Q. 115. A. 2. Whether there are any seminal virtues in corporeal matter?

Q. 115. A. 1. Whether a body can be active?

+ Objection 1: It would seem that no bodies are active. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 9): "There are things that are acted upon, but + do not act; such are bodies: there is one Who acts but is not acted upon; this is God: there are things that both act and + are acted upon; these are the spiritual substances." +

[33232] Iª q. 115 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod nullum corpus sit activum. Dicit enim +Augustinus quod in rebus invenitur aliquid actum et non agens, +sicut sunt corpora; aliquid agens et non actum, sicut Deus; aliquid +agens et actum, sicut substantiae spirituales.

+ Objection 2: Further, every agent except the first agent requires in its work a subject susceptible of its action. But there is not substance + below the corporeal substance which can be susceptible of the latter's action; since it belongs to the lowest degree of beings. + Therefore corporeal substance is not active. +

[33233] Iª q. 115 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, omne +agens, excepto primo agente, in suo opere indiget subiecto quod sit +susceptibile suae actionis. Sed infra substantiam corporalem non +est substantia quae sit susceptibilis suae actionis, quia haec +substantia tenet infimum gradum in entibus. Ergo substantia +corporalis non est activa.

+ Objection 3: Further, every corporeal substance is limited by quantity. But quantity hinders substance from movement and action, because + it surrounds it and penetrates it: just as a cloud hinders the air from receiving light. A proof of this is that the more + a body increases in quantity, the heavier it is and the more difficult to move. Therefore no corporeal substance is active. +

[33234] Iª q. 115 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, +omnis substantia corporalis concluditur quantitate. Sed quantitas +impedit substantiam a motu et actione, quia comprehendit eam, et +mergitur in ea, sicut impeditur aer nubilosus a perceptione +luminis. Et huius signum est, quod quanto magis accreverit +quantitas corporis, tanto est ponderosius et gravius ad hoc quod +moveatur. Ergo nulla substantia corporalis est activa.

+ Objection 4: Further, the power of action in every agent is according to its propinquity to the first active cause. But bodies, being + most composite, are most remote from the first active cause, which is most simple. Therefore no bodies are active. +

[33235] Iª q. 115 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, omne +agens habet virtutem agendi ex propinquitate ad primum activum. Sed +a primo activo, quod est simplicissimum, remotissima sunt corpora, +quae sunt maxime composita. Ergo nullum corpus est agens.

+ Objection 5: Further, if a body is an agent, the term of its action is either a substantial, or an accidental form. But it is not a substantial + form; for it is not possible to find in a body any principle of action, save an active quality, which is an accident; and + an accident cannot be the cause of a substantial form, since the cause is always more excellent than the effect. Likewise, + neither is it an accidental form, for "an accident does not extend beyond its subject," + as Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4). Therefore no bodies are active. +

[33236] Iª q. 115 a. 1 arg. 5 Praeterea, si +aliquod corpus est agens, aut agit ad formam substantialem; aut ad +formam accidentalem. Sed non ad formam substantialem, quia non +invenitur in corporibus principium actionis nisi aliqua qualitas +activa, quae est accidens; accidens autem non potest esse causa +formae substantialis, cum causa sit potior quam effectus. Similiter +etiam neque ad formam accidentalem, quia accidens non se +extendit ultra suum subiectum, ut Augustinus dicit IX de Trin. +Ergo nullum corpus est activum.

+ On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv) that among other qualities of corporeal fire, "it shows its greatness in its action and power + on that of which it lays hold." +

[33237] Iª q. 115 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est +quod Dionysius, XV cap. Cael. Hier., inter ceteras proprietates +corporei ignis, dicit quod ad susceptas materias manifestat sui +ipsius magnitudinem activus et potens.

+ I answer that, It is apparent to the senses that some bodies are active. But concerning the action of bodies there have been three errors. + For some denied all action to bodies. This is the opinion of Avicebron in his book on The Fount of Life, where, by the arguments + mentioned above, he endeavors to prove that no bodies act, but that all the actions which seem to be the actions of bodies, + are the actions of some spiritual power that penetrates all bodies: so that, + according to him, it is not fire that heats, but a spiritual power which penetrates, by means of the fire. And this opinion + seems to be derived from that of Plato. For Plato held that all forms existing in corporeal matter are participated thereby, + and determined and limited thereto; and that separate forms are absolute and as it were universal; wherefore he said that + these separate forms are the causes of forms that exist in matter. Therefore inasmuch as the form which is in corporeal matter + is determined to this matter individualized by quantity, Avicebron held that the corporeal form is held back and imprisoned + by quantity, as the principle of individuality, so as to be unable by action to extend to any other matter: and that the spiritual + and immaterial form alone, which is not hedged in by quantity, can issue forth by acting on something else. +

But this does not prove that the corporeal form is not an agent, but that it is not a universal agent. For in proportion + as a thing is participated, so, of necessity, must that be participated which is proper thereto; thus in proportion to the + participation of light is the participation of visibility. But to act, which is nothing else than to make something to be + in act, is essentially proper to an act as such; wherefore every agent produces its like. So therefore to the fact of + its being a form not determined by matter subject to quantity, a thing owes its being an agent indeterminate and universal: + but to the fact that it is determined to this matter, it owes its being an agent limited and particular. Wherefore if the + form of fire were separate, as the Platonists supposed, it would be, in a fashion, the cause of every ignition. But this form + of fire which is in this corporeal matter, is the cause of this ignition which passes from this body to that. Hence such an + action is effected by the contact of two bodies. +

But this opinion of Avicebron goes further than that of Plato. For Plato held only substantial forms to be separate; while + he referred accidents to the material principles which are "the great" and "the small," which he considered to be the first + contraries, by others considered to the "the rare" and "the dense." Consequently both Plato and Avicenna, who follows him + to a certain extent, held that corporeal agents act through their accidental forms, by disposing matter for the + substantial form; but that the ultimate perfection attained by the introduction of the substantial form is due to an immaterial + principle. And this is the second opinion concerning the action of bodies; of which we have spoken above when treating of + the creation ( + Q[45], A[8]). +

The third opinion is that of Democritus, who held that action takes place through the issue of atoms from the corporeal agent, + while passion consists in the reception of the atoms in the pores of the passive body. This opinion is disproved by Aristotle + (De Gener. i, 8,9). For it would follow that a body would not be passive as a whole, and the quantity of the active body would + be diminished through its action; which things are manifestly untrue. +

We must therefore say that a body acts forasmuch as it is in act, on a body forasmuch as it is in potentiality.

[33238] Iª q. 115 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum +quod sensibiliter apparet aliqua corpora esse activa. Sed circa +corporum actiones tripliciter aliqui erraverunt. Fuerunt enim +aliqui qui totaliter corporibus actiones subtraxerunt. Et haec est +opinio Avicebron in libro fontis vitae, ubi per rationes quae +tactae sunt, probare nititur quod nullum corpus agit, sed omnes +actiones quae videntur esse corporum, sunt actiones cuiusdam +virtutis spiritualis quae penetrat per omnia corpora; ita quod +ignis, secundum eum, non calefacit, sed virtus spiritualis +penetrans per ipsum. Et videtur haec opinio derivata esse ab +opinione Platonis. Nam Plato posuit omnes formas quae sunt in +materia corporali, esse participatas et determinatas et contractas +ad hanc materiam; formas vero separatas esse absolutas et quasi +universales; et ideo illas formas separatas dicebat esse causas +formarum quae sunt in materia. Secundum hoc ergo quod forma quae +est in materia corporali, determinata est ad hanc materiam +individuatam per quantitatem, ponebat Avicebron quod a quantitate, +prout est individuationis principium, retinetur et arcetur forma +corporalis, ne possit se extendere per actionem in aliam materiam; +sed solum forma spiritualis et immaterialis, quae non est coarctata +per quantitatem, potest effluere per actionem in aliud. Sed ista +ratio non concludit quod forma corporalis non sit agens, sed quod +non sit agens universale. Secundum enim quod participatur aliquid, +secundum hoc est necessarium quod participetur id quod est proprium +ei, sicut quantum participatur de lumine, tantum participatur de +ratione visibilis. Agere autem, quod nihil est aliud quam facere +aliquid actu, est per se proprium actus, inquantum est actus, unde +et omne agens agit sibi simile. Sic ergo ex hoc quod aliquid est +forma non determinata per materiam quantitati subiectam, habet quod +sit agens indeterminatum et universale, ex hoc vero quod est +determinata ad hanc materiam, habet quod sit agens contractum et +particulare. Unde si esset forma ignis separata, ut Platonici +posuerunt, esset aliquo modo causa omnis ignitionis. Sed haec forma +ignis quae est in hac materia corporali, est causa huius ignitionis +quae est ab hoc corpore in hoc corpus. Unde et fit talis actio per +contactum duorum corporum. Sed tamen haec opinio Avicebron +superexcedit opinionem Platonis. Nam Plato ponebat solum formas +substantiales separatas; accidentia vero reducebat ad principia +materialia quae sunt magnum et parvum, quae ponebat esse prima +contraria, sicut et alii rarum et densum. Et ideo tam Plato quam +Avicenna, in aliquo ipsum sequens, ponebant quod agentia corporalia +agunt secundum formas accidentales, disponendo materiam ad formam +substantialem; sed ultima perfectio, quae est per introductionem +formae substantialis est a principio immateriali. Et haec est +secunda opinio de actione corporum, de qua supra dictum est, cum de +creatione ageretur. Tertia vero opinio fuit Democriti, qui ponebat +actionem esse per effluxionem atomorum a corpore agente, et +passionem esse per receptionem eorundem in poris corporis +patientis. Quam opinionem improbat Aristoteles in I de Generat. +Sequeretur enim quod corpus non pateretur per totum, et quod +quantitas corporis agentis diminueretur ex hoc quod agit, quae sunt +manifeste falsa. Dicendum est ergo quod corpus agit secundum quod +est actu, in aliud corpus secundum quod est in potentia.

+ Reply to Objection 1: This passage of Augustine is to be understood of the whole corporeal nature considered as a whole, while thus has no nature + inferior to it, on which it can act; as the spiritual nature acts on the corporeal, and the uncreated nature on the created. + Nevertheless one body is inferior to another, forasmuch as it is in potentiality to that which the other has in act. +

[33239] Iª q. 115 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod dictum Augustini est intelligendum de tota natura +corporali simul accepta, quae non habet aliquam inferiorem naturam +infra se, in quam agat, sicut natura spiritualis in corporalem, et +natura increata in creatam. Sed tamen unum corpus est infra +alterum, inquantum est in potentia ad id quod habet aliud in +actu.

Reply to Objection 2: From this follows the solution of the second objection. But it must be observed, when Avicebron argues thus, "There is a + mover who is not moved, to wit, the first maker of all; therefore, on the other hand, there exists something moved which is + purely passive," that this is to be conceded. But this latter is primary matter, which is a pure potentiality, just as God + is pure act. Now a body is composed of potentiality and act; and therefore it is both active and passive. +

[33240] Iª q. 115 a. 1 ad 2 Et per hoc patet +solutio ad secundum. Sciendum est tamen quod, cum Avicebron sic +argumentatur, est aliquid quod est movens non motum, scilicet +primus factor rerum, ergo, ex opposito, est aliquid quod est motum +et patiens tantum, quod concedendum est. Sed hoc est materia prima, +quae est potentia pura, sicut Deus est actus purus. Corpus autem +componitur ex potentia et actu, et ideo est agens et patiens.

+ Reply to Objection 3: Quantity does not entirely hinder the corporeal form from action, as stated above; but from being a universal agent, forasmuch + as a form is individualized through being in matter subject to quantity. The proof taken from the weight of bodies is not + to the purpose. First, because addition of quantity does not cause weight; as is proved (De Coelo et Mundo iv, 2). Secondly, + it is false that weight retards movement; on the contrary, the heavier a thing, + the greater its movement, if we consider the movement proper thereto. Thirdly, because action is not effected by local movement, + as Democritus held: but by something being reduced from potentiality to act. +

[33241] Iª q. 115 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium +dicendum quod quantitas non impedit formam corporalem omnino ab +actione, sicut dictum est, sed impedit eam ne sit agens universale, +inquantum forma individuatur prout est in materia quantitati +subiecta. Signum tamen quod inducitur de ponderositate corporum, +non est ad propositum. Primo quidem, quia additio quantitatis non +est causa gravitatis; ut probatur in IV de caelo et mundo. Secundo, +quia falsum est quod ponderositas facit tardiorem motum, immo +quanto aliquid est gravius, tanto magis movetur motu proprio. +Tertio, quia actio non fit per motum localem, ut Democritus posuit; +sed per hoc quod aliquid reducitur de potentia in actum.

+ Reply to Objection 4: A body is not that which is most distant from God; for it participates something of a likeness to the Divine Being, forasmuch + as it has a form. That which is most distant from God is primary matter; which is in no way active, since it is a pure potentiality. +

[33242] Iª q. 115 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod corpus non est id quod maxime distat a Deo, +participat enim aliquid de similitudine divini esse, secundum +formam quam habet. Sed id quod maxime distat a Deo, est materia +prima; quae nullo modo est agens, cum sit in potentia tantum.

+ Reply to Objection 5: The term of a body's action is both an accidental form and a substantial form. For the active quality, such as heat, although + itself an accident, acts nevertheless by virtue of the substantial form, as its instrument: wherefore its action can terminate + in a substantial form; thus natural heat, as the instrument of the soul, has an action terminating in the generation of flesh. + But by its own virtue it produces an accident. Nor is it against the nature + of an accident to surpass its subject in acting, but it is to surpass it in being; unless indeed one were to imagine that + an accident transfers its identical self from the agent to the patient; thus Democritus explained action by an issue of atoms. +

[33243] Iª q. 115 a. 1 ad 5 Ad quintum +dicendum quod corpus agit et ad formam accidentalem, et ad formam +substantialem. Qualitas enim activa, ut calor, etsi sit accidens, +agit tamen in virtute formae substantialis, sicut eius +instrumentum; et ideo potest agere ad formam substantialem; sicut +et calor naturalis, inquantum est instrumentum animae, agit ad +generationem carnis. Ad accidens vero agit propria virtute. Nec est +contra rationem accidentis, quod excedat suum subiectum in agendo, +sed quod excedat in essendo, nisi forsan quis imaginetur idem +accidens numero defluere ab agente in patiens, sicut Democritus +ponebat fieri actionem per defluxum atomorum.

Q. 115. A. 2. Whether there are any seminal virtues in corporeal matter?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. For virtue [ratio] implies something of a spiritual order. But in corporeal matter nothing exists spiritually, but only materially, that is, according to the mode of that in which it is. Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. @@ -7437,7 +7806,130 @@ circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, an fatum sit. Secundo, in quo sit. Tertio, utrum sit immobile. Quarto, utrum omnia subsint fato.

Q. 116. A. 2. Whether fate is in created things?

Q. 116. A. 1. Whether there be such a thing as fate?

+ Objection 1: It would seem that fate is nothing. For Gregory says in a homily for the Epiphany (Hom. x in Evang.): "Far be it from the + hearts of the faithful to think that fate is anything real." +

[33289] Iª q. 116 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod fatum nihil sit. Dicit enim Gregorius, in +homilia Epiphaniae, absit a fidelium cordibus ut fatum esse +aliquid dicant.

+ Objection 2: Further, what happens by fate is not unforeseen, for as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 4), "fate is understood to be derived + from the verb 'fari' which means to speak"; as though things were said to happen by fate, which are "fore-spoken" by one who + decrees them to happen. Now what is foreseen is neither lucky nor chance-like. If therefore things happen by fate, there will + be neither luck nor chance in the world. +

[33290] Iª q. 116 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, ea +quae fato aguntur, non sunt improvisa, quia, ut Augustinus dicit V +de Civ. Dei, fatum a fando dictum intelligimus, idest a +loquendo; ut ea fato fieri dicantur, quae ab aliquo +determinante sunt ante praelocuta. Quae autem sunt provisa, non +sunt fortuita neque casualia. Si igitur res fato aguntur, +excludetur casus et fortuna a rebus.

+ On the contrary, What does not exist cannot be defined. But Boethius (De Consol. iv) defines fate thus: "Fate is a disposition inherent to + changeable things, by which Providence connects each one with its proper order." +

[33291] Iª q. 116 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra quod +non est, non definitur. Sed Boetius, in IV de Consol., definit +fatum, dicens quod fatum est inhaerens rebus mobilibus +dispositio, per quam providentia suis quaeque nectit ordinibus. +Ergo fatum aliquid est.

+ I answer that, In this world some things seem to happen by luck or chance. Now it happens sometimes that something is lucky or chance-like + as compared to inferior causes, which, if compared to some higher cause, is directly intended. For instance, if two servants + are sent by their master to the same place; the meeting of the two servants in regard to themselves is by chance; but as compared + to the master, who had ordered it, it is directly intended. +

So there were some who refused to refer to a higher cause such events which by luck or chance take place here below. These + denied the existence of fate and Providence, as Augustine relates of Tully (De Civ. Dei v, 9). And this is contrary to what + we have said above about Providence ( + Q[22], A[2]). +

On the other hand, some have considered that everything that takes place here below by luck or by chance, whether in natural + things or in human affairs, is to be reduced to a superior cause, namely, the heavenly bodies. According to these fate is + nothing else than "a disposition of the stars under which each one is begotten or born" [*Cf. St. Augustine De Civ. Dei v, + 1,8,9]. But this will not hold. First, as to human affairs: because we have proved above ( + Q[115], A[4]) that human actions are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies, save accidentally and indirectly. Now the cause of + fate, since it has the ordering of things that happen by fate, must of necessity be directly and of itself the cause of what + takes place. Secondly, as to all things that happen accidentally: for it has been said ( + Q[115], A[6]) that what is accidental, is properly speaking neither a being, nor a unity. But every + action of nature terminates in some one thing. Wherefore it is impossible for that which is accidental to be the proper effect + of an active natural principle. No natural cause can therefore have for its proper effect that a man intending to dig a grace + finds a treasure. Now it is manifest that a heavenly body acts after the manner of a natural principle: wherefore its effects + in this world are natural. It is therefore impossible that any active power of a heavenly body be the cause of what + happens by accident here below, whether by luck or by chance. +

We must therefore say that what happens here by accident, both in natural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a preordaining + cause, which is Divine Providence. For nothing hinders that which happens by accident being considered as one by an intellect: + otherwise the intellect could not form this proposition: "The digger of a grave found a treasure." And just as an intellect + can apprehend this so can it effect it; for instance, someone who knows a place where a treasure is + hidden, might instigate a rustic, ignorant of this, to dig a grave there. Consequently, nothing hinders what happens here + by accident, by luck or by chance, being reduced to some ordering cause which acts by the intellect, especially the Divine + intellect. For God alone can change the will, as shown above ( + Q[105], A[4]). Consequently the ordering of human actions, the principle of which is the will, must be ascribed to God alone. +

So therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to Divine Providence, as being pre-ordained, and as it were + "fore-spoken," we can admit the existence of fate: although the holy doctors avoided the use of this word, on account of those + who twisted its application to a certain force in the position of the stars. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1): "If + anyone ascribes human affairs to fate, meaning thereby the will or power of God, let him keep to his opinion, + but hold his tongue."

[33292] Iª q. 116 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum +quod in rebus inferioribus videntur quaedam a fortuna vel casu +provenire. Contingit autem quandoque quod aliquid, ad inferiores +causas relatum, est fortuitum vel casuale, quod tamen, relatum ad +causam aliquam superiorem, invenitur esse per se intentum. Sicut si +duo servi alicuius domini mittantur ab eo ad eundem locum, uno de +altero ignorante; concursus duorum servorum, si ad ipsos servos +referatur, casualis est, quia accidit praeter utriusque +intentionem; si autem referatur ad dominum, qui hoc praeordinavit, +non est casuale, sed per se intentum. Fuerunt igitur aliqui qui +huiusmodi casualia et fortuita, quae in his inferioribus accidunt, +in nullam superiorem causam reducere voluerunt. Et hi fatum et +providentiam negaverunt; ut de Tullio Augustinus recitat in V de +Civ. Dei. Quod est contra ea quae superius de providentia dicta +sunt. Quidam vero omnia fortuita et casualia quae in istis +inferioribus accidunt, sive in rebus naturalibus sive in rebus +humanis, reducere voluerunt in superiorem causam, idest in +caelestia corpora. Et secundum hos, fatum nihil aliud est quam +dispositio siderum in qua quisque conceptus est vel natus. +Sed hoc stare non potest, propter duo. Primo quidem, quantum ad res +humanas. Quia iam ostensum est quod humani actus non subduntur +actioni caelestium corporum, nisi per accidens et indirecte. Causa +autem fatalis, cum habeat ordinationem super ea quae fato aguntur, +necesse est quod sit directe et per se causa eius quod agitur. +Secundo, quantum ad omnia quae per accidens aguntur. Dictum est +enim supra quod id quod est per accidens, non est proprie ens neque +unum. Omnis autem naturae actio terminatur ad aliquid unum. Unde +impossibile est quod id quod est per accidens, sit effectus per se +alicuius naturalis principii agentis. Nulla ergo natura per se hoc +facere potest, quod intendens fodere sepulcrum, inveniat thesaurum. +Manifestum est autem quod corpus caeleste agit per modum naturalis +principii, unde et effectus eius in hoc mundo sunt naturales. +Impossibile est ergo quod aliqua virtus activa caelestis corporis +sit causa eorum quae hic aguntur per accidens, sive a casu sive a +fortuna. Et ideo dicendum est quod ea quae hic per accidens +aguntur, sive in rebus naturalibus sive in rebus humanis, +reducuntur in aliquam causam praeordinantem, quae est providentia +divina. Quia nihil prohibet id quod est per accidens, accipi ut +unum ab aliquo intellectu, alioquin intellectus formare non posset +hanc propositionem, fodiens sepulcrum invenit thesaurum. Et sicut +hoc potest intellectus apprehendere, ita potest efficere, sicut si +aliquis sciens in quo loco sit thesaurus absconditus, instiget +aliquem rusticum hoc ignorantem, ut ibi fodiat sepulcrum. Et sic +nihil prohibet ea quae hic per accidens aguntur, ut fortuita vel +casualia, reduci in aliquam causam ordinantem, quae per intellectum +agat; et praecipue intellectum divinum. Nam solus Deus potest +voluntatem immutare, ut supra habitum est. Et per consequens +ordinatio humanorum actuum, quorum principium est voluntas, soli +Deo attribui debet. Sic igitur inquantum omnia quae hic aguntur, +divinae providentiae subduntur, tanquam per eam praeordinata et +quasi praelocuta, fatum ponere possumus, licet hoc nomine sancti +doctores uti recusaverint, propter eos qui ad vim positionis +siderum hoc nomen retorquebant. Unde Augustinus dicit, in V de Civ. +Dei, si propterea quisquam res humanas fato tribuit, quia ipsam +Dei voluntatem vel potestatem fati nomine appellat, sententiam +teneat, linguam corrigat. Et sic etiam Gregorius fatum esse +negat.

Reply to Objection 1: For this reason Gregory denies the existence of fate: wherefore the first objection's solution is manifest. +

[33293] Iª q. 116 a. 1 ad 1 Unde patet +solutio ad primum.

+ Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders certain things happening by luck or by chance, if compared to their proximate causes: but not if compared + to Divine Providence, whereby "nothing happens at random in the world," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 24). +

[33294] Iª q. 116 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliqua esse fortuita vel casualia per +comparationem ad causas proximas, non tamen per comparationem ad +divinam providentiam, sic enim nihil temere fit in mundo, ut +Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest.

Q. 116. A. 2. Whether fate is in created things?

Objection 1: It would seem that fate is not in created things. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that the "Divine will or power is called fate." But the Divine will or power is not in creatures, but in God. Therefore fate is not in creatures but in God.

[33295] Iª q. 116 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic @@ -7522,7 +8014,70 @@ comparationem ad suum principium, est unus, et sic dicitur unum fatum. Si autem consideretur per comparationem ad effectus, vel ad ipsas causas medias, sic multiplicatur, per quem modum poeta dixit, -te tua fata trahunt.

Q. 116. A. 4. Whether all things are subject to fate?

+te tua fata trahunt.

Q. 116. A. 3. Whether fate is unchangeable?

+ Objection 1: It seems that fate is not unchangeable. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "As reasoning is to the intellect, as the begotten + is to that which is, as time to eternity, as the circle to its centre; so is the fickle chain of fate to the unwavering simplicity + of Providence." +

[33303] Iª q. 116 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic +proceditur. Videtur quod fatum non sit immobile. Dicit enim +Boetius, in IV de Consol., uti est ad intellectum ratiocinatio, +ad id quod est id quod gignitur, ad aeternitatem tempus, ad punctum +medium circulus; ita est fati series mobilis ad providentiae +stabilem simplicitatem.

+ Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7): "If we be moved, what is in us is moved." But fate is a "disposition inherent + to changeable things," as Boethius says (De Consol. iv). Therefore fate is changeable. +

[33304] Iª q. 116 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, +sicut philosophus dicit in II Topic., motis nobis, moventur ea +quae in nobis sunt. Sed fatum est dispositio inhaerens rebus +mobilibus, ut Boetius dicit. Ergo fatum est mobile.

+ Objection 3: Further, if fate is unchangeable, what is subject to fate happens unchangeably and of necessity. But things ascribed to fate + seem principally to be contingencies. Therefore there would be no contingencies in the world, but all things would happen + of necessity. +

[33305] Iª q. 116 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, si +fatum est immobile, ea quae subduntur fato, immobiliter et ex +necessitate eveniunt. Sed talia maxime videntur esse contingentia, +quae fato attribuuntur. Ergo nihil erit contingens in rebus, sed +omnia ex necessitate evenient.

+ On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate is an unchangeable disposition. +

[33306] Iª q. 116 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est +quod Boetius dicit, quod fatum est immobilis dispositio.

+ I answer that, The disposition of second causes which we call fate, can be considered in two ways: firstly, in regard to the second causes, + which are thus disposed or ordered; secondly, in regard to the first principle, namely, God, by Whom they are ordered. Some, + therefore, have held that the series itself or dispositions of causes is in itself necessary, so that all things would happen + of necessity; for this reason that each effect has a cause, and given a cause the + effect must follow of necessity. But this is false, as proved above ( + Q[115], A[6]). +

Others, on the other hand, held that fate is changeable, even as dependent on Divine Providence. Wherefore the Egyptians + said that fate could be changed by certain sacrifices, as Gregory of Nyssa says (Nemesius, De Homine). This too has been disproved + above for the reason that it is repugnant to Divine Providence. +

We must therefore say that fate, considered in regard to second causes, is changeable; but as subject to Divine Providence, + it derives a certain unchangeableness, not of absolute but of conditional necessity. In this sense we say that this conditional + is true and necessary: "If God foreknew that this would happen, it will happen." Wherefore Boethius, having said that the + chain of fate is fickle, shortly afterwards adds---"which, since it is derived from an unchangeable + Providence must also itself be unchangeable." +

[33307] Iª q. 116 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum +quod dispositio secundarum causarum, quam fatum dicimus, potest +dupliciter considerari, uno modo, secundum ipsas causas secundas, +quae sic disponuntur seu ordinantur; alio modo, per relationem ad +primum principium a quo ordinantur, scilicet Deum. Quidam ergo +posuerunt ipsam seriem seu dispositionem causarum esse secundum se +necessariam, ita quod omnia ex necessitate contingerent; propter +hoc, quod quilibet effectus habet causam, et causa posita necesse +est effectum poni. Sed hoc patet esse falsum, per ea quae supra +dicta sunt. Alii vero e contrario posuerunt fatum esse mobile, +etiam secundum quod a divina providentia dependet. Unde Aegyptii +dicebant quibusdam sacrificiis fatum posse mutari, ut Gregorius +Nyssenus dicit. Sed hoc supra exclusum est, quia immobilitati +divinae providentiae repugnat. Et ideo dicendum est quod fatum, +secundum considerationem secundarum causarum, mobile est, sed +secundum quod subest divinae providentiae, immobilitatem sortitur, +non quidem absolutae necessitatis, sed conditionatae; secundum quod +dicimus hanc conditionalem esse veram vel necessariam, si Deus +praescivit hoc futurum, erit. Unde cum Boetius dixisset fati seriem +esse mobilem, post pauca subdit, quae cum ab immobilis +providentiae proficiscatur exordiis, ipsam quoque immutabilem esse +necesse est.

Reply to Objections: From this the answers to the objections are clear.

[33308] Iª q. 116 a. 3 ad arg. Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.

Q. 116. A. 4. Whether all things are subject to fate?

Objection 1: It seems that all things are subject to fate. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "The chain of fate moves the heaven and the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a reciprocal transformation. By fate all things that are born into the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring and seed." Nothing therefore seems to be @@ -8987,7 +9542,159 @@ semper remanet idem ignis numero, quia semper quod additur, transit in praeexistens. Et similiter est intelligendum in corporibus viventibus, in quibus ex nutrimento restauratur id quod per calorem -naturalem consumitur.

+naturalem consumitur.

Q. 119. A. 2. Whether the semen is produced from surplus food?

+ Objection 1: It would seem that the semen is not produced from the surplus food, but from the substance of the begetter. For Damascene + says (De Fide Orth. i, 8) that "generation is a work of nature, producing, from the substance of the begetter, that which + is begotten." But that which is generated is produced from the semen. Therefore the semen is produced from the substance of + the begetter. +

[33394] Iª q. 119 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic +proceditur. Videtur quod semen non sit de superfluo alimenti, sed +de substantia generantis. Dicit enim Damascenus quod generatio +est opus naturae ex substantia generantis producens quod +generatur. Sed id quod generatur, generatur ex semine. Ergo +semen est de substantia generantis.

+ Objection 2: Further, the son is like his father, in respect of that which he receives from him. But if the semen from which something + is generated, is produced from the surplus food, a man would receive nothing from his grandfather and his ancestors in whom + the food never existed. Therefore a man would not be more like to his grandfather or ancestors, than to any other men. +

[33395] Iª q. 119 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, +secundum hoc filius assimilatur patri, quod ab eo aliquid accipit. +Sed si semen ex quo aliquid generatur, sit de superfluo alimenti; +nihil acciperet aliquis ab avo et praecedentibus, in quibus hoc +alimentum nullo modo fuit. Ergo non assimilaretur aliquis avo et +praecedentibus, magis quam aliis hominibus.

+ Objection 3: Further, the food of the generator is sometimes the flesh of cows, pigs and suchlike. If therefore, the semen were produced + from surplus food, the man begotten of such semen would be more akin to the cow and the pig, than to his father or other relations. +

[33396] Iª q. 119 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, +alimentum hominis generantis quandoque est ex carnibus bovis, vel +porci, et aliorum huiusmodi. Si igitur semen esset de superfluo +alimenti, homo generatus ex semine maiorem affinitatem haberet cum +bove et porco, quam cum patre et aliis consanguineis.

+ Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x, 20) that we were in Adam "not only by seminal virtue, but also in the very substance + of the body." But this would not be, if the semen were produced from surplus food. Therefore the semen is not produced therefrom. +

[33397] Iª q. 119 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, X super Gen. ad Litt., quod nos fuimus in Adam +non solum secundum seminalem rationem, sed etiam secundum +corpulentam substantiam. Hoc autem non esset, si semen esset ex +superfluo alimenti. Ergo semen non est superfluo alimenti.

+ On the contrary, The Philosopher proves in many ways (De Gener. Animal. i, 18) that "the semen is surplus food." +

[33398] Iª q. 119 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est +quod philosophus probat multipliciter, in libro de Generat. +Animal., quod semen est superfluum alimenti.

+ I answer that, This question depends in some way on what has been stated above + (A[1]; + Q[118], A[1]). For if human nature has a virtue for the communication of its form to alien matter not only in another, but also in its + own subject; it is clear that the food which at first is dissimilar, becomes at length similar through the form communicated + to it. Now it belongs to the natural order that a thing should be reduced from + potentiality to act gradually: hence in things generated we observe that at first each is imperfect and is afterwards perfected. + But it is clear that the common is to the proper and determinate, as imperfect is to perfect: therefore we see that in the + generation of an animal, the animal is generated first, then the man or the horse. So therefore food first of all receives + a certain common virtue in regard to all the parts of the body, which virtue is subsequently determinate to this or that + part. +

Now it is not possible that the semen be a kind of solution from what is already transformed into the substance of the members. + For this solution, if it does not retain the nature of the member it is taken from, it would no longer be of the nature of + the begetter, and would be due to a process of corruption; and consequently it would not have the power of transforming something + else into the likeness of that nature. But if it retained the nature of the member it is taken from, + then, since it is limited to a certain part of the body, it would not have the power of moving towards (the production of) + the whole nature, but only the nature of that part. Unless one were to say that the solution is taken from all the parts of + the body, and that it retains the nature of each part. Thus the semen would be a small animal in act; and generation of animal + from animal would be a mere division, as mud is generated from mud, and as animals which continue to live after being cut + in + two: which is inadmissible. +

It remains to be said, therefore, that the semen is not something separated from what was before the actual whole; rather + is it the whole, though potentially, having the power, derived from the soul of the begetter, to produce the whole body, as + stated above + (A[1]; + Q[108], A[1] ). Now that which is in potentiality to the whole, is that which is generated from the food, before it is transformed into + the substance of the members. + Therefore the semen is taken from this. In this sense the nutritive power is said to serve the generative power: because what + is transformed by the nutritive power is employed as semen by the generative power. A sign of this, according to the Philosopher, + is that animals of great size, which require much food, have little semen in proportion to the size of their bodies, and generated + seldom; in like manner fat men, and for the same reason. +

[33399] Iª q. 119 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum +quod ista quaestio aliqualiter dependet ex praemissis. Si enim in +natura humana est virtus ad communicandum suam formam materiae +alienae non solum in alio, sed etiam in ipso; manifestum est quod +alimentum, quod est in principio dissimile, in fine fit simile per +formam communicatam. Est autem naturalis ordo ut aliquid gradatim +de potentia reducatur in actum, et ideo in his quae generantur, +invenimus quod primo unumquodque est imperfectum, et postea +perficitur. Manifestum est autem quod commune se habet ad proprium +et determinatum, ut imperfectum ad perfectum, et ideo videmus quod +in generatione animalis prius generatur animal, quam homo vel +equus. Sic igitur et ipsum alimentum primo quidem accipit quandam +virtutem communem respectu omnium partium corporis, et in fine +determinatur ad hanc partem vel ad illam. Non autem est possibile +quod accipiatur pro semine id quod iam conversum est in substantiam +membrorum, per quandam resolutionem. Quia illud resolutum, si non +retineret naturam eius a quo resolvitur, tunc iam esset recedens a +natura generantis, quasi in via corruptionis existens; et sic non +haberet virtutem convertendi aliud in similem naturam. Si vero +retineret naturam eius a quo resolvitur, tunc, cum esset contractum +ad determinatam partem, non haberet virtutem movendi ad naturam +totius, sed solum ad naturam partis. Nisi forte quis dicat quod +esset resolutum ab omnibus partibus corporis, et quod retineat +naturam omnium partium. Et sic semen esset quasi quoddam parvum +animal in actu; et generatio animalis ex animali non esset nisi per +divisionem, sicut lutum generatur ex luto, et sicut accidit in +animalibus quae decisa vivunt. Hoc autem est inconveniens. +Relinquitur ergo quod semen non sit decisum ab eo quod erat actu +totum; sed magis sit in potentia totum, habens virtutem ad +productionem totius corporis, derivatam an anima generantis, ut +supra dictum est. Hoc autem quod est in potentia ad totum, est +illud quod generatur ex alimento, antequam convertatur in +substantiam membrorum. Et ideo ex hoc semen accipitur. Et secundum +hoc, virtus nutritiva dicitur deservire generativae, quia id quod +est conversum per virtutem nutritivam, accipitur a virtute +generativa ut semen. Et huius signum ponit philosophus, quod +animalia magni corporis, quae indigent multo nutrimento, sunt pauci +seminis secundum quantitatem sui corporis, et paucae generationis; +et similiter homines pingues sunt pauci seminis, propter eandem +causam.

+ Reply to Objection 1: Generation is from the substance of the begetter in animals and plants, inasmuch as the semen owes its virtue to the form + of the begetter, and inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the substance. +

[33400] Iª q. 119 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo +dicendum quod generatio est de substantia generantis in animalibus +et plantis, inquantum semen habet virtutem ex forma generantis, et +inquantum est in potentia ad substantiam ipsius.

+ Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of the begetter to the begotten is on account not of the matter, but of the form of the agent that generates + its like. Wherefore in order for a man to be like his grandfather, there is no need that the corporeal seminal matter should + have been in the grandfather; but that there be in the semen a virtue derived from the soul of the grandfather through the + father.

[33401] Iª q. 119 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum +dicendum quod assimilatio generantis ad genitum non fit propter +materiam, sed propter formam agentis, quod generat sibi simile. +Unde non oportet ad hoc quod aliquis assimiletur avo, quod materia +corporalis seminis fuerit in avo; sed quod sit in semine aliqua +virtus derivata ab anima avi, mediante patre.

Reply to Objection 3: In like manner the third objection is answered. For kinship is not in + relation to matter, but rather to the derivation of the forms. +

[33402] Iª q. 119 a. 2 ad 3 Et similiter +dicendum est ad tertium. Nam affinitas non attenditur secundum +materiam, sed magis secundum derivationem formae.

+ Reply to Objection 4: These words of Augustine are not to be understood as though the immediate seminal virtue, or the corporeal substance from + which this individual was formed were actually in Adam: but so that both were in Adam as in principle. For even the corporeal + matter, which is supplied by the mother, and which he calls the corporeal substance, is originally derived from Adam: and + likewise the active seminal power of the father, which is the immediate seminal + virtue (in the production) of this man. +

But Christ is said to have been in Adam according to the "corporeal substance," not according to the seminal virtue. Because + the matter from which His Body was formed, and which was supplied by the Virgin Mother, was derived from Adam; whereas the + active virtue was not derived from Adam, because His Body was not formed by the seminal virtue of a man, but by the operation + of the Holy Ghost. For "such a birth was becoming to Him," [*Hymn for Vespers at Christmas; Breviary, O. P.], + WHO IS ABOVE ALL GOD FOR EVER BLESSED. Amen. +

[33403] Iª q. 119 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum +dicendum quod verbum Augustini non est sic intelligendum, quasi in +Adam actu fuerit aut seminalis ratio huius hominis propinqua, aut +corpulenta eius substantia, sed utrumque fuit in Adam secundum +originem. Nam et materia corporalis, quae ministrata est a matre, +quam vocat corpulentam substantiam, derivatur originaliter ab Adam, +et similiter virtus activa existens in semine patris, quae est +huius hominis propinqua ratio seminalis. Sed Christus dicitur +fuisse in Adam secundum corpulentam substantiam, sed non secundum +seminalem rationem. Quia materia corporis eius, quae ministrata est +a matre virgine, derivata est ab Adam, sed virtus activa non est +derivata ab Adam, quia corpus eius non est formatum per virtutem +virilis seminis, sed operatione spiritus sancti. Talis enim partus +decebat eum, qui est super omnia benedictus Deus in saecula. +Amen.

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Q. 114. A. 4. Whether demons can lead men astray by means of real miracles?

Q. 114. A. 2. Whether to tempt is proper to the devil?

Q. 114. A. 3. Whether all sins are due to the temptation of the devil?

Q. 114. A. 4. Whether demons can lead men astray by means of real miracles?

Q. 115. A. 2. Whether there are any seminal virtues in corporeal matter?

Q. 115. A. 1. Whether a body can be active?

Q. 115. A. 2. Whether there are any seminal virtues in corporeal matter?

Q. 116. A. 2. Whether fate is in created things?

Q. 116. A. 1. Whether there be such a thing as fate?

Q. 116. A. 2. Whether fate is in created things?

Q. 116. A. 4. Whether all things are subject to fate?

Q. 116. A. 3. Whether fate is unchangeable?

Q. 116. A. 4. Whether all things are subject to fate?

Q. 119. A. 2. Whether the semen is produced from surplus food?