From this the reply to the Third Objection is evident.
+Reply to Objection 3: From this the reply to the Third Objection is evident.
@@ -5709,10 +5709,10 @@ On the contrary, The same thing cannot be the subject of contraries. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore the same action cannot be both good and evil. -+
I answer that, Nothing hinders a thing from being one, in so far as it is in one genus, and manifold, in so far as it is referred to another genus. Thus a continuous surface is one, considered as in the genus of quantity; and yet it is manifold, considered as to diff -r 076728bd4fc1 -r 5cef55a2686a summa/english/FS_iii.html --- a/summa/english/FS_iii.html Sat Jun 30 14:13:54 2018 +0000 +++ b/summa/english/FS_iii.html Sat Nov 17 15:42:30 2018 +0000 @@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ and fear): and also contrariety according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term (as between daring and fear).
-From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
+Reply to Objections: From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
@@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ is contrary thereto; thus the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "calm is contrary to anger," by opposition not of contrariety but of negation or privation. -From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
+Reply to Objections: From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@Consequently there are altogether eleven passions differing specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained.
-From this the replies to the objections are evident.
+Reply to Objections: From this the replies to the objections are evident.
@@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ ailing, is not sound; so, this mean in the diseases or passions of the soul, is not sound." For passions are not called "diseases" or "disturbances" of the soul, save when they are not controlled by reason. -Hence the reply to the First Objection is evident.
+Reply to Objection 1 Hence the reply to the First Objection is evident.
Reply to Objection 2: In every passion there is an increase or decrease in the natural movement of the heart, according as the heart is moved more or less intensely by contraction and dilatation; and hence it derives the character of passion. But there is no need for passion @@ -804,9 +804,10 @@
Reply to Objection 2: The remover of an obstacle is not a direct but an accidental mover: and here we are speaking of passions as directly related to one another. Moreover, the irascible passion removes the obstacle that hinders the concupiscible from resting in its object. - Wherefore it only follows that the irascible passions precede those concupiscible passions that connote rest. The third object - leads to the same conclusion. -
+ Wherefore it only follows that the irascible passions precede those concupiscible passions that connote rest. + +Reply to Objection 3:The third object + leads to the same conclusion.
@@ -1244,7 +1245,7 @@ Reply to Objection 1: Love is not divided into friendship and concupiscence, but into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence. For a friend is, properly speaking, one to whom we wish good: while we are said to desire, what we wish for ourselves. -Hence the Reply to the Second Objection.
+Reply to Objection 2: Hence the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: When friendship is based on usefulness or pleasure, a man does indeed wish his friend some good: and in this respect the character of friendship is preserved. But since he refers this good further to his own pleasure or use, the result is that @@ -1435,7 +1436,7 @@ among themselves," because they hinder one another's gain: and why "there are contentions among the proud," because they hinder one another in attaining the position they covet.
-Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident.
+Reply to Objection 1: Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident.
Reply to Objection 2: Even when a man loves in another what he loves not in himself, there is a certain likeness of proportion: because as the latter is to that which is loved in him, so is the former to that which he loves in himself: for instance, if a good singer @@ -1822,7 +1823,7 @@ this change being excessive: just as it happens in the senses, and in every act of a power of the soul that is exercised through the change of some bodily organ.
-In reply to the objections, it is to be observed that four proximate effects may be ascribed to love: viz. melting, enjoyment, +
Reply to Objection 1: In reply to the objections, it is to be observed that four proximate effects may be ascribed to love: viz. melting, enjoyment, languor, and fervor. Of these the first is "melting," which is opposed to freezing. For things that are frozen, are closely bound together, so as to be hard to pierce. But it belongs to love that the appetite is fitted to receive the good which is loved, inasmuch as the object loved is in the lover, as stated above @@ -2101,7 +2102,7 @@ according to what they take themselves to be, while they hate that which they really are, by desiring what is contrary to reason. And in both these ways, "he that loveth iniquity hateth" not only "his own soul," but also himself.
-Wherefore the reply to the First Objection is evident.
+Reply to Objection 1: Wherefore the reply to the First Objection is evident.
Reply to Objection 2: No man wills and works evil to himself, except he apprehend it under the aspect of good. For even they who kill themselves, apprehend death itself as a good, considered as putting an end to some unhappiness or pain. @@ -4320,7 +4321,7 @@ therefore on the part of the subject every pleasure is a remedy for any kind of sorrow, and every sorrow is a hindrance of all manner of pleasure: but chiefly when pleasure is opposed to sorrow specifically.
-Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident. Or we may say that, although not every sorrow is specifically contrary +
Reply to Objection 3: Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident. Or we may say that, although not every sorrow is specifically contrary to every pleasure, yet they are contrary to one another in regard to their effects: since one has the effect of strengthening the animal nature, while the other results in a kind of discomfort.
@@ -6320,7 +6321,7 @@ evil; both of which are contrary to the inclination of nature. Wherefore such like passions are in no way ascribed to inanimate beings. -Thus the Replies to the Objections are evident.
+Reply to the Objections are evident.
@@ -6356,7 +6357,7 @@ Objection 5: Further, Philosophers have been led by amazement to seek the truth, as stated in the beginning of Metaphysics. But fear leads to flight rather than to search. Therefore amazement is not a species of fear. -On the contrary suffices the authority of Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] (Cf. OBJ 1,3).
+On the contrary, suffices the authority of Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] (Cf. OBJ 1,3).
I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), fear regards a future evil which surpasses the power of him that fears, so that it is irresistible. Now man's evil, like @@ -6463,7 +6464,7 @@
In like manner one fears "to be over another," i.e. to lean on another, so that it is in his power to do us a harm: thus a man fears another, who knows him to be guilty of a crime lest he reveal it to others.
-This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
+Reply to objections This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
@@ -7010,7 +7011,7 @@ are: thus to a lover, what he loves seems better; to him that fears, what he fears seems more dreadful. Consequently owing to the want of right judgment, every passion, considered in itself, hinders the faculty of giving good counsel. -This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
+Reply to objections This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: The stronger a passion is, the greater the hindrance is it to the man who is swayed by it. Consequently, when fear is intense, man does indeed wish to take counsel, but his thoughts are so disturbed, that he can find no counsel. If, however, the fear @@ -7065,7 +7066,7 @@ and urinary or even seminal evacuation. Or else such like evacuations are due to contraction of the abdomen and testicles, as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxii, 11).
-This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
+Reply to Objection 2: This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: In fear, heat abandons the heart, with a downward movement: hence in those who are afraid the heart especially trembles, as also those members which are connected with the breast where the heart resides. Hence those who fear tremble especially @@ -7112,7 +7113,7 @@ counsel and work with greater attention. If, however, fear increases so much as to disturb the reason, it hinders action even on the part of the soul. But of such a fear the Apostle does not speak.
-This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
+Reply to Objection 1: This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: He that falls from a plank placed aloft, suffers a disturbance of his imagination, through fear of the fall that is pictured to his imagination. @@ -7508,7 +7509,7 @@ to him. Whereas anger regards one object under the aspect of evil, viz. the noxious person, on whom it seeks to be avenged. Consequently it is a passion somewhat made up of contrary passions.
-This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
+Reply to objections: This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
@@ -8059,7 +8060,7 @@ of defect is above all a cause of grief; since men who suffer from some defect are more easily hurt. And this is why men who are weak, or subject to some other defect, are more easily angered, since they are more easily grieved. -This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
+Reply to Objection 1: This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: If a man be despised in a matter in which he evidently excels greatly, he does not consider himself the loser thereby, and therefore is not grieved: and in this respect he is less angered. But in another respect, in so far as he is more undeservedly @@ -8114,7 +8115,7 @@ Prov. 15:1: "A mild answer breaketh wrath": because, to wit, they seem not to despise, but rather to think much of those before whom they humble themselves.
-This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
+Reply to Objection 1: This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: There are two reasons why anger ceases at the sight of death. One is because the dead are incapable of sorrow and sensation; and this is chiefly what the angry seek in those with whom they are angered. Another reason is because the dead seem to have @@ -8381,7 +8382,7 @@ Reply to Objection 1: Anger sometimes goes so far as to hinder the reason from curbing the tongue: but sometimes it goes yet farther, so as to paralyze the tongue and other outward members.
-And this suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
+Reply to Objection 2: And this suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: The disturbance of the heart may sometimes superabound to the extend that the movements of the outward members are hindered by the inordinate movement of the heart. Thence ensue taciturnity and immobility of the outward members; and sometimes even @@ -8399,4 +8400,4 @@ ` - \ No newline at end of file + diff -r 076728bd4fc1 -r 5cef55a2686a summa/english/FS_iv.html --- a/summa/english/FS_iv.html Sat Jun 30 14:13:54 2018 +0000 +++ b/summa/english/FS_iv.html Sat Nov 17 15:42:30 2018 +0000 @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ of quality.
-Wherefore it is clear how to answer the second objection: though some give another solution, as Simplicius says in his Commentary +
Reply to Objection 2: Wherefore it is clear how to answer the second objection: though some give another solution, as Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Predicaments.
@@ -1823,4 +1823,4 @@ ` - \ No newline at end of file + diff -r 076728bd4fc1 -r 5cef55a2686a summa/latin/sth2006.html --- a/summa/latin/sth2006.html Sat Jun 30 14:13:54 2018 +0000 +++ b/summa/latin/sth2006.html Sat Nov 17 15:42:30 2018 +0000 @@ -5648,7 +5648,7 @@ addit ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus.
[34469] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod eventus sequens aut est praecogitatus, aut non. Si est praecogitatus, manifestum est quod addit ad bonitatem vel -malitiam. Cum enim aliquis cogitans quod ex opere suo multa mala +malitiam.
Cum enim aliquis cogitans quod ex opere suo multa mala possunt sequi, nec propter hoc dimittit, ex hoc apparet voluntas eius esse magis inordinata. Si autem eventus sequens non sit praecogitatus, tunc distinguendum est. Quia si per se sequitur ex diff -r 076728bd4fc1 -r 5cef55a2686a summa/latin/sth2040.html --- a/summa/latin/sth2040.html Sat Jun 30 14:13:54 2018 +0000 +++ b/summa/latin/sth2040.html Sat Nov 17 15:42:30 2018 +0000 @@ -726,7 +726,7 @@ obiectum, bonum speratum. Sed quia bonum speratum est arduum possibile; aliquando autem fit aliquod arduum possibile nobis, non per nos, sed per alios; ideo spes etiam respicit illud per quod fit -nobis aliquid possibile. Inquantum igitur spes respicit bonum +nobis aliquid possibile.
Inquantum igitur spes respicit bonum speratum, spes ex amore causatur, non enim est spes nisi de bono desiderato et amato. Inquantum vero spes respicit illum per quem fit aliquid nobis possibile, sic amor causatur ex spe, et non e @@ -889,7 +889,7 @@ appetitivae virtutis reducuntur in naturam, sicut in principium primum. Et per hunc modum, etiam ipsi actus apprehensivae virtutis, ut intelligere, sentire et memorari, et etiam motus appetitus -animalis, quandoque dicuntur naturales. Et per hunc modum potest +animalis, quandoque dicuntur naturales.
Et per hunc modum potest dici timor naturalis. Et distinguitur a timore non naturali, secundum diversitatem obiecti. Est enim, ut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., timor de malo corruptivo, quod natura refugit propter @@ -897,7 +897,7 @@ iterum de malo contristativo, quod non repugnat naturae, sed desiderio appetitus, et talis timor non est naturalis. Sicut etiam supra amor, concupiscentia et delectatio distincta sunt per -naturale et non naturale. Sed secundum primam acceptionem +naturale et non naturale.
Sed secundum primam acceptionem naturalis, sciendum est quod quaedam de passionibus animae quandoque dicuntur naturales, ut amor, desiderium et spes, aliae vero naturales dici non possunt. Et hoc ideo, quia amor et odium, diff -r 076728bd4fc1 -r 5cef55a2686a summa/latin/sth2049.html --- a/summa/latin/sth2049.html Sat Jun 30 14:13:54 2018 +0000 +++ b/summa/latin/sth2049.html Sat Nov 17 15:42:30 2018 +0000 @@ -1190,7 +1190,7 @@ totaliter vincitur appetitiva potentia, ut feratur in idem ut in pluribus, per modum naturae, quod pertinet ad habitum virtutis. Et ideo habitus virtutis non potest causari per unum actum, sed per -multos. In apprehensivis autem potentiis considerandum est quod +multos.
In apprehensivis autem potentiis considerandum est quod duplex est passivum, unum quidem ipse intellectus possibilis; aliud autem intellectus quem vocat Aristoteles passivum, qui est ratio particularis, idest vis cogitativa cum memorativa et imaginativa. @@ -1508,7 +1508,7 @@ vel diversum participationis modum. Est enim dissimile non solum nigrum albo, sed etiam minus album magis albo, nam etiam motus fit a minus albo in magis album, tanquam ex opposito in oppositum, ut -dicitur in V Physic. Quia vero usus habituum in voluntate hominis +dicitur in V Physic.
Quia vero usus habituum in voluntate hominis
consistit, ut ex supradictis patet; sicut contingit quod aliquis
habens habitum non utitur illo, vel etiam agit actum contrarium;
ita etiam potest contingere quod utitur habitu secundum actum non
@@ -1976,4 +1976,4 @@
Iura omnia asservantur
OCLC nr. 49644264