After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is will in God?
(2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?
(3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?
(4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?
(5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?
(6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?
(7) Whether the will of God is mutable?
(8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?
(9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?
(10) Whether God has free will?
(11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?
(12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?
@@ -935,33 +937,445 @@ se omnes causas comprehendens, quia sic effectus nullo modo posset suum ordinem evadere. Et sic est de voluntate Dei, ut dictum est.Objection 1: It seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord says (
Objection 2: Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: "I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them" (
Objection 3: Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God does not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the law to be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable will.
Objection 4: Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as said before (A[3]). Therefore He can both will and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is changeable substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable as regards His will.
On the contrary, It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son of man, that He should be changed" (
I answer that, The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if one should begin to will what before he had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless +
Objection 1: It
+seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord says (
[29238] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei sit mutabilis. Dicit enim +dominus Genes. VI, poenitet me fecisse hominem. Sed +quemcumque poenitet de eo quod fecit, habet mutabilem voluntatem. +Ergo Deus habet mutabilem voluntatem.
Objection 2: Further, it is said in the person
+of the Lord: "I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to
+root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it; but if that nation
+shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have
+thought to do to them" (
[29239] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, +Ierem. XVIII, ex persona domini dicitur, loquar adversus gentem +et adversus regnum, ut eradicem et destruam et disperdam illud; sed +si poenitentiam egerit gens illa a malo suo, agam et ego +poenitentiam super malo quod cogitavi ut facerem ei. Ergo Deus +habet mutabilem voluntatem.
Objection 3: Further, whatever God does, He +does voluntarily. But God does not always do the same thing, for at +one time He ordered the law to be observed, and at another time +forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable will.
[29240] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, +quidquid Deus facit, voluntarie facit. Sed Deus non semper eadem +facit, nam quandoque praecepit legalia observari, quandoque +prohibuit. Ergo habet mutabilem voluntatem.
Objection 4: Further, God does not will of +necessity what He wills, as said before (A[3]). Therefore He can both will +and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two +opposites, is changeable substantially; and that which can exist in a +place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is +changeable as regards His will.
[29241] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 4 Praeterea, Deus +non ex necessitate vult quod vult, ut supra dictum est. Ergo potest +velle et non velle idem. Sed omne quod habet potentiam ad opposita, +est mutabile, sicut quod potest esse et non esse, est mutabile +secundum substantiam; et quod potest esse hic et non esse hic, est +mutabile secundum locum. Ergo Deus est mutabilis secundum +voluntatem.
On the contrary,
+It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son
+of man, that He should be changed" (
[29242] Iª q. 19 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est +quod dicitur Num. XXIII, non est Deus, quasi homo, ut mentiatur; +neque ut filius hominis, ut mutetur.
I answer that, The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if one should begin to will what before he had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will regards good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not so before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before; - hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both the substance of God and His knowledge are entirely unchangeable (Q[9], A[1]; Q[14], A[15]). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable.
Reply to Objection 1: These words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when we repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so far as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom - He had made.
Reply to Objection 2: The will of God, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in the divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one who looked only on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not + hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it +has already been shown that both the substance of God and His +knowledge are entirely unchangeable (Q[9], A[1]; Q[14], A[15]). Therefore His will +must be entirely unchangeable.
[29243] Iª q. 19 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum +quod voluntas Dei est omnino immutabilis. Sed circa hoc +considerandum est, quod aliud est mutare voluntatem; et aliud est +velle aliquarum rerum mutationem. Potest enim aliquis, eadem +voluntate immobiliter permanente, velle quod nunc fiat hoc, et +postea fiat contrarium. Sed tunc voluntas mutaretur, si aliquis +inciperet velle quod prius non voluit, vel desineret velle quod +voluit. Quod quidem accidere non potest, nisi praesupposita +mutatione vel ex parte cognitionis, vel circa dispositionem +substantiae ipsius volentis. Cum enim voluntas sit boni, aliquis de +novo dupliciter potest incipere aliquid velle. Uno modo sic, quod +de novo incipiat sibi illud esse bonum. Quod non est absque +mutatione eius, sicut adveniente frigore, incipit esse bonum sedere +ad ignem, quod prius non erat. Alio modo sic, quod de novo +cognoscat illud esse sibi bonum, cum prius hoc ignorasset, ad hoc +enim consiliamur, ut sciamus quid nobis sit bonum. Ostensum est +autem supra quod tam substantia Dei quam eius scientia est omnino +immutabilis. Unde oportet voluntatem eius omnino esse +immutabilem.
Reply to Objection 1: These words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when we repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so far as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom + He had made.
[29244] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod illud verbum domini metaphorice intelligendum est, +secundum similitudinem nostram, cum enim nos poenitet, destruimus +quod fecimus. Quamvis hoc esse possit absque mutatione voluntatis, +cum etiam aliquis homo, absque mutatione voluntatis, interdum velit +aliquid facere, simul intendens postea illud destruere. Sic igitur +Deus poenituisse dicitur, secundum similitudinem operationis, +inquantum hominem quem fecerat, per diluvium a facie terrae +delevit.
Reply to Objection 2: The will of God, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in the divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one who looked only on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not
rise again," but looking at the divine first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise again." And God wills both: that is, that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen; or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine
and higher cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live" (
Reply to Objection 3: It does not follow from this argument that God has a will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should change.
Reply to Objection 4: Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the unchangeableness of the divine will, as has been said above (A[3]).
Objection 1: It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved, except whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be."
Objection 2: Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84) "Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder it." But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says (
[29245] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod voluntas Dei, cum sit causa prima et universalis, non +excludit causas medias, in quarum virtute est ut aliqui effectus +producantur. Sed quia omnes causae mediae non adaequant virtutem +causae primae, multa sunt in virtute et scientia et voluntate +divina, quae non continentur sub ordine causarum inferiorum; sicut +resuscitatio Lazari. Unde aliquis respiciens ad causas inferiores, +dicere poterat, Lazarus non resurget, respiciens vero ad causam +primam divinam, poterat dicere, Lazarus resurget. Et utrumque horum +Deus vult, scilicet quod aliquid quandoque sit futurum secundum +causam inferiorem, quod tamen futurum non sit secundum causam +superiorem; vel e converso. Sic ergo dicendum est quod Deus +aliquando pronuntiat aliquid futurum, secundum quod continetur in +ordine causarum inferiorum, ut puta secundum dispositionem naturae +vel meritorum; quod tamen non fit, quia aliter est in causa +superiori divina. Sicut cum praedixit Ezechiae, dispone domui +tuae, quia morieris et non vives, ut habetur Isaiae XXXVIII; +neque tamen ita evenit, quia ab aeterno aliter fuit in scientia et +voluntate divina, quae immutabilis est. Propter quod dicit +Gregorius, quod Deus immutat sententiam, non tamen mutat +consilium, scilicet voluntatis suae. Quod ergo dicit, +poenitentiam agam ego, intelligitur metaphorice dictum, nam homines +quando non implent quod comminati sunt, poenitere +videntur.
Reply to Objection +3: It does not follow from this argument that God has a will that +changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should +change.
[29246] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod ex ratione illa non potest concludi quod Deus habeat +mutabilem voluntatem; sed quod mutationem velit.
Reply to Objection 4: Although God's willing a +thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by +supposition, on account of the unchangeableness of the divine will, as +has been said above (A[3]).
[29247] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod, licet Deum velle aliquid non sit necessarium +absolute, tamen necessarium est ex suppositione, propter +immutabilitatem divinae voluntatis, ut supra dictum est.
Objection 1: It seems that the will of God +imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says +(Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved, except whom God has willed to be +saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it +must necessarily be."
[29248] Iª q. 19 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei rebus volitis necessitatem +imponat. Dicit enim Augustinus, in Enchirid., nullus fit salvus, +nisi quem Deus voluerit salvari. Et ideo rogandus est ut velit, +quia necesse est fieri, si voluerit.
Objection 2: Further, every cause that cannot
+be hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the
+Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84) "Nature always works in the same way,
+if there is nothing to hinder it." But the will of God cannot be
+hindered. For the Apostle says (
[29249] Iª q. 19 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, omnis +causa quae non potest impediri, ex necessitate suum effectum +producit, quia et natura semper idem operatur, nisi aliquid +impediat, ut dicitur in II Physic. Sed voluntas Dei non potest +impediri, dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. IX, voluntati enim eius +quis resistit? Ergo voluntas Dei imponit rebus volitis +necessitatem.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die, being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every true conditional statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is - necessary absolutely.
On the contrary, All good things that exist God wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will, counsel, and all other such things.
[29250] Iª q. 19 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, illud +quod habet necessitatem ex priori, est necessarium absolute, sicut +animal mori est necessarium, quia est ex contrariis compositum. Sed +res creatae a Deo, comparantur ad voluntatem divinam sicut ad +aliquid prius, a quo habent necessitatem, cum haec conditionalis +sit vera, si aliquid Deus vult, illud est; omnis autem +conditionalis vera est necessaria. Sequitur ergo quod omne quod +Deus vult, sit necessarium absolute.
On the contrary, All good things that exist God +wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, +it follows that all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an +end of free will, counsel, and all other such things.
[29251] Iª q. 19 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra, omnia +bona quae fiunt, Deus vult fieri. Si igitur eius voluntas imponat +rebus volitis necessitatem, sequitur quod omnia bona ex necessitate +eveniunt. Et sic perit liberum arbitrium et consilium, et omnia +huiusmodi.
I answer that, The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent.
This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.
-Reply to Objection 1: By the words of Augustine we must understand a necessity in things willed by God that is not absolute, but conditional. For the conditional statement that if God wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily true.
Reply to Objection 2: From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His will.
Reply to Objection 3: Consequents have necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the divine will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute necessities.
Objection 1: It seems that God wills evils. For every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should exist, but also evil things." Therefore God wills evil things.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. And Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil." But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and - beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil.
Objection 3: Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should exist.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom. Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it." Therefore it is not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not evil things.
I answer that, Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before (Q[5], A[1]), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or +
[29252] Iª q. 19 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum +quod divina voluntas quibusdam volitis necessitatem imponit, non +autem omnibus. Cuius quidem rationem aliqui assignare voluerunt ex +causis mediis quia ea quae producit per causas necessarias, sunt +necessaria; ea vero quae producit per causas contingentes, sunt +contingentia. Sed hoc non videtur sufficienter dictum, propter duo. +Primo quidem, quia effectus alicuius primae causae est contingens +propter causam secundam, ex eo quod impeditur effectus causae +primae per defectum causae secundae; sicut virtus solis per +defectum plantae impeditur. Nullus autem defectus causae secundae +impedire potest quin voluntas Dei effectum suum producat. Secundo, +quia, si distinctio contingentium a necessariis referatur solum in +causas secundas, sequitur hoc esse praeter intentionem et +voluntatem divinam, quod est inconveniens. Et ideo melius dicendum +est, quod hoc contingit propter efficaciam divinae voluntatis. Cum +enim aliqua causa efficax fuerit ad agendum, effectus consequitur +causam non tantum secundum id quod fit, sed etiam secundum modum +fiendi vel essendi, ex debilitate enim virtutis activae in semine, +contingit quod filius nascitur dissimilis patri in accidentibus, +quae pertinent ad modum essendi. Cum igitur voluntas divina sit +efficacissima, non solum sequitur quod fiant ea quae Deus vult +fieri; sed quod eo modo fiant, quo Deus ea fieri vult. Vult autem +quaedam fieri Deus necessario, et quaedam contingenter, ut sit ordo +in rebus, ad complementum universi. Et ideo quibusdam effectibus +aptavit causas necessarias, quae deficere non possunt, ex quibus +effectus de necessitate proveniunt, quibusdam autem aptavit causas +contingentes defectibiles, ex quibus effectus contingenter +eveniunt. Non igitur propterea effectus voliti a Deo, eveniunt +contingenter, quia causae proximae sunt contingentes, sed propterea +quia Deus voluit eos contingenter evenire, contingentes causas ad +eos praeparavit.
Reply to Objection 1: By the words of Augustine +we must understand a necessity in things willed by God that is not +absolute, but conditional. For the conditional statement that if God +wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily +true.
[29253] Iª q. 19 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod per illud verbum Augustini intelligenda est +necessitas in rebus volitis a Deo, non absoluta, sed conditionalis, +necesse est enim hanc conditionalem veram esse, si Deus hoc vult, +necesse est hoc esse.
Reply to Objection 2: From the very fact that +nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things +happen that God wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or +contingently according to His will.
[29254] Iª q. 19 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod, ex hoc ipso quod nihil voluntati divinae resistit, +sequitur quod non solum fiant ea quae Deus vult fieri; sed quod +fiant contingenter vel necessario, quae sic fieri vult.
Reply to Objection 3: Consequents have +necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the +antecedents. Hence things effected by the divine will have that kind +of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or +conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute +necessities.
[29255] Iª q. 19 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod posteriora habent necessitatem a prioribus, secundum +modum priorum. Unde et ea quae fiunt a voluntate divina, talem +necessitatem habent, qualem Deus vult ea habere, scilicet, vel +absolutam, vel conditionalem tantum. Et sic, non omnia sunt +necessaria absolute.
Objection 1: It seems that God wills evils. For +every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should +exist. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far +as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things +should exist, but also evil things." Therefore God wills evil +things.
[29256] Iª q. 19 a. 9 arg. 1 Ad nonum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei sit malorum. Omne enim bonum +quod fit, Deus vult. Sed mala fieri bonum est, dicit enim +Augustinus, in Enchirid., quamvis ea quae mala sunt, inquantum +mala sunt, non sint bona; tamen, ut non solum bona, sed etiam ut +sint mala, bonum est. Ergo Deus vult mala.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. And Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil." But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and + beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all +things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil.
[29257] Iª q. 19 a. 9 arg. 2 Praeterea, dicit +Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., erit malum ad omnis (idest +universi) perfectionem conferens. Et Augustinus dicit, in +Enchirid., ex omnibus consistit universitatis admirabilis +pulchritudo; in qua etiam illud quod malum dicitur, bene ordinatum, +et loco suo positum, eminentius commendat bona; ut magis placeant, +et laudabiliora sint, dum comparantur malis. Sed Deus vult omne +illud quod pertinet ad perfectionem et decorem universi, quia hoc +est quod Deus maxime vult in creaturis. Ergo Deus vult +mala.
Objection 3: +Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are +contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not +exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not +always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should +exist.
[29258] Iª q. 19 a. 9 arg. 3 Praeterea, mala +fieri, et non fieri, sunt contradictorie opposita. Sed Deus non +vult mala non fieri, quia, cum mala quaedam fiant, non semper +voluntas Dei impleretur. Ergo Deus vult mala +fieri.
On the contrary, +Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the cause of another man +becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom. Much less +therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is said +to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it." Therefore it is +not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every +evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not evil +things.
[29259] Iª q. 19 a. 9 s. c. Sed contra est +quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., nullo +sapiente homine auctore, fit homo deterior; est autem Deus omni +sapiente homine praestantior; multo igitur minus, Deo auctore, fit +aliquis deterior. Illo autem auctore cum dicitur, illo volente +dicitur. Non ergo volente Deo, fit homo deterior. Constat autem +quod quolibet malo fit aliquid deterius. Ergo Deus non vult +mala.
I answer that, Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before (Q[5], A[1]), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in - willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted.
Reply to Objection 1: Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that evil should be or be done." This, however, is not correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is - beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from his sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot therefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done, since nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it accidentally, but by that which belongs to it essentially.
Reply to Objection 2: Evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore Dionysius in saying that "evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe," draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.
Reply to Objection 3: The statements that evil exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affirmative. God therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good.
Objection 1: It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; "God alone is He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either side."
Objection 2: Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, as has been said (A[9]). Therefore there is not free-will in God.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of the will, not in obedience to necessity."
I answer that, We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above (A[3]), He has free will with respect to what He does not + willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things +to be naturally corrupted.
[29260] Iª q. 19 a. 9 co. Respondeo dicendum +quod, cum ratio boni sit ratio appetibilis, ut supra dictum est, +malum autem opponatur bono; impossibile est quod aliquod malum, +inquantum huiusmodi, appetatur, neque appetitu naturali, neque +animali, neque intellectuali, qui est voluntas. Sed aliquod malum +appetitur per accidens, inquantum consequitur ad aliquod bonum. Et +hoc apparet in quolibet appetitu. Non enim agens naturale intendit +privationem vel corruptionem; sed formam, cui coniungitur privatio +alterius formae; et generationem unius, quae est corruptio +alterius. Leo etiam, occidens cervum, intendit cibum, cui +coniungitur occisio animalis. Similiter fornicator intendit +delectationem, cui coniungitur deformitas culpae. Malum autem quod +coniungitur alicui bono, est privatio alterius boni. Nunquam igitur +appeteretur malum, nec per accidens, nisi bonum cui coniungitur +malum, magis appeteretur quam bonum quod privatur per malum. Nullum +autem bonum Deus magis vult quam suam bonitatem, vult tamen aliquod +bonum magis quam aliud quoddam bonum. Unde malum culpae, quod +privat ordinem ad bonum divinum, Deus nullo modo vult. Sed malum +naturalis defectus, vel malum poenae vult, volendo aliquod bonum, +cui coniungitur tale malum, sicut, volendo iustitiam, vult poenam; +et volendo ordinem naturae servari, vult quaedam naturaliter +corrumpi.
Reply to Objection 1: Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that evil should be or be done." This, however, is not correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is + beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from +his sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience +of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It +cannot therefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in +the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done, +since nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it +accidentally, but by that which belongs to it +essentially.
[29261] Iª q. 19 a. 9 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod, licet Deus non velit mala, vult +tamen mala esse vel fieri, quia, licet mala non sint bona, bonum +tamen est mala esse vel fieri. Quod ideo dicebant, quia ea quae in +se mala sunt, ordinantur ad aliquod bonum, quem quidem ordinem +importari credebant in hoc quod dicitur, mala esse vel fieri. Sed +hoc non recte dicitur. Quia malum non ordinatur ad bonum per se, +sed per accidens. Praeter intentionem enim peccantis est, quod ex +hoc sequatur aliquod bonum; sicut praeter intentionem tyrannorum +fuit, quod ex eorum persecutionibus claresceret patientia martyrum. +Et ideo non potest dici quod talis ordo ab bonum importetur per hoc +quod dicitur, quod malum esse vel fieri sit bonum, quia nihil +iudicatur secundum illud quod competit ei per accidens, sed +secundum illud quod competit ei per se.
Reply to Objection 2: Evil does not operate +towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except +accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore Dionysius in saying that +"evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe," draws a +conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.
[29262] Iª q. 19 a. 9 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod malum non operatur ad perfectionem et decorem +universi nisi per accidens, ut dictum est. Unde et hoc quod dicit +Dionysius, quod malum est ad universi perfectionem conferens, +concludit inducendo quasi ad inconveniens.
Reply to Objection 3: The statements that evil +exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet +the statements that anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it +not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affirmative. God +therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, +but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good.
[29263] Iª q. 19 a. 9 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod, licet mala fieri, et mala non fieri, contradictorie +opponantur; tamen velle mala fieri, et velle mala non fieri, non +opponuntur contradictorie, cum utrumque sit affirmativum. Deus +igitur neque vult mala fieri, neque vult mala non fieri, sed vult +permittere mala fieri. Et hoc est bonum.
Objection 1: It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; "God alone is He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either side."
Objection 2: Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, as has been said (A[9]). Therefore there is not free-will in God.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of the will, not in obedience to necessity."
I answer that, We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above (A[3]), He has free will with respect to what He does not necessarily will.
Reply to Objection 1: Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply, but only as regards the inclination to sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown (De Fide ii, 3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can will to sit down, and not will to sit down.
Objection 1: It seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine will.
Objection 2: Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will.
On the contrary, The will of God is one, since it is the very essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of
I answer that, Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (Q[13], A[3]). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that
punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" (