TREATISE ON GRACE (QQ[109]-114)

Q. 109. OF THE NECESSITY OF GRACE (TEN ARTICLES)
Q. 110. OF THE GRACE OF GOD AS REGARDS ITS ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
Q. 111. OF THE DIVISION OF GRACE (FIVE ARTICLES)
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Q. 109. OF THE NECESSITY OF GRACE (TEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider the exterior principle of human acts, i.e. God, in so far as, through grace, we are helped by Him to do right: and, first, we must consider the grace of God; secondly, its cause; thirdly, its effects.

The first point of consideration will be threefold: for we shall consider (1) The necessity of grace; (2) grace itself, as to its essence; (3) its division.

Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:

(1) Whether without grace man can know anything?

(2) Whether without God's grace man can do or wish any good?

(3) Whether without grace man can love God above all things?

(4) Whether without grace man can keep the commandments of the Law?

(5) Whether without grace he can merit eternal life?

(6) Whether without grace man can prepare himself for grace?

(7) Whether without grace he can rise from sin?

(8) Whether without grace man can avoid sin?

(9) Whether man having received grace can do good and avoid sin without any further Divine help?

(10) Whether he can of himself persevere in good?

[38361] Iª-IIae q. 109 pr. Consequenter considerandum est de exteriori principio humanorum actuum, scilicet de Deo, prout ab ipso per gratiam adiuvamur ad recte agendum. Et primo, considerandum est de gratia Dei; secundo, de causa eius; tertio, de eius effectibus. Prima autem consideratio erit tripartita, nam primo considerabimus de necessitate gratiae; secundo, de ipsa gratia quantum ad eius essentiam; tertio, de eius divisione. Circa primum quaeruntur decem. Primo, utrum absque gratia possit homo aliquod verum cognoscere. Secundo, utrum absque gratia Dei possit homo aliquod bonum facere vel velle. Tertio, utrum homo absque gratia possit Deum diligere super omnia. Quarto, utrum absque gratia possit praecepta legis observare. Quinto, utrum absque gratia possit mereri vitam aeternam. Sexto, utrum homo possit se ad gratiam praeparare sine gratia. Septimo, utrum homo sine gratia possit resurgere a peccato. Octavo, utrum absque gratia possit homo vitare peccatum. Nono, utrum homo gratiam consecutus possit, absque alio divino auxilio, bonum facere et vitare peccatum. Decimo, utrum possit perseverare in bono per seipsum.

Q. 109. A. 1. Whether without grace man can know any truth?

Objection 1: It would seem that without grace man can know no truth. For, on 1 Cor. 12:3: "No man can say, the Lord Jesus, but by the Holy Ghost," a gloss says: "Every truth, by whomsoever spoken is from the Holy Ghost." Now the Holy Ghost dwells in us by grace. Therefore we cannot know truth without grace.

[38362] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo sine gratia nullum verum cognoscere possit. Quia super illud I Cor. XII, *nemo potest dicere, dominus Iesus, nisi in spiritu sancto*, dicit Glossa Ambrosii, *omne verum, a quocumque dicatur, a spiritu sancto est*. Sed spiritus sanctus habitat in nobis per gratiam.

Ergo veritatem cognoscere non possumus sine gratia.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Solil. i, 6) that "the most certain sciences are like things lit up by the sun so as to be seen. Now God Himself is He Whom sheds the light. And reason is in the mind as sight is in the eye. And the eyes of the mind are the senses of the soul." Now the bodily senses, however pure, cannot see any visible object, without the sun's light. Therefore the human mind, however perfect, cannot, by reasoning, know any truth without Divine light: and this pertains to the aid of grace.

[38363] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in I Soliloq., quod *disciplinarum certissima talia sunt qualia illa quae a sole illustrantur ut videri possint; Deus autem ipse est qui illustrat; ratio autem ita est in mentibus ut in oculis est aspectus; mentis autem oculi sunt sensus animae*. Sed sensus corporis, quantumcumque sit purus, non potest aliquod visibile videre sine solis illustratione. Ergo humana mens, quantumcumque sit perfecta, non potest ratiocinando veritatem cognoscere absque illustratione divina. Quae ad auxilium gratiae pertinet.

Objection 3: Further, the human mind can only understand truth by thinking, as is clear from Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7). But the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:5): "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is from God." Therefore man cannot, of himself, know truth without the help of grace.

[38364] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, humana mens non potest veritatem intelligere nisi cogitando; ut patet per Augustinum XIV de Trin. Sed apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. III, *non sufficientes sumus aliquid cogitare a nobis, quasi ex nobis*. Ergo homo non potest cognoscere veritatem per seipsum sine auxilio gratiae.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 4): "I do not approve having said in the prayer, O God, Who dost wish the sinless alone to know the truth; for it may be answered that many who are not sinless know many truths." Now man is cleansed from sin by grace, according to Ps. 50:12: "Create a clean heart in me, O God, and renew a right spirit within my bowels." Therefore without grace man of himself can know truth.

[38365] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I Retract., *non approbo quod in oratione dixi, Deus, qui non nisi mundos verum scire voluisti. Responderi enim potest multos etiam non mundos multa scire vera*. Sed per gratiam homo mundus efficitur; secundum illud Psalmi l, *cor mundum crea in me, Deus; et spiritum rectum innova in visceribus meis*. Ergo sine gratia potest homo per seipsum veritatem cognoscere.

I answer that, To know truth is a use or act of intellectual light, since, according to the Apostle (Eph. 5:13): "All that is made manifest is light." Now every use implies movement, taking movement broadly, so as to call thinking and willing movements, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 4). Now in corporeal things we see that for movement there is required not merely the form which is the principle of the movement or action, but there is also required the motion of the first mover. Now the first mover in the order of corporeal things is the heavenly body. Hence no matter how perfectly fire has heat, it

[38366] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod cognoscere veritatem est usus quidam, vel actus, intellectualis luminis, quia secundum apostolum, ad Ephes. V, *omne quod manifestatur, lumen est*. Usus autem quilibet quendam motum importat, large accipiendo motum secundum quod intelligere et velle motus quidam esse dicuntur, ut patet per philosophum in III de anima. Videmus autem in corporalibus quod ad motum non solum requiritur ipsa forma quae est principium motus vel actionis; sed etiam requiritur motio primi moventis. Primum autem movens in ordine corporalium est corpus caeleste.

would not bring about alteration, except by the motion of the heavenly body. But it is clear that as all corporeal movements are reduced to the motion of the heavenly body as to the first corporeal mover, so all movements, both corporeal and spiritual, are reduced to the simple First Mover, Who is God. And hence no matter how perfect a corporeal or spiritual nature is supposed to be, it cannot proceed to its act unless it be moved by God; but this motion is according to the plan of His providence, and not by necessity of nature, as the motion of the heavenly body. Now not only is every motion from God as from the First Mover, but all formal perfection is from Him as from the First Act. And thus the act of the intellect or of any created being whatsoever depends upon God in two ways: first, inasmuch as it is from Him that it has the form whereby it acts; secondly, inasmuch as it is moved by Him to act.

Now every form bestowed on created things by God has power for a determined act, which it can bring about in proportion to its own proper endowment; and beyond which it is powerless, except by a superadded form, as water can only heat when heated by the fire. And thus the human understanding has a form, viz. intelligible light, which of itself is sufficient for knowing certain intelligible things, viz. those we can come to know through the senses. Higher intelligible things of the human intellect cannot know, unless it be perfected by a stronger light, viz. the light of faith or prophecy which is called the "light of grace," inasmuch as it is added to nature.

Hence we must say that for the knowledge of any truth whatsoever man needs Divine help, that the intellect may be moved by God to its act. But he does not need a new light added to his natural light, in order to know the truth in all things, but only in some that surpass his natural knowledge. And yet at times God miraculously instructs some by His grace in things that can be known by natural reason, even as He sometimes brings about miraculously what nature can do.

Unde quantumcumque ignis habeat perfectum calorem, non alteraret nisi per motionem caelestis corporis. Manifestum est autem quod, sicut omnes motus corporales reducuntur in motum caelestis corporis sicut in primum movens corporale; ita omnes motus tam corporales quam spirituales reducuntur in primum movens simpliciter, quod est Deus. Et ideo quantumcumque natura aliqua corporalis vel spiritualis ponatur perfecta, non potest in suum actum procedere nisi moveatur a Deo. Quae quidem motio est secundum suae providentiae rationem; non secundum necessitatem naturae, sicut motio corporis caelestis. Non solum autem a Deo est omnis motio sicut a primo movente; sed etiam ab ipso est omnis formalis perfectio sicut a primo actu. Sic igitur actio intellectus, et cuiuscumque entis creati, dependet a Deo quantum ad duo, uno modo, inquantum ab ipso habet formam per quam agit; alio modo, inquantum ab ipso movetur ad agendum. Unaquaeque autem forma indita rebus creatis a Deo, habet efficaciam respectu alicuius actus determinati, in quem potest secundum suam proprietatem, ultra autem non potest nisi per aliquam formam superadditam, sicut aqua non potest calefacere nisi calefacta ab igne. Sic igitur intellectus humanus habet aliquam formam, scilicet ipsum intelligibile lumen, quod est de se sufficiens ad quaedam intelligibilia cognoscenda, ad ea scilicet in quorum notitiam per sensibilia possumus devenire. Altiora vero intelligibilia intellectus humanus cognoscere non potest nisi fortiori lumine perficiatur, sicut lumine fidei vel prophetiae; quod dicitur lumen gratiae, inquantum est naturae superadditum. Sic igitur dicendum est quod ad cognitionem cuiuscumque veri, homo indiget auxilio divino ut intellectus a Deo moveatur ad suum actum. Non autem indiget ad cognoscendam veritatem in omnibus, nova illustratione superaddita naturali illustrationi; sed in quibusdam, quae excedunt naturalem cognitionem. Et tamen quandoque Deus miraculose per suam gratiam aliquos instruit de his quae per naturalem rationem cognosci possunt, sicut et quandoque miraculose facit quaedam quae natura facere potest.

Reply to Objection 1: Every truth by whomsoever spoken is from the Holy Ghost as bestowing the natural light, and moving us to understand and speak the truth, but not as

[38367] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omne verum, a quocumque dicatur, est a spiritu sancto sicut ab infundente naturale lumen, et movente ad intelligendum et

dwelling in us by sanctifying grace, or as bestowing any habitual gift superadded to nature. For this only takes place with regard to certain truths that are known and spoken, and especially in regard to such as pertain to faith, of which the Apostle speaks.

loquendum veritatem. Non autem sicut ab inhabitante per gratiam gratum facientem, vel sicut a largiente aliquod habituale donum naturae superadditum, sed hoc solum est in quibusdam veris cognoscendis et loquendis; et maxime in illis quae pertinent ad fidem, de quibus apostolus loquebatur.

Reply to Objection 2: The material sun sheds its light outside us; but the intelligible Sun, Who is God, shines within us. Hence the natural light bestowed upon the soul is God's enlightenment, whereby we are enlightened to see what pertains to natural knowledge; and for this there is required no further knowledge, but only for such things as surpass natural knowledge.

[38368] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod sol corporalis illustrat exterius; sed sol intelligibilis, qui est Deus, illustrat interius. Unde ipsum lumen naturale animae inditum est illustratio Dei, qua illustramur ab ipso ad cognoscendum ea quae pertinent ad naturalem cognitionem. Et ad hoc non requiritur alia illustratio, sed solum ad illa quae naturalem cognitionem excedunt.

Reply to Objection 3: We always need God's help for every thought, inasmuch as He moves the understanding to act; for actually to understand anything is to think, as is clear from Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7).

[38369] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod semper indigemus divino auxilio ad cogitandum quodcumque, inquantum ipse movet intellectum ad agendum, actu enim intelligere aliquid est cogitare, ut patet per Augustinum, XIV de Trin.

Q. 109. A. 2. Whether man can wish or do any good without grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that man can wish and do good without grace. For that is in man's power, whereof he is master. Now man is master of his acts, and especially of his willing, as stated above (Q[1], A[1]; Q[13], A[6]). Hence man, of himself, can wish and do good without the help of grace.

[38370] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo possit velle et facere bonum absque gratia. Illud enim est in hominis potestate cuius ipse est dominus. Sed homo est dominus suorum actuum, et maxime eius quod est velle, ut supra dictum est. Ergo homo potest velle et facere bonum per seipsum absque auxilio gratiae.

Objection 2: Further, man has more power over what is according to his nature than over what is beyond his nature. Now sin is against his nature, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30); whereas deeds of virtue are according to his nature, as stated above (Q[71], A[1]). Therefore since man can sin of himself he can wish and do good.

[38371] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, unumquodque magis potest in id quod est sibi secundum naturam, quam in id quod est sibi praeter naturam. Sed peccatum est contra naturam, ut Damascenus dicit, in II libro, opus autem virtutis est homini secundum naturam, ut supra dictum est. Cum igitur homo per seipsum possit peccare, videtur quod multo magis per seipsum possit bonum velle et facere.

Objection 3: Further, the understanding's good is truth, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2). Now

[38372] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, bonum intellectus est verum, ut philosophus dicit, in VI

the intellect can of itself know truth, even as every other thing can work its own operation of itself. Therefore, much more can man, of himself, do and wish good.

Ethic. Sed intellectus potest cognoscere verum per seipsum, sicut et quaelibet alia res potest suam naturalem operationem per se facere. Ergo multo magis homo potest per seipsum facere et velle bonum.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 9:16): "It is not of him that willeth," namely, to will, "nor of him that runneth," namely to run, "but of God that showeth mercy." And Augustine says (De Corrept. et Gratia ii) that "without grace men do nothing good when they either think or wish or love or act."

[38373] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. IX, non est volentis, scilicet velle, neque currentis, scilicet currere, sed miserentis Dei. Et Augustinus dicit, in libro de Corrept. et gratia, quod *sine gratia nullum prorsus, sive cogitando, sive volendo et amando, sive agendo, faciunt homines bonum*.

I answer that, Man's nature may be looked at in two ways: first, in its integrity, as it was in our first parent before sin; secondly, as it is corrupted in us after the sin of our first parent. Now in both states human nature needs the help of God as First Mover, to do or wish any good whatsoever, as stated above (A[1]). But in the state of integrity, as regards the sufficiency of the operative power, man by his natural endowments could wish and do the good proportionate to his nature, such as the good of acquired virtue; but not surpassing good, as the good of infused virtue. But in the state of corrupt nature, man falls short of what he could do by his nature, so that he is unable to fulfil it by his own natural powers. Yet because human nature is not altogether corrupted by sin, so as to be shorn of every natural good, even in the state of corrupted nature it can, by virtue of its natural endowments, work some particular good, as to build dwellings, plant vineyards, and the like; yet it cannot do all the good natural to it, so as to fall short in nothing; just as a sick man can of himself make some movements, yet he cannot be perfectly moved with the movements of one in health, unless by the help of medicine he be cured.

And thus in the state of perfect nature man needs a gratuitous strength superadded to natural strength for one reason, viz. in order to do and wish supernatural good; but for two reasons, in the state of corrupt nature, viz. in order to be healed, and furthermore in order to carry out works of supernatural virtue, which are meritorious. Beyond this, in both states man needs the Divine help, that he may be moved to act well.

[38374] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod natura hominis dupliciter potest considerari, uno modo, in sui integritate, sicut fuit in primo parente ante peccatum; alio modo, secundum quod est corrupta in nobis post peccatum primi parentis. Secundum autem utrumque statum, natura humana indiget auxilio divino ad faciendum vel volendum quodcumque bonum, sicut primo movente, ut dictum est. Sed in statu naturae integrae, quantum ad sufficientiam operativae virtutis, poterat homo per sua naturalia velle et operari bonum suae naturae proportionatum, quale est bonum virtutis acquisitae, non autem bonum superexcedens, quale est bonum virtutis infusae. Sed in statu naturae corruptae etiam deficit homo ab hoc quod secundum suam naturam potest, ut non possit totum huiusmodi bonum implere per sua naturalia. Quia tamen natura humana per peccatum non est totaliter corrupta, ut scilicet toto bono naturae privetur; potest quidem etiam in statu naturae corruptae, per virtutem suae naturae aliquod bonum particulare agere, sicut aedificare domos, plantare vineas, et alia huiusmodi; non tamen totum bonum sibi connaturale, ita quod in nullo deficiat. Sicut homo infirmus potest per seipsum aliquem motum habere; non tamen perfecte potest moveri motu hominis sani, nisi sanetur auxilio medicinae. Sic igitur virtute gratuita superaddita virtuti naturae indiget homo in statu naturae integrae quantum ad unum, scilicet ad operandum et volendum bonum supernaturale. Sed in statu naturae corruptae, quantum ad duo, scilicet ut sanetur; et ulterius ut bonum supernaturalis virtutis operetur, quod est meritorium. Ulterius autem in utroque statu

indiget homo auxilio divino ut ab ipso moveatur ad bene agendum.

Reply to Objection 1: Man is master of his acts and of his willing or not willing, because of his deliberate reason, which can be bent to one side or another. And although he is master of his deliberating or not deliberating, yet this can only be by a previous deliberation; and since it cannot go on to infinity, we must come at length to this, that man's free-will is moved by an extrinsic principle, which is above the human mind, to wit by God, as the Philosopher proves in the chapter "On Good Fortune" (Ethic. Eudem. vii). Hence the mind of man still unweakened is not so much master of its act that it does not need to be moved by God; and much more the free-will of man weakened by sin, whereby it is hindered from good by the corruption of the nature.

[38375] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo est dominus suorum actuum, et volendi et non volendi, propter deliberationem rationis, quae potest flecti ad unam partem vel ad aliam. Sed quod deliberet vel non deliberet, si huius etiam sit dominus, oportet quod hoc sit per deliberationem praecedentem. Et cum hoc non procedat in infinitum, oportet quod finaliter deveniatur ad hoc quod liberum arbitrium hominis moveatur ab aliquo exteriori principio quod est supra mentem humanam, scilicet a Deo; ut etiam philosophus probat in cap. de bona fortuna. Unde mens hominis etiam sani non ita habet dominium sui actus quin indigeat moveri a Deo. Et multo magis liberum arbitrium hominis infirmi post peccatum, quod impeditur a bono per corruptionem naturae.

Reply to Objection 2: To sin is nothing else than to fail in the good which belongs to any being according to its nature. Now as every created thing has its being from another, and, considered in itself, is nothing, so does it need to be preserved by another in the good which pertains to its nature. For it can of itself fail in good, even as of itself it can fall into non-existence, unless it is upheld by God.

[38376] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod peccare nihil aliud est quam deficere a bono quod convenit alicui secundum suam naturam. Unaquaeque autem res creata, sicut esse non habet nisi ab alio, et in se considerata est nihil, ita indiget conservari in bono suae naturae convenienti ab alio. Potest autem per seipsam deficere a bono, sicut et per seipsam potest deficere in non esse, nisi divinitus conservaretur.

Reply to Objection 3: Man cannot even know truth without Divine help, as stated above (A[1]). And yet human nature is more corrupt by sin in regard to the desire for good, than in regard to the knowledge of truth.

[38377] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam verum non potest homo cognoscere sine auxilio divino, sicut supra dictum est. Et tamen magis est natura humana corrupta per peccatum quantum ad appetitum boni, quam quantum ad cognitionem veri.

Q. 109. A. 3. Whether by his own natural powers and without grace man can love God above all things?

Objection 1: It would seem that without grace man cannot love God above all things by his own natural powers. For to love God above all things is the proper and principal act of charity. Now man cannot of himself possess charity, since the "charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us," as is said Rom. 5:5. Therefore man by his natural powers

[38378] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non possit diligere Deum super omnia ex solis naturalibus sine gratia. Diligere enim Deum super omnia est proprius et principalis caritatis actus. Sed caritatem homo non potest habere per seipsum, quia *caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis*, ut dicitur

alone cannot love God above all things.

Rom. V. Ergo homo ex solis naturalibus non potest Deum diligere super omnia.

Objection 2: Further, no nature can rise above itself. But to love God above all things is to tend above oneself. Therefore without the help of grace no created nature can love God above itself.

[38379] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, nulla natura potest supra seipsam. Sed diligere aliquid plus quam se, est tendere in aliquid supra seipsum. Ergo nulla natura creata potest Deum diligere supra seipsam sine auxilio gratiae.

Objection 3: Further, to God, Who is the Highest Good, is due the best love, which is that He be loved above all things. Now without grace man is not capable of giving God the best love, which is His due; otherwise it would be useless to add grace. Hence man, without grace and with his natural powers alone, cannot love God above all things.

[38380] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, Deo, cum sit summum bonum, debetur summus amor, qui est ut super omnia diligatur. Sed ad summum amorem Deo impendendum, qui ei a nobis debetur, homo non sufficit sine gratia, alioquin frustra gratia adderetur. Ergo homo non potest sine gratia ex solis naturalibus diligere Deum super omnia.

On the contrary, As some maintain, man was first made with only natural endowments; and in this state it is manifest that he loved God to some extent. But he did not love God equally with himself, or less than himself, otherwise he would have sinned. Therefore he loved God above himself. Therefore man, by his natural powers alone, can love God more than himself and above all things.

[38381] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, primus homo in solis naturalibus constitutus fuit, ut a quibusdam ponitur. In quo statu manifestum est quod aliqualiter Deum dilexit. Sed non dilexit Deum aequaliter sibi, vel minus se, quia secundum hoc peccasset. Ergo dilexit Deum supra se. Ergo homo ex solis naturalibus potest Deum diligere plus quam se, et super omnia.

I answer that, As was said above (FP, Q[60], A[5]), where the various opinions concerning the natural love of the angels were set forth, man in a state of perfect nature, could by his natural power, do the good natural to him without the addition of any gratuitous gift, though not without the help of God moving him. Now to love God above all things is natural to man and to every nature, not only rational but irrational, and even to inanimate nature according to the manner of love which can belong to each creature. And the reason of this is that it is natural to all to seek and love things according as they are naturally fit (to be sought and loved) since "all things act according as they are naturally fit" as stated in Phys. ii, 8. Now it is manifest that the good of the part is for the good of the whole; hence everything, by its natural appetite and love, loves its own proper good on account of the common good of the whole universe, which is God. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "God leads everything to love

[38382] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est in primo, in quo etiam circa naturalem dilectionem Angelorum diversae opiniones sunt positae; homo in statu naturae integrae poterat operari virtute suae naturae bonum quod est sibi connaturale, absque superadditione gratuiti doni, licet non absque auxilio Dei moventis. Diligere autem Deum super omnia est quiddam connaturale homini; et etiam cuilibet creaturae non solum rationali, sed irrationali et etiam inanimatae, secundum modum amoris qui unicuique creaturae competere potest. Cuius ratio est quia unicuique naturale est quod appetat et amet aliquid, secundum quod aptum natum est esse, *sic enim agit unumquodque, prout aptum natum est*, ut dicitur in II Physic. Manifestum est autem quod bonum partis est propter bonum totius. Unde etiam naturali appetitu vel amore unaquaeque res particularis amat bonum suum proprium propter bonum commune totius universi, quod est Deus.

of Himself." Hence in the state of perfect nature man referred the love of himself and of all other things to the love of God as to its end; and thus he loved God more than himself and above all things. But in the state of corrupt nature man falls short of this in the appetite of his rational will, which, unless it is cured by God's grace, follows its private good, on account of the corruption of nature. And hence we must say that in the state of perfect nature man did not need the gift of grace added to his natural endowments, in order to love God above all things naturally, although he needed God's help to move him to it; but in the state of corrupt nature man needs, even for this, the help of grace to heal his nature.

Unde et Dionysius dicit, in libro de Div. Nom., quod *Deus convertit omnia ad amorem sui ipsius*. Unde homo in statu naturae integrae dilectionem sui ipsius referebat ad amorem Dei sicut ad finem, et similiter dilectionem omnium aliarum rerum. Et ita Deum diligebat plus quam seipsum, et super omnia. Sed in statu naturae corruptae homo ab hoc deficit secundum appetitum voluntatis rationalis, quae propter corruptionem naturae sequitur bonum privatum, nisi sanetur per gratiam Dei. Et ideo dicendum est quod homo in statu naturae integrae non indigebat dono gratiae superadditae naturalibus bonis ad diligendum Deum naturaliter super omnia; licet indigeret auxilio Dei ad hoc eum moventis. Sed in statu naturae corruptae indiget homo etiam ad hoc auxilio gratiae naturam sanantis.

Reply to Objection 1: Charity loves God above all things in a higher way than nature does. For nature loves God above all things inasmuch as He is the beginning and the end of natural good; whereas charity loves Him, as He is the object of beatitude, and inasmuch as man has a spiritual fellowship with God. Moreover charity adds to natural love of God a certain quickness and joy, in the same way that every habit of virtue adds to the good act which is done merely by the natural reason of a man who has not the habit of virtue.

[38383] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caritas diligit Deum super omnia eminentius quam natura. Natura enim diligit Deum super omnia, prout est principium et finis naturalis boni, caritas autem secundum quod est obiectum beatitudinis, et secundum quod homo habet quandam societatem spiritualem cum Deo. Addit etiam caritas super dilectionem naturalem Dei promptitudinem quandam et delectationem, sicut et quilibet habitus virtutis addit supra actum bonum qui fit ex sola naturali ratione hominis virtutis habitum non habentis.

Reply to Objection 2: When it is said that nature cannot rise above itself, we must not understand this as if it could not be drawn to any object above itself, for it is clear that our intellect by its natural knowledge can know things above itself, as is shown in our natural knowledge of God. But we are to understand that nature cannot rise to an act exceeding the proportion of its strength. Now to love God above all things is not such an act; for it is natural to every creature, as was said above.

[38384] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum dicitur quod nulla natura potest supra seipsam, non est intelligendum quod non possit ferri in aliquod obiectum quod est supra se, manifestum est enim quod intellectus noster naturali cognitione potest aliqua cognoscere quae sunt supra seipsum, ut patet in naturali cognitione Dei. Sed intelligendum est quod natura non potest in actum excedentem proportionem suae virtutis. Talis autem actus non est diligere Deum super omnia, hoc enim est naturale cuilibet naturae creatae, ut dictum est.

Reply to Objection 3: Love is said to be best, both with respect to degree of love, and with regard to the motive of loving, and the mode of love. And thus the highest degree of love is that whereby charity loves God as the giver of beatitude, as was said above.

[38385] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod amor dicitur summus non solum quantum ad gradum dilectionis, sed etiam quantum ad rationem diligendi, et dilectionis modum. Et secundum hoc, supremus gradus dilectionis est quo caritas diligit Deum ut

beatificantem, sicut dictum est.

Q. 109. A. 4. Whether man without grace and by his own natural powers can fulfil the commandments of the Law?

Objection 1: It would seem that man without grace, and by his own natural powers, can fulfil the commandments of the Law. For the Apostle says (Rom. 2:14) that "the Gentiles who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the Law." Now what a man does naturally he can do of himself without grace. Hence a man can fulfil the commandments of the Law without grace.

[38386] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo sine gratia per sua naturalia possit praecepta legis implere. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. II, quod *gentes, quae legem non habent, naturaliter ea quae legis sunt faciunt*. Sed illud quod naturaliter homo facit, potest per seipsum facere absque gratia. Ergo homo potest legis praecepta facere absque gratia.

Objection 2: Further, Jerome says (Expos. Cathol. Fide [*Symboli Explanatio ad Damasum, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome: now ascribed to Pelagius]) that "they are anathema who say God has laid impossibilities upon man." Now what a man cannot fulfil by himself is impossible to him. Therefore a man can fulfil all the commandments of himself.

[38387] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit, in expositione Catholicae fidei, *illos esse maledicendos qui Deum praecepisse homini aliquid impossibile dicunt*. Sed impossibile est homini quod per seipsum implere non potest. Ergo homo potest implere omnia praecepta legis per seipsum.

Objection 3: Further, of all the commandments of the Law, the greatest is this, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart" (Mat. 27:37). Now man with his natural endowments can fulfil this command by loving God above all things, as stated above (A[3]). Therefore man can fulfil all the commandments of the Law without grace.

[38388] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, inter omnia praecepta legis maximum est illud, *diliges dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo*; ut patet Matth. XXII. Sed hoc mandatum potest homo implere ex solis naturalibus, diligendo Deum super omnia, ut supra dictum est. Ergo omnia mandata legis potest homo implere sine gratia.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Haeres. lxxxviii) that it is part of the Pelagian heresy that "they believe that without grace man can fulfil all the Divine commandments."

[38389] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de haeresibus, hoc pertinere ad haeresim Pelagianorum, ut credant *sine gratia posse hominem facere omnia divina mandata*.

I answer that, There are two ways of fulfilling the commandments of the Law. The first regards the substance of the works, as when a man does works of justice, fortitude, and of other virtues. And in this way man in the state of perfect nature could fulfil all the commandments of the Law; otherwise he would have been unable to sin in that state, since to sin is nothing else than to transgress the Divine commandments. But in the state of corrupted nature man cannot fulfil all the Divine commandments without healing grace.

[38390] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod implere mandata legis contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad substantiam operum, prout scilicet homo operatur iusta et fortia, et alia virtutis opera. Et hoc modo homo in statu naturae integrae potuit omnia mandata legis implere, alioquin non potuisset in statu illo non peccare, cum nihil aliud sit peccare quam transgredi divina mandata. Sed in statu naturae corruptae non potest homo implere omnia mandata divina sine gratia sanante. Alio modo

Secondly, the commandments of the law can be fulfilled, not merely as regards the substance of the act, but also as regards the mode of acting, i.e. their being done out of charity. And in this way, neither in the state of perfect nature, nor in the state of corrupt nature can man fulfil the commandments of the law without grace. Hence, Augustine (De Corrupt. et Grat. ii) having stated that "without grace men can do no good whatever," adds: "Not only do they know by its light what to do, but by its help they do lovingly what they know." Beyond this, in both states they need the help of God's motion in order to fulfil the commandments, as stated above (AA[2],3).

possunt impleri mandata legis non solum quantum ad substantiam operis, sed etiam quantum ad modum agendi, ut scilicet ex caritate fiant. Et sic neque in statu naturae integrae, neque in statu naturae corruptae, potest homo implere absque gratia legis mandata. Unde Augustinus, in libro de Corrept. et Grat., cum dixisset quod sine gratia nullum prorsus bonum homines faciunt, subdit, *non solum ut, monstrante ipsa quid faciendum sit, sciant; verum etiam ut, praestante ipsa, faciant cum dilectione quod sciunt*. Indigent insuper in utroque statu auxilio Dei moventis ad mandata implenda, ut dictum est.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xxvii), "do not be disturbed at his saying that they do by nature those things that are of the Law; for the Spirit of grace works this, in order to restore in us the image of God, after which we were naturally made."

[38391] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Spir. et Litt., *non moveat quod naturaliter eos dixit quae legis sunt facere, hoc enim agit spiritus gratiae, ut imaginem Dei, in qua naturaliter facti sumus, instauret in nobis*.

Reply to Objection 2: What we can do with the Divine assistance is not altogether impossible to us; according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 3): "What we can do through our friends, we can do, in some sense, by ourselves." Hence Jerome [*Symboli Explanatio ad Damasum, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome: now ascribed to Pelagius] concedes that "our will is in such a way free that we must confess we still require God's help."

[38392] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod illud quod possumus cum auxilio divino, non est nobis omnino impossibile; secundum illud philosophi, in III Ethic., *quae per amicos possumus, aliqualiter per nos possumus*. Unde et Hieronymus ibidem *confitetur sic nostrum liberum esse arbitrium, ut dicamus nos semper indigere Dei auxilio*.

Reply to Objection 3: Man cannot, with his purely natural endowments, fulfil the precept of the love of God, as stated above (A[3]).

[38393] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod praeceptum de dilectione Dei non potest homo implere ex puris naturalibus secundum quod ex caritate impletur, ut ex supradictis patet.

Q. 109. A. 5. Whether man can merit everlasting life without grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that man can merit everlasting life without grace. For Our Lord says (Mat. 19:17): "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments"; from which it would seem that to enter into everlasting life rests with man's will. But what rests with our will, we can do of ourselves. Hence it seems that man can merit everlasting life of himself.

[38394] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo possit mereri vitam aeternam sine gratia. Dicit enim dominus, Matth. XIX, *si vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata*, ex quo videtur quod ingredi in vitam aeternam sit constitutum in hominis voluntate. Sed id quod in nostra voluntate constitutum est, per nos ipsos possumus. Ergo videtur quod homo

per seipsum possit vitam aeternam mereri.

Objection 2: Further, eternal life is the wage of reward bestowed by God on men, according to Mat. 5:12: "Your reward is very great in heaven." But wage or reward is meted by God to everyone according to his works, according to Ps. 61:12: "Thou wilt render to every man according to his works." Hence, since man is master of his works, it seems that it is within his power to reach everlasting life.

[38395] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, vita aeterna est praemium vel merces quae hominibus redditur a Deo; secundum illud Matth. V, *merces vestra multa est in caelis*. Sed merces vel praemium redditur a Deo homini secundum opera eius; secundum illud Psalmi LXI, *tu reddes unicuique secundum opera eius*. Cum igitur homo sit dominus suorum operum, videtur quod in eius potestate constitutum sit ad vitam aeternam pervenire.

Objection 3: Further, everlasting life is the last end of human life. Now every natural thing by its natural endowments can attain its end. Much more, therefore, may man attain to life everlasting by his natural endowments, without grace.

[38396] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, vita aeterna est ultimus finis humanae vitae. Sed quaelibet res naturalis per sua naturalia potest consequi finem suum. Ergo multo magis homo, qui est altioris naturae, per sua naturalia potest pervenire ad vitam aeternam absque aliqua gratia.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 6:23): "The grace of God is life everlasting." And as a gloss says, this is said "that we may understand that God, of His own mercy, leads us to everlasting life."

[38397] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Rom. VI, *gratia Dei vita aeterna*. Quod ideo dicitur, sicut Glossa ibidem dicit, *ut intelligeremus Deum ad aeternam vitam pro sua miseratione nos perducere*.

I answer that, Acts conducing to an end must be proportioned to the end. But no act exceeds the proportion of its active principle; and hence we see in natural things, that nothing can by its operation bring about an effect which exceeds its active force, but only such as is proportionate to its power. Now everlasting life is an end exceeding the proportion of human nature, as is clear from what we have said above (Q[5], A[5]). Hence man, by his natural endowments, cannot produce meritorious works proportionate to everlasting life; and for this a higher force is needed, viz. the force of grace. And thus without grace man cannot merit everlasting life; yet he can perform works conducing to a good which is natural to man, as "to toil in the fields, to drink, to eat, or to have friends," and the like, as Augustine says in his third Reply to the Pelagians [*Hypognosticon iii, among the spurious works of St. Augustine].

[38398] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod actus perducentes ad finem oportet esse fini proportionatos. Nullus autem actus excedit proportionem principii activi. Et ideo videmus in rebus naturalibus quod nulla res potest perficere effectum per suam operationem qui excedat virtutem activam, sed solum potest producere per operationem suam effectum suae virtuti proportionatum. Vita autem aeterna est finis excedens proportionem naturae humanae, ut ex supradictis patet. Et ideo homo per sua naturalia non potest producere opera meritoria proportionata vitae aeternae, sed ad hoc exigitur altior virtus, quae est virtus gratiae. Et ideo sine gratia homo non potest mereri vitam aeternam. Potest tamen facere opera perducentia ad aliquod bonum homini connaturale, sicut laborare in agro, bibere, manducare, et habere amicum, et alia huiusmodi; ut Augustinus dicit, in tertia responsione contra Pelagianos.

Reply to Objection 1: Man, by his will, does

[38399] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo

works meritorious of everlasting life; but as Augustine says, in the same book, for this it is necessary that the will of man should be prepared with grace by God.

dicendum quod homo sua voluntate facit opera meritoria vitae aeternae, sed, sicut Augustinus in eodem libro dicit, ad hoc exigitur quod voluntas hominis praeparetur a Deo per gratiam.

Reply to Objection 2: As the gloss upon Rom. 6:23, "The grace of God is life everlasting," says, "It is certain that everlasting life is meter to good works; but the works to which it is meted, belong to God's grace." And it has been said (A[4]), that to fulfil the commandments of the Law, in their due way, whereby their fulfilment may be meritorious, requires grace.

[38400] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Glossa dicit Rom. VI, super illud, *gratia Dei vita aeterna, certum est vitam aeternam bonis operibus reddi, sed ipsa opera quibus redditur, ad Dei gratiam pertinent*, cum etiam supra dictum sit quod ad implendum mandata legis secundum debitum modum, per quem eorum impletio est meritoria, requiritur gratia.

Reply to Objection 3: This objection has to do with the natural end of man. Now human nature, since it is nobler, can be raised by the help of grace to a higher end, which lower natures can nowise reach; even as a man who can recover his health by the help of medicines is better disposed to health than one who can nowise recover it, as the Philosopher observes (De Coelo ii, 12).

[38401] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de fine homini connaturali. Natura autem humana, ex hoc ipso quod nobilior est, potest ad altiorem finem perduci, saltem auxilio gratiae, ad quem inferiores naturae nullo modo pertingere possunt. Sicut homo est melius dispositus ad sanitatem qui aliquibus auxiliis medicinae potest sanitatem consequi, quam ille qui nullo modo; ut philosophus introducit in II de caelo.

Q. 109. A. 6. Whether a man, by himself and without the external aid of grace, can prepare himself for grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that man, by himself and without the external help of grace, can prepare himself for grace. For nothing impossible is laid upon man, as stated above (A[4], ad 1). But it is written (Zech. 1:3): "Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you." Now to prepare for grace is nothing more than to turn to God. Therefore it seems that man of himself, and without the external help of grace, can prepare himself for grace.

[38402] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo possit seipsum ad gratiam praeparare per seipsum, absque exteriori auxilio gratiae. Nihil enim imponitur homini quod sit ei impossibile, ut supra dictum est. Sed Zach. I dicitur, *convertimini ad me, et ego convertar ad vos*, nihil autem est aliud se ad gratiam praeparare quam ad Deum converti. Ergo videtur quod homo per seipsum possit se ad gratiam praeparare absque auxilio gratiae.

Objection 2: Further, man prepares himself for grace by doing what is in him to do, since if man does what is in him to do, God will not deny him grace, for it is written (Mat. 7:11) that God gives His good Spirit "to them that ask Him." But what is in our power is in us to do. Therefore it seems to be in our power to prepare ourselves for grace.

[38403] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, homo se ad gratiam praeparat faciendo quod in se est, quia si homo facit quod in se est, Deus ei non denegat gratiam; dicitur enim Matth. VII, quod Deus dat spiritum bonum petentibus se. Sed illud in nobis esse dicitur quod est in nostra potestate. Ergo videtur quod in nostra potestate sit constitutum ut nos ad gratiam praeparemus.

Objection 3: Further, if a man needs grace in order to prepare for grace, with equal reason will he need grace to prepare himself for the first grace; and thus to infinity, which is impossible. Hence it seems that we must not go beyond what was said first, viz. that man, of himself and without grace, can prepare himself for grace.

[38404] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, si homo indiget gratia ad hoc quod praeparet se ad gratiam, pari ratione indigebit gratia ad hoc quod praeparet se ad illam gratiam, et sic procederetur in infinitum, quod est inconveniens. Ergo videtur standum in primo, ut scilicet homo sine gratia possit se ad gratiam praeparare.

Objection 4: Further, it is written (Prov. 16:1) that "it is the part of man to prepare the soul." Now an action is said to be part of a man, when he can do it by himself. Hence it seems that man by himself can prepare himself for grace.

[38405] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 6 arg. 4 Praeterea, Prov. XVI dicitur, hominis est praeparare animum. Sed illud dicitur esse hominis quod per seipsum potest. Ergo videtur quod homo per seipsum se possit ad gratiam praeparare.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 6:44): "No man can come to Me except the Father, Who hath sent Me, draw him." But if man could prepare himself, he would not need to be drawn by another. Hence man cannot prepare himself without the help of grace.

[38406] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. VI, *nemo potest venire ad me, nisi pater, qui misit me, traxerit eum*. Si autem homo seipsum praeparare posset, non oporteret quod ab alio traheretur. Ergo homo non potest se praeparare ad gratiam absque auxilio gratiae.

I answer that, The preparation of the human will for good is twofold: the first, whereby it is prepared to operate rightly and to enjoy God; and this preparation of the will cannot take place without the habitual gift of grace, which is the principle of meritorious works, as stated above (A[5]). There is a second way in which the human will may be taken to be prepared for the gift of habitual grace itself. Now in order that man prepare himself to receive this gift, it is not necessary to presuppose any further habitual gift in the soul, otherwise we should go on to infinity. But we must presuppose a gratuitous gift of God, Who moves the soul inwardly or inspires the good wish. For in these two ways do we need the Divine assistance, as stated above (AA[2],3). Now that we need the help of God to move us, is manifest. For since every agent acts for an end, every cause must direct is effect to its end, and hence since the order of ends is according to the order of agents or movers, man must be directed to the last end by the motion of the first mover, and to the proximate end by the motion of any of the subordinate movers; as the spirit of the soldier is bent towards seeking the victory by the motion of the leader of the army---and towards following the standard of a regiment by the motion of the standard-bearer. And thus since God is the First Mover, simply, it is by His motion that everything

[38407] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est praeparatio voluntatis humanae ad bonum. Una quidem qua praeparatur ad bene operandum et ad Deo fruendum. Et talis praeparatio voluntatis non potest fieri sine habituali gratiae dono, quod sit principium operis meritorii, ut dictum est. Alio modo potest intelligi praeparatio voluntatis humanae ad consequendum ipsum gratiae habitualis donum. Ad hoc autem quod praeparet se ad susceptionem huius doni, non oportet praesupponere aliquod aliud donum habituale in anima, quia sic procederetur in infinitum, sed oportet praesupponi aliquod auxilium gratuitum Dei interius animam moventis, sive inspirantis bonum propositum. His enim duobus modis indigemus auxilio divino, ut supra dictum est. Quod autem ad hoc indigeamus auxilio Dei moventis, manifestum est. Necesse est enim, cum omne agens agat propter finem, quod omnis causa convertat suos effectus ad suum finem. Et ideo, cum secundum ordinem agentium sive moventium sit ordo finium, necesse est quod ad ultimum finem convertatur homo per motionem primi moventis, ad finem autem proximum per motionem alicuius inferiorum moventium, sicut animus militis convertitur ad quaerendum victoriam ex motione ducis exercitus, ad sequendum autem vexillum alicuius aciei ex motione tribuni. Sic igitur, cum Deus sit

seeks to be likened to God in its own way. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "God turns all to Himself." But He directs righteous men to Himself as to a special end, which they seek, and to which they wish to cling, according to Ps. 72:28, "it is good for Me to adhere to my God." And that they are "turned" to God can only spring from God's having "turned" them. Now to prepare oneself for grace is, as it were, to be turned to God; just as, whoever has his eyes turned away from the light of the sun, prepares himself to receive the sun's light, by turning his eyes towards the sun. Hence it is clear that man cannot prepare himself to receive the light of grace except by the gratuitous help of God moving him inwardly.

primum movens simpliciter, ex eius motione est quod omnia in ipsum convertantur secundum communem intentionem boni, per quam unumquodque intendit assimilari Deo secundum suum modum. Unde et Dionysius, in libro de Div. Nom., dicit quod Deus convertit omnia ad seipsum. Sed homines iustos convertit ad seipsum sicut ad specialem finem, quem intendunt, et cui cupiunt adhaerere sicut bono proprio; secundum illud Psalmi LXXII, mihi adhaerere Deo bonum est. Et ideo quod homo convertatur ad Deum, hoc non potest esse nisi Deo ipsum convertente. Hoc autem est praeparare se ad gratiam, quasi ad Deum converti, sicut ille qui habet oculum aversum a lumine solis, per hoc se praeparat ad recipiendum lumen solis, quod oculos suos convertit versus solem. Unde patet quod homo non potest se praeparare ad lumen gratiae suscipiendum, nisi per auxilium gratuitum Dei interius moventis.

Reply to Objection 1: Man's turning to God is by free-will; and thus man is bidden to turn himself to God. But free-will can only be turned to God, when God turns it, according to Jer. 31:18: "Convert me and I shall be converted, for Thou art the Lord, my God"; and Lam. 5:21: "Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted."

[38408] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod conversio hominis ad Deum fit quidem per liberum arbitrium; et secundum hoc homini praecipitur quod se ad Deum convertat. Sed liberum arbitrium ad Deum converti non potest nisi Deo ipsum ad se convertente; secundum illud Ierem. XXXI, *converte me, et convertar, quia tu dominus Deus meus*; et Thren. ult., *converte nos, domine, ad te, et convertemur*.

Reply to Objection 2: Man can do nothing unless moved by God, according to Jn. 15:5: "Without Me, you can do nothing." Hence when a man is said to do what is in him to do, this is said to be in his power according as he is moved by God.

[38409] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod nihil homo potest facere nisi a Deo moveatur; secundum illud Ioan. XV, sine me nihil potestis facere. Et ideo cum dicitur homo facere quod in se est, dicitur hoc esse in potestate hominis secundum quod est motus a Deo.

Reply to Objection 3: This objection regards habitual grace, for which some preparation is required, since every form requires a disposition in that which is to be its subject. But in order that man should be moved by God, no further motion is presupposed since God is the First Mover. Hence we need not go to infinity.

[38410] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de gratia habituali, ad quam requiritur aliqua praeparatio, quia omnis forma requirit susceptibile dispositum. Sed hoc quod homo moveatur a Deo non praeexigit aliquam aliam motionem, cum Deus sit primum movens. Unde non oportet abire in infinitum.

Reply to Objection 4: It is the part of man to prepare his soul, since he does this by his free-

[38411] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 6 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod hominis est praeparare animum,

will. And yet he does not do this without the help of God moving him, and drawing him to Himself, as was said above.

quia hoc facit per liberum arbitrium, sed tamen hoc non facit sine auxilio Dei moventis et ad se attrahentis, ut dictum est.

Q. 109. A. 7. Whether man can rise from sin without the help of grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that man can rise from sin without the help of grace. For what is presupposed to grace, takes place without grace. But to rise to sin is presupposed to the enlightenment of grace; since it is written (Eph. 5:14): "Arise from the dead and Christ shall enlighten thee." Therefore man can rise from sin without grace.

[38412] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo possit resurgere a peccato sine auxilio gratiae. Illud enim quod praeexigitur ad gratiam, fit sine gratia. Sed resurgere a peccato praeexigitur ad illuminationem gratiae, dicitur enim ad Ephes. V, *exurge a mortuis, et illuminabit te Christus*. Ergo homo potest resurgere a peccato sine gratia.

Objection 2: Further, sin is opposed to virtue as illness to health, as stated above (Q[71], A[1], ad 3). Now, man, by force of his nature, can rise from illness to health, without the external help of medicine, since there still remains in him the principle of life, from which the natural operation proceeds. Hence it seems that, with equal reason, man may be restored by himself, and return from the state of sin to the state of justice without the help of external grace.

[38413] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, peccatum virtuti opponitur sicut morbus sanitati, ut supra dictum est. Sed homo per virtutem naturae potest resurgere de aegritudine ad sanitatem sine auxilio exterioris medicinae, propter hoc quod intus manet principium vitae, a quo procedit operatio naturalis. Ergo videtur quod, simili ratione, homo possit reparari per seipsum, redeundo de statu peccati ad statum iustitiae, absque auxilio exterioris gratiae.

Objection 3: Further, every natural thing can return by itself to the act befitting its nature, as hot water returns by itself to its natural coldness, and a stone cast upwards returns by itself to its natural movement. Now a sin is an act against nature, as is clear from Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 30). Hence it seems that man by himself can return from sin to the state of justice.

[38414] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, quaelibet res naturalis potest redire ad actum convenientem suae naturae, sicut aqua calefacta per seipsam redit ad naturalem frigiditatem, et lapis sursum proiectus per seipsum redit ad suum naturalem motum. Sed peccatum est quidam actus contra naturam; ut patet per Damascenus, in II libro. Ergo videtur quod homo possit per seipsum redire de peccato ad statum iustitiae.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 2:21; Cf. Gal. 3:21): "For if there had been a law given which could give life---then Christ died in vain," i.e. to no purpose. Hence with equal reason, if man has a nature, whereby he can he justified, "Christ died in vain," i.e. to no purpose. But this cannot fittingly be said. Therefore by himself he cannot be justified, i.e. he cannot return from a state of sin to a state of justice.

[38415] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Gal. II, *si data est lex quae potest iustificare, ergo Christus gratis mortuus est*, idest sine causa. Pari ergo ratione, si homo habet naturam per quam potest iustificari, Christus gratis, idest sine causa, mortuus est. Sed hoc est inconveniens dicere. Ergo non potest homo per seipsum iustificari, idest redire de statu culpae ad statum iustitiae.

I answer that, Man by himself can no wise rise from sin without the help of grace. For since sin is

[38416] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod homo nullo modo potest resurgere

transient as to the act and abiding in its guilt, as stated above (Q[87], A[6]), to rise from sin is not the same as to cease the act of sin; but to rise from sin means that man has restored to him what he lost by sinning. Now man incurs a triple loss by sinning, as was clearly shown above (Q[85], A[1]; Q[86], A[1] ; Q[87], A[1]), viz. stain, corruption of natural good, and debt of punishment. He incurs a stain, inasmuch as he forfeits the lustre of grace through the deformity of sin. Natural good is corrupted, inasmuch as man's nature is disordered by man's will not being subject to God's; and this order being overthrown, the consequence is that the whole nature of sinful man remains disordered. Lastly, there is the debt of punishment, inasmuch as by sinning man deserves everlasting damnation.

Now it is manifest that none of these three can be restored except by God. For since the lustre of grace springs from the shedding of Divine light, this lustre cannot be brought back, except God sheds His light anew: hence a habitual gift is necessary, and this is the light of grace. Likewise, the order of nature can only be restored, i.e. man's will can only be subject to God when God draws man's will to Himself, as stated above (A[6]). So, too, the guilt of eternal punishment can be remitted by God alone, against Whom the offense was committed and Who is man's Judge. And thus in order that man rise from sin there is required the help of grace, both as regards a habitual gift, and as regards the internal motion of God.

a peccato per seipsum sine auxilio gratiae. Cum enim peccatum transiens actu remaneat reatu, ut supra dictum est; non est idem resurgere a peccato quod cessare ab actu peccati. Sed resurgere a peccato est reparari hominem ad ea quae peccando amisit. Incurrit autem homo triplex detrimentum peccando, ut ex supradictis patet, scilicet maculam, corruptionem naturalis boni, et reatum poenae. Maculam quidem incurrit, inquantum privatur decore gratiae ex deformitate peccati. Bonum autem naturae corrumpitur, inquantum natura hominis deordinatur voluntate hominis Deo non subiecta, hoc enim ordine sublato, consequens est ut tota natura hominis peccantis inordinata remaneat. Reatus vero poenae est per quem homo peccando mortaliter meretur damnationem aeternam. Manifestum est autem de singulis horum trium, quod non possunt reparari nisi per Deum. Cum enim decor gratiae proveniat ex illustratione divini luminis, non potest talis decor in anima reparari, nisi Deo denuo illustrante, unde requiritur habituale donum, quod est gratiae lumen. Similiter ordo naturae reparari non potest, ut voluntas hominis Deo subiiciatur, nisi Deo voluntatem hominis ad se trahente, sicut dictum est. Similiter etiam reatus poenae aeternae remitti non potest nisi a Deo, in quem est offensa commissa, et qui est hominum iudex. Et ideo requiritur auxilium gratiae ad hoc quod homo a peccato resurgat, et quantum ad habituale donum, et quantum ad interiorem Dei motionem.

Reply to Objection 1: To man is bidden that which pertains to the act of free-will, as this act is required in order that man should rise from sin. Hence when it is said, "Arise, and Christ shall enlighten thee," we are not to think that the complete rising from sin precedes the enlightenment of grace; but that when man by his free-will, moved by God, strives to rise from sin, he receives the light of justifying grace.

[38417] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illud indicitur homini quod pertinet ad actum liberi arbitrii qui requiritur in hoc quod homo a peccato resurgat. Et ideo cum dicitur, exsurge, et illuminabit te Christus, non est intelligendum quod tota exurrectio a peccato praecedat illuminationem gratiae, sed quia cum homo per liberum arbitrium a Deo motum surgere conatur a peccato, recipit lumen gratiae iustificantis.

Reply to Objection 2: The natural reason is not the sufficient principle of the health that is in man by justifying grace. This principle is grace which is taken away by sin. Hence man cannot be restored by himself; but he requires the light of

[38418] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod naturalis ratio non est sufficiens principium huius sanitatis quae est in homine per gratiam iustificantem; sed huius principium est gratia, quae tollitur per peccatum. Et ideo non

grace to be poured upon him anew, as if the soul were infused into a dead body for its resurrection.

potest homo per seipsum reparari, sed indiget ut denuo ei lumen gratiae infundatur, sicut si corpori mortuo resuscitando denuo infunderetur anima.

Reply to Objection 3: When nature is perfect, it can be restored by itself to its befitting and proportionate condition; but without exterior help it cannot be restored to what surpasses its measure. And thus human nature undone by reason of the act of sin, remains no longer perfect, but corrupted, as stated above (Q[85]); nor can it be restored, by itself, to its connatural good, much less to the supernatural good of justice.

[38419] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, quando natura est integra, per seipsam potest reparari ad id quod est sibi conveniens et proportionatum, sed ad id quod superexcedit suam proportionem, reparari non potest sine exteriori auxilio. Sic igitur humana natura defluens per actum peccati, quia non manet integra sed corrumpitur, ut supra dictum est, non potest per seipsam reparari neque etiam ad bonum sibi connaturale; et multo minus ad bonum supernaturalis iustitiae.

Q. 109. A. 8. Whether man without grace can avoid sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that without grace man can avoid sin. Because "no one sins in what he cannot avoid," as Augustine says (De Duab. Anim. x, xi; De Libero Arbit. iii, 18). Hence if a man in mortal sin cannot avoid sin, it would seem that in sinning he does not sin, which is impossible.

[38420] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo sine gratia possit non peccare. *Nullus enim peccat in eo quod vitare non potest*; ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Duab. Animab., et de Lib. Arb. Si ergo homo existens in peccato mortali non possit vitare peccatum, videtur quod peccando non peccet. Quod est inconveniens.

Objection 2: Further, men are corrected that they may not sin. If therefore a man in mortal sin cannot avoid sin, correction would seem to be given to no purpose; which is absurd.

[38421] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, ad hoc corripitur homo ut non peccet. Si igitur homo in peccato mortali existens non potest non peccare, videtur quod frustra ei correptio adhibeatur. Quod est inconveniens.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 15:18): "Before man is life and death, good and evil; that which he shall choose shall be given him." But by sinning no one ceases to be a man. Hence it is still in his power to choose good or evil; and thus man can avoid sin without grace.

[38422] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, Eccli. XV dicitur, *ante hominem vita et mors, bonum et malum, quod placuerit ei, dabitur illi*. Sed aliquis peccando non desinit esse homo. Ergo adhuc in eius potestate est eligere bonum vel malum. Et ita potest homo sine gratia vitare peccatum.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect Just. xxi): "Whoever denies that we ought to say the prayer 'Lead us not into temptation' (and they deny it who maintain that the help of God's grace is not necessary to man for salvation, but that the gift of the law is enough for the human will) ought without doubt to be removed beyond all hearing, and to be anathematized by the tongues

[38423] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Perfect. Iustit., *quisquis negat nos orare debere ne intremus in tentationem (negat autem hoc qui contendit ad non peccandum gratiae Dei adiutorium non esse homini necessarium, sed, sola lege accepta, humanam sufficere voluntatem), ab auribus omnium removendum, et ore omnium*

of all."

I answer that, We may speak of man in two ways: first, in the state of perfect nature; secondly, in the state of corrupted nature. Now in the state of perfect nature, man, without habitual grace, could avoid sinning either mortally or venially; since to sin is nothing else than to stray from what is according to our nature---and in the state of perfect nature man could avoid this. Nevertheless he could not have done it without God's help to uphold him in good, since if this had been withdrawn, even his nature would have fallen back into nothingness.

But in the state of corrupt nature man needs grace to heal his nature in order that he may entirely abstain from sin. And in the present life this healing is wrought in the mind---the carnal appetite being not yet restored. Hence the Apostle (Rom. 7:25) says in the person of one who is restored: "I myself, with the mind, serve the law of God, but with the flesh, the law of sin." And in this state man can abstain from all mortal sin, which takes its stand in his reason, as stated above (Q[74], A[5]); but man cannot abstain from all venial sin on account of the corruption of his lower appetite of sensuality. For man can, indeed, repress each of its movements (and hence they are sinful and voluntary), but not all, because whilst he is resisting one, another may arise, and also because the reason is always alert to avoid these movements, as was said above (Q[74], A[3], ad 2).

So, too, before man's reason, wherein is mortal sin, is restored by justifying grace, he can avoid each mortal sin, and for a time, since it is not necessary that he should be always actually sinning. But it cannot be that he remains for a long time without mortal sin. Hence Gregory says (Super Ezech. Hom. xi) that " a sin not at once taken away by repentance, by its weight drags us down to other sins": and this because, as the lower appetite ought to be subject to the reason, so should the reason be subject to God, and should place in Him the end of its will. Now it is by the end that all human acts ought to be regulated, even as it is by the judgment of the reason that the movements of the lower appetite should be regulated. And thus, even as inordinate

anathematizandum esse non dubito.

[38424] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod de homine dupliciter loqui possumus, uno modo, secundum statum naturae integrae; alio modo, secundum statum naturae corruptae. Secundum statum quidem naturae integrae, etiam sine gratia habituali, poterat homo non peccare nec mortaliter nec venialiter, quia peccare nihil aliud est quam recedere ab eo quod est secundum naturam, quod vitare homo poterat in integritate naturae. Non tamen hoc poterat sine auxilio Dei in bono conservantis, quo subtracto, etiam ipsa natura in nihilum decideret. In statu autem naturae corruptae, indiget homo gratia habituali sanante naturam, ad hoc quod omnino a peccato abstineat. Quae quidem sanatio primo fit in praesenti vita secundum mentem, appetitu carnali nondum totaliter reparato, unde apostolus, ad Rom. VII, in persona hominis reparati, dicit, *ego ipse mente servio legi Dei, carne autem legi peccati*. In quo quidem statu potest homo abstinere a peccato mortali quod in ratione consistit, ut supra habitum est. Non autem potest homo abstinere ab omni peccato veniali, propter corruptionem inferioris appetitus sensualitatis, cuius motus singulos quidem ratio reprimere potest (et ex hoc habent rationem peccati et voluntarii), non autem omnes, quia dum uni resistere nititur, fortassis alius insurgit; et etiam quia ratio non semper potest esse pervigil ad huiusmodi motus vitandos; ut supra dictum est. Similiter etiam antequam hominis ratio, in qua est peccatum mortale, reparetur per gratiam iustificantem, potest singula peccata mortalia vitare, et secundum aliquod tempus, quia non est necesse quod continuo peccet in actu. Sed quod diu maneat absque peccato mortali, esse non potest. Unde et Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod *peccatum quod mox per poenitentiam non deletur, suo pondere ad aliud trahit*. Et huius ratio est quia, sicut rationi subdi debet inferior appetitus, ita etiam ratio debet subdi Deo, et in ipso constituere finem suae voluntatis. Per finem autem oportet quod regulentur omnes actus humani, sicut per rationis iudicium regulari debent motus inferioris appetitus. Sicut ergo, inferiori appetitu non totaliter subiecto rationi, non potest esse quin contingant inordinati motus in appetitu sensitivo; ita etiam, ratione hominis non existente subiecta Deo, consequens est ut

movements of the sensitive appetite cannot help occurring since the lower appetite is not subject to reason, so likewise, since man's reason is not entirely subject to God, the consequence is that many disorders occur in the reason. For when man's heart is not so fixed on God as to be unwilling to be parted from Him for the sake of finding any good or avoiding any evil, many things happen for the achieving or avoiding of which a man strays from God and breaks His commandments, and thus sins mortally: especially since, when surprised, a man acts according to his preconceived end and his pre-existing habits, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii); although with premeditation of his reason a man may do something outside the order of his preconceived end and the inclination of his habit. But because a man cannot always have this premeditation, it cannot help occurring that he acts in accordance with his will turned aside from God, unless, by grace, he is quickly brought back to the due order.

contingant multae inordinationes in ipsis actibus rationis. Cum enim homo non habet cor suum firmatum in Deo, ut pro nullo bono consequendo vel malo vitando ab eo separari vellet; occurrunt multa propter quae consequenda vel vitanda homo recedit a Deo contemnendo praecepta ipsius, et ita peccat mortaliter, praecipue quia in repentinis homo operatur secundum finem praeconceptum, et secundum habitum praeexistentem, ut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic.; quamvis ex praemeditatione rationis homo possit aliquid agere praeter ordinem finis praeconcepti, et praeter inclinationem habitus. Sed quia homo non potest semper esse in tali praemeditatione, non potest contingere ut diu permaneat quin operetur secundum consequentiam voluntatis deordinatae a Deo, nisi cito per gratiam ad debitum ordinem reparetur.

Reply to Objection 1: Man can avoid each but every act of sin, except by grace, as stated above. Nevertheless, since it is by his own shortcoming that he does not prepare himself to have grace, the fact that he cannot avoid sin without grace does not excuse him from sin.

[38425] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo potest vitare singulos actus peccati, non tamen omnes, nisi per gratiam, ut dictum est. Et tamen quia ex eius defectu est quod homo se ad gratiam habendam non praeparet, per hoc a peccato non excusatur, quod sine gratia peccatum vitare non potest.

Reply to Objection 2: Correction is useful "in order that out of the sorrow of correction may spring the wish to be regenerate; if indeed he who is corrected is a son of promise, in such sort that whilst the noise of correction is outwardly resounding and punishing, God by hidden inspirations is inwardly causing to will," as Augustine says (De Corr. et Gratia vi). Correction is therefore necessary, from the fact that man's will is required in order to abstain from sin; yet it is not sufficient without God's help. Hence it is written (Eccles. 7:14): "Consider the works of God that no man can correct whom He hath despised."

[38426] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod correptio utilis est *ut ex dolore correptionis voluntas regenerationis oriatur. Si tamen qui corripitur filius est promissionis, ut, strepitu correptionis forinsecus insonante ac flagellante, Deus in illo intrinsecus occulta inspiratione operetur et velle*; ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Correpț. et Grat. Ideo ergo necessaria est correptio, quia voluntas hominis requiritur ad hoc quod a peccato abstineat. Sed tamen correptio non est sufficiens sine Dei auxilio, unde dicitur Eccle. VII, *considera opera Dei, quod nemo possit corrigere quem ille despexerit*.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Hypognosticon iii [*Among the spurious works of St. Augustine]), this saying is to be understood of man in the state of perfect nature, when as yet he was not a slave of sin. Hence he was able to sin

[38427] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in Hypognost., verbum illud intelligitur de homine secundum statum naturae integrae, quando nondum erat servus peccati, unde poterat peccare

and not to sin. Now, too, whatever a man wills, is given to him; but his willing good, he has by God's assistance.

et non peccare. Nunc etiam quodcumque vult homo, datur ei. Sed hoc quod bonum velit, habet ex auxilio gratiae.

Q. 109. A. 9. Whether one who has already obtained grace, can, of himself and without further help of grace, do good and avoid sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that whoever has already obtained grace, can by himself and without further help of grace, do good and avoid sin. For a thing is useless or imperfect, if it does not fulfil what it was given for. Now grace is given to us that we may do good and keep from sin. Hence if with grace man cannot do this, it seems that grace is either useless or imperfect.

[38428] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 9 arg. 1 Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ille qui iam consecutus est gratiam, per seipsum possit operari bonum et vitare peccatum, absque alio auxilio gratiae. Unumquodque enim aut frustra est, aut imperfectum, si non implet illud ad quod datur. Sed gratia ad hoc datur nobis ut possimus bonum facere et vitare peccatum. Si igitur per gratiam hoc homo non potest, videtur quod vel gratia sit frustra data, vel sit imperfecta.

Objection 2: Further, by grace the Holy Spirit dwells in us, according to 1 Cor. 3:16: "Know you not that you are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?" Now since the Spirit of God is omnipotent, He is sufficient to ensure our doing good and to keep us from sin. Hence a man who has obtained grace can do the above two things without any further assistance of grace.

[38429] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 9 arg. 2 Praeterea, per gratiam ipse spiritus sanctus in nobis habitat; secundum illud I ad Cor. III, *nescitis quia templum Dei estis, et spiritus Dei habitat in vobis?* Sed spiritus sanctus, cum sit omnipotens, sufficiens est ut nos inducat ad bene operandum, et ut nos a peccato custodiat. Ergo homo gratiam consecutus potest utrumque praedictorum absque alio auxilio gratiae.

Objection 3: Further, if a man who has obtained grace needs further aid of grace in order to live righteously and to keep free from sin, with equal reason, will he need yet another grace, even though he has obtained this first help of grace. Therefore we must go on to infinity; which is impossible. Hence whoever is in grace needs no further help of grace in order to do righteously and to keep free from sin.

[38430] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 9 arg. 3 Praeterea, si homo consecutus gratiam adhuc alio auxilio gratiae indiget ad hoc quod recte vivat et a peccato abstineat, pari ratione et si illud aliud auxilium gratiae consecutus fuerit, adhuc alio auxilio indigebit. Procedetur ergo in infinitum, quod est inconveniens. Ergo ille qui est in gratia, non indiget alio auxilio gratiae ad hoc quod bene operetur et a peccato abstineat.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia xxvi) that "as the eye of the body though most healthy cannot see unless it is helped by the brightness of light, so, neither can a man, even if he is most righteous, live righteously unless he be helped by the eternal light of justice." But justification is by grace, according to Rom. 3:24: "Being justified freely by His grace." Hence even a man who already possesses grace needs a further assistance of grace in order to live righteously.

[38431] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 9 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura et gratia, quod *sicut oculus corporis plenissime sanus, nisi candore lucis adiutus, non potest cernere; sic et homo perfectissime etiam iustificatus, nisi aeterna luce iustitiae divinitus adiuvetur, recte non potest vivere*. Sed iustificatio fit per gratiam; secundum illud Rom. III. *Iustificati gratis per gratiam ipsius*. Ergo etiam homo iam habens gratiam indiget alio auxilio gratiae ad hoc quod recte vivat.

I answer that, As stated above (A[5]), in order to live righteously a man needs a twofold help of God---first, a habitual gift whereby corrupted human nature is healed, and after being healed is lifted up so as to work deeds meritoriously of everlasting life, which exceed the capability of nature. Secondly, man needs the help of grace in order to be moved by God to act.

Now with regard to the first kind of help, man does not need a further help of grace, e.g. a further infused habit. Yet he needs the help of grace in another way, i.e. in order to be moved by God to act righteously, and this for two reasons: first, for the general reason that no created thing can put forth any act, unless by virtue of the Divine motion. Secondly, for this special reason---the condition of the state of human nature. For although healed by grace as to the mind, yet it remains corrupted and poisoned in the flesh, whereby it serves "the law of sin," Rom. 7:25. In the intellect, too, there seems the darkness of ignorance, whereby, as is written (Rom. 8:26): "We know not what we should pray for as we ought"; since on account of the various turns of circumstances, and because we do not know ourselves perfectly, we cannot fully know what is for our good, according to Wis. 9:14: "For the thoughts of mortal men are fearful and our counsels uncertain." Hence we must be guided and guarded by God, Who knows and can do all things. For which reason also it is becoming in those who have been born again as sons of God, to say: "Lead us not into temptation," and "Thy Will be done on earth as it is in heaven," and whatever else is contained in the Lord's Prayer pertaining to this.

[38432] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 9 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, homo ad recte vivendum dupliciter auxilio Dei indiget. Uno quidem modo, quantum ad aliquod habituale donum, per quod natura humana corrupta sanetur; et etiam sanata elevetur ad operandum opera meritoria vitae aeternae, quae excedunt proportionem naturae. Alio modo indiget homo auxilio gratiae ut a Deo moveatur ad agendum. Quantum igitur ad primum auxilii modum, homo in gratia existens non indiget alio auxilio gratiae quasi aliquo alio habitu infuso. Indiget tamen auxilio gratiae secundum alium modum, ut scilicet a Deo moveatur ad recte agendum. Et hoc propter duo. Primo quidem, ratione generali, propter hoc quod, sicut supra dictum est, nulla res creata potest in quemcumque actum prodire nisi virtute motionis divinae. Secundo, ratione speciali, propter conditionem status humanae naturae. Quae quidem licet per gratiam sanetur quantum ad mentem, remanet tamen in ea corruptio et infectio quantum ad carnem, per quam servit legi peccati, ut dicitur ad Rom. VII. Remanet etiam quaedam ignorantiae obscuritas in intellectu, secundum quam, ut etiam dicitur Rom. VIII, *quid oremus sicut oportet, nescimus*. Propter varios enim rerum eventus, et quia etiam nosipsos non perfecte cognoscimus, non possumus ad plenum scire quid nobis expediat; secundum illud Sap. IX, *cogitationes mortalium timidae, et incertae providentiae nostrae*. Et ideo necesse est nobis ut a Deo dirigamur et protegamur, qui omnia novit et omnia potest. Et propter hoc etiam renatis in filios Dei per gratiam, convenit dicere, *et ne nos inducas in tentationem, et, fiat voluntas tua sicut in caelo et in terra*, et cetera quae in oratione dominica continentur ad hoc pertinentia.

Reply to Objection 1: The gift of habitual grace is not therefore given to us that we may no longer need the Divine help; for every creature needs to be preserved in the good received from Him. Hence if after having received grace man still needs the Divine help, it cannot be concluded that grace is given to no purpose, or that it is imperfect, since man will need the Divine help even in the state of glory, when grace shall be fully perfected. But here grace is to some extent imperfect, inasmuch as it does not completely heal man, as stated above.

[38433] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 9 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod donum habitualis gratiae non ad hoc datur nobis ut per ipsum non indigeamus ulterius divino auxilio, indiget enim quaelibet creatura ut a Deo conservetur in bono quod ab ipso accepit. Et ideo si post acceptam gratiam homo adhuc indiget divino auxilio, non potest concludi quod gratia sit in vacuum data, vel quod sit imperfecta. Quia etiam in statu gloriae, quando gratia erit omnino perfecta, homo divino auxilio indigebit. Hic autem aliqualiter gratia imperfecta est, inquantum hominem non totaliter sanat, ut dictum est.

Reply to Objection 2: The operation of the Holy Ghost, which moves and protects, is not circumscribed by the effect of habitual grace which it causes in us; but beyond this effect He, together with the Father and the Son, moves and protects us.

[38434] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 9 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod operatio spiritus sancti qua nos movet et protegit, non circumscribitur per effectum habitualis doni quod in nobis causat; sed praeter hunc effectum nos movet et protegit, simul cum patre et filio.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument merely proves that man needs no further habitual grace.

[38435] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 9 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa concludit quod homo non indigeat alia habituali gratia.

Q. 109. A. 10. Whether man possessed of grace needs the help of grace in order to persevere?

Objection 1: It would seem that man possessed of grace needs no help to persevere. For perseverance is something less than virtue, even as continence is, as is clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7,9). Now since man is justified by grace, he needs no further help of grace in order to have the virtues. Much less, therefore, does he need the help of grace to have perseverance.

[38436] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 10 arg. 1 Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo in gratia constitutus non indigeat auxilio gratiae ad perseverandum. Perseverantia enim est aliquid minus virtute, sicut et continentia, ut patet per philosophum in VII Ethic. Sed homo non indiget alio auxilio gratiae ad habendum virtutes, ex quo est iustificatus per gratiam. Ergo multo minus indiget auxilio gratiae ad habendum perseverantiam.

Objection 2: Further, all the virtues are infused at once. But perseverance is put down as a virtue. Hence it seems that, together with grace, perseverance is given to the other infused virtues.

[38437] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 10 arg. 2 Praeterea, omnes virtutes simul infunduntur. Sed perseverantia ponitur quaedam virtus. Ergo videtur quod, simul cum gratia infusis aliis virtutibus, perseverantia detur.

Objection 3: Further, as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:20) more was restored to man by Christ's gift, than he had lost by Adam's sin. But Adam received what enabled him to persevere; and thus man does not need grace in order to persevere.

[38438] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 10 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut apostolus dicit, ad Rom. V, plus restitutum est homini per donum Christi, quam amiserit per peccatum Adae. Sed Adam accepit unde posset perseverare. Ergo multo magis nobis restituitur per gratiam Christi ut perseverare possimus. Et ita homo non indiget gratia ad perseverandum.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Persev. ii): "Why is perseverance besought of God, if it is not bestowed by God? For is it not a mocking request to seek what we know He does not give, and what is in our power without His giving it?" Now perseverance is besought by even those who are hallowed by grace; and this is seen, when we say "Hallowed be Thy name," which Augustine confirms by the words of Cyprian (De Correp. et Grat. xii). Hence man, even when possessed of

[38439] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 10 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de perseverantia, *cur perseverantia poscitur a Deo, si non datur a Deo? An et ista irrisoria petitio est, cum id ab eo petitur quod scitur non ipsum dare, sed, ipso non dante, esse in hominis potestate?* Sed perseverantia petitur etiam ab illis qui sunt per gratiam sanctificati, quod intelligitur cum dicimus, sanctificetur nomen tuum, ut ibidem Augustinus confirmat per verba Cypriani. Ergo

grace, needs perseverance to be given to him by God.

homo etiam in gratia constitutus, indiget ut ei perseverantia a Deo detur.

I answer that, Perseverance is taken in three ways. First, to signify a habit of the mind whereby a man stands steadfastly, lest he be moved by the assault of sadness from what is virtuous. And thus perseverance is to sadness as continence is to concupiscence and pleasure, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7). Secondly, perseverance may be called a habit, whereby a man has the purpose of persevering in good unto the end. And in both these ways perseverance is infused together with grace, even as continence and the other virtues are. Thirdly, perseverance is called the abiding in good to the end of life. And in order to have this perseverance man does not, indeed, need another habitual grace, but he needs the Divine assistance guiding and guarding him against the attacks of the passions, as appears from the preceding article. And hence after anyone has been justified by grace, he still needs to beseech God for the aforesaid gift of perseverance, that he may be kept from evil till the end of his life. For to many grace is given to whom perseverance in grace is not given.

[38440] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 10 co. Respondeo dicendum quod perseverantia tripliciter dicitur. Quandoque enim significat habitum mentis per quem homo firmiter stat, ne removeatur ab eo quod est secundum virtutem, per tristitias irruentes, ut sic se habeat perseverantia ad tristitias sicut continentia ad concupiscentias et delectationes ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic. Alio modo potest dici perseverantia habitus quidam secundum quem habet homo propositum perseverandi in bono usque in finem. Et utroque istorum modorum, perseverantia simul cum gratia infunditur sicut et continentia et ceterae virtutes. Alio modo dicitur perseverantia continuatio quaedam boni usque ad finem vitae. Et ad talem perseverantiam habendam homo in gratia constitutus non quidem indiget aliqua alia habituali gratia, sed divino auxilio ipsum dirigente et protegente contra tentationum impulsus, sicut ex praecedenti quaestione apparet. Et ideo postquam aliquis est iustificatus per gratiam, necesse habet a Deo petere praedictum perseverantiae donum, ut scilicet custodiatur a malo usque ad finem vitae. Multis enim datur gratia, quibus non datur perseverare in gratia.

Reply to Objection 1: This objection regards the first mode of perseverance, as the second objection regards the second.

[38441] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 10 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de primo modo perseverantiae, sicut et secunda obiectio procedit de secundo.

Hence the solution of the second objection is clear.

[38442] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 10 ad 2 Unde patet solutio ad secundum.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia xliii) [*Cf. De Correp. et Grat. xii]: "in the original state man received a gift whereby he could persevere, but to persevere was not given him. But now, by the grace of Christ, many receive both the gift of grace whereby they may persevere, and the further gift of persevering," and thus Christ's gift is greater than Adam's fault. Nevertheless it was easier for man to persevere, with the gift of grace in the state of innocence in which the flesh was not rebellious against the spirit, than it is now. For the

[38443] Iª-IIae q. 109 a. 10 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura et gratia, *homo in primo statu accepit donum per quod perseverare posset, non autem accepit ut perseveraret. Nunc autem per gratiam Christi multi accipiunt et donum gratiae quo perseverare possunt, et ulterius eis datur quod perseverent*. Et sic donum Christi est maius quam delictum Adae. Et tamen facilius homo per gratiae donum perseverare poterat in statu innocentiae, in quo nulla erat rebellio carnis ad spiritum, quam nunc possumus, quando reparatio gratiae Christi,

restoration by Christ's grace, although it is already begun in the mind, is not yet completed in the flesh, as it will be in heaven, where man will not merely be able to persevere but will be unable to sin.

etsi sit inchoata quantum ad mentem, nondum tamen est consummata quantum ad carnem. Quod erit in patria, ubi homo non solum perseverare poterit, sed etiam peccare non poterit.

Q. 110. OF THE GRACE OF GOD AS REGARDS ITS ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the grace of God as regards its essence; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether grace implies something in the soul?

(2) Whether grace is a quality?

(3) Whether grace differs from infused virtue?

(4) Of the subject of grace.

[38444] Iª-IIae q. 110 pr. Deinde considerandum est de gratia Dei quantum ad eius essentiam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum gratia ponat aliquid in anima. Secundo, utrum gratia sit qualitas. Tertio, utrum gratia differat a virtute infusa. Quarto, de subiecto gratiae.

Q. 110. A. 1. Whether grace implies anything in the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that grace does not imply anything in the soul. For man is said to have the grace of God even as the grace of man. Hence it is written (Gn. 39:21) that the Lord gave to Joseph "grace [Douay: 'favor'] in the sight of the chief keeper of the prison." Now when we say that a man has the favor of another, nothing is implied in him who has the favor of the other, but an acceptance is implied in him whose favor he has. Hence when we say that a man has the grace of God, nothing is implied in his soul; but we merely signify the Divine acceptance.

[38445] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gratia non ponat aliquid in anima. Sicut enim homo dicitur habere gratiam Dei, ita etiam gratiam hominis, unde dicitur Gen. XXXIX, quod *dominus dedit Ioseph gratiam in conspectu principis carceris*. Sed per hoc quod homo dicitur habere gratiam hominis, nihil ponitur in eo qui gratiam alterius habet; sed in eo cuius gratiam habet, ponitur acceptatio quaedam. Ergo per hoc quod homo dicitur gratiam Dei habere, nihil ponitur in anima, sed solum significatur acceptatio divina.

Objection 2: Further, as the soul quickens the body so does God quicken the soul; hence it is written (Dt. 30:20): "He is thy life." Now the soul quickens the body immediately. Therefore nothing can come as a medium between God and the soul. Hence grace implies nothing created in the soul.

[38446] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut anima vivificat corpus, ita Deus vivificat animam, unde dicitur Deut. XXX, ipse est vita tua. Sed anima vivificat corpus immediate. Ergo etiam nihil cadit medium inter Deum et animam. Non ergo gratia ponit aliquid creatum in anima.

Objection 3: Further, on Rom. 1:7, "Grace to you and peace," the gloss says: "Grace, i.e. the remission of sins." Now the remission of sin implies nothing in the soul, but only in God, Who does not impute the sin, according to Ps. 31:2: "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin." Hence neither does grace imply anything in the soul.

[38447] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, ad Rom. I, super illud, *gratia vobis et pax*, dicit Glossa. Gratia, idest remissio peccatorum, sed remissio peccatorum non ponit in anima aliquid, sed solum in Deo, non imputando peccatum; secundum illud Psalmi XXXI, *beatus vir cui non imputavit dominus peccatum*. Ergo nec gratia ponit aliquid in anima.

On the contrary, Light implies something in what is enlightened. But grace is a light of the soul; hence Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia xxii): "The light of truth rightly deserts the

[38448] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, lux ponit aliquid in illuminato. Sed gratia est quaedam lux animae, unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura et gratia, *praevaricatorem legis*

prevaricator of the law, and those who have been thus deserted become blind." Therefore grace implies something in the soul.

digne lux deserit veritatis, qua desertus utique fit caecus. Ergo gratia ponit aliquid in anima.

I answer that, According to the common manner of speech, grace is usually taken in three ways. First, for anyone's love, as we are accustomed to say that the soldier is in the good graces of the king, i.e. the king looks on him with favor. Secondly, it is taken for any gift freely bestowed, as we are accustomed to say: I do you this act of grace. Thirdly, it is taken for the recompense of a gift given "gratis," inasmuch as we are said to be "grateful" for benefits. Of these three the second depends on the first, since one bestows something on another "gratis" from the love wherewith he receives him into his good "graces." And from the second proceeds the third, since from benefits bestowed "gratis" arises "gratitude."

[38449] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod secundum communem modum loquendi, gratia tripliciter accipi consuevit. Uno modo, pro dilectione alicuius, sicut consuevimus dicere quod iste miles habet gratiam regis, idest, rex habet eum gratum. Secundo sumitur pro aliquo dono gratis dato, sicut consuevimus dicere, hanc gratiam facio tibi. Tertio modo sumitur pro recompensatione beneficii gratis dati, secundum quod dicimur agere gratias beneficiorum. Quorum trium secundum dependet ex primo, ex amore enim quo aliquis alium gratum habet, procedit quod aliquid ei gratis impendat. Ex secundo autem procedit tertium, quia ex beneficiis gratis exhibitis gratiarum actio consurgit. Quantum igitur ad duo ultima, manifestum est quod gratia aliquid ponit in eo qui gratiam accipit, primo quidem, ipsum donum gratis datum; secundo, huius doni recognitionem. Sed quantum ad primum, est differentia attendenda circa gratiam Dei et gratiam hominis. Quia enim bonum creaturae provenit ex voluntate divina, ideo ex dilectione Dei qua vult creaturae bonum, profluit aliquod bonum in creatura. Voluntas autem hominis movetur ex bono praeexistente in rebus, et inde est quod dilectio hominis non causat totaliter rei bonitatem, sed praesupponit ipsam vel in parte vel in toto. Patet igitur quod quamlibet Dei dilectionem sequitur aliquod bonum in creatura causatum quandoque, non tamen dilectioni aeternae coaeternum. Et secundum huiusmodi boni differentiam, differens consideratur dilectio Dei ad creaturam. Una quidem communis, secundum quam diligit omnia quae sunt, ut dicitur Sap. XI; secundum quam esse naturale rebus creatis largitur. Alia autem est dilectio specialis, secundum quam trahit creaturam rationalem supra conditionem naturae, ad participationem divini boni. Et secundum hanc dilectionem dicitur aliquem diligere simpliciter, quia secundum hanc dilectionem vult Deus simpliciter creaturae bonum aeternum, quod est ipse. Sic igitur per hoc quod dicitur homo gratiam Dei habere, significatur quiddam supernaturale in homine a Deo proveniens. Quandoque tamen gratia Dei dicitur ipsa aeterna Dei dilectio, secundum quod dicitur etiam gratia

Now as regards the last two, it is clear that grace implies something in him who receives grace: first, the gift given gratis; secondly, the acknowledgment of the gift. But as regards the first, a difference must be noted between the grace of God and the grace of man; for since the creature's good springs from the Divine will, some good in the creature flows from God's love, whereby He wishes the good of the creature. On the other hand, the will of man is moved by the good pre-existing in things; and hence man's love does not wholly cause the good of the thing, but pre-supposes it either in part or wholly. Therefore it is clear that every love of God is followed at some time by a good caused in the creature, but not co-eternal with the eternal love. And according to this difference of good the love of God to the creature is looked at differently. For one is common, whereby He loves "all things that are" (Wis. 11:25), and thereby gives things their natural being. But the second is a special love, whereby He draws the rational creature above the condition of its nature to a participation of the Divine good; and according to this love He is said to love anyone simply, since it is by this love that God simply wishes the eternal good, which is Himself, for the creature.

Accordingly when a man is said to have the grace of God, there is signified something bestowed on man by God. Nevertheless the grace of God

sometimes signifies God's eternal love, as we say the grace of predestination, inasmuch as God gratuitously and not from merits predestines or elects some; for it is written (Eph. 1:5): "He hath predestinated us into the adoption of children . . . unto the praise of the glory of His grace."

praedestinationis, inquantum Deus gratuito, et non ex meritis, aliquos praedestinavit sive elegit; dicitur enim ad Ephes. I, *praedestinavit nos in adoptionem filiorum, in laudem gloriae gratiae suae*.

Reply to Objection 1: Even when a man is said to be in another's good graces, it is understood that there is something in him pleasing to the other; even as anyone is said to have God's grace---with this difference, that what is pleasing to a man in another is presupposed to his love, but whatever is pleasing to God in a man is caused by the Divine love, as was said above.

[38450] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod etiam in hoc quod dicitur aliquis habere gratiam hominis, intelligitur in aliquo esse aliquid quod sit homini gratum, sicut et in hoc quod dicitur aliquis gratiam Dei habere; sed differenter. Nam illud quod est homini gratum in alio homine, praesupponitur eius dilectioni, causatur autem ex dilectione divina quod est in homine Deo gratum, ut dictum est.

Reply to Objection 2: God is the life of the soul after the manner of an efficient cause; but the soul is the life of the body after the manner of a formal cause. Now there is no medium between form and matter, since the form, of itself, "informs" the matter or subject; whereas the agent "informs" the subject, not by its substance, but by the form, which it causes in the matter.

[38451] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus est vita animae per modum causae efficientis, sed anima est vita corporis per modum causae formalis inter formam autem et materiam non cadit aliquod medium, quia forma per seipsam informat materiam vel subiectum. Sed agens informat subiectum non per suam substantiam, sed per formam quam in materia causat.

Reply to Objection 3: Augustine says (Retract. i, 25): "When I said that grace was for the remission of sins, and peace for our reconciliation with God, you must not take it to mean that peace and reconciliation do not pertain to general peace, but that the special name of grace signifies the remission of sins." Not only grace, therefore, but many other of God's gifts pertain to grace. And hence the remission of sins does not take place without some effect divinely caused in us, as will appear later (Q[113], A[2]).

[38452] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Augustinus dicit, in libro Retract., *ubi dixi gratiam esse remissionem peccatorum, pacem vero in reconciliatione Dei, non sic accipiendum est ac si pax ipsa et reconciliatio non pertineant ad gratiam generalem; sed quod specialiter nomine gratiae remissionem significaverit peccatorum*. Non ergo sola remissio peccatorum ad gratiam pertinet, sed etiam multa alia Dei dona. Et etiam remissio peccatorum non fit sine aliquo effectu divinitus in nobis causato, ut infra patebit.

Q. 110. A. 2. Whether grace is a quality of the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not a quality of the soul. For no quality acts on its subject, since the action of a quality is not without the action of its subject, and thus the subject would necessarily act upon itself. But grace acts upon the soul, by justifying it. Therefore grace is not a quality.

[38453] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gratia non sit qualitas animae. Nulla enim qualitas agit in suum subiectum, quia actio qualitatis non est absque actione subiecti, et sic oporteret quod subiectum ageret in seipsum. Sed gratia agit in animam, iustificando ipsam. Ergo gratia non est qualitas.

Objection 2: Furthermore, substance is nobler than quality. But grace is nobler than the nature of the soul, since we can do many things by grace, to which nature is not equal, as stated above (Q[109], AA[1],2,3). Therefore grace is not a quality.

[38454] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, substantia est nobilior qualitate. Sed gratia est nobilior quam natura animae, multa enim possumus per gratiam ad quae natura non sufficit, ut supra dictum est. Ergo gratia non est qualitas.

Objection 3: Furthermore, no quality remains after it has ceased to be in its subject. But grace remains; since it is not corrupted, for thus it would be reduced to nothing, since it was created from nothing; hence it is called a "new creature"(Gal. 6:15).

[38455] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, nulla qualitas remanet postquam desinit esse in subiecto. Sed gratia remanet. Non enim corrumpitur, quia sic in nihilum redigeretur, sicut ex nihilo creatur, unde et dicitur nova creatura, ad Gal. ult. Ergo gratia non est qualitas.

On the contrary, on Ps. 103:15: "That he may make the face cheerful with oil"; the gloss says: "Grace is a certain beauty of soul, which wins the Divine love." But beauty of soul is a quality, even as beauty of body. Therefore grace is a quality.

[38456] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod, super illud Psalmi CIII, *ut exhilaret faciem in oleo*, dicit Glossa quod *gratia est nitor animae, sanctum concilians amorem*. Sed nitor animae est quaedam qualitas, sicut et pulchritudo corporis. Ergo gratia est quaedam qualitas.

I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), there is understood to be an effect of God's gratuitous will in whoever is said to have God's grace. Now it was stated (Q[109], A[1]) that man is aided by God's gratuitous will in two ways: first, inasmuch as man's soul is moved by God to know or will or do something, and in this way the gratuitous effect in man is not a quality, but a movement of the soul; for "motion is the act of the mover in the moved." Secondly, man is helped by God's gratuitous will, inasmuch as a habitual gift is infused by God into the soul; and for this reason, that it is not fitting that God should provide less for those He loves, that they may acquire supernatural good, than for creatures, whom He loves that they may acquire natural good. Now He so provides for natural creatures, that not merely does He move them to their natural acts, but He bestows upon them certain forms and powers, which are the principles of acts, in order that they may of themselves be inclined to these movements, and thus the movements whereby they are moved by God become natural and easy to creatures, according to Wis. 8:1: "she . . . ordereth all things sweetly." Much more therefore does He infuse into such as He moves towards the acquisition of supernatural good, certain forms or supernatural qualities, whereby they may be moved by Him sweetly and promptly to acquire

[38457] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, in eo qui dicitur gratiam Dei habere, significatur esse quidam effectus gratuitae Dei voluntatis. Dictum est autem supra quod dupliciter ex gratuita Dei voluntate homo adiuvatur. Uno modo, inquantum anima hominis movetur a Deo ad aliquid cognoscendum vel volendum vel agendum. Et hoc modo ipse gratuitus effectus in homine non est qualitas, sed motus quidam animae, actus enim moventis in moto est motus, ut dicitur in III Physic. Alio modo adiuvatur homo ex gratuita Dei voluntate, secundum quod aliquod habituale donum a Deo animae infunditur. Et hoc ideo, quia non est conveniens quod Deus minus provideat his quos diligit ad supernaturale bonum habendum, quam creaturis quas diligit ad bonum naturale habendum. Creaturis autem naturalibus sic providet ut non solum moveat eas ad actus naturales, sed etiam largiatur eis formas et virtutes quasdam, quae sunt principia actuum, ut secundum seipsas inclinentur ad huiusmodi motus. Et sic motus quibus a Deo moventur, fiunt creaturis connaturales et faciles; secundum illud Sap. VIII, et disponit omnia suaviter. Multo igitur magis illis quos movet ad consequendum bonum supernaturale aeternum, infundit aliquas formas seu qualitates supernaturales, secundum quas suaviter et prompte ab ipso moveantur ad bonum

eternal good; and thus the gift of grace is a quality.

aeternum consequendum. Et sic donum gratiae qualitas quaedam est.

Reply to Objection 1: Grace, as a quality, is said to act upon the soul, not after the manner of an efficient cause, but after the manner of a formal cause, as whiteness makes a thing white, and justice, just.

[38458] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod gratia, secundum quod est qualitas, dicitur agere in animam non per modum causae efficientis, sed per modum causae formalis, sicut albedo facit album, et iustitia iustum.

Reply to Objection 2: Every substance is either the nature of the thing whereof it is the substance or is a part of the nature, even as matter and form are called substance. And because grace is above human nature, it cannot be a substance or a substantial form, but is an accidental form of the soul. Now what is substantially in God, becomes accidental in the soul participating the Divine goodness, as is clear in the case of knowledge. And thus because the soul participates in the Divine goodness imperfectly, the participation of the Divine goodness, which is grace, has its being in the soul in a less perfect way than the soul subsists in itself. Nevertheless, inasmuch as it is the expression or participation of the Divine goodness, it is nobler than the nature of the soul, though not in its mode of being.

[38459] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod omnis substantia vel est ipsa natura rei cuius est substantia, vel est pars naturae, secundum quem modum materia vel forma substantia dicitur. Et quia gratia est supra naturam humanam, non potest esse quod sit substantia aut forma substantialis, sed est forma accidentalis ipsius animae. Id enim quod substantialiter est in Deo, accidentaliter fit in anima participante divinam bonitatem, ut de scientia patet. Secundum hoc ergo, quia anima imperfecte participat divinam bonitatem, ipsa participatio divinae bonitatis quae est gratia, imperfectiori modo habet esse in anima quam anima in seipsa subsistat. Est tamen nobilior quam natura animae, inquantum est expressio vel participatio divinae bonitatis, non autem quantum ad modum essendi.

Reply to Objection 3: As Boethius [*Pseudo-Bede, Sent. Phil. ex Artist] says, the "being of an accident is to inhere." Hence no accident is called being as if it had being, but because by it something is; hence it is said to belong to a being rather to be a being (Metaph. vii, text. 2). And because to become and to be corrupted belong to what is, properly speaking, no accident comes into being or is corrupted, but is said to come into being and to be corrupted inasmuch as its subject begins or ceases to be in act with this accident. And thus grace is said to be created inasmuch as men are created with reference to it, i.e. are given a new being out of nothing, i.e. not from merits, according to Eph. 2:10, "created in Jesus Christ in good works."

[38460] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dicit Boetius, accidentis esse est inesse. Unde omne accidens non dicitur ens quasi ipsum esse habeat, sed quia eo aliquid est, unde et magis dicitur esse entis quam ens, ut dicitur in VII Metaphys. Et quia eius est fieri vel corrumpi cuius est esse, ideo, proprie loquendo, nullum accidens neque fit neque corrumpitur, sed dicitur fieri vel corrumpi, secundum quod subiectum incipit vel desinit esse in actu secundum illud accidens. Et secundum hoc etiam gratia dicitur creari, ex eo quod homines secundum ipsam creantur, idest in novo esse constituuntur, ex nihilo, idest non ex meritis; secundum illud ad Ephes. II, *creati in Christo Iesu in operibus bonis*.

Q. 110. A. 3. Whether grace is the same as virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that grace is the same

[38461] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic

as virtue. For Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xiv) that "operating grace is faith that worketh by charity." But faith that worketh by charity is a virtue. Therefore grace is a virtue.

proceditur. Videtur quod gratia sit idem quod virtus. Dicit enim Augustinus quod *gratia operans est fides quae per dilectionem operatur*; ut habetur in libro de spiritu et littera. Sed fides quae per dilectionem operatur, est virtus. Ergo gratia est virtus.

Objection 2: Further, what fits the definition, fits the defined. But the definitions of virtue given by saints and philosophers fit grace, since "it makes its subject good, and his work good," and "it is a good quality of the mind, whereby we live righteously," etc. Therefore grace is virtue.

[38462] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, cuicumque convenit definitio, et definitum. Sed definitiones de virtute datae sive a sanctis sive a philosophis, conveniunt gratiae, ipsa enim bonum facit habentem et opus eius bonum reddit; ipsa etiam est bona qualitas mentis qua recte vivitur, et cetera. Ergo gratia est virtus.

Objection 3: Further, grace is a quality. Now it is clearly not in the "fourth" species of quality; viz. "form" which is the "abiding figure of things," since it does not belong to bodies. Nor is it in the "third," since it is not a "passion nor a passion-like quality," which is in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in Physic. viii; and grace is principally in the mind. Nor is it in the "second" species, which is "natural power" or "impotence"; since grace is above nature and does not regard good and evil, as does natural power. Therefore it must be in the "first" species which is "habit" or "disposition." Now habits of the mind are virtues; since even knowledge itself is a virtue after a manner, as stated above (Q[57], AA[1],2). Therefore grace is the same as virtue.

[38463] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, gratia est qualitas quaedam. Sed manifestum est quod non est in quarta specie qualitatis, quae est forma et circa aliquid constans figura, quia non pertinet ad corpus. Neque etiam in tertia est, quia non est passio vel passibilis qualitas, quae est in parte animae sensitiva, ut probatur in VII Physic.; ipsa autem gratia principaliter est in mente. Neque iterum est in secunda specie, quae est potentia vel impotentia naturalis, quia gratia est supra naturam; et non se habet ad bonum et malum, sicut potentia naturalis. Ergo relinquitur quod sit in prima specie, quae est habitus vel dispositio. Habitus autem mentis sunt virtutes, quia etiam ipsa scientia quodammodo est virtus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo gratia est idem quod virtus.

On the contrary, If grace is a virtue, it would seem before all to be one of the three theological virtues. But grace is neither faith nor hope, for these can be without sanctifying grace. Nor is it charity, since "grace foreruns charity," as Augustine says in his book on the Predestination of the Saints (De Dono Persev. xvi). Therefore grace is not virtue.

[38464] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, si gratia est virtus, maxime videtur quod sit aliqua trium theologicarum virtutum. Sed gratia non est fides vel spes, quia haec possunt esse sine gratia gratum faciente. Neque etiam caritas, quia gratia praevenit caritatem, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Praedest. sanctorum. Ergo gratia non est virtus.

I answer that, Some held that grace and virtue were identical in essence, and differed only logically---in the sense that we speak of grace inasmuch as it makes man pleasing to God, or is given gratuitously---and of virtue inasmuch as it empowers us to act rightly. And the Master seems to have thought this (Sent. ii, D 27).

[38465] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt idem esse gratiam et virtutem secundum essentiam, sed differre solum secundum rationem, ut gratia dicatur secundum quod facit hominem Deo gratum, vel secundum quod gratis datur; virtus autem, secundum quod perficit ad bene operandum. Et hoc videtur sensisse Magister, in II

But if anyone rightly considers the nature of virtue, this cannot hold, since, as the Philosopher says (Physic. vii, text. 17), "virtue is disposition of what is perfect---and I call perfect what is disposed according to its nature." Now from this it is clear that the virtue of a thing has reference to some pre-existing nature, from the fact that everything is disposed with reference to what befits its nature. But it is manifest that the virtues acquired by human acts of which we spoke above (Q[55], seqq.) are dispositions, whereby a man is fittingly disposed with reference to the nature whereby he is a man; whereas infused virtues dispose man in a higher manner and towards a higher end, and consequently in relation to some higher nature, i.e. in relation to a participation of the Divine Nature, according to 2 Pet. 1:4: "He hath given us most great and most precious promises; that by these you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature." And it is in respect of receiving this nature that we are said to be born again sons of God.

Sent. Sed si quis recte consideret rationem virtutis, hoc stare non potest. Quia ut philosophus dicit, in VII Physic., *virtus est quaedam dispositio perfecti, dico autem perfectum, quod est dispositum secundum naturam*. Ex quo patet quod virtus uniuscuiusque rei dicitur in ordine ad aliquam naturam praeexistentem, quando scilicet unumquodque sic est dispositum, secundum quod congruit suae naturae. Manifestum est autem quod virtutes acquisitae per actus humanos, de quibus supra dictum est, sunt dispositiones quibus homo convenienter disponitur in ordine ad naturam qua homo est. Virtutes autem infusae disponunt hominem altiori modo, et ad altiorem finem, unde etiam oportet quod in ordine ad aliquam altiorem naturam. Hoc autem est in ordine ad naturam divinam participatam; secundum quod dicitur II Petr. I, *maxima et pretiosa nobis promissa donavit, ut per haec efficiamini divinae consortes naturae*. Et secundum acceptionem huius naturae, dicimur regenerari in filios Dei. Sicut igitur lumen naturale rationis est aliquid praeter virtutes acquisitas, quae dicuntur in ordine ad ipsum lumen naturale; ita etiam ipsum lumen gratiae, quod est participatio divinae naturae, est aliquid praeter virtutes infusas, quae a lumine illo derivantur, et ad illud lumen ordinantur. Unde et apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. V, *eratis aliquando tenebrae, nunc autem lux in domino, ut filii lucis ambulate*. Sicut enim virtutes acquisitae perficiunt hominem ad ambulandum congruenter lumini naturali rationis; ita virtutes infusae perficiunt hominem ad ambulandum congruenter lumini gratiae.

And thus, even as the natural light of reason is something besides the acquired virtues, which are ordained to this natural light, so also the light of grace which is a participation of the Divine Nature is something besides the infused virtues which are derived from and are ordained to this light, hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:8): "For you were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord. Walk then as children of the light." For as the acquired virtues enable a man to walk, in accordance with the natural light of reason, so do the infused virtues enable a man to walk as befits the light of grace.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine calls "faith that worketh by charity" grace, since the act of faith of him that worketh by charity is the first act by which sanctifying grace is manifested.

[38466] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus nominat fidem per dilectionem operantem gratiam, quia actus fidei per dilectionem operantis est primus actus in quo gratia gratum faciens manifestatur.

Reply to Objection 2: Good is placed in the definition of virtue with reference to its fitness with some pre-existing nature essential or participated. Now good is not attributed to grace in this manner, but as to the root of goodness in man, as stated above.

[38467] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum positum in definitione virtutis, dicitur secundum convenientiam ad aliquam naturam praeexistentem, vel essentialem vel participatam. Sic autem bonum non attribuitur gratiae, sed sicut radici bonitatis in homine, ut dictum est.

Reply to Objection 3: Grace is reduced to the first species of quality; and yet it is not the same as virtue, but is a certain disposition which is presupposed to the infused virtues, as their principle and root.

[38468] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod gratia reducitur ad primam speciem qualitatis. Nec tamen est idem quod virtus, sed habitudo quaedam quae praesupponitur virtutibus infusis, sicut earum principium et radix.

Q. 110. A. 4. Whether grace is in the essence of the soul as in a subject, or in one of the powers?

Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not in the essence of the soul, as in a subject, but in one of the powers. For Augustine says (Hypognosticon iii [*Among the spurious works of St. Augustine]) that grace is related to the will or to the free will "as a rider to his horse." Now the will or the free will is a power, as stated above (FP, Q[83], A[2]). Hence grace is in a power of the soul, as in a subject.

[38469] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gratia non sit in essentia animae sicut in subiecto, sed in aliqua potentiarum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in Hypognost., quod gratia comparatur ad voluntatem, sive ad liberum arbitrium, sicut sessor ad equum. Sed voluntas, sive liberum arbitrium, est potentia quaedam, ut in primo dictum est. Ergo gratia est in potentia animae sicut in subiecto.

Objection 2: Further, "Man's merit springs from grace" as Augustine says (De Gratia et Lib. Arbit. vi). Now merit consists in acts, which proceed from a power. Hence it seems that grace is a perfection of a power of the soul.

[38470] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, ex gratia incipiunt merita hominis, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed meritum consistit in actu, qui ex aliqua potentia procedit. Ergo videtur quod gratia sit perfectio alicuius potentiae animae.

Objection 3: Further, if the essence of the soul is the proper subject of grace, the soul, inasmuch as it has an essence, must be capable of grace. But this is false; since it would follow that every soul would be capable of grace. Therefore the essence of the soul is not the proper subject of grace.

[38471] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, si essentia animae sit proprium subiectum gratiae, oportet quod anima inquantum habet essentiam, sit capax gratiae. Sed hoc est falsum, quia sic sequeretur quod omnis anima esset gratiae capax. Non ergo essentia animae est proprium subiectum gratiae.

Objection 4: Further, the essence of the soul is prior to its powers. Now what is prior may be understood without what is posterior. Hence it follows that grace may be taken to be in the soul, although we suppose no part or power of the soul---viz. neither the will, nor the intellect, nor anything else; which is impossible.

[38472] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, essentia animae est prior potentiis eius. Prius autem potest intelligi sine posteriori. Ergo sequetur quod gratia possit intelligi in anima, nulla parte vel potentia animae intellecta, scilicet neque voluntate neque intellectu neque aliquo huiusmodi. Quod est inconveniens.

On the contrary, By grace we are born again sons of God. But generation terminates at the essence prior to the powers. Therefore grace is in the soul's essence prior to being in the powers.

[38473] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod per gratiam regeneramur in filios Dei. Sed generatio per prius terminatur ad essentiam quam ad potentias. Ergo gratia per prius est in essentia animae quam in potentiis.

I answer that, This question depends on the

[38474] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 4 co. Respondeo

preceding. For if grace is the same as virtue, it must necessarily be in the powers of the soul as in a subject; since the soul's powers are the proper subject of virtue, as stated above (Q[56], A[1]). But if grace differs from virtue, it cannot be said that a power of the soul is the subject of grace, since every perfection of the soul's powers has the nature of virtue, as stated above (Q[55], A[1]; Q[56], A[1]). Hence it remains that grace, as it is prior to virtue, has a subject prior to the powers of the soul, so that it is in the essence of the soul. For as man in his intellective powers participates in the Divine knowledge through the virtue of faith, and in his power of will participates in the Divine love through the virtue of charity, so also in the nature of the soul does he participate in the Divine Nature, after the manner of a likeness, through a certain regeneration or re-creation.

dicendum quod ista quaestio ex praecedenti dependet. Si enim gratia sit idem quod virtus, necesse est quod sit in potentia animae sicut in subiecto, nam potentia animae est proprium subiectum virtutis, ut supra dictum est. Si autem gratia differt a virtute, non potest dici quod potentia animae sit gratiae subiectum, quia omnis perfectio potentiae animae habet rationem virtutis, ut supra dictum est. Unde relinquitur quod gratia, sicut est prius virtute, ita habeat subiectum prius potentiis animae, ita scilicet quod sit in essentia animae. Sicut enim per potentiam intellectivam homo participat cognitionem divinam per virtutem fidei; et secundum potentiam voluntatis amorem divinum, per virtutem caritatis; ita etiam per naturam animae participat, secundum quandam similitudinem, naturam divinam, per quandam regenerationem sive recreationem.

Reply to Objection 1: As from the essence of the soul flows its powers, which are the principles of deeds, so likewise the virtues, whereby the powers are moved to act, flow into the powers of the soul from grace. And thus grace is compared to the will as the mover to the moved, which is the same comparison as that of a horseman to the horse---but not as an accident to a subject.

[38475] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut ab essentia animae effluunt eius potentiae, quae sunt operum principia; ita etiam ab ipsa gratia effluunt virtutes in potentias animae, per quas potentiae moventur ad actus. Et secundum hoc gratia comparatur ad voluntatem ut movens ad motum, quae est comparatio sessoris ad equum, non autem sicut accidens ad subiectum.

And thereby is made clear the Reply to the Second Objection. For grace is the principle of meritorious works through the medium of virtues, as the essence of the soul is the principal of vital deeds through the medium of the powers.

[38476] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 4 ad 2 Et per hoc etiam patet solutio ad secundum. Est enim gratia principium meritorii operis mediantibus virtutibus, sicut essentia animae est principium operum vitae mediantibus potentiis.

Reply to Objection 3: The soul is the subject of grace, as being in the species of intellectual or rational nature. But the soul is not classed in a species by any of its powers, since the powers are natural properties of the soul following upon the species. Hence the soul differs specifically in its essence from other souls, viz. of dumb animals, and of plants. Consequently it does not follow that, if the essence of the human soul is the subject of grace, every soul may be the subject of grace; since it belongs to the essence of the soul, inasmuch as it is of such a species.

[38477] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod anima est subiectum gratiae secundum quod est in specie intellectualis vel rationalis naturae. Non autem constituitur anima in specie per aliquam potentiam, cum potentiae sint proprietates naturales animae speciem consequentes. Et ideo anima secundum suam essentiam differt specie ab aliis animabus, scilicet brutorum animalium et plantarum. Et propter hoc, non sequitur, si essentia animae humanae sit subiectum gratiae, quod quaelibet anima possit esse gratiae subiectum, hoc enim convenit essentiae animae inquantum est talis speciei.

Reply to Objection 4: Since the powers of the soul are natural properties following upon the species, the soul cannot be without them. Yet, granted that it was without them, the soul would still be called intellectual or rational in its species, not that it would actually have these powers, but on account of the essence of such a species, from which these powers naturally flow.

[38478] Iª-IIae q. 110 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod, cum potentiae animae sint naturales proprietates speciem consequentes, anima non potest sine his esse. Dato autem quod sine his esset, adhuc tamen anima diceretur secundum speciem suam intellectualis vel rationalis, non quia actu haberet has potentias; sed propter speciem talis essentiae ex qua natae sunt huiusmodi potentiae effluere.

Q. 111. OF THE DIVISION OF GRACE (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the division of grace; under which head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether grace is fittingly divided into gratuitous grace and sanctifying grace?

(2) Of the division into operating and cooperating grace;

(3) Of the division of it into prevenient and subsequent grace;

(4) Of the division of gratuitous grace;

(5) Of the comparison between sanctifying and gratuitous grace.

[38479] Iª-IIae q. 111 pr. Deinde considerandum est de divisione gratiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum convenienter dividatur gratia per gratiam gratis datam et gratiam gratum facientem. Secundo, de divisione gratiae gratum facientis per operantem et cooperantem. Tertio, de divisione eiusdem per gratiam praevenientem et subsequentem. Quarto, de divisione gratiae gratis datae. Quinto, de comparatione gratiae gratum facientis et gratis datae.

Q. 111. A. 1. Whether grace is fittingly divided into sanctifying grace and gratuitous grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into sanctifying grace and gratuitous grace. For grace is a gift of God, as is clear from what has been already stated (Q[110], A[1]). But man is not therefore pleasing to God because something is given him by God, but rather on the contrary; since something is freely given by God, because man is pleasing to Him. Hence there is no sanctifying grace.

[38480] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gratia non convenienter dividatur per gratiam gratum facientem et gratiam gratis datam. Gratia enim est quoddam Dei donum, ut ex supradictis patet. Homo autem ideo non est Deo gratus quia aliquid est ei datum a Deo, sed potius e converso, ideo enim aliquid datur alicui gratis a Deo, quia est homo gratus ei. Ergo nulla est gratia gratum faciens.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is not given on account of preceding merits is given gratis. Now even natural good is given to man without preceding merit, since nature is presupposed to merit. Therefore nature itself is given gratuitously by God. But nature is condivided with grace. Therefore to be gratuitously given is not fittingly set down as a difference of grace, since it is found outside the genus of grace.

[38481] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, quaecumque non dantur ex meritis praecedentibus, dantur gratis. Sed etiam ipsum bonum naturae datur homini absque merito praecedenti, quia natura praesupponitur ad meritum. Ergo ipsa natura est etiam gratis data a Deo. Natura autem dividitur contra gratiam. Inconvenienter igitur hoc quod est gratis datum, ponitur ut gratiae differentia, quia invenitur etiam extra gratiae genus.

Objection 3: Further, members of a division are mutually opposed. But even sanctifying grace, whereby we are justified, is given to us gratuitously, according to Rom. 3:24: "Being justified freely [gratis] by His grace." Hence sanctifying grace ought not to be divided against gratuitous grace.

[38482] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, omnis divisio debet esse per opposita. Sed etiam ipsa gratia gratum faciens, per quam iustificamur, gratis nobis a Deo conceditur; secundum illud Rom. III, *iustificati gratis per gratiam ipsius*. Ergo gratia gratum faciens non debet dividi contra gratiam gratis datam.

On the contrary, The Apostle attributes both to grace, viz. to sanctify and to be gratuitously given. For with regard to the first he says (Eph. 1:6): "He hath graced us in His beloved son." And with regard to the second (Rom. 2:6): "And if by grace, it is not now by works, otherwise grace is no more grace." Therefore grace can be distinguished by its having one only or both.

[38483] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus utrumque attribuit gratiae, scilicet et gratum facere, et esse gratis datum. Dicit enim quantum ad primum, ad Ephes. I, *gratificavit nos in dilecto filio suo*. Quantum vero ad secundum, dicitur ad Rom. XI, *si autem gratia, iam non ex operibus, alioquin gratia iam non est gratia*. Potest ergo distingui gratia quae vel habet unum tantum, vel utrumque.

I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1), "those things that are of God are well ordered [Vulg.: 'those that are, are ordained by God]." Now the order of things consists in this, that things are led to God by other things, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). And hence since grace is ordained to lead men to God, this takes place in a certain order, so that some are led to God by others.

And thus there is a twofold grace: one whereby man himself is united to God, and this is called "sanctifying grace"; the other is that whereby one man cooperates with another in leading him to God, and this gift is called "gratuitous grace," since it is bestowed on a man beyond the capability of nature, and beyond the merit of the person. But whereas it is bestowed on a man, not to justify him, but rather that he may cooperate in the justification of another, it is not called sanctifying grace. And it is of this that the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:7): "And the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto utility," i.e. of others.

[38484] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, ad Rom. XIII, *quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt*. In hoc autem ordo rerum consistit, quod quaedam per alia in Deum reducuntur; ut Dionysius dicit, in Cael. Hier. Cum igitur gratia ad hoc ordinetur ut homo reducatur in Deum, ordine quodam hoc agitur, ut scilicet quidam per alios in Deum reducantur. Secundum hoc igitur duplex est gratia. Una quidem per quam ipse homo Deo coniungitur, quae vocatur gratia gratum faciens. Alia vero per quam unus homo cooperatur alteri ad hoc quod ad Deum reducatur. Huiusmodi autem donum vocatur gratia gratis data, quia supra facultatem naturae, et supra meritum personae, homini conceditur, sed quia non datur ad hoc ut homo ipse per eam iustificetur, sed potius ut ad iustificationem alterius cooperetur, ideo non vocatur gratum faciens. Et de hac dicit apostolus, I ad Cor. XII, *unicuique datur manifestatio spiritus ad utilitatem*, scilicet aliorum.

Reply to Objection 1: Grace is said to make pleasing, not efficiently but formally, i.e. because thereby a man is justified, and is made worthy to be called pleasing to God, according to Col. 1:21: "He hath made us worthy to be made partakers of the lot of the saints in light."

[38485] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod gratia non dicitur facere gratum effective, sed formaliter, scilicet quia per hanc homo iustificatur, et dignus efficitur vocari Deo gratus; secundum quod dicitur ad Coloss. I, *dignos nos fecit in partem sortis sanctorum in lumine*.

Reply to Objection 2: Grace, inasmuch as it is gratuitously given, excludes the notion of debt. Now debt may be taken in two ways: first, as arising from merit; and this regards the person whose it is to do meritorious works, according to Rom. 4:4: "Now to him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according

[38486] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod gratia, secundum quod gratis datur, excludit rationem debiti. Potest autem intelligi duplex debitum. Unum quidem ex merito proveniens, quod refertur ad personam, cuius est agere meritoria opera; secundum illud ad Rom. IV, *ei qui operatur, merces imputatur secundum*

to debt." The second debt regards the condition of nature. Thus we say it is due to a man to have reason, and whatever else belongs to human nature. Yet in neither way is debt taken to mean that God is under an obligation to His creature, but rather that the creature ought to be subject to God, that the Divine ordination may be fulfilled in it, which is that a certain nature should have certain conditions or properties, and that by doing certain works it should attain to something further. And hence natural endowments are not a debt in the first sense but in the second. Hence they especially merit the name of grace.

debitum, non secundum gratiam. Aliud est debitum ex conditione naturae, puta si dicamus debitum esse homini quod habeat rationem et alia quae ad humanam pertinent naturam. Neutro autem modo dicitur debitum propter hoc quod Deus creaturae obligatur, sed potius inquantum creatura debet subiici Deo ut in ea divina ordinatio impleatur, quae quidem est ut talis natura tales conditiones vel proprietates habeat, et quod talia operans talia consequatur. Dona igitur naturalia carent primo debito, non autem carent secundo debito. Sed dona supernaturalia utroque debito carent, et ideo specialius sibi nomen gratiae vindicant.

Reply to Objection 3: Sanctifying grace adds to the notion of gratuitous grace something pertaining to the nature of grace, since it makes man pleasing to God. And hence gratuitous grace which does not do this keeps the common name, as happens in many other cases; and thus the two parts of the division are opposed as sanctifying and non-sanctifying grace.

[38487] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod gratia gratum faciens addit aliquid supra rationem gratiae gratis datae quod etiam ad rationem gratiae pertinet, quia scilicet hominem gratum facit Deo. Et ideo gratia gratis data, quae hoc non facit, retinet sibi nomen commune, sicut in pluribus aliis contingit. Et sic opponuntur duae partes divisionis sicut gratum faciens et non faciens gratum.

Q. 111. A. 2. Whether grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into operating and cooperating grace. For grace is an accident, as stated above (Q[110], A[2]). Now no accident can act upon its subject. Therefore no grace can be called operating.

[38488] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gratia inconvenienter dividatur per operantem et cooperantem. Gratia enim accidens quoddam est, ut supra dictum est. Sed accidens non potest agere in subiectum. Ergo nulla gratia debet dici operans.

Objection 2: Further, if grace operates anything in us it assuredly brings about justification. But not only grace works this. For Augustine says, on Jn. 14:12, "the works that I do he also shall do," says (Serm. clxix): "He Who created thee without thyself, will not justify thee without thyself." Therefore no grace ought to be called simply operating.

[38489] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, si gratia aliquid operetur in nobis, maxime operatur iustificationem. Sed hoc non sola gratia operatur in nobis, dicit enim Augustinus, super illud Ioan. XIV, *opera quae ego facio, et ipse faciet, qui creavit te sine te, non iustificabit te sine te*. Ergo nulla gratia debet dici simpliciter operans.

Objection 3: Further, to cooperate seems to pertain to the inferior agent, and not to the principal agent. But grace works in us more than free-will, according to Rom. 9:16: "It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy." Therefore no grace

[38490] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, cooperari alicui videtur pertinere ad inferius agens, non autem ad principalius. Sed gratia principalius operatur in nobis quam liberum arbitrium; secundum illud Rom. IX, *non est volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis Dei*. Ergo

ought to be called cooperating.

gratia non debet dici cooperans.

Objection 4: Further, division ought to rest on opposition. But to operate and to cooperate are not opposed; for one and the same thing can both operate and cooperate. Therefore grace is not fittingly divided into operating and cooperating.

[38491] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, divisio debet dari per opposita. Sed operari et cooperari non sunt opposita, idem enim potest operari et cooperari. Ergo inconvenienter dividitur gratia per operantem et cooperantem.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Gratia et Lib. Arbit. xvii): "God by cooperating with us, perfects what He began by operating in us, since He who perfects by cooperation with such as are willing, beings by operating that they may will." But the operations of God whereby He moves us to good pertain to grace. Therefore grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating.

[38492] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Grat. et Lib. Arb., *cooperando Deus in nobis perficit quod operando incipit, quia ipse ut velimus operatur incipiens, qui volentibus cooperatur perficiens*. Sed operationes Dei quibus movet nos ad bonum, ad gratiam pertinent. Ergo convenienter gratia dividitur per operantem et cooperantem.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[110], A[2]) grace may be taken in two ways; first, as a Divine help, whereby God moves us to will and to act; secondly, as a habitual gift divinely bestowed on us.

Now in both these ways grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating. For the operation of an effect is not attributed to the thing moved but to the mover. Hence in that effect in which our mind is moved and does not move, but in which God is the sole mover, the operation is attributed to God, and it is with reference to this that we speak of "operating grace." But in that effect in which our mind both moves and is moved, the operation is not only attributed to God, but also to the soul; and it is with reference to this that we speak of "cooperating grace." Now there is a double act in us. First, there is the interior act of the will, and with regard to this act the will is a thing moved, and God is the mover; and especially when the will, which hitherto willed evil, begins to will good. And hence, inasmuch as God moves the human mind to this act, we speak of operating grace. But there is another, exterior act; and since it is commanded by the will, as was shown above (Q[17], A[9]) the operation of this act is attributed to the will. And because God assists us in this act, both by strengthening our will interiorly so as to attain to the act, and by granting outwardly the capability of operating, it is with respect to this that we speak of cooperating grace. Hence after the aforesaid

[38493] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, gratia dupliciter potest intelligi, uno modo, divinum auxilium quo nos movet ad bene volendum et agendum; alio modo, habituale donum nobis divinitus inditum. Utroque autem modo gratia dicta convenienter dividitur per operantem et cooperantem. Operatio enim alicuius effectus non attribuitur mobili, sed moventi. In illo ergo effectu in quo mens nostra est mota et non movens, solus autem Deus movens, operatio Deo attribuitur, et secundum hoc dicitur gratia operans. In illo autem effectu in quo mens nostra et movet et movetur, operatio non solum attribuitur Deo, sed etiam animae, et secundum hoc dicitur gratia cooperans. Est autem in nobis duplex actus. Primus quidem, interior voluntatis. Et quantum ad istum actum, voluntas se habet ut mota, Deus autem ut movens, et praesertim cum voluntas incipit bonum velle quae prius malum volebat. Et ideo secundum quod Deus movet humanam mentem ad hunc actum, dicitur gratia operans. Alius autem actus est exterior; qui cum a voluntate imperetur, ut supra habitum est, consequens est ut ad hunc actum operatio attribuatur voluntati. Et quia etiam ad hunc actum Deus nos adiuvat, et interius confirmando voluntatem ut ad actum perveniat, et exterius facultatem operandi praebendo; respectu huius actus dicitur gratia cooperans. Unde post praemissa verba subdit Augustinus, *ut autem velimus operatur, cum autem volumus, ut perficiamus nobis cooperatur*. Sic igitur si gratia accipiatur pro gratuita Dei motione qua movet nos

words Augustine subjoins: "He operates that we may will; and when we will, He cooperates that we may perfect." And thus if grace is taken for God's gratuitous motion whereby He moves us to meritorious good, it is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating grace.

But if grace is taken for the habitual gift, then again there is a double effect of grace, even as of every other form; the first of which is "being," and the second, "operation"; thus the work of heat is to make its subject hot, and to give heat outwardly. And thus habitual grace, inasmuch as it heals and justifies the soul, or makes it pleasing to God, is called operating grace; but inasmuch as it is the principle of meritorious works, which spring from the free-will, it is called cooperating grace.

ad bonum meritorium, convenienter dividitur gratia per operantem et cooperantem. Si vero accipiatur gratia pro habituali dono, sic etiam duplex est gratiae effectus, sicut et cuiuslibet alterius formae, quorum primus est esse, secundus est operatio; sicut caloris operatio est facere calidum, et exterior calefactio. Sic igitur habitualis gratia, inquantum animam sanat vel iustificat, sive gratam Deo facit, dicitur gratia operans, inquantum vero est principium operis meritorii, quod etiam ex libero arbitrio procedit, dicitur cooperans.

Reply to Objection 1: Inasmuch as grace is a certain accidental quality, it does not act upon the soul efficiently, but formally, as whiteness makes a surface white.

[38494] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum quod gratia est quaedam qualitas accidentalis, non agit in animam effective; sed formaliter, sicut albedo dicitur facere albam superficiem.

Reply to Objection 2: God does not justify us without ourselves, because whilst we are being justified we consent to God's justification [justitiae] by a movement of our free-will. Nevertheless this movement is not the cause of grace, but the effect; hence the whole operation pertains to grace.

[38495] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus non sine nobis nos iustificat, quia per motum liberi arbitrii, dum iustificamur, Dei iustitiae consentimus. Ille tamen motus non est causa gratiae, sed effectus. Unde tota operatio pertinet ad gratiam.

Reply to Objection 3: One thing is said to cooperate with another not merely when it is a secondary agent under a principal agent, but when it helps to the end intended. Now man is helped by God to will the good, through the means of operating grace. And hence, the end being already intended, grace cooperates with us.

[38496] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod cooperari dicitur aliquis alicui non solum sicut secundarium agens principali agenti, sed sicut adiuvans ad praesuppositum finem. Homo autem per gratiam operantem adiuvatur a Deo ut bonum velit. Et ideo, praesupposito iam fine, consequens est ut gratia nobis cooperetur.

Reply to Objection 4: Operating and cooperating grace are the same grace; but are distinguished by their different effects, as is plain from what has been said.

[38497] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod gratia operans et cooperans est eadem gratia, sed distinguitur secundum diversos effectus, ut ex dictis patet.

Q. 111. A. 3. Whether grace is fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent. For grace is an effect of the Divine love. But God's love is never subsequent, but always prevenient, according to 1 Jn. 4:10: "Not as though we had loved God, but because He hath first loved us." Therefore grace ought not to be divided into prevenient and subsequent.

[38498] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod gratia inconvenienter dividatur in praevenientem et subsequentem. Gratia enim est divinae dilectionis effectus. Sed Dei dilectio nunquam est subsequens, sed semper praeveniens; secundum illud I Ioan. IV, *non quasi nos dilexerimus Deum, sed quia ipse prior dilexit nos*. Ergo gratia non debet poni praeveniens et subsequens.

Objection 2: Further, there is but one sanctifying grace in man, since it is sufficient, according to 2 Cor. 12:9: "My grace is sufficient for thee." But the same thing cannot be before and after. Therefore grace is not fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent.

[38499] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, gratia gratum faciens est una tantum in homine, cum sit sufficiens, secundum illud II ad Cor. XII, *sufficit tibi gratia mea*. Sed idem non potest esse prius et posterius. Ergo gratia inconvenienter dividitur in praevenientem et subsequentem.

Objection 3: Further, grace is known by its effects. Now there are an infinite number of effects---one preceding another. Hence it with regard to these, grace must be divided into prevenient and subsequent, it would seem that there are infinite species of grace. Now no art takes note of the infinite in number. Hence grace is not fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent.

[38500] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, gratia cognoscitur per effectus. Sed infiniti sunt effectus gratiae, quorum unus praecedit alium. Ergo si penes hoc gratia deberet dividi in praevenientem et subsequentem, videtur quod infinitae essent species gratiae. Infinita autem relinquuntur a qualibet arte. Non ergo gratia convenienter dividitur in praevenientem et subsequentem.

On the contrary, God's grace is the outcome of His mercy. Now both are said in Ps. 58:11: "His mercy shall prevent me," and again, Ps. 22:6: "Thy mercy will follow me." Therefore grace is fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent.

[38501] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod gratia Dei ex eius misericordia provenit. Sed utrumque in Psalmo legitur, *misericordia eius praeveniet me*; et iterum, *misericordia eius subsequetur me*. Ergo gratia convenienter dividitur in praevenientem et subsequentem.

I answer that, As grace is divided into operating and cooperating, with regard to its diverse effects, so also is it divided into prevenient and subsequent, howsoever we consider grace. Now there are five effects of grace in us: of these, the first is, to heal the soul; the second, to desire good; the third, to carry into effect the good proposed; the fourth, to persevere in good; the fifth, to reach glory. And hence grace, inasmuch as it causes the first effect in us, is called prevenient with respect to the second, and inasmuch as it causes the second, it is called subsequent with respect to the first effect. And as

[38502] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut gratia dividitur in operantem et cooperantem secundum diversos effectus, ita etiam in praevenientem et subsequentem, qualitercumque gratia accipiatur. Sunt autem quinque effectus gratiae in nobis, quorum primus est ut anima sanetur; secundus est ut bonum velit; tertius est ut bonum quod vult, efficaciter operetur; quartus est ut in bono perseveret; quintus est ut ad gloriam perveniat. Et ideo gratia secundum quod causat in nobis primum effectum, vocatur praeveniens respectu secundi effectus; et prout causat in nobis

one effect is posterior to this effect, and prior to that, so may grace be called prevenient and subsequent on account of the same effect viewed relatively to divers others. And this is what Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia xxxi): "It is prevenient, inasmuch as it heals, and subsequent, inasmuch as, being healed, we are strengthened; it is prevenient, inasmuch as we are called, and subsequent, inasmuch as we are glorified."

secundum, vocatur subsequens respectu primi effectus. Et sicut unus effectus est posterior uno effectu et prior alio, ita gratia potest dici et praeveniens et subsequens secundum eundem effectum, respectu diversorum. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Nat. et Grat., *praevenit ut sanemur, subsequitur ut sanati vegetemur, praevenit ut vocemur, subsequitur ut glorificemur*.

Reply to Objection 1: God's love signifies something eternal; and hence can never be called anything but prevenient. But grace signifies a temporal effect, which can precede and follow another; and thus grace may be both prevenient and subsequent.

[38503] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dilectio Dei nominat aliquid aeternum, et ideo nunquam potest dici nisi praeveniens. Sed gratia significat effectum temporalem, qui potest praecedere aliquid et ad aliquid subsequi. Et ideo gratia potest dici praeveniens et subsequens.

Reply to Objection 2: The division into prevenient and subsequent grace does not divide grace in its essence, but only in its effects, as was already said of operating and cooperating grace. For subsequent grace, inasmuch as it pertains to glory, is not numerically distinct from prevenient grace whereby we are at present justified. For even as the charity of the earth is not voided in heaven, so must the same be said of the light of grace, since the notion of neither implies imperfection.

[38504] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod gratia non diversificatur per hoc quod est praeveniens et subsequens, secundum essentiam, sed solum secundum effectum, sicut et de operante et cooperante dictum est. Quia etiam secundum quod gratia subsequens ad gloriam pertinet, non est alia numero a gratia praeveniente per quam nunc iustificamur. Sicut enim caritas viae non evacuatur, sed perficitur in patria, ita etiam et de lumine gratiae est dicendum, quia neutrum in sui ratione imperfectionem importat.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the effects of grace may be infinite in number, even as human acts are infinite, nevertheless all reduced to some of a determinate species, and moreover all coincide in this---that one precedes another.

[38505] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, quamvis effectus gratiae possint esse infiniti numero, sicut sunt infiniti actus humani; tamen omnes reducuntur ad aliqua determinata in specie. Et praeterea omnes conveniunt in hoc quod unus alium praecedit.

Q. 111. A. 4. Whether gratuitous grace is rightly divided by the Apostle?

Objection 1: It would seem that gratuitous grace is not rightly divided by the Apostle. For every gift vouchsafed to us by God, may be called a gratuitous grace. Now there are an infinite number of gifts freely bestowed on us by God as regards both the good of the soul and the good of the body---and yet they do not make us pleasing to God. Hence gratuitous graces cannot be contained under any certain division.

[38506] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gratia gratis data inconvenienter ab apostolo distinguatur. Omne enim donum quod nobis a Deo gratis datur, potest dici gratia gratis data. Sed infinita sunt dona quae nobis gratis a Deo conceduntur, tam in bonis animae quam in bonis corporis, quae tamen nos Deo gratos non faciunt. Ergo gratiae gratis datae non possunt comprehendi sub aliqua certa divisione.

Objection 2: Further, gratuitous grace is distinguished from sanctifying grace. But faith pertains to sanctifying grace, since we are justified by it, according to Rom. 5:1: "Being justified therefore by faith." Hence it is not right to place faith amongst the gratuitous graces, especially since the other virtues are not so placed, as hope and charity.

[38507] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, gratia gratis data distinguitur contra gratiam gratum facientem. Sed fides pertinet ad gratiam gratum facientem, quia per ipsam iustificamur, secundum illud Rom. V, *iustificati ergo ex fide,* et cetera. Ergo inconvenienter fides ponitur inter gratias gratis datas, praesertim cum aliae virtutes ibi non ponantur, ut spes et caritas.

Objection 3: Further, the operation of healing, and speaking divers tongues are miracles. Again, the interpretation of speeches pertains either to wisdom or to knowledge, according to Dan. 1:17: "And to these children God gave knowledge and understanding in every book and wisdom." Hence it is not correct to divide the grace of healing and kinds of tongues against the working of miracles; and the interpretation of speeches against the word of wisdom and knowledge.

[38508] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, operatio sanitatum, et loqui diversa genera linguarum, miracula quaedam sunt. Interpretatio etiam sermonum ad sapientiam vel scientiam pertinet; secundum illud Dan. I, *pueris his dedit Deus scientiam et disciplinam in omni libro et sapientia*. Ergo inconvenienter dividitur gratia sanitatum, et genera linguarum, contra operationem virtutum; et interpretatio sermonum contra sermonem sapientiae et scientiae.

Objection 4: Further, as wisdom and knowledge are gifts of the Holy Ghost, so also are understanding, counsel, piety, fortitude, and fear, as stated above (Q[68], A[4]). Therefore these also ought to be placed amongst the gratuitous gifts.

[38509] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, sicut sapientia et scientia sunt quaedam dona spiritus sancti, ita etiam intellectus et consilium, pietas, fortitudo et timor, ut supra dictum est. Ergo haec etiam deberent poni inter gratias gratis datas.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8, 9, 10): "To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom; and to another the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit; to another, the working of miracles; to another, prophecy; to another, the discerning of spirits; to another divers kinds of tongues; to another interpretation of speeches."

[38510] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XII, *alii per spiritum datur sermo sapientiae, alii autem sermo scientiae secundum eundem spiritum, alteri fides in eodem spiritu, alii gratia sanitatum, alii operatio virtutum, alii prophetia, alii discretio spirituum, alii genera linguarum, alii interpretatio sermonum*.

I answer that, As was said above (A[1]), gratuitous grace is ordained to this, viz. that a man may help another to be led to God. Now no man can help in this by moving interiorly (for this belongs to God alone), but only exteriorly by teaching or persuading. Hence gratuitous grace embraces whatever a man needs in order to instruct another in Divine things which are above reason. Now for this three things are required: first, a man must possess the fullness of knowledge of Divine things, so as to be capable of teaching others. Secondly, he must be able to confirm or prove what he says, otherwise his

[38511] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, gratia gratis data ordinatur ad hoc quod homo alteri cooperetur ut reducatur ad Deum. Homo autem ad hoc operari non potest interius movendo, hoc enim solius Dei est; sed solum exterius docendo vel persuadendo. Et ideo gratia gratis data illa sub se continet quibus homo indiget ad hoc quod alterum instruat in rebus divinis, quae sunt supra rationem. Ad hoc autem tria requiruntur. Primo quidem, quod homo sit sortitus plenitudinem cognitionis divinorum, ut ex hoc possit alios instruere. Secundo, ut possit confirmare vel

words would have no weight. Thirdly, he must be capable of fittingly presenting to his hearers what he knows.

Now as regards the first, three things are necessary, as may be seen in human teaching. For whoever would teach another in any science must first be certain of the principles of the science, and with regard to this there is "faith," which is certitude of invisible things, the principles of Catholic doctrine. Secondly, it behooves the teacher to know the principal conclusions of the science, and hence we have the word of "wisdom," which is the knowledge of Divine things. Thirdly, he ought to abound with examples and a knowledge of effects, whereby at times he needs to manifest causes; and thus we have the word of "knowledge," which is the knowledge of human things, since "the invisible things of Him . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rom. 1:20).

Now the confirmation of such things as are within reason rests upon arguments; but the confirmation of what is above reason rests on what is proper to the Divine power, and this in two ways: first, when the teacher of sacred doctrine does what God alone can do, in miraculous deeds, whether with respect to bodily health---and thus there is the "grace of healing," or merely for the purpose of manifesting the Divine power; for instance, that the sun should stand still or darken, or that the sea should be divided---and thus there is the "working of miracles." Secondly, when he can manifest what God alone can know, and these are either future contingents---and thus there is "prophecy," or also the secrets of hearts---and thus there is the "discerning of spirits."

But the capability of speaking can regard either the idiom in which a person can be understood, and thus there is "kinds of tongues"; or it can regard the sense of what is said, and thus there is the "interpretation of speeches."

probare ea quae dicit, alias non esset efficax eius doctrina. Tertio, ut ea quae concipit, possit convenienter auditoribus proferre. Quantum igitur ad primum, tria sunt necessaria, sicut etiam apparet in magisterio humano. Oportet enim quod ille qui debet alium instruere in aliqua scientia, primo quidem, ut principia illius scientiae sint ei certissima. Et quantum ad hoc ponitur fides, quae est certitudo de rebus invisibilibus, quae supponuntur ut principia in Catholica doctrina. Secundo, oportet quod doctor recte se habeat circa principales conclusiones scientiae. Et sic ponitur sermo sapientiae, quae est cognitio divinorum. Tertio, oportet ut etiam abundet exemplis et cognitione effectuum, per quos interdum oportet manifestare causas. Et quantum ad hoc ponitur sermo scientiae, quae est cognitio rerum humanarum, quia invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, conspiciuntur. Confirmatio autem in his quae subduntur rationi, est per argumenta. In his autem quae sunt supra rationem divinitus revelata, confirmatio est per ea quae sunt divinae virtuti propria. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, ut doctor sacrae doctrinae faciat quae solus Deus facere potest, in operibus miraculosis, sive sint ad salutem corporum, et quantum ad hoc ponitur gratia sanitatum; sive ordinentur ad solam divinae potestatis manifestationem, sicut quod sol stet aut tenebrescat, quod mare dividatur; et quantum ad hoc ponitur operatio virtutum. Secundo, ut possit manifestare ea quae solius Dei est scire. Et haec sunt contingentia futura, et quantum ad hoc ponitur prophetia; et etiam occulta cordium, et quantum ad hoc ponitur discretio spirituum. Facultas autem pronuntiandi potest attendi vel quantum ad idioma in quo aliquis intelligi possit, et secundum hoc ponuntur genera linguarum, vel quantum ad sensum eorum quae sunt proferenda, et quantum ad hoc ponitur interpretatio sermonum.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[1]), not all the benefits divinely conferred upon us are called gratuitous graces, but only those that surpass the power of nature---e.g. that a fisherman should be replete with the word of wisdom and of knowledge and the like; and such as these are here

[38512] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, non omnia beneficia quae nobis divinitus conceduntur, gratiae gratis datae dicuntur, sed solum illa quae excedunt facultatem naturae, sicut quod piscator abundet sermone sapientiae et scientiae et aliis

set down as gratuitous graces.

huiusmodi. Et talia ponuntur hic sub gratia gratis data.

Reply to Objection 2: Faith is enumerated here under the gratuitous graces, not as a virtue justifying man in himself, but as implying a super-eminent certitude of faith, whereby a man is fitted for instructing others concerning such things as belong to the faith. With regard to hope and charity, they belong to the appetitive power, according as man is ordained thereby to God.

[38513] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod fides non numeratur hic inter gratias gratis datas secundum quod est quaedam virtus iustificans hominem in seipso, sed secundum quod importat quandam supereminentem certitudinem fidei, ex qua homo sit idoneus ad instruendum alios de his quae ad fidem pertinent. Spes autem et caritas pertinent ad vim appetitivam, secundum quod per eam homo in Deum ordinatur.

Reply to Objection 3: The grace of healing is distinguished from the general working of miracles because it has a special reason for inducing one to the faith, since a man is all the more ready to believe when he has received the gift of bodily health through the virtue of faith. So, too, to speak with divers tongues and to interpret speeches have special efficacy in bestowing faith. Hence they are set down as special gratuitous graces.

[38514] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod gratia sanitatum distinguitur a generali operatione virtutum, quia habet specialem rationem inducendi ad fidem; ad quam aliquis magis promptus redditur per beneficium corporalis sanitatis quam per fidei virtutem assequitur. Similiter etiam loqui variis linguis, et interpretari sermones, habent speciales quasdam rationes movendi ad fidem, et ideo ponuntur speciales gratiae gratis datae.

Reply to Objection 4: Wisdom and knowledge are not numbered among the gratuitous graces in the same way as they are reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, i.e. inasmuch as man's mind is rendered easily movable by the Holy Ghost to the things of wisdom and knowledge; for thus they are gifts of the Holy Ghost, as stated above (Q[68], AA[1],4). But they are numbered amongst the gratuitous graces, inasmuch as they imply such a fullness of knowledge and wisdom that a man may not merely think aright of Divine things, but may instruct others and overpower adversaries. Hence it is significant that it is the "word" of wisdom and the "word" of knowledge that are placed in the gratuitous graces, since, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1), "It is one thing merely to know what a man must believe in order to reach everlasting life, and another thing to know how this may benefit the godly and may be defended against the ungodly."

[38515] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod sapientia et scientia non computantur inter gratias gratis datas secundum quod enumerantur inter dona spiritus sancti, prout scilicet mens hominis est bene mobilis per spiritum sanctum ad ea quae sunt sapientiae vel scientiae, sic enim sunt dona spiritus sancti, ut supra dictum est. Sed computantur inter gratias gratis datas secundum quod important quandam abundantiam scientiae et sapientiae, ut homo possit non solum in seipso recte sapere de divinis, sed etiam alios instruere et contradicentes revincere. Et ideo inter gratias gratis datas signanter ponitur sermo sapientiae, et sermo scientiae, quia ut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin., *aliud est scire tantummodo quid homo credere debeat propter adipiscendam vitam beatam; aliud, scire quemadmodum hoc ipsum et piis opituletur, et contra impios defendatur*.

Q. 111. A. 5. Whether gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that gratuitous grace

[38516] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic

is nobler than sanctifying grace. For "the people's good is better than the individual good," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 2). Now sanctifying grace is ordained to the good of one man alone, whereas gratuitous grace is ordained to the common good of the whole Church, as stated above (AA[1],4). Hence gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace.

proceditur. Videtur quod gratia gratis data sit dignior quam gratia gratum faciens. *Bonum enim gentis est melius quam bonum unius*; ut philosophus dicit, in I Ethic. Sed gratia gratum faciens ordinatur solum ad bonum unius hominis, gratia autem gratis data ordinatur ad bonum commune totius Ecclesiae, ut supra dictum est. Ergo gratia gratis data est dignior quam gratia gratum faciens.

Objection 2: Further, it is a greater power that is able to act upon another, than that which is confined to itself, even as greater is the brightness of the body that can illuminate other bodies, than of that which can only shine but cannot illuminate; and hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) "that justice is the most excellent of the virtues," since by it a man bears himself rightly towards others. But by sanctifying grace a man is perfected only in himself; whereas by gratuitous grace a man works for the perfection of others. Hence gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace.

[38517] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, maioris virtutis est quod aliquid possit agere in aliud, quam quod solum in seipso perficiatur, sicut maior est claritas corporis quod potest etiam alia corpora illuminare, quam eius quod ita in se lucet quod alia illuminare non potest. Propter quod etiam philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., quod iustitia est praeclarissima virtutum, per quam homo recte se habet etiam ad alios. Sed per gratiam gratum facientem homo perficitur in seipso, per gratiam autem gratis datam homo operatur ad perfectionem aliorum. Ergo gratia gratis data est dignior quam gratia gratum faciens.

Objection 3: Further, what is proper to the best is nobler than what is common to all; thus to reason, which is proper to man is nobler than to feel, which is common to all animals. Now sanctifying grace is common to all members of the Church, but gratuitous grace is the proper gift of the more exalted members of the Church. Hence gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace.

[38518] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, id quod est proprium meliorum, dignius est quam id quod est commune omnium, sicut ratiocinari, quod est proprium hominis, dignius est quam sentire, quod est commune omnibus animalibus. Sed gratia gratum faciens est communis omnibus membris Ecclesiae, gratia autem gratis data est proprium donum digniorum membrorum Ecclesiae. Ergo gratia gratis data est dignior quam gratia gratum faciens.

On the contrary, The Apostle (1 Cor. 12:31), having enumerated the gratuitous graces adds: "And I shew unto you yet a more excellent way"; and as the sequel proves he is speaking of charity, which pertains to sanctifying grace. Hence sanctifying grace is more noble than gratuitous grace.

[38519] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus, I ad Cor. XII, enumeratis gratiis gratis datis, subdit, *adhuc excellentiorem viam vobis demonstro*, et sicut per subsequentia patet, loquitur de caritate, quae pertinet ad gratiam gratum facientem. Ergo gratia gratum faciens excellentior est quam gratia gratis data.

I answer that, The higher the good to which a virtue is ordained, the more excellent is the virtue. Now the end is always greater than the means. But sanctifying grace ordains a man immediately to a union with his last end, whereas gratuitous grace ordains a man to what is preparatory to the

[38520] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod unaquaeque virtus tanto excellentior est, quanto ad altius bonum ordinatur. Semper autem finis potior est his quae sunt ad finem. Gratia autem gratum faciens ordinat hominem immediate ad coniunctionem ultimi

end; i.e. by prophecy and miracles and so forth, men are induced to unite themselves to their last end. And hence sanctifying grace is nobler than gratuitous grace.

finis. Gratiae autem gratis datae ordinant hominem ad quaedam praeparatoria finis ultimi, sicut per prophetiam et miracula et alia huiusmodi homines inducuntur ad hoc quod ultimo fini coniungantur. Et ideo gratia gratum faciens est multo excellentior quam gratia gratis data.

Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, text. 52), a multitude, as an army, has a double good; the first is in the multitude itself, viz. the order of the army; the second is separate from the multitude, viz. the good of the leader---and this is better good, since the other is ordained to it. Now gratuitous grace is ordained to the common good of the Church, which is ecclesiastical order, whereas sanctifying grace is ordained to the separate common good, which is God. Hence sanctifying grace is the nobler.

[38521] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in XII Metaphys., bonum multitudinis, sicut exercitus, est duplex. Unum quidem quod est in ipsa multitudine, puta ordo exercitus. Aliud autem quod est separatum a multitudine, sicut bonum ducis, et hoc melius est, quia ad hoc etiam illud aliud ordinatur. Gratia autem gratis data ordinatur ad bonum commune Ecclesiae quod est ordo ecclesiasticus, sed gratia gratum faciens ordinatur ad bonum commune separatum, quod est ipse Deus. Et ideo gratia gratum faciens est nobilior.

Reply to Objection 2: If gratuitous grace could cause a man to have sanctifying grace, it would follow that the gratuitous grace was the nobler; even as the brightness of the sun that enlightens is more excellent than that of an object that is lit up. But by gratuitous grace a man cannot cause another to have union with God, which he himself has by sanctifying grace; but he causes certain dispositions towards it. Hence gratuitous grace needs not to be the more excellent, even as in fire, the heat, which manifests its species whereby it produces heat in other things, is not more noble than its substantial form.

[38522] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, si gratia gratis data posset hoc agere in altero quod homo per gratiam gratum facientem consequitur, sequeretur quod gratia gratis data esset nobilior, sicut excellentior est claritas solis illuminantis quam corporis illuminati. Sed per gratiam gratis datam homo non potest causare in alio coniunctionem ad Deum, quam ipse habet per gratiam gratum facientem; sed causat quasdam dispositiones ad hoc. Et ideo non oportet quod gratia gratis data sit excellentior, sicut nec in igne calor manifestativus speciei eius, per quam agit ad inducendum calorem in alia, est nobilior quam forma substantialis ipsius.

Reply to Objection 3: Feeling is ordained to reason, as to an end; and thus, to reason is nobler. But here it is the contrary; for what is proper is ordained to what is common as to an end. Hence there is no comparison.

[38523] Iª-IIae q. 111 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod sentire ordinatur ad ratiocinari sicut ad finem, et ideo ratiocinari est nobilius. Hic autem est e converso, quia id quod est proprium, ordinatur ad id quod est commune sicut ad finem. Unde non est simile.

Q. 112. OF THE CAUSE OF GRACE (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the cause of grace; and under this head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether God alone is the efficient cause of grace?

(2) Whether any disposition towards grace is needed on the part of the recipient, by an act of free-will?

(3) Whether such a disposition can make grace follow of necessity?

(4) Whether grace is equal in all?

(5) Whether anyone may know that he has grace?

[38524] Iª-IIae q. 112 pr. Deinde considerandum est de causa gratiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum solus Deus sit causa efficiens gratiae. Secundo, utrum requiratur aliqua dispositio ad gratiam ex parte recipientis ipsam, per actum liberi arbitrii. Tertio, utrum talis dispositio possit esse necessitas ad gratiam. Quarto, utrum gratia sit aequalis in omnibus. Quinto, utrum aliquis possit scire se habere gratiam.

Q. 112. A. 1. Whether God alone is the cause of grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that God alone is not the cause of grace. For it is written (Jn. 1:17): "Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." Now, by the name of Jesus Christ is understood not merely the Divine Nature assuming, but the created nature assumed. Therefore a creature may be the cause of grace.

[38525] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non solus Deus sit causa gratiae. Dicitur enim Ioan. I, *gratia et veritas per Iesum Christum facta est*. Sed in nomine Iesu Christi intelligitur non solum natura divina assumens, sed etiam natura creata assumpta. Ergo aliqua creatura potest esse causa gratiae.

Objection 2: Further, there is this difference between the sacraments of the New Law and those of the Old, that the sacraments of the New Law cause grace, whereas the sacraments of the Old Law merely signify it. Now the sacraments of the New Law are certain visible elements. Therefore God is not the only cause of grace.

[38526] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, ista differentia ponitur inter sacramenta novae legis et veteris, quod sacramenta novae legis causant gratiam, quam sacramenta veteris legis solum significant. Sed sacramenta novae legis sunt quaedam visibilia elementa. Ergo non solus Deus est causa gratiae.

Objection 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iii, iv, vii, viii), "Angels cleanse, enlighten, and perfect both lesser angels and men." Now the rational creature is cleansed, enlightened, and perfected by grace. Therefore God is not the only cause of grace.

[38527] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, secundum Dionysium, in libro Cael. Hier., Angeli purgant et illuminant et perficiunt et Angelos inferiores et etiam homines. Sed rationalis creatura purgatur, illuminatur et perficitur per gratiam. Ergo non solus Deus est causa gratiae.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 83:12): "The Lord will give grace and glory."

[38528] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod in Psalmo LXXXIII dicitur, *gratiam et gloriam dabit dominus*.

I answer that, Nothing can act beyond its

[38529] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 1 co. Respondeo

species, since the cause must always be more powerful than its effect. Now the gift of grace surpasses every capability of created nature, since it is nothing short of a partaking of the Divine Nature, which exceeds every other nature. And thus it is impossible that any creature should cause grace. For it is as necessary that God alone should deify, bestowing a partaking of the Divine Nature by a participated likeness, as it is impossible that anything save fire should enkindle.

dicendum quod nulla res agere potest ultra suam speciem, quia semper oportet quod causa potior sit effectu. Donum autem gratiae excedit omnem facultatem naturae creatae, cum nihil aliud sit quam quaedam participatio divinae naturae, quae excedit omnem aliam naturam. Et ideo impossibile est quod aliqua creatura gratiam causet. Sic enim necesse est quod solus Deus deificet, communicando consortium divinae naturae per quandam similitudinis participationem, sicut impossibile est quod aliquid igniat nisi solus ignis.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ's humanity is an "organ of His Godhead," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 19). Now an instrument does not bring forth the action of the principal agent by its own power, but in virtue of the principal agent. Hence Christ's humanity does not cause grace by its own power, but by virtue of the Divine Nature joined to it, whereby the actions of Christ's humanity are saving actions.

[38530] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod humanitas Christi est sicut quoddam organum divinitatis eius; ut Damascenus dicit, in III libro. Instrumentum autem non agit actionem agentis principalis propria virtute, sed virtute principalis agentis. Et ideo humanitas Christi non causat gratiam propria virtute, sed virtute divinitatis adiunctae, ex qua actiones humanitatis Christi sunt salutares.

Reply to Objection 2: As in the person of Christ the humanity causes our salvation by grace, the Divine power being the principal agent, so likewise in the sacraments of the New Law, which are derived from Christ, grace is instrumentally caused by the sacraments, and principally by the power of the Holy Ghost working in the sacraments, according to Jn. 3:5: "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost he cannot enter into the kingdom of God."

[38531] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut in ipsa persona Christi humanitas causat salutem nostram per gratiam, virtute divina principaliter operante; ita etiam in sacramentis novae legis, quae derivantur a Christo, causatur gratia instrumentaliter quidem per ipsa sacramenta, sed principaliter per virtutem spiritus sancti in sacramentis operantis; secundum illud Ioan. III, *nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et spiritu sancto,* et cetera.

Reply to Objection 3: Angels cleanse, enlighten, and perfect angels or men, by instruction, and not by justifying them through grace. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that "this cleansing and enlightenment and perfecting is nothing else than the assumption of Divine knowledge."

[38532] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Angelus purgat, illuminat et perficit Angelum vel hominem, per modum instructionis cuiusdam, non autem iustificando per gratiam. Unde Dionysius dicit, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod *huiusmodi purgatio, illuminatio et perfectio nihil est aliud quam divinae scientiae assumptio*.

Q. 112. A. 2. Whether any preparation and disposition for grace is required on man's part?

Objection 1: It would seem that no preparation or disposition for grace is required on man's part, since, as the Apostle says (Rom. 4:4), "To him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned

[38533] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non requiratur aliqua praeparatio sive dispositio ad gratiam ex parte hominis. Quia ut apostolus dicit, Rom. IV, *ei qui*

according to grace, but according to debt." Now a man's preparation by free-will can only be through some operation. Hence it would do away with the notion of grace.

operatur, merces non imputatur secundum gratiam, sed secundum debitum. Sed praeparatio hominis per liberum arbitrium non est nisi per aliquam operationem. Ergo tolleretur ratio gratiae.

Objection 2: Further, whoever is going on sinning, is not preparing himself to have grace. But to some who are going on sinning grace is given, as is clear in the case of Paul, who received grace whilst he was "breathing our threatenings and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord" (Act 9:1). Hence no preparation for grace is required on man's part.

[38534] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, ille qui in peccato progreditur, non se praeparat ad gratiam habendam. Sed aliquibus in peccato progredientibus data est gratia, sicut patet de Paulo, qui gratiam consecutus est *dum esset spirans minarum et caedis in discipulos domini*, ut dicitur Act. IX. Ergo nulla praeparatio ad gratiam requiritur ex parte hominis.

Objection 3: Further, an agent of infinite power needs no disposition in matter, since it does not even require matter, as appears in creation, to which grace is compared, which is called "a new creature" (Gal. 6:15). But only God, Who has infinite power, causes grace, as stated above (A[1]). Hence no preparation is required on man's part to obtain grace.

[38535] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, agens infinitae virtutis non requirit dispositionem in materia, cum nec ipsam materiam requirat, sicut in creatione apparet; cui collatio gratiae comparatur, quae dicitur nova creatura, ad Gal. ult. Sed solus Deus, qui est infinitae virtutis, gratiam causat, ut dictum est. Ergo nulla praeparatio requiritur ex parte hominis ad gratiam consequendam.

On the contrary, It is written (Amos 4:12): "Be prepared to meet thy God, O Israel," and (1 Kings 7:3): "Prepare your hearts unto the Lord."

[38536] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Amos IV, *praeparare in occursum Dei tui, Israel*. Et I Reg. VII dicitur, *praeparate corda vestra domino*.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[111], A[2]), grace is taken in two ways: first, as a habitual gift of God. Secondly, as a help from God, Who moves the soul to good. Now taking grace in the first sense, a certain preparation of grace is required for it, since a form can only be in disposed matter. But if we speak of grace as it signifies a help from God to move us to good, no preparation is required on man's part, that, as it were, anticipates the Divine help, but rather, every preparation in man must be by the help of God moving the soul to good. And thus even the good movement of the free-will, whereby anyone is prepared for receiving the gift of grace is an act of the free-will moved by God. And thus man is said to prepare himself, according to Prov. 16:1: "It is the part of man to prepare the soul"; yet it is principally from God, Who moves the free-will. Hence it is said that man's will is prepared by God, and that man's steps are guided by God.

[38537] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, gratia dupliciter dicitur, quandoque quidem ipsum habituale donum Dei; quandoque autem ipsum auxilium Dei moventis animam ad bonum. Primo igitur modo accipiendo gratiam, praeexigitur ad gratiam aliqua gratiae praeparatio, quia nulla forma potest esse nisi in materia disposita. Sed si loquamur de gratia secundum quod significat auxilium Dei moventis ad bonum, sic nulla praeparatio requiritur ex parte hominis quasi praeveniens divinum auxilium, sed potius quaecumque praeparatio in homine esse potest, est ex auxilio Dei moventis animam ad bonum. Et secundum hoc, ipse bonus motus liberi arbitrii quo quis praeparatur ad donum gratiae suscipiendum, est actus liberi arbitrii moti a Deo, et quantum ad hoc, dicitur homo se praeparare, secundum illud Prov. XVI, *hominis est praeparare animum*. Et est principaliter a Deo

movente liberum arbitrium, et secundum hoc, dicitur a Deo voluntas hominis praeparari, et a domino gressus hominis dirigi.

Reply to Objection 1: A certain preparation of man for grace is simultaneous with the infusion of grace; and this operation is meritorious, not indeed of grace, which is already possessed---but of glory which is not yet possessed. But there is another imperfect preparation, which sometimes precedes the gift of sanctifying grace, and yet it is from God's motion. But it does not suffice for merit, since man is not yet justified by grace, and merit can only arise from grace, as will be seen further on (Q[114], A[2]).

[38538] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praeparatio hominis ad gratiam habendam, quaedam est simul cum ipsa infusione gratiae. Et talis operatio est quidem meritoria; sed non gratiae, quae iam habetur, sed gloriae, quae nondum habetur. Est autem alia praeparatio gratiae imperfecta, quae aliquando praecedit donum gratiae gratum facientis, quae tamen est a Deo movente. Sed ista non sufficit ad meritum, nondum homine per gratiam iustificato, quia nullum meritum potest esse nisi ex gratia, ut infra dicetur.

Reply to Objection 2: Since a man cannot prepare himself for grace unless God prevent and move him to good, it is of no account whether anyone arrive at perfect preparation instantaneously, or step by step. For it is written (Ecclus. 11:23): "It is easy in the eyes of God on a sudden to make the poor man rich." Now it sometimes happens that God moves a man to good, but not perfect good, and this preparation precedes grace. But He sometimes moves him suddenly and perfectly to good, and man receives grace suddenly, according to Jn. 6:45: "Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me." And thus it happened to Paul, since, suddenly when he was in the midst of sin, his heart was perfectly moved by God to hear, to learn, to come; and hence he received grace suddenly.

[38539] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum homo ad gratiam se praeparare non possit nisi Deo eum praeveniente et movente ad bonum, non refert utrum subito vel paulatim aliquis ad perfectam praeparationem perveniat, dicitur enim Eccli. XI, quod *facile est in oculis Dei subito honestare pauperem*. Contingit autem quandoque quod Deus movet hominem ad aliquod bonum, non tamen perfectum, et talis praeparatio praecedit gratiam. Sed quandoque statim perfecte movet ipsum ad bonum, et subito homo gratiam accipit; secundum illud Ioan. VI, *omnis qui audivit a patre et didicit, venit ad me*. Et ita contigit Paulo, quia subito, cum esset in progressu peccati, perfecte motum est cor eius a Deo, audiendo et addiscendo et veniendo; et ideo subito est gratiam consecutus.

Reply to Objection 3: An agent of infinite power needs no matter or disposition of matter, brought about by the action of something else; and yet, looking to the condition of the thing caused, it must cause, in the thing caused, both the matter and the due disposition for the form. So likewise, when God infuses grace into a soul, no preparation is required which He Himself does not bring about.

[38540] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod agens infinitae virtutis non exigit materiam, vel dispositionem materiae, quasi praesuppositam ex alterius causae actione. Sed tamen oportet quod, secundum conditionem rei causandae, in ipsa re causet et materiam et dispositionem debitam ad formam. Et similiter ad hoc quod Deus gratiam infundat animae, nulla praeparatio exigitur quam ipse non faciat.

Q. 112. A. 3. Whether grace is necessarily given to whoever prepares himself for it, or to whoever does what he can?

Objection 1: It would seem that grace is necessarily given to whoever prepares himself for grace, or to whoever does what he can, because, on Rom. 5:1, "Being justified . . . by faith, let us have peace," etc. the gloss says: "God welcomes whoever flies to Him, otherwise there would be injustice with Him." But it is impossible for injustice to be with God. Therefore it is impossible for God not to welcome whoever flies to Him. Hence he receives grace of necessity.

[38541] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod ex necessitate detur gratia se praeparanti ad gratiam, vel facienti quod in se est. Quia super illud Rom. V, *iustificati ex fide pacem habeamus* etc., dicit Glossa, *Deus recipit eum qui ad se confugit, aliter esset in eo iniquitas*. Sed impossibile est in Deo iniquitatem esse. Ergo impossibile est quod Deus non recipiat eum qui ad se confugit. Ex necessitate igitur gratiam assequitur.

Objection 2: Further, Anselm says (De Casu Diaboli. iii) that the reason why God does not bestow grace on the devil, is that he did not wish, nor was he prepared, to receive it. But if the cause be removed, the effect must needs be removed also. Therefore, if anyone is willing to receive grace it is bestowed on them of necessity.

[38542] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, Anselmus dicit, in libro de casu Diaboli, quod ista est causa quare Deus non concedit Diabolo gratiam, quia ipse non voluit accipere, nec paratus fuit. Sed remota causa, necesse est removeri effectum. Ergo si aliquis velit accipere gratiam, necesse est quod ei detur.

Objection 3: Further, good is diffusive of itself, as appears from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Now the good of grace is better than the good of nature. Hence, since natural forms necessarily come to disposed matter, much more does it seem that grace is necessarily bestowed on whoever prepares himself for grace.

[38543] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, bonum est communicativum sui; ut patet per Dionysium, in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed bonum gratiae est melius quam bonum naturae. Cum igitur forma naturalis ex necessitate adveniat materiae dispositae, videtur quod multo magis gratia ex necessitate detur praeparanti se ad gratiam.

On the contrary, Man is compared to God as clay to the potter, according to Jer. 18:6: "As clay is in the hand of the potter, so are you in My hand." But however much the clay is prepared, it does not necessarily receive its shape from the potter. Hence, however much a man prepares himself, he does not necessarily receive grace from God.

[38544] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod homo comparatur ad Deum sicut lutum ad figulum; secundum illud Ierem. XVIII, *sicut lutum in manu figuli, sic vos in manu mea*. Sed lutum non ex necessitate accipit formam a figulo, quantumcumque sit praeparatum. Ergo neque homo recipit ex necessitate gratiam a Deo, quantumcumque se praeparet.

I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), man's preparation for grace is from God, as Mover, and from the free-will, as moved. Hence the preparation may be looked at in two ways: first, as it is from free-will, and thus there is no necessity that it should obtain grace, since the gift of grace exceeds every preparation of human power. But it may be considered, secondly, as it is from God the Mover, and thus it has a necessity---not indeed of coercion, but of infallibility---as

[38545] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, praeparatio ad hominis gratiam est a Deo sicut a movente, a libero autem arbitrio sicut a moto. Potest igitur praeparatio dupliciter considerari. Uno quidem modo, secundum quod est a libero arbitrio. Et secundum hoc, nullam necessitatem habet ad gratiae consecutionem, quia donum gratiae excedit omnem praeparationem virtutis humanae. Alio modo potest considerari secundum

regards what it is ordained to by God, since God's intention cannot fail, according to the saying of Augustine in his book on the Predestination of the Saints (De Dono Persev. xiv) that "by God's good gifts whoever is liberated, is most certainly liberated." Hence if God intends, while moving, that the one whose heart He moves should attain to grace, he will infallibly attain to it, according to Jn. 6:45: "Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me."

quod est a Deo movente. Et tunc habet necessitatem ad id ad quod ordinatur a Deo, non quidem coactionis, sed infallibilitatis, quia intentio Dei deficere non potest; secundum quod et Augustinus dicit, in libro de Praedest. Sanct., *quod per beneficia Dei certissime liberantur quicumque liberantur*. Unde si ex intentione Dei moventis est quod homo cuius cor movet, gratiam consequatur, infallibiliter ipsam consequitur; secundum illud Ioan. VI, *omnis qui audivit a patre et didicit, venit ad me*.

Reply to Objection 1: This gloss is speaking of such as fly to God by a meritorious act of their free-will, already "informed" with grace; for if they did not receive grace, it would be against the justice which He Himself established. Or if it refers to the movement of free-will before grace, it is speaking in the sense that man's flight to God is by a Divine motion, which ought not, in justice, to fail.

[38546] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Glossa illa loquitur de illo qui confugit ad Deum per actum meritorium liberi arbitrii iam per gratiam informati, quem si non reciperet, esset contra iustitiam quam ipse statuit. Vel si referatur ad motum liberi arbitrii ante gratiam, loquitur secundum quod ipsum confugium hominis ad Deum est per motionem divinam, quam iustum est non deficere.

Reply to Objection 2: The first cause of the defect of grace is on our part; but the first cause of the bestowal of grace is on God's according to Osee 13:9: "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in Me."

[38547] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod defectus gratiae prima causa est ex nobis, sed collationis gratiae prima causa est a Deo; secundum illud Osee XIII, *perditio tua, Israel, tantummodo ex me auxilium tuum*.

Reply to Objection 3: Even in natural things, the form does not necessarily ensue the disposition of the matter, except by the power of the agent that causes the disposition.

[38548] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam in rebus naturalibus dispositio materiae non ex necessitate consequitur formam, nisi per virtutem agentis qui dispositionem causat.

Q. 112. A. 4. Whether grace is greater in one than in another?

Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not greater in one than in another. For grace is caused in us by the Divine love, as stated above (Q[110], A[1]). Now it is written (Wis. 6:8): "He made the little and the great and He hath equally care of all." Therefore all obtain grace from Him equally.

[38549] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gratia non sit maior in uno quam in alio. Gratia enim causatur in nobis ex dilectione divina, ut dictum est. Sed Sap. VI dicitur, *pusillum et magnum ipse fecit, et aequaliter est illi cura de omnibus*. Ergo omnes aequaliter gratiam ab eo consequuntur.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is the greatest possible, cannot be more or less. But grace is the greatest possible, since it joins us with our last end. Therefore there is no greater or less in it.

[38550] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, ea quae in summo dicuntur, non recipiunt magis et minus. Sed gratia in summo dicitur, quia coniungit ultimo fini. Ergo non recipit magis et

Hence it is not greater in one than in another.

minus. Non ergo est maior in uno quam in alio.

Objection 3: Further, grace is the soul's life, as stated above (Q[110], A[1], ad 2). But there is no greater or less in life. Hence, neither is there in grace.

[38551] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, gratia est vita animae, ut supra dictum est. Sed vivere non dicitur secundum magis et minus. Ergo etiam neque gratia.

On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:7): "But to every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ." Now what is given in measure, is not given to all equally. Hence all have not an equal grace.

[38552] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur ad Ephes. IV, *unicuique data est gratia secundum mensuram donationis Christi*. Quod autem mensurate datur, non omnibus aequaliter datur. Ergo non omnes aequalem gratiam habent.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[52], AA[1],2; Q[56], AA[1],2), habits can have a double magnitude: one, as regards the end or object, as when a virtue is said to be more noble through being ordained to a greater good; the other on the part of the subject, which more or less participates in the habit inhering to it.

Now as regards the first magnitude, sanctifying grace cannot be greater or less, since, of its nature, grace joins man to the Highest Good, which is God. But as regards the subject, grace can receive more or less, inasmuch as one may be more perfectly enlightened by grace than another. And a certain reason for this is on the part of him who prepares himself for grace; since he who is better prepared for grace, receives more grace. Yet it is not here that we must seek the first cause of this diversity, since man prepares himself, only inasmuch as his free-will is prepared by God. Hence the first cause of this diversity is to be sought on the part of the God, Who dispenses His gifts of grace variously, in order that the beauty and perfection of the Church may result from these various degree; even as He instituted the various conditions of things, that the universe might be perfect. Hence after the Apostle had said (Eph. 4:7): "To every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ," having enumerated the various graces, he adds (Eph. 4:12): "For the perfecting of the saints . . . for the edifying of the body of Christ."

[38553] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus duplicem magnitudinem habere potest, unam ex parte finis vel obiecti, secundum quod dicitur una virtus alia nobilior inquantum ad maius bonum ordinatur; aliam vero ex parte subiecti, quod magis vel minus participat habitum inhaerentem. Secundum igitur primam magnitudinem, gratia gratum faciens non potest esse maior et minor, quia gratia secundum sui rationem coniungit hominem summo bono, quod est Deus. Sed ex parte subiecti, gratia potest suscipere magis vel minus, prout scilicet unus perfectius illustratur a lumine gratiae quam alius. Cuius diversitatis ratio quidem est aliqua ex parte praeparantis se ad gratiam, qui enim se magis ad gratiam praeparat, pleniorem gratiam accipit. Sed ex hac parte non potest accipi prima ratio huius diversitatis, quia praeparatio ad gratiam non est hominis nisi inquantum liberum arbitrium eius praeparatur a Deo. Unde prima causa huius diversitatis accipienda est ex parte ipsius Dei, qui diversimode suae gratiae dona dispensat, ad hoc quod ex diversis gradibus pulchritudo et perfectio Ecclesiae consurgat, sicut etiam diversos gradus rerum instituit ut esset universum perfectum. Unde apostolus, ad Ephes. IV, postquam dixerat, *unicuique data est gratia secundum mensuram donationis Christi*, enumeratis diversis gratiis, subiungit, *ad consummationem sanctorum, in aedificationem corporis Christi*.

Reply to Objection 1: The Divine care may be looked at in two ways: first, as regards the Divine

[38554] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod cura divina dupliciter considerari

act, which is simple and uniform; and thus His care looks equally to all, since by one simple act He administers great things and little. But, "secondly," it may be considered in those things which come to be considered by the Divine care; and thus, inequality is found, inasmuch as God by His care provides greater gifts to some, and lesser gifts for others.

potest. Uno modo, quantum ad ipsum divinum actum, qui est simplex et uniformis. Et secundum hoc, aequaliter se habet eius cura ad omnes, quia scilicet uno actu et simplici et maiora et minora dispensat. Alio modo potest considerari ex parte eorum quae in creaturis ex divina cura proveniunt. Et secundum hoc invenitur inaequalitas, inquantum scilicet Deus sua cura quibusdam maiora, quibusdam minora providet dona.

Reply to Objection 2: This objection is based on the first kind of magnitude of grace; since grace cannot be greater by ordaining to a greater good, but inasmuch as it more or less ordains to a greater or less participation of the same good. For there may be diversity of intensity and remissness, both in grace and in final glory as regards the subjects' participation.

[38555] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit secundum primum modum magnitudinis gratiae. Non enim potest gratia secundum hoc maior esse, quod ad maius bonum ordinet, sed ex eo quod magis vel minus ordinat ad idem bonum magis vel minus participandum. Potest enim esse diversitas intensionis et remissionis secundum participationem subiecti, et in ipsa gratia et in finali gloria.

Reply to Objection 3: Natural life pertains to man's substance, and hence cannot be more or less; but man partakes of the life of grace accidentally, and hence man may possess it more or less.

[38556] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod vita naturalis pertinet ad substantiam hominis, et ideo non recipit magis et minus. Sed vitam gratiae participat homo accidentaliter, et ideo eam potest homo magis vel minus habere.

Q. 112. A. 5. Whether man can know that he has grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that man can know that he has grace. For grace by its physical reality is in the soul. Now the soul has most certain knowledge of those things that are in it by their physical reality, as appears from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 31). Hence grace may be known most certainly by one who has grace.

[38557] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo possit scire se habere gratiam. Gratia enim est in anima per sui essentiam. Sed certissima cognitio animae est eorum quae sunt in anima per sui essentiam; ut patet per Augustinum, XII super Gen. ad Litt. Ergo gratia certissime potest cognosci a Deo qui gratiam habet.

Objection 2: Further, as knowledge is a gift of God, so is grace. But whoever receives knowledge from God, knows that he has knowledge, according to Wis. 7:17: The Lord "hath given me the true knowledge of the things that are." Hence, with equal reason, whoever receives grace from God, knows that he has grace.

[38558] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut scientia est donum Dei, ita et gratia. Sed qui a Deo scientiam accipit, scit se scientiam habere; secundum illud Sap. VII, *dominus dedit mihi horum quae sunt veram scientiam*. Ergo pari ratione qui accipit gratiam a Deo, scit se gratiam habere.

Objection 3: Further, light is more knowable than

[38559] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, lumen

darkness, since, according to the Apostle (Eph. 5:13), "all that is made manifest is light," Now sin, which is spiritual darkness, may be known with certainty by one that is in sin. Much more, therefore, may grace, which is spiritual light, be known.

est magis cognoscibile quam tenebra, quia secundum apostolum, ad Ephes. V, *omne quod manifestatur, lumen est*. Sed peccatum, quod est spiritualis tenebra, per certitudinem potest sciri ab eo qui habet peccatum. Ergo multo magis gratia, quae est spirituale lumen.

Objection 4: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:12): "Now we have received not the Spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God; that we may know the things that are given us from God." Now grace is God's first gift. Hence, the man who receives grace by the Holy Spirit, by the same Holy Spirit knows the grace given to him.

[38560] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 5 arg. 4 Praeterea, apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. II, *nos autem non spiritum huius mundi accepimus, sed spiritum qui a Deo est, ut sciamus quae a Deo donata sunt nobis*. Sed gratia est praecipuum donum Dei. Ergo homo qui accepit gratiam per spiritum sanctum, per eundem spiritum scit gratiam esse sibi datam.

Objection 5: Further, it was said by the Lord to Abraham (Gn. 22:12): "Now I know that thou fearest God," i.e. "I have made thee know." Now He is speaking there of chaste fear, which is not apart from grace. Hence a man may know that he has grace.

[38561] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 5 arg. 5 Praeterea, Gen. XXII, ex persona domini dicitur ad Abraham, *nunc cognovi quod timeas dominum, idest, cognoscere te feci*. Loquitur autem ibi de timore casto, qui non est sine gratia. Ergo homo potest cognoscere se habere gratiam.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 9:1): "Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred." Now sanctifying grace maketh a man worthy of God's love. Therefore no one can know whether he has sanctifying grace.

[38562] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccle. IX, *nemo scit utrum sit dignus odio vel amore*. Sed gratia gratum faciens facit hominem dignum Dei amore. Ergo nullus potest scire utrum habeat gratiam gratum facientem.

I answer that, There are three ways of knowing a thing: first, by revelation, and thus anyone may know that he has grace, for God by a special privilege reveals this at times to some, in order that the joy of safety may begin in them even in this life, and that they may carry on toilsome works with greater trust and greater energy, and may bear the evils of this present life, as when it was said to Paul (2 Cor. 12:9): "My grace is sufficient for thee."

Secondly, a man may, of himself, know something, and with certainty; and in this way no one can know that he has grace. For certitude about a thing can only be had when we may judge of it by its proper principle. Thus it is by undemonstrable universal principles that certitude is obtained concerning demonstrative conclusions. Now no one can know he has the knowledge of a conclusion if he does not know its principle. But the principle of grace and its object is God, Who

[38563] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod tripliciter aliquid cognosci potest. Uno modo, per revelationem. Et hoc modo potest aliquis scire se habere gratiam. Revelat enim Deus hoc aliquando aliquibus ex speciali privilegio, ut securitatis gaudium etiam in hac vita in eis incipiat, et confidentius et fortius magnifica opera prosequantur, et mala praesentis vitae sustineant, sicut Paulo dictum est, II ad Cor. XII, *sufficit tibi gratia mea*. Alio modo homo cognoscit aliquid per seipsum, et hoc certitudinaliter. Et sic nullus potest scire se habere gratiam. Certitudo enim non potest haberi de aliquo, nisi possit diiudicari per proprium principium, sic enim certitudo habetur de conclusionibus demonstrativis per indemonstrabilia universalia principia; nullus autem posset scire se habere scientiam alicuius conclusionis, si principium ignoraret. Principium autem gratiae, et obiectum eius, est ipse Deus, qui propter sui excellentiam est nobis ignotus;

by reason of His very excellence is unknown to us, according to Job 36:26: "Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge." And hence His presence in us and His absence cannot be known with certainty, according to Job 9:11: "If He come to me, I shall not see Him; if He depart I shall not understand." And hence man cannot judge with certainty that he has grace, according to 1 Cor. 4:3,4: "But neither do I judge my own self . . . but He that judgeth me is the Lord."

Thirdly, things are known conjecturally by signs; and thus anyone may know he has grace, when he is conscious of delighting in God, and of despising worldly things, and inasmuch as a man is not conscious of any mortal sin. And thus it is written (Apoc. 2:17): "To him that overcometh I will give the hidden manna . . . which no man knoweth, but he that receiveth it," because whoever receives it knows, by experiencing a certain sweetness, which he who does not receive it, does not experience. Yet this knowledge is imperfect; hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:4): "I am not conscious to myself of anything, yet am I not hereby justified," since, according to Ps. 18:13: "Who can understand sins? From my secret ones cleanse me, O Lord, and from those of others spare Thy servant."

secundum illud Iob XXXVI, *ecce, Deus magnus, vincens scientiam nostram*. Et ideo eius praesentia in nobis vel absentia per certitudinem cognosci non potest; secundum illud Iob IX, *si venerit ad me, non videbo eum, si autem abierit, non intelligam*. Et ideo homo non potest per certitudinem diiudicare utrum ipse habeat gratiam; secundum illud I ad Cor. IV, *sed neque meipsum iudico, qui autem iudicat me, dominus est*. Tertio modo cognoscitur aliquid coniecturaliter per aliqua signa. Et hoc modo aliquis cognoscere potest se habere gratiam, inquantum scilicet percipit se delectari in Deo, et contemnere res mundanas; et inquantum homo non est conscius sibi alicuius peccati mortalis. Secundum quem modum potest intelligi quod habetur Apoc. II, *vincenti dabo manna absconditum, quod nemo novit nisi qui accipit*, quia scilicet ille qui accipit, per quandam experientiam dulcedinis novit, quam non experitur ille qui non accipit. Ista tamen cognitio imperfecta est. Unde apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. IV, *nihil mihi conscius sum, sed non in hoc iustificatus sum*. Quia ut dicitur in Psalmo XVIII, *delicta quis intelligit? Ab occultis meis munda me, domine*.

Reply to Objection 1: Those things which are in the soul by their physical reality, are known through experimental knowledge; in so far as through acts man has experience of their inward principles: thus when we wish, we perceive that we have a will; and when we exercise the functions of life, we observe that there is life in us.

[38564] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa quae sunt per essentiam sui in anima, cognoscuntur experimentali cognitione, inquantum homo experitur per actus principia intrinseca, sicut voluntatem percipimus volendo, et vitam in operibus vitae.

Reply to Objection 2: It is an essential condition of knowledge that a man should have certitude of the objects of knowledge; and again, it is an essential condition of faith that a man should be certain of the things of faith, and this, because certitude belongs to the perfection of the intellect, wherein these gifts exist. Hence, whoever has knowledge or faith is certain that he has them. But it is otherwise with grace and charity and such like, which perfect the appetitive faculty.

[38565] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod de ratione scientiae est quod homo certitudinem habeat de his quorum habet scientiam, et similiter de ratione fidei est quod homo sit certus de his quorum habet fidem. Et hoc ideo, quia certitudo pertinet ad perfectionem intellectus, in quo praedicta dona existunt. Et ideo quicumque habet scientiam vel fidem, certus est se habere. Non est autem similis ratio de gratia et caritate et aliis huiusmodi, quae perficiunt vim appetitivam.

Reply to Objection 3: Sin has for its principal object commutable good, which is known to us. But the object or end of grace is unknown to us on account of the greatness of its light, according to 1 Tim. 6:16: "Who . . . inhabiteth light inaccessible."

[38566] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod peccatum habet pro principio et pro obiecto bonum commutabile, quod nobis est notum. Obiectum autem vel finis gratiae est nobis ignotum, propter sui luminis immensitatem; secundum illud I ad Tim. ult., *lucem habitat inaccessibilem*.

Reply to Objection 4: The Apostle is here speaking of the gifts of glory, which have been given to us in hope, and these we know most certainly by faith, although we do not know for certain that we have grace to enable us to merit them. Or it may be said that he is speaking of the privileged knowledge, which comes of revelation. Hence he adds (1 Cor. 2:10): "But to us God hath revealed them by His Spirit."

[38567] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 5 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod apostolus ibi loquitur de donis gloriae, quae sunt nobis data in spe, quae certissime cognoscimus per fidem; licet non cognoscamus per certitudinem nos habere gratiam, per quam nos possumus ea promereri. Vel potest dici quod loquitur de notitia privilegiata, quae est per revelationem. Unde subdit, *nobis autem revelavit Deus per spiritum sanctum*.

Reply to Objection 5: What was said to Abraham may refer to experimental knowledge which springs from deeds of which we are cognizant. For in the deed that Abraham had just wrought, he could know experimentally that he had the fear of God. Or it may refer to a revelation.

[38568] Iª-IIae q. 112 a. 5 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod illud etiam verbum Abrahae dictum, potest referri ad notitiam experimentalem, quae est per exhibitionem operis. In opere enim illo quod fecerat Abraham, cognoscere potuit experimentaliter se Dei timorem habere. Vel potest etiam ad revelationem referri.

Q. 113. OF THE EFFECTS OF GRACE (TEN ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the effect of grace; (1) the justification of the ungodly, which is the effect of operating grace; and (2) merit, which is the effect of cooperating grace. Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:

(1) What is the justification of the ungodly?

(2) Whether grace is required for it?

(3) Whether any movement of the free-will is required?

(4) Whether a movement of faith is required?

(5) Whether a movement of the free-will against sin is required?

(6) Whether the remission of sins is to be reckoned with the foregoing?

(7) Whether the justification of the ungodly is a work of time or is sudden?

(8) Of the natural order of the things concurring to justification;

(9) Whether the justification of the ungodly is God's greatest work?

(10) Whether the justification of the ungodly is miraculous?

[38569] Iª-IIae q. 113 pr. Deinde considerandum est de effectibus gratiae. Et primo, de iustificatione impii, quae est effectus gratiae operantis; secundo, de merito, quod est effectus gratiae cooperantis. Circa primum quaeruntur decem. Primo, quid sit iustificatio impii. Secundo, utrum ad eam requiratur gratiae infusio. Tertio, utrum ad eam requiratur aliquis motus liberi arbitrii. Quarto, utrum ad eam requiratur motus fidei. Quinto, utrum ad eam requiratur motus liberi arbitrii contra peccatum. Sexto, utrum praemissis sit connumeranda remissio peccatorum. Septimo, utrum in iustificatione impii sit ordo temporis, aut sit subito. Octavo, de naturali ordine eorum quae ad iustificationem concurrunt. Nono, utrum iustificatio impii sit maximum opus Dei. Decimo, utrum iustificatio impii sit miraculosa.

Q. 113. A. 1. Whether the justification of the ungodly is the remission of sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly is not the remission of sins. For sin is opposed not only to justice, but to all the other virtues, as stated above (Q[71], A[1]). Now justification signifies a certain movement towards justice. Therefore not even remission of sin is justification, since movement is from one contrary to the other.

[38570] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iustificatio impii non sit remissio peccatorum. Peccatum enim non solum iustitiae opponitur, sed omnibus virtutibus; ut ex supradictis patet. Sed iustificatio significat motum quendam ad iustitiam. Non ergo omnis peccati remissio est iustificatio, cum omnis motus sit de contrario in contrarium.

Objection 2: Further, everything ought to be named from what is predominant in it, according to De Anima ii, text. 49. Now the remission of sins is brought about chiefly by faith, according to Acts 15:9: "Purifying their hearts by faith"; and by charity, according to Prov. 10:12: "Charity

[38571] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, unumquodque debet denominari ab eo quod est potissimum in ipso, ut dicitur in II de anima. Sed remissio peccatorum praecipue fit per fidem, secundum illud Act. XV, *fide purificans corda eorum*; et per caritatem, secundum illud Prov. X,

covereth all sins." Therefore the remission of sins ought to be named after faith or charity rather than justice.

universa delicta operit caritas. Magis ergo remissio peccatorum debuit denominari a fide vel a caritate, quam a iustitia.

Objection 3: Further, the remission of sins seems to be the same as being called, for whoever is called is afar off, and we are afar off from God by sin. But one is called before being justified according to Rom. 8:30: "And whom He called, them He also justified." Therefore justification is not the remission of sins.

[38572] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, remissio peccatorum idem esse videtur quod vocatio, vocatur enim qui distat; distat autem aliquis a Deo per peccatum. Sed vocatio iustificationem praecedit; secundum illud Rom. VIII, *quos vocavit, hos et iustificavit*. Ergo iustificatio non est remissio peccatorum.

On the contrary, On Rom. 8:30, "Whom He called, them He also justified," the gloss says i.e. "by the remission of sins." Therefore the remission of sins is justification.

[38573] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod, Rom. VIII super illud, *quos vocavit, hos et iustificavit*, dicit Glossa, remissione peccatorum. Ergo remissio peccatorum est iustificatio.

I answer that, Justification taken passively implies a movement towards heat. But since justice, by its nature, implies a certain rectitude of order, it may be taken in two ways: first, inasmuch as it implies a right order in man's act, and thus justice is placed amongst the virtues---either as particular justice, which directs a man's acts by regulating them in relation to his fellowman---or as legal justice, which directs a man's acts by regulating them in their relation to the common good of society, as appears from Ethic. v, 1.

Secondly, justice is so-called inasmuch as it implies a certain rectitude of order in the interior disposition of a man, in so far as what is highest in man is subject to God, and the inferior powers of the soul are subject to the superior, i.e. to the reason; and this disposition the Philosopher calls "justice metaphorically speaking" (Ethic. v, 11). Now this justice may be in man in two ways: first, by simple generation, which is from privation to form; and thus justification may belong even to such as are not in sin, when they receive this justice from God, as Adam is said to have received original justice. Secondly, this justice may be brought about in man by a movement from one contrary to the other, and thus justification implies a transmutation from the state of injustice to the aforesaid state of justice. And it is thus we are now speaking of the justification of the ungodly, according to the Apostle (Rom. 4:5): "But to him that worketh not, yet believeth in Him

[38574] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod iustificatio passive accepta importat motum ad iustitiam; sicut et calefactio motum ad calorem. Cum autem iustitia de sui ratione importet quandam rectitudinem ordinis, dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo, secundum quod importat ordinem rectum in ipso actu hominis. Et secundum hoc iustitia ponitur virtus quaedam, sive sit particularis iustitia, quae ordinat actum hominis secundum rectitudinem in comparatione ad alium singularem hominem; sive sit iustitia legalis, quae ordinat secundum rectitudinem actum hominis in comparatione ad bonum commune multitudinis; ut patet in V Ethic. Alio modo dicitur iustitia prout importat rectitudinem quandam ordinis in ipsa interiori dispositione hominis, prout scilicet supremum hominis subditur Deo, et inferiores vires animae subduntur supremae, scilicet rationi. Et hanc etiam dispositionem vocat philosophus, in V Ethic., iustitiam metaphorice dictam. Haec autem iustitia in homine potest fieri dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, per modum simplicis generationis, quae est ex privatione ad formam. Et hoc modo iustificatio posset competere etiam ei qui non esset in peccato, dum huiusmodi iustitiam a Deo acciperet, sicut Adam dicitur accepisse originalem iustitiam. Alio modo potest fieri huiusmodi iustitia in homine secundum rationem motus qui est de contrario in contrarium. Et secundum hoc, iustificatio importat transmutationem quandam de statu iniustitiae ad statum iustitiae praedictae. Et hoc modo loquimur hic de iustificatione impii;

that justifieth the ungodly," etc. And because movement is named after its term "whereto" rather than from its term "whence," the transmutation whereby anyone is changed by the remission of sins from the state of ungodliness to the state of justice, borrows its name from its term "whereto," and is called "justification of the ungodly."

secundum illud apostoli, ad Rom. IV, *ei qui non operatur, credenti autem in eum qui iustificat impium*, et cetera. Et quia motus magis denominatur a termino ad quem quam a termino a quo, ideo huiusmodi transmutatio, qua aliquis transmutatur a statu iniustitiae per remissionem peccati, sortitur nomen a termino ad quem, et vocatur iustificatio impii.

Reply to Objection 1: Every sin, inasmuch as it implies the disorder of a mind not subject to God, may be called injustice, as being contrary to the aforesaid justice, according to 1 Jn. 3:4: "Whosoever committeth sin, committeth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity." And thus the removal of any sin is called the justification of the ungodly.

[38575] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omne peccatum, secundum quod importat quandam inordinationem mentis non subditae Deo, iniustitia potest dici praedictae iustitiae contraria; secundum illud I Ioan. III, *omnis qui facit peccatum, et iniquitatem facit, et peccatum est iniquitas*. Et secundum hoc, remotio cuiuslibet peccati dicitur iustificatio.

Reply to Objection 2: Faith and charity imply a special directing of the human mind to God by the intellect and will; whereas justice implies a general rectitude of order. Hence this transmutation is named after justice rather than after charity or faith.

[38576] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod fides et caritas dicunt ordinem specialem mentis humanae ad Deum secundum intellectum vel affectum. Sed iustitia importat generaliter totam rectitudinem ordinis. Et ideo magis denominatur huiusmodi transmutatio a iustitia quam a caritate vel fide.

Reply to Objection 3: Being called refers to God's help moving and exciting our mind to give up sin, and this motion of God is not the remission of sins, but its cause.

[38577] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod vocatio refertur ad auxilium Dei interius moventis et excitantis mentem ad deserendum peccatum. Quae quidem motio Dei non est ipsa remissio peccati, sed causa eius.

Q. 113. A. 2. Whether the infusion of grace is required for the remission of guilt, i.e. for the justification of the ungodly?

Objection 1: It would seem that for the remission of guilt, which is the justification of the ungodly, no infusion of grace is required. For anyone may be moved from one contrary without being led to the other, if the contraries are not immediate. Now the state of guilt and the state of grace are not immediate contraries; for there is the middle state of innocence wherein a man has neither grace nor guilt. Hence a man may be pardoned his guilt without his being brought to a state of grace.

[38578] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad remissionem culpae, quae est iustificatio impii, non requiratur gratiae infusio. Potest enim aliquis removeri ab uno contrario sine hoc quod perducatur ad alterum, si contraria sint mediata. Sed status culpae et status gratiae sunt contraria mediata, est enim medius status innocentiae, in quo homo nec gratiam habet nec culpam. Ergo potest alicui remitti culpa sine hoc quod perducatur ad gratiam.

Objection 2: Further, the remission of guilt consists in the Divine imputation, according to Ps.

[38579] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, remissio culpae consistit in reputatione divina;

31:2: "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin." Now the infusion of grace puts something into our soul, as stated above (Q[110], A[1]). Hence the infusion of grace is not required for the remission of guilt.

secundum illud Psalmi XXXI, *beatus vir cui non imputavit dominus peccatum*. Sed infusio gratiae ponit etiam aliquid in nobis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo infusio gratiae non requiritur ad remissionem culpae.

Objection 3: Further, no one can be subject to two contraries at once. Now some sins are contraries, as wastefulness and miserliness. Hence whoever is subject to the sin of wastefulness is not simultaneously subject to the sin of miserliness, yet it may happen that he has been subject to it hitherto. Hence by sinning with the vice of wastefulness he is freed from the sin of miserliness. And thus a sin is remitted without grace.

[38580] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, nullus subiicitur simul duobus contrariis. Sed quaedam peccata sunt contraria, sicut prodigalitas et illiberalitas. Ergo qui subiicitur peccato prodigalitatis, non simul subiicitur peccato illiberalitatis. Potest tamen contingere quod prius ei subiiciebatur. Ergo peccando vitio prodigalitatis, liberatur a peccato illiberalitatis. Et sic remittitur aliquod peccatum sine gratia.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 3:24): "Justified freely by His grace."

[38581] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. III, *iustificati gratis per gratiam ipsius*.

I answer that, by sinning a man offends God as stated above (Q[71], A[5]). Now an offense is remitted to anyone, only when the soul of the offender is at peace with the offended. Hence sin is remitted to us, when God is at peace with us, and this peace consists in the love whereby God loves us. Now God's love, considered on the part of the Divine act, is eternal and unchangeable; whereas, as regards the effect it imprints on us, it is sometimes interrupted, inasmuch as we sometimes fall short of it and once more require it. Now the effect of the Divine love in us, which is taken away by sin, is grace, whereby a man is made worthy of eternal life, from which sin shuts him out. Hence we could not conceive the remission of guilt, without the infusion of grace.

[38582] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod homo peccando Deum offendit, sicut ex supradictis patet. Offensa autem non remittitur alicui nisi per hoc quod animus offensi pacatur offendenti. Et ideo secundum hoc peccatum nobis remitti dicitur, quod Deus nobis pacatur. Quae quidem pax consistit in dilectione qua Deus nos diligit. Dilectio autem Dei, quantum est ex parte actus divini, est aeterna et immutabilis, sed quantum ad effectum quem nobis imprimit, quandoque interrumpitur, prout scilicet ab ipso quandoque deficimus et quandoque iterum recuperamus. Effectus autem divinae dilectionis in nobis qui per peccatum tollitur, est gratia, qua homo fit dignus vita aeterna, a qua peccatum mortale excludit. Et ideo non posset intelligi remissio culpae, nisi adesset infusio gratiae.

Reply to Objection 1: More is required for an offender to pardon an offense, than for one who has committed no offense, not to be hated. For it may happen amongst men that one man neither hates nor loves another. But if the other offends him, then the forgiveness of the offense can only spring from a special goodwill. Now God's goodwill is said to be restored to man by the gift of grace; and hence although a man before

[38583] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod plus requiritur ad hoc quod offendenti remittatur offensa, quam ad hoc quod simpliciter aliquis non offendens non habeatur odio. Potest enim apud homines contingere quod unus homo aliquem alium nec diligat nec odiat; sed si eum offendat, quod ei dimittat offensam, hoc non potest contingere absque speciali benevolentia. Benevolentia autem Dei ad

sinning may be without grace and without guilt, yet that he is without guilt after sinning can only be because he has grace.

hominem reparari dicitur per donum gratiae. Et ideo licet, antequam homo peccet, potuerit esse sine gratia et sine culpa; tamen post peccatum, non potest esse sine culpa nisi gratiam habeat.

Reply to Objection 2: As God's love consists not merely in the act of the Divine will but also implies a certain effect of grace, as stated above (Q[110], A[1]), so likewise, when God does not impute sin to a man, there is implied a certain effect in him to whom the sin is not imputed; for it proceeds from the Divine love, that sin is not imputed to a man by God.

[38584] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dilectio Dei non solum consistit in actu voluntatis divinae, sed etiam importat quendam gratiae effectum, ut supra dictum est; ita etiam et hoc quod est Deum non imputare peccatum homini, importat quendam effectum in ipso cuius peccatum non imputatur. Quod enim alicui non imputetur peccatum a Deo, ex divina dilectione procedit.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i, 26), if to leave off sinning was the same as to have no sin, it would be enough if Scripture warned us thus: "'My son, hast thou sinned? do so no more?' Now this is not enough, but it is added: 'But for thy former sins also pray that they may be forgiven thee.'" For the act of sin passes, but the guilt remains, as stated above (Q[87], A[6]). Hence when anyone passes from the sin of one vice to the sin of a contrary vice, he ceases to have the act of the former sin, but he does not cease to have the guilt, hence he may have the guilt of both sins at once. For sins are not contrary to each other on the part of their turning from God, wherein sin has its guilt.

[38585] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de nuptiis et Concup., *si a peccato desistere, hoc esset non habere peccatum, sufficeret ut hoc moneret Scriptura, fili, peccasti, non adiicias iterum. Non autem sufficit, sed additur, et de pristinis deprecare, ut tibi remittantur*. Transit enim peccatum actu, et remanet reatu, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo cum aliquis a peccato unius vitii transit in peccatum contrarii vitii, desinit quidem habere actum praeteriti, sed non desinit habere reatum, unde simul habet reatum utriusque peccati. Non enim peccata sunt sibi contraria ex parte aversionis a Deo, ex qua parte peccatum reatum habet.

Q. 113. A. 3. Whether for the justification of the ungodly is required a movement of the free-will?

Objection 1: It would seem that no movement of the free-will is required for the justification of the ungodly. For we see that by the sacrament of Baptism, infants and sometimes adults are justified without a movement of their free-will: hence Augustine says (Confess. iv) that when one of his friends was taken with a fever, "he lay for a long time senseless and in a deadly sweat, and when he was despaired of, he was baptized without his knowing, and was regenerated"; which is effected by sanctifying grace. Now God does not confine His power to the sacraments. Hence He can justify a man without the sacraments, and without any movement of the free-will.

[38586] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad iustificationem impii non requiratur motus liberi arbitrii. Videmus enim quod per sacramentum Baptismi iustificantur pueri absque motu liberi arbitrii, et etiam interdum adulti, dicit enim Augustinus, in IV Confess., quod cum quidam suus amicus laboraret febribus, *iacuit diu sine sensu in sudore letali; et dum desperaretur, baptizatus est nesciens, et recreatus est*; quod fit per gratiam iustificantem. Sed Deus potentiam suam non alligavit sacramentis. Ergo etiam potest iustificare hominem sine sacramentis absque omni motu liberi arbitrii.

Objection 2: Further, a man has not the use of reason when asleep, and without it there can be no movement of the free-will. But Solomon received from God the gift of wisdom when asleep, as related in 3 Kings 3 and 2 Paral 1. Hence with equal reason the gift of sanctifying grace is sometimes bestowed by God on man without the movement of his free-will.

[38587] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, in dormiendo homo non habet usum rationis, sine quo non potest esse motus liberi arbitrii. Sed Salomon in dormiendo consecutus est a Deo donum sapientiae; ut habetur III Reg. III, et II Paral. I. Ergo etiam, pari ratione, donum gratiae iustificantis quandoque datur homini a Deo absque motu liberi arbitrii.

Objection 3: Further, grace is preserved by the same cause as brings it into being, for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) that "so ought man to turn to God as he is ever made just by Him." Now grace is preserved in man without a movement of his free-will. Hence it can be infused in the beginning without a movement of the free-will.

[38588] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, per eandem causam gratia producitur in esse et conservatur, dicit enim Augustinus, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., quod *ita se debet homo ad Deum convertere, ut ab illo semper fiat iustus*. Sed absque motu liberi arbitrii gratia in homine conservatur. Ergo absque motu liberi arbitrii potest a principio infundi.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 6:45): "Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me." Now to learn cannot be without a movement of the free-will, since the learner assents to the teacher. Hence, no one comes to the Father by justifying grace without a movement of the free-will.

[38589] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. VI, *omnis qui audit a patre et didicit, venit ad me*. Sed discere non est sine motu liberi arbitrii, addiscens enim consentit docenti. Ergo nullus venit ad Deum per gratiam iustificantem absque motu liberi arbitrii.

I answer that, The justification of the ungodly is brought about by God moving man to justice. For He it is "that justifieth the ungodly" according to Rom. 4:5. Now God moves everything in its own manner, just as we see that in natural things, what is heavy and what is light are moved differently, on account of their diverse natures. Hence He moves man to justice according to the condition of his human nature. But it is man's proper nature to have free-will. Hence in him who has the use of reason, God's motion to justice does not take place without a movement of the free-will; but He so infuses the gift of justifying grace that at the same time He moves the free-will to accept the gift of grace, in such as are capable of being moved thus.

[38590] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod iustificatio impii fit Deo movente hominem ad iustitiam, ipse enim est qui iustificat impium, ut dicitur Rom. IV. Deus autem movet omnia secundum modum uniuscuiusque, sicut in naturalibus videmus quod aliter moventur ab ipso gravia et aliter levia, propter diversam naturam utriusque. Unde et homines ad iustitiam movet secundum conditionem naturae humanae. Homo autem secundum propriam naturam habet quod sit liberi arbitrii. Et ideo in eo qui habet usum liberi arbitrii, non fit motio a Deo ad iustitiam absque motu liberi arbitrii; sed ita infundit donum gratiae iustificantis, quod etiam simul cum hoc movet liberum arbitrium ad donum gratiae acceptandum, in his qui sunt huius motionis capaces.

Reply to Objection 1: Infants are not capable of the movement of their free-will; hence it is by the mere infusion of their souls that God moves them to justice. Now this cannot be brought about without a sacrament; because as original sin, from which they are justified, does not come to them

[38591] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod pueri non sunt capaces motus liberi arbitrii, et ideo moventur a Deo ad iustitiam per solam informationem animae ipsorum. Non autem hoc fit sine sacramento, quia sicut peccatum originale, a quo iustificantur, non

from their own will, but by carnal generation, so also is grace given them by Christ through spiritual regeneration. And the same reason holds good with madmen and idiots that have never had the use of their free-will. But in the case of one who has had the use of his free-will and afterwards has lost it either through sickness or sleep, he does not obtain justifying grace by the exterior rite of Baptism, or of any other sacrament, unless he intended to make use of this sacrament, and this can only be by the use of his free-will. And it was in this way that he of whom Augustine speaks was regenerated, because both previously and afterwards he assented to the Baptism.

propria voluntate ad eos pervenit, sed per carnalem originem; ita etiam per spiritualem regenerationem a Christo in eos gratia derivatur. Et eadem ratio est de furiosis et amentibus qui nunquam usum liberi arbitrii habuerunt. Sed si quis aliquando habuerit usum liberi arbitrii, et postmodum eo careat vel per infirmitatem vel per somnum; non consequitur gratiam iustificantem per Baptismum exterius adhibitum, aut per aliquod aliud sacramentum, nisi prius habuerit sacramentum in proposito; quod sine usu liberi arbitrii non contingit. Et hoc modo ille de quo loquitur Augustinus, recreatus fuit, quia et prius et postea Baptismum acceptavit.

Reply to Objection 2: Solomon neither merited nor received wisdom whilst asleep; but it was declared to him in his sleep that on account of his previous desire wisdom would be infused into him by God. Hence it is said in his person (Wis. 7:7): "I wished, and understanding was given unto me."

Or it may be said that his sleep was not natural, but was the sleep of prophecy, according to Num. 12:6: "If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream." In such cases the use of free-will remains.

And yet it must be observed that the comparison between the gift of wisdom and the gift of justifying grace does not hold. For the gift of justifying grace especially ordains a man to good, which is the object of the will; and hence a man is moved to it by a movement of the will which is a movement of free-will. But wisdom perfects the intellect which precedes the will; hence without any complete movement of the free-will, the intellect can be enlightened with the gift of wisdom, even as we see that things are revealed to men in sleep, according to Job 33:15,16: "When deep sleep falleth upon men and they are sleeping in their beds, then He openeth the ears of men, and teaching, instructeth them in what they are to learn."

[38592] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam Salomon dormiendo non meruit sapientiam, nec accepit. Sed in somno declaratum est ei quod, propter praecedens desiderium, ei a Deo sapientia infunderetur, unde ex eius persona dicitur, Sap. VII, optavi, et datus est mihi sensus. Vel potest dici quod ille somnus non fuit naturalis, sed somnus prophetiae; secundum quod dicitur Num. XII, *si quis fuerit inter vos propheta domini, per somnium aut in visione loquar ad eum*. In quo casu aliquis usum liberi arbitrii habet. Et tamen sciendum est quod non est eadem ratio de dono sapientiae et de dono gratiae iustificantis. Nam donum gratiae iustificantis praecipue ordinat hominem ad bonum, quod est obiectum voluntatis, et ideo ad ipsum movetur homo per motum voluntatis, qui est motus liberi arbitrii. Sed sapientia perficit intellectum, qui praecedit voluntatem, unde absque completo motu liberi arbitrii, potest intellectus dono sapientiae illuminari. Sicut etiam videmus quod in dormiendo aliqua hominibus revelantur, sicut dicitur Iob XXXIII, *quando irruit sopor super homines et dormiunt in lectulo, tunc aperit aures virorum, et erudiens eos instruit disciplina*.

Reply to Objection 3: In the infusion of justifying grace there is a certain transmutation of the human soul, and hence a proper movement of

[38593] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in infusione gratiae iustificantis est quaedam transmutatio animae, et ideo

the human soul is required in order that the soul may be moved in its own manner. But the conservation of grace is without transmutation: no movement on the part of the soul is required but only a continuation of the Divine influx.

requiritur motus proprius animae humanae, ut anima moveatur secundum modum suum. Sed conservatio gratiae est absque transmutatione, unde non requiritur aliquis motus ex parte animae, sed sola continuatio influxus divini.

Q. 113. A. 4. Whether a movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly?

Objection 1: It would seem that no movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly. For as a man is justified by faith, so also by other things, viz. by fear, of which it is written (Ecclus. 1:27): "The fear of the Lord driveth out sin, for he that is without fear cannot be justified"; and again by charity, according to Lk. 7:47: "Many sins are forgiven her because she hath loved much"; and again by humility, according to James 4:6: "God resisteth the proud and giveth grace to the humble"; and again by mercy, according to Prov. 15:27: "By mercy and faith sins are purged away." Hence the movement of faith is no more required for the justification of the ungodly, than the movements of the aforesaid virtues.

[38594] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad iustificationem impii non requiratur motus fidei. Sicut enim per fidem iustificatur homo, ita etiam et per quaedam alia. Scilicet per timorem; de quo dicitur Eccli. I, *timor domini expellit peccatum, nam qui sine timore est, non poterit iustificari*. Et iterum per caritatem; secundum illud Luc. VII, *dimissa sunt ei peccata multa, quoniam dilexit multum*. Et iterum per humilitatem; secundum illud Iac. IV, *Deus superbis resistit, humilibus autem dat gratiam*. Et iterum per misericordiam; secundum illud Prov. XV, *per misericordiam et fidem purgantur peccata*. Non ergo magis motus fidei requiritur ad iustificationem quam motus praedictarum virtutum.

Objection 2: Further, the act of faith is required for justification only inasmuch as a man knows God by faith. But a man may know God in other ways, viz. by natural knowledge, and by the gift of wisdom. Hence no act of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly.

[38595] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, actus fidei non requiritur ad iustificationem nisi inquantum per fidem homo cognoscit Deum. Sed etiam aliis modis potest homo Deum cognoscere, scilicet per cognitionem naturalem, et per donum sapientiae. Ergo non requiritur actus fidei ad iustificationem impii.

Objection 3: Further, there are several articles of faith. Therefore if the act of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly, it would seem that a man ought to think on every article of faith when he is first justified. But this seems inconvenient, since such thought would require a long delay of time. Hence it seems that an act of faith is not required for the justification of the ungodly.

[38596] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, diversi sunt articuli fidei. Si igitur actus fidei requiratur ad iustificationem impii, videtur quod oporteret hominem, quando primo iustificatur, de omnibus articulis fidei cogitare. Sed hoc videtur inconveniens, cum talis cogitatio longam temporis moram requirat. Ergo videtur quod actus fidei non requiratur ad iustificationem.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 5:1): "Being justified therefore by faith, let us have peace with God."

[38597] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. V, *iustificati igitur ex fide, pacem habeamus ad Deum*.

I answer that, As stated above (A[3]) a

[38598] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 4 co. Respondeo

movement of free-will is required for the justification of the ungodly, inasmuch as man's mind is moved by God. Now God moves man's soul by turning it to Himself according to Ps. 84:7 (Septuagint): "Thou wilt turn us, O God, and bring us to life." Hence for the justification of the ungodly a movement of the mind is required, by which it is turned to God. Now the first turning to God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6: "He that cometh to God must believe that He is." Hence a movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly.

dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, motus liberi arbitrii requiritur ad iustificationem impii, secundum quod mens hominis movetur a Deo. Deus autem movet animam hominis convertendo eam ad seipsum; ut dicitur in Psalmo LXXXIV, secundum aliam litteram, *Deus, tu convertens vivificabis nos*. Et ideo ad iustificationem impii requiritur motus mentis quo convertitur in Deum. Prima autem conversio in Deum fit per fidem; secundum illud ad Heb. XI, *accedentem ad Deum oportet credere quia est*. Et ideo motus fidei requiritur ad iustificationem impii.

Reply to Objection 1: The movement of faith is not perfect unless it is quickened by charity; hence in the justification of the ungodly, a movement of charity is infused together with the movement of faith. Now free-will is moved to God by being subject to Him; hence an act of filial fear and an act of humility also concur. For it may happen that one and the same act of free-will springs from different virtues, when one commands and another is commanded, inasmuch as the act may be ordained to various ends. But the act of mercy counteracts sin either by way of satisfying for it, and thus it follows justification; or by way of preparation, inasmuch as the merciful obtain mercy; and thus it can either precede justification, or concur with the other virtues towards justification, inasmuch as mercy is included in the love of our neighbor.

[38599] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod motus fidei non est perfectus nisi sit caritate informatus, unde simul in iustificatione impii cum motu fidei, est etiam motus caritatis. Movetur autem liberum arbitrium in Deum ad hoc quod ei se subiiciat, unde etiam concurrit actus timoris filialis, et actus humilitatis. Contingit enim unum et eundem actum liberi arbitrii diversarum virtutum esse, secundum quod una imperat et alia imperatur, prout scilicet actus est ordinabilis ad diversos fines. Actus autem misericordiae operatur contra peccatum per modum satisfactionis, et sic sequitur iustificationem, vel per modum praeparationis, inquantum misericordes misericordiam consequuntur, et sic etiam potest praecedere iustificationem; vel etiam ad iustificationem concurrere simul cum praedictis virtutibus, secundum quod misericordia includitur in dilectione proximi.

Reply to Objection 2: By natural knowledge a man is not turned to God, according as He is the object of beatitude and the cause of justification. Hence such knowledge does not suffice for justification. But the gift of wisdom presupposes the knowledge of faith, as stated above (Q[68], A[4], ad 3).

[38600] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod per cognitionem naturalem homo non convertitur in Deum inquantum est obiectum beatitudinis et iustificationis causa, unde talis cognitio non sufficit ad iustificationem. Donum autem sapientiae praesupponit cognitionem fidei, ut ex supradictis patet.

Reply to Objection 3: As the Apostle says (Rom. 4:5), "to him that . . . believeth in Him that justifieth the ungodly his faith is reputed to justice, according to the purpose of the grace of God." Hence it is clear that in the justification of the ungodly an act of faith is required in order that a man may believe that God justifies man through the mystery of Christ.

[38601] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, ad Rom. IV, *credenti in eum qui iustificat impium, reputabitur fides eius ad iustitiam, secundum propositum gratiae Dei*. Ex quo patet quod in iustificatione impii requiritur actus fidei quantum ad hoc, quod homo credat Deum esse iustificatorem hominum per mysterium Christi.

Q. 113. A. 5. Whether for the justification of the ungodly there is required a movement of the free-will towards sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that no movement of the free-will towards sin is required for the justification of the ungodly. For charity alone suffices to take away sin, according to Prov. 10:12: "Charity covereth all sins." Now the object of charity is not sin. Therefore for this justification of the ungodly no movement of the free-will towards sin is required.

[38602] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad iustificationem impii non requiratur motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum. Sola enim caritas sufficit ad deletionem peccati, secundum illud Prov. X, *universa delicta operit caritas*. Sed caritatis obiectum non est peccatum. Ergo non requiritur ad iustificationem impii motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum.

Objection 2: Further, whoever is tending onward, ought not to look back, according to Phil. 3:13,14: "Forgetting the things that are behind, and stretching forth myself to those that are before, I press towards the mark, to the prize of the supernal vocation." But whoever is stretching forth to righteousness has his sins behind him. Hence he ought to forget them, and not stretch forth to them by a movement of his free-will.

[38603] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, qui in anteriora tendit, ad posteriora respicere non debet; secundum illud apostoli, ad Philipp. III, *quae quidem retro sunt obliviscens, ad ea vero quae sunt priora extendens meipsum, ad destinatum persequor bravium supernae vocationis*. Sed tendenti in iustitiam retrorsum sunt peccata praeterita. Ergo eorum debet oblivisci, nec in ea se debet extendere per motum liberi arbitrii.

Objection 3: Further, in the justification of the ungodly one sin is not remitted without another, for "it is irreverent to expect half a pardon from God" [*Cap., Sunt. plures: Dist. iii, De Poenit.]. Hence, in the justification of the ungodly, if man's free-will must move against sin, he ought to think of all his sins. But this is unseemly, both because a great space of time would be required for such thought, and because a man could not obtain the forgiveness of such sins as he had forgotten. Hence for the justification of the ungodly no movement of the free-will is required.

[38604] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, in iustificatione impii non remittitur unum peccatum sine alio, impium enim est a Deo dimidiam sperare veniam. Si igitur in iustificatione impii oporteat liberum arbitrium moveri contra peccatum, oporteret quod de omnibus peccatis suis cogitaret. Quod videtur inconveniens, tum quia requireretur magnum tempus ad huiusmodi cogitationem; tum etiam quia peccatorum quorum est homo oblitus, veniam habere non posset. Ergo motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum non requiritur ad iustificationem impii.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 31:5): "I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord; and Thou hast forgiven the wickedness of my sin."

[38605] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo XXXI, *dixi, confitebor adversum me iniustitiam meam domino, et tu remisisti impietatem peccati mei*.

I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the justification of the ungodly is a certain movement whereby the human mind is moved by God from the state of sin to the state of justice. Hence it is necessary for the human mind to regard both extremes by an act of free-will, as a body in local movement is related to both terms of the movement. Now it is clear that in local movement the moving body leaves the term "whence" and

[38606] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, iustificatio impii est quidam motus quo humana mens movetur a Deo a statu peccati in statum iustitiae. Oportet igitur quod humana mens se habeat ad utrumque extremorum secundum motum liberi arbitrii, sicut se habet corpus localiter motum ab aliquo movente ad duos terminos motus. Manifestum est autem in motu locali corporum

nears the term "whereto." Hence the human mind whilst it is being justified, must, by a movement of its free-will withdraw from sin and draw near to justice.

Now to withdraw from sin and to draw near to justice, in an act of free-will, means detestation and desire. For Augustine says on the words "the hireling fleeth," etc. (Jn. 10:12): "Our emotions are the movements of our soul; joy is the soul's outpouring; fear is the soul's flight; your soul goes forward when you seek; your soul flees, when you are afraid." Hence in the justification of the ungodly there must be two acts of the free-will---one, whereby it tends to God's justice; the other whereby it hates sin.

quod corpus motum recedit a termino a quo, et accedit ad terminum ad quem. Unde oportet quod mens humana, dum iustificatur, per motum liberi arbitrii recedat a peccato, et accedat ad iustitiam. Recessus autem et accessus in motu liberi arbitrii accipitur secundum detestationem et desiderium, dicit enim Augustinus, super Ioan. exponens illud, *mercenarius autem fugit, affectiones nostrae motus animorum sunt, laetitia animi diffusio, timor animi fuga est; progrederis animo cum appetis, fugis animo cum metuis*. Oportet igitur quod in iustificatione impii sit motus liberi arbitrii duplex, unus quo per desiderium tendat in Dei iustitiam; et alius quo detestetur peccatum.

Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to the same virtue to seek one contrary and to avoid the other; and hence, as it belongs to charity to love God, so likewise, to detest sin whereby the soul is separated from God.

[38607] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad eandem virtutem pertinet prosequi unum oppositorum, et refugere aliud. Et ideo sicut ad caritatem pertinet diligere Deum, ita etiam detestari peccata, per quae anima separatur a Deo.

Reply to Objection 2: A man ought not to return to those things that are behind, by loving them; but, for that matter, he ought to forget them, lest he be drawn to them. Yet he ought to recall them to mind, in order to detest them; for this is to fly from them.

[38608] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ad posteriora non debet homo regredi per amorem; sed quantum ad hoc debet ea oblivisci, ut ad ea non afficiatur. Debet tamen eorum recordari per considerationem ut ea detestetur, sic enim ab eis recedit.

Reply to Objection 3: Previous to justification a man must detest each sin he remembers to have committed, and from this remembrance the soul goes on to have a general movement of detestation with regard to all sins committed, in which are included such sins as have been forgotten. For a man is then in such a frame of mind that he would be sorry even for those he does not remember, if they were present to his memory; and this movement cooperates in his justification.

[38609] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in tempore praecedente iustificationem, oportet quod homo singula peccata quae commisit detestetur, quorum memoriam habet. Et ex tali consideratione praecedenti subsequitur in anima quidam motus detestantis universaliter omnia peccata commissa, inter quae etiam includuntur peccata oblivioni tradita, quia homo in statu illo est sic dispositus ut etiam de his quae non meminit, contereretur, si memoriae adessent. Et iste motus concurrit ad iustificationem.

Q. 113. A. 6. Whether the remission of sins ought to be reckoned amongst the things required for justification?

Objection 1: It would seem that the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned amongst the things

[38610] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod remissio peccatorum non

required for justification. For the substance of a thing is not reckoned together with those that are required for a thing; thus a man is not reckoned together with his body and soul. But the justification of the ungodly is itself the remission of sins, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned among the things required for the justification of the ungodly.

debeat numerari inter ea quae requiruntur ad iustificationem impii. Substantia enim rei non connumeratur his quae ad rem requiruntur, sicut homo non debet connumerari animae et corpori. Sed ipsa iustificatio impii est remissio peccatorum, ut dictum est. Ergo remissio peccatorum non debet computari inter ea quae ad iustificationem impii requiruntur.

Objection 2: Further, infusion of grace and remission of sins are the same; as illumination and expulsion of darkness are the same. But a thing ought not to be reckoned together with itself; for unity is opposed to multitude. Therefore the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned with the infusion of grace.

[38611] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, idem est gratiae infusio et culpae remissio, sicut idem est illuminatio et tenebrarum expulsio. Sed idem non debet connumerari sibi ipsi, unum enim multitudini opponitur. Ergo non debet culpae remissio connumerari infusioni gratiae.

Objection 3: Further, the remission of sin follows as effect from cause, from the free-will's movement towards God and sin; since it is by faith and contrition that sin is forgiven. But an effect ought not to be reckoned with its cause; since things thus enumerated together, and, as it were, condivided, are by nature simultaneous. Hence the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned with the things required for the justification of the ungodly.

[38612] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, remissio peccatorum consequitur ad motum liberi arbitrii in Deum et in peccatum, sicut effectus ad causam, per fidem enim et contritionem remittuntur peccata. Sed effectus non debet connumerari suae causae, quia ea quae connumerantur quasi ad invicem condivisa, sunt simul natura. Ergo remissio culpae non debet connumerari aliis quae requiruntur ad iustificationem impii.

On the contrary, In reckoning what is required for a thing we ought not to pass over the end, which is the chief part of everything. Now the remission of sins is the end of the justification of the ungodly; for it is written (Is. 27:9): "This is all the fruit, that the sin thereof should be taken away." Hence the remission of sins ought to be reckoned amongst the things required for justification.

[38613] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod in enumeratione eorum quae requiruntur ad rem, non debet praetermitti finis, qui est potissimum in unoquoque. Sed remissio peccatorum est finis in iustificatione impii, dicitur enim Isaiae XXVII, *iste est omnis fructus, ut auferatur peccatum eius*. Ergo remissio peccatorum debet connumerari inter ea quae requiruntur ad iustificationem impii.

I answer that, There are four things which are accounted to be necessary for the justification of the ungodly, viz. the infusion of grace, the movement of the free-will towards God by faith, the movement of the free-will towards sin, and the remission of sins. The reason for this is that, as stated above (A[1]), the justification of the ungodly is a movement whereby the soul is moved by God from a state of sin to a state of justice. Now in the movement whereby one thing

[38614] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quatuor enumerantur quae requiruntur ad iustificationem impii, scilicet gratiae infusio; motus liberi arbitrii in Deum per fidem; et motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum; et remissio culpae. Cuius ratio est quia, sicut dictum est, iustificatio est quidam motus quo anima movetur a Deo a statu culpae in statum iustitiae. In quolibet autem motu quo aliquid ab altero movetur, tria requiruntur, primo quidem, motio

is moved by another, three things are required: first, the motion of the mover; secondly, the movement of the moved; thirdly, the consummation of the movement, or the attainment of the end. On the part of the Divine motion, there is the infusion of grace; on the part of the free-will which is moved, there are two movements---of departure from the term "whence," and of approach to the term "whereto"; but the consummation of the movement or the attainment of the end of the movement is implied in the remission of sins; for in this is the justification of the ungodly completed.

ipsius moventis; secundo, motus mobilis; et tertio, consummatio motus, sive perventio ad finem. Ex parte igitur motionis divinae, accipitur gratiae infusio; ex parte vero liberi arbitrii moti, accipiuntur duo motus ipsius, secundum recessum a termino a quo, et accessum ad terminum ad quem; consummatio autem, sive perventio ad terminum huius motus, importatur per remissionem culpae, in hoc enim iustificatio consummatur.

Reply to Objection 1: The justification of the ungodly is called the remission of sins, even as every movement has its species from its term. Nevertheless, many other things are required in order to reach the term, as stated above (A[5]).

[38615] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod iustificatio impii dicitur esse ipsa remissio peccatorum, secundum quod omnis motus accipit speciem a termino. Et tamen ad terminum consequendum multa alia requiruntur, ut ex supradictis patet.

Reply to Objection 2: The infusion of grace and the remission of sin may be considered in two ways: first, with respect to the substance of the act, and thus they are the same; for by the same act God bestows grace and remits sin. Secondly, they may be considered on the part of the objects; and thus they differ by the difference between guilt, which is taken away, and grace, which is infused; just as in natural things generation and corruption differ, although the generation of one thing is the corruption of another.

[38616] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod gratiae infusio et remissio culpae dupliciter considerari possunt. Uno modo, secundum ipsam substantiam actus. Et sic idem sunt, eodem enim actu Deus et largitur gratiam et remittit culpam. Alio modo possunt considerari ex parte obiectorum. Et sic differunt, secundum differentiam culpae quae tollitur, et gratiae quae infunditur. Sicut etiam in rebus naturalibus generatio et corruptio differunt, quamvis generatio unius sit corruptio alterius.

Reply to Objection 3: This enumeration is not the division of a genus into its species, in which the things enumerated must be simultaneous; but it is division of the things required for the completion of anything; and in this enumeration we may have what precedes and what follows, since some of the principles and parts of a composite thing may precede and some follow.

[38617] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ista non est connumeratio secundum divisionem generis in species, in qua oportet quod connumerata sint simul, sed secundum differentiam eorum quae requiruntur ad completionem alicuius. In qua quidem enumeratione aliquid potest esse prius, et aliquid posterius, quia principiorum et partium rei compositae potest esse aliquid alio prius.

Q. 113. A. 7. Whether the justification of the ungodly takes place in an instant or successively?

Objection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly does not take place in an instant, but successively, since, as already stated (A[3]), for the justification of the ungodly, there is

[38618] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iustificatio impii non fiat in instanti, sed successive. Quia ut dictum est, ad iustificationem impii requiritur motus liberi

required a movement of free-will. Now the act of the free-will is choice, which requires the deliberation of counsel, as stated above (Q[13], A[1]). Hence, since deliberation implies a certain reasoning process, and this implies succession, the justification of the ungodly would seem to be successive.

arbitrii. Actus autem liberi arbitrii est eligere, qui praeexigit deliberationem consilii, ut supra habitum est. Cum igitur deliberatio discursum quendam importet, qui successionem quandam habet, videtur quod iustificatio impii sit successiva.

Objection 2: Further, the free-will's movement is not without actual consideration. But it is impossible to understand many things actually and at once, as stated above (FP, Q[85], A[4]). Hence, since for the justification of the ungodly there is required a movement of the free-will towards several things, viz. towards God and towards sin, it would seem impossible for the justification of the ungodly to be in an instant.

[38619] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, motus liberi arbitrii non est absque actuali consideratione. Sed impossibile est simul multa intelligere in actu, ut in primo dictum est. Cum igitur ad iustificationem impii requiratur motus liberi arbitrii in diversa, scilicet in Deum et in peccatum, videtur quod iustificatio impii non possit esse in instanti.

Objection 3: Further, a form that may be greater or less, e.g. blackness or whiteness, is received successively by its subject. Now grace may be greater or less, as stated above (Q[112], A[4]). Hence it is not received suddenly by its subject. Therefore, seeing that the infusion of grace is required for the justification of the ungodly, it would seem that the justification of the ungodly cannot be in an instant.

[38620] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, forma quae suscipit magis et minus, successive recipitur in subiecto, sicut patet de albedine et nigredine. Sed gratia suscipit magis et minus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo non recipitur subito in subiecto. Cum igitur ad iustificationem impii requiratur gratiae infusio, videtur quod iustificatio impii non possit esse in instanti.

Objection 4: Further, the free-will's movement, which cooperates in justification, is meritorious; and hence it must proceed from grace, without which there is no merit, as we shall state further on (Q[114], A[2]). Now a thing receives its form before operating by this form. Hence grace is first infused, and then the free-will is moved towards God and to detest sin. Hence justification is not all at once.

[38621] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 7 arg. 4 Praeterea, motus liberi arbitrii qui ad iustificationem impii concurrit, est meritorius, et ita oportet quod procedat a gratia, sine qua nullum est meritum, ut infra dicetur. Sed prius est aliquid consequi formam, quam secundum formam operari. Ergo prius infunditur gratia, et postea liberum arbitrium movetur in Deum et in detestationem peccati. Non ergo iustificatio est tota simul.

Objection 5: Further, if grace is infused into the soul, there must be an instant when it first dwells in the soul; so, too, if sin is forgiven there must be a last instant that man is in sin. But it cannot be the same instant, otherwise opposites would be in the same simultaneously. Hence they must be two successive instants; between which there must be time, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vi, 1). Therefore the justification of the ungodly takes place not all at once, but successively.

[38622] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 7 arg. 5 Praeterea, si gratia infundatur animae, oportet dare aliquod instans in quo primo animae insit. Similiter si culpa remittitur, oportet ultimum instans dare in quo homo culpae subiaceat. Sed non potest esse idem instans, quia sic opposita simul inessent eidem. Ergo oportet esse duo instantia sibi succedentia, inter quae, secundum philosophum, in VI Physic., oportet esse tempus medium. Non ergo iustificatio fit tota simul, sed successive.

On the contrary, The justification of the ungodly is caused by the justifying grace of the Holy Spirit. Now the Holy Spirit comes to men's minds suddenly, according to Acts 2:2: "And suddenly there came a sound from heaven as of a mighty wind coming," upon which the gloss says that "the grace of the Holy Ghost knows no tardy efforts." Hence the justification of the ungodly is not successive, but instantaneous.

[38623] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod iustificatio impii fit per gratiam spiritus sancti iustificantis. Sed spiritus sanctus subito advenit mentibus hominum; secundum illud Act. II, *factus est repente de caelo sonus tanquam advenientis spiritus vehementis*; ubi dicit Glossa quod *nescit tarda molimina spiritus sancti gratia*. Ergo iustificatio impii non est successiva, sed instantanea.

I answer that, The entire justification of the ungodly consists as to its origin in the infusion of grace. For it is by grace that free-will is moved and sin is remitted. Now the infusion of grace takes place in an instant and without succession. And the reason of this is that if a form be not suddenly impressed upon its subject, it is either because that subject is not disposed, or because the agent needs time to dispose the subject. Hence we see that immediately the matter is disposed by a preceding alteration, the substantial form accrues to the matter; thus because the atmosphere of itself is disposed to receive light, it is suddenly illuminated by a body actually luminous. Now it was stated (Q[112], A[2]) that God, in order to infuse grace into the soul, needs no disposition, save what He Himself has made. And sometimes this sufficient disposition for the reception of grace He makes suddenly, sometimes gradually and successively, as stated above (Q[112], A[2], ad 2). For the reason why a natural agent cannot suddenly dispose matter is that in the matter there is a resistant which has some disproportion with the power of the agent; and hence we see that the stronger the agent, the more speedily is the matter disposed. Therefore, since the Divine power is infinite, it can suddenly dispose any matter whatsoever to its form; and much more man's free-will, whose movement is by nature instantaneous. Therefore the justification of the ungodly by God takes place in an instant.

[38624] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod tota iustificatio impii originaliter consistit in gratiae infusione, per eam enim et liberum arbitrium movetur, et culpa remittitur. Gratiae autem infusio fit in instanti absque successione. Cuius ratio est quia quod aliqua forma non subito imprimatur subiecto, contingit ex hoc quod subiectum non est dispositum, et agens indiget tempore ad hoc quod subiectum disponat. Et ideo videmus quod statim cum materia est disposita per alterationem praecedentem, forma substantialis acquiritur materiae, et eadem ratione, quia diaphanum est secundum se dispositum ad lumen recipiendum, subito illuminatur a corpore lucido in actu. Dictum est autem supra quod Deus ad hoc quod gratiam infundat animae, non requirit aliquam dispositionem nisi quam ipse facit. Facit autem huiusmodi dispositionem sufficientem ad susceptionem gratiae, quandoque quidem subito, quandoque autem paulatim et successive, ut supra dictum est. Quod enim agens naturale non subito possit disponere materiam, contingit ex hoc quod est aliqua disproportio eius quod in materia resistit, ad virtutem agentis, et propter hoc videmus quod quanto virtus agentis fuerit fortior, tanto materia citius disponitur. Cum igitur virtus divina sit infinita, potest quamcumque materiam creatam subito disponere ad formam, et multo magis liberum arbitrium hominis, cuius motus potest esse instantaneus secundum naturam. Sic igitur iustificatio impii fit a Deo in instanti.

Reply to Objection 1: The movement of the free-will, which concurs in the justification of the ungodly, is a consent to detest sin, and to draw near to God; and this consent takes place suddenly. Sometimes, indeed, it happens that deliberation precedes, yet this is not of the substance of justification, but a way of

[38625] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod motus liberi arbitrii qui concurrit ad iustificationem impii, est consensus ad detestandum peccatum et ad accedendum ad Deum, qui quidem consensus subito fit. Contingit autem quandoque quod praecedit aliqua deliberatio, quae non est de substantia

justification; as local movement is a way of illumination, and alteration to generation.

iustificationis, sed via in iustificationem, sicut motus localis est via ad illuminationem, et alteratio ad generationem.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (FP, Q[85], A[5]), there is nothing to prevent two things being understood at once, in so far as they are somehow one; thus we understand the subject and predicate together, inasmuch as they are united in the order of one affirmation. And in the same manner can the free-will be moved to two things at once in so far as one is ordained to the other. Now the free-will's movement towards sin is ordained to the free-will's movement towards God, since a man detests sin, as contrary to God, to Whom he wishes to cling. Hence in the justification of the ungodly the free-will simultaneously detests sin and turns to God, even as a body approaches one point and withdraws from another simultaneously.

[38626] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, nihil prohibet duo simul intelligere actu, secundum quod sunt quodammodo unum, sicut simul intelligimus subiectum et praedicatum, inquantum uniuntur in ordine affirmationis unius. Et per eundem modum liberum arbitrium potest in duo simul moveri, secundum quod unum ordinatur in aliud. Motus autem liberi arbitrii in peccatum, ordinatur ad motum liberi arbitrii in Deum, propter hoc enim homo detestatur peccatum, quia est contra Deum, cui vult adhaerere. Et ideo liberum arbitrium in iustificatione impii simul detestatur peccatum et convertit se ad Deum, sicut etiam corpus simul, recedendo ab uno loco, accedit ad alium.

Reply to Objection 3: The reason why a form is not received instantaneously in the matter is not the fact that it can inhere more or less; for thus the light would not be suddenly received in the air, which can be illumined more or less. But the reason is to be sought on the part of the disposition of the matter or subject, as stated above.

[38627] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod non est ratio quare forma subito in materia non recipiatur, quia magis et minus inesse potest, sic enim lumen non subito reciperetur in aere, qui potest magis et minus illuminari. Sed ratio est accipienda ex parte dispositionis materiae vel subiecti, ut dictum est.

Reply to Objection 4: The same instant the form is acquired, the thing begins to operate with the form; as fire, the instant it is generated moves upwards, and if its movement was instantaneous, it would be terminated in the same instant. Now to will and not to will---the movements of the free-will---are not successive, but instantaneous. Hence the justification of the ungodly must not be successive.

[38628] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 7 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod in eodem instanti in quo forma acquiritur, incipit res operari secundum formam, sicut ignis statim cum est generatus, movetur sursum; et si motus eius esset instantaneus, in eodem instanti compleretur. Motus autem liberi arbitrii, qui est velle, non est successivus, sed instantaneus. Et ideo non oportet quod iustificatio impii sit successiva.

Reply to Objection 5: The succession of opposites in the same subject must be looked at differently in the things that are subject to time and in those that are above time. For in those that are in time, there is no last instant in which the previous form inheres in the subject; but there is the last time, and the first instant that the subsequent form inheres in the matter or subject; and this for the reason, that in time we are not to

[38629] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 7 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod successio duorum oppositorum in eodem subiecto aliter est consideranda in his quae subiacent tempori, et aliter in his quae sunt supra tempus. In his enim quae subiacent tempori, non est dare ultimum instans in quo forma prior subiecto inest, est autem dare ultimum tempus, et primum instans in quo forma sequens inest materiae vel subiecto. Cuius ratio est quia in

consider one instant, since neither do instants succeed each other immediately in time, nor points in a line, as is proved in Physic. vi, 1. But time is terminated by an instant. Hence in the whole of the previous time wherein anything is moving towards its form, it is under the opposite form; but in the last instant of this time, which is the first instant of the subsequent time, it has the form which is the term of the movement.

But in those that are above time, it is otherwise. For if there be any succession of affections or intellectual conceptions in them (as in the angels), such succession is not measured by continuous time, but by discrete time, even as the things measured are not continuous, as stated above (FP, Q[53], AA[2],3). In these, therefore, there is a last instant in which the preceding is, and a first instant in which the subsequent is. Nor must there be time in between, since there is no continuity of time, which this would necessitate.

Now the human mind, which is justified, is, in itself, above time, but is subject to time accidentally, inasmuch as it understands with continuity and time, with respect to the phantasms in which it considers the intelligible species, as stated above (FP, Q[85], AA[1],2). We must, therefore, decide from this about its change as regards the condition of temporal movements, i.e. we must say that there is no last instant that sin inheres, but a last time; whereas there is a first instant that grace inheres; and in all the time previous sin inhered.

tempore non potest accipi ante unum instans aliud instans praecedens immediate, eo quod instantia non consequenter se habeant in tempore, sicut nec puncta in linea, ut probatur in VI Physic. Sed tempus terminatur ad instans. Et ideo in toto tempore praecedenti, quo aliquid movetur ad unam formam, subest formae oppositae, et in ultimo instanti illius temporis, quod est primum instans sequentis temporis, habet formam, quae est terminus motus. Sed in his quae sunt supra tempus, aliter se habet. Si qua enim successio sit ibi affectuum vel intellectualium conceptionum, puta in Angelis, talis successio non mensuratur tempore continuo, sed tempore discreto, sicut et ipsa quae mensurantur non sunt continua, ut in primo habitum est. Unde in talibus est dandum ultimum instans in quo primum fuit, et primum instans in quo est id quod sequitur, nec oportet esse tempus medium, quia non est ibi continuitas temporis, quae hoc requirebat. Mens autem humana quae iustificatur, secundum se quidem est supra tempus, sed per accidens subditur tempori, inquantum scilicet intelligit cum continuo et tempore secundum phantasmata, in quibus species intelligibiles considerat, ut in primo dictum est. Et ideo iudicandum est, secundum hoc, de eius mutatione secundum conditionem temporalium motuum, ut scilicet dicamus quod non est dare ultimum instans in quo culpa infuit, sed ultimum tempus; est autem dare primum instans in quo gratia inest, in toto autem tempore praecedenti inerat culpa.

Q. 113. A. 8. Whether the infusion of grace is naturally the first of the things required for the justification of the ungodly?

Objection 1: It would seem that the infusion of grace is not what is naturally required first for the justification of the ungodly. For we withdraw from evil before drawing near to good, according to Ps. 33:15: "Turn away from evil, and do good." Now the remission of sins regards the turning away from evil, and the infusion of grace regards the turning to good. Hence the remission of sin is naturally before the infusion of grace.

[38630] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gratiae infusio non sit prima ordine naturae inter ea quae requiruntur ad iustificationem impii. Prius enim est recedere a malo quam accedere ad bonum; secundum illud Psalmi XXXVI, *declina a malo, et fac bonum*. Sed remissio culpae pertinet ad recessum a malo, infusio autem gratiae pertinet ad prosecutionem boni. Ergo naturaliter prius est remissio culpae quam infusio gratiae.

Objection 2: Further, the disposition naturally precedes the form to which it disposes. Now the

[38631] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, dispositio praecedit naturaliter formam ad quam

free-will's movement is a disposition for the reception of grace. Therefore it naturally precedes the infusion of grace.

disponit. Sed motus liberi arbitrii est quaedam dispositio ad susceptionem gratiae. Ergo naturaliter praecedit infusionem gratiae.

Objection 3: Further, sin hinders the soul from tending freely to God. Now a hindrance to movement must be removed before the movement takes place. Hence the remission of sin and the free-will's movement towards sin are naturally before the infusion of grace.

[38632] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, peccatum impedit animam ne libere tendat in Deum. Sed prius est removere id quod prohibet motum, quam motus sequatur. Ergo prius est naturaliter remissio culpae et motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum, quam motus liberi arbitrii in Deum, et quam infusio gratiae.

On the contrary, The cause is naturally prior to its effect. Now the infusion of grace is the cause of whatever is required for the justification of the ungodly, as stated above (A[7]). Therefore it is naturally prior to it.

[38633] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra, causa naturaliter est prior effectu. Sed gratiae infusio causa est omnium aliorum quae requiruntur ad iustificationem impii, ut supra dictum est. Ergo est naturaliter prior.

I answer that, The aforesaid four things required for the justification of the ungodly are simultaneous in time, since the justification of the ungodly is not successive, as stated above (A[7]); but in the order of nature, one is prior to another; and in their natural order the first is the infusion of grace; the second, the free-will's movement towards God; the third, the free-will's movement towards sin; the fourth, the remission of sin.

The reason for this is that in every movement the motion of the mover is naturally first; the disposition of the matter, or the movement of the moved, is second; the end or term of the movement in which the motion of the mover rests, is last. Now the motion of God the Mover is the infusion of grace, as stated above (A[6]); the movement or disposition of the moved is the free-will's double movement; and the term or end of the movement is the remission of sin, as stated above (A[6]). Hence in their natural order the first in the justification of the ungodly is the infusion of grace; the second is the free-will's movement towards God; the third is the free-will's movement towards sin, for he who is being justified detests sin because it is against God, and thus the free-will's movement towards God naturally precedes the free-will's movement towards sin, since it is its cause and reason; the fourth and last is the remission of sin, to which this transmutation is ordained as to an end, as stated above (AA[1],6).

[38634] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod praedicta quatuor quae requiruntur ad iustificationem impii, tempore quidem sunt simul, quia iustificatio impii non est successiva, ut dictum est, sed ordine naturae unum eorum est prius altero. Et inter ea naturali ordine primum est gratiae infusio; secundum, motus liberi arbitrii in Deum; tertium est motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum; quartum vero est remissio culpae. Cuius ratio est quia in quolibet motu naturaliter primum est motio ipsius moventis; secundum autem est dispositio materiae, sive motus ipsius mobilis; ultimum vero est finis vel terminus motus, ad quem terminatur motio moventis. Ipsa igitur Dei moventis motio est gratiae infusio, ut dictum est supra; motus autem vel dispositio mobilis est duplex motus liberi arbitrii; terminus autem vel finis motus est remissio culpae, ut ex supradictis patet. Et ideo naturali ordine primum in iustificatione impii est gratiae infusio; secundum est motus liberi arbitrii in Deum; tertium vero est motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum (propter hoc enim ille qui iustificatur, detestatur peccatum, quia est contra Deum, unde motus liberi arbitrii in Deum, praecedit naturaliter motum liberi arbitrii in peccatum, cum sit causa et ratio eius); quartum vero et ultimum est remissio culpae, ad quam tota ista transmutatio ordinatur sicut ad finem, ut dictum est.

Reply to Objection 1: The withdrawal from one term and approach to another may be looked at in two ways: first, on the part of the thing moved, and thus the withdrawal from a term naturally precedes the approach to a term, since in the subject of movement the opposite which is put away is prior to the opposite which the subject moved attains to by its movement. But on the part of the agent it is the other way about, since the agent, by the form pre-existing in it, acts for the removal of the opposite form; as the sun by its light acts for the removal of darkness, and hence on the part of the sun, illumination is prior to the removal of darkness; but on the part of the atmosphere to be illuminated, to be freed from darkness is, in the order of nature, prior to being illuminated, although both are simultaneous in time. And since the infusion of grace and the remission of sin regard God Who justifies, hence in the order of nature the infusion of grace is prior to the freeing from sin. But if we look at what is on the part of the man justified, it is the other way about, since in the order of nature the being freed from sin is prior to the obtaining of justifying grace. Or it may be said that the term "whence" of justification is sin; and the term "whereto" is justice; and that grace is the cause of the forgiveness of sin and of obtaining of justice.

[38635] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod recessus a termino et accessus ad terminum dupliciter considerari possunt. Uno modo, ex parte mobilis. Et sic naturaliter recessus a termino praecedit accessum ad terminum, prius enim est in subiecto mobili oppositum quod abiicitur, et postmodum est id quod per motum assequitur mobile. Sed ex parte agentis, est e converso. Agens enim per formam quae in eo praeexistit, agit ad removendum contrarium, sicut sol per suam lucem agit ad removendum tenebras. Et ideo ex parte solis, prius est illuminare quam tenebras removere; ex parte autem aeris illuminandi, prius est purgari a tenebris quam consequi lumen, ordine naturae; licet utrumque sit simul tempore. Et quia infusio gratiae et remissio culpae dicuntur ex parte Dei iustificantis, ideo ordine naturae prior est gratiae infusio quam culpae remissio. Sed si sumantur ea quae sunt ex parte hominis iustificati, est e converso, nam prius est naturae ordine liberatio a culpa, quam consecutio gratiae iustificantis. Vel potest dici quod termini iustificationis sunt culpa sicut a quo, et iustitia sicut ad quem, gratia vero est causa remissionis culpae, et adeptionis iustitiae.

Reply to Objection 2: The disposition of the subject precedes the reception of the form, in the order of nature; yet it follows the action of the agent, whereby the subject is disposed. And hence the free-will's movement precedes the reception of grace in the order of nature, and follows the infusion of grace.

[38636] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod dispositio subiecti praecedit susceptionem formae ordine naturae, sequitur tamen actionem agentis, per quam etiam ipsum subiectum disponitur. Et ideo motus liberi arbitrii naturae ordine praecedit consecutionem gratiae, sequitur autem gratiae infusionem.

Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 9), in movements of the soul the movement toward the speculative principle or the practical end is the very first, but in exterior movements the removal of the impediment precedes the attainment of the end. And as the free-will's movement is a movement of the soul, in the order of nature it moves towards God as to its end, before removing the impediment of sin.

[38637] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in II Physic., in motibus animi omnino praecedit motus in principium speculationis, vel in finem actionis, sed in exterioribus motibus remotio impedimenti praecedit assecutionem finis. Et quia motus liberi arbitrii est motus animi, prius naturae ordine movetur in Deum sicut in finem, quam ad removendum impedimentum peccati.

Q. 113. A. 9. Whether the justification of the ungodly is God's greatest work?

Objection 1: It would seem that the justification

[38638] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 9 arg. 1 Ad nonum sic

of the ungodly is not God's greatest work. For it is by the justification of the ungodly that we attain the grace of a wayfarer. Now by glorification we receive heavenly grace, which is greater. Hence the glorification of angels and men is a greater work than the justification of the ungodly.

proceditur. Videtur quod iustificatio impii non sit maximum opus Dei. Per iustificationem enim impii consequitur aliquis gratiam viae. Sed per glorificationem consequitur aliquis gratiam patriae, quae maior est. Ergo glorificatio Angelorum vel hominum est maius opus quam iustificatio impii.

Objection 2: Further, the justification of the ungodly is ordained to the particular good of one man. But the good of the universe is greater than the good of one man, as is plain from Ethic. i, 2. Hence the creation of heaven and earth is a greater work than the justification of the ungodly.

[38639] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 9 arg. 2 Praeterea, iustificatio impii ordinatur ad bonum particulare unius hominis. Sed bonum universi est maius quam bonum unius hominis; ut patet in I Ethic. Ergo maius opus est creatio caeli et terrae quam iustificatio impii.

Objection 3: Further, to make something from nothing, where there is nought to cooperate with the agent, is greater than to make something with the cooperation of the recipient. Now in the work of creation something is made from nothing, and hence nothing can cooperate with the agent; but in the justification of the ungodly God makes something from something, i.e. a just man from a sinner, and there is a cooperation on man's part, since there is a movement of the free-will, as stated above (A[3]). Hence the justification of the ungodly is not God's greatest work.

[38640] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 9 arg. 3 Praeterea, maius est ex nihilo aliquid facere, et ubi nihil cooperatur agenti, quam ex aliquo facere aliquid cum aliqua cooperatione patientis. Sed in opere creationis ex nihilo fit aliquid, unde nihil potest cooperari agenti. Sed in iustificatione impii Deus ex aliquo aliquid facit, idest ex impio iustum, et est ibi aliqua cooperatio ex parte hominis, quia est ibi motus liberi arbitrii, ut dictum est. Ergo iustificatio impii non est maximum opus Dei.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 144:9): "His tender mercies are over all His works," and in a collect [*Tenth Sunday after Pentecost] we say: "O God, Who dost show forth Thine all-mightiness most by pardoning and having mercy," and Augustine, expounding the words, "greater than these shall he do" (Jn. 14:12) says that "for a just man to be made from a sinner, is greater than to create heaven and earth."

[38641] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 9 s. c. Sed contra est quod in Psalmo CXLIV, dicitur, *miserationes eius super omnia opera eius*. Et in collecta dicitur, *Deus, qui omnipotentiam tuam parcendo maxime et miserando manifestas*. Et Augustinus dicit exponens illud Ioan. XIV, maiora horum faciet, *quod maius opus est ut ex impio iustus fiat, quam creare caelum et terram*.

I answer that, A work may be called great in two ways: first, on the part of the mode of action, and thus the work of creation is the greatest work, wherein something is made from nothing; secondly, a work may be called great on account of what is made, and thus the justification of the ungodly, which terminates at the eternal good of a share in the Godhead, is greater than the creation of heaven and earth, which terminates at the good of mutable nature. Hence, Augustine, after saying that "for a just man to be made from a sinner is

[38642] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 9 co. Respondeo dicendum quod opus aliquod potest dici magnum dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte modi agendi. Et sic maximum est opus creationis, in quo ex nihilo fit aliquid. Alio modo potest dici opus magnum propter magnitudinem eius quod fit. Et secundum hoc, maius opus est iustificatio impii, quae terminatur ad bonum aeternum divinae participationis, quam creatio caeli et terrae, quae terminatur ad bonum naturae mutabilis. Et ideo Augustinus, cum dixisset quod *maius est quod ex*

greater than to create heaven and earth," adds, "for heaven and earth shall pass away, but the justification of the ungodly shall endure."

Again, we must bear in mind that a thing is called great in two ways: first, in an absolute quantity, and thus the gift of glory is greater than the gift of grace that sanctifies the ungodly; and in this respect the glorification of the just is greater than the justification of the ungodly. Secondly, a thing may be said to be great in proportionate quantity, and thus the gift of grace that justifies the ungodly is greater than the gift of glory that beatifies the just, for the gift of grace exceeds the worthiness of the ungodly, who are worthy of punishment, more than the gift of glory exceeds the worthiness of the just, who by the fact of their justification are worthy of glory. Hence Augustine says: "Let him that can, judge whether it is greater to create the angels just, than to justify the ungodly. Certainly, if they both betoken equal power, one betokens greater mercy."

impio fiat iustus, quam creare caelum et terram, subiungit, *caelum enim et terra transibit, praedestinatorum autem salus et iustificatio permanebit*. Sed sciendum est quod aliquid magnum dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quantitatem absolutam. Et hoc modo donum gloriae est maius quam donum gratiae iustificantis impium. Et secundum hoc, glorificatio iustorum est maius opus quam iustificatio impii. Alio modo dicitur aliquid magnum quantitate proportionis, sicut dicitur mons parvus, et milium magnum. Et hoc modo donum gratiae impium iustificantis est maius quam donum gloriae beatificantis iustum, quia plus excedit donum gratiae dignitatem impii, qui erat dignus poena, quam donum gloriae dignitatem iusti, qui ex hoc ipso quod est iustificatus, est dignus gloria. Et ideo Augustinus dicit ibidem, *iudicet qui potest, utrum maius sit iustos Angelos creare quam impios iustificare. Certe, si aequalis est utrumque potentiae, hoc maioris est misericordiae*.

Reply to Objection 1: And thus the reply to the first is clear.

[38643] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 9 ad 1 Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum.

Reply to Objection 2: The good of the universe is greater than the particular good of one, if we consider both in the same genus. But the good of grace in one is greater than the good of nature in the whole universe.

[38644] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 9 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum universi est maius quam bonum particulare unius, si accipiatur utrumque in eodem genere. Sed bonum gratiae unius maius est quam bonum naturae totius universi.

Reply to Objection 3: This objection rests on the manner of acting, in which way creation is God's greatest work.

[38645] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 9 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit ex parte modi agendi, secundum quem creatio est maximum opus Dei.

Q. 113. A. 10. Whether the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous work?

Objection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous work. For miraculous works are greater than non-miraculous. Now the justification of the ungodly is greater than the other miraculous works, as is clear from the quotation from Augustine (A[9]). Hence the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous work.

[38646] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 10 arg. 1 Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iustificatio impii sit opus miraculosum. Opera enim miraculosa sunt maiora non miraculosis. Sed iustificatio impii est maius opus quam alia opera miraculosa; ut patet per Augustinum in auctoritate inducta. Ergo iustificatio impii est opus miraculosum.

Objection 2: Further, the movement of the will in the soul is like the natural inclination in natural things. But when God works in natural things against their inclination of their nature, it is a miraculous work, as when He gave sight to the blind or raised the dead. Now the will of the ungodly is bent on evil. Hence, since God in justifying a man moves him to good, it would seem that the justification of the ungodly is miraculous.

[38647] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 10 arg. 2 Praeterea, motus voluntatis ita est in anima, sicut inclinatio naturalis in rebus naturalibus. Sed quando Deus aliquid operatur in rebus naturalibus contra inclinationem naturae, est opus miraculosum, sicut cum illuminat caecum, vel suscitat mortuum. Voluntas autem impii tendit in malum. Cum igitur Deus, iustificando hominem, moveat eum in bonum, videtur quod iustificatio impii sit miraculosa.

Objection 3: Further, as wisdom is a gift of God, so also is justice. Now it is miraculous that anyone should suddenly obtain wisdom from God without study. Therefore it is miraculous that the ungodly should be justified by God.

[38648] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 10 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut sapientia est donum Dei, ita et iustitia. Sed miraculosum est quod aliquis subito sine studio sapientiam assequatur a Deo. Ergo miraculosum est quod aliquis impius iustificetur a Deo.

On the contrary, Miraculous works are beyond natural power. Now the justification of the ungodly is not beyond natural power; for Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. v) that "to be capable of having faith and to be capable of having charity belongs to man's nature; but to have faith and charity belongs to the grace of the faithful." Therefore the justification of the ungodly is not miraculous.

[38649] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 10 s. c. Sed contra, opera miraculosa sunt supra potentiam naturalem. Sed iustificatio impii non est supra potentiam naturalem, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Praedest. Sanct., quod *posse habere fidem, sicut posse habere caritatem, naturae est hominum, habere autem gratiae est fidelium*. Ergo iustificatio impii non est miraculosa.

I answer that, In miraculous works it is usual to find three things: the first is on the part of the active power, because they can only be performed by Divine power; and they are simply wondrous, since their cause is hidden, as stated above (FP, Q[105], A[7]). And thus both the justification of the ungodly and the creation of the world, and, generally speaking, every work that can be done by God alone, is miraculous.

Secondly, in certain miraculous works it is found that the form introduced is beyond the natural power of such matter, as in the resurrection of the dead, life is above the natural power of such a body. And thus the justification of the ungodly is not miraculous, because the soul is naturally capable of grace; since from its having been made to the likeness of God, it is fit to receive God by grace, as Augustine says, in the above quotation.

Thirdly, in miraculous works something is found besides the usual and customary order of causing an effect, as when a sick man suddenly and

[38650] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 10 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in operibus miraculosis tria consueverunt inveniri. Quorum unum est ex parte potentiae agentis, quia sola divina virtute fieri possunt. Et ideo sunt simpliciter mira, quasi habentia causam occultam, ut in primo dictum est. Et secundum hoc, tam iustificatio impii quam creatio mundi, et universaliter omne opus quod a solo Deo fieri potest, miraculosum dici potest. Secundo, in quibusdam miraculosis operibus invenitur quod forma inducta est supra naturalem potentiam talis materiae, sicut in suscitatione mortui vita est supra naturalem potentiam talis corporis. Et quantum ad hoc, iustificatio impii non est miraculosa, quia naturaliter anima est gratiae capax; *eo enim ipso quod facta est ad imaginem Dei, capax est Dei per gratiam*, ut Augustinus dicit. Tertio modo, in operibus miraculosis invenitur aliquid praeter solitum et consuetum ordinem causandi effectum, sicut cum aliquis infirmus sanitatem perfectam assequitur subito, praeter solitum cursum sanationis quae fit a natura vel arte. Et quantum ad hoc, iustificatio impii

beyond the wonted course of healing by nature or art, receives perfect health; and thus the justification of the ungodly is sometimes miraculous and sometimes not. For the common and wonted course of justification is that God moves the soul interiorly and that man is converted to God, first by an imperfect conversion, that it may afterwards become perfect; because "charity begun merits increase, and when increased merits perfection," as Augustine says (In Epist. Joan. Tract. v). Yet God sometimes moves the soul so vehemently that it reaches the perfection of justice at once, as took place in the conversion of Paul, which was accompanied at the same time by a miraculous external prostration. Hence the conversion of Paul is commemorated in the Church as miraculous.

quandoque est miraculosa, et quandoque non. Est enim iste consuetus et communis cursus iustificationis, ut, Deo movente interius animam, homo convertatur ad Deum, primo quidem conversione imperfecta, et postmodum ad perfectam deveniat, quia *caritas inchoata meretur augeri, ut aucta mereatur perfici*, sicut Augustinus dicit. Quandoque vero tam vehementer Deus animam movet ut statim quandam perfectionem iustitiae assequatur, sicut fuit in conversione Pauli, adhibita etiam exterius miraculosa prostratione. Et ideo conversio Pauli, tanquam miraculosa, in Ecclesia commemoratur celebriter.

Reply to Objection 1: Certain miraculous works, although they are less than the justification of the ungodly, as regards the good caused, are beyond the wonted order of such effects, and thus have more of the nature of a miracle.

[38651] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 10 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quaedam miraculosa opera, etsi sint minora quam iustificatio impii quantum ad bonum quod fit, sunt tamen praeter consuetum ordinem talium effectuum. Et ideo plus habent de ratione miraculi.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not a miraculous work, whenever a natural thing is moved contrary to its inclination, otherwise it would be miraculous for water to be heated, or for a stone to be thrown upwards; but only whenever this takes place beyond the order of the proper cause, which naturally does this. Now no other cause save God can justify the ungodly, even as nothing save fire can heat water. Hence the justification of the ungodly by God is not miraculous in this respect.

[38652] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 10 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod non quandocumque res naturalis movetur contra suam inclinationem, est opus miraculosum, alioquin miraculosum esset quod aqua calefieret, vel quod lapis sursum proiiceretur, sed quando hoc fit praeter ordinem propriae causae, quae nata est hoc facere. Iustificare autem impium nulla alia causa potest nisi Deus, sicut nec aquam calefacere nisi ignis. Et ideo iustificatio impii a Deo, quantum ad hoc, non est miraculosa.

Reply to Objection 3: A man naturally acquires wisdom and knowledge from God by his own talent and study. Hence it is miraculous when a man is made wise or learned outside this order. But a man does not naturally acquire justifying grace by his own action, but by God's. Hence there is no parity.

[38653] Iª-IIae q. 113 a. 10 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod sapientiam et scientiam homo natus est acquirere a Deo per proprium ingenium et studium, et ideo quando praeter hunc modum homo sapiens vel sciens efficitur, est miraculosum. Sed gratiam iustificantem non est homo natus acquirere per suam operationem, sed Deo operante. Unde non est simile.

Q. 114. OF MERIT (TEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider merit, which is the effect of cooperating grace; and under this head there are ten points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a man can merit anything from God?

(2) Whether without grace anyone can merit eternal life?

(3) Whether anyone with grace may merit eternal life condignly?

(4) Whether it is chiefly through the instrumentality of charity that grace is the principle of merit?

(5) Whether a man may merit the first grace for himself?

(6) Whether he may merit it for someone else?

(7) Whether anyone can merit restoration after sin?

(8) Whether he can merit for himself an increase of grace or charity?

(9) Whether he can merit final perseverance?

(10) Whether temporal goods fall under merit?

[38654] Iª-IIae q. 114 pr. Deinde considerandum est de merito, quod est effectus gratiae cooperantis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur decem. Primo, utrum homo possit aliquid mereri a Deo. Secundo, utrum aliquis sine gratia possit mereri vitam aeternam. Tertio, utrum aliquis per gratiam possit mereri vitam aeternam ex condigno. Quarto, utrum gratia sit principium merendi mediante caritate principaliter. Quinto, utrum homo possit sibi mereri primam gratiam. Sexto, utrum homo possit eam mereri alii. Septimo, utrum possit sibi aliquis mereri reparationem post lapsum. Octavo, utrum possit sibi mereri augmentum gratiae vel caritatis. Nono, utrum possit sibi mereri finalem perseverantiam. Decimo, utrum bona temporalia cadant sub merito.

Q. 114. A. 1. Whether a man may merit anything from God?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man can merit nothing from God. For no one, it would seem, merits by giving another his due. But by all the good we do, we cannot make sufficient return to God, since yet more is His due, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14). Hence it is written (Lk. 17:10): "When you have done all these things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which we ought to do." Therefore a man can merit nothing from God.

[38655] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non possit aliquid mereri a Deo. Nullus enim videtur mercedem mereri ex hoc quod reddit alteri quod debet. Sed *per omnia bona quae facimus, non possumus sufficienter recompensare Deo quod debemus, quin semper amplius debeamus*; ut etiam philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic. Unde et Luc. XVII, dicitur, *cum omnia quae praecepta sunt, feceritis, dicite, servi inutiles sumus, quod debuimus facere, fecimus*. Ergo homo non potest aliquid mereri a Deo.

Objection 2: Further, it would seem that a man merits nothing from God, by what profits himself only, and profits God nothing. Now by acting well, a man profits himself or another man, but

[38656] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, ex eo quod aliquis sibi proficit, nihil videtur mereri apud eum cui nihil proficit. Sed homo bene operando sibi proficit, vel alteri homini, non

not God, for it is written (Job 35:7): "If thou do justly, what shalt thou give Him, or what shall He receive of thy hand." Hence a man can merit nothing from God.

autem Deo, dicitur enim Iob XXXV, *si iuste egeris, quid donabis ei, aut quid de manu tua accipiet?* Ergo homo non potest aliquid a Deo mereri.

Objection 3: Further, whoever merits anything from another makes him his debtor; for a man's wage is a debt due to him. Now God is no one's debtor; hence it is written (Rom. 11:35): "Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made to him?" Hence no one can merit anything from God.

[38657] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, quicumque apud aliquem aliquid meretur, constituit eum sibi debitorem, debitum enim est ut aliquis merendi mercedem rependat. Sed Deus nulli est debitor, unde dicitur Rom. XI, *quis prior dedit ei, et retribuetur ei?* Ergo nullus a Deo potest aliquid mereri.

On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 31:16): "There is a reward for thy work." Now a reward means something bestowed by reason of merit. Hence it would seem that a man may merit from God.

[38658] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ierem. XXXI, *est merces operi tuo*. Sed merces dicitur quod pro merito redditur. Ergo videtur quod homo possit a Deo mereri.

I answer that, Merit and reward refer to the same, for a reward means something given anyone in return for work or toil, as a price for it. Hence, as it is an act of justice to give a just price for anything received from another, so also is it an act of justice to make a return for work or toil. Now justice is a kind of equality, as is clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 3), and hence justice is simply between those that are simply equal; but where there is no absolute equality between them, neither is there absolute justice, but there may be a certain manner of justice, as when we speak of a father's or a master's right (Ethic. v, 6), as the Philosopher says. And hence where there is justice simply, there is the character of merit and reward simply. But where there is no simple right, but only relative, there is no character of merit simply, but only relatively, in so far as the character of justice is found there, since the child merits something from his father and the slave from his lord.

Now it is clear that between God and man there is the greatest inequality: for they are infinitely apart, and all man's good is from God. Hence there can be no justice of absolute equality between man and God, but only of a certain proportion, inasmuch as both operate after their own manner. Now the manner and measure of human virtue is in man from God. Hence man's merit with God only exists on the presupposition

[38659] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod meritum et merces ad idem referuntur, id enim merces dicitur quod alicui recompensatur pro retributione operis vel laboris, quasi quoddam pretium ipsius. Unde sicut reddere iustum pretium pro re accepta ab aliquo, est actus iustitiae; ita etiam recompensare mercedem operis vel laboris, est actus iustitiae. Iustitia autem aequalitas quaedam est; ut patet per philosophum, in V Ethic. Et ideo simpliciter est iustitia inter eos quorum est simpliciter aequalitas, eorum vero quorum non est simpliciter aequalitas, non est simpliciter iustitia, sed quidam iustitiae modus potest esse, sicut dicitur quoddam ius paternum vel dominativum, ut in eodem libro philosophus dicit. Et propter hoc, in his in quibus est simpliciter iustum, est etiam simpliciter ratio meriti et mercedis. In quibus autem est secundum quid iustum, et non simpliciter, in his etiam non simpliciter est ratio meriti, sed secundum quid, inquantum salvatur ibi iustitiae ratio, sic enim et filius meretur aliquid a patre, et servus a domino. Manifestum est autem quod inter Deum et hominem est maxima inaequalitas, in infinitum enim distant, et totum quod est hominis bonum, est a Deo. Unde non potest hominis ad Deum esse iustitia secundum absolutam aequalitatem, sed secundum proportionem quandam, inquantum scilicet uterque operatur secundum modum suum. Modus autem et mensura humanae virtutis homini est a Deo. Et ideo meritum hominis apud Deum

of the Divine ordination, so that man obtains from God, as a reward of his operation, what God gave him the power of operation for, even as natural things by their proper movements and operations obtain that to which they were ordained by God; differently, indeed, since the rational creature moves itself to act by its free-will, hence its action has the character of merit, which is not so in other creatures.

esse non potest nisi secundum praesuppositionem divinae ordinationis, ita scilicet ut id homo consequatur a Deo per suam operationem quasi mercedem, ad quod Deus ei virtutem operandi deputavit. Sicut etiam res naturales hoc consequuntur per proprios motus et operationes, ad quod a Deo sunt ordinatae. Differenter tamen, quia creatura rationalis seipsam movet ad agendum per liberum arbitrium, unde sua actio habet rationem meriti; quod non est in aliis creaturis.

Reply to Objection 1: Man merits, inasmuch as he does what he ought, by his free-will; otherwise the act of justice whereby anyone discharges a debt would not be meritorious.

[38660] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo inquantum propria voluntate facit illud quod debet, meretur. Alioquin actus iustitiae quo quis reddit debitum, non esset meritorius.

Reply to Objection 2: God seeks from our goods not profit, but glory, i.e. the manifestation of His goodness; even as He seeks it also in His own works. Now nothing accrues to Him, but only to ourselves, by our worship of Him. Hence we merit from God, not that by our works anything accrues to Him, but inasmuch as we work for His glory.

[38661] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus ex bonis nostris non quaerit utilitatem, sed gloriam, idest manifestationem suae bonitatis, quod etiam ex suis operibus quaerit. Ex hoc autem quod eum colimus, nihil ei accrescit, sed nobis. Et ideo meremur aliquid a Deo, non quasi ex nostris operibus aliquid ei accrescat, sed inquantum propter eius gloriam operamur.

Reply to Objection 3: Since our action has the character of merit, only on the presupposition of the Divine ordination, it does not follow that God is made our debtor simply, but His own, inasmuch as it is right that His will should be carried out.

[38662] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, quia actio nostra non habet rationem meriti nisi ex praesuppositione divinae ordinationis, non sequitur quod Deus efficiatur simpliciter debitor nobis, sed sibi ipsi, inquantum debitum est ut sua ordinatio impleatur.

Q. 114. A. 2. Whether anyone without grace can merit eternal life?

Objection 1: It would seem that without grace anyone can merit eternal life. For man merits from God what he is divinely ordained to, as stated above (A[1]). Now man by his nature is ordained to beatitude as his end; hence, too, he naturally wishes to be blessed. Hence man by his natural endowments and without grace can merit beatitude which is eternal life.

[38663] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis sine gratia possit mereri vitam aeternam. Illud enim homo a Deo meretur ad quod divinitus ordinatur, sicut dictum est. Sed homo secundum suam naturam ordinatur ad beatitudinem sicut ad finem, unde etiam naturaliter appetit esse beatus. Ergo homo per sua naturalia, absque gratia, mereri potest beatitudinem, quae est vita aeterna.

Objection 2: Further, the less a work is due, the

[38664] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, idem

more meritorious it is. Now, less due is that work which is done by one who has received fewer benefits. Hence, since he who has only natural endowments has received fewer gifts from God, than he who has gratuitous gifts as well as nature, it would seem that his works are more meritorious with God. And thus if he who has grace can merit eternal life to some extent, much more may he who has no grace.

opus quanto est minus debitum, tanto est magis meritorium. Sed minus debitum est bonum quod fit ab eo qui minoribus beneficiis est praeventus. Cum igitur ille qui habet solum bona naturalia, minora beneficia sit consecutus a Deo quam ille qui cum naturalibus habet gratuita; videtur quod eius opera sint apud Deum magis meritoria. Et ita, si ille qui habet gratiam, potest mereri aliquo modo vitam aeternam, multo magis ille qui non habet.

Objection 3: Further, God's mercy and liberality infinitely surpass human mercy and liberality. Now a man may merit from another, even though he has not hitherto had his grace. Much more, therefore, would it seem that a man without grace may merit eternal life.

[38665] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, misericordia et liberalitas Dei in infinitum excedit misericordiam et liberalitatem humanam. Sed unus homo potest apud alium mereri, etiam si nunquam suam gratiam ante habuerit. Ergo videtur quod multo magis homo absque gratia vitam aeternam possit a Deo mereri.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 6:23): "The grace of God, life everlasting."

[38666] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. VI, *gratia Dei vita aeterna*.

I answer that, Man without grace may be looked at in two states, as was said above (Q[109], A[2]): the first, a state of perfect nature, in which Adam was before his sin; the second, a state of corrupt nature, in which we are before being restored by grace. Therefore, if we speak of man in the first state, there is only one reason why man cannot merit eternal life without grace, by his purely natural endowments, viz. because man's merit depends on the Divine pre-ordination. Now no act of anything whatsoever is divinely ordained to anything exceeding the proportion of the powers which are the principles of its act; for it is a law of Divine providence that nothing shall act beyond its powers. Now everlasting life is a good exceeding the proportion of created nature; since it exceeds its knowledge and desire, according to 1 Cor. 2:9: "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man." And hence it is that no created nature is a sufficient principle of an act meritorious of eternal life, unless there is added a supernatural gift, which we call grace. But if we speak of man as existing in sin, a second reason is added to this, viz. the impediment of sin. For since sin is an offense against God, excluding us from eternal life, as is clear from what has been said above (

[38667] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod hominis sine gratia duplex status considerari potest sicut supra dictum est, unus quidem naturae integrae, qualis fuit in Adam ante peccatum; alius autem naturae corruptae, sicut est in nobis ante reparationem gratiae. Si ergo loquamur de homine quantum ad primum statum, sic una ratione non potest mereri absque gratia vitam aeternam per pura naturalia. Quia scilicet meritum hominis dependet ex praeordinatione divina. Actus autem cuiuscumque rei non ordinatur divinitus ad aliquid excedens proportionem virtutis quae est principium actus, hoc enim est ex institutione divinae providentiae, ut nihil agat ultra suam virtutem. Vita autem aeterna est quoddam bonum excedens proportionem naturae creatae, quia etiam excedit cognitionem et desiderium eius, secundum illud I ad Cor. II, *nec oculus vidit, nec auris audivit, nec in cor hominis ascendit*. Et inde est quod nulla natura creata est sufficiens principium actus meritorii vitae aeternae, nisi superaddatur aliquod supernaturale donum, quod gratia dicitur. Si vero loquamur de homine sub peccato existente, additur cum hac secunda ratio, propter impedimentum peccati. Cum enim peccatum sit quaedam Dei offensa excludens a vita aeterna, ut

Q[71], A[6]; Q[113], A[2]), no one existing in a state of mortal sin can merit eternal life unless first he be reconciled to God, through his sin being forgiven, which is brought about by grace. For the sinner deserves not life, but death, according to Rom. 6:23: "The wages of sin is death."

patet per supradicta; nullus in statu peccati existens potest vitam aeternam mereri, nisi prius Deo reconcilietur, dimisso peccato, quod fit per gratiam. Peccatori enim non debetur vita, sed mors; secundum illud Rom. VI, *stipendia peccati mors*.

Reply to Objection 1: God ordained human nature to attain the end of eternal life, not by its own strength, but by the help of grace; and in this way its act can be meritorious of eternal life.

[38668] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus ordinavit humanam naturam ad finem vitae aeternae consequendum non propria virtute, sed per auxilium gratiae. Et hoc modo eius actus potest esse meritorius vitae aeternae.

Reply to Objection 2: Without grace a man cannot have a work equal to a work proceeding from grace, since the more perfect the principle, the more perfect the action. But the objection would hold good, if we supposed the operations equal in both cases.

[38669] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod homo sine gratia non potest habere aequale opus operi quod ex gratia procedit, quia quanto est perfectius principium actionis, tanto est perfectior actio. Sequeretur autem ratio, supposita aequalitate operationis utrobique.

Reply to Objection 3: With regard to the first reason adduced, the case is different in God and in man. For a man receives all his power of well-doing from God, and not from man. Hence a man can merit nothing from God except by His gift, which the Apostle expresses aptly saying (Rom. 11:35): "Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made to him?" But man may merit from man, before he has received anything from him, by what he has received from God.

But as regards the second proof taken from the impediment of sin, the case is similar with man and God, since one man cannot merit from another whom he has offended, unless he makes satisfaction to him and is reconciled.

[38670] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, quantum ad primam rationem inductam, dissimiliter se habet in Deo et in homine. Nam homo omnem virtutem benefaciendi habet a Deo, non autem ab homine. Et ideo a Deo non potest homo aliquid mereri nisi per donum eius, quod apostolus signanter exprimit, dicens, *quis prior dedit ei, et retribuetur illi?* Sed ab homine potest aliquis mereri antequam ab eo acceperit, per id quod accepit a Deo. Sed quantum ad secundam rationem, sumptam ex impedimento peccati, simile est de homine et de Deo, quia etiam homo ab alio mereri non potest quem offendit prius, nisi ei satisfaciens reconcilietur.

Q. 114. A. 3. Whether a man in grace can merit eternal life condignly?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man in grace cannot merit eternal life condignly, for the Apostle says (Rom. 8:18): "The sufferings of this time are not worthy [condignae] to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us." But of all meritorious works, the sufferings of the saints would seem the most meritorious. Therefore no works of men are meritorious of

[38671] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo in gratia constitutus non possit mereri vitam aeternam ex condigno. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. VIII, *non sunt condignae passiones huius temporis ad futuram gloriam quae revelabitur in nobis*. Sed inter alia opera meritoria maxime videntur esse meritoriae sanctorum passiones. Ergo nulla opera

eternal life condignly.

hominum sunt meritoria vitae aeternae ex condigno.

Objection 2: Further, on Rom. 6:23, "The grace of God, life everlasting," a gloss says: "He might have truly said: 'The wages of justice, life everlasting'; but He preferred to say 'The grace of God, life everlasting,' that we may know that God leads us to life everlasting of His own mercy and not by our merits." Now when anyone merits something condignly he receives it not from mercy, but from merit. Hence it would seem that a man with grace cannot merit life everlasting condignly.

[38672] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, super illud Rom. VI, *gratia Dei vita aeterna*, dicit Glossa, *posset recte dicere, stipendium iustitiae vita aeterna, sed maluit dicere, gratia Dei vita aeterna, ut intelligeremus Deum ad aeternam vitam pro sua miseratione nos perducere, non meritis nostris*. Sed id quod ex condigno quis meretur, non ex miseratione, sed ex merito accipit. Ergo videtur quod homo non possit per gratiam mereri vitam aeternam ex condigno.

Objection 3: Further, merit that equals the reward, would seem to be condign. Now no act of the present life can equal everlasting life, which surpasses our knowledge and our desire, and moreover, surpasses the charity or love of the wayfarer, even as it exceeds nature. Therefore with grace a man cannot merit eternal life condignly.

[38673] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, illud meritum videtur esse condignum quod aequatur mercedi. Sed nullus actus praesentis vitae potest aequari vitae aeternae, quae cognitionem et desiderium nostrum excedit. Excedit etiam caritatem vel dilectionem viae, sicut et excedit naturam. Ergo homo non potest per gratiam mereri vitam aeternam ex condigno.

On the contrary, What is granted in accordance with a fair judgment, would seem a condign reward. But life everlasting is granted by God, in accordance with the judgment of justice, according to 2 Tim. 4:8: "As to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day." Therefore man merits everlasting life condignly.

[38674] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, id quod redditur secundum iustum iudicium, videtur esse merces condigna. Sed vita aeterna redditur a Deo secundum iudicium iustitiae; secundum illud II ad Tim. IV, *in reliquo reposita est mihi corona iustitiae, quam reddet mihi dominus in illa die, iustus iudex*. Ergo homo meretur vitam aeternam ex condigno.

I answer that, Man's meritorious work may be considered in two ways: first, as it proceeds from free-will; secondly, as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Ghost. If it is considered as regards the substance of the work, and inasmuch as it springs from the free-will, there can be no condignity because of the very great inequality. But there is congruity, on account of an equality of proportion: for it would seem congruous that, if a man does what he can, God should reward him according to the excellence of his power.

If, however, we speak of a meritorious work, inasmuch as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Ghost moving us to life everlasting, it is meritorious of life everlasting condignly. For thus

[38675] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod opus meritorium hominis dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, secundum quod procedit ex libero arbitrio; alio modo, secundum quod procedit ex gratia spiritus sancti. Si consideretur secundum substantiam operis, et secundum quod procedit ex libero arbitrio, sic non potest ibi esse condignitas, propter maximam inaequalitatem. Sed est ibi congruitas, propter quandam aequalitatem proportionis, videtur enim congruum ut homini operanti secundum suam virtutem, Deus recompenset secundum excellentiam suae virtutis. Si autem loquamur de opere meritorio secundum quod procedit ex gratia spiritus sancti, sic est meritorium vitae aeternae ex condigno. Sic enim

the value of its merit depends upon the power of the Holy Ghost moving us to life everlasting according to Jn. 4:14: "Shall become in him a fount of water springing up into life everlasting." And the worth of the work depends on the dignity of grace, whereby a man, being made a partaker of the Divine Nature, is adopted as a son of God, to whom the inheritance is due by right of adoption, according to Rom. 8:17: "If sons, heirs also."

valor meriti attenditur secundum virtutem spiritus sancti moventis nos in vitam aeternam; secundum illud Ioan. IV, *fiet in eo fons aquae salientis in vitam aeternam*. Attenditur etiam pretium operis secundum dignitatem gratiae, per quam homo, consors factus divinae naturae, adoptatur in filium Dei, cui debetur hereditas ex ipso iure adoptionis, secundum illud Rom. VIII, *si filii, et heredes*.

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is speaking of the substance of these sufferings.

[38676] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostolus loquitur de passionibus sanctorum secundum eorum substantiam.

Reply to Objection 2: This saying is to be understood of the first cause of our reaching everlasting life, viz. God's mercy. But our merit is a subsequent cause.

[38677] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum Glossae intelligendum est quantum ad primam causam perveniendi ad vitam aeternam, quae est miseratio Dei. Meritum autem nostrum est causa subsequens.

Reply to Objection 3: The grace of the Holy Ghost which we have at present, although unequal to glory in act, is equal to it virtually as the seed of a tree, wherein the whole tree is virtually. So likewise by grace of the Holy Ghost dwells in man; and He is a sufficient cause of life everlasting; hence, 2 Cor. 1:22, He is called the "pledge" of our inheritance.

[38678] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod gratia spiritus sancti quam in praesenti habemus, etsi non sit aequalis gloriae in actu, est tamen aequalis in virtute, sicut et semen arborum, in quo est virtus ad totam arborem. Et similiter per gratiam inhabitat hominem spiritus sanctus, qui est sufficiens causa vitae aeternae, unde et dicitur esse pignus hereditatis nostrae, II ad Cor. I.

Q. 114. A. 4. Whether grace is the principle of merit through charity rather than the other virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not the principle of merit through charity rather than the other virtues. For wages are due to work, according to Mat. 20:8: "Call the laborers and pay them their hire." Now every virtue is a principle of some operation, since virtue is an operative habit, as stated above (Q[55], A[2]). Hence every virtue is equally a principle of merit.

[38679] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gratia non sit principium meriti principalius per caritatem quam per alias virtutes. Merces enim operi debetur; secundum illud Matth. XX, *voca operarios, et redde illis mercedem suam*. Sed quaelibet virtus est principium alicuius operis, est enim virtus habitus operativus, ut supra habitum est. Ergo quaelibet virtus est aequaliter principium merendi.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:8): "Every man shall receive his own reward according to his labor." Now charity lessens rather than increases the labor, because as Augustine says (De Verbis Dom., Serm. lxx), "love makes all

[38680] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. III, *unusquisque propriam mercedem accipiet secundum proprium laborem*. Sed caritas magis diminuit laborem quam augeat, quia sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro

hard and repulsive tasks easy and next to nothing." Hence charity is no greater principle of merit than any other virtue.

de verbis Dom., *omnia saeva et immania, facilia et prope nulla facit amor*. Ergo caritas non est principalius principium merendi quam alia virtus.

Objection 3: Further, the greatest principle of merit would seem to be the one whose acts are most meritorious. But the acts of faith and patience or fortitude would seem to be the most meritorious, as appears in the martyrs, who strove for the faith patiently and bravely even till death. Hence other virtues are a greater principle of merit than charity.

[38681] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, illa virtus videtur principalius esse principium merendi, cuius actus sunt maxime meritorii. Sed maxime meritorii videntur esse actus fidei et patientiae, sive fortitudinis, sicut patet in martyribus, qui pro fide patienter et fortiter usque ad mortem certaverunt. Ergo aliae virtutes principalius sunt principium merendi quam caritas.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 14:21): "He that loveth Me, shall be loved of My Father; and I will love him and will manifest Myself to him." Now everlasting life consists in the manifest knowledge of God, according to Jn. 17:3: "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true" and living "God." Hence the merit of eternal life rests chiefly with charity.

[38682] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dominus, Ioan. XIV, dicit, *si quis diligit me, diligetur a patre meo, et ego diligam eum, et manifestabo ei meipsum*. Sed in manifesta Dei cognitione consistit vita aeterna; secundum illud Ioan. XVII, *haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te solum Deum verum et vivum*. Ergo meritum vitae aeternae maxime residet penes caritatem.

I answer that, As we may gather from what has been stated above (A[1]), human acts have the nature of merit from two causes: first and chiefly from the Divine ordination, inasmuch as acts are said to merit that good to which man is divinely ordained. Secondly, on the part of free-will, inasmuch as man, more than other creatures, has the power of voluntary acts by acting by himself. And in both these ways does merit chiefly rest with charity. For we must bear in mind that everlasting life consists in the enjoyment of God. Now the human mind's movement to the fruition of the Divine good is the proper act of charity, whereby all the acts of the other virtues are ordained to this end, since all the other virtues are commanded by charity. Hence the merit of life everlasting pertains first to charity, and secondly, to the other virtues, inasmuch as their acts are commanded by charity. So, likewise, is it manifest that what we do out of love we do most willingly. Hence, even inasmuch as merit depends on voluntariness, merit is chiefly attributed to charity.

[38683] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis accipi potest, humanus actus habet rationem merendi ex duobus, primo quidem et principaliter, ex divina ordinatione, secundum quod actus dicitur esse meritorius illius boni ad quod homo divinitus ordinatur; secundo vero, ex parte liberi arbitrii, inquantum scilicet homo habet prae ceteris creaturis ut per se agat, voluntarie agens. Et quantum ad utrumque, principalitas meriti penes caritatem consistit. Primo enim considerandum est quod vita aeterna in Dei fruitione consistit. Motus autem humanae mentis ad fruitionem divini boni, est proprius actus caritatis, per quem omnes actus aliarum virtutum ordinantur in hunc finem, secundum quod aliae virtutes imperantur a caritate. Et ideo meritum vitae aeternae primo pertinet ad caritatem, ad alias autem virtutes secundario, secundum quod eorum actus a caritate imperantur. Similiter etiam manifestum est quod id quod ex amore facimus, maxime voluntarie facimus. Unde etiam secundum quod ad rationem meriti requiritur quod sit voluntarium, principaliter meritum caritati attribuitur.

Reply to Objection 1: Charity, inasmuch as it has

[38684] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo

the last end for object, moves the other virtues to act. For the habit to which the end pertains always commands the habits to which the means pertain, as was said above (Q[9], A[1]).

dicendum quod caritas, inquantum habet ultimum finem pro obiecto, movet alias virtutes ad operandum. Semper enim habitus ad quem pertinet finis, imperat habitibus ad quos pertinent ea quae sunt ad finem; ut ex supradictis patet.

Reply to Objection 2: A work can be toilsome and difficult in two ways: first, from the greatness of the work, and thus the greatness of the work pertains to the increase of merit; and thus charity does not lessen the toil---rather, it makes us undertake the greatest toils, "for it does great things, if it exists," as Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxx). Secondly, from the defect of the operator; for what is not done with a ready will is hard and difficult to all of us, and this toil lessens merit and is removed by charity.

[38685] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod opus aliquod potest esse laboriosum et difficile dupliciter. Uno modo, ex magnitudine operis. Et sic magnitudo laboris pertinet ad augmentum meriti. Et sic caritas non diminuit laborem, immo facit aggredi opera maxima; magna enim operatur, si est, ut Gregorius dicit in quadam homilia. Alio modo ex defectu ipsius operantis, unicuique enim est laboriosum et difficile quod non prompta voluntate facit. Et talis labor diminuit meritum, et a caritate tollitur.

Reply to Objection 3: The act of faith is not meritorious unless "faith . . . worketh by charity" (Gal. 5:6). So, too, the acts of patience and fortitude are not meritorious unless a man does them out of charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:3: "If I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing."

[38686] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod fidei actus non est meritorius nisi fides per dilectionem operetur, ut dicitur ad Gal. V. Similiter etiam actus patientiae et fortitudinis non est meritorius nisi aliquis ex caritate haec operetur; secundum illud I ad Cor. XIII, *si tradidero corpus meum ita ut ardeam, caritatem autem non habuero, nihil mihi prodest*.

Q. 114. A. 5. Whether a man may merit for himself the first grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man may merit for himself the first grace, because, as Augustine says (Ep. clxxxvi), "faith merits justification." Now a man is justified by the first grace. Therefore a man may merit the first grace.

[38687] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo possit sibi mereri primam gratiam. Quia ut Augustinus dicit, *fides meretur iustificationem*. Iustificatur autem homo per primam gratiam. Ergo homo potest sibi mereri primam gratiam.

Objection 2: Further, God gives grace only to the worthy. Now, no one is said to be worthy of some good, unless he has merited it condignly. Therefore we may merit the first grace condignly.

[38688] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, Deus non dat gratiam nisi dignis. Sed non dicitur aliquis dignus aliquo dono, nisi qui ipsum promeruit ex condigno. Ergo aliquis ex condigno potest mereri primam gratiam.

Objection 3: Further, with men we may merit a gift already received. Thus if a man receives a horse from his master, he merits it by a good use of it in his master's service. Now God is much more bountiful than man. Much more, therefore,

[38689] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, apud homines aliquis potest promereri donum iam acceptum, sicut qui accepit equum a domino, meretur ipsum bene utendo eo in servitio domini. Sed Deus est liberalior quam homo. Ergo multo

may a man, by subsequent works, merit the first grace already received from God.

magis primam gratiam iam susceptam potest homo promereri a Deo per subsequentia opera.

On the contrary, The nature of grace is repugnant to reward of works, according to Rom. 4:4: "Now to him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace but according to debt." Now a man merits what is reckoned to him according to debt, as the reward of his works. Hence a man may not merit the first grace.

[38690] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod ratio gratiae repugnat mercedi operum; secundum illud Rom. IV, *ei qui operatur, merces non imputatur secundum gratiam, sed secundum debitum*. Sed illud meretur homo quod imputatur quasi merces operis eius. Ergo primam gratiam non potest homo mereri.

I answer that, The gift of grace may be considered in two ways: first in the nature of a gratuitous gift, and thus it is manifest that all merit is repugnant to grace, since as the Apostle says (Rom. 11:6), "if by grace, it is not now by works." Secondly, it may be considered as regards the nature of the thing given, and thus, also, it cannot come under the merit of him who has not grace, both because it exceeds the proportion of nature, and because previous to grace a man in the state of sin has an obstacle to his meriting grace, viz. sin. But when anyone has grace, the grace already possessed cannot come under merit, since reward is the term of the work, but grace is the principle of all our good works, as stated above (Q[109]). But of anyone merits a further gratuitous gift by virtue of the preceding grace, it would not be the first grace. Hence it is manifest that no one can merit for himself the first grace.

[38691] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod donum gratiae considerari potest dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum rationem gratuiti doni. Et sic manifestum est quod omne meritum repugnat gratiae, quia ut ad Rom. XI apostolus dicit, *si ex operibus, iam non ex gratia*. Alio modo potest considerari secundum naturam ipsius rei quae donatur. Et sic etiam non potest cadere sub merito non habentis gratiam, tum quia excedit proportionem naturae; tum etiam quia ante gratiam, in statu peccati, homo habet impedimentum promerendi gratiam, scilicet ipsum peccatum. Postquam autem iam aliquis habet gratiam, non potest gratia iam habita sub merito cadere, quia merces est terminus operis, gratia vero est principium cuiuslibet boni operis in nobis, ut supra dictum est. Si vero aliud donum gratuitum aliquis mereatur virtute gratiae praecedentis, iam non erit prima. Unde manifestum est quod nullus potest sibi mereri primam gratiam.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Retract. i, 23), he was deceived on this point for a time, believing the beginning of faith to be from us, and its consummation to be granted us by God; and this he here retracts. And seemingly it is in this sense that he speaks of faith as meriting justification. But if we suppose, as indeed it is a truth of faith, that the beginning of faith is in us from God, the first act must flow from grace; and thus it cannot be meritorious of the first grace. Therefore man is justified by faith, not as though man, by believing, were to merit justification, but that, he believes, whilst he is being justified; inasmuch as a movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly, as stated above (Q[113], A[4]).

[38692] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro Retract., ipse aliquando in hoc fuit deceptus, quod credidit initium fidei esse ex nobis, sed consummationem nobis dari ex Deo, quod ipse ibidem retractat. Et ad hunc sensum videtur pertinere quod fides iustificationem mereatur. Sed si supponamus, sicut fidei veritas habet, quod initium fidei sit in nobis a Deo; iam etiam ipse actus fidei consequitur primam gratiam, et ita non potest esse meritorius primae gratiae. Per fidem igitur iustificatur homo, non quasi homo credendo mereatur iustificationem, sed quia, dum iustificatur, credit; eo quod motus fidei requiritur ad iustificationem impii, ut supra dictum est.

Reply to Objection 2: God gives grace to none but to the worthy, not that they were previously worthy, but that by His grace He makes them worthy, Who alone "can make him clean that is conceived of unclean seed" (Job 14:4).

[38693] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus non dat gratiam nisi dignis. Non tamen ita quod prius digni fuerint, sed quia ipse per gratiam eos facit dignos, *qui solus potest facere mundum de immundo conceptum semine*.

Reply to Objection 3: Man's every good work proceeds from the first grace as from its principle; but not from any gift of man. Consequently, there is no comparison between gifts of grace and gifts of men.

[38694] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod omne bonum opus hominis procedit a prima gratia sicut a principio. Non autem procedit a quocumque humano dono. Et ideo non est similis ratio de dono gratiae et de dono humano.

Q. 114. A. 6. Whether a man can merit the first grace for another?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man can merit the first grace for another. Because on Mat. 9:2: "Jesus seeing their faith," etc. a gloss says: "How much is our personal faith worth with God, Who set such a price on another's faith, as to heal the man both inwardly and outwardly!" Now inward healing is brought about by grace. Hence a man can merit the first grace for another.

[38695] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo possit alteri mereri primam gratiam. Quia Matth. IX, super illud, *videns Iesus fidem illorum* etc., dicit Glossa, *quantum valet apud Deum fides propria, apud quem sic valuit aliena ut intus et extra sanaret hominem*. Sed interior sanatio hominis est per primam gratiam. Ergo homo potest alteri mereri primam gratiam.

Objection 2: Further, the prayers of the just are not void, but efficacious, according to James 5:16: "The continued prayer of a just man availeth much." Now he had previously said: "Pray one for another, that you may be saved." Hence, since man's salvation can only be brought about by grace, it seems that one man may merit for another his first grace.

[38696] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, orationes iustorum non sunt vacuae, sed efficaces; secundum illud Iac. ult., *multum valet deprecatio iusti assidua*. Sed ibidem praemittitur, *orate pro invicem ut salvemini*. Cum igitur salus hominis non possit esse nisi per gratiam, videtur quod unus homo possit alteri mereri primam gratiam.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Lk. 16:9): "Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity, that when you shall fail they may receive you into everlasting dwellings." Now it is through grace alone that anyone is received into everlasting dwellings, for by it alone does anyone merit everlasting life as stated above (A[2]; Q[109], A[5]). Hence one man may by merit obtain for another his first grace.

[38697] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, Luc. XVI dicitur, *facite vobis amicos de mammona iniquitatis, ut cum defeceritis, recipiant vos in aeterna tabernacula*. Sed nullus recipitur in aeterna tabernacula nisi per gratiam, per quam solam aliquis meretur vitam aeternam, ut supra dictum est. Ergo unus homo potest alteri acquirere, merendo, primam gratiam.

On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 15:1): "If Moses and Samuel shall stand before Me, My soul is not towards this people" ---yet they had great merit with God. Hence it seems that no one

[38698] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ierem. XV, *si steterint Moyses et Samuel coram me, non est anima mea ad populum istum*, qui tamen fuerunt maximi meriti apud

can merit the first grace for another.

Deum. Videtur ergo quod nullus possit alteri mereri primam gratiam.

I answer that, As shown above (AA[1],3,4), our works are meritorious from two causes: first, by virtue of the Divine motion; and thus we merit condignly; secondly, according as they proceed from free-will in so far as we do them willingly, and thus they have congruous merit, since it is congruous that when a man makes good use of his power God should by His super-excellent power work still higher things. And therefore it is clear that no one can merit condignly for another his first grace, save Christ alone; since each one of us is moved by God to reach life everlasting through the gift of grace; hence condign merit does not reach beyond this motion. But Christ's soul is moved by God through grace, not only so as to reach the glory of life everlasting, but so as to lead others to it, inasmuch as He is the Head of the Church, and the Author of human salvation, according to Heb. 2:10: "Who hath brought many children into glory [to perfect] the Author of their salvation."

But one may merit the first grace for another congruously; because a man in grace fulfils God's will, and it is congruous and in harmony with friendship that God should fulfil man's desire for the salvation of another, although sometimes there may be an impediment on the part of him whose salvation the just man desires. And it is in this sense that the passage from Jeremias speaks.

[38699] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, opus nostrum habet rationem meriti ex duobus. Primo quidem, ex vi motionis divinae, et sic meretur aliquis ex condigno. Alio modo habet rationem meriti, secundum quod procedit ex libero arbitrio, inquantum voluntarie aliquid facimus. Et ex hac parte est meritum congrui, quia congruum est ut, dum homo bene utitur sua virtute, Deus secundum superexcellentem virtutem excellentius operetur. Ex quo patet quod merito condigni nullus potest mereri alteri primam gratiam nisi solus Christus. Quia unusquisque nostrum movetur a Deo per donum gratiae ut ipse ad vitam aeternam perveniat, et ideo meritum condigni ultra hanc motionem non se extendit. Sed anima Christi mota est a Deo per gratiam non solum ut ipse perveniret ad gloriam vitae aeternae, sed etiam ut alios in eam adduceret, inquantum est caput Ecclesiae et auctor salutis humanae; secundum illud ad Heb. II, *qui multos filios in gloriam adduxerat, auctorem salutis* et cetera. Sed merito congrui potest aliquis alteri mereri primam gratiam. Quia enim homo in gratia constitutus implet Dei voluntatem, congruum est, secundum amicitiae proportionem, ut Deus impleat hominis voluntatem in salvatione alterius, licet quandoque possit habere impedimentum ex parte illius cuius aliquis sanctus iustificationem desiderat. Et in hoc casu loquitur auctoritas Ieremiae ultimo inducta.

Reply to Objection 1: A man's faith avails for another's salvation by congruous and not by condign merit.

[38700] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod fides aliorum valet alii ad salutem merito congrui, non merito condigni.

Reply to Objection 2: The impetration of prayer rests on mercy, whereas condign merit rests on justice; hence a man may impetrate many things from the Divine mercy in prayer, which he does not merit in justice, according to Dan. 9:18: "For it is not for our justifications that we present our prayers before Thy face, but for the multitude of Thy tender mercies."

[38701] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod impetratio orationis innititur misericordiae, meritum autem condigni innititur iustitiae. Et ideo multa orando impetrat homo ex divina misericordia, quae tamen non meretur secundum iustitiam; secundum illud Dan. IX, *neque enim in iustificationibus nostris prosternimus preces ante faciem tuam, sed in miserationibus tuis multis*.

Reply to Objection 3: The poor who receive

[38702] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium

alms are said to receive others into everlasting dwellings, either by impetrating their forgiveness in prayer, or by meriting congruously by other good works, or materially speaking, inasmuch as by these good works of mercy, exercised towards the poor, we merit to be received into everlasting dwellings.

dicendum quod pauperes eleemosynas recipientes dicuntur recipere alios in aeterna tabernacula, vel impetrando eis veniam orando; vel merendo per alia bona ex congruo; vel etiam materialiter loquendo, quia per ipsa opera misericordiae quae quis in pauperes exercet, meretur recipi in aeterna tabernacula.

Q. 114. A. 7. Whether a man may merit restoration after a fall?

Objection 1: It would seem that anyone may merit for himself restoration after a fall. For what a man may justly ask of God, he may justly merit. Now nothing may more justly be besought of God than to be restored after a fall, as Augustine says [*Cf. Ennar. i super Ps. lxx.], according to Ps. 70:9: "When my strength shall fail, do not Thou forsake me." Hence a man may merit to be restored after a fall.

[38703] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis possit mereri sibi ipsi reparationem post lapsum. Illud enim quod iuste a Deo petitur, homo videtur posse mereri. Sed nihil iustius a Deo petitur, ut Augustinus dicit, quam quod reparetur post lapsum; secundum illud Psalmi LXX, *cum defecerit virtus mea, ne derelinquas me, domine*. Ergo homo potest mereri ut reparetur post lapsum.

Objection 2: Further, a man's works benefit himself more than another. Now a man may, to some extent, merit for another his restoration after a fall, even as his first grace. Much more, therefore, may he merit for himself restoration after a fall.

[38704] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, multo magis homini prosunt opera sua quam prosint alii. Sed homo potest aliquo modo alteri mereri reparationem post lapsum, sicut et primam gratiam. Ergo multo magis sibi potest mereri ut reparetur post lapsum.

Objection 3: Further, when a man is once in grace he merits life everlasting by the good works he does, as was shown above (A[2]; Q[109], A[5]). Now no one can attain life everlasting unless he is restored by grace. Hence it would seem that he merits for himself restoration.

[38705] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, homo qui aliquando fuit in gratia, per bona opera quae fecit, meruit sibi vitam aeternam; ut ex supradictis patet. Sed ad vitam aeternam non potest quis pervenire nisi reparetur per gratiam. Ergo videtur quod sibi meruit reparationem per gratiam.

On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:24): "If the just man turn himself away from his justice and do iniquity . . . all his justices which he hath done shall not be remembered." Therefore his previous merits will nowise help him to rise again. Hence no one can merit for himself restoration after a fall.

[38706] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ezech. XVIII, *si averterit se iustus a iustitia sua, et fecerit iniquitatem; omnes iustitiae eius quas fecerat, non recordabuntur*. Ergo nihil valebunt ei praecedentia merita ad hoc quod resurgat. Non ergo aliquis potest sibi mereri reparationem post lapsum futurum.

I answer that, No one can merit for himself restoration after a future fall, either condignly or congruously. He cannot merit for himself condignly, since the reason of this merit depends on the motion of Divine grace, and this motion is interrupted by the subsequent sin; hence all

[38707] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod nullus potest sibi mereri reparationem post lapsum futurum, neque merito condigni, neque merito congrui. Merito quidem condigni hoc sibi mereri non potest, quia ratio huius meriti dependet ex motione divinae gratiae,

benefits which he afterwards obtains from God, whereby he is restored, do not fall under merit---the motion of the preceding grace not extending to them. Again, congruous merit, whereby one merits the first grace for another, is prevented from having its effect on account of the impediment of sin in the one for whom it is merited. Much more, therefore, is the efficacy of such merit impeded by the obstacle which is in him who merits, and in him for whom it is merited; for both these are in the same person. And therefore a man can nowise merit for himself restoration after a fall.

quae quidem motio interrumpitur per sequens peccatum. Unde omnia beneficia quae postmodum aliquis a Deo consequitur, quibus reparatur, non cadunt sub merito; tanquam motione prioris gratiae usque ad hoc non se extendente. Meritum etiam congrui quo quis alteri primam gratiam meretur, impeditur ne consequatur effectum, propter impedimentum peccati in eo cui quis meretur. Multo igitur magis impeditur talis meriti efficacia per impedimentum quod est et in eo qui meretur et in eo cui meretur, hic enim utrumque in unam personam concurrit. Et ideo nullo modo aliquis potest sibi mereri reparationem post lapsum.

Reply to Objection 1: The desire whereby we seek for restoration after a fall is called just, and likewise the prayer whereby this restoration is besought is called just, because it tends to justice; and not that it depends on justice by way of merit, but only on mercy.

[38708] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod desiderium quo quis desiderat reparationem post lapsum, iustum dicitur, et similiter oratio, quia tendit ad iustitiam. Non tamen ita quod iustitiae innitatur per modum meriti, sed solum misericordiae.

Reply to Objection 2: Anyone may congruously merit for another his first grace, because there is no impediment (at least, on the part of him who merits), such as is found when anyone recedes from justice after the merit of grace.

[38709] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod aliquis potest alteri mereri ex congruo primam gratiam, quia non est ibi impedimentum saltem ex parte merentis. Quod invenitur dum aliquis post meritum gratiae a iustitia recedit.

Reply to Objection 3: Some have said that no one "absolutely" merits life everlasting except by the act of final grace, but only "conditionally," i.e. if he perseveres. But it is unreasonable to say this, for sometimes the act of the last grace is not more, but less meritorious than preceding acts, on account of the prostration of illness. Hence it must be said that every act of charity merits eternal life absolutely; but by subsequent sin, there arises an impediment to the preceding merit, so that it does not obtain its effect; just as natural causes fail of their effects on account of a supervening impediment.

[38710] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod nullus meretur absolute vitam aeternam, nisi per actum finalis gratiae; sed solum sub conditione, si perseverat. Sed hoc irrationabiliter dicitur, quia quandoque actus ultimae gratiae non est magis meritorius, sed minus, quam actus praecedentis, propter aegritudinis oppressionem. Unde dicendum quod quilibet actus caritatis meretur absolute vitam aeternam. Sed per peccatum sequens ponitur impedimentum praecedenti merito, ut non sortiatur effectum, sicut etiam causae naturales deficiunt a suis effectibus propter superveniens impedimentum.

Q. 114. A. 8. Whether a man may merit the increase of grace or charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot merit an increase of grace or charity. For when anyone receives the reward he merited no other

[38711] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non possit mereri augmentum gratiae vel caritatis. Cum enim aliquis

reward is due to him; thus it was said of some (Mat. 6:2): "They have received their reward." Hence, if anyone were to merit the increase of charity or grace, it would follow that, when his grace has been increased, he could not expect any further reward, which is unfitting.

acceperit praemium quod meruit, non debetur ei alia merces, sicut de quibusdam dicitur Matth. VI, *receperunt mercedem suam*. Si igitur aliquis mereretur augmentum caritatis vel gratiae, sequeretur quod, gratia augmentata, non posset ulterius expectare aliud praemium. Quod est inconveniens.

Objection 2: Further, nothing acts beyond its species. But the principle of merit is grace or charity, as was shown above (AA[2], 4). Therefore no one can merit greater grace or charity than he has.

[38712] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, nihil agit ultra suam speciem. Sed principium meriti est gratia vel caritas, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo nullus potest maiorem gratiam vel caritatem mereri quam habeat.

Objection 3: Further, what falls under merit a man merits by every act flowing from grace or charity, as by every such act a man merits life everlasting. If, therefore, the increase of grace or charity falls under merit, it would seem that by every act quickened by charity a man would merit an increase of charity. But what a man merits, he infallibly receives from God, unless hindered by subsequent sin; for it is written (2 Tim. 1:12): "I know Whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is able to keep that which I have committed unto Him." Hence it would follow that grace or charity is increased by every meritorious act; and this would seem impossible since at times meritorious acts are not very fervent, and would not suffice for the increase of charity. Therefore the increase of charity does not come under merit.

[38713] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, id quod cadit sub merito, meretur homo per quemlibet actum a gratia vel caritate procedentem, sicut per quemlibet talem actum meretur homo vitam aeternam. Si igitur augmentum gratiae vel caritatis cadat sub merito, videtur quod per quemlibet actum caritate informatum aliquis meretur augmentum caritatis. Sed id quod homo meretur, infallibiliter a Deo consequitur, nisi impediatur per peccatum sequens, dicitur enim II ad Tim. I, *scio cui credidi, et certus sum quia potens est depositum meum servare*. Sic ergo sequeretur quod per quemlibet actum meritorium gratia vel caritas augeretur. Quod videtur esse inconveniens, cum quandoque actus meritorii non sint multum ferventes, ita quod sufficiant ad caritatis augmentum. Non ergo augmentum caritatis cadit sub merito.

On the contrary, Augustine says (super Ep. Joan.; cf. Ep. clxxxvi) that "charity merits increase, and being increased merits to be perfected." Hence the increase of grace or charity falls under merit.

[38714] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, super Epist. Ioan., quod *caritas meretur augeri, ut aucta mereatur perfici*. Ergo augmentum caritatis vel gratiae cadit sub merito.

I answer that, As stated above (AA[6],7), whatever the motion of grace reaches to, falls under condign merit. Now the motion of a mover extends not merely to the last term of the movement, but to the whole progress of the movement. But the term of the movement of grace is eternal life; and progress in this movement is by the increase of charity or grace according to Prov. 4:18: "But the path of the just

[38715] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, illud cadit sub merito condigni, ad quod motio gratiae se extendit. Motio autem alicuius moventis non solum se extendit ad ultimum terminum motus, sed etiam ad totum progressum in motu. Terminus autem motus gratiae est vita aeterna, progressus autem in hoc motu est secundum augmentum caritatis vel gratiae, secundum illud Prov. IV,

as a shining light, goeth forward and increaseth even to perfect day," which is the day of glory. And thus the increase of grace falls under condign merit.

iustorum semita quasi lux splendens procedit, et crescit usque ad perfectum diem, qui est dies gloriae. Sic igitur augmentum gratiae cadit sub merito condigni.

Reply to Objection 1: Reward is the term of merit. But there is a double term of movement, viz. the last, and the intermediate, which is both beginning and term; and this term is the reward of increase. Now the reward of human favor is as the last end to those who place their end in it; hence such as these receive no other reward.

[38716] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praemium est terminus meriti. Est autem duplex terminus motus, scilicet ultimus; et medius, qui est et principium et terminus. Et talis terminus est merces augmenti. Merces autem favoris humani est sicut ultimus terminus his qui finem in hoc constituunt, unde tales nullam aliam mercedem recipiunt.

Reply to Objection 2: The increase of grace is not above the virtuality of the pre-existing grace, although it is above its quantity, even as a tree is not above the virtuality of the seed, although above its quantity.

[38717] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod augmentum gratiae non est supra virtutem praeexistentis gratiae, licet sit supra quantitatem ipsius, sicut arbor, etsi sit supra quantitatem seminis, non est tamen supra virtutem ipsius.

Reply to Objection 3: By every meritorious act a man merits the increase of grace, equally with the consummation of grace which is eternal life. But just as eternal life is not given at once, but in its own time, so neither is grace increased at once, but in its own time, viz. when a man is sufficiently disposed for the increase of grace.

[38718] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod quolibet actu meritorio meretur homo augmentum gratiae, sicut et gratiae consummationem, quae est vita aeterna. Sed sicut vita aeterna non statim redditur, sed suo tempore; ita nec gratia statim augetur, sed suo tempore; cum scilicet aliquis sufficienter fuerit dispositus ad gratiae augmentum.

Q. 114. A. 9. Whether a man may merit perseverance?

Objection 1: It would seem that anyone may merit perseverance. For what a man obtains by asking, can come under the merit of anyone that is in grace. Now men obtain perseverance by asking it of God; otherwise it would be useless to ask it of God in the petitions of the Lord's Prayer, as Augustine says (De Dono Persev. ii). Therefore perseverance may come under the merit of whoever has grace.

[38719] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 9 arg. 1 Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis possit perseverantiam mereri. Illud enim quod homo obtinet petendo, potest cadere sub merito habentis gratiam. Sed perseverantiam petendo homines a Deo obtinent, alioquin frustra peteretur a Deo in petitionibus orationis dominicae, ut Augustinus exponit, in libro de dono Persever. Ergo perseverantia potest cadere sub merito habentis gratiam.

Objection 2: Further, it is more not to be able to sin than not to sin. But not to be able to sin comes under merit, for we merit eternal life, of which impeccability is an essential part. Much more, therefore, may we merit not to sin, i.e. to

[38720] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 9 arg. 2 Praeterea, magis est non posse peccare quam non peccare. Sed non posse peccare cadit sub merito, meretur enim aliquis vitam aeternam, de cuius ratione est impeccabilitas. Ergo multo magis potest aliquis

persevere.

mereri ut non peccet, quod est perseverare.

Objection 3: Further, increase of grace is greater than perseverance in the grace we already possess. But a man may merit an increase of grace, as was stated above (A[8]). Much more, therefore, may he merit perseverance in the grace he has already.

[38721] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 9 arg. 3 Praeterea, maius est augmentum gratiae quam perseverantia in gratia quam quis habet. Sed homo potest mereri augmentum gratiae, ut supra dictum est. Ergo multo magis potest mereri perseverantiam in gratia quam quis habet.

On the contrary, What we merit, we obtain from God, unless it is hindered by sin. Now many have meritorious works, who do not obtain perseverance; nor can it be urged that this takes place because of the impediment of sin, since sin itself is opposed to perseverance; and thus if anyone were to merit perseverance, God would not permit him to fall into sin. Hence perseverance does not come under merit.

[38722] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 9 s. c. Sed contra est quod omne quod quis meretur, a Deo consequitur, nisi impediatur per peccatum. Sed multi habent opera meritoria, qui non consequuntur perseverantiam. Nec potest dici quod hoc fiat propter impedimentum peccati, quia hoc ipsum quod est peccare, opponitur perseverantiae; ita quod, si aliquis perseverantiam mereretur, Deus non permitteret aliquem cadere in peccatum. Non igitur perseverantia cadit sub merito.

I answer that, Since man's free-will is naturally flexible towards good and evil, there are two ways of obtaining from God perseverance in good: first, inasmuch as free-will is determined to good by consummate grace, which will be in glory; secondly, on the part of the Divine motion, which inclines man to good unto the end. Now as explained above (AA[6],7,8), that which is related as a term to the free-will's movement directed to God the mover, falls under human merit; and not what is related to the aforesaid movement as principle. Hence it is clear that the perseverance of glory which is the term of the aforesaid movement falls under merit; but perseverance of the wayfarer does not fall under merit, since it depends solely on the Divine motion, which is the principle of all merit. Now God freely bestows the good of perseverance, on whomsoever He bestows it.

[38723] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 9 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum homo naturaliter habeat liberum arbitrium flexibile ad bonum et ad malum, dupliciter potest aliquis perseverantiam in bono obtinere a Deo. Uno quidem modo, per hoc quod liberum arbitrium determinatur ad bonum per gratiam consummatam, quod erit in gloria. Alio modo, ex parte motionis divinae, quae hominem inclinat ad bonum usque in finem. Sicut autem ex dictis patet, illud cadit sub humano merito, quod comparatur ad motum liberi arbitrii directi a Deo movente, sicut terminus, non autem id quod comparatur ad praedictum motum sicut principium. Unde patet quod perseverantia gloriae, quae est terminus praedicti motus, cadit sub merito, perseverantia autem viae non cadit sub merito, quia dependet solum ex motione divina, quae est principium omnis meriti. Sed Deus gratis perseverantiae bonum largitur, cuicumque illud largitur.

Reply to Objection 1: We impetrate in prayer things that we do not merit, since God hears sinners who beseech the pardon of their sins, which they do not merit, as appears from Augustine [*Tract. xliv in Joan.] on Jn. 11:31, "Now we know that God doth not hear sinners," otherwise it would have been useless for the publican to say: "O God, be merciful to me a

[38724] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 9 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod etiam ea quae non meremur, orando impetramus. Nam et peccatores Deus audit, peccatorum veniam petentes, quam non merentur, ut patet per Augustinum, super illud Ioan. IX, scimus quia peccatores Deus non exaudit; alioquin frustra dixisset publicanus, Deus, propitius esto mihi peccatori, ut dicitur Luc.

sinner," Lk. 18:13. So too may we impetrate of God in prayer the grace of perseverance either for ourselves or for others, although it does not fall under merit.

XVIII. Et similiter perseverantiae donum aliquis petendo a Deo impetrat vel sibi vel alii, quamvis sub merito non cadat.

Reply to Objection 2: The perseverance which is in heaven is compared as term to the free-will's movement; not so, the perseverance of the wayfarer, for the reason given in the body of the article.

[38725] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 9 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod perseverantia quae erit in gloria, comparatur ad motum liberi arbitrii meritorium sicut terminus, non autem perseverantia viae, ratione praedicta.

In the same way may we answer the third objection which concerns the increase of grace, as was explained above.

[38726] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 9 ad 3 Et similiter dicendum est ad tertium, de augmento gratiae, ut per praedicta patet.

Q. 114. A. 10. Whether temporal goods fall under merit?

Objection 1: It would seem that temporal goods fall under merit. For what is promised to some as a reward of justice, falls under merit. Now, temporal goods were promised in the Old Law as the reward of justice, as appears from Dt. 28. Hence it seems that temporal goods fall under merit.

[38727] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 10 arg. 1 Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod temporalia bona cadant sub merito. Illud enim quod promittitur aliquibus ut praemium iustitiae, cadit sub merito. Sed temporalia bona promissa sunt in lege veteri sicut merces iustitiae, ut patet Deut. XXVIII. Ergo videtur quod bona temporalia cadant sub merito.

Objection 2: Further, that would seem to fall under merit, which God bestows on anyone for a service done. But God sometimes bestows temporal goods on men for services done for Him. For it is written (Ex. 1:21): "And because the midwives feared God, He built them houses"; on which a gloss of Gregory (Moral. xviii, 4) says that "life everlasting might have been awarded them as the fruit of their goodwill, but on account of their sin of falsehood they received an earthly reward." And it is written (Ezech. 29:18): "The King of Babylon hath made his army to undergo hard service against Tyre . . . and there hath been no reward given him," and further on: "And it shall be wages for his army . . . I have given him the land of Egypt because he hath labored for me." Therefore temporal goods fall under merit.

[38728] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 10 arg. 2 Praeterea, illud videtur sub merito cadere, quod Deus alicui retribuit pro aliquo servitio quod fecit. Sed Deus aliquando recompensat hominibus pro servitio sibi facto, aliqua bona temporalia. Dicitur enim Exod. I, *et quia timuerunt obstetrices Deum, aedificavit illis domos*; ubi Glossa Gregorii dicit quod *benignitatis earum merces potuit in aeterna vita retribui, sed pro culpa mendacii, terrenam recompensationem accepit*. Et Ezech. XXIX dicitur, *rex Babylonis servire fecit exercitum suum servitute magna adversus Tyrum, et merces non est reddita ei*; et postea subdit, *erit merces exercitui illius, et dedi ei terram Aegypti, pro eo quod laboraverit mihi*. Ergo bona temporalia cadunt sub merito.

Objection 3: Further, as good is to merit so is evil to demerit. But on account of the demerit of sin some are punished by God with temporal punishments, as appears from the Sodomites, Gn. 19. Hence temporal goods fall under merit.

[38729] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 10 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut bonum se habet ad meritum, ita malum se habet ad demeritum. Sed propter demeritum peccati aliqui puniuntur a Deo temporalibus poenis, sicut patet de Sodomitis, Gen. XIX. Ergo et bona

temporalia cadunt sub merito.

Objection 4: On the contrary, What falls under merit does not come upon all alike. But temporal goods regard the good and the wicked alike; according to Eccles. 9:2: "All things equally happen to the just and the wicked, to the good and to the evil, to the clean and to the unclean, to him that offereth victims and to him that despiseth sacrifices." Therefore temporal goods do not fall under merit.

[38730] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 10 s. c. Sed contra est quod illa quae cadunt sub merito, non similiter se habent ad omnes. Sed bona temporalia et mala similiter se habent ad bonos et malos; secundum illud Eccle. IX, *universa aeque eveniunt iusto et impio, bono et malo, mundo et immundo, immolanti victimas et sacrificia contemnenti*. Ergo bona temporalia non cadunt sub merito.

I answer that, What falls under merit is the reward or wage, which is a kind of good. Now man's good is twofold: the first, simply; the second, relatively. Now man's good simply is his last end (according to Ps. 72:27: "But it is good for men to adhere to my God") and consequently what is ordained and leads to this end; and these fall simply under merit. But the relative, not the simple, good of man is what is good to him now, or what is a good to him relatively; and this does not fall under merit simply, but relatively.

Hence we must say that if temporal goods are considered as they are useful for virtuous works, whereby we are led to heaven, they fall directly and simply under merit, even as increase of grace, and everything whereby a man is helped to attain beatitude after the first grace. For God gives men, both just and wicked, enough temporal goods to enable them to attain to everlasting life; and thus these temporal goods are simply good. Hence it is written (Ps. 33:10): "For there is no want to them that fear Him," and again, Ps. 36:25: "I have not seen the just forsaken," etc.

But if these temporal goods are considered in themselves, they are not man's good simply, but relatively, and thus they do not fall under merit simply, but relatively, inasmuch as men are moved by God to do temporal works, in which with God's help they reach their purpose. And thus as life everlasting is simply the reward of the works of justice in relation to the Divine motion, as stated above (AA[3],6), so have temporal goods, considered in themselves, the nature of reward, with respect to the Divine motion, whereby men's wills are moved to undertake these works, even though, sometimes, men have not a right intention in them.

[38731] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 10 co. Respondeo dicendum quod illud quod sub merito cadit, est praemium vel merces, quod habet rationem alicuius boni. Bonum autem hominis est duplex, unum simpliciter, et aliud secundum quid. Simpliciter quidem bonum hominis est ultimus finis eius, secundum illud Psalmi LXXII, *mihi autem adhaerere Deo bonum est*, et per consequens omnia illa quae ordinantur ut ducentia ad hunc finem. Et talia simpliciter cadunt sub merito. Bonum autem secundum quid et non simpliciter hominis, est quod est bonum ei ut nunc, vel quod ei est secundum aliquid bonum. Et huiusmodi non cadunt sub merito simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Secundum hoc ergo dicendum est quod, si temporalia bona considerentur prout sunt utilia ad opera virtutum, quibus perducimur in vitam aeternam, secundum hoc directe et simpliciter cadunt sub merito, sicut et augmentum gratiae, et omnia illa quibus homo adiuvatur ad perveniendum in beatitudinem, post primam gratiam. Tantum enim dat Deus viris iustis de bonis temporalibus, et etiam de malis, quantum eis expedit ad perveniendum ad vitam aeternam. Et intantum sunt simpliciter bona huiusmodi temporalia. Unde dicitur in Psalmo, *timentes autem dominum non minuentur omni bono*; et alibi, *non vidi iustum derelictum*. Si autem considerentur huiusmodi temporalia bona secundum se, sic non sunt simpliciter bona hominis, sed secundum quid. Et ita non simpliciter cadunt sub merito, sed secundum quid, inquantum scilicet homines moventur a Deo ad aliqua temporaliter agenda, in quibus suum propositum consequuntur, Deo favente. Ut sicut vita aeterna est simpliciter praemium operum iustitiae per relationem ad motionem divinam, sicut supra dictum est; ita temporalia bona in se

considerata habeant rationem mercedis, habito respectu ad motionem divinam qua voluntates hominum moventur ad haec prosequenda; licet interdum in his non habeant homines rectam intentionem.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. iv, 2), "in these temporal promises were figures of spiritual things to come. For the carnal people were adhering to the promises of the present life; and not merely their speech but even their life was prophetic."

[38732] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 10 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, contra Faust., libro IV, *in illis temporalibus promissis figurae fuerunt futurorum spiritualium, quae implentur in nobis. Carnalis enim populus promissis vitae praesentis inhaerebat, et illorum non tantum lingua, sed etiam vita prophetica fuit*.

Reply to Objection 2: These rewards are said to have been divinely brought about in relation to the Divine motion, and not in relation to the malice of their wills, especially as regards the King of Babylon, since he did not besiege Tyre as if wishing to serve God, but rather in order to usurp dominion. So, too, although the midwives had a good will with regard to saving the children, yet their will was not right, inasmuch as they framed falsehoods.

[38733] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 10 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod illae retributiones dicuntur esse divinitus factae secundum comparationem ad divinam motionem, non autem secundum respectum ad malitiam voluntatis. Praecipue quantum ad regem Babylonis, qui non impugnavit Tyrum quasi volens Deo servire, sed potius ut sibi dominium usurparet. Similiter etiam obstetrices, licet habuerunt bonam voluntatem quantum ad liberationem puerorum, non tamen fuit earum recta voluntas quantum ad hoc quod mendacium confinxerunt.

Reply to Objection 3: Temporal evils are imposed as a punishment on the wicked, inasmuch as they are not thereby helped to reach life everlasting. But to the just who are aided by these evils they are not punishments but medicines as stated above (Q[87], A[8]).

[38734] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 10 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod temporalia mala infliguntur in poenam impiis, inquantum per ea non adiuvantur ad consecutionem vitae aeternae. Iustis autem, qui per huiusmodi mala iuvantur, non sunt poenae, sed magis medicinae, ut etiam supra dictum est.

Reply to Objection 4: All things happen equally to the good and the wicked, as regards the substance of temporal good or evil; but not as regards the end, since the good and not the wicked are led to beatitude by them.

And now enough has been said regarding morals in general.

[38735] Iª-IIae q. 114 a. 10 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod omnia aeque eveniunt bonis et malis, quantum ad ipsam substantiam bonorum vel malorum temporalium. Sed non quantum ad finem, quia boni per huiusmodi manuducuntur ad beatitudinem, non autem mali. Et haec de moralibus in communi dicta sufficiant.