Mercurial > hg > Aquinas

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+					xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head><title>Bilingual Aquinas Questions 19--25</title><style>
+     h2, h3, h4 {margin-bottom: 0px; clear: both}
+    @page { size: A4 portrait; margin: 1cm}
+    </style></head><body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="bi.xsl"?><div id="FP.ii" next="FP_Q2" prev="FP_Q1_A10" progress="0.25%" n="ii" title="Treatise on The One God (QQ[2-26])"><h2 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ19-26)</h2><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19" next="FP_Q19_A1" prev="FP_Q18_A4" progress="3.41%" n="xviii" title="Question. 19 - THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p0.1">Question 19. THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p2" shownumber="no"> After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether there is will in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p7" shownumber="no"> (5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p8" shownumber="no"> (6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p9" shownumber="no"> (7) Whether the will of God is mutable?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p10" shownumber="no"> (8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p11" shownumber="no"> (9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p12" shownumber="no"> (10) Whether God has free will?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p13" shownumber="no"> (11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p14" shownumber="no"> (12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 pr."><a name="29179"><span class="ref">[29179]
+I&ordf; q. 19 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem eorum quae ad
+divinam scientiam pertinent, considerandum est de his quae
+pertinent ad voluntatem divinam, ut sit prima consideratio de ipsa
+Dei voluntate; secunda, de his quae ad voluntatem absolute
+pertinent; tertia, de his quae ad intellectum in ordine ad
+voluntatem pertinent. Circa ipsam autem voluntatem quaeruntur
+duodecim. Primo, utrum in Deo sit voluntas. Secundo, utrum Deus
+velit alia a se. Tertio, utrum quidquid Deus vult, ex necessitate
+velit. Quarto, utrum voluntas Dei sit causa rerum. Quinto, utrum
+voluntatis divinae sit assignare aliquam causam. Sexto, utrum
+voluntas divina semper impleatur. Septimo, utrum voluntas Dei sit
+mutabilis. Octavo, utrum voluntas Dei necessitatem rebus volitis
+imponat. Nono, utrum in Deo sit voluntas malorum. Decimo, utrum
+Deus habeat liberum arbitrium. Undecimo, utrum sit distinguenda in
+Deo voluntas signi. Duodecimo, utrum convenienter circa divinam
+voluntatem ponantur quinque signa.</p></div></div>
+<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1" next="FP_Q19_A2" prev="FP_Q19"
+progress="3.42%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether there is will in
+God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p0.1">Whether there
+is will in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
+style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
+seems that there is not will in God. For the object of will is the end
+and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end. Therefore there is
+not will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29180"><span class=
+"ref">[29180] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sit voluntas. Obiectum enim
+voluntatis est finis et bonum. Sed Dei non est assignare aliquem
+finem. Ergo voluntas non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
+both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p3"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, will is a kind of
+appetite. But appetite, as it is directed to things not possessed,
+implies imperfection, which cannot be imputed to God. Therefore there
+is not will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29181"><span class=
+"ref">[29181] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+voluntas est appetitus quidam. Appetitus autem, cum sit rei non
+habitae, imperfectionem designat, quae Deo non competit. Ergo
+voluntas non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
+margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p4"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the
+Philosopher (De Anima iii, 54), the will moves, and is moved. But God
+is the first cause of movement, and Himself is unmoved, as proved in
+Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there is not will in God.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29182"><span class=
+"ref">[29182] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+secundum philosophum, in III de anima, voluntas est movens motum.
+Sed Deus est primum movens immobile. Ut probatur VIII Physic. Ergo
+in Deo non est voluntas.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
+margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the
+contrary,</b> The Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.12.2"
+parsed="vul|Rom|12|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p5.1"
+passage="Rom. 12:2">Rom. 12:2</scripRef>): "That you may prove what is
+the will of God."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29183"><span class=
+"ref">[29183] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit apostolus, Rom. XII, <i>ut probetis quae sit voluntas
+Dei</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> There is will in God, as there is intellect: since will follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual existence by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards its natural form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when it has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same with every natural perfection, which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things
+  without knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also intellectual natures have a like aptitude as apprehended through its intelligible form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain to the will. Hence in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there is animal appetite. And so there must be will in God, since there is intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own existence, so is His
+  will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 co."><a name="29184"><span class=
+"ref">[29184] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+in Deo voluntatem esse, sicut et in eo est intellectus, voluntas
+enim intellectum consequitur. Sicut enim res naturalis habet esse
+in actu per suam formam, ita intellectus intelligens actu per suam
+formam intelligibilem. Quaelibet autem res ad suam formam naturalem
+hanc habet habitudinem, ut quando non habet ipsam, tendat in eam;
+et quando habet ipsam, quiescat in ea. Et idem est de qualibet
+perfectione naturali, quod est bonum naturae. Et haec habitudo ad
+bonum, in rebus carentibus cognitione, vocatur appetitus naturalis.
+Unde et natura intellectualis ad bonum apprehensum per formam
+intelligibilem, similem habitudinem habet, ut scilicet, cum habet
+ipsum, quiescat in illo; cum vero non habet, quaerat ipsum. Et
+utrumque pertinet ad voluntatem. Unde in quolibet habente
+intellectum, est voluntas; sicut in quolibet habente sensum, est
+appetitus animalis. Et sic oportet in Deo esse voluntatem, cum sit
+in eo intellectus. Et sicut suum intelligere est suum esse, ita
+suum velle.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
+1:</b> Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He Himself is
+the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this by His
+essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above (<a
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3"
+shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[6], A[3]</a>): for the end has the
+aspect of good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29185"><span class=
+"ref">[29185] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod, licet nihil aliud a Deo sit finis Dei, tamen ipsemet
+est finis respectu omnium quae ab eo fiunt. Et hoc per suam
+essentiam, cum per suam essentiam sit bonus, ut supra ostensum est,
+finis enim habet rationem boni.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
+both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
+to Objection 2:</b> Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which,
+although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking
+what it does not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in
+what it does possess. In this respect will is said to be in God, as
+having always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is
+not distinct from His essence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29186"><span class=
+"ref">[29186] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod voluntas in nobis pertinet ad appetitivam partem,
+quae licet ab appetendo nominetur, non tamen hunc solum habet
+actum, ut appetat quae non habet; sed etiam ut amet quod habet, et
+delectetur in illo. Et quantum ad hoc voluntas in Deo ponitur; quae
+semper habet bonum quod est eius obiectum, cum sit indifferens ab
+eo secundum essentiam, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div
+style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
+left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p9"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A will of which the
+principal object is a good outside itself, must be moved by another;
+but the object of the divine will is His goodness, which is His
+essence. Hence, since the will of God is His essence, it is not moved
+by another than itself, but by itself alone, in the same sense as
+understanding and willing are said to be movement. This is what Plato
+meant when he said that the first mover moves itself.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29187"><span class=
+"ref">[29187] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod voluntas cuius obiectum principale est bonum quod est
+extra voluntatem, oportet quod sit mota ab aliquo. Sed obiectum
+divinae voluntatis est bonitas sua, quae est eius essentia. Unde,
+cum voluntas Dei sit eius essentia, non movetur ab alio a se, sed a
+se tantum, eo modo loquendi quo intelligere et velle dicitur motus.
+Et secundum hoc Plato dixit quod primum movens movet
+seipsum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2"
+next="FP_Q19_A3" prev="FP_Q19_A1" progress="3.44%" n="ii"
+title="Article. 2 - Whether God wills things apart from Himself?"><h4
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p0.1">Whether God wills
+things apart from Himself?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
+seems that God does not will things apart from Himself. For the divine
+will is the divine existence. But God is not other than
+Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than
+Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29188"><span class=
+"ref">[29188] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non velit alia a se. Velle enim
+divinum est eius esse. Sed Deus non est aliud a se. Ergo non vult
+aliud a se.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
+Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the appetite,
+as stated in De Anima iii, 54. If, therefore, God wills anything apart
+from Himself, His will must be moved by another; which is
+impossible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29189"><span class=
+"ref">[29189] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+volitum movet voluntatem, sicut appetibile appetitum, ut dicitur in
+III de anima. Si igitur Deus velit aliquid aliud a se, movebitur
+eius voluntas ab aliquo alio, quod est
+impossibile.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
+Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks nothing
+beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely satisfies
+His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from
+Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29190"><span class=
+"ref">[29190] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+cuicumque voluntati sufficit aliquod volitum, nihil quaerit extra
+illud. Sed Deo sufficit sua bonitas, et voluntas eius ex ea
+satiatur. Ergo Deus non vult aliquid aliud a se.</p></div></div><div
+style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
+left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p5"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, acts of will are
+multiplied in proportion to the number of their objects. If,
+therefore, God wills Himself and things apart from Himself, it follows
+that the act of His will is manifold, and consequently His existence,
+which is His will. But this is impossible. Therefore God does not will
+things apart from Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="29191"><span class=
+"ref">[29191] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, actus
+voluntatis multiplicatur secundum volita. Si igitur Deus velit se
+et alia a se, sequitur quod actus voluntatis eius sit multiplex, et
+per consequens eius esse, quod est eius velle. Hoc autem est
+impossibile. Non ergo vult alia a se.</p></div></div><div
+style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
+left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p6"
+shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:1Thess.4.3" parsed="vul|1Thess|4|3|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p6.1" passage="1 Thess. 4:3">1
+Thess. 4:3</scripRef>): "This is the will of God, your
+sanctification."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29192"><span class=
+"ref">[29192] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod apostolus dicit, I Thess. IV, <i>haec est voluntas Dei,
+sanctificatio vestra</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. For natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces
+  its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed; and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other
+  things to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained
+to that end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other
+things should be partakers therein.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
+float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 co."><a name="29193"><span class=
+"ref">[29193] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod Deus non solum se vult, sed etiam alia a se. Quod apparet a
+simili prius introducto. Res enim naturalis non solum habet
+naturalem inclinationem respectu proprii boni, ut acquirat ipsum
+cum non habet, vel ut quiescat in illo cum habet; sed etiam ut
+proprium bonum in alia diffundat, secundum quod possibile est. Unde
+videmus quod omne agens, inquantum est actu et perfectum, facit
+sibi simile. Unde et hoc pertinet ad rationem voluntatis, ut bonum
+quod quis habet, aliis communicet, secundum quod possibile est. Et
+hoc praecipue pertinet ad voluntatem divinam, a qua, per quandam
+similitudinem, derivatur omnis perfectio. Unde, si res naturales,
+inquantum perfectae sunt, suum bonum aliis communicant, multo magis
+pertinet ad voluntatem divinam, ut bonum suum aliis per
+similitudinem communicet, secundum quod possibile est. Sic igitur
+vult et se esse, et alia. Sed se ut finem, alia vero ut ad finem,
+inquantum condecet divinam bonitatem etiam alia ipsam
+participare.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine will is God's own existence essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of understanding them and expressing them, as is clear from what has already been said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[4]</a>). For when we say that God exists, no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say that God wills. Therefore, although He is not anything apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart from
+  Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29194"><span class=
+"ref">[29194] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod, licet divinum velle sit eius esse secundum rem,
+tamen differt ratione, secundum diversum modum intelligendi et
+significandi, ut ex superioribus patet. In hoc enim quod dico Deum
+esse, non importatur habitudo ad aliquid, sicut in hoc quod dico
+Deum velle. Et ideo, licet non sit aliquid aliud a se, vult tamen
+aliquid aliud a se.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things willed for the sake of the end, the whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves the will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing so wills nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant, which anyone may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its
+  own sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only
+for the sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it does not follow
+that anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He
+understands things apart from Himself by understanding His own
+essence, so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own
+goodness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29195"><span class=
+"ref">[29195] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod in his quae volumus propter finem, tota ratio movendi
+est finis, et hoc est quod movet voluntatem. Et hoc maxime apparet
+in his quae volumus tantum propter finem. Qui enim vult sumere
+potionem amaram, nihil in ea vult nisi sanitatem, et hoc solum est
+quod movet eius voluntatem. Secus autem est in eo qui sumit
+potionem dulcem, quam non solum propter sanitatem, sed etiam
+propter se aliquis velle potest. Unde, cum Deus alia a se non velit
+nisi propter finem qui est sua bonitas, ut dictum est, non sequitur
+quod aliquid aliud moveat voluntatem eius nisi bonitas sua. Et sic,
+sicut alia a se intelligit intelligendo essentiam suam, ita alia a
+se vult, volendo bonitatem suam.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
+both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
+to Objection 3:</b> From the fact that His own goodness suffices the
+divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from
+itself, but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its
+goodness. Thus, too, the divine intellect, though its perfection
+consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that
+essence knows other things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29196"><span class=
+"ref">[29196] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ex hoc quod voluntati divinae sufficit sua bonitas,
+non sequitur quod nihil aliud velit, sed quod nihil aliud vult nisi
+ratione suae bonitatis. Sicut etiam intellectus divinus, licet sit
+perfectus ex hoc ipso quod essentiam divinam cognoscit, tamen in ea
+cognoscit alia.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
+4:</b> As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the many only in the
+one, in the same way the divine will is one and simple, as willing the
+many only through the one, that is, through its own
+goodness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="29197"><span class=
+"ref">[29197] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod, sicut intelligere divinum est unum, quia multa non
+videt nisi in uno; ita velle divinum est unum et simplex, quia
+multa non vult nisi per unum, quod est bonitas
+sua.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3"
+next="FP_Q19_A4" prev="FP_Q19_A2" progress="3.47%" n="iii"
+title="Article. 3 - Whether whatever God wills He wills
+necessarily?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p0.1">Whether whatever God wills He wills
+necessarily?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
+style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
+seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For everything
+eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills from eternity,
+for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever He wills,
+He wills necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29198"><span class=
+"ref">[29198] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod quidquid Deus vult, ex necessitate velit.
+Omne enim aeternum est necessarium. Sed quidquid Deus vult, ab
+aeterno vult, alias, voluntas eius esset mutabilis. Ergo quidquid
+vult, ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
+margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p3"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God wills things apart
+from Himself, inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His
+own goodness necessarily. Therefore He wills things apart from Himself
+necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29199"><span class=
+"ref">[29199] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
+vult alia a se, inquantum vult bonitatem suam. Sed Deus bonitatem
+suam ex necessitate vult. Ergo alia a se ex necessitate
+vult.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
+style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
+Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary, for God
+is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of all necessity, as
+above shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p4.1"
+href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[2],
+A[3]</a>). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills;
+since in God there can be nothing over and above His nature as stated
+in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills
+necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29200"><span class=
+"ref">[29200] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+quidquid est Deo naturale, est necessarium, quia Deus est per se
+necesse esse, et principium omnis necessitatis, ut supra ostensum
+est. Sed naturale est ei velle quidquid vult, quia in Deo nihil
+potest esse praeter naturam, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Ergo
+quidquid vult, ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
+both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p5"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, being that is not
+necessary, and being that is possible not to be, are one and the same
+thing. If, therefore, God does not necessarily will a thing that He
+wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore possible
+for Him to will what He does not will. And so the divine will is
+contingent upon one or the other of two things, and imperfect, since
+everything contingent is imperfect and mutable.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="29201"><span class=
+"ref">[29201] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, non
+necesse esse, et possibile non esse, aequipollent. Si igitur non
+necesse est Deum velle aliquid eorum quae vult, possibile est eum
+non velle illud; et possibile est eum velle illud quod non vult.
+Ergo voluntas divina est contingens ad utrumlibet. Et sic
+imperfecta, quia omne contingens est imperfectum et
+mutabile.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 5:</b>
+Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one or the other
+of two things, no action results unless it is inclined to one or the
+other by some other power, as the Commentator [*Averroes] says in
+Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent with regard to
+anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from another;
+and thus He has some cause prior to Himself.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 5"><a name="29202"><span class=
+"ref">[29202] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 3 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, ab eo
+quod est ad utrumlibet, non sequitur aliqua actio, nisi ab aliquo
+alio inclinetur ad unum, ut dicit Commentator, in II Physic. Si
+ergo voluntas Dei in aliquibus se habet ad utrumlibet, sequitur
+quod ab aliquo alio determinetur ad effectum. Et sic habet aliquam
+causam priorem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 6:</b>
+Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as the divine
+knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore whatever
+God wills, He wills necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
+float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 6"><a name="29203"><span class=
+"ref">[29203] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 3 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea,
+quidquid Deus scit, ex necessitate scit. Sed sicut scientia divina
+est eius essentia, ita voluntas divina. Ergo quidquid Deus vult, ex
+necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b>
+The Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eph.1.11"
+parsed="vul|Eph|1|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p8.1"
+passage="Eph. 1:11">Eph. 1:11</scripRef>): "Who worketh all things
+according to the counsel of His will." Now, what we work according to
+the counsel of the will, we do not will necessarily. Therefore God
+does not will necessarily whatever He wills.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29204"><span class=
+"ref">[29204] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit apostolus, Ephes. I, <i>qui operatur omnia secundum
+consilium voluntatis suae</i>. Quod autem operamur ex consilio
+voluntatis, non ex necessitate volumus. Non ergo quidquid Deus
+vult, ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> There are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it is not
+  necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we
+  will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for instance the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take ship
+  in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for
+  supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it,
+as His will cannot change.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 co."><a name="29205"><span class=
+"ref">[29205] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod necessarium dicitur aliquid dupliciter, scilicet absolute, et
+ex suppositione. Necessarium absolute iudicatur aliquid ex
+habitudine terminorum, utpote quia praedicatum est in definitione
+subiecti, sicut necessarium est hominem esse animal; vel quia
+subiectum est de ratione praedicati, sicut hoc est necessarium,
+numerum esse parem vel imparem. Sic autem non est necessarium
+Socratem sedere. Unde non est necessarium absolute, sed potest dici
+necessarium ex suppositione, supposito enim quod sedeat, necesse
+est eum sedere dum sedet. Circa divina igitur volita hoc
+considerandum est, quod aliquid Deum velle est necessarium
+absolute, non tamen hoc est verum de omnibus quae vult. Voluntas
+enim divina necessariam habitudinem habet ad bonitatem suam, quae
+est proprium eius obiectum. Unde bonitatem suam esse Deus ex
+necessitate vult; sicut et voluntas nostra ex necessitate vult
+beatitudinem. Sicut et quaelibet alia potentia necessariam
+habitudinem habet ad proprium et principale obiectum, ut visus ad
+colorem; quia de sui ratione est, ut in illud tendat. Alia autem a
+se Deus vult, inquantum ordinantur ad suam bonitatem ut in finem.
+Ea autem quae sunt ad finem, non ex necessitate volumus volentes
+finem, nisi sint talia, sine quibus finis esse non potest, sicut
+volumus cibum, volentes conservationem vitae; et navem, volentes
+transfretare. Non sic autem ex necessitate volumus ea sine quibus
+finis esse potest, sicut equum ad ambulandum, quia sine hoc
+possumus ire; et eadem ratio est in aliis. Unde, cum bonitas Dei
+sit perfecta, et esse possit sine aliis, cum nihil ei perfectionis
+ex aliis accrescat; sequitur quod alia a se eum velle, non sit
+necessarium absolute. Et tamen necessarium est ex suppositione,
+supposito enim quod velit, non potest non velle, quia non potest
+voluntas eius mutari.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
+margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
+to Objection 1:</b> From the fact that God wills from eternity
+whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily;
+except by supposition.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29206"><span class=
+"ref">[29206] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod ex hoc quod Deus ab aeterno vult aliquid, non
+sequitur quod necesse est eum illud velle, nisi ex
+suppositione.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
+.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
+2:</b> Although God necessarily wills His own goodness, He does not
+necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness; for it can
+exist without other things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29207"><span class=
+"ref">[29207] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, licet Deus ex necessitate velit bonitatem suam, non
+tamen ex necessitate vult ea quae vult propter bonitatem suam, quia
+bonitas eius potest esse sine aliis.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
+both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p12" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
+to Objection 3:</b> It is not natural to God to will any of those
+other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not
+unnatural or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29208"><span class=
+"ref">[29208] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod non est naturale Deo velle aliquid aliorum, quae non
+ex necessitate vult. Neque tamen innaturale, aut contra naturam,
+sed est voluntarium.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p13" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in the cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the
+  divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing
+willed, namely, that the perfect goodness of God can be without it;
+and such defect accompanies all created good.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="29209"><span class=
+"ref">[29209] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod aliquando aliqua causa necessaria habet non
+necessariam habitudinem ad aliquem effectum, quod est propter
+defectum effectus, et non propter defectum causae. Sicut virtus
+solis habet non necessariam habitudinem ad aliquid eorum quae
+contingenter hic eveniunt, non propter defectum virtutis solaris,
+sed propter defectum effectus non necessario ex causa provenientis.
+Et similiter, quod Deus non ex necessitate velit aliquid eorum quae
+vult, non accidit ex defectu voluntatis divinae, sed ex defectu qui
+competit volito secundum suam rationem, quia scilicet est tale, ut
+sine eo esse possit perfecta bonitas Dei. Qui quidem defectus
+consequitur omne bonum creatum.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
+both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
+xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p14" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
+to Objection 5:</b> A naturally contingent cause must be determined to
+act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is
+necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no
+necessary relation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 5"><a name="29210"><span class=
+"ref">[29210] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 3 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum ergo
+dicendum quod causa quae est ex se contingens, oportet quod
+determinetur ab aliquo exteriori ad effectum. Sed voluntas divina,
+quae ex se necessitatem habet, determinat seipsam ad volitum, ad
+quod habet habitudinem non necessariam.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p15" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves. Since then all other things have necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute
+  necessity so as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they
+exist in themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily whatever He
+wills, but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 6"><a name="29211"><span class=
+"ref">[29211] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 3 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum
+quod, sicut divinum esse in se est necessarium, ita et divinum
+velle et divinum scire, sed divinum scire habet necessariam
+habitudinem ad scita, non autem divinum velle ad volita. Quod ideo
+est, quia scientia habetur de rebus, secundum quod sunt in sciente,
+voluntas autem comparatur ad res, secundum quod sunt in seipsis.
+Quia igitur omnia alia habent necessarium esse secundum quod sunt
+in Deo; non autem secundum quod sunt in seipsis, habent
+necessitatem absolutam ita quod sint per seipsa necessaria; propter
+hoc Deus quaecumque scit, ex necessitate scit, non autem quaecumque
+vult, ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4" next="FP_Q19_A5" prev="FP_Q19_A3" progress="3.51%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether the will of God is the cause of things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p0.1">Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p2"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is
+not the cause of things. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "As our
+sun, not by reason nor by pre-election, but by its very being,
+enlightens all things that can participate in its light, so the divine
+good by its very essence pours the rays of goodness upon everything
+that exists." But every voluntary agent acts by reason and
+pre-election. Therefore God does not act by will; and so His will is
+not the cause of things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29212"><span class=
+"ref">[29212] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei non sit causa rerum. Dicit
+enim Dionysius, cap. IV de Div. Nom., <i>sicut noster sol, non
+ratiocinans aut praeeligens, sed per ipsum esse illuminat omnia
+participare lumen ipsius valentia; ita et bonum divinum per ipsam
+essentiam omnibus existentibus immittit bonitatis suae radios</i>.
+Sed omne quod agit per voluntatem, agit ut ratiocinans et
+praeeligens. Ergo Deus non agit per voluntatem. Ergo voluntas Dei
+non est causa rerum.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p3"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, The first in any order is
+that which is essentially so, thus in the order of burning things,
+that comes first which is fire by its essence. But God is the first
+agent. Therefore He acts by His essence; and that is His nature. He
+acts then by nature, and not by will. Therefore the divine will is not
+the cause of things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29213"><span class=
+"ref">[29213] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id
+quod est per essentiam, est primum in quolibet ordine sicut in
+ordine ignitorum est primum, quod est ignis per essentiam sed Deus
+est primum agens. Ergo est agens per essentiam suam, quae est
+natura eius. Agit igitur per naturam, et non per voluntatem.
+Voluntas igitur divina non est causa rerum.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p4"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Whatever is the cause of
+anything, through being "such" a thing, is the cause by nature, and
+not by will. For fire is the cause of heat, as being itself hot;
+whereas an architect is the cause of a house, because he wills to
+build it. Now Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because God
+is good, we exist." Therefore God is the cause of things by His
+nature, and not by His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29214"><span class=
+"ref">[29214] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+quidquid est causa alicuius per hoc quod est tale, est causa per
+naturam, et non per voluntatem, ignis enim causa est calefactionis,
+quia est calidus; sed artifex est causa domus, quia vult eam
+facere. Sed Augustinus dicit, in I de Doct. Christ., quod <i>quia
+Deus bonus est, sumus</i>. Ergo Deus per suam naturam est causa
+rerum, et non per voluntatem.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p5"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Of one thing there is one
+cause. But the created things is the knowledge of God, as said before
+(<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8"
+shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[8]</a>). Therefore the will of
+God cannot be considered the cause of things.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="29215"><span class=
+"ref">[29215] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, unius
+rei una est causa. Sed rerum creatarum est causa scientia Dei, ut
+supra dictum est. Ergo voluntas Dei non debet poni causa rerum.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p6"
+shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.26" parsed="vul|Wis|11|26|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p6.1"
+passage="Wis. 11:26">Wis. 11:26</scripRef>), "How could anything
+endure, if Thou wouldst not?"</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29216"><span class=
+"ref">[29216] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur Sap. XI, <i>quomodo posset aliquid permanere, nisi tu
+voluisses?</i></p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We must hold that the will of God is the cause of things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed, by a necessity of His nature.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p8" shownumber="no"> This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as proved in Phys. ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary means predetermined for it by some higher intellect; as the end and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the agent that acts by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of agents, He
+  must act by intellect and will.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p9" shownumber="no"> This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of which the property is to produce one and the same effect; for nature operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent; and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance with that nature; for every natural agent has a determinate being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself
+  the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[7], A[2]</a>). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and intellect.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p10" shownumber="no"> Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause. Wherefore since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed from Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will,
+  for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived appertains to the will. Therefore the will of God is the cause of things.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 co."><a name="29217"><span class=
+"ref">[29217] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod necesse est dicere voluntatem Dei esse causam rerum, et Deum
+agere per voluntatem, non per necessitatem naturae, ut quidam
+existimaverunt. Quod quidem apparere potest tripliciter. Primo
+quidem, ex ipso ordine causarum agentium. Cum enim propter finem
+agat et intellectus et natura, ut probatur in II Physic., necesse
+est ut agenti per naturam praedeterminetur finis, et media
+necessaria ad finem, ab aliquo superiori intellectu; sicut sagittae
+praedeterminatur finis et certus modus a sagittante. Unde necesse
+est quod agens per intellectum et voluntatem, sit prius agente per
+naturam. Unde, cum primum in ordine agentium sit Deus, necesse est
+quod per intellectum et voluntatem agat. Secundo, ex ratione
+naturalis agentis, ad quod pertinet ut unum effectum producat, quia
+natura uno et eodem modo operatur, nisi impediatur. Et hoc ideo,
+quia secundum quod est tale, agit, unde, quandiu est tale, non
+facit nisi tale. Omne enim agens per naturam, habet esse
+determinatum. Cum igitur esse divinum non sit determinatum, sed
+contineat in se totam perfectionem essendi, non potest esse quod
+agat per necessitatem naturae, nisi forte causaret aliquid
+indeterminatum et infinitum in essendo; quod est impossibile, ut ex
+superioribus patet. Non igitur agit per necessitatem naturae sed
+effectus determinati ab infinita ipsius perfectione procedunt
+secundum determinationem voluntatis et intellectus ipsius. Tertio,
+ex habitudine effectuum ad causam. Secundum hoc enim effectus
+procedunt a causa agente, secundum quod praeexistunt in ea, quia
+omne agens agit sibi simile. Praeexistunt autem effectus in causa
+secundum modum causae. Unde, cum esse divinum sit ipsum eius
+intelligere, praeexistunt in eo effectus eius secundum modum
+intelligibilem. Unde et per modum intelligibilem procedunt ab eo.
+Et sic, per consequens, per modum voluntatis, nam inclinatio eius
+ad agendum quod intellectu conceptum est, pertinet ad voluntatem.
+Voluntas igitur Dei est causa rerum.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p11"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius in these words
+does not intend to exclude election from God absolutely; but only in a
+certain sense, in so far, that is, as He communicates His goodness not
+merely to certain things, but to all; and as election implies a
+certain distinction.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29218"><span class=
+"ref">[29218] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod Dionysius per verba illa non intendit excludere
+electionem a Deo simpliciter, sed secundum quid, inquantum
+scilicet, non quibusdam solum bonitatem suam communicat, sed
+omnibus, prout scilicet electio discretionem quandam importat.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p12"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because the essence of
+God is His intellect and will, from the fact of His acting by His
+essence, it follows that He acts after the mode of intellect and
+will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29219"><span class=
+"ref">[29219] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, quia essentia Dei est eius intelligere et velle, ex
+hoc ipso quod per essentiam suam agit, sequitur quod agat per modum
+intellectus et voluntatis.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p13"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Good is the object of the
+will. The words, therefore, "Because God is good, we exist," are true
+inasmuch as His goodness is the reason of His willing all other
+things, as said before (A[2], ad 2).</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
+float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29220"><span class=
+"ref">[29220] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod bonum est obiectum voluntatis. Pro tanto ergo
+dicitur, quia Deus bonus est, sumus, inquantum sua bonitas est ei
+ratio volendi omnia alia, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p14" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even in us the cause of one and the same effect is knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is conceived, and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the effect, except by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to operation. But the power is cause, as executing the effect, since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in God
+  all these things are one.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="29221"><span class=
+"ref">[29221] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod unius et eiusdem effectus, etiam in nobis, est causa
+scientia ut dirigens, qua concipitur forma operis, et voluntas ut
+imperans, quia forma, ut est in intellectu tantum, non determinatur
+ad hoc quod sit vel non sit in effectu, nisi per voluntatem. Unde
+intellectus speculativus nihil dicit de operando. Sed potentia est
+causa ut exequens, quia nominat immediatum principium operationis.
+Sed haec omnia in Deo unum sunt.</p></div></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5" next="FP_Q19_A6" prev="FP_Q19_A4" progress="3.55%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p0.1">Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p2"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that some cause can be
+assigned to the divine will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46):
+"Who would venture to say that God made all things irrationally?" But
+to a voluntary agent, what is the reason of operating, is the cause of
+willing. Therefore the will of God has some cause.</p></div><div
+style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="29222"><span class=
+"ref">[29222] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod voluntatis divinae sit assignare aliquam
+causam. Dicit enim Augustinus, libro octoginta trium quaest.,
+<i>quis audeat dicere Deum irrationabiliter omnia condidisse?</i>
+Sed agenti voluntario, quod est ratio operandi, est etiam causa
+volendi. Ergo voluntas Dei habet aliquam causam.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause of all things, as has been already shown <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[4])</a>. If, then, there is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause, except the divine will alone. Thus all science would be in vain, since science seeks to assign causes
+  to effects. This seems inadmissible, and therefore we must assign
+some cause to the divine will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="29223"><span class=
+"ref">[29223] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in
+his quae fiunt a volente qui propter nullam causam aliquid vult,
+non oportet aliam causam assignare nisi voluntatem volentis. Sed
+voluntas Dei est causa omnium rerum, ut ostensum est. Si igitur
+voluntatis eius non sit aliqua causa, non oportebit in omnibus
+rebus naturalibus aliam causam quaerere, nisi solam voluntatem
+divinam. Et sic omnes scientiae essent supervacuae, quae causas
+aliquorum effectuum assignare nituntur, quod videtur inconveniens.
+Est igitur assignare aliquam causam voluntatis divinae.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p4"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is done by the
+willer, on account of no cause, depends simply on his will. If,
+therefore, the will of God has no cause, it follows that all things
+made depend simply on His will, and have no other cause. But this also
+is not admissible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="29224"><span class=
+"ref">[29224] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod
+fit a volente non propter aliquam causam, dependet ex simplici
+voluntate eius. Si igitur voluntas Dei non habeat aliquam causam,
+sequitur quod omnia quae fiunt, dependeant ex simplici eius
+voluntate, et non habeant aliquam aliam causam. Quod est
+inconveniens.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p5"
+shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii,
+28): "Every efficient cause is greater than the thing effected." But
+nothing is greater than the will of God. We must not then seek for a
+cause of it.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 s. c."><a name="29225"><span class=
+"ref">[29225] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>omnis
+causa efficiens maior est eo quod efficitur; nihil tamen maius est
+voluntate Dei; non ergo causa eius quaerenda est</i>.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> In no wise has the will of God a cause. In proof of which we must consider that, since the will follows from the intellect, there is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the same way as there is a cause of the understanding, in the person that understands. The case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its conclusion are understood separately from each other, the understanding the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is known.
+  If the understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself, apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance, in this case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding the premisses, since a thing cannot be its own cause; and yet, it would be true that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the cause of the conclusion. It is the same with the will, with respect to which the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end, as do the
+  premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p7" shownumber="no"> Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means to that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and means; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by one act understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the
+  cause is not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause of His willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end. Therefore, He wills this to be as means to that; but does not will this on account of that.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 co."><a name="29226"><span class=
+"ref">[29226] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod nullo modo voluntas Dei causam habet. Ad cuius evidentiam,
+considerandum est quod, cum voluntas sequatur intellectum, eodem
+modo contingit esse causam alicuius volentis ut velit, et alicuius
+intelligentis ut intelligat. In intellectu autem sic est quod, si
+seorsum intelligat principium, et seorsum conclusionem,
+intelligentia principii est causa scientiae conclusionis. Sed si
+intellectus in ipso principio inspiceret conclusionem, uno intuitu
+apprehendens utrumque, in eo scientia conclusionis non causaretur
+ab intellectu principiorum, quia idem non est causa sui ipsius. Sed
+tamen intelligeret principia esse causas conclusionis. Similiter
+est ex parte voluntatis, circa quam sic se habet finis ad ea quae
+sunt ad finem, sicut in intellectu principia ad conclusiones. Unde,
+si aliquis uno actu velit finem, et alio actu ea quae sunt ad
+finem, velle finem erit ei causa volendi ea quae sunt ad finem. Sed
+si uno actu velit finem et ea quae sunt ad finem, hoc esse non
+poterit, quia idem non est causa sui ipsius. Et tamen erit verum
+dicere quod velit ordinare ea quae sunt ad finem, in finem. Deus
+autem, sicut uno actu omnia in essentia sua intelligit, ita uno
+actu vult omnia in sua bonitate. Unde, sicut in Deo intelligere
+causam non est causa intelligendi effectus, sed ipse intelligit
+effectus in causa; ita velle finem non est ei causa volendi ea quae
+sunt ad finem, sed tamen vult ea quae sunt ad finem, ordinari in
+finem. Vult ergo hoc esse propter hoc, sed non propter hoc vult
+hoc.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p8"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will of God is
+reasonable, not because anything is to God a cause of willing, but in
+so far as He wills one thing to be on account of
+another.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="29227"><span class=
+"ref">[29227] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod voluntas Dei rationabilis est, non quod aliquid sit
+Deo causa volendi, sed inquantum vult unum esse propter aliud.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since God wills effects to proceed from definite causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not unreasonable to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It would, however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary, and not as dependent on the will of God. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 2): "Philosophers in their vanity have thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes, being utterly
+  unable to perceive the cause that is shown above all others, the
+will of God."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="29228"><span class=
+"ref">[29228] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, cum velit Deus effectus sic esse, ut ex causis
+certis proveniant, ad hoc quod servetur ordo in rebus; non est
+supervacuum, etiam cum voluntate Dei, alias causas quaerere. Esset
+tamen supervacuum, si aliae causae quaererentur ut primae, et non
+dependentes a divina voluntate. Et sic loquitur Augustinus in III
+de Trin., <i>placuit vanitati philosophorum etiam aliis causis
+effectus contingentes tribuere, cum omnino videre non possent
+superiorem ceteris omnibus causam, idest voluntatem Dei</i>.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since God wills effects to come from causes, all effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the will of God, but on something else besides: but the first effect depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say that God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work, and intellect, that he might be man; and willed him to be man that he might enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this
+  cannot be reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things
+depend on the simple will of God; but the others on the order of other
+causes.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="29229"><span class=
+"ref">[29229] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, cum Deus velit effectus esse propter causas,
+quicumque effectus praesupponunt aliquem alium effectum, non
+dependent ex sola Dei voluntate, sed ex aliquo alio. Sed primi
+effectus ex sola divina voluntate dependent. Utpote si dicamus quod
+Deus voluit hominem habere manus, ut deservirent intellectui,
+operando diversa opera, et voluit eum habere intellectum, ad hoc
+quod esset homo, et voluit eum esse hominem, ut frueretur ipso, vel
+ad complementum universi. Quae quidem non est reducere ad alios
+fines creatos ulteriores. Unde huiusmodi dependent ex simplici
+voluntate Dei, alia vero ex ordine etiam aliarum causarum.</p></div></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6" next="FP_Q19_A7" prev="FP_Q19_A5" progress="3.58%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p0.1">Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p2"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is
+not always fulfilled. For the Apostle says (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:1Tim.2.4" parsed="vul|1Tim|2|4|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p2.1" passage="1 Tim. 2:4">1
+Tim. 2:4</scripRef>): "God will have all men to be saved, and to come
+to the knowledge of the truth." But this does not happen. Therefore
+the will of God is not always fulfilled.</p></div><div style="width:
+45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="29230"><span class=
+"ref">[29230] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
+proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei non semper impleatur. Dicit
+enim apostolus, I ad Tim. II, quod <i>Deus vult omnes homines
+salvos fieri, et ad agnitionem veritatis venire</i>. Sed hoc non
+ita evenit. Ergo voluntas Dei non semper impletur.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p3"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as is the relation of
+knowledge to truth, so is that of the will to good. Now God knows all
+truth. Therefore He wills all good. But not all good actually exists;
+for much more good might exist. Therefore the will of God is not
+always fulfilled.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="29231"><span class=
+"ref">[29231] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
+se habet scientia ad verum, ita voluntas ad bonum. Sed Deus scit
+omne verum. Ergo vult omne bonum. Sed non omne bonum fit, multa
+enim bona possunt fieri, quae non fiunt. Non ergo voluntas Dei
+semper impletur.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p4"
+shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since the will of God is
+the first cause, it does not exclude intermediate causes. But the
+effect of a first cause may be hindered by a defect of a secondary
+cause; as the effect of the motive power may be hindered by the
+weakness of the limb. Therefore the effect of the divine will may be
+hindered by a defect of the secondary causes. The will of God,
+therefore, is not always fulfilled.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
+float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="29232"><span class=
+"ref">[29232] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+voluntas Dei, cum sit causa prima, non excludit causas medias, ut
+dictum est. Sed effectus causae primae potest impediri per defectum
+causae secundae, sicut effectus virtutis motivae impeditur propter
+debilitatem tibiae. Ergo et effectus divinae voluntatis potest
+impediri propter defectum secundarum causarum. Non ergo voluntas
+Dei semper impletur.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p5"
+shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef
+osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.113.11" parsed="vul|Ps|113|11|0|0"
+id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p5.1"
+passage="Ps. 113:11">Ps. 113:11</scripRef>): "God hath done all
+things, whatsoever He would."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 s. c."><a name="29233"><span class=
+"ref">[29233] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
+quod dicitur in Psalmo CXIII, <i>omnia quaecumque voluit Deus,
+fecit</i>.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In proof of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active causes as with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that although a thing may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the universal form. For though a thing may fail to be, for example, a man or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence
+  the same must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the order of any particular active cause, but not outside the order of the universal cause; under which all particular causes are included: and if any particular cause fails of its effect, this is because of the hindrance of some other particular cause, which is included in the order of the universal cause. Therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen.
+  For it may happen that a star is hindered from producing its effects; yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things, from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred through intermediate causes to the universal influence of the first heaven. Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will should not produce its effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in another order; as
+  does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the divine will as much
+as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that will, when by
+its justice he is punished.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
+right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 co."><a name="29234"><span class=
+"ref">[29234] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
+quod necesse est voluntatem Dei semper impleri. Ad cuius
+evidentiam, considerandum est quod, cum effectus conformetur agenti
+secundum suam formam, eadem ratio est in causis agentibus, quae est
+in causis formalibus. In formis autem sic est quod, licet aliquid
+possit deficere ab aliqua forma particulari, tamen a forma
+universali nihil deficere potest, potest enim esse aliquid quod non
+est homo vel vivum, non autem potest esse aliquid quod non sit ens.
+Unde et hoc idem in causis agentibus contingere oportet. Potest
+enim aliquid fieri extra ordinem alicuius causae particularis
+agentis, non autem extra ordinem alicuius causae universalis, sub
+qua omnes causae particulares comprehenduntur. Quia, si aliqua
+causa particularis deficiat a suo effectu, hoc est propter aliquam
+aliam causam particularem impedientem, quae continetur sub ordine
+causae universalis, unde effectus ordinem causae universalis nullo
+modo potest exire. Et hoc etiam patet in corporalibus. Potest enim
+impediri quod aliqua stella non inducat suum effectum, sed tamen
+quicumque effectus ex causa corporea impediente in rebus
+corporalibus consequatur, oportet quod reducatur per aliquas causas
+medias in universalem virtutem primi caeli. Cum igitur voluntas Dei
+sit universalis causa omnium rerum, impossibile est quod divina
+voluntas suum effectum non consequatur. Unde quod recedere videtur
+a divina voluntate secundum unum ordinem, relabitur in ipsam
+secundum alium, sicut peccator, qui, quantum est in se, recedit a
+divina voluntate peccando, incidit in ordinem divinae voluntatis,
+dum per eius iustitiam punitur.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a restricted application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not will." Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every
+  class of individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case they mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition. Thirdly, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent,
+  but to the things willed.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p8" shownumber="no"> To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or
+  dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in
+  themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills
+  takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="29235"><span class=
+"ref">[29235] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
+dicendum quod illud verbum apostoli, quod Deus vult omnes homines
+salvos fieri etc., potest tripliciter intelligi. Uno modo, ut sit
+accommoda distributio, secundum hunc sensum, Deus vult salvos fieri
+omnes homines qui salvantur, non quia nullus homo sit quem salvum
+fieri non velit, sed quia nullus salvus fit, quem non velit salvum
+fieri, ut dicit Augustinus secundo potest intelligi, ut fiat
+distributio pro generibus singulorum, et non pro singulis generum,
+secundum hunc sensum, Deus vult de quolibet statu hominum salvos
+fieri, mares et feminas, Iudaeos et gentiles, parvos et magnos; non
+tamen omnes de singulis statibus. Tertio, secundum Damascenum,
+intelligitur de voluntate antecedente, non de voluntate
+consequente. Quae quidem distinctio non accipitur ex parte ipsius
+voluntatis divinae, in qua nihil est prius vel posterius; sed ex
+parte volitorum. Ad cuius intellectum, considerandum est quod
+unumquodque, secundum quod bonum est, sic est volitum a Deo.
+Aliquid autem potest esse in prima sui consideratione, secundum
+quod absolute consideratur, bonum vel malum, quod tamen, prout cum
+aliquo adiuncto consideratur, quae est consequens consideratio
+eius, e contrario se habet. Sicut hominem vivere est bonum, et
+hominem occidi est malum, secundum absolutam considerationem, sed
+si addatur circa aliquem hominem, quod sit homicida, vel vivens in
+periculum multitudinis, sic bonum est eum occidi, et malum est eum
+vivere. Unde potest dici quod iudex iustus antecedenter vult omnem
+hominem vivere; sed consequenter vult homicidam suspendi. Similiter
+Deus antecedenter vult omnem hominem salvari; sed consequenter vult
+quosdam damnari, secundum exigentiam suae iustitiae. Neque tamen id
+quod antecedenter volumus, simpliciter volumus, sed secundum quid.
+Quia voluntas comparatur ad res, secundum quod in seipsis sunt, in
+seipsis autem sunt in particulari, unde simpliciter volumus
+aliquid, secundum quod volumus illud consideratis omnibus
+circumstantiis particularibus, quod est consequenter velle. Unde
+potest dici quod iudex iustus simpliciter vult homicidam suspendi,
+sed secundum quid vellet eum vivere, scilicet inquantum est homo.
+Unde magis potest dici velleitas, quam absoluta voluntas. Et sic
+patet quod quidquid Deus simpliciter vult, fit; licet illud quod
+antecedenter vult, non fiat.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p9"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An act of the cognitive
+faculty is according as the thing known is in the knower; while an act
+of the appetite faculty is directed to things as they exist in
+themselves. But all that can have the nature of being and truth
+virtually exists in God, though it does not all exist in created
+things. Therefore God knows all truth; but does not will all good,
+except in so far as He wills Himself, in Whom all good virtually
+exists.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
+xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="29236"><span class=
+"ref">[29236] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod actus cognoscitivae virtutis est secundum quod
+cognitum est in cognoscente, actus autem virtutis appetitivae est
+ordinatus ad res, secundum quod in seipsis sunt. Quidquid autem
+potest habere rationem entis et veri, totum est virtualiter in Deo;
+sed non totum existit in rebus creatis. Et ideo Deus cognoscit omne
+verum, non tamen vult omne bonum, nisi inquantum vult se, in quo
+virtualiter omne bonum existit.</p></div></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
+float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p10"
+shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A first cause can be
+hindered in its effect by deficiency in the secondary cause, when it
+is not the universal first cause, including within itself all causes;
+for then the effect could in no way escape its order. And thus it is
+with the will of God, as said above.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
+float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="29237"><span class=
+"ref">[29237] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod causa prima tunc potest impediri a suo effectu per
+defectum causae secundae, quando non est universaliter prima, sub
+se omnes causas comprehendens, quia sic effectus nullo modo posset
+suum ordinem evadere. Et sic est de voluntate Dei, ut dictum
+est.</p></div></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7" next="FP_Q19_A8" prev="FP_Q19_A6" progress="3.62%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether the will of God is changeable?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p0.1">Whether the will of God is changeable?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gen.6.7" parsed="vul|Gen|6|7|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p2.1" passage="Gn. 6:7">Gn. 6:7</scripRef>): "It repenteth Me that I have made man." But whoever repents of what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has a changeable will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: "I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.18.7-Jer.18.8" parsed="vul|Jer|18|7|18|8" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p3.1" passage="Jer. 18:7,8">Jer. 18:7,8</scripRef>) Therefore God has a changeable will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God does not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the law to be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as said before <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>. Therefore He can both will and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is changeable substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable as regards His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son of man, that He should be changed" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Num.23.19" parsed="vul|Num|23|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p6.1" passage="Num. 23:19">Num. 23:19</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if one should begin to will what before he had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless
+  we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will regards good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not so before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before;
+  hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both the substance of God and His knowledge are entirely unchangeable (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[9], A[1]</a>; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when we repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so far as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom
+  He had made.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will of God, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in the divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one who looked only on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not
+  rise again," but looking at the divine first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise again." And God wills both: that is, that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen; or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine
+  and higher cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.38.1" parsed="vul|Isa|38|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p9.1" passage="Is. 38:1">Is. 38:1</scripRef>). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, which is unchangeable. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5): "The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel"---that is to say, the counsel of His will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent," His words must be understood metaphorically. For
+  men seem to repent, when they do not fulfill what they have threatened.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It does not follow from this argument that God has a will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should change.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the unchangeableness of the divine will, as has been said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p11.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8" next="FP_Q19_A9" prev="FP_Q19_A7" progress="3.65%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p0.1">Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved, except whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84) "Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder it." But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.9.19" parsed="vul|Rom|9|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p3.1" passage="Rom. 9:19">Rom. 9:19</scripRef>): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die, being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every true conditional statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is
+  necessary absolutely.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> All good things that exist God wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will, counsel, and all other such things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p7" shownumber="no"> This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be
+  referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that
+  belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise
+  contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the words of Augustine we must understand a necessity in things willed by God that is not absolute, but conditional. For the conditional statement that if God wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Consequents have necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the divine will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute necessities.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9" next="FP_Q19_A10" prev="FP_Q19_A8" progress="3.68%" n="ix" title="Article. 9 - Whether God wills evils?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p0.1">Whether God wills evils?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God wills evils. For every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should exist, but also evil things." Therefore God wills evil things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. And Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil." But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and
+  beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should exist.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom. Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it." Therefore it is not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not evil things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[5], A[1]</a>), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or
+  corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not
+  even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in
+  willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that evil should be or be done." This, however, is not correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is
+  beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from his sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot therefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done, since nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it accidentally, but by that which belongs to it essentially.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore Dionysius in saying that "evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe," draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The statements that evil exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affirmative. God therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10" next="FP_Q19_A11" prev="FP_Q19_A9" progress="3.71%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether God has free-will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p0.1">Whether God has free-will?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; "God alone is He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either side."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, as has been said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>. Therefore there is not free-will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of the will, not in obedience to necessity."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>, He has free will with respect to what He does not
+  necessarily will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply, but only as regards the inclination to sin.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown (De Fide ii, 3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can will to sit down, and not will to sit down.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11" next="FP_Q19_A12" prev="FP_Q19_A10" progress="3.73%" n="xi" title="Article. 11 - Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p0.1">Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The will of God is one, since it is the very essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.110.2" parsed="vul|Ps|110|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4.1" passage=" Ps. 110:2"> Ps. 110:2</scripRef>: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills." Therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for the will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[3]</a>). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that
+  punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.6.10" parsed="vul|Matt|6|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.2" passage="Mat. 6:10">Mat.
+  6:10</scripRef>). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called
+  will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge, but to will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the usual expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12" next="FP_Q20" prev="FP_Q19_A11" progress="3.75%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p0.1">Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that five expressions of will---namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission---are not rightly assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God works nothing unless He wills it, as the Scripture says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.26" parsed="vul|Wis|11|26|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p3.1" passage="Wis. 11:26">Wis. 11:26</scripRef>). But the will of expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be comprehended in the will of expression.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, operation and permission appertain to all creatures in common, since God works in them all, and permits some action in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly under one division, not being of one order.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, evil happens in more ways than good, since "good happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of ways," as declared by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not right therefore to assign one expression only in the case of evil---namely, prohibition---and two---namely, counsel and precept---in the case of good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> By these signs we name the expression of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may show that he wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may show it by himself, by doing something either directly, or indirectly and accidentally. He shows it directly when he works in his own person; in that way the expression of his will is his own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering the doing of a thing; for
+  what removes an impediment is called an accidental mover. In this respect the expression is called permission. He declares his will by means of another when he orders another to perform a work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept, and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of man makes itself known, the same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will, as the expression of that will. That precept,
+  counsel, and prohibition are called the will of God is clear from the words of <scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.6.10" parsed="vul|Matt|6|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p6.1" passage="Mat. 6:10">Mat. 6:10</scripRef>: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." That permission and operation are called the will of God is clear from Augustine (Enchiridion 95), who says: "Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually doing it."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p7" shownumber="no"> Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, operation with regard to good. Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is necessary and counsel to good that is of supererogation.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will about the same matter in different ways; thus we find many words that mean the same thing. Hence there is not reason why the same thing should not be the subject of precept, operation, and counsel; or of prohibition or permission.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God may by metaphor be said to will what by His will, properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be said to will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing to prevent the same thing being the object of the will of good pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is always the same as the will of good pleasure; while precept and counsel are not; both because the former regards the present, and the two latter
+  the future; and because the former is of itself the effect of the will; the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of another.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Rational creatures are masters of their own acts; and for this reason certain special expressions of the divine will are assigned to their acts, inasmuch as God ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily and of themselves. Other creatures act only as moved by the divine operation; therefore only operation and permission are concerned with these.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All evil of sin, though happening in many ways, agrees in being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard to evil, only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. On the other hand, good stands in various relations to the divine goodness, since there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject of precept; and there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and
+  these are the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is not only concerned with the obtaining of greater good; but also with the avoiding of lesser evils.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q20" next="FP_Q20_A1" prev="FP_Q19_A12" progress="3.78%" n="xix" title="Question. 20 - GOD'S LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p0.1">Question 20. GOD'S LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p2" shownumber="no"> We next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of God. In the appetitive part of the soul there are found in ourselves both the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the habits of the moral virtues, as justice, fortitude and the like. Hence we shall first consider the love of God, and secondly His justice and mercy. About the first there are four points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether love exists in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether He loves all things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether He loves one thing more than another?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether He loves more the better things?</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1" next="FP_Q20_A2" prev="FP_Q20" progress="3.78%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether love exists in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p0.1">Whether love exists in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that love does not exist in God. For in God there are no passions. Now love is a passion. Therefore love is not in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love, anger, sorrow and the like, are mutually divided against one another. But sorrow and anger are not attributed to God, unless by metaphor. Therefore neither is love attributed to Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a uniting and binding force." But this cannot take place in God, since He is simple. Therefore love does not exist in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "God is love" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.4.16" parsed="vul|John|4|16|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p5.1" passage="Jn. 4:16">Jn. 4:16</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We must needs assert that in God there is love: because love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty. For since the acts of the will and of every appetitive faculty tend towards good and evil, as to their proper objects: and since good is essentially and especially the object of the will and the appetite, whereas evil is only the object secondarily and indirectly, as opposed to good; it follows that the acts of the will and appetite
+  that regard good must naturally be prior to those that regard evil; thus, for instance, joy is prior to sorrow, love to hate: because what exists of itself is always prior to that which exists through another. Again, the more universal is naturally prior to what is less so. Hence the intellect is first directed to universal truth; and in the second place to particular and special truths. Now there are certain acts of the will and appetite that regard good under some special condition, as joy
+  and delight regard good present and possessed; whereas desire and hope regard good not as yet possessed. Love, however, regards good universally, whether possessed or not. Hence love is naturally the first act of the will and appetite; for which reason all the other appetite movements presuppose love, as their root and origin. For nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything, except as a good that is loved: nor is anything an object of hate except as opposed to the object of love.
+  Similarly, it is clear that sorrow, and other things like to it, must be referred to love as to their first principle. Hence, in whomsoever there is will and appetite, there must also be love: since if the first is wanting, all that follows is also wanting. Now it has been shown that will is in God (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[1]</a>), and hence we must attribute love to Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The cognitive faculty does not move except through the medium of the appetitive: and just as in ourselves the universal reason moves through the medium of the particular reason, as stated in De Anima iii, 58,75, so in ourselves the intellectual appetite, or the will as it is called, moves through the medium of the sensitive appetite. Hence, in us the sensitive appetite is the proximate motive-force of our bodies. Some bodily change therefore always
+  accompanies an act of the sensitive appetite, and this change affects especially the heart, which, as the Philosopher says (De part. animal. iii, 4), is the first principle of movement in animals. Therefore acts of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as they have annexed to them some bodily change, are called passions; whereas acts of the will are not so called. Love, therefore, and joy and delight are passions; in so far as they denote acts of the intellective appetite, they are not passions. It
+  is in this latter sense that they are in God. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii): "God rejoices by an operation that is one and simple," and for the same reason He loves without passion.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the passions of the sensitive appetite there may be distinguished a certain material element---namely, the bodily change---and a certain formal element, which is on the part of the appetite. Thus in anger, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 15,63,64), the material element is the kindling of the blood about the heart; but the formal, the appetite for revenge. Again, as regards the formal element of certain passions a certain imperfection is
+  implied, as in desire, which is of the good we have not, and in sorrow, which is about the evil we have. This applies also to anger, which supposes sorrow. Certain other passions, however, as love and joy, imply no imperfection. Since therefore none of these can be attributed to God on their material side, as has been said (ad 1); neither can those that even on their formal side imply imperfection be attributed to Him; except metaphorically, and from likeness of effects, as already show (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[3], A[2]</a> , ad 2; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p8.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[11]</a>). Whereas, those that do not imply imperfection, such as love and joy, can be properly predicated of God, though without attributing passion to Him, as said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p8.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[11]</a>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An act of love always tends towards two things; to the good that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it: since to love a person is to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as we love ourselves, we wish ourselves good; and, so far as possible, union with that good. So love is called the unitive force, even in God, yet without implying composition; for the good that He wills for Himself, is no other than Himself, Who is good by His essence,
+  as above shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,3). And by the fact that anyone loves another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, in the place of himself; and regards the good done to him as done to himself. So far love is a binding force, since it aggregates another to ourselves, and refers his good to our own. And then again the divine love is a binding force, inasmuch as God wills good to others; yet it implies no composition in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2" next="FP_Q20_A3" prev="FP_Q20_A1" progress="3.82%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether God loves all things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p0.1">Whether God loves all things?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not love all things. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1), love places the lover outside himself, and causes him to pass, as it were, into the object of his love. But it is not admissible to say that God is placed outside of Himself, and passes into other things. Therefore it is inadmissible to say that God loves things other than Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the love of God is eternal. But things apart from God are not from eternity; except in God. Therefore God does not love anything, except as it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it is no other than Himself. Therefore God does not love things other than Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love is twofold---the love, namely, of desire, and the love of friendship. Now God does not love irrational creatures with the love of desire, since He needs no creature outside Himself. Nor with the love of friendship; since there can be no friendship with irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. viii, 2). Therefore God does not love all things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.5.7" parsed="vul|Ps|5|7|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p5.1" passage="Ps. 5:7">Ps. 5:7</scripRef>): "Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity." Now nothing is at the same time hated and loved. Therefore God does not love all things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.25" parsed="vul|Wis|11|25|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p6.1" passage="Wis. 11:25">Wis. 11:25</scripRef>): "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> God loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a thing is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses. Now it has been shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that God's will is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some
+  good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as by its object, our love, whereby we will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides
+  the good it has not, and to this end we direct our actions: whereas the love of God infuses and creates goodness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A lover is placed outside himself, and made to pass into the object of his love, inasmuch as he wills good to the beloved; and works for that good by his providence even as he works for his own. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "On behalf of the truth we must make bold to say even this, that He Himself, the cause of all things, by His abounding love and goodness, is placed outside Himself by His providence for all existing things."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although creatures have not existed from eternity, except in God, yet because they have been in Him from eternity, God has known them eternally in their proper natures; and for that reason has loved them, even as we, by the images of things within us, know things existing in themselves.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Friendship cannot exist except towards rational creatures, who are capable of returning love, and communicating one with another in the various works of life, and who may fare well or ill, according to the changes of fortune and happiness; even as to them is benevolence properly speaking exercised. But irrational creatures cannot attain to loving God, nor to any share in the intellectual and beatific life that He lives. Strictly speaking, therefore,
+  God does not love irrational creatures with the love of friendship; but as it were with the love of desire, in so far as He orders them to rational creatures, and even to Himself. Yet this is not because He stands in need of them; but only on account of His goodness, and of the services they render to us. For we can desire a thing for others as well as for ourselves.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Nothing prevents one and the same thing being loved under one aspect, while it is hated under another. God loves sinners in so far as they are existing natures; for they have existence and have it from Him. In so far as they are sinners, they have not existence at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from God. Hence under this aspect, they are hated by Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3" next="FP_Q20_A4" prev="FP_Q20_A2" progress="3.86%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God loves all things equally?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p0.1">Whether God loves all things equally?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God loves all things equally. For it is said: "He hath equally care of all" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.6.8" parsed="vul|Wis|6|8|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p2.1" passage="Wis. 6:8">Wis. 6:8</scripRef>). But God's providence over things comes from the love wherewith He loves them. Therefore He loves all things equally.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the love of God is His essence. But God's essence does not admit of degree; neither therefore does His love. He does not therefore love some things more than others.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as God's love extends to created things, so do His knowledge and will extend. But God is not said to know some things more than others; nor will one thing more than another. Neither therefore does He love some things more than others.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. cx): "God loves all things that He has made, and amongst them rational creatures more, and of these especially those who are members of His only-begotten Son Himself."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since to love a thing is to will it good, in a twofold way anything may be loved more, or less. In one way on the part of the act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. In this way God does not love some things more than others, because He loves all things by an act of the will that is one, simple, and always the same. In another way on the part of the good itself that a person wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that one more
+  than another, for whom we will a greater good, though our will is not more intense. In this way we must needs say that God loves some things more than others. For since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, as has been said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[2])</a>, no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to have equally care of all, not because by His care He deals out equal good to all, but because He administers all things with a like wisdom and goodness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument is based on the intensity of love on the part of the act of the will, which is the divine essence. But the good that God wills for His creatures, is not the divine essence. Therefore there is no reason why it may not vary in degree.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To understand and to will denote the act alone, and do not include in their meaning objects from the diversity of which God may be said to know or will more or less, as has been said with respect to God's love.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4" next="FP_Q21" prev="FP_Q20_A3" progress="3.87%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether God always loves more the better things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p0.1">Whether God always loves more the better things?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not always love more the better things. For it is manifest that Christ is better than the whole human race, being God and man. But God loved the human race more than He loved Christ; for it is said: "He spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.32" parsed="vul|Rom|8|32|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p2.1" passage="Rom. 8:32">Rom. 8:32</scripRef>). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an angel is better than a man. Hence it is said of man: "Thou hast made him a little less than the angels" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.8.6" parsed="vul|Ps|8|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p3.1" passage="Ps. 8:6">Ps. 8:6</scripRef>). But God loved men more than He loved the angels, for it is said: "Nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Heb.2.16" parsed="vul|Heb|2|16|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p3.2" passage="Heb. 2:16">Heb. 2:16</scripRef>). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Peter was better than John, since he loved Christ more. Hence the Lord, knowing this to be true, asked Peter, saying: "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me more than these?" Yet Christ loved John more than He loved Peter. For as Augustine says, commenting on the words, "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me?": "By this very mark is John distinguished from the other disciples, not that He loved him only, but that He loved him more than the rest." Therefore
+  God does not always love more the better things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the innocent man is better than the repentant, since repentance is, as Jerome says (Cap. 3 in Isa.), "a second plank after shipwreck." But God loves the penitent more than the innocent; since He rejoices over him the more. For it is said: "I say to you that there shall be joy in heaven upon the one sinner that doth penance, more than upon ninety-nine just who need not penance" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Luke.15.7" parsed="vul|Luke|15|7|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p5.1" passage="Lk. 15:7">Lk. 15:7</scripRef>). Therefore God does not always love more
+  the better things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the just man who is foreknown is better than the predestined sinner. Now God loves more the predestined sinner, since He wills for him a greater good, life eternal. Therefore God does not always love more the better things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Everything loves what is like it, as appears from (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Sir.13.19" parsed="vul|Sir|13|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p7.1" passage="Ecclus. 13:19">Ecclus. 13:19</scripRef>): "Every beast loveth its like." Now the better a thing is, the more like is it to God. Therefore the better things are more loved by God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> It must needs be, according to what has been said before, that God loves more the better things . For it has been shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">AA[2]</a>,3), that God's loving one thing more than another is nothing else than His willing for that thing a greater good: because God's will is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some things are better than others, is that God wills for them a greater good. Hence it follows that He loves more the
+  better things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God loves Christ not only more than He loves the whole human race, but more than He loves the entire created universe: because He willed for Him the greater good in giving Him "a name that is above all names," in so far as He was true God. Nor did anything of His excellence diminish when God delivered Him up to death for the salvation of the human race; rather did He become thereby a glorious conqueror: "The government was placed upon His shoulder,"
+  according to<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.9.6" parsed="vul|Isa|9|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p9.1" passage=" Is. 9:6."> Is. 9:6.</scripRef></p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God loves the human nature assumed by the Word of God in the person of Christ more than He loves all the angels; for that nature is better, especially on the ground of the union with the Godhead. But speaking of human nature in general, and comparing it with the angelic, the two are found equal, in the order of grace and of glory: since according to<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rev.21.17" parsed="vul|Rev|21|17|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p10.1" passage=" Rev 21:17, "> Rev 21:17, </scripRef> the measure of a man and of an angel is the same. Yet so that, in this
+  respect, some angels are found nobler than some men, and some men nobler than some angels. But as to natural condition an angel is better than a man. God therefore did not assume human nature because He loved man, absolutely speaking, more; but because the needs of man were greater; just as the master of a house may give some costly delicacy to a sick servant, that he does not give to his own son in sound health.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This doubt concerning Peter and John has been solved in various ways. Augustine interprets it mystically, and says that the active life, signified by Peter, loves God more than the contemplative signified by John, because the former is more conscious of the miseries of this present life, and therefore the more ardently desires to be freed from them, and depart to God. God, he says, loves more the contemplative life, since He preserves it longer. For
+  it does not end, as the active life does, with the life of the body.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p12" shownumber="no"> Some say that Peter loved Christ more in His members, and therefore was loved more by Christ also, for which reason He gave him the care of the Church; but that John loved Christ more in Himself, and so was loved more by Him; on which account Christ commended His mother to his care. Others say that it is uncertain which of them loved Christ more with the love of charity, and uncertain also which of them God loved more and ordained to a greater degree of glory in eternal life.
+  Peter is said to have loved more, in regard to a certain promptness and fervor; but John to have been more loved, with respect to certain marks of familiarity which Christ showed to him rather than to others, on account of his youth and purity. While others say that Christ loved Peter more, from his more excellent gift of charity; but John more, from his gifts of intellect. Hence, absolutely speaking, Peter was the better and more beloved; but, in a certain sense, John was the better, and was
+  loved the more. However, it may seem presumptuous to pass judgment on these matters; since "the Lord" and no other "is the weigher of spirits" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Prov.16.2" parsed="vul|Prov|16|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p12.1" passage="Prov. 16:2">Prov. 16:2</scripRef>).</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p13" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The penitent and the innocent are related as exceeding and exceeded. For whether innocent or penitent, those are the better and better loved who have most grace. Other things being equal, innocence is the nobler thing and the more beloved. God is said to rejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent, because often penitents rise from sin more cautious, humble, and fervent. Hence Gregory commenting on these words (Hom. 34 in Ev.) says that, "In
+  battle the general loves the soldier who after flight returns and bravely pursues the enemy, more than him who has never fled, but has never done a brave deed."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p14" shownumber="no"> Or it may be answered that gifts of grace, equal in themselves, are more as conferred on the penitent, who deserved punishment, than as conferred on the innocent, to whom no punishment was due; just as a hundred pounds [marcoe] are a greater gift to a poor man than to a king.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p15" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since God's will is the cause of goodness in things, the goodness of one who is loved by God is to be reckoned according to the time when some good is to be given to him by divine goodness. According therefore to the time, when there is to be given by the divine will to the predestined sinner a greater good, the sinner is better; although according to some other time he is the worse; because even according to some time he is neither good nor bad.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q21" next="FP_Q21_A1" prev="FP_Q20_A4" progress="3.92%" n="xx" title="Question. 21 - THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21-p0.1">Question 21. THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21-p2" shownumber="no"> After considering the divine love, we must treat of God's justice and mercy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether there is justice in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether His justice can be called truth?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether there is mercy in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether in every work of God there are justice and mercy?</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1" next="FP_Q21_A2" prev="FP_Q21" progress="3.92%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether there is justice in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p0.1">Whether there is justice in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is not justice in God. For justice is divided against temperance. But temperance does not exist in God: neither therefore does justice.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who does whatsoever he wills and pleases does not work according to justice. But, as the Apostle says: "God worketh all things according to the counsel of His will" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eph.1.11" parsed="vul|Eph|1|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p3.1" passage="Eph. 1:11">Eph. 1:11</scripRef>). Therefore justice cannot be attributed to Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the act of justice is to pay what is due. But God is no man's debtor. Therefore justice does not belong to God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whatever is in God, is His essence. But justice cannot belong to this. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "Good regards the essence; justice the act." Therefore justice does not belong to God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.10.8" parsed="vul|Ps|10|8|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p6.1" passage="Ps. 10:8">Ps. 10:8</scripRef>): "The Lord is just, and hath loved justice."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> There are two kinds of justice. The one consists in mutual giving and receiving, as in buying and selling, and other kinds of intercourse and exchange. This the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) calls commutative justice, that directs exchange and intercourse of business. This does not belong to God, since, as the Apostle says: "Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him?" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.11.35" parsed="vul|Rom|11|35|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p7.1" passage="Rom. 11:35">Rom. 11:35</scripRef>). The other consists in distribution, and
+  is called distributive justice; whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank deserves. As then the proper order displayed in ruling a family or any kind of multitude evinces justice of this kind in the ruler, so the order of the universe, which is seen both in effects of nature and in effects of will, shows forth the justice of God. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii, 4): "We must needs see that God is truly just, in seeing how He gives to all existing things what is proper to the
+  condition of each; and preserves the nature of each in the order and with the powers that properly belong to it."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Certain of the moral virtues are concerned with the passions, as temperance with concupiscence, fortitude with fear and daring, meekness with anger. Such virtues as these can only metaphorically be attributed to God; since, as stated above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[20], A[1]</a> ), in God there are no passions; nor a sensitive appetite, which is, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), the subject of those virtues. On the other hand, certain moral
+  virtues are concerned with works of giving and expending; such as justice, liberality, and magnificence; and these reside not in the sensitive faculty, but in the will. Hence, there is nothing to prevent our attributing these virtues to God; although not in civil matters, but in such acts as are not unbecoming to Him. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8), it would be absurd to praise God for His political virtues.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since good as perceived by intellect is the object of the will, it is impossible for God to will anything but what His wisdom approves. This is, as it were, His law of justice, in accordance with which His will is right and just. Hence, what He does according to His will He does justly: as we do justly what we do according to law. But whereas law comes to us from some higher power, God is a law unto Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To each one is due what is his own. Now that which is directed to a man is said to be his own. Thus the master owns the servant, and not conversely, for that is free which is its own cause. In the word debt, therefore, is implied a certain exigence or necessity of the thing to which it is directed. Now a twofold order has to be considered in things: the one, whereby one created thing is directed to another, as the parts of the whole, accident to
+  substance, and all things whatsoever to their end; the other, whereby all created things are ordered to God. Thus in the divine operations debt may be regarded in two ways, as due either to God, or to creatures, and in either way God pays what is due. It is due to God that there should be fulfilled in creatures what His will and wisdom require, and what manifests His goodness. In this respect, God's justice regards what befits Him; inasmuch as He renders to Himself what is due to Himself. It is
+  also due to a created thing that it should possess what is ordered to it; thus it is due to man to have hands, and that other animals should serve him. Thus also God exercises justice, when He gives to each thing what is due to it by its nature and condition. This debt however is derived from the former; since what is due to each thing is due to it as ordered to it according to the divine wisdom. And although God in this way pays each thing its due, yet He Himself is not the debtor, since He is
+  not directed to other things, but rather other things to Him. Justice, therefore, in God is sometimes spoken of as the fitting accompaniment of His goodness; sometimes as the reward of merit. Anselm touches on either view where he says (Prosolog. 10): "When Thou dost punish the wicked, it is just, since it agrees with their deserts; and when Thou dost spare the wicked, it is also just; since it befits Thy goodness."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although justice regards act, this does not prevent its being the essence of God; since even that which is of the essence of a thing may be the principle of action. But good does not always regard act; since a thing is called good not merely with respect to act, but also as regards perfection in its essence. For this reason it is said (De Hebdom.) that the good is related to the just, as the general to the special.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2" next="FP_Q21_A3" prev="FP_Q21_A1" progress="3.96%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether the justice of God is truth?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p0.1">Whether the justice of God is truth?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the justice of God is not truth. For justice resides in the will; since, as Anselm says (Dial. Verit. 13), it is a rectitude of the will, whereas truth resides in the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi; Ethic. vi, 2,6). Therefore justice does not appertain to truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), truth is a virtue distinct from justice. Truth therefore does not appertain to the idea of justice.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> it is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.84.11" parsed="vul|Ps|84|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p4.1" passage="Ps. 84:11">Ps. 84:11</scripRef>): "Mercy and truth have met each other": where truth stands for justice.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Truth consists in the equation of mind and thing, as said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[16], A[1]</a>). Now the mind, that is the cause of the thing, is related to it as its rule and measure; whereas the converse is the case with the mind that receives its knowledge from things. When therefore things are the measure and rule of the mind, truth consists in the equation of the mind to the thing, as happens in ourselves. For according as a thing is, or is not,
+  our thoughts or our words about it are true or false. But when the mind is the rule or measure of things, truth consists in the equation of the thing to the mind; just as the work of an artist is said to be true, when it is in accordance with his art.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p6" shownumber="no"> Now as works of art are related to art, so are works of justice related to the law with which they accord. Therefore God's justice, which establishes things in the order conformable to the rule of His wisdom, which is the law of His justice, is suitably called truth. Thus we also in human affairs speak of the truth of justice.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Justice, as to the law that governs, resides in the reason or intellect; but as to the command whereby our actions are governed according to the law, it resides in the will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The truth of which the Philosopher is speaking in this passage, is that virtue whereby a man shows himself in word and deed such as he really is. Thus it consists in the conformity of the sign with the thing signified; and not in that of the effect with its cause and rule: as has been said regarding the truth of justice.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3" next="FP_Q21_A4" prev="FP_Q21_A2" progress="3.98%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether mercy can be attributed to God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p0.1">Whether mercy can be attributed to God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that mercy cannot be attributed to God. For mercy is a kind of sorrow, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But there is no sorrow in God; and therefore there is no mercy in Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mercy is a relaxation of justice. But God cannot remit what appertains to His justice. For it is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Tim.2.13" parsed="vul|2Tim|2|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p3.1" passage="2 Tim. 2:13">2 Tim. 2:13</scripRef>): "If we believe not, He continueth faithful: He cannot deny Himself." But He would deny Himself, as a gloss says, if He should deny His words. Therefore mercy is not becoming to God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> it is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.110.4" parsed="vul|Ps|110|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p4.1" passage="Ps. 110:4">Ps. 110:4</scripRef>): "He is a merciful and gracious Lord."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Mercy is especially to be attributed to God, as seen in its effect, but not as an affection of passion. In proof of which it must be considered that a person is said to be merciful [misericors], as being, so to speak, sorrowful at heart [miserum cor]; being affected with sorrow at the misery of another as though it were his own. Hence it follows that he endeavors to dispel the misery of this other, as if it were his; and this is the effect of mercy. To
+  sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others belongs not to God; but it does most properly belong to Him to dispel that misery, whatever be the defect we call by that name. Now defects are not removed, except by the perfection of some kind of goodness; and the primary source of goodness is God, as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[6] , A[4]</a>). It must, however, be considered that to bestow perfections appertains not only to the divine goodness, but also to His justice, liberality, and
+  mercy; yet under different aspects. The communicating of perfections, absolutely considered, appertains to goodness, as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p5.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,4); in so far as perfections are given to things in proportion, the bestowal of them belongs to justice, as has been already said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p5.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>; in so far as God does not bestow them for His own use, but only on account of His goodness, it belongs to liberality; in so far as perfections given to things by God
+  expel defects, it belongs to mercy.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is based on mercy, regarded as an affection of passion.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God acts mercifully, not indeed by going against His justice, but by doing something more than justice; thus a man who pays another two hundred pieces of money, though owing him only one hundred, does nothing against justice, but acts liberally or mercifully. The case is the same with one who pardons an offence committed against him, for in remitting it he may be said to bestow a gift. Hence the Apostle calls remission a forgiving: "Forgive one
+  another, as Christ has forgiven you" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eph.4.32" parsed="vul|Eph|4|32|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p7.1" passage="Eph. 4:32">Eph. 4:32</scripRef>). Hence it is clear that mercy does not destroy justice, but in a sense is the fulness thereof. And thus it is said: "Mercy exalteth itself above judgement" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jas.2.13" parsed="vul|Jas|2|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3-p7.2" passage="James 2:13">James 2:13</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4" next="FP_Q22" prev="FP_Q21_A3" progress="4.00%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether in every work of God there are mercy and justice?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p0.1">Whether in every work of God there are mercy and justice?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not in every work of God are mercy and justice. For some works of God are attributed to mercy, as the justification of the ungodly; and others to justice, as the damnation of the wicked. Hence it is said: "Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jas.2.13" parsed="vul|Jas|2|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p2.1" passage="James 2:13">James 2:13</scripRef>). Therefore not in every work of God do mercy and justice appear.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle attributes the conversion of the Jews to justice and truth, but that of the Gentiles to mercy (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.15" parsed="vul|Rom|15|0|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p3.1" passage="Rom. 15">Rom. 15</scripRef>). Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, many just persons are afflicted in this world; which is unjust. Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is the part of justice to pay what is due, but of mercy to relieve misery. Thus both justice and mercy presuppose something in their works: whereas creation presupposes nothing. Therefore in creation neither mercy nor justice is found.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.24.10" parsed="vul|Ps|24|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p6.1" passage="Ps. 24:10">Ps. 24:10</scripRef>): "All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Mercy and truth are necessarily found in all God's works, if mercy be taken to mean the removal of any kind of defect. Not every defect, however, can properly be called a misery; but only defect in a rational nature whose lot is to be happy; for misery is opposed to happiness. For this necessity there is a reason, because since a debt paid according to the divine justice is one due either to God, or to some creature, neither the one nor the other can be
+  lacking in any work of God: because God can do nothing that is not in accord with His wisdom and goodness; and it is in this sense, as we have said, that anything is due to God. Likewise, whatever is done by Him in created things, is done according to proper order and proportion wherein consists the idea of justice. Thus justice must exist in all God's works. Now the work of divine justice always presupposes the work of mercy; and is founded thereupon. For nothing is due to creatures, except
+  for something pre-existing in them, or foreknown. Again, if this is due to a creature, it must be due on account of something that precedes. And since we cannot go on to infinity, we must come to something that depends only on the goodness of the divine will---which is the ultimate end. We may say, for instance, that to possess hands is due to man on account of his rational soul; and his rational soul is due to him that he may be man; and his being man is on account of the divine goodness. So
+  in every work of God, viewed at its primary source, there appears mercy. In all that follows, the power of mercy remains, and works indeed with even greater force; as the influence of the first cause is more intense than that of second causes. For this reason does God out of abundance of His goodness bestow upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully than is proportionate to their deserts: since less would suffice for preserving the order of justice than what the divine goodness
+  confers; because between creatures and God's goodness there can be no proportion.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Certain works are attributed to justice, and certain others to mercy, because in some justice appears more forcibly and in others mercy. Even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen, which, though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat alleviates, in punishing short of what is deserved.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p9" shownumber="no"> In the justification of the ungodly, justice is seen, when God remits sins on account of love, though He Himself has mercifully infused that love. So we read of Magdalen: "Many sins are forgiven her, because she hath loved much" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Luke.7.47" parsed="vul|Luke|7|47|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p9.1" passage="Lk. 7:47">Lk. 7:47</scripRef>).</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's justice and mercy appear both in the conversion of the Jews and of the Gentiles. But an aspect of justice appears in the conversion of the Jews which is not seen in the conversion of the Gentiles; inasmuch as the Jews were saved on account of the promises made to the fathers.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Justice and mercy appear in the punishment of the just in this world, since by afflictions lesser faults are cleansed in them, and they are the more raised up from earthly affections to God. As to this Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 9): "The evils that press on us in this world force us to go to God."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4-p12" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although creation presupposes nothing in the universe; yet it does presuppose something in the knowledge of God. In this way too the idea of justice is preserved in creation; by the production of beings in a manner that accords with the divine wisdom and goodness. And the idea of mercy, also, is preserved in the change of creatures from non-existence to existence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q22" next="FP_Q22_A1" prev="FP_Q21_A4" progress="4.03%" n="xxi" title="Question. 22 - THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22-p0.1">Question 22. THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22-p2" shownumber="no"> Having considered all that relates to the will absolutely, we must now proceed to those things which have relation to both the intellect and the will, namely providence, in respect to all created things; predestination and reprobation and all that is connected with these acts in respect especially of man as regards his eternal salvation. For in the science of morals, after the moral virtues themselves, comes the consideration of prudence, to which providence would seem to belong.
+Concerning God's providence there are four points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether providence is suitably assigned to God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether everything comes under divine providence?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether divine providence is immediately concerned with all things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether divine providence imposes any necessity upon things foreseen?</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1" next="FP_Q22_A2" prev="FP_Q22" progress="4.04%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether providence can suitably be attributed to God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p0.1">Whether providence can suitably be attributed to God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that providence is not becoming to God. For providence, according to Tully (De Invent. ii), is a part of prudence. But prudence, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5,9,18), it gives good counsel, cannot belong to God, Who never has any doubt for which He should take counsel. Therefore providence cannot belong to God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in God, is eternal. But providence is not anything eternal, for it is concerned with existing things that are not eternal, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29). Therefore there is no providence in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there is nothing composite in God. But providence seems to be something composite, because it includes both the intellect and the will. Therefore providence is not in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.14.3" parsed="vul|Wis|14|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p5.1" passage="Wis. 14:3">Wis. 14:3</scripRef>): "But Thou, Father, governest all things by providence [*Vulg. But 'Thy providence, O Father, governeth it.']."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to attribute providence to God. For all the good that is in created things has been created by God, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[6], A[4]</a>). In created things good is found not only as regards their substance, but also as regards their order towards an end and especially their last end, which, as was said above, is the divine goodness (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[21], A[4]</a>). This good of order existing in things created, is
+  itself created by God. Since, however, God is the cause of things by His intellect, and thus it behooves that the type of every effect should pre-exist in Him, as is clear from what has gone before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p6.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[4]</a>), it is necessary that the type of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and the type of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking, providence. For it is the chief part of prudence, to which two other parts are
+  directed---namely, remembrance of the past, and understanding of the present; inasmuch as from the remembrance of what is past and the understanding of what is present, we gather how to provide for the future. Now it belongs to prudence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), to direct other things towards an end whether in regard to oneself---as for instance, a man is said to be prudent, who orders well his acts towards the end of life--or in regard to others subject to him, in a
+  family, city or kingdom; in which sense it is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.24.45" parsed="vul|Matt|24|45|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p6.4" passage="Mat. 24:45">Mat. 24:45</scripRef>), "a faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family." In this way prudence or providence may suitably be attributed to God. For in God Himself there can be nothing ordered towards an end, since He is the last end. This type of order in things towards an end is therefore in God called providence. Whence Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6) that "Providence is the divine type itself, seated in
+  the Supreme Ruler; which disposeth all things": which disposition may refer either to the type of the order of things towards an end, or to the type of the order of parts in the whole.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9,10), "Prudence is what, strictly speaking, commands all that 'ebulia' has rightly counselled and 'synesis' rightly judged" [*Cf. <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p7.1" href="#FS.v.FS_Q57.FS_Q57_A6" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">FS, Q[57], A[6]</a>]. Whence, though to take counsel may not be fitting to God, from the fact that counsel is an inquiry into matters that are doubtful, nevertheless to give a command as to the ordering of things towards an end, the right reason of which He
+  possesses, does belong to God, according to<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.148.6" parsed="vul|Ps|148|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p7.2" passage=" Ps. 148:6"> Ps. 148:6</scripRef>: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away." In this manner both prudence and providence belong to God. Although at the same time it may be said that the very reason of things to be done is called counsel in God; not because of any inquiry necessitated, but from the certitude of the knowledge, to which those who take counsel come by inquiry. Whence it is said: "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of
+  His will" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eph.1.11" parsed="vul|Eph|1|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p7.3" passage="Eph. 1:11">Eph. 1:11</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Two things pertain to the care of providence---namely, the "reason of order," which is called providence and disposition; and the execution of order, which is termed government. Of these, the first is eternal, and the second is temporal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Providence resides in the intellect; but presupposes the act of willing the end. Nobody gives a precept about things done for an end; unless he will that end. Hence prudence presupposes the moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty is directed towards good, as the Philosopher says. Even if Providence has to do with the divine will and intellect equally, this would not affect the divine simplicity, since in God both the will and intellect
+  are one and the same thing, as we have said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(Q[19])</a>.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2" next="FP_Q22_A3" prev="FP_Q22_A1" progress="4.07%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether everything is subject to the providence of God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p0.1">Whether everything is subject to the providence of God?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that everything is not subject to divine providence. For nothing foreseen can happen by chance. If then everything was foreseen by God, nothing would happen by chance. And thus hazard and luck would disappear; which is against common opinion.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a wise provider excludes any defect or evil, as far as he can, from those over whom he has a care. But we see many evils existing. Either, then, God cannot hinder these, and thus is not omnipotent; or else He does not have care for everything.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever happens of necessity does not require providence or prudence. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5,9, 10,11): "Prudence is the right reason of things contingent concerning which there is counsel and choice." Since, then, many things happen from necessity, everything cannot be subject to providence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whatsoever is left to itself cannot be subject to the providence of a governor. But men are left to themselves by God in accordance with the words: "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Sir.15.14" parsed="vul|Sir|15|14|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p5.1" passage="Ecclus. 15:14">Ecclus. 15:14</scripRef>). And particularly in reference to the wicked: "I let them go according to the desires of their heart" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.80.13" parsed="vul|Ps|80|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p5.2" passage="Ps. 80:13">Ps. 80:13</scripRef>). Everything, therefore, cannot be subject to divine
+  providence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Cor.9.9" parsed="vul|1Cor|9|9|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p6.1" passage="1 Cor. 9:9">1 Cor. 9:9</scripRef>): "God doth not care for oxen [*Vulg. 'Doth God take care for oxen?']": and we may say the same of other irrational creatures. Thus everything cannot be under the care of divine providence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p7" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said of Divine Wisdom: "She reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.8.1" parsed="vul|Wis|8|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p7.1" passage="Wis. 8:1">Wis. 8:1</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Certain persons totally denied the existence of providence, as Democritus and the Epicureans, maintaining that the world was made by chance. Others taught that incorruptible things only were subject to providence and corruptible things not in their individual selves, but only according to their species; for in this respect they are incorruptible. They are represented as saying (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Job.22.14" parsed="vul|Job|22|14|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p8.1" passage="Job 22:14">Job 22:14</scripRef>): "The clouds are His covert; and He doth not
+  consider our things; and He walketh about the poles of heaven." Rabbi Moses, however, excluded men from the generality of things corruptible, on account of the excellence of the intellect which they possess, but in reference to all else that suffers corruption he adhered to the opinion of the others.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p9" shownumber="no"> We must say, however, that all things are subject to divine providence, not only in general, but even in their own individual selves. This is mad evident thus. For since every agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects towards that end extends as far as the causality of the first agent extends. Whence it happens that in the effects of an agent something takes place which has no reference towards the end, because the effect comes from a cause other than, and outside the
+  intention of the agent. But the causality of God, Who is the first agent, extends to all being, not only as to constituent principles of species, but also as to the individualizing principles; not only of things incorruptible, but also of things corruptible. Hence all things that exist in whatsoever manner are necessarily directed by God towards some end; as the Apostle says: "Those things that are of God are well ordered [*Vulg.'Those powers that are, are ordained of God': 'Quae autem sunt, a
+  Deo ordinatae sunt.' St. Thomas often quotes this passage, and invariably reads: 'Quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt.']" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.13.1" parsed="vul|Rom|13|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p9.1" passage="Rom. 13:1">Rom. 13:1</scripRef>). Since, therefore, as the providence of God is nothing less than the type of the order of things towards an end, as we have said; it necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as they participate in existence, must likewise be subject to divine providence. It has also been shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p9.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], AA[6]</a>,11) that God knows all
+  things, both universal and particular. And since His knowledge may be compared to the things themselves, as the knowledge of art to the objects of art, all things must of necessity come under His ordering; as all things wrought by art are subject to the ordering of that art.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is a difference between universal and particular causes. A thing can escape the order of a particular cause; but not the order of a universal cause. For nothing escapes the order of a particular cause, except through the intervention and hindrance of some other particular cause; as, for instance, wood may be prevented from burning, by the action of water. Since then, all particular causes are included under the universal cause, it could not be
+  that any effect should take place outside the range of that universal cause. So far then as an effect escapes the order of a particular cause, it is said to be casual or fortuitous in respect to that cause; but if we regard the universal cause, outside whose range no effect can happen, it is said to be foreseen. Thus, for instance, the meeting of two servants, although to them it appears a chance circumstance, has been fully foreseen by their master, who has purposely sent to meet at the one
+  place, in such a way that the one knows not about the other.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is otherwise with one who has care of a particular thing, and one whose providence is universal, because a particular provider excludes all defects from what is subject to his care as far as he can; whereas, one who provides universally allows some little defect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be hindered. Hence, corruption and defects in natural things are said to be contrary to some particular nature; yet they are in keeping with the
+  plan of universal nature; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields to the good of another, or even to the universal good: for the corruption of one is the generation of another, and through this it is that a species is kept in existence. Since God, then, provides universally for all being, it belongs to His providence to permit certain defects in particular effects, that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much good would be absent from the
+  universe. A lion would cease to live, if there were no slaying of animals; and there would be no patience of martyrs if there were no tyrannical persecution. Thus Augustine says (Enchiridion 2): "Almighty God would in no wise permit evil to exist in His works, unless He were so almighty and so good as to produce good even from evil." It would appear that it was on account of these two arguments to which we have just replied, that some were persuaded to consider corruptible things---e.g. casual
+  and evil things---as removed from the care of divine providence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p12" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man is not the author of nature; but he uses natural things in applying art and virtue to his own use. Hence human providence does not reach to that which takes place in nature from necessity; but divine providence extends thus far, since God is the author of nature. Apparently it was this argument that moved those who withdrew the course of nature from the care of divine providence, attributing it rather to the necessity of matter, as Democritus, and
+  others of the ancients.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p13" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When it is said that God left man to himself, this does not mean that man is exempt from divine providence; but merely that he has not a prefixed operating force determined to only the one effect; as in the case of natural things, which are only acted upon as though directed by another towards an end; and do not act of themselves, as if they directed themselves towards an end, like rational creatures, through the possession of free will, by which
+  these are able to take counsel and make a choice. Hence it is significantly said: "In the hand of his own counsel." But since the very act of free will is traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily follows that everything happening from the exercise of free will must be subject to divine providence. For human providence is included under the providence of God, as a particular under a universal cause. God, however, extends His providence over the just in a certain more excellent way than over
+  the wicked; inasmuch as He prevents anything happening which would impede their final salvation. For "to them that love God, all things work together unto good" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.28" parsed="vul|Rom|8|28|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p13.1" passage="Rom. 8:28">Rom. 8:28</scripRef>). But from the fact that He does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin, He is said to abandon them: not that He altogether withdraws His providence from them; otherwise they would return to nothing, if they were not preserved in existence by His providence. This was the reason that had weight with
+  Tully, who withdrew from the care of divine providence human affairs concerning which we take counsel.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p14" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since a rational creature has, through its free will, control over its actions, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2-p14.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[10]</a>), it is subject to divine providence in an especial manner, so that something is imputed to it as a fault, or as a merit; and there is given it accordingly something by way of punishment or reward. In this way, the Apostle withdraws oxen from the care of God: not, however, that individual irrational creatures escape
+  the care of divine providence; as was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3" next="FP_Q22_A4" prev="FP_Q22_A2" progress="4.13%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God has immediate providence over everything?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p0.1">Whether God has immediate providence over everything?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not immediate providence over all things. For whatever is contained in the notion of dignity, must be attributed to God. But it belongs to the dignity of a king, that he should have ministers; through whose mediation he provides for his subjects. Therefore much less has God Himself immediate providence over all things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to providence to order all things to an end. Now the end of everything is its perfection and its good. But it appertains to every cause to direct its effect to good; wherefore every active cause is a cause of the effect of providence. If therefore God were to have immediate providence over all things, all secondary causes would be withdrawn.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 17) that, "It is better to be ignorant of some things than to know them, for example, vile things": and the Philosopher says the same (Metaph. xii, 51). But whatever is better must be assigned to God. Therefore He has not immediate providence over bad and vile things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Job.34.13" parsed="vul|Job|34|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p5.1" passage="Job 34:13">Job 34:13</scripRef>): "What other hath He appointed over the earth? or whom hath He set over the world which He made?" On which passage Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 20): "Himself He ruleth the world which He Himself hath made."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Two things belong to providence---namely, the type of the order of things foreordained towards an end; and the execution of this order, which is called government. As regards the first of these, God has immediate providence over everything, because He has in His intellect the types of everything, even the smallest; and whatsoever causes He assigns to certain effects, He gives them the power to produce those effects. Whence it must be that He has beforehand
+  the type of those effects in His mind. As to the second, there are certain intermediaries of God's providence; for He governs things inferior by superior, not on account of any defect in His power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness; so that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures. Thus Plato's opinion, as narrated by Gregory of Nyssa (De Provid. viii, 3), is exploded. He taught a threefold providence. First, one which belongs to the supreme Deity, Who first and
+  foremost has provision over spiritual things, and thus over the whole world as regards genus, species, and universal causes. The second providence, which is over the individuals of all that can be generated and corrupted, he attributed to the divinities who circulate in the heavens; that is, certain separate substances, which move corporeal things in a circular direction. The third providence, over human affairs, he assigned to demons, whom the Platonic philosophers placed between us and the
+  gods, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei, 1, 2: viii, 14).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It pertains to a king's dignity to have ministers who execute his providence. But the fact that he has not the plan of those things which are done by them arises from a deficiency in himself. For every operative science is the more perfect, the more it considers the particular things with which its action is concerned.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's immediate provision over everything does not exclude the action of secondary causes; which are the executors of His order, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], AA[5]</a>,8).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is better for us not to know low and vile things, because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is better and higher; for we cannot understand many things simultaneously; because the thought of evil sometimes perverts the will towards evil. This does not hold with God, Who sees everything simultaneously at one glance, and whose will cannot turn in the direction of evil.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4" next="FP_Q23" prev="FP_Q22_A3" progress="4.16%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether providence imposes any necessity on things foreseen?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4-p0.1">Whether providence imposes any necessity on things foreseen?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that divine providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen. For every effect that has a "per se" cause, either present or past, which it necessarily follows, happens from necessity; as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vi, 7). But the providence of God, since it is eternal, pre-exists; and the effect flows from it of necessity, for divine providence cannot be frustrated. Therefore divine providence imposes a necessity upon things foreseen.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every provider makes his work as stable as he can, lest it should fail. But God is most powerful. Therefore He assigns the stability of necessity to things provided.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6): "Fate from the immutable source of providence binds together human acts and fortunes by the indissoluble connection of causes." It seems therefore that providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says that (Div. Nom. iv, 23) "to corrupt nature is not the work of providence." But it is in the nature of some things to be contingent. Divine providence does not therefore impose any necessity upon things so as to destroy their contingency.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Divine providence imposes necessity upon some things; not upon all, as some formerly believed. For to providence it belongs to order things towards an end. Now after the divine goodness, which is an extrinsic end to all things, the principal good in things themselves is the perfection of the universe; which would not be, were not all grades of being found in things. Whence it pertains to divine providence to produce every grade of being. And thus it has
+  prepared for some things necessary causes, so that they happen of necessity; for others contingent causes, that they may happen by contingency, according to the nature of their proximate causes.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The effect of divine providence is not only that things should happen somehow; but that they should happen either by necessity or by contingency. Therefore whatsoever divine providence ordains to happen infallibly and of necessity happens infallibly and of necessity; and that happens from contingency, which the plan of divine providence conceives to happen from contingency.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The order of divine providence is unchangeable and certain, so far as all things foreseen happen as they have been foreseen, whether from necessity or from contingency.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That indissolubility and unchangeableness of which Boethius speaks, pertain to the certainty of providence, which fails not to produce its effect, and that in the way foreseen; but they do not pertain to the necessity of the effects. We must remember that properly speaking 'necessary' and "contingent" are consequent upon being, as such. Hence the mode both of necessity and of contingency falls under the foresight of God, who provides universally for
+  all being; not under the foresight of causes that provide only for some particular order of things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q23" next="FP_Q23_A1" prev="FP_Q22_A4" progress="4.18%" n="xxii" title="Question. 23 - OF PREDESTINATION (EIGHT ARTICLES)">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p0.1">Question 23. OF PREDESTINATION (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p2" shownumber="no"> After consideration of divine providence, we must treat of predestination and the book of life. Concerning predestination there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether predestination is suitably attributed to God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) What is predestination, and whether it places anything in the predestined?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether to God belongs the reprobation of some men?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) On the comparison of predestination to election; whether, that is to say, the predestined are chosen?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p7" shownumber="no"> (5) Whether merits are the cause or reason of predestination, or reprobation, or election?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p8" shownumber="no"> (6) of the certainty of predestination; whether the predestined will infallibly be saved?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p9" shownumber="no"> (7) Whether the number of the predestined is certain?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23-p10" shownumber="no"> (8) Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1" next="FP_Q23_A2" prev="FP_Q23" progress="4.19%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether men are predestined by God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p0.1">Whether men are predestined by God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that men are not predestined by God, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): "It must be borne in mind that God foreknows but does not predetermine everything, since He foreknows all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all." But human merit and demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts by free will. All that pertains therefore to merit or demerit is not predestined by God; and thus man's predestination is done
+  away.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all creatures are directed to their end by divine providence, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2). But other creatures are not said to be predestined by God. Therefore neither are men.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angels are capable of beatitude, as well as men. But predestination is not suitable to angels, since in them there never was any unhappiness (miseria); for predestination, as Augustine says (De praedest. sanct. 17), is the "purpose to take pity [miserendi]" [*See <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[22], A[3]</a>]. Therefore men are not predestined.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the benefits God confers upon men are revealed by the Holy Ghost to holy men according to the saying of the Apostle (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Cor.2.12" parsed="vul|1Cor|2|12|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p5.1" passage="1 Cor. 2:12">1 Cor. 2:12</scripRef>): "Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God: that we may know the things that are given us from God." Therefore if man were predestined by God, since predestination is a benefit from God, his predestination would be made known to each predestined; which is clearly false.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.30" parsed="vul|Rom|8|30|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p6.1" passage="Rom. 8:30">Rom. 8:30</scripRef>): "Whom He predestined, them He also called."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> It is fitting that God should predestine men. For all things are subject to His providence, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end, as was also said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2). The end towards which created things are directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of created nature; and this end is life eternal, that consists in seeing
+  God which is above the nature of every creature, as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p7.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[12], A[4]</a>). The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power of its nature. Now if a thing cannot attain to something by the power of its nature, it must be directed thereto by another; thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of eternal life, is led towards it,
+  directed, as it were, by God. The reason of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him is the type of the order of all things towards an end, which we proved above to be providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be done, is a kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done. Hence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that
+  predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of providence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Damascene calls predestination an imposition of necessity, after the manner of natural things which are predetermined towards one end. This is clear from his adding: "He does not will malice, nor does He compel virtue." Whence predestination is not excluded by Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Irrational creatures are not capable of that end which exceeds the faculty of human nature. Whence they cannot be properly said to be predestined; although improperly the term is used in respect of any other end.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Predestination applies to angels, just as it does to men, although they have never been unhappy. For movement does not take its species from the term "wherefrom" but from the term "whereto." Because it matters nothing, in respect of the notion of making white, whether he who is made white was before black, yellow or red. Likewise it matters nothing in respect of the notion of predestination whether one is predestined to life eternal from the state of
+  misery or not. Although it may be said that every conferring of good above that which is due pertains to mercy; as was shown previously (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p10.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[21], AA[3]</a>,4).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even if by a special privilege their predestination were revealed to some, it is not fitting that it should be revealed to everyone; because, if so, those who were not predestined would despair; and security would beget negligence in the predestined.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2" next="FP_Q23_A3" prev="FP_Q23_A1" progress="4.22%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether predestination places anything in the predestined?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p0.1">Whether predestination places anything in the predestined?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that predestination does place something in the predestined. For every action of itself causes passion. If therefore predestination is action in God, predestination must be passion in the predestined.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Origen says on the text, "He who was predestined," etc. (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.1.4" parsed="vul|Rom|1|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p3.1" passage="Rom. 1:4">Rom. 1:4</scripRef>): "Predestination is of one who is not; destination, of one who is." And Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct.): "What is predestination but the destination of one who is?" Therefore predestination is only of one who actually exists; and it thus places something in the predestined.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, preparation is something in the thing prepared. But predestination is the preparation of God's benefits, as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14). Therefore predestination is something in the predestined.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, nothing temporal enters into the definition of eternity. But grace, which is something temporal, is found in the definition of predestination. For predestination is the preparation of grace in the present; and of glory in the future. Therefore predestination is not anything eternal. So it must needs be that it is in the predestined, and not in God; for whatever is in Him is eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14) that "predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits." But foreknowledge is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who foreknows them. Therefore, predestination is in the one who predestines, and not in the predestined.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Predestination is not anything in the predestined; but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that predestination is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the provider, as was proved above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[22], A[1]</a>). But the execution of providence which is called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed, and in an active way in the governor.
+  Whence it is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God. The execution of predestination is the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.30" parsed="vul|Rom|8|30|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p7.2" passage="Rom. 8:30">Rom. 8:30</scripRef>): "Whom He predestined, them He also called and whom He called, them He also magnified [Vulg. 'justified']."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Actions passing out to external matter imply of themselves passion---for example, the actions of warming and cutting; but not so actions remaining in the agent, as understanding and willing, as said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[2]</a>; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p8.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[18], A[3]</a>, ad 1). Predestination is an action of this latter class. Wherefore, it does not put anything in the predestined. But its execution, which passes out to external things, has
+  an effect in them.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Destination sometimes denotes a real mission of someone to a given end; thus, destination can only be said of someone actually existing. It is taken, however, in another sense for a mission which a person conceives in the mind; and in this manner we are said to destine a thing which we firmly propose in our mind. In this latter way it is said that Eleazar "determined not to do any unlawful things for the love of life" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Macc.6.20" parsed="vul|2Macc|6|20|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p9.1" passage="2 Macc. 6:20">2 Macc.
+  6:20</scripRef>). Thus destination can be of a thing which does not exist. Predestination, however, by reason of the antecedent nature it implies, can be attributed to a thing which does not actually exist; in whatsoever way destination is accepted.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Preparation is twofold: of the patient in respect to passion and this is in the thing prepared; and of the agent to action, and this is in the agent. Such a preparation is predestination, and as an agent by intellect is said to prepare itself to act, accordingly as it preconceives the idea of what is to be done. Thus, God from all eternity prepared by predestination, conceiving the idea of the order of some towards salvation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A2-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Grace does not come into the definition of predestination, as something belonging to its essence, but inasmuch as predestination implies a relation to grace, as of cause to effect, and of act to its object. Whence it does not follow that predestination is anything temporal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3" next="FP_Q23_A4" prev="FP_Q23_A2" progress="4.25%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God reprobates any man?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p0.1">Whether God reprobates any man?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God reprobates no man. For nobody reprobates what he loves. But God loves every man, according to (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.25" parsed="vul|Wis|11|25|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p2.1" passage="Wis. 11:25">Wis. 11:25</scripRef>): "Thou lovest all things that are, and Thou hatest none of the things Thou hast made." Therefore God reprobates no man.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if God reprobates any man, it would be necessary for reprobation to have the same relation to the reprobates as predestination has to the predestined. But predestination is the cause of the salvation of the predestined. Therefore reprobation will likewise be the cause of the loss of the reprobate. But this false. For it is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Hos.13.9" parsed="vul|Hos|13|9|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p3.1" passage="Osee 13:9">Osee 13:9</scripRef>): "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; Thy help is only in Me." God does not, then, reprobate
+  any man.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to no one ought anything be imputed which he cannot avoid. But if God reprobates anyone, that one must perish. For it is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eccl.7.14" parsed="vul|Eccl|7|14|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p4.1" passage="Eccles. 7:14">Eccles. 7:14</scripRef>): "Consider the works of God, that no man can correct whom He hath despised." Therefore it could not be imputed to any man, were he to perish. But this is false. Therefore God does not reprobate anyone.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Mal.1.2-Mal.1.3" parsed="vul|Mal|1|2|1|3" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p5.1" passage="Malachi 1:2,3">Malachi 1:2,3</scripRef>): "I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> God does reprobate some. For it was said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a> that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to providence, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from that end; this is called
+  reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but also something more, as does providence, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p6.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[22], A[1]</a>). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into
+  sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them all. So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular good---namely, eternal life---He is said to hate or reprobated them.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reprobation differs in its causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future life by the predestined---namely, glory---and of what is received in this life---namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not the cause of what is in the present---namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of what is assigned in the future---namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from
+  the free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way, the word of the prophet is true---namely, "Destruction is thy own, O Israel."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the reprobated cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as implying absolute impossibility: but only conditional impossibility: as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[3]</a>), that the predestined must necessarily be saved; yet a conditional necessity, which does not do away with the liberty of choice. Whence, although
+  anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the use of his free-will. Hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4" next="FP_Q23_A5" prev="FP_Q23_A3" progress="4.27%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether the predestined are chosen by God? [*“Eligantur.”]"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p0.1">Whether the predestined are chosen by God? [*"Eligantur."]</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the predestined are not chosen by God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1) that as the corporeal sun sends his rays upon all without selection, so does God His goodness. But the goodness of God is communicated to some in an especial manner through a participation of grace and glory. Therefore God without any selection communicates His grace and glory; and this belongs to predestination.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, election is of things that exist. But predestination from all eternity is also of things which do not exist. Therefore, some are predestined without election.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, election implies some discrimination. Now God "wills all men to be saved" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Tim.2.4" parsed="vul|1Tim|2|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p4.1" passage="1 Tim. 2:4">1 Tim. 2:4</scripRef>). Therefore, predestination which ordains men towards eternal salvation, is without election.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eph.1.4" parsed="vul|Eph|1|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p5.1" passage="Eph. 1:4">Eph. 1:4</scripRef>): "He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Predestination presupposes election in the order of reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that predestination, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>, is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering of some things towards an end; as was proved above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[22], A[2]</a>). But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end
+  already exists. Whence the predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that God wills their salvation; and to this belong both election and love:---love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of eternal salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as stated above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p6.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[20], AA[2]</a>,3):---election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p6.4" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>. Election and love, however, are differently ordered in God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not cause good, but we are incited to love by the good which already exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election in us precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love
+  precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects of election and love.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered, God communicates His goodness without election; inasmuch as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness, as we said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[6], A[4]</a>). But if we consider the communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it without election; since He gives certain goods to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus in the
+  conferring of grace and glory election is implied.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the will of the person choosing is incited to make a choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen, the choice must needs be of those things which already exist, as happens in our choice. In God it is otherwise; as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[20], A[2]</a>). Thus, as Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11): "Those are chosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does not err in His choice."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will, which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent will, which is to will simply.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5" next="FP_Q23_A6" prev="FP_Q23_A4" progress="4.30%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p0.1">Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. For the Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.29" parsed="vul|Rom|8|29|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p2.1" passage="Rom. 8:29">Rom. 8:29</scripRef>): "Whom He foreknew, He also predestined." Again a gloss of Ambrose on<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.9.15" parsed="vul|Rom|9|15|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p2.2" passage=" Rom. 9:15"> Rom. 9:15</scripRef>: "I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy" says: "I will give mercy to him who, I foresee, will turn to Me with his whole heart." Therefore it seems the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Divine predestination includes the divine will, which by no means can be irrational; since predestination is "the purpose to have mercy," as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 17). But there can be no other reason for predestination than the foreknowledge of merits. Therefore it must be the cause of reason of predestination.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "There is no injustice in God" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.9.14" parsed="vul|Rom|9|14|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p4.1" passage="Rom. 9:14">Rom. 9:14</scripRef>). Now it would seem unjust that unequal things be given to equals. But all men are equal as regards both nature and original sin; and inequality in them arises from the merits or demerits of their actions. Therefore God does not prepare unequal things for men by predestinating and reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and demerits.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Titus.3.5" parsed="vul|Titus|3|5|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p5.1" passage="Titus 3:5">Titus 3:5</scripRef>): "Not by works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us." But as He saved us, so He predestined that we should be saved. Therefore, foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of predestination.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since predestination includes will, as was said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[4])</a>, the reason of predestination must be sought for in the same way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[5]</a> ), that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the part of the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on account of something else.
+  Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator. But this is the question, whether, as regards the effect, predestination has any cause; or what comes to the same thing, whether God pre-ordained that He would give the effect of predestination to anyone on account of any merits.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p7" shownumber="no"> Accordingly there were some who held that the effect of predestination was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing merits in a former life. This was the opinion of Origen, who thought that the souls of men were created in the beginning, and according to the diversity of their works different states were assigned to them in this world when united with the body. The Apostle, however, rebuts this opinion where he says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.9.11-Rom.9.12" parsed="vul|Rom|9|11|9|12" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p7.1" passage="Rom. 9:11,12">Rom. 9:11,12</scripRef>): "For when they were
+  not yet born, nor had done any good or evil . . . not of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said of her: The elder shall serve the younger."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p8" shownumber="no"> Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians taught that the beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummation from God: so that it came about that the effect of predestination was granted to one, and not to another, because the one made a beginning by preparing, whereas the other did not. But against this we have the saying of the Apostle (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Cor.3.5" parsed="vul|2Cor|3|5|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p8.1" passage="2 Cor. 3:5">2 Cor. 3:5</scripRef>), that "we are not
+  sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves." Now no principle of action can be imagined previous to the act of thinking. Wherefore it cannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason of the effect of predestination.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p9" shownumber="no"> And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand that God gives grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it, because He knows beforehand that He will make good use of that grace, as if a king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make good use of it. But these seem to have drawn a distinction between that which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as
+  if the same thing cannot come from both. It is, however, manifest that what is of grace is the effect of predestination; and this cannot be considered as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the notion of predestination. Therefore, if anything else in us be the reason of predestination, it will outside the effect of predestination. Now there is no distinction between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; as there is not distinction between what flows from a
+  secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of God produces effects through the operation of secondary causes, as was above shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We must say, therefore, that the effect of predestination may be considered in a twofold light---in one way, in particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of predestination should not be the reason or cause of another; a subsequent
+  effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent as its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the matter. Thus we might say that God pre-ordained to give glory on account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace to merit glory. In another way, the effect of predestination may be considered in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination in general should have
+  any cause as coming from us; because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all included under the effect of predestination; even the preparation for grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by divine help, according to the prophet Jeremias (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Lam.5.21" parsed="vul|Lam|5|21|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p9.2" passage="Lam. 5:21">Lam. 5:21</scripRef>): "convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted." Yet predestination has in this way, in regard to its effect, the goodness of God for its reason; towards which the whole effect of
+  predestination is directed as to an end; and from which it proceeds, as from its first moving principle.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The use of grace foreknown by God is not the cause of conferring grace, except after the manner of a final cause; as was explained above.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Predestination has its foundation in the goodness of God as regards its effects in general. Considered in its particular effects, however, one effect is the reason of another; as already stated.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p12" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that
+  for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p12.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines,
+  by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.9.22-Rom.9.23" parsed="vul|Rom|9|22|9|23" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p12.2" passage="Rom. 9:22,23">Rom. 9:22,23</scripRef>): "What if God, willing to show His wrath [that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power known, endured [that is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His
+  glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory" and (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Tim.2.20" parsed="vul|2Tim|2|20|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p12.3" passage="2 Tim. 2:20">2 Tim. 2:20</scripRef>): "But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto honor, but some unto dishonor." Yet why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine will. Whence Augustine says (Tract. xxvi. in Joan.): "Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err."
+  Thus too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form, and that under another, depends upon the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part of
+  the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place. Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given gratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he deprives nobody
+  of his due), without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said: "Take what is thine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.20.14-Matt.20.15" parsed="vul|Matt|20|14|20|15" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A5-p12.4" passage="Mat. 20:14,15">Mat. 20:14,15</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6" next="FP_Q23_A7" prev="FP_Q23_A5" progress="4.36%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether predestination is certain?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p0.1">Whether predestination is certain?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that predestination is not certain. Because on the words "Hold fast that which thou hast, that no one take thy crown," (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rev.3.11" parsed="vul|Rev|3|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p2.1" passage="Rev 3:11">Rev 3:11</scripRef>), Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 15): "Another will not receive, unless this one were to lose it." Hence the crown which is the effect of predestination can be both acquired and lost. Therefore predestination cannot be certain.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, granted what is possible, nothing impossible follows. But it is possible that one predestined---e.g. Peter---may sin and then be killed. But if this were so, it would follow that the effect of predestination would be thwarted. This then, is not impossible. Therefore predestination is not certain.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever God could do in the past, He can do now. But He could have not predestined whom He hath predestined. Therefore now He is able not to predestine him. Therefore predestination is not certain.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.29" parsed="vul|Rom|8|29|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p5.1" passage=" Rom. 8:29"> Rom. 8:29</scripRef>: "Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated", says: "Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God, by which whosoever are freed will most certainly be freed."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that, namely, its effect should take place from necessity. For it was said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>, that predestination is a part of providence. But not all things subject to providence are necessary; some things happening from contingency, according to the nature of the proximate causes, which divine providence has ordained for such effects. Yet
+  the order of providence is infallible, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[22], A[4]</a>). So also the order of predestination is certain; yet free-will is not destroyed; whence the effect of predestination has its contingency. Moreover all that has been said about the divine knowledge and will (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p6.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[13]</a>; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p6.4" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[4]</a>) must also be taken into consideration; since they do not destroy contingency in things, although they themselves are
+  most certain and infallible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The crown may be said to belong to a person in two ways; first, by God's predestination, and thus no one loses his crown: secondly, by the merit of grace; for what we merit, in a certain way is ours; and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal sin. Another person receives that crown thus lost, inasmuch as he takes the former's place. For God does not permit some to fall, without raising others; according to<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Job.34.24" parsed="vul|Job|34|24|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p7.1" passage=" Job 34:24"> Job 34:24</scripRef>: "He shall
+  break in pieces many and innumerable, and make others to stand in their stead." Thus men are substituted in the place of the fallen angels; and the Gentiles in that of the Jews. He who is substituted for another in the state of grace, also receives the crown of the fallen in that in eternal life he will rejoice at the good the other has done, in which life he will rejoice at all good whether done by himself or by others.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although it is possible for one who is predestinated considered in himself to die in mortal sin; yet it is not possible, supposed, as in fact it is supposed. that he is predestinated. Whence it does not follow that predestination can fall short of its effect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since predestination includes the divine will as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[4])</a>: and the fact that God wills any created thing is necessary on the supposition that He so wills, on account of the immutability of the divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so the same must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not to say that God is able not to predestinate one whom He has predestinated, taking it in a composite sense,
+  thought, absolutely speaking, God can predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty of predestination is not destroyed.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7" next="FP_Q23_A8" prev="FP_Q23_A6" progress="4.39%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether the number of the predestined is certain?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p0.1">Whether the number of the predestined is certain?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the number of the predestined is not certain. For a number to which an addition can be made is not certain. But there can be an addition to the number of the predestined as it seems; for it is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Deut.1.11" parsed="vul|Deut|1|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p2.1" passage="Dt. 1:11">Dt. 1:11</scripRef>): "The Lord God adds to this number many thousands," and a gloss adds, "fixed by God, who knows those who belong to Him." Therefore the number of the predestined is not certain.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no reason can be assigned why God pre-ordains to salvation one number of men more than another. But nothing is arranged by God without a reason. Therefore the number to be saved pre-ordained by God cannot be certain.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the operations of God are more perfect than those of nature. But in the works of nature, good is found in the majority of things; defect and evil in the minority. If, then, the number of the saved were fixed by God at a certain figure, there would be more saved than lost. Yet the contrary follows from<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.7.13-Matt.7.14" parsed="vul|Matt|7|13|7|14" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p4.1" passage=" Mat. 7:13,14"> Mat. 7:13,14</scripRef>: "For wide is the gate, and broad the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat. How narrow
+  is the gate, and strait is the way that leadeth to life; and few there are who find it!" Therefore the number of those pre-ordained by God to be saved is not certain.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 13): "The number of the predestined is certain, and can neither be increased nor diminished."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The number of the predestined is certain. Some have said that it was formally, but not materially certain; as if we were to say that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be saved; not however these or those individuals. But this destroys the certainty of predestination; of which we spoke above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A6" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[6])</a>. Therefore we must say that to God the number of the predestined is certain, not only formally, but also materially. It
+  must, however, be observed that the number of the predestined is said to be certain to God, not by reason of His knowledge, because, that is to say, He knows how many will be saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain and the sands of the sea are certain to God); but by reason of His deliberate choice and determination. For the further evidence of which we must remember that every agent intends to make something finite, as is clear from what has been said above when we treated of the
+  infinite (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[7], AA[2]</a>,3). Now whosoever intends some definite measure in his effect thinks out some definite number in the essential parts, which are by their very nature required for the perfection of the whole. For of those things which are required not principally, but only on account of something else, he does not select any definite number "per se"; but he accepts and uses them in such numbers as are necessary on account of that other thing. For instance, a builder
+  thinks out the definite measurements of a house, and also the definite number of rooms which he wishes to make in the house; and definite measurements of the walls and roof; he does not, however, select a definite number of stones, but accepts and uses just so many as are sufficient for the required measurements of the wall. So also must we consider concerning God in regard to the whole universe, which is His effect. For He pre-ordained the measurements of the whole of the universe, and what
+  number would befit the essential parts of that universe---that is to say, which have in some way been ordained in perpetuity; how many spheres, how many stars, how many elements, and how many species. Individuals, however, which undergo corruption, are not ordained as it were chiefly for the good of the universe, but in a secondary way, inasmuch as the good of the species is preserved through them. Whence, although God knows the total number of individuals, the number of oxen, flies and such
+  like, is not pre-ordained by God "per se"; but divine providence produces just so many as are sufficient for the preservation of the species. Now of all creatures the rational creature is chiefly ordained for the good of the universe, being as such incorruptible; more especially those who attain to eternal happiness, since they more immediately reach the ultimate end. Whence the number of the predestined is certain to God; not only by way of knowledge, but also by way of a principal
+  pre-ordination.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p7" shownumber="no"> It is not exactly the same thing in the case of the number of the reprobate, who would seem to be pre-ordained by God for the good of the elect, in whose regard "all things work together unto good" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.28" parsed="vul|Rom|8|28|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p7.1" passage="Rom. 8:28">Rom. 8:28</scripRef>). Concerning the number of all the predestined, some say that so many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as there were angels left; others, as many as the number of angels created by God. It is, however, better to say that, "to God alone is
+  known the number for whom is reserved eternal happiness [*From the 'secret' prayer of the missal, 'pro vivis et defunctis.']"</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Deuteronomy must be taken as applied to those who are marked out by God beforehand in respect to present righteousness. For their number is increased and diminished, but not the number of the predestined.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason of the quantity of any one part must be judged from the proportion of that part of the whole. Thus in God the reason why He has made so many stars, or so many species of things, or predestined so many, is according to the proportion of the principal parts to the good of the whole universe.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A7-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The good that is proportionate to the common state of nature is to be found in the majority; and is wanting in the minority. The good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be found in the minority, and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is clear that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guidance of life; and those who have not this knowledge are said to be half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a profound knowledge
+  of things intelligible are a very small minority in respect to the rest. Since their eternal happiness, consisting in the vision of God, exceeds the common state of nature, and especially in so far as this is deprived of grace through the corruption of original sin, those who are saved are in the minority. In this especially, however, appears the mercy of God, that He has chosen some for that salvation, from which very many in accordance with the common course and tendency of nature fall
+  short.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8" next="FP_Q24" prev="FP_Q23_A7" progress="4.44%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p0.1">Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For nothing eternal can be preceded by anything temporal; and in consequence nothing temporal can help towards making something else eternal. But predestination is eternal. Therefore, since the prayers of the saints are temporal, they cannot so help as to cause anyone to become predestined. Predestination therefore is not furthered by the prayers of the saints.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as there is no need of advice except on account of defective knowledge, so there is not need of help except through defective power. But neither of these things can be said of God when He predestines. Whence it is said: "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord? [*Vulg.: 'Who hath known the mind of the Lord?'] Or who hath been His counsellor?" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.11.34" parsed="vul|Rom|11|34|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p3.1" passage="Rom. 11:34">Rom. 11:34</scripRef>). Therefore predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a thing can be helped, it can also be hindered. But predestination cannot be hindered by anything. Therefore it cannot be furthered by anything.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said that "Isaac besought the Lord for his wife because she was barren; and He heard him and made Rebecca to conceive" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gen.25.21" parsed="vul|Gen|25|21|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p5.1" passage="Gn. 25:21">Gn. 25:21</scripRef>). But from that conception Jacob was born, and he was predestined. Now his predestination would not have happened if he had never been born. Therefore predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Concerning this question, there were different errors. Some, regarding the certainty of divine predestination, said that prayers were superfluous, as also anything else done to attain salvation; because whether these things were done or not, the predestined would attain, and the reprobate would not attain, eternal salvation. But against this opinion are all the warnings of Holy Scripture, exhorting us to prayer and other good works.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p7" shownumber="no"> Others declared that the divine predestination was altered through prayer. This is stated to have the opinion of the Egyptians, who thought that the divine ordination, which they called fate, could be frustrated by certain sacrifices and prayers. Against this also is the authority of Scripture. For it is said: "But the triumpher in Israel will not spare and will not be moved to repentance" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Kgs.15.29" parsed="vul|1Kgs|15|29|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p7.1" passage="1 Kings 15:29">1 Kings 15:29</scripRef>); and that "the gifts and the calling of God are
+  without repentance" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.11.29" parsed="vul|Rom|11|29|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p7.2" passage="Rom. 11:29">Rom. 11:29</scripRef>).</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p8" shownumber="no"> Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are to be considered---namely, the divine ordination; and its effect. As regards the former, in no possible way can predestination be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For it is not due to their prayers that anyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter, predestination is said to be helped by the prayers of the saints, and by other good works; because providence, of which predestination is a part, does
+  not do away with secondary causes but so provides effects, that the order of secondary causes falls also under providence. So, as natural effects are provided by God in such a way that natural causes are directed to bring about those natural effects, without which those effects would not happen; so the salvation of a person is predestined by God in such a way, that whatever helps that person towards salvation falls under the order of predestination; whether it be one's own prayers or those of
+  another; or other good works, and such like, without which one would not attain to salvation. Whence, the predestined must strive after good works and prayer; because through these means predestination is most certainly fulfilled. For this reason it is said: "Labor more that by good works you may make sure your calling and election" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Pet.1.10" parsed="vul|2Pet|1|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p8.1" passage="2 Pet. 1:10">2 Pet. 1:10</scripRef>).</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument shows that predestination is not furthered by the prayers of the saints, as regards the preordination.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One is said to be helped by another in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as he receives power from him: and to be helped thus belongs to the weak; but this cannot be said of God, and thus we are to understand, "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord?" In another way one is said to be helped by a person through whom he carries out his work, as a master through a servant. In this way God is helped by us; inasmuch as we execute His orders, according to
+  <scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Cor.3.9" parsed="vul|1Cor|3|9|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p10.1" passage="1 Cor. 3:9">1 Cor. 3:9</scripRef>: "We are God's co-adjutors." Nor is this on account of any defect in the power of God, but because He employs intermediary causes, in order that the beauty of order may be preserved in the universe; and also that He may communicate to creatures the dignity of causality.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Secondary causes cannot escape the order of the first universal cause, as has been said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A8-p11.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[6]</a>), indeed, they execute that order. And therefore predestination can be furthered by creatures, but it cannot be impeded by them.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q24" next="FP_Q24_A1" prev="FP_Q23_A8" progress="4.47%" n="xxiii" title="Question. 24 - THE BOOK OF LIFE (THREE ARTICLES)">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24-p0.1">Question 24. THE BOOK OF LIFE (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24-p2" shownumber="no"> We now consider the book of life; concerning which there are three points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) What is the book of life?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Of what life is it the book?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether anyone can be blotted out of the book of life?</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1" next="FP_Q24_A2" prev="FP_Q24" progress="4.47%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether the book of life is the same as predestination?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p0.1">Whether the book of life is the same as predestination?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the book of life is not the same thing as pre-destination. For it is said, "All things are the book of life" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Sir.4.32" parsed="vul|Sir|4|32|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p2.1" passage="Ecclus. 4:32">Ecclus. 4:32</scripRef>)---i.e. the Old and New Testament according to a gloss. This, however, is not predestination. Therefore the book of life is not predestination.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 14) that "the book of life is a certain divine energy, by which it happens that to each one his good or evil works are recalled to memory." But divine energy belongs seemingly, not to predestination, but rather to divine power. Therefore the book of life is not the same thing as predestination.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, reprobation is opposed to predestination. So, if the book of life were the same as predestination, there should also be a book of death, as there is a book of life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in a gloss upon<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.68.29" parsed="vul|Ps|68|29|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p5.1" passage=" Ps. 68:29, "> Ps. 68:29, </scripRef> "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living. This book is the knowledge of God, by which He hath predestined to life those whom He foreknew."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The book of life is in God taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a comparison with human affairs. For it is usual among men that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed in a book; as, for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who formerly were called "conscript" fathers. Now it is clear from the preceding (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[23], A[4]</a>) that all the predestined are chosen by God to possess eternal life. This conscription, therefore,
+  of the predestined is called the book of life. A thing is said metaphorically to be written upon the mind of anyone when it is firmly held in the memory, according to<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Prov.3.3" parsed="vul|Prov|3|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p6.2" passage=" Prov. 3:3"> Prov. 3:3</scripRef>: "Forget not My Law, and let thy heart keep My commandments," and further on, "Write them in the tables of thy heart." For things are written down in material books to help the memory. Whence, the knowledge of God, by which He firmly remembers that He has predestined some to eternal life, is called
+  the book of life. For as the writing in a book is the sign of things to be done, so the knowledge of God is a sign in Him of those who are to be brought to eternal life, according to <scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Tim.11.19" parsed="vul|2Tim|11|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p6.3" passage="2 Tim. 11:19">2 Tim. 11:19</scripRef>: "The sure foundation of God standeth firm, having this seal; the Lord knoweth who are His."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The book of life may be understood in two senses. In one sense as the inscription of those who are chosen to life; thus we now speak of the book of life. In another sense the inscription of those things which lead us to life may be called the book of life; and this also is twofold, either as of things to be done; and thus the Old and New Testament are called a book of life; or of things already done, and thus that divine energy by which it happens
+  that to each one his deeds will be recalled to memory, is spoken of as the book of life. Thus that also may be called the book of war, whether it contains the names inscribed of those chosen for military service; or treats of the art of warfare, or relates the deeds of soldiers.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p8" shownumber="no"> Hence the solution of the Second Objection.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is the custom to inscribe, not those who are rejected, but those who are chosen. Whence there is no book of death corresponding to reprobation; as the book of life to predestination.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Predestination and the book of life are different aspects of the same thing. For this latter implies the knowledge of predestination; as also is made clear from the gloss quoted above.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2" next="FP_Q24_A3" prev="FP_Q24_A1" progress="4.50%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the  predestined?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p0.1">Whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the predestined?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the book of life does not only regard the life of glory of the predestined. For the book of life is the knowledge of life. But God, through His own life, knows all other life. Therefore the book of life is so called in regard to divine life; and not only in regard to the life of the predestined.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the life of glory comes from God, so also does the life of nature. Therefore, if the knowledge of the life of glory is called the book of life; so also should the knowledge of the life of nature be so called.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some are chosen to the life of grace who are not chosen to the life of glory; as it is clear from what is said: "Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.6.71" parsed="vul|John|6|71|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p4.1" passage="Jn. 6:71">Jn. 6:71</scripRef>). But the book of life is the inscription of the divine election, as stated above (A[1] ). Therefore it applies also to the life of grace.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The book of life is the knowledge of predestination, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. But predestination does not regard the life of grace, except so far as it is directed to glory; for those are not predestined who have grace and yet fail to obtain glory. The book of life altogether is only so called in regard to the life of glory.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The book of life, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>, implies a conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life. Now a man is chosen for something which does not belong to him by nature; and again that to which a man is chosen has the aspect of an end. For a soldier is not chosen or inscribed merely to put on armor, but to fight; since this is the proper duty to which military service is directed. But the life of glory is an end exceeding
+  human nature, as said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q23.FP_Q23_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[23], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, strictly speaking, the book of life regards the life of glory.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine life, even considered as a life of glory, is natural to God; whence in His regard there is no election, and in consequence no book of life: for we do not say that anyone is chosen to possess the power of sense, or any of those things that are consequent on nature.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p8" shownumber="no"> From this we gather the Reply to the Second Objection. For there is no election, nor a book of life, as regards the life of nature.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The life of grace has the aspect, not of an end, but of something directed towards an end. Hence nobody is said to be chosen to the life of grace, except so far as the life of grace is directed to glory. For this reason those who, possessing grace, fail to obtain glory, are not said to be chosen simply, but relatively. Likewise they are not said to be written in the book of life simply, but relatively; that is to say, that it is in the ordination and
+  knowledge of God that they are to have some relation to eternal life, according to their participation in grace.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3" next="FP_Q25" prev="FP_Q24_A2" progress="4.52%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p0.1">Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no one may be blotted out of the book of life. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 15): "God's foreknowledge, which cannot be deceived, is the book of life." But nothing can be taken away from the foreknowledge of God, nor from predestination. Therefore neither can anyone be blotted out from the book of life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in a thing is in it according to the disposition of that thing. But the book of life is something eternal and immutable. Therefore whatsoever is written therein, is there not in a temporary way, but immovably, and indelibly.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, blotting out is the contrary to inscription. But nobody can be written a second time in the book of life. Neither therefore can he be blotted out.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said, "Let them be blotted out from the book of the living" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.68.29" parsed="vul|Ps|68|29|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p5.1" passage="Ps. 68:29">Ps. 68:29</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Some have said that none could be blotted out of the book of life as a matter of fact, but only in the opinion of men. For it is customary in the Scriptures to say that something is done when it becomes known. Thus some are said to be written in the book of life, inasmuch as men think they are written therein, on account of the present righteousness they see in them; but when it becomes evident, either in this world or in the next, that they have fallen from
+  that state of righteousness, they are then said to be blotted out. And thus a gloss explains the passage: "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living." But because not to be blotted out of the book of life is placed among the rewards of the just, according to the text, "He that shall overcome, shall thus be clothed in white garments, and I will not blot his name out of the book of life" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rev.3.5" parsed="vul|Rev|3|5|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p6.1" passage="Apoc. 3:5">Apoc. 3:5</scripRef>) (and what is promised to holy men, is not merely something in the
+  opinion of men), it can therefore be said that to be blotted out, and not blotted out, of the book of life is not only to be referred to the opinion of man, but to the reality of the fact. For the book of life is the inscription of those ordained to eternal life, to which one is directed from two sources; namely, from predestination, which direction never fails, and from grace; for whoever has grace, by this very fact becomes fitted for eternal life. This direction fails sometimes; because some
+  are directed by possessing grace, to obtain eternal life, yet they fail to obtain it through mortal sin. Therefore those who are ordained to possess eternal life through divine predestination are written down in the book of life simply, because they are written therein to have eternal life in reality; such are never blotted out from the book of life. Those, however, who are ordained to eternal life, not through divine predestination, but through grace, are said to be written in the book of life
+  not simply, but relatively, for they are written therein not to have eternal life in itself, but in its cause only. Yet though these latter can be said to be blotted out of the book of life, this blotting out must not be referred to God, as if God foreknew a thing, and afterwards knew it not; but to the thing known, namely, because God knows one is first ordained to eternal life, and afterwards not ordained when he falls from grace.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The act of blotting out does not refer to the book of life as regards God's foreknowledge, as if in God there were any change; but as regards things foreknown, which can change.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although things are immutably in God, yet in themselves they are subject to change. To this it is that the blotting out of the book of life refers.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q24.FP_Q24_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The way in which one is said to be blotted out of the book of life is that in which one is said to be written therein anew; either in the opinion of men, or because he begins again to have relation towards eternal life through grace; which also is included in the knowledge of God, although not anew.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q25" next="FP_Q25_A1" prev="FP_Q24_A3" progress="4.54%" n="xxiv" title="Question. 25 - THE POWER OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p0.1">Question 25. THE POWER OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p2" shownumber="no"> After considering the divine foreknowledge and will, and other things pertaining thereto, it remains for us to consider the power of God. About this are six points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether there is power in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether His power is infinite?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether He is almighty?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether He could make the past not to have been?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p7" shownumber="no"> (5) Whether He could do what He does not, or not do what He does?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25-p8" shownumber="no"> (6) Whether what He makes He could make better?</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1" next="FP_Q25_A2" prev="FP_Q25" progress="4.55%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether there is power in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p0.1">Whether there is power in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that power is not in God. For as primary matter is to power, so God, who is the first agent, is to act. But primary matter, considered in itself, is devoid of all act. Therefore, the first agent---namely, God---is devoid of power.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 19), better than every power is its act. For form is better than matter; and action than active power, since it is its end. But nothing is better than what is in God; because whatsoever is in God, is God, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[3] , A[3]</a>). Therefore, there is no power in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Power is the principle of operation. But the divine power is God's essence, since there is nothing accidental in God: and of the essence of God there is no principle. Therefore there is no power in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[8]</a>; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p5.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that God's knowledge and will are the cause of things. But the cause and principle of a thing are identical. We ought not, therefore, to assign power to God; but only knowledge and will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "Thou art mighty, O Lord, and Thy truth is round about Thee" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.88.9" parsed="vul|Ps|88|9|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p6.1" passage="Ps. 88:9">Ps. 88:9</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Power is twofold---namely, passive, which exists not at all in God; and active, which we must assign to Him in the highest degree. For it is manifest that everything, according as it is in act and is perfect, is the active principle of something: whereas everything is passive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now it was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[3], A[2]</a>; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[4], AA[1]</a>, 2), that God is pure act, simply and in all
+  ways perfect, nor in Him does any imperfection find place. Whence it most fittingly belongs to Him to be an active principle, and in no way whatsoever to be passive. On the other hand, the notion of active principle is consistent with active power. For active power is the principle of acting upon something else; whereas passive power is the principle of being acted upon by something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 17). It remains, therefore, that in God there is active power in the
+  highest degree.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Active power is not contrary to act, but is founded upon it, for everything acts according as it is actual: but passive power is contrary to act; for a thing is passive according as it is potential. Whence this potentiality is not in God, but only active power.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whenever act is distinct from power, act must be nobler than power. But God's action is not distinct from His power, for both are His divine essence; neither is His existence distinct from His essence. Hence it does not follow that there should be anything in God nobler than His power.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In creatures, power is the principle not only of action, but likewise of effect. Thus in God the idea of power is retained, inasmuch as it is the principle of an effect; not, however, as it is a principle of action, for this is the divine essence itself; except, perchance, after our manner of understanding, inasmuch as the divine essence, which pre-contains in itself all perfection that exists in created things, can be understood either under the
+  notion of action, or under that of power; as also it is understood under the notion of "suppositum" possessing nature, and under that of nature. Accordingly the notion of power is retained in God in so far as it is the principle of an effect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Power is predicated of God not as something really distinct from His knowledge and will, but as differing from them logically; inasmuch as power implies a notion of a principle putting into execution what the will commands, and what knowledge directs, which three things in God are identified. Or we may say, that the knowledge or will of God, according as it is the effective principle, has the notion of power contained in it. Hence the consideration of
+  the knowledge and will of God precedes the consideration of His power, as the cause precedes the operation and effect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2" next="FP_Q25_A3" prev="FP_Q25_A1" progress="4.58%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether the power of God is infinite?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p0.1">Whether the power of God is infinite?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the power of God is not infinite. For everything that is infinite is imperfect according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 6). But the power of God is far from imperfect. Therefore it is not infinite.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every power is made known by its effect; otherwise it would be ineffectual. If, then, the power of God were infinite, it could produce an infinite effect, but this is impossible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 79) that if the power of any corporeal thing were infinite, it would cause instantaneous movement. God, however, does not cause instantaneous movement, but moves the spiritual creature in time, and the corporeal creature in place and time, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 20,22,23). Therefore, His power is not infinite.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. viii), that "God's power is immeasurable. He is the living mighty one." Now everything that is immeasurable is infinite. Therefore the power of God is infinite.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>, active power exists in God according to the measure in which He is actual. Now His existence is infinite, inasmuch as it is not limited by anything that receives it, as is clear from what has been said, when we discussed the infinity of the divine essence (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, it is necessary that the active power in God should be infinite. For in every agent is it found that the
+  more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts the greater its power to act. For instance, the hotter a thing is, the greater the power has it to give heat; and it would have infinite power to give heat, were its own heat infinite. Whence, since the divine essence, through which God acts, is infinite, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p6.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[7], A[1]</a>) it follows that His power likewise is infinite.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is here speaking of an infinity in regard to matter not limited by any form; and such infinity belongs to quantity. But the divine essence is otherwise, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[7], A[1]</a>); and consequently so also His power. It does not follow, therefore, that it is imperfect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The power of a univocal agent is wholly manifested in its effect. The generative power of man, for example, is not able to do more than beget man. But the power of a non-univocal agent does not wholly manifest itself in the production of its effect: as, for example, the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself in the production of an animal generated from putrefaction. Now it is clear that God is not a univocal agent. For nothing agrees with
+  Him either in species or in genus, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A5" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[3], A[5]</a>; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p8.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[4], A[3]</a>). Whence it follows that His effect is always less than His power. It is not necessary, therefore, that the infinite power of God should be manifested so as to produce an infinite effect. Yet even if it were to produce no effect, the power of God would not be ineffectual; because a thing is ineffectual which is ordained towards an end to which it does not attain. But the
+  power of God is not ordered toward its effect as towards an end; rather, it is the end of the effect produced by it.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 79) proves that if a body had infinite power, it would cause a non-temporal movement. And he shows that the power of the mover of heaven is infinite, because it can move in an infinite time. It remains, therefore, according to his reckoning, that the infinite power of a body, if such existed, would move without time; not, however, the power of an incorporeal mover. The reason of this is that one body moving another is a
+  univocal agent; wherefore it follows that the whole power of the agent is made known in its motion. Since then the greater the power of a moving body, the more quickly does it move; the necessary conclusion is that if its power were infinite, it would move beyond comparison faster, and this is to move without time. An incorporeal mover, however, is not a univocal agent; whence it is not necessary that the whole of its power should be manifested in motion, so as to move without time; and
+  especially since it moves in accordance with the disposition of its will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3" next="FP_Q25_A4" prev="FP_Q25_A2" progress="4.60%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God is omnipotent?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p0.1">Whether God is omnipotent?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God, for He is immovable, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Therefore He is not omnipotent.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin, nor "deny Himself" as it is said in <scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Tim.2.13" parsed="vul|2Tim|2|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p3.1" passage="2 Tim. 2:13.">2 Tim. 2:13.</scripRef> Therefore He is not omnipotent.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is said of God that He manifests His omnipotence "especially by sparing and having mercy" [*Collect, 10th Sunday after Pentecost]. Therefore the greatest act possible to the divine power is to spare and have mercy. There are things much greater, however, than sparing and having mercy; for example, to create another world, and the like. Therefore God is not omnipotent.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, upon the text, "God hath made foolish the wisdom of this world" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Cor.1.20" parsed="vul|1Cor|1|20|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p5.1" passage="1 Cor. 1:20">1 Cor. 1:20</scripRef>), a gloss says: "God hath made the wisdom of this world foolish [*Vulg.: 'Hath not God', etc.] by showing those things to be possible which it judges to be impossible." Whence it would seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in reference to inferior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges them; but in reference to the divine power. If
+  God, then, were omnipotent, all things would be possible; nothing, therefore impossible. But if we take away the impossible, then we destroy also the necessary; for what necessarily exists is impossible not to exist. Therefore there would be nothing at all that is necessary in things if God were omnipotent. But this is an impossibility. Therefore God is not omnipotent.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "No word shall be impossible with God" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Luke.1.37" parsed="vul|Luke|1|37|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p6.1" passage="Lk. 1:37">Lk. 1:37</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase, "God can do all things," is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said
+  to be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 17), a thing is said to be possible in two ways. First in relation to some power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be possible to man. Secondly absolutely, on account of the relation in which the very terms stand to each other. Now God cannot be said to be omnipotent through being able to do all things that are possible to created nature; for the divine power extends farther than that. If, however, we were to say
+  that God is omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle in explaining the nature of His power. For this would be saying nothing else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do all that He is able to do.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p8" shownumber="no"> It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible absolutely; which is the second way of saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the subject, as, for
+  instance, that a man is a donkey.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p9" shownumber="no"> It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds a thing possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on which its active power is founded; for instance, the power of giving warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being warmed. The divine existence, however, upon which the nature of power in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of
+  being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being. Whence, whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is numbered among the absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the idea of being except non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the same time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing, within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under the divine omnipotence,
+  not because of any defect in the power of God, but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing. Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do
+  them. Nor is this contrary to the word of the angel, saying: "No word shall be impossible with God." For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His active power, not to passive power, as was shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p10.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. Whence the fact that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to His omnipotence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To sin is to fall short of a perfect action; hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is repugnant to omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin, because of His omnipotence. Nevertheless, the Philosopher says (Topic. iv, 3) that God can deliberately do what is evil. But this must be understood either on a condition, the antecedent of which is impossible---as, for instance, if we were to say that God can do evil things
+  if He will. For there is no reason why a conditional proposition should not be true, though both the antecedent and consequent are impossible: as if one were to say: "If man is a donkey, he has four feet." Or he may be understood to mean that God can do some things which now seem to be evil: which, however, if He did them, would then be good. Or he is, perhaps, speaking after the common manner of the heathen, who thought that men became gods, like Jupiter or Mercury.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p12" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God's omnipotence is particularly shown in sparing and having mercy, because in this is it made manifest that God has supreme power, that He freely forgives sins. For it is not for one who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free will. Or, because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads them on to the participation of an infinite good; which is the ultimate effect of the divine power. Or because, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p12.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[21],
+  A[4]</a>), the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the divine works. For nothing is due to anyone, except on account of something already given him gratuitously by God. In this way the divine omnipotence is particularly made manifest, because to it pertains the first foundation of all good things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p13" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The absolute possible is not so called in reference either to higher causes, or to inferior causes, but in reference to itself. But the possible in reference to some power is named possible in reference to its proximate cause. Hence those things which it belongs to God alone to do immediately---as, for example, to create, to justify, and the like---are said to be possible in reference to a higher cause. Those things, however, which are of such kind as
+  to be done by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to those inferior causes. For it is according to the condition of the proximate cause that the effect has contingency or necessity, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3-p13.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[1]</a>, ad 2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the world is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, it judges to be impossible to God. So it is clear that the omnipotence of God does not take away from things their impossibility and
+  necessity.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4" next="FP_Q25_A5" prev="FP_Q25_A3" progress="4.66%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether God can make the past not to have been?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p0.1">Whether God can make the past not to have been?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God can make the past not to have been. For what is impossible in itself is much more impossible than that which is only impossible accidentally. But God can do what is impossible in itself, as to give sight to the blind, or to raise the dead. Therefore, and much more can He do what is only impossible accidentally. Now for the past not to have been is impossible accidentally: thus for Socrates not to be running is accidentally impossible, from
+  the fact that his running is a thing of the past. Therefore God can make the past not to have been.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what God could do, He can do now, since His power is not lessened. But God could have effected, before Socrates ran, that he should not run. Therefore, when he has run, God could effect that he did not run.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is a more excellent virtue than virginity. But God can supply charity that is lost; therefore also lost virginity. Therefore He can so effect that what was corrupt should not have been corrupt.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome says (<scripRef id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p5.1" passage="Ep. 22">Ep. 22</scripRef> ad Eustoch.): "Although God can do all things, He cannot make a thing that is corrupt not to have been corrupted." Therefore, for the same reason, He cannot effect that anything else which is past should not have been.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[7], A[2]</a>), there does not fall under the scope of God's omnipotence anything that implies a contradiction. Now that the past should not have been implies a contradiction. For as it implies a contradiction to say that Socrates is sitting, and is not sitting, so does it to say that he sat, and did not sit. But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the past. To say that he did not sit, is to say that
+  it did not happen. Whence, that the past should not have been, does not come under the scope of divine power. This is what Augustine means when he says (Contra Faust. xxix, 5): "Whosoever says, If God is almighty, let Him make what is done as if it were not done, does not see that this is to say: If God is almighty let Him effect that what is true, by the very fact that it is true, be false": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2): "Of this one thing alone is God deprived---namely, to make
+  undone the things that have been done."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although it is impossible accidentally for the past not to have been, if one considers the past thing itself, as, for instance, the running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past thing is considered as past, that it should not have been is impossible, not only in itself, but absolutely since it implies a contradiction. Thus, it is more impossible than the raising of the dead; in which there is nothing contradictory, because this is reckoned impossible
+  in reference to some power, that is to say, some natural power; for such impossible things do come beneath the scope of divine power.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God, in accordance with the perfection of the divine power, can do all things, and yet some things are not subject to His power, because they fall short of being possible; so, also, if we regard the immutability of the divine power, whatever God could do, He can do now. Some things, however, at one time were in the nature of possibility, whilst they were yet to be done, which now fall short of the nature of possibility, when they have been done. So
+  is God said not to be able to do them, because they themselves cannot be done.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A4-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God can remove all corruption of the mind and body from a woman who has fallen; but the fact that she had been corrupt cannot be removed from her; as also is it impossible that the fact of having sinned or having lost charity thereby can be removed from the sinner.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5" next="FP_Q25_A6" prev="FP_Q25_A4" progress="4.69%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether God can do what He does not?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p0.1">Whether God can do what He does not?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot do other than what He does. For God cannot do what He has not foreknown and pre-ordained that He would do. But He neither foreknew nor pre-ordained that He would do anything except what He does. Therefore He cannot do except what He does.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God can only do what ought to be done and what is right to be done. But God is not bound to do what He does not; nor is it right that He should do what He does not. Therefore He cannot do except what He does.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God cannot do anything that is not good and befitting creation. But it is not good for creatures nor befitting them to be otherwise than as they are. Therefore God cannot do except what He does.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "Thinkest thou that I cannot ask My Father, and He will give Me presently more than twelve legions of angels?" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.26.53" parsed="vul|Matt|26|53|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p5.1" passage="Mat. 26:53">Mat. 26:53</scripRef>). But He neither asked for them, nor did His Father show them to refute the Jews. Therefore God can do what He does not.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> In this matter certain persons erred in two ways. Some laid it down that God acts from natural necessity in such way that as from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually takes place---as, for instance, from the seed of man, a man must come, and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the divine operation there could not result other things, nor another order of things, than that which now is. But we showed above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[3]</a>) that God does not act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of all things; nor is that will naturally and from any necessity determined to those things. Whence in no way at all is the present course of events produced by God from any necessity, so that other things could not happen. Others, however, said that the divine power is restricted to this present course of events through the order of the divine wisdom and justice without which God
+  does nothing. But since the power of God, which is His essence, is nothing else but His wisdom, it can indeed be fittingly said that there is nothing in the divine power which is not in the order of the divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom includes the whole potency of the divine power. Yet the order placed in creation by divine wisdom, in which order the notion of His justice consists, as said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q21.FP_Q21_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[21], A[2]</a>), is not so adequate to the divine wisdom that the divine
+  wisdom should be restricted to this present order of things. Now it is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man puts into things made by him is taken from their end. So, when the end is proportionate to the things made for that end, the wisdom of the maker is restricted to some definite order. But the divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all proportion things created. Whence the divine wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no other course of events could
+  happen. Wherefore we must simply say that God can do other things than those He has done.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In ourselves, in whom power and essence are distinct from will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom, and will from justice, there can be something in the power which is not in the just will nor in the wise intellect. But in God, power and essence, will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Whence, there can be nothing in the divine power which cannot also be in His just will or in His wise intellect. Nevertheless, because
+  His will cannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things, except upon supposition, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[3]</a>), neither are the wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present order, as was shown above; so nothing prevents there being something in the divine power which He does not will, and which is not included in the order which He has place in things. Again, because power is considered as executing, the will as commanding, and the
+  intellect and wisdom as directing; what is attributed to His power considered in itself, God is said to be able to do in accordance with His absolute power. Of such a kind is everything which has the nature of being, as was said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>. What is, however, attributed to the divine power, according as it carries into execution the command of a just will, God is said to be able to do by His ordinary power. In this manner, we must say that God can do other things by
+  His absolute power than those He has foreknown and pre-ordained He would do. But it could not happen that He should do anything which He had not foreknown, and had not pre-ordained that He would do, because His actual doing is subject to His foreknowledge and pre-ordination, though His power, which is His nature, is not so. For God does things because He wills so to do; yet the power to do them does not come from His will, but from His nature.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is bound to nobody but Himself. Hence, when it is said that God can only do what He ought, nothing else is meant by this than that God can do nothing but what is befitting to Himself, and just. But these words "befitting" and "just" may be understood in two ways: one, in direct connection with the verb "is"; and thus they would be restricted to the present order of things; and would concern His power. Then what is said in the objection is false;
+  for the sense is that God can do nothing except what is now fitting and just. If, however, they be joined directly with the verb "can" (which has the effect of extending the meaning), and then secondly with "is," the present will be signified, but in a confused and general way. The sentence would then be true in this sense: "God cannot do anything except that which, if He did it, would be suitable and just."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A5-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although this order of things be restricted to what now exists, the divine power and wisdom are not thus restricted. Whence, although no other order would be suitable and good to the things which now are, yet God can do other things and impose upon them another order.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6" next="FP_Q26" prev="FP_Q25_A5" progress="4.73%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether God can do better than what He does?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p0.1">Whether God can do better than what He does?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot do better than He does. For whatever God does, He does in a most powerful and wise way. But a thing is so much the better done as it is more powerfully and wisely done. Therefore God cannot do anything better than He does.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine thus argues (Contra Maximin. iii, 8): "If God could, but would not, beget a Son His equal, He would have been envious." For the same reason, if God could have made better things than He has done, but was not willing so to do, He would have been envious. But envy is far removed from God. Therefore God makes everything of the best. He cannot therefore make anything better than He does.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is very good and the best of all cannot be bettered; because nothing is better than the best. But as Augustine says (Enchiridion 10), "each thing that God has made is good, and, taken all together they are very good; because in them all consists the wondrous beauty of the universe." Therefore the good in the universe could not be made better by God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Christ as man is full of grace and truth, and has the Spirit without measure; and so He cannot be better. Again created happiness is described as the highest good, and thus cannot be better. And the Blessed Virgin Mary is raised above all the choirs of angels, and so cannot be better than she is. God cannot therefore make all things better than He has made them.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eph.3.20" parsed="vul|Eph|3|20|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p6.1" passage="Eph. 3:20">Eph. 3:20</scripRef>): "God is able to do all things more abundantly than we desire or understand."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The goodness of anything is twofold; one, which is of the essence of it---thus, for instance, to be rational pertains to the essence of man. As regards this good, God cannot make a thing better than it is itself; although He can make another thing better than it; even as He cannot make the number four greater than it is; because if it were greater it would no longer be four, but another number. For the addition of a substantial difference in definitions is
+  after the manner of the addition of unity of numbers (Metaph. viii, 10). Another kind of goodness is that which is over and above the essence; thus, the good of a man is to be virtuous or wise. As regards this kind of goodness, God can make better the things He has made. Absolutely speaking, however, God can make something else better than each thing made by Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When it is said that God can make a thing better than He makes it, if "better" is taken substantively, this proposition is true. For He can always make something else better than each individual thing: and He can make the same thing in one way better than it is, and in another way not; as was explained above. If, however, "better" is taken as an adverb, implying the manner of the making; thus God cannot make anything better than He makes it, because
+  He cannot make it from greater wisdom and goodness. But if it implies the manner of the thing done, He can make something better; because He can give to things made by Him a better manner of existence as regards the accidents, although not as regards the substance.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is of the nature of a son that he should be equal to his father, when he comes to maturity. But it is not of the nature of anything created, that it should be better than it was made by God. Hence the comparison fails.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The universe, the present creation being supposed, cannot be better, on account of the most beautiful order given to things by God; in which the good of the universe consists. For if any one thing were bettered, the proportion of order would be destroyed; as if one string were stretched more than it ought to be, the melody of the harp would be destroyed. Yet God could make other things, or add something to the present creation; and then there would be
+  another and a better universe.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A6-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The humanity of Christ, from the fact that it is united to the Godhead; and created happiness from the fact that it is the fruition of God; and the Blessed Virgin from the fact that she is the mother of God; have all a certain infinite dignity from the infinite good, which is God. And on this account there cannot be anything better than these; just as there cannot be anything better than God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q26" next="FP_Q26_A1" prev="FP_Q25_A6" progress="4.76%" n="xxv" title="Question. 26 - OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES) ">
+<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26-p0.1">Question 26. OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES) </h3>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26-p2" shownumber="no"> After considering all that pertains to the unity of the divine essence, we come to treat of the divine beatitude. Concerning this, there are four points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether beatitude belongs to God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) In regard to what is God called blessed; does this regard His act of intellect?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether He is essentially the beatitude of each of the blessed?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether all other beatitude is included in the divine beatitude?</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1" next="FP_Q26_A2" prev="FP_Q26" progress="4.76%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether beatitude belongs to God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p0.1">Whether beatitude belongs to God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that beatitude does not belong to God. For beatitude according to Boethius (De Consol. iv) "is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all good things." But the aggregation of goods has no place in God; nor has composition. Therefore beatitude does not belong to God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, beatitude or happiness is the reward of virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9). But reward does not apply to God; as neither does merit. Therefore neither does beatitude.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says: "Which in His times He shall show, who is the Blessed and only Almighty, the King of Kings and Lord of Lords." (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Tim.6.15" parsed="vul|1Tim|6|15|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p4.1" passage="1 Tim. 6:15">1 Tim. 6:15</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Beatitude belongs to God in a very special manner. For nothing else is understood to be meant by the term beatitude than the perfect good of an intellectual nature; which is capable of knowing that it has a sufficiency of the good which it possesses, to which it is competent that good or ill may befall, and which can control its own actions. All of these things belong in a most excellent manner to God, namely, to be perfect, and to possess intelligence.
+  Whence beatitude belongs to God in the highest degree.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Aggregation of good is in God, after the manner not of composition, but of simplicity; for those things which in creatures is manifold, pre-exist in God, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[4], A[2]</a>; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[4]</a>), in simplicity and unity.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It belongs as an accident to beatitude or happiness to be the reward of virtue, so far as anyone attains to beatitude; even as to be the term of generation belongs accidentally to a being, so far as it passes from potentiality to act. As, then, God has being, though not begotten; so He has beatitude, although not acquired by merit.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2" next="FP_Q26_A3" prev="FP_Q26_A1" progress="4.77%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether God is called blessed in respect of His intellect?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2-p0.1">Whether God is called blessed in respect of His intellect?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not called blessed in respect to His intellect. For beatitude is the highest good. But good is said to be in God in regard to His essence, because good has reference to being which is according to essence, according to Boethius (De Hebdom.). Therefore beatitude also is said to be in God in regard to His essence, and not to His intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Beatitude implies the notion of end. Now the end is the object of the will, as also is the good. Therefore beatitude is said to be in God with reference to His will, and not with reference to His intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxxii, 7): "He is in glory, Who whilst He rejoices in Himself, needs not further praise." To be in glory, however, is the same as to be blessed. Therefore, since we enjoy God in respect to our intellect, because "vision is the whole of the reward," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii), it would seem that beatitude is said to be in God in respect of His intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Beatitude, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>, is the perfect good of an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as everything desires the perfection of its nature, intellectual nature desires naturally to be happy. Now that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is the intellectual operation, by which in some sense it grasps everything. Whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists in understanding. Now in God, to be and to
+  understand are one and the same thing; differing only in the manner of our understanding them. Beatitude must therefore be assigned to God in respect of His intellect; as also to the blessed, who are called blesses [beati] by reason of the assimilation to His beatitude.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument proves that beatitude belongs to God; not that beatitude pertains essentially to Him under the aspect of His essence; but rather under the aspect of His intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A2-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since beatitude is a good, it is the object of the will; now the object is understood as prior to the act of a power. Whence in our manner of understanding, divine beatitude precedes the act of the will at rest in it. This cannot be other than the act of the intellect; and thus beatitude is to be found in an act of the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3" next="FP_Q26_A4" prev="FP_Q26_A2" progress="4.79%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p0.1">Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is the beatitude of each of the blessed. For God is the supreme good, as was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[6], AA[2]</a>,4). But it is quite impossible that there should be many supreme goods, as also is clear from what has been said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p2.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[11], A[3]</a>). Therefore, since it is of the essence of beatitude that it should be the supreme good, it seems that beatitude is nothing else but God Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, beatitude is the last end of the rational nature. But to be the last end of the rational nature belongs only to God. Therefore the beatitude of every blessed is God alone.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The beatitude of one is greater than that of another, according to <scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Cor.15.41" parsed="vul|1Cor|15|41|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p4.1" passage="1 Cor. 15:41">1 Cor. 15:41</scripRef>: "Star differeth from star in glory." But nothing is greater than God. Therefore beatitude is something different from God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The beatitude of an intellectual nature consists in an act of the intellect. In this we may consider two things, namely, the object of the act, which is the thing understood; and the act itself which is to understand. If, then, beatitude be considered on the side of the object, God is the only beatitude; for everyone is blessed from this sole fact, that he understands God, in accordance with the saying of Augustine (Confess. v, 4): "Blessed is he who knoweth
+  Thee, though he know nought else." But as regards the act of understanding, beatitude is a created thing in beatified creatures; but in God, even in this way, it is an uncreated thing.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Beatitude, as regards its object, is the supreme good absolutely, but as regards its act, in beatified creatures it is their supreme good, not absolutely, but in that kind of goods which a creature can participate.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> End is twofold, namely, "objective" and "subjective," as the Philosopher says (Greater Ethics i, 3), namely, the "thing itself" and "its use." Thus to a miser the end is money, and its acquisition. Accordingly God is indeed the last end of a rational creature, as the thing itself; but created beatitude is the end, as the use, or rather fruition, of the thing.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4" next="FP.iii" prev="FP_Q26_A3" progress="4.81%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether all other beatitude is included in the beatitude of God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p0.1">Whether all other beatitude is included in the beatitude of God?</h4>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes. For there are some false beatitudes. But nothing false can be in God. Therefore the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a certain beatitude, according to some, consists in things corporeal; as in pleasure, riches, and such like. Now none of these have to do with God, since He is incorporeal. Therefore His beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Beatitude is a certain perfection. But the divine perfection embraces all other perfection, as was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[4], A[2]</a> ). Therefore the divine beatitude embraces all other beatitudes.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Whatever is desirable in whatsoever beatitude, whether true or false, pre-exists wholly and in a more eminent degree in the divine beatitude. As to contemplative happiness, God possesses a continual and most certain contemplation of Himself and of all things else; and as to that which is active, He has the governance of the whole universe. As to earthly happiness, which consists in delight, riches, power, dignity, and fame, according to Boethius (De Consol.
+  iii, 10), He possesses joy in Himself and all things else for His delight; instead of riches He has that complete self-sufficiency, which is promised by riches; in place of power, He has omnipotence; for dignities, the government of all things; and in place of fame, He possesses the admiration of all creatures.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A particular kind of beatitude is false according as it falls short of the idea of true beatitude; and thus it is not in God. But whatever semblance it has, howsoever slight, of beatitude, the whole of it pre-exists in the divine beatitude.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
+<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good that exists in things corporeal in a corporeal manner, is also in God, but in a spiritual manner.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q26.FP_Q26_A4-p8" shownumber="no"> We have now spoken enough concerning what pertains to the unity of the divine essence.</p>
+</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
+</div></div></div></body></html>