Mercurial > hg > Aquinas
changeset 62:65a42d281c99
auto-split, with hand corrections
| author | ht |
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| date | Sun, 03 Jan 2010 14:36:37 +0000 |
| parents | bfebbcb9ddf1 |
| children | 4665e252e26e |
| files | summa/english/FP_ii.html |
| diffstat | 1 files changed, 10586 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) [+] |
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--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/summa/english/FP_ii.html Sun Jan 03 14:36:37 2010 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,10586 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FP.ii" class="div2"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q1_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q2.html"></a> + <h2 id="FP.ii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ[2]-26)</h2> + <div id="FP_Q2" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP.ii.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q2_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q2-p0.1">THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q2-p2"> Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is + the beginning of things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures, as is clear from what has been already said, + therefore, in our endeavor to expound this science, we shall treat: (1) Of God; (2) Of the rational creature's advance towards + God; (3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2-p3"> In treating of God there will be a threefold division, for we shall consider: (1) Whatever concerns the Divine Essence; (2) + Whatever concerns the distinctions of Persons; (3) Whatever concerns the procession of creatures from Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2-p4"> Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider: (1) Whether God exists? (2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what + is NOT the manner of His existence; (3) Whatever concerns His operations---namely, His knowledge, will, power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2-p5"> Concerning the first, there are three points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q2-p6"> (1) Whether the proposition "God exists" is self-evident?</p> + <p id="FP_Q2-p7"> (2) Whether it is demonstrable?</p> + <p id="FP_Q2-p8"> (3) Whether God exists?</p> + <div id="FP_Q2_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q2_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q2_A1-p0.1">Whether the existence of God is self-evident?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the existence of God is self-evident. Now those things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which + is naturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to first principles. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), "the + knowledge of God is naturally implanted in all." Therefore the existence of God is self-evident. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1 + Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, + it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word "God" is + understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than + which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only + mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word "God" is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually. + Therefore the proposition "God exists" is self-evident. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist: + and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition "Truth does not exist" is true: and if there is anything true, there must + be truth. But God is truth itself: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.6" target="asv">Jn. 14:6</a>) Therefore "God exists" is self-evident. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states concerning + the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the proposition "God is" can be mentally admitted: "The fool said + in his heart, There is no God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.52.1" target="asv">Ps. 52:1</a>). Therefore, that God exists is not self-evident. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other, + self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, + as "Man is an animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject + be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with + regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of, such as + being and non-being, whole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject + is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate + and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: "Whether all that + is, + is good"), "that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in + space." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the + subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown ( + <a id="FP_Q2_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated + by things that are more + known to us, though less known in their nature---namely, by effects. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude. For + man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not + to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, + even though it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are who + imagine that man's perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and others in pleasures, and others in something else. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God" understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, + seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified + something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what + the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can + it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater + can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The existence of truth in general is self-evident but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q2_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q2_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q2_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q2_A2-p0.1">Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated. For it is an article of faith that God exists. But what is of + faith cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration produces scientific knowledge; whereas faith is of the unseen ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>). Therefore it cannot be demonstrated that God exists. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the essence is the middle term of demonstration. But we cannot know in what God's essence consists, but solely in + what it does not consist; as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4). Therefore we cannot demonstrate that God exists. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the existence of God were demonstrated, this could only be from His effects. But His effects are not proportionate + to Him, since He is infinite and His effects are finite; and between the finite and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, + since a cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says: "The invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv">Rom. 1:20</a>). But this would not be unless the existence of God could be demonstrated through the things that are made; for the first + thing we must know of anything is whether it exists. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through the cause, and is called "a priori," and this is to argue from what + is prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration "a posteriori"; this is to argue from + what is prior relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the + knowledge of the cause. And from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be + demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect + exists, the cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated + from those of His effects which are known to us. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but + are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes + something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as + a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically + known and demonstrated. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the cause + in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case in regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence + of anything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word, and not its essence, for the question of + its essence follows on the question of its existence. Now the names given to God are + derived from His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from His effects, we may take for the middle + term the meaning of the word "God". + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From effects not proportionate to the cause no perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect the + existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though + from them we cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q2_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q2_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q2_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q2_A3-p0.1">Whether God exists?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. + But the word "God" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but + there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it + seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural + things can be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle which is + human reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose God's existence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in the person of God: "I am Who am." ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.3.14" target="asv">Ex. 3:14</a>) + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The existence of God can be proved in five ways. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p6"> The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world + some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is + in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing + else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality + to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is + potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be + at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot + simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same + respect + and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion + must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs + be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no + first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion + by the + first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first + mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p7"> The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. + There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for + so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because + in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the + intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away + the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, + nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient + cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. + Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p8"> The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and + not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. + But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything + is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, + even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already + existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to + exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence---which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but + there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused + by + another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, + as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having + of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men + speak of as God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p9"> The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, + noble and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different + ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; + so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, + something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in + Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause + of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every + other perfection; and this we call God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p10"> The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, + act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best + result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence + cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the + arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to + their end; and this being we call God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): "Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless + His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil." This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that + He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be + traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause + other than human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect + must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown + in the body of the Article. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q2_A3-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q2_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP.ii.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q2_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q3" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q3-p0.1">OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q3-p2"> When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the further question of the manner of its existence, in + order that we may know its essence. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather what He is not, we have no means for + considering how God is, but rather how He is not. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3-p3"> Therefore, we must consider: (1) How He is not; (2) How He is known by us; (3) How He is named.</p> + <p id="FP_Q3-p4"> Now it can be shown how God is not, by denying Him whatever is opposed to the idea of Him, viz. composition, motion, and + the like. Therefore (1) we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we deny composition in Him; and because whatever is simple + in material things is imperfect and a part of something else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection; (3) His infinity; (4) His + immutability; (5) His unity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3-p5"> Concerning His simplicity, there are eight points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q3-p6"> (1) Whether God is a body?</p> + <p id="FP_Q3-p7"> (2) Whether He is composed of matter and form?</p> + <p id="FP_Q3-p8"> (3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence or nature, and subject?</p> + <p id="FP_Q3-p9"> (4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence?</p> + <p id="FP_Q3-p10"> (5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference?</p> + <p id="FP_Q3-p11"> (6) Whether He is composed of subject and accident?</p> + <p id="FP_Q3-p12"> (7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple?</p> + <p id="FP_Q3-p13"> (8) Whether He enters into composition with other things?</p> + <div id="FP_Q3_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q3_A1-p0.1">Whether God is a body?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three dimensions + to God, for it is written: "He is higher than Heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know? + The measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.11.8" target="asv">Job 11:8,9</a>). Therefore God is a body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything that has figure is a body, since figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for it + is written: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>). Now a figure is called an image, according to the text: "Who being the brightness of His glory and the figure," i.e. the + image, "of His substance" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.3" target="asv">Heb. 1:3</a>). Therefore God is a body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now Scripture attributes corporeal parts to God. "Hast thou an arm like + God?" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.40.4" target="asv">Job 40:4</a>); and "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.16" target="asv">Ps. 33:16</a>); and "The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.117.16" target="asv">Ps. 117:16</a>). Therefore God is a body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, posture belongs only to bodies. But something which supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: "I saw the + Lord sitting" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.1" target="asv">Is. 6:1</a>), and "He standeth up to judge" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.3.13" target="asv">Is. 3:13</a>). Therefore God is a body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local term "wherefrom" or "whereto." But in the Scriptures God is spoken + of as a local term "whereto," according to the words, "Come ye to Him and be enlightened" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.6" target="asv">Ps. 33:6</a>), and as a term "wherefrom": "All they that depart from Thee shall be written in the earth" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.17.13" target="asv">Jer. 17:13</a>). Therefore God is a body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written in the Gospel of St. John ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.24" target="asv">Jn. 4:24</a>): "God is a spirit." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this can be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless + it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been already proved ( + <a id="FP_Q3_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>), that God is the First Mover, and is Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body. Secondly, because the + first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. For although in any + single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless, + absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only + by some being in actuality. Now it has been already proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in + God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in potentiality because the continuous, as such, is divisible to + infinity; it is therefore impossible that God should be a body. Thirdly, because God is the most noble of beings. Now it is + impossible for a body to be the most noble of beings; for a body must be either animate or inanimate; and an animate body + is manifestly nobler than any inanimate body. But an animate body is not animate precisely as body; otherwise all bodies would + be animate. Therefore its animation depends upon some other thing, as our body depends for its animation on the soul. Hence + that by which a body becomes animated must be nobler than the body. Therefore it is impossible that God should be a body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q3_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q1_A9.html">Q[1], A[9]</a>), Holy Writ puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes + to God the three dimensions under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His virtual quantity; thus, by depth, it + signifies His power of knowing hidden things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by length, the duration + of His existence; by + breadth, His act of love for all. Or, as says Dionysius (Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is meant the incomprehensibility + of His essence; by length, the procession of His all-pervading power; by breadth, His overspreading all things, inasmuch as + all things lie under His protection. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man is said to be after the image of God, not as regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals. Hence, + when it is said, "Let us make man to our image and likeness", it is added, "And let him have dominion over the fishes of the + sea" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>). Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence; hence it is according to his intelligence and reason, which + are incorporeal, that man is said to be according to the image of + God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Corporeal parts are attributed to God in Scripture on account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain parallel. For + instance the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye attributed to God signifies His power of seeing intellectually, not sensibly; + and so on with the other parts. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Whatever pertains to posture, also, is only attributed to God by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as sitting, on account + of His unchangeableness and dominion; and as standing, on account of His power of overcoming whatever withstands Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> We draw near to God by no corporeal steps, since He is everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by the actions + of that same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near to or to withdraw signifies merely spiritual actions based on + the metaphor of local motion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A1-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q3_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q3_A2-p0.1">Whether God is composed of matter and form?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is composed of matter and form. For whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul + is the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it is mentioned in Hebrews ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.38" target="asv">Heb. 10:38</a>), where God says: "But My just man liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My soul." Therefore God + is composed of matter and form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, anger, joy and the like are passions of the composite. But these are attributed to God in Scripture: "The Lord was + exceeding angry with His people" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.105.40" target="asv">Ps. 105:40</a>). Therefore God is composed of matter and form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, matter is the principle of individualization. But God seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many. + Therefore He is composed of matter and form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body; for dimensive quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not + a body as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not composed of matter and form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible that matter should exist in God. First, because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown ( + <a id="FP_Q3_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>) that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly, + because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form; therefore its goodness is participated, + inasmuch as matter participates the form. Now the + first good and the best---viz. God---is not a participated good, because the essential good is prior to the participated good. + Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form; hence + the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially + an agent must be primarily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, since He is the first efficient cause. He is + therefore of His essence a form; and not composed of matter and form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A soul is attributed to God because His acts resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our soul. + Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Anger and the like are attributed to God on account of a similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly the act + of an angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of as His anger. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Forms which can be received in matter are individualized by matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject since it is + the first underlying subject; although form of itself, unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that + form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is individualized precisely because it cannot be received + in a subject; and such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in + God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q3_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q3_A3-p0.1">Whether God is the same as His essence or nature?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q3_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of + God---i.e. the Godhead---is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause; for every agent produces its like. But in created things the "suppositum" + is not identical with its nature; for a man is not the same as his humanity. Therefore God is not the same as His Godhead. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A3-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said of God that He is life itself, and not only that He is a living thing: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.6" target="asv">Jn. 14:6</a>). Now the relation between Godhead and God is the same as the relation between life and a living thing. Therefore God is + His very Godhead. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A3-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, + the nature or essence must differ from the "suppositum," because the essence or nature connotes only what is included in the + definition of the species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the definition of man, for it is by this that man + is man, and it is this that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now + individual matter, with all the individualizing accidents, is not included in the definition of the species. For this particular + flesh, these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc., are not included in the definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, + these bones, and the accidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are not included in humanity; and yet they + are included in the thing which is man. Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has humanity. + Consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical; but humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because + the principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal constituent in regard to the individualizing matter. + On the other hand, in things not composed of matter and form, in which individualization is not due to individual matter---that + is to say, to "this" matter---the very forms being individualized of themselves---it is necessary the forms themselves should + be subsisting "supposita." Therefore "suppositum" and nature in them are identified. Since God then is not composed of matter + and form, He must be His own Godhead, His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A3-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We can speak of simple things only as though they were like the composite things from which we derive our knowledge. Therefore + in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence, because with us only those things subsist which are + composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are + in God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands, but not + that there is any composition in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The effects of God do not imitate Him perfectly, but only as far as they are able; and the imitation is here defective, precisely + because what is simple and one, can only be represented by divers things; consequently, composition is accidental to them, + and therefore, in them "suppositum" is not the same as nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A3-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A3-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q3_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q3_A4-p0.1">Whether essence and existence are the same in God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that essence and existence are not the same in God. For if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to + it. Now being to which no addition is made is universal being which is predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that + God is being in general which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: "For men gave the incommunicable name to + stones and wood" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.21" target="asv">Wis. 14:21</a>). Therefore God's existence is not His + essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we can know "whether" God exists as said above ( + <a id="FP_Q3_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A2.html">Q[2], A[2]</a>); but we cannot know "what" He is. Therefore God's existence is not the same as His essence---that is, as His quiddity or + nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (Trin. vii): "In God existence is not an accidental quality, but subsisting truth." Therefore what subsists in + God is His existence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God is not only His own essence, as shown in the preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in several + ways. First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either by the constituent principles of that essence + (like a property that necessarily accompanies the species---as the faculty of laughing is proper to a man---and is caused + by the constituent principles of the species), or by some exterior agent---as heat is caused + in water by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs from its essence, this existence must be caused either by + some exterior agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible for a thing's existence to be caused by its essential + constituent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its existence is caused. Therefore + that thing, whose existence differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by another. But this cannot be true of + God; because we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from + His essence. Secondly, existence is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spoken of + as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing. Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is + a distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as shown above + + <a id="FP_Q3_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, it follows that in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence. Thirdly, because, + just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that which has existence but is not existence, + is a being by participation. But God is His own essence, as shown above + <a id="FP_Q3_A4-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">(A[3])</a> if, therefore, He is not His own existence He will be not essential, but participated being. He will not + therefore be the first being---which is absurd. Therefore God is His own existence, and not merely His own essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing that has nothing added to it can be of two kinds. Either its essence precludes any addition; thus, for example, it + is of the essence of an irrational animal to be without reason. Or we may understand a thing to have nothing added to it, + inasmuch as its essence does not require that anything should be added to it; thus the genus animal is without reason, because + it is not of the essence of animal in general to have reason; but neither is it to + lack reason. And so the divine being has nothing added to it in the first sense; whereas universal being has nothing added + to it in the second sense. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "To be" can mean either of two things. It may mean the act of essence, or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected + by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject. Taking "to be" in the first sense, we cannot understand God's existence nor + His essence; but only in the second sense. We know that this proposition which we form about God when we say "God is," is + true; and this we know from His effects ( + <a id="FP_Q3_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A2.html">Q[2], + A[2] + </a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p9"></p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A4-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q3_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q3_A5-p0.1">Whether God is contained in a genus?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q3_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is contained in a genus. For a substance is a being that subsists of itself. But this is especially true + of God. Therefore God is in a genus of substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing can be measured save by something of its own genus; as length is measured by length and numbers by number. + But God is the measure of all substances, as the Commentator shows (Metaph. x). Therefore God is in the genus of substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A5-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> In the mind, genus is prior to what it contains. But nothing is prior to God either really or mentally. Therefore God is + not in any genus. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A5-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either absolutely and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as being + reducible to it, as principles and privations. For example, a point and unity are reduced to the genus of quantity, as its + principles; while blindness and all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit. But in neither way is God in a genus. + That He cannot be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways. First, because a + species is constituted of genus and difference. Now that from which the difference constituting the species is derived, is + always related to that from which the genus is derived, as actuality is related to potentiality. For animal is derived from + sensitive nature, by concretion as it were, for that is animal, which has a sensitive nature. Rational being, on the other + hand, is derived from intellectual nature, because that is rational, which has an intellectual nature, and intelligence is + compared to sense, as actuality is to potentiality. The same argument holds good in other things. Hence since in God actuality + is not added to potentiality, it is impossible that He should be in any genus as a species. Secondly, since the existence + of God is His essence, if God were in any genus, He would be the genus "being", because, since genus is predicated as an essential + it refers to the essence of a thing. But the Philosopher has shown (Metaph. iii) that being cannot be a genus, for + every genus has differences distinct from its generic essence. Now no difference can exist distinct from being; for non-being + cannot be a difference. It follows then that God is not in a genus. Thirdly, because all in one genus agree in the quiddity + or essence of the genus which is predicated of them as an essential, but they differ in their existence. For the existence + of man and of horse is not the same; as also of this man and that man: thus in every member of a genus, existence and + quiddity---i.e. essence---must differ. But in God they do not differ, as shown in the preceding article. Therefore it is plain + that God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this it is also plain that He has no genus nor difference, nor can + there be any definition of Him; nor, save through His effects, a demonstration of Him: for a definition is from genus and + difference; and the mean of a demonstration is a definition. That God is not in a genus, as reducible to it as its principle, + is clear from this, that a principle reducible to any genus does not extend beyond that genus; as, a point is the principle + of continuous quantity alone; and unity, of discontinuous quantity. But God is the principle of all being. Therefore He is + not contained in any genus as its principle. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A5-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The word substance signifies not only what exists of itself---for existence cannot of itself be a genus, as shown in the + body of the article; but, it also signifies an essence that has the property of existing in this way---namely, of existing + of itself; this existence, however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that God is not in the genus of substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection turns upon proportionate measure which must be homogeneous with what is measured. Now, God is not a measure + proportionate to anything. Still, He is called the measure of all things, in the sense that everything has being only according + as it resembles Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A5-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A5-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q3_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q3_A6-p0.1">Whether in God there are any accidents?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q3_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are accidents in God. For substance cannot be an accident, as Aristotle says (Phys. i). Therefore that + which is an accident in one, cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus it is proved that heat cannot be the substantial form + of fire, because it is an accident in other things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like, which are accidents in us, are attributes + of God. Therefore in God there are accidents. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in every genus there is a first principle. But there are many "genera" of accidents. If, therefore, the primal members + of these genera are not in God, there will be many primal beings other than God---which is absurd. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A6-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Every accident is in a subject. But God cannot be a subject, for "no simple form can be a subject", as Boethius says (De + Trin.). Therefore in God there cannot be any accident. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A6-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> From all we have said, it is clear there can be no accident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents + as potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made actual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality + in God, as was shown ( + <a id="FP_Q3_A6-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Secondly, because God is His own existence; and as Boethius says (Hebdom.), although every essence may have something superadded + to it, this cannot apply to + absolute being: thus a heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to it, as whiteness, nevertheless absolute + heat can have nothing else than heat. Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is accidental. Whence as God is + absolute primal being, there can be in Him nothing accidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents (as the capability + of laughing is an essential accident of man), because such accidents are caused by the constituent principles of the + subject. Now there can be nothing caused in God, since He is the first cause. Hence it follows that there is no accident in + God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A6-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue and wisdom are not predicated of God and of us univocally. Hence it does not follow that there are accidents in God + as there are in us. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since substance is prior to its accidents, the principles of accidents are reducible to the principles of the substance as + to that which is prior; although God is not first as if contained in the genus of substance; yet He is first in respect to + all being, outside of every genus. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A6-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A6-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q3_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q3_A7-p0.1">Whether God is altogether simple?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q3_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not altogether simple. For whatever is from God must imitate Him. Thus from the first being are all + beings; and from the first good is all good. But in the things which God has made, nothing is altogether simple. Therefore + neither is God altogether simple. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is best must be attributed to God. But with us that which is composite is better than that which is simple; + thus, chemical compounds are better than simple elements, and animals than the parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot + be said that God is altogether simple. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A7-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7): "God is truly and absolutely simple." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A7-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many ways. First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is + neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His + nature differ from His "suppositum"; nor His essence from His existence; neither is there in Him composition of genus and + difference, nor of subject and accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, + but is altogether simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to its component parts, and is dependent on them; + but God is the first being, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Thirdly, because every composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite unless something causes them + to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>), since He is the first efficient cause. Fourthly, because in every composite there must + be potentiality and actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts actuates another, or at least all + the parts are potential to the whole. Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one of its parts. + And this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts of the foot, + a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a + part (as a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water), nevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which + cannot be predicated of any of the parts; for instance, if the whole volume of water is two cubits, no part of it can be two + cubits. Thus in every composite there is something which is not it itself. But, even if this could be said of whatever has + a form, viz. that it has something which is not it itself, as in a white object there is something which does not belong to + the essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself, there is nothing besides itself. And so, since God is absolute form, + or rather absolute being, He can be in no way composite. Hilary implies this argument, when he says (De Trin. vii): "God, + Who is strength, is not made up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is light, composed of things that are dim." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A7-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to be in + some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from its essence, as will be shown hereafter, ( + <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> With us composite things are better than simple things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in one + simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine goodness is found in one simple thing ( + <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a> and + <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html">Q[6], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A7-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A7-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q3_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q3_A8-p0.1">Whether God enters into the composition of other things?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God enters into the composition of other things, for Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The being of all things + is that which is above being---the Godhead." But the being of all things enters into the composition of everything. Therefore + God enters into the composition of other things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is a form; for Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., [*Serm. xxxviii]) that, "the word of God, which is God, is an + uncreated form." But a form is part of a compound. Therefore God is part of some compound. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever things exist, in no way differing from each other, are the same. But God and primary matter exist, and + in no way differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same. But primary matter enters into the composition things. + Therefore also does God. Proof of the minor---whatever things differ, they differ by some differences, and therefore must + be composite. But God and primary matter are altogether simple. Therefore they nowise differ + from each other. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "There can be no touching Him," i.e. God, "nor any other union with Him by mingling part with + part." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p6"> Further, the first cause rules all things without commingling with them, as the Philosopher says (De Causis).</p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> On this point there have been three errors. Some have affirmed that God is the world-soul, as is clear from Augustine (De + Civ. Dei vii, 6). This is practically the same as the opinion of those who assert that God is the soul of the highest heaven. + Again, others have said that God is the formal principle of all things; and this was the theory of the Almaricians. The third + error is that of David of Dinant, who most absurdly taught that God was primary matter. + Now all these contain manifest untruth; since it is not possible for God to enter into the composition of anything, either + as a formal or a material principle. First, because God is the first efficient cause. Now the efficient cause is not identical + numerically with the form of the thing caused, but only specifically: for man begets man. But primary matter can be neither + numerically nor specifically identical with an efficient cause; for the former is merely potential, while the latter is + actual. Secondly, because, since God is the first efficient cause, to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially. But that + which enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and essentially, but rather the composite so acts; for + the hand does not act, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence God cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly, + because no part of a compound can be absolutely primal among beings---not even matter, nor form, though they are the primal + parts of every compound. For matter is merely potential; and potentiality is absolutely posterior to actuality, as is clear + from the foregoing ( + <a id="FP_Q3_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], A[1]</a>): while a form which is part of a compound is a participated form; and as that which participates is posterior to that which + is essential, so likewise is that which is participated; as fire in ignited objects is posterior to fire that is essentially + such. Now it has been proved that God is absolutely primal being ( + <a id="FP_Q3_A8-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Godhead is called the being of all things, as their efficient and exemplar cause, but not as being their essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Word is an exemplar form; but not a form that is part of a compound. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Simple things do not differ by added differences---for this is the property of compounds. Thus man and horse differ by their + differences, rational and irrational; which differences, however, do not differ from each other by other differences. Hence, + to be quite accurate, it is better to say that they are, not different, but diverse. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. + x), "things which are diverse are absolutely distinct, but things which are + different differ by something." Therefore, strictly speaking, primary matter and God do not differ, but are by their very + being, diverse. Hence it does not follow they are the same. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q3_A8-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q4.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q4" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q4-p0.1">THE PERFECTION OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q4-p2"> Having considered the divine simplicity, we treat next of God's perfection. Now because everything in so far as it is perfect + is called good, we shall speak first of the divine perfection; secondly of the divine goodness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q4-p3"> Concerning the first there are three points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q4-p4"> (1) Whether God is perfect?</p> + <p id="FP_Q4-p5"> (2) Whether God is perfect universally, as having in Himself the perfections of all things?</p> + <p id="FP_Q4-p6"> (3) Whether creatures can be said to be like God?</p> + <div id="FP_Q4_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q4_A1-p0.1">Whether God is perfect?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that perfection does not belong to God. For we say a thing is perfect if it is completely made. But it does not + befit God to be made. Therefore He is not perfect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is the first beginning of things. But the beginnings of things seem to be imperfect, as seed is the beginning + of animal and vegetable life. Therefore God is imperfect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q4_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), God's essence is existence. But existence seems most imperfect, since it is most universal and receptive of all modification. + Therefore God is imperfect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "Be you perfect as also your heavenly Father is perfect" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.48" target="asv">Mat. 5:48</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher relates (Metaph. xii), some ancient philosophers, namely, the Pythagoreans and Leucippus, did not predicate + "best" and "most perfect" of the first principle. The reason was that the ancient philosophers considered only a material + principle; and a material principle is most imperfect. For since matter as such is merely potential, the first material principle + must be simply potential, and thus most imperfect. Now God is the first principle, + not material, but in the order of efficient cause, which must be most perfect. For just as matter, as such, is merely potential, + an agent, as such, is in the state of actuality. Hence, the first active principle must needs be most actual, and therefore + most perfect; for a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing + of the mode of its perfection. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Gregory says (Moral. v, 26,29): "Though our lips can only stammer, we yet chant the high things of God." For that which + is not made is improperly called perfect. Nevertheless because created things are then called perfect, when from potentiality + they are brought into actuality, this word "perfect" signifies whatever is not wanting in actuality, whether this be by way + of perfection or not. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The material principle which with us is found to be imperfect, cannot be absolutely primal; but must be preceded by something + perfect. For seed, though it be the principle of animal life reproduced through seed, has previous to it, the animal or plant + from which is came. Because, previous to that which is potential, must be that which is actual; since a potential being can + only be reduced into act by some being already actual. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Existence is the most perfect of all things, for it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual; for + nothing has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence existence is that which actuates all things, even their forms. Therefore + it is not compared to other things as the receiver is to the received; but rather as the received to the receiver. When therefore + I speak of the existence of man, or horse, or anything else, existence is + considered a formal principle, and as something received; and not as that which exists. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q4_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q4_A2-p0.1">Whether the perfections of all things are in God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the perfections of all things are not in God. For God is simple, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q4_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>); whereas the perfections of things are many and diverse. Therefore the perfections of all things are not in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, opposites cannot coexist. Now the perfections of things are opposed to each other, for each thing is perfected by + its specific difference. But the differences by which "genera" are divided, and "species" constituted, are opposed to each + other. Therefore because opposites cannot coexist in the same subject, it seems that the perfections of all things are not + in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists; and an intelligent thing than what merely lives. Therefore + life is more perfect than existence; and knowledge than life. But the essence of God is existence itself. Therefore He has + not the perfections of life, and knowledge, and other similar perfections. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that "God in His one existence prepossesses all things." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> All created perfections are in God. Hence He is spoken of as universally perfect, because He lacks not (says the Commentator, + Metaph. v) any excellence which may be found in any genus. This may be seen from two considerations. First, because whatever + perfection exists in an effect must be found in the effective cause: either in the same formality, if it is a univocal agent---as + when man reproduces man; or in a more eminent degree, if it is an equivocal + agent---thus in the sun is the likeness of whatever is generated by the sun's power. Now it is plain that the effect pre-exists + virtually in the efficient cause: and although to pre-exist in the potentiality of a material cause is to pre-exist in a more + imperfect way, since matter as such is imperfect, and an agent as such is perfect; still to pre-exist virtually in the efficient + cause is to pre-exist not in a more imperfect, but in a more perfect way. Since therefore God is the first effective + cause of things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in God in a more eminent way. Dionysius implies the same line + of argument by saying of God (Div. Nom. v): "It is not that He is this and not that, but that He is all, as the cause of all." + Secondly, from what has been already proved, God is existence itself, of itself subsistent ( + <a id="FP_Q4_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Consequently, He must contain within Himself the whole perfection of being. For it is clear that if some hot thing has + not the whole perfection of heat, this is because heat is not participated in its full perfection; but if this heat were self-subsisting, + nothing of the virtue of heat would be wanting to it. Since therefore God is subsisting being itself, nothing of the perfection + of being can be wanting to Him. Now all created perfections are included in the perfection of being; for things are perfect, + precisely so far as they have being after some fashion. It follows therefore that the perfection of no one + thing is wanting to God. This line of argument, too, is implied by Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), when he says that, "God exists + not in any single mode, but embraces all being within Himself, absolutely, without limitation, uniformly;" and afterwards + he adds that, "He is the very existence to subsisting things." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as the sun (as Dionysius remarks, (Div. Nom. v)), while remaining one and shining uniformly, contains within itself + first and uniformly the substances of sensible things, and many and diverse qualities; "a fortiori" should all things in a + kind of natural unity pre-exist in the cause of all things; and thus things diverse and in themselves opposed to each other, + pre-exist in God as one, without injury to His simplicity.</p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p7a"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This suffices for the Reply + to the Second Objection. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that, although existence is more perfect than life, and life than wisdom, if they are + considered as distinguished in idea; nevertheless, a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists, because living + things also exist and intelligent things both exist and live. Although therefore existence does not include life and wisdom, + because that which participates in existence need not participate in every mode of + existence; nevertheless God's existence includes in itself life and wisdom, because nothing of the perfection of being can + be wanting to Him who is subsisting being itself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p9"></p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A2-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q4_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q4_A3-p0.1">Whether any creature can be like God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no creature can be like God. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.85.8" target="asv">Ps. 85:8</a>): "There is none among the gods like unto Thee, O Lord." But of all creatures the most excellent are those which are called + participation gods. Therefore still less can other creatures be said to be like God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, likeness implies comparison. But there can be no comparison between things in a different "genus." Therefore neither + can there be any likeness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like whiteness. But no creature is in the same "genus" as + God: since God is no "genus," as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q4_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Therefore no creature is like God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we speak of those things as like which agree in form. But nothing can agree with God in form; for, save in God alone, + essence and existence differ. Therefore no creature can be like to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, among like things there is mutual likeness; for like is like to like. If therefore any creature is like God, God + will be like some creature, which is against what is said by Isaias: "To whom have you likened God?" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.40.18" target="asv">Is. 40:18</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>), and: "When He shall appear we shall be like to Him" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since likeness is based upon agreement or communication in form, it varies according to the many modes of communication in + form. Some things are said to be like, which communicate in the same form according to the same formality, and according to + the same mode; and these are said to be not merely like, but equal in their likeness; as two things equally white are said + to be alike in whiteness; and this is the most perfect likeness. In another way, we speak of + things as alike which communicate in form according to the same formality, though not according to the same measure, but according + to more or less, as something less white is said to be like another thing more white; and this is imperfect likeness. In a + third way some things are said to be alike which communicate in the same form, but not according to the same formality; as + we see in non-univocal agents. For since every agent reproduces itself so far as it is an agent, and everything acts + according to the manner of its form, the effect must in some way resemble the form of the agent. If therefore the agent is + contained in the same species as its effect, there will be a likeness in form between that which makes and that which is made, + according to the same formality of the species; as man reproduces man. If, however, the agent and its effect are not contained + in the same species, there will be a likeness, but not according to the formality of the same species; as things generated + by the sun's heat may be in some sort spoken of as like the sun, not as though they received the form of the sun in its specific + likeness, but in its generic likeness. Therefore if there is an agent not contained in any "genus," its effect will still + more distantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so as to participate in the likeness of the agent's form according + to the same specific or generic formality, but only according to some sort of analogy; as existence is common to all. + In this way all created things, so far as they are beings, are like God as the first and universal principle of all being. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix), when Holy Writ declares that nothing is like God, it does not mean to deny all likeness + to Him. For, "the same things can be like and unlike to God: like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not + perfectly imitable, can be imitated; unlike according as they fall short of their cause," not merely in intensity and remission, + as that which is less white falls short of that which is more white; but because + they are not in agreement, specifically or generically. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is not related to creatures as though belonging to a different "genus," but as transcending every "genus," and as the + principle of all "genera." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Likeness of creatures to God is not affirmed on account of agreement in form according to the formality of the same genus + or species, but solely according to analogy, inasmuch as God is essential being, whereas other things are beings by participation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although it may be admitted that creatures are in some sort like God, it must nowise be admitted that God is like creatures; + because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "A mutual likeness may be found between things of the same order, but not between + a cause and that which is caused." For, we say that a statue is like a man, but not conversely; so also a creature can be + spoken of as in some sort like God; but not that God is like a creature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q4_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q5.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q3_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q5" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q5-p0.1">OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q5-p2"> We next consider goodness: First, goodness in general. Secondly, the goodness of God.</p> + <p id="FP_Q5-p3"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q5-p4"> (1) Whether goodness and being are the same really?</p> + <p id="FP_Q5-p5"> (2) Granted that they differ only in idea, which is prior in thought?</p> + <p id="FP_Q5-p6"> (3) Granted that being is prior, whether every being is good?</p> + <p id="FP_Q5-p7"> (4) To what cause should goodness be reduced?</p> + <p id="FP_Q5-p8"> (5) Whether goodness consists in mode, species, and order?</p> + <p id="FP_Q5-p9"> (6) Whether goodness is divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant?</p> + <div id="FP_Q5_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q5_A1-p0.1">Whether goodness differs really from being?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goodness differs really from being. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "I perceive that in nature the fact that + things are good is one thing: that they are is another." Therefore goodness and being really differ. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing can be its own form. "But that is called good which has the form of being", according to the commentary + on De Causis. Therefore goodness differs really from being. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, goodness can be more or less. But being cannot be more or less. Therefore goodness differs really from being. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 42) that, "inasmuch as we exist we are good." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence + of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. i): "Goodness is what all + desire." Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection. But + everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect + so far as it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is clear from the foregoing ( + <a id="FP_Q5_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q5_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a>). Hence it is clear that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the aspect of desirableness, which + being does not present. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although goodness and being are the same really, nevertheless since they differ in thought, they are not predicated of a + thing absolutely in the same way. Since being properly signifies that something actually is, and actuality properly correlates + to potentiality; a thing is, in consequence, said simply to have being, accordingly as it is primarily distinguished from + that which is only in potentiality; and this is precisely each thing's substantial + being. Hence by its substantial being, everything is said to have being simply; but by any further actuality it is said to + have being relatively. Thus to be white implies relative being, for to be white does not take a thing out of simply potential + being; because only a thing that actually has being can receive this mode of being. But goodness signifies perfection which + is desirable; and consequently of ultimate perfection. Hence that which has ultimate perfection is said to be simply good; + but + that which has not the ultimate perfection it ought to have (although, in so far as it is at all actual, it has some perfection), + is not said to be perfect simply nor good simply, but only relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in its primal (i.e. + substantial) being a thing is said to be simply, and to be good relatively (i.e. in so far as it has being) but viewed in + its complete actuality, a thing is said to be relatively, and to be good simply. Hence the saying of Boethius (De Hebrom.), + "I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing; that they are is another," is to be referred to a thing's + goodness simply, and having being simply. Because, regarded in its primal actuality, a thing simply exists; and regarded in + its complete actuality, it is good simply---in such sort that even in its primal actuality, it is in some sort good, and even + in its complete actuality, it in some sort has being. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness signifies complete actuality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less according to a thing's superadded actuality, for example, as to knowledge or + virtue. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q5_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q5_A2-p0.1">Whether goodness is prior in idea to being?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goodness is prior in idea to being. For names are arranged according to the arrangement of the things signified + by the names. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) assigned the first place, amongst the other names of God, to His goodness rather + than to His being. Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is the more extensive is prior in idea. But goodness is more extensive than being, because, as Dionysius + notes (Div. Nom. v), "goodness extends to things both existing and non-existing; whereas existence extends to existing things + alone." Therefore goodness is in idea prior to being. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is the more universal is prior in idea. But goodness seems to be more universal than being, since goodness + has the aspect of desirable; whereas to some non-existence is desirable; for it is said of Judas: "It were better for him, + if that man had not been born" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q5_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.26.24" target="asv">Mat. 26:24</a>). Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, not only is existence desirable, but life, knowledge, and many other things besides. Thus it seems that existence + is a particular appetible, and goodness a universal appetible. Therefore, absolutely, goodness is prior in idea to being. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said by Aristotle (De Causis) that "the first of created things is being." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In idea being is prior to goodness. For the meaning signified by the name of a thing is that which the mind conceives of + the thing and intends by the word that stands for it. Therefore, that is prior in idea, which is first conceived by the intellect. + Now the first thing conceived by the intellect is being; because everything is knowable only inasmuch as it is in actuality. + Hence, being is the proper object of the intellect, and is primarily intelligible; as + sound is that which is primarily audible. Therefore in idea being is prior to goodness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius discusses the Divine Names (Div. Nom. i, iii) as implying some causal relation in God; for we name God, as he says, + from creatures, as a cause from its effects. But goodness, since it has the aspect of desirable, implies the idea of a final + cause, the causality of which is first among causes, since an agent does not act except for some end; and by an agent matter + is moved to its form. Hence the end is called the cause of causes. Thus + goodness, as a cause, is prior to being, as is the end to the form. Therefore among the names signifying the divine causality, + goodness precedes being. Again, according to the Platonists, who, through not distinguishing primary matter from privation, + said that matter was non-being, goodness is more extensively participated than being; for primary matter participates in goodness + as tending to it, for all seek their like; but it does not participate in being, since it is presumed to be non-being. + Therefore Dionysius says that "goodness extends to non-existence" (Div. Nom. v). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same solution is applied to this objection. Or it may be said that goodness extends to existing and non-existing things, + not so far as it can be predicated of them, but so far as it can cause them---if, indeed, by non-existence we understand not + simply those things which do not exist, but those which are potential, and not actual. For goodness has the aspect of the + end, in which not only actual things find their completion, but also towards which + tend even those things which are not actual, but merely potential. Now being implies the habitude of a formal cause only, + either inherent or exemplar; and its causality does not extend save to those things which are actual. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Non-being is desirable, not of itself, but only relatively---i.e. inasmuch as the removal of an evil, which can only be removed + by non-being, is desirable. Now the removal of an evil cannot be desirable, except so far as this evil deprives a thing of + some being. Therefore being is desirable of itself; and non-being only relatively, inasmuch as one seeks some mode of being + of which one cannot bear to be deprived; thus even non-being can be spoken of as + relatively good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Life, wisdom, and the like, are desirable only so far as they are actual. Hence, in each one of them some sort of being is + desired. And thus nothing can be desired except being; and consequently nothing is good except being. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q5_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q5_A3-p0.1">Whether every being is good?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not every being is good. For goodness is something superadded to being, as is clear from A[1]. But whatever + is added to being limits it; as substance, quantity, quality, etc. Therefore goodness limits being. Therefore not every being + is good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no evil is good: "Woe to you that call evil good and good evil" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q5_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.5.20" target="asv">Is. 5:20</a>). But some things are called evil. Therefore not every being is good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, goodness implies desirability. Now primary matter does not imply desirability, but rather that which desires. Therefore + primary matter does not contain the formality of goodness. Therefore not every being is good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher notes (Metaph. iii) that "in mathematics goodness does not exist." But mathematics are entities; + otherwise there would be no science of mathematics. Therefore not every being is good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Every being that is not God is God's creature. Now every creature of God is good ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q5_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:4</a>): and God is the greatest good. Therefore every being is good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as being, has actuality and is in some way perfect; since every act implies + some sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability and goodness, as is clear from A[1]. Hence it follows that every + being as such is good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Substance, quantity, quality, and everything included in them, limit being by applying it to some essence or nature. Now + in this sense, goodness does not add anything to being beyond the aspect of desirability and perfection, which is also proper + to being, whatever kind of nature it may be. Hence goodness does not limit being. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as being, but only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be evil, because + he lacks some virtue; and an eye is said to be evil, because it lacks the power to see well. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As primary matter has only potential being, so it is only potentially good. Although, according to the Platonists, primary + matter may be said to be a non-being on account of the privation attaching to it, nevertheless, it does participate to a certain + extent in goodness, viz. by its relation to, or aptitude for, goodness. Consequently, to be desirable is not its property, + but to desire. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Mathematical entities do not subsist as realities; because they would be in some sort good if they subsisted; but they have + only logical existence, inasmuch as they are abstracted from motion and matter; thus they cannot have the aspect of an end, + which itself has the aspect of moving another. Nor is it repugnant that there should be in some logical entity neither goodness + nor form of goodness; since the idea of being is prior to the idea of goodness, + as was said in the preceding article. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q5_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q5_A4-p0.1">Whether goodness has the aspect of a final cause?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goodness has not the aspect of a final cause, but rather of the other causes. For, as Dionysius says (Div. + Nom. iv), "Goodness is praised as beauty." But beauty has the aspect of a formal cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect + of a formal cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, goodness is self-diffusive; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that goodness is that whereby all things subsist, + and are. But to be self-giving implies the aspect of an efficient cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of an efficient + cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 31) that "we exist because God is good." But we owe our existence to God as + the efficient cause. Therefore goodness implies the aspect of an efficient cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "that is to be considered as the end and the good of other things, for the sake of which + something is." Therefore goodness has the aspect of a final cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since goodness is that which all things desire, and since this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies + the aspect of an end. Nevertheless, the idea of goodness presupposes the idea of an efficient cause, and also of a formal + cause. For we see that what is first in causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, e.g. heats first of all before it reproduces + the form of fire; though the heat in the fire follows from its substantial form. Now in + causing, goodness and the end come first, both of which move the agent to act; secondly, the action of the agent moving to + the form; thirdly, comes the form. Hence in that which is caused the converse ought to take place, so that there should be + first, the form whereby it is a being; secondly, we consider in it its effective power, whereby it is perfect in being, for + a thing is perfect when it can reproduce its like, as the Philosopher says (Meteor. iv); thirdly, there follows the formality + of + goodness which is the basic principle of its perfection. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical fundamentally; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the form; and + consequently goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ logically, for goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness + being what all things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an end (the appetite being a kind of movement towards a + thing). On the other hand, beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful + things are those which please when seen. Hence beauty consists in due proportion; for the senses delight in things duly proportioned, + as in what is after their own kind---because even sense is a sort of reason, just as is every cognitive faculty. Now since + knowledge is by assimilation, and similarity relates to form, beauty properly belongs to the nature of a formal cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the sense that an end is said to move. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He who has a will is said to be good, so far as he has a good will; because it is by our will that we employ whatever powers + we may have. Hence a man is said to be good, not by his good understanding; but by his good will. Now the will relates to + the end as to its proper object. Thus the saying, "we exist because God is good" has reference to the final cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q5_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q5_A5-p0.1">Whether the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order. For goodness and being differ logically. + But mode, species and order seem to belong to the nature of being, for it is written: "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, + and number, and weight" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q5_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>). And to these three can be reduced species, mode and order, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3): "Measure fixes the mode + of everything, number gives it + its species, and weight gives it rest and stability." Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species + and order. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mode, species and order are themselves good. Therefore if the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and + order, then every mode must have its own mode, species and order. The same would be the case with species and order in endless + succession. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, evil is the privation of mode, species and order. But evil is not the total absence of goodness. Therefore the essence + of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that wherein consists the essence of goodness cannot be spoken of as evil. Yet we can speak of an evil mode, species + and order. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, mode, species and order are caused by weight, number and measure, as appears from the quotation from Augustine. + But not every good thing has weight, number and measure; for Ambrose says (Hexam. i, 9): "It is of the nature of light not + to have been created in number, weight and measure." Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and + order. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. iii): "These three---mode, species and order---as common good things, are in everything God + has made; thus, where these three abound the things are very good; where they are less, the things are less good; where they + do not exist at all, there can be nothing good." But this would not be unless the essence of goodness consisted in them. Therefore + the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect; for in that way only is it desirable (as shown above + <a id="FP_Q5_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,3). Now a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode of its perfection. But since everything is + what it is by its form (and since the form presupposes certain things, and from the form certain things necessarily follow), + in order for a thing to be perfect and good it must have a form, together + with all that precedes and follows upon that form. Now the form presupposes determination or commensuration of its principles, + whether material or efficient, and this is signified by the mode: hence it is said that the measure marks the mode. But the + form itself is signified by the species; for everything is placed in its species by its form. Hence the number is said to + give the species, for definitions signifying species are like numbers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x); for as a + unit + added to, or taken from a number, changes its species, so a difference added to, or taken from a definition, changes its species. + Further, upon the form follows an inclination to the end, or to an action, or something of the sort; for everything, in so + far as it is in act, acts and tends towards that which is in accordance with its form; and this belongs to weight and order. + Hence the essence of goodness, so far as it consists in perfection, consists also in mode, species and order. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These three only follow upon being, so far as it is perfect, and according to this perfection is it good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Mode, species and order are said to be good, and to be beings, not as though they themselves were subsistences, but because + it is through them that other things are both beings and good. Hence they have no need of other things whereby they are good: + for they are spoken of as good, not as though formally constituted so by something else, but as formally constituting others + good: thus whiteness is not said to be a being as though it were by anything + else; but because, by it, something else has accidental being, as an object that is white. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every being is due to some form. Hence, according to every being of a thing is its mode, species, order. Thus, a man has + a mode, species and order as he is white, virtuous, learned and so on; according to everything predicated of him. But evil + deprives a thing of some sort of being, as blindness deprives us of that being which is sight; yet it does not destroy every + mode, species and order, but only such as follow upon the being of sight. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. xxiii), "Every mode, as mode, is good" (and the same can be said of species and order). "But + an evil mode, species and order are so called as being less than they ought to be, or as not belonging to that which they + ought to belong. Therefore they are called evil, because they are out of place and incongruous." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The nature of light is spoken of as being without number, weight and measure, not absolutely, but in comparison with corporeal + things, because the power of light extends to all corporeal things; inasmuch as it is an active quality of the first body + that causes change, i.e. the heavens. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A5-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q5_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q5_A6-p0.1">Whether goodness is rightly divided into the virtuous*, the useful and the pleasant? [*"Bonum honestum" is the virtuous good + considered as fitting. (cf. SS, Q[141], A[3]; SS, Q[145])] + </h4> + <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goodness is not rightly divided into the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant. For goodness is divided by + the ten predicaments, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i). But the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant can be found under + one predicament. Therefore goodness is not rightly divided by them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every division is made by opposites. But these three do not seem to be opposites; for the virtuous is pleasing, + and no wickedness is useful; whereas this ought to be the case if the division were made by opposites, for then the virtuous + and the useful would be opposed; and Tully speaks of this (De Offic. ii). Therefore this division is incorrect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, where one thing is on account of another, there is only one thing. But the useful is not goodness, except so far + as it is pleasing and virtuous. Therefore the useful ought not to divided against the pleasant and the virtuous. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose makes use of this division of goodness (De Offic. i, 9) + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> This division properly concerns human goodness. But if we consider the nature of goodness from a higher and more universal + point of view, we shall find that this division properly concerns goodness as such. For everything is good so far as it is + desirable, and is a term of the movement of the appetite; the term of whose movement can be seen from a consideration of the + movement of a natural body. Now the movement of a natural body is terminated by the end + absolutely; and relatively by the means through which it comes to the end, where the movement ceases; so a thing is called + a term of movement, so far as it terminates any part of that movement. Now the ultimate term of movement can be taken in two + ways, either as the thing itself towards which it tends, e.g. a place or form; or a state of rest in that thing. Thus, in + the movement of the appetite, the thing desired that terminates the movement of the appetite relatively, as a means by which + something tends towards another, is called the useful; but that sought after as the last thing absolutely terminating the + movement of the appetite, as a thing towards which for its own sake the appetite tends, is called the virtuous; for the virtuous + is that which is desired for its own sake; but that which terminates the movement of the appetite in the form of rest in the + thing desired, is called the pleasant. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Goodness, so far as it is identical with being, is divided by the ten predicaments. But this division belongs to it according + to its proper formality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This division is not by opposite things; but by opposite aspects. Now those things are called pleasing which have no other + formality under which they are desirable except the pleasant, being sometimes hurtful and contrary to virtue. Whereas the + useful applies to such as have nothing desirable in themselves, but are desired only as helpful to something further, as the + taking of bitter medicine; while the virtuous is predicated of such as are desirable + in themselves. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Goodness is not divided into these three as something univocal to be predicated equally of them all; but as something analogical + to be predicated of them according to priority and posteriority. Hence it is predicated chiefly of the virtuous; then of the + pleasant; and lastly of the useful. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q5_A6-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q6.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q6" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q6-p0.1">THE GOODNESS OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q6-p2"> We next consider the goodness of God; under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q6-p3"> (1) Whether goodness belongs to God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q6-p4"> (2) Whether God is the supreme good?</p> + <p id="FP_Q6-p5"> (3) Whether He alone is essentially good?</p> + <p id="FP_Q6-p6"> (4) Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?</p> + <div id="FP_Q6_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q6_A1-p0.1">Whether God is good?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q6_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be good does not belong to God. For goodness consists in mode, species and order. But these do not seem + to belong to God; since God is immense and is not ordered to anything else. Therefore to be good does not belong to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the good is what all things desire. But all things do not desire God, because all things do not know Him; and nothing + is desired unless it is known. Therefore to be good does not belong to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A1-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q6_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Lam.3.25" target="asv">Lam. 3:25</a>): "The Lord is good to them that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A1-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> To be good belongs pre-eminently to God. For a thing is good according to its desirableness. Now everything seeks after its + own perfection; and the perfection and form of an effect consist in a certain likeness to the agent, since every agent makes + its like; and hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good. For the very thing which is desirable in it + is the participation of its likeness. Therefore, since God is the first effective cause of + all things, it is manifest that the aspect of good and of desirableness belong to Him; and hence Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) + attributes good to God as to the first efficient cause, saying that, God is called good "as by Whom all things subsist." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A1-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To have mode, species and order belongs to the essence of caused good; but good is in God as in its cause, and hence it belongs + to Him to impose mode, species and order on others; wherefore these three things are in God as in their cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes + of the divine being; as appears from what is said above ( + <a id="FP_Q6_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4] , A[3]</a>). And so of those things which desire God, some know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature; others + know some participation of His goodness, and this belongs also to sensible knowledge; others have a + natural desire without knowledge, as being directed to their ends by a higher intelligence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A1-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A1-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q6_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q6_A2-p0.1">Whether God is the supreme good?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not the supreme good. For the supreme good adds something to good; otherwise it would belong to every + good. But everything which is an addition to anything else is a compound thing: therefore the supreme good is a compound. + But God is supremely simple; as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q6_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore God is not the supreme good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Good is what all desire," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Now what all desire is nothing but God, Who is + the end of all things: therefore there is no other good but God. This appears also from what is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q6_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.18.19" target="asv">Lk. 18:19</a>): "None is good but God alone." But we use the word supreme in comparison with others, as e.g. supreme heat is used in comparison + with all other heats. Therefore God cannot be called the supreme good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, supreme implies comparison. But things not in the same genus are not comparable; as, sweetness is not properly greater + or less than a line. Therefore, since God is not in the same genus as other good things, as appears above ( + <a id="FP_Q6_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q6_A2-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>) it seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in relation to others. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. ii) that, the Trinity of the divine persons is "the supreme good, discerned by purified minds." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God is the supreme good simply, and not only as existing in any genus or order of things. For good is attributed to God, + as was said in the preceding article, inasmuch as all desired perfections flow from Him as from the first cause. They do not, + however, flow from Him as from a univocal agent, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q6_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>); but as from an agent which does not agree with its effects either in species or genus. Now the likeness of an + effect in the univocal cause is found uniformly; but in the equivocal cause it is found more excellently, as, heat is in the + sun more excellently than it is in fire. Therefore as good is in God as in the first, but not the univocal, cause of all things, + it must be in Him in a most excellent way; and therefore He is called the supreme good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The supreme good does not add to good any absolute thing, but only a relation. Now a relation of God to creatures, is not + a reality in God, but in the creature; for it is in God in our idea only: as, what is knowable is so called with relation + to knowledge, not that it depends on knowledge, but because knowledge depends on it. Thus it is not necessary that there should + be composition in the supreme good, but only that other things are deficient in + comparison with it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When we say that good is what all desire, it is not to be understood that every kind of good thing is desired by all; but + that whatever is desired has the nature of good. And when it is said, "None is good but God alone," this is to be understood + of essential goodness, as will be explained in the next article. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things not of the same genus are in no way comparable to each other if indeed they are in different genera. Now we say that + God is not in the same genus with other good things; not that He is any other genus, but that He is outside genus, and is + the principle of every genus; and thus He is compared to others by excess, and it is this kind of comparison the supreme good + implies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q6_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q6_A3-p0.1">Whether to be essentially good belongs to God alone?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be essentially good does not belong to God alone. For as "one" is convertible with "being," so is "good"; + as we said above ( + <a id="FP_Q6_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html">Q[5], A[1]</a>). But every being is one essentially, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iv); therefore every being is good essentially. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if good is what all things desire, since being itself is desired by all, then the being of each thing is its good. + But everything is a being essentially; therefore every being is good essentially. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything is good by its own goodness. Therefore if there is anything which is not good essentially, it is necessary + to say that its goodness is not its own essence. Therefore its goodness, since it is a being, must be good; and if it is good + by some other goodness, the same question applies to that goodness also; therefore we must either proceed to infinity, or + come to some goodness which is not good by any other goodness. Therefore the first + supposition holds good. Therefore everything is good essentially. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Hebdom.), that "all things but God are good by participation." Therefore they are not good essentially. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God alone is good essentially. For everything is called good according to its perfection. Now perfection of a thing is threefold: + first, according to the constitution of its own being; secondly, in respect of any accidents being added as necessary for + its perfect operation; thirdly, perfection consists in the attaining to something else as the end. Thus, for instance, the + first perfection of fire consists in its existence, which it has through its own + substantial form; its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness and dryness, and the like; its third perfection is + to rest in its own place. This triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own essence; it belongs to God only, in Whom + alone essence is existence; in Whom there are no accidents; since whatever belongs to others accidentally belongs to Him essentially; + as, to be powerful, wise and the like, as appears from what is stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q6_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A6.html">Q[3], A[6]</a>); and + He is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God + alone has every kind of perfection by His own essence; therefore He Himself alone is good essentially. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "One" does not include the idea of perfection, but only of indivision, which belongs to everything according to its own essence. + Now the essences of simple things are undivided both actually and potentially, but the essences of compounds are undivided + only actually; and therefore everything must be one essentially, but not good essentially, as was shown above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although everything is good in that it has being, yet the essence of a creature is not very being; and therefore it does + not follow that a creature is good essentially. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The goodness of a creature is not its very essence, but something superadded; it is either its existence, or some added perfection, + or the order to its end. Still, the goodness itself thus added is good, just as it is being. But for this reason is it called + being because by it something has being, not because it itself has being through something else: hence for this reason is + it called good because by it something is good, and not because it itself + has some other goodness whereby it is good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q6_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q6_A4-p0.1">Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that all things are good by the divine goodness. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii), "This and that are good; take + away this and that, and see good itself if thou canst; and so thou shalt see God, good not by any other good, but the good + of every good." But everything is good by its own good; therefore everything is good by that very good which is God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), all things are called good, accordingly as they are directed to God, and this is + by reason of the divine goodness; therefore all things are good by the divine goodness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> All things are good, inasmuch as they have being. But they are not called beings through the divine being, but through their + own being; therefore all things are not good by the divine goodness, but by their own goodness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As regards relative things, we must admit extrinsic denomination; as, a thing is denominated "placed" from "place," and "measured" + from "measure." But as regards absolute things opinions differ. Plato held the existence of separate ideas ( + <a id="FP_Q6_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A4.html">Q[84], A[4]</a>) of all things, and that individuals were denominated by them as participating in the separate ideas; for instance, that + Socrates is called man according to the separate idea of man. Now + just as he laid down separate ideas of man and horse which he called absolute man and absolute horse, so likewise he laid + down separate ideas of "being" and of "one," and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and by participation + of these, everything was called "being" or "one"; and what was thus absolute being and absolute one, he said was the supreme + good. And because good is convertible with being, as one is also; he called God the absolute good, from whom all things are + called good by way of participation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p6"> Although this opinion appears to be unreasonable in affirming separate ideas of natural things as subsisting of themselves---as + Aristotle argues in many ways---still, it is absolutely true that there is first something which is essentially being and + essentially good, which we call God, as appears from what is shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q6_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>), and Aristotle agrees with this. Hence from the first being, essentially such, and good, everything can be called good and + a being, inasmuch as it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation which is far removed and defective; as appears + from the above ( + <a id="FP_Q6_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p7"> Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from the first exemplary effective and final principle of + all goodness. Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the similitude of the divine goodness belonging to it, + which is formally its own goodness, whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there is one goodness, and yet many + goodnesses. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p8"><b>Reply to objections.</b> This is a sufficient Reply to the Objections.</p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p9"></p> + <p id="FP_Q6_A4-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q7.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q5_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q7" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q7-p0.1">THE INFINITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q7-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q7-p2"> After considering the divine perfection we must consider the divine infinity, and God's existence in things: for God is everywhere, + and in all things, inasmuch as He is boundless and infinite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7-p3"> Concerning the first, there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q7-p4"> (1) Whether God is infinite?</p> + <p id="FP_Q7-p5"> (2) Whether anything besides Him is infinite in essence?</p> + <p id="FP_Q7-p6"> (3) Whether anything can be infinitude in magnitude?</p> + <p id="FP_Q7-p7"> (4) Whether an infinite multitude can exist?</p> + <div id="FP_Q7_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q7_A1-p0.1">Whether God is infinite?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not infinite. For everything infinite is imperfect, as the Philosopher says; because it has parts and + matter, as is said in Phys. iii. But God is most perfect; therefore He is not infinite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i), finite and infinite belong to quantity. But there is no quantity in God, + for He is not a body, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q7_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], A[1]</a>). Therefore it does not belong to Him to be infinite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is here in such a way as not to be elsewhere, is finite according to place. Therefore that which is a thing + in such a way as not to be another thing, is finite according to substance. But God is this, and not another; for He is not + a stone or wood. Therefore God is not infinite in substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4) that "God is infinite and eternal, and boundless." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> All the ancient philosophers attribute infinitude to the first principle, as is said (Phys. iii), and with reason; for they + considered that things flow forth infinitely from the first principle. But because some erred concerning the nature of the + first principle, as a consequence they erred also concerning its infinity; forasmuch as they asserted that matter was the + first principle; consequently they attributed to the first principle a material infinity to + the effect that some infinite body was the first principle of things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p7"> We must consider therefore that a thing is called infinite because it is not finite. Now matter is in a way made finite by + form, and the form by matter. Matter indeed is made finite by form, inasmuch as matter, before it receives its form, is in + potentiality to many forms; but on receiving a form, it is terminated by that one. Again, form is made finite by matter, inasmuch + as form, considered in itself, is common to many; but when received in matter, the form is determined to + this one particular thing. Now matter is perfected by the form by which it is made finite; therefore infinite as attributed + to matter, has the nature of something imperfect; for it is as it were formless matter. On the other hand, form is not made + perfect by matter, but rather is contracted by matter; and hence the infinite, regarded on the part of the form not determined + by matter, has the nature of something perfect. Now being is the most formal of all things, as appears from what is shown + above ( + <a id="FP_Q7_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a>, OBJ[3]). Since therefore the divine being is not a being received in anything, but He is His own subsistent being as was + shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q7_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it is clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From this appears the Reply to the First Objection.</p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Quantity is terminated by its form, which can be seen in the fact that a figure which consists in quantity terminated, is + a kind of quantitative form. Hence the infinite of quantity is the infinite of matter; such a kind of infinite cannot be attributed + to God; as was said above, in this article. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact that the being of God is self-subsisting, not received in any other, and is thus called infinite, shows Him to be + distinguished from all other beings, and all others to be apart from Him. Even so, were there such a thing as a self-subsisting + whiteness, the very fact that it did not exist in anything else, would make it distinct from every other whiteness existing + in a subject. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q7_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q7_A2-p0.1">Whether anything but God can be essentially infinite?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that something else besides God can be essentially infinite. For the power of anything is proportioned to its essence. + Now if the essence of God is infinite, His power must also be infinite. Therefore He can produce an infinite effect, since + the extent of a power is known by its effect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever has infinite power, has an infinite essence. Now the created intellect has an infinite power; for it apprehends + the universal, which can extend itself to an infinitude of singular things. Therefore every created intellectual substance + is infinite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, primary matter is something other than God, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q7_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A8.html">Q[3], A[8]</a>). But primary matter is infinite. Therefore something besides God can be infinite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The infinite cannot have a beginning, as said in Phys. iii. But everything outside God is from God as from its first principle. + Therefore besides God nothing can be infinite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Things other than God can be relatively infinite, but not absolutely infinite. For with regard to infinite as applied to + matter, it is manifest that everything actually existing possesses a form; and thus its matter is determined by form. But + because matter, considered as existing under some substantial form, remains in potentiality to many accidental forms, which + is absolutely finite can be relatively infinite; as, for example, wood is finite according to + its own form, but still it is relatively infinite, inasmuch as it is in potentiality to an infinite number of shapes. But + if we speak of the infinite in reference to form, it is manifest that those things, the forms of which are in matter, are + absolutely finite, and in no way infinite. If, however, any created forms are not received into matter, but are self-subsisting, + as some think is the case with angels, these will be relatively infinite, inasmuch as such kinds of forms are not terminated, + nor contracted by any matter. But because a created form thus subsisting has being, and yet is not its own being, it follows + that its being is received and contracted to a determinate nature. Hence it cannot be absolutely infinite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is against the nature of a made thing for its essence to be its existence; because subsisting being is not a created being; + hence it is against the nature of a made thing to be absolutely infinite. Therefore, as God, although He has infinite power, + cannot make a thing to be not made (for this would imply that two contradictories are true at the same time), so likewise + He cannot make anything to be absolutely infinite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that the power of the intellect extends itself in a way to infinite things, is because the intellect is a form not + in matter, but either wholly separated from matter, as is the angelic substance, or at least an intellectual power, which + is not the act of any organ, in the intellectual soul joined to a body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Primary matter does not exist by itself in nature, since it is not actually being, but potentially only; hence it is something + concreated rather than created. Nevertheless, primary matter even as a potentiality is not absolutely infinite, but relatively, + because its potentiality extends only to natural forms. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q7_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q7_A3-p0.1">Whether an actually infinite magnitude can exist?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there can be something actually infinite in magnitude. For in mathematics there is no error, since "there is + no lie in things abstract," as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii). But mathematics uses the infinite in magnitude; thus, the + geometrician in his demonstrations says, "Let this line be infinite." Therefore it is not impossible for a thing to be infinite + in magnitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is not against the nature of anything, can agree with it. Now to be infinite is not against the nature of magnitude; + but rather both the finite and the infinite seem to be properties of quantity. Therefore it is not impossible for some magnitude + to be infinite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, magnitude is infinitely divisible, for the continuous is defined that which is infinitely divisible, as is clear + from Phys. iii. But contraries are concerned about one and the same thing. Since therefore addition is opposed to division, + and increase opposed to diminution, it appears that magnitude can be increased to infinity. Therefore it is possible for magnitude + to be infinite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, movement and time have quantity and continuity derived from the magnitude over which movement passes, as is said + in Phys. iv. But it is not against the nature of time and movement to be infinite, since every determinate indivisible in + time and circular movement is both a beginning and an end. Therefore neither is it against the nature of magnitude to be infinite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Every body has a surface. But every body which has a surface is finite; because surface is the term of a finite body. Therefore + all bodies are finite. The same applies both to surface and to a line. Therefore nothing is infinite in magnitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is one thing to be infinite in essence, and another to be infinite in magnitude. For granted that a body exists infinite + in magnitude, as fire or air, yet this could not be infinite in essence, because its essence would be terminated in a species + by its form, and confined to individuality by matter. And so assuming from these premises that no creature is infinite in + essence, it still remains to inquire whether any creature can be infinite in + magnitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p8"> We must therefore observe that a body, which is a complete magnitude, can be considered in two ways; mathematically, in respect + to its quantity only; and naturally, as regards its matter and form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p9"> Now it is manifest that a natural body cannot be actually infinite. For every natural body has some determined substantial + form. Since therefore the accidents follow upon the substantial form, it is necessary that determinate accidents should follow + upon a determinate form; and among these accidents is quantity. So every natural body has a greater or smaller determinate + quantity. Hence it is impossible for a natural body to be infinite. The same appears from movement; because + every natural body has some natural movement; whereas an infinite body could not have any natural movement; neither direct, + because nothing moves naturally by a direct movement unless it is out of its place; and this could not happen to an infinite + body, for it would occupy every place, and thus every place would be indifferently its own place. Neither could it move circularly; + forasmuch as circular motion requires that one part of the body is necessarily transferred to a place occupied by + another part, and this could not happen as regards an infinite circular body: for if two lines be drawn from the centre, the + farther they extend from the centre, the farther they are from each other; therefore, if a body were infinite, the lines would + be infinitely distant from each other; and thus one could never occupy the place belonging to any other. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p10"> The same applies to a mathematical body. For if we imagine a mathematical body actually existing, we must imagine it under + some form, because nothing is actual except by its form; hence, since the form of quantity as such is figure, such a body + must have some figure, and so would be finite; for figure is confined by a term or boundary. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A geometrician does not need to assume a line actually infinite, but takes some actually finite line, from which he subtracts + whatever he finds necessary; which line he calls infinite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the infinite is not against the nature of magnitude in general, still it is against the nature of any species of + it; thus, for instance, it is against the nature of a bicubical or tricubical magnitude, whether circular or triangular, and + so on. Now what is not possible in any species cannot exist in the genus; hence there cannot be any infinite magnitude, since + no species of magnitude is infinite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The infinite in quantity, as was shown above, belongs to matter. Now by division of the whole we approach to matter, forasmuch + as parts have the aspect of matter; but by addition we approach to the whole which has the aspect of a form. Therefore the + infinite is not in the addition of magnitude, but only in division. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Movement and time are whole, not actually but successively; hence they have potentiality mixed with actuality. But magnitude + is an actual whole; therefore the infinite in quantity refers to matter, and does not agree with the totality of magnitude; + yet it agrees with the totality of time and movement: for it is proper to matter to be in potentiality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p15"></p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A3-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q7_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q7_A4-p0.1">Whether an infinite multitude can exist?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that an actually infinite multitude is possible. For it is not impossible for a potentiality to be made actual. + But number can be multiplied to infinity. Therefore it is possible for an infinite multitude actually to exist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is possible for any individual of any species to be made actual. But the species of figures are infinite. Therefore + an infinite number of actual figures is possible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things not opposed to each other do not obstruct each other. But supposing a multitude of things to exist, there + can still be many others not opposed to them. Therefore it is not impossible for others also to coexist with them, and so + on to infinitude; therefore an actual infinite number of things is possible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q7_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some, as Avicenna and Algazel, said that it was impossible for an actually infinite + multitude to exist absolutely; but that an accidentally infinite multitude was not impossible. A multitude is said to be infinite + absolutely, when an infinite multitude is necessary that something may exist. Now this is impossible; because it would entail + something dependent on an infinity for its existence; and hence its generation + could never come to be, because it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p7"> A multitude is said to be accidentally infinite when its existence as such is not necessary, but accidental. This can be + shown, for example, in the work of a carpenter requiring a certain absolute multitude; namely, art in the soul, the movement + of the hand, and a hammer; and supposing that such things were infinitely multiplied, the carpentering work would never be + finished, forasmuch as it would depend on an infinite number of causes. But the multitude of hammers, inasmuch as + one may be broken and another used, is an accidental multitude; for it happens by accident that many hammers are used, and + it matters little whether one or two, or many are used, or an infinite number, if the work is carried on for an infinite time. + In this way they said that there can be an accidentally infinite multitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p8"> This, however, is impossible; since every kind of multitude must belong to a species of multitude. Now the species of multitude + are to be reckoned by the species of numbers. But no species of number is infinite; for every number is multitude measured + by one. Hence it is impossible for there to be an actually infinite multitude, either absolute or accidental. Likewise multitude + in nature is created; and everything created is comprehended under some clear intention of the Creator; + for no agent acts aimlessly. Hence everything created must be comprehended in a certain number. Therefore it is impossible + for an actually infinite multitude to exist, even accidentally. But a potentially infinite multitude is possible; because + the increase of multitude follows upon the division of magnitude; since the more a thing is divided, the greater number of + things result. Hence, as the infinite is to be found potentially in the division of the continuous, because we thus approach + matter, as was shown in the preceding article, by the same rule, the infinite can be also found potentially in the addition + of multitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Every potentiality is made actual according to its mode of being; for instance, a day is reduced to act successively, and + not all at once. Likewise the infinite in multitude is reduced to act successively, and not all at once; because every multitude + can be succeeded by another multitude to infinity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Species of figures are infinite by infinitude of number. Now there are various species of figures, such as trilateral, quadrilateral + and so on; and as an infinitely numerable multitude is not all at once reduced to act, so neither is the multitude of figures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the supposition of some things does not preclude the supposition of others, still the supposition of an infinite + number is opposed to any single species of multitude. Hence it is not possible for an actually infinite multitude to exist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q7_A4-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q8.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q8" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q8-p0.1">THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q8-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q8-p2"> Since it evidently belongs to the infinite to be present everywhere, and in all things, we now consider whether this belongs + to God; and concerning this there arise four points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8-p3"> (1) Whether God is in all things?</p> + <p id="FP_Q8-p4"> (2) Whether God is everywhere?</p> + <p id="FP_Q8-p5"> (3) Whether God is everywhere by essence, power, and presence?</p> + <p id="FP_Q8-p6"> (4) Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?</p> + <div id="FP_Q8_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q8_A1-p0.1">Whether God is in all things?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not in all things. For what is above all things is not in all things. But God is above all, according + to the Psalm ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.112.4" target="asv">Ps. 112:4</a>), "The Lord is high above all nations," etc. Therefore God is not in all things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is in anything is thereby contained. Now God is not contained by things, but rather does He contain them. Therefore + God is not in things but things are rather in Him. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 20), that "in Him things + are, rather than He is in any place." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more powerful an agent is, the more extended is its action. But God is the most powerful of all agents. Therefore + His action can extend to things which are far removed from Him; nor is it necessary that He should be in all things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the demons are beings. But God is not in the demons; for there is no fellowship between light and darkness ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.14" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:14</a>). Therefore God is not in all things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A thing is wherever it operates. But God operates in all things, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.26.12" target="asv"> Is. 26:12, </a> "Lord . . . Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us." Therefore God is in all things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon + which it works. For an agent must be joined to that wherein it acts immediately and touch it by its power; hence it is proved + in Phys. vii that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Now since God is very being by His own essence, created + being must be His proper effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now God + causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as they are preserved in being; as light is + caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing has being, God must be present + to it, according to its mode of being. But being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all things + since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q8_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Hence + it must be that God is in all things, and innermostly. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is above all things by the excellence of His nature; nevertheless, He is in all things as the cause of the being of all + things; as was shown above in this article. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although corporeal things are said to be in another as in that which contains them, nevertheless, spiritual things contain + those things in which they are; as the soul contains the body. Hence also God is in things containing them; nevertheless, + by a certain similitude to corporeal things, it is said that all things are in God; inasmuch as they are contained by Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No action of an agent, however powerful it may be, acts at a distance, except through a medium. But it belongs to the great + power of God that He acts immediately in all things. Hence nothing is distant from Him, as if it could be without God in itself. + But things are said to be distant from God by the unlikeness to Him in nature or grace; as also He is above all by the excellence + of His own nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the demons there is their nature which is from God, and also the deformity of sin which is not from Him; therefore, it + is not to be absolutely conceded that God is in the demons, except with the addition, "inasmuch as they are beings." But in + things not deformed in their nature, we must say absolutely that God is. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q8_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q8_A2-p0.1">Whether God is everywhere?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not everywhere. For to be everywhere means to be in every place. But to be in every place does not belong + to God, to Whom it does not belong to be in place at all; for "incorporeal things," as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), "are not + in a place." Therefore God is not everywhere. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the relation of time to succession is the same as the relation of place to permanence. But one indivisible part + of action or movement cannot exist in different times; therefore neither can one indivisible part in the genus of permanent + things be in every place. Now the divine being is not successive but permanent. Therefore God is not in many places; and thus + He is not everywhere. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is wholly in any one place is not in part elsewhere. But if God is in any one place He is all there; for He + has no parts. No part of Him then is elsewhere; and therefore God is not everywhere. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "I fill heaven and earth." ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.23.24" target="asv">Jer. 23:24</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since place is a thing, to be in place can be understood in a twofold sense; either by way of other things---i.e. as one + thing is said to be in another no matter how; and thus the accidents of a place are in place; or by a way proper to place; + and thus things placed are in a place. Now in both these senses, in some way God is in every place; and this is to be everywhere. + First, as He is in all things giving them being, power and operation; so He is in every + place as giving it existence and locative power. Again, things placed are in place, inasmuch as they fill place; and God fills + every place; not, indeed, like a body, for a body is said to fill place inasmuch as it excludes the co-presence of another + body; whereas by God being in a place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed, by the very fact that He gives being + to the things that fill every place, He Himself fills every place. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Incorporeal things are in place not by contact of dimensive quantity, as bodies are but by contact of power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The indivisible is twofold. One is the term of the continuous; as a point in permanent things, and as a moment in succession; + and this kind of the indivisible in permanent things, forasmuch as it has a determinate site, cannot be in many parts of place, + or in many places; likewise the indivisible of action or movement, forasmuch as it has a determinate order in movement or + action, cannot be in many parts of time. Another kind of the indivisible is + outside of the whole genus of the continuous; and in this way incorporeal substances, like God, angel and soul, are called + indivisible. Such a kind of indivisible does not belong to the continuous, as a part of it, but as touching it by its power; + hence, according as its power can extend itself to one or to many, to a small thing, or to a great one, in this way it is + in one or in many places, and in a small or large place. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A whole is so called with reference to its parts. Now part is twofold: viz. a part of the essence, as the form and the matter + are called parts of the composite, while genus and difference are called parts of species. There is also part of quantity + into which any quantity is divided. What therefore is whole in any place by totality of quantity, cannot be outside of that + place, because the quantity of anything placed is commensurate to the quantity of + the place; and hence there is no totality of quantity without totality of place. But totality of essence is not commensurate + to the totality of place. Hence it is not necessary for that which is whole by totality of essence in a thing, not to be at + all outside of it. This appears also in accidental forms which have accidental quantity; as an example, whiteness is whole + in each part of the surface if we speak of its totality of essence; because according to the perfect idea of its species it + is + found to exist in every part of the surface. But if its totality be considered according to quantity which it has accidentally, + then it is not whole in every part of the surface. On the other hand, incorporeal substances have no totality either of themselves + or accidentally, except in reference to the perfect idea of their essence. Hence, as the soul is whole in every part of the + body, so is God whole in all things and in each one. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q8_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q8_A3-p0.1">Whether God is everywhere by essence, presence and power?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the mode of God's existence in all things is not properly described by way of essence, presence and power. + For what is by essence in anything, is in it essentially. But God is not essentially in things; for He does not belong to + the essence of anything. Therefore it ought not to be said that God is in things by essence, presence and power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to be present in anything means not to be absent from it. Now this is the meaning of God being in things by His + essence, that He is not absent from anything. Therefore the presence of God in all things by essence and presence means the + same thing. Therefore it is superfluous to say that God is present in things by His essence, presence and power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as God by His power is the principle of all things, so He is the same likewise by His knowledge and will. But it + is not said that He is in things by knowledge and will. Therefore neither is He present by His power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as grace is a perfection added to the substance of a thing, so many other perfections are likewise added. Therefore + if God is said to be in certain persons in a special way by grace, it seems that according to every perfection there ought + to be a special mode of God's existence in things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on the Canticle of Canticles (5) says that, "God by a common mode is in all things by His presence, power and substance; + still He is said to be present more familiarly in some by grace" [*The quotation is from St. Gregory, (Hom. viii in Ezech.)]. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things + created by Him; in another way he is in things as the object of operation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations + of the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and the thing desired in the one desiring. In this second + way God is especially in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually or + habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this prerogative by grace, as will be shown later + <a id="FP_Q8_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12.html">(Q[12])</a>. He is said to be thus in the saints by grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p8"> But how He is in other things created by Him, may be considered from human affairs. A king, for example, is said to be in + the whole kingdom by his power, although he is not everywhere present. Again a thing is said to be by its presence in other + things which are subject to its inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who nevertheless may not + be in substance in every part of the house. Lastly, a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that + place in which its substance may be. Now there were some (the Manichees) who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were + subject to the divine power; but that visible and corporeal things were subject to the power of a contrary principle. Therefore + against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p9"> But others, though they believed that all things were subject to the divine power, still did not allow that divine providence + extended to these inferior bodies, and in the person of these it is said, "He walketh about the poles of the heavens; and + He doth not consider our things [*Vulg.: 'He doth not consider . . . and He walketh,' etc.]" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Job.22.14" target="asv">Job 22:14</a>). Against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His presence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p10"> Further, others said that, although all things are subject to God's providence, still all things are not immediately created + by God; but that He immediately created the first creatures, and these created the others. Against these it is necessary to + say that He is in all things by His essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p11"> Therefore, God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things are subject to His power; He is by His presence in all + things, as all things are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His essence, inasmuch as He is present to all + as the cause of their being. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to be in all things by essence, not indeed by the essence of the things themselves, as if He were of their essence; + but by His own essence; because His substance is present to all things as the cause of their being. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing can be said to be present to another, when in its sight, though the thing may be distant in substance, as was shown + in this article; and therefore two modes of presence are necessary; viz. by essence and by presence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Knowledge and will require that the thing known should be in the one who knows, and the thing willed in the one who wills. + Hence by knowledge and will things are more truly in God than God in things. But power is the principle of acting on another; + hence by power the agent is related and applied to an external thing; thus by power an agent may be said to be present to + another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> No other perfection, except grace, added to substance, renders God present in anything as the object known and loved; therefore + only grace constitutes a special mode of God's existence in things. There is, however, another special mode of God's existence + in man by union, which will be treated of in its own place (TP). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p16"></p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A3-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q8_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q9.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q8_A4-p0.1">Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. For the universal, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i), + is everywhere, and always; primary matter also, since it is in all bodies, is everywhere. But neither of these is God, as + appears from what is said above + <a id="FP_Q8_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3.html">(Q[3])</a>. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, number is in things numbered. But the whole universe is constituted in number, as appears from the Book of Wisdom + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>). Therefore there is some number which is in the whole universe, and is thus everywhere. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the universe is a kind of "whole perfect body" (Coel. et Mund. i). But the whole universe is everywhere, because + there is no place outside it. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if any body were infinite, no place would exist outside of it, and so it would be everywhere. Therefore to be everywhere + does not appear to belong to God alone. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the soul, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), is "whole in the whole body, and whole in every one of its parts." + Therefore if there was only one animal in the world, its soul would be everywhere; and thus to be everywhere does not belong + to God alone. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, as Augustine says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">Ep. 137</a>), "The soul feels where it sees, and lives where it feels, and is where it lives." But the soul sees as it were everywhere: + for in a succession of glances it comprehends the entire space of the heavens in its sight. Therefore the soul is everywhere. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Who dares to call the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all things, and everywhere, and + always is, which assuredly belongs to the divinity alone?" + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> To be everywhere primarily and absolutely, is proper to God. Now to be everywhere primarily is said of that which in its + whole self is everywhere; for if a thing were everywhere according to its parts in different places, it would not be primarily + everywhere, forasmuch as what belongs to anything according to part does not belong to it primarily; thus if a man has white + teeth, whiteness belongs primarily not to the man but to his teeth. But a thing is + everywhere absolutely when it does not belong to it to be everywhere accidentally, that is, merely on some supposition; as + a grain of millet would be everywhere, supposing that no other body existed. It belongs therefore to a thing to be everywhere + absolutely when, on any supposition, it must be everywhere; and this properly belongs to God alone. For whatever number of + places be supposed, even if an infinite number be supposed besides what already exist, it would be necessary that God should + be + in all of them; for nothing can exist except by Him. Therefore to be everywhere primarily and absolutely belongs to God and + is proper to Him: because whatever number of places be supposed to exist, God must be in all of them, not as to a part of + Him, but as to His very self. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The universal, and also primary matter are indeed everywhere; but not according to the same mode of existence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Number, since it is an accident, does not, of itself, exist in place, but accidentally; neither is the whole but only part + of it in each of the things numbered; hence it does not follow that it is primarily and absolutely everywhere. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The whole body of the universe is everywhere, but not primarily; forasmuch as it is not wholly in each place, but according + to its parts; nor again is it everywhere absolutely, because, supposing that other places existed besides itself, it would + not be in them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> If an infinite body existed, it would be everywhere; but according to its parts. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Were there one animal only, its soul would be everywhere primarily indeed, but only accidentally. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> When it is said that the soul sees anywhere, this can be taken in two senses. In one sense the adverb "anywhere" determines + the act of seeing on the part of the object; and in this sense it is true that while it sees the heavens, it sees in the heavens; + and in the same way it feels in the heavens; but it does not follow that it lives or exists in the heavens, because to live + and to exist do not import an act passing to an exterior object. In another + sense it can be understood according as the adverb determines the act of the seer, as proceeding from the seer; and thus it + is true that where the soul feels and sees, there it is, and there it lives according to this mode of speaking; and thus it + does not follow that it is everywhere. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p16"></p> + <p id="FP_Q8_A4-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q9.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q7_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q9" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q9-p0.1">THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q9-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q9-p2"> We next consider God's immutability, and His eternity following on His immutability. On the immutability of God there are + two points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q9-p3"> (1) Whether God is altogether immutable?</p> + <p id="FP_Q9-p4"> (2) Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?</p> + <div id="FP_Q9_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q9_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q9_A1-p0.1">Whether God is altogether immutable?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not altogether immutable. For whatever moves itself is in some way mutable. But, as Augustine says (Gen. + ad lit viii, 20), "The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by time, nor by place." Therefore God is in some way mutable. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said of Wisdom, that "it is more mobile than all things active [Vulg.'mobilior']" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q9_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.24" target="asv">Wis. 7:24</a>). But God is wisdom itself; therefore God is movable. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to approach and to recede signify movement. But these are said of God in Scripture, "Draw nigh to God and He will + draw nigh to you" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q9_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.8" target="asv">James 4:8</a>). Therefore God is mutable. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "I am the Lord, and I change not" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q9_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.3.6" target="asv">Malachi 3:6</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> From what precedes, it is shown that God is altogether immutable. First, because it was shown above that there is some first + being, whom we call God; and that this first being must be pure act, without the admixture of any potentiality, for the reason + that, absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality. + Hence it is evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable. + Secondly, because everything which is moved, remains as it was in part, and passes away in part; as what is moved from whiteness + to blackness, remains the same as to substance; thus in everything which is moved, there is some kind of composition to be + found. But it has been shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q9_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>) that in God there is no composition, for He is altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that God cannot be moved. Thirdly, + because everything which is moved acquires something + by its movement, and attains to what it had not attained previously. But since God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all + the plenitude of perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything new, nor extend Himself to anything whereto He was not + extended previously. Hence movement in no way belongs to Him. So, some of the ancients, constrained, as it were, by the truth, + decided that the first principle was immovable. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine there speaks in a similar way to Plato, who said that the first mover moves Himself; calling every operation a + movement, even as the acts of understanding, and willing, and loving, are called movements. Therefore because God understands + and loves Himself, in that respect they said that God moves Himself, not, however, as movement and change belong to a thing + existing in potentiality, as we now speak of change and movement. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Wisdom is called mobile by way of similitude, according as it diffuses its likeness even to the outermost of things; for + nothing can exist which does not proceed from the divine wisdom by way of some kind of imitation, as from the first effective + and formal principle; as also works of art proceed from the wisdom of the artist. And so in the same way, inasmuch as the + similitude of the divine wisdom proceeds in degrees from the highest things, which + participate more fully of its likeness, to the lowest things which participate of it in a lesser degree, there is said to + be a kind of procession and movement of the divine wisdom to things; as when we say that the sun proceeds to the earth, inasmuch + as the ray of light touches the earth. In this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. i) expounds the matter, that every procession of + the divine manifestation comes to us from the movement of the Father of light. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These things are said of God in Scripture metaphorically. For as the sun is said to enter a house, or to go out, according + as its rays reach the house, so God is said to approach to us, or to recede from us, when we receive the influx of His goodness, + or decline from Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q9_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q9_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q9_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q10.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q9_A2-p0.1">Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be immutable does not belong to God alone. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that "matter is in everything + which is moved." But, according to some, certain created substances, as angels and souls, have not matter. Therefore to be + immutable does not belong to God alone. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything in motion moves to some end. What therefore has already attained its ultimate end, is not in motion. + But some creatures have already attained to their ultimate end; as all the blessed in heaven. Therefore some creatures are + immovable. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything which is mutable is variable. But forms are invariable; for it is said (Sex Princip. i) that "form is + essence consisting of the simple and invariable." Therefore it does not belong to God alone to be immutable. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. i), "God alone is immutable; and whatever things He has made, being from nothing, are mutable." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God alone is altogether immutable; whereas every creature is in some way mutable. Be it known therefore that a mutable thing + can be called so in two ways: by a power in itself; and by a power possessed by another. For all creatures before they existed, + were possible, not by any created power, since no creature is eternal, but by the divine power alone, inasmuch as God could + produce them into existence. Thus, as the production of a thing into existence + depends on the will of God, so likewise it depends on His will that things should be preserved; for He does not preserve them + otherwise than by ever giving them existence; hence if He took away His action from them, all things would be reduced to nothing, + as appears from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12). Therefore as it was in the Creator's power to produce them before they existed + in themselves, so likewise it is in the Creator's power when they exist in themselves to bring them to nothing. In + this way therefore, by the power of another---namely, of God---they are mutable, inasmuch as they are producible from nothing + by Him, and are by Him reducible from existence to non-existence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p7"> If, however, a thing is called mutable by a power in itself, thus also in some manner every creature is mutable. For every + creature has a twofold power, active and passive; and I call that power passive which enables anything to attain its perfection + either in being, or in attaining to its end. Now if the mutability of a thing be considered according to its power for being, + in that way all creatures are not mutable, but those only in which what is potential in them is consistent + with non-being. Hence, in the inferior bodies there is mutability both as regards substantial being, inasmuch as their matter + can exist with privation of their substantial form, and also as regards their accidental being, supposing the subject to coexist + with privation of accident; as, for example, this subject "man" can exist with "not-whiteness" and can therefore be changed + from white to not-white. But supposing the accident to be such as to follow on the essential principles of the subject, + then the privation of such an accident cannot coexist with the subject. Hence the subject cannot be changed as regards that + kind of accident; as, for example, snow cannot be made black. Now in the celestial bodies matter is not consistent with privation + of form, because the form perfects the whole potentiality of the matter; therefore these bodies are not mutable as to substantial + being, but only as to locality, because the subject is consistent with privation of this or that place. On the + other hand incorporeal substances, being subsistent forms which, although with respect to their own existence are as potentiality + to act, are not consistent with the privation of this act; forasmuch as existence is consequent upon form, and nothing corrupts + except it lose its form. Hence in the form itself there is no power to non-existence; and so these kinds of substances are + immutable and invariable as regards their existence. Wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "intellectual + created substances are pure from generation and from every variation, as also are incorporeal and immaterial substances." + Still, there remains in them a twofold mutability: one as regards their potentiality to their end; and in that way there is + in them a mutability according to choice from good to evil, as Damascene says (De Fide ii, 3,4); the other as regards place, + inasmuch as by their finite power they attain to certain fresh places---which cannot be said of God, who by His infinity fills + all places, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q9_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q8_A2.html">Q[8], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p8"> Thus in every creature there is a potentiality to change either as regards substantial being as in the case of things corruptible; + or as regards locality only, as in the case of the celestial bodies; or as regards the order to their end, and the application + of their powers to divers objects, as in the case with the angels; and universally all creatures generally are mutable by + the power of the Creator, in Whose power is their existence and non-existence. Hence since God is in + none of these ways mutable, it belongs to Him alone to be altogether immutable. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection proceeds from mutability as regards substantial or accidental being; for philosophers treated of such movement. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good angels, besides their natural endowment of immutability of being, have also immutability of election by divine power; + nevertheless there remains in them mutability as regards place. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Forms are called invariable, forasmuch as they cannot be subjects of variation; but they are subject to variation because + by them their subject is variable. Hence it is clear that they vary in so far as they are; for they are not called beings + as though they were the subject of being, but because through them something has being. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q9_A2-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q10.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q8_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q10" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q9_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q10-p0.1">THE ETERNITY OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q10-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q10-p2"> We must now consider the eternity of God, concerning which arise six points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q10-p3"> (1) What is eternity?</p> + <p id="FP_Q10-p4"> (2) Whether God is eternal?</p> + <p id="FP_Q10-p5"> (3) Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?</p> + <p id="FP_Q10-p6"> (4) Whether eternity differs from time?</p> + <p id="FP_Q10-p7"> (5) The difference of aeviternity, as there is one time, and one eternity?</p> + <p id="FP_Q10-p8"> (6) Whether there is only one aeviternity?</p> + <div id="FP_Q10_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q10_A1-p0.1">Whether this is a good definition of eternity, "The simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life"?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the definition of eternity given by Boethius (De Consol. v) is not a good one: "Eternity is the simultaneously-whole + and perfect possession of interminable life." For the word "interminable" is a negative one. But negation only belongs to + what is defective, and this does not belong to eternity. Therefore in the definition of eternity the word "interminable" ought + not to be found. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, eternity signifies a certain kind of duration. But duration regards existence rather than life. Therefore the word + "life" ought not to come into the definition of eternity; but rather the word "existence." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a whole is what has parts. But this is alien to eternity which is simple. Therefore it is improperly said to be + "whole." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Many days cannot occur together, nor can many times exist all at once. But in eternity, days and times are in the plural, + for it is said, "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Mic.5.2" target="asv">Micah 5:2</a>); and also it is said, "According to the revelation of the mystery hidden from eternity" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.16.25" target="asv">Rom. 16:25</a>). Therefore eternity is not omni-simultaneous. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the whole and the perfect are the same thing. Supposing, therefore, that it is "whole," it is superfluously described + as "perfect." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, duration does not imply "possession." But eternity is a kind of duration. Therefore eternity is not possession. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way of compound things, so must we reach to the knowledge of eternity by + means of time, which is nothing but the numbering of movement by "before" and "after." For since succession occurs in every + movement, and one part comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and after in movement, makes us apprehend time, + which is nothing else but the measure of before and after in movement. Now in a thing bereft + of movement, which is always the same, there is no before or after. As therefore the idea of time consists in the numbering + of before and after in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity of what is outside of movement, consists + the idea of eternity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p9"> Further, those things are said to be measured by time which have a beginning and an end in time, because in everything which + is moved there is a beginning, and there is an end. But as whatever is wholly immutable can have no succession, so it has + no beginning, and no end. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p10"> Thus eternity is known from two sources: first, because what is eternal is interminable---that is, has no beginning nor end + (that is, no term either way); secondly, because eternity has no succession, being simultaneously whole. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Simple things are usually defined by way of negation; as "a point is that which has no parts." Yet this is not to be taken + as if the negation belonged to their essence, but because our intellect which first apprehends compound things, cannot attain + to the knowledge of simple things except by removing the opposite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What is truly eternal, is not only being, but also living; and life extends to operation, which is not true of being. Now + the protraction of duration seems to belong to operation rather than to being; hence time is the numbering of movement. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Eternity is called whole, not because it has parts, but because it is wanting in nothing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As God, although incorporeal, is named in Scripture metaphorically by corporeal names, so eternity though simultaneously + whole, is called by names implying time and succession. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Two things are to be considered in time: time itself, which is successive; and the "now" of time, which is imperfect. Hence + the expression "simultaneously-whole" is used to remove the idea of time, and the word "perfect" is used to exclude the "now" + of time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Whatever is possessed, is held firmly and quietly; therefore to designate the immutability and permanence of eternity, we + use the word "possession." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p17"></p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A1-p18"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q10_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q10_A2-p0.1">Whether God is eternal?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not eternal. For nothing made can be predicated of God; for Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "The now + that flows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity;" and Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 28) "that + God is the author of eternity." Therefore God is not eternal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is before eternity, and after eternity, is not measured by eternity. But, as Aristotle says (De Causis), "God + is before eternity and He is after eternity": for it is written that "the Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond [*Douay: + 'for ever and ever']" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.15.18" target="asv">Ex. 15:18</a>). Therefore to be eternal does not belong to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, eternity is a kind of measure. But to be measured belongs not to God. Therefore it does not belong to Him to be + eternal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in eternity, there is no present, past or future, since it is simultaneously whole; as was said in the preceding + article. But words denoting present, past and future time are applied to God in Scripture. Therefore God is not eternal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Athanasius says in his Creed: "The Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea of time follows movement, as appears from the preceding article. Hence, + as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity; + whereas, no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own being. Now God is His own uniform being; and hence as + He is His own essence, so He is His own eternity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The "now" that stands still, is said to make eternity according to our apprehension. As the apprehension of time is caused + in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the "now," so the apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending + the "now" standing still. When Augustine says that "God is the author of eternity," this is to be understood of participated + eternity. For God communicates His eternity to some in the same way as He + communicates His immutability. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From this appears the answer to the Second Objection. For God is said to be before eternity, according as it is shared by + immaterial substances. Hence, also, in the same book, it is said that "intelligence is equal to eternity." In the words of + Exodus, "The Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond," eternity stands for age, as another rendering has it. Thus it is + said that the Lord will reign beyond eternity, inasmuch as He endures beyond every age, + i.e. beyond every kind of duration. For age is nothing more than the period of each thing, as is said in the book De Coelo + i. Or to reign beyond eternity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were conceived to exist for ever, as the movement + of the heavens according to some philosophers, then God would still reign beyond, inasmuch as His reign is simultaneously + whole. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Eternity is nothing else but God Himself. Hence God is not called eternal, as if He were in any way measured; but the idea + of measurement is there taken according to the apprehension of our mind alone. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Words denoting different times are applied to God, because His eternity includes all times; not as if He Himself were altered + through present, past and future. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q10_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q10_A3-p0.1">Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that it does not belong to God alone to be eternal. For it is written that "those who instruct many to justice," + shall be "as stars unto perpetual eternities [*Douay: 'for all eternity']" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.12.3" target="asv">Dan. 12:3</a>). Now if God alone were eternal, there could not be many eternities. Therefore God alone is not the only eternal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written "Depart, ye cursed into eternal [Douay: 'everlasting'] fire" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.41" target="asv">Mat. 25:41</a>). Therefore God is not the only eternal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every necessary thing is eternal. But there are many necessary things; as, for instance, all principles of demonstration + and all demonstrative propositions. Therefore God is not the only eternal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome says (Ep. ad Damasum. xv) that "God is the only one who has no beginning." Now whatever has a beginning, is not eternal. + Therefore God is the only one eternal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone, because eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first + article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability from Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability + from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is said of the earth, "it standeth for ever" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Eccl.1.4" target="asv">Eccles. 1:4</a>). Again, some things are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their duration, although they are in nature + corruptible; thus ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.75.5" target="asv">Ps. 75:5</a>) the hills are called "eternal" and we read "of the fruits of the eternal hills." ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Deut.33.15" target="asv">Dt. 33:15</a>). Some again, share more fully than others in the nature of eternity, inasmuch as they possess unchangeableness either in + being or further still in operation; like the angels, and + the blessed, who enjoy the Word, because "as regards that vision of the Word, no changing thoughts exist in the Saints," as + Augustine says (De Trin. xv). Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life; according to that text, "This is eternal + life, that they may know Thee the only true God," etc. ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.5" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv">Jn. 17:3</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are said to be many eternities, accordingly as many share in eternity, by the contemplation of God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fire of hell is called eternal, only because it never ends. Still, there is change in the pains of the lost, according + to the words "To extreme heat they will pass from snowy waters" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Job.24.19" target="asv">Job 24:19</a>). Hence in hell true eternity does not exist, but rather time; according to the text of the Psalm "Their time will be for + ever" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.80.16" target="asv">Ps. 80:16</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Necessary means a certain mode of truth; and truth, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi), is in the mind. Therefore + in this sense the true and necessary are eternal, because they are in the eternal mind, which is the divine intellect alone; + hence it does not follow that anything beside God is eternal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q10_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q10_A4-p0.1">Whether eternity differs from time?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that eternity does not differ from time. For two measures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part + of the other; for instance two days or two hours cannot be together; nevertheless, we may say that a day or an hour are together, + considering hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur together, each of which imports a certain measure of duration. + Since therefore eternity is not a part of time, forasmuch as eternity exceeds time, and + includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity, and is not a different thing from eternity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv), the "now" of time remains the same in the whole of time. But the nature + of eternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the whole space of time. Therefore eternity is the "now" + of time. But the "now" of time is not substantially different from time. Therefore eternity is not substantially different + from time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the measure of the first movement is the measure of every movement, as said in Phys. iv, it thus appears that + the measure of the first being is that of every being. But eternity is the measure of the first being---that is, of the divine + being. Therefore eternity is the measure of every being. But the being of things corruptible is measured by time. Time therefore + is either eternity or is a part of eternity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Eternity is simultaneously whole. But time has a "before" and an "after." Therefore time and eternity are not the same thing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same. Some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has neither + beginning nor an end; whereas time has a beginning and an end. This, however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute + difference because, granted that time always was and always will be, according to the idea of those who think the movement + of the heavens goes on for ever, there would yet remain a difference between eternity + and time, as Boethius says (De Consol. v), arising from the fact that eternity is simultaneously whole; which cannot be applied + to time: for eternity is the measure of a permanent being; while time is a measure of movement. Supposing, however, that the + aforesaid difference be considered on the part of the things measured, and not as regards the measures, then there is some + reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is measured by time which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if the movement of + the heavens lasted always, time would not be of its measure as regards the whole of its duration, since the infinite is not + measurable; but it would be the measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning and end in time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p7"> Another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in themselves, if we consider the end and the beginning as potentialities; + because, granted also that time always goes on, yet it is possible to note in time both the beginning and the end, by considering + its parts: thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year; which cannot be applied to eternity. Still these + differences follow upon the essential and primary differences, that eternity is + simultaneously whole, but that time is not so. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Such a reason would be a valid one if time and eternity were the same kind of measure; but this is seen not to be the case + when we consider those things of which the respective measures are time and eternity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The "now" of time is the same as regards its subject in the whole course of time, but it differs in aspect; for inasmuch + as time corresponds to movement, its "now" corresponds to what is movable; and the thing movable has the same one subject + in all time, but differs in aspect a being here and there; and such alteration is movement. Likewise the flow of the "now" + as alternating in aspect is time. But eternity remains the same according to both subject + and aspect; and hence eternity is not the same as the "now" of time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As eternity is the proper measure of permanent being, so time is the proper measure of movement; and hence, according as + any being recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to change, it recedes from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore + the being of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured by eternity, but by time; for time measures not + only things actually changed, but also things changeable; hence it not only + measures movement but it also measures repose, which belongs to whatever is naturally movable, but is not actually in motion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q10_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q10_A5-p0.1">The difference of aeviternity and time</h4> + <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that aeviternity is the same as time. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23), that "God moves the spiritual + through time." But aeviternity is said to be the measure of spiritual substances. Therefore time is the same as aeviternity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is essential to time to have "before" and "after"; but it is essential to eternity to be simultaneously whole, + as was shown above in the first article. Now aeviternity is not eternity; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.1" target="asv">Ecclus. 1:1</a>) that eternal "Wisdom is before age." Therefore it is not simultaneously whole but has "before" and "after"; and thus it + is the same as time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if there is no "before" and "after" in aeviternity, it follows that in aeviternal things there is no difference + between being, having been, or going to be. Since then it is impossible for aeviternal things not to have been, it follows + that it is impossible for them not to be in the future; which is false, since God can reduce them to nothing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, since the duration of aeviternal things is infinite as to subsequent duration, if aeviternity is simultaneously + whole, it follows that some creature is actually infinite; which is impossible. Therefore aeviternity does not differ from + time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iii) "Who commandest time to be separate from aeviternity." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Aeviternity differs from time, and from eternity, as the mean between them both. This difference is explained by some to + consist in the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor end, aeviternity, a beginning but no end, and time both beginning + and end. This difference, however, is but an accidental one, as was shown above, in the preceding article; because even if + aeviternal things had always been, and would always be, as some think, and even if they + might sometimes fail to be, which is possible to God to allow; even granted this, aeviternity would still be distinguished + from eternity, and from time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p8"> Others assign the difference between these three to consist in the fact that eternity has no "before" and "after"; but that + time has both, together with innovation and veteration; and that aeviternity has "before" and "after" without innovation and + veteration. This theory, however, involves a contradiction; which manifestly appears if innovation and veteration be referred + to the measure itself. For since "before" and "after" of duration cannot exist together, if aeviternity has + "before" and "after," it must follow that with the receding of the first part of aeviternity, the after part of aeviternity + must newly appear; and thus innovation would occur in aeviternity itself, as it does in time. And if they be referred to the + things measured, even then an incongruity would follow. For a thing which exists in time grows old with time, because it has + a changeable existence, and from the changeableness of a thing measured, there follows "before" and "after" in the measure, + as is clear from Phys. iv. Therefore the fact that an aeviternal thing is neither inveterate, nor subject to innovation, comes + from its changelessness; and consequently its measure does not contain "before" and "after." We say then that since eternity + is the measure of a permanent being, in so far as anything recedes from permanence of being, it recedes from eternity. Now + some things recede from permanence of being, so that their being is subject to change, or consists in change; and these + things are measured by time, as are all movements, and also the being of all things corruptible. But others recede less from + permanence of being, forasmuch as their being neither consists in change, nor is the subject of change; nevertheless they + have change annexed to them either actually or potentially. This appears in the heavenly bodies, the substantial being of + which is unchangeable; and yet with unchangeable being they have changeableness of place. The same applies to the angels, + who have + an unchangeable being as regards their nature with changeableness as regards choice; moreover they have changeableness of + intelligence, of affections and of places in their own degree. Therefore these are measured by aeviternity which is a mean + between eternity and time. But the being that is measured by eternity is not changeable, nor is it annexed to change. In this + way time has "before" and "after"; aeviternity in itself has no "before" and "after," which can, however, be annexed to it; + while eternity has neither "before" nor "after," nor is it compatible with such at all. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Spiritual creatures as regards successive affections and intelligences are measured by time. Hence also Augustine says (Gen. + ad lit. viii, 20,22,23) that to be moved through time, is to be moved by affections. But as regards their nature they are + measured by aeviternity; whereas as regards the vision of glory, they have a share of eternity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Aeviternity is simultaneously whole; yet it is not eternity, because "before" and "after" are compatible with it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the very being of an angel considered absolutely, there is no difference of past and future, but only as regards accidental + change. Now to say that an angel was, or is, or will be, is to be taken in a different sense according to the acceptation + of our intellect, which apprehends the angelic existence by comparison with different parts of time. But when we say that + an angel is, or was, we suppose something, which being supposed, its opposite is not + subject to the divine power. Whereas when we say he will be, we do not as yet suppose anything. Hence, since the existence + and non-existence of an angel considered absolutely is subject to the divine power, God can make the existence of an angel + not future; but He cannot cause him not to be while he is, or not to have been, after he has been. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The duration of aeviternity is infinite, forasmuch as it is not finished by time. Hence, there is no incongruity in saying + that a creature is infinite, inasmuch as it is not ended by any other creature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A5-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q10_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q11.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q10_A6-p0.1">Whether there is only one aeviternity?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is not only one aeviternity; for it is written in the apocryphal books of Esdras: "Majesty and power + of ages are with Thee, O Lord." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different genera have different measures. But some aeviternal things belong to the corporeal genus, as the heavenly + bodies; and others are spiritual substances, as are the angels. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since aeviternity is a term of duration, where there is one aeviternity, there is also one duration. But not all + aeviternal things have one duration, for some begin to exist after others; as appears in the case especially of human souls. + Therefore there is not only one aeviternity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, things not dependent on each other do not seem to have one measure of duration; for there appears to be one time + for all temporal things; since the first movement, measured by time, is in some way the cause of all movement. But aeviternal + things do not depend on each other, for one angel is not the cause of another angel. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Aeviternity is a more simple thing than time, and is nearer to eternity. But time is one only. Therefore much more is aeviternity + one only. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some say there is only one aeviternity; others that there are many aeviternities. + Which of these is true, may be considered from the cause why time is one; for we can rise from corporeal things to the knowledge + of spiritual things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p8"> Now some say that there is only one time for temporal things, forasmuch as one number exists for all things numbered; as + time is a number, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv). This, however, is not a sufficient reason; because time is not + a number abstracted from the thing numbered, but existing in the thing numbered; otherwise it would not be continuous; for + ten ells of cloth are continuous not by reason of the number, but by reason of the thing numbered. Now number as it + exists in the thing numbered, is not the same for all; but it is different for different things. Hence, others assert that + the unity of eternity as the principle of all duration is the cause of the unity of time. Thus all durations are one in that + view, in the light of their principle, but are many in the light of the diversity of things receiving duration from the influx + of the first principle. On the other hand others assign primary matter as the cause why time is one; as it is the first + subject of movement, the measure of which is time. Neither of these reasons, however, is sufficient; forasmuch as things which + are one in principle, or in subject, especially if distant, are not one absolutely, but accidentally. Therefore the true reason + why time is one, is to be found in the oneness of the first movement by which, since it is most simple, all other movements + are measured. Therefore time is referred to that movement, not only as a measure is to the thing measured, but also as + accident is to subject; and thus receives unity from it. Whereas to other movements it is compared only as the measure is + to the thing measured. Hence it is not multiplied by their multitude, because by one separate measure many things can be measured. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p9"> This being established, we must observe that a twofold opinion existed concerning spiritual substances. Some said that all + proceeded from God in a certain equality, as Origen said (Peri Archon. i); or at least many of them, as some others thought. + Others said that all spiritual substances proceeded from God in a certain degree and order; and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. x) + seems to have thought so, when he said that among spiritual substances there are the first, the middle and the + last; even in one order of angels. Now according to the first opinion, it must be said that there are many aeviternities as + there are many aeviternal things of first degree. But according to the second opinion, it would be necessary to say that there + is one aeviternity only; because since each thing is measured by the most simple element of its genus, it must be that the + existence of all aeviternal things should be measured by the existence of the first aeviternal thing, which is all the more + simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore because the second opinion is truer, as will be shown later ( + <a id="FP_Q10_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q47_A2.html">Q[47], A[2]</a>); we concede at present that there is only one aeviternity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Aeviternity is sometimes taken for age, that is, a space of a thing's duration; and thus we say many aeviternities when we + mean ages. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the heavenly bodies and spiritual things differ in the genus of their nature, still they agree in having a changeless + being, and are thus measured by aeviternity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All temporal things did not begin together; nevertheless there is one time for all of them, by reason of the first measured + by time; and thus all aeviternal things have one aeviternity by reason of the first, though all did not begin together. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> For things to be measured by one, it is not necessary that the one should be the cause of all, but that it be more simple + than the rest. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q10_A6-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q11.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q9_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q11" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q11-p0.1">THE UNITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q11-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q11-p2"> After the foregoing, we consider the divine unity; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q11-p3"> (1) Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?</p> + <p id="FP_Q11-p4"> (2) Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other?</p> + <p id="FP_Q11-p5"> (3) Whether God is one?</p> + <p id="FP_Q11-p6"> (4) Whether He is in the highest degree one?</p> + <div id="FP_Q11_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q11.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q11_A1-p0.1">Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that "one" adds something to "being." For everything is in a determinate genus by addition to being, which penetrates + all "genera." But "one" is a determinate genus, for it is the principle of number, which is a species of quantity. Therefore + "one" adds something to "being." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what divides a thing common to all, is an addition to it. But "being" is divided by "one" and by "many." Therefore + "one" is an addition to "being." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if "one" is not an addition to "being," "one" and "being" must have the same meaning. But it would be nugatory to + call "being" by the name of "being"; therefore it would be equally so to call being "one." Now this is false. Therefore "one" + is an addition to "being." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 5, ult.): "Nothing which exists is not in some way one," which would be false if "one" were an + addition to "being," in the sense of limiting it. Therefore "one" is not an addition to "being." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> "One" does not add any reality to "being"; but is only a negation of division; for "one" means undivided "being." This is + the very reason why "one" is the same as "being." Now every being is either simple or compound. But what is simple is undivided, + both actually and potentially. Whereas what is compound, has not being whilst its parts are divided, but after they make up + and compose it. Hence it is manifest that the being of anything consists in undivision; + and hence it is that everything guards its unity as it guards its being. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some, thinking that the "one" convertible with "being" is the same as the "one" which is the principle of number, were divided + into contrary opinions. Pythagoras and Plato, seeing that the "one" convertible with "being" did not add any reality to "being," + but signified the substance of "being" as undivided, thought that the same applied to the "one" which is the principle of + number. And because number is composed of unities, they thought that numbers + were the substances of all things. Avicenna, however, on the contrary, considering that "one" which is the principle of number, + added a reality to the substance of "being" (otherwise number made of unities would not be a species of quantity), thought + that the "one" convertible with "being" added a reality to the substance of beings; as "white" to "man." This, however, is + manifestly false, inasmuch as each thing is "one" by its substance. For if a thing were "one" by anything else but by its + substance, since this again would be "one," supposing it were again "one" by another thing, we should be driven on to infinity. + Hence we must adhere to the former statement; therefore we must say that the "one" which is convertible with "being," does + not add a reality to being; but that the "one" which is the principle of number, does add a reality to "being," belonging + to the genus of quantity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There is nothing to prevent a thing which in one way is divided, from being another way undivided; as what is divided in + number, may be undivided in species; thus it may be that a thing is in one way "one," and in another way "many." Still, if + it is absolutely undivided, either because it is so according to what belongs to its essence, though it may be divided as + regards what is outside its essence, as what is one in subject may have many accidents; + or because it is undivided actually, and divided potentially, as what is "one" in the whole, and is "many" in parts; in such + a case a thing will be "one" absolutely and "many" accidentally. On the other hand, if it be undivided accidentally, and divided + absolutely, as if it were divided in essence and undivided in idea or in principle or cause, it will be "many" absolutely + and "one" accidentally; as what are "many" in number and "one" in species or "one" in principle. Hence in that way, being + is divided by "one" and by "many"; as it were by "one" absolutely and by "many" accidentally. For multitude itself would not + be contained under "being," unless it were in some way contained under "one." Thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. cap. ult.) that + "there is no kind of multitude that is not in a way one. But what are many in their parts, are one in their whole; and what + are many in accidents, are one in subject; and what are many in number, are one in species; and what are many in species, + are + one in genus; and what are many in processions, are one in principle." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It does not follow that it is nugatory to say "being" is "one"; forasmuch as "one" adds an idea to "being." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q11.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q11_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q11_A2-p0.1">Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that "one" and "many" are not mutually opposed. For no opposite thing is predicated of its opposite. But every "multitude" + is in a certain way "one," as appears from the preceding article. Therefore "one" is not opposed to "multitude." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no opposite thing is constituted by its opposite. But "multitude" is constituted by "one." Therefore it is not opposed + to "multitude." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "one" is opposed to "one." But the idea of "few" is opposed to "many." Therefore "one" is not opposed to "many." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if "one" is opposed to "multitude," it is opposed as the undivided is to the divided; and is thus opposed to it + as privation is to habit. But this appears to be incongruous; because it would follow that "one" comes after "multitude," + and is defined by it; whereas, on the contrary, "multitude" is defined by "one." Hence there would be a vicious circle in + the definition; which is inadmissible. Therefore "one" and "many" are not opposed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Things which are opposed in idea, are themselves opposed to each other. But the idea of "one" consists in indivisibility; + and the idea of "multitude" contains division. Therefore "one" and "many" are opposed to each other. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> "One" is opposed to "many," but in various ways. The "one" which is the principle of number is opposed to "multitude" which + is number, as the measure is to the thing measured. For "one" implies the idea of a primary measure; and number is "multitude" + measured by "one," as is clear from Metaph. x. But the "one" which convertible with "being" is opposed to "multitude" by way + of privation; as the undivided is to the thing divided. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> No privation entirely takes away the being of a thing, inasmuch as privation means "negation in the subject," according to + the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Nevertheless every privation takes away some being; and so in being, by reason of its universality, + the privation of being has its foundation in being; which is not the case in privations of special forms, as of sight, or + of whiteness and the like. And what applies to being applies also to one and + to good, which are convertible with being, for the privation of good is founded in some good; likewise the removal of unity + is founded in some one thing. Hence it happens that multitude is some one thing; and evil is some good thing, and non-being + is some kind of being. Nevertheless, opposite is not predicated of opposite; forasmuch as one is absolute, and the other is + relative; for what is relative being (as a potentiality) is non-being absolutely, i.e. actually; or what is absolute being + in + the genus of substance is non-being relatively as regards some accidental being. In the same way, what is relatively good + is absolutely bad, or vice versa; likewise what is absolutely "one" is relatively "many," and vice versa. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A "whole" is twofold. In one sense it is homogeneous, composed of like parts; in another sense it is heterogeneous, composed + of dissimilar parts. Now in every homogeneous whole, the whole is made up of parts having the form of the whole; as, for instance, + every part of water is water; and such is the constitution of a continuous thing made up of its parts. In every heterogeneous + whole, however, every part is wanting in the form belonging to the whole; + as, for instance, no part of a house is a house, nor is any part of a man a man. Now multitude is such a kind of a whole. + Therefore inasmuch as its part has not the form of the multitude, the latter is composed of unities, as a house is composed + of not houses; not, indeed, as if unities constituted multitude so far as they are undivided, in which way they are opposed + to multitude; but so far as they have being, as also the parts of a house make up the house by the fact that they are beings, + not + by the fact that they are not houses. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "Many" is taken in two ways: absolutely, and in that sense it is opposed to "one"; in another way as importing some kind + of excess, in which sense it is opposed to "few"; hence in the first sense two are many but not in the second sense. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> "One" is opposed to "many" privatively, inasmuch as the idea of "many" involves division. Hence division must be prior to + unity, not absolutely in itself, but according to our way of apprehension. For we apprehend simple things by compound things; + and hence we define a point to be, "what has no part," or "the beginning of a line." "Multitude" also, in idea, follows on + "one"; because we do not understand divided things to convey the idea of multitude + except by the fact that we attribute unity to every part. Hence "one" is placed in the definition of "multitude"; but "multitude" + is not placed in the definition of "one." But division comes to be understood from the very negation of being: so what first + comes to mind is being; secondly, that this being is not that being, and thus we apprehend division as a consequence; thirdly, + comes the notion of one; fourthly, the notion of multitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q11_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q11_A3-p0.1">Whether God is one?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not one. For it is written "For there be many gods and many lords" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q11_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.8.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 8:5</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "One," as the principle of number, cannot be predicated of God, since quantity is not predicated of God; likewise, + neither can "one" which is convertible with "being" be predicated of God, because it imports privation, and every privation + is an imperfection, which cannot apply to God. Therefore God is not one. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q11_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.4" target="asv">Dt. 6:4</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It can be shown from these three sources that God is one. First from His simplicity. For it is manifest that the reason why + any singular thing is "this particular thing" is because it cannot be communicated to many: since that whereby Socrates is + a man, can be communicated to many; whereas, what makes him this particular man, is only communicable to one. Therefore, if + Socrates were a man by what makes him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many + Socrates, so there could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs to God alone; for God Himself is His own nature, as + was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q11_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">Q[3], A[3]</a>). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He is this God. Impossible is it therefore that many Gods should exist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p6"> Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q11_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that God comprehends in Himself the whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would necessarily differ + from each other. Something therefore would belong to one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation, one + of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one of them would be without it. So it is impossible + for many gods to exist. Hence also the ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by truth, when they asserted an infinite + principle, asserted likewise that there was only one such principle. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p7"> Thirdly, this is shown from the unity of the world. For all things that exist are seen to be ordered to each other since + some serve others. But things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same order, unless they are ordered thereto by one. + For many are reduced into one order by one better than by many: because one is the "per se" cause of one, and many are only + the accidental cause of one, inasmuch as they are in some way one. Since therefore what is first is most perfect, + and is so "per se" and not accidentally, it must be that the first which reduces all into one order should be only one. And + this one is God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gods are called many by the error of some who worshipped many deities, thinking as they did that the planets and other stars + were gods, and also the separate parts of the world. Hence the Apostle adds: "Our God is one," etc. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "One" which is the principle of number is not predicated of God, but only of material things. For "one" the principle of + number belongs to the "genus" of mathematics, which are material in being, and abstracted from matter only in idea. But "one" + which is convertible with being is a metaphysical entity and does not depend on matter in its being. And although in God there + is no privation, still, according to the mode of our apprehension, He is known to + us by way only of privation and remotion. Thus there is no reason why a certain kind of privation should not be predicated + of God; for instance, that He is incorporeal and infinite; and in the same way it is said of God that He is one. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q11_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q11_A4-p0.1">Whether God is supremely one?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not supremely "one." For "one" is so called from the privation of division. But privation cannot be + greater or less. Therefore God is not more "one" than other things which are called "one." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing seems to be more indivisible than what is actually and potentially indivisible; such as a point and unity. + But a thing is said to be more "one" according as it is indivisible. Therefore God is not more "one" than unity is "one" and + a point is "one." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is essentially good is supremely good. Therefore what is essentially "one" is supremely "one." But every being + is essentially "one," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv). Therefore every being is supremely "one"; and therefore God is + not "one" more than any other being is "one." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Bernard says (De Consid. v): "Among all things called one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds the first place." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since "one" is an undivided being, if anything is supremely "one" it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided. Now + both of these belong to God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch as His being is not determined by any nature to which it + is adjoined; since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is + divided neither actually nor potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether + simple, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q11_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Hence it is manifest that God is "one" in the supreme degree. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although privation considered in itself is not susceptive of more or less, still according as its opposite is subject to + more or less, privation also can be considered itself in the light of more and less. Therefore according as a thing is more + divided, or is divisible, either less or not at all, in the degree it is called more, or less, or supremely, "one." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A point and unity which is the principle of number, are not supremely being, inasmuch as they have being only in some subject. + Hence neither of them can be supremely "one." For as a subject cannot be supremely "one," because of the difference within + it of accident and subject, so neither can an accident. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although every being is "one" by its substance, still every such substance is not equally the cause of unity; for the substance + of some things is compound and of others simple. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q11_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q10_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q12" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q12-p0.1">HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q12-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q12-p2"> As hitherto we have considered God as He is in Himself, we now go on to consider in what manner He is in the knowledge of + creatures; concerning which there are thirteen points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12-p3"> (1) Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q12-p4"> (2) Whether the essence of God is seen by the intellect through any created image?</p> + <p id="FP_Q12-p5"> (3) Whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye?</p> + <p id="FP_Q12-p6"> (4) Whether any created intellectual substance is sufficient by its own natural powers to see the essence of God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q12-p7"> (5) Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q12-p8"> (6) Whether of those who see God, one sees Him more perfectly than another?</p> + <p id="FP_Q12-p9"> (7) Whether any created intellect can comprehend the essence of God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q12-p10"> (8) Whether the created intellect seeing the essence of God, knows all things in it?</p> + <p id="FP_Q12-p11"> (9) Whether what is there known is known by any similitudes?</p> + <p id="FP_Q12-p12"> (10) Whether the created intellect knows at once what it sees in God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q12-p13"> (11) Whether in the state of this life any man can see the essence of God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q12-p14"> (12) Whether by natural reason we can know God in this life?</p> + <p id="FP_Q12-p15"> (13) Whether there is in this life any knowledge of God through grace above the knowledge of natural reason?</p> + <div id="FP_Q12_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q12_A1-p0.1">Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no created intellect can see the essence of God. For Chrysostom (Hom. xiv. in Joan.) commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.18" target="asv"> Jn. 1:18, </a> "No man hath seen God at any time," says: "Not prophets only, but neither angels nor archangels have seen God. For how can + a creature see what is increatable?" Dionysius also says (Div. Nom. i), speaking of God: "Neither is there sense, nor image, + nor opinion, nor reason, nor knowledge of Him." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything infinite, as such, is unknown. But God is infinite, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q12_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Therefore in Himself He is unknown. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the created intellect knows only existing things. For what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is + being. Now God is not something existing; but He is rather super-existence, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore God + is not intelligible; but above all intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there must be some proportion between the knower and the known, since the known is the perfection of the knower. + But no proportion exists between the created intellect and God; for there is an infinite distance between them. Therefore + the created intellect cannot see the essence of God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "We shall see Him as He is" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:2</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since everything is knowable according as it is actual, God, Who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, is in + Himself supremely knowable. But what is supremely knowable in itself, may not be knowable to a particular intellect, on account + of the excess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for example, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot + be seen by the bat by reason of its excess of light. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p8"> Therefore some who considered this, held that no created intellect can see the essence of God. This opinion, however, is + not tenable. For as the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest function, which is the operation of his + intellect; if we suppose that the created intellect could never see God, it would either never attain to beatitude, or its + beatitude would consist in something else beside God; which is opposed to faith. For the ultimate perfection of + the rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of its being; since a thing is perfect so far as it attains + to its principle. Further the same opinion is also against reason. For there resides in every man a natural desire to know + the cause of any effect which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect of the rational creature could + not reach so far as to the first cause of things, the natural desire would remain void. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p9"> Hence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of God.</p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Both of these authorities speak of the vision of comprehension. Hence Dionysius premises immediately before the words cited, + "He is universally to all incomprehensible," etc. Chrysostom likewise after the words quoted says: "He says this of the most + certain vision of the Father, which is such a perfect consideration and comprehension as the Father has of the Son." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The infinity of matter not made perfect by form, is unknown in itself, because all knowledge comes by the form; whereas the + infinity of the form not limited by matter, is in itself supremely known. God is Infinite in this way, and not in the first + way: as appears from what was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q12_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is not said to be not existing as if He did not exist at all, but because He exists above all that exists; inasmuch as + He is His own existence. Hence it does not follow that He cannot be known at all, but that He exceeds every kind of knowledge; + which means that He is not comprehended. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a certain relation of one quantity to another, according as double, treble and + equal are species of proportion. In another sense every relation of one thing to another is called proportion. And in this + sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is related to Him as the effect of its cause, and as + potentiality to its act; and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned + to know God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A1-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q12_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q12_A2-p0.1">Whether the essence of God is seen by the created intellect through an image?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the essence of God is seen through an image by the created intellect. For it is written: "We know that when + He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall see Him as He is" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v): "When we know God, some likeness of God is made in us." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect in act is the actual intelligible; as sense in act is the actual sensible. But this comes about inasmuch + as sense is informed with the likeness of the sensible object, and the intellect with the likeness of the thing understood. + Therefore, if God is seen by the created intellect in act, it must be that He is seen by some similitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xv) that when the Apostle says, "We see through a glass and in an enigma [*Douay: 'in a dark manner']," + "by the terms 'glass' and 'enigma' certain similitudes are signified by him, which are accommodated to the vision of God." + But to see the essence of God is not an enigmatic nor a speculative vision, but is, on the contrary, of an opposite kind. + Therefore the divine essence is not seen through a similitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Two things are required both for sensible and for intellectual vision---viz. power of sight, and union of the thing seen + with the sight. For vision is made actual only when the thing seen is in a certain way in the seer. Now in corporeal things + it is clear that the thing seen cannot be by its essence in the seer, but only by its likeness; as the similitude of a stone + is in the eye, whereby the vision is made actual; whereas the substance of the stone is not + there. But if the principle of the visual power and the thing seen were one and the same thing, it would necessarily follow + that the seer would receive both the visual power and the form whereby it sees, from that one same thing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p7"> Now it is manifest both that God is the author of the intellect power, and that He can be seen by the intellect. And since + the intellective power of the creature is not the essence of God, it follows that it is some kind of participated likeness + of Him who is the first intellect. Hence also the intellectual power of the creature is called an intelligible light, as it + were, derived from the first light, whether this be understood of the natural power, or of some perfection + superadded of grace or of glory. Therefore, in order to see God, there must be some similitude of God on the part of the visual + faculty, whereby the intellect is made capable of seeing God. But on the part of the object seen, which must necessarily be + united to the seer, the essence of God cannot be seen by any created similitude. First, because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. + i), "by the similitudes of the inferior order of things, the superior can in no way be known;" as by the likeness of a + body the essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known. Much less therefore can the essence of God be seen by any created + likeness whatever. Secondly, because the essence of God is His own very existence, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q12_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), which cannot be said of any created form; and so no created form can be the similitude representing the essence of God + to the seer. Thirdly, because the divine essence is uncircumscribed, and contains in itself super-eminently whatever + can be signified or understood by the created intellect. Now this cannot in any way be represented by any created likeness; + for every created form is determined according to some aspect of wisdom, or of power, or of being itself, or of some like + thing. Hence to say that God is seen by some similitude, is to say that the divine essence is not seen at all; which is false. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p8"> Therefore it must be said that to see the essence of God, there is required some similitude in the visual faculty, namely, + the light of glory strengthening the intellect to see God, which is spoken of in the + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.10" target="asv"> Ps. 35:10, </a> "In Thy light we shall see light." The essence of God, however, cannot be seen by any created similitude representing the + divine essence itself as it really is. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That authority speaks of the similitude which is caused by participation of the light of glory. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine speaks of the knowledge of God here on earth. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The divine essence is existence itself. Hence as other intelligible forms which are not their own existence are united to + the intellect by means of some entity, whereby the intellect itself is informed, and made in act; so the divine essence is + united to the created intellect, as the object actually understood, making the intellect in act by and of itself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q12_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q12_A3-p0.1">Whether the essence of God can be seen with the bodily eye?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.19.26" target="asv">Job 19:26</a>): "In my flesh I shall see . . . God," and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Job.42.5" target="asv">Job 42:5</a>), "With the hearing of the ear I have heard Thee, but now my eye seeth Thee." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxix, 29): "Those eyes" (namely the glorified) "will therefore have a greater power + of sight, not so much to see more keenly, as some report of the sight of serpents or of eagles (for whatever acuteness of + vision is possessed by these creatures, they can see only corporeal things) but to see even incorporeal things." Now whoever + can see incorporeal things, can be raised up to see God. Therefore the glorified eye can see + God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God can be seen by man through a vision of the imagination. For it is written: "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne," + etc. ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.1" target="asv">Is. 6:1</a>). But an imaginary vision originates from sense; for the imagination is moved by sense to act. Therefore God can be seen + by a vision of sense. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "No one has ever seen God either in this life, as He is, nor in the angelic life, + as visible things are seen by corporeal vision." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of sight, or by any other sense, or faculty of the sensitive power. For + every such kind of power is the act of a corporeal organ, as will be shown later + <a id="FP_Q12_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q78.html">(Q[78])</a>. Now act is proportional to the nature which possesses it. Hence no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal things. For + God is incorporeal, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q12_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], A[1]</a>). Hence He cannot be seen by the + sense or the imagination, but only by the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words, "In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour," do not mean that God will be seen with the eye of the flesh, but that + man existing in the flesh after the resurrection will see God. Likewise the words, "Now my eye seeth Thee," are to be understood + of the mind's eye, as the Apostle says: "May He give unto you the spirit of wisdom . . . in the knowledge of Him, that the + eyes of your heart" may be "enlightened" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.17" target="asv">Eph. + 1:17,18 + </a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine speaks as one inquiring, and conditionally. This appears from what he says previously: "Therefore they will have + an altogether different power (viz. the glorified eyes), if they shall see that incorporeal nature;" and afterwards he explains + this, saying: "It is very credible, that we shall so see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see + most clearly God everywhere present, governing all corporeal things, not as we + now see the invisible things of God as understood by what is made; but as when we see men among whom we live, living and exercising + the functions of human life, we do not believe they live, but see it." Hence it is evident how the glorified eyes will see + God, as now our eyes see the life of another. But life is not seen with the corporeal eye, as a thing in itself visible, but + as the indirect object of the sense; which indeed is not known by sense, but at once, together with sense, by some + other cognitive power. But that the divine presence is known by the intellect immediately on the sight of, and through, corporeal + things, happens from two causes---viz. from the perspicuity of the intellect, and from the refulgence of the divine glory + infused into the body after its renovation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The essence of God is not seen in a vision of the imagination; but the imagination receives some form representing God according + to some mode of similitude; as in the divine Scripture divine things are metaphorically described by means of sensible things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q12_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q12_A4-p0.1">Whether any created intellect by its natural powers can see the Divine essence?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that a created intellect can see the Divine essence by its own natural power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): + "An angel is a pure mirror, most clear, receiving, if it is right to say so, the whole beauty of God." But if a reflection + is seen, the original thing is seen. Therefore since an angel by his natural power understands himself, it seems that by his + own natural power he understands the Divine essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is supremely visible, is made less visible to us by reason of our defective corporeal or intellectual sight. + But the angelic intellect has no such defect. Therefore, since God is supremely intelligible in Himself, it seems that in + like manner He is supremely so to an angel. Therefore, if he can understand other intelligible things by his own natural power, + much more can he understand God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, corporeal sense cannot be raised up to understand incorporeal substance, which is above its nature. Therefore if + to see the essence of God is above the nature of every created intellect, it follows that no created intellect can reach up + to see the essence of God at all. But this is false, as appears from what is said above + <a id="FP_Q12_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it seems that it is natural for a created intellect to see the Divine essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The grace of God is life everlasting" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.23" target="asv">Rom. 6:23</a>). But life everlasting consists in the vision of the Divine essence, according to the words: "This is eternal life, that + they may know Thee the only true God," etc. ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv">Jn. 17:3</a>). Therefore to see the essence of God is possible to the created intellect by grace, and not by nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for any created intellect to see the essence of God by its own natural power. For knowledge is regulated + according as the thing known is in the knower. But the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence + the knowledge of every knower is ruled according to its own nature. If therefore the mode of anything's being exceeds the + mode of the knower, it must result that the knowledge of the object is above the nature of + the knower. Now the mode of being of things is manifold. For some things have being only in this one individual matter; as + all bodies. But others are subsisting natures, not residing in matter at all, which, however, are not their own existence, + but receive it; and these are the incorporeal beings, called angels. But to God alone does it belong to be His own subsistent + being. Therefore what exists only in individual matter we know naturally, forasmuch as our soul, whereby we know, is the form + of certain matter. Now our soul possesses two cognitive powers; one is the act of a corporeal organ, which naturally knows + things existing in individual matter; hence sense knows only the singular. But there is another kind of cognitive power in + the soul, called the intellect; and this is not the act of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the intellect naturally knows natures + which exist only in individual matter; not as they are in such individual matter, but according as they are abstracted + therefrom by the considering act of the intellect; hence it follows that through the intellect we can understand these objects + as universal; and this is beyond the power of the sense. Now the angelic intellect naturally knows natures that are not in + matter; but this is beyond the power of the intellect of our soul in the state of its present life, united as it is to the + body. It follows therefore that to know self-subsistent being is natural to the divine intellect alone; and this is beyond + the + natural power of any created intellect; for no creature is its own existence, forasmuch as its existence is participated. + Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of God, unless God by His grace unites Himself to the created intellect, + as an object made intelligible to it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This mode of knowing God is natural to an angel---namely, to know Him by His own likeness refulgent in the angel himself. + But to know God by any created similitude is not to know the essence of God, as was shown above + <a id="FP_Q12_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Hence it does not follow that an angel can know the essence of God by his own power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angelic intellect is not defective, if defect be taken to mean privation, as if it were without anything which it ought + to have. But if the defect be taken negatively, in that sense every creature is defective, when compared with God; forasmuch + as it does not possess the excellence which is in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sense of sight, as being altogether material, cannot be raised up to immateriality. But our intellect, or the angelic + intellect, inasmuch as it is elevated above matter in its own nature, can be raised up above its own nature to a higher level + by grace. The proof is, that sight cannot in any way know abstractedly what it knows concretely; for in no way can it perceive + a nature except as this one particular nature; whereas our intellect is able to + consider abstractedly what it knows concretely. Now although it knows things which have a form residing in matter, still it + resolves the composite into both of these elements; and it considers the form separately by itself. Likewise, also, the intellect + of an angel, although it naturally knows the concrete in any nature, still it is able to separate that existence by its intellect; + since it knows that the thing itself is one thing, and its existence is another. Since therefore the created + intellect is naturally capable of apprehending the concrete form, and the concrete being abstractedly, by way of a kind of + resolution of parts; it can by grace be raised up to know separate subsisting substance, and separate subsisting existence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q12_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q12_A5-p0.1">Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the created intellect does not need any created light in order to see the essence of God. For what is of itself + lucid in sensible things does not require any other light in order to be seen. Therefore the same applies to intelligible + things. Now God is intelligible light. Therefore He is not seen by means of any created light. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if God is seen through a medium, He is not seen in His essence. But if seen by any created light, He is seen through + a medium. Therefore He is not seen in His essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is created can be natural to some creature. Therefore if the essence of God is seen through any created light, + such a light can be made natural to some other creature; and thus, that creature would not need any other light to see God; + which is impossible. Therefore it is not necessary that every creature should require a superadded light in order to see the + essence of God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "In Thy light we shall see light" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.10" target="asv">Ps. 35:10</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Everything which is raised up to what exceeds its nature, must be prepared by some disposition above its nature; as, for + example, if air is to receive the form of fire, it must be prepared by some disposition for such a form. But when any created + intellect sees the essence of God, the essence of God itself becomes the intelligible form of the intellect. Hence it is necessary + that some supernatural disposition should be added to the intellect in order that it + may be raised up to such a great and sublime height. Now since the natural power of the created intellect does not avail to + enable it to see the essence of God, as was shown in the preceding article, it is necessary that the power of understanding + should be added by divine grace. Now this increase of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of the intellect, + as we also call the intelligible object itself by the name of light of illumination. And this is the light spoken of in the + Apocalypse ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.23" target="asv">Apoc. 21:23</a>): "The glory of God hath enlightened it"---viz. the society of the blessed who see God. By this light the blessed are made + "deiform"---i.e. like to God, according to the saying: "When He shall appear we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.: 'because'] + we shall see Him as He is" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:2</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The created light is necessary to see the essence of God, not in order to make the essence of God intelligible, which is + of itself intelligible, but in order to enable the intellect to understand in the same way as a habit makes a power abler + to act. Even so corporeal light is necessary as regards external sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium actually transparent, + and susceptible of color. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This light is required to see the divine essence, not as a similitude in which God is seen, but as a perfection of the intellect, + strengthening it to see God. Therefore it may be said that this light is to be described not as a medium in which God is seen, + but as one by which He is seen; and such a medium does not take away the immediate vision of God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The disposition to the form of fire can be natural only to the subject of that form. Hence the light of glory cannot be natural + to a creature unless the creature has a divine nature; which is impossible. But by this light the rational creature is made + deiform, as is said in this article. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q12_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q12_A6-p0.1">Whether of those who see the essence of God, one sees more perfectly than another?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that of those who see the essence of God, one does not see more perfectly than another. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>): "We shall see Him as He is." But He is only in one way. Therefore He will be seen by all in one way only; and therefore + He will not be seen more perfectly by one and less perfectly by another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xxxii): "One person cannot see one and the same thing more perfectly than + another." But all who see the essence of God, understand the Divine essence, for God is seen by the intellect and not by sense, + as was shown above (A[3] ). Therefore of those who see the divine essence, one does not see more clearly than another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, That anything be seen more perfectly than another can happen in two ways: either on the part of the visible object, + or on the part of the visual power of the seer. On the part of the object, it may so happen because the object is received + more perfectly in the seer, that is, according to the greater perfection of the similitude; but this does not apply to the + present question, for God is present to the intellect seeing Him not by way of similitude, + but by His essence. It follows then that if one sees Him more perfectly than another, this happens according to the difference + of the intellectual power; thus it follows too that the one whose intellectual power is higher, will see Him the more clearly; + and this is incongruous; since equality with angels is promised to men as their beatitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Eternal life consists in the vision of God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv"> Jn. 17:3</a>: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God," etc. Therefore if all saw the essence of God equally + in eternal life, all would be equal; the contrary to which is declared by the Apostle: "Star differs from star in glory" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A6-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.41" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:41</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Of those who see the essence of God, one sees Him more perfectly than another. This, indeed, does not take place as if one + had a more perfect similitude of God than another, since that vision will not spring from any similitude; but it will take + place because one intellect will have a greater power or faculty to see God than another. The faculty of seeing God, however, + does not belong to the created intellect naturally, but is given to it by the light of + glory, which establishes the intellect in a kind of "deiformity," as appears from what is said above, in the preceding article. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p7"> Hence the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God the more perfectly; and he will have a fuller participation + of the light of glory who has more charity; because where there is the greater charity, there is the more desire; and desire + in a certain degree makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object desired. Hence he who possesses the more + charity, will see God the more perfectly, and will be the more beatified. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the words,"We shall see Him as He is," the conjunction "as" determines the mode of vision on the part of the object seen, + so that the meaning is, we shall see Him to be as He is, because we shall see His existence, which is His essence. But it + does not determine the mode of vision on the part of the one seeing; as if the meaning was that the mode of seeing God will + be as perfect as is the perfect mode of God's existence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Thus appears the answer to the Second Objection. For when it is said that one intellect does not understand one and the same + thing better than another, this would be true if referred to the mode of the thing understood, for whoever understands it + otherwise than it really is, does not truly understand it, but not if referred to the mode of understanding, for the understanding + of one is more perfect than the understanding of another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The diversity of seeing will not arise on the part of the object seen, for the same object will be presented to all---viz. + the essence of God; nor will it arise from the diverse participation of the object seen by different similitudes; but it will + arise on the part of the diverse faculty of the intellect, not, indeed, the natural faculty, but the glorified faculty. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A6-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q12_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q12_A7-p0.1">Whether those who see the essence of God comprehend Him?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that those who see the divine essence, comprehend God. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.12" target="asv">Phil. 3:12</a>): "But I follow after, if I may by any means comprehend [Douay: 'apprehend']." But the Apostle did not follow in vain; for + he said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A7-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.26" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:26</a>): "I . . . so run, not as at an uncertainty." Therefore he comprehended; and in the same way, others also, whom he invites + to do the same, saying: "So run that you may + comprehend." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "That is comprehended which is so seen as a whole, that nothing of it + is hidden from the seer." But if God is seen in His essence, He is seen whole, and nothing of Him is hidden from the seer, + since God is simple. Therefore whoever sees His essence, comprehends Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if we say that He is seen as a "whole," but not "wholly," it may be contrarily urged that "wholly" refers either + to the mode of the seer, or to the mode of the thing seen. But he who sees the essence of God, sees Him wholly, if the mode + of the thing seen is considered; forasmuch as he sees Him as He is; also, likewise, he sees Him wholly if the mode of the + seer is meant, forasmuch as the intellect will with its full power see the Divine essence. + Therefore all who see the essence of God see Him wholly; therefore they comprehend Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "O most mighty, great, and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Thy Name. Great in counsel, and incomprehensible + in thought" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.32.18" target="asv">Jer. 32:18,19</a>). Therefore He cannot be comprehended. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend God; yet "for the mind to attain to God in some degree is great + beatitude," as Augustine says (De Verb. Dim., Serm. xxxvii). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p7"> In proof of this we must consider that what is comprehended is perfectly known; and that is perfectly known which is known + so far as it can be known. Thus, if anything which is capable of scientific demonstration is held only by an opinion resting + on a probably proof, it is not comprehended; as, for instance, if anyone knows by scientific demonstration that a triangle + has three angles equal to two right angles, he comprehends that truth; whereas if anyone accepts it as a + probable opinion because wise men or most men teach it, he cannot be said to comprehend the thing itself, because he does + not attain to that perfect mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable. But no created intellect can attain to + that perfect mode of the knowledge of the Divine intellect whereof it is intrinsically capable. Which thus appears---Everything + is knowable according to its actuality. But God, whose being is infinite, as was shown above + <a id="FP_Q12_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7.html">(Q[7])</a> is + infinitely knowable. Now no created intellect can know God infinitely. For the created intellect knows the Divine essence + more or less perfectly in proportion as it receives a greater or lesser light of glory. Since therefore the created light + of glory received into any created intellect cannot be infinite, it is clearly impossible for any created intellect to know + God in an infinite degree. Hence it is impossible that it should comprehend God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Comprehension" is twofold: in one sense it is taken strictly and properly, according as something is included in the one + comprehending; and thus in no way is God comprehended either by intellect, or in any other way; forasmuch as He is infinite + and cannot be included in any finite being; so that no finite being can contain Him infinitely, in the degree of His own infinity. + In this sense we now take comprehension. But in another sense "comprehension" + is taken more largely as opposed to "non-attainment"; for he who attains to anyone is said to comprehend him when he attains + to him. And in this sense God is comprehended by the blessed, according to the words, "I held him, and I will not let him + go" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Song.3.4" target="asv">Cant 3:4</a>); in this sense also are to be understood the words quoted from the Apostle concerning comprehension. And in this way "comprehension" + is one of the three prerogatives of the soul, responding to hope, as vision + responds to faith, and fruition responds to charity. For even among ourselves not everything seen is held or possessed, forasmuch + as things either appear sometimes afar off, or they are not in our power of attainment. Neither, again, do we always enjoy + what we possess; either because we find no pleasure in them, or because such things are not the ultimate end of our desire, + so as to satisfy and quell it. But the blessed possess these three things in God; because they see Him, and in seeing Him, + possess Him as present, having the power to see Him always; and possessing Him, they enjoy Him as the ultimate fulfilment + of desire. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is called incomprehensible not because anything of Him is not seen; but because He is not seen as perfectly as He is + capable of being seen; thus when any demonstrable proposition is known by probable reason only, it does not follow that any + part of it is unknown, either the subject, or the predicate, or the composition; but that it is not as perfectly known as + it is capable of being known. Hence Augustine, in his definition of comprehension, says + the whole is comprehended when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer, or when its boundaries + can be completely viewed or traced; for the boundaries of a thing are said to be completely surveyed when the end of the knowledge + of it is attained. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The word "wholly" denotes a mode of the object; not that the whole object does not come under knowledge, but that the mode + of the object is not the mode of the one who knows. Therefore he who sees God's essence, sees in Him that He exists infinitely, + and is infinitely knowable; nevertheless, this infinite mode does not extend to enable the knower to know infinitely; thus, + for instance, a person can have a probable opinion that a proposition is + demonstrable, although he himself does not know it as demonstrated. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A7-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q12_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A9.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q12_A8-p0.1">Whether those who see the essence of God see all in God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that those who see the essence of God see all things in God. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv): "What do they not see, + who see Him Who sees all things?" But God sees all things. Therefore those who see God see all things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever sees a mirror, sees what is reflected in the mirror. But all actual or possible things shine forth in God + as in a mirror; for He knows all things in Himself. Therefore whoever sees God, sees all actual things in Him, and also all + possible things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever understands the greater, can understand the least, as is said in De Anima iii. But all that God does, or + can do, are less than His essence. Therefore whoever understands God, can understand all that God does, or can do. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the rational creature naturally desires to know all things. Therefore if in seeing God it does not know all things, + its natural desire will not rest satisfied; thus, in seeing God it will not be fully happy; which is incongruous. Therefore + he who sees God knows all things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The angels see the essence of God; and yet do not know all things. For as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), "the inferior + angels are cleansed from ignorance by the superior angels." Also they are ignorant of future contingent things, and of secret + thoughts; for this knowledge belongs to God alone. Therefore whosoever sees the essence of God, does not know all things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The created intellect, in seeing the divine essence, does not see in it all that God does or can do. For it is manifest that + things are seen in God as they are in Him. But all other things are in God as effects are in the power of their cause. Therefore + all things are seen in God as an effect is seen in its cause. Now it is clear that the more perfectly a cause is seen, the + more of its effects can be seen in it. For whoever has a lofty understanding, as soon + as one demonstrative principle is put before him can gather the knowledge of many conclusions; but this is beyond one of a + weaker intellect, for he needs things to be explained to him separately. And so an intellect can know all the effects of a + cause and the reasons for those effects in the cause itself, if it comprehends the cause wholly. Now no created intellect + can comprehend God wholly, as shown above + <a id="FP_Q12_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know + all that God does or can do, for this would be to comprehend His power; but of what God does or can do any intellect can know + the more, the more perfectly it sees God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory speaks as regards the object being sufficient, namely, God, who in Himself sufficiently contains and shows forth + all things; but it does not follow that whoever sees God knows all things, for he does not perfectly comprehend Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not necessary that whoever sees a mirror should see all that is in the mirror, unless his glance comprehends the mirror + itself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although it is more to see God than to see all things else, still it is a greater thing to see Him so that all things are + known in Him, than to see Him in such a way that not all things, but the fewer or the more, are known in Him. For it has been + shown in this article that the more things are known in God according as He is seen more or less perfectly. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The natural desire of the rational creature is to know everything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect, namely, + the species and the genera of things and their types, and these everyone who sees the Divine essence will see in God. But + to know other singulars, their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to the perfection of the created intellect nor does + its natural desire go out to these things; neither, again, does it desire to know + things that exist not as yet, but which God can call into being. Yet if God alone were seen, Who is the fount and principle + of all being and of all truth, He would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that nothing else would be desired, and the + seer would be completely beatified. Hence Augustine says (Confess. v): "Unhappy the man who knoweth all these" (i.e. all creatures) + "and knoweth not Thee! but happy whoso knoweth Thee although he know not these. And whoso knoweth both Thee and them is + not the happier for them, but for Thee alone." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A8-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A9.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q12_A9" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A10.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q12_A9-p0.1">Whether what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen through any similitude?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q12_A9-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen by means of some similitude. For every kind + of knowledge comes about by the knower being assimilated to the object known. For thus the intellect in act becomes the actual + intelligible, and the sense in act becomes the actual sensible, inasmuch as it is informed by a similitude of the object, + as the eye by the similitude of color. Therefore if the intellect of one who sees the Divine + essence understands any creatures in God, it must be informed by their similitudes. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what we have seen, we keep in memory. But Paul, seeing the essence of God whilst in ecstasy, when he had ceased + to see the Divine essence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 28,34), remembered many of the things he had seen in the rapture; + hence he said: "I have heard secret words which it is not granted to man to utter" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A9-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.4" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:4</a>). Therefore it must be said that certain similitudes of what he remembered, remained in his mind; and in the same way, + when he actually saw the essence of God, he had certain similitudes or ideas of what he actually saw in it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A9-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A mirror and what is in it are seen by means of one likeness. But all things are seen in God as in an intelligible mirror. + Therefore if God Himself is not seen by any similitude but by His own essence, neither are the things seen in Him seen by + any similitudes or ideas. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A9-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Those who see the divine essence see what they see in God not by any likeness, but by the divine essence itself united to + their intellect. For each thing is known in so far as its likeness is in the one who knows. Now this takes place in two ways. + For as things which are like one and the same thing are like to each other, the cognitive faculty can be assimilated to any + knowable object in two ways. In one way it is assimilated by the object itself, when it is + directly informed by a similitude, and then the object is known in itself. In another way when informed by a similitude which + resembles the object; and in this way, the knowledge is not of the thing in itself, but of the thing in its likeness. For + the knowledge of a man in himself differs from the knowledge of him in his image. Hence to know things thus by their likeness + in the one who knows, is to know them in themselves or in their own nature; whereas to know them by their similitudes + pre-existing in God, is to see them in God. Now there is a difference between these two kinds of knowledge. Hence, according + to the knowledge whereby things are known by those who see the essence of God, they are seen in God Himself not by any other + similitudes but by the Divine essence alone present to the intellect; by which also God Himself is seen. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A9-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The created intellect of one who sees God is assimilated to what is seen in God, inasmuch as it is united to the Divine essence, + in which the similitudes of all things pre-exist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A9-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some of the cognitive faculties form other images from those first conceived; thus the imagination from the preconceived + images of a mountain and of gold can form the likeness of a golden mountain; and the intellect, from the preconceived ideas + of genus and difference, forms the idea of species; in like manner from the similitude of an image we can form in our minds + the similitude of the original of the image. Thus Paul, or any other person who sees + God, by the very vision of the divine essence, can form in himself the similitudes of what is seen in the divine essence, + which remained in Paul even when he had ceased to see the essence of God. Still this kind of vision whereby things are seen + by this likeness thus conceived, is not the same as that whereby things are seen in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A9-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A9-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A10.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q12_A10" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A11.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q12_A10-p0.1">Whether those who see the essence of God see all they see in it at the same time?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that those who see the essence of God do not see all they see in Him at one and the same time. For according to + the Philosopher (Topic. ii): "It may happen that many things are known, but only one is understood." But what is seen in God, + is understood; for God is seen by the intellect. Therefore those who see God do not see all in Him at the same time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 22,23), "God moves the spiritual creature according to time"---i.e. by intelligence + and affection. But the spiritual creature is the angel who sees God. Therefore those who see God understand and are affected + successively; for time means succession. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xvi): "Our thoughts will not be unstable, going to and fro from one thing to another; but we shall + see all we know at one glance." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> What is seen in the Word is seen not successively, but at the same time. In proof whereof, we ourselves cannot know many + things all at once, forasmuch as understand many things by means of many ideas. But our intellect cannot be actually informed + by many diverse ideas at the same time, so as to understand by them; as one body cannot bear different shapes simultaneously. + Hence, when many things can be understood by one idea, they are understood at the same + time; as the parts of a whole are understood successively, and not all at the same time, if each one is understood by its + own idea; whereas if all are understood under the one idea of the whole, they are understood simultaneously. Now it was shown + above that things seen in God, are not seen singly by their own similitude; but all are seen by the one essence of God. Hence + they are seen simultaneously, and not successively. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We understand one thing only when we understand by one idea; but many things understood by one idea are understood simultaneously, + as in the idea of a man we understand "animal" and "rational"; and in the idea of a house we understand the wall and the roof. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As regards their natural knowledge, whereby they know things by diverse ideas given them, the angels do not know all things + simultaneously, and thus they are moved in the act of understanding according to time; but as regards what they see in God, + they see all at the same time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p9"></p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A10-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A11.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q12_A11" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q12_A11-p0.1">Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that one can in this life see the Divine essence. For Jacob said: "I have seen God face to face" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A11-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.32.30" target="asv">Gn. 32:30</a>). But to see Him face to face is to see His essence, as appears from the words: "We see now in a glass and in a dark manner, + but then face to face" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A11-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:12</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Lord said to Moses: "I speak to him mouth to mouth, and plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he see + the Lord" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A11-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Num.12.8" target="asv">Num. 12:8</a>); but this is to see God in His essence. Therefore it is possible to see the essence of God in this life. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that wherein we know all other things, and whereby we judge of other things, is known in itself to us. But even + now we know all things in God; for Augustine says (Confess. viii): "If we both see that what you say is true, and we both + see that what I say is true; where, I ask, do we see this? neither I in thee, nor thou in me; but both of us in the very incommutable + truth itself above our minds." He also says (De Vera Relig. xxx) that, "We judge of all + things according to the divine truth"; and (De Trin. xii) that, "it is the duty of reason to judge of these corporeal things + according to the incorporeal and eternal ideas; which unless they were above the mind could not be incommutable." Therefore + even in this life we see God Himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24, 25), those things that are in the soul by their essence are seen by + intellectual vision. But intellectual vision is of intelligible things, not by similitudes, but by their very essences, as + he also says (Gen. ad lit. xiii, 24,25). Therefore since God is in our soul by His essence, it follows that He is seen by + us in His essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "Man shall not see Me, and live" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A11-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.32.20" target="asv">Ex. 32:20</a>), and a gloss upon this says, "In this mortal life God can be seen by certain images, but not by the likeness itself of His + own nature." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human being, except he be separated from this mortal life. The reason is because, + as was said above + <a id="FP_Q12_A11-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, the mode of knowledge follows the mode of the nature of the knower. But our soul, as long as we live in this life, has its + being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it knows only what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a form. Now + it is evident that the Divine essence + cannot be known through the nature of material things. For it was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q12_A11-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,9) that the knowledge of God by means of any created similitude is not the vision of His essence. Hence it is impossible + for the soul of man in this life to see the essence of God. This can be seen in the fact that the more our soul is abstracted + from corporeal things, the more it is capable of receiving abstract intelligible things. Hence in dreams and alienations of + the bodily senses + divine revelations and foresight of future events are perceived the more clearly. It is not possible, therefore, that the + soul in this mortal life should be raised up to the supreme of intelligible objects, i.e. to the divine essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv) a man is said in the Scriptures to see God in the sense that certain figures are + formed in the senses or imagination, according to some similitude representing in part the divinity. So when Jacob says, "I + have seen God face to face," this does not mean the Divine essence, but some figure representing God. And this is to be referred + to some high mode of prophecy, so that God seems to speak, though in an imaginary + vision; as will later be explained (SS, + <a id="FP_Q12_A11-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q174.html">Q[174])</a> in treating of the degrees of prophecy. We may also say that Jacob spoke thus to designate some exalted intellectual contemplation, + above the ordinary state. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God works miracles in corporeal things, so also He does supernatural wonders above the common order, raising the minds + of some living in the flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to the vision of His own essence; as Augustine says (Gen. ad + lit. xii, 26,27,28) of Moses, the teacher of the Jews; and of Paul, the teacher of the Gentiles. This will be treated more + fully in the question of rapture (SS, + <a id="FP_Q12_A11-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q175.html">Q[175])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All things are said to be seen in God and all things are judged in Him, because by the participation of His light, we know + and judge all things; for the light of natural reason itself is a participation of the divine light; as likewise we are said + to see and judge of sensible things in the sun, i.e., by the sun's light. Hence Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 8), "The lessons + of instruction can only be seen as it were by their own sun," namely God. As + therefore in order to see a sensible object, it is not necessary to see the substance of the sun, so in like manner to see + any intelligible object, it is not necessary to see the essence of God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Intellectual vision is of the things which are in the soul by their essence, as intelligible things are in the intellect. + And thus God is in the souls of the blessed; not thus is He in our soul, but by presence, essence and power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A11-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q12_A12" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A11.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A13.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q12_A12-p0.1">Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that by natural reason we cannot know God in this life. For Boethius says (De Consol. v) that "reason does not grasp + simple form." But God is a supremely simple form, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q12_A12-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a> ). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the soul understands nothing by natural reason without the use of the imagination. But we cannot have an imagination + of God, Who is incorporeal. Therefore we cannot know God by natural knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of natural reason belongs to both good and evil, inasmuch as they have a common nature. But the knowledge + of God belongs only to the good; for Augustine says (De Trin. i): "The weak eye of the human mind is not fixed on that excellent + light unless purified by the justice of faith." Therefore God cannot be known by natural reason. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A12-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.19" target="asv">Rom. 1:19</a>), "That which is known of God," namely, what can be known of God by natural reason, "is manifest in them." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things. But + our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of God; because the sensible effects of God do not equal the + power of God as their cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole power of God cannot be known; nor therefore + can His essence be seen. But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we + can be led from them so far as to know of God "whether He exists," and to know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, + as the first cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p7"> Hence we know that His relationship with creatures so far as to be the cause of them all; also that creatures differ from + Him, inasmuch as He is not in any way part of what is caused by Him; and that creatures are not removed from Him by reason + of any defect on His part, but because He superexceeds them all. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reason cannot reach up to simple form, so as to know "what it is"; but it can know "whether it is." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is known by natural knowledge through the images of His effects. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the knowledge of God's essence is by grace, it belongs only to the good; but the knowledge of Him by natural reason can + belong to both good and bad; and hence Augustine says (Retract. i), retracting what he had said before: "I do not approve + what I said in prayer, 'God who willest that only the pure should know truth.' For it can be answered that many who are not + pure can know many truths," i.e. by natural reason. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A12-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A11.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A13.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q12_A13" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q12_A13-p0.1">Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than by natural reason?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that by grace a higher knowledge of God is not obtained than by natural reason. For Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol. + i) that whoever is the more united to God in this life, is united to Him as to one entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses, + who nevertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge conferred by grace. But to be united to God while ignoring + of Him "what He is," comes about also by natural reason. Therefore God is not more + known to us by grace than by natural reason. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we can acquire the knowledge of divine things by natural reason only through the imagination; and the same applies + to the knowledge given by grace. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that "it is impossible for the divine ray to shine upon + us except as screened round about by the many colored sacred veils." Therefore we cannot know God more fully by grace than + by natural reason. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, our intellect adheres to God by grace of faith. But faith does not seem to be knowledge; for Gregory says (Hom. + xxvi in Ev.) that "things not seen are the objects of faith, and not of knowledge." Therefore there is not given to us a more + excellent knowledge of God by grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says that "God hath revealed to us His spirit," what "none of the princes of this world knew" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A13-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:10</a>), namely, the philosophers, as the gloss expounds. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We have a more perfect knowledge of God by grace than by natural reason. Which is proved thus. The knowledge which we have + by natural reason contains two things: images derived from the sensible objects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling + us to abstract from them intelligible conceptions. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p7"> Now in both of these, human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of grace. For the intellect's natural light is strengthened + by the infusion of gratuitous light; and sometimes also the images in the human imagination are divinely formed, so as to + express divine things better than those do which we receive from sensible objects, as appears in prophetic visions; while + sometimes sensible things, or even voices, are divinely formed to express some divine meaning; as in the + Baptism, the Holy Ghost was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice of the Father was heard, "This is My beloved Son" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A13-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.3.17" target="asv">Mat. 3:17</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although by the revelation of grace in this life we cannot know of God "what He is," and thus are united to Him as to one + unknown; still we know Him more fully according as many and more excellent of His effects are demonstrated to us, and according + as we attribute to Him some things known by divine revelation, to which natural reason cannot reach, as, for instance, that + God is Three and One. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the images either received from sense in the natural order, or divinely formed in the imagination, we have so much the + more excellent intellectual knowledge, the stronger the intelligible light is in man; and thus through the revelation given + by the images a fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of the divine light. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Faith is a kind of knowledge, inasmuch as the intellect is determined by faith to some knowable object. But this determination + to one object does not proceed from the vision of the believer, but from the vision of Him who is believed. Thus as far as + faith falls short of vision, it falls short of the knowledge which belongs to science, for science determines the intellect + to one object by the vision and understanding of first principles. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q12_A13-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q11_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q13" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A13.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q13-p0.1">THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q13-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q13-p2"> After the consideration of those things which belong to the divine knowledge, we now proceed to the consideration of the + divine names. For everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13-p3"> Under this head, there are twelve points for inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q13-p4"> (1) Whether God can be named by us?</p> + <p id="FP_Q13-p5"> (2) Whether any names applied to God are predicated of Him substantially?</p> + <p id="FP_Q13-p6"> (3) Whether any names applied to God are said of Him literally, or are all to be taken metaphorically?</p> + <p id="FP_Q13-p7"> (4) Whether any names applied to God are synonymous?</p> + <p id="FP_Q13-p8"> (5) Whether some names are applied to God and to creatures univocally or equivocally?</p> + <p id="FP_Q13-p9"> (6) Whether, supposing they are applied analogically, they are applied first to God or to creatures?</p> + <p id="FP_Q13-p10"> (7) Whether any names are applicable to God from time?</p> + <p id="FP_Q13-p11"> (8) Whether this name "God" is a name of nature, or of the operation?</p> + <p id="FP_Q13-p12"> (9) Whether this name "God" is a communicable name?</p> + <p id="FP_Q13-p13"> (10) Whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as signifying God, by nature, by participation, and by opinion?</p> + <p id="FP_Q13-p14"> (11) Whether this name, "Who is," is the supremely appropriate name of God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q13-p15"> (12) Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?</p> + <div id="FP_Q13_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q13_A1-p0.1">Whether a name can be given to God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no name can be given to God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that, "Of Him there is neither name, nor can + one be found of Him;" and it is written: "What is His name, and what is the name of His Son, if thou knowest?" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.30.4" target="asv">Prov. 30:4</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every name is either abstract or concrete. But concrete names do not belong to God, since He is simple, nor do abstract + names belong to Him, forasmuch as they do not signify any perfect subsisting thing. Therefore no name can be said of God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nouns are taken to signify substance with quality; verbs and participles signify substance with time; pronouns the + same with demonstration or relation. But none of these can be applied to God, for He has no quality, nor accident, nor time; + moreover, He cannot be felt, so as to be pointed out; nor can He be described by relation, inasmuch as relations serve to + recall a thing mentioned before by nouns, participles, or demonstrative pronouns. Therefore + God cannot in any way be named by us. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.15.3" target="asv">Ex. 15:3</a>): "The Lord is a man of war, Almighty is His name." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), words are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is evident + that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore + that we can give a name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now it was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q13_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A11.html">Q[12], AA[11]</a>,12) that in this life we cannot see the essence of God; but we know God + from creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way therefore He can be named by us + from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus the name "man" expresses + the essence of man in himself, since it signifies the definition of man by manifesting his essence; for the idea expressed + by the name is the definition. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The reason why God has no name, or is said to be above being named, is because His essence is above all that we understand + about God, and signify in word. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because we know and name God from creatures, the names we attribute to God signify what belongs to material creatures, of + which the knowledge is natural to us. And because in creatures of this kind what is perfect and subsistent is compound; whereas + their form is not a complete subsisting thing, but rather is that whereby a thing is; hence it follows that all names used + by us to signify a complete subsisting thing must have a concrete meaning as + applicable to compound things; whereas names given to signify simple forms, signify a thing not as subsisting, but as that + whereby a thing is; as, for instance, whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white. And as God is simple, and subsisting, + we attribute to Him abstract names to signify His simplicity, and concrete names to signify His substance and perfection, + although both these kinds of names fail to express His mode of being, forasmuch as our intellect does not know Him in this + life + as He is. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To signify substance with quality is to signify the "suppositum" with a nature or determined form in which it subsists. Hence, + as some things are said of God in a concrete sense, to signify His subsistence and perfection, so likewise nouns are applied + to God signifying substance with quality. Further, verbs and participles which signify time, are applied to Him because His + eternity includes all time. For as we can apprehend and signify simple + subsistences only by way of compound things, so we can understand and express simple eternity only by way of temporal things, + because our intellect has a natural affinity to compound and temporal things. But demonstrative pronouns are applied to God + as describing what is understood, not what is sensed. For we can only describe Him as far as we understand Him. Thus, according + as nouns, participles and demonstrative pronouns are applicable to God, so far can He be signified by relative + pronouns. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q13_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q13_A2-p0.1">Whether any name can be applied to God substantially?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no name can be applied to God substantially. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 9): "Everything said of God + signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what He is not; or expresses some relation, or something following from + His nature or operation." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "You will find a chorus of holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly + and praiseworthily the divine processions in the denomination of God." Thus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising + God are distinguished according to the divine processions themselves. But what expresses the procession of anything, does + not signify its essence. Therefore the names applied to God are not said of Him + substantially. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing is named by us according as we understand it. But God is not understood by us in this life in His substance. + Therefore neither is any name we can use applied substantially to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi): "The being of God is the being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say of that + simplicity whereby His substance is signified." Therefore all names of this kind signify the divine substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Negative names applied to God, or signifying His relation to creatures manifestly do not at all signify His substance, but + rather express the distance of the creature from Him, or His relation to something else, or rather, the relation of creatures + to Himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p7"> But as regards absolute and affirmative names of God, as "good," "wise," and the like, various and many opinions have been + given. For some have said that all such names, although they are applied to God affirmatively, nevertheless have been brought + into use more to express some remotion from God, rather than to express anything that exists positively in Him. Hence they + assert that when we say that God lives, we mean that God is not like an inanimate thing; and the same in like + manner applies to other names; and this was taught by Rabbi Moses. Others say that these names applied to God signify His + relationship towards creatures: thus in the words, "God is good," we mean, God is the cause of goodness in things; and the + same rule applies to other names. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p8"> Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue for three reasons. First because in neither of them can a reason be assigned + why some names more than others are applied to God. For He is assuredly the cause of bodies in the same way as He is the cause + of good things; therefore if the words "God is good," signified no more than, "God is the cause of good things," it might + in like manner be said that God is a body, inasmuch as He is the cause of bodies. So also to say that He + is a body implies that He is not a mere potentiality, as is primary matter. Secondly, because it would follow that all names + applied to God would be said of Him by way of being taken in a secondary sense, as healthy is secondarily said of medicine, + forasmuch as it signifies only the cause of the health in the animal which primarily is called healthy. Thirdly, because this + is against the intention of those who speak of God. For in saying that God lives, they assuredly mean more than to say the + He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from inanimate bodies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p9"> Therefore we must hold a different doctrine---viz. that these names signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially + of God, although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is proved thus. For these names express God, so far + as our intellects know Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him. + Now it is shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q13_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that God prepossesses in Himself all the + perfections of creatures, being Himself simply and universally perfect. Hence every creature represents Him, and is like Him + so far as it possesses some perfection; yet it represents Him not as something of the same species or genus, but as the excelling + principle of whose form the effects fall short, although they derive some kind of likeness thereto, even as the forms of inferior + bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained above ( + <a id="FP_Q13_A2-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>), in treating + of the divine perfection. Therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as + creatures represent it imperfectly. So when we say, "God is good," the meaning is not, "God is the cause of goodness," or + "God is not evil"; but the meaning is, "Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God," and in a more excellent + and higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is good, because He causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He causes + goodness in things because He is good; according to what Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because He is good, we + are." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Damascene says that these names do not signify what God is, forasmuch as by none of these names is perfectly expressed what + He is; but each one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent Him imperfectly. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the significance of names, that from which the name is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to signify, + as for instance, this name "stone" [lapis] is imposed from the fact that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem], but it is not imposed + to signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a certain kind of body; otherwise everything that hurts the foot + would be a stone [*This refers to the Latin etymology of the word "lapis" + which has no place in English]. So we must say that these kinds of divine names are imposed from the divine processions; for + as according to the diverse processions of their perfections, creatures are the representations of God, although in an imperfect + manner; so likewise our intellect knows and names God according to each kind of procession; but nevertheless these names are + not imposed to signify the procession themselves, as if when we say "God lives," the sense were, "life proceeds from + Him"; but to signify the principle itself of things, in so far as life pre-exists in Him, although it pre-exists in Him in + a more eminent way than can be understood or signified. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We cannot know the essence of God in this life, as He really is in Himself; but we know Him accordingly as He is represented + in the perfections of creatures; and thus the names imposed by us signify Him in that manner only. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A2-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q13_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q13_A3-p0.1">Whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no name is applied literally to God. For all names which we apply to God are taken from creatures; as was explained + above + <a id="FP_Q13_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But the names of creatures are applied to God metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the like. Therefore + names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no name can be applied literally to anything if it should be withheld from it rather than given to it. But all such + names as "good," "wise," and the like are more truly withheld from God than given to Him; as appears from Dionysius says (Coel. + Hier. ii). Therefore none of these names belong to God in their literal sense. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, corporeal names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense only; since He is incorporeal. But all such names imply + some kind of corporeal condition; for their meaning is bound up with time and composition and like corporeal conditions. Therefore + all these names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii), "Some names there are which express evidently the property of the divinity, and some which express + the clear truth of the divine majesty, but others there are which are applied to God metaphorically by way of similitude." + Therefore not all names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense, but there are some which are said of Him in their literal + sense. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the preceding article, our knowledge of God is derived from the perfections which flow from Him to creatures, + which perfections are in God in a more eminent way than in creatures. Now our intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures, + and as it apprehends them it signifies them by names. Therefore as to the names applied to God---viz. the perfections which + they signify, such as goodness, life and the like, and their mode of signification. + As regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to God, and more properly than they belong to creatures, + and are applied primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of signification, they do not properly and strictly apply to God; + for their mode of signification applies to creatures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are some names which signify these perfections flowing from God to creatures in such a way that the imperfect way in + which creatures receive the divine perfection is part of the very signification of the name itself as "stone" signifies a + material being, and names of this kind can be applied to God only in a metaphorical sense. Other names, however, express these + perfections absolutely, without any such mode of participation being part of their + signification as the words "being," "good," "living," and the like, and such names can be literally applied to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Such names as these, as Dionysius shows, are denied of God for the reason that what the name signifies does not belong to + Him in the ordinary sense of its signification, but in a more eminent way. Hence Dionysius says also that God is above all + substance and all life. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These names which are applied to God literally imply corporeal conditions not in the thing signified, but as regards their + mode of signification; whereas those which are applied to God metaphorically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing + signified. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q13_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q13_A4-p0.1">Whether names applied to God are synonymous?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that these names applied to God are synonymous names. For synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same. + But these names applied to God mean entirely the same thing in God; for the goodness of God is His essence, and likewise it + is His wisdom. Therefore these names are entirely synonymous. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it be said these names signify one and the same thing in reality, but differ in idea, it can be objected that + an idea to which no reality corresponds is a vain notion. Therefore if these ideas are many, and the thing is one, it seems + also that all these ideas are vain notions. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea, is more one than what is one in reality and many in idea. But God is + supremely one. Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality and many in idea; and thus the names applied to God do not + signify different ideas; and thus they are synonymous. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> All synonyms united with each other are redundant, as when we say, "vesture clothing." Therefore if all names applied to + God are synonymous, we cannot properly say "good God" or the like, and yet it is written, "O most mighty, great and powerful, + the Lord of hosts is Thy name" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.32.18" target="asv">Jer. 32:18</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This would be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to remove, + or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it would follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse + things denied of God, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But even according to what was said above + <a id="FP_Q13_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, that these names signify the divine substance, although in an + imperfect manner, it is also clear from what has been said (AA 1,2) that they have diverse meanings. For the idea signified + by the name is the conception in the intellect of the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since it knows God from + creatures, in order to understand God, forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures, which + perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are received and divided and multiplied. As + therefore, to the different perfections of creatures, there corresponds one simple principle represented by different perfections + of creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to the various and multiplied conceptions of our intellect, there corresponds + one altogether simple principle, according to these conceptions, imperfectly understood. Therefore although the names applied + to God signify one thing, still because they signify that under many and different aspects, they are not + synonymous. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p7"> Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, since synonymous terms signify one thing under one aspect; for words which + signify different aspects of one things, do not signify primarily and absolutely one thing; because the term only signifies + the thing through the medium of the intellectual conception, as was said above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The many aspects of these names are not empty and vain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality represented + by them in a manifold and imperfect manner. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The perfect unity of God requires that what are manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and unitedly. Thus + it comes about that He is one in reality, and yet multiple in idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold manner, + as things represent Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q13_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q13_A5-p0.1">Whether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally predicated of them?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the things attributed to God and creatures are univocal. For every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal, + as many are reduced to one; for if the name "dog" be said equivocally of the barking dog, and of the dogfish, it must be said + of some univocally---viz. of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to infinitude. Now there are some univocal agents which + agree with their effects in name and definition, as man generates man; and there are some + agents which are equivocal, as the sun which causes heat, although the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense. Therefore it + seems that the first agent to which all other agents are reduced, is an univocal agent: and thus what is said of God and creatures, + is predicated univocally. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no similitude among equivocal things. Therefore as creatures have a certain likeness to God, according + to the word of Genesis ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>), "Let us make man to our image and likeness," it seems that something can be said of God and creatures univocally. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, measure is homogeneous with the thing measured. But God is the first measure of all beings. Therefore God is homogeneous + with creatures; and thus a word may be applied univocally to God and to creatures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> whatever is predicated of various things under the same name but not in the same sense, is predicated equivocally. But no + name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures; for instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not + in God. Now a different genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the definition; and the same applies to other + things. Therefore whatever is said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p6"> Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from each other. But the distance of some creatures makes + any univocal predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which are not in the same genus. Therefore much + less can anything be predicated univocally of God and creatures; and so only equivocal predication can be applied to them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an adequate + result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure + that falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; + as for example the sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms + in all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the preceding article, all perfections existing in creatures divided and + multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly. Thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to a creature, it signifies that + perfection distinct in idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by the term "wise" applied to man, we signify some perfection + distinct from a man's essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when we + apply to it God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence, or power, or existence. Thus also this term + "wise" applied to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when + it is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name. + Hence it is evident that this term "wise" is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same rule applies to other + terms. + Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p8"> Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because + if that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all; for the reasoning + would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who proved many things about + God, and also against what the Apostle says: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by + the things that are made" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv">Rom. 1:20</a>). Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e. according to proportion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p9"> Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things are proportionate to one, thus for example "healthy" + predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body, of which the former is the sign and the + latter the cause: or according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is said of medicine and animal, since + medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures + analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures + <a id="FP_Q13_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Thus whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and + cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure + equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the + same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various + proportions to some one thing; thus "healthy" applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine + signifies the cause of the same health. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although equivocal predications must be reduced to univocal, still in actions, the non-univocal agent must precede the univocal + agent. For the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of the whole species, as for instance the sun is the cause of the + generation of all men; whereas the univocal agent is not the universal efficient cause of the whole species (otherwise it + would be the cause of itself, since it is contained in the species), but is a + particular cause of this individual which it places under the species by way of participation. Therefore the universal cause + of the whole species is not an univocal agent; and the universal cause comes before the particular cause. But this universal + agent, whilst it is not univocal, nevertheless is not altogether equivocal, otherwise it could not produce its own likeness, + but rather it is to be called an analogical agent, as all univocal predications are reduced to one first non-univocal + analogical predication, which is being. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The likeness of the creature to God is imperfect, for it does not represent one and the same generic thing ( + <a id="FP_Q13_A5-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is not the measure proportioned to things measured; hence it is not necessary that God and creatures should be in the + same genus. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p13"><b>Reply to Objections:</b> The arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove indeed that these names are not predicated univocally of God and creatures; + yet they do not prove that they are predicated equivocally. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A5-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q13_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q13_A6-p0.1">Whether names predicated of God are predicated primarily of creatures?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God. For we name anything accordingly as we know + it, since "names", as the Philosopher says, "are signs of ideas." But we know creatures before we know God. Therefore the + names imposed by us are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We name God from creatures." But names transferred from creatures to God, are said + primarily of creatures rather than of God, as "lion," "stone," and the like. Therefore all names applied to God and creatures + are applied primarily to creatures rather than to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all names equally applied to God and creatures, are applied to God as the cause of all creatures, as Dionysius says + (De Mystica Theol.). But what is applied to anything through its cause, is applied to it secondarily, for "healthy" is primarily + predicated of animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of health. Therefore these names are said primarily of creatures + rather than of God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "I bow my knees to the Father, of our Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.14" target="asv">Eph. 3:14,15</a>); and the same applies to the other names applied to God and creatures. Therefore these names are applied primarily to God + rather than to creatures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In names predicated of many in an analogical sense, all are predicated because they have reference to some one thing; and + this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And since that expressed by the name is the definition, as the + Philosopher says (Metaph. iv), such a name must be applied primarily to that which is put in the definition of such other + things, and secondarily to these others according as they approach more or less to that first. + Thus, for instance, "healthy" applied to animals comes into the definition of "healthy" applied to medicine, which is called + healthy as being the cause of health in the animal; and also into the definition of "healthy" which is applied to urine, which + is called healthy in so far as it is the sign of the animal's health. Thus all names applied metaphorically to God, are applied + to creatures primarily rather than to God, because when said of God they mean only similitudes to such creatures. For + as "smiling" applied to a field means only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like the beauty of the human smile + by proportionate likeness, so the name of "lion" applied to God means only that God manifests strength in His works, as a + lion in his. Thus it is clear that applied to God the signification of names can be defined only from what is said of creatures. + But to other names not applied to God in a metaphorical sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as + the cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, "God is good," it would then only mean "God is the cause of the + creature's goodness"; thus the term good applied to God would included in its meaning the creature's goodness. Hence "good" + would apply primarily to creatures rather than to God. But as was shown above + <a id="FP_Q13_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, these names are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially. For the words, "God is good," or "wise," signify + not only that + He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name + signifies, these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures; + but as regards the imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to creatures which we know first. Hence they + have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures, as said above + <a id="FP_Q13_A6-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection refers to the imposition of the name. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and to other names, as said above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection would be valid if these names were applied to God only as cause, and not also essentially, for instance as + "healthy" is applied to medicine. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A6-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q13_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q13_A7-p0.1">Whether names which imply relation to creatures are predicated of God temporally?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that names which imply relation to creatures are not predicated of God temporally. For all such names signify the + divine substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose (De Fide i) that this name "Lord" is the name of power, which + is the divine substance; and "Creator" signifies the action of God, which is His essence. Now the divine substance is not + temporal, but eternal. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally, but + eternally. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that to which something applies temporally can be described as made; for what is white temporally is made white. + But to make does no apply to God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of God temporally. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if any names are applied to God temporally as implying relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all things + that imply relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of God implying relation of God to creatures from eternity; for + from eternity He knew and loved the creature, according to the word: "I have loved thee with an everlasting love" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.3" target="asv">Jer. 31:3</a>). Therefore also other names implying relation to creatures, as + "Lord" and "Creator," are applied to God from eternity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, names of this kind signify relation. Therefore that relation must be something in God, or in the creature only. + But it cannot be that it is something in the creature only, for in that case God would be called "Lord" from the opposite + relation which is in creatures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore the relation must be something in God also. + But nothing temporal can be in God, for He is above time. Therefore these names are not applied + to God temporally. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, a thing is called relative from relation; for instance lord from lordship, as white from whiteness. Therefore if + the relation of lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it follows that God is not really Lord, which is plainly + false. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in nature, one can exist without the other; as a thing knowable can + exist without the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). But relative things which are said of God and creatures + are not simultaneous in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God to the creature even without the existence of + the creature; and thus these names "Lord" and "Creator" are predicated of God from + eternity, and not temporally. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this relative appellation "Lord" is applied to God temporally. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The names which import relation to creatures are applied to God temporally, and not from eternity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p10"> To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly seen + to be false from the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and habitude. Nevertheless it is necessary + to know that since relation has two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or logical. Sometimes from + both extremes it is an idea only, as when mutual order or habitude can only go between things in the apprehension + of reason; as when we say a thing "the same as itself." For reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it + apprehends a certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same applies to relations between "being" and "non-being" formed + by reason, apprehending "non-being" as an extreme. The same is true of relations that follow upon an act of reason, as genus + and species, and the like. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p11"> Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between + two things according to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all relations, consequent upon quantity; as great + and small, double and half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes: and the same applies to relations consequent + upon action and passion, as motive power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p12"> Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in the other extreme it is an idea only; and this happens + whenever two extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively to sensible things and to intellectual + things; which, inasmuch as they are realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible and intellectual existence. + Therefore in science and in sense a real relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge + or to the sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in themselves are outside this order, and hence in them + there is no real relation to science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the intellect apprehends them as terms of the + relations of science and sense. Hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that they are called relative, not forasmuch as they + are related to other things, but as others are related to them. Likewise for instance, "on the right" is not applied to a + column, unless it stands as regards an animal on the right side; which relation is not really in the column, but in the animal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p13"> Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it + is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a + relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent these names which import + relation to the creature from being predicated of God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason + of the change of the creature; as a column is on the right of an animal, without change in itself, but by change in the animal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some relative names are imposed to signify the relative habitudes themselves, as "master" and "servant," "father," and "son," + and the like, and these relatives are called predicamental [secundum esse]. But others are imposed to signify the things from + which ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing moved, the head and the thing that has a head, and the like: and + these relatives are called transcendental [secundum dici]. Thus, there is the + same two-fold difference in divine names. For some signify the habitude itself to the creature, as "Lord," and these do not + signify the divine substance directly, but indirectly, in so far as they presuppose the divine substance; as dominion presupposes + power, which is the divine substance. Others signify the divine essence directly, and consequently the corresponding habitudes, + as "Saviour," "Creator," and suchlike; and these signify the action of God, which is His essence. Yet both names are + said of God temporarily so far as they imply a habitude either principally or consequently, but not as signifying the essence, + either directly or indirectly. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As relations applied to God temporally are only in God in our idea, so, "to become" or "to be made" are applied to God only + in idea, with no change in Him, as for instance when we say, "Lord, Thou art become [Douay: 'hast been'] our refuge" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A7-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.89.1" target="asv">Ps. 89:1</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The operation of the intellect and the will is in the operator, therefore names signifying relations following upon the action + of the intellect or will, are applied to God from eternity; whereas those following upon the actions proceeding according + to our mode of thinking to external effects are applied to God temporally, as "Saviour," "Creator," and the like. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Relations signified by these names which are applied to God temporally, are in God only in idea; but the opposite relations + in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God should be denominated from relations really existing in the thing, yet + so that the opposite relations in God should also be understood by us at the same time; in the sense that God is spoken of + relatively to the creature, inasmuch as the creature is related to Him: thus the + Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that the object is said to be knowable relatively because knowledge relates to it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since God is related to the creature for the reason that the creature is related to Him: and since the relation of subjection + is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not in idea only, but in reality; for He is called Lord according to + the manner in which the creature is subject to Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> To know whether relations are simultaneous by nature or otherwise, it is not necessary by nature or otherwise of things to + which they belong but the meaning of the relations themselves. For if one in its idea includes another, and vice versa, then + they are simultaneous by nature: as double and half, father and son, and the like. But if one in its idea includes another, + and not vice versa, they are not simultaneous by nature. This applies to science + and its object; for the object knowable is considered as a potentiality, and the science as a habit, or as an act. Hence the + knowable object in its mode of signification exists before science, but if the same object is considered in act, then it is + simultaneous with science in act; for the object known is nothing as such unless it is known. Thus, though God is prior to + the creature, still because the signification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and vice versa, these two relative terms, + "Lord" and "servant," are simultaneous by nature. Hence, God was not "Lord" until He had a creature subject to Himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p20"></p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A7-p21"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q13_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A9.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q13_A8-p0.1">Whether this name "God" is a name of the nature?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name, "God," is not a name of the nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 1) that "God {Theos} is so + called from the {theein} [which means to care of] and to cherish all things; or from the {aithein}, that is to burn, for our + God is a fire consuming all malice; or from {theasthai}, which means to consider all things." But all these names belong to + operation. Therefore this name "God" signifies His operation and not His nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is named by us as we know it. But the divine nature is unknown to us. Therefore this name "God" does not + signify the divine nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide i) that "God" is a name of the nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Whence a name is imposed, and what the name signifies are not always the same thing. For as we know substance from its properties + and operations, so we name substance sometimes for its operation, or its property; e.g. we name the substance of a stone from + its act, as for instance that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem]; but still this name is not meant to signify the particular + action, but the stone's substance. The things, on the other hand, known to us in + themselves, such as heat, cold, whiteness and the like, are not named from other things. Hence as regards such things the + meaning of the name and its source are the same. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p6"> Because therefore God is not known to us in His nature, but is made known to us from His operations or effects, we name Him + from these, as said in A[1]; hence this name "God" is a name of operation so far as relates to the source of its meaning. + For this name is imposed from His universal providence over all things; since all who speak of God intend to name God as exercising + providence over all; hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii), "The Deity watches over all with perfect + providence and goodness." But taken from this operation, this name "God" is imposed to signify the divine nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All that Damascene says refers to providence; which is the source of the signification of the name "God." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We can name a thing according to the knowledge we have of its nature from its properties and effects. Hence because we can + know what stone is in itself from its property, this name "stone" signifies the nature of the stone itself; for it signifies + the definition of stone, by which we know what it is, for the idea which the name signifies is the definition, as is said + in Metaph. iv. Now from the divine effects we cannot know the divine nature in + itself, so as to know what it is; but only by way of eminence, and by way of causality, and of negation as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q13_A8-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html">Q[12], A[12]</a>). Thus the name "God" signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to signify something existing above all things, + the principle of all things and removed from all things; for those who name God intend to signify all this. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p9"></p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A8-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A9.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q13_A9" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A10.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q13_A9-p0.1">Whether this name "God" is communicable?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name "God" is communicable. For whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name itself. + But this name "God" signifies the divine nature, which is communicable to others, according to the words, "He hath given us + great [Vulg.: 'most great'] and precious promises, that by these we [Vulg.: 'ye'] may be made partakers of the divine nature" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.1.4" target="asv">2 Pet. 1:4</a>). Therefore this name "God" can be communicated to + others. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this name "God" is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which appears + from the fact that it has a plural, according to the text, "I have said, You are gods" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.81.6" target="asv">Ps. 81:6</a>). Therefore this name "God" is communicable. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, this name "God" comes from operation, as explained. But other names given to God from His operations or effects + are communicable; as "good," "wise," and the like. Therefore this name "God" is communicable. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "They gave the incommunicable name to wood and stones" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.21" target="asv">Wis. 14:21</a>), in reference to the divine name. Therefore this name "God" is incommunicable. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A name is communicable in two ways: properly, and by similitude. It is properly communicable in the sense that its whole + signification can be given to many; by similitude it is communicable according to some part of the signification of the name. + For instance this name "lion" is properly communicable to all things of the same nature as "lion"; by similitude it is communicable + to those who participate in the nature of a lion, as for instance by courage, or + strength, and those who thus participate are called lions metaphorically. To know, however, what names are properly communicable, + we must consider that every form existing in the singular subject, by which it is individualized, is common to many either + in reality, or in idea; as human nature is common to many in reality, and in idea; whereas the nature of the sun is not common + to many in reality, but only in idea; for the nature of the sun can be understood as existing in many subjects; and the + reason is because the mind understands the nature of every species by abstraction from the singular. Hence to be in one singular + subject or in many is outside the idea of the nature of the species. So, given the idea of a species, it can be understood + as existing in many. But the singular, from the fact that it is singular, is divided off from all others. Hence every name + imposed to signify any singular thing is incommunicable both in reality and idea; for the plurality of this individual thing + cannot be; nor can it be conceived in idea. Hence no name signifying any individual thing is properly communicable to many, + but only by way of similitude; as for instance a person can be called "Achilles" metaphorically, forasmuch as he may possess + something of the properties of Achilles, such as strength. On the other hand, forms which are individualized not by any "suppositum," + but by and of themselves, as being subsisting forms, if understood as they are in themselves, could not be + communicable either in reality or in idea; but only perhaps by way of similitude, as was said of individuals. Forasmuch as + we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms as they really are, we understand them as compound things having + forms in matter; therefore, as was said in the first article, we give them concrete names signifying a nature existing in + some "suppositum." Hence, so far as concerns images, the same rules apply to names we impose to signify the nature of compound + things as to names given to us to signify simple subsisting natures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p7"> Since, then, this name "God" is given to signify the divine nature as stated above + <a id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A8.html">(A[8])</a>, and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html">Q[11], A[3]</a>), it follows that this name "God" is incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the same way as this + name "sun" would be communicable according to the opinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is written: + "You served them who + by nature are not gods," ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.8" target="asv">Gal. 4:8</a>), and a gloss adds, "Gods not in nature, but in human opinion." Nevertheless this name "God" is communicable, not in its + whole signification, but in some part of it by way of similitude; so that those are called gods who share in divinity by likeness, + according to the text, "I have said, You are gods" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.81.6" target="asv">Ps. 81:6</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p8"> But if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as to His "suppositum," accordingly as He is considered + as "this something," that name would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for instance, perhaps the Tetragrammaton among the + Hebrew; and this is like giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine nature is only communicable according to the participation of some similitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This name "God" is an appellative name, and not a proper name, for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor; although + God Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular. For names do not follow upon the mode of being in things, but + upon the mode of being as it is in our mind. And yet it is incommunicable according to the truth of the thing, as was said + above concerning the name "sun." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These names "good," "wise," and the like, are imposed from the perfections proceeding from God to creatures; but they do + not signify the divine nature, but rather signify the perfections themselves absolutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable + to many. But this name "God" is given to God from His own proper operation, which we experience continually, to signify the + divine nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A9-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A10.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q13_A10" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A11.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q13_A10-p0.1">Whether this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion. For where + a diverse signification exists, there is no contradiction of affirmation and negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction. + But a Catholic who says: "An idol is not God," contradicts a pagan who says: "An idol is God." Therefore GOD in both senses + is spoken of univocally. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in truth, so the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion, + and not in truth. But this name "beatitude" is applied univocally to this supposed happiness, and also to true happiness. + Therefore also this name "God" is applied univocally to the true God, and to God also in opinion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, names are called univocal because they contain one idea. Now when a Catholic says: "There is one God," he understands + by the name God an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while the heathen understands the same when he says: "An + idol is God." Therefore this name "God" is applied univocally to both. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is in the thing as is said in Peri Herm. i. But the word "animal" applied + to a true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore this name "God" applied to the true God and to God in opinion + is applied equivocally. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p6"> Further, No one can signify what he does not know. But the heathen does not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol + is God, he does not signify the true Deity. On the other hand, A Catholic signifies the true Deity when he says that there + is one God. Therefore this name "God" is not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true God, and to God according to + opinion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> This name "God" in the three aforesaid significations is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. This + is apparent from this reason: Univocal terms mean absolutely the same thing, but equivocal terms absolutely different; whereas + in analogical terms a word taken in one signification must be placed in the definition of the same word taken in other senses; + as, for instance, "being" which is applied to "substance" is placed in the definition + of being as applied to "accident"; and "healthy" applied to animal is placed in the definition of healthy as applied to urine + and medicine. For urine is the sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the cause of health. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p8"> The same applies to the question at issue. For this name "God," as signifying the true God, includes the idea of God when + it is used to denote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone god by participation, we understand by the + name of god some likeness of the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god we understand and signify + something which men think is God; thus it is manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is + comprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said analogically. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The multiplication of names does not depend on the predication of the name, but on the signification: for this name "man," + of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is predicated in one sense. But it would be multiplied if by the + name "man" we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one meant to signify by this name "man" what man really + is, and another meant to signify by the same name a stone, or something else. Hence it + is evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not God contradicts the pagan asserting that it is God; because each of + them uses this name GOD to signify the true God. For when the pagan says an idol is God, he does not use this name as meaning + God in opinion, for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics sometimes use the name in the sense, as in the Psalm, + "All the gods of the Gentiles are demons" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A10-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.95.5" target="asv">Ps. 95:5</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p10"><b>Reply to Objections 2 and 3:</b> The same remark applies to the Second and Third Objections. For these reasons proceed from the different predication of the + name, and not from its various significations. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The term "animal" applied to a true and a pictured animal is not purely equivocal; for the Philosopher takes equivocal names + in a large sense, including analogous names; because also being, which is predicated analogically, is sometimes said to be + predicated equivocally of different predicaments. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one knows it according to some idea + of causality, or excellence, or remotion ( + <a id="FP_Q13_A10-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html">Q[12], A[12]</a>). So a pagan can take this name "God" in the same way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying an idol + is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use + names the meaning of which we know not. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A10-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A11.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q13_A11" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A12.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q13_A11-p0.1">Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of God. For this name "God" is an incommunicable name. But + this name HE WHO IS, is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "the name of good excellently manifests all the processions of God." But it + especially belongs to God to be the universal principle of all things. Therefore this name "good" is supremely proper to God, + and not this name HE WHO IS. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every divine name seems to imply relation to creatures, for God is known to us only through creatures. But this + name HE WHO IS imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not the most applicable to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written that when Moses asked, "If they should say to me, What is His name? what shall I say to them?" The Lord answered + him, "Thus shalt thou say to them, HE WHO IS hath sent me to you" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A11-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.3.13" target="asv">Ex. 3:13,14</a>). Therefor this name HE WHO IS most properly belongs to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God, for three reasons: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p7"> First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the existence + of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other ( + <a id="FP_Q13_A11-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for everything is denominated by its form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p8"> Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add + something above it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine it. Now our intellect cannot know the + essence of God itself in this life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining what it understands about + God, it falls short of the mode of what God is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the + more universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are applied to God. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i) that, + "HE WHO IS, is the principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending all in itself, it contains existence itself as + an infinite and indeterminate sea of substance." Now by any other name some mode of substance is determined, whereas this + name HE WHO IS, determines no mode of being, but is indeterminate to all; and therefore it denominates the "infinite ocean + of + substance." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p9"> Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present existence; and this above all properly applies to God, whose + existence knows not past or future, as Augustine says (De Trin. v). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This name HE WHO IS is the name of God more properly than this name "God," as regards its source, namely, existence; and + as regards the mode of signification and consignification, as said above. But as regards the object intended by the name, + this name "God" is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the divine nature; and still more proper is the Tetragrammaton, + imposed to signify the substance of God itself, incommunicable and, if one may so speak, + singular. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This name "good" is the principal name of God in so far as He is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered absolutely + comes before the idea of cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not necessary that all the divine names should import relation to creatures, but it suffices that they be imposed from + some perfections flowing from God to creatures. Among these the first is existence, from which comes this name, HE WHO IS. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A11-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A12.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q13_A12" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A11.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q13_A12-p0.1">Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed about God. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that "negations about + God are true; but affirmations are vague." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that "a simple form cannot be a subject." But God is the most absolutely simple form, + as shown (Q[3] ): therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about which an affirmative proposition is made is taken + as a subject. Therefore an affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise than as it is. But God has existence without any composition + as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q13_A12-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore since every affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows that a true affirmative proposition + about God cannot be made. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> What is of faith cannot be false. But some affirmative propositions are of faith; as that God is Three and One; and that + He is omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can be formed about God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> True affirmative propositions can be formed about God. To prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition + the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in reality, and different things in idea. And this appears + to be the case both in propositions which have an accidental predicate, and in those which have an essential predicate. For + it is manifest that "man" and "white" are the same in subject, and different in idea; for + the idea of man is one thing, and that of whiteness is another. The same applies when I say, "man is an animal"; since the + same thing which is man is truly animal; for in the same "suppositum" there is sensible nature by reason of which he is called + animal, and the rational nature by reason of which he is called man; hence here again predicate and subject are the same as + to "suppositum," but different as to idea. But in propositions where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same rule + in + some way applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to the "suppositum" what it places in the subject; and what it places in + the predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the "suppositum"; according to the saying that "predicates are + to be taken formally, and subjects materially." To this diversity in idea corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject, + while the intellect signifies the identity of the thing by the composition itself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p7"> God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple, yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions + because it cannot see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him under different conceptions, it knows + that one and the same simple object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of predicate and subject represents + the plurality of idea; and the intellect represents the unity by composition. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius says that the affirmations about God are vague or, according to another translation, "incongruous," inasmuch as + no name can be applied to God according to its mode of signification. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting forms, as they really are in themselves; but it apprehends them as compound + things in which there is something taken as subject and something that is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form + as a subject, and attributes something else to it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This proposition, "The intellect understanding anything otherwise than it is, is false," can be taken in two senses, accordingly + as this adverb "otherwise" determines the word "understanding" on the part of the thing understood, or on the part of the + one who understands. Taken as referring to the thing understood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any intellect + which understands that the thing is otherwise than it is, is false. But this + does not hold in the present case; because our intellect, when forming a proposition about God, does not affirm that He is + composite, but that He is simple. But taken as referring to the one who understands, the proposition is false. For the mode + of the intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing in its essence. Since it is clear that our intellect + understands material things below itself in an immaterial manner; not that it understands them to be immaterial things; but + its manner of understanding is immaterial. Likewise, when it understands simple things above itself, it understands them according + to its own mode, which is in a composite manner; yet not so as to understand them to be composite things. And thus our intellect + is not false in forming composition in its ideas concerning God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q13_A12-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A11.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q12_A13.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q14" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A12.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q14-p0.1">OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q14-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14-p2"> Having considered what belongs to the divine substance, we have now to treat of God's operation. And since one kind of operation + is immanent, and another kind of operation proceeds to the exterior effect, we treat first of knowledge and of will (for understanding + abides in the intelligent agent, and will is in the one who wills); and afterwards of the power of God, the principle of the + divine operation as proceeding to the exterior effect. Now because to understand is a kind of + life, after treating of the divine knowledge, we consider truth and falsehood. Further, as everything known is in the knower, + and the types of things as existing in the knowledge of God are called ideas, to the consideration of knowledge will be added + the treatment of ideas. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14-p3"> Concerning knowledge, there are sixteen points for inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q14-p4"> (1) Whether there is knowledge in God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q14-p5"> (2) Whether God understands Himself?</p> + <p id="FP_Q14-p6"> (3) Whether He comprehends Himself?</p> + <p id="FP_Q14-p7"> (4) Whether His understanding is His substance?</p> + <p id="FP_Q14-p8"> (5) Whether He understands other things besides Himself?</p> + <p id="FP_Q14-p9"> (6) Whether He has a proper knowledge of them?</p> + <p id="FP_Q14-p10"> (7) Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?</p> + <p id="FP_Q14-p11"> (8) Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?</p> + <p id="FP_Q14-p12"> (9) Whether God has knowledge of non-existing things?</p> + <p id="FP_Q14-p13"> (10) Whether He has knowledge of evil?</p> + <p id="FP_Q14-p14"> (11) Whether He has knowledge of individual things?</p> + <p id="FP_Q14-p15"> (12) Whether He knows the infinite?</p> + <p id="FP_Q14-p16"> (13) Whether He knows future contingent things?</p> + <p id="FP_Q14-p17"> (14) Whether He knows enunciable things?</p> + <p id="FP_Q14-p18"> (15) Whether the knowledge of God is variable?</p> + <p id="FP_Q14-p19"> (16) Whether God has speculative or practical knowledge of things?</p> + <div id="FP_Q14_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q14_A1-p0.1">Whether there is knowledge [*Scientia]?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that in God there is not knowledge. For knowledge is a habit; and habit does not belong to God, since it is the + mean between potentiality and act. Therefore knowledge is not in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since science is about conclusions, it is a kind of knowledge caused by something else which is the knowledge of + principles. But nothing is caused in God; therefore science is not in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all knowledge is universal, or particular. But in God there is no universal or particular ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Therefore in God there is not knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says, "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.33" target="asv">Rom. 11:33</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In God there exists the most perfect knowledge. To prove this, we must note that intelligent beings are distinguished from + non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted + to have also the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the knower. Hence it is manifest that the + nature of a non-intelligent being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of + intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that "the soul is + in a sense all things." Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>) forms according as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore it is clear that + the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive; and according to the mode of immateriality is + the mode of knowledge. Hence it is said in De Anima ii that plants do not know, because they are wholly material. But sense + is cognitive because it can receive images free from matter, and the intellect is still further cognitive, because it is more + separated from matter and unmixed, as said in De Anima iii. Since therefore God is in the highest degree of immateriality + as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>), it follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because perfections flowing from God to creatures exist in a higher state in God Himself ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>), whenever a name taken from any created perfection is attributed to God, it must be separated in its signification from + anything that belongs to that imperfect mode proper to creatures. Hence knowledge is not a quality of God, nor a habit; but + substance and pure act. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whatever is divided and multiplied in creatures exists in God simply and unitedly ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html">Q[13], A[4]</a>). Now man has different kinds of knowledge, according to the different objects of His knowledge. He has "intelligence" as + regards the knowledge of principles; he has "science" as regards knowledge of conclusions; he has "wisdom," according as he + knows the highest cause; he has "counsel" or "prudence," according as he knows what is to + be done. But God knows all these by one simple act of knowledge, as will be shown + <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Hence the simple knowledge of God can be named by all these names; in such a way, however, that there must be removed from + each of them, so far as they enter into divine predication, everything that savors of imperfection; and everything that expresses + perfection is to be retained in them. Hence it is said, "With Him is wisdom and strength, He hath counsel and understanding" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A1-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Job.12.13" target="asv">Job 12:13</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Knowledge is according to the mode of the one who knows; for the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the + knower. Now since the mode of the divine essence is higher than that of creatures, divine knowledge does not exist in God + after the mode of created knowledge, so as to be universal or particular, or habitual, or potential, or existing according + to any such mode. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q14_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q14_A2-p0.1">Whether God understands Himself?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not understand Himself. For it is said by the Philosopher (De Causis), "Every knower who knows his + own essence, returns completely to his own essence." But God does not go out from His own essence, nor is He moved at all; + thus He cannot return to His own essence. Therefore He does not know His own essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to understand is a kind of passion and movement, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii); and knowledge also is a + kind of assimilation to the object known; and the thing known is the perfection of the knower. But nothing is moved, or suffers, + or is made perfect by itself, "nor," as Hilary says (De Trin. iii), "is a thing its own likeness." Therefore God does not + understand Himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we are like to God chiefly in our intellect, because we are the image of God in our mind, as Augustine says (Gen. + ad lit. vi). But our intellect understands itself, only as it understands other things, as is said in De Anima iii. Therefore + God understands Himself only so far perchance as He understands other things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:11</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God understands Himself through Himself. In proof whereof it must be known that although in operations which pass to an external + effect, the object of the operation, which is taken as the term, exists outside the operator; nevertheless in operations that + remain in the operator, the object signified as the term of operation, resides in the operator; and accordingly as it is in + the operator, the operation is actual. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) + that "the sensible in act is sense in act, and the intelligible in act is intellect in act." For the reason why we actually + feel or know a thing is because our intellect or sense is actually informed by the sensible or intelligible species. And because + of this only, it follows that sense or intellect is distinct from the sensible or intelligible object, since both are in potentiality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p7"> Since therefore God has nothing in Him of potentiality, but is pure act, His intellect and its object are altogether the + same; so that He neither is without the intelligible species, as is the case with our intellect when it understands potentially; + nor does the intelligible species differ from the substance of the divine intellect, as it differs in our intellect when it + understands actually; but the intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself, and thus God + understands Himself through Himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Return to its own essence means only that a thing subsists in itself. Inasmuch as the form perfects the matter by giving + it existence, it is in a certain way diffused in it; and it returns to itself inasmuch as it has existence in itself. Therefore + those cognitive faculties which are not subsisting, but are the acts of organs, do not know themselves, as in the case of + each of the senses; whereas those cognitive faculties which are subsisting, know + themselves; hence it is said in De Causis that, "whoever knows his essence returns to it." Now it supremely belongs to God + to be self-subsisting. Hence according to this mode of speaking, He supremely returns to His own essence, and knows Himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Movement and passion are taken equivocally, according as to understand is described as a kind of movement or passion, as + stated in De Anima iii. For to understand is not a movement that is an act of something imperfect passing from one to another, + but it is an act, existing in the agent itself, of something perfect. Likewise that the intellect is perfected by the intelligible + object, i.e. is assimilated to it, this belongs to an intellect which is + sometimes in potentiality; because the fact of its being in a state of potentiality makes it differ from the intelligible + object and assimilates it thereto through the intelligible species, which is the likeness of the thing understood, and makes + it to be perfected thereby, as potentiality is perfected by act. On the other hand, the divine intellect, which is no way + in potentiality, is not perfected by the intelligible object, nor is it assimilated thereto, but is its own perfection, and + its + own intelligible object. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Existence in nature does not belong to primary matter, which is a potentiality, unless it is reduced to act by a form. Now + our passive intellect has the same relation to intelligible objects as primary matter has to natural things; for it is in + potentiality as regards intelligible objects, just as primary matter is to natural things. Hence our passive intellect can + be exercised concerning intelligible objects only so far as it is perfected by the + intelligible species of something; and in that way it understands itself by an intelligible species, as it understands other + things: for it is manifest that by knowing the intelligible object it understands also its own act of understanding, and by + this act knows the intellectual faculty. But God is a pure act in the order of existence, as also in the order of intelligible + objects; therefore He understands Himself through Himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q14_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q14_A3-p0.1">Whether God comprehends Himself?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q14_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not comprehend Himself. For Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that "whatever comprehends itself + is finite as regards itself." But God is in all ways infinite. Therefore He does not comprehend Himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> If it is said that God is infinite to us, and finite to Himself, it can be urged to the contrary, that everything in God + is truer than it is in us. If therefore God is finite to Himself, but infinite to us, then God is more truly finite than infinite; + which is against what was laid down above ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Therefore God does not comprehend Himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A3-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that "Everything that understands itself, comprehends itself." But God understands + Himself. Therefore He comprehends Himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A3-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God perfectly comprehends Himself, as can be thus proved. A thing is said to be comprehended when the end of the knowledge + of it is attained, and this is accomplished when it is known as perfectly as it is knowable; as, for instance, a demonstrable + proposition is comprehended when known by demonstration, not, however, when it is known by some probable reason. Now it is + manifest that God knows Himself as perfectly as He is perfectly knowable. For everything + is knowable according to the mode of its own actuality; since a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality, but + in so far as it is in actuality, as said in Metaph. ix. Now the power of God in knowing is as great as His actuality in existing; + because it is from the fact that He is in act and free from all matter and potentiality, that God is cognitive, as shown above + ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2). Whence it is manifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable; and for that + reason He perfectly comprehends Himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A3-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The strict meaning of "comprehension" signifies that one thing holds and includes another; and in this sense everything comprehended + is finite, as also is everything included in another. But God is not said to be comprehended by Himself in this sense, as + if His intellect were a faculty apart from Himself, and as if it held and included Himself; for these modes of speaking are + to be taken by way of negation. But as God is said to be in Himself, + forasmuch as He is not contained by anything outside of Himself; so He is said to be comprehended by Himself, forasmuch as + nothing in Himself is hidden from Himself. For Augustine says (De Vid. Deum. ep. cxii), "The whole is comprehended when seen, + if it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When it is said, "God is finite to Himself," this is to be understood according to a certain similitude of proportion, because + He has the same relation in not exceeding His intellect, as anything finite has in not exceeding finite intellect. But God + is not to be called finite to Himself in this sense, as if He understood Himself to be something finite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A3-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A3-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q14_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q14_A4-p0.1">Whether the act of God's intellect is His substance?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the act of God's intellect is not His substance. For to understand is an operation. But an operation signifies + something proceeding from the operator. Therefore the act of God's intellect is not His substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to understand one's act of understanding, is to understand something that is neither great nor chiefly understood, + and but secondary and accessory. If therefore God be his own act of understanding, His act of understanding will be as when + we understand our act of understanding: and thus God's act of understanding will not be something great. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every act of understanding means understanding something. When therefore God understands Himself, if He Himself + is not distinct from this act of understanding, He understands that He understands Himself; and so on to infinity. Therefore + the act of God's intellect is not His substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vii), "In God to be is the same as to be wise." But to be wise is the same thing as to understand. + Therefore in God to be is the same thing as to understand. But God's existence is His substance, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Therefore the act of God's intellect is His substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It must be said that the act of God's intellect is His substance. For if His act of understanding were other than His substance, + then something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii), would be the act and perfection of the divine substance, to which + the divine substance would be related, as potentiality is to act, which is altogether impossible; because the act of understanding + is the perfection and act of the one understanding. Let us now consider how + this is. As was laid down above + <a id="FP_Q14_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, to understand is not an act passing to anything extrinsic; for it remains in the operator as his own act and perfection; + as existence is the perfection of the one existing: just as existence follows on the form, so in like manner to understand + follows on the intelligible species. Now in God there is no form which is something other than His existence, as shown above + + <a id="FP_Q14_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3.html">(Q[3])</a>. Hence as His essence itself is also + His intelligible species, it necessarily follows that His act of understanding must be His essence and His existence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p7"> Thus it follows from all the foregoing that in God, intellect, and the object understood, and the intelligible species, and + His act of understanding are entirely one and the same. Hence when God is said to be understanding, no kind of multiplicity + is attached to His substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To understand is not an operation proceeding out of the operator, but remaining in him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When that act of understanding which is not subsistent is understood, something not great is understood; as when we understand + our act of understanding; and so this cannot be likened to the act of the divine understanding which is subsistent. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Thus appears the Reply to the Third Objection. For the act of divine understanding subsists in itself, and belongs to its + very self and is not another's; hence it need not proceed to infinity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q14_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q14_A5-p0.1">Whether God knows things other than Himself?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know things besides Himself. For all other things but God are outside of God. But Augustine says + (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi) that "God does not behold anything out of Himself." Therefore He does not know things other + than Himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object understood is the perfection of the one who understands. If therefore God understands other things besides + Himself, something else will be the perfection of God, and will be nobler than He; which is impossible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the act of understanding is specified by the intelligible object, as is every other act from its own object. Hence + the intellectual act is so much the nobler, the nobler the object understood. But God is His own intellectual act. If therefore + God understands anything other than Himself, then God Himself is specified by something else than Himself; which cannot be. + Therefore He does not understand things other than Himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "All things are naked and open to His eyes" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.4.13" target="asv">Heb. 4:13</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For it is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His + existence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows + of necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its + power extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by the very fact + that it is the first effective cause of all things, as is clear from the aforesaid ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>), God must necessarily know things other than Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we add that the every existence + of the first effective cause---viz. God---is His own act of understanding. Hence whatever effects pre-exist in God, as in + the first cause, must be in His act of understanding, and all things must be in Him according to an intelligible mode: for + everything which is in another, is in it according to the mode of that in which it is. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p7"> Now in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must consider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself, + and in another. A thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species adequate to the knowable object; as when + the eye sees a man through the image of a man. A thing is seen in another through the image of that which contains it; as + when a part is seen in the whole by the image of the whole; or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in the + mirror, or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p8"> So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself through His essence; and He sees other things not in + themselves, but in Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of things other than Himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage of Augustine in which it is said that God "sees nothing outside Himself" is not to be taken in such a way, as + if God saw nothing outside Himself, but in the sense that what is outside Himself He does not see except in Himself, as above + explained. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object understood is a perfection of the one understanding not by its substance, but by its image, according to which + it is in the intellect, as its form and perfection, as is said in De Anima iii. For "a stone is not in the soul, but its image." + Now those things which are other than God are understood by God, inasmuch as the essence of God contains their images as above + explained; hence it does not follow that there is any perfection in the + divine intellect other than the divine essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellectual act is not specified by what is understood in another, but by the principal object understood in which other + things are understood. For the intellectual act is specified by its object, inasmuch as the intelligible form is the principle + of the intellectual operation: since every operation is specified by the form which is its principle of operation; as heating + by heat. Hence the intellectual operation is specified by that intelligible + form which makes the intellect in act. And this is the image of the principal thing understood, which in God is nothing but + His own essence in which all images of things are comprehended. Hence it does not follow that the divine intellectual act, + or rather God Himself, is specified by anything else than the divine essence itself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A5-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q14_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q14_A6-p0.1">Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know things other than Himself by proper knowledge. For, as was shown + <a id="FP_Q14_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html">(A[5])</a>, God knows things other than Himself, according as they are in Himself. But other things are in Him as in their common and + universal cause, and are known by God as in their first and universal cause. This is to know them by general, and not by proper + knowledge. Therefore God knows things besides Himself by general, and not by proper + knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the created essence is as distant from the divine essence, as the divine essence is distant from the created essence. + But the divine essence cannot be known by the created essence, as said above (Q[12]/A[2]). Therefore neither can the created + essence be known by the divine essence. Thus as God knows only by His essence, it follows that He does not know what the creature + is in its essence, so as to know "what it is," which is to have proper knowledge + of it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, proper knowledge of a thing can come only through its proper ratio. But as God knows all things by His essence, + it seems that He does not know each thing by its proper ratio; for one thing cannot be the proper ratio of many and diverse + things. Therefore God has not a proper knowledge of things, but a general knowledge; for to know things otherwise than by + their proper ratio is to have only a common and general knowledge of them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> To have a proper knowledge of things is to know them not only in general, but as they are distinct from each other. Now God + knows things in that manner. Hence it is written that He reaches "even to the division of the soul and the spirit, of the + joints also and the marrow, and is a discerner of thoughts and intents of the heart; neither is there any creature invisible + in His sight" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.4.12" target="asv">Heb. 4:12,13</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have erred on this point, saying that God knows things other than Himself only in general, that is, only as beings. + For as fire, if it knew the nature of heat, and all things else in so far as they are hot; so God, through knowing Himself + as the principle of being, knows the nature of being, and all other things in so far as they are beings. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p7"> But this cannot be. For to know a thing in general and not in particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge. Hence our intellect, + when it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a universal and confused knowledge of things, before it knows + them in particular; as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is clear from Phys. i. If therefore the knowledge + of God regarding things other than Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow that His + understanding would not be absolutely perfect; therefore neither would His being be perfect; and this is against what was + said above ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a>). We must therefore hold that God knows things other than Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far as being is + common to them, but in so far as one is distinguished from the other. In proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to + show that God knows many things by one, bring forward some examples, as, for + instance, that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines that proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it + would know all colors. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p8"> Now these examples although they are similar in part, namely, as regards universal causality, nevertheless they fail in this + respect, that multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal principle, not as regards that which is the principle + of distinction, but only as regards that in which they communicate. For the diversity of colors is not caused by the light + only, but by the different disposition of the diaphanous medium which receives it; and likewise, the diversity + of the lines is caused by their different position. Hence it is that this kind of diversity and multitude cannot be known + in its principle by proper knowledge, but only in a general way. In God, however, it is otherwise. For it was shown above + ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that whatever perfection exists in any creature, wholly pre-exists and is contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not + only what is common to creatures--viz. being---belongs to their perfection, but also what makes + them distinguished from each other; as living and understanding, and the like, whereby living beings are distinguished from + the non-living, and the intelligent from the non-intelligent. Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its + own species, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God, not only as regards what is common to all, but also as + regards what distinguishes one thing from another. And therefore as God contains all perfections in Himself, the essence of + God + is compared to all other essences of things, not as the common to the proper, as unity is to numbers, or as the centre (of + a circle) to the (radiating) lines; but as perfect acts to imperfect; as if I were to compare man to animal; or six, a perfect + number, to the imperfect numbers contained under it. Now it is manifest that by a perfect act imperfect acts can be known + not only in general, but also by proper knowledge; thus, for example, whoever knows a man, knows an animal by proper knowledge; + and whoever knows the number six, knows the number three also by proper knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p9"> As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the perfection contained in the essence of any other being, and far + more, God can know in Himself all of them with proper knowledge. For the nature proper to each thing consists in some degree + of participation in the divine perfection. Now God could not be said to know Himself perfectly unless He knew all the ways + in which His own perfection can be shared by others. Neither could He know the very nature of being perfectly, + unless He knew all modes of being. Hence it is manifest that God knows all things with proper knowledge, in their distinction + from each other. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> So to know a thing as it is in the knower, may be understood in two ways. In one way this adverb "so" imports the mode of + knowledge on the part of the thing known; and in that sense it is false. For the knower does not always know the object known + according to the existence it has in the knower; since the eye does not know a stone according to the existence it has in + the eye; but by the image of the stone which is in the eye, the eye knows the stone + according to its existence outside the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge of the object known according to the (mode of) + existence it has in the knower, the knower nevertheless knows it according to its (mode of) existence outside the knower; + thus the intellect knows a stone according to the intelligible existence it has in the intellect, inasmuch as it knows that + it understands; while nevertheless it knows what a stone is in its own nature. If however the adverb 'so' be understood to + import the mode (of knowledge) on the part of the knower, in that sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge of the + object known as it is in the knower; for the more perfectly the thing known is in the knower, the more perfect is the mode + of knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p11"> We must say therefore that God not only knows that all things are in Himself; but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows + them in their own nature and all the more perfectly, the more perfectly each one is in Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The created essence is compared to the essence of God as the imperfect to the perfect act. Therefore the created essence + cannot sufficiently lead us to the knowledge of the divine essence, but rather the converse. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same thing cannot be taken in an equal manner as the ratio of different things. But the divine essence excels all creatures. + Hence it can be taken as the proper ration of each thing according to the diverse ways in which diverse creatures participate + in, and imitate it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A6-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q14_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q14_A7-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is discursive. For the knowledge of God is not habitual knowledge, but actual knowledge. + Now the Philosopher says (Topic. ii): "The habit of knowledge may regard many things at once; but actual understanding regards + only one thing at a time." Therefore as God knows many things, Himself and others, as shown above (AA 2,5), it seems that + He does not understand all at once, but discourses from one to another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, discursive knowledge is to know the effect through its cause. But God knows things through Himself; as an effect + (is known) through its cause. Therefore His knowledge is discursive. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knows each creature more perfectly than we know it. But we know the effects in their created causes; and thus + we go discursively from causes to things caused. Therefore it seems that the same applies to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "God does not see all things in their particularity or separately, as if He saw alternately + here and there; but He sees all things together at once." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the divine knowledge there is no discursion; the proof of which is as follows. In our knowledge there is a twofold discursion: + one is according to succession only, as when we have actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand something + else; while the other mode of discursion is according to causality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge + of conclusions. The first kind of discursion cannot belong to God. For many things, + which we understand in succession if each is considered in itself, we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one + thing; if, for instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see different things in a mirror. Now God sees all things + in one (thing), which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and not successively. Likewise the second mode of + discursion cannot be applied to God. First, because this second mode of discursion presupposes the first mode; for whosoever + proceeds from principles to conclusions does not consider both at once; secondly, because to discourse thus is to proceed + from the known to the unknown. Hence it is manifest that when the first is known, the second is still unknown; and thus the + second is known not in the first, but from the first. Now the term discursive reasoning is attained when the second is seen + in the first, by resolving the effects into their causes; and then the discursion ceases. Hence as God sees His effects in + Himself as their cause, His knowledge is not discursive. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Altogether there is only one act of understanding in itself, nevertheless many things may be understood in one (medium), + as shown above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God does not know by their cause, known, as it were previously, effects unknown; but He knows the effects in the cause; and + hence His knowledge is not discursive, as was shown above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God sees the effects of created causes in the causes themselves, much better than we can; but still not in such a manner + that the knowledge of the effects is caused in Him by the knowledge of the created causes, as is the case with us; and hence + His knowledge is not discursive. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A7-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q14_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q14_A8-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is not the cause of things. For Origen says, on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.30" target="asv"> Rom. 8:30, </a> "Whom He called, them He also justified," etc.: "A thing will happen not because God knows it as future; but because it is + future, it is on that account known by God, before it exists." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, given the cause, the effect follows. But the knowledge of God is eternal. Therefore if the knowledge of God is the + cause of things created, it seems that creatures are eternal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "The thing known is prior to knowledge, and is its measure," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x). But what is posterior + and measured cannot be a cause. Therefore the knowledge of God is not the cause of things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "Not because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He knows + them, therefore they are." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer + is to things made by his art. Now the knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact + that the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the intellect must be the principle of action; as heat is the + principle of heating. Nevertheless, we must observe that a natural form, being a form that + remains in that to which it gives existence, denotes a principle of action according only as it has an inclination to an effect; + and likewise, the intelligible form does not denote a principle of action in so far as it resides in the one who understands + unless there is added to it the inclination to an effect, which inclination is through the will. For since the intelligible + form has a relation to opposite things (inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to opposites), it would not produce a + determinate effect unless it were determined to one thing by the appetite, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. ix). Now it is + manifest that God causes things by His intellect, since His being is His act of understanding; and hence His knowledge must + be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined to it. Hence the knowledge of God as the cause of things is usually + called the "knowledge of approbation." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Origen spoke in reference to that aspect of knowledge to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is joined + to it, as is said above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p8"> But when he says the reason why God foreknows some things is because they are future, this must be understood according to + the cause of consequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things are in the future, it follows that God + knows them; but not that the futurity of things is the cause why God knows them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The knowledge of God is the cause of things according as things are in His knowledge. Now that things should be eternal was + not in the knowledge of God; hence although the knowledge of God is eternal, it does not follow that creatures are eternal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God and our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things, of + which God is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its + measure, so, the knowledge of God is prior to natural things, and is the measure of them; as, for instance, a house is midway + between the knowledge of the builder who made it, and the knowledge of the one who + gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already built. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A8-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q14_A9" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A10.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q14_A9-p0.1">Whether God has knowledge of things that are not?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not knowledge of things that are not. For the knowledge of God is of true things. But "truth" and "being" + are convertible terms. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of things that are not. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, knowledge requires likeness between the knower and the thing known. But those things that are not cannot have any + likeness to God, Who is very being. Therefore what is not, cannot be known by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of God is the cause of what is known by Him. But it is not the cause of things that are not, because + a thing that is not, has no cause. Therefore God has no knowledge of things that are not. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says: "Who . . . calleth those things that are not as those that are" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.17" target="asv">Rom. 4:17</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God knows all things whatsoever that in any way are. Now it is possible that things that are not absolutely, should be in + a certain sense. For things absolutely are which are actual; whereas things which are not actual, are in the power either + of God Himself or of a creature, whether in active power, or passive; whether in power of thought or of imagination, or of + any other manner of meaning whatsoever. Whatever therefore can be made, or thought, or said by + the creature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to God, although they are not actual. And in so far it can + be said that He has knowledge even of things that are not. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p7"> Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those things that are not actual. For though some of them + may not be in act now, still they were, or they will be; and God is said to know all these with the knowledge of vision: for + since God's act of understanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and since eternity is without succession, comprehending + all time, the present glance of God extends over all time, and to all things which exist in any time, + as to objects present to Him. But there are other things in God's power, or the creature's, which nevertheless are not, nor + will be, nor were; and as regards these He is said to have knowledge, not of vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so + called because the things we see around us have distinct being outside the seer. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those things that are not actual are true in so far as they are in potentiality; for it is true that they are in potentiality; + and as such they are known by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since God is very being everything is, in so far as it participates in the likeness of God; as everything is hot in so far + as it participates in heat. So, things in potentiality are known by God, although they are not in act. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge of God, joined to His will is the cause of things. Hence it is not necessary that what ever God knows, is, + or was, or will be; but only is this necessary as regards what He wills to be, or permits to be. Further, it is in the knowledge + of God not that they be, but that they be possible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A9-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A10.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q14_A10" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A11.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q14_A10-p0.1">Whether God knows evil things?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know evil things. For the Philosopher (De Anima iii) says that the intellect which is not in potentiality + does not know privation. But "evil is the privation of good," as Augustine says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as the intellect + of God is never in potentiality, but is always in act, as is clear from the foregoing (A[2] ), it seems that God does not + know evil things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all knowledge is either the cause of the thing known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge of God is not the cause + of evil, nor is it caused by evil. Therefore God does not know evil things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything known is known either by its likeness, or by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He knows through His + essence, as is clear from the foregoing + <a id="FP_Q14_A10-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. Now the divine essence neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it; for to the divine essence there is no + contrary, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore God does not know evil things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what is known through another and not through itself, is imperfectly known. But evil is not known by God; for the + thing known must be in the knower. Therefore if evil is known through another, namely, through good, it would be known by + Him imperfectly; which cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not imperfect. Therefore God does not know evil things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A10-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.11" target="asv">Prov. 15:11</a>), "Hell and destruction are before God [Vulg: 'the Lord']." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must know all that can be accidental to it. Now there are some good things to which corruption + by evil may be accidental. Hence God would not know good things perfectly, unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is + knowable in the degree in which it is; hence since this is the essence of evil that it is the privation of good, by the fact + that God knows good things, He knows evil things also; as by light is known darkness. + Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "God through Himself receives the vision of darkness, not otherwise seeing darkness + except through light." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as meaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality, does not know + privation by privation existing in it; and this agrees with what he said previously, that a point and every indivisible thing + are known by privation of division. This is because simple and indivisible forms are in our intellect not actually, but only + potentially; for were they actually in our intellect, they would not be known by + privation. It is thus that simple things are known by separate substances. God therefore knows evil, not by privation existing + in Himself, but by the opposite good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil; but is the cause of the good whereby evil is known. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although evil is not opposed to the divine essence, which is not corruptible by evil; it is opposed to the effects of God, + which He knows by His essence; and knowing them, He knows the opposite evils. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> To know a thing by something else only, belongs to imperfect knowledge, if that thing is of itself knowable; but evil is + not of itself knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of evil means the privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined + nor known except by good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A10-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A11.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q14_A11" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A12.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q14_A11-p0.1">Whether God knows singular things?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know singular things. For the divine intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect. Now + the human intellect by reason of its immateriality does not know singular things; but as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii), + "reason has to do with universals, sense with singular things." Therefore God does not know singular things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in us those faculties alone know the singular, which receive the species not abstracted from material conditions. + But in God things are in the highest degree abstracted from all materiality. Therefore God does not know singular things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all knowledge comes about through the medium of some likeness. But the likeness of singular things in so far as + they are singular, does not seem to be in God; for the principle of singularity is matter, which, since it is in potentiality + only, is altogether unlike God, Who is pure act. Therefore God cannot know singular things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A11-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.2" target="asv">Prov. 16:2</a>), "All the ways of a man are open to His eyes." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God knows singular things. For all perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the + foregoing ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A11-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>). Now to know singular things is part of our perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher considers + it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and Metaph. + iii) that God would be most ignorant if + He did not know discord. Now the perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and unitedly in God; hence, + although by one faculty we know the universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material things, nevertheless + God knows both by His simple intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p7"> Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows singular things by universal causes. For nothing exists in + any singular thing, that does not arise from some universal cause. They give the example of an astrologer who knows all the + universal movements of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that are to come. This, however, is not enough; for + singular things from universal causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however they may be joined + together, are not individualized except by individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates because he is white, or because + he is the son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that kind, would not know him in so far as he is this particular + man. Hence according to the aforesaid mode, God would not know + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p8"> singular things in their singularity.</p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p9"> On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by the application of universal causes to particular effects. + But this will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that thing; hence the said + application cannot be the reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of singular things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p10"> Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of things by His knowledge, as stated above + <a id="FP_Q14_A11-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">(A[8])</a>, His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of God extends not only to forms, which + are the source of universality, but also to matter, as we shall prove further on ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A11-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html">Q[44], A[2]</a>), the knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are individualized by matter. For since + He knows things other than Himself by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their active principle, His essence + must be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. The + same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer, if it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the individualizing principles; hence the intelligible species in our + intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and on that account our intellect does not know the singular. + But the intelligible species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of + itself, being the principle of all the principles which enter into the composition + of things, whether principles of the species or principles of the individual; hence by it God knows not only universal, but + also singular things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although as regards the species in the divine intellect its being has no material conditions like the images received in + the imagination and sense, yet its power extends to both immaterial and material things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although matter as regards its potentiality recedes from likeness to God, yet, even in so far as it has being in this wise, + it retains a certain likeness to the divine being. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A11-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A12.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q14_A12" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A11.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q14_A12-p0.1">Whether God can know infinite things?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot know infinite things. For the infinite, as such, is unknown; since the infinite is that which, "to + those who measure it, leaves always something more to be measured," as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii). Moreover, Augustine + says (De Civ. Dei xii) that "whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is bounded by the comprehension of the knower." Now infinite + things have no boundary. Therefore they cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of + God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if we say that things infinite in themselves are finite in God's knowledge, against this it may be urged that the + essence of the infinite is that it is untraversable, and the finite that it is traversable, as said in Phys. iii. But the + infinite is not traversable either by the finite or by the infinite, as is proved in Phys. vi. Therefore the infinite cannot + be bounded by the finite, nor even by the infinite; and so the infinite cannot be finite in + God's knowledge, which is infinite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of God is the measure of what is known. But it is contrary to the essence of the infinite that it + be measured. Therefore infinite things cannot be known by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii), "Although we cannot number the infinite, nevertheless it can be comprehended by Him whose + knowledge has no bounds." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since God knows not only things actual but also things possible to Himself or to created things, as shown above + <a id="FP_Q14_A12-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html">(A[9])</a>, and as these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows infinite things. Although the knowledge of vision which has + relation only to things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite things, as some say, for we do not say that the + world is eternal, nor that generation and movement will go on for ever, so + that individuals be infinitely multiplied; yet, if we consider more attentively, we must hold that God knows infinite things + even by the knowledge of vision. For God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts, which will be multiplied to infinity + as rational creatures go on for ever. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p7"> The reason of this is to be found in the fact that the knowledge of every knower is measured by the mode of the form which + is the principle of knowledge. For the sensible image in sense is the likeness of only one individual thing, and can give + the knowledge of only one individual. But the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of the thing as regards + its specific nature, which is participable by infinite particulars; hence our intellect by the intelligible + species of man in a certain way knows infinite men; not however as distinguished from each other, but as communicating in + the nature of the species; and the reason is because the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of man not + as to the individual principles, but as to the principles of the species. On the other hand, the divine essence, whereby the + divine intellect understands, is a sufficing likeness of all things that are, or can be, not only as regards the universal + principles, but also as regards the principles proper to each one, as shown above. Hence it follows that the knowledge of + God extends to infinite things, even as distinct from each other. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The idea of the infinite pertains to quantity, as the Philosopher says (Phys. i). But the idea of quantity implies the order + of parts. Therefore to know the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to know part after part; and in this way + the infinite cannot be known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken, there will always remain something else outside. But + God does not know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after + part; since He knows all things simultaneously, and not successively, as said above + <a id="FP_Q14_A12-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Hence there is nothing to prevent Him from knowing infinite things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Transition imports a certain succession of parts; and hence it is that the infinite cannot be traversed by the finite, nor + by the infinite. But equality suffices for comprehension, because that is said to be comprehended which has nothing outside + the comprehender. Hence it is not against the idea of the infinite to be comprehended by the infinite. And so, what is infinite + in itself can be called finite to the knowledge of God as comprehended; but not + as if it were traversable. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge of God is the measure of things, not quantitatively, for the infinite is not subject to this kind of measure; + but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things. For everything has truth of nature according to the degree in which + it imitates the knowledge of God, as the thing made by art agrees with the art. Granted, however, an actually infinite number + of things, for instance, an infinitude of men, or an infinitude in continuous + quantity, as an infinitude of air, as some of the ancients held; yet it is manifest that these would have a determinate and + finite being, because their being would be limited to some determinate nature. Hence they would be measurable as regards the + knowledge of God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A12-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A11.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q14_A13" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A12.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A14.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q14_A13-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future contingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary effect. + But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said above + <a id="FP_Q14_A13-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">(A[8])</a>. Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not + of contingent things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every conditional proposition of which the antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary + consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only + a necessary conclusion can follow, as is proved in Poster. i. But this is a true conditional proposition, "If God knew that + this thing will be, it will be," for the knowledge of God is only of true things. Now the + antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it is eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore + the consequent is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God knows, is necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not + of contingent things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything known by God must necessarily be, because even what we ourselves know, must necessarily be; and, of course, + the knowledge of God is much more certain than ours. But no future contingent things must necessarily be. Therefore no contingent + future thing is known by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A13-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.32.15" target="asv">Ps. 32:15</a>), "He Who hath made the hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works," i.e. of men. Now the works of men + are contingent, being subject to free will. Therefore God knows future contingent things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since as was shown above + <a id="FP_Q14_A13-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html">(A[9])</a>, God knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and creature; and since some of these are future + contingent to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p7"> In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far + as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present; neither is it considered as contingent + (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this it can be infallibly the object + of certain knowledge, for instance to the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In + another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as + a contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation to opposite things: and in this + sense a contingent thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a contingent effect in its cause only, + has merely a conjectural knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also + as + each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows + contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because His + knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said + above ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A13-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q10_A2.html">Q[10], A[2]</a> ). Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only + because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all + things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch + as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their + own causes. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as + the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which + is the first cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are contingent on account of their proximate causes, while + the knowledge of God, which is the first cause, is necessary. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some say that this antecedent, "God knew this contingent to be future," is not necessary, but contingent; because, although + it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This however does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had + relation to the future, must have had it, although the future sometimes does not follow. On the other hand some say that this + antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and contingent; as + this saying is contingent, "Socrates is a white man." But this also is to no purpose; for when we say, "God knew this contingent + to be future," contingent is used here only as the matter of the word, and not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence + its contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or + false. For it may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I said Socrates runs, or God is: and the same applies + to necessary and contingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely necessary. Nor does it follow, as some + say, that the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of the consequent, which is contingent + by reason of the proximate cause. But this is to no purpose. For the conditional would be false were its antecedent the remote + necessary cause, and the consequent a contingent effect; as, for example, if I said, "if the sun moves, the grass + will grow." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p10"> Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent + must be taken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the existence of a thing in itself is different from the + existence of a thing in the soul. For example, when I say, "What the soul understands is immaterial," this is to be understood + that it is immaterial as it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself. Likewise if I say, "If God knew + anything, it will be," the consequent must be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, i.e. as it is in its presentiality. + And thus it is necessary, as also is the antecedent: "For everything that is, while it is, must be necessarily be," as the + Philosopher says in Peri Herm. i. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things reduced to act in time, as known by us successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is above time. + Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God + alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who goes along the road, does not see those who come after + him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling + by the way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, + cannot be known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the + divine knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes. Hence also this proposition, "Everything + known by God must necessarily be," is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or to the saying. If it + refers to the thing, it is divided and false; for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary." If understood of + the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense is, "This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p12"> Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good with regard to forms that are separable from the subject; + thus if I said, "It is possible for a white thing to be black," it is false as applied to the saying, and true as applied + to the thing: for a thing which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, " a white thing is black" can never be true. + But in forms that are inseparable from the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said, + "A black crow can be white"; for in both senses it is false. Now to be known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what + is known by God cannot be known. This objection, however, would hold if these words "that which is known" implied any disposition + inherent to the subject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be attributed to the thing known, in itself + (even if it always be known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under actual knowledge; thus + material existence is attributed to a stone in itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A13-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A12.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A14.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q14_A14" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A15.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q14_A14-p0.1">Whether God knows enunciable things?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know enunciable things. For to know enunciable things belongs to our intellect as it composes + and divides. But in the divine intellect, there is no composition. Therefore God does not know enunciable things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every kind of knowledge is made through some likeness. But in God there is no likeness of enunciable things, since + He is altogether simple. Therefore God does not know enunciable things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A14-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.93.11" target="asv">Ps. 93:11</a>). But enunciable things are contained in the thoughts of men. Therefore God knows enunciable things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since it is in the power of our intellect to form enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in that + of creatures, as said above + <a id="FP_Q14_A14-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html">(A[9])</a>, it follows of necessity that God knows all enunciations that can be formed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p6"> Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite things simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not + after the manner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were composition or division of enunciations; for He knows + each thing by simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if we by the very fact that we understand + what man is, were to understand all that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in our + intellect, which discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch as the intelligible species represents one thing in such + a way as not to represent another. Hence when we understand what man is, we do not forthwith understand other things which + belong to him, but we understand them one by one, according to a certain succession. On this account the things we understand + as separated, we must reduce to one by way of composition or division, by forming an enunciation. Now the species of the divine + intellect, which is God's essence, suffices to represent all things. Hence by understanding His essence, God knows the essences + of all things, and also whatever can be accidental to them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection would avail if God knew enunciable things after the manner of enunciable things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Enunciatory composition signifies some existence of a thing; and thus God by His existence, which is His essence, is the + similitude of all those things which are signified by enunciation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p9"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A14-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A15.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q14_A15" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A14.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A16.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q14_A15-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is variable?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is variable. For knowledge is related to what is knowable. But whatever imports relation + to the creature is applied to God from time, and varies according to the variation of creatures. Therefore the knowledge of + God is variable according to the variation of creatures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever God can make, He can know. But God can make more than He does. Therefore He can know more than He knows. + Thus His knowledge can vary according to increase and diminution. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knew that Christ would be born. But He does not know now that Christ will be born; because Christ is not to + be born in the future. Therefore God does not know everything He once knew; and thus the knowledge of God is variable. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said, that in God "there is no change nor shadow of alteration" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A15-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.17" target="asv">James 1:17</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is clear from the foregoing + <a id="FP_Q14_A15-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, just as His substance is altogether immutable, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q14_A15-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>), so His knowledge likewise must be altogether invariable. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import relations to creatures in so far as they are in themselves. But the knowledge of God + imports relation to creatures in so far as they are in God; because everything is actually understood according as it is in + the one who understands. Now created things are in God in an invariable manner; while they exist variably in themselves. We + may also say that "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import the relations consequent + upon the acts which are understood as terminating in the creatures themselves, as they are in themselves; and thus these relations + are attributed to God variously, according to the variation of creatures. But "knowledge" and "love," and the like, import + relations consequent upon the acts which are understood to be in God; and therefore these are predicated of God in an invariable + manner. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God knows also what He can make, and does not make. Hence from the fact that He can make more than He makes, it does not + follow that He can know more than He knows, unless this be referred to the knowledge of vision, according to which He is said + to know those things which are in act in some period of time. But from the fact that He knows some things might be which are + not, or that some things might not be which are, it does not follow that His + knowledge is variable, but rather that He knows the variability of things. If, however, anything existed which God did not + previously know, and afterwards knew, then His knowledge would be variable. But this could not be; for whatever is, or can + be in any period of time, is known by God in His eternity. Therefore from the fact that a thing exists in some period of time, + it follows that it is known by God from eternity. Therefore it cannot be granted that God can know more than He knows; because + such a proposition implies that first of all He did not know, and then afterwards knew. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The ancient Nominalists said that it was the same thing to say "Christ is born" and "will be born" and "was born"; because + the same thing is signified by these three---viz. the nativity of Christ. Therefore it follows, they said, that whatever God + knew, He knows; because now He knows that Christ is born, which means the same thing as that Christ will be born. This opinion, + however, is false; both because the diversity in the parts of a sentence causes + a diversity of enunciations; and because it would follow that a proposition which is true once would be always true; which + is contrary to what the Philosopher lays down (Categor. iii) when he says that this sentence, "Socrates sits," is true when + he is sitting, and false when he rises up. Therefore, it must be conceded that this proposition is not true, "Whatever God + knew He knows," if referred to enunciable propositions. But because of this, it does not follow that the knowledge of God + is + variable. For as it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows one and the same thing sometime to be, and + sometime not to be, so it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows an enunciable proposition is sometime + true, and sometime false. The knowledge of God, however, would be variable if He knew enunciable things by way of enunciation, + by composition and division, as occurs in our intellect. Hence our knowledge varies either as regards truth and falsity, for + example, if when either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if when a thing suffers change we retained the same opinion + about it; or as regards diverse opinions, as if we first thought that anyone was sitting, and afterwards thought that he was + not sitting; neither of which can be in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A15-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A14.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A16.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q14_A16" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A15.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q15.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q14_A16-p0.1">Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not a speculative knowledge of things. For the knowledge of God is the cause of things, as shown above + + <a id="FP_Q14_A16-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">(A[8])</a>. But speculative knowledge is not the cause of the things known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, speculative knowledge comes by abstraction from things; which does not belong to the divine knowledge. Therefore + the knowledge of God is not speculative. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is the more excellent must be attributed to God. But speculative knowledge is more excellent than practical knowledge, + as the Philosopher says in the beginning of Metaphysics. Therefore God has a speculative knowledge of things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some knowledge is speculative only; some is practical only; and some is partly speculative and partly practical. In proof + whereof it must be observed that knowledge can be called speculative in three ways: first, on the part of the things known, + which are not operable by the knower; such is the knowledge of man about natural or divine thing. Secondly, as regards the + manner of knowing---as, for instance, if a builder consider a house by defining and dividing, + and considering what belongs to it in general: for this is to consider operable things in a speculative manner, and not as + practically operable; for operable means the application of form to matter, and not the resolution of the composite into its + universal formal principles. Thirdly, as regards the end; "for the practical intellect differs in its end from the speculative," + as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii). For the practical intellect is ordered to the end of the operation; whereas the + end of the speculative intellect is the consideration of truth. Hence if a builder should consider how a house can be made, + not ordering this to the end of operation, but only to know (how to do it), this would be only a speculative considerations + as regards the end, although it concerns an operable thing. Therefore knowledge which is speculative by reason of the thing + itself known, is merely speculative. But that which is speculative either in its mode or as to its end is partly speculative + and partly practical: and when it is ordained to an operative end it is simply practical. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p6"> In accordance with this, therefore, it must be said that God has of Himself a speculative knowledge only; for He Himself + is not operable. But of all other things He has both speculative and practical knowledge. He has speculative knowledge as + regards the mode; for whatever we know speculatively in things by defining and dividing, God knows all this much more perfectly. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p7"> Now of things which He can make, but does not make at any time, He has not a practical knowledge, according as knowledge + is called practical from the end. But He has a practical knowledge of what He makes in some period of time. And, as regards + evil things, although they are not operable by Him, yet they fall under His practical knowledge, like good things, inasmuch + as He permits, or impedes, or directs them; as also sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of the + physician, inasmuch as he cures them by his art. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The knowledge of God is the cause, not indeed of Himself, but of other things. He is actually the cause of some, that is, + of things that come to be in some period of time; and He is virtually the cause of others, that is, of things which He can + make, and which nevertheless are never made. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that knowledge is derived from things known does not essentially belong to speculative knowledge, but only accidentally + in so far as it is human. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p10"><b>Reply to Objections:</b> + In answer to what is objected on the contrary, we must say that perfect knowledge of operable things is obtainable only if + they are known in so far as they are operable. Therefore, since the knowledge of God is in every way perfect, He must know + what is operable by Him, formally as such, and not only in so far as they are speculative. Nevertheless this does not impair + the nobility of His speculative knowledge, forasmuch as He sees all things other than Himself in Himself, and He + knows Himself speculatively; and so in the speculative knowledge of Himself, he possesses both speculative and practical knowledge + of all other things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q14_A16-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A15.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q15.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q13_A12.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q15" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A16.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q15-p0.1">OF IDEAS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q15-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q15-p2"> After considering the knowledge of God, it remains to consider ideas. And about this there are three points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q15-p3"> (1) Whether there are ideas?</p> + <p id="FP_Q15-p4"> (2) Whether they are many, or one only?</p> + <p id="FP_Q15-p5"> (3) Whether there are ideas of all things known by God?</p> + <div id="FP_Q15_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q15.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q15_A1-p0.1">Whether there are ideas?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), that God does not know things by ideas. But ideas are + for nothing else except that things may be known through them. Therefore there are no ideas. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been already said ( + <a id="FP_Q15_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html">Q[14], A[5]</a>). But He does not know Himself through an idea; neither therefore other things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an idea is considered to be the principle of knowledge and action. But the divine essence is a sufficient principle + of knowing and effecting all things. It is not therefore necessary to suppose ideas. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi),"Such is the power inherent in ideas, that no one can be wise unless they are + understood." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind. For the Greek word {Idea} is in Latin "forma." Hence by ideas are understood + the forms of things, existing apart from the things themselves. Now the form of anything existing apart from the thing itself + can be for one of two ends: either to be the type of that of which it is called the form, or to be the principle of the knowledge + of that thing, inasmuch as the forms of things knowable are said to be in + him who knows them. In either case we must suppose ideas, as is clear for the following reason: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p7"> In all things not generated by chance, the form must be the end of any generation whatsoever. But an agent does not act on + account of the form, except in so far as the likeness of the form is in the agent, as may happen in two ways. For in some + agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists according to its natural being, as in those that act by their nature; as + a man generates a man, or fire generates fire. Whereas in other agents (the form of the thing to be made + pre-exists) according to intelligible being, as in those that act by the intellect; and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists + in the mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends to build his house like + to the form conceived in his mind. As then the world was not made by chance, but by God acting by His intellect, as will appear + later ( + <a id="FP_Q15_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q46_A1.html">Q[46], A[1]</a>), there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which the + world was made. And in this the notion of an idea consists. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God does not understand things according to an idea existing outside Himself. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. ix) rejects the opinion + of Plato, who held that ideas existed of themselves, and not in the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although God knows Himself and all else by His own essence, yet His essence is the operative principle of all things, except + of Himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with respect to other things; though not with respect to Himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is the similitude of all things according to His essence; therefore an idea in God is identical with His essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q15.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q15_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q15_A2-p0.1">Whether ideas are many?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in God is His essence. But God's essence is one only. Therefore there is only + one idea. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and operating, so are art and wisdom. But in God there are not several arts + or wisdoms. Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be said that ideas are multiplied according to their relations to different creatures, it may be argued on + the contrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal. If, then, ideas are many, but creatures temporal, then the temporal must + be the cause of the eternal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, these relations are either real in creatures only, or in God also. If in creatures only, since creatures are not + from eternity, the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity, if ideas are multiplied only according to these relations. + But if they are real in God, it follows that there is a real plurality in God other than the plurality of Persons: and this + is against the teaching of Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 10), who says, in God all things are one, + except "ingenerability, generation, and procession." Ideas therefore are not many. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "Ideas are certain principal forms, or permanent and immutable types of things, + they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal, and existing always in the same manner, as being contained in the + divine intelligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come into being nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with + them everything is formed that can rise or decay, and all that actually does so." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It must necessarily be held that ideas are many. In proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the ultimate + end is the proper intention of the principal agent, as the order of an army (is the proper intention) of the general. Now + the highest good existing in things is the good of the order of the universe, as the Philosopher clearly teaches in Metaph. + xii. Therefore the order of the universe is properly intended by God, and is not the + accidental result of a succession of agents, as has been supposed by those who have taught that God created only the first + creature, and that this creature created the second creature, and so on, until this great multitude of beings was produced. + According to this opinion God would have the idea of the first created thing alone; whereas, if the order itself of the universe + was created by Him immediately, and intended by Him, He must have the idea of the order of the universe. Now there cannot + be an idea of any whole, unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which the whole is made; just as a builder cannot + conceive the idea of a house unless he has the idea of each of its parts. So, then, it must needs be that in the divine mind + there are the proper ideas of all things. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "that each thing was created + by God according to the idea proper to it," from which it follows that in the divine mind ideas are many. Now it can easily + be seen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of God, if we consider that the idea of a work is in the mind of the operator + as that which is understood, and not as the image whereby he understands, which is a form that makes the intellect in act. + For the form of the house in the mind of the builder, is something understood by him, to the likeness of which he forms the + house in matter. Now, it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it understand many things; though it + would be repugnant to its simplicity were His understanding to be formed by a plurality of images. Hence many ideas exist + in the divine mind, as things understood by it; as can be proved thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own essence perfectly, He + knows it according to every mode in which it can be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in itself, but as it can + be participated in by creatures according to some degree of likeness. But every creature has its own proper species, according + to + which it participates in some degree in likeness to the divine essence. So far, therefore, as God knows His essence as capable + of such imitation by any creature, He knows it as the particular type and idea of that creature; and in like manner as regards + other creatures. So it is clear that God understands many particular types of things and these are many ideas. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine essence is not called an idea in so far as it is that essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or type + of this or that thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch as many types are understood through the self-same essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By wisdom and art we signify that by which God understands; but an idea, that which God understands. For God by one understands + many things, and that not only according to what they are in themselves, but also according as they are understood, and this + is to understand the several types of things. In the same way, an architect is said to understand a house, when he understands + the form of the house in matter. But if he understands the form of a house, + as devised by himself, from the fact that he understands that he understands it, he thereby understands the type or idea of + the house. Now not only does God understand many things by His essence, but He also understands that He understands many things + by His essence. And this means that He understands the several types of things; or that many ideas are in His intellect as + understood by Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Such relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are caused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect comparing + its own essence with these things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in created things, but in God. Yet they are not real relations, such as those whereby + the Persons are distinguished, but relations understood by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q15_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q15_A3-p0.1">Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would + follow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God. Therefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be, nor have been, as has been said above + <a id="FP_Q15_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q15_A9.html">(A[9])</a>. But of such things there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): "Acts of the divine will are the determining + and effective types of things." Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knows primary matter, of which there can be no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is certain that God knows not only species, but also genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are not ideas + of these, according to Plato's teaching, who first taught ideas, as Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore + there are not ideas in God of all things known by Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But God has the proper + types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas of all things known by Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold + office, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the principle of the making of things, it may be called an + "exemplar," and belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of knowledge, it is properly called a "type," + and may belong to speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect to + everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a principle of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God, + even though they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows according to their proper type, in so far as they + are known by Him in a speculative manner. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil is known by God not through its own type, but through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God, neither + in so far as an idea is an "exemplar" nor as a "type." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God has no practical knowledge, except virtually, of things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with respect + to these there is no idea in God in so far as idea signifies an "exemplar" but only in so far as it denotes a "type." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a concause + with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God; + but not apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in itself can neither exist, nor be known. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species, in so far as idea denotes an "exemplar"; for genus cannot exist except + in some species. The same is the case with those accidents that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being + along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the subject, have their special idea. For an architect produces + through the form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it; + whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such as painting, or any other such thing, are produced through + some other form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea than that of species; both because particular + things are individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated and the concause with the idea; and because + the intention of nature regards the species, and produces individuals only that in them the species may be preserved. + However, divine providence extends not merely to species; but to individuals as will be shown later ( + <a id="FP_Q15_A3-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a> ). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q15_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q14_A16.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q16" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q16-p0.1">OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q16-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q16-p2"> Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration of the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth. + About this there are eight points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16-p3"> (1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect?</p> + <p id="FP_Q16-p4"> (2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?</p> + <p id="FP_Q16-p5"> (3) On the comparison of the true to being.</p> + <p id="FP_Q16-p6"> (4) On the comparison of the true to the good.</p> + <p id="FP_Q16-p7"> (5) Whether God is truth?</p> + <p id="FP_Q16-p8"> (6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many?</p> + <p id="FP_Q16-p9"> (7) On the eternity of truth.</p> + <p id="FP_Q16-p10"> (8) On the unchangeableness of truth.</p> + <div id="FP_Q16_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q16_A1-p0.1">Whether truth resides only in the intellect?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns + this definition of truth, "That is true which is seen"; since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth + would not be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, "That is true which is as it appears to the + knower, who is willing and able to know," for hence it would follow that nothing would be true, + unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: "That is true which is." It seems, then, that truth resides + in things, and not in the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If, then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except + in so far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true + is so. Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as seen by different persons at the same time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "that, on account of which a thing is so, is itself more so," as is evident from the Philosopher (Poster. i). But + it is from the fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is true or false, as the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam. + iii). Therefore truth resides rather in things than in the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), " The true and the false reside not in things, but in the intellect." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the good denotes that towards which the appetite tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now + there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according + as the thing known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends towards the thing desired. Thus the + term of the appetite, namely good, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect, + namely true, is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is related to the appetite---and + hence the aspect of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far as the appetite is called good + if its object is good; so, since the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object understood, the aspect + of the true must needs pass from the intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood is said to be + true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect. Now a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either + essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect on which it depends as regards its essence; but accidentally + to an intellect by which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is related essentially to the intellect of the architect, + but accidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p7"> Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said + to be true absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it depends; and thus it is that artificial things + are said to be true a being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the form + in the architect's mind; and words are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the + intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so far as they express the likeness of the species that are + in the divine mind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to a stone, according to the preconception + in the divine intellect. Thus, then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things according as they + are related to the intellect as their principle. Consequently there are various definitions of truth. Augustine says (De Vera + Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is;" and Hilary says (De Trin. v) that "Truth makes being + clear and evident" and this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as + they are related to the intellect, we have Augustine's definition (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is a supreme likeness without + any unlikeness to a principle": also Anselm's definition (De Verit. xii), "Truth is rightness, perceptible by the mind alone"; + for that is right which is in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna's definition (Metaph. viii, 6), "The truth of each + thing is a property of the essence which is immutably attached to it." The definition that "Truth is the equation of thought + and thing" is applicable to it under either aspect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking about the truth of things, and excludes from the notion of this truth, relation to our intellect; for + what is accidental is excluded from every definition. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The ancient philosophers held that the species of natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by + chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they were compelled to base the truth of things on their + relation to our intellect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph. + iv). Such, however, do not follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their + relation to the divine intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing, yet it is not necessary that truth should be there primarily, + any more than that health should be primarily in medicine, rather than in the animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not + its health, is the cause of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the same way, the being of the thing, not its truth, + is the cause of truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a thought + or a word is true "from the fact that a thing is, not because a thing is true." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q16_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q16_A2-p0.1">Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q16_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) + that as the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible objects, so is the intellect as regards "what a thing + is." Now composition and division are neither in the senses nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is." Therefore truth + does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isaac says in his book On Definitions that truth is the equation of thought and thing. Now just as the intellect + with regard to complex things can be equated to things, so also with regard to simple things; and this is true also of sense + apprehending a thing as it is. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A2-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi) that with regard to simple things and "what a thing is," truth is "found neither in the + intellect nor in things." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A2-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect, in the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has + the form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing, must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the + thing known, this being its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the conformity of intellect and thing; and + hence to know this conformity is to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For + although sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the comparison which exists between the thing seen + and that which itself apprehends concerning it. But the intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing; + yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of a thing "what a thing is." When, however, it judges that a thing corresponds to + the form which it apprehends about that thing, then first it knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and dividing: + for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes from the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by + the predicate: and this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing, as is also the intellect, when it knows "what a + thing is"; but it does not thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like manner the case with complex or non-complex words. + Truth therefore may be in the senses, or in the intellect knowing "what a thing is," as in anything that is true; yet not + as the + thing known in the knower, which is implied by the word "truth"; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as known. Therefore, + properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect composing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect knowing + "what a thing is." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A2-p6"> And thus the Objections given are solved.</p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A2-p7"></p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A2-p8"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q16_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q16_A3-p0.1">Whether the true and being are convertible terms?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated + <a id="FP_Q16_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not convertible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being; + for it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not. Therefore the true and being are not convertible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true + appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are + not convertible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the same disposition of things in being and in truth. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, + so far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in De Anima iii that "the soul is in some manner all things," through the senses + and the intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the true. But as good adds to being the notion + of desirable, so the true adds relation to the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said before + <a id="FP_Q16_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible + with being, as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already + <a id="FP_Q16_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. It may, however, be said that being also is in the things and in the + intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in idea. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be known; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable. + Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. + In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and + this is true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended + also; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be + apprehended also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object + with being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility + is not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by understanding being. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q16_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q16_A4-p0.1">Whether good is logically prior to the true?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For what is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from Phys. + i. But the good is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the + good is logically prior to the true. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect composing and dividing as said above + <a id="FP_Q16_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But that which is in things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is logically prior to the true. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from Ethic. iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine + says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind. Therefore the good is prior to the true. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> What is in more things is prior logically. But the true is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in mathematics. + Therefore the true is prior to good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Although the good and the true are convertible with being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner + the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two reasons. First, because the true is more closely related + to being than is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately; while the nature of good follows being in + so far as being is in some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident + from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the true regards knowledge, but the good regards the + appetite, the true must be prior in idea to the good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will and the intellect mutually include one another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the intellect + to understand. So then, among things directed to the object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the intellect; + and conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas + in the order of intelligible things the converse of the case. From the + fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good is prior in the order of things desirable; but not that + it is prior absolutely. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing is prior logically in so far as it is prior to the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself; + secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly, it apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being + is first, that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself + in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to "life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills + in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has been said that truth exists in other things + <a id="FP_Q16_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Whereas the truth of "justice" is found in man as he + fulfills his duty to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in general. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q16_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q16_A5-p0.1">Whether God is truth?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the intellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition + and division. Therefore in Him there is not truth. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxvi) is a "likeness to the principle." But in God there is no likeness + to a principle. Therefore in God there is not truth. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the first cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause + of all being; and His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is truth in God, all truth will be from Him. But + it is true that someone sins. Therefore this will be from God; which is evidently false. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord says, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.6" target="asv">Jn. 14:6</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As said above + <a id="FP_Q16_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things according as they have being + conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His intellect, + but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of + every other intellect, and He Himself is His + own existence and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but that He is truth itself, and + the sovereign and first truth. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although in the divine intellect there is neither composition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He judges + of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is truth in His intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The truth of our intellect is according to its conformity with its principle, that is to say, to the things from which it + receives knowledge. The truth also of things is according to their conformity with their principle, namely, the divine intellect. + Now this cannot be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless perhaps in so far as truth is appropriated to the Son, + Who has a principle. But if we speak of divine truth in its essence, we cannot + understand this unless the affirmative must be resolved into the negative, as when one says: "the Father is of Himself, because + He is not from another." Similarly, the divine truth can be called a "likeness to the principle," inasmuch as His existence + is not dissimilar to His intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not-being and privation have no truth of themselves, but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all apprehension + of the intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that exists in the statement---"that a person commits fornication is true"---is + entirely from God. But to argue, "Therefore that this person fornicates is from God", is a fallacy of Accident. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q16_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q16_A6-p0.1">Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q16_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is only one truth, according to which all things are true. For according to Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1), + "nothing is greater than the mind of man, except God." Now truth is greater than the mind of man; otherwise the mind would + be the judge of truth: whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth, and not according to its own measure. Therefore + God alone is truth. Therefore there is no other truth but God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Anselm says (De Verit. xiv), that, "as is the relation of time to temporal things, so is that of truth to true things." + But there is only one time for all temporal things. Therefore there is only one truth, by which all things are true. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A6-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.11.2" target="asv">Ps. 11:2</a>), "Truths are decayed from among the children of men." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A6-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is one, and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must consider + that when anything is predicated of many things univocally, it is found in each of them according to its proper nature; as + animal is found in each species of animal. But when anything is predicated of many things analogically, it is found in only + one of them according to its proper nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So + healthiness is predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is only in the animal; but from the health + of the animal, medicine is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and urine is called healthy, in so far + as it indicates health. And although health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something whereby + the one causes, and the other indicates health. Now we have said + <a id="FP_Q16_A6-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that truth resides primarily in the + intellect; and secondarily in things, according as they are related to the divine intellect. If therefore we speak of truth, + as it exists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many truths in many created intellects; and + even in one and the same intellect, according to the number of things known. Whence a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A6-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.11.2" target="asv"> Ps. 11:2, </a> "Truths are decayed from among the children of men," says: "As from one man's face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror, + so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth." But if we speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are + true by one primary truth; to which each one is assimilated according to its own entity. And thus, although the essences or + forms of things are many, yet the truth of the divine intellect is one, in conformity to which all things are said to be true. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A6-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The soul does not judge of things according to any kind of truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it is reflected + in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first principles of the understanding. It follows, therefore, that the primary + truth is greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth, which resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not + simply, but in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even as + science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it is true that nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul, + except God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The saying of Anselm is correct in so far as things are said to be true by their relation to the divine intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A6-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A6-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q16_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q16_A7-p0.1">Whether created truth is eternal?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) "Nothing is more eternal than the nature + of a circle, and that two added to three make five." But the truth of these is a created truth. Therefore created truth is + eternal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals are always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore + is truth, which is the most universal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it was always true that what is true in the present was to be in the future. But as the truth of a proposition regarding + the present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition regarding the future. Therefore some created truth is eternal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal. But the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end; for + if their truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true that truth was not, and true, of course, by reason of + truth; so that truth was before it began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that truth has an end, it follows that it is + after it has ceased to be, for it will still be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is + eternal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> God alone is eternal, as laid down before ( + <a id="FP_Q16_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q10_A3.html">Q[10], A[3]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in + speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself: but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable + truth, according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on account of any truth residing in the enunciation, as + though in a subject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health within it but + from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it has been already said that things are called true from + the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal. Now because only the divine intellect + is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else but God is eternal; since the + truth of the divine intellect is God Himself, as shown already + <a id="FP_Q16_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and three make five, have eternity in the mind of God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That something is always and everywhere, can be understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of extension + to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself + determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of + all distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be everywhere + and always, in so far as universals are independent of place and time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are + eternal, except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which now is, was future, before it (actually) was; because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the cause + were removed, that thing's coming to be was not future. But the first cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that + it was always true that what now is would be, except in so far as its future being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone + is such a cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal, but + it had a beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was not true to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason + of the divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now to say that that truth did not then exist: and + this is true only by reason of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not by + reason of any truth in the things. For this is truth concerning not-being; and not-being has not truth of itself, but only + so far as our intellect apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did not exist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being + as preceding its being. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A7-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q16_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q17.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q16_A8-p0.1">Whether truth is immutable?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that "Truth and mind do not rank as equals, + otherwise truth would be mutable, as the mind is." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as primary matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains + after all generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change; for after every change it is true to say that a thing + is, or is not. Therefore truth is immutable. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the truth of an enunciation changes, it changes mostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus change. + For truth, according to Anselm (De Verit. viii), "is a certain rightness" in so far as a thing answers to that which is in + the divine mind concerning it. But this proposition that "Socrates sits", receives from the divine mind the signification + that Socrates does sit; and it has the same signification even though he does not sit. + Therefore the truth of the proposition in no way changes. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, where there is the same cause, there is the same effect. But the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three + propositions, "Socrates sits, will sit, sat." Therefore the truth of each is the same. But one or other of these must be the + true one. Therefore the truth of these propositions remains immutable; and for the same reason that of any other. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.11.2" target="asv">Ps. 11:2</a>),"Truths are decayed from among the children of men." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect, as said before + <a id="FP_Q16_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; but things are called true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be regarded + from the point of view of the intellect, the truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity + may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness, through change in one of the two extremes. Hence in + one way truth varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing which in itself + has not changed, and in another way, when the thing is changed, but not the opinion; and in either way there can be a change + from true to false. If, then, there is an intellect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and the knowledge of + which nothing can escape, in this is immutable truth. Now such is the divine intellect, as is clear from what has been said + before ( + <a id="FP_Q16_A8-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A15.html">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Hence the truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But the truth of our intellect is mutable; not because it is itself + the subject of change, but in so far as our intellect changes from truth to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable. + Whereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether + immutable. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of divine truth. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The true and being are convertible terms. Hence just as being is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but accidentally, + in so far as this being or that is corrupted or generated, as is said in Phys. i, so does truth change, not so as that no + truth remains, but because that truth does not remain which was before. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which + is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but it said to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates + the truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing. When this disappears, the truth + of an opinion changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore + this proposition, "Socrates sits," is true, as long as he is sitting, both with the truth of the thing, in so far as the expression + is significative, and with the truth of signification, in so far as it signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the + first truth remains, but the second is changed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of the truth of the proposition, "Socrates sits," has not the same meaning when + Socrates sits, after he sits, and before he sits. Hence the truth which results, varies, and is variously signified by these + propositions concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not follow, though one of the three propositions is true, that + the same truth remains invariable. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q16_A8-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q17.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q15_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q17" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q17-p0.1">CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q17-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q17-p2"> We next consider falsity. About this four points of inquiry arise:</p> + <p id="FP_Q17-p3"> (1) Whether falsity exists in things?</p> + <p id="FP_Q17-p4"> (2) Whether it exists in the sense?</p> + <p id="FP_Q17-p5"> (3) Whether it exists in the intellect?</p> + <p id="FP_Q17-p6"> (4) Concerning the opposition of the true and the false.</p> + <div id="FP_Q17_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q17.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q17_A1-p0.1">Whether falsity exists in things?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), "If the true is that which is, it + will be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may appear to the contrary." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, false is derived from "fallere" [to deceive]. But things do not deceive; for, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. + 33), they show nothing but their own species. Therefore the false is not found in things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the true is said to exist in things by conformity to the divine intellect, as stated above + <a id="FP_Q17_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16.html">(Q[16])</a>. But everything, in so far as it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true without admixture of falsity; and thus + nothing is false. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 34): "Every body is a true body and a false unity: for it imitates unity without being unity." + But everything imitates the divine unity yet falls short of it. Therefore in all things falsity exists. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since true and false are opposed, and since opposites stand in relation to the same thing, we must needs seek falsity, where + primarily we find truth; that is to say, in the intellect. Now, in things, neither truth nor falsity exists, except in relation + to the intellect. And since every thing is denominated simply by what belongs to it "per se," but is denominated relatively + by what belongs to it accidentally; a thing indeed may be called false simply when + compared with the intellect on which it depends, and to which it is compared "per se" but may be called false relatively as + directed to another intellect, to which it is compared accidentally. Now natural things depend on the divine intellect, as + artificial things on the human. Wherefore artificial things are said to be false simply and in themselves, in so far as they + fall short of the form of the art; whence a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if it falls short of the proper + operation of his art. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p7"> In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be found, in so far as they are compared with the divine intellect; since + whatever takes place in things proceeds from the ordinance of that intellect, unless perhaps in the case of voluntary agents + only, who have it in their power to withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; wherein consists the evil of sin. Thus sins + themselves are called untruths and lies in the Scriptures, according to the words of the text, "Why do you love + vanity, and seek after lying?" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q17_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.3" target="asv">Ps. 4:3</a>): as on the other hand virtuous deeds are called the "truth of life" as being obedient to the order of the divine intellect. + Thus it is said, "He that doth truth, cometh to the light" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q17_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#John.3.21" target="asv">Jn. 3:21</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p8"> But in relation to our intellect, natural things which are compared thereto accidentally, can be called false; not simply, + but relatively; and that in two ways. In one way according to the thing signified, and thus a thing is said to be false as + being signified or represented by word or thought that is false. In this respect anything can be said to be false as regards + any quality not possessed by it; as if we should say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing, as the + Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34). So, too, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 10): "The true tragedian is a false Hector": even + as, on the contrary, anything can be called true, in regard to that which is becoming to it. In another way a thing can be + called false, by way of cause---and thus a thing is said to be false that naturally begets a false opinion. And whereas it + is innate in us to judge things by external appearances, since our knowledge takes its rise from sense, which principally + and + naturally deals with external accidents, therefore those external accidents, which resemble things other than themselves, + are said to be false with respect to those things; thus gall is falsely honey; and tin, false gold. Regarding this, Augustine + says (Soliloq. ii, 6): "We call those things false that appear to our apprehension like the true:" and the Philosopher says + (Metaph. v, 34): "Things are called false that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not, or what they are not." In + this + way a man is called false as delighting in false opinions or words, and not because he can invent them; for in this way many + wise and learned persons might be called false, as stated in Metaph. v, 34. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing compared with the intellect is said to be true in respect to what it is; and false in respect to what it is not. + Hence, "The true tragedian is a false Hector," as stated in Soliloq. ii, 6. As, therefore, in things that are is found a certain + non-being, so in things that are is found a degree of falseness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things do not deceive by their own nature, but by accident. For they give occasion to falsity, by the likeness they bear + to things which they actually are not. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things are said to be false, not as compared with the divine intellect, in which case they would be false simply, but as + compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only relatively. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p12"> To the argument which is urged on the contrary, likeness or defective representation does not involve the idea of falsity + except in so far as it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always said to be false, because it resembles + another thing; but only when the resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not in any one case, but in + the majority of instances. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A1-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q17.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q17_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q17_A2-p0.1">Whether there is falsity in the senses?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that falsity is not in the senses. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33): "If all the bodily senses report as they + are affected, I do not know what more we can require from them." Thus it seems that we are not deceived by the senses; and + therefore that falsity is not in them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 24) that falsity is not proper to the senses, but to the imagination. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in non-complex things there is neither true nor false, but in complex things only. But affirmation and negation + do not belong to the senses. Therefore in the senses there is no falsity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6), "It appears that the senses entrap us into error by their deceptive similitudes." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as truth is in them. Now truth is not in them in such a way as that the + senses know truth, but in so far as they apprehend sensible things truly, as said above ( + <a id="FP_Q17_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html">Q[16], A[2]</a>), and this takes place through the senses apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that falsity exists in the + senses through their apprehending or judging things to be otherwise than they really + are. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p7"> The knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the existence of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness + of a thing can exist in the senses in three ways. In the first way, primarily and of its own nature, as in sight there is + the likeness of colors, and of other sensible objects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature, though not primarily; as + in sight there is the likeness of shape, size, and of other sensible objects common to more than one sense. Thirdly, + neither primarily nor of its own nature, but accidentally, as in sight, there is the likeness of a man, not as man, but in + so far as it is accidental to the colored object to be a man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p8"> Sense, then, has no false knowledge about its proper objects, except accidentally and rarely, and then, because of the unsound + organ it does not receive the sensible form rightly; just as other passive subjects because of their indisposition receive + defectively the impressions of the agent. Hence, for instance, it happens that on account of an unhealthy tongue sweet seems + bitter to a sick person. But as to common objects of sense, and accidental objects, even a rightly disposed + sense may have a false judgment, because it is referred to them not directly, but accidentally, or as a consequence of being + directed to other things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The affection of sense is its sensation itself. Hence, from the fact that sense reports as it is affected, it follows that + we are not deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we experience sensation. Since, however, sense is sometimes affected + erroneously of that object, it follows that it sometimes reports erroneously of that object; and thus we are deceived by sense + about the object, but not about the fact of sensation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Falsity is said not to be proper to sense, since sense is not deceived as to its proper object. Hence in another translation + it is said more plainly, "Sense, about its proper object, is never false." Falsity is attributed to the imagination, as it + represents the likeness of something even in its absence. Hence, when anyone perceives the likeness of a thing as if it were + the thing itself, falsity results from such an apprehension; and for this reason + the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34) that shadows, pictures, and dreams are said to be false inasmuch as they convey the likeness + of things that are not present in substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument proves that the false is not in the sense, as in that which knows the true and the false. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q17_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q17_A3-p0.1">Whether falsity is in the intellect?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that falsity is not in the intellect. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 32), "Everyone who is deceived, understands + not that in which he is deceived." But falsity is said to exist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived therein. Therefore + falsity does not exist in the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 51) that the intellect is always right. Therefore there is no falsity in the + intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in De Anima iii, 21,[22] that "where there is composition of objects understood, there is truth and falsehood." + But such composition is in the intellect. Therefore truth and falsehood exist in the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Just as a thing has being by its proper form, so the knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known. Hence, + as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs to them by their form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent + qualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail to be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in + knowledge of the thing with the likeness of which it is informed; but may fail + with regard to something consequent upon that form, or accidental thereto. For it has been said + <a id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q17_A2.html">(A[2])</a> that sight is not deceived in its proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent to that object; or about + accidental objects of sense. Now as the sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so is the intellect + by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither the + sense about its proper object. But in affirming and denying, the intellect may be deceived, by attributing to the thing of + which it understands the essence, something which is not consequent upon it, or is opposed to it. For the intellect is in + the same position as regards judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common, or accidental, sensible objects. + There is, however, this difference, as before mentioned regarding truth ( + <a id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html">Q[16], A[2]</a>), that falsity can + exist in the intellect not only because the intellect is conscious of that knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas + in sense falsity does not exist as known, as stated above + <a id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q17_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p6"> But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs + also accidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of a thing, in so far as composition of + the intellect is mixed up in it. This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying to one thing the definition + proper to another; as that of a circle to a man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is false of another. + In another way, by composing a definition of parts which are mutually exclusive. For thus the definition is not only false + of the thing, but false in itself. A definition such as " a reasonable four-footed animal" would be of this kind, and the + intellect false in making it; for such a statement as "some reasonable animals are four-footed" is false in itself. For this + reason the intellect cannot be false in its knowledge of simple essences; but it is either true, or it understands nothing + at + all. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because the essence of a thing is the proper object of the intellect, we are properly said to understand a thing when we + reduce it to its essence, and judge of it thereby; as takes place in demonstrations, in which there is no falsity. In this + sense Augustine's words must be understood, "that he who is deceived, understands not that wherein he is deceived;" and not + in the sense that no one is ever deceived in any operation of the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellect is always right as regards first principles; since it is not deceived about them for the same reason that it + is not deceived about what a thing is. For self-known principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are understood, + from the fact that the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p9"></p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A3-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q17_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q18.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q17_A4-p0.1">Whether true and false are contraries?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that true and false are not contraries. For true and false are opposed, as that which is to that which is not; for + "truth," as Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 5), "is that which is." But that which is and that which is not are not opposed as + contraries. Therefore true and false are not contrary things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one of two contraries is not in the other. But falsity is in truth, because, as Augustine says, (Soliloq. ii, 10), + "A tragedian would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true tragedian." Therefore true and false are not contraries. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in God there is no contrariety, for "nothing is contrary to the Divine Substance," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei + xii, 2). But falsity is opposed to God, for an idol is called in Scripture a lie, "They have laid hold on lying" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q17_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.8.5" target="asv">Jer. 8:5</a>), that is to say, "an idol," as a gloss says. Therefore false and true are not contraries. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Peri Herm. ii), that a false opinion is contrary to a true one. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as some have said, as affirmation and negation. In proof of which it must + be considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines any subject, and can therefore be said of being as of + not-being, for instance not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation asserts nothing, whereas it determines its subject, for it + is "negation in a subject," as stated in Metaph. iv, 4: v. 27; for blindness is not said + except of one whose nature it is to see. Contraries, however, both assert something and determine the subject, for blackness + is a species of color. Falsity asserts something, for a thing is false, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 27), inasmuch + as something is said or seems to be something that it is not, or not to be what it really is. For as truth implies an adequate + apprehension of a thing, so falsity implies the contrary. Hence it is clear that true and false are contraries. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> What is in things is the truth of the thing; but what is apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth primarily + resides. Hence the false is that which is not as apprehended. To apprehend being, and not-being, implies contrariety; for, + as the Philosopher proves (Peri Herm. ii), the contrary of this statement "God is good," is, "God is not good." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Falsity is not founded in the truth which is contrary to it, just as evil is not founded in the good which is contrary to + it, but in that which is its proper subject. This happens in either, because true and good are universals, and convertible + with being. Hence, as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a being, so every evil is founded in some good, and + every falsity in some truth. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Because contraries, and opposites by way of privation, are by nature about one and the same thing, therefore there is nothing + contrary to God, considered in Himself, either with respect to His goodness or His truth, for in His intellect there can be + nothing false. But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for the false opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true. + So idols are called lies, opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch as the false + opinion concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the divine unity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q17_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q18.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q16_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q18" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q18-p0.1">THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q18-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q18-p2"> Since to understand belongs to living beings, after considering the divine knowledge and intellect, we must consider the + divine life. About this, four points of inquiry arise: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18-p3"> (1) To whom does it belong to live?</p> + <p id="FP_Q18-p4"> (2) What is life?</p> + <p id="FP_Q18-p5"> (3) Whether life is properly attributed to God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q18-p6"> (4) Whether all things in God are life?</p> + <div id="FP_Q18_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q18.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q18_A1-p0.1">Whether to live belongs to all natural things?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to live belongs to all natural things. For the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 1) that "Movement is like a kind + of life possessed by all things existing in nature." But all natural things participate in movement. Therefore all natural + things partake of life. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, plants are said to live, inasmuch as they in themselves a principle of movement of growth and decay. But local movement + is naturally more perfect than, and prior to, movement of growth and decay, as the Philosopher shows (Phys. viii, 56,57). + Since then, all natural bodies have in themselves some principle of local movement, it seems that all natural bodies live. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, amongst natural bodies the elements are the less perfect. Yet life is attributed to them, for we speak of "living + waters." Much more, therefore, have other natural bodies life. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vi, 1) that "The last echo of life is heard in the plants," whereby it is inferred that their life + is life in its lowest degree. But inanimate bodies are inferior to plants. Therefore they have not life. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We can gather to what things life belongs, and to what it does not, from such things as manifestly possess life. Now life + manifestly belongs to animals, for it said in De Vegetab. i [*De Plantis i, 1] that in animals life is manifest. We must, + therefore, distinguish living from lifeless things, by comparing them to that by reason of which animals are said to live: + and this it is in which life is manifested first and remains last. We say then that an animal + begins to live when it begins to move of itself: and as long as such movement appears in it, so long as it is considered to + be alive. When it no longer has any movement of itself, but is only moved by another power, then its life is said to fail, + and the animal to be dead. Whereby it is clear that those things are properly called living that move themselves by some kind + of movement, whether it be movement properly so called, as the act of an imperfect being, i.e. of a thing in potentiality, + is + called movement; or movement in a more general sense, as when said of the act of a perfect thing, as understanding and feeling + are called movement. Accordingly all things are said to be alive that determine themselves to movement or operation of any + kind: whereas those things that cannot by their nature do so, cannot be called living, unless by a similitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Philosopher may be understood either of the first movement, namely, that of the celestial bodies, or of + the movement in its general sense. In either way is movement called the life, as it were, of natural bodies, speaking by a + similitude, and not attributing it to them as their property. The movement of the heavens is in the universe of corporeal + natures as the movement of the heart, whereby life is preserved, is in animals. + Similarly also every natural movement in respect to natural things has a certain similitude to the operations of life. Hence, + if the whole corporeal universe were one animal, so that its movement came from an "intrinsic moving force," as some in fact + have held, in that case movement would really be the life of all natural bodies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To bodies, whether heavy or light, movement does not belong, except in so far as they are displaced from their natural conditions, + and are out of their proper place; for when they are in the place that is proper and natural to them, then they are at rest. + Plants and other living things move with vital movement, in accordance with the disposition of their nature, but not by approaching + thereto, or by receding from it, for in so far as they recede from + such movement, so far do they recede from their natural disposition. Heavy and light bodies are moved by an extrinsic force, + either generating them and giving them form, or removing obstacles from their way. They do not therefore move themselves, + as do living bodies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Waters are called living that have a continuous current: for standing waters, that are not connected with a continually flowing + source, are called dead, as in cisterns and ponds. This is merely a similitude, inasmuch as the movement they are seen to + possess makes them look as if they were alive. Yet this is not life in them in its real sense, since this movement of theirs + is not from themselves but from the cause that generates them. The same is the + case with the movement of other heavy and light bodies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q18.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q18_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q18_A2-p0.1">Whether life is an operation?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is an operation. For nothing is divided except into parts of the same genus. But life is divided by certain + operations, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 13), who distinguishes four kinds of life, namely, nourishment, + sensation, local movement and understanding. Therefore life is an operation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the active life is said to be different from the contemplative. But the contemplative is only distinguished from + the active by certain operations. Therefore life is an operation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to know God is an operation. But this is life, as is clear from the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q18_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.18.3" target="asv"> Jn. 18:3, </a> "Now this is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God." Therefore life is an operation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 37), "In living things, to live is to be." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said ( + <a id="FP_Q18_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q17_A3.html">Q[17], A[3]</a>), our intellect, which takes cognizance of the essence of a thing as its proper object, gains knowledge from sense, of which + the proper objects are external accidents. Hence from external appearances we come to the knowledge of the essence of things. + And because we name a thing in accordance with our knowledge of it, as is clear from what has already been said ( + <a id="FP_Q18_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">Q[13], A[1]</a>), so from external properties names are often imposed to signify essences. Hence such names are sometimes taken strictly + to denote the essence itself, the signification of which is their principal object; but sometimes, and less strictly, to denote + the properties by reason of which they are imposed. And so we see that the word "body" is used to denote a genus of substances + from the fact of their possessing three dimensions: and is sometimes taken to denote the + dimensions themselves; in which sense body is said to be a species of quantity. The same must be said of life. The name is + given from a certain external appearance, namely, self-movement, yet not precisely to signify this, but rather a substance + to which self-movement and the application of itself to any kind of operation, belong naturally. To live, accordingly, is + nothing else than to exist in this or that nature; and life signifies this, though in the abstract, just as the word "running" + denotes "to run" in the abstract. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p7"> Hence "living" is not an accidental but an essential predicate. Sometimes, however, life is used less properly for the operations + from which its name is taken, and thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is principally to sense or to understand. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher here takes "to live" to mean an operation of life. Or it would be better to say that sensation and intelligence + and the like, are sometimes taken for the operations, sometimes for the existence itself of the operator. For he says (Ethic. + ix, 9) that to live is to sense or to understand---in other words, to have a nature capable of sensation or understanding. + Thus, then, he distinguishes life by the four operations mentioned. For in + this lower world there are four kinds of living things. It is the nature of some to be capable of nothing more than taking + nourishment, and, as a consequence, of growing and generating. Others are able, in addition, to sense, as we see in the case + of shellfish and other animals without movement. Others have the further power of moving from place to place, as perfect animals, + such as quadrupeds, and birds, and so on. Others, as man, have the still higher faculty of understanding. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By vital operations are meant those whose principles are within the operator, and in virtue of which the operator produces + such operations of itself. It happens that there exist in men not merely such natural principles of certain operations as + are their natural powers, but something over and above these, such as habits inclining them like a second nature to particular + kinds of operations, so that the operations become sources of pleasure. Thus, as by + a similitude, any kind of work in which a man takes delight, so that his bent is towards it, his time spent in it, and his + whole life ordered with a view to it, is said to be the life of that man. Hence some are said to lead to life of self-indulgence, + others a life of virtue. In this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the active, and thus to know God is said + to be life eternal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p10"> Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.</p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q18_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q18_A3-p0.1">Whether life is properly attributed to God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is not properly attributed to God. For things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as previously + stated + <a id="FP_Q18_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q18_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But movement does not belong to God. Neither therefore does life. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in all living things we must needs suppose some principle of life. Hence it is said by the Philosopher (De Anima + ii, 4) that "the soul is the cause and principle of the living body." But God has no principle. Therefore life cannot be attributed + to Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the principle of life in the living things that exist among us is the vegetative soul. But this exists only in corporeal + things. Therefore life cannot be attributed to incorporeal things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q18_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.3" target="asv">Ps. 83:3</a>): "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Life is in the highest degree properly in God. In proof of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to live + in so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another, the more perfectly this power is found in anything, the more + perfect is the life of that thing. In things that move and are moved, a threefold order is found. In the first place, the + end moves the agent: and the principal agent is that which acts through its form, and + sometimes it does so through some instrument that acts by virtue not of its own form, but of the principal agent, and does + no more than execute the action. Accordingly there are things that move themselves, not in respect of any form or end naturally + inherent in them, but only in respect of the executing of the movement; the form by which they act, and the end of the action + being alike determined for them by their nature. Of this kind are plants, which move themselves according to their + inherent nature, with regard only to executing the movements of growth and decay. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p7"> Other things have self-movement in a higher degree, that is, not only with regard to executing the movement, but even as + regards to the form, the principle of movement, which form they acquire of themselves. Of this kind are animals, in which + the principle of movement is not a naturally implanted form; but one received through sense. Hence the more perfect is their + sense, the more perfect is their power of self-movement. Such as have only the sense of touch, as shellfish, move + only with the motion of expansion and contraction; and thus their movement hardly exceeds that of plants. Whereas such as + have the sensitive power in perfection, so as to recognize not only connection and touch, but also objects apart from themselves, + can move themselves to a distance by progressive movement. Yet although animals of the latter kind receive through sense the + form that is the principle of their movement, nevertheless they cannot of themselves propose to themselves the end of + their operation, or movement; for this has been implanted in them by nature; and by natural instinct they are moved to any + action through the form apprehended by sense. Hence such animals as move themselves in respect to an end they themselves propose + are superior to these. This can only be done by reason and intellect; whose province it is to know the proportion between + the end and the means to that end, and duly coordinate them. Hence a more perfect degree of life is that of intelligible + beings; for their power of self-movement is more perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one and the same man the intellectual + faculty moves the sensitive powers; and these by their command move the organs of movement. Thus in the arts we see that the + art of using a ship, i.e. the art of navigation, rules the art of ship-designing; and this in its turn rules the art that + is only concerned with preparing the material for the ship. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p8"> But although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are supplied by nature, as are first principles, which + it cannot doubt; and the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with respect to some things it moves itself, + yet with regard to other things it must be moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is its very nature, + and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most perfect + degree. Such is God; and hence in Him principally is life. From this the Philosopher concludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after showing + God to be intelligent, that God has life most perfect and eternal, since His intellect is most perfect and always in act. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in Metaph. ix, 16, action is twofold. Actions of one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat or to cut; whilst + actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand, to sense and to will. The difference between them is this, + that the former action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of the thing moved; whereas the latter action is + the perfection of the agent. Hence, because movement is an act of the thing in + movement, the latter action, in so far as it is the act of the operator, is called its movement, by this similitude, that + as movement is an act of the thing moved, so an act of this kind is the act of the agent, although movement is an act of the + imperfect, that is, of what is in potentiality; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that is to say, of what is + in act as stated in De Anima iii, 28. In the sense, therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which understands + itself + is said to move itself. It is in this sense that Plato also taught that God moves Himself; not in the sense in which movement + is an act of the imperfect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God is His own very existence and understanding, so is He His own life; and therefore He so lives that He has not principle + of life. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Life in this lower world is bestowed on a corruptible nature, that needs generation to preserve the species, and nourishment + to preserve the individual. For this reason life is not found here below apart from a vegetative soul: but this does not hold + good with incorruptible natures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q18_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q18_A4-p0.1">Whether all things are life in God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not all things are life in God. For it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q18_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.17.28" target="asv">Acts 17:28</a>), "In Him we live, and move, and be." But not all things in God are movement. Therefore not all things are life in Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all things are in God as their first model. But things modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not + all things have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29), a living substance is better than a substance that does not live. If, therefore, + things which in themselves have not life, are life in God, it seems that things exist more truly in God than themselves. But + this appears to be false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in God potentially. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as good things and things made in time are known by God, so are bad things, and things that God can make, but + never will be made. If, therefore, all things are life in God, inasmuch as known by Him, it seems that even bad things and + things that will never be made are life in God, as known by Him, and this appears inadmissible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q18_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.3" target="asv">Jn. 1:3,4</a>), it is said, "What was made, in Him was life." But all things were made, except God. Therefore all things are life in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In God to live is to understand, as before stated + <a id="FP_Q18_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q18_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as + understood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been made by God are in Him as things + understood, it follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold sense. In one way, so far are they are held together and preserved by the divine + power; even as we say that things that are in our power are in us. And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they + exist in their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the Apostle when he says, "In Him we live, move, + and be"; since our being, living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In + another sense things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows them, in which sense they are in God through their proper + ideas, which in God are not distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they are in God are the divine essence. And + since the divine essence is life and not movement, it follows that things existing in God in this manner are not movement, + but life. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The thing modelled must be like the model according to the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form has being + of another kind in the model from that which it has in the thing modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the + architect immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that exists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence + the ideas of things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine mind, + as having a divine existence in that mind. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in the + divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which reason, in fact, Plato held that the "separate" man was the + true man; and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by participation. But since matter enters into the being of natural + things, we must say that those things have simply being in the divine mind more + truly than in themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated being, but in themselves a created being: whereas this + particular being, a man, or horse, for example, has this being more truly in its own nature than in the divine mind, because + it belongs to human nature to be material, which, as existing in the divine mind, it is not. Even so a house has nobler being + in the architect's mind than in matter; yet a material house is called a house more truly than the one which exists in the + mind; since the former is actual, the latter only potential. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although bad things are in God's knowledge, as being comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as created by + Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him. They are known by God through the types of good things. Hence it + cannot be said that bad things are life in God. Those things that are not in time may be called life in God in so far as life + means understanding only, and inasmuch as they are understood by God; but not in so + far as life implies a principle of operation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q18_A4-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q17_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q19" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q19-p0.1">THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q19-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q19-p2"> After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration + is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect + in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19-p3"> (1) Whether there is will in God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q19-p4"> (2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</p> + <p id="FP_Q19-p5"> (3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?</p> + <p id="FP_Q19-p6"> (4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</p> + <p id="FP_Q19-p7"> (5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</p> + <p id="FP_Q19-p8"> (6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?</p> + <p id="FP_Q19-p9"> (7) Whether the will of God is mutable?</p> + <p id="FP_Q19-p10"> (8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</p> + <p id="FP_Q19-p11"> (9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?</p> + <p id="FP_Q19-p12"> (10) Whether God has free will?</p> + <p id="FP_Q19-p13"> (11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q19-p14"> (12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</p> + <div id="FP_Q19_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q19_A1-p0.1">Whether there is will in God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is not will in God. For the object of will is the end and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end. + Therefore there is not will in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, will is a kind of appetite. But appetite, as it is directed to things not possessed, implies imperfection, which + cannot be imputed to God. Therefore there is not will in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 54), the will moves, and is moved. But God is the first cause of movement, + and Himself is unmoved, as proved in Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there is not will in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.2" target="asv">Rom. 12:2</a>): "That you may prove what is the will of God." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There is will in God, as there is intellect: since will follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual existence + by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards + its natural form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when it has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same + with every natural perfection, which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things + without knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also intellectual natures have a like aptitude as apprehended through + its intelligible form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain + to the will. Hence in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there is animal appetite. And + so there must be will in God, since there is intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own existence, so is His + will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this by + His essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q19_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A3.html">Q[6], A[3]</a>): for the end has the aspect of good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which, although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking what + it does not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in what it does possess. In this respect will is said to be in + God, as having always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is not distinct from His essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A will of which the principal object is a good outside itself, must be moved by another; but the object of the divine will + is His goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since the will of God is His essence, it is not moved by another than itself, + but by itself alone, in the same sense as understanding and willing are said to be movement. This is what Plato meant when + he said that the first mover moves itself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q19_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q19_A2-p0.1">Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not will things apart from Himself. For the divine will is the divine existence. But God is not other + than Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than Himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, 54. If, therefore, God wills + anything apart from Himself, His will must be moved by another; which is impossible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks nothing beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely + satisfies His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from Himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, acts of will are multiplied in proportion to the number of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and things + apart from Himself, it follows that the act of His will is manifold, and consequently His existence, which is His will. But + this is impossible. Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.4.3" target="asv">1 Thess. 4:3</a>): "This is the will of God, your sanctification." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above + <a id="FP_Q19_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. For natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, + if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that + every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces + its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed; + and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence, + if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the divine + will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other + things to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness + that other things should be partakers therein. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine will is God's own existence essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of understanding + them and expressing them, as is clear from what has already been said ( + <a id="FP_Q19_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html">Q[13], A[4]</a>). For when we say that God exists, no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say that God wills. + Therefore, although He is not anything apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart from + Himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things willed for the sake of the end, the whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves the + will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing + so wills nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant, + which anyone may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its + own sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only for the sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it + does not follow that anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He understands things apart from Himself by + understanding His own essence, so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own goodness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From the fact that His own goodness suffices the divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from itself, + but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its goodness. Thus, too, the divine intellect, though its perfection + consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that essence knows other things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the many only in the one, in the same way the divine will is one and simple, as + willing the many only through the one, that is, through its own goodness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q19_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q19_A3-p0.1">Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills + from eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His own goodness necessarily. + Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of + all necessity, as above shown ( + <a id="FP_Q19_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing over and above His nature as + stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God + does not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore possible for Him to + will what He does not will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two things, and imperfect, since + everything contingent is imperfect and mutable. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one or the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined + to one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator [*Averroes] says in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent + with regard to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from another; and thus He has some cause prior to + Himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as the divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore + whatever God wills, He wills necessarily. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.11" target="asv">Eph. 1:11</a>): "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will." Now, what we work according to the counsel of the will, + we do not will necessarily. Therefore God does not will necessarily whatever He wills. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to + be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: + thus it is absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; + thus it is absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it is not + necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that + he is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe + that He wills something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will has a necessary + relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we + will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for + instance the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God wills things apart from Himself in so far as + they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to + it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take + ship + in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for + a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since + the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, + it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, + for + supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From the fact that God wills from eternity whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily; except by + supposition. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although God necessarily wills His own goodness, He does not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness; for + it can exist without other things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not natural to God to will any of those other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not unnatural + or contrary to His nature, but voluntary. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in the + cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not + in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily + will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the + divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely, that the perfect goodness of God can be + without it; and such defect accompanies all created good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A naturally contingent cause must be determined to act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is necessary, + determines itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has + a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is + of things as they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves. Since then all other + things have necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute + necessity so as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily + whatever He wills, but does not will necessarily whatever He wills. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p16"></p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A3-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q19_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q19_A4-p0.1">Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "As our sun, not by reason + nor by pre-election, but by its very being, enlightens all things that can participate in its light, so the divine good by + its very essence pours the rays of goodness upon everything that exists." But every voluntary agent acts by reason and pre-election. + Therefore God does not act by will; and so His will is not the cause of things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, The first in any order is that which is essentially so, thus in the order of burning things, that comes first which + is fire by its essence. But God is the first agent. Therefore He acts by His essence; and that is His nature. He acts then + by nature, and not by will. Therefore the divine will is not the cause of things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Whatever is the cause of anything, through being "such" a thing, is the cause by nature, and not by will. For fire + is the cause of heat, as being itself hot; whereas an architect is the cause of a house, because he wills to build it. Now + Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because God is good, we exist." Therefore God is the cause of things by His nature, + and not by His will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the created things is the knowledge of God, as said before ( + <a id="FP_Q19_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">Q[14], A[8]</a>). Therefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.26" target="asv">Wis. 11:26</a>), "How could anything endure, if Thou wouldst not?" + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We must hold that the will of God is the cause of things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed, by + a necessity of His nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p8"> This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an + end, as proved in Phys. ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary means predetermined for it by some higher + intellect; as the end and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence the intellectual and voluntary + agent must precede the agent that acts by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of agents, He + must act by intellect and will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p9"> This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of which the property is to produce one and the same effect; + for nature operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of the act is according to + the nature of the agent; and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance with that nature; for every + natural agent has a determinate being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself + the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined + and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown ( + <a id="FP_Q19_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html">Q[7], A[2]</a>). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection + according to the determination of His will and intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p10"> Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so + far as they pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode + of the cause. Wherefore since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him after the mode of intellect, + and therefore proceed from Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will, + for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived appertains to the will. Therefore the will of God is the + cause of things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius in these words does not intend to exclude election from God absolutely; but only in a certain sense, in so far, + that is, as He communicates His goodness not merely to certain things, but to all; and as election implies a certain distinction. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because the essence of God is His intellect and will, from the fact of His acting by His essence, it follows that He acts + after the mode of intellect and will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Good is the object of the will. The words, therefore, "Because God is good, we exist," are true inasmuch as His goodness + is the reason of His willing all other things, as said before (A[2], ad 2). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even in us the cause of one and the same effect is knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is conceived, + and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the + effect, except by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to operation. But the power is cause, as executing + the effect, since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in God + all these things are one. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p15"></p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A4-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q19_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q19_A5-p0.1">Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that some cause can be assigned to the divine will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46): "Who would venture to + say that God made all things irrationally?" But to a voluntary agent, what is the reason of operating, is the cause of willing. + Therefore the will of God has some cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned + except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause of all things, as has been already shown + <a id="FP_Q19_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. If, then, there is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause, except the divine will alone. Thus + all science would be in vain, since science seeks to assign causes + to effects. This seems inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no cause, depends simply on his will. If, therefore, the will of God has + no cause, it follows that all things made depend simply on His will, and have no other cause. But this also is not admissible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 28): "Every efficient cause is greater than the thing effected." But nothing is greater than + the will of God. We must not then seek for a cause of it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In no wise has the will of God a cause. In proof of which we must consider that, since the will follows from the intellect, + there is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the same way as there is a cause of the understanding, in the person + that understands. The case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its conclusion are understood separately + from each other, the understanding the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is known. + If the understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself, apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance, + in this case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding the premisses, since a thing cannot be its + own cause; and yet, it would be true that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the cause of the conclusion. It + is the same with the will, with respect to which the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end, as do the + premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p7"> Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means to that end, his willing the end will be the cause + of his willing the means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and means; for a thing cannot be its own + cause. Yet it will be true to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by one act understands + all things in His essence, so by one act He wills all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the + cause is not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an + end is not the cause of His willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end. Therefore, He wills this + to be as means to that; but does not will this on account of that. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will of God is reasonable, not because anything is to God a cause of willing, but in so far as He wills one thing to + be on account of another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since God wills effects to proceed from definite causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not unreasonable + to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It would, however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary, + and not as dependent on the will of God. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 2): "Philosophers in their vanity have + thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes, being utterly + unable to perceive the cause that is shown above all others, the will of God." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since God wills effects to come from causes, all effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the will + of God, but on something else besides: but the first effect depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say + that God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work, and intellect, that he might be man; and willed him + to be man that he might enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this + cannot be reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things depend on the simple will of God; but the others on the + order of other causes. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A5-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q19_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q19_A6-p0.1">Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:4</a>): "God will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." But this does not happen. Therefore the + will of God is not always fulfilled. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is that of the will to good. Now God knows all truth. Therefore He + wills all good. But not all good actually exists; for much more good might exist. Therefore the will of God is not always + fulfilled. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since the will of God is the first cause, it does not exclude intermediate causes. But the effect of a first cause + may be hindered by a defect of a secondary cause; as the effect of the motive power may be hindered by the weakness of the + limb. Therefore the effect of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the secondary causes. The will of God, therefore, + is not always fulfilled. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.113.11" target="asv">Ps. 113:11</a>): "God hath done all things, whatsoever He would." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In proof of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the + agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active causes as with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that + although a thing may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the universal form. For though a thing may + fail to be, for example, a man or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence + the same must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the order of any particular active cause, but not outside + the order of the universal cause; under which all particular causes are included: and if any particular cause fails of its + effect, this is because of the hindrance of some other particular cause, which is included in the order of the universal cause. + Therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen. + For it may happen that a star is hindered from producing its effects; yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things, + from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred through intermediate causes to the universal influence of the first + heaven. Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will should not + produce its effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in another order; + as + does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the divine will as much as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that + will, when by its justice he is punished. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a restricted + application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men + to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish saved, but because there is no man saved whose + salvation He does not will." Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every + class of individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case they mean that God wills some men of every class + and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition. Thirdly, + according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent will. + This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent, + but to the things willed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p8"> To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary + sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account, + by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and that a man should + be killed is evil, absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or + dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently + he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men + to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, + but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in + themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular + circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills + simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such + a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills + takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An act of the cognitive faculty is according as the thing known is in the knower; while an act of the appetite faculty is + directed to things as they exist in themselves. But all that can have the nature of being and truth virtually exists in God, + though it does not all exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth; but does not will all good, except in so far + as He wills Himself, in Whom all good virtually exists. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A first cause can be hindered in its effect by deficiency in the secondary cause, when it is not the universal first cause, + including within itself all causes; for then the effect could in no way escape its order. And thus it is with the will of + God, as said above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A6-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q19_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q19_A7-p0.1">Whether the will of God is changeable?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.6.7" target="asv">Gn. 6:7</a>): "It repenteth Me that I have made man." But whoever repents of what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has + a changeable will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: "I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to + pull down, and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought + to do to them" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.18.7" target="asv">Jer. 18:7,8</a>) Therefore God has a changeable will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God does not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the + law to be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as said before + <a id="FP_Q19_A7-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore He can both will and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is changeable + substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable + as regards His will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son of man, that He should be changed" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Num.23.19" target="asv">Num. 23:19</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that + certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and + yet for the will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if one should begin to will what before + he had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless + we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will regards + good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not + take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not + so before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before; + hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both the substance of God and + His knowledge are entirely unchangeable ( + <a id="FP_Q19_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q19_A7-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A15.html">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when we repent, + we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at + the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of + acting, in so far as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom + He had made. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will of God, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce + certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in + the divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising + of Lazarus, one who looked only on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not + rise again," but looking at the divine first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise again." And God wills both: that is, + that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen; + or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under + the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine + and higher cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A7-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.38.1" target="asv">Is. 38:1</a>). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, which is unchangeable. + Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5): "The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel"---that is to say, the counsel of His + will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent," His words must be understood metaphorically. For + men seem to repent, when they do not fulfill what they have threatened. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It does not follow from this argument that God has a will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should change. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the unchangeableness + of the divine will, as has been said above + <a id="FP_Q19_A7-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A7-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q19_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A9.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q19_A8-p0.1">Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved, + except whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, + 84) "Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder it." But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the + Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.19" target="asv">Rom. 9:19</a>): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should + die, being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, + whereby they have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every + true conditional statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is + necessary absolutely. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> All good things that exist God wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that all + good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will, counsel, and all other such things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to + intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes + contingent. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p7"> This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent + on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second + cause, as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God's will from + producing its effect. Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be + referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is + better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to + act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being. + Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that + belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, + which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, + some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has + attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise + contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently, + but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the words of Augustine we must understand a necessity in things willed by God that is not absolute, but conditional. For + the conditional statement that if God wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily true. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen, + but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Consequents have necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the + divine will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, + are absolute necessities. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A8-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A9.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q19_A9" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A10.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q19_A9-p0.1">Whether God wills evils?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God wills evils. For every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine + says (Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should + exist, but also evil things." Therefore God wills evil things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. And + Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that + which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy + when contrasted with evil." But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and + beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should + not exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil + should exist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom. + Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to + will it." Therefore it is not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore + God wills not evil things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before ( + <a id="FP_Q19_A9-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html">Q[5], A[1]</a>), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either + natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far + as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or + corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies + the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is + only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. + Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not + even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. + Now God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills + the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, + He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in + willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil + is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered + to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that evil should be or be done." This, however, + is not correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is + beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from his sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that + the patience of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot therefore be said that such an ordering + to good is implied in the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done, since nothing is judged of by + that which appertains to it accidentally, but by that which belongs to it essentially. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore + Dionysius in saying that "evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe," draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The statements that evil exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that anyone + wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affirmative. God therefore neither + wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A9-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A10.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q19_A10" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A11.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q19_A10-p0.1">Whether God has free-will?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q19_A10-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A10-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; "God alone is + He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either side." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A10-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, + as has been said + <a id="FP_Q19_A10-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A9.html">(A[9])</a>. Therefore there is not free-will in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A10-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of + the will, not in obedience to necessity." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A10-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not + appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said + to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above + + <a id="FP_Q19_A10-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, He has free will with respect to what He does not + necessarily will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A10-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply, but only as regards the inclination to sin. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A10-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown (De + Fide ii, 3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, + inasmuch as He can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can will to sit down, and + not will to sit down. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A10-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A10-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A11.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q19_A11" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A12.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q19_A11-p0.1">Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q19_A11-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A11-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so + is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the + divine will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A11-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the + expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are + superfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A11-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The will of God is one, since it is the very essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A11-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.110.2" target="asv"> Ps. 110:2</a>: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills." Therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for + the will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A11-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before ( + <a id="FP_Q19_A11-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A3.html">Q[13], A[3]</a>). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. + Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus + with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that + punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed + to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just + as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called + by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A11-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.10" target="asv">Mat. + 6:10 + </a>). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its + primary meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished + will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure; + and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called + will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A11-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless + we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge, but to will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A11-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the usual + expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it + is called anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A11-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A11-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A12.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q19_A12" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A11.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q20.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q19_A12-p0.1">Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that five expressions of will---namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission---are not rightly + assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates + in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God works nothing unless He wills it, as the Scripture says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A12-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.26" target="asv">Wis. 11:26</a>). But the will of expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be comprehended + in the will of expression. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, operation and permission appertain to all creatures in common, since God works in them all, and permits some action + in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly under + one division, not being of one order. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, evil happens in more ways than good, since "good happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of ways," as declared + by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not right therefore to assign one expression only + in the case of evil---namely, prohibition---and two---namely, counsel and precept---in the case of good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> By these signs we name the expression of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may show that + he wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may show it by himself, by doing something either directly, + or indirectly and accidentally. He shows it directly when he works in his own person; in that way the expression of his will + is his own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering the doing of a thing; for + what removes an impediment is called an accidental mover. In this respect the expression is called permission. He declares + his will by means of another when he orders another to perform a work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept, + and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of man makes itself + known, the same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will, as the expression of that will. That precept, + counsel, and prohibition are called the will of God is clear from the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A12-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.10" target="asv">Mat. 6:10</a>: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." That permission and operation are called the will of God is clear from Augustine + (Enchiridion 95), who says: "Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually + doing it." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p7"> Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, operation with + regard to good. Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is necessary and counsel + to good that is of supererogation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will about the same matter in different ways; thus we find many words that + mean the same thing. Hence there is not reason why the same thing should not be the subject of precept, operation, and counsel; + or of prohibition or permission. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God may by metaphor be said to will what by His will, properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be said to + will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing to prevent the same thing being the object of the will + of good pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is always the same as the will of good pleasure; while precept + and counsel are not; both because the former regards the present, and the two latter + the future; and because the former is of itself the effect of the will; the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Rational creatures are masters of their own acts; and for this reason certain special expressions of the divine will are + assigned to their acts, inasmuch as God ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily and of themselves. Other creatures act + only as moved by the divine operation; therefore only operation and permission are concerned with these. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All evil of sin, though happening in many ways, agrees in being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard to + evil, only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. On the other hand, good stands in various relations to the divine + goodness, since there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject + of precept; and there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and + these are the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is not only concerned with the obtaining of greater good; + but also with the avoiding of lesser evils. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q19_A12-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A11.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q20.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q18_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q20" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A12.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q20-p0.1">GOD'S LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q20-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q20-p2"> We next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of God. In the appetitive part of the soul there are found + in ourselves both the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the habits of the moral virtues, as justice, fortitude + and the like. Hence we shall first consider the love of God, and secondly His justice and mercy. About the first there are + four points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20-p3"> (1) Whether love exists in God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q20-p4"> (2) Whether He loves all things?</p> + <p id="FP_Q20-p5"> (3) Whether He loves one thing more than another?</p> + <p id="FP_Q20-p6"> (4) Whether He loves more the better things?</p> + <div id="FP_Q20_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q20.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q20_A1-p0.1">Whether love exists in God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that love does not exist in God. For in God there are no passions. Now love is a passion. Therefore love is not + in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love, anger, sorrow and the like, are mutually divided against one another. But sorrow and anger are not attributed + to God, unless by metaphor. Therefore neither is love attributed to Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a uniting and binding force." But this cannot take place in God, since He + is simple. Therefore love does not exist in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "God is love" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.16" target="asv">Jn. 4:16</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We must needs assert that in God there is love: because love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty. + For since the acts of the will and of every appetitive faculty tend towards good and evil, as to their proper objects: and + since good is essentially and especially the object of the will and the appetite, whereas evil is only the object secondarily + and indirectly, as opposed to good; it follows that the acts of the will and appetite + that regard good must naturally be prior to those that regard evil; thus, for instance, joy is prior to sorrow, love to hate: + because what exists of itself is always prior to that which exists through another. Again, the more universal is naturally + prior to what is less so. Hence the intellect is first directed to universal truth; and in the second place to particular + and special truths. Now there are certain acts of the will and appetite that regard good under some special condition, as + joy + and delight regard good present and possessed; whereas desire and hope regard good not as yet possessed. Love, however, regards + good universally, whether possessed or not. Hence love is naturally the first act of the will and appetite; for which reason + all the other appetite movements presuppose love, as their root and origin. For nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything, + except as a good that is loved: nor is anything an object of hate except as opposed to the object of love. + Similarly, it is clear that sorrow, and other things like to it, must be referred to love as to their first principle. Hence, + in whomsoever there is will and appetite, there must also be love: since if the first is wanting, all that follows is also + wanting. Now it has been shown that will is in God ( + <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A1.html">Q[19], A[1]</a>), and hence we must attribute love to Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The cognitive faculty does not move except through the medium of the appetitive: and just as in ourselves the universal reason + moves through the medium of the particular reason, as stated in De Anima iii, 58,75, so in ourselves the intellectual appetite, + or the will as it is called, moves through the medium of the sensitive appetite. Hence, in us the sensitive appetite is the + proximate motive-force of our bodies. Some bodily change therefore always + accompanies an act of the sensitive appetite, and this change affects especially the heart, which, as the Philosopher says + (De part. animal. iii, 4), is the first principle of movement in animals. Therefore acts of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch + as they have annexed to them some bodily change, are called passions; whereas acts of the will are not so called. Love, therefore, + and joy and delight are passions; in so far as they denote acts of the intellective appetite, they are not passions. It + is in this latter sense that they are in God. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii): "God rejoices by an operation that + is one and simple," and for the same reason He loves without passion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the passions of the sensitive appetite there may be distinguished a certain material element---namely, the bodily change---and + a certain formal element, which is on the part of the appetite. Thus in anger, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 15,63,64), + the material element is the kindling of the blood about the heart; but the formal, the appetite for revenge. Again, as regards + the formal element of certain passions a certain imperfection is + implied, as in desire, which is of the good we have not, and in sorrow, which is about the evil we have. This applies also + to anger, which supposes sorrow. Certain other passions, however, as love and joy, imply no imperfection. Since therefore + none of these can be attributed to God on their material side, as has been said (ad 1); neither can those that even on their + formal side imply imperfection be attributed to Him; except metaphorically, and from likeness of effects, as already show + ( + <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A2.html">Q[3], A[2]</a> , ad 2; + <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A11.html">Q[19], A[11]</a>). Whereas, those that do not imply imperfection, such as love and joy, can be properly predicated of God, though without + attributing passion to Him, as said before ( + <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A11.html">Q[19], A[11]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An act of love always tends towards two things; to the good that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it: since + to love a person is to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as we love ourselves, we wish ourselves good; and, so far as + possible, union with that good. So love is called the unitive force, even in God, yet without implying composition; for the + good that He wills for Himself, is no other than Himself, Who is good by His essence, + as above shown ( + <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,3). And by the fact that anyone loves another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, in the place + of himself; and regards the good done to him as done to himself. So far love is a binding force, since it aggregates another + to ourselves, and refers his good to our own. And then again the divine love is a binding force, inasmuch as God wills good + to others; yet it implies no composition in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q20.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q20_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q20_A2-p0.1">Whether God loves all things?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not love all things. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1), love places the lover outside himself, + and causes him to pass, as it were, into the object of his love. But it is not admissible to say that God is placed outside + of Himself, and passes into other things. Therefore it is inadmissible to say that God loves things other than Himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the love of God is eternal. But things apart from God are not from eternity; except in God. Therefore God does not + love anything, except as it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it is no other than Himself. Therefore God does not + love things other than Himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love is twofold---the love, namely, of desire, and the love of friendship. Now God does not love irrational creatures + with the love of desire, since He needs no creature outside Himself. Nor with the love of friendship; since there can be no + friendship with irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. viii, 2). Therefore God does not love all things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.5.7" target="asv">Ps. 5:7</a>): "Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity." Now nothing is at the same time hated and loved. Therefore God does not love + all things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.25" target="asv">Wis. 11:25</a>): "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a thing + is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses. Now it has been shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q20_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that God's will is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good, + only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some + good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything + that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as + by its object, our love, whereby we will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness, + whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides + the good it has not, and to this end we direct our actions: whereas the love of God infuses and creates goodness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A lover is placed outside himself, and made to pass into the object of his love, inasmuch as he wills good to the beloved; + and works for that good by his providence even as he works for his own. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "On behalf + of the truth we must make bold to say even this, that He Himself, the cause of all things, by His abounding love and goodness, + is placed outside Himself by His providence for all existing things." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although creatures have not existed from eternity, except in God, yet because they have been in Him from eternity, God has + known them eternally in their proper natures; and for that reason has loved them, even as we, by the images of things within + us, know things existing in themselves. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Friendship cannot exist except towards rational creatures, who are capable of returning love, and communicating one with + another in the various works of life, and who may fare well or ill, according to the changes of fortune and happiness; even + as to them is benevolence properly speaking exercised. But irrational creatures cannot attain to loving God, nor to any share + in the intellectual and beatific life that He lives. Strictly speaking, therefore, + God does not love irrational creatures with the love of friendship; but as it were with the love of desire, in so far as He + orders them to rational creatures, and even to Himself. Yet this is not because He stands in need of them; but only on account + of His goodness, and of the services they render to us. For we can desire a thing for others as well as for ourselves. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Nothing prevents one and the same thing being loved under one aspect, while it is hated under another. God loves sinners + in so far as they are existing natures; for they have existence and have it from Him. In so far as they are sinners, they + have not existence at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from God. Hence under this aspect, they are hated + by Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q20_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q20_A3-p0.1">Whether God loves all things equally?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God loves all things equally. For it is said: "He hath equally care of all" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.8" target="asv">Wis. 6:8</a>). But God's providence over things comes from the love wherewith He loves them. Therefore He loves all things equally. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the love of God is His essence. But God's essence does not admit of degree; neither therefore does His love. He + does not therefore love some things more than others. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as God's love extends to created things, so do His knowledge and will extend. But God is not said to know some things + more than others; nor will one thing more than another. Neither therefore does He love some things more than others. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. cx): "God loves all things that He has made, and amongst them rational creatures more, and + of these especially those who are members of His only-begotten Son Himself." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since to love a thing is to will it good, in a twofold way anything may be loved more, or less. In one way on the part of + the act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. In this way God does not love some things more than others, because + He loves all things by an act of the will that is one, simple, and always the same. In another way on the part of the good + itself that a person wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that one more + than another, for whom we will a greater good, though our will is not more intense. In this way we must needs say that God + loves some things more than others. For since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, as has been said + <a id="FP_Q20_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to have equally care of all, not because by His care He deals out equal good to all, but because He administers + all things with a like wisdom and goodness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument is based on the intensity of love on the part of the act of the will, which is the divine essence. But the + good that God wills for His creatures, is not the divine essence. Therefore there is no reason why it may not vary in degree. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To understand and to will denote the act alone, and do not include in their meaning objects from the diversity of which God + may be said to know or will more or less, as has been said with respect to God's love. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q20_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q21.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q20_A4-p0.1">Whether God always loves more the better things?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not always love more the better things. For it is manifest that Christ is better than the whole human + race, being God and man. But God loved the human race more than He loved Christ; for it is said: "He spared not His own Son, + but delivered Him up for us all" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.32" target="asv">Rom. 8:32</a>). Therefore God does not always love more the better things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an angel is better than a man. Hence it is said of man: "Thou hast made him a little less than the angels" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.8.6" target="asv">Ps. 8:6</a>). But God loved men more than He loved the angels, for it is said: "Nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed + of Abraham He taketh hold" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.2.16" target="asv">Heb. 2:16</a>). Therefore God does not always love more the better things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Peter was better than John, since he loved Christ more. Hence the Lord, knowing this to be true, asked Peter, saying: + "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me more than these?" Yet Christ loved John more than He loved Peter. For as Augustine says, + commenting on the words, "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me?": "By this very mark is John distinguished from the other disciples, + not that He loved him only, but that He loved him more than the rest." Therefore + God does not always love more the better things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the innocent man is better than the repentant, since repentance is, as Jerome says (Cap. 3 in Isa.), "a second plank + after shipwreck." But God loves the penitent more than the innocent; since He rejoices over him the more. For it is said: + "I say to you that there shall be joy in heaven upon the one sinner that doth penance, more than upon ninety-nine just who + need not penance" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.15.7" target="asv">Lk. 15:7</a>). Therefore God does not always love more + the better things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the just man who is foreknown is better than the predestined sinner. Now God loves more the predestined sinner, + since He wills for him a greater good, life eternal. Therefore God does not always love more the better things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Everything loves what is like it, as appears from ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.13.19" target="asv">Ecclus. 13:19</a>): "Every beast loveth its like." Now the better a thing is, the more like is it to God. Therefore the better things are more + loved by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It must needs be, according to what has been said before, that God loves more the better things . For it has been shown ( + <a id="FP_Q20_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3), that God's loving one thing more than another is nothing else than His willing for that thing a greater good: because + God's will is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some things are better than others, is that God wills for + them a greater good. Hence it follows that He loves more the + better things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God loves Christ not only more than He loves the whole human race, but more than He loves the entire created universe: because + He willed for Him the greater good in giving Him "a name that is above all names," in so far as He was true God. Nor did anything + of His excellence diminish when God delivered Him up to death for the salvation of the human race; rather did He become thereby + a glorious conqueror: "The government was placed upon His shoulder," + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.9.6" target="asv"> Is. 9:6.</a> + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God loves the human nature assumed by the Word of God in the person of Christ more than He loves all the angels; for that + nature is better, especially on the ground of the union with the Godhead. But speaking of human nature in general, and comparing + it with the angelic, the two are found equal, in the order of grace and of glory: since according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.17" target="asv"> Rev 21:17, </a> the measure of a man and of an angel is the same. Yet so that, in this + respect, some angels are found nobler than some men, and some men nobler than some angels. But as to natural condition an + angel is better than a man. God therefore did not assume human nature because He loved man, absolutely speaking, more; but + because the needs of man were greater; just as the master of a house may give some costly delicacy to a sick servant, that + he does not give to his own son in sound health. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This doubt concerning Peter and John has been solved in various ways. Augustine interprets it mystically, and says that the + active life, signified by Peter, loves God more than the contemplative signified by John, because the former is more conscious + of the miseries of this present life, and therefore the more ardently desires to be freed from them, and depart to God. God, + he says, loves more the contemplative life, since He preserves it longer. For + it does not end, as the active life does, with the life of the body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p12"> Some say that Peter loved Christ more in His members, and therefore was loved more by Christ also, for which reason He gave + him the care of the Church; but that John loved Christ more in Himself, and so was loved more by Him; on which account Christ + commended His mother to his care. Others say that it is uncertain which of them loved Christ more with the love of charity, + and uncertain also which of them God loved more and ordained to a greater degree of glory in eternal life. + Peter is said to have loved more, in regard to a certain promptness and fervor; but John to have been more loved, with respect + to certain marks of familiarity which Christ showed to him rather than to others, on account of his youth and purity. While + others say that Christ loved Peter more, from his more excellent gift of charity; but John more, from his gifts of intellect. + Hence, absolutely speaking, Peter was the better and more beloved; but, in a certain sense, John was the better, and was + loved the more. However, it may seem presumptuous to pass judgment on these matters; since "the Lord" and no other "is the + weigher of spirits" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.2" target="asv">Prov. 16:2</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The penitent and the innocent are related as exceeding and exceeded. For whether innocent or penitent, those are the better + and better loved who have most grace. Other things being equal, innocence is the nobler thing and the more beloved. God is + said to rejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent, because often penitents rise from sin more cautious, humble, + and fervent. Hence Gregory commenting on these words (Hom. 34 in Ev.) says that, "In + battle the general loves the soldier who after flight returns and bravely pursues the enemy, more than him who has never fled, + but has never done a brave deed." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p14"> Or it may be answered that gifts of grace, equal in themselves, are more as conferred on the penitent, who deserved punishment, + than as conferred on the innocent, to whom no punishment was due; just as a hundred pounds [marcoe] are a greater gift to + a poor man than to a king. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since God's will is the cause of goodness in things, the goodness of one who is loved by God is to be reckoned according + to the time when some good is to be given to him by divine goodness. According therefore to the time, when there is to be + given by the divine will to the predestined sinner a greater good, the sinner is better; although according to some other + time he is the worse; because even according to some time he is neither good nor bad. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p16"></p> + <p id="FP_Q20_A4-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q21.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q19_A12.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q21" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q21-p0.1">THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q21-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q21-p2"> After considering the divine love, we must treat of God's justice and mercy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q21-p3"> (1) Whether there is justice in God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q21-p4"> (2) Whether His justice can be called truth?</p> + <p id="FP_Q21-p5"> (3) Whether there is mercy in God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q21-p6"> (4) Whether in every work of God there are justice and mercy?</p> + <div id="FP_Q21_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q21.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q21_A1-p0.1">Whether there is justice in God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is not justice in God. For justice is divided against temperance. But temperance does not exist in God: + neither therefore does justice. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who does whatsoever he wills and pleases does not work according to justice. But, as the Apostle says: "God worketh + all things according to the counsel of His will" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.11" target="asv">Eph. 1:11</a>). Therefore justice cannot be attributed to Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the act of justice is to pay what is due. But God is no man's debtor. Therefore justice does not belong to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whatever is in God, is His essence. But justice cannot belong to this. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "Good regards + the essence; justice the act." Therefore justice does not belong to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.10.8" target="asv">Ps. 10:8</a>): "The Lord is just, and hath loved justice." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There are two kinds of justice. The one consists in mutual giving and receiving, as in buying and selling, and other kinds + of intercourse and exchange. This the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) calls commutative justice, that directs exchange and intercourse + of business. This does not belong to God, since, as the Apostle says: "Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be + made him?" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.35" target="asv">Rom. 11:35</a>). The other consists in distribution, and + is called distributive justice; whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank deserves. As then the proper order + displayed in ruling a family or any kind of multitude evinces justice of this kind in the ruler, so the order of the universe, + which is seen both in effects of nature and in effects of will, shows forth the justice of God. Hence Dionysius says (Div. + Nom. viii, 4): "We must needs see that God is truly just, in seeing how He gives to all existing things what is proper to + the + condition of each; and preserves the nature of each in the order and with the powers that properly belong to it." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Certain of the moral virtues are concerned with the passions, as temperance with concupiscence, fortitude with fear and daring, + meekness with anger. Such virtues as these can only metaphorically be attributed to God; since, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q21_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A1.html">Q[20], A[1]</a> ), in God there are no passions; nor a sensitive appetite, which is, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), the subject + of those virtues. On the other hand, certain moral + virtues are concerned with works of giving and expending; such as justice, liberality, and magnificence; and these reside + not in the sensitive faculty, but in the will. Hence, there is nothing to prevent our attributing these virtues to God; although + not in civil matters, but in such acts as are not unbecoming to Him. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8), it would + be absurd to praise God for His political virtues. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since good as perceived by intellect is the object of the will, it is impossible for God to will anything but what His wisdom + approves. This is, as it were, His law of justice, in accordance with which His will is right and just. Hence, what He does + according to His will He does justly: as we do justly what we do according to law. But whereas law comes to us from some higher + power, God is a law unto Himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To each one is due what is his own. Now that which is directed to a man is said to be his own. Thus the master owns the servant, + and not conversely, for that is free which is its own cause. In the word debt, therefore, is implied a certain exigence or + necessity of the thing to which it is directed. Now a twofold order has to be considered in things: the one, whereby one created + thing is directed to another, as the parts of the whole, accident to + substance, and all things whatsoever to their end; the other, whereby all created things are ordered to God. Thus in the divine + operations debt may be regarded in two ways, as due either to God, or to creatures, and in either way God pays what is due. + It is due to God that there should be fulfilled in creatures what His will and wisdom require, and what manifests His goodness. + In this respect, God's justice regards what befits Him; inasmuch as He renders to Himself what is due to Himself. It is + also due to a created thing that it should possess what is ordered to it; thus it is due to man to have hands, and that other + animals should serve him. Thus also God exercises justice, when He gives to each thing what is due to it by its nature and + condition. This debt however is derived from the former; since what is due to each thing is due to it as ordered to it according + to the divine wisdom. And although God in this way pays each thing its due, yet He Himself is not the debtor, since He is + not directed to other things, but rather other things to Him. Justice, therefore, in God is sometimes spoken of as the fitting + accompaniment of His goodness; sometimes as the reward of merit. Anselm touches on either view where he says (Prosolog. 10): + "When Thou dost punish the wicked, it is just, since it agrees with their deserts; and when Thou dost spare the wicked, it + is also just; since it befits Thy goodness." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although justice regards act, this does not prevent its being the essence of God; since even that which is of the essence + of a thing may be the principle of action. But good does not always regard act; since a thing is called good not merely with + respect to act, but also as regards perfection in its essence. For this reason it is said (De Hebdom.) that the good is related + to the just, as the general to the special. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q21.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q21_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q21_A2-p0.1">Whether the justice of God is truth?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the justice of God is not truth. For justice resides in the will; since, as Anselm says (Dial. Verit. 13), + it is a rectitude of the will, whereas truth resides in the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi; Ethic. vi, 2,6). + Therefore justice does not appertain to truth. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), truth is a virtue distinct from justice. Truth therefore does not appertain + to the idea of justice. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.84.11" target="asv">Ps. 84:11</a>): "Mercy and truth have met each other": where truth stands for justice. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Truth consists in the equation of mind and thing, as said above ( + <a id="FP_Q21_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">Q[16], A[1]</a>). Now the mind, that is the cause of the thing, is related to it as its rule and measure; whereas the converse is the case + with the mind that receives its knowledge from things. When therefore things are the measure and rule of the mind, truth consists + in the equation of the mind to the thing, as happens in ourselves. For according as a thing is, or is not, + our thoughts or our words about it are true or false. But when the mind is the rule or measure of things, truth consists in + the equation of the thing to the mind; just as the work of an artist is said to be true, when it is in accordance with his + art. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p6"> Now as works of art are related to art, so are works of justice related to the law with which they accord. Therefore God's + justice, which establishes things in the order conformable to the rule of His wisdom, which is the law of His justice, is + suitably called truth. Thus we also in human affairs speak of the truth of justice. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Justice, as to the law that governs, resides in the reason or intellect; but as to the command whereby our actions are governed + according to the law, it resides in the will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The truth of which the Philosopher is speaking in this passage, is that virtue whereby a man shows himself in word and deed + such as he really is. Thus it consists in the conformity of the sign with the thing signified; and not in that of the effect + with its cause and rule: as has been said regarding the truth of justice. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p9"></p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A2-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q21_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q21_A3-p0.1">Whether mercy can be attributed to God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q21_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that mercy cannot be attributed to God. For mercy is a kind of sorrow, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). + But there is no sorrow in God; and therefore there is no mercy in Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mercy is a relaxation of justice. But God cannot remit what appertains to His justice. For it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.13" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:13</a>): "If we believe not, He continueth faithful: He cannot deny Himself." But He would deny Himself, as a gloss says, if He + should deny His words. Therefore mercy is not becoming to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A3-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.110.4" target="asv">Ps. 110:4</a>): "He is a merciful and gracious Lord." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A3-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Mercy is especially to be attributed to God, as seen in its effect, but not as an affection of passion. In proof of which + it must be considered that a person is said to be merciful [misericors], as being, so to speak, sorrowful at heart [miserum + cor]; being affected with sorrow at the misery of another as though it were his own. Hence it follows that he endeavors to + dispel the misery of this other, as if it were his; and this is the effect of mercy. To + sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others belongs not to God; but it does most properly belong to Him to dispel that misery, + whatever be the defect we call by that name. Now defects are not removed, except by the perfection of some kind of goodness; + and the primary source of goodness is God, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html">Q[6] , A[4]</a>). It must, however, be considered that to bestow perfections appertains not only to the divine goodness, but also to His + justice, liberality, and + mercy; yet under different aspects. The communicating of perfections, absolutely considered, appertains to goodness, as shown + above ( + <a id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,4); in so far as perfections are given to things in proportion, the bestowal of them belongs to justice, as has been already + said + <a id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; in so far as God does not bestow them for His own use, but only on account of His goodness, it belongs to liberality; in + so far as perfections given to things by God + expel defects, it belongs to mercy. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A3-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is based on mercy, regarded as an affection of passion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God acts mercifully, not indeed by going against His justice, but by doing something more than justice; thus a man who pays + another two hundred pieces of money, though owing him only one hundred, does nothing against justice, but acts liberally or + mercifully. The case is the same with one who pardons an offence committed against him, for in remitting it he may be said + to bestow a gift. Hence the Apostle calls remission a forgiving: "Forgive one + another, as Christ has forgiven you" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.32" target="asv">Eph. 4:32</a>). Hence it is clear that mercy does not destroy justice, but in a sense is the fulness thereof. And thus it is said: "Mercy + exalteth itself above judgement" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.13" target="asv">James 2:13</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A3-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A3-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q21_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q22.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q21_A4-p0.1">Whether in every work of God there are mercy and justice?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not in every work of God are mercy and justice. For some works of God are attributed to mercy, as the justification + of the ungodly; and others to justice, as the damnation of the wicked. Hence it is said: "Judgment without mercy to him that + hath not done mercy" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.13" target="asv">James 2:13</a>). Therefore not in every work of God do mercy and justice appear. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle attributes the conversion of the Jews to justice and truth, but that of the Gentiles to mercy ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.15" target="asv">Rom. 15</a>). Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, many just persons are afflicted in this world; which is unjust. Therefore not in every work of God are justice and + mercy. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is the part of justice to pay what is due, but of mercy to relieve misery. Thus both justice and mercy presuppose + something in their works: whereas creation presupposes nothing. Therefore in creation neither mercy nor justice is found. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.24.10" target="asv">Ps. 24:10</a>): "All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Mercy and truth are necessarily found in all God's works, if mercy be taken to mean the removal of any kind of defect. Not + every defect, however, can properly be called a misery; but only defect in a rational nature whose lot is to be happy; for + misery is opposed to happiness. For this necessity there is a reason, because since a debt paid according to the divine justice + is one due either to God, or to some creature, neither the one nor the other can be + lacking in any work of God: because God can do nothing that is not in accord with His wisdom and goodness; and it is in this + sense, as we have said, that anything is due to God. Likewise, whatever is done by Him in created things, is done according + to proper order and proportion wherein consists the idea of justice. Thus justice must exist in all God's works. Now the work + of divine justice always presupposes the work of mercy; and is founded thereupon. For nothing is due to creatures, except + for something pre-existing in them, or foreknown. Again, if this is due to a creature, it must be due on account of something + that precedes. And since we cannot go on to infinity, we must come to something that depends only on the goodness of the divine + will---which is the ultimate end. We may say, for instance, that to possess hands is due to man on account of his rational + soul; and his rational soul is due to him that he may be man; and his being man is on account of the divine goodness. So + in every work of God, viewed at its primary source, there appears mercy. In all that follows, the power of mercy remains, + and works indeed with even greater force; as the influence of the first cause is more intense than that of second causes. + For this reason does God out of abundance of His goodness bestow upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully than + is proportionate to their deserts: since less would suffice for preserving the order of justice than what the divine goodness + confers; because between creatures and God's goodness there can be no proportion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Certain works are attributed to justice, and certain others to mercy, because in some justice appears more forcibly and in + others mercy. Even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen, which, though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat + alleviates, in punishing short of what is deserved. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p9"> In the justification of the ungodly, justice is seen, when God remits sins on account of love, though He Himself has mercifully + infused that love. So we read of Magdalen: "Many sins are forgiven her, because she hath loved much" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.7.47" target="asv">Lk. 7:47</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's justice and mercy appear both in the conversion of the Jews and of the Gentiles. But an aspect of justice appears in + the conversion of the Jews which is not seen in the conversion of the Gentiles; inasmuch as the Jews were saved on account + of the promises made to the fathers. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Justice and mercy appear in the punishment of the just in this world, since by afflictions lesser faults are cleansed in + them, and they are the more raised up from earthly affections to God. As to this Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 9): "The evils + that press on us in this world force us to go to God." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although creation presupposes nothing in the universe; yet it does presuppose something in the knowledge of God. In this + way too the idea of justice is preserved in creation; by the production of beings in a manner that accords with the divine + wisdom and goodness. And the idea of mercy, also, is preserved in the change of creatures from non-existence to existence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q21_A4-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q22.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q20_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q22" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q22-p0.1">THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q22-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q22-p2"> Having considered all that relates to the will absolutely, we must now proceed to those things which have relation to both + the intellect and the will, namely providence, in respect to all created things; predestination and reprobation and all that + is connected with these acts in respect especially of man as regards his eternal salvation. For in the science of morals, + after the moral virtues themselves, comes the consideration of prudence, to which providence would seem to belong. + Concerning God's providence there are four points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22-p3"> (1) Whether providence is suitably assigned to God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q22-p4"> (2) Whether everything comes under divine providence?</p> + <p id="FP_Q22-p5"> (3) Whether divine providence is immediately concerned with all things?</p> + <p id="FP_Q22-p6"> (4) Whether divine providence imposes any necessity upon things foreseen?</p> + <div id="FP_Q22_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q22.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q22_A1-p0.1">Whether providence can suitably be attributed to God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that providence is not becoming to God. For providence, according to Tully (De Invent. ii), is a part of prudence. + But prudence, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5,9,18), it gives good counsel, cannot belong to God, Who never + has any doubt for which He should take counsel. Therefore providence cannot belong to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in God, is eternal. But providence is not anything eternal, for it is concerned with existing things + that are not eternal, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29). Therefore there is no providence in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there is nothing composite in God. But providence seems to be something composite, because it includes both the + intellect and the will. Therefore providence is not in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.3" target="asv">Wis. 14:3</a>): "But Thou, Father, governest all things by providence [*Vulg. But 'Thy providence, O Father, governeth it.']." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to attribute providence to God. For all the good that is in created things has been created by God, as was + shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html">Q[6], A[4]</a>). In created things good is found not only as regards their substance, but also as regards their order towards an end and + especially their last end, which, as was said above, is the divine goodness ( + <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A4.html">Q[21], A[4]</a>). This good of order existing in things created, is + itself created by God. Since, however, God is the cause of things by His intellect, and thus it behooves that the type of + every effect should pre-exist in Him, as is clear from what has gone before ( + <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>), it is necessary that the type of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and the type + of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking, providence. For it is the chief part of prudence, to which two other + parts are + directed---namely, remembrance of the past, and understanding of the present; inasmuch as from the remembrance of what is + past and the understanding of what is present, we gather how to provide for the future. Now it belongs to prudence, according + to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), to direct other things towards an end whether in regard to oneself---as for instance, + a man is said to be prudent, who orders well his acts towards the end of life--or in regard to others subject to him, in a + family, city or kingdom; in which sense it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.45" target="asv">Mat. 24:45</a>), "a faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family." In this way prudence or providence may suitably + be attributed to God. For in God Himself there can be nothing ordered towards an end, since He is the last end. This type + of order in things towards an end is therefore in God called providence. Whence Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6) that "Providence + is the divine type itself, seated in + the Supreme Ruler; which disposeth all things": which disposition may refer either to the type of the order of things towards + an end, or to the type of the order of parts in the whole. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9,10), "Prudence is what, strictly speaking, commands all that 'ebulia' has rightly + counselled and 'synesis' rightly judged" [*Cf. + <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A6.html">FS, Q[57], A[6]</a>]. Whence, though to take counsel may not be fitting to God, from the fact that counsel is an inquiry into matters that are + doubtful, nevertheless to give a command as to the ordering of things towards an end, the right reason of which He + possesses, does belong to God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.148.6" target="asv"> Ps. 148:6</a>: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away." In this manner both prudence and providence belong to God. Although + at the same time it may be said that the very reason of things to be done is called counsel in God; not because of any inquiry + necessitated, but from the certitude of the knowledge, to which those who take counsel come by inquiry. Whence it is said: + "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of + His will" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A1-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.11" target="asv">Eph. 1:11</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Two things pertain to the care of providence---namely, the "reason of order," which is called providence and disposition; + and the execution of order, which is termed government. Of these, the first is eternal, and the second is temporal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Providence resides in the intellect; but presupposes the act of willing the end. Nobody gives a precept about things done + for an end; unless he will that end. Hence prudence presupposes the moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty + is directed towards good, as the Philosopher says. Even if Providence has to do with the divine will and intellect equally, + this would not affect the divine simplicity, since in God both the will and intellect + are one and the same thing, as we have said above + <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19.html">(Q[19])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q22.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q22_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q22_A2-p0.1">Whether everything is subject to the providence of God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that everything is not subject to divine providence. For nothing foreseen can happen by chance. If then everything + was foreseen by God, nothing would happen by chance. And thus hazard and luck would disappear; which is against common opinion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a wise provider excludes any defect or evil, as far as he can, from those over whom he has a care. But we see many + evils existing. Either, then, God cannot hinder these, and thus is not omnipotent; or else He does not have care for everything. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever happens of necessity does not require providence or prudence. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. + vi, 5,9, 10,11): "Prudence is the right reason of things contingent concerning which there is counsel and choice." Since, + then, many things happen from necessity, everything cannot be subject to providence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whatsoever is left to itself cannot be subject to the providence of a governor. But men are left to themselves by + God in accordance with the words: "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 15:14</a>). And particularly in reference to the wicked: "I let them go according to the desires of their heart" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.80.13" target="asv">Ps. 80:13</a>). Everything, therefore, cannot be subject to divine + providence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:9</a>): "God doth not care for oxen [*Vulg. 'Doth God take care for oxen?']": and we may say the same of other irrational creatures. + Thus everything cannot be under the care of divine providence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said of Divine Wisdom: "She reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.1" target="asv">Wis. 8:1</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Certain persons totally denied the existence of providence, as Democritus and the Epicureans, maintaining that the world + was made by chance. Others taught that incorruptible things only were subject to providence and corruptible things not in + their individual selves, but only according to their species; for in this respect they are incorruptible. They are represented + as saying ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Job.22.14" target="asv">Job 22:14</a>): "The clouds are His covert; and He doth not + consider our things; and He walketh about the poles of heaven." Rabbi Moses, however, excluded men from the generality of + things corruptible, on account of the excellence of the intellect which they possess, but in reference to all else that suffers + corruption he adhered to the opinion of the others. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p9"> We must say, however, that all things are subject to divine providence, not only in general, but even in their own individual + selves. This is mad evident thus. For since every agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects towards that end extends + as far as the causality of the first agent extends. Whence it happens that in the effects of an agent something takes place + which has no reference towards the end, because the effect comes from a cause other than, and outside the + intention of the agent. But the causality of God, Who is the first agent, extends to all being, not only as to constituent + principles of species, but also as to the individualizing principles; not only of things incorruptible, but also of things + corruptible. Hence all things that exist in whatsoever manner are necessarily directed by God towards some end; as the Apostle + says: "Those things that are of God are well ordered [*Vulg.'Those powers that are, are ordained of God': 'Quae autem sunt, + a + Deo ordinatae sunt.' St. Thomas often quotes this passage, and invariably reads: 'Quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt.']" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1</a>). Since, therefore, as the providence of God is nothing less than the type of the order of things towards an end, as we have + said; it necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as they participate in existence, must likewise be subject to divine + providence. It has also been shown ( + <a id="FP_Q22_A2-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A6.html">Q[14], AA[6]</a>,11) that God knows all + things, both universal and particular. And since His knowledge may be compared to the things themselves, as the knowledge + of art to the objects of art, all things must of necessity come under His ordering; as all things wrought by art are subject + to the ordering of that art. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is a difference between universal and particular causes. A thing can escape the order of a particular cause; but not + the order of a universal cause. For nothing escapes the order of a particular cause, except through the intervention and hindrance + of some other particular cause; as, for instance, wood may be prevented from burning, by the action of water. Since then, + all particular causes are included under the universal cause, it could not be + that any effect should take place outside the range of that universal cause. So far then as an effect escapes the order of + a particular cause, it is said to be casual or fortuitous in respect to that cause; but if we regard the universal cause, + outside whose range no effect can happen, it is said to be foreseen. Thus, for instance, the meeting of two servants, although + to them it appears a chance circumstance, has been fully foreseen by their master, who has purposely sent to meet at the one + place, in such a way that the one knows not about the other. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is otherwise with one who has care of a particular thing, and one whose providence is universal, because a particular + provider excludes all defects from what is subject to his care as far as he can; whereas, one who provides universally allows + some little defect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be hindered. Hence, corruption and defects in natural things + are said to be contrary to some particular nature; yet they are in keeping with the + plan of universal nature; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields to the good of another, or even to the universal good: + for the corruption of one is the generation of another, and through this it is that a species is kept in existence. Since + God, then, provides universally for all being, it belongs to His providence to permit certain defects in particular effects, + that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much good would be absent from + the + universe. A lion would cease to live, if there were no slaying of animals; and there would be no patience of martyrs if there + were no tyrannical persecution. Thus Augustine says (Enchiridion 2): "Almighty God would in no wise permit evil to exist in + His works, unless He were so almighty and so good as to produce good even from evil." It would appear that it was on account + of these two arguments to which we have just replied, that some were persuaded to consider corruptible things---e.g. casual + and evil things---as removed from the care of divine providence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man is not the author of nature; but he uses natural things in applying art and virtue to his own use. Hence human providence + does not reach to that which takes place in nature from necessity; but divine providence extends thus far, since God is the + author of nature. Apparently it was this argument that moved those who withdrew the course of nature from the care of divine + providence, attributing it rather to the necessity of matter, as Democritus, and + others of the ancients. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When it is said that God left man to himself, this does not mean that man is exempt from divine providence; but merely that + he has not a prefixed operating force determined to only the one effect; as in the case of natural things, which are only + acted upon as though directed by another towards an end; and do not act of themselves, as if they directed themselves towards + an end, like rational creatures, through the possession of free will, by which + these are able to take counsel and make a choice. Hence it is significantly said: "In the hand of his own counsel." But since + the very act of free will is traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily follows that everything happening from the exercise + of free will must be subject to divine providence. For human providence is included under the providence of God, as a particular + under a universal cause. God, however, extends His providence over the just in a certain more excellent way than over + the wicked; inasmuch as He prevents anything happening which would impede their final salvation. For "to them that love God, + all things work together unto good" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.28" target="asv">Rom. 8:28</a>). But from the fact that He does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin, He is said to abandon them: not that He altogether + withdraws His providence from them; otherwise they would return to nothing, if they were not preserved in existence by His + providence. This was the reason that had weight with + Tully, who withdrew from the care of divine providence human affairs concerning which we take counsel. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since a rational creature has, through its free will, control over its actions, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q22_A2-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A10.html">Q[19], A[10]</a>), it is subject to divine providence in an especial manner, so that something is imputed to it as a fault, or as a merit; + and there is given it accordingly something by way of punishment or reward. In this way, the Apostle withdraws oxen from the + care of God: not, however, that individual irrational creatures escape + the care of divine providence; as was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p15"></p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A2-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q22_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q22_A3-p0.1">Whether God has immediate providence over everything?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not immediate providence over all things. For whatever is contained in the notion of dignity, must + be attributed to God. But it belongs to the dignity of a king, that he should have ministers; through whose mediation he provides + for his subjects. Therefore much less has God Himself immediate providence over all things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to providence to order all things to an end. Now the end of everything is its perfection and its good. + But it appertains to every cause to direct its effect to good; wherefore every active cause is a cause of the effect of providence. + If therefore God were to have immediate providence over all things, all secondary causes would be withdrawn. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 17) that, "It is better to be ignorant of some things than to know them, for example, + vile things": and the Philosopher says the same (Metaph. xii, 51). But whatever is better must be assigned to God. Therefore + He has not immediate providence over bad and vile things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.34.13" target="asv">Job 34:13</a>): "What other hath He appointed over the earth? or whom hath He set over the world which He made?" On which passage Gregory + says (Moral. xxiv, 20): "Himself He ruleth the world which He Himself hath made." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Two things belong to providence---namely, the type of the order of things foreordained towards an end; and the execution + of this order, which is called government. As regards the first of these, God has immediate providence over everything, because + He has in His intellect the types of everything, even the smallest; and whatsoever causes He assigns to certain effects, He + gives them the power to produce those effects. Whence it must be that He has beforehand + the type of those effects in His mind. As to the second, there are certain intermediaries of God's providence; for He governs + things inferior by superior, not on account of any defect in His power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness; so + that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures. Thus Plato's opinion, as narrated by Gregory of Nyssa (De Provid. + viii, 3), is exploded. He taught a threefold providence. First, one which belongs to the supreme Deity, Who first and + foremost has provision over spiritual things, and thus over the whole world as regards genus, species, and universal causes. + The second providence, which is over the individuals of all that can be generated and corrupted, he attributed to the divinities + who circulate in the heavens; that is, certain separate substances, which move corporeal things in a circular direction. The + third providence, over human affairs, he assigned to demons, whom the Platonic philosophers placed between us and the + gods, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei, 1, 2: viii, 14). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It pertains to a king's dignity to have ministers who execute his providence. But the fact that he has not the plan of those + things which are done by them arises from a deficiency in himself. For every operative science is the more perfect, the more + it considers the particular things with which its action is concerned. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's immediate provision over everything does not exclude the action of secondary causes; which are the executors of His + order, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q22_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A5.html">Q[19], AA[5]</a>,8). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is better for us not to know low and vile things, because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is better and + higher; for we cannot understand many things simultaneously; because the thought of evil sometimes perverts the will towards + evil. This does not hold with God, Who sees everything simultaneously at one glance, and whose will cannot turn in the direction + of evil. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q22_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q22_A4-p0.1">Whether providence imposes any necessity on things foreseen?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that divine providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen. For every effect that has a "per se" cause, either + present or past, which it necessarily follows, happens from necessity; as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vi, 7). But the + providence of God, since it is eternal, pre-exists; and the effect flows from it of necessity, for divine providence cannot + be frustrated. Therefore divine providence imposes a necessity upon things foreseen. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every provider makes his work as stable as he can, lest it should fail. But God is most powerful. Therefore He assigns + the stability of necessity to things provided. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6): "Fate from the immutable source of providence binds together human acts and fortunes + by the indissoluble connection of causes." It seems therefore that providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says that (Div. Nom. iv, 23) "to corrupt nature is not the work of providence." But it is in the nature of some + things to be contingent. Divine providence does not therefore impose any necessity upon things so as to destroy their contingency. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Divine providence imposes necessity upon some things; not upon all, as some formerly believed. For to providence it belongs + to order things towards an end. Now after the divine goodness, which is an extrinsic end to all things, the principal good + in things themselves is the perfection of the universe; which would not be, were not all grades of being found in things. + Whence it pertains to divine providence to produce every grade of being. And thus it has + prepared for some things necessary causes, so that they happen of necessity; for others contingent causes, that they may happen + by contingency, according to the nature of their proximate causes. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The effect of divine providence is not only that things should happen somehow; but that they should happen either by necessity + or by contingency. Therefore whatsoever divine providence ordains to happen infallibly and of necessity happens infallibly + and of necessity; and that happens from contingency, which the plan of divine providence conceives to happen from contingency. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The order of divine providence is unchangeable and certain, so far as all things foreseen happen as they have been foreseen, + whether from necessity or from contingency. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That indissolubility and unchangeableness of which Boethius speaks, pertain to the certainty of providence, which fails not + to produce its effect, and that in the way foreseen; but they do not pertain to the necessity of the effects. We must remember + that properly speaking 'necessary' and "contingent" are consequent upon being, as such. Hence the mode both of necessity and + of contingency falls under the foresight of God, who provides universally for + all being; not under the foresight of causes that provide only for some particular order of things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q22_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q21_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q23" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q23-p0.1">OF PREDESTINATION (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q23-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q23-p2"> After consideration of divine providence, we must treat of predestination and the book of life. Concerning predestination + there are eight points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23-p3"> (1) Whether predestination is suitably attributed to God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q23-p4"> (2) What is predestination, and whether it places anything in the predestined?</p> + <p id="FP_Q23-p5"> (3) Whether to God belongs the reprobation of some men?</p> + <p id="FP_Q23-p6"> (4) On the comparison of predestination to election; whether, that is to say, the predestined are chosen?</p> + <p id="FP_Q23-p7"> (5) Whether merits are the cause or reason of predestination, or reprobation, or election?</p> + <p id="FP_Q23-p8"> (6) of the certainty of predestination; whether the predestined will infallibly be saved?</p> + <p id="FP_Q23-p9"> (7) Whether the number of the predestined is certain?</p> + <p id="FP_Q23-p10"> (8) Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?</p> + <div id="FP_Q23_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q23_A1-p0.1">Whether men are predestined by God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that men are not predestined by God, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): "It must be borne in mind that God + foreknows but does not predetermine everything, since He foreknows all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all." But + human merit and demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts by free will. All that pertains therefore + to merit or demerit is not predestined by God; and thus man's predestination is done + away. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all creatures are directed to their end by divine providence, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2). But other creatures are not said to be predestined by God. Therefore neither are men. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angels are capable of beatitude, as well as men. But predestination is not suitable to angels, since in them + there never was any unhappiness (miseria); for predestination, as Augustine says (De praedest. sanct. 17), is the "purpose + to take pity [miserendi]" [*See + <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a>]. Therefore men are not predestined. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the benefits God confers upon men are revealed by the Holy Ghost to holy men according to the saying of the Apostle + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:12</a>): "Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God: that we may know the things that are + given us from God." Therefore if man were predestined by God, since predestination is a benefit from God, his predestination + would be made known to each predestined; which is clearly false. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.30" target="asv">Rom. 8:30</a>): "Whom He predestined, them He also called." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is fitting that God should predestine men. For all things are subject to His providence, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end, as was also said ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2). The end towards which created things are directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of + created nature; and this end is life eternal, that consists in seeing + God which is above the nature of every creature, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">Q[12], A[4]</a>). The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power + of its nature. Now if a thing cannot attain to something by the power of its nature, it must be directed thereto by another; + thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of eternal + life, is led towards it, + directed, as it were, by God. The reason of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him is the type of the order of all things + towards an end, which we proved above to be providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be done, is a + kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done. Hence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards + the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that + predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of providence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Damascene calls predestination an imposition of necessity, after the manner of natural things which are predetermined towards + one end. This is clear from his adding: "He does not will malice, nor does He compel virtue." Whence predestination is not + excluded by Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Irrational creatures are not capable of that end which exceeds the faculty of human nature. Whence they cannot be properly + said to be predestined; although improperly the term is used in respect of any other end. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Predestination applies to angels, just as it does to men, although they have never been unhappy. For movement does not take + its species from the term "wherefrom" but from the term "whereto." Because it matters nothing, in respect of the notion of + making white, whether he who is made white was before black, yellow or red. Likewise it matters nothing in respect of the + notion of predestination whether one is predestined to life eternal from the state of + misery or not. Although it may be said that every conferring of good above that which is due pertains to mercy; as was shown + previously ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A3.html">Q[21], AA[3]</a>,4). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even if by a special privilege their predestination were revealed to some, it is not fitting that it should be revealed to + everyone; because, if so, those who were not predestined would despair; and security would beget negligence in the predestined. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q23_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q23_A2-p0.1">Whether predestination places anything in the predestined?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that predestination does place something in the predestined. For every action of itself causes passion. If therefore + predestination is action in God, predestination must be passion in the predestined. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Origen says on the text, "He who was predestined," etc. ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.4" target="asv">Rom. 1:4</a>): "Predestination is of one who is not; destination, of one who is." And Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct.): "What is predestination + but the destination of one who is?" Therefore predestination is only of one who actually exists; and it thus places something + in the predestined. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, preparation is something in the thing prepared. But predestination is the preparation of God's benefits, as Augustine + says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14). Therefore predestination is something in the predestined. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, nothing temporal enters into the definition of eternity. But grace, which is something temporal, is found in the + definition of predestination. For predestination is the preparation of grace in the present; and of glory in the future. Therefore + predestination is not anything eternal. So it must needs be that it is in the predestined, and not in God; for whatever is + in Him is eternal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14) that "predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits." But foreknowledge + is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who foreknows them. Therefore, predestination is in the one who predestines, + and not in the predestined. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Predestination is not anything in the predestined; but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that predestination + is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the provider, + as was proved above ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], A[1]</a>). But the execution of providence which is called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed, and in an active + way in the governor. + Whence it is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing + in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God. The + execution of predestination is the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.30" target="asv">Rom. 8:30</a>): "Whom He predestined, them He also called and whom He called, them He also magnified [Vulg. 'justified']." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Actions passing out to external matter imply of themselves passion---for example, the actions of warming and cutting; but + not so actions remaining in the agent, as understanding and willing, as said above ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html">Q[14], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q23_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q18_A3.html">Q[18], A[3]</a>, ad 1). Predestination is an action of this latter class. Wherefore, it does not put anything in the predestined. But its + execution, which passes out to external things, has + an effect in them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Destination sometimes denotes a real mission of someone to a given end; thus, destination can only be said of someone actually + existing. It is taken, however, in another sense for a mission which a person conceives in the mind; and in this manner we + are said to destine a thing which we firmly propose in our mind. In this latter way it is said that Eleazar "determined not + to do any unlawful things for the love of life" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.6.20" target="asv">2 Macc. + 6:20 + </a>). Thus destination can be of a thing which does not exist. Predestination, however, by reason of the antecedent nature it + implies, can be attributed to a thing which does not actually exist; in whatsoever way destination is accepted. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Preparation is twofold: of the patient in respect to passion and this is in the thing prepared; and of the agent to action, + and this is in the agent. Such a preparation is predestination, and as an agent by intellect is said to prepare itself to + act, accordingly as it preconceives the idea of what is to be done. Thus, God from all eternity prepared by predestination, + conceiving the idea of the order of some towards salvation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Grace does not come into the definition of predestination, as something belonging to its essence, but inasmuch as predestination + implies a relation to grace, as of cause to effect, and of act to its object. Whence it does not follow that predestination + is anything temporal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q23_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q23_A3-p0.1">Whether God reprobates any man?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God reprobates no man. For nobody reprobates what he loves. But God loves every man, according to ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.25" target="asv">Wis. 11:25</a>): "Thou lovest all things that are, and Thou hatest none of the things Thou hast made." Therefore God reprobates no man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if God reprobates any man, it would be necessary for reprobation to have the same relation to the reprobates as + predestination has to the predestined. But predestination is the cause of the salvation of the predestined. Therefore reprobation + will likewise be the cause of the loss of the reprobate. But this false. For it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.13.9" target="asv">Osee 13:9</a>): "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; Thy help is only in Me." God does not, then, reprobate + any man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to no one ought anything be imputed which he cannot avoid. But if God reprobates anyone, that one must perish. For + it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.14" target="asv">Eccles. 7:14</a>): "Consider the works of God, that no man can correct whom He hath despised." Therefore it could not be imputed to any man, + were he to perish. But this is false. Therefore God does not reprobate anyone. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.1.2" target="asv">Malachi 1:2,3</a>): "I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> God does reprobate some. For it was said above + <a id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things + which are subject to providence, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit + some to fall away from that end; this is called + reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation + is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, + but also something more, as does providence, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], A[1]</a>). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit + a person to fall into + sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them all. + So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular good---namely, eternal life---He is said to hate or reprobated them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reprobation differs in its causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future + life by the predestined---namely, glory---and of what is received in this life---namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not + the cause of what is in the present---namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of + what is assigned in the future---namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from + the free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way, the word of the prophet is true---namely, + "Destruction is thy own, O Israel." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the reprobated + cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as implying absolute impossibility: but only conditional impossibility: as + was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>), that the predestined must necessarily be saved; yet a conditional necessity, which does not do away with the liberty of + choice. Whence, although + anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the + use of his free-will. Hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q23_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q23_A4-p0.1">Whether the predestined are chosen by God? [*"Eligantur."]</h4> + <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the predestined are not chosen by God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1) that as the corporeal sun sends + his rays upon all without selection, so does God His goodness. But the goodness of God is communicated to some in an especial + manner through a participation of grace and glory. Therefore God without any selection communicates His grace and glory; and + this belongs to predestination. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, election is of things that exist. But predestination from all eternity is also of things which do not exist. Therefore, + some are predestined without election. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, election implies some discrimination. Now God "wills all men to be saved" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:4</a>). Therefore, predestination which ordains men towards eternal salvation, is without election. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.4" target="asv">Eph. 1:4</a>): "He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Predestination presupposes election in the order of reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that predestination, + as stated above + <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering + of some things towards an end; as was proved above ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end + already exists. Whence the predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that God wills + their salvation; and to this belong both election and love:---love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of eternal + salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html">Q[20], AA[2]</a>,3):---election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated above + + <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Election and love, however, are differently ordered in God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not + cause good, but we are incited to love by the good which already exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election + in us precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the + cause of that good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love + precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects of + election and love. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered, God communicates His goodness without election; inasmuch + as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness, as we said above ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html">Q[6], A[4]</a>). But if we consider the communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it without election; since He gives + certain goods to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus in the + conferring of grace and glory election is implied. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the will of the person choosing is incited to make a choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen, the + choice must needs be of those things which already exist, as happens in our choice. In God it is otherwise; as was said above + ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html">Q[20], A[2]</a>). Thus, as Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11): "Those are chosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does not err in His + choice." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will, which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent + will, which is to will simply. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q23_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q23_A5-p0.1">Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.29" target="asv">Rom. 8:29</a>): "Whom He foreknew, He also predestined." Again a gloss of Ambrose on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.15" target="asv"> Rom. 9:15</a>: "I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy" says: "I will give mercy to him who, I foresee, will turn to Me with his + whole heart." Therefore it seems the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Divine predestination includes the divine will, which by no means can be irrational; since predestination is "the + purpose to have mercy," as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 17). But there can be no other reason for predestination than + the foreknowledge of merits. Therefore it must be the cause of reason of predestination. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "There is no injustice in God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.14" target="asv">Rom. 9:14</a>). Now it would seem unjust that unequal things be given to equals. But all men are equal as regards both nature and original + sin; and inequality in them arises from the merits or demerits of their actions. Therefore God does not prepare unequal things + for men by predestinating and reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and demerits. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Titus.3.5" target="asv">Titus 3:5</a>): "Not by works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us." But as He saved us, so He predestined + that we should be saved. Therefore, foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of predestination. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since predestination includes will, as was said above + <a id="FP_Q23_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, the reason of predestination must be sought for in the same way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above + ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A5.html">Q[19], A[5]</a> ), that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the + part of the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on account of something else. + Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator. + But this is the question, whether, as regards the effect, predestination has any cause; or what comes to the same thing, whether + God pre-ordained that He would give the effect of predestination to anyone on account of any merits. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p7"> Accordingly there were some who held that the effect of predestination was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing + merits in a former life. This was the opinion of Origen, who thought that the souls of men were created in the beginning, + and according to the diversity of their works different states were assigned to them in this world when united with the body. + The Apostle, however, rebuts this opinion where he says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.11" target="asv">Rom. 9:11,12</a>): "For when they were + not yet born, nor had done any good or evil . . . not of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said of her: The elder shall + serve the younger." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p8"> Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians + taught that the beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummation from God: so that it came about that the effect + of predestination was granted to one, and not to another, because the one made a beginning by preparing, whereas the other + did not. But against this we have the saying of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.5" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:5</a>), that "we are not + sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves." Now no principle of action can be imagined previous to the act + of thinking. Wherefore it cannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason of the effect of predestination. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p9"> And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand + that God gives grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it, because He knows beforehand that He will make good + use of that grace, as if a king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make good use of it. But these + seem to have drawn a distinction between that which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as + if the same thing cannot come from both. It is, however, manifest that what is of grace is the effect of predestination; and + this cannot be considered as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the notion of predestination. Therefore, + if anything else in us be the reason of predestination, it will outside the effect of predestination. Now there is no distinction + between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; as there is not distinction between what flows from a + secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of God produces effects through the operation of secondary causes, + as was above shown ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We must say, therefore, that the effect of predestination + may be considered in a twofold light---in one way, in particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of predestination + should not be the reason or cause of another; a subsequent + effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent + as its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the matter. Thus we might say that God pre-ordained to give + glory on account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace to merit glory. In another way, the effect of predestination + may be considered in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination in general should have + any cause as coming from us; because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all included under the effect + of predestination; even the preparation for grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by divine help, according to + the prophet Jeremias ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Lam.5.21" target="asv">Lam. 5:21</a>): "convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted." Yet predestination has in this way, in regard to its effect, + the goodness of God for its reason; towards which the whole effect of + predestination is directed as to an end; and from which it proceeds, as from its first moving principle. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The use of grace foreknown by God is not the cause of conferring grace, except after the manner of a final cause; as was + explained above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Predestination has its foundation in the goodness of God as regards its effects in general. Considered in its particular + effects, however, one effect is the reason of another; as already stated. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He + is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is + necessary that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because + creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that + for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low + place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good + things should never happen, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness + in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, + by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing + them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.22" target="asv">Rom. 9:22,23</a>): "What if God, willing to show His wrath [that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power known, endured [that + is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His + glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory" and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.3" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.20" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:20</a>): "But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto + honor, but some unto dishonor." Yet why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine + will. Whence Augustine says (Tract. xxvi. in Joan.): "Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou + dost not wish to err." + Thus too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it + was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity + of species in things of nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form, and that under another, + depends upon the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part of + the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place. + Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This + would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratuitously. + In things which are given gratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he deprives nobody + of his due), without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said: "Take what is thine, and go thy + way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.20.14" target="asv">Mat. 20:14,15</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A5-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q23_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q23_A6-p0.1">Whether predestination is certain?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that predestination is not certain. Because on the words "Hold fast that which thou hast, that no one take thy crown," + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.3.11" target="asv">Rev 3:11</a>), Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 15): "Another will not receive, unless this one were to lose it." Hence the crown which + is the effect of predestination can be both acquired and lost. Therefore predestination cannot be certain. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, granted what is possible, nothing impossible follows. But it is possible that one predestined---e.g. Peter---may + sin and then be killed. But if this were so, it would follow that the effect of predestination would be thwarted. This then, + is not impossible. Therefore predestination is not certain. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever God could do in the past, He can do now. But He could have not predestined whom He hath predestined. Therefore + now He is able not to predestine him. Therefore predestination is not certain. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.29" target="asv"> Rom. 8:29</a>: "Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated", says: "Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of + God, by which whosoever are freed will most certainly be freed." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that, namely, its effect + should take place from necessity. For it was said above + <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, that predestination is a part of providence. But not all things subject to providence are necessary; some things happening + from contingency, according to the nature of the proximate causes, which divine providence has ordained for such effects. + Yet + the order of providence is infallible, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A4.html">Q[22], A[4]</a>). So also the order of predestination is certain; yet free-will is not destroyed; whence the effect of predestination has + its contingency. Moreover all that has been said about the divine knowledge and will ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html">Q[14], A[13]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>) must also be taken into consideration; since they do not destroy contingency in things, although they themselves are + most certain and infallible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The crown may be said to belong to a person in two ways; first, by God's predestination, and thus no one loses his crown: + secondly, by the merit of grace; for what we merit, in a certain way is ours; and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal + sin. Another person receives that crown thus lost, inasmuch as he takes the former's place. For God does not permit some to + fall, without raising others; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Job.34.24" target="asv"> Job 34:24</a>: "He shall + break in pieces many and innumerable, and make others to stand in their stead." Thus men are substituted in the place of the + fallen angels; and the Gentiles in that of the Jews. He who is substituted for another in the state of grace, also receives + the crown of the fallen in that in eternal life he will rejoice at the good the other has done, in which life he will rejoice + at all good whether done by himself or by others. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although it is possible for one who is predestinated considered in himself to die in mortal sin; yet it is not possible, + supposed, as in fact it is supposed. that he is predestinated. Whence it does not follow that predestination can fall short + of its effect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since predestination includes the divine will as stated above + <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html">(A[4])</a>: and the fact that God wills any created thing is necessary on the supposition that He so wills, on account of the immutability + of the divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so the same must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not to + say that God is able not to predestinate one whom He has predestinated, taking it in a composite sense, + thought, absolutely speaking, God can predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty of predestination is not destroyed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A6-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q23_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q23_A7-p0.1">Whether the number of the predestined is certain?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the number of the predestined is not certain. For a number to which an addition can be made is not certain. + But there can be an addition to the number of the predestined as it seems; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.1.11" target="asv">Dt. 1:11</a>): "The Lord God adds to this number many thousands," and a gloss adds, "fixed by God, who knows those who belong to Him." + Therefore the number of the predestined is not certain. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no reason can be assigned why God pre-ordains to salvation one number of men more than another. But nothing is arranged + by God without a reason. Therefore the number to be saved pre-ordained by God cannot be certain. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the operations of God are more perfect than those of nature. But in the works of nature, good is found in the majority + of things; defect and evil in the minority. If, then, the number of the saved were fixed by God at a certain figure, there + would be more saved than lost. Yet the contrary follows from + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.13" target="asv"> Mat. 7:13,14</a>: "For wide is the gate, and broad the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat. How narrow + is the gate, and strait is the way that leadeth to life; and few there are who find it!" Therefore the number of those pre-ordained + by God to be saved is not certain. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 13): "The number of the predestined is certain, and can neither be increased nor diminished." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The number of the predestined is certain. Some have said that it was formally, but not materially certain; as if we were + to say that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be saved; not however these or those individuals. But this destroys + the certainty of predestination; of which we spoke above + <a id="FP_Q23_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A6.html">(A[6])</a>. Therefore we must say that to God the number of the predestined is certain, not only formally, but also materially. It + must, however, be observed that the number of the predestined is said to be certain to God, not by reason of His knowledge, + because, that is to say, He knows how many will be saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain and the sands of the + sea are certain to God); but by reason of His deliberate choice and determination. For the further evidence of which we must + remember that every agent intends to make something finite, as is clear from what has been said above when we treated of the + infinite ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A7-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html">Q[7], AA[2]</a>,3). Now whosoever intends some definite measure in his effect thinks out some definite number in the essential parts, which + are by their very nature required for the perfection of the whole. For of those things which are required not principally, + but only on account of something else, he does not select any definite number "per se"; but he accepts and uses them in such + numbers as are necessary on account of that other thing. For instance, a builder + thinks out the definite measurements of a house, and also the definite number of rooms which he wishes to make in the house; + and definite measurements of the walls and roof; he does not, however, select a definite number of stones, but accepts and + uses just so many as are sufficient for the required measurements of the wall. So also must we consider concerning God in + regard to the whole universe, which is His effect. For He pre-ordained the measurements of the whole of the universe, and + what + number would befit the essential parts of that universe---that is to say, which have in some way been ordained in perpetuity; + how many spheres, how many stars, how many elements, and how many species. Individuals, however, which undergo corruption, + are not ordained as it were chiefly for the good of the universe, but in a secondary way, inasmuch as the good of the species + is preserved through them. Whence, although God knows the total number of individuals, the number of oxen, flies and such + like, is not pre-ordained by God "per se"; but divine providence produces just so many as are sufficient for the preservation + of the species. Now of all creatures the rational creature is chiefly ordained for the good of the universe, being as such + incorruptible; more especially those who attain to eternal happiness, since they more immediately reach the ultimate end. + Whence the number of the predestined is certain to God; not only by way of knowledge, but also by way of a principal + pre-ordination. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p7"> It is not exactly the same thing in the case of the number of the reprobate, who would seem to be pre-ordained by God for + the good of the elect, in whose regard "all things work together unto good" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A7-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.28" target="asv">Rom. 8:28</a>). Concerning the number of all the predestined, some say that so many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as + there were angels left; others, as many as the number of angels created by God. It is, however, better to say that, "to God + alone is + known the number for whom is reserved eternal happiness [*From the 'secret' prayer of the missal, 'pro vivis et defunctis.']" + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Deuteronomy must be taken as applied to those who are marked out by God beforehand in respect to present righteousness. + For their number is increased and diminished, but not the number of the predestined. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason of the quantity of any one part must be judged from the proportion of that part of the whole. Thus in God the + reason why He has made so many stars, or so many species of things, or predestined so many, is according to the proportion + of the principal parts to the good of the whole universe. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The good that is proportionate to the common state of nature is to be found in the majority; and is wanting in the minority. + The good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be found in the minority, and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is + clear that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guidance of life; and those who have not this knowledge + are said to be half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a profound knowledge + of things intelligible are a very small minority in respect to the rest. Since their eternal happiness, consisting in the + vision of God, exceeds the common state of nature, and especially in so far as this is deprived of grace through the corruption + of original sin, those who are saved are in the minority. In this especially, however, appears the mercy of God, that He has + chosen some for that salvation, from which very many in accordance with the common course and tendency of nature fall + short. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A7-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q23_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q24.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q23_A8-p0.1">Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For nothing eternal can be preceded by anything + temporal; and in consequence nothing temporal can help towards making something else eternal. But predestination is eternal. + Therefore, since the prayers of the saints are temporal, they cannot so help as to cause anyone to become predestined. Predestination + therefore is not furthered by the prayers of the saints. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as there is no need of advice except on account of defective knowledge, so there is not need of help except through + defective power. But neither of these things can be said of God when He predestines. Whence it is said: "Who hath helped the + Spirit of the Lord? [*Vulg.: 'Who hath known the mind of the Lord?'] Or who hath been His counsellor?" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.34" target="asv">Rom. 11:34</a>). Therefore predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a thing can be helped, it can also be hindered. But predestination cannot be hindered by anything. Therefore + it cannot be furthered by anything. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said that "Isaac besought the Lord for his wife because she was barren; and He heard him and made Rebecca to conceive" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.25.21" target="asv">Gn. 25:21</a>). But from that conception Jacob was born, and he was predestined. Now his predestination would not have happened if he had + never been born. Therefore predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Concerning this question, there were different errors. Some, regarding the certainty of divine predestination, said that + prayers were superfluous, as also anything else done to attain salvation; because whether these things were done or not, the + predestined would attain, and the reprobate would not attain, eternal salvation. But against this opinion are all the warnings + of Holy Scripture, exhorting us to prayer and other good works. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p7"> Others declared that the divine predestination was altered through prayer. This is stated to have the opinion of the Egyptians, + who thought that the divine ordination, which they called fate, could be frustrated by certain sacrifices and prayers. Against + this also is the authority of Scripture. For it is said: "But the triumpher in Israel will not spare and will not be moved + to repentance" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.15.29" target="asv">1 Kings 15:29</a>); and that "the gifts and the calling of God are + without repentance" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.29" target="asv">Rom. 11:29</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p8"> Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are to be considered---namely, the divine ordination; and + its effect. As regards the former, in no possible way can predestination be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For it + is not due to their prayers that anyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter, predestination is said to be helped + by the prayers of the saints, and by other good works; because providence, of which predestination is a part, does + not do away with secondary causes but so provides effects, that the order of secondary causes falls also under providence. + So, as natural effects are provided by God in such a way that natural causes are directed to bring about those natural effects, + without which those effects would not happen; so the salvation of a person is predestined by God in such a way, that whatever + helps that person towards salvation falls under the order of predestination; whether it be one's own prayers or those of + another; or other good works, and such like, without which one would not attain to salvation. Whence, the predestined must + strive after good works and prayer; because through these means predestination is most certainly fulfilled. For this reason + it is said: "Labor more that by good works you may make sure your calling and election" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.1.10" target="asv">2 Pet. 1:10</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument shows that predestination is not furthered by the prayers of the saints, as regards the preordination. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One is said to be helped by another in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as he receives power from him: and to be helped thus + belongs to the weak; but this cannot be said of God, and thus we are to understand, "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord?" + In another way one is said to be helped by a person through whom he carries out his work, as a master through a servant. In + this way God is helped by us; inasmuch as we execute His orders, according to + + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:9</a>: "We are God's co-adjutors." Nor is this on account of any defect in the power of God, but because He employs intermediary + causes, in order that the beauty of order may be preserved in the universe; and also that He may communicate to creatures + the dignity of causality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Secondary causes cannot escape the order of the first universal cause, as has been said above ( + <a id="FP_Q23_A8-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A6.html">Q[19], A[6]</a>), indeed, they execute that order. And therefore predestination can be furthered by creatures, but it cannot be impeded by + them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q23_A8-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q24.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q22_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q24" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q24-p0.1">THE BOOK OF LIFE (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q24-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q24-p2"> We now consider the book of life; concerning which there are three points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q24-p3"> (1) What is the book of life?</p> + <p id="FP_Q24-p4"> (2) Of what life is it the book?</p> + <p id="FP_Q24-p5"> (3) Whether anyone can be blotted out of the book of life?</p> + <div id="FP_Q24_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q24.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q24_A1-p0.1">Whether the book of life is the same as predestination?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the book of life is not the same thing as pre-destination. For it is said, "All things are the book of life" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.4.32" target="asv">Ecclus. 4:32</a>)---i.e. the Old and New Testament according to a gloss. This, however, is not predestination. Therefore the book of life + is not predestination. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 14) that "the book of life is a certain divine energy, by which it happens that + to each one his good or evil works are recalled to memory." But divine energy belongs seemingly, not to predestination, but + rather to divine power. Therefore the book of life is not the same thing as predestination. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, reprobation is opposed to predestination. So, if the book of life were the same as predestination, there should + also be a book of death, as there is a book of life. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in a gloss upon + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.68.29" target="asv"> Ps. 68:29, </a> "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living. This book is the knowledge of God, by which He hath predestined to life + those whom He foreknew." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The book of life is in God taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a comparison with human affairs. For it is usual among + men that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed in a book; as, for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who + formerly were called "conscript" fathers. Now it is clear from the preceding ( + <a id="FP_Q24_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html">Q[23], A[4]</a>) that all the predestined are chosen by God to possess eternal life. This conscription, therefore, + of the predestined is called the book of life. A thing is said metaphorically to be written upon the mind of anyone when it + is firmly held in the memory, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.3" target="asv"> Prov. 3:3</a>: "Forget not My Law, and let thy heart keep My commandments," and further on, "Write them in the tables of thy heart." For + things are written down in material books to help the memory. Whence, the knowledge of God, by which He firmly remembers that + He has predestined some to eternal life, is called + the book of life. For as the writing in a book is the sign of things to be done, so the knowledge of God is a sign in Him + of those who are to be brought to eternal life, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#iiTim.11.19" target="asv">2 Tim. 11:19</a>: "The sure foundation of God standeth firm, having this seal; the Lord knoweth who are His." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The book of life may be understood in two senses. In one sense as the inscription of those who are chosen to life; thus we + now speak of the book of life. In another sense the inscription of those things which lead us to life may be called the book + of life; and this also is twofold, either as of things to be done; and thus the Old and New Testament are called a book of + life; or of things already done, and thus that divine energy by which it happens + that to each one his deeds will be recalled to memory, is spoken of as the book of life. Thus that also may be called the + book of war, whether it contains the names inscribed of those chosen for military service; or treats of the art of warfare, + or relates the deeds of soldiers. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p8"> Hence the solution of the Second Objection.</p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is the custom to inscribe, not those who are rejected, but those who are chosen. Whence there is no book of death corresponding + to reprobation; as the book of life to predestination. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Predestination and the book of life are different aspects of the same thing. For this latter implies the knowledge of predestination; + as also is made clear from the gloss quoted above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q24.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q24_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q24_A2-p0.1">Whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the predestined?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the book of life does not only regard the life of glory of the predestined. For the book of life is the knowledge + of life. But God, through His own life, knows all other life. Therefore the book of life is so called in regard to divine + life; and not only in regard to the life of the predestined. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the life of glory comes from God, so also does the life of nature. Therefore, if the knowledge of the life of + glory is called the book of life; so also should the knowledge of the life of nature be so called. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some are chosen to the life of grace who are not chosen to the life of glory; as it is clear from what is said: + "Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.6.71" target="asv">Jn. 6:71</a>). But the book of life is the inscription of the divine election, as stated above (A[1] ). Therefore it applies also to the + life of grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The book of life is the knowledge of predestination, as stated above + <a id="FP_Q24_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q24_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But predestination does not regard the life of grace, except so far as it is directed to glory; for those are not predestined + who have grace and yet fail to obtain glory. The book of life altogether is only so called in regard to the life of glory. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The book of life, as stated above + <a id="FP_Q24_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q24_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, implies a conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life. Now a man is chosen for something which does not belong to + him by nature; and again that to which a man is chosen has the aspect of an end. For a soldier is not chosen or inscribed + merely to put on armor, but to fight; since this is the proper duty to which military service is directed. But the life of + glory is an end exceeding + human nature, as said above ( + <a id="FP_Q24_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html">Q[23], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, strictly speaking, the book of life regards the life of glory. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine life, even considered as a life of glory, is natural to God; whence in His regard there is no election, and in + consequence no book of life: for we do not say that anyone is chosen to possess the power of sense, or any of those things + that are consequent on nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p8"> From this we gather the Reply to the Second Objection. For there is no election, nor a book of life, as regards the life + of nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The life of grace has the aspect, not of an end, but of something directed towards an end. Hence nobody is said to be chosen + to the life of grace, except so far as the life of grace is directed to glory. For this reason those who, possessing grace, + fail to obtain glory, are not said to be chosen simply, but relatively. Likewise they are not said to be written in the book + of life simply, but relatively; that is to say, that it is in the ordination and + knowledge of God that they are to have some relation to eternal life, according to their participation in grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q24_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q25.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q24_A3-p0.1">Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no one may be blotted out of the book of life. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 15): "God's foreknowledge, + which cannot be deceived, is the book of life." But nothing can be taken away from the foreknowledge of God, nor from predestination. + Therefore neither can anyone be blotted out from the book of life. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in a thing is in it according to the disposition of that thing. But the book of life is something eternal + and immutable. Therefore whatsoever is written therein, is there not in a temporary way, but immovably, and indelibly. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, blotting out is the contrary to inscription. But nobody can be written a second time in the book of life. Neither + therefore can he be blotted out. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said, "Let them be blotted out from the book of the living" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.68.29" target="asv">Ps. 68:29</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have said that none could be blotted out of the book of life as a matter of fact, but only in the opinion of men. For + it is customary in the Scriptures to say that something is done when it becomes known. Thus some are said to be written in + the book of life, inasmuch as men think they are written therein, on account of the present righteousness they see in them; + but when it becomes evident, either in this world or in the next, that they have fallen from + that state of righteousness, they are then said to be blotted out. And thus a gloss explains the passage: "Let them be blotted + out of the book of the living." But because not to be blotted out of the book of life is placed among the rewards of the just, + according to the text, "He that shall overcome, shall thus be clothed in white garments, and I will not blot his name out + of the book of life" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.3.5" target="asv">Apoc. 3:5</a>) (and what is promised to holy men, is not merely something in the + opinion of men), it can therefore be said that to be blotted out, and not blotted out, of the book of life is not only to + be referred to the opinion of man, but to the reality of the fact. For the book of life is the inscription of those ordained + to eternal life, to which one is directed from two sources; namely, from predestination, which direction never fails, and + from grace; for whoever has grace, by this very fact becomes fitted for eternal life. This direction fails sometimes; because + some + are directed by possessing grace, to obtain eternal life, yet they fail to obtain it through mortal sin. Therefore those who + are ordained to possess eternal life through divine predestination are written down in the book of life simply, because they + are written therein to have eternal life in reality; such are never blotted out from the book of life. Those, however, who + are ordained to eternal life, not through divine predestination, but through grace, are said to be written in the book of + life + not simply, but relatively, for they are written therein not to have eternal life in itself, but in its cause only. Yet though + these latter can be said to be blotted out of the book of life, this blotting out must not be referred to God, as if God foreknew + a thing, and afterwards knew it not; but to the thing known, namely, because God knows one is first ordained to eternal life, + and afterwards not ordained when he falls from grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The act of blotting out does not refer to the book of life as regards God's foreknowledge, as if in God there were any change; + but as regards things foreknown, which can change. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although things are immutably in God, yet in themselves they are subject to change. To this it is that the blotting out of + the book of life refers. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The way in which one is said to be blotted out of the book of life is that in which one is said to be written therein anew; + either in the opinion of men, or because he begins again to have relation towards eternal life through grace; which also is + included in the knowledge of God, although not anew. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q24_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q25.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q23_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q25" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q25-p0.1">THE POWER OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q25-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q25-p2"> After considering the divine foreknowledge and will, and other things pertaining thereto, it remains for us to consider the + power of God. About this are six points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25-p3"> (1) Whether there is power in God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q25-p4"> (2) Whether His power is infinite?</p> + <p id="FP_Q25-p5"> (3) Whether He is almighty?</p> + <p id="FP_Q25-p6"> (4) Whether He could make the past not to have been?</p> + <p id="FP_Q25-p7"> (5) Whether He could do what He does not, or not do what He does?</p> + <p id="FP_Q25-p8"> (6) Whether what He makes He could make better?</p> + <div id="FP_Q25_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q25.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q25_A1-p0.1">Whether there is power in God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that power is not in God. For as primary matter is to power, so God, who is the first agent, is to act. But primary + matter, considered in itself, is devoid of all act. Therefore, the first agent---namely, God---is devoid of power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 19), better than every power is its act. For form is better than matter; + and action than active power, since it is its end. But nothing is better than what is in God; because whatsoever is in God, + is God, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">Q[3] , A[3]</a>). Therefore, there is no power in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Power is the principle of operation. But the divine power is God's essence, since there is nothing accidental in + God: and of the essence of God there is no principle. Therefore there is no power in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">Q[14], A[8]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that God's knowledge and will are the cause of things. But the cause and principle of a thing are identical. We ought not, + therefore, to assign power to God; but only knowledge and will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "Thou art mighty, O Lord, and Thy truth is round about Thee" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.88.9" target="asv">Ps. 88:9</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Power is twofold---namely, passive, which exists not at all in God; and active, which we must assign to Him in the highest + degree. For it is manifest that everything, according as it is in act and is perfect, is the active principle of something: + whereas everything is passive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now it was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A2.html">Q[3], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], AA[1]</a>, 2), that God is pure act, simply and in all + ways perfect, nor in Him does any imperfection find place. Whence it most fittingly belongs to Him to be an active principle, + and in no way whatsoever to be passive. On the other hand, the notion of active principle is consistent with active power. + For active power is the principle of acting upon something else; whereas passive power is the principle of being acted upon + by something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 17). It remains, therefore, that in God there is active power in the + highest degree. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Active power is not contrary to act, but is founded upon it, for everything acts according as it is actual: but passive power + is contrary to act; for a thing is passive according as it is potential. Whence this potentiality is not in God, but only + active power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whenever act is distinct from power, act must be nobler than power. But God's action is not distinct from His power, for + both are His divine essence; neither is His existence distinct from His essence. Hence it does not follow that there should + be anything in God nobler than His power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In creatures, power is the principle not only of action, but likewise of effect. Thus in God the idea of power is retained, + inasmuch as it is the principle of an effect; not, however, as it is a principle of action, for this is the divine essence + itself; except, perchance, after our manner of understanding, inasmuch as the divine essence, which pre-contains in itself + all perfection that exists in created things, can be understood either under the + notion of action, or under that of power; as also it is understood under the notion of "suppositum" possessing nature, and + under that of nature. Accordingly the notion of power is retained in God in so far as it is the principle of an effect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Power is predicated of God not as something really distinct from His knowledge and will, but as differing from them logically; + inasmuch as power implies a notion of a principle putting into execution what the will commands, and what knowledge directs, + which three things in God are identified. Or we may say, that the knowledge or will of God, according as it is the effective + principle, has the notion of power contained in it. Hence the consideration of + the knowledge and will of God precedes the consideration of His power, as the cause precedes the operation and effect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q25.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q25_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q25_A2-p0.1">Whether the power of God is infinite?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the power of God is not infinite. For everything that is infinite is imperfect according to the Philosopher + (Phys. iii, 6). But the power of God is far from imperfect. Therefore it is not infinite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every power is made known by its effect; otherwise it would be ineffectual. If, then, the power of God were infinite, + it could produce an infinite effect, but this is impossible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 79) that if the power of any corporeal thing were infinite, it would cause instantaneous + movement. God, however, does not cause instantaneous movement, but moves the spiritual creature in time, and the corporeal + creature in place and time, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 20,22,23). Therefore, His power is not infinite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. viii), that "God's power is immeasurable. He is the living mighty one." Now everything that is immeasurable + is infinite. Therefore the power of God is infinite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, active power exists in God according to the measure in which He is actual. Now His existence is infinite, inasmuch as it + is not limited by anything that receives it, as is clear from what has been said, when we discussed the infinity of the divine + essence ( + <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, it is necessary that the active power in God should be infinite. For in every agent is it found that the + more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts the greater its power to act. For instance, the hotter a thing is, the + greater the power has it to give heat; and it would have infinite power to give heat, were its own heat infinite. Whence, + since the divine essence, through which God acts, is infinite, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>) it follows that His power likewise is infinite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is here speaking of an infinity in regard to matter not limited by any form; and such infinity belongs to + quantity. But the divine essence is otherwise, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>); and consequently so also His power. It does not follow, therefore, that it is imperfect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The power of a univocal agent is wholly manifested in its effect. The generative power of man, for example, is not able to + do more than beget man. But the power of a non-univocal agent does not wholly manifest itself in the production of its effect: + as, for example, the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself in the production of an animal generated from putrefaction. + Now it is clear that God is not a univocal agent. For nothing agrees with + Him either in species or in genus, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>). Whence it follows that His effect is always less than His power. It is not necessary, therefore, that the infinite power + of God should be manifested so as to produce an infinite effect. Yet even if it were to produce no effect, the power of God + would not be ineffectual; because a thing is ineffectual which is ordained towards an end to which it does not attain. But + the + power of God is not ordered toward its effect as towards an end; rather, it is the end of the effect produced by it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 79) proves that if a body had infinite power, it would cause a non-temporal movement. And he + shows that the power of the mover of heaven is infinite, because it can move in an infinite time. It remains, therefore, according + to his reckoning, that the infinite power of a body, if such existed, would move without time; not, however, the power of + an incorporeal mover. The reason of this is that one body moving another is a + univocal agent; wherefore it follows that the whole power of the agent is made known in its motion. Since then the greater + the power of a moving body, the more quickly does it move; the necessary conclusion is that if its power were infinite, it + would move beyond comparison faster, and this is to move without time. An incorporeal mover, however, is not a univocal agent; + whence it is not necessary that the whole of its power should be manifested in motion, so as to move without time; and + especially since it moves in accordance with the disposition of its will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q25_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q25_A3-p0.1">Whether God is omnipotent?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God, + for He is immovable, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q25_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Therefore He is not omnipotent. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin, nor "deny Himself" as it is said in + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.13" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:13.</a> Therefore He is not omnipotent. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is said of God that He manifests His omnipotence "especially by sparing and having mercy" [*Collect, 10th Sunday + after Pentecost]. Therefore the greatest act possible to the divine power is to spare and have mercy. There are things much + greater, however, than sparing and having mercy; for example, to create another world, and the like. Therefore God is not + omnipotent. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, upon the text, "God hath made foolish the wisdom of this world" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.1.20" target="asv">1 Cor. 1:20</a>), a gloss says: "God hath made the wisdom of this world foolish [*Vulg.: 'Hath not God', etc.] by showing those things to + be possible which it judges to be impossible." Whence it would seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in + reference to inferior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges them; but in reference to the divine power. If + God, then, were omnipotent, all things would be possible; nothing, therefore impossible. But if we take away the impossible, + then we destroy also the necessary; for what necessarily exists is impossible not to exist. Therefore there would be nothing + at all that is necessary in things if God were omnipotent. But this is an impossibility. Therefore God is not omnipotent. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "No word shall be impossible with God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.1.37" target="asv">Lk. 1:37</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for there + may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider + the matter aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase, "God can do all things," is rightly understood + to mean that God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said + to be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 17), a thing is said to be possible in two ways. First in relation + to some power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be possible to man. Secondly absolutely, on account of the + relation in which the very terms stand to each other. Now God cannot be said to be omnipotent through being able to do all + things that are possible to created nature; for the divine power extends farther than that. If, however, we were to say + that God is omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle in explaining + the nature of His power. For this would be saying nothing else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do all that He is + able to do. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p8"> It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible absolutely; which is the + second way of saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely, according to the relation + in which the very terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates + sits; and absolutely impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the subject, as, for + instance, that a man is a donkey. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p9"> It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds + a thing possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on which its active power is founded; for instance, + the power of giving warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being warmed. The divine existence, + however, upon which the nature of power in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of + being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being. Whence, whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is + numbered among the absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the + idea of being except non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the same time is repugnant to the idea + of an absolutely possible thing, within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under the divine omnipotence, + not because of any defect in the power of God, but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing. Therefore, + everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God + is called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because + it cannot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot + do + them. Nor is this contrary to the word of the angel, saying: "No word shall be impossible with God." For whatever implies + a contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His active power, not to passive power, as was shown above + <a id="FP_Q25_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Whence the fact that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to His omnipotence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To sin is to fall short of a perfect action; hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is repugnant + to omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin, because of His omnipotence. Nevertheless, the Philosopher says (Topic. + iv, 3) that God can deliberately do what is evil. But this must be understood either on a condition, the antecedent of which + is impossible---as, for instance, if we were to say that God can do evil things + if He will. For there is no reason why a conditional proposition should not be true, though both the antecedent and consequent + are impossible: as if one were to say: "If man is a donkey, he has four feet." Or he may be understood to mean that God can + do some things which now seem to be evil: which, however, if He did them, would then be good. Or he is, perhaps, speaking + after the common manner of the heathen, who thought that men became gods, like Jupiter or Mercury. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God's omnipotence is particularly shown in sparing and having mercy, because in this is it made manifest that God has supreme + power, that He freely forgives sins. For it is not for one who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free + will. Or, because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads them on to the participation of an infinite good; which is + the ultimate effect of the divine power. Or because, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q25_A3-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A4.html">Q[21], + A[4] + </a>), the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the divine works. For nothing is due to anyone, except on account + of something already given him gratuitously by God. In this way the divine omnipotence is particularly made manifest, because + to it pertains the first foundation of all good things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The absolute possible is not so called in reference either to higher causes, or to inferior causes, but in reference to itself. + But the possible in reference to some power is named possible in reference to its proximate cause. Hence those things which + it belongs to God alone to do immediately---as, for example, to create, to justify, and the like---are said to be possible + in reference to a higher cause. Those things, however, which are of such kind as + to be done by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to those inferior causes. For it is according to the condition + of the proximate cause that the effect has contingency or necessity, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q25_A3-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A1.html">Q[14], A[1]</a>, ad 2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the world is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, it judges to be + impossible to God. So it is clear that the omnipotence of God does not take away from things their impossibility and + necessity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A3-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q25_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q25_A4-p0.1">Whether God can make the past not to have been?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God can make the past not to have been. For what is impossible in itself is much more impossible than that + which is only impossible accidentally. But God can do what is impossible in itself, as to give sight to the blind, or to raise + the dead. Therefore, and much more can He do what is only impossible accidentally. Now for the past not to have been is impossible + accidentally: thus for Socrates not to be running is accidentally impossible, from + the fact that his running is a thing of the past. Therefore God can make the past not to have been. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what God could do, He can do now, since His power is not lessened. But God could have effected, before Socrates + ran, that he should not run. Therefore, when he has run, God could effect that he did not run. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is a more excellent virtue than virginity. But God can supply charity that is lost; therefore also lost + virginity. Therefore He can so effect that what was corrupt should not have been corrupt. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">Ep. 22</a> ad Eustoch.): "Although God can do all things, He cannot make a thing that is corrupt not to have been corrupted." Therefore, + for the same reason, He cannot effect that anything else which is past should not have been. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q25_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html">Q[7], A[2]</a>), there does not fall under the scope of God's omnipotence anything that implies a contradiction. Now that the past should + not have been implies a contradiction. For as it implies a contradiction to say that Socrates is sitting, and is not sitting, + so does it to say that he sat, and did not sit. But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the past. To say + that he did not sit, is to say that + it did not happen. Whence, that the past should not have been, does not come under the scope of divine power. This is what + Augustine means when he says (Contra Faust. xxix, 5): "Whosoever says, If God is almighty, let Him make what is done as if + it were not done, does not see that this is to say: If God is almighty let Him effect that what is true, by the very fact + that it is true, be false": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2): "Of this one thing alone is God deprived---namely, to + make + undone the things that have been done." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although it is impossible accidentally for the past not to have been, if one considers the past thing itself, as, for instance, + the running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past thing is considered as past, that it should not have been is impossible, + not only in itself, but absolutely since it implies a contradiction. Thus, it is more impossible than the raising of the dead; + in which there is nothing contradictory, because this is reckoned impossible + in reference to some power, that is to say, some natural power; for such impossible things do come beneath the scope of divine + power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God, in accordance with the perfection of the divine power, can do all things, and yet some things are not subject to + His power, because they fall short of being possible; so, also, if we regard the immutability of the divine power, whatever + God could do, He can do now. Some things, however, at one time were in the nature of possibility, whilst they were yet to + be done, which now fall short of the nature of possibility, when they have been done. So + is God said not to be able to do them, because they themselves cannot be done. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God can remove all corruption of the mind and body from a woman who has fallen; but the fact that she had been corrupt cannot + be removed from her; as also is it impossible that the fact of having sinned or having lost charity thereby can be removed + from the sinner. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q25_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q25_A5-p0.1">Whether God can do what He does not?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot do other than what He does. For God cannot do what He has not foreknown and pre-ordained that He + would do. But He neither foreknew nor pre-ordained that He would do anything except what He does. Therefore He cannot do except + what He does. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God can only do what ought to be done and what is right to be done. But God is not bound to do what He does not; + nor is it right that He should do what He does not. Therefore He cannot do except what He does. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God cannot do anything that is not good and befitting creation. But it is not good for creatures nor befitting them + to be otherwise than as they are. Therefore God cannot do except what He does. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "Thinkest thou that I cannot ask My Father, and He will give Me presently more than twelve legions of angels?" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.26.53" target="asv">Mat. 26:53</a>). But He neither asked for them, nor did His Father show them to refute the Jews. Therefore God can do what He does not. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In this matter certain persons erred in two ways. Some laid it down that God acts from natural necessity in such way that + as from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually takes place---as, for instance, from the seed of + man, a man must come, and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the divine operation there could not result other things, + nor another order of things, than that which now is. But we showed above ( + <a id="FP_Q25_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>) that God does not act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of all things; nor is that will naturally and + from any necessity determined to those things. Whence in no way at all is the present course of events produced by God from + any necessity, so that other things could not happen. Others, however, said that the divine power is restricted to this present + course of events through the order of the divine wisdom and justice without which God + does nothing. But since the power of God, which is His essence, is nothing else but His wisdom, it can indeed be fittingly + said that there is nothing in the divine power which is not in the order of the divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom includes + the whole potency of the divine power. Yet the order placed in creation by divine wisdom, in which order the notion of His + justice consists, as said above ( + <a id="FP_Q25_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A2.html">Q[21], A[2]</a>), is not so adequate to the divine wisdom that the divine + wisdom should be restricted to this present order of things. Now it is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man + puts into things made by him is taken from their end. So, when the end is proportionate to the things made for that end, the + wisdom of the maker is restricted to some definite order. But the divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all proportion + things created. Whence the divine wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no other course of events could + happen. Wherefore we must simply say that God can do other things than those He has done. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In ourselves, in whom power and essence are distinct from will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom, and will from + justice, there can be something in the power which is not in the just will nor in the wise intellect. But in God, power and + essence, will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Whence, there can be nothing in the divine power which + cannot also be in His just will or in His wise intellect. Nevertheless, because + His will cannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things, except upon supposition, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q25_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>), neither are the wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present order, as was shown above; so nothing prevents there + being something in the divine power which He does not will, and which is not included in the order which He has place in things. + Again, because power is considered as executing, the will as commanding, and the + intellect and wisdom as directing; what is attributed to His power considered in itself, God is said to be able to do in accordance + with His absolute power. Of such a kind is everything which has the nature of being, as was said above + <a id="FP_Q25_A5-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. What is, however, attributed to the divine power, according as it carries into execution the command of a just will, God + is said to be able to do by His ordinary power. In this manner, we must say that God can do other things by + His absolute power than those He has foreknown and pre-ordained He would do. But it could not happen that He should do anything + which He had not foreknown, and had not pre-ordained that He would do, because His actual doing is subject to His foreknowledge + and pre-ordination, though His power, which is His nature, is not so. For God does things because He wills so to do; yet the + power to do them does not come from His will, but from His nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is bound to nobody but Himself. Hence, when it is said that God can only do what He ought, nothing else is meant by this + than that God can do nothing but what is befitting to Himself, and just. But these words "befitting" and "just" may be understood + in two ways: one, in direct connection with the verb "is"; and thus they would be restricted to the present order of things; + and would concern His power. Then what is said in the objection is false; + for the sense is that God can do nothing except what is now fitting and just. If, however, they be joined directly with the + verb "can" (which has the effect of extending the meaning), and then secondly with "is," the present will be signified, but + in a confused and general way. The sentence would then be true in this sense: "God cannot do anything except that which, if + He did it, would be suitable and just." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although this order of things be restricted to what now exists, the divine power and wisdom are not thus restricted. Whence, + although no other order would be suitable and good to the things which now are, yet God can do other things and impose upon + them another order. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q25_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q26.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q25_A6-p0.1">Whether God can do better than what He does?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot do better than He does. For whatever God does, He does in a most powerful and wise way. But a thing + is so much the better done as it is more powerfully and wisely done. Therefore God cannot do anything better than He does. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine thus argues (Contra Maximin. iii, 8): "If God could, but would not, beget a Son His equal, He would have + been envious." For the same reason, if God could have made better things than He has done, but was not willing so to do, He + would have been envious. But envy is far removed from God. Therefore God makes everything of the best. He cannot therefore + make anything better than He does. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is very good and the best of all cannot be bettered; because nothing is better than the best. But as Augustine + says (Enchiridion 10), "each thing that God has made is good, and, taken all together they are very good; because in them + all consists the wondrous beauty of the universe." Therefore the good in the universe could not be made better by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Christ as man is full of grace and truth, and has the Spirit without measure; and so He cannot be better. Again + created happiness is described as the highest good, and thus cannot be better. And the Blessed Virgin Mary is raised above + all the choirs of angels, and so cannot be better than she is. God cannot therefore make all things better than He has made + them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.20" target="asv">Eph. 3:20</a>): "God is able to do all things more abundantly than we desire or understand." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The goodness of anything is twofold; one, which is of the essence of it---thus, for instance, to be rational pertains to + the essence of man. As regards this good, God cannot make a thing better than it is itself; although He can make another thing + better than it; even as He cannot make the number four greater than it is; because if it were greater it would no longer be + four, but another number. For the addition of a substantial difference in definitions is + after the manner of the addition of unity of numbers (Metaph. viii, 10). Another kind of goodness is that which is over and + above the essence; thus, the good of a man is to be virtuous or wise. As regards this kind of goodness, God can make better + the things He has made. Absolutely speaking, however, God can make something else better than each thing made by Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When it is said that God can make a thing better than He makes it, if "better" is taken substantively, this proposition is + true. For He can always make something else better than each individual thing: and He can make the same thing in one way better + than it is, and in another way not; as was explained above. If, however, "better" is taken as an adverb, implying the manner + of the making; thus God cannot make anything better than He makes it, because + He cannot make it from greater wisdom and goodness. But if it implies the manner of the thing done, He can make something + better; because He can give to things made by Him a better manner of existence as regards the accidents, although not as regards + the substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is of the nature of a son that he should be equal to his father, when he comes to maturity. But it is not of the nature + of anything created, that it should be better than it was made by God. Hence the comparison fails. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The universe, the present creation being supposed, cannot be better, on account of the most beautiful order given to things + by God; in which the good of the universe consists. For if any one thing were bettered, the proportion of order would be destroyed; + as if one string were stretched more than it ought to be, the melody of the harp would be destroyed. Yet God could make other + things, or add something to the present creation; and then there would be + another and a better universe. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The humanity of Christ, from the fact that it is united to the Godhead; and created happiness from the fact that it is the + fruition of God; and the Blessed Virgin from the fact that she is the mother of God; have all a certain infinite dignity from + the infinite good, which is God. And on this account there cannot be anything better than these; just as there cannot be anything + better than God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q25_A6-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q26.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q24_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q26" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q26-p0.1">OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES) </h3> + <p id="FP_Q26-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q26-p2"> After considering all that pertains to the unity of the divine essence, we come to treat of the divine beatitude. Concerning + this, there are four points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q26-p3"> (1) Whether beatitude belongs to God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q26-p4"> (2) In regard to what is God called blessed; does this regard His act of intellect?</p> + <p id="FP_Q26-p5"> (3) Whether He is essentially the beatitude of each of the blessed?</p> + <p id="FP_Q26-p6"> (4) Whether all other beatitude is included in the divine beatitude?</p> + <div id="FP_Q26_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q26.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q26_A1-p0.1">Whether beatitude belongs to God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q26_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that beatitude does not belong to God. For beatitude according to Boethius (De Consol. iv) "is a state made perfect + by the aggregation of all good things." But the aggregation of goods has no place in God; nor has composition. Therefore beatitude + does not belong to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, beatitude or happiness is the reward of virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9). But reward does not + apply to God; as neither does merit. Therefore neither does beatitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A1-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says: "Which in His times He shall show, who is the Blessed and only Almighty, the King of Kings and Lord of + Lords." ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q26_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.15" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:15</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A1-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Beatitude belongs to God in a very special manner. For nothing else is understood to be meant by the term beatitude than + the perfect good of an intellectual nature; which is capable of knowing that it has a sufficiency of the good which it possesses, + to which it is competent that good or ill may befall, and which can control its own actions. All of these things belong in + a most excellent manner to God, namely, to be perfect, and to possess intelligence. + Whence beatitude belongs to God in the highest degree. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A1-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Aggregation of good is in God, after the manner not of composition, but of simplicity; for those things which in creatures + is manifold, pre-exist in God, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q26_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q26_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html">Q[13], A[4]</a>), in simplicity and unity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It belongs as an accident to beatitude or happiness to be the reward of virtue, so far as anyone attains to beatitude; even + as to be the term of generation belongs accidentally to a being, so far as it passes from potentiality to act. As, then, God + has being, though not begotten; so He has beatitude, although not acquired by merit. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A1-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A1-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q26.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q26_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q26_A2-p0.1">Whether God is called blessed in respect of His intellect?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q26_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not called blessed in respect to His intellect. For beatitude is the highest good. But good is said + to be in God in regard to His essence, because good has reference to being which is according to essence, according to Boethius + (De Hebdom.). Therefore beatitude also is said to be in God in regard to His essence, and not to His intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Beatitude implies the notion of end. Now the end is the object of the will, as also is the good. Therefore beatitude + is said to be in God with reference to His will, and not with reference to His intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A2-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxxii, 7): "He is in glory, Who whilst He rejoices in Himself, needs not further praise." To be in glory, + however, is the same as to be blessed. Therefore, since we enjoy God in respect to our intellect, because "vision is the whole + of the reward," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii), it would seem that beatitude is said to be in God in respect of His + intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A2-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Beatitude, as stated above + <a id="FP_Q26_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q26_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, is the perfect good of an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as everything desires the perfection of its nature, intellectual + nature desires naturally to be happy. Now that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is the intellectual operation, + by which in some sense it grasps everything. Whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists in understanding. + Now in God, to be and to + understand are one and the same thing; differing only in the manner of our understanding them. Beatitude must therefore be + assigned to God in respect of His intellect; as also to the blessed, who are called blesses [beati] by reason of the assimilation + to His beatitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A2-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument proves that beatitude belongs to God; not that beatitude pertains essentially to Him under the aspect of His + essence; but rather under the aspect of His intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since beatitude is a good, it is the object of the will; now the object is understood as prior to the act of a power. Whence + in our manner of understanding, divine beatitude precedes the act of the will at rest in it. This cannot be other than the + act of the intellect; and thus beatitude is to be found in an act of the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A2-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A2-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q26_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q26_A3-p0.1">Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q26_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is the beatitude of each of the blessed. For God is the supreme good, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q26_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html">Q[6], AA[2]</a>,4). But it is quite impossible that there should be many supreme goods, as also is clear from what has been said above ( + <a id="FP_Q26_A3-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html">Q[11], A[3]</a>). Therefore, since it is of the essence of beatitude that it should be the supreme good, it seems that beatitude is nothing + else but God Himself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, beatitude is the last end of the rational nature. But to be the last end of the rational nature belongs only to + God. Therefore the beatitude of every blessed is God alone. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A3-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The beatitude of one is greater than that of another, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q26_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.41" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:41</a>: "Star differeth from star in glory." But nothing is greater than God. Therefore beatitude is something different from God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A3-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The beatitude of an intellectual nature consists in an act of the intellect. In this we may consider two things, namely, + the object of the act, which is the thing understood; and the act itself which is to understand. If, then, beatitude be considered + on the side of the object, God is the only beatitude; for everyone is blessed from this sole fact, that he understands God, + in accordance with the saying of Augustine (Confess. v, 4): "Blessed is he who knoweth + Thee, though he know nought else." But as regards the act of understanding, beatitude is a created thing in beatified creatures; + but in God, even in this way, it is an uncreated thing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A3-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Beatitude, as regards its object, is the supreme good absolutely, but as regards its act, in beatified creatures it is their + supreme good, not absolutely, but in that kind of goods which a creature can participate. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> End is twofold, namely, "objective" and "subjective," as the Philosopher says (Greater Ethics i, 3), namely, the "thing itself" + and "its use." Thus to a miser the end is money, and its acquisition. Accordingly God is indeed the last end of a rational + creature, as the thing itself; but created beatitude is the end, as the use, or rather fruition, of the thing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A3-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A3-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q26_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP.iii.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q26_A4-p0.1">Whether all other beatitude is included in the beatitude of God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q26_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes. For there are some false beatitudes. But nothing + false can be in God. Therefore the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a certain beatitude, according to some, consists in things corporeal; as in pleasure, riches, and such like. Now + none of these have to do with God, since He is incorporeal. Therefore His beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A4-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Beatitude is a certain perfection. But the divine perfection embraces all other perfection, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q26_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a> ). Therefore the divine beatitude embraces all other beatitudes. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A4-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Whatever is desirable in whatsoever beatitude, whether true or false, pre-exists wholly and in a more eminent degree in the + divine beatitude. As to contemplative happiness, God possesses a continual and most certain contemplation of Himself and of + all things else; and as to that which is active, He has the governance of the whole universe. As to earthly happiness, which + consists in delight, riches, power, dignity, and fame, according to Boethius (De Consol. + iii, 10), He possesses joy in Himself and all things else for His delight; instead of riches He has that complete self-sufficiency, + which is promised by riches; in place of power, He has omnipotence; for dignities, the government of all things; and in place + of fame, He possesses the admiration of all creatures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A4-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A particular kind of beatitude is false according as it falls short of the idea of true beatitude; and thus it is not in + God. But whatever semblance it has, howsoever slight, of beatitude, the whole of it pre-exists in the divine beatitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good that exists in things corporeal in a corporeal manner, is also in God, but in a spiritual manner. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A4-p8"> We have now spoken enough concerning what pertains to the unity of the divine essence.</p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A4-p9"></p> + <p id="FP_Q26_A4-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP.iii.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q25_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q26_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q1_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q2.html"></a> + ` + </div>