioribus quatuor sunt genera viventium.
+Quorum quaedam habent naturam solum ad utendum alimento, et ad
+consequentia, quae sunt augmentum et generatio; quaedam ulterius ad
+sentiendum, ut patet in animalibus immobilibus, sicut sunt ostrea;
+quaedam vero, cum his, ulterius ad movendum se secundum locum,
+sicut animalia perfecta, ut quadrupedia et volatilia et huiusmodi;
+quaedam vero ulterius ad intelligendum, sicut homines.</p></div></div>
 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By vital operations are meant those whose principles are within the operator, and in virtue of which the operator produces such operations of itself. It happens that there exist in men not merely such natural principles of certain operations as are their natural powers, but something over and above these, such as habits inclining them like a second nature to particular kinds of operations, so that the operations become sources of pleasure. Thus, as by
   a similitude, any kind of work in which a man takes delight, so that his bent is towards it, his time spent in it, and his whole life ordered with a view to it, is said to be the life of that man. Hence some are said to lead to life of self-indulgence, others a life of virtue. In this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the active, and thus to know God is said to be life eternal.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p10" shownumber="no"> Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.</p>
-</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29159"><span class=
+"ref">[29159] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod opera vitae dicuntur, quorum principia sunt in
+operantibus, ut seipsos inducant in tales operationes. Contingit
+autem aliquorum operum inesse hominibus non solum principia
+naturalia, ut sunt potentiae naturales; sed etiam quaedam
+superaddita, ut sunt habitus inclinantes ad quaedam operationum
+genera quasi per modum naturae, et facientes illas operationes esse
+delectabiles. Et ex hoc dicitur, quasi per quandam similitudinem,
+quod illa operatio quae est homini delectabilis, et ad quam
+inclinatur, et in qua conversatur, et ordinat vitam suam ad ipsam,
+dicitur vita hominis, unde quidam dicuntur agere vitam luxuriosam,
+quidam vitam honestam. Et per hunc modum vita contemplativa ab
+activa distinguitur. Et per hunc etiam modum cognoscere Deum
+dicitur vita aeterna.</p><p title="I q. 18 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29160"><span class=
+"ref">[29160] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Unde patet solutio
+ad tertium.</p></div></div>
 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3" next="FP_Q18_A4" prev="FP_Q18_A2" progress="3.34%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether life is properly attributed to God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p0.1">Whether life is properly attributed to God?</h4>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is not properly attributed to God. For things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as previously stated <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[2])</a>. But movement does not belong to God. Neither therefore does life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in all living things we must needs suppose some principle of life. Hence it is said by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 4) that "the soul is the cause and principle of the living body." But God has no principle. Therefore life cannot be attributed to Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the principle of life in the living things that exist among us is the vegetative soul. But this exists only in corporeal things. Therefore life cannot be attributed to incorporeal things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.83.3" parsed="vul|Ps|83|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p5.1" passage="Ps. 83:3">Ps. 83:3</scripRef>): "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p2"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is not properly
+attributed to God. For things are said to live inasmuch as they move
+themselves, as previously stated <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p2.1"
+href="#FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2" shape="rect"
+xml:link="simple">(A[2])</a>. But movement does not belong to
+God. Neither therefore does life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
+float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29161"><span class=
+"ref">[29161] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod Deo non conveniat vita. Vivere enim
+dicuntur aliqua secundum quod movent seipsa, ut dictum est. Sed Deo
+non competit moveri. Ergo neque vivere.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p3"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in all living things we
+must needs suppose some principle of life. Hence it is said by the
+Philosopher (De Anima ii, 4) that "the soul is the cause and principle
+of the living body." But God has no principle. Therefore life cannot
+be attributed to Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29162"><span class=
+"ref">[29162] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in
+omnibus quae vivunt, est accipere aliquod vivendi principium, unde
+dicitur in II de anima, quod <i>anima est viventis corporis causa
+et principium</i>. Sed Deus non habet aliquod principium. Ergo sibi
+non competit vivere.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p4"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the principle of life in
+the living things that exist among us is the vegetative soul. But this
+exists only in corporeal things. Therefore life cannot be attributed
+to incorporeal things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29163"><span class=
+"ref">[29163] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+principium vitae in rebus viventibus quae apud nos sunt, est anima
+vegetabilis, quae non est nisi in rebus corporalibus. Ergo rebus
+incorporalibus non competit vivere.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p5"
+shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.83.3" parsed="vul|Ps|83|3|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p5.1"
+passage="Ps. 83:3">Ps. 83:3</scripRef>): "My heart and my flesh have
+rejoiced in the living God."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29164"><span class=
+"ref">[29164] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur in Psalmo LXXXIII, <i>cor meum et caro mea
+exultaverunt in Deum vivum</i>.</p></div></div>
 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Life is in the highest degree properly in God. In proof of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to live in so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another, the more perfectly this power is found in anything, the more perfect is the life of that thing. In things that move and are moved, a threefold order is found. In the first place, the end moves the agent: and the principal agent is that which acts through its form, and
   sometimes it does so through some instrument that acts by virtue not of its own form, but of the principal agent, and does no more than execute the action. Accordingly there are things that move themselves, not in respect of any form or end naturally inherent in them, but only in respect of the executing of the movement; the form by which they act, and the end of the action being alike determined for them by their nature. Of this kind are plants, which move themselves according to their
@@ -2278,18 +3854,257 @@
   their operation, or movement; for this has been implanted in them by nature; and by natural instinct they are moved to any action through the form apprehended by sense. Hence such animals as move themselves in respect to an end they themselves propose are superior to these. This can only be done by reason and intellect; whose province it is to know the proportion between the end and the means to that end, and duly coordinate them. Hence a more perfect degree of life is that of intelligible
   beings; for their power of self-movement is more perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one and the same man the intellectual faculty moves the sensitive powers; and these by their command move the organs of movement. Thus in the arts we see that the art of using a ship, i.e. the art of navigation, rules the art of ship-designing; and this in its turn rules the art that is only concerned with preparing the material for the ship.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p8" shownumber="no"> But although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are supplied by nature, as are first principles, which it cannot doubt; and the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with respect to some things it moves itself, yet with regard to other things it must be moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is its very nature, and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most perfect
   degree. Such is God; and hence in Him principally is life. From this the Philosopher concludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after showing God to be intelligent, that God has life most perfect and eternal, since His intellect is most perfect and always in act.</p>
-</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 3 co."><a name="29165"><span class=
+"ref">[29165] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod vita maxime proprie in Deo est. Ad cuius evidentiam,
+considerandum est quod, cum vivere dicantur aliqua secundum quod
+operantur ex seipsis, et non quasi ab aliis mota; quanto perfectius
+competit hoc alicui, tanto perfectius in eo invenitur vita. In
+moventibus autem et motis tria per ordinem inveniuntur. Nam primo,
+finis movet agentem; agens vero principale est quod per suam formam
+agit; et hoc interdum agit per aliquod instrumentum, quod non agit
+ex virtute suae formae, sed ex virtute principalis agentis; cui
+instrumento competit sola executio actionis. Inveniuntur igitur
+quaedam, quae movent seipsa, non habito respectu ad formam vel
+finem, quae inest eis a natura, sed solum quantum ad executionem
+motus, sed forma per quam agunt, et finis propter quem agunt,
+determinantur eis a natura. Et huiusmodi sunt plantae, quae
+secundum formam inditam eis a natura, movent seipsas secundum
+augmentum et decrementum. Quaedam vero ulterius movent seipsa, non
+solum habito respectu ad executionem motus, sed etiam quantum ad
+formam quae est principium motus, quam per se acquirunt. Et
+huiusmodi sunt animalia, quorum motus principium est forma non a
+natura indita, sed per sensum accepta. Unde quanto perfectiorem
+sensum habent, tanto perfectius movent seipsa. Nam ea quae non
+habent nisi sensum tactus, movent solum seipsa motu dilatationis et
+constrictionis, ut ostrea, parum excedentia motum plantae. Quae
+vero habent virtutem sensitivam perfectam, non solum ad
+cognoscendum coniuncta et tangentia, sed etiam ad cognoscendum
+distantia, movent seipsa in remotum motu processivo. Sed quamvis
+huiusmodi animalia formam quae est principium motus, per sensum
+accipiant, non tamen per seipsa praestituunt sibi finem suae
+operationis, vel sui motus; sed est eis inditus a natura, cuius
+instinctu ad aliquid agendum moventur per formam sensu apprehensam.
+Unde supra talia animalia sunt illa quae movent seipsa, etiam
+habito respectu ad finem, quem sibi praestituunt. Quod quidem non
+fit nisi per rationem et intellectum, cuius est cognoscere
+proportionem finis et eius quod est ad finem, et unum ordinare in
+alterum. Unde perfectior modus vivendi est eorum quae habent
+intellectum, haec enim perfectius movent seipsa. Et huius est
+signum, quod in uno et eodem homine virtus intellectiva movet
+potentias sensitivas; et potentiae sensitivae per suum imperium
+movent organa, quae exequuntur motum. Sicut etiam in artibus,
+videmus quod ars ad quam pertinet usus navis, scilicet ars
+gubernatoria, praecipit ei quae inducit formam navis, et haec
+praecipit illi quae habet executionem tantum, in disponendo
+materiam. Sed quamvis intellectus noster ad aliqua se agat, tamen
+aliqua sunt ei praestituta a natura; sicut sunt prima principia,
+circa quae non potest aliter se habere, et ultimus finis, quem non
+potest non velle. Unde, licet quantum ad aliquid moveat se, tamen
+oportet quod quantum ad aliqua ab alio moveatur. Illud igitur cuius
+sua natura est ipsum eius intelligere, et cui id quod naturaliter
+habet, non determinatur ab alio, hoc est quod obtinet summum gradum
+vitae. Tale autem est Deus. Unde in Deo maxime est vita. Unde
+philosophus, in XII Metaphys., ostenso quod Deus sit intelligens,
+concludit quod habeat vitam perfectissimam et sempiternam, quia
+intellectus eius est perfectissimus, et semper in actu.</p></div></div>
 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in Metaph. ix, 16, action is twofold. Actions of one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat or to cut; whilst actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand, to sense and to will. The difference between them is this, that the former action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of the thing moved; whereas the latter action is the perfection of the agent. Hence, because movement is an act of the thing in
   movement, the latter action, in so far as it is the act of the operator, is called its movement, by this similitude, that as movement is an act of the thing moved, so an act of this kind is the act of the agent, although movement is an act of the imperfect, that is, of what is in potentiality; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that is to say, of what is in act as stated in De Anima iii, 28. In the sense, therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which understands itself
-  is said to move itself. It is in this sense that Plato also taught that God moves Himself; not in the sense in which movement is an act of the imperfect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God is His own very existence and understanding, so is He His own life; and therefore He so lives that He has not principle of life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Life in this lower world is bestowed on a corruptible nature, that needs generation to preserve the species, and nourishment to preserve the individual. For this reason life is not found here below apart from a vegetative soul: but this does not hold good with incorruptible natures.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
-</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4" next="FP_Q19" prev="FP_Q18_A3" progress="3.38%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether all things are life in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p0.1">Whether all things are life in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not all things are life in God. For it is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Acts.17.28" parsed="vul|Acts|17|28|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p2.1" passage="Acts 17:28">Acts 17:28</scripRef>), "In Him we live, and move, and be." But not all things in God are movement. Therefore not all things are life in Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all things are in God as their first model. But things modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not all things have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29), a living substance is better than a substance that does not live. If, therefore, things which in themselves have not life, are life in God, it seems that things exist more truly in God than themselves. But this appears to be false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in God potentially.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as good things and things made in time are known by God, so are bad things, and things that God can make, but never will be made. If, therefore, all things are life in God, inasmuch as known by Him, it seems that even bad things and things that will never be made are life in God, as known by Him, and this appears inadmissible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.1.3-John.1.4" parsed="vul|John|1|3|1|4" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p6.1" passage="Jn. 1:3,4">Jn. 1:3,4</scripRef>), it is said, "What was made, in Him was life." But all things were made, except God. Therefore all things are life in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> In God to live is to understand, as before stated <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>. In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as understood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been made by God are in Him as things understood, it follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold sense. In one way, so far are they are held together and preserved by the divine power; even as we say that things that are in our power are in us. And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they exist in their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the Apostle when he says, "In Him we live, move, and be"; since our being, living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In
-  another sense things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows them, in which sense they are in God through their proper ideas, which in God are not distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they are in God are the divine essence. And since the divine essence is life and not movement, it follows that things existing in God in this manner are not movement, but life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The thing modelled must be like the model according to the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form has being of another kind in the model from that which it has in the thing modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the architect immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that exists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence the ideas of things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine mind,
-  as having a divine existence in that mind.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in the divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which reason, in fact, Plato held that the "separate" man was the true man; and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by participation. But since matter enters into the being of natural things, we must say that those things have simply being in the divine mind more
+  is said to move itself. It is in this sense that Plato also taught
+that God moves Himself; not in the sense in which movement is an act
+of the imperfect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29166"><span class=
+"ref">[29166] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in IX Metaphys., duplex est actio,
+una, quae transit in exteriorem materiam, ut calefacere et secare;
+alia, quae manet in agente, ut intelligere, sentire et velle.
+Quarum haec est differentia, quia prima actio non est perfectio
+agentis quod movet, sed ipsius moti; secunda autem actio est
+perfectio agentis. Unde, quia motus est actus mobilis, secunda
+actio, inquantum est actus operantis, dicitur motus eius; ex hac
+similitudine, quod, sicut motus est actus mobilis, ita huiusmodi
+actio est actus agentis; licet motus sit actus imperfecti, scilicet
+existentis in potentia, huiusmodi autem actio est actus perfecti,
+idest existentis in actu, ut dicitur in III de anima. Hoc igitur
+modo quo intelligere est motus, id quod se intelligit, dicitur se
+movere. Et per hunc modum etiam Plato posuit quod Deus movet
+seipsum, non eo modo quo motus est actus imperfecti.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p10"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God is His own very
+existence and understanding, so is He His own life; and therefore He
+so lives that He has not principle of life.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29167"><span class=
+"ref">[29167] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, sicut Deus est ipsum suum esse et suum intelligere,
+ita est suum vivere. Et propter hoc, sic vivit, quod non habet
+vivendi principium.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p11"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Life in this lower world
+is bestowed on a corruptible nature, that needs generation to preserve
+the species, and nourishment to preserve the individual. For this
+reason life is not found here below apart from a vegetative soul: but
+this does not hold good with incorruptible natures.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29168"><span class=
+"ref">[29168] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod vita in istis inferioribus recipitur in natura
+corruptibili, quae indiget et generatione ad conservationem
+speciei, et alimento ad conservationem individui. Et propter hoc,
+in istis inferioribus non invenitur vita sine anima vegetabili. Sed
+hoc non habet locum in rebus incorruptibilibus.</p></div></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4" next="FP_Q19" prev="FP_Q18_A3"
+progress="3.38%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether all things are
+life in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p0.1">Whether all things are life in
+God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width:
+45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p2"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not all things are
+life in God. For it is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Acts.17.28"
+parsed="vul|Acts|17|28|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p2.1"
+passage="Acts 17:28">Acts 17:28</scripRef>), "In Him we live, and
+move, and be." But not all things in God are movement. Therefore not
+all things are life in Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29169"><span class=
+"ref">[29169] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia sint vita in Deo. Dicitur enim
+Act. XVII, <i>in ipso vivimus, movemur et sumus</i>. Sed non omnia
+in Deo sunt motus. Ergo non omnia in ipso sunt
+vita.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
+style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
+Further, all things are in God as their first model. But things
+modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not all things
+have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life in
+God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29170"><span class=
+"ref">[29170] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnia
+sunt in Deo sicut in primo exemplari. Sed exemplata debent
+conformari exemplari. Cum igitur non omnia vivant in seipsis,
+videtur quod non omnia in Deo sint vita.</p></div></div><div
+style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
+left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p4"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De
+Vera Relig. 29), a living substance is better than a substance that
+does not live. If, therefore, things which in themselves have not
+life, are life in God, it seems that things exist more truly in God
+than themselves. But this appears to be false; since in themselves
+they exist actually, but in God potentially.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29171"><span class=
+"ref">[29171] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
+Augustinus dicit in libro de vera Relig., substantia vivens est
+melior qualibet substantia non vivente. Si igitur ea quae in
+seipsis non vivunt, in Deo sunt vita, videtur quod verius sint res
+in Deo quam in seipsis. Quod tamen videtur esse falsum, cum in
+seipsis sint in actu, in Deo vero in potentia.</p></div></div><div
+style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
+left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p5"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as good things and
+things made in time are known by God, so are bad things, and things
+that God can make, but never will be made. If, therefore, all things
+are life in God, inasmuch as known by Him, it seems that even bad
+things and things that will never be made are life in God, as known by
+Him, and this appears inadmissible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
+float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="29172"><span class=
+"ref">[29172] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
+sciuntur a Deo bona, et ea quae fiunt secundum aliquod tempus; ita
+mala, et ea quae Deus potest facere, sed nunquam fiunt. Si ergo
+omnia sunt vita in Deo, inquantum sunt scita ab ipso, videtur quod
+etiam mala, et quae nunquam fiunt, sunt vita in Deo, inquantum sunt
+scita ab eo. Quod videtur inconveniens.</p></div></div><div
+style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
+left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p6"
+shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:John.1.3-John.1.4" parsed="vul|John|1|3|1|4"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p6.1"
+passage="Jn. 1:3,4">Jn. 1:3,4</scripRef>), it is said, "What was made,
+in Him was life." But all things were made, except God. Therefore all
+things are life in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29173"><span class=
+"ref">[29173] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur Ioan. I, <i>quod factum est, in ipso vita erat</i>.
+Sed omnia praeter Deum facta sunt. Ergo omnia in Deo sunt
+vita.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
+style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b>
+In God to live is to understand, as before stated <a
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3"
+shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>. In God intellect, the thing
+understood, and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence
+whatever is in God as understood is the very living or life of
+God. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been made by God are
+in Him as things understood, it follows that all things in Him are the
+divine life itself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 co."><a name="29174"><span class=
+"ref">[29174] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod, sicut dictum est, vivere Dei est eius intelligere. In Deo
+autem est idem intellectus et quod intelligitur, et ipsum
+intelligere eius. Unde quidquid est in Deo ut intellectum, est
+ipsum vivere vel vita eius. Unde, cum omnia quae facta sunt a Deo,
+sint in ipso ut intellecta, sequitur quod omnia in ipso sunt ipsa
+vita divina.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold sense. In one way, so far are they are held together and preserved by the divine power; even as we say that things that are in our power are in us. And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they exist in their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the Apostle when he says, "In Him we live, move, and be"; since our being, living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In
+  another sense things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows
+them, in which sense they are in God through their proper ideas, which
+in God are not distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they
+are in God are the divine essence. And since the divine essence is
+life and not movement, it follows that things existing in God in this
+manner are not movement, but life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
+float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29175"><span class=
+"ref">[29175] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod creaturae in Deo esse dicuntur dupliciter. Uno modo,
+inquantum continentur et conservantur virtute divina, sicut dicimus
+ea esse in nobis, quae sunt in nostra potestate. Et sic creaturae
+dicuntur esse in Deo, etiam prout sunt in propriis naturis. Et hoc
+modo intelligendum est verbum apostoli dicentis, <i>in ipso
+vivimus, movemur et sumus</i>, quia et nostrum vivere, et nostrum
+esse, et nostrum moveri causantur a Deo. Alio modo dicuntur res
+esse in Deo sicut in cognoscente. Et sic sunt in Deo per proprias
+rationes, quae non sunt aliud in Deo ab essentia divina. Unde res,
+prout sic in Deo sunt, sunt essentia divina. Et quia essentia
+divina est vita, non autem motus, inde est quod res, hoc modo
+loquendi, in Deo non sunt motus, sed vita.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The thing modelled must be like the model according to the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form has being of another kind in the model from that which it has in the thing modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the architect immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that exists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence the ideas of things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine mind,
+  as having a divine existence in that mind.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29176"><span class=
+"ref">[29176] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod exemplata oportet conformari exemplari secundum
+rationem formae, non autem secundum modum essendi. Nam alterius
+modi esse habet quandoque forma in exemplari et in exemplato, sicut
+forma domus in mente artificis habet esse immateriale et
+intelligibile, in domo autem quae est extra animam, habet esse
+materiale et sensibile. Unde et rationes rerum quae in seipsis non
+vivunt, in mente divina sunt vita, quia in mente divina habent esse
+divinum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in the divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which reason, in fact, Plato held that the "separate" man was the true man; and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by participation. But since matter enters into the being of natural things, we must say that those things have simply being in the divine mind more
   truly than in themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated being, but in themselves a created being: whereas this particular being, a man, or horse, for example, has this being more truly in its own nature than in the divine mind, because it belongs to human nature to be material, which, as existing in the divine mind, it is not. Even so a house has nobler being in the architect's mind than in matter; yet a material house is called a house more truly than the one which exists in the
-  mind; since the former is actual, the latter only potential.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although bad things are in God's knowledge, as being comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as created by Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him. They are known by God through the types of good things. Hence it cannot be said that bad things are life in God. Those things that are not in time may be called life in God in so far as life means understanding only, and inasmuch as they are understood by God; but not in so
-  far as life implies a principle of operation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19" next="FP_Q19_A1" prev="FP_Q18_A4" progress="3.41%" n="xviii" title="Question. 19 - THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)">
+  mind; since the former is actual, the latter only
+potential.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29177"><span class=
+"ref">[29177] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, si de ratione rerum naturalium non esset materia,
+sed tantum forma, omnibus modis veriori modo essent res naturales
+in mente divina per suas ideas, quam in seipsis. Propter quod et
+Plato posuit quod homo separatus erat verus homo, homo autem
+materialis est homo per participationem. Sed quia de ratione rerum
+naturalium est materia, dicendum quod res naturales verius esse
+habent simpliciter in mente divina, quam in seipsis, quia in mente
+divina habent esse increatum, in seipsis autem esse creatum. Sed
+esse hoc, utpote homo vel equus, verius habent in propria natura
+quam in mente divina, quia ad veritatem hominis pertinet esse
+materiale, quod non habent in mente divina. Sicut domus nobilius
+esse habet in mente artificis, quam in materia, sed tamen verius
+dicitur domus quae est in materia, quam quae est in mente; quia
+haec est domus in actu, illa autem domus in potentia.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although bad things are in God's knowledge, as being comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as created by Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him. They are known by God through the types of good things. Hence it cannot be said that bad things are life in God. Those things that are not in time may be called life in God in so far as life means understanding only, and inasmuch as they are understood by God; but not in so
+  far as life implies a principle of operation.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="29178"><span class=
+"ref">[29178] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod, licet mala sint in Dei scientia, inquantum sub Dei
+scientia comprehenduntur, non tamen sunt in Deo sicut creata a Deo
+vel conservata ab ipso, neque sicut habentia rationem in Deo,
+cognoscuntur enim a Deo per rationes bonorum. Unde non potest dici
+quod mala sint vita in Deo. Ea vero quae secundum nullum tempus
+sunt, possunt dici esse vita in Deo, secundum quod vivere nominat
+intelligere tantum, inquantum intelliguntur a Deo, non autem
+secundum quod vivere importat principium
+operationis.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19" next="FP_Q19_A1" prev="FP_Q18_A4" progress="3.41%" n="xviii" title="Question. 19 - THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)">
 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p0.1">Question 19. THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p2" shownumber="no"> After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether there is will in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p7" shownumber="no"> (5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p8" shownumber="no"> (6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p9" shownumber="no"> (7) Whether the will of God is mutable?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p10" shownumber="no"> (8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p11" shownumber="no"> (9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p12" shownumber="no"> (10) Whether God has free will?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p13" shownumber="no"> (11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p14" shownumber="no"> (12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</p>