TREATISE ON THE CONSERVATION AND GOVERNMENT OF CREATURES (QQ[103]-119)

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Q. 103. OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THINGS IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Having considered the creation of things and their distinction, we now consider in the third place the government thereof, and (1) the government of things in general; (2) in particular, the effects of this government. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

[32692] Iª q. 103 pr. Postquam praemissum est de creatione rerum et distinctione earum, restat nunc tertio considerandum de rerum gubernatione. Et primo, in communi; secundo, in speciali de effectibus gubernationis. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum mundus ab aliquo gubernetur. Secundo, quis sit finis gubernationis ipsius. Tertio, utrum gubernetur ab uno. Quarto, de effectibus gubernationis. Quinto, utrum omnia divinae gubernationi subsint. Sexto, utrum omnia immediate gubernentur a Deo. Septimo, utrum divina gubernatio cassetur in aliquo. Octavo, utrum aliquid divinae providentiae contranitatur.

(1) Whether the world is governed by someone?

(2) What is the end of this government?

(3) Whether the world is governed by one?

(4) Of the effects of this government?

(5) Whether all things are subject to Divine government?

(6) Whether all things are immediately governed by God?

(7) Whether the Divine government is frustrated in anything?

(8) Whether anything is contrary to the Divine Providence?

Q. 103. A. 1. Whether the world is governed by anyone?

Objection 1: It would seem that the world is not governed by anyone. For it belongs to those things to be governed, which move or work for an end. But natural things which make up the greater part of the world do not move, or work for an end; for they have no knowledge of their end. Therefore the world is not governed.

[32693] Iª q. 103 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mundus non gubernetur ab aliquo. Illorum enim est gubernari, quae moventur vel operantur propter finem. Sed res naturales, quae sunt magna pars mundi, non moventur aut operantur propter finem, quia non cognoscunt finem. Ergo mundus non gubernatur.

Objection 2: Further, those things are governed which are moved towards an object. But the world does not appear to be so directed, but has stability in itself. Therefore it is not governed.

[32694] Iª q. 103 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, eorum est proprie gubernari, quae ad aliquid moventur. Sed mundus non videtur ad aliquid moveri, sed in se stabilitatem habet. Ergo non gubernatur.

Objection 3: Further, what is necessarily determined by its own nature to one particular thing, does not require any external principle of government. But the principal parts of the world are by a certain necessity determined to something particular in their actions and

[32695] Iª q. 103 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, id quod in se habet necessitatem qua determinatur ad unum, non indiget exteriori gubernante. Sed principaliores mundi partes quadam necessitate determinantur ad unum in suis actibus et motibus. Ergo mundus gubernatione non indiget.

movements. Therefore the world does not require to be governed.

On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 14:3): "But Thou, O Father, governest all things by Thy Providence." And Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Thou Who governest this universe by mandate eternal."

[32696] Iª q. 103 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Sap. XIV, *tu autem, pater, gubernas omnia providentia*. Et Boetius dicit, in libro de Consol., *o qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas*.

I answer that, Certain ancient philosophers denied the government of the world, saying that all things happened by chance. But such an opinion can be refuted as impossible in two ways. First, by observation of things themselves: for we observe that in nature things happen always or nearly always for the best; which would not be the case unless some sort of providence directed nature towards good as an end; which is to govern. Wherefore the unfailing order we observe in things is a sign of their being governed; for instance, if we enter a well-ordered house we gather therefrom the intention of him that put it in order, as Tullius says (De Nat. Deorum ii), quoting Aristotle [*Cleanthes]. Secondly, this is clear from a consideration of Divine goodness, which, as we have said above (Q[44], A[4]; Q[65], A[2]), was the cause of the production of things in existence. For as "it belongs to the best to produce the best," it is not fitting that the supreme goodness of God should produce things without giving them their perfection. Now a thing's ultimate perfection consists in the attainment of its end. Therefore it belongs to the Divine goodness, as it brought things into existence, so to lead them to their end: and this is to govern.

[32697] Iª q. 103 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam antiqui philosophi gubernationem mundo subtraxerunt, dicentes omnia fortuito agi. Sed haec positio ostenditur esse impossibilis ex duobus. Primo quidem, ex eo quod apparet in ipsis rebus. Videmus enim in rebus naturalibus provenire quod melius est, aut semper aut in pluribus, quod non contingeret, nisi per aliquam providentiam res naturales dirigerentur ad finem boni, quod est gubernare. Unde ipse ordo certus rerum manifeste demonstrat gubernationem mundi, sicut si quis intraret domum bene ordinatam, ex ipsa domus ordinatione ordinatoris rationem perpenderet; ut, ab Aristotele dictum, Tullius introducit in libro de natura deorum. Secundo autem apparet idem ex consideratione divinae bonitatis, per quam res in esse productae sunt, ut ex supra dictis patet. Cum enim optimi sit optima producere, non convenit summae Dei bonitati quod res productas ad perfectum non perducat. Ultima autem perfectio uniuscuiusque est in consecutione finis. Unde ad divinam bonitatem pertinet ut, sicut produxit res in esse, ita etiam eas ad finem perducat. Quod est gubernare.

Reply to Objection 1: A thing moves or operates for an end in two ways. First, in moving itself to the end, as man and other rational creatures; and such things have knowledge of their end, and of the means to the end. Secondly, a thing is said to move or operate for an end, as though moved or directed by another thereto, as an arrow directed to the target by the archer, who knows the end unknown to the arrow. Wherefore, as the movement of the arrow towards a definite end shows clearly that it is directed by someone with knowledge, so the unvarying course of natural

[32698] Iª q. 103 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliquid movetur vel operatur propter finem dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut agens seipsum in finem, ut homo et aliae creaturae rationales, et talium est cognoscere rationem finis, et eorum quae sunt ad finem. Aliquid autem dicitur moveri vel operari propter finem, quasi ab alio actum vel directum in finem, sicut sagitta movetur ad signum directa a sagittante, qui cognoscit finem, non autem sagitta. Unde sicut motus sagittae ad determinatum finem demonstrat aperte quod sagitta dirigitur ab aliquo cognoscente; ita certus cursus naturalium rerum

things which are without knowledge, shows clearly that the world is governed by some reason.

cognitione carentium, manifeste declarat mundum ratione aliqua gubernari.

Reply to Objection 2: In all created things there is a stable element, at least primary matter; and something belonging to movement, if under movement we include operation. And things need governing as to both: because even that which is stable, since it is created from nothing, would return to nothingness were it not sustained by a governing hand, as will be explained later (Q[104], A[1]).

[32699] Iª q. 103 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in omnibus rebus creatis est aliquid stabile, ad minus prima materia; et aliquid ad motum pertinens, ut sub motu etiam operationem comprehendamus. Et quantum ad utrumque, res indiget gubernatione, quia hoc ipsum quod in rebus est stabile, in nihilum decideret (quia ex nihilo est), nisi manu gubernatoris servaretur, ut infra patebit.

Reply to Objection 3: The natural necessity inherent in those beings which are determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression from God, directing them to their end; as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression from the archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a difference, inasmuch as that which creatures receive from God is their nature, while that which natural things receive from man in addition to their nature is somewhat violent. Wherefore, as the violent necessity in the movement of the arrow shows the action of the archer, so the natural necessity of things shows the government of Divine Providence.

[32700] Iª q. 103 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod necessitas naturalis inhaerens rebus quae determinantur ad unum, est impressio quaedam Dei dirigentis ad finem, sicut necessitas qua sagitta agitur ut ad certum signum tendat, est impressio sagittantis, et non sagittae. Sed in hoc differt, quia id quod creaturae a Deo recipiunt, est earum natura; quod autem ab homine rebus naturalibus imprimitur praeter earum naturam, ad violentiam pertinet. Unde sicut necessitas violentiae in motu sagittae demonstrat sagittantis directionem; ita necessitas naturalis creaturarum demonstrat divinae providentiae gubernationem.

Q. 103. A. 2. Whether the end of the government of the world is something outside the world?

Objection 1: It would seem that the end of the government of the world is not something existing outside the world. For the end of the government of a thing is that whereto the thing governed is brought. But that whereto a thing is brought is some good in the thing itself; thus a sick man is brought back to health, which is something good in him. Therefore the end of government of things is some good not outside, but within the things themselves.

[32701] Iª q. 103 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod finis gubernationis mundi non sit aliquid extra mundum existens. Illud enim est finis gubernationis rei, ad quod res gubernata perducitur. Sed illud ad quod res aliqua perducitur, est aliquod bonum in ipsa re, sicut infirmus perducitur ad sanitatem, quae est aliquod bonum in ipso. Ergo finis gubernationis rerum non est aliquod bonum extrinsecum, sed aliquod bonum in ipsis rebus existens.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1): "Some ends are an operation; some are a work"---i.e. produced by an operation. But nothing can be produced by the whole universe outside itself; and operation exists in the agent. Therefore nothing extrinsic can be the end of the government of things.

[32702] Iª q. 103 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, I Ethic., quod *finium quidam sunt operationes, quidam opera*, idest operata. Sed nihil extrinsecum a toto universo potest esse operatum, operatio autem est in ipsis operantibus. Ergo nihil extrinsecum potest esse finis gubernationis rerum.

Objection 3: Further, the good of the multitude seems to consist in order, and peace which is the "tranquillity of order," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). But the world is composed of a multitude of things. Therefore the end of the government of the world is the peaceful order in things themselves. Therefore the end of the government of the world is not an extrinsic good.

[32703] Iª q. 103 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, bonum multitudinis videtur esse ordo et pax, quae est tranquillitas ordinis. Ut Augustinus dicit XIX de Civ. Dei. Sed mundus in quadam rerum multitudine consistit. Ergo finis gubernationis mundi est pacificus ordo, qui est in ipsis rebus. Non ergo finis gubernationis rerum est quoddam bonum extrinsecum.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord hath made all things for Himself." But God is outside the entire order of the universe. Therefore the end of all things is something extrinsic to them.

[32704] Iª q. 103 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Prov. XVI, *universa propter se operatus est dominus*. Ipse autem est extra totum ordinem universi. Ergo finis rerum est quoddam bonum extrinsecum.

I answer that, As the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning, it is not possible to be ignorant of the end of things if we know their beginning. Therefore, since the beginning of all things is something outside the universe, namely, God, it is clear from what has been expounded above (Q[44], AA[1],2), that we must conclude that the end of all things is some extrinsic good. This can be proved by reason. For it is clear that good has the nature of an end; wherefore, a particular end of anything consists in some particular good; while the universal end of all things is the Universal Good; Which is good of Itself by virtue of Its Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness; whereas a particular good is good by participation. Now it is manifest that in the whole created universe there is not a good which is not such by participation. Wherefore that good which is the end of the whole universe must be a good outside the universe.

[32705] Iª q. 103 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum finis respondeat principio, non potest fieri ut, principio cognito, quid sit rerum finis ignoretur. Cum igitur principium rerum sit aliquid extrinsecum a toto universo, scilicet Deus, ut ex supra dictis patet; necesse est quod etiam finis rerum sit quoddam bonum extrinsecum. Et hoc ratione apparet. Manifestum est enim quod bonum habet rationem finis. Unde finis particularis alicuius rei est quoddam bonum particulare, finis autem universalis rerum omnium est quoddam bonum universale. Bonum autem universale est quod est per se et per suam essentiam bonum, quod est ipsa essentia bonitatis, bonum autem particulare est quod est participative bonum. Manifestum est autem quod in tota universitate creaturarum nullum est bonum quod non sit participative bonum. Unde illud bonum quod est finis totius universi, oportet quod sit extrinsecum a toto universo.

Reply to Objection 1: We may acquire some good in many ways: first, as a form existing in us, such as health or knowledge; secondly, as something done by us, as a builder attains his end by building a house; thirdly, as something good possessed or acquired by us, as the buyer of a field attains his end when he enters into possession. Wherefore nothing prevents something outside the universe being the good to which it is directed.

[32706] Iª q. 103 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod bonum aliquod consequimur multipliciter, uno modo, sicut formam in nobis existentem, ut sanitatem aut scientiam; alio modo, ut aliquid per nos operatum, sicut aedificator consequitur finem faciendo domum; alio modo, sicut aliquod bonum habitum vel possessum, ut ille qui emit, consequitur finem possidendo agrum. Unde nihil prohibet illud ad quod perducitur universum, esse quoddam bonum extrinsecum.

Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher is speaking of the ends of various arts; for the end of some arts consists in the operation itself, as the end of a harpist is to play the harp; whereas the end of other arts consists in something produced, as the end of a builder is not the act of building, but the house he builds. Now it may happen that something extrinsic is the end not only as made, but also as possessed or acquired or even as represented, as if we were to say that Hercules is the end of the statue made to represent him. Therefore we may say that some good outside the whole universe is the end of the government of the universe, as something possessed and represented; for each thing tends to a participation thereof, and to an assimilation thereto, as far as is possible.

[32707] Iª q. 103 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de finibus artium, quarum quaedam habent pro finibus operationes ipsas, sicut citharistae finis est citharizare; quaedam vero habent pro fine quoddam operatum, sicut aedificatoris finis non est aedificare, sed domus. Contingit autem aliquid extrinsecum esse finem non solum sicut operatum, sed etiam sicut possessum seu habitum, vel etiam sicut repraesentatum, sicut si dicamus quod Hercules est finis imaginis, quae fit ad eum repraesentandum. Sic igitur potest dici quod bonum extrinsecum a toto universo est finis gubernationis rerum sicut habitum et repraesentatum, quia ad hoc unaquaeque res tendit, ut participet ipsum, et assimiletur ei, quantum potest.

Reply to Objection 3: A good existing in the universe, namely, the order of the universe, is an end thereof; this. however, is not its ultimate end, but is ordered to the extrinsic good as to the end: thus the order in an army is ordered to the general, as stated in Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10.

[32708] Iª q. 103 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod finis quidem universi est aliquod bonum in ipso existens, scilicet ordo ipsius universi, hoc autem bonum non est ultimus finis, sed ordinatur ad bonum extrinsecum ut ad ultimum finem; sicut etiam ordo exercitus ordinatur ad ducem, ut dicitur in XII Metaphys.

Q. 103. A. 3. Whether the world is governed by one?

Objection 1: It would seem that the world is not governed by one. For we judge the cause by the effect. Now, we see in the government of the universe that things are not moved and do not operate uniformly, but some contingently and some of necessity in variously different ways. Therefore the world is not governed by one.

[32709] Iª q. 103 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod mundus non gubernetur ab uno. De causa enim per effectus iudicamus. Sed in gubernatione rerum apparet quod res non uniformiter moventur et operantur, quaedam enim contingenter, quaedam vero ex necessitate, et secundum alias diversitates. Ergo mundus non gubernatur ab uno.

Objection 2: Further, things which are governed by one do not act against each other, except by the incapacity or unskillfulness of the ruler; which cannot apply to God. But created things agree not together, and act against each other; as is evident in the case of contraries. Therefore the world is not governed by one.

[32710] Iª q. 103 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, ea quae gubernantur ab uno, a se invicem non dissentiunt nisi propter imperitiam aut impotentiam gubernantis, quae a Deo sunt procul. Sed res creatae a se invicem dissentiunt, et contra se invicem pugnant; ut in contrariis apparet. Non ergo mundus gubernatur ab uno.

Objection 3: Further, in nature we always find what is the better. But it "is better that two should be together than one" (Eccles. 4:9). Therefore the world is not governed by one, but by many.

[32711] Iª q. 103 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, in natura semper invenitur quod melius est. Sed melius est simul esse duos quam unum, ut dicitur Eccle. IV.

Ergo mundus non gubernatur ab uno, sed a pluribus.

On the contrary, We confess our belief in one God and one Lord, according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 8:6): "To us there is but one God, the Father . . . and one Lord": and both of these pertain to government. For to the Lord belongs dominion over subjects; and the name of God is taken from Providence as stated above (Q[13], A[8]). Therefore the world is governed by one.

[32712] Iª q. 103 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod unum Deum et unum dominum confitemur; secundum illud apostoli I ad Cor. VIII, *nobis est unus Deus, pater, et dominus unus*. Quorum utrumque ad gubernationem pertinet, nam ad dominum pertinet gubernatio subditorum; et Dei nomen ex providentia sumitur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo mundus gubernatur ab uno.

I answer that, We must of necessity say that the world is governed by one. For since the end of the government of the world is that which is essentially good, which is the greatest good; the government of the world must be the best kind of government. Now the best government is the government by one. The reason of this is that government is nothing but the directing of the things governed to the end; which consists in some good. But unity belongs to the idea of goodness, as Boethius proves (De Consol. iii, 11) from this, that, as all things desire good, so do they desire unity; without which they would cease to exist. For a thing so far exists as it is one. Whence we observe that things resist division, as far as they can; and the dissolution of a thing arises from defect therein. Therefore the intention of a ruler over a multitude is unity, or peace. Now the proper cause of unity is one. For it is clear that several cannot be the cause of unity or concord, except so far as they are united. Furthermore, what is one in itself is a more apt and a better cause of unity than several things united. Therefore a multitude is better governed by one than by several. From this it follows that the government of the world, being the best form of government, must be by one. This is expressed by the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10): "Things refuse to be ill governed; and multiplicity of authorities is a bad thing, therefore there should be one ruler."

[32713] Iª q. 103 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere quod mundus ab uno gubernetur. Cum enim finis gubernationis mundi sit quod est essentialiter bonum, quod est optimum, necesse est quod mundi gubernatio sit optima. Optima autem gubernatio est quae fit per unum. Cuius ratio est, quia gubernatio nihil aliud est quam directio gubernatorum ad finem, qui est aliquod bonum. Unitas autem pertinet ad rationem bonitatis; ut Boetius probat, in III de Consol., per hoc quod. Sicut omnia desiderant bonum, ita desiderant unitatem, sine qua esse non possunt. Nam unumquodque intantum est, inquantum unum est, unde videmus quod res repugnant suae divisioni quantum possunt, et quod dissolutio uniuscuiusque rei provenit ex defectu illius rei. Et ideo id ad quod tendit intentio multitudinem gubernantis, est unitas sive pax. Unitatis autem causa per se est unum. Manifestum est enim quod plures multa unire et concordare non possunt, nisi ipsi aliquo modo uniantur. Illud autem quod est per se unum, potest convenientius et melius esse causa unitatis, quam multi uniti. Unde multitudo melius gubernatur per unum quam per plures. Relinquitur ergo quod gubernatio mundi, quae est optima, sit ab uno gubernante. Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit in XII Metaphys., *entia nolunt disponi male, nec bonum pluralitas principatuum, unus ergo princeps*.

Reply to Objection 1: Movement is "the act of a thing moved, caused by the mover." Wherefore dissimilarity of movements is caused by diversity of things moved, which diversity is essential to the perfection of the universe (Q[47], AA[1],2; Q[48], A[2]), and not by a diversity of governors.

[32714] Iª q. 103 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod motus est actus mobilis a movente. Difformitas ergo motuum est ex diversitate mobilium, quam requirit perfectio universi, ut supra dictum est; non ex diversitate gubernantium.

Reply to Objection 2: Although contraries do not agree with each other in their proximate ends, nevertheless they agree in the ultimate end, so far as they are included in the one order of the universe.

[32715] Iª q. 103 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod contraria, etsi dissentiant quantum ad fines proximos, conveniunt tamen quantum ad finem ultimum, prout concluduntur sub uno ordine universi.

Reply to Objection 3: If we consider individual goods, then two are better than one. But if we consider the essential good, then no addition is possible.

[32716] Iª q. 103 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in particularibus bonis duo sunt meliora quam unum, sed ei quod est essentialiter bonum, non potest fieri aliqua additio bonitatis.

Q. 103. A. 4. Whether the effect of government is one or many?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one effect of the government of the world and not many. For the effect of government is that which is caused in the things governed. This is one, namely, the good which consists in order; as may be seen in the example of an army. Therefore the government of the world has but one effect.

[32717] Iª q. 103 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod effectus gubernationis mundi sit unus tantum, et non plures. Effectus enim gubernationis esse videtur id quod per gubernationem in rebus gubernatis causatur. Hoc autem est unum, scilicet bonum ordinis; ut in exercitu patet. Ergo gubernationis mundi est unus effectus.

Objection 2: Further, from one there naturally proceeds but one. But the world is governed by one as we have proved (A[3]). Therefore also the effect of this government is but one.

[32718] Iª q. 103 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, ab uno natum est unum tantum procedere. Sed mundus gubernatur ab uno, ut ostensum est. Ergo et gubernationis effectus est unus tantum.

Objection 3: Further, if the effect of government is not one by reason of the unity of the Governor, it must be many by reason of the many things governed. But these are too numerous to be counted. Therefore we cannot assign any definite number to the effects of government.

[32719] Iª q. 103 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, si effectus gubernationis non est unus tantum propter unitatem gubernantis, oportet quod multiplicetur secundum multitudinem gubernatorum. Haec autem sunt nobis innumerabilia. Ergo gubernationis effectus non possunt comprehendi sub aliquo certo numero.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "God contains all and fills all by His providence and perfect goodness." But government belongs to providence. Therefore there are certain definite effects of the Divine government.

[32720] Iª q. 103 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, quod *deitas providentia et bonitate perfecta omnia continet, et seipsa implet*. Gubernatio autem ad providentiam pertinet. Ergo gubernationis divinae sunt aliqui determinati effectus.

I answer that, The effect of any action may be judged from its end; because it is by action that the attainment of the end is effected. Now the end of the government of the world is the essential good, to the participation and similarity of which all things tend. Consequently the effect of the government of the world may be taken in three ways. First, on the part of the end itself; and in this way there is but one effect, that is, assimilation to the supreme good. Secondly, the effect of the government of the world may be considered on the part of those things by means of which the creature is made like to God. Thus there are, in general, two effects of the government. For the creature is assimilated to God in two things; first, with regard to this, that God is good; and so the creature becomes like Him by being good; and secondly, with regard to this, that God is the cause of goodness in others; and so the creature becomes like God by moving others to be good. Wherefore there are two effects of government, the preservation of things in their goodness, and the moving of things to good. Thirdly, we may consider in the individual the effects of the government of the world; and in this way they are without number.

[32721] Iª q. 103 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod effectus cuiuslibet actionis ex fine eius pensari potest, nam per operationem efficitur ut pertingatur ad finem. Finis autem gubernationis mundi est bonum essentiale, ad cuius participationem et assimilationem omnia tendunt. Effectus igitur gubernationis potest accipi tripliciter. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius finis, et sic est unus effectus gubernationis, scilicet assimilari summo bono. Alio modo potest considerari effectus gubernationis secundum ea quibus ad Dei assimilationem creatura perducitur. Et sic in generali sunt duo effectus gubernationis. Creatura enim assimilatur Deo quantum ad duo, scilicet quantum ad id quod Deus bonus est, inquantum creatura est bona; et quantum ad hoc quod Deus est aliis causa bonitatis, inquantum una creatura movet aliam ad bonitatem. Unde duo sunt effectus gubernationis, scilicet conservatio rerum in bono, et motio earum ad bonum. Tertio modo potest considerari effectus gubernationis in particulari, et sic sunt nobis innumerabiles.

Reply to Objection 1: The order of the universe includes both the preservation of things created by God and their movement. As regards these two things we find order among them, inasmuch as one is better than another; and one is moved by another.

[32722] Iª q. 103 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ordo universi includit in se et conservationem rerum diversarum a Deo institutarum, et motionem earum, quia secundum haec duo invenitur ordo in rebus, secundum scilicet quod una est melior alia, et secundum quod una ab alia movetur.

From what has been said above, we can gather the replies to the other two objections.

[32723] Iª q. 103 a. 4 ad 2 Ad alia duo patet responsio ea quae dicta sunt.

Q. 103. A. 5. Whether all things are subject to the Divine government?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all things are subject to the Divine government. For it is written (Eccles. 9:11): "I saw that under the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the learned, nor favor to the skillful, but time and chance in all." But things subject to the Divine government are not ruled by chance. Therefore those things which are under the sun are not subject to the Divine government.

[32724] Iª q. 103 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia divinae gubernationi subdantur. Dicitur enim Eccle. IX, *vidi sub sole nec velocium esse cursum, nec fortium bellum, nec sapientium panem, nec doctorum divitias, nec artificum gratiam, sed tempus casumque in omnibus*. Quae autem gubernationi alicuius subsunt, non sunt casualia. Ergo ea quae sunt sub sole, non subduntur divinae gubernationi.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9): "God hath no care for oxen." But he that governs has care for the things he governs. Therefore all things are not subject to the Divine government.

[32725] Iª q. 103 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, apostolus, I ad Cor. IX, dicit quod *non est Deo cura de bobus*. Sed unicuique est cura eorum quae gubernantur ab ipso. Non ergo omnia subduntur divinae gubernationi.

Objection 3: Further, what can govern itself needs not to be governed by another. But the rational creature can govern itself; since it is master of its own act, and acts of itself; and is not made to act by another, which seems proper to things which are governed. Therefore all things are not subject to the Divine government.

[32726] Iª q. 103 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, illud quod seipsum gubernare potest, non videtur alterius gubernatione indigere. Sed creatura rationalis seipsam gubernare potest, cum habeat dominium sui actus, et per se agat; et non solum agatur ab alio, quod videtur esse eorum quae gubernantur. Ergo non omnia subsunt divinae gubernationi.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 11): "Not only heaven and earth, not only man and angel, even the bowels of the lowest animal, even the wing of the bird, the flower of the plant, the leaf of the tree, hath God endowed with every fitting detail of their nature." Therefore all things are subject to His government.

[32727] Iª q. 103 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, V de Civ. Dei, quod *Deus non solum caelum et terram, nec solum hominem et Angelum, sed nec exigui et contemptibilis animantis viscera, nec avis pennulam, nec herbae flosculum, nec arboris folium, sine suarum partium convenientia dereliquit*. Omnia ergo eius gubernationi subduntur.

I answer that, For the same reason is God the ruler of things as He is their cause, because the same gives existence as gives perfection; and this belongs to government. Now God is the cause not indeed only of some particular kind of being, but of the whole universal being, as proved above (Q[44], AA[1],2). Wherefore, as there can be nothing which is not created by God, so there can be nothing which is not subject to His government. This can also be proved from the nature of the end of government. For a man's government extends over all those things which come under the end of his government. Now the end of the Divine government is the Divine goodness; as we have shown (A[2]). Wherefore, as there can be nothing that is not ordered to the Divine goodness as its end, as is clear from what we have said above (Q[44], A[4]; Q[65], A[2]), so it is impossible for anything to escape from the Divine government.

Foolish therefore was the opinion of those who said that the corruptible lower world, or individual things, or that even human affairs, were not subject to the Divine government. These are represented as saying, "God hath abandoned the earth" (Ezech. 9:9).

[32728] Iª q. 103 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod secundum eandem rationem competit Deo esse gubernatorem rerum, et causam earum, quia eiusdem est rem producere, et ei perfectionem dare, quod ad gubernantem pertinet. Deus autem est causa non quidem particularis unius generis rerum, sed universalis totius entis, ut supra ostensum est. Unde sicut nihil potest esse quod non sit a Deo creatum, ita nihil potest esse quod eius gubernationi non subdatur. Patet etiam hoc idem ex ratione finis. Intantum enim alicuius gubernatio se extendit, inquantum se extendere potest finis gubernationis. Finis autem divinae gubernationis est ipsa sua bonitas, ut supra ostensum est. Unde cum nihil esse possit quod non ordinetur in divinam bonitatem sicut in finem, ut ex supra dictis patet; impossibile est quod aliquod entium subtrahatur gubernationi divinae. Stulta igitur fuit opinio dicentium quod haec inferiora corruptibilia, vel etiam singularia, aut etiam res humanae non gubernantur a Deo. Ex quorum persona dicitur Ezech. IX, *dereliquit dominus terram*.

Reply to Objection 1: These things are said to be under the sun which are generated and corrupted according to the sun's movement. In all such things we find chance: not that everything is casual which occurs in such things; but that in each one there is an element of chance. And the very fact that an element of chance is found in those things proves that they are subject to government of some kind. For unless corruptible things were governed by a higher being, they would tend to nothing definite, especially those which possess no kind of knowledge. So nothing would happen unintentionally; which constitutes the nature of chance. Wherefore to show how things happen by chance and yet according to the ordering of a higher cause, he does not say absolutely that he observes chance in all things, but "time and chance," that is to say, that defects may be found in these things according to some order of time.

[32729] Iª q. 103 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sub sole dicuntur esse ea quae secundum motum solis generantur et corrumpuntur. In quibus omnibus casus invenitur; non ita quod omnia quae in eis fiunt, sint casualia; sed quia in quolibet eorum aliquid casuale inveniri potest. Et hoc ipsum quod aliquid casuale invenitur in huiusmodi rebus, demonstrat ea alicuius gubernationi esse subiecta. Nisi enim huiusmodi corruptibilia ab aliquo superiori gubernarentur, nihil intenderent, maxime quae non cognoscunt, et sic non eveniret in eis aliquid praeter intentionem, quod facit rationem casus. Unde ad ostendendum quod casualia secundum ordinem alicuius superioris causae proveniunt, non dicit simpliciter quod vidit casum esse in omnibus, sed dicit tempus et casum; quia scilicet secundum aliquem ordinem temporis, casuales defectus inveniuntur in his rebus.

Reply to Objection 2: Government implies a certain change effected by the governor in the things governed. Now every movement is the act of a movable thing, caused by the moving principle, as is laid down Phys. iii, 3. And every act is proportionate to that of which it is an act. Consequently, various movable things must be moved variously, even as regards movement by one and the same mover. Thus by the one art of the Divine governor, various things are variously governed according to their variety. Some, according to their nature, act of themselves, having dominion over their actions; and these are governed by God, not only in this, that they are moved by God Himself, Who works in them interiorly; but also in this, that they are induced by Him to do good and to fly from evil, by precepts and prohibitions, rewards and punishments. But irrational creatures which do not act but are acted upon, are not thus governed by God. Hence, when the Apostle says that "God hath no care for oxen," he does not wholly withdraw them from the Divine government, but only as regards the way in which rational creatures are governed.

[32730] Iª q. 103 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod gubernatio est quaedam mutatio gubernatorum a gubernante. Omnis autem motus est actus mobilis a movente, ut dicitur in III Physic. Omnis autem actus proportionatur ei cuius est actus. Et sic oportet quod diversa mobilia diversimode moveantur, etiam secundum motionem unius motoris. Sic igitur secundum unam artem Dei gubernantis, res diversimode gubernantur, secundum earum diversitatem. Quaedam enim secundum suam naturam sunt per se agentia, tanquam habentia dominium sui actus, et ista gubernantur a Deo non solum per hoc quod moventur ab ipso Deo in eis interius operante, sed etiam per hoc quod ab eo inducuntur ad bonum et retrahuntur a malo per praecepta et prohibitiones, praemia et poenas. Hoc autem modo non gubernantur a Deo creaturae irrationales, quae tantum aguntur, et non agunt. Cum ergo apostolus dicit quod Deo non est cura de bobus, non totaliter subtrahit boves a cura gubernationis divinae; sed solum quantum ad modum qui proprie competit rationali creaturae.

Reply to Objection 3: The rational creature governs itself by its intellect and will, both of which require to be governed and perfected by the

[32731] Iª q. 103 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod creatura rationalis gubernat seipsam per intellectum et voluntatem, quorum utrumque

Divine intellect and will. Therefore above the government whereby the rational creature governs itself as master of its own act, it requires to be governed by God.

indiget regi et perfici ab intellectu et voluntate Dei. Et ideo supra gubernationem qua creatura rationalis gubernat seipsam tanquam domina sui actus, indiget gubernari a Deo.

Q. 103. A. 6. Whether all things are immediately governed by God?

Objection 1: It would seem that all things are governed by God immediately. For Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) reproves the opinion of Plato who divides providence into three parts. The first he ascribes to the supreme god, who watches over heavenly things and all universals; the second providence he attributes to the secondary deities, who go the round of the heavens to watch over generation and corruption; while he ascribes a third providence to certain spirits who are guardians on earth of human actions. Therefore it seems that all things are immediately governed by God.

[32732] Iª q. 103 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia immediate gubernentur a Deo. Gregorius enim Nyssenus reprehendit opinionem Platonis, qui divisit providentiam in tria, primam quidem primi Dei, qui providet rebus caelestibus, et universalibus omnibus; secundam vero providentiam esse dixit secundorum deorum, qui caelum circumeunt, scilicet respectu eorum quae sunt in generatione et corruptione; tertiam vero providentiam dixit quorundam Daemonum, qui sunt custodes circa terram humanarum actionum. Ergo videtur quod omnia immediate a Deo gubernentur.

Objection 2: Further, it is better that a thing be done by one, if possible, than by many, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 6). But God can by Himself govern all things without any intermediary cause. Therefore it seems that He governs all things immediately.

[32733] Iª q. 103 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, melius est aliquid fieri per unum quam per multa, si sit possibile, ut dicitur in VIII Physic. Sed Deus potest per seipsum absque mediis causis omnia gubernare. Ergo videtur quod omnia immediate gubernet.

Objection 3: Further, in God nothing is defective or imperfect. But it seems to be imperfect in a ruler to govern by means of others; thus an earthly king, by reason of his not being able to do everything himself, and because he cannot be everywhere at the same time, requires to govern by means of ministers. Therefore God governs all things immediately.

[32734] Iª q. 103 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, nihil in Deo est deficiens et imperfectum. Sed ad defectum gubernatoris pertinere videtur quod mediantibus aliquibus gubernet, sicut rex terrenus, quia non sufficit ad omnia agenda, nec ubique est praesens in suo regno, propter hoc oportet quod habeat suae gubernationis ministros. Ergo Deus immediate omnia gubernat.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "As the lower and grosser bodies are ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of greater subtlety and power; so all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life; and the sinful and unfaithful spirit is ruled by the good and just spirit of life; and this spirit by God Himself."

[32735] Iª q. 103 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in III de Trin., *quemadmodum corpora crassiora et inferiora per subtiliora et potentiora quodam ordine reguntur; ita omnia corpora per spiritum vitae rationalem, et spiritus vitae rationalis desertor atque peccator per spiritum vitae rationalem pium et iustum, et ille per ipsum Deum*.

I answer that, In government there are two things to be considered; the design of government,

[32736] Iª q. 103 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in gubernatione duo sunt consideranda,

which is providence itself; and the execution of the design. As to the design of government, God governs all things immediately; whereas in its execution, He governs some things by means of others.

The reason of this is that as God is the very essence of goodness, so everything must be attributed to God in its highest degree of goodness. Now the highest degree of goodness in any practical order, design or knowledge (and such is the design of government) consists in knowing the individuals acted upon; as the best physician is not the one who can only give his attention to general principles, but who can consider the least details; and so on in other things. Therefore we must say that God has the design of the government of all things, even of the very least.

But since things which are governed should be brought to perfection by government, this government will be so much the better in the degree the things governed are brought to perfection. Now it is a greater perfection for a thing to be good in itself and also the cause of goodness in others, than only to be good in itself. Therefore God so governs things that He makes some of them to be causes of others in government; as a master, who not only imparts knowledge to his pupils, but gives also the faculty of teaching others.

scilicet ratio gubernationis, quae est ipsa providentia; et executio. Quantum igitur ad rationem gubernationis pertinet, Deus immediate omnia gubernat, quantum autem pertinet ad executionem gubernationis, Deus gubernat quaedam mediantibus aliis. Cuius ratio est quia, cum Deus sit ipsa essentia bonitatis, unumquodque attribuendum est Deo secundum sui optimum. Optimum autem in omni genere vel ratione vel cognitione practica, qualis est ratio gubernationis, in hoc consistit, quod particularia cognoscantur, in quibus est actus, sicut optimus medicus est, non qui considerat sola universalia, sed qui potest etiam considerare minima particularium; et idem patet in ceteris. Unde oportet dicere quod Deus omnium etiam minimorum particularium rationem gubernationis habeat. Sed cum per gubernationem res quae gubernantur sint ad perfectionem perducendae; tanto erit melior gubernatio, quanto maior perfectio a gubernante rebus gubernatis communicatur. Maior autem perfectio est quod aliquid in se sit bonum, et etiam sit aliis causa bonitatis, quam si esset solummodo in se bonum. Et ideo sic Deus gubernat res, ut quasdam aliarum in gubernando causas instituat, sicut si aliquis magister discipulos suos non solum scientes faceret, sed etiam aliorum doctores.

Reply to Objection 1: Plato's opinion is to be rejected, because he held that God did not govern all things immediately, even in the design of government; this is clear from the fact that he divided providence, which is the design of government, into three parts.

[32737] Iª q. 103 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod opinio Platonis reprehenditur, quia etiam quantum ad rationem gubernationis, posuit Deum non immediate omnia gubernare. Quod patet per hoc, quod divisit in tria providentiam, quae est ratio gubernationis.

Reply to Objection 2: If God governed alone, things would be deprived of the perfection of causality. Wherefore all that is effected by many would not be accomplished by one.

[32738] Iª q. 103 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, si solus Deus gubernaret, subtraheretur perfectio causalis a rebus. Unde non totum fieret per unum, quod fit per multa.

Reply to Objection 3: That an earthly king should have ministers to execute his laws is a sign not only of his being imperfect, but also of his dignity; because by the ordering of ministers the kingly power is brought into greater evidence.

[32739] Iª q. 103 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod non solum pertinet ad imperfectionem regis terreni quod executores habeat suae gubernationis, sed etiam ad regis dignitatem, quia

ex ordine ministrorum potestas regia praeclarior redditur.

Q. 103. A. 7. Whether anything can happen outside the order of the Divine government?

Objection 1: It would seem possible that something may occur outside the order of the Divine government. For Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that "God disposes all for good." Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government, it would follow that no evil exists.

[32740] Iª q. 103 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis contingere possit. Dicit enim Boetius, in III de Consol., quod *Deus per bonum cuncta disponit*. Si ergo nihil in rebus contingit praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis, sequeretur quod nihil esset malum in rebus.

Objection 2: Further, nothing that is in accordance with the pre-ordination of a ruler occurs by chance. Therefore, if nothing occurs outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that there is nothing fortuitous and casual.

[32741] Iª q. 103 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, nihil est casuale quod evenit secundum praeordinationem alicuius gubernantis. Si igitur nihil accidit in rebus praeter ordinem gubernationis divinae, sequitur quod nihil in rebus sit fortuitum et casuale.

Objection 3: Further, the order of Divine Providence is certain and unchangeable; because it is in accordance with the eternal design. Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that all things happen by necessity, and nothing is contingent; which is false. Therefore it is possible for something to occur outside the order of the Divine government.

[32742] Iª q. 103 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, ordo divinae gubernationis est certus et immutabilis, quia est secundum rationem aeternam. Si igitur nihil possit contingere in rebus praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis, sequitur quod omnia ex necessitate eveniant, et nihil sit in rebus contingens, quod est inconveniens. Potest igitur in rebus aliquid contingere praeter ordinem gubernationis divinae.

On the contrary, It is written (Esther 13:9): "O Lord, Lord, almighty King, all things are in Thy power, and there is none that can resist Thy will."

[32743] Iª q. 103 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Esther XIII, *domine Deus, rex omnipotens, in ditione tua cuncta sunt posita, et non est qui possit resistere tuae voluntati*.

I answer that, It is possible for an effect to result outside the order of some particular cause; but not outside the order of the universal cause. The reason of this is that no effect results outside the order of a particular cause, except through some other impeding cause; which other cause must itself be reduced to the first universal cause; as indigestion may occur outside the order of the nutritive power by some such impediment as the coarseness of the food, which again is to be ascribed to some other cause, and so on till we come to the first universal cause. Therefore as God is the first universal cause, not of one genus

[32744] Iª q. 103 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod praeter ordinem alicuius particularis causae, aliquis effectus evenire potest; non autem praeter ordinem causae universalis. Cuius ratio est, quia praeter ordinem particularis causae nihil provenit nisi ex aliqua alia causa impediente, quam quidem causam necesse est reducere in primam causam universalem, sicut indigestio contingit praeter ordinem virtutis nutritivae, ex aliquo impedimento, puta ex grossitie cibi, quam necesse est reducere in aliquam aliam causam, et sic usque ad causam primam universalem. Cum igitur Deus sit prima causa universalis non unius generis

only, but of all being in general, it is impossible for anything to occur outside the order of the Divine government; but from the very fact that from one point of view something seems to evade the order of Divine providence considered in regard to one particular cause, it must necessarily come back to that order as regards some other cause.

tantum, sed universaliter totius entis; impossibile est quod aliquid contingat praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis, sed ex hoc ipso quod aliquid ex una parte videtur exire ab ordine divinae providentiae qui consideratur secundum aliquam particularem causam, necesse est quod in eundem ordinem relabatur secundum aliam causam.

Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing wholly evil in the world, for evil is ever founded on good, as shown above (Q[48], A[3]). Therefore something is said to be evil through its escaping from the order of some particular good. If it wholly escaped from the order of the Divine government, it would wholly cease to exist.

[32745] Iª q. 103 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nihil invenitur in mundo quod sit totaliter malum, quia malum semper fundatur in bono, ut supra ostensum est. Et ideo res aliqua dicitur mala, per hoc quod exit ab ordine alicuius particularis boni. Si autem totaliter exiret ab ordine gubernationis divinae, totaliter nihil esset.

Reply to Objection 2: Things are said to be fortuitous as regards some particular cause from the order of which they escape. But as to the order of Divine providence, "nothing in the world happens by chance," as Augustine declares (QQ. 83, qu. 24).

[32746] Iª q. 103 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod aliqua dicuntur esse casualia in rebus, per ordinem ad causas particulares, extra quarum ordinem fiunt. Sed quantum ad divinam providentiam pertinet, nihil fit casu in mundo, ut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest.

Reply to Objection 3: Certain effects are said to be contingent as compared to their proximate causes, which may fail in their effects; and not as though anything could happen entirely outside the order of Divine government. The very fact that something occurs outside the order of some proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself subject to the Divine government.

[32747] Iª q. 103 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod dicuntur aliqui effectus contingentes, per comparationem ad proximas causas, quae in suis effectibus deficere possunt, non propter hoc quod aliquid fieri possit extra totum ordinem gubernationis divinae. Quia hoc ipsum quod aliquid contingit praeter ordinem causae proximae, est ex aliqua causa subiecta gubernationi divinae.

Q. 103. A. 8. Whether anything can resist the order of the Divine government?

Objection 1: It would seem possible that some resistance can be made to the order of the Divine government. For it is written (Is. 3:8): "Their tongue and their devices are against the Lord."

[32748] Iª q. 103 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid possit reniti contra ordinem gubernationis divinae. Dicitur enim Isaiae III, *lingua eorum et adinventiones eorum contra dominum*.

Objection 2: Further, a king does not justly punish those who do not rebel against his commands. Therefore if no one rebelled against God's commands, no one would be justly punished by God.

[32749] Iª q. 103 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, nullus rex iuste punit eos qui eius ordinationi non repugnant. Si igitur nihil contraniteretur divinae ordinationi, nullus iuste puniretur a Deo.

Objection 3: Further, everything is subject to the order of the Divine government. But some things oppose others. Therefore some things rebel against the order of the Divine government.

[32750] Iª q. 103 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, quaelibet res est subiecta ordini divinae gubernationis. Sed una res ab alia impugnatur. Ergo aliqua sunt quae contranituntur divinae gubernationi.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "There is nothing that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this sovereign good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all sweetly," as is said (Wis. 8) of Divine wisdom.

[32751] Iª q. 103 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Boetius, in III de Consol., *non est aliquid quod summo huic bono vel velit vel possit obsistere. Est igitur summum bonum quod regit cuncta fortiter, suaviterque disponit*; ut dicitur Sap. VIII, de divina sapientia.

I answer that, We may consider the order of Divine providence in two ways: in general, inasmuch as it proceeds from the governing cause of all; and in particular, inasmuch as it proceeds from some particular cause which executes the order of the Divine government.

Considered in the first way, nothing can resist the order of the Divine government. This can be proved in two ways: firstly from the fact that the order of the Divine government is wholly directed to good, and everything by its own operation and effort tends to good only, "for no one acts intending evil," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): secondly from the fact that, as we have said above (A[1], ad 3; A[5], ad 2), every inclination of anything, whether natural or voluntary, is nothing but a kind of impression from the first mover; as the inclination of the arrow towards a fixed point is nothing but an impulse received from the archer. Wherefore every agent, whether natural or free, attains to its divinely appointed end, as though of its own accord. For this reason God is said "to order all things sweetly."

[32752] Iª q. 103 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ordo divinae providentiae dupliciter potest considerari, uno modo in generali, secundum scilicet quod progreditur a causa gubernativa totius; alio modo in speciali, secundum scilicet quod progreditur ex aliqua causa particulari, quae est executiva divinae gubernationis. Primo igitur modo, nihil contranititur ordini divinae gubernationis. Quod ex duobus patet. Primo quidem, ex hoc quod ordo divinae gubernationis totaliter in bonum tendit, et unaquaeque res in sua operatione et conatu non tendit nisi ad bonum, nullus enim respiciens ad malum operatur, ut Dionysius dicit. Alio modo apparet idem ex hoc quod, sicut supra dictum est, omnis inclinatio alicuius rei vel naturalis vel voluntaria, nihil est aliud quam quaedam impressio a primo movente, sicut inclinatio sagittae ad signum determinatum, nihil aliud est quam quaedam impressio a sagittante. Unde omnia quae agunt vel naturaliter vel voluntarie, quasi propria sponte perveniunt in id ad quod divinitus ordinantur. Et ideo dicitur Deus omnia disponere suaviter.

Reply to Objection 1: Some are said to think or speak, or act against God: not that they entirely resist the order of the Divine government; for even the sinner intends the attainment of a certain good: but because they resist some particular good, which belongs to their nature or state. Therefore they are justly punished by God.

[32753] Iª q. 103 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dicuntur aliqui vel cogitare vel loqui vel agere contra Deum, non quia totaliter renitantur ordini divinae gubernationis, quia etiam peccantes intendunt aliquod bonum, sed quia contranituntur cuidam determinato bono, quod est eis conveniens secundum suam naturam aut statum. Et ideo puniuntur iuste a Deo.

Reply to Objection 2: is clear from the above.

[32754] Iª q. 103 a. 8 ad 2 Et per hoc patet solutio ad secundum.

Reply to Objection 3: From the fact that one thing opposes another, it follows that some one thing can resist the order of a particular cause; but not that order which depends on the universal cause of all things.

[32755] Iª q. 103 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ex hoc quod una res alteri contrapugnat, ostenditur quod aliquid reniti potest ordini qui est ex aliqua causa particulari, non autem ordini qui dependet a causa universali totius.

Q. 104. THE SPECIAL EFFECTS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT (FOUR ARTICLES)

We next consider the effects of the Divine government in particular; concerning which four points of inquiry arise:

(1) Whether creatures need to be kept in existence by God?

(2) Whether they are immediately preserved by God?

(3) Whether God can reduce anything to nothingness?

(4) Whether anything is reduced to nothingness?

[32756] Iª q. 104 pr. Deinde considerandum est de effectibus divinae gubernationis in speciali. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum creaturae indigeant ut conserventur in esse a Deo. Secundo, utrum conserventur a Deo immediate. Tertio, utrum Deus possit aliquid redigere in nihilum. Quarto, utrum aliquid in nihilum redigatur.

Q. 104. A. 1. Whether creatures need to be kept in being by God?

Objection 1: It would seem that creatures do not need to be kept in being by God. For what cannot not-be, does not need to be kept in being; just as that which cannot depart, does not need to be kept from departing. But some creatures by their very nature cannot not-be. Therefore not all creatures need to be kept in being by God. The middle proposition is proved thus. That which is included in the nature of a thing is necessarily in that thing, and its contrary cannot be in it; thus a multiple of two must necessarily be even, and cannot possibly be an odd number. Now form brings being with itself, because everything is actually in being, so far as it has form. But some creatures are subsistent forms, as we have said of the angels (Q[50], AA[2],5): and thus to be is in them of themselves. The same reasoning applies to those creatures whose matter is in potentiality to one form only, as above explained of heavenly bodies (Q[66], A[2]). Therefore such creatures as these have in their nature to be necessarily, and cannot not-be; for there can be no potentiality to not-being, either in the form which has being of itself, or in matter existing under a form which it cannot lose, since it is not in potentiality to any other form.

[32757] Iª q. 104 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod creaturae non indigeant ut a Deo conserventur in esse. Quod enim non potest non esse, non indiget ut conservetur in esse, sicut quod non potest abscedere, non indiget ut conservetur ne abscedat. Sed quaedam creaturae sunt quae secundum sui naturam non possunt non esse. Ergo non omnes creaturae indigent ut a Deo conserventur in esse. Probatio mediae. Quod per se inest alicui, necesse est ei inesse, et oppositum eius impossibile est ei inesse, sicut necessarium est binarium esse parem, et impossibile est eum esse imparem. Esse autem per se consequitur ad formam, quia unumquodque secundum hoc est ens actu, quod habet formam. Quaedam autem creaturae sunt, quae sunt formae quaedam subsistentes, sicut de Angelis dictum est; et sic per se inest eis esse. Et eadem ratio est de illis quorum materia non est in potentia nisi ad unam formam, sicut supra dictum est de corporibus caelestibus. Huiusmodi ergo creaturae secundum suam naturam ex necessitate sunt, et non possunt non esse, potentia enim ad non esse non potest fundari neque in forma, quam per se sequitur esse; neque in materia existente sub forma quam non potest amittere, cum non sit in potentia ad aliam formam.

Objection 2: Further, God is more powerful than any created agent. But a created agent, even after ceasing to act, can cause its effect to be preserved in being; thus the house continues to stand after

[32758] Iª q. 104 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, Deus est potentior quolibet creato agente. Sed aliquod creatum agens potest communicare suo effectui ut conservetur in esse, etiam eius operatione

the builder has ceased to build; and water remains hot for some time after the fire has ceased to heat. Much more, therefore, can God cause His creature to be kept in being, after He has ceased to create it.

cessante, sicut cessante actione aedificatoris, remanet domus; et cessante actione ignis, remanet aqua calefacta per aliquod tempus. Ergo multo magis Deus potest suae creaturae conferre quod conservetur in esse, sua operatione cessante.

Objection 3: Further, nothing violent can occur, except there be some active cause thereof. But tendency to not-being is unnatural and violent to any creature, since all creatures naturally desire to be. Therefore no creature can tend to not-being, except through some active cause of corruption. Now there are creatures of such a nature that nothing can cause them to corrupt; such are spiritual substances and heavenly bodies. Therefore such creatures cannot tend to not-being, even if God were to withdraw His action.

[32759] Iª q. 104 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, nullum violentum potest contingere absque aliqua causa agente. Sed tendere ad non esse est innaturale et violentum cuilibet creaturae, quia quaelibet creatura naturaliter appetit esse. Ergo nulla creatura potest tendere in non esse, nisi aliquo agente ad corruptionem. Sed quaedam sunt ad quorum corruptionem nihil agere potest; sicut spirituales substantiae, et corpora caelestia. Ergo huiusmodi creaturae non possunt tendere in non esse, etiam Dei operatione cessante.

Objection 4: Further, if God keeps creatures in being, this is done by some action. Now every action of an agent, if that action be efficacious, produces something in the effect. Therefore the preserving power of God must produce something in the creature. But this is not so; because this action does not give being to the creature, since being is not given to that which already is: nor does it add anything new to the creature; because either God would not keep the creature in being continually, or He would be continually adding something new to the creature; either of which is unreasonable. Therefore creatures are not kept in being by God.

[32760] Iª q. 104 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, si Deus conservat res in esse, hoc erit per aliquam actionem. Per quamlibet autem actionem agentis, si sit efficax, aliquid fit in effectu. Oportet igitur quod per actionem Dei conservantis aliquid fiat in creatura. Sed hoc non videtur. Non enim per huiusmodi actionem fit ipsum esse creaturae, quia quod iam est, non fit. Neque iterum aliquid aliud superadditum, quia vel non continue Deus conservaret creaturam in esse, vel continue aliquid adderetur creaturae, quod est inconveniens. Non igitur creaturae conservantur in esse a Deo.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 1:3): "Upholding all things by the word of His power."

[32761] Iª q. 104 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Heb. I, *portans omnia verbo virtutis suae*.

I answer that, Both reason and faith bind us to say that creatures are kept in being by God. To make this clear, we must consider that a thing is preserved by another in two ways. First, indirectly, and accidentally; thus a person is said to preserve anything by removing the cause of its corruption, as a man may be said to preserve a child, whom he guards from falling into the fire. In this way God preserves some things, but not all, for there are some things of such a nature that nothing can corrupt them, so that it is not necessary to keep them from corruption. Secondly, a thing is said to preserve another 'per

[32762] Iª q. 104 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere, et secundum fidem et secundum rationem, quod creaturae conservantur in esse a Deo. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod aliquid conservatur ab altero dupliciter. Uno modo, indirecte et per accidens, sicut ille dicitur rem conservare, qui removet corrumpens; puta si aliquis puerum custodiat ne cadat in ignem, dicitur eum conservare. Et sic etiam Deus dicitur aliqua conservare, sed non omnia, quia quaedam sunt quae non habent corrumpentia, quae necesse sit removere ad rei conservationem. Alio modo

se' and directly, namely, when what is preserved depends on the preserver in such a way that it cannot exist without it. In this manner all creatures need to be preserved by God. For the being of every creature depends on God, so that not for a moment could it subsist, but would fall into nothingness were it not kept in being by the operation of the Divine power, as Gregory says (Moral. xvi).

This is made clear as follows: Every effect depends on its cause, so far as it is its cause. But we must observe that an agent may be the cause of the "becoming" of its effect, but not directly of its "being." This may be seen both in artificial and in natural beings: for the builder causes the house in its "becoming," but he is not the direct cause of its "being." For it is clear that the "being" of the house is a result of its form, which consists in the putting together and arrangement of the materials, and results from the natural qualities of certain things. Thus a cook dresses the food by applying the natural activity of fire; thus a builder constructs a house, by making use of cement, stones, and wood which are able to be put together in a certain order and to preserve it. Therefore the "being" of a house depends on the nature of these materials, just as its "becoming" depends on the action of the builder. The same principle applies to natural things. For if an agent is not the cause of a form as such, neither will it be directly the cause of "being" which results from that form; but it will be the cause of the effect, in its "becoming" only.

Now it is clear that of two things in the same species one cannot directly cause the other's form as such, since it would then be the cause of its own form, which is essentially the same as the form of the other; but it can be the cause of this form for as much as it is in matter---in other words, it may be the cause that "this matter" receives "this form." And this is to be the cause of "becoming," as when man begets man, and fire causes fire. Thus whenever a natural effect is such that it has an aptitude to receive from its active cause an impression specifically the same as in that active cause, then the "becoming" of the effect, but not its "being," depends on the agent.

Sometimes, however, the effect has not this aptitude to receive the impression of its cause, in

dicitur aliquid rem aliquam conservare per se et directe, inquantum scilicet illud quod conservatur, dependet a conservante, ut sine eo esse non possit. Et hoc modo omnes creaturae indigent divina conservatione. Dependet enim esse cuiuslibet creaturae a Deo, ita quod nec ad momentum subsistere possent, sed in nihilum redigerentur, nisi operatione divinae virtutis conservarentur in esse, sicut Gregorius dicit. Et hoc sic perspici potest. Omnis enim effectus dependet a sua causa, secundum quod est causa eius. Sed considerandum est quod aliquod agens est causa sui effectus secundum fieri tantum, et non directe secundum esse eius. Quod quidem contingit et in artificialibus, et in rebus naturalibus. Aedificator enim est causa domus quantum ad eius fieri, non autem directe quantum ad esse eius. Manifestum est enim quod esse domus consequitur formam eius, forma autem domus est compositio et ordo, quae quidem forma consequitur naturalem virtutem quarundam rerum. Sicut enim coquus coquit cibum adhibendo aliquam virtutem naturalem activam, scilicet ignis; ita aedificator facit domum adhibendo caementum, lapides et ligna, quae sunt susceptiva et conservativa talis compositionis et ordinis. Unde esse domus dependet ex naturis harum rerum, sicut fieri domus dependet ex actione aedificatoris. Et simili ratione est considerandum in rebus naturalibus. Quia si aliquod agens non est causa formae inquantum huiusmodi, non erit per se causa esse quod consequitur ad talem formam, sed erit causa effectus secundum fieri tantum. Manifestum est autem quod, si aliqua duo sunt eiusdem speciei, unum non potest esse per se causa formae alterius, inquantum est talis forma, quia sic esset causa formae propriae, cum sit eadem ratio utriusque. Sed potest esse causa huiusmodi formae secundum quod est in materia, idest quod haec materia acquirat hanc formam. Et hoc est esse causa secundum fieri; sicut cum homo generat hominem, et ignis ignem. Et ideo quandocumque naturalis effectus est natus impressionem agentis recipere secundum eandem rationem secundum quam est in agente, tunc fieri effectus dependet ab agente, non autem esse ipsius. Sed aliquando effectus non est natus recipere impressionem agentis secundum eandem rationem secundum quam est in agente, sicut patet in omnibus agentibus quae non agunt simile secundum speciem; sicut caelestia corpora sunt causa generationis inferiorum corporum dissimilium

the same way as it exists in the agent: as may be seen clearly in all agents which do not produce an effect of the same species as themselves: thus the heavenly bodies cause the generation of inferior bodies which differ from them in species. Such an agent can be the cause of a form as such, and not merely as existing in this matter, consequently it is not merely the cause of "becoming" but also the cause of "being."

Therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue when that action of the agent ceases which causes the "becoming" of the effect: so neither can the "being" of a thing continue after that action of the agent has ceased, which is the cause of the effect not only in "becoming" but also in "being." This is why hot water retains heat after the cessation of the fire's action; while, on the contrary, the air does not continue to be lit up, even for a moment, when the sun ceases to act upon it, because water is a matter susceptive of the fire's heat in the same way as it exists in the fire. Wherefore if it were to be reduced to the perfect form of fire, it would retain that form always; whereas if it has the form of fire imperfectly and inchoately, the heat will remain for a time only, by reason of the imperfect participation of the principle of heat. On the other hand, air is not of such a nature as to receive light in the same way as it exists in the sun, which is the principle of light. Therefore, since it has not root in the air, the light ceases with the action of the sun.

Now every creature may be compared to God, as the air is to the sun which enlightens it. For as the sun possesses light by its nature, and as the air is enlightened by sharing the sun's nature; so God alone is Being in virtue of His own Essence, since His Essence is His existence; whereas every creature has being by participation, so that its essence is not its existence. Therefore, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12): "If the ruling power of God were withdrawn from His creatures, their nature would at once cease, and all nature would collapse." In the same work (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) he says: "As the air becomes light by the presence of the sun, so is man enlightened by the presence of God, and in His absence returns at once to darkness."

secundum speciem. Et tale agens potest esse causa formae secundum rationem talis formae, et non solum secundum quod acquiritur in hac materia, et ideo est causa non solum fiendi, sed essendi. Sicut igitur fieri rei non potest remanere, cessante actione agentis quod est causa effectus secundum fieri; ita nec esse rei potest remanere, cessante actione agentis quod est causa effectus non solum secundum fieri, sed etiam secundum esse. Et haec est ratio quare aqua calefacta retinet calorem, cessante actione ignis; non autem remanet aer illuminatus, nec ad momentum, cessante actione solis. Quia scilicet materia aquae susceptiva est caloris ignis secundum eandem rationem qua est in igne, unde si perfecte perducatur ad formam ignis, retinebit calorem semper; si autem imperfecte participet aliquid de forma ignis secundum quandam inchoationem, calor non semper remanebit, sed ad tempus, propter debilem participationem principii caloris. Aer autem nullo modo natus est recipere lumen secundum eandem rationem secundum quam est in sole, ut scilicet recipiat formam solis, quae est principium luminis, et ideo, quia non habet radicem in aere, statim cessat lumen, cessante actione solis. Sic autem se habet omnis creatura ad Deum, sicut aer ad solem illuminantem. Sicut enim sol est lucens per suam naturam, aer autem fit luminosus participando lumen a sole, non tamen participando naturam solis; ita solus Deus est ens per essentiam suam, quia eius essentia est suum esse; omnis autem creatura est ens participative, non quod sua essentia sit eius esse. Et ideo, ut Augustinus dicit IV super Gen. ad Litt., *virtus Dei ab eis quae creata sunt regendis si cessaret aliquando, simul et illorum cessaret species, omnisque natura concideret*. Et in VIII eiusdem libri dicit quod, *sicut aer praesente lumine fit lucidus, sic homo, Deo sibi praesente, illuminatur, absente autem, continuo tenebratur*.

Reply to Objection 1: "Being" naturally results from the form of a creature, given the influence of the Divine action; just as light results from the diaphanous nature of the air, given the action of the sun. Wherefore the potentiality to not-being in spiritual creatures and heavenly bodies is rather something in God, Who can withdraw His influence, than in the form or matter of those creatures.

[32763] Iª q. 104 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod esse per se consequitur formam creaturae, supposito tamen influxu Dei, sicut lumen sequitur diaphanum aeris, supposito influxu solis. Unde potentia ad non esse in spiritualibus creaturis et corporibus caelestibus, magis est in Deo, qui potest subtrahere suum influxum, quam in forma vel in materia talium creaturarum.

Reply to Objection 2: God cannot grant to a creature to be preserved in being after the cessation of the Divine influence: as neither can He make it not to have received its being from Himself. For the creature needs to be preserved by God in so far as the being of an effect depends on the cause of its being. So that there is no comparison with an agent that is not the cause of 'being' but only of "becoming."

[32764] Iª q. 104 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus non potest communicare alicui creaturae ut conservetur in esse, sua operatione cessante; sicut non potest ei communicare quod non sit causa esse illius. Intantum enim indiget creatura conservari a Deo, inquantum esse effectus dependet a causa essendi. Unde non est simile de agente quod non est causa essendi, sed fieri tantum.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument holds in regard to that preservation which consists in the removal of corruption: but all creatures do not need to be preserved thus, as stated above.

[32765] Iª q. 104 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de conservatione quae est per remotionem corrumpentis; qua non indigent omnes creaturae, ut dictum est.

Reply to Objection 4: The preservation of things by God is a continuation of that action whereby He gives existence, which action is without either motion or time; so also the preservation of light in the air is by the continual influence of the sun.

[32766] Iª q. 104 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod conservatio rerum a Deo non est per aliquam novam actionem; sed per continuationem actionis qua dat esse, quae quidem actio est sine motu et tempore. Sicut etiam conservatio luminis in aere est per continuatum influxum a sole.

Q. 104. A. 2. Whether God preserves every creature immediately?

Objection 1: It would seem that God preserves every creature immediately. For God creates and preserves things by the same action, as above stated (A[1], ad 4). But God created all things immediately. Therefore He preserves all things immediately.

[32767] Iª q. 104 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus immediate omnem creaturam conservet. Eadem enim actione Deus est conservator rerum, qua et creator, ut dictum est. Sed Deus immediate est creator omnium. Ergo immediate est etiam conservator.

Objection 2: Further, a thing is nearer to itself than to another. But it cannot be given to a creature to preserve itself; much less therefore can it be given to a creature to preserve another. Therefore God preserves all things without any intermediate cause preserving them.

[32768] Iª q. 104 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, unaquaeque res magis est proxima sibi, quam rei alteri. Sed non potest communicari alicui creaturae quod conservet seipsam. Ergo multo minus potest ei communicari quod conservet aliam. Ergo Deus omnia conservat absque aliqua media causa conservante.

Objection 3: Further, an effect is kept in being by the cause, not only of its "becoming," but also of its being. But all created causes do not seem to cause their effects except in their "becoming," for they cause only by moving, as above stated (Q[45], A[3]). Therefore they do not cause so as to keep their effects in being.

[32769] Iª q. 104 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, effectus conservatur in esse ab eo quod est causa eius non solum secundum fieri, sed etiam secundum esse. Sed omnes causae creatae, ut videtur, non sunt causae suorum effectuum nisi secundum fieri, non sunt enim causae nisi movendo, ut supra habitum est. Ergo non sunt causae conservantes suos effectus in esse.

On the contrary, A thing is kept in being by that which gives it being. But God gives being by means of certain intermediate causes. Therefore He also keeps things in being by means of certain causes.

[32770] Iª q. 104 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod per idem conservatur res, per quod habet esse. Sed Deus dat esse rebus mediantibus aliquibus causis mediis. Ergo etiam res in esse conservat mediantibus aliquibus causis.

I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), a thing keeps another in being in two ways; first, indirectly and accidentally, by removing or hindering the action of a corrupting cause; secondly, directly and "per se," by the fact that that on it depends the other's being, as the being of the effect depends on the cause. And in both ways a created thing keeps another in being. For it is clear that even in corporeal things there are many causes which hinder the action of corrupting agents, and for that reason are called preservatives; just as salt preserves meat from putrefaction; and in like manner with many other things. It happens also that an effect depends on a creature as to its being. For when we have a series of causes depending on one another, it necessarily follows that, while the effect depends first and principally on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way on all the middle causes. Therefore the first cause is the principal cause of the preservation of the effect which is to be referred to the middle causes in a secondary way; and all the more so, as the middle cause is higher and nearer to the first cause.

For this reason, even in things corporeal, the preservation and continuation of things is ascribed to the higher causes: thus the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 6), that the first, namely the diurnal movement is the cause of the continuation of things generated; whereas the second movement, which is from the zodiac, is the cause of diversity owing to generation and corruption. In like manner astrologers ascribe to Saturn, the highest of the planets, those things which are

[32771] Iª q. 104 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, dupliciter aliquid rem aliquam in esse conservat, uno modo, indirecte et per accidens, per hoc quod removet vel impedit actionem corrumpentis; alio modo, directe et per se, quia ab eo dependet esse alterius, sicut a causa dependet esse effectus. Utroque autem modo aliqua res creata invenitur esse alterius conservativa. Manifestum est enim quod etiam in rebus corporalibus multa sunt quae impediunt actiones corrumpentium, et per hoc dicuntur rerum conservativa; sicut sal impedit carnes a putrefactione, et simile est in multis aliis. Invenitur etiam quod ab aliqua creatura dependet aliquis effectus secundum suum esse. Cum enim sunt multae causae ordinatae, necesse est quod effectus dependeat primo quidem et principaliter a causa prima; secundario vero ab omnibus causis mediis. Et ideo principaliter quidem prima causa est effectus conservativa; secundario vero omnes mediae causae, et tanto magis quanto causa fuerit altior et primae causae proximior. Unde superioribus causis, etiam in corporalibus rebus, attribuitur conservatio et permanentia rerum, sicut philosophus dicit, in XII Metaphys., quod primus motus, scilicet diurnus, est causa continuitatis generationis; secundus autem motus, qui est per zodiacum, est causa diversitatis quae est secundum generationem et corruptionem. Et similiter astrologi, attribuunt Saturno, qui est supremus planetarum; res fixas et permanentes. Sic igitur dicendum est quod Deus conservat res quasdam in esse, mediantibus aliquibus causis.

permanent and fixed. So we conclude that God keeps certain things in being, by means of certain causes.

Reply to Objection 1: God created all things immediately, but in the creation itself He established an order among things, so that some depend on others, by which they are preserved in being, though He remains the principal cause of their preservation.

[32772] Iª q. 104 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus immediate omnia creavit, sed in ipsa rerum creatione ordinem in rebus instituit, ut quaedam ab aliis dependerent, per quas secundario conservarentur in esse; praesupposita tamen principali conservatione, quae est ab ipso.

Reply to Objection 2: Since an effect is preserved by its proper cause on which it depends; just as no effect can be its own cause, but can only produce another effect, so no effect can be endowed with the power of self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving another.

[32773] Iª q. 104 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum propria causa sit conservativa effectus ab ea dependentis; sicut nulli effectui praestari potest quod sit causa sui ipsius, potest tamen ei praestari quod sit causa alterius; ita etiam nulli effectui praestari potest quod sit sui ipsius conservativus, potest tamen ei praestari quod sit conservativus alterius.

Reply to Objection 3: No created nature can be the cause of another, as regards the latter acquiring a new form, or disposition, except by virtue of some change; for the created nature acts always on something presupposed. But after causing the form or disposition in the effect, without any fresh change in the effect, the cause preserves that form or disposition; as in the air, when it is lit up anew, we must allow some change to have taken place, while the preservation of the light is without any further change in the air due to the presence of the source of light.

[32774] Iª q. 104 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod nulla creatura potest esse causa alterius, quantum ad hoc quod acquirat novam formam vel dispositionem, nisi per modum alicuius mutationis, quia semper agit praesupposito aliquo subiecto. Sed postquam formam vel dispositionem induxit in effectu, absque alia immutatione effectus, huiusmodi formam vel dispositionem conservat. Sicut in aere, prout illuminatur de novo, intelligitur quaedam mutatio; sed conservatio luminis est absque aeris immutatione, ex sola praesentia illuminantis.

Q. 104. A. 3. Whether God can annihilate anything?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot annihilate anything. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21) that "God is not the cause of anything tending to non-existence." But He would be such a cause if He were to annihilate anything. Therefore He cannot annihilate anything.

[32775] Iª q. 104 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit aliquid in nihilum redigere. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod *Deus non est causa tendendi in non esse*. Hoc autem contingeret, si aliquam creaturam redigeret in nihilum. Ergo Deus non potest aliquid in nihilum redigere.

Objection 2: Further, by His goodness God is the cause why things exist, since, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32): "Because God is good,

[32776] Iª q. 104 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, Deus est causa rerum ut sint, per suam bonitatem, quia, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de Doct. Christ.,

we exist." But God cannot cease to be good. Therefore He cannot cause things to cease to exist; which would be the case were He to annihilate anything.

inquantum Deus bonus est, sumus. Sed Deus non potest non esse bonus. Ergo non potest facere ut res non sint. Quod faceret, si eas in nihilum redigeret.

Objection 3: Further, if God were to annihilate anything it would be by His action. But this cannot be; because the term of every action is existence. Hence even the action of a corrupting cause has its term in something generated; for when one thing is generated another undergoes corruption. Therefore God cannot annihilate anything.

[32777] Iª q. 104 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, si Deus in nihilum aliqua redigeret, oporteret quod hoc fieret per aliquam actionem. Sed hoc non potest esse, quia omnis actio terminatur ad aliquod ens; unde etiam actio corrumpentis terminatur ad aliquid generatum, quia generatio unius est corruptio alterius. Ergo Deus non potest aliquid in nihilum redigere.

On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 10:24): "Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment; and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing."

[32778] Iª q. 104 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ierem. X, *corripe me, domine, verumtamen in iudicio, et non in furore tuo, ne forte ad nihilum redigas me*.

I answer that, Some have held that God, in giving existence to creatures, acted from natural necessity. Were this true, God could not annihilate anything, since His nature cannot change. But, as we have said above (Q[19], A[4]), such an opinion is entirely false, and absolutely contrary to the Catholic faith, which confesses that God created things of His own free-will, according to Ps. 134:6: "Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He hath done." Therefore that God gives existence to a creature depends on His will; nor does He preserve things in existence otherwise than by continually pouring out existence into them, as we have said. Therefore, just as before things existed, God was free not to give them existence, and not to make them; so after they are made, He is free not to continue their existence; and thus they would cease to exist; and this would be to annihilate them.

[32779] Iª q. 104 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt quod Deus res in esse produxit agendo de necessitate naturae. Quod si esset verum, Deus non posset rem aliquam in nihilum redigere; sicut non potest a sua natura mutari. Sed, sicut supra est habitum, haec positio est falsa, et a fide Catholica penitus aliena, quae confitetur Deum res libera voluntate produxisse in esse, secundum illud Psalmi, *omnia quaecumque voluit dominus, fecit*. Hoc igitur quod Deus creaturae esse communicat, ex Dei voluntate dependet. Nec aliter res in esse conservat, nisi inquantum eis continue influit esse. Ut dictum est. Sicut ergo antequam res essent, potuit eis non communicare esse, et sic eas non facere; ita postquam iam factae sunt, potest eis non influere esse, et sic esse desisterent. Quod est eas in nihilum redigere.

Reply to Objection 1: Non-existence has no direct cause; for nothing is a cause except inasmuch as it has existence, and a being essentially as such is a cause of something existing. Therefore God cannot cause a thing to tend to non-existence, whereas a creature has this tendency of itself, since it is produced from nothing. But indirectly God can be the cause of things being reduced to non-existence, by withdrawing His action therefrom.

[32780] Iª q. 104 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non esse non habet causam per se, quia nihil potest esse causa nisi inquantum est ens; ens autem, per se loquendo, est causa essendi. Sic igitur Deus non potest esse causa tendendi in non esse; sed hoc habet creatura ex seipsa, inquantum est de nihilo. Sed per accidens Deus potest esse causa quod res in nihilum redigantur, subtrahendo scilicet suam actionem a rebus.

Reply to Objection 2: God's goodness is the cause of things, not as though by natural necessity, because the Divine goodness does not depend on creatures; but by His free-will. Wherefore, as without prejudice to His goodness, He might not have produced things into existence, so, without prejudice to His goodness, He might not preserve things in existence.

[32781] Iª q. 104 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod bonitas Dei est causa rerum, non quasi ex necessitate naturae, quia divina bonitas non dependet ex rebus creatis; sed per liberam voluntatem. Unde sicut potuit sine praeiudicio bonitatis suae, res non producere in esse; ita absque detrimento suae bonitatis, potest res in esse non conservare.

Reply to Objection 3: If God were to annihilate anything, this would not imply an action on God's part; but a mere cessation of His action.

[32782] Iª q. 104 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, si Deus rem aliquam redigeret in nihilum, hoc non esset per aliquam actionem; sed per hoc quod ab agendo cessaret.

Q. 104. A. 4. Whether anything is annihilated?

Objection 1: It would seem that something is annihilated. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But in the beginning there was nothing but God. Therefore all things must tend to this end, that there shall be nothing but God. Therefore creatures will be reduced to nothing.

[32783] Iª q. 104 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid in nihilum redigatur. Finis enim respondet principio. Sed a principio nihil erat nisi Deus. Ergo ad hunc finem res perducentur, ut nihil sit nisi Deus. Et ita creaturae in nihilum redigentur.

Objection 2: Further, every creature has a finite power. But no finite power extends to the infinite. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 10) that, "a finite power cannot move in infinite time." Therefore a creature cannot last for an infinite duration; and so at some time it will be reduced to nothing.

[32784] Iª q. 104 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, omnis creatura habet potentiam finitam. Sed nulla potentia finita se extendit ad infinitum, unde in VIII Physic. probatur quod potentia finita non potest movere tempore infinito. Ergo nulla creatura potest durare in infinitum. Et ita quandoque in nihilum redigetur.

Objection 3: Further, forms and accidents have no matter as part of themselves. But at some time they cease to exist. Therefore they are reduced to nothing.

[32785] Iª q. 104 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, forma et accidentia non habent materiam partem sui. Sed quandoque desinunt esse. Ergo in nihilum rediguntur.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 3:14): "I have learned that all the works that God hath made continue for ever."

[32786] Iª q. 104 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccle. III. *Didici quod omnia opera quae fecit Deus, perseverant in aeternum*.

I answer that, Some of those things which God does in creatures occur in accordance with the natural course of things; others happen miraculously, and not in accordance with the natural order, as will be explained (Q[105], A[6]). Now whatever God wills to do according to the natural order of things may be observed from their nature; but those things which occur

[32787] Iª q. 104 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod eorum quae a Deo fiunt circa creaturam, quaedam proveniunt secundum naturalem cursum rerum; quaedam vero miraculose operatur praeter ordinem naturalem creaturis inditum, ut infra dicetur. Quae autem facturus est Deus secundum ordinem naturalem rebus inditum, considerari possunt ex ipsis rerum naturis, quae vero

miraculously, are ordered for the manifestation of grace, according to the Apostle, "To each one is given the manifestation of the Spirit, unto profit" (1 Cor. 12:7); and subsequently he mentions, among others, the working of miracles.

Now the nature of creatures shows that none of them is annihilated. For, either they are immaterial, and therefore have no potentiality to non-existence; or they are material, and then they continue to exist, at least in matter, which is incorruptible, since it is the subject of generation and corruption. Moreover, the annihilation of things does not pertain to the manifestation of grace; since rather the power and goodness of God are manifested by the preservation of things in existence. Wherefore we must conclude by denying absolutely that anything at all will be annihilated.

miraculose fiunt, ordinantur ad gratiae manifestationem, secundum illud apostoli I ad Cor. XII, *unicuique datur manifestatio spiritus ad utilitatem*; et postmodum, inter cetera, subdit de miraculorum operatione. Creaturarum autem naturae hoc demonstrant, ut nulla earum in nihilum redigatur, quia vel sunt immateriales, et sic in eis non est potentia ad non esse; vel sunt materiales, et sic saltem remanent semper secundum materiam, quae incorruptibilis est, utpote subiectum existens generationis et corruptionis. Redigere etiam aliquid in nihilum, non pertinet ad gratiae manifestationem, cum magis per hoc divina potentia et bonitas ostendatur, quod res in esse conservat. Unde simpliciter dicendum est quod nihil omnino in nihilum redigetur.

Reply to Objection 1: That things are brought into existence from a state of non-existence, clearly shows the power of Him Who made them; but that they should be reduced to nothing would hinder that manifestation, since the power of God is conspicuously shown in His preserving all things in existence, according to the Apostle: "Upholding all things by the word of His power" (Heb. 1:3).

[32788] Iª q. 104 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc quod res in esse productae sunt, postquam non fuerunt, declarat potentiam producentis. Sed quod in nihilum redigerentur, huiusmodi manifestationem impediret, cum Dei potentia in hoc maxime ostendatur, quod res in esse conservat, secundum illud apostoli Heb. I, *portans omnia verbo virtutis suae*.

Reply to Objection 2: A creature's potentiality to existence is merely receptive; the active power belongs to God Himself, from Whom existence is derived. Wherefore the infinite duration of things is a consequence of the infinity of the Divine power. To some things, however, is given a determinate power of duration for a certain time, so far as they may be hindered by some contrary agent from receiving the influx of existence which comes from Him Whom finite power cannot resist, for an infinite, but only for a fixed time. So things which have no contrary, although they have a finite power, continue to exist for ever.

[32789] Iª q. 104 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod potentia creaturae ad essendum est receptiva tantum; sed potentia activa est ipsius Dei, a quo est influxus essendi. Unde quod res in infinitum durent, sequitur infinitatem divinae virtutis. Determinatur tamen quibusdam rebus virtus ad manendum tempore determinato, inquantum impediri possunt ne percipiant influxum essendi qui est ab eo, ex aliquo contrario agente, cui finita virtus non potest resistere tempore infinito, sed solum tempore determinato. Et ideo ea quae non habent contrarium, quamvis habeant finitam virtutem, perseverant in aeternum.

Reply to Objection 3: Forms and accidents are not complete beings, since they do not subsist: but each one of them is something "of a being"; for it is called a being, because something is by it. Yet so far as their mode of existence is concerned,

[32790] Iª q. 104 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod formae et accidentia non sunt entia completa, cum non subsistant, sed quodlibet eorum est aliquid entis, sic enim ens dicitur, quia eo aliquid est. Et tamen eo modo quo sunt, non

they are not entirely reduced to nothingness; not that any part of them survives, but that they remain in the potentiality of the matter, or of the subject.

omnino in nihilum rediguntur; non quia aliqua pars eorum remaneat, sed remanent in potentia materiae vel subiecti.

Q. 105. OF THE CHANGE OF CREATURES BY GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We now consider the second effect of the Divine government, i.e. the change of creatures; and first, the change of creatures by God; secondly, the change of one creature by another.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether God can move immediately the matter to the form?

(2) Whether He can immediately move a body?

(3) Whether He can move the intellect?

(4) Whether He can move the will?

(5) Whether God works in every worker?

(6) Whether He can do anything outside the order imposed on things?

(7) Whether all that God does is miraculous?

(8) Of the diversity of miracles.

[32791] Iª q. 105 pr. Deinde considerandum est de secundo effectu gubernationis divinae qui est mutatio creaturarum. Et primo, de mutatione creaturarum a Deo; secundo, de mutatione unius creaturae ab alia. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum Deus immediate possit movere materiam ad formam. Secundo, utrum immediate possit movere aliquod corpus. Tertio, utrum possit movere intellectum. Quarto, utrum possit movere voluntatem. Quinto, utrum Deus operetur in omni operante. Sexto, utrum possit aliquid facere praeter ordinem rebus inditum. Septimo, utrum omnia quae sic Deus facit, sint miracula. Octavo, de diversitate miraculorum.

Q. 105. A. 1. Whether God can move the matter immediately to the form?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot move the matter immediately to receive the form. For as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8), nothing can bring a form into any particular matter, except that form which is in matter; because, like begets like. But God is not a form in matter. Therefore He cannot cause a form in matter.

[32792] Iª q. 105 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit immediate movere materiam ad formam. Sicut enim probat philosophus in VII Metaphys., formam in hac materia nihil facere potest nisi forma quae est in materia, quia simile facit sibi simile. Sed Deus non est forma in materia. Ergo non potest causare formam in materia.

Objection 2: Further, any agent inclined to several effects will produce none of them, unless it is determined to a particular one by some other cause; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), a general assertion does not move the mind, except by means of some particular apprehension. But the Divine power is the universal cause of all things. Therefore it cannot produce any particular form, except by means of a particular agent.

[32793] Iª q. 105 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, si aliquod agens se habeat ad multa, nullum eorum producet, nisi determinetur ad ipsum per aliquid aliud, ut enim in III de anima dicitur, universalis opinio non movet nisi mediante aliqua particulari apprehensione. Sed virtus divina est universalis causa omnium. Ergo non potest producere aliquam particularem formam, nisi mediante aliquo particulari agente.

Objection 3: As universal being depends on the first universal cause, so determinate being

[32794] Iª q. 105 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut esse commune dependet a prima causa universali, ita

depends on determinate particular causes; as we have seen above (Q[104], A[2]). But the determinate being of a particular thing is from its own form. Therefore the forms of things are produced by God, only by means of particular causes.

esse determinatum dependet a determinatis causis particularibus, ut supra habitum est. Sed determinatum esse alicuius rei est per propriam eius formam. Ergo propriae rerum formae non producuntur a Deo, nisi mediantibus causis particularibus.

On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:7): "God formed man of the slime of the earth."

[32795] Iª q. 105 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, *formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae*.

I answer that, God can move matter immediately to form; because whatever is in passive potentiality can be reduced to act by the active power which extends over that potentiality. Therefore, since the Divine power extends over matter, as produced by God, it can be reduced to act by the Divine power: and this is what is meant by matter being moved to a form; for a form is nothing else but the act of matter.

[32796] Iª q. 105 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod Deus immediate potest movere materiam ad formam. Quia ens in potentia passiva reduci potest in actum, a potentia activa quae eam sub sua potestate continet. Cum igitur materia contineatur sub potestate divina, utpote a Deo producta, potest reduci in actum per divinam potentiam. Et hoc est moveri materiam ad formam, quia forma nihil aliud est quam actus materiae.

Reply to Objection 1: An effect is assimilated to the active cause in two ways. First, according to the same species; as man is generated by man, and fire by fire. Secondly, by being virtually contained in the cause; as the form of the effect is virtually contained in its cause: thus animals produced by putrefaction, and plants, and minerals are like the sun and stars, by whose power they are produced. In this way the effect is like its active cause as regards all that over which the power of that cause extends. Now the power of God extends to both matter and form; as we have said above (Q[14], A[2]; Q[44], A[2]); wherefore if a composite thing be produced, it is likened to God by way of a virtual inclusion; or it is likened to the composite generator by a likeness of species. Therefore just as the composite generator can move matter to a form by generating a composite thing like itself; so also can God. But no other form not existing in matter can do this; because the power of no other separate substance extends over matter. Hence angels and demons operate on visible matter; not by imprinting forms in matter, but by making use of corporeal seeds.

[32797] Iª q. 105 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod effectus aliquis invenitur assimilari causae agenti dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum eandem speciem; ut homo generatur ab homine, et ignis ab igne. Alio modo, secundum virtualem continentiam, prout scilicet forma effectus virtualiter continetur in causa, et sic animalia ex putrefactione generata, et plantae et corpora mineralia assimilantur soli et stellis, quorum virtute generantur. Sic igitur effectus causae agenti similatur secundum totum illud ad quod se extendit virtus agentis. Virtus autem Dei se extendit ad formam et materiam, ut supra habitum est. Unde compositum quod generatur, similatur Deo secundum virtualem continentiam, sicut similatur composito generanti per similitudinem speciei. Unde sicut compositum generans potest movere materiam ad formam generando compositum sibi simile, ita et Deus. Non autem aliqua alia forma non in materia existens, quia materia non continetur in virtute alterius substantiae separatae. Et ideo Daemones et Angeli operantur circa haec visibilia, non quidem imprimendo formas, sed adhibendo corporalia semina.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument would hold if God were to act of natural necessity. But since He acts by His will and intellect, which knows the particular and not only the universal natures of all forms, it follows that He can determinately imprint this or that form on matter.

[32798] Iª q. 105 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si Deus ageret, ex necessitate naturae. Sed quia agit per voluntatem et intellectum, qui cognoscit rationes proprias omnium formarum, et non solum universales; inde est quod potest determinate hanc vel illam formam materiae imprimere.

Reply to Objection 3: The fact that secondary causes are ordered to determinate effects is due to God; wherefore since God ordains other causes to certain effects He can also produce certain effects by Himself without any other cause.

[32799] Iª q. 105 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod causae secundae ordinantur ad determinatos effectus est illis a Deo. Unde Deus, quia alias causas ordinat ad determinatos effectus, potest etiam determinatos effectus producere per seipsum.

Q. 105. A. 2. Whether God can move a body immediately?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot move a body immediately. For as the mover and the moved must exist simultaneously, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, 2), it follows that there must be some contact between the mover and moved. But there can be no contact between God and a body; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): "There is no contact with God." Therefore God cannot move a body immediately.

[32800] Iª q. 105 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit immediate movere aliquod corpus. Cum enim movens et motum oporteat esse simul, ut probatur in VII Physic., oportet esse contactum quendam moventis et moti. Sed non potest esse contactus Dei, et corporis alicuius, dicit enim Dionysius, in I cap. de Div. Nom., quod *Dei non est aliquis tactus*. Ergo Deus non potest immediate movere aliquod corpus.

Objection 2: Further, God is the mover unmoved. But such also is the desirable object when apprehended. Therefore God moves as the object of desire and apprehension. But He cannot be apprehended except by the intellect, which is neither a body nor a corporeal power. Therefore God cannot move a body immediately.

[32801] Iª q. 105 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, Deus est movens non motum. Tale autem est appetibile apprehensum. Movet igitur Deus sicut desideratum et apprehensum. Sed non apprehenditur nisi ab intellectu, qui non est corpus, nec virtus corporis. Ergo Deus non potest movere aliquod corpus immediate.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 10) that an infinite power moves instantaneously. But it is impossible for a body to be moved in one instant; for since every movement is between opposites, it follows that two opposites would exist at once in the same subject, which is impossible. Therefore a body cannot be moved immediately by an infinite power. But God's power is infinite, as we have explained (Q[25], A[2]). Therefore God cannot move a body immediately.

[32802] Iª q. 105 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, philosophus probat in VIII Physic., quod potentia infinita movet in instanti. Sed impossibile est aliquod corpus in instanti moveri, quia, cum omnis motus sit inter opposita, sequeretur quod duo opposita simul inessent eidem; quod est impossibile. Ergo corpus non potest immediate moveri a potentia infinita. Potentia autem Dei est infinita, ut supra habitum est. Ergo Deus non potest immediate movere aliquod corpus.

On the contrary, God produced the works of the six days immediately among which is included the movements of bodies, as is clear from Gn. 1:9 "Let the waters be gathered together into one place." Therefore God alone can move a body immediately.

[32803] Iª q. 105 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, opera sex dierum Deus fecit immediate; in quibus continetur motus corporum, ut patet per hoc quod dicitur Gen. I, *congregentur aquae in locum unum*. Ergo Deus immediate potest movere corpus.

I answer that, It is erroneous to say that God cannot Himself produce all the determinate effects which are produced by any created cause. Wherefore, since bodies are moved immediately by created causes, we cannot possibly doubt that God can move immediately any bodies whatever. This indeed follows from what is above stated (A[1]). For every movement of any body whatever, either results from a form, as the movements of things heavy and light result from the form which they have from their generating cause, for which reason the generator is called the mover; or else tends to a form, as heating tends to the form of heat. Now it belongs to the same cause, to imprint a form, to dispose to that form, and to give the movement which results from that form; for fire not only generates fire, but it also heats and moves things upwards. Therefore, as God can imprint form immediately in matter, it follows that He can move any body whatever in respect of any movement whatever.

[32804] Iª q. 105 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod erroneum est dicere Deum non posse facere per seipsum omnes determinatos effectus qui fiunt per quamcumque causam creatam. Unde cum corpora moveantur immediate a causis creatis, nulli debet venire in dubium quin Deus possit movere immediate quodcumque corpus. Et hoc quidem consequens est ad ea quae supra dicta sunt. Nam omnis motus corporis cuiuscumque vel consequitur ad aliquam formam, sicut motus localis gravium et levium consequitur formam quae datur a generante, ratione cuius generans dicitur movens, vel est via ad formam aliquam, sicut calefactio est via ad formam ignis. Eiusdem autem est imprimere formam, et disponere ad formam, et dare motum consequentem formam, ignis enim non solum generat alium ignem, sed etiam calefacit, et sursum movet. Cum igitur Deus possit immediate formam materiae imprimere, consequens est ut possit, secundum quemcumque motum, corpus quodcumque movere.

Reply to Objection 1: There are two kinds of contact; corporeal contact, when two bodies touch each other; and virtual contact, as the cause of sadness is said to touch the one made sad. According to the first kind of contact, God, as being incorporeal, neither touches, nor is touched; but according to virtual contact He touches creatures by moving them; but He is not touched, because the natural power of no creature can reach up to Him. Thus did Dionysius understand the words, "There is no contact with God"; that is, so that God Himself be touched.

[32805] Iª q. 105 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod duplex est tactus, scilicet corporalis, sicut duo corpora se tangunt; et virtualis, sicut dicitur quod contristans tangit contristatum. Secundum igitur primum contactum, Deus, cum sit incorporeus, nec tangit nec tangitur. Secundum autem virtualem contactum, tangit quidem movendo creaturas, sed non tangitur, quia nullius creaturae virtus naturalis potest ad ipsum pertingere. Et sic intellexit Dionysius quod non est tactus Dei, ut scilicet tangatur.

Reply to Objection 2: God moves as the object of desire and apprehension; but it does not follow that He always moves as being desired and apprehended by that which is moved; but as being desired and known by Himself; for He does all things for His own goodness.

[32806] Iª q. 105 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod movet Deus sicut desideratum et intellectum. Sed non oportet quod semper moveat sicut desideratum et intellectum ab eo quod movetur; sed sicut desideratum et notum a seipso; quia omnia operatur propter suam bonitatem.

Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 10) intends to prove that the power of the first mover is not a power of the first mover "of bulk," by the following argument. The power of the first mover is infinite (which he proves from the fact that the first mover can move in infinite time). Now an infinite power, if it were a power "of bulk," would move without time, which is impossible; therefore the infinite power of the first mover must be in something which is not measured by its bulk. Whence it is clear that for a body to be moved without time can only be the result of an infinite power. The reason is that every power of bulk moves in its entirety; since it moves by the necessity of its nature. But an infinite power surpasses out of all proportion any finite power. Now the greater the power of the mover, the greater is the velocity of the movement. Therefore, since a finite power moves in a determinate time, it follows that an infinite power does not move in any time; for between one time and any other time there is some proportion. On the other hand, a power which is not in bulk is the power of an intelligent being, which operates in its effects according to what is fitting to them; and therefore, since it cannot be fitting for a body to be moved without time, it does not follow that it moves without time.

[32807] Iª q. 105 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod philosophus in VIII Physic. intendit probare quod virtus primi motoris non sit virtus in magnitudine, tali ratione, virtus primi motoris est infinita (quod probat per hoc quod potest movere tempore infinito); virtus autem infinita, si esset in aliqua magnitudine, moveret in non tempore, quod est impossibile; ergo oportet quod infinita virtus primi motoris sit non in magnitudine. Ex quo patet quod corpus moveri in non tempore, non consequitur nisi virtutem infinitam in magnitudine. Cuius ratio est, quia omnis virtus quae est in magnitudine, movet secundum se totam, cum moveat per necessitatem naturae. Potentia autem infinita improportionabiliter excedit quamlibet potentiam finitam. Quanto autem maior est potentia moventis, tanto est maior velocitas motus. Cum igitur potentia finita moveat tempore determinato, sequitur quod potentia infinita non moveat in aliquo tempore, quia cuiuscumque temporis ad aliud tempus est aliqua proportio. Sed virtus quae non est in magnitudine, est virtus alicuius intelligentis, qui operatur in effectibus secundum quod eis convenit. Et ideo, cum corpori non possit esse conveniens moveri in non tempore, non sequitur quod moveat in non tempore.

Q. 105. A. 3. Whether God moves the created intellect immediately?

Objection 1: It would seem that God does not immediately move the created intellect. For the action of the intellect is governed by its own subject; since it does not pass into external matter; as stated in Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8. But the action of what is moved by another does not proceed from that wherein it is; but from the mover. Therefore the intellect is not moved by another; and so apparently God cannot move the created intellect.

[32808] Iª q. 105 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non moveat immediate intellectum creatum. Actio enim intellectus est ab eo in quo est, non enim transit in exteriorem materiam, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys. Actio autem eius quod movetur ab alio, non est ab eo in quo est, sed a movente. Non ergo intellectus movetur ab alio. Et ita videtur quod Deus non possit movere intellectum.

Objection 2: Further, anything which in itself is a sufficient principle of movement, is not moved by another. But the movement of the intellect is its act of understanding; in the sense in which we say that to understand or to feel is a kind of movement, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7). But the intellectual light which is natural to the soul, is a sufficient principle of understanding. Therefore it is not moved by another.

[32809] Iª q. 105 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, id quod habet in se principium sufficiens sui motus, non movetur ab alio. Sed motus intellectus est ipsum intelligere eius, sicut dicitur quod intelligere vel sentire est motus quidam, secundum philosophum, in III de anima. Sufficiens autem principium intelligendi est lumen intelligibile inditum intellectui. Ergo non movetur ab alio.

Objection 3: Further, as the senses are moved by the sensible, so the intellect is moved by the intelligible. But God is not intelligible to us, and exceeds the capacity of our intellect. Therefore God cannot move our intellect.

[32810] Iª q. 105 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut sensus movetur a sensibili, ita intellectus ab intelligibili. Sed Deus non est intelligibilis nobis, sed nostrum intellectum excedit. Ergo Deus non potest movere nostrum intellectum.

On the contrary, The teacher moves the intellect of the one taught. But it is written (Ps. 93:10) that God "teaches man knowledge." Therefore God moves the human intellect.

[32811] Iª q. 105 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, docens movet intellectum addiscentis. Sed Deus docet hominem scientiam, sicut dicitur in Psalmo. Ergo Deus movet intellectum hominis.

I answer that, As in corporeal movement that is called the mover which gives the form that is the principle of movement, so that is said to move the intellect, which is the cause of the form that is the principle of the intellectual operation, called the movement of the intellect. Now there is a twofold principle of intellectual operation in the intelligent being; one which is the intellectual power itself, which principle exists in the one who understands in potentiality; while the other is the principle of actual understanding, namely, the likeness of the thing understood in the one who understands. So a thing is said to move the intellect, whether it gives to him who understands the power of understanding; or impresses on him the likeness of the thing understood.

Now God moves the created intellect in both ways. For He is the First immaterial Being; and as intellectuality is a result of immateriality, it follows that He is the First intelligent Being. Therefore since in each order the first is the cause of all that follows, we must conclude that from Him proceeds all intellectual power. In like manner, since He is the First Being, and all other beings pre-exist in Him as in their First Cause, it follows that they exist intelligibly in Him, after the mode of His own Nature. For as the intelligible types of everything exist first of all in God, and are derived from Him by other intellects in order that these may actually understand; so also are they derived by creatures that they may subsist. Therefore God so moves the created intellect, inasmuch as He gives it the intellectual power, whether natural, or superadded; and impresses on the created intellect the intelligible species, and maintains and preserves both power and species in existence.

[32812] Iª q. 105 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in motibus corporalibus movens dicitur quod dat formam quae est principium motus; ita dicitur movere intellectum, quod causat formam quae est principium intellectualis operationis, quae dicitur motus intellectus. Operationis autem intellectus est duplex principium in intelligente, unum scilicet quod est ipsa virtus intellectualis, quod quidem principium est etiam in intelligente in potentia; aliud autem est principium intelligendi in actu, scilicet similitudo rei intellectae in intelligente. Dicitur ergo aliquid movere intellectum, sive det intelligenti virtutem ad intelligendum, sive imprimat ei similitudinem rei intellectae. Utroque autem modo Deus movet intellectum creatum. Ipse enim est primum ens immateriale. Et quia intellectualitas consequitur immaterialitatem, sequitur quod ipse sit primum intelligens. Unde cum primum in quolibet ordine sit causa eorum quae consequuntur, sequitur quod ab ipso sit omnis virtus intelligendi. Similiter cum ipse sit primum ens, et omnia entia praeexistant in ipso sicut in prima causa, oportet quod sint in eo intelligibiliter secundum modum eius. Sicut enim omnes rationes rerum intelligibiles primo existunt in Deo, et ab derivantur in alios intellectus, ut actu intelligant; sic etiam derivantur in creaturas ut subsistant. Sic igitur Deus movet intellectum creatum, inquantum dat ei virtutem ad intelligendum, vel naturalem vel superadditam; et inquantum imprimit ei species intelligibiles; et utrumque tenet et conservat in esse.

Reply to Objection 1: The intellectual operation is performed by the intellect in which it exists, as by a secondary cause; but it proceeds from God as from its first cause. For by Him the power to understand is given to the one who understands.

[32813] Iª q. 105 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod operatio intellectualis est quidem ab intellectu in quo est, sicut a causa secunda, sed a Deo sicut a causa prima. Ab ipso enim datur intelligenti quod intelligere possit.

Reply to Objection 2: The intellectual light together with the likeness of the thing understood is a sufficient principle of understanding; but it is a secondary principle, and depends upon the First Principle.

[32814] Iª q. 105 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod lumen intellectuale, simul cum similitudine rei intellectae, est sufficiens principium intelligendi; secundarium tamen, et a primo principio dependens.

Reply to Objection 3: The intelligible object moves our human intellect, so far as, in a way, it impresses on it its own likeness, by means of which the intellect is able to understand it. But the likenesses which God impresses on the created intellect are not sufficient to enable the created intellect to understand Him through His Essence, as we have seen above (Q[12], A[2]; Q[56], A[3]). Hence He moves the created intellect, and yet He cannot be intelligible to it, as we have explained (Q[12], A[4]).

[32815] Iª q. 105 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod intelligibile movet intellectum nostrum, inquantum quodammodo imprimit ei suam similitudinem, per quam intelligi potest. Sed similitudines quas Deus imprimit intellectui creato, non sufficiunt ad ipsum Deum intelligendum per essentiam, ut supra habitum est. Unde movet intellectum creatum, cum tamen non sit ei intelligibilis, ut dictum est.

Q. 105. A. 4. Whether God can move the created will?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot move the created will. For whatever is moved from without, is forced. But the will cannot be forced. Therefore it is not moved from without; and therefore cannot be moved by God.

[32816] Iª q. 105 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit movere voluntatem creatam. Omne enim quod movetur ab extrinseco, cogitur. Sed voluntas non potest cogi. Ergo non movetur ab aliquo extrinseco. Et ita non potest moveri a Deo.

Objection 2: Further, God cannot make two contradictories to be true at the same time. But this would follow if He moved the will; for to be voluntarily moved means to be moved from within, and not by another. Therefore God cannot move the will.

[32817] Iª q. 105 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, Deus non potest facere quod contradictoria sint simul vera. Hoc autem sequeretur, si voluntatem moveret, nam voluntarie moveri est ex se moveri, et non ab alio. Ergo Deus non potest voluntatem movere.

Objection 3: Further, movement is attributed to the mover rather than to the one moved; wherefore homicide is not ascribed to the stone, but to the thrower. Therefore, if God moves the will, it follows that voluntary actions are not imputed to man for reward or blame. But this is false. Therefore God does not move the will.

[32818] Iª q. 105 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, motus magis attribuitur moventi quam mobili, unde homicidium non attribuitur lapidi, sed proiicienti. Si igitur Deus moveat voluntatem, sequitur quod opera voluntaria non imputentur homini ad meritum vel demeritum. Hoc autem est falsum. Non igitur Deus movet voluntatem.

On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:13): "It is God who worketh in us [Vulgate---'you'] both to will and to accomplish."

[32819] Iª q. 105 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur ad Philipp. II, *Deus est qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere*.

I answer that, As the intellect is moved by the object and by the Giver of the power of intelligence, as stated above (A[3]), so is the will moved by its object, which is good, and by Him who creates the power of willing. Now the will can be moved by good as its object, but by God alone sufficiently and efficaciously. For nothing can move a movable thing sufficiently unless the active power of the mover surpasses or at least equals the potentiality of the thing movable. Now the potentiality of the will extends to the universal good; for its object is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal being. But every created good is some particular good; God alone is the universal good. Whereas He alone fills the capacity of the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object. In like manner the power of willing is caused by God alone. For to will is nothing but to be inclined towards the object of the will, which is universal good. But to incline towards the universal good belongs to the First Mover, to Whom the ultimate end is proportionate; just as in human affairs to him that presides over the community belongs the directing of his subjects to the common weal. Wherefore in both ways it belongs to God to move the will; but especially in the second way by an interior inclination of the will.

[32820] Iª q. 105 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut intellectus, ut dictum est, movetur ab obiecto, et ab eo qui dedit virtutem intelligendi; ita voluntas movetur ab obiecto, quod est bonum, et ab eo qui creat virtutem volendi. Potest autem voluntas moveri sicut ab obiecto, a quocumque bono; non tamen sufficienter et efficaciter nisi a Deo. Non enim sufficienter aliquid potest movere aliquod mobile, nisi virtus activa moventis excedat, vel saltem adaequet virtutem passivam mobilis. Virtus autem passiva voluntatis se extendit ad bonum in universali, est enim eius obiectum bonum universale, sicut et intellectus obiectum est ens universale. Quodlibet autem bonum creatum est quoddam particulare bonum, solus autem Deus est bonum universale. Unde ipse solus implet voluntatem, et sufficienter eam movet ut obiectum. Similiter autem et virtus volendi a solo Deo causatur. Velle enim nihil aliud est quam inclinatio quaedam in obiectum voluntatis, quod est bonum universale. Inclinare autem in bonum universale est primi moventis cui proportionatur ultimus finis, sicut in rebus humanis dirigere ad bonum commune est eius qui praeest multitudini. Unde utroque modo proprium est Dei movere voluntatem, sed maxime secundo modo, interius eam inclinando.

Reply to Objection 1: A thing moved by another is forced if moved against its natural inclination; but if it is moved by another giving to it the proper natural inclination, it is not forced; as when a heavy body is made to move downwards by that which produced it, then it is not forced. In like manner God, while moving the will, does not force it, because He gives the will its own natural inclination.

[32821] Iª q. 105 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illud quod movetur ab altero dicitur cogi, si moveatur contra inclinationem propriam, sed si moveatur ab alio quod sibi dat propriam inclinationem, non dicitur cogi; sicut grave, cum movetur deorsum a generante, non cogitur. Sic igitur Deus, movendo voluntatem, non cogit ipsam, quia dat ei eius propriam inclinationem.

Reply to Objection 2: To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within, that is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle may be caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is not repugnant to being moved by another.

[32822] Iª q. 105 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod moveri voluntarie est moveri ex se, idest a principio intrinseco, sed illud principium intrinsecum potest esse ab alio principio extrinseco. Et sic moveri ex se non repugnat ei quod movetur ab alio.

Reply to Objection 3: If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed for reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have stated (ad 2), it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit.

[32823] Iª q. 105 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, si voluntas ita moveretur ab alio quod ex se nullatenus moveretur, opera voluntatis non imputarentur ad meritum vel demeritum. Sed quia per hoc quod movetur ab alio, non excluditur quin moveatur ex se, ut dictum est; ideo per consequens non tollitur ratio meriti vel demeriti.

Q. 105. A. 5. Whether God works in every agent?

Objection 1: It would seem that God does not work in every agent. For we must not attribute any insufficiency to God. If therefore God works in every agent, He works sufficiently in each one. Hence it would be superfluous for the created agent to work at all.

[32824] Iª q. 105 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non operetur in omni operante. Nulla enim insufficientia est Deo attribuenda. Si igitur Deus operatur in omni operante, sufficienter in quolibet operatur. Superfluum igitur esset quod agens creatum aliquid operaretur.

Objection 2: Further, the same work cannot proceed at the same time from two sources; as neither can one and the same movement belong to two movable things. Therefore if the creature's operation is from God operating in the creature, it cannot at the same time proceed from the creature; and so no creature works at all.

[32825] Iª q. 105 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, una operatio non est simul a duobus operantibus, sicut nec unus numero motus potest esse duorum mobilium. Si igitur operatio creaturae est a Deo in creatura operante, non potest esse simul a creatura. Et ita nulla creatura aliquid operatur.

Objection 3: Further, the maker is the cause of the operation of the thing made, as giving it the form whereby it operates. Therefore, if God is the cause of the operation of things made by Him, this would be inasmuch as He gives them the power of operating. But this is in the beginning, when He makes them. Thus it seems that God does not operate any further in the operating creature.

[32826] Iª q. 105 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, faciens dicitur esse causa operationis facti, inquantum dat ei formam qua operatur. Si igitur Deus est causa operationis rerum factarum ab ipso, hoc erit inquantum dat eis virtutem operandi. Sed hoc est a principio, quando rem facit. Ergo videtur quod ulterius non operetur in creatura operante.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 26:12): "Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us."

[32827] Iª q. 105 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae XXVI, *omnia opera nostra operatus es in nobis, domine*.

I answer that, Some have understood God to work in every agent in such a way that no created power has any effect in things, but that God alone is the ultimate cause of everything wrought; for instance, that it is not fire that gives heat, but God in the fire, and so forth. But this is impossible. First, because the order of cause and effect would be taken away from created things: and this would

[32828] Iª q. 105 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod Deum operari in quolibet operante aliqui sic intellexerunt, quod nulla virtus creata aliquid operaretur in rebus, sed solus Deus immediate omnia operaretur; puta quod ignis non calefaceret, sed Deus in igne, et similiter de omnibus aliis. Hoc autem est impossibile. Primo quidem, quia sic subtraheretur ordo causae et causati a rebus

imply lack of power in the Creator: for it is due to the power of the cause, that it bestows active power on its effect. Secondly, because the active powers which are seen to exist in things, would be bestowed on things to no purpose, if these wrought nothing through them. Indeed, all things created would seem, in a way, to be purposeless, if they lacked an operation proper to them; since the purpose of everything is its operation. For the less perfect is always for the sake of the more perfect: and consequently as the matter is for the sake of the form, so the form which is the first act, is for the sake of its operation, which is the second act; and thus operation is the end of the creature. We must therefore understand that God works in things in such a manner that things have their proper operation.

In order to make this clear, we must observe that as there are few kinds of causes; matter is not a principle of action, but is the subject that receives the effect of action. On the other hand, the end, the agent, and the form are principles of action, but in a certain order. For the first principle of action is the end which moves the agent; the second is the agent; the third is the form of that which the agent applies to action (although the agent also acts through its own form); as may be clearly seen in things made by art. For the craftsman is moved to action by the end, which is the thing wrought, for instance a chest or a bed; and applies to action the axe which cuts through its being sharp.

Thus then does God work in every worker, according to these three things. First as an end. For since every operation is for the sake of some good, real or apparent; and nothing is good either really or apparently, except in as far as it participates in a likeness to the Supreme Good, which is God; it follows that God Himself is the cause of every operation as its end. Again it is to be observed that where there are several agents in order, the second always acts in virtue of the first; for the first agent moves the second to act. And thus all agents act in virtue of God Himself: and therefore He is the cause of action in every agent. Thirdly, we must observe that God not only moves things to operated, as it were applying their forms and powers to operation, just as the workman applies the axe to cut, who nevertheless at times does not give the axe its form; but He

creatis. Quod pertinet ad impotentiam creantis, ex virtute enim agentis est, quod suo effectui det virtutem agendi. Secundo, quia virtutes operativae quae in rebus inveniuntur, frustra essent rebus attributae, si per eas nihil operarentur. Quinimmo omnes res creatae viderentur quodammodo esse frustra, si propria operatione destituerentur, cum omnis res sit propter suam operationem. Semper enim imperfectum est propter perfectius, sicut igitur materia est propter formam, ita forma, quae est actus primus, est propter suam operationem, quae est actus secundus; et sic operatio est finis rei creatae. Sic igitur intelligendum est Deum operari in rebus, quod tamen ipsae res propriam habeant operationem. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod, cum sint causarum quatuor genera, materia quidem non est principium actionis, sed se habet ut subiectum recipiens actionis effectum. Finis vero et agens et forma se habent ut actionis principium, sed ordine quodam. Nam primo quidem, principium actionis est finis, qui movet agentem; secundo vero, agens; tertio autem, forma eius quod ab agente applicatur ad agendum (quamvis et ipsum agens per formam suam agat); ut patet in artificialibus. Artifex enim movetur ad agendum a fine, qui est ipsum operatum, puta arca vel lectus; et applicat ad actionem securim quae incidit per suum acumen. Sic igitur secundum haec tria Deus in quolibet operante operatur. Primo quidem, secundum rationem finis. Cum enim omnis operatio sit propter aliquod bonum verum vel apparens; nihil autem est vel apparet bonum, nisi secundum quod participat aliquam similitudinem summi boni, quod est Deus; sequitur quod ipse Deus sit cuiuslibet operationis causa ut finis. Similiter etiam considerandum est quod, si sint multa agentia ordinata, semper secundum agens agit in virtute primi, nam primum agens movet secundum ad agendum. Et secundum hoc, omnia agunt in virtute ipsius Dei; et ita ipse est causa actionum omnium agentium. Tertio, considerandum est quod Deus movet non solum res ad operandum, quasi applicando formas et virtutes rerum ad operationem, sicut etiam artifex applicat securim ad scindendum, qui tamen interdum formam securi non tribuit; sed etiam dat formam creaturis agentibus, et eas tenet in esse. Unde non solum est causa actionum inquantum dat formam quae est principium actionis, sicut generans dicitur esse causa motus gravium et levium; sed etiam sicut conservans formas et

also gives created agents their forms and preserves them in being. Therefore He is the cause of action not only by giving the form which is the principle of action, as the generator is said to be the cause of movement in things heavy and light; but also as preserving the forms and powers of things; just as the sun is said to be the cause of the manifestation of colors, inasmuch as it gives and preserves the light by which colors are made manifest. And since the form of a thing is within the thing, and all the more, as it approaches nearer to the First and Universal Cause; and because in all things God Himself is properly the cause of universal being which is innermost in all things; it follows that in all things God works intimately. For this reason in Holy Scripture the operations of nature are attributed to God as operating in nature, according to Job 10:11: "Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh: Thou hast put me together with bones and sinews."

virtutes rerum; prout sol dicitur esse causa manifestationis colorum, inquantum dat et conservat lumen, quo manifestantur colores. Et quia forma rei est intra rem, et tanto magis quanto consideratur ut prior et universalior; et ipse Deus est proprie causa ipsius esse universalis in rebus omnibus, quod inter omnia est magis intimum rebus; sequitur quod Deus in omnibus intime operetur. Et propter hoc in sacra Scriptura operationes naturae Deo attribuuntur quasi operanti in natura; secundum illud Iob X, *pelle et carnibus vestisti me, ossibus et nervis compegisti me*.

Reply to Objection 1: God works sufficiently in things as First Agent, but it does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents is superfluous.

[32829] Iª q. 105 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus sufficienter operatur in rebus ad modum primi agentis, nec propter hoc superfluit operatio secundorum agentium.

Reply to Objection 2: One action does not proceed from two agents of the same order. But nothing hinders the same action from proceeding from a primary and a secondary agent.

[32830] Iª q. 105 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod una actio non procedit a duobus agentibus unius ordinis, sed nihil prohibet quin una et eadem actio procedat a primo et secundo agente.

Reply to Objection 3: God not only gives things their form, but He also preserves them in existence, and applies them to act, and is moreover the end of every action, as above explained.

[32831] Iª q. 105 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus non solum dat formas rebus, sed etiam conservat eas in esse, et applicat eas ad agendum, et est finis omnium actionum, ut dictum est.

Q. 105. A. 6. Whether God can do anything outside the established order of nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot do anything outside the established order of nature. For Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3) says: "God the Maker and Creator of each nature, does nothing against nature." But that which is outside the natural order seems to be against nature. Therefore God can do nothing outside the natural order.

[32832] Iª q. 105 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit facere aliquid praeter ordinem rebus inditum. Dicit enim Augustinus, XXVI contra Faustum, *Deus, conditor et creator omnium naturarum, nihil contra naturam facit*. Sed hoc videtur esse contra naturam, quod est praeter ordinem naturaliter rebus inditum. Ergo Deus non potest facere aliquid praeter ordinem rebus inditum.

Objection 2: Further, as the order of justice is from God, so is the order of nature. But God cannot do anything outside the order of justice; for then He would do something unjust. Therefore He cannot do anything outside the order of nature.

[32833] Iª q. 105 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut ordo iustitiae est a Deo, ita et ordo naturae. Sed Deus non potest facere aliquid praeter ordinem iustitiae, faceret enim tunc aliquid iniustum. Ergo non potest facere aliquid praeter ordinem naturae.

Objection 3: Further, God established the order of nature. Therefore it God does anything outside the order of nature, it would seem that He is changeable; which cannot be said.

[32834] Iª q. 105 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, ordinem naturae Deus instituit. Si igitur praeter ordinem naturae Deus aliquid faciat, videtur quod ipse sit mutabilis. Quod est inconveniens.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God sometimes does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of nature."

[32835] Iª q. 105 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum, quod *Deus aliquando aliquid facit contra solitum cursum naturae*.

I answer that, From each cause there results a certain order to its effects, since every cause is a principle; and so, according to the multiplicity of causes, there results a multiplicity of orders, subjected one to the other, as cause is subjected to cause. Wherefore a higher cause is not subjected to a cause of a lower order; but conversely. An example of this may be seen in human affairs. On the father of a family depends the order of the household; which order is contained in the order of the city; which order again depends on the ruler of the city; while this last order depends on that of the king, by whom the whole kingdom is ordered.

If therefore we consider the order of things depending on the first cause, God cannot do anything against this order; for, if He did so, He would act against His foreknowledge, or His will, or His goodness. But if we consider the order of things depending on any secondary cause, thus God can do something outside such order; for He is not subject to the order of secondary causes; but, on the contrary, this order is subject to Him, as proceeding from Him, not by a natural necessity, but by the choice of His own will; for He could have created another order of things. Wherefore God can do something outside this order created by Him, when He chooses, for instance by producing the effects of secondary causes without them, or by producing certain effects to which secondary causes do not extend. So Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God acts against the wonted course of nature, but by

[32836] Iª q. 105 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod a qualibet causa derivatur aliquis ordo in suos effectus, cum quaelibet causa habeat rationem principii. Et ideo secundum multiplicationem causarum, multiplicantur et ordines, quorum unus continetur sub altero, sicut et causa continetur sub causa. Unde causa superior non continetur sub ordine causae inferioris, sed e converso. Cuius exemplum apparet in rebus humanis, nam ex patrefamilias dependet ordo domus, qui continetur sub ordine civitatis, qui procedit a civitatis rectore, cum et hic contineatur sub ordine regis, a quo totum regnum ordinatur. Si ergo ordo rerum consideretur prout dependet a prima causa, sic contra rerum ordinem Deus facere non potest, sic enim si faceret, faceret contra suam praescientiam aut voluntatem aut bonitatem. Si vero consideretur rerum ordo prout dependet a qualibet secundarum causarum, sic Deus potest facere praeter ordinem rerum. Quia ordini secundarum causarum ipse non est subiectus, sed talis ordo ei subiicitur, quasi ab eo procedens non per necessitatem naturae, sed per arbitrium voluntatis, potuisset enim et alium ordinem rerum instituere. Unde et potest praeter hunc ordinem institutum agere, cum voluerit; puta agendo effectus secundarum causarum sine ipsis, vel producendo aliquos effectus ad quos causae secundae non se extendunt. Unde et Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum, quod *Deus contra solitum cursum naturae facit; sed contra summam legem tam nullo modo facit, quam contra seipsum non facit*.

no means does He act against the supreme law; because He does not act against Himself."

Reply to Objection 1: In natural things something may happen outside this natural order, in two ways. It may happen by the action of an agent which did not give them their natural inclination; as, for example, when a man moves a heavy body upwards, which does not owe to him its natural inclination to move downwards; and that would be against nature. It may also happen by the action of the agent on whom the natural inclination depends; and this is not against nature, as is clear in the ebb and flow of the tide, which is not against nature; although it is against the natural movement of water in a downward direction; for it is owing to the influence of a heavenly body, on which the natural inclination of lower bodies depends. Therefore since the order of nature is given to things by God; if He does anything outside this order, it is not against nature. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "That is natural to each thing which is caused by Him from Whom is all mode, number, and order in nature."

[32837] Iª q. 105 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum aliquid contingit in rebus naturalibus praeter naturam inditam, hoc potest dupliciter contingere. Uno modo, per actionem agentis qui inclinationem naturalem non dedit, sicut cum homo movet corpus grave sursum, quod non habet ab eo ut moveatur deorsum, et hoc est contra naturam. Alio modo, per actionem illius agentis a quo dependet actio naturalis. Et hoc non est contra naturam, ut patet in fluxu et refluxu maris, qui non est contra naturam, quamvis sit praeter motum naturalem aquae, quae movetur deorsum; est enim ex impressione caelestis corporis, a quo dependet naturalis inclinatio inferiorum corporum. Cum igitur naturae ordo sit a Deo rebus inditus, si quid praeter hunc ordinem faciat, non est contra naturam. Unde Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum, quod *id est cuique rei naturale, quod ille fecerit a quo est omnis modus, numerus et ordo naturae*.

Reply to Objection 2: The order of justice arises by relation to the First Cause, Who is the rule of all justice; and therefore God can do nothing against such order.

[32838] Iª q. 105 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ordo iustitiae est secundum relationem ad causam primam, quae est regula omnis iustitiae. Et ideo praeter hunc ordinem, Deus nihil facere potest.

Reply to Objection 3: God fixed a certain order in things in such a way that at the same time He reserved to Himself whatever he intended to do otherwise than by a particular cause. So when He acts outside this order, He does not change.

[32839] Iª q. 105 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus sic rebus certum ordinem indidit, ut tamen sibi reservaret quid ipse aliquando aliter ex causa esset facturus. Unde cum praeter hunc ordinem agit, non mutatur.

Q. 105. A. 7. Whether whatever God does outside the natural order is miraculous?

Objection 1: It would seem that not everything which God does outside the natural order of things, is miraculous. For the creation of the world, and of souls, and the justification of the unrighteous, are done by God outside the natural order; as not being accomplished by the action of any natural cause. Yet these things are not called miracles. Therefore not everything that God does outside the natural order is a miracle.

[32840] Iª q. 105 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia quae Deus facit praeter ordinem naturalem rerum, sint miracula. Creatio enim mundi, et etiam animarum, et iustificatio impii fiunt a Deo praeter ordinem naturalem, non enim fiunt per actionem alicuius causae naturalis. Et tamen haec miracula non dicuntur. Ergo non omnia quae facit Deus praeter ordinem naturalem rerum, sunt miracula.

Objection 2: Further, a miracle is "something difficult, which seldom occurs, surpassing the faculty of nature, and going so far beyond our hopes as to compel our astonishment" [*St. Augustine, De utilitate credendi xvi.]. But some things outside the order of nature are not arduous; for they occur in small things, such as the recovery and healing of the sick. Nor are they of rare occurrence, since they happen frequently; as when the sick were placed in the streets, to be healed by the shadow of Peter (Acts 5:15). Nor do they surpass the faculty of nature; as when people are cured of a fever. Nor are they beyond our hopes, since we all hope for the resurrection of the dead, which nevertheless will be outside the course of nature. Therefore not all things are outside the course of natur are miraculous.

[32841] Iª q. 105 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, miraculum dicitur aliquid arduum et insolitum supra facultatem naturae et spem admirantis proveniens. Sed quaedam fiunt praeter naturae ordinem, quae tamen non sunt ardua, sunt enim in minimis rebus, sicut in restauratione gemmarum, vel sanatione aegrorum. Nec etiam sunt insolita, cum frequenter eveniant, sicut cum infirmi in plateis ponebantur ut ad umbram Petri sanarentur. Nec etiam sunt supra facultatem naturae, ut cum aliqui sanantur a febribus. Nec etiam supra spem, sicut resurrectionem mortuorum omnes speramus, quae tamen fiet praeter ordinem naturae. Ergo non omnia quae fiunt praeter naturae ordinem, sunt miracula.

Objection 3: Further, the word miracle is derived from admiration. Now admiration concerns things manifest to the senses. But sometimes things happen outside the order of nature, which are not manifest to the senses; as when the Apostles were endowed with knowledge without studying or being taught. Therefore not everything that occurs outside the order of nature is miraculous.

[32842] Iª q. 105 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, miraculi nomen ab admiratione sumitur. Sed admiratio est de rebus sensui manifestis. Sed quandoque aliqua accidunt praeter ordinem naturalem in rebus sensui non manifestis, sicut cum apostoli facti sunt scientes, neque invenientes neque discentes. Ergo non omnia quae fiunt praeter ordinem naturae, sunt miracula.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "Where God does anything against that order of nature which we know and are accustomed to observe, we call it a miracle."

[32843] Iª q. 105 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum, quod *cum Deus aliquid facit contra cognitum nobis cursum solitumque naturae, magnalia, vel mirabilia nominantur*.

I answer that, The word miracle is derived from admiration, which arises when an effect is manifest, whereas its cause is hidden; as when a man sees an eclipse without knowing its cause, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of his Metaphysics. Now the cause of a manifest effect may be known to one, but unknown to others. Wherefore a thing is wonderful to one man, and not at all to others: as an eclipse is to a rustic, but not to an astronomer. Now a miracle is so called as being full of wonder; as having a cause absolutely hidden from all: and this cause is God. Wherefore those things which God does outside those causes which we know, are called miracles.

[32844] Iª q. 105 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod nomen miraculi ab admiratione sumitur. Admiratio autem consurgit, cum effectus sunt manifesti et causa occulta; sicut aliquis admiratur cum videt eclipsim solis et ignorat causam, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. Potest autem causa effectus alicuius apparentis alicui esse nota, quae tamen est aliis incognita. Unde aliquid est mirum uni, quod non est mirum aliis; sicut eclipsim solis miratur rusticus, non autem astrologus. Miraculum autem dicitur quasi admiratione plenum, quod scilicet habet causam simpliciter et omnibus occultam. Haec autem est Deus. Unde illa quae a Deo fiunt praeter causas nobis notas, miracula dicuntur.

Reply to Objection 1: Creation, and the justification of the unrighteous, though done by God alone, are not, properly speaking, miracles, because they are not of a nature to proceed from any other cause; so they do not occur outside the order of nature, since they do not belong to that order.

[32845] Iª q. 105 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod creatio, et iustificatio impii, etsi a solo Deo fiant, non tamen, proprie loquendo, miracula dicuntur. Quia non sunt nata fieri per alias causas, et ita non contingunt praeter ordinem naturae, cum haec ad ordinem naturae non pertineant.

Reply to Objection 2: An arduous thing is called a miracle, not on account of the excellence of the thing wherein it is done, but because it surpasses the faculty of nature: likewise a thing is called unusual, not because it does not often happen, but because it is outside the usual natural course of things. Furthermore, a thing is said to be above the faculty of nature, not only by reason of the substance of the thing done, but also on account of the manner and order in which it is done. Again, a miracle is said to go beyond the hope "of nature," not above the hope "of grace," which hope comes from faith, whereby we believe in the future resurrection.

[32846] Iª q. 105 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod arduum dicitur miraculum, non propter dignitatem rei in qua fit; sed quia excedit facultatem naturae. Similiter etiam insolitum dicitur, non quia frequenter non eveniat sed quia est praeter naturalem consuetudinem. Supra facultatem autem naturae dicitur aliquid, non solum propter substantiam facti sed etiam propter modum et ordinem faciendi. Supra spem etiam naturae miraculum esse dicitur; non supra spem gratiae, quae est ex fide, per quam credimus resurrectionem futuram.

Reply to Objection 3: The knowledge of the Apostles, although not manifest in itself, yet was made manifest in its effect, from which it was shown to be wonderful.

[32847] Iª q. 105 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod scientia apostolorum, quamvis secundum se non fuerit manifesta, manifestabatur tamen in effectibus, ex quibus mirabilis apparebat.

Q. 105. A. 8. Whether one miracle is greater than another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one miracle is not greater than another. For Augustine says (Epist. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): "In miraculous deeds, the whole measure of the deed is the power of the doer." But by the same power of God all miracles are done. Therefore one miracle is not greater than another.

[32848] Iª q. 105 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unum miraculum non sit maius alio. Dicit enim Augustinus, in epistola ad Volusianum, *in rebus mirabiliter factis tota ratio facti est potentia facientis*. Sed eadem potentia, scilicet Dei, fiunt omnia miracula. Ergo unum non est maius alio.

Objection 2: Further, the power of God is infinite. But the infinite exceeds the finite beyond all proportion; and therefore no more reason exists to wonder at one effect thereof than at another. Therefore one miracle is not greater than another.

[32849] Iª q. 105 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, potentia Dei est infinita. Sed infinitum improportionabiliter excedit omne finitum. Ergo non magis est mirandum quod faciat hunc effectum, quam illum. Ergo unum miraculum non est maius altero.

On the contrary, The Lord says, speaking of miraculous works (Jn. 14:12): "The works that I

[32850] Iª q. 105 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Ioan. XIV, de operibus miraculosis

do, he also shall do, and greater than these shall he do."

loquens, *opera quae ego facio, et ipse faciet, et maiora horum faciet*.

I answer that, Nothing is called a miracle by comparison with the Divine Power; because no action is of any account compared with the power of God, according to Is. 40:15: "Behold the Gentiles are as a drop from a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a balance." But a thing is called a miracle by comparison with the power of nature which it surpasses. So the more the power of nature is surpassed, the greater the miracle. Now the power of nature is surpassed in three ways: firstly, in the substance of the deed, for instance, if two bodies occupy the same place, or if the sun goes backwards; or if a human body is glorified: such things nature is absolutely unable to do; and these hold the highest rank among miracles. Secondly, a thing surpasses the power of nature, not in the deed, but in that wherein it is done; as the raising of the dead, and giving sight to the blind, and the like; for nature can give life, but not to the dead; and such hold the second rank in miracles. Thirdly, a thing surpasses nature's power in the measure and order in which it is done; as when a man is cured of a fever suddenly, without treatment or the usual process of nature; or as when the air is suddenly condensed into rain, by Divine power without a natural cause, as occurred at the prayers of Samuel and Elias; and these hold the lowest place in miracles. Moreover, each of these kinds has various degrees, according to the different ways in which the power of nature is surpassed.

[32851] Iª q. 105 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod nihil potest dici miraculum ex comparatione potentiae divinae, quia quodcumque factum, divinae potentiae comparatum, est minimum; secundum illud Isaiae XL, *ecce gentes quasi stilla situlae, et quasi momentum staterae reputatae sunt*. Sed dicitur aliquid miraculum per comparationem ad facultatem naturae, quam excedit. Et ideo secundum quod magis excedit facultatem naturae, secundum hoc maius miraculum dicitur. Excedit autem aliquid facultatem naturae tripliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad substantiam facti, sicut quod duo corpora sint simul, vel quod sol retrocedat, aut quod corpus humanum glorificetur; quod nullo modo natura facere potest. Et ista tenent summum gradum in miraculis. Secundo aliquid excedit facultatem naturae, non quantum ad id quod fit, sed quantum ad id in quo fit, sicut resuscitatio mortuorum, et illuminatio caecorum, et similia. Potest enim natura causare vitam, sed non in mortuo, et potest praestare visum, sed non caeco. Et haec tenent secundum locum in miraculis. Tertio modo excedit aliquid facultatem naturae, quantum ad modum et ordinem faciendi, sicut cum aliquis subito per virtutem divinam a febre curatur absque curatione et consueto processu naturae in talibus, et cum statim aer divina virtute in pluvias densatur absque naturalibus causis, sicut factum est ad preces Samuelis et Eliae. Et huiusmodi tenent infimum locum in miraculis. Quaelibet tamen horum habent diversos gradus, secundum quod diversimode excedunt facultatem naturae.

From this is clear how to reply to the objections, arguing as they do from the Divine power.

[32852] Iª q. 105 a. 8 ad arg. Et per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta, quae procedunt ex parte divinae potentiae.

Q. 106. HOW ONE CREATURE MOVES ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)

We next consider how one creature moves another. This consideration will be threefold: (1) How the angels move, who are purely spiritual creatures; (2) How bodies move; (3) How man moves, who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal nature.

Concerning the first point, there are three things to be considered: (1) How an angel acts on an angel; (2) How an angel acts on a corporeal nature; (3) How an angel acts on man.

The first of these raises the question of the enlightenment and speech of the angels; and of their mutual coordination, both of the good and of the bad angels.

Concerning their enlightenment there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether one angel moves the intellect of another by enlightenment?

(2) Whether one angel moves the will of another?

(3) Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?

(4) Whether a superior angel enlightens an inferior angel in all that he knows himself?

[32853] Iª q. 106 pr. Deinde considerandum est quomodo una creatura moveat aliam. Erit autem haec consideratio tripartita, ut primo consideremus quomodo Angeli moveant, qui sunt creaturae pure spirituales; secundo, quomodo corpora moveant; tertio, quomodo homines, qui sunt ex spirituali et corporali natura compositi. Circa primum tria consideranda occurrunt, primo, quomodo Angelus agat in Angelum; secundo, quomodo in creaturam corporalem; tertio, quomodo in homines. Circa primum, considerare oportet de illuminatione, et locutione Angelorum, et ordinatione eorum ad invicem, tam bonorum, quam malorum. Circa illuminationem quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum unus Angelus moveat intellectum alterius illuminando. Secundo, utrum unus moveat voluntatem alterius. Tertio, utrum inferior Angelus possit illuminare superiorem. Quarto, utrum superior Angelus illuminet inferiorem de omnibus quae cognoscit.

Q. 106. A. 1. Whether one angel enlightens another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not enlighten another. For the angels possess now the same beatitude which we hope to obtain. But one man will not then enlighten another, according to Jer. 31:34: "They shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother." Therefore neither does an angel enlighten another now.

[32854] Iª q. 106 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus Angelus non illuminet alium. Angeli enim eandem beatitudinem possident nunc, quam nos in futuro expectamus. Sed tunc unus homo non illuminabit alium; secundum illud Ierem. XXXI, *non docebit ultra vir proximum suum, et vir fratrem suum*. Ergo etiam neque nunc unus Angelus illuminat alium.

Objection 2: Further, light in the angels is threefold; of nature, of grace, and of glory. But an angel is enlightened in the light of nature by the Creator; in the light of grace by the Justifier; in the light of glory by the Beatifier; all of which comes from God. Therefore one angel does not enlighten another.

[32855] Iª q. 106 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, triplex est lumen in Angelis, naturae, gratiae et gloriae. Sed Angelus illuminatur lumine naturae, a creante; lumine gratiae, a iustificante; lumine gloriae, a beatificante; quod totum Dei est. Ergo unus Angelus non illuminat alium.

Objection 3: Further, light is a form in the mind. But the rational mind is "informed by God alone, without created intervention," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51). Therefore one angel does not enlighten the mind of another.

[32856] Iª q. 106 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, lumen est forma quaedam mentis. Sed mens rationalis a solo Deo formatur, nulla interposita creatura, ut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest. Ergo unus Angelus non illuminat mentem alterius.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that "the angels of the second hierarchy are cleansed, enlightened and perfected by the angels of the first hierarchy."

[32857] Iª q. 106 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, VIII cap. Cael. Hier., quod *Angeli secundae hierarchiae purgantur et illuminantur et perficiuntur per Angelos primae hierarchiae*.

I answer that, One angel enlightens another. To make this clear, we must observe that intellectual light is nothing else than a manifestation of truth, according to Eph. 5:13: "All that is made manifest is light." Hence to enlighten means nothing else but to communicate to others the manifestation of the known truth; according to the Apostle (Eph. 3:8): "To me the least of all the saints is given this grace . . . to enlighten all men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from eternity in God." Therefore one angel is said to enlighten another by manifesting the truth which he knows himself. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii): "Theologians plainly show that the orders of the heavenly beings are taught Divine science by the higher minds."

Now since two things concur in the intellectual operation, as we have said (Q[105], A[3]), namely, the intellectual power, and the likeness of the thing understood; in both of these one angel can notify the known truth to another. First, by strengthening his intellectual power; for just as the power of an imperfect body is strengthened by the neighborhood of a more perfect body ---for instance, the less hot is made hotter by the presence of what is hotter; so the intellectual power of an inferior angel is strengthened by the superior angel turning to him: since in spiritual things, for one thing to turn to another, corresponds to neighborhood in corporeal things. Secondly, one angel manifests the truth to another as regards the likeness of the thing understood. For the superior angel receives the knowledge of truth by a kind of universal conception, to receive which the inferior angel's intellect is not sufficiently powerful, for it is natural to him to receive truth in a more particular manner.

[32858] Iª q. 106 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod unus Angelus illuminat alium. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod lumen, secundum quod ad intellectum pertinet, nihil est aliud quam quaedam manifestatio veritatis; secundum illud ad Ephes. V, *omne quod manifestatur, lumen est*. Unde illuminare nihil aliud est quam manifestationem cognitae veritatis alteri tradere; secundum quem modum apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. III, *mihi, omnium sanctorum minimo, data est gratia haec, illuminare omnes quae sit dispensatio sacramenti absconditi a saeculis in Deo*. Sic igitur unus Angelus dicitur illuminare alium, inquantum ei manifestat veritatem quam ipse cognoscit. Unde Dionysius dicit, VII cap. Cael. Hier., quod *theologi plane monstrant caelestium substantiarum ornatus a supremis mentibus doceri deificas scientias*. Cum autem ad intelligendum duo concurrant, ut supra diximus, scilicet virtus intellectiva, et similitudo rei intellectae; secundum haec duo unus Angelus alteri veritatem notam notificare potest. Primo quidem, fortificando virtutem intellectivam eius. Sicut enim virtus imperfectioris corporis confortatur ex situali propinquitate perfectioris corporis, ut minus calidum crescit in calore ex praesentia magis calidi; ita virtus intellectiva inferioris Angeli confortatur ex conversione superioris Angeli ad ipsum. Hoc enim facit in spiritualibus ordo conversionis, quod facit in corporalibus ordo localis propinquitatis. Secundo autem unus Angelus alteri manifestat veritatem, ex parte similitudinis intellectae. Superior enim Angelus notitiam veritatis accipit in universali quadam conceptione, ad quam capiendam inferioris Angeli intellectus non esset sufficiens, sed est ei connaturale ut magis particulariter veritatem accipiat. Superior ergo Angelus veritatem quam universaliter concipit,

Therefore the superior angel distinguishes, in a way, the truth which he conceives universally, so that it can be grasped by the inferior angel; and thus he proposes it to his knowledge. Thus it is with us that the teacher, in order to adapt himself to others, divides into many points the knowledge which he possesses in the universal. This is thus expressed by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xv): "Every intellectual substance with provident power divides and multiplies the uniform knowledge bestowed on it by one nearer to God, so as to lead its inferiors upwards by analogy."

quodammodo distinguit, ut ab inferiori capi possit; et sic eam cognoscendam illi proponit. Sicut etiam apud nos, doctores, quod in summa capiunt, multipliciter distinguunt, providentes capacitati aliorum. Et hoc est quod Dionysius dicit, XV cap. Cael. Hier., *unaquaeque substantia intellectualis datam sibi a diviniore uniformem intelligentiam, provida virtute dividit et multiplicat, ad inferioris sursum ductricem analogiam*.

Reply to Objection 1: All the angels, both inferior and superior, see the Essence of God immediately, and in this respect one does not teach another. It is of this truth that the prophet speaks; wherefore he adds: "They shall teach no more every man his brother, saying: 'Know the Lord': for all shall know Me, from the least of them even to the greatest." But all the types of the Divine works, which are known in God as in their cause, God knows in Himself, because He comprehends Himself; but of others who see God, each one knows the more types, the more perfectly he sees God. Hence a superior angel knows more about the types of the Divine works than an inferior angel, and concerning these the former enlightens the latter; and as to this Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the angels "are enlightened by the types of existing things."

[32859] Iª q. 106 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnes Angeli, tam superiores quam inferiores, immediate vident Dei essentiam; et quantum ad hoc, unus non docet alium. De hac enim doctrina propheta loquitur, unde dicit *non docebit vir fratrem suum, dicens, cognosce dominum. Omnes enim cognoscent me, a minimo eorum usque ad maximum*. Sed rationes divinorum operum, quae in Deo cognoscuntur sicut in causa, omnes quidem Deus in seipso cognoscit, quia seipsum comprehendit, aliorum vero Deum videntium tanto unusquisque in Deo plures rationes cognoscit, quanto eum perfectius videt. Unde superior Angelus plura in Deo de rationibus divinorum operum cognoscit quam inferior; et de his eum illuminat. Et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod *Angeli existentium illuminantur rationibus*.

Reply to Objection 2: An angel does not enlighten another by giving him the light of nature, grace, or glory; but by strengthening his natural light, and by manifesting to him the truth concerning the state of nature, of grace, and of glory, as explained above.

[32860] Iª q. 106 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod unus Angelus non illuminat alium tradendo ei lumen naturae vel gratiae vel gloriae; sed confortando lumen naturale ipsius, et manifestando ei veritatem de his quae pertinent ad statum naturae, gratiae et gloriae, ut dictum est.

Reply to Objection 3: The rational mind is formed immediately by God, either as the image from the exemplar, forasmuch as it is made to the image of God alone; or as the subject by the ultimate perfecting form: for the created mind is always considered to be unformed, except it adhere to the first truth; while the other kinds of enlightenment that proceed from man or angel, are, as it were, dispositions to this ultimate form.

[32861] Iª q. 106 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod rationalis mens formatur immediate a Deo, vel sicut imago ab exemplari, quia non est facta ad alterius imaginem quam Dei, vel sicut subiectum ab ultima forma completiva, quia semper mens creata reputatur informis, nisi ipsi primae veritati inhaereat. Aliae vero illuminationes, quae sunt ab homine vel Angelo, sunt quasi dispositiones ad ultimam formam.

Q. 106. A. 2. Whether one angel moves another angel's will?

Objection 1: It would seem that one angel can move another angel's will. Because, according to Dionysius quoted above (A[1]), as one angel enlightens another, so does he cleanse and perfect another. But cleansing and perfecting seem to belong to the will: for the former seems to point to the stain of sin which appertains to will; while to be perfected is to obtain an end, which is the object of the will. Therefore an angel can move another angel's will.

[32862] Iª q. 106 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus Angelus possit movere voluntatem alterius. Quia secundum Dionysium, sicut unus Angelus illuminat alium, ita purgat et perficit; ut patet ex auctoritate supra inducta. Sed purgatio et perfectio videntur pertinere ad voluntatem, nam purgatio videtur esse a sordibus culpae, quae pertinet ad voluntatem; perfectio autem videtur esse per consecutionem finis, qui est obiectum voluntatis. Ergo unus Angelus potest movere voluntatem alterius.

Objection 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii): "The names of the angels designate their properties." Now the Seraphim are so called because they "kindle" or "give heat": and this is by love which belongs to the will. Therefore one angel moves another angel's will.

[32863] Iª q. 106 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier., *nomina Angelorum designant eorum proprietates*. Seraphim autem incendentes dicuntur, aut calefacientes, quod est per amorem, qui ad voluntatem pertinet. Unus ergo Angelus movet voluntatem alterius.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11) that the higher appetite moves the lower. But as the intellect of the superior angel is higher, so also is his will. It seems, therefore, that the superior angel can change the will of another angel.

[32864] Iª q. 106 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod appetitus superior movet appetitum inferiorem. Sed sicut intellectus Angeli superioris superior est, ita etiam appetitus. Ergo videtur quod superior Angelus possit immutare voluntatem alterius.

On the contrary, To him it belongs to change the will, to whom it belongs to bestow righteousness: for righteousness is the rightness of the will. But God alone bestows righteousness. Therefore one angel cannot change another angel's will.

[32865] Iª q. 106 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, eius est immutare voluntatem, cuius est iustificare, cum iustitia sit rectitudo voluntatis. Sed solus Deus est qui iustificat. Ergo unus Angelus non potest mutare voluntatem alterius.

I answer that, As was said above (Q[105], A[4]), the will is changed in two ways; on the part of the object, and on the part of the power. On the part of the object, both the good itself which is the object of the will, moves the will, as the appetible moves the appetite; and he who points out the object, as, for instance, one who proves something to be good. But as we have said above (Q[105], A[4]), other goods in a measure incline the will, yet nothing sufficiently moves the will save the universal good, and that is God. And this good He alone shows, that it may be seen by the blessed, Who, when Moses asked: "Show me Thy

[32866] Iª q. 106 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, voluntas immutatur dupliciter, uno modo, ex parte obiecti; alio modo ex parte ipsius potentiae. Ex parte quidem obiecti, movet voluntatem et ipsum bonum quod est voluntatis obiectum, sicut appetibile movet appetitum; et ille qui demonstrat obiectum, puta qui demonstrat aliquid esse bonum. Sed sicut supra dictum est, alia quidem bona aliqualiter inclinant voluntatem; sed nihil sufficienter movet voluntatem, nisi bonum universale, quod est Deus. Et hoc bonum solus ipse ostendit, ut per essentiam videatur a beatis, qui dicenti Moysi,

glory," answered: "I will show thee all good" (Ex. 33:18,19). Therefore an angel does not move the will sufficiently, either as the object or as showing the object. But he inclines the will as something lovable, and as manifesting some created good ordered to God's goodness. And thus he can incline the will to the love of the creature or of God, by way of persuasion.

ostende mihi gloriam tuam, respondit, *ego ostendam tibi omne bonum*, ut habetur Exod. XXXIII. Angelus ergo non sufficienter movet voluntatem, neque ut obiectum, neque ut ostendens obiectum. Sed inclinat eam, ut amabile quoddam, et ut manifestans aliqua bona creata ordinata in Dei bonitatem. Et per hoc inclinare potest ad amorem creaturae vel Dei, per modum suadentis. Ex parte vero ipsius potentiae, voluntas nullo modo potest moveri nisi a Deo. Operatio enim voluntatis est inclinatio quaedam volentis in volitum. Hanc autem inclinationem solus ille immutare potest, qui virtutem volendi creaturae contulit, sicut et naturalem inclinationem solum illud agens potest mutare, quod potest dare virtutem quam consequitur inclinatio naturalis. Solus autem Deus est qui potentiam volendi tribuit creaturae, quia ipse solus est auctor intellectualis naturae. Unde unus Angelus voluntatem alterius movere non potest.

But on the part of the power the will cannot be moved at all save by God. For the operation of the will is a certain inclination of the willer to the thing willed. And He alone can change this inclination, Who bestowed on the creature the power to will: just as that agent alone can change the natural inclination, which can give the power to which follows that natural inclination. Now God alone gave to the creature the power to will, because He alone is the author of the intellectual nature. Therefore an angel cannot move another angel's will.

Reply to Objection 1: Cleansing and perfecting are to be understood according to the mode of enlightenment. And since God enlightens by changing the intellect and will, He cleanses by removing defects of intellect and will, and perfects unto the end of the intellect and will. But the enlightenment caused by an angel concerns the intellect, as explained above (A[1]); therefore an angel is to be understood as cleansing from the defect of nescience in the intellect; and as perfecting unto the consummate end of the intellect, and this is the knowledge of truth. Thus Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi): that "in the heavenly hierarchy the chastening of the inferior essence is an enlightening of things unknown, that leads them to more perfect knowledge." For instance, we might say that corporeal sight is cleansed by the removal of darkness; enlightened by the diffusion of light; and perfected by being brought to the perception of the colored object.

[32867] Iª q. 106 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod secundum modum illuminationis, est accipienda et purgatio et perfectio. Et quia Deus illuminat immutando intellectum et voluntatem, purgat a defectibus intellectus et voluntatis, et perficit in finem intellectus et voluntatis. Angeli autem illuminatio refertur ad intellectum, ut dictum est. Et ideo etiam purgatio Angeli intelligitur a defectu intellectus, qui est nescientia; perfectio autem est consummatio in finem intellectus, qui est veritas cognita. Et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius, VI cap. Eccl. Hier., quod *in caelesti hierarchia purgatio est in subiectis essentiis tanquam ignotorum illuminatio in perfectiorem eas scientiam ducens*. Sicut si dicamus visum corporalem purgari, inquantum removentur tenebrae; illuminari vero, inquantum perfunditur lumine; perfici vero, secundum quod perducitur ad cognitionem colorati.

Reply to Objection 2: One angel can induce another to love God by persuasion as explained above.

[32868] Iª q. 106 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod unus Angelus potest inducere alium ad amorem Dei per modum persuadentis, ut supra dictum est.

Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher speaks of the lower sensitive appetite which can be moved

[32869] Iª q. 106 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de appetitu inferiori

by the superior intellectual appetite, because it belongs to the same nature of the soul, and because the inferior appetite is a power in a corporeal organ. But this does not apply to the angels.

sensitivo, qui potest moveri a superiori intellectivo, quia pertinet ad eandem naturam animae, et quia inferior appetitus est virtus in organo corporali. Quod in Angelis locum non habet.

Q. 106. A. 3. Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel. For the ecclesiastical hierarchy is derived from, and represents the heavenly hierarchy; and hence the heavenly Jerusalem is called "our mother" (Gal. 4:26). But in the Church even superiors are enlightened and taught by their inferiors, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:31): "You may all prophesy one by one, that all may learn and all may be exhorted." Therefore, likewise in the heavenly hierarchy, the superiors can be enlightened by inferiors.

[32870] Iª q. 106 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus inferior superiorem illuminare possit. Ecclesiastica enim hierarchia derivata est a caelesti, et eam repraesentat, unde et superna Ierusalem dicitur mater nostra, Gal. IV. Sed in Ecclesia etiam superiores illuminantur ab inferioribus et docentur; secundum illud apostoli, I ad Cor. XIV, *potestis omnes per singulos prophetare, ut omnes discant, et omnes exhortentur*. Ergo et in caelesti hierarchia superiores ab inferioribus possunt illuminari.

Objection 2: Further, as the order of corporeal substances depends on the will of God, so also does the order of spiritual substances. But, as was said above (Q[105], A[6]), God sometimes acts outside the order of corporeal substances. Therefore He also sometimes acts outside the order of spiritual substances, by enlightening inferior otherwise than through their superiors. Therefore in that way the inferiors enlightened by God can enlighten superiors.

[32871] Iª q. 106 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut ordo corporalium substantiarum dependet ex Dei voluntate, ita et ordo substantiarum spiritualium. Sed sicut dictum est, Deus quandoque praeter ordinem substantiarum corporalium operatur. Ergo quandoque etiam operatur praeter ordinem spiritualium substantiarum, illuminando inferiores non per medios superiores. Sic ergo inferiores illuminati a Deo, possunt superiores illuminare.

Objection 3: Further, one angel enlightens the other to whom he turns, as was above explained (A[1]). But since this turning to another is voluntary, the highest angel can turn to the lowest passing over the others. Therefore he can enlighten him immediately; and thus the latter can enlighten his superiors.

[32872] Iª q. 106 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, unus Angelus alium illuminat, ad quem se convertit, ut supra dictum est. Sed cum ista conversio sit voluntaria, potest supremus Angelus ad infimum se convertere, mediis praetermissis. Ergo potest eum immediate illuminare, et ita potest illuminare superiores.

On the contrary, Dionysius says that "this is the Divine unalterable law, that inferior things are led to God by the superior" (Coel. Hier. iv; Eccl. Hier. v).

[32873] Iª q. 106 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit *hanc legem esse divinitatis immobiliter firmatam, ut inferiora reducantur in Deum per superiora*.

I answer that, The inferior angels never enlighten the superior, but are always enlightened by them. The reason is, because, as above

[32874] Iª q. 106 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod inferiores Angeli nunquam illuminant superiores, sed semper ab eis illuminantur. Cuius

explained (Q[105], A[6]), one order is under another, as cause is under cause; and hence as cause is ordered to cause, so is order to order. Therefore there is no incongruity if sometimes anything is done outside the order of the inferior cause, to be ordered to the superior cause, as in human affairs the command of the president is passed over from obedience to the prince. So it happens that God works miraculously outside the order of corporeal nature, that men may be ordered to the knowledge of Him. But the passing over of the order that belongs to spiritual substances in no way belongs to the ordering of men to God; since the angelic operations are not made known to us; as are the operations of sensible bodies. Thus the order which belongs to spiritual substances is never passed over by God; so that the inferiors are always moved by the superior, and not conversely.

ratio est quia, sicut supra dictum est, ordo continetur sub ordine, sicut causa continetur sub causa. Unde sicut ordinatur causa ad causam, ita ordo ad ordinem. Et ideo non est inconveniens, si aliquando aliquid fiat praeter ordinem inferioris causae, ad ordinandum in superiorem causam, sicut in rebus humanis praetermittitur mandatum praesidis, ut obediatur principi. Et ita contingit ut praeter ordinem naturae corporalis, aliquid Deus miraculose operetur, ad ordinandum homines in eius cognitionem. Sed praetermissio ordinis qui debetur spiritualibus substantiis, in nullo pertinet ad ordinationem hominum in Deum, cum operationes Angelorum non sint nobis manifestae, sicut operationes visibilium corporum. Et ideo ordo qui convenit spiritualibus substantiis, nunquam a Deo praetermittitur, quin semper inferiora moveantur per superiora, et non e converso.

Reply to Objection 1: The ecclesiastical hierarchy imitates the heavenly in some degree, but by a perfect likeness. For in the heavenly hierarchy the perfection of the order is in proportion to its nearness to God; so that those who are the nearer to God are the more sublime in grade, and more clear in knowledge; and on that account the superiors are never enlightened by the inferiors, whereas in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, sometimes those who are the nearer to God in sanctity, are in the lowest grade, and are not conspicuous for science; and some also are eminent in one kind of science, and fail in another; and on that account superiors may be taught by inferiors.

[32875] Iª q. 106 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ecclesiastica hierarchia imitatur caelestem aliqualiter, sed non perfecte consequitur eius similitudinem. In caelesti enim hierarchia tota ratio ordinis est ex propinquitate ad Deum. Et ideo illi qui sunt Deo propinquiores, sunt et gradu sublimiores, et scientia clariores, et propter hoc superiores nunquam ab inferioribus illuminantur. Sed in ecclesiastica hierarchia, interdum qui sunt Deo per sanctitatem propinquiores, sunt gradu infimi, et scientia non eminentes, et quidam in uno etiam secundum scientiam eminent, et in alio deficiunt. Et propter hoc superiores ab inferioribus doceri possunt.

Reply to Objection 2: As above explained, there is no similarity between what God does outside the order of corporeal nature, and that of spiritual nature. Hence the argument does not hold.

[32876] Iª q. 106 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod non est similis ratio de hoc quod Deus agat praeter ordinem naturae corporalis, et naturae spiritualis, ut dictum est. Unde ratio non sequitur.

Reply to Objection 3: An angel turns voluntarily to enlighten another angel, but the angel's will is ever regulated by the Divine law which made the order in the angels.

[32877] Iª q. 106 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Angelus voluntate convertitur ad alium Angelum illuminandum; sed voluntas Angeli semper regulatur lege divina, quae ordinem in Angelis instituit.

Q. 106. A. 4. Whether the superior angel enlightens the inferior as regards all he himself knows?

Objection 1: It would seem that the superior angel does not enlighten the inferior concerning all he himself knows. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii) that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge; and the inferior a more particular and individual knowledge. But more is contained under a universal knowledge than under a particular knowledge. Therefore not all that the superior angels know, is known by the inferior, through these being enlightened by the former.

[32878] Iª q. 106 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus superior non illuminet inferiorem de omnibus quae ipse novit. Dicit enim Dionysius, XII cap. Cael. Hier., quod Angeli superiores habent scientiam magis universalem, inferiores vero magis particularem et subiectam. Sed plura continentur sub scientia universali quam sub particulari. Ergo non omnia quae sciunt superiores Angeli, cognoscunt inferiores per superiorum illuminationem.

Objection 2: Further, the Master of the Sentences (ii, D, 11) says that the superior angels had long known the Mystery of the Incarnation, whereas the inferior angels did not know it until it was accomplished. Thus we find that on some of the angels inquiring, as it were, in ignorance: "Who is this King of glory?" other angels, who knew, answered: "The Lord of Hosts, He is the King of glory," as Dionysius expounds (Coel. Hier. vii). But this would not apply if the superior angels enlightened the inferior concerning all they know themselves. Therefore they do not do so.

[32879] Iª q. 106 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, Magister dicit, in XI distinctione II Sent., quod superiores Angeli cognoverunt a saeculis mysterium incarnationis, inferioribus vero ignotum fuit usquequo completum est. Quod videtur per hoc quod, quibusdam Angelis quaerentibus, quis est iste rex gloriae? Quasi ignorantibus, alii respondent, quasi scientes, dominus virtutum ipse est rex gloriae, ut Dionysius exponit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Hoc autem non esset, si superiores Angeli illuminarent inferiores de omnibus quae ipsi cognoscunt. Non ergo eos illuminant de omnibus sibi notis.

Objection 3: Further, if the superior angels enlighten the inferior about all they know, nothing that the superior angels know would be unknown to the inferior angels. Therefore the superior angels could communicate nothing more to the inferior; which appears open to objection. Therefore the superior angels enlighten the inferior in all things.

[32880] Iª q. 106 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, si omnia superiores Angeli inferioribus annuntiant quae cognoscunt, nihil inferioribus ignotum remanet, quod superiores cognoscant. Non ergo de cetero superiores poterunt illuminare inferiores. Quod videtur inconveniens. Non ergo superiores de omnibus inferiores illuminant.

On the contrary, Gregory [*Peter Lombard, Sent. ii, D, ix; Cf. Gregory, Hom. xxxiv, in Ev.] says: "In that heavenly country, though there are some excellent gifts, yet nothing is held individually." And Dionysius says: "Each heavenly essence communicates to the inferior the gift derived from the superior" (Coel. Hier. xv), as quoted above (A[1]).

[32881] Iª q. 106 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, quod *in illa caelesti patria, licet quaedam data sint excellenter, nihil tamen possidetur singulariter*. Et Dionysius dicit, XV cap. Cael. Hier., quod *unaquaeque caelestis essentia intelligentiam sibi a superiori datam, inferiori communicat*; ut patet ex auctoritate supra inducta.

I answer that, Every creature participates in the Divine goodness, so as to diffuse the good it possesses to others; for it is of the nature of good to communicate itself to others. Hence also

[32882] Iª q. 106 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod omnes creaturae ex divina bonitate participant ut bonum quod habent, in alia diffundant, nam de ratione boni est quod se aliis

corporeal agents give their likeness to others so far as they can. So the more an agent is established in the share of the Divine goodness, so much the more does it strive to transmit its perfections to others as far as possible. Hence the Blessed Peter admonishes those who by grace share in the Divine goodness; saying: "As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another; as good stewards of the manifold grace of God" (1 Pet. 4:10). Much more therefore do the holy angels, who enjoy the plenitude of participation of the Divine goodness, impart the same to those below them.

communicet. Et inde est etiam quod agentia corporalia similitudinem suam aliis tradunt, quantum possibile est. Quanto igitur aliqua agentia magis in participatione divinae bonitatis constituuntur, tanto magis perfectiones suas nituntur in alios transfundere, quantum possibile est. Unde beatus Petrus monet eos qui divinam bonitatem per gratiam participant, dicens, I Petr. IV, *unusquisque, sicut accepit gratiam, in alterutrum illam administrantes, sicut boni dispensatores multiformis gratiae Dei*. Multo igitur magis sancti Angeli, qui sunt in plenissima participatione divinae bonitatis, quidquid a Deo percipiunt, subiectis impartiuntur. Non tamen recipitur ab inferioribus ita excellenter sicut est in superioribus. Et ideo superiores semper remanent in altiori ordine, et perfectiorem scientiam habentes. Sicut unam et eandem rem plenius intelligit magister, quam discipulus qui ab eo addiscit.

Nevertheless this gift is not received so excellently by the inferior as by the superior angels; and therefore the superior ever remain in a higher order, and have a more perfect knowledge; as the master understands the same thing better than the pupil who learns from him.

Reply to Objection 1: The knowledge of the superior angels is said to be more universal as regards the more eminent mode of knowledge.

[32883] Iª q. 106 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod superiorum Angelorum scientia dicitur esse universalior, quantum ad eminentiorem modum intelligendi.

Reply to Objection 2: The Master's words are not to be understood as if the inferior angels were entirely ignorant of the Mystery of the Incarnation but that they did not know it as fully as the superior angels; and that they progressed in the knowledge of it afterwards when the Mystery was accomplished.

[32884] Iª q. 106 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum Magistri non sic est intelligendum, quod inferiores Angeli penitus ignoraverint mysterium incarnationis; sed quia non ita plene cognoverunt sicut superiores, et in eius cognitione postmodum profecerunt, dum illud mysterium impleretur.

Reply to Objection 3: Till the Judgment Day some new things are always being revealed by God to the highest angels, concerning the course of the world, and especially the salvation of the elect. Hence there is always something for the superior angels to make known to the inferior.

[32885] Iª q. 106 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, usque ad diem iudicii, semper nova aliqua supremis Angelis revelantur divinitus de his quae pertinent ad dispositionem mundi, et praecipue ad salutem electorum. Unde semper remanet unde superiores Angeli inferiores illuminent.

Q. 107. THE SPEECH OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)

We next consider the speech of the angels. Here there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether one angel speaks to another?

(2) Whether the inferior speaks to the superior?

(3) Whether an angel speaks to God?

(4) Whether the angelic speech is subject to local distance?

(5) Whether all the speech of one angel to another is known to all?

[32886] Iª q. 107 pr. Deinde considerandum est de locutionibus Angelorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum unus Angelus loquatur alii. Secundo, utrum inferior superiori. Tertio, utrum Angelus Deo. Quarto, utrum in locutione Angeli aliquid distantia localis operetur. Quinto, utrum locutionem unius Angeli ad alterum omnes cognoscant.

Q. 107. A. 1. Whether one angel speaks to another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not speak to another. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that, in the state of the resurrection "each one's body will not hide his mind from his fellows." Much less, therefore, is one angel's mind hidden from another. But speech manifests to another what lies hidden in the mind. Therefore it is not necessary that one angel should speak to another.

[32887] Iª q. 107 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus Angelus alteri non loquatur. Dicit enim Gregorius, XVIII Moral., quod *in statu resurrectionis uniuscuiusque mentem ab alterius oculis membrorum corpulentia non abscondit*. Multo igitur minus mens unius Angeli absconditur ab altero. Sed locutio est ad manifestandum alteri quod latet in mente. Non igitur oportet quod unus Angelus alteri loquatur.

Objection 2: Further, speech is twofold; interior, whereby one speaks to oneself; and exterior, whereby one speaks to another. But exterior speech takes place by some sensible sign, as by voice, or gesture, or some bodily member, as the tongue, or the fingers, and this cannot apply to the angels. Therefore one angel does not speak to another.

[32888] Iª q. 107 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, duplex est locutio, interior, per quam aliquis sibi ipsi loquitur; et exterior, per quam aliquis loquitur alteri. Exterior autem locutio fit per aliquod sensibile signum, puta voce vel nutu vel aliquo corporis membro, puta lingua vel digito, quae Angelis competere non possunt. Ergo unus Angelus alteri non loquitur.

Objection 3: Further, the speaker incites the hearer to listen to what he says. But it does not appear that one angel incites another to listen; for this happens among us by some sensible sign. Therefore one angel does not speak to another.

[32889] Iª q. 107 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, loquens excitat audientem ut attendat suae locutioni. Sed non videtur per quid unus Angelus excitet alium ad attendendum, hoc enim fit apud nos aliquo sensibili signo. Ergo unus Angelus non loquitur alteri.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:1): "If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels."

[32890] Iª q. 107 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur I Cor. XIII, *si linguis hominum loquar et Angelorum*.

I answer that, The angels speak in a certain way. But, as Gregory says (Moral. ii): "It is fitting that our mind, rising above the properties of bodily speech, should be lifted to the sublime and unknown methods of interior speech."

To understand how one angel speaks to another, we must consider that, as we explained above (Q[82], A[4]), when treating of the actions and powers of the soul, the will moves the intellect to its operation. Now an intelligible object is present to the intellect in three ways; first, habitually, or in the memory, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 6,7); secondly, as actually considered or conceived; thirdly, as related to something else. And it is clear that the intelligible object passes from the first to the second stage by the command of the will, and hence in the definition of habit these words occur, "which anyone uses when he wills." So likewise the intelligible object passes from the second to the third stage by the will; for by the will the concept of the mind is ordered to something else, as, for instance, either to the performing of an action, or to being made known to another. Now when the mind turns itself to the actual consideration of any habitual knowledge, then a person speaks to himself; for the concept of the mind is called "the interior word." And by the fact that the concept of the angelic mind is ordered to be made known to another by the will of the angel himself, the concept of one angel is made known to another; and in this way one angel speaks to another; for to speak to another only means to make known the mental concept to another.

[32891] Iª q. 107 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in Angelis est aliqua locutio, sed, sicut dicit Gregorius II Moral., *dignum est ut mens nostra, qualitatem corporeae locutionis excedens, ad sublimes atque incognitos modos locutionis intimae suspendatur*. Ad intelligendum igitur qualiter unus Angelus alii loquatur, considerandum est quod, sicut supra diximus cum de actibus et potentiis animae ageretur, voluntas movet intellectum ad suam operationem. Intelligibile autem est in intellectu tripliciter, primo quidem, habitualiter, vel secundum memoriam, ut Augustinus dicit; secundo autem, ut in actu consideratum vel conceptum; tertio, ut ad aliud relatum. Manifestum est autem quod de primo gradu in secundum transfertur intelligibile per imperium voluntatis, unde in definitione habitus dicitur, quo quis utitur cum voluerit. Similiter autem et de secundo gradu transfertur in tertium per voluntatem, nam per voluntatem conceptus mentis ordinatur ad alterum, puta vel ad agendum aliquid, vel ad manifestandum alteri. Quando autem mens convertit se ad actu considerandum quod habet in habitu, loquitur aliquis sibi ipsi, nam ipse conceptus mentis interius verbum vocatur. Ex hoc vero quod conceptus mentis angelicae ordinatur ad manifestandum alteri, per voluntatem ipsius Angeli, conceptus mentis unius Angeli innotescit alteri, et sic loquitur unus Angelus alteri. Nihil est enim aliud loqui ad alterum, quam conceptum mentis alteri manifestare.

Reply to Objection 1: Our mental concept is hidden by a twofold obstacle. The first is in the will, which can retain the mental concept within, or can direct it externally. In this way God alone can see the mind of another, according to 1 Cor. 2:11: "What man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?" The other obstacle whereby the mental concept is excluded from another one's knowledge, comes from the body; and so it happens that even when the will directs the concept of the mind to make itself known, it is not at once make known to another; but some sensible sign must be used. Gregory alludes to this fact when he says (Moral. ii): "To other eyes we seem to stand aloof as it were

[32892] Iª q. 107 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in nobis interior mentis conceptus quasi duplici obstaculo clauditur. Primo quidem, ipsa voluntate, quae conceptum intellectus potest retinere interius, vel ad extra ordinare. Et quantum ad hoc, mentem unius nullus alius potest videre nisi solus Deus; secundum illud I Cor. II, *quae sunt hominis, nemo novit nisi spiritus hominis, qui in ipso est*. Secundo autem clauditur mens hominis ab alio homine per grossitiem corporis. Unde cum etiam voluntas ordinat conceptum mentis ad manifestandum alteri, non statim cognoscitur ab alio, sed oportet aliquod signum sensibile adhibere. Et hoc est quod Gregorius dicit, II Moral., *alienis oculis intra secretum*

behind the wall of the body; and when we wish to make ourselves known, we go out as it were by the door of the tongue to show what we really are." But an angel is under no such obstacle, and so he can make his concept known to another at once.

mentis, quasi post parietem corporis stamus, sed cum manifestare nosmetipsos cupimus, quasi per linguae ianuam egredimur, ut quales sumus intrinsecus, ostendamus. Hoc autem obstaculum non habet Angelus. Et ideo quam cito vult manifestare suum conceptum, statim alius cognoscit.

Reply to Objection 2: External speech, made by the voice, is a necessity for us on account of the obstacle of the body. Hence it does not befit an angel; but only interior speech belongs to him, and this includes not only the interior speech by mental concept, but also its being ordered to another's knowledge by the will. So the tongue of an angel is called metaphorically the angel's power, whereby he manifests his mental concept.

[32893] Iª q. 107 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod locutio exterior quae fit per vocem, est nobis necessaria propter obstaculum corporis. Unde non convenit Angelo, sed sola locutio interior; ad quam pertinet non solum quod loquatur sibi interius concipiendo, sed etiam quod ordinet per voluntatem ad alterius manifestationem. Et sic lingua Angelorum metaphorice dicitur ipsa virtus Angeli, qua conceptum suum manifestat.

Reply to Objection 3: There is no need to draw the attention of the good angels, inasmuch as they always see each other in the Word; for as one ever sees the other, so he ever sees what is ordered to himself. But because by their very nature they can speak to each other, and even now the bad angels speak to each other, we must say that the intellect is moved by the intelligible object just as sense is affected by the sensible object. Therefore, as sense is aroused by the sensible object, so the mind of an angel can be aroused to attention by some intelligible power.

[32894] Iª q. 107 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, quantum ad Angelos bonos, qui semper se invicem vident in verbo, non esset necessarium ponere aliquid excitativum, quia sicut unus semper videt alium, ita semper videt quidquid in eo est ad se ordinatum. Sed quia etiam in statu naturae conditae sibi invicem loqui poterant, et mali Angeli etiam nunc sibi invicem loquuntur; dicendum est quod, sicut sensus movetur a sensibili, ita intellectus movetur ab intelligibili. Sicut ergo per signum sensibile excitatur sensus, ita per aliquam virtutem intelligibilem potest excitari mens Angeli ad attendendum.

Q. 107. A. 2. Whether the inferior angel speaks to the superior?

Objection 1: It would seem that the inferior angel does not speak to the superior. For on the text (1 Cor. 13:1), "If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels," a gloss remarks that the speech of the angels is an enlightenment whereby the superior enlightens the inferior. But the inferior never enlightens the superior, as was above explained (Q[106], A[3]). Therefore neither do the inferior speak to the superior.

[32895] Iª q. 107 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inferior Angelus superiori non loquatur. Quia super illud I Cor. XIII, *si linguis hominum loquar et Angelorum*, dicit Glossa quod locutiones Angelorum sunt illuminationes, quibus superiores illuminant inferiores. Sed inferiores nunquam illuminant superiores, ut supra dictum est. Ergo nec inferiores superioribus loquuntur.

Objection 2: Further, as was said above (Q[106], A[1]), to enlighten means merely to acquaint one man of what is known to another; and this is to

[32896] Iª q. 107 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, supra dictum est quod illuminare nihil est aliud quam illud quod est alicui manifestum, alteri

speak. Therefore to speak and to enlighten are the same; so the same conclusion follows.

manifestare. Sed hoc idem est loqui. Ergo idem est loqui, et illuminare, et sic idem quod prius.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii): "God speaks to the angels by the very fact that He shows to their hearts His hidden and invisible things." But this is to enlighten them. Therefore, whenever God speaks, He enlightens. In the same way every angelic speech is an enlightening. Therefore an inferior angel can in no way speak to a superior angel.

[32897] Iª q. 107 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, II Moral., quod *Deus ad Angelos loquitur, eo ipso quod eorum cordibus occulta sua invisibilia ostendit*. Sed hoc ipsum est illuminare. Ergo omnis Dei locutio est illuminatio. Pari ergo ratione, omnis Angeli locutio est illuminatio. Nullo ergo modo Angelus inferior superiori loqui potest.

On the contrary, According to the exposition of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), the inferior angels said to the superior: "Who is this King of Glory?"

[32898] Iª q. 107 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod, sicut Dionysius exponit VII Cael. Hier., inferiores Angeli superioribus dixerunt, quis est iste rex gloriae?

I answer that, The inferior angels can speak to the superior. To make this clear, we must consider that every angelic enlightening is an angelic speech; but on the other hand, not every speech is an enlightening; because, as we have said (A[1]), for one angel to speak to another angel means nothing else, but that by his own will he directs his mental concept in such a way, that it becomes known to the other. Now what the mind conceives may be reduced to a twofold principle; to God Himself, Who is the primal truth; and to the will of the one who understands, whereby we actually consider anything. But because truth is the light of the intellect, and God Himself is the rule of all truth; the manifestation of what is conceived by the mind, as depending on the primary truth, is both speech and enlightenment; for example, when one man says to another: "Heaven was created by God"; or, "Man is an animal." The manifestation, however, of what depends on the will of the one who understands, cannot be called an enlightenment, but is only a speech; for instance, when one says to another: "I wish to learn this; I wish to do this or that." The reason is that the created will is not a light, nor a rule of truth; but participates of light. Hence to communicate what comes from the created will is not, as such, an enlightening. For to know what you may will, or what you may understand does not belong to the perfection of my intellect; but only to know the truth in reality.

[32899] Iª q. 107 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod Angeli inferiores superioribus loqui possunt. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod omnis illuminatio est locutio in Angelis, sed non omnis locutio est illuminatio. Quia sicut dictum est, Angelum loqui Angelo nihil aliud est quam conceptum suum ordinare ad hoc ut ei innotescat, per propriam voluntatem. Ea vero quae mente concipiuntur, ad duplex principium referri possunt, scilicet ad ipsum Deum, qui est prima veritas; et ad voluntatem intelligentis, per quam aliquid actu consideramus. Quia vero veritas est lumen intellectus, et regula omnis veritatis est ipse Deus; manifestatio eius quod mente concipitur, secundum quod dependet a prima veritate, et locutio est et illuminatio; puta si unus homo dicat alii, caelum est a Deo creatum, vel, homo est animal. Sed manifestatio eorum quae dependent ex voluntate intelligentis, non potest dici illuminatio, sed locutio tantum; puta si aliquis alteri dicat, volo hoc addiscere, volo hoc vel illud facere. Cuius ratio est, quia voluntas creata non est lux, nec regula veritatis, sed participans lucem, unde communicare ea quae sunt a voluntate creata, inquantum huiusmodi, non est illuminare. Non enim pertinet ad perfectionem intellectus mei, quid tu velis, vel quid tu intelligas, cognoscere, sed solum quid rei veritas habeat. Manifestum est autem quod Angeli dicuntur superiores vel inferiores per comparationem ad hoc principium quod est Deus. Et ideo illuminatio, quae dependet a principio quod est Deus, solum per superiores Angelos ad inferiores

Now it is clear that the angels are called superior or inferior by comparison with this principle, God; and therefore enlightenment, which depends on the principle which is God, is conveyed only by the superior angels to the inferior. But as regards the will as the principle, he who wills is first and supreme; and therefore the manifestation of what belongs to the will, is conveyed to others by the one who wills. In that manner both the superior angels speak to the inferior, and the inferior speak to the superior.

deducitur. Sed in ordine ad principium quod est voluntas, ipse volens est primus et supremus. Et ideo manifestatio eorum quae ad voluntatem pertinent, per ipsum volentem deducitur ad alios quoscumque. Et quantum ad hoc, et superiores inferioribus, et inferiores superioribus loquuntur.

Reply to Objections 1 & 2: From this clearly appear the replies to the first and second objections.

[32900] Iª q. 107 a. 2 ad 1 Et per hoc patet solutio ad primum, et ad secundum.

Reply to Objection 3: Every speech of God to the angels is an enlightening; because since the will of God is the rule of truth, it belongs to the perfection and enlightenment of the created mind to know even what God wills. But the same does not apply to the will of the angels, as was explained above.

[32901] Iª q. 107 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod omnis Dei locutio ad Angelos est illuminatio, quia cum voluntas Dei sit regula veritatis, etiam scire quid Deus velit, pertinet ad perfectionem et illuminationem mentis creatae. Sed non est eadem ratio de voluntate Angeli, ut dictum est.

Q. 107. A. 3. Whether an angel speaks to God?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not speak to God. For speech makes known something to another. But an angel cannot make known anything to God, Who knows all things. Therefore an angel does not speak to God.

[32902] Iª q. 107 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus Deo non loquatur. Locutio enim est ad manifestandum aliquid alteri. Sed Angelus nihil potest manifestare Deo, qui omnia novit. Ergo Angelus non loquitur Deo.

Objection 2: Further, to speak is to order the mental concept in reference to another, as was shown above (A[1]). But an angel ever orders his mental concept to God. So if an angel speaks to God, he ever speaks to God; which in some ways appears to be unreasonable, since an angel sometimes speaks to another angel. Therefore it seems that an angel never speaks to God.

[32903] Iª q. 107 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, loqui est ordinare conceptum intellectus ad alterum, ut dictum est. Sed Angelus semper conceptum suae mentis ordinat in Deum. Si ergo aliquando Deo loquitur, semper Deo loquitur, quod potest videri alicui inconveniens, cum aliquando Angelus Angelo loquatur. Videtur ergo quod Angelus nunquam loquatur Deo.

On the contrary, It is written (Zech. 1:12): "The angel of the Lord answered and said: O Lord of hosts, how long wilt Thou not have mercy on Jerusalem." Therefore an angel speaks to God.

[32904] Iª q. 107 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Zachar. I, *respondit Angelus domini, et dixit, domine exercituum, usquequo non misereberis Ierusalem?* Loquitur ergo Angelus Deo.

I answer that, As was said above (AA[1],2), the angel speaks by ordering his mental concept to something else. Now one thing is ordered to another in a twofold manner. In one way for the purpose of giving one thing to another, as in natural things the agent is ordered to the patient, and in human speech the teacher is ordered to the learner; and in this sense an angel in no way speaks to God either of what concerns the truth, or of whatever depends on the created will; because God is the principle and source of all truth and of all will. In another way one thing is ordered to another to receive something, as in natural things the passive is ordered to the agent, and in human speech the disciple to the master; and in this way an angel speaks to God, either by consulting the Divine will of what ought to be done, or by admiring the Divine excellence which he can never comprehend; thus Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "the angels speak to God, when by contemplating what is above themselves they rise to emotions of admiration."

[32905] Iª q. 107 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, locutio Angeli est per hoc, quod conceptus mentis ordinatur ad alterum. Sed aliquid ordinatur ad alterum dupliciter. Uno modo, ad hoc quod communicet alteri; sicut in rebus naturalibus agens ordinatur ad patiens et in locutione humana doctor ordinatur ad discipulum. Et quantum ad hoc, nullo modo Angelus loquitur Deo, neque de his quae ad rerum veritatem pertinent, neque de his quae dependent a voluntate creata, quia Deus est omnis veritatis et omnis voluntatis principium et conditor. Alio modo ordinatur aliquid ad alterum, ut ab eo aliquid accipiat; sicut in rebus naturalibus passivum ad agens, et in locutione humana discipulus ad magistrum. Et hoc modo Angelus loquitur Deo, vel consultando divinam voluntatem de agendis; vel eius excellentiam, quam nunquam comprehendit, admirando; sicut Gregorius dicit, II Moral., quod *Angeli loquuntur Deo, cum per hoc quod super semetipsos respiciunt, in motum admirationis surgunt*.

Reply to Objection 1: Speech is not always for the purpose of making something known to another; but is sometimes finally ordered to the purpose of manifesting something to the speaker himself; as when the disciples ask instruction from the master.

[32906] Iª q. 107 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod locutio non semper est ad manifestandum alteri; sed quandoque ad hoc ordinatur finaliter, ut loquenti aliquid manifestetur; sicut cum discipulus quaerit aliquid a magistro.

Reply to Objection 2: The angels are ever speaking to God in the sense of praising and admiring Him and His works; but they speak to Him by consulting Him about what ought to be done whenever they have to perform any new work, concerning which they desire enlightenment.

[32907] Iª q. 107 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod locutione qua Angeli loquuntur Deo laudantes ipsum et admirantes, semper Angeli Deo loquuntur. Sed locutione qua eius sapientiam consulunt super agendis, tunc ei loquuntur, quando aliquod novum per eos agendum occurrit, super quo desiderant illuminari.

Q. 107. A. 4. Whether local distance influences the angelic speech?

Objection 1: It would seem that local distance affects the angelic speech. For as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 13): "An angel works where he is." But speech is an angelic operation. Therefore, as an angel is in a determinate place, it seems that an angel's speech is limited by the bounds of that place.

[32908] Iª q. 107 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod localis distantia operetur aliquid in locutione angelica. Sicut enim dicit Damascenus, *Angelus ubi est, ibi operatur*. Locutio autem est quaedam operatio Angeli. Cum ergo Angelus sit in determinato loco, videtur quod usque ad determinatam loci distantiam Angelus loqui possit.

Objection 2: Further, a speaker cries out on account of the distance of the hearer. But it is said of the Seraphim that "they cried one to another" (Is. 6:3). Therefore in the angelic speech local distance has some effect.

[32909] Iª q. 107 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, clamor loquentis fit propter distantiam audientis. Sed Isaiae VI dicitur de Seraphim, quod clamabat alter ad alterum. Ergo videtur quod in locutione Angelorum aliquid operetur localis distantia.

On the contrary, It is said that the rich man in hell spoke to Abraham, notwithstanding the local distance (Lk. 16:24). Much less therefore does local distance impede the speech of one angel to another.

[32910] Iª q. 107 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod, sicut dicitur Luc. XVI, dives in Inferno positus loquebatur Abrahae, non impediente locali distantia. Multo igitur minus localis distantia potest impedire locutionem unius Angeli ad alterum.

I answer that, The angelic speech consists in an intellectual operation, as explained above (AA[1],2,3). And the intellectual operation of an angel abstracts from the "here and now." For even our own intellectual operation takes place by abstraction from the "here and now," except accidentally on the part of the phantasms, which do not exist at all in an angel. But as regards whatever is abstracted from "here and now," neither difference of time nor local distance has any influence whatever. Hence in the angelic speech local distance is no impediment.

[32911] Iª q. 107 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod locutio Angeli in intellectuali operatione consistit, ut ex dictis patet. Intellectualis autem operatio Angeli omnino abstracta est a loco et tempore, nam etiam nostra intellectualis operatio est per abstractionem ab hic et nunc, nisi per accidens ex parte phantasmatum, quae in Angelis nulla sunt. In eo autem quod est omnino abstractum a loco et tempore, nihil operatur neque temporis diversitas, neque loci distantia. Unde in locutione Angeli nullum impedimentum facit distantia loci.

Reply to Objection 1: The angelic speech, as above explained (A[1], ad 2), is interior; perceived, nevertheless, by another; and therefore it exists in the angel who speaks, and consequently where the angel is who speaks. But as local distance does not prevent one angel seeing another, so neither does it prevent an angel perceiving what is ordered to him on the part of another; and this is to perceive his speech.

[32912] Iª q. 107 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod locutio Angeli, sicut dictum est, est locutio interior, quae tamen ab alio percipitur, et ideo est in Angelo loquente, et per consequens ubi est Angelus loquens. Sed sicut distantia localis non impedit quin unus Angelus alium videre possit; ita etiam non impedit quin percipiat quod in eo ad se ordinatur, quod est eius locutionem percipere.

Reply to Objection 2: The cry mentioned is not a bodily voice raised by reason of the local distance; but is taken to signify the magnitude of what is said, or the intensity of the affection, according to what Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The less one desires, the less one cries out."

[32913] Iª q. 107 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod clamor ille non est vocis corporeae, qui fit propter distantiam loci; sed significat magnitudinem rei quae dicebatur, vel magnitudinem affectus, secundum quod dicit Gregorius, II Moral., *tanto quisque minus clamat, quanto minus desiderat*.

Q. 107. A. 5. Whether all the angels know what one speaks to another?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels know what one speaks to another. For unequal

[32914] Iª q. 107 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod locutionem unius Angeli

local distance is the reason why all men do not know what one man says to another. But in the angelic speech local distance has no effect, as above explained (A[4]). Therefore all the angels know what one speaks to another.

ad alterum omnes cognoscant. Quod enim unius hominis locutionem non omnes audiant, facit inaequalis loci distantia. Sed in locutione Angeli nihil operatur localis distantia, ut dictum est. Ergo uno Angelo loquente ad alterum, omnes percipiunt.

Objection 2: Further, all the angels have the intellectual power in common. So if the mental concept of one ordered to another is known by one, it is for the same reason known by all.

[32915] Iª q. 107 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, omnes Angeli communicant in virtute intelligendi. Si ergo conceptus mentis unius ordinatus ad alterum cognoscitur ab uno, pari ratione cognoscitur ab aliis.

Objection 3: Further, enlightenment is a kind of speech. But the enlightenment of one angel by another extends to all the angels, because, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv): "Each one of the heavenly beings communicates what he learns to the others." Therefore the speech of one angel to another extends to all.

[32916] Iª q. 107 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, illuminatio est quaedam species locutionis. Sed illuminatio unius Angeli ab altero, pervenit ad omnes Angelos, quia, ut Dionysius dicit XV cap. Cael. Hier., *unaquaeque caelestis essentia intelligentiam sibi traditam aliis communicat*. Ergo et locutio unius Angeli ad alterum, ad omnes perducitur.

On the contrary, One man can speak to another alone; much more can this be the case among the angels.

[32917] Iª q. 107 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod unus homo potest alteri soli loqui. Multo igitur magis hoc in Angelis esse potest.

I answer that, As above explained (AA[1],2), the mental concept of one angel can be perceived by another when the angel who possesses the concept refers it by his will to another. Now a thing can be ordered through some cause to one thing and not to another; consequently the concept of one (angel) may be known by one and not by another; and therefore an angel can perceive the speech of one angel to another; whereas others do not, not through the obstacle of local distance, but on account of the will so ordering, as explained above.

[32918] Iª q. 107 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, conceptus mentis unius Angeli percipi potest ab altero, per hoc quod ille cuius est conceptus, sua voluntate ordinat ipsum ad alterum. Potest autem ex aliqua causa ordinari aliquid ad unum, et non ad alterum. Et ideo potest conceptus unius ab aliquo uno cognosci, et non ab aliis. Et sic locutionem unius Angeli ad alterum potest percipere unus absque aliis, non quidem impediente distantia locali, sed hoc faciente voluntaria ordinatione, ut dictum est.

From this appear the replies to the first and second objections.

[32919] Iª q. 107 a. 5 ad 1 Unde patet responsio ad primum et secundum.

Reply to Objection 3: Enlightenment is of those truths that emanate from the first rule of truth, which is the principle common to all the angels; and in that way all enlightenments are common to all. But speech may be of something ordered to

[32920] Iª q. 107 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod illuminatio est de his quae emanant a prima regula veritatis, quae est principium commune omnium Angelorum, et ideo illuminationes sunt omnibus communes. Sed locutio potest esse de

the principle of the created will, which is proper to each angel; and in this way it is not necessary that these speeches should be common to all.

his quae ordinantur ad principium voluntatis creatae, quod est proprium unicuique Angelo, et ideo non oportet quod huiusmodi locutiones sint omnibus communes.

Q. 108. OF THE ANGELIC DEGREES OF HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We next consider the degrees of the angels in their hierarchies and orders; for it was said above (Q[106], A[3]), that the superior angels enlighten the inferior angels; and not conversely.

Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether all the angels belong to one hierarchy?

(2) Whether in one hierarchy there is only one order?

(3) Whether in one order there are many angels?

(4) Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders is natural?

(5) Of the names and properties of each order.

(6) Of the comparison of the orders to one another.

(7) Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment?

(8) Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?

[32921] Iª q. 108 pr. Deinde considerandum est de ordinatione Angelorum secundum hierarchias et ordines, dictum est enim quod superiores inferiores illuminant, et non e converso. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum omnes Angeli sint unius hierarchiae. Secundo, utrum in una hierarchia sit unus tantum ordo. Tertio, utrum in uno ordine sint plures Angeli. Quarto, utrum distinctio hierarchiarum et ordinum sit a natura. Quinto, de nominibus et proprietatibus singulorum ordinum. Sexto, de comparatione ordinum ad invicem. Septimo, utrum ordines durent post diem iudicii. Octavo, utrum homines assumantur ad ordines Angelorum.

Q. 108. A. 1. Whether all the angels are of one hierarchy?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels belong to one hierarchy. For since the angels are supreme among creatures, it is evident that they are ordered for the best. But the best ordering of a multitude is for it to be governed by one authority, as the Philosopher shows (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10; Polit. iii, 4). Therefore as a hierarchy is nothing but a sacred principality, it seems that all the angels belong to one hierarchy.

[32922] Iª q. 108 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnes Angeli sint unius hierarchiae. Cum enim Angeli sint supremi inter creaturas, oportet dicere quod sint optime dispositi. Sed optima dispositio est multitudinis secundum quod continetur sub uno principatu; ut patet per philosophum, XII Metaphys., et in III Politic. Cum ergo hierarchia nihil sit aliud quam sacer principatus, videtur quod omnes Angeli sint unius hierarchiae.

Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii) that "hierarchy is order, knowledge, and action." But all the angels agree in one order towards God, Whom they know, and by Whom in their actions they are ruled. Therefore all the angels belong to one hierarchy.

[32923] Iª q. 108 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, in III cap. Cael. Hier., quod *hierarchia est ordo, scientia et actio*. Sed omnes Angeli conveniunt in uno ordine ad Deum, quem cognoscunt, et a quo in suis actionibus regulantur. Ergo omnes Angeli sunt unius hierarchiae.

Objection 3: Further, the sacred principality called hierarchy is to be found among men and angels. But all men are of one hierarchy. Therefore likewise all the angels are of one hierarchy.

[32924] Iª q. 108 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, sacer principatus, qui dicitur hierarchia, invenitur in hominibus et Angelis. Sed omnes homines sunt unius hierarchiae. Ergo etiam omnes Angeli sunt unius hierarchiae.

On the contrary, Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vi) distinguishes three hierarchies of angels.

[32925] Iª q. 108 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Dionysius, VI cap. Cael. Hier., distinguit tres hierarchias Angelorum.

I answer that, Hierarchy means a "sacred" principality, as above explained. Now principality includes two things: the prince himself and the multitude ordered under the prince. Therefore because there is one God, the Prince not only of all the angels but also of men and all creatures; so there is one hierarchy, not only of all the angels, but also of all rational creatures, who can be participators of sacred things; according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xii, 1): "There are two cities, that is, two societies, one of the good angels and men, the other of the wicked." But if we consider the principality on the part of the multitude ordered under the prince, then principality is said to be "one" accordingly as the multitude can be subject in "one" way to the government of the prince. And those that cannot be governed in the same way by a prince belong to different principalities: thus, under one king there are different cities, which are governed by different laws and administrators. Now it is evident that men do not receive the Divine enlightenments in the same way as do the angels; for the angels receive them in their intelligible purity, whereas men receive them under sensible signs, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i). Therefore there must needs be a distinction between the human and the angelic hierarchy. In the same manner we distinguish three angelic hierarchies. For it was shown above (Q[55], A[3]), in treating of the angelic knowledge, that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge of the truth than the inferior angels. This universal knowledge has three grades among the angels. For the types of things, concerning which the angels are enlightened, can be considered in a threefold manner. First as preceding from God as the first universal principle, which mode of knowledge belongs to the first hierarchy, connected immediately with God, and, "as it were, placed in

[32926] Iª q. 108 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod hierarchia est sacer principatus, ut dictum est. In nomine autem principatus duo intelliguntur, scilicet ipse princeps, et multitudo ordinata sub principe. Quia igitur unus est Deus princeps non solum omnium Angelorum, sed etiam hominum, et totius creaturae; ideo non solum omnium Angelorum, sed etiam totius rationalis creaturae, quae sacrorum particeps esse potest, una est hierarchia, secundum quod Augustinus dicit, in XII de Civ. Dei *duas esse civitates, hoc est societates, unam in bonis Angelis et hominibus, alteram in malis*. Sed si consideretur principatus ex parte multitudinis ordinatae sub principe, sic unus principatus dicitur secundum quod multitudo uno et eodem modo potest gubernationem principis recipere. Quae vero non possunt secundum eundem modum gubernari a principe, ad diversos principatus pertinent, sicut sub uno rege sunt diversae civitates, quae diversis reguntur legibus et ministris. Manifestum est autem quod homines alio modo divinas illuminationes percipiunt quam Angeli, nam Angeli percipiunt eas in intelligibili puritate, homines vero percipiunt eas sub sensibilium similitudinibus, ut Dionysius dicit I cap. Cael. Hier. Et ideo oportuit distingui humanam hierarchiam ab angelica. Et per eundem modum in Angelis tres hierarchiae distinguuntur. Dictum est enim supra, dum de cognitione Angelorum ageretur, quod superiores Angeli habent universaliorem cognitionem veritatis quam inferiores. Huiusmodi autem universalis acceptio cognitionis secundum tres gradus in Angelis distingui potest. Possunt enim rationes rerum de quibus Angeli illuminantur, considerari tripliciter. Primo quidem, secundum quod procedunt a primo principio universali, quod est Deus, et iste modus convenit primae hierarchiae, quae immediate ad Deum extenditur, et quasi in vestibulis Dei

the vestibule of God," as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). Secondly, forasmuch as these types depend on the universal created causes which in some way are already multiplied; which mode belongs to the second hierarchy. Thirdly, forasmuch as these types are applied to particular things as depending on their causes; which mode belongs to the lowest hierarchy. All this will appear more clearly when we treat of each of the orders (A[6]). In this way are the hierarchies distinguished on the part of the multitude of subjects.

collocatur, ut Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Secundo vero, prout huiusmodi rationes dependent ab universalibus causis creatis, quae iam aliquo modo multiplicantur, et hic modus convenit secundae hierarchiae. Tertio autem modo, secundum quod huiusmodi rationes applicantur singulis rebus, et prout dependent a propriis causis, et hic modus convenit infimae hierarchiae. Quod plenius patebit, cum de singulis ordinibus agetur. Sic igitur distinguuntur hierarchiae ex parte multitudinis subiectae. Unde manifestum est eos errare, et contra intentionem Dionysii loqui, qui ponunt in divinis personis hierarchiam quam vocant supercaelestem. In divinis enim personis est quidam ordo naturae, sed non hierarchiae. Nam, ut Dionysius dicit III cap. Cael. Hier., *ordo hierarchiae est alios quidem purgari et illuminari et perfici, alios autem purgare et illuminare et perficere*. Quod absit ut in divinis personis ponamus.

Hence it is clear that those err and speak against the opinion of Dionysius who place a hierarchy in the Divine Persons, and call it the "supercelestial" hierarchy. For in the Divine Persons there exists, indeed, a natural order, but there is no hierarchical order, for as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii): "The hierarchical order is so directed that some be cleansed, enlightened, and perfected; and that others cleanse, enlighten, and perfect"; which far be it from us to apply to the Divine Persons.

Reply to Objection 1: This objection considers principality on the part of the ruler, inasmuch as a multitude is best ruled by one ruler, as the Philosopher asserts in those passages.

[32927] Iª q. 108 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de principatu ex parte principis, quia optimum est quod multitudo regatur ab uno principe, ut philosophus in praedictis locis intendit.

Reply to Objection 2: As regards knowing God Himself, Whom all see in one way---that is, in His essence---there is no hierarchical distinction among the angels; but there is such a distinction as regards the types of created things, as above explained.

[32928] Iª q. 108 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, quantum ad cognitionem ipsius Dei, quem omnes uno modo, scilicet per essentiam, vident, non distinguuntur in Angelis hierarchiae, sed quantum ad rationes rerum creatarum, ut dictum est.

Reply to Objection 3: All men are of one species, and have one connatural mode of understanding; which is not the case in the angels: and hence the same argument does not apply to both.

[32929] Iª q. 108 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod omnes homines sunt unius speciei, et unus modus intelligendi est eis connaturalis, non sic autem est in Angelis. Unde non est similis ratio.

Q. 108. A. 2. Whether there are several orders in one hierarchy?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the one hierarchy there are not several orders. For when a definition is multiplied, the thing defined is also multiplied. But hierarchy is order, as Dionysius

[32930] Iª q. 108 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in una hierarchia non sint plures ordines. Multiplicata enim definitione, multiplicatur et definitum. Sed hierarchia, ut

says (Coel. Hier. iii). Therefore, if there are many orders, there is not one hierarchy only, but many.

Dionysius dicit, est ordo. Si ergo sunt multi ordines, non erit una hierarchia, sed multae.

Objection 2: Further, different orders are different grades, and grades among spirits are constituted by different spiritual gifts. But among the angels all the spiritual gifts are common to all, for "nothing is possessed individually" (Sent. ii, D, ix). Therefore there are not different orders of angels.

[32931] Iª q. 108 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, diversi ordines sunt diversi gradus. Sed gradus in spiritualibus constituuntur secundum diversa dona spiritualia. Sed in Angelis omnia dona spiritualia sunt communia, quia nihil ibi singulariter possidetur. Ergo non sunt diversi ordines Angelorum.

Objection 3: Further, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy the orders are distinguished according to the actions of "cleansing," "enlightening," and "perfecting." For the order of deacons is "cleansing," the order of priests, is "enlightening," and of bishops "perfecting," as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v). But each of the angels cleanses, enlightens, and perfects. Therefore there is no distinction of orders among the angels.

[32932] Iª q. 108 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, in ecclesiastica hierarchia distinguuntur ordines secundum purgare, illuminare et perficere, nam ordo diaconorum est purgativus, sacerdotum illuminativus, episcoporum perfectivus, ut Dionysius dicit V cap. Eccles. Hier. Sed quilibet Angelus purgat, illuminat et perficit. Non ergo est distinctio ordinum in Angelis.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 1:20,21) that "God has set the Man Christ above all principality and power, and virtue, and dominion": which are the various orders of the angels, and some of them belong to one hierarchy, as will be explained (A[6]).

[32933] Iª q. 108 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit ad Ephes. I, quod Deus constituit Christum hominem supra *omnem principatum et potestatem et virtutem et dominationem*; qui sunt diversi ordines Angelorum, et quidam eorum ad unam hierarchiam pertinent, ut infra patebit.

I answer that, As explained above, one hierarchy is one principality---that is, one multitude ordered in one way under the rule of a prince. Now such a multitude would not be ordered, but confused, if there were not in it different orders. So the nature of a hierarchy requires diversity of orders.

This diversity of order arises from the diversity of offices and actions, as appears in one city where there are different orders according to the different actions; for there is one order of those who judge, and another of those who fight, and another of those who labor in the fields, and so forth.

But although one city thus comprises several orders, all may be reduced to three, when we consider that every multitude has a beginning, a middle, and an end. So in every city, a threefold order of men is to be seen, some of whom are supreme, as the nobles; others are the last, as the

[32934] Iª q. 108 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, una hierarchia est unus principatus, idest una multitudo ordinata uno modo sub principis gubernatione. Non autem esset multitudo ordinata, sed confusa, si in multitudine diversi ordines non essent. Ipsa ergo ratio hierarchiae requirit ordinum diversitatem. Quae quidem diversitas ordinum secundum diversa officia et actus consideratur. Sicut patet quod in una civitate sunt diversi ordines secundum diversos actus, nam alius est ordo iudicantium, alius pugnantium, alius laborantium in agris, et sic de aliis. Sed quamvis multi sint unius civitatis ordines, omnes tamen ad tres possunt reduci, secundum quod quaelibet multitudo perfecta habet principium, medium et finem. Unde et in civitatibus triplex ordo hominum invenitur, quidam enim sunt supremi, ut optimates; quidam autem sunt infimi, ut vilis populus; quidam autem sunt medii, ut populus honorabilis. Sic igitur et in qualibet hierarchia

common people, while others hold a place between these, as the middle-class [populus honorabilis]. In the same way we find in each angelic hierarchy the orders distinguished according to their actions and offices, and all this diversity is reduced to three---namely, to the summit, the middle, and the base; and so in every hierarchy Dionysius places three orders (Coel. Hier. vi).

angelica ordines distinguuntur secundum diversos actus et officia; et omnis ista diversitas ad tria reducitur, scilicet ad summum, medium et infimum. Et propter hoc in qualibet hierarchia Dionysius ponit tres ordines.

Reply to Objection 1: Order is twofold. In one way it is taken as the order comprehending in itself different grades; and in that way a hierarchy is called an order. In another way one grade is called an order; and in that sense the several orders of one hierarchy are so called.

[32935] Iª q. 108 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ordo dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, ipsa ordinatio comprehendens sub se diversos gradus, et hoc modo hierarchia dicitur ordo. Alio modo dicitur ordo gradus unus, et sic dicuntur plures ordines unius hierarchiae.

Reply to Objection 2: All things are possessed in common by the angelic society, some things, however, being held more excellently by some than by others. Each gift is more perfectly possessed by the one who can communicate it, than by the one who cannot communicate it; as the hot thing which can communicate heat is more perfect that what is unable to give heat. And the more perfectly anyone can communicate a gift, the higher grade he occupies, as he is in the more perfect grade of mastership who can teach a higher science. By this similitude we can reckon the diversity of grades or orders among the angels, according to their different offices and actions.

[32936] Iª q. 108 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in societate Angelorum omnia possidentur communiter; sed tamen quaedam excellentius habentur a quibusdam quam ab aliis. Unumquodque autem perfectius habetur ab eo qui potest illud communicare, quam ab eo qui non potest, sicut perfectius est calidum quod potest calefacere, quam quod non potest; et perfectius scit qui potest docere, quam qui non potest. Et quanto perfectius donum aliquis communicare potest, tanto in perfectiori gradu est, sicut in perfectiori gradu magisterii est qui potest docere altiorem scientiam. Et secundum hanc similitudinem consideranda est diversitas graduum vel ordinum in Angelis, secundum diversa officia et actus.

Reply to Objection 3: The inferior angel is superior to the highest man of our hierarchy, according to the words, "He that is the lesser in the kingdom of heaven, is greater than he"---namely, John the Baptist, than whom "there hath not risen a greater among them that are born of women" (Mat. 11:11). Hence the lesser angel of the heavenly hierarchy can not only cleanse, but also enlighten and perfect, and in a higher way than can the orders of our hierarchy. Thus the heavenly orders are not distinguished by reason of these, but by reason of other different acts.

[32937] Iª q. 108 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod inferior Angelus est superior supremo homine nostrae hierarchiae; secundum illud Matth. XI, *qui minor est in regno caelorum, maior est illo*, scilicet Ioanne Baptista, quo nullus maior inter natos mulierum surrexit. Unde minor Angelus caelestis hierarchiae potest non solum purgare sed illuminare et perficere, et altiori modo quam ordines nostrae hierarchiae. Et sic secundum distinctionem harum actionum non distinguuntur caelestes ordines; sed secundum alias differentias actionum.

Q. 108. A. 3. Whether there are many angels in one order?

Objection 1: It seems that there are not many angels in one order. For it was shown above (Q[50], A[4]), that all the angels are unequal. But equals belong to one order. Therefore there are not many angels in one order.

[32938] Iª q. 108 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in uno ordine non sint plures Angeli. Dictum est enim supra omnes Angelos inaequales esse ad invicem. Sed unius ordinis esse dicuntur quae sunt aequalia. Ergo plures Angeli non sunt unius ordinis.

Objection 2: Further, it is superfluous for a thing to be done by many, which can be done sufficiently by one. But that which belongs to one angelic office can be done sufficiently by one angel; so much more sufficiently than the one sun does what belongs to the office of the sun, as the angel is more perfect than a heavenly body. If, therefore, the orders are distinguished by their offices, as stated above (A[2]), several angels in one order would be superfluous.

[32939] Iª q. 108 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, quod potest sufficienter fieri per unum, superfluum est quod fiat per multa. Sed illud quod pertinet ad unum officium angelicum, sufficienter potest fieri per unum Angelum; multo magis quam per unum solem sufficienter fit quod pertinet ad officium solis, quanto perfectior est Angelus caelesti corpore. Si ergo ordines distinguuntur secundum officia, ut dictum est, superfluum est quod sint plures Angeli unius ordinis.

Objection 3: Further, it was said above (OBJ 1) that all the angels are unequal. Therefore, if several angels (for instance, three or four), are of one order, the lowest one of the superior order will be more akin to the highest of the inferior order than with the highest of his own order; and thus he does not seem to be more of one order with the latter than with the former. Therefore there are not many angels of one order.

[32940] Iª q. 108 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, supra dictum est quod omnes Angeli sunt inaequales. Si ergo plures Angeli sint unius ordinis, puta tres vel quatuor, infimus superioris ordinis magis conveniet cum supremo inferioris quam cum supremo sui ordinis. Et sic non videtur quod magis sit unius ordinis cum hoc, quam cum illo. Non igitur sunt plures Angeli unius ordinis.

On the contrary, It is written: "The Seraphim cried to one another" (Is. 6:3). Therefore there are many angels in the one order of the Seraphim.

[32941] Iª q. 108 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Isaiae VI dicitur, quod Seraphim clamabant alter ad alterum. Sunt ergo plures Angeli in uno ordine Seraphim.

I answer that, Whoever knows anything perfectly, is able to distinguish its acts, powers, and nature, down to the minutest details, whereas he who knows a thing in an imperfect manner can only distinguish it in a general way, and only as regards a few points. Thus, one who knows natural things imperfectly, can distinguish their orders in a general way, placing the heavenly bodies in one order, inanimate inferior bodies in another, plants in another, and animals in another; whilst he who knows natural things perfectly, is able to distinguish different orders in the heavenly bodies themselves, and in each of the other orders.

[32942] Iª q. 108 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ille qui perfecte cognoscit res aliquas, potest usque ad minima et actus et virtutes et naturas earum distinguere. Qui autem cognoscit eas imperfecte, non potest distinguere nisi in universali, quae quidem distinctio fit per pauciora. Sicut qui imperfecte cognoscit res naturales, distinguit earum ordines in universali, ponens in uno ordine caelestia corpora, in alio corpora inferiora inanimata, in alio plantas, in alio animalia, qui autem perfectius cognosceret res naturales, posset distinguere et in ipsis corporibus caelestibus diversos ordines, et in singulis aliorum. Nos autem imperfecte Angelos

Now our knowledge of the angels is imperfect, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi). Hence we can only distinguish the angelic offices and orders in a general way, so as to place many angels in one order. But if we knew the offices and distinctions of the angels perfectly, we should know perfectly that each angel has his own office and his own order among things, and much more so than any star, though this be hidden from us.

cognoscimus, et eorum officia, ut Dionysius dicit VI cap. Cael. Hier. Unde non possumus distinguere officia et ordines Angelorum, nisi in communi; secundum quem modum, multi Angeli sub uno ordine continentur. Si autem perfecte cognosceremus officia Angelorum, et eorum distinctiones, perfecte sciremus quod quilibet Angelus habet suum proprium officium et suum proprium ordinem in rebus, multo magis quam quaelibet stella, etsi nos lateat.

Reply to Objection 1: All the angels of one order are in some way equal in a common similitude, whereby they are placed in that order; but absolutely speaking they are not equal. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) that in one and the same order of angels there are those who are first, middle, and last.

[32943] Iª q. 108 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnes Angeli unius ordinis sunt aliquo modo aequales, quantum ad communem similitudinem secundum quam constituuntur in uno ordine, sed simpliciter non sunt aequales. Unde Dionysius dicit, X cap. Cael. Hier., quod in uno et eodem ordine Angelorum, est accipere primos, medios et ultimos.

Reply to Objection 2: That special distinction of orders and offices wherein each angel has his own office and order, is hidden from us.

[32944] Iª q. 108 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod illa specialis distinctio ordinum et officiorum secundum quam quilibet Angelus habet proprium officium et ordinem, est nobis ignota.

Reply to Objection 3: As in a surface which is partly white and partly black, the two parts on the borders of white and black are more akin as regards their position than any other two white parts, but are less akin in quality; so two angels who are on the boundary of two orders are more akin in propinquity of nature than one of them is akin to the others of its own order, but less akin in their fitness for similar offices, which fitness, indeed, extends to a definite limit.

[32945] Iª q. 108 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut in superficie quae partim est alba et partim nigra, duae partes quae sunt in confinio albi et nigri, magis conveniunt secundum situm quam aliquae duae partes albae, minus tamen secundum qualitatem; ita duo Angeli qui sunt in terminis duorum ordinum, magis secum conveniunt secundum propinquitatem naturae, quam unus eorum cum aliquibus aliis sui ordinis; minus autem secundum idoneitatem ad similia officia, quae quidem idoneitas usque ad aliquem certum terminum protenditur.

Q. 108. A. 4. Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders comes from the angelic nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that the distinction of hierarchies and of orders is not from the nature of the angels. For hierarchy is "a sacred principality," and Dionysius places in its definition that it "approaches a resemblance to God, as far as may be" (Coel. Hier. iii). But sanctity and resemblance to God is in the angels by grace, and not by nature. Therefore the

[32946] Iª q. 108 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod distinctio hierarchiarum et ordinum non sit a natura in Angelis. Hierarchia enim dicitur sacer principatus, et in definitione eius Dionysius ponit quod *deiforme, quantum possibile est, similat*. Sed sanctitas et deiformitas est in Angelis per gratiam, non per naturam. Ergo

distinction of hierarchies and orders in the angels is by grace, and not by nature.

distinctio hierarchiarum et ordinum in Angelis est per gratiam, non per naturam.

Objection 2: Further, the Seraphim are called "burning" or "kindling," as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). This belongs to charity which comes not from nature but from grace; for "it is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us" (Rom. 5:5): "which is said not only of holy men, but also of the holy angels," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore the angelic orders are not from nature, but from grace.

[32947] Iª q. 108 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, Seraphim dicuntur ardentes, vel incendentes, ut Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Hoc autem videtur ad caritatem pertinere, quae non est a natura, sed a gratia, *diffunditur enim in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis*, ut dicitur ad Rom. V. *Quod non solum ad sanctos homines pertinet, sed etiam de sanctis Angelis dici potest*, ut Augustinus dicit XII de Civ. Dei. Ergo ordines in Angelis non sunt a natura, sed a gratia.

Objection 3: Further, the ecclesiastical hierarchy is copied from the heavenly. But the orders among men are not from nature, but by the gift of grace; for it is not a natural gift for one to be a bishop, and another a priest, and another a deacon. Therefore neither in the angels are the orders from nature, but from grace only.

[32948] Iª q. 108 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, hierarchia ecclesiastica exemplatur a caelesti. Sed ordines in hominibus non sunt per naturam, sed per donum gratiae, non enim est a natura quod unus est episcopus, et alius est sacerdos, et alius diaconus. Ergo neque in Angelis sunt ordines a natura, sed a gratia tantum.

On the contrary, The Master says (ii, D. 9) that "an angelic order is a multitude of heavenly spirits, who are likened to each other by some gift of grace, just as they agree also in the participation of natural gifts." Therefore the distinction of orders among the angels is not only by gifts of grace, but also by gifts of nature.

[32949] Iª q. 108 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Magister dicit, IX dist. II Sent., quod *ordo Angelorum dicitur multitudo caelestium spirituum, qui inter se aliquo munere gratiae similantur, sicut et naturalium datorum participatione conveniunt*. Distinctio ergo ordinum in Angelis est non solum secundum dona gratuita, sed etiam secundum dona naturalia.

I answer that, The order of government, which is the order of a multitude under authority, is derived from its end. Now the end of the angels may be considered in two ways. First, according to the faculty of nature, so that they may know and love God by natural knowledge and love; and according to their relation to this end the orders of the angels are distinguished by natural gifts. Secondly, the end of the angelic multitude can be taken from what is above their natural powers, which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, and in the unchangeable fruition of His goodness; to which end they can reach only by grace; and hence as regards this end, the orders in the angels are adequately distinguished by the gifts of grace, but dispositively by natural gifts, forasmuch as to the angels are given gratuitous gifts according to the capacity of their natural

[32950] Iª q. 108 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ordo gubernationis, qui est ordo multitudinis sub principatu existentis, attenditur per respectum ad finem. Finis autem Angelorum potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum facultatem suae naturae, ut scilicet cognoscant et ament Deum naturali cognitione et amore. Et secundum respectum ad hunc finem, distinguuntur ordines Angelorum secundum naturalia dona. Alio modo potest accipi finis angelicae multitudinis supra naturalem facultatem eorum, qui consistit in visione divinae essentiae, et in immobili fruitione bonitatis ipsius; ad quem finem pertingere non possunt nisi per gratiam. Unde secundum respectum ad hunc finem, ordines distinguuntur in Angelis completive quidem secundum dona gratuita, dispositive autem secundum dona naturalia, quia Angelis data sunt dona gratuita

gifts; which is not the case with men, as above explained (Q[62], A[6]). Hence among men the orders are distinguished according to the gratuitous gifts only, and not according to natural gifts.

secundum capacitatem naturalium, quod non est in hominibus, ut supra dictum est. Unde in hominibus distinguuntur ordines secundum dona gratuita tantum, et non secundum naturam.

From the above the replies to the objections are evident.

[32951] Iª q. 108 a. 4 ad arg. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.

Q. 108. A. 5. Whether the orders of the angels are properly named?

Objection 1: It would seem that the orders of the angels are not properly named. For all the heavenly spirits are called angels and heavenly virtues. But common names should not be appropriated to individuals. Therefore the orders of the angels and virtues are ineptly named.

[32952] Iª q. 108 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ordines Angelorum non convenienter nominentur. Omnes enim caelestes spiritus dicuntur et Angeli et virtutes caelestes. Sed nomina communia inconvenienter aliquibus appropriantur. Ergo inconvenienter nominatur unus ordo Angelorum, et alius virtutum.

Objection 2: Further, it belongs to God alone to be Lord, according to the words, "Know ye that the Lord He is God" (Ps. 99:3). Therefore one order of the heavenly spirits is not properly called "Dominations."

[32953] Iª q. 108 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, esse dominum est proprium Dei; secundum illud Psal. XCIX *scitote quoniam dominus ipse est Deus*. Ergo inconvenienter unus ordo caelestium spirituum dominationes vocatur.

Objection 3: Further, the name "Domination" seems to imply government and likewise the names "Principalities" and "Powers." Therefore these three names do not seem to be properly applied to three orders.

[32954] Iª q. 108 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, nomen dominationis ad gubernationem pertinere videtur. Similiter autem et nomen principatuum, et potestatum. Inconvenienter ergo tribus ordinibus haec tria nomina imponuntur.

Objection 4: Further, archangels are as it were angel princes. Therefore this name ought not to be given to any other order than to the "Principalities."

[32955] Iª q. 108 a. 5 arg. 4 Praeterea, Archangeli dicuntur quasi principes Angeli. Non ergo hoc nomen debet imponi alii ordini quam ordini principatuum.

Objection 5: Further, the name "Seraphim" is derived from ardor, which pertains to charity; and the name "Cherubim" from knowledge. But charity and knowledge are gifts common to all the angels. Therefore they ought not to be names of any particular orders.

[32956] Iª q. 108 a. 5 arg. 5 Praeterea, nomen Seraphim imponitur ab ardore qui ad caritatem pertinet, nomen autem Cherubim imponitur a scientia. Caritas autem et scientia sunt dona communia omnibus Angelis. Non ergo debent esse nomina specialium ordinum.

Objection 6: Further, Thrones are seats. But from the fact that God knows and loves the rational creature He is said to sit within it. Therefore there ought not to be any order of "Thrones" besides the

[32957] Iª q. 108 a. 5 arg. 6 Praeterea, throni dicuntur sedes. Sed ex hoc ipso Deus in creatura rationali sedere dicitur, quod ipsum cognoscit et amat. Non ergo debet esse alius ordo thronorum

"Cherubim" and "Seraphim." Therefore it appears that the orders of angels are not properly styled.

ab ordine Cherubim et Seraphim. Sic igitur videtur quod inconvenienter ordines Angelorum nominentur.

On the contrary, is the authority of Holy Scripture wherein they are so named. For the name "Seraphim" is found in Is. 6:2; the name "Cherubim" in Ezech. 1 (Cf. 10:15,20); "Thrones" in Col. 1:16; "Dominations," "Virtues," "Powers," and "Principalities" are mentioned in Eph. 1:21; the name "Archangels" in the canonical epistle of St. Jude (9), and the name "Angels" is found in many places of Scripture.

[32958] Iª q. 108 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est auctoritas sacrae Scripturae, quae sic eos nominat. Nomen enim Seraphim ponitur Isaiae VI; nomen Cherubim Ezech. I; nomen thronorum, Coloss. I; dominationes autem et virtutes et potestates et principatus ponuntur Ephes. I; nomen autem Archangeli ponitur in canonica Iudae, nomina autem Angelorum in pluribus Scripturae locis.

I answer that, As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), in the names of the angelic orders it is necessary to observe that the proper name of each order expresses its property. Now to see what is the property of each order, we must consider that in coordinated things, something may be found in a threefold manner: by way of property, by way of excess, and by way of participation. A thing is said to be in another by way of property, if it is adequate and proportionate to its nature: by excess when an attribute is less than that to which it is attributed, but is possessed thereby in an eminent manner, as we have stated (Q[13], A[2]) concerning all the names which are attributed to God: by participation, when an attribute is possessed by something not fully but partially; thus holy men are called gods by participation. Therefore, if anything is to be called by a name designating its property, it ought not to be named from what it participates imperfectly, nor from that which it possesses in excess, but from that which is adequate thereto; as, for instance, when we wish properly to name a man, we should call him a "rational substance," but not an "intellectual substance," which latter is the proper name of an angel; because simple intelligence belongs to an angel as a property, and to man by participation; nor do we call him a "sensible substance," which is the proper name of a brute; because sense is less than the property of a man, and belongs to man in a more excellent way than to other animals.

So we must consider that in the angelic orders all spiritual perfections are common to all the angels, and that they are all more excellently in the

[32959] Iª q. 108 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in nominatione angelicorum ordinum, considerare oportet quod *propria nomina singulorum ordinum proprietates eorum designant*, ut Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Ad videndum autem quae sit proprietas cuiuslibet ordinis, considerare oportet quod in rebus ordinatis tripliciter aliquid esse contingit, scilicet per proprietatem, per excessum, et per participationem. Per proprietatem autem dicitur esse aliquid in re aliqua, quod adaequatur et proportionatur naturae ipsius. Per excessum autem, quando illud quod attribuitur alicui, est minus quam res cui attribuitur, sed tamen convenit illi rei per quendam excessum; sicut dictum est de omnibus nominibus quae attribuuntur Deo. Per participationem autem, quando illud quod attribuitur alicui, non plenarie invenitur in eo, sed deficienter; sicut sancti homines participative dicuntur dii. Si ergo aliquid nominari debeat nomine designante proprietatem ipsius, non debet nominari ab eo quod imperfecte participat, neque ab eo quod excedenter habet; sed ab eo quod est sibi quasi coaequatum. Sicut si quis velit proprie nominare hominem, dicet eum substantiam rationalem, non autem substantiam intellectualem, quod est proprium nomen Angeli, quia simplex intelligentia convenit Angelo per proprietatem, homini vero per participationem; neque substantiam sensibilem, quod est nomen bruti proprium, quia sensus est minus quam id quod est proprium homini, et convenit homini excedenter prae aliis animalibus. Sic igitur considerandum est in ordinibus Angelorum, quod omnes spirituales perfectiones sunt omnibus Angelis communes et quod omnes abundantius

superior than in the inferior angels. Further, as in these perfections there are grades, the superior perfection belongs to the superior order as its property, whereas it belongs to the inferior by participation; and conversely the inferior perfection belongs to the inferior order as its property, and to the superior by way of excess; and thus the superior order is denominated from the superior perfection.

So in this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the names of the orders accordingly as they befit the spiritual perfections they signify. Gregory, on the other hand, in expounding these names (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.) seems to regard more the exterior ministrations; for he says that "angels are so called as announcing the least things; and the archangels in the greatest; by the virtues miracles are wrought; by the powers hostile powers are repulsed; and the principalities preside over the good spirits themselves."

existunt in superioribus quam in inferioribus. Sed cum in ipsis etiam perfectionibus sit quidam gradus, superior perfectio attribuitur superiori ordini per proprietatem, inferiori vero per participationem, e converso autem inferior attribuitur inferiori per proprietatem, superiori autem per excessum. Et ita superior ordo a superiori perfectione nominatur. Sic igitur Dionysius exponit ordinum nomina secundum convenientiam ad spirituales perfectiones eorum. Gregorius vero, in expositione horum nominum, magis attendere videtur exteriora ministeria. Dicit enim, quod *Angeli dicuntur qui minima nuntiant; Archangeli, qui summa; virtutes per quas miracula fiunt; potestates quibus adversae potestates repelluntur; principatus, qui ipsis bonis spiritibus praesunt*.

Reply to Objection 1: Angel means "messenger." So all the heavenly spirits, so far as they make known Divine things, are called "angels." But the superior angels enjoy a certain excellence, as regards this manifestation, from which the superior orders are denominated. The lowest order of angels possess no excellence above the common manifestation; and therefore it is denominated from manifestation only; and thus the common name remains as it were proper to the lowest order, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. v). Or we may say that the lowest order can be specially called the order of "angels," forasmuch as they announce things to us immediately.

"Virtue" can be taken in two ways. First, commonly, considered as the medium between the essence and the operation, and in that sense all the heavenly spirits are called heavenly virtues, as also "heavenly essences." Secondly, as meaning a certain excellence of strength; and thus it is the proper name of an angelic order. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the "name 'virtues' signifies a certain virile and immovable strength"; first, in regard of those Divine operations which befit them; secondly, in regard to receiving Divine gifts. Thus it signifies that they undertake fearlessly the Divine behests appointed to them; and this seems to imply strength of mind.

[32960] Iª q. 108 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Angelus nuntius dicitur. Omnes ergo caelestes spiritus, inquantum sunt manifestatores divinorum, Angeli vocantur. Sed superiores Angeli habent quandam excellentiam in hac manifestatione, a qua superiores ordines nominantur. Infimus autem Angelorum ordo nullam excellentiam supra communem manifestationem addit, et ideo a simplici manifestatione nominatur. Et sic nomen commune remanet infimo ordini quasi proprium, ut dicit Dionysius V cap. Cael. Hier. Vel potest dici quod infimus ordo specialiter dicitur ordo Angelorum, quia immediate nobis annuntiant. Virtus autem dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo, communiter, secundum quod est media inter essentiam et operationem, et sic omnes caelestes spiritus nominantur caelestes virtutes, sicut et caelestes essentiae. Alio modo, secundum quod importat quendam excessum fortitudinis, et sic est proprium nomen ordinis. Unde Dionysius dicit, VIII cap. Cael. Hier., quod nomen virtutum significat quandam virilem et inconcussam fortitudinem, primo quidem ad omnes operationes divinas eis convenientes; secundo, ad suscipiendum divina. Et ita significat quod sine aliquo timore aggrediuntur divina quae ad eos pertinent, quod videtur ad fortitudinem animi pertinere.

Reply to Objection 2: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "Dominion is attributed to God in a special manner, by way of excess: but the Divine word gives the more illustrious heavenly princes the name of Lord by participation, through whom the inferior angels receive the Divine gifts." Hence Dionysius also states (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name "Domination" means first "a certain liberty, free from servile condition and common subjection, such as that of plebeians, and from tyrannical oppression," endured sometimes even by the great. Secondly, it signifies "a certain rigid and inflexible supremacy which does not bend to any servile act, or to the act, of those who are subject to or oppressed by tyrants." Thirdly, it signifies "the desire and participation of the true dominion which belongs to God." Likewise the name of each order signifies the participation of what belongs to God; as the name "Virtues" signifies the participation of the Divine virtue; and the same principle applies to the rest.

[32961] Iª q. 108 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Dionysius XII cap. de Div. Nom., *dominatio laudatur in Deo singulariter per quendam excessum, sed per participationem, divina eloquia vocant dominos principaliores ornatus, per quos inferiores ex donis eius accipiunt*. Unde et Dionysius dicit in VIII cap. Cael. Hier., quod nomen dominationum primo quidem significat quandam libertatem, quae est a servili conditione et pedestri subiectione, sicut plebs subiicitur, et a tyrannica oppressione, quam interdum etiam maiores patiuntur. Secundo significat quandam rigidam et inflexibilem gubernationem, quae ad nullum servilem actum inclinatur, neque ad aliquem actum subiectorum vel oppressorum a tyrannis. Tertio significat appetitum et participationem veri dominii, quod est in Deo. Et similiter nomen cuiuslibet ordinis significat participationem eius quod est in Deo; sicut nomen virtutum significat participationem divinae virtutis; et sic de aliis.

Reply to Objection 3: The names "Domination," "Power," and "Principality" belong to government in different ways. The place of a lord is only to prescribe what is to be done. So Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in Evang.), that "some companies of the angels, because others are subject to obedience to them, are called dominations." The name "Power" points out a kind of order, according to what the Apostle says, "He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordination of God" (Rom. 13:2). And so Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name "Power" signifies a kind of ordination both as regards the reception of Divine things, and as regards the Divine actions performed by superiors towards inferiors by leading them to things above. Therefore, to the order of "Powers" it belongs to regulate what is to be done by those who are subject to them. To preside [principari] as Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) is "to be first among others," as being first in carrying out what is ordered to be done. And so Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix) that the name of "Principalities" signifies "one who leads in a sacred order." For those who lead others, being first among them, are properly called "princes," according to the words, "Princes went before joined with singers" (Ps. 67:26).

[32962] Iª q. 108 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod nomen dominationis, et potestatis, et principatus, diversimode ad gubernationem pertinet. Nam domini est solummodo praecipere de agendis. Et ideo Gregorius dicit quod *quaedam Angelorum agmina, pro eo quod eis cetera ad obediendum subiecta sunt, dominationes vocantur*. Nomen vero potestatis ordinationem quandam designat; secundum illud apostoli ad Rom. XIII, *qui potestati resistit, Dei ordinationi resistit*. Et ideo Dionysius dicit quod nomen potestatis significat quandam ordinationem et circa susceptionem divinorum, et circa actiones divinas quas superiores in inferiores agunt, eas sursum ducendo. Ad ordinem ergo potestatum pertinet ordinare quae a subditis sint agenda. Principari vero, ut Gregorius dicit, est inter reliquos priorem existere, quasi primi sint in executione eorum quae imperantur. Et ideo Dionysius dicit, IX cap. Cael. Hier., quod nomen principatuum significat ductivum cum ordine sacro. Illi enim qui alios ducunt, primi inter eos existentes, principes proprie vocantur secundum illud Psalmi LXVII, *praevenerunt principes coniuncti psallentibus*.

Reply to Objection 4: The "Archangels," according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. ix), are between the "Principalities" and the "Angels." A medium compared to one extreme seems like the other, as participating in the nature of both extremes; thus tepid seems cold compared to hot, and hot compared to cold. So the "Archangels" are called the "angel princes"; forasmuch as they are princes as regards the "Angels," and angels as regards the Principalities. But according to Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) they are called "Archangels," because they preside over the one order of the "Angels"; as it were, announcing greater things: and the "Principalities" are so called as presiding over all the heavenly "Virtues" who fulfil the Divine commands.

[32963] Iª q. 108 a. 5 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod Archangeli, secundum Dionysium, medii sunt inter principatus et Angelos. Medium autem comparatum uni extremo, videtur alterum, inquantum participat naturam utriusque, sicut tepidum respectu calidi est frigidum, respectu vero frigidi est calidum. Sic et Archangeli dicuntur quasi principes Angeli, quia respectu Angelorum sunt principes, respectu vero principatuum sunt Angeli. Secundum Gregorium autem, dicuntur Archangeli ex eo quod principantur soli ordini Angelorum, quasi magna nuntiantes. Principatus autem dicuntur ex eo quod principantur omnibus caelestibus virtutibus divinas iussiones explentibus.

Reply to Objection 5: The name "Seraphim" does not come from charity only, but from the excess of charity, expressed by the word ardor or fire. Hence Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds the name "Seraphim" according to the properties of fire, containing an excess of heat. Now in fire we may consider three things. First, the movement which is upwards and continuous. This signifies that they are borne inflexibly towards God. Secondly, the active force which is "heat," which is not found in fire simply, but exists with a certain sharpness, as being of most penetrating action, and reaching even to the smallest things, and as it were, with superabundant fervor; whereby is signified the action of these angels, exercised powerfully upon those who are subject to them, rousing them to a like fervor, and cleansing them wholly by their heat. Thirdly we consider in fire the quality of clarity, or brightness; which signifies that these angels have in themselves an inextinguishable light, and that they also perfectly enlighten others.

In the same way the name "Cherubim" comes from a certain excess of knowledge; hence it is interpreted "fulness of knowledge," which Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds in regard to four things: the perfect vision of God; the full reception of the Divine Light; their contemplation in God of the beauty of the Divine order; and in regard to the fact that possessing this knowledge fully, they pour it forth copiously upon others.

[32964] Iª q. 108 a. 5 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod nomen Seraphim non imponitur tantum a caritate, sed a caritatis excessu, quem importat nomen ardoris vel incendii. Unde Dionysius, VII cap. Cael. Hier., exponit nomen Seraphim secundum proprietates ignis, in quo est excessus caliditatis. In igne autem tria possumus considerare. Primo quidem, motum, qui est sursum, et qui est continuus. Per quod significatur quod indeclinabiliter moventur in Deum. Secundo vero, virtutem activam eius, quae est calidum. Quod quidem non simpliciter invenitur in igne, sed cum quadam acuitate, quia maxime est penetrativus in agendo, et pertingit usque ad minima; et iterum cum quodam superexcedenti fervore. Et per hoc significatur actio huiusmodi Angelorum, quam in subditos potenter exercent, eos in similem fervorem excitantes, et totaliter eos per incendium purgantes. Tertio consideratur in igne claritas eius. Et hoc significat quod huiusmodi Angeli in seipsis habent inextinguibilem lucem, et quod alios perfecte illuminant. Similiter etiam nomen Cherubim imponitur a quodam excessu scientiae, unde interpretatur plenitudo scientiae. Quod Dionysius exponit quantum ad quatuor, primo quidem, quantum ad perfectam Dei visionem; secundo, quantum ad plenam susceptionem divini luminis; tertio, quantum ad hoc, quod in ipso Deo contemplantur pulchritudinem ordinis rerum a Deo derivatam; quarto, quantum ad hoc, quod ipsi pleni existentes huiusmodi cognitione, eam copiose in alios effundunt.

Reply to Objection 6: The order of the "Thrones" excels the inferior orders as having an immediate knowledge of the types of the Divine works; whereas the "Cherubim" have the excellence of knowledge and the "Seraphim" the excellence of ardor. And although these two excellent attributes include the third, yet the gift belonging to the "Thrones" does not include the other two; and so the order of the "Thrones" is distinguished from the orders of the "Cherubim" and the "Seraphim." For it is a common rule in all things that the excellence of the inferior is contained in the superior, but not conversely. But Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the name "Thrones" by its relation to material seats, in which we may consider four things. First, the site; because seats are raised above the earth, and to the angels who are called "Thrones" are raised up to the immediate knowledge of the types of things in God. Secondly, because in material seats is displayed strength, forasmuch as a person sits firmly on them. But here the reverse is the case; for the angels themselves are made firm by God. Thirdly, because the seat receives him who sits thereon, and he can be carried thereupon; and so the angels receive God in themselves, and in a certain way bear Him to the inferior creatures. Fourthly, because in its shape, a seat is open on one side to receive the sitter; and thus are the angels promptly open to receive God and to serve Him.

[32965] Iª q. 108 a. 5 ad 6 Ad sextum dicendum quod ordo thronorum habet excellentiam prae inferioribus ordinibus in hoc, quod immediate in Deo rationes divinorum operum cognoscere possunt. Sed Cherubim habent excellentiam scientiae; Seraphim vero excellentiam ardoris. Et licet in his duabus excellentiis includatur tertia, non tamen in illa quae est thronorum, includuntur aliae duae. Et ideo ordo thronorum distinguitur ab ordine Cherubim et Seraphim. Hoc enim est commune in omnibus, quod excellentia inferioris continetur in excellentia superioris, et non e converso. Exponit autem Dionysius nomen thronorum, per convenientiam ad materiales sedes. In quibus est quatuor considerare. Primo quidem, situm, quia sedes supra terram elevantur. Et sic ipsi Angeli qui throni dicuntur, elevantur usque ad hoc, quod in Deo immediate rationes rerum cognoscant. Secundo in materialibus sedibus consideratur firmitas, quia in ipsis aliquis firmiter sedet. Hic autem est e converso, nam ipsi Angeli firmantur per Deum. Tertio, quia sedes suscipit sedentem, et in ea deferri potest. Sic et isti Angeli suscipiunt Deum in seipsis, et eum quodammodo ad inferiores ferunt. Quarto, ex figura, quia sedes ex una parte est aperta ad suscipiendum sedentem. Ita et isti Angeli sunt per promptitudinem aperti ad suscipiendum Deum, et famulandum ipsi.

Q. 108. A. 6. Whether the grades of the orders are properly assigned?

Objection 1: It would seem that the grades of the orders are not properly assigned. For the order of prelates is the highest. But the names of "Dominations," "Principalities," and "Powers" of themselves imply prelacy. Therefore these orders ought not to be supreme.

[32966] Iª q. 108 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter gradus ordinum assignentur. Ordo enim praelatorum videtur esse supremus. Sed dominationes, principatus et potestates ex ipsis nominibus praelationem quandam habent. Ergo isti ordines debent esse inter omnes supremi.

Objection 2: Further, the nearer an order is to God, the higher it is. But the order of "Thrones" is the nearest to God; for nothing is nearer to the sitter than the seat. Therefore the order of the "Thrones" is the highest.

[32967] Iª q. 108 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, quanto aliquis ordo est Deo propinquior, tanto est superior. Sed ordo thronorum videtur esse Deo propinquissimus, nihil enim coniungitur propinquius sedenti, quam sua sedes. Ergo ordo thronorum est altissimus.

Objection 3: Further, knowledge comes before love, and intellect is higher than will. Therefore the order of "Cherubim" seems to be higher than the "Seraphim."

[32968] Iª q. 108 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, scientia est prior quam amor; et intellectus videtur esse altior quam voluntas. Ergo et ordo Cherubim videtur esse altior quam ordo Seraphim.

Objection 4: Further, Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Evang.) places the "Principalities" above the "Powers." These therefore are not placed immediately above the Archangels, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix).

[32969] Iª q. 108 a. 6 arg. 4 Praeterea, Gregorius ponit principatus supra potestates. Non ergo collocantur immediate supra Archangelos, ut Dionysius dicit.

On the contrary, Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), places in the highest hierarchy the "Seraphim" as the first, the "Cherubim" as the middle, the "Thrones" as the last; in the middle hierarchy he places the "Dominations," as the first, the "Virtues" in the middle, the "Powers" last; in the lowest hierarchy the "Principalities" first, then the "Archangels," and lastly the "Angels."

[32970] Iª q. 108 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod Dionysius ponit, in prima quidem hierarchia. Seraphim ut primos, Cherubim ut medios, thronos ut ultimos; in media vero, dominationes ut primos, virtutes ut medios, potestates ut ultimos; in ultima, principatus ut primos, Archangelos ut medios, Angelos ut ultimos.

I answer that, The grades of the angelic orders are assigned by Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), who agree as regards all except the "Principalities" and "Virtues." For Dionysius places the "Virtues" beneath the "Dominations," and above the "Powers"; the "Principalities" beneath the "Powers" and above the "Archangels." Gregory, however, places the "Principalities" between the "Dominations" and the "Powers"; and the "Virtues" between the "Powers" and the "Archangels." Each of these placings may claim authority from the words of the Apostle, who (Eph. 1:20,21) enumerates the middle orders, beginning from the lowest saying that "God set Him," i.e. Christ, "on His right hand in the heavenly places above all Principality and Power, and Virtue, and Dominion." Here he places "Virtues" between "Powers" and "Dominations," according to the placing of Dionysius. Writing however to the Colossians (1:16), numbering the same orders from the highest, he says: "Whether Thrones, or Dominations, or Principalities, or Powers, all things were created by Him and in Him." Here he places the "Principalities" between "Dominations" and "Powers," as does also Gregory.

Let us then first examine the reason for the ordering of Dionysius, in which we see, that, as said above (A[1]), the highest hierarchy

[32971] Iª q. 108 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod gradus angelicorum ordinum assignant et Gregorius et Dionysius, quantum ad alia quidem convenienter, sed quantum ad principatus et virtutes differenter. Nam Dionysius collocat virtutes sub dominationibus et supra potestates, principatus autem sub potestatibus et supra Archangelos, Gregorius autem ponit principatus in medio dominationum et potestatum, virtutes vero in medio potestatum et Archangelorum. Et utraque assignatio fulcimentum habere potest ex auctoritate apostoli. Qui, medios ordines ascendendo enumerans, dicit, Ephes. I, quod Deus constituit illum, scilicet Christum, ad dexteram suam in caelestibus, supra omnem principatum et potestatem et virtutem et dominationem, ubi virtutem ponit inter potestatem et dominationem, secundum assignationem Dionysii. Sed ad Coloss. I, enumerans eosdem ordines descendendo, dicit, sive throni, sive dominationes, sive principatus, sive potestates, omnia per ipsum et in ipso creata sunt, ubi principatus ponit medios inter dominationes et potestates, secundum assignationem Gregorii. Primo igitur videamus rationem assignationis Dionysii. In qua considerandum est quod, sicut supra dictum est, prima hierarchia accipit rationes rerum in ipso Deo; secunda vero in causis universalibus; tertia vero secundum determinationem ad speciales effectus. Et quia Deus est finis non solum

contemplates the ideas of things in God Himself; the second in the universal causes; and third in their application to particular effects. And because God is the end not only of the angelic ministrations, but also of the whole creation, it belongs to the first hierarchy to consider the end; to the middle one belongs the universal disposition of what is to be done; and to the last belongs the application of this disposition to the effect, which is the carrying out of the work; for it is clear that these three things exist in every kind of operation. So Dionysius, considering the properties of the orders as derived from their names, places in the first hierarchy those orders the names of which are taken from their relation to God, the "Seraphim," "Cherubim," and "Thrones"; and he places in the middle hierarchy those orders whose names denote a certain kind of common government or disposition---the "Dominations," "Virtues," and "Powers"; and he places in the third hierarchy the orders whose names denote the execution of the work, the "Principalities," "Angels," and "Archangels."

As regards the end, three things may be considered. For firstly we consider the end; then we acquire perfect knowledge of the end; thirdly, we fix our intention on the end; of which the second is an addition to the first, and the third an addition to both. And because God is the end of creatures, as the leader is the end of an army, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10); so a somewhat similar order may be seen in human affairs. For there are some who enjoy the dignity of being able with familiarity to approach the king or leader; others in addition are privileged to know his secrets; and others above these ever abide with him, in a close union. According to this similitude, we can understand the disposition in the orders of the first hierarchy; for the "Thrones" are raised up so as to be the familiar recipients of God in themselves, in the sense of knowing immediately the types of things in Himself; and this is proper to the whole of the first hierarchy. The "Cherubim" know the Divine secrets supereminently; and the "Seraphim" excel in what is the supreme excellence of all, in being united to God Himself; and all this in such a manner that the whole of this hierarchy can be called the "Thrones"; as, from what is common to all the heavenly spirits together, they are all called "Angels."

angelicorum ministeriorum, sed etiam totius creaturae, ad primam hierarchiam pertinet consideratio finis; ad mediam vero dispositio universalis de agendis; ad ultimam autem applicatio dispositionis ad effectum, quae est operis executio; haec enim tria manifestum est in qualibet operatione inveniri. Et ideo Dionysius, ex nominibus ordinum proprietates illorum considerans, illos ordines in prima hierarchia posuit, quorum nomina imponuntur per respectum ad Deum, scilicet Seraphim et Cherubim et thronos. Illos vero ordines posuit in media hierarchia, quorum nomina designant communem quandam gubernationem sive dispositionem, scilicet dominationes, virtutes et potestates. Illos vero ordines posuit in tertia hierarchia, quorum nomina designant operis executionem, scilicet principatus, Angelos et Archangelos. In respectu autem ad finem, tria considerari possunt, nam primo, aliquis considerat finem; secundo vero, perfectam finis cognitionem accipit; tertio vero, intentionem suam in ipso defigit; quorum secundum ex additione se habet ad primum, et tertium ad utrumque. Et quia Deus est finis creaturarum sicut dux est finis exercitus, ut dicitur in XII Metaphys., potest aliquid simile huius ordinis considerari in rebus humanis, nam quidam sunt qui hoc habent dignitatis, ut per seipsos familiariter accedere possunt ad regem vel ducem; quidam vero super hoc habent, ut etiam secreta eius cognoscant; alii vero insuper circa ipsum semper inhaerent, quasi ei coniuncti. Et secundum hanc similitudinem accipere possumus dispositionem ordinum primae hierarchiae. Nam throni elevantur ad hoc, quod Deum familiariter in seipsis recipiant, secundum quod rationes rerum in ipso immediate cognoscere possunt, quod est proprium totius primae hierarchiae. Cherubim vero supereminenter divina secreta cognoscunt. Seraphim vero excellunt in hoc quod est omnium supremum, scilicet Deo ipsi uniri. Ut sic ab eo quod est commune toti hierarchiae, denominetur ordo thronorum; sicut ab eo quod est commune omnibus caelestibus spiritibus, denominatur ordo Angelorum. Ad gubernationis autem rationem tria pertinent. Quorum primum est definitio eorum quae agenda sunt, quod est proprium dominationum. Secundum autem est praebere facultatem ad implendum, quod pertinet ad virtutes. Tertium autem est ordinare qualiter ea quae praecepta vel definita sunt, impleri possint, ut aliqui exequantur, et hoc pertinet ad potestates.

As regards government, three things are comprised therein, the first of which is to appoint those things which are to be done, and this belongs to the "Dominations"; the second is to give the power of carrying out what is to be done, which belongs to the "Virtues"; the third is to order how what has been commanded or decided to be done can be carried out by others, which belongs to the "Powers."

The execution of the angelic ministrations consists in announcing Divine things. Now in the execution of any action there are beginners and leaders; as in singing, the precentors; and in war, generals and officers; this belongs to the "Principalities." There are others who simply execute what is to be done; and these are the "Angels." Others hold a middle place; and these are the "Archangels," as above explained.

This explanation of the orders is quite a reasonable one. For the highest in an inferior order always has affinity to the lowest in the higher order; as the lowest animals are near to the plants. Now the first order is that of the Divine Persons, which terminates in the Holy Ghost, Who is Love proceeding, with Whom the highest order of the first hierarchy has affinity, denominated as it is from the fire of love. The lowest order of the first hierarchy is that of the "Thrones," who in their own order are akin to the "Dominations"; for the "Thrones," according to Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.), are so called "because through them God accomplishes His judgments," since they are enlightened by Him in a manner adapted to the immediate enlightening of the second hierarchy, to which belongs the disposition of the Divine ministrations. The order of the "Powers" is akin to the order of the "Principalities"; for as it belongs to the "Powers" to impose order on those subject to them, this ordering is plainly shown at once in the name of "Principalities," who, as presiding over the government of peoples and kingdoms (which occupies the first and principal place in the Divine ministrations), are the first in the execution thereof; "for the good of a nation is more divine than the good of one man" (Ethic. i, 2); and hence it is written, "The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me" (Dan. 10:13).

Executio autem angelicorum ministeriorum consistit in annuntiando divina. In executione autem cuiuslibet actus, sunt quidam quasi incipientes actionem et alios ducentes, sicut in cantu praecentores, et in bello illi qui alios ducunt et dirigunt, et hoc pertinet ad principatus. Alii vero sunt qui simpliciter exequuntur, et hoc pertinet ad Angelos. Alii vero medio modo se habent, quod ad Archangelos pertinet, ut supra dictum est. Invenitur autem congrua haec ordinum assignatio. Nam semper summum inferioris ordinis affinitatem habet cum ultimo superioris; sicut infima animalia parum distant a plantis. Primus autem ordo est divinarum personarum, qui terminatur ad spiritum sanctum, qui est amor procedens, cum quo affinitatem habet supremus ordo primae hierarchiae, ab incendio amoris denominatus. Infimus autem ordo primae hierarchiae est thronorum, qui ex suo nomine habent quandam affinitatem cum dominationibus, nam throni dicuntur, secundum Gregorium, per quos Deus sua iudicia exercet; accipiunt enim divinas illuminationes per convenientiam ad immediate illuminandum secundam hierarchiam, ad quam pertinet dispositio divinorum ministeriorum. Ordo vero potestatum affinitatem habet cum ordine principatuum, nam cum potestatum sit ordinationem subiectis imponere, haec ordinatio statim in nomine principatuum designatur, qui sunt primi in executione divinorum ministeriorum, utpote praesidentes gubernationi gentium et regnorum, quod est primum et praecipuum in divinis ministeriis; nam bonum gentis est divinius quam bonum unius hominis. Unde dicitur Dan. X, *princeps regni Persarum restitit mihi*. Dispositio etiam ordinum quam Gregorius ponit, congruitatem habet. Nam cum dominationes sint definientes et praecipientes ea quae ad divina ministeria pertinent, ordines eis subiecti disponuntur secundum dispositionem eorum in quos divina ministeria exercentur ut autem Augustinus dicit in III de Trin., *corpora quodam ordine reguntur, inferiora per superiora, et omnia per spiritualem creaturam; et spiritus malus per spiritum bonum*. Primus ergo ordo post dominationes dicitur principatuum, qui etiam bonis spiritibus principantur. Deinde potestates, per quas arcentur mali spiritus, sicut per potestates terrenas arcentur malefactores, ut habetur Rom. XIII. Post quas sunt virtutes, quae habent potestatem super corporalem naturam in operatione miraculorum. Post quas sunt

The disposition of the orders which is mentioned by Gregory is also reasonable. For since the "Dominations" appoint and order what belongs to the Divine ministrations, the orders subject to them are arranged according to the disposition of those things in which the Divine ministrations are effected. Still, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii), "bodies are ruled in a certain order; the inferior by the superior; and all of them by the spiritual creature, and the bad spirit by the good spirit." So the first order after the "Dominations" is called that of "Principalities," who rule even over good spirits; then the "Powers," who coerce the evil spirits; even as evil-doers are coerced by earthly powers, as it is written (Rom. 13:3,4). After these come the "Virtues," which have power over corporeal nature in the working of miracles; after these are the "Angels" and the "Archangels," who announce to men either great things above reason, or small things within the purview of reason.

Archangeli et Angeli, qui nuntiant hominibus vel magna, quae sunt supra rationem; vel parva, ad quae ratio se extendere potest.

Reply to Objection 1: The angel's subjection to God is greater than their presiding over inferior things; and the latter is derived from the former. Thus the orders which derive their name from presiding are not the first and highest; but rather the orders deriving their name from their nearness and relation to God.

[32972] Iª q. 108 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in Angelis potius est quod subiiciuntur Deo, quam quod inferioribus praesident, et hoc derivatur ex illo. Et ideo ordines nominati a praelatione non sunt supremi, sed magis ordines nominati a conversione ad Deum.

Reply to Objection 2: The nearness to God designated by the name of the "Thrones," belongs also to the "Cherubim" and "Seraphim," and in a more excellent way, as above explained.

[32973] Iª q. 108 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod illa propinquitas ad Deum quae designatur nomine thronorum, convenit etiam Cherubim et Seraphim, et excellentius, ut dictum est.

Reply to Objection 3: As above explained (Q[27], A[3]), knowledge takes place accordingly as the thing known is in the knower; but love as the lover is united to the object loved. Now higher things are in a nobler way in themselves than in lower things; whereas lower things are in higher things in a nobler way than they are in themselves. Therefore to know lower things is better than to love them; and to love the higher things, God above all, is better than to know them.

[32974] Iª q. 108 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cognitio est secundum quod cognita sunt in cognoscente; amor autem secundum quod amans unitur rei amatae. Superiora autem nobiliori modo sunt in seipsis quam in inferioribus, inferiora vero nobiliori modo in superioribus quam in seipsis. Et ideo inferiorum quidem cognitio praeeminet dilectioni, superiorum autem dilectio, et praecipue Dei, praeeminet cognitioni.

Reply to Objection 4: A careful comparison will show that little or no difference exists in reality

[32975] Iª q. 108 a. 6 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod, si quis diligenter consideret dispositiones

between the dispositions of the orders according to Dionysius and Gregory. For Gregory expounds the name "Principalities" from their "presiding over good spirits," which also agrees with the "Virtues" accordingly as this name expressed a certain strength, giving efficacy to the inferior spirits in the execution of the Divine ministrations. Again, according to Gregory, the "Virtues" seem to be the same as "Principalities" of Dionysius. For to work miracles holds the first place in the Divine ministrations; since thereby the way is prepared for the announcements of the "Archangels" and the "Angels."

ordinum secundum Dionysium et Gregorium, parum vel nihil differunt, si ad rem referantur. Exponit enim Gregorius principatuum nomen ex hoc, quod bonis spiritibus praesunt, et hoc convenit virtutibus, secundum quod in nomine virtutum intelligitur quaedam fortitudo dans efficaciam inferioribus spiritibus ad exequenda divina ministeria. Rursus virtutes, secundum Gregorium, videntur esse idem quod principatus secundum Dionysium. Nam hoc est primum in divinis ministeriis, miracula facere, per hoc enim paratur via Annuntiationi Archangelorum et Angelorum.

Q. 108. A. 7. Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment?

Objection 1: It would seem that the orders of angels will not outlast the Day of Judgment. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:24), that Christ will "bring to naught all principality and power, when He shall have delivered up the kingdom to God and the Father," and this will be in the final consummation. Therefore for the same reason all others will be abolished in that state.

[32976] Iª q. 108 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ordines non remanebunt post diem iudicii. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XV, quod Christus evacuabit omnem principatum et potestatem, cum tradiderit regnum Deo et patri, quod erit in ultima consummatione. Pari ergo ratione, in illo statu omnes alii ordines evacuabuntur.

Objection 2: Further, to the office of the angelic orders it belongs to cleanse, enlighten, and perfect. But after the Day of Judgment one angel will not cleanse, enlighten, or perfect another, because they will not advance any more in knowledge. Therefore the angelic orders would remain for no purpose.

[32977] Iª q. 108 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, ad officium angelicorum ordinum pertinet purgare, illuminare et perficere. Sed post diem iudicii unus Angelus non purgabit aut illuminabit aut perficiet alium, quia non proficient amplius in scientia. Ergo frustra ordines angelici remanerent.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says of the angels (Heb. 1:14), that "they are all ministering spirits, sent to minister to them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation"; whence it appears that the angelic offices are ordered for the purpose of leading men to salvation. But all the elect are in pursuit of salvation until the Day of Judgment. Therefore the angelic offices and orders will not outlast the Day of Judgment.

[32978] Iª q. 108 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, apostolus dicit, ad Heb. I, de Angelis, quod *omnes sunt administratorii spiritus, in ministerium missi propter eos qui haereditatem capiunt salutis*, ex quo patet quod officia Angelorum ordinantur ad hoc, quod homines ad salutem adducantur. Sed omnes electi usque ad diem iudicii salutem consequuntur. Non ergo post diem iudicii remanebunt officia et ordines Angelorum.

On the contrary, It is written (Judges 5:20): "Stars remaining in their order and courses," which is applied to the angels. Therefore the angels will ever remain in their orders.

[32979] Iª q. 108 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Iudic. V, stellae manentes in ordine et cursu suo, quod exponitur de Angelis. Ergo Angeli semper in suis ordinibus remanebunt.

I answer that, In the angelic orders we may consider two things; the distinction of grades, and the execution of their offices. The distinction of grades among the angels takes place according to the difference of grace and nature, as above explained (A[4]); and these differences will ever remain in the angels; for these differences of natures cannot be taken from them unless they themselves be corrupted. The difference of glory will also ever remain in them according to the difference of preceding merit. As to the execution of the angelic offices, it will to a certain degree remain after the Day of Judgment, and to a certain degree will cease. It will cease accordingly as their offices are directed towards leading others to their end; but it will remain, accordingly as it agrees with the attainment of the end. Thus also the various ranks of soldiers have different duties to perform in battle and in triumph.

[32980] Iª q. 108 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in ordinibus angelicis duo possunt considerari, scilicet distinctio graduum, et executio officiorum. Distinctio autem graduum est in Angelis secundum differentiam gratiae et naturae, ut supra dictum est. Et utraque differentia semper in Angelis remanebit. Non enim posset naturarum differentia ab eis auferri, nisi eis corruptis, differentia etiam gloriae erit in eis semper, secundum differentiam meriti praecedentis. Executio autem officiorum angelicorum aliquo modo remanebit post diem iudicii, et aliquo modo cessabit. Cessabit quidem, secundum quod eorum officia ordinantur ad perducendum aliquos ad finem, remanebit autem, secundum quod convenit in ultima finis consecutione. Sicut etiam alia sunt officia militarium ordinum in pugna, et in triumpho.

Reply to Objection 1: The principalities and powers will come to an end in that final consummation as regards their office of leading others to their end; because when the end is attained, it is no longer necessary to tend towards the end. This is clear from the words of the Apostle, "When He shall have delivered up the kingdom of God and the Father," i.e. when He shall have led the faithful to the enjoyment of God Himself.

[32981] Iª q. 108 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod principatus et potestates evacuabuntur in illa finali consummatione quantum ad hoc, quod alios ad finem perducant, quia consecuto iam fine, non est necessarium tendere in finem. Et haec ratio intelligitur ex verbis apostoli, dicentis, cum tradiderit regnum Deo et patri, idest, cum perduxerit fideles ad fruendum ipso Deo.

Reply to Objection 2: The actions of angels over the other angels are to be considered according to a likeness to our own intellectual actions. In ourselves we find many intellectual actions which are ordered according to the order of cause and effect; as when we gradually arrive at one conclusion by many middle terms. Now it is manifest that the knowledge of a conclusion depends on all the preceding middle terms not only in the new acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards the keeping of the knowledge acquired. A proof of this is that when anyone forgets any of the preceding middle terms he can have opinion or belief about the conclusion, but not knowledge; as he is ignorant of the order of the causes. So, since the inferior angels know the types of the Divine works by the light of the superior angels, their knowledge depends on the light of the superior angels not only as regards the acquisition

[32982] Iª q. 108 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod actiones Angelorum super alios Angelos considerandae sunt secundum similitudinem actionum intelligibilium quae sunt in nobis. Inveniuntur autem in nobis multae intelligibiles actiones quae sunt ordinatae secundum ordinem causae et causati; sicut cum per multa media gradatim in unam conclusionem devenimus. Manifestum est autem quod cognitio conclusionis dependet ex omnibus mediis praecedentibus, non solum quantum ad novam acquisitionem scientiae, sed etiam quantum ad scientiae conservationem. Cuius signum est quod, si quis oblivisceretur aliquod praecedentium mediorum, opinionem quidem vel fidem de conclusione posset habere, sed non scientiam, ordine causarum ignorato. Sic igitur, cum inferiores Angeli rationes divinorum operum cognoscant per lumen superiorum Angelorum,

of knowledge, but also as regards the preserving of the knowledge possessed. So, although after the Judgment the inferior angels will not progress in the knowledge of some things, still this will not prevent their being enlightened by the superior angels.

dependet eorum cognitio ex lumine superiorum, non solum quantum ad novam acquisitionem scientiae, sed etiam quantum ad cognitionis conservationem. Licet ergo post iudicium non proficiant inferiores Angeli in cognitione aliquarum rerum, non tamen propter hoc excluditur quin a superioribus illuminentur.

Reply to Objection 3: Although after the Day of Judgment men will not be led any more to salvation by the ministry of the angels, still those who are already saved will be enlightened through the angelic ministry.

[32983] Iª q. 108 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, etsi post diem iudicii homines non sint ulterius ad salutem adducendi per ministerium Angelorum; tamen illi qui iam salutem erunt consecuti, aliquam illustrationem habebunt per Angelorum officia.

Q. 108. A. 8. Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?

Objection 1: It would seem that men are not taken up into the orders of the angels. For the human hierarchy is stationed beneath the lowest heavenly hierarchy, as the lowest under the middle hierarchy and the middle beneath the first. But the angels of the lowest hierarchy are never transferred into the middle, or the first. Therefore neither are men transferred to the angelic orders.

[32984] Iª q. 108 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homines non assumantur ad ordines Angelorum. Hierarchia enim humana continetur sub infima hierarchiarum caelestium, sicut infima sub media, et media sub prima. Sed Angeli infimae hierarchiae nunquam transferentur in mediam aut in primam. Ergo neque homines transferentur ad ordines Angelorum.

Objection 2: Further, certain offices belong to the orders of the angels, as to guard, to work miracles, to coerce the demons, and the like; which do not appear to belong to the souls of the saints. Therefore they are not transferred to the angelic orders.

[32985] Iª q. 108 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, ordinibus Angelorum aliqua officia competunt, utpote custodire, miracula facere, Daemones arcere, et huiusmodi, quae non videntur convenire animabus sanctorum. Ergo non transferentur ad ordines Angelorum.

Objection 3: Further, as the good angels lead on to good, so do the demons to what is evil. But it is erroneous to say that the souls of bad men are changed into demons; for Chrysostom rejects this (Hom. xxviii in Matt.). Therefore it does not seem that the souls of the saints will be transferred to the orders of angels.

[32986] Iª q. 108 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut boni Angeli inducunt ad bonum, ita Daemones inducunt ad malum. Sed erroneum est dicere quod animae hominum malorum convertantur in Daemones, hoc enim Chrysostomus reprobat, super Matth. Ergo non videtur quod animae sanctorum transferantur ad ordines Angelorum.

On the contrary, The Lord says of the saints that, "they will be as the angels of God" (Mat. 22:30).

[32987] Iª q. 108 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Matth. XXII, de sanctis, quod *erunt sicut Angeli Dei in caelo*.

I answer that, As above explained (AA[4],7), the orders of the angels are distinguished according to the conditions of nature and

[32988] Iª q. 108 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ordines Angelorum distinguuntur et secundum conditionem naturae,

according to the gifts of grace. Considered only as regards the grade of nature, men can in no way be assumed into the angelic orders; for the natural distinction will always remain. In view of this distinction, some asserted that men can in no way be transferred to an equality with the angels; but this is erroneous, contradicting as it does the promise of Christ saying that the children of the resurrection will be equal to the angels in heaven (Lk. 20:36). For whatever belongs to nature is the material part of an order; whilst that which perfects is from grace which depends on the liberality of God, and not on the order of nature. Therefore by the gift of grace men can merit glory in such a degree as to be equal to the angels, in each of the angelic grades; and this implies that men are taken up into the orders of the angels. Some, however, say that not all who are saved are assumed into the angelic orders, but only virgins or the perfect; and that the other will constitute their own order, as it were, corresponding to the whole society of the angels. But this is against what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), that "there will not be two societies of men and angels, but only one; because the beatitude of all is to cleave to God alone."

et secundum dona gratiae. Si ergo considerentur Angelorum ordines solum quantum ad gradum naturae, sic homines nullo modo assumi possunt ad ordines Angelorum, quia semper remanebit naturarum distinctio. Quam quidam considerantes, posuerunt quod nullo modo homines transferri possunt ad aequalitatem Angelorum. Quod est erroneum, repugnat enim promissioni Christi, dicentis, Lucae XX, quod filii resurrectionis erunt aequales Angelis in caelis. Illud enim quod est ex parte naturae, se habet ut materiale in ratione ordinis, completivum vero est quod est ex dono gratiae, quae dependet ex liberalitate Dei, non ex ordine naturae. Et ideo per donum gratiae homines mereri possunt tantam gloriam, ut Angelis aequentur secundum singulos Angelorum gradus. Quod est homines ad ordines Angelorum assumi. Quidam tamen dicunt quod ad ordines Angelorum non assumuntur omnes qui salvantur, sed soli virgines vel perfecti; alii vero suum ordinem constituent, quasi condivisum toti societati Angelorum. Sed hoc est contra Augustinum, qui dicit XII de Civ. Dei, quod non erunt duae societates hominum et Angelorum, sed una, quia omnium beatitudo est adhaerere uni Deo.

Reply to Objection 1: Grace is given to the angels in proportion to their natural gifts. This, however, does not apply to men, as above explained (A[4]; Q[62], A[6]). So, as the inferior angels cannot be transferred to the natural grade of the superior, neither can they be transferred to the superior grade of grace; whereas men can ascend to the grade of grace, but not of nature.

[32989] Iª q. 108 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod gratia Angelis datur secundum proportionem naturalium; non autem sic est de hominibus, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo sicut inferiores Angeli non possunt transferri ad naturalem gradum superiorum, ita nec ad gratuitum. Homines vero possunt ad gratuitum conscendere, sed non ad naturalem.

Reply to Objection 2: The angels according to the order of nature are between us and God; and therefore according to the common law not only human affairs are administered by them, but also all corporeal matters. But holy men even after this life are of the same nature with ourselves; and hence according to the common law they do not administer human affairs, "nor do they interfere in the things of the living," as Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis xiii, xvi). Still, by a certain special dispensation it is sometimes granted to some of the saints to exercise these offices; by working miracles, by coercing the demons, or by

[32990] Iª q. 108 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Angeli, secundum naturae ordinem, medii sunt inter nos et Deum. Et ideo, secundum legem communem, per eos administrantur non solum res humanae, sed etiam omnia corporalia. Homines autem sancti, etiam post hanc vitam, sunt eiusdem naturae nobiscum. Unde secundum legem communem, non administrant humana, nec rebus vivorum intersunt, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de cura pro mortuis agenda. Ex quadam tamen speciali dispensatione interdum aliquibus sanctis conceditur, vel vivis vel mortuis, huiusmodi officia exercere, vel miracula faciendo, vel

doing something of that kind, as Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis xvi).

Daemones arcendo, vel aliquid huiusmodi; sicut Augustinus in eodem libro dicit.

Reply to Objection 3: It is not erroneous to say that men are transferred to the penalty of demons; but some erroneously stated that the demons are nothing but souls of the dead; and it is this that Chrysostom rejects.

[32991] Iª q. 108 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod homines ad poenam Daemonum transferri, non est erroneum, sed quidam erronee posuerunt Daemones nihil aliud esse quam animas defunctorum. Et hoc Chrysostomus reprobat.

Q. 109. THE ORDERING OF THE BAD ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We now consider the ordering of the bad angels; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there are orders among the demons?

(2) Whether among them there is precedence?

(3) Whether one enlightens another?

(4) Whether they are subject to the precedence of the good angels?

[32992] Iª q. 109 pr. Deinde considerandum est de ordinatione malorum Angelorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum ordines sint in Daemonibus. Secundo, utrum in eis sit praelatio. Tertio, utrum unus illuminet alium. Quarto, utrum subiiciantur praelationi bonorum Angelorum.

Q. 109. A. 1. Whether there are orders among the demons?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are no orders among the demons. For order belongs to good, as also mode, and species, as Augustine says (De Nat. Boni iii); and on the contrary, disorder belongs to evil. But there is nothing disorderly in the good angels. Therefore in the bad angels there are no orders.

[32993] Iª q. 109 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ordines non sint in Daemonibus. Ordo enim pertinet ad rationem boni, sicut et modus et species, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de natura boni; et e contrario inordinatio pertinet ad rationem mali. Sed in bonis Angelis nihil est inordinatum. Ergo in malis Angelis non sunt aliqui ordines.

Objection 2: Further, the angelic orders are contained under a hierarchy. But the demons are not in a hierarchy, which is defined as a holy principality; for they are void of all holiness. Therefore among the demons there are no orders.

[32994] Iª q. 109 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, ordines angelici sub aliqua hierarchia continentur. Sed Daemones non sunt sub aliqua hierarchia, quae est sacer principatus, cum ab omni sanctitate sint vacui. Ergo in Daemonibus non sunt ordines.

Objection 3: Further, the demons fell from every one of the angelic orders; as is commonly supposed. Therefore, if some demons are said to belong to an order, as falling from that order, it would seem necessary to give them the names of each of those orders. But we never find that they are called "Seraphim," or "Thrones," or "Dominations." Therefore on the same ground they are not to be placed in any other order.

[32995] Iª q. 109 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, Daemones de singulis ordinibus Angelorum ceciderunt, ut communiter dicitur. Si ergo aliqui Daemones dicuntur esse alicuius ordinis, quia de illo ordine ceciderunt; videtur quod deberent eis attribui nomina singulorum ordinum. Nunquam autem invenitur quod dicantur Seraphim, vel throni, vel dominationes. Ergo, pari ratione, non sunt in aliquibus ordinibus.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 6:12): "Our wrestling . . . is against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness."

[32996] Iª q. 109 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. ult., quod *est nobis colluctatio adversus principes et potestates, adversus mundi rectores tenebrarum harum*.

I answer that, As explained above (Q[108], AA[4],7,8), order in the angels is considered both according to the grade of nature; and according to

[32997] Iª q. 109 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, ordo angelicus consideratur et secundum gradum naturae, et

that of grace. Now grace has a twofold state, the imperfect, which is that of merit; and the perfect, which is that of consummate glory.

If therefore we consider the angelic orders in the light of the perfection of glory, then the demons are not in the angelic orders, and never were. But if we consider them in relation to imperfect grace, in that view the demons were at the time in the orders of angels, but fell away from them, according to what was said above (Q[62], A[3]), that all the angels were created in grace. But if we consider them in the light of nature, in that view they are still in those orders; because they have not lost their natural gifts; as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).

secundum gradum gratiae. Gratia vero habet duplicem statum, scilicet imperfectum, qui est status merendi; et perfectum, qui est status gloriae consummatae. Si ergo considerentur ordines angelici quantum ad perfectionem gloriae, sic Daemones neque sunt in ordinibus angelicis, neque unquam fuerunt. Si autem considerentur quantum ad id quod est gratiae imperfectae, sic Daemones fuerunt quidem aliquando in ordinibus Angelorum, sed ab eis ceciderunt; secundum illud quod supra posuimus, omnes Angelos in gratia creatos fuisse. Si autem considerentur quantum ad id quod est naturae, sic adhuc sunt in ordinibus, quia data naturalia non amiserunt, ut Dionysius dicit.

Reply to Objection 1: Good can exist without evil; whereas evil cannot exist without good (Q[49], A[3]); so there is order in the demons, as possessing a good nature.

[32998] Iª q. 109 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod bonum potest inveniri sine malo; sed malum non potest inveniri sine bono, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo Daemones, inquantum habent naturam bonam, ordinati sunt.

Reply to Objection 2: If we consider the ordering of the demons on the part of God Who orders them, it is sacred; for He uses the demons for Himself; but on the part of the demons' will it is not a sacred thing, because they abuse their nature for evil.

[32999] Iª q. 109 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ordinatio Daemonum, si consideretur ex parte Dei ordinantis, est sacra, utitur enim Daemonibus propter seipsum. Sed ex parte voluntatis Daemonum, non est sacra, quia abutuntur sua natura ad malum.

Reply to Objection 3: The name "Seraphim" is given from the ardor of charity; and the name "Thrones" from the Divine indwelling; and the name "Dominations" imports a certain liberty; all of which are opposed to sin; and therefore these names are not given to the angels who sinned.

[33000] Iª q. 109 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod nomen Seraphim imponitur ab ardore caritatis, nomen autem thronorum ab inhabitatione divina, nomen autem dominationum importat libertatem quandam, quae omnia opponuntur peccato. Et ideo peccantibus Angelis huiusmodi nomina non attribuuntur.

Q. 109. A. 2. Whether among the demons there is precedence?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no precedence among the demons. For every precedence is according to some order of justice. But the demons are wholly fallen from justice. Therefore there is no precedence among them.

[33001] Iª q. 109 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Daemonibus non sit praelatio. Omnis enim praelatio est secundum aliquem ordinem iustitiae. Sed Daemones totaliter a iustitia ceciderunt. Ergo in eis non est praelatio.

Objection 2: Further, there is no precedence where obedience and subjection do not exist. But

[33002] Iª q. 109 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, ubi non est obedientia et subiectio, non est praelatio. Haec

these cannot be without concord; which is not to be found among the demons, according to the text, "Among the proud there are always contentions" (Prov. 13:10). Therefore there is no precedence among the demons.

autem sine concordia esse non possunt; quae in Daemonibus nulla est, secundum illud Prov. XIII, *inter superbos semper sunt iurgia*. Ergo in Daemonibus non est praelatio.

Objection 3: If there be precedence among them it is either according to nature, or according to their sin or punishment. But it is not according to their nature, for subjection and service do not come from nature but from subsequent sin; neither is it according to sin or punishment, because in that case the superior demons who have sinned the most grievously, would be subject to the inferior. Therefore there is no precedence among the demons.

[33003] Iª q. 109 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, si in eis est aliqua praelatio, aut hoc pertinet ad eorum naturam, aut ad eorum culpam vel poenam. Sed non ad eorum naturam, quia subiectio et servitus non est ex natura, sed est ex peccato subsecuta. Nec pertinet ad culpam vel poenam, quia sic superiores Daemones, qui magis peccaverunt, inferioribus subderentur. Non ergo est praelatio in Daemonibus.

On the contrary, On 1 Cor. 15:24 the gloss says: "While the world lasts, angels will preside over angels, men over men, and demons over demons."

[33004] Iª q. 109 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Glossa, I ad Cor. XV, *quandiu durat mundus, Angeli Angelis, homines hominibus, et Daemones Daemonibus praesunt*.

I answer that, Since action follows the nature of a thing, where natures are subordinate, actions also must be subordinate to each other. Thus it is in corporeal things, for as the inferior bodies by natural order are below the heavenly bodies, their actions and movements are subject to the actions and movements of the heavenly bodies. Now it is plain from what we have said (A[1]), that the demons are by natural order subject to others; and hence their actions are subject to the action of those above them, and this is what we mean by precedence---that the action of the subject should be under the action of the prelate. So the very natural disposition of the demons requires that there should be authority among them. This agrees too with Divine wisdom, which leaves nothing inordinate, which "reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (Wis. 8:1).

[33005] Iª q. 109 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum actio sequatur naturam rei, quorumcumque naturae sunt ordinatae, oportet quod etiam actiones sub invicem ordinentur. Sicut patet in rebus corporalibus, quia enim inferiora corpora naturali ordine sunt infra corpora caelestia actiones et motus eorum subduntur actionibus et motibus caelestium corporum. Manifestum est autem ex praemissis quod Daemonum quidam naturali ordine sub aliis constituuntur. Unde et actiones eorum sub actionibus superiorum sunt. Et hoc est quod rationem praelationis facit, ut scilicet actio subditi subdatur actioni praelati. Sic igitur ipsa naturalis dispositio Daemonum requirit quod sit in eis praelatio. Convenit etiam hoc divinae sapientiae, quae nihil in universo inordinatum relinquit, *quae attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter*, ut dicitur Sap. VIII.

Reply to Objection 1: The authority of the demons is not founded on their justice, but on the justice of God ordering all things.

[33006] Iª q. 109 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praelatio Daemonum non fundatur super eorum iustitia, sed super iustitia Dei cuncta ordinantis.

Reply to Objection 2: The concord of the demons, whereby some obey others, does not arise from mutual friendships, but from their common wickedness whereby they hate men, and fight against God's justice. For it belongs to wicked men to be joined to and subject to those whom they see to be stronger, in order to carry out their own wickedness.

[33007] Iª q. 109 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod concordia Daemonum, qua quidam aliis obediunt, non est ex amicitia quam inter se habeant; sed ex communi nequitia, qua homines odiunt, et Dei iustitiae repugnant. Est enim proprium hominum impiorum, ut eis se adiungant et subiiciant, ad propriam nequitiam exequendam, quos potiores viribus vident.

Reply to Objection 3: The demons are not equal in nature; and so among them there exists a natural precedence; which is not the case with men, who are naturally equal. That the inferior are subject to the superior, is not for the benefit of the superior, but rather to their detriment; because since to do evil belongs in a pre-eminent degree to unhappiness, it follows that to preside in evil is to be more unhappy.

[33008] Iª q. 109 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Daemones non sunt aequales secundum naturam, unde in eis est naturalis praelatio. Quod in hominibus non contingit, qui natura sunt pares. Quod autem superioribus inferiores subdantur, non est ad bonum superiorum, sed magis ad malum eorum; quia cum mala facere maxime ad miseriam pertineat, praeesse in malis est esse magis miserum.

Q. 109. A. 3. Whether there is enlightenment in the demons?

Objection 1: It would seem that enlightenment is in the demons. For enlightenment means the manifestation of the truth. But one demon can manifest truth to another, because the superior excel in natural knowledge. Therefore the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.

[33009] Iª q. 109 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Daemonibus sit illuminatio. Illuminatio enim consistit in manifestatione veritatis. Sed unus Daemon potest alteri veritatem manifestare, quia superiores magis acumine naturalis scientiae vigent. Ergo superiores Daemones possunt inferiores illuminare.

Objection 2: Further, a body abounding in light can enlighten a body deficient in light, as the sun enlightens the moon. But the superior demons abound in the participation of natural light. Therefore it seems that the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.

[33010] Iª q. 109 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, corpus quod superabundat in lumine, potest illuminare corpus quod in lumine deficit; sicut sol lunam. Sed superiores Daemones magis abundant in participatione luminis naturalis. Ergo videtur quod superiores Daemones possunt inferiores illuminare.

On the contrary, Enlightenment is not without cleansing and perfecting, as stated above (Q[106], A[1]). But to cleanse does not befit the demons, according to the words: "What can be made clean by the unclean?" (Ecclus. 34:4). Therefore neither can they enlighten.

[33011] Iª q. 109 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, illuminatio cum purgatione est et perfectione, ut supra dictum est. Sed purgare non convenit Daemonibus; secundum illud Eccli. XXXIV, *ab immundo quid mundabitur?* Ergo etiam neque illuminare.

I answer that, There can be no enlightenment properly speaking among the demons. For, as above explained (Q[107], A[2]), enlightenment

[33012] Iª q. 109 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in Daemonibus non potest esse illuminatio proprie. Dictum est enim supra quod illuminatio

properly speaking is the manifestation of the truth in reference to God, Who enlightens every intellect. Another kind of manifestation of the truth is speech, as when one angel manifests his concept to another. Now the demon's perversity does not lead one to order another to God, but rather to lead away from the Divine order; and so one demon does not enlighten another; but one can make known his mental concept to another by way of speech.

proprie est manifestatio veritatis, secundum quod habet ordinem ad Deum, qui illuminat omnem intellectum. Alia autem manifestatio veritatis potest esse locutio; sicut cum unus Angelus alteri suum conceptum manifestat. Perversitas autem Daemonum hoc habet, quod unus alium non intendit ordinare ad Deum, sed magis ab ordine divino abducere. Et ideo unus Daemon alium non illuminat; sed unus alii suum conceptum per modum locutionis intimare potest.

Reply to Objection 1: Not every kind of manifestation of the truth is enlightenment, but only that which is above described.

[33013] Iª q. 109 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non quaelibet veritatis manifestatio habet rationem illuminationis, sed solum quae dicta est.

Reply to Objection 2: According to what belongs to natural knowledge, there is no necessary manifestation of the truth either in the angels, or in the demons, because, as above explained (Q[55], A[2]; Q[58], A[2]; Q[79], A[2]), they know from the first all that belongs to their natural knowledge. So the greater fulness of natural light in the superior demons does not prove that they can enlighten others.

[33014] Iª q. 109 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod secundum ea quae ad naturalem cognitionem pertinent, non est necessaria manifestatio veritatis neque in Angelis neque in Daemonibus, quia, sicut supra dictum est, statim a principio suae conditionis omnia cognoverunt quae ad naturalem cognitionem pertinent. Et ideo maior plenitudo naturalis luminis quae est in superioribus Daemonibus, non potest esse ratio illuminationis.

Q. 109. A. 4. Whether the good angels have precedence over the bad angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that the good angels have no precedence over the bad angels. For the angels' precedence is especially connected with enlightenment. But the bad angels, being darkness, are not enlightened by the good angels. Therefore the good angels do not rule over the bad.

[33015] Iª q. 109 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod boni Angeli non habeant praelationem super malos. Praelatio enim Angelorum praecipue attenditur secundum illuminationes. Sed mali Angeli, cum sint tenebrae, non illuminantur a bonis. Ergo boni Angeli non habent praelationem super malos.

Objection 2: Further, superiors are responsible as regards negligence for the evil deeds of their subjects. But the demons do much evil. Therefore if they are subject to the good angels, it seems that negligence is to be charged to the good angels; which cannot be admitted.

[33016] Iª q. 109 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, ad negligentiam praesidentis pertinere videntur ea quae per subditos male fiunt. Sed Daemones multa mala faciunt. Si igitur subsunt praelationi bonorum Angelorum, videtur in Angelis bonis esse aliqua negligentia. Quod est inconveniens.

Objection 3: Further, the angels' precedence follows upon the order of nature, as above explained (A[2]). But if the demons fell from every order, as is commonly said, many of the

[33017] Iª q. 109 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, praelatio Angelorum sequitur naturae ordinem, ut supra dictum est. Sed si Daemones de singulis ordinibus ceciderunt, ut communiter dicitur, multi

demons are superior to many good angels in the natural order. Therefore the good angels have no precedence over all the bad angels.

Daemones multis bonis Angelis sunt superiores ordine naturae. Non ergo boni Angeli praelationem habent super omnes malos.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii), that "the treacherous and sinful spirit of life is ruled by the rational, pious, and just spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv) that "the Powers are the angels to whose charge are subjected the hostile powers."

[33018] Iª q. 109 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod *spiritus vitae desertor atque peccator regitur per spiritum vitae rationalem, pium et iustum*. Et Gregorius dicit quod *potestates dicuntur Angeli quorum ditioni virtutes adversae subiectae sunt*.

I answer that, The whole order of precedence is first and originally in God; and it is shared by creatures accordingly as they are the nearer to God. For those creatures, which are more perfect and nearer to God, have the power to act on others. Now the greatest perfection and that which brings them nearest to God belongs to the creatures who enjoy God, as the holy angels; of which perfection the demons are deprived; and therefore the good angels have precedence over the bad, and these are ruled by them.

[33019] Iª q. 109 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod totus ordo praelationis primo et originaliter est in Deo, et participatur a creaturis secundum quod Deo magis appropinquant, illae enim creaturae super alias influentiam habent, quae sunt perfectiores et Deo propinquiores. Maxima autem perfectio, et per quam maxime Deo appropinquatur, est creaturarum fruentium Deo, sicut sunt sancti Angeli, qua perfectione Daemones privantur. Et ideo boni Angeli super malos praelationem habent, et per eos reguntur.

Reply to Objection 1: Many things concerning Divine mysteries are made known by the holy angels to the bad angels, whenever the Divine justice requires the demons to do anything for the punishment of the evil; or for the trial of the good; as in human affairs the judge's assessors make known his sentence to the executioners. This revelation, if compared to the angelic revealers, can be called an enlightenment, forasmuch as they direct it to God; but it is not an enlightenment on the part of the demons, for these do not direct it to God; but to the fulfilment of their own wickedness.

[33020] Iª q. 109 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per sanctos Angelos multa de divinis mysteriis Daemonibus revelantur, cum divina iustitia exigit ut per Daemones aliqua fiant vel ad punitionem malorum, vel ad exercitationem bonorum, sicut in rebus humanis assessores iudicis revelant tortoribus eius sententiam. Huiusmodi autem revelationes, si ad Angelos revelantes comparentur, illuminationes sunt, quia ordinant eas ad Deum. Ex parte vero Daemonum, non sunt illuminationes, quia eas in Deum non ordinant, sed ad expletionem propriae iniquitatis.

Reply to Objection 2: The holy angels are the ministers of the Divine wisdom. Hence as the Divine wisdom permits some evil to be done by bad angels or men, for the sake of the good that follows; so also the good angels do not entirely restrain the bad from inflicting harm.

[33021] Iª q. 109 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod sancti Angeli sunt ministri divinae sapientiae. Unde sicut divina sapientia permittit aliqua mala fieri per malos Angelos vel homines, propter bona quae ex eis elicit; ita et boni Angeli non totaliter cohibent malos a nocendo.

Reply to Objection 3: An angel who is inferior in the natural order presides over demons, although these may be naturally superior; because the

[33022] Iª q. 109 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Angelus qui est inferior ordine naturae, praeest Daemonibus, quamvis superioribus ordine

power of Divine justice to which the good angels cleave, is stronger than the natural power of the angels. Hence likewise among men, "the spiritual man judgeth all things" (1 Cor. 2:15), and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 4; x, 5) that "the virtuous man is the rule and measure of all human acts."

naturae; quia virtus divinae iustitiae, cui inhaerent boni Angeli, potior est quam virtus naturalis Angelorum. Unde et apud homines, spiritualis iudicat omnia, ut dicitur I ad Cor. II. Et philosophus dicit, in libro Ethic., quod *virtuosus est regula et mensura omnium humanorum actuum*.

Q. 110. HOW ANGELS ACT ON BODIES (FOUR ARTICLES)

We now consider how the angels preside over the corporeal creatures. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?

(2) Whether the corporeal creature obeys the mere will of the angels?

(3) Whether the angels by their own power can immediately move bodies locally?

(4) Whether the good or bad angels can work miracles?

[33023] Iª q. 110 pr. Deinde considerandum est de praesidentia Angelorum super creaturam corporalem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum creatura corporalis administretur per Angelos. Secundo, utrum creatura corporalis obediat Angelis ad nutum. Tertio, utrum Angeli sua virtute possint immediate movere corpora localiter. Quarto, utrum Angeli boni vel mali possint facere miracula.

Q. 110. A. 1. Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that the corporeal creature is not governed by angels. For whatever possesses a determinate mode of action, needs not to be governed by any superior power; for we require to be governed lest we do what we ought not. But corporeal things have their actions determined by the nature divinely bestowed upon them. Therefore they do not need the government of angels.

[33024] Iª q. 110 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod creatura corporalis non administretur per Angelos. Res enim quae habent determinatum modum operandi, non indigent gubernari ab aliquo praesidente, ideo enim indigemus gubernari, ne aliter operemur quam oporteat. Sed res corporales habent determinatas actiones ex naturis sibi divinitus datis. Non ergo indigent gubernatione Angelorum.

Objection 2: Further, the lowest things are ruled by the superior. But some corporeal things are inferior, and others are superior. Therefore they need not be governed by the angels.

[33025] Iª q. 110 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, inferiora in entibus gubernantur per superiora. Sed in corporibus quaedam dicuntur inferiora, quaedam superiora. Inferiora igitur gubernantur per superiora. Non ergo est necessarium quod gubernentur per Angelos.

Objection 3: Further, the different orders of the angels are distinguished by different offices. But if corporeal creatures were ruled by the angels, there would be as many angelic offices as there are species of things. So also there would be as many orders of angels as there are species of things; which is against what is laid down above (Q[108], A[2]). Therefore the corporeal creature is not governed by angels.

[33026] Iª q. 110 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, diversi ordines Angelorum distinguuntur secundum diversa officia. Sed si creaturae corporales administrantur per Angelos, tot erunt officia Angelorum, quot sunt species rerum. Ergo etiam tot erunt ordines Angelorum, quot sunt species rerum. Quod est contra supra dicta. Non ergo corporalis creatura administratur per Angelos.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Dial. iv, 6), that "in this

[33027] Iª q. 110 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod *omnia corpora reguntur per spiritum vitae rationalem*. Et

visible world nothing takes place without the agency of the invisible creature."

Gregorius dicit, in IV Dial., quod *in hoc mundo visibili nihil nisi per creaturam invisibilem disponi potest*.

I answer that, It is generally found both in human affairs and in natural things that every particular power is governed and ruled by the universal power; as, for example, the bailiff's power is governed by the power of the king. Among the angels also, as explained above (Q[55], A[3] ; Q[108], A[1]), the superior angels who preside over the inferior possess a more universal knowledge. Now it is manifest that the power of any individual body is more particular than the power of any spiritual substance; for every corporeal form is a form individualized by matter, and determined to the "here and now"; whereas immaterial forms are absolute and intelligible. Therefore, as the inferior angels who have the less universal forms, are ruled by the superior; so are all corporeal things ruled by the angels. This is not only laid down by the holy doctors, but also by all philosophers who admit the existence of incorporeal substances.

[33028] Iª q. 110 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod tam in rebus humanis quam in rebus naturalibus, hoc communiter invenitur, quod potestas particularis gubernatur et regitur a potestate universali; sicut potestas ballivi gubernatur per potestatem regis. Et in Angelis etiam est dictum quod superiores Angeli, qui praesunt inferioribus, habent scientiam magis universalem. Manifestum est autem quod virtus cuiuslibet corporis est magis particularis quam virtus spiritualis substantiae, nam omnis forma corporalis est forma individuata per materiam, et determinata ad hic et nunc; formae autem immateriales sunt absolutae et intelligibiles. Et ideo sicut inferiores Angeli, qui habent formas minus universales, reguntur per superiores; ita omnia corporalia reguntur per Angelos et hoc non solum a sanctis doctoribus ponitur, sed etiam ab omnibus philosophis qui incorporeas substantias posuerunt.

Reply to Objection 1: Corporeal things have determinate actions; but they exercise such actions only according as they are moved; because it belongs to a body not to act unless moved. Hence a corporeal creature must be moved by a spiritual creature.

[33029] Iª q. 110 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod res corporales habent determinatas actiones, sed has actiones non exercent nisi secundum quod moventur, quia proprium corporis est quod non agat nisi motum. Et ideo oportet quod creatura corporalis a spirituali moveatur.

Reply to Objection 2: The reason alleged is according to the opinion of Aristotle who laid down (Metaph. xi, 8) that the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual substances; the number of which he endeavored to assign according to the number of motions apparent in the heavenly bodies. But he did not say that there were any spiritual substances with immediate rule over the inferior bodies, except perhaps human souls; and this was because he did not consider that any operations were exercised in the inferior bodies except the natural ones for which the movement of the heavenly bodies sufficed. But because we assert that many things are done in the inferior bodies besides the natural corporeal actions, for which the movements of the heavenly bodies are not sufficient; therefore in our opinion we must

[33030] Iª q. 110 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio ista procedit secundum opinionem Aristotelis, qui posuit quod corpora caelestia moventur a substantiis spiritualibus; quarum numerum conatus fuit assignare secundum numerum motuum qui apparent in corporibus caelestibus. Sed non posuit quod essent aliquae substantiae spirituales quae haberent immediatam praesidentiam supra inferiora corpora, nisi forte animas humanas. Et hoc ideo, quia non consideravit aliquas operationes in inferioribus corporibus exerceri nisi naturales, ad quas sufficiebat motus corporum caelestium. Sed quia nos ponimus multa in corporibus inferioribus fieri praeter naturales actiones corporum, ad quae non sufficiunt virtutes caelestium corporum; ideo secundum nos, necesse

assert that the angels possess an immediate presidency not only over the heavenly bodies, but also over the inferior bodies.

Reply to Objection 3: Philosophers have held different opinions about immaterial substances. For Plato laid down that immaterial substances were types and species of sensible bodies; and that some were more universal than others; and so he held that immaterial substances preside immediately over all sensible bodies, and different ones over different bodies. But Aristotle held that immaterial substances are not the species of sensible bodies, but something higher and more universal; and so he did not attribute to them any immediate presiding over single bodies, but only over the universal agents, the heavenly bodies. Avicenna followed a middle course. For he agreed with Plato in supposing some spiritual substance to preside immediately in the sphere of active and passive elements; because, as Plato also said, he held that the forms of these sensible things are derived from immaterial substances. But he differed from Plato because he supposed only one immaterial substance to preside over all inferior bodies, which he called the "active intelligence."

The holy doctors held with the Platonists that different spiritual substances were placed over corporeal things. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79): "Every visible thing in this world has an angelic power placed over it"; and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4): "The devil was one of the angelic powers who presided over the terrestrial order"; and Origen says on the text, "When the ass saw the angel" (Num. 22:23), that "the world has need of angels who preside over beasts, and over the birth of animals, and trees, and plants, and over the increase of all other things" (Hom. xiv in Num.). The reason of this, however, is not that an angel is more fitted by his nature to preside over animals than over plants; because each angel, even the least, has a higher and more universal power than any kind of corporeal things: the reason is to be sought in the order of Divine wisdom, Who places different rulers over different things. Nor does it follow that there are more than nine orders of angels, because, as above expounded (Q[108], A[2]), the orders are distinguished by their general offices. Hence as according to Gregory all the angels

est ponere quod Angeli habeant immediatam praesidentiam non solum supra caelestia corpora, sed etiam supra corpora inferiora.

[33031] Iª q. 110 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod de substantiis immaterialibus diversimode philosophi sunt locuti. Plato enim posuit substantias immateriales esse rationes et species sensibilium corporum, et quasdam aliis universaliores, et ideo posuit substantias immateriales habere praesidentiam immediatam circa omnia sensibilia corpora, et diversas circa diversa. Aristoteles autem posuit quod substantiae immateriales non sunt species corporum sensibilium, sed aliquid altius et universalius, et ideo non attribuit eis immediatam praesidentiam supra singula corpora, sed solum supra universalia agentia, quae sunt corpora caelestia. Avicenna vero mediam viam secutus est. Posuit enim cum Platone, aliquam substantiam spiritualem praesidentem immediate sphaerae activorum et passivorum; eo quod, sicut Plato ponebat quod formae horum sensibilium derivantur a substantiis immaterialibus, ita etiam Avicenna hoc posuit. Sed in hoc a Platone differt, quod posuit unam tantum substantiam immaterialem praesidentem omnibus corporibus inferioribus, quam vocavit intelligentiam agentem. Doctores autem sancti posuerunt, sicut et Platonici, diversis rebus corporeis diversas substantias spirituales esse praepositas. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., *unaquaeque res visibilis in hoc mundo habet angelicam potestatem sibi praepositam*. Et Damascenus dicit, *Diabolus erat ex iis angelicis virtutibus quae praeerant terrestri ordini*. Et Origenes dicit, super illud Num. XXII, *cum vidisset asina Angelum, quod opus est mundo Angelis, qui praesunt super bestias, et praesunt animalium nativitati, et virgultorum et plantationum et ceterarum rerum incrementis*. Sed hoc non est ponendum propter hoc, quod secundum suam naturam unus Angelus magis se habeat ad praesidendum animalibus quam plantis, quia quilibet Angelus, etiam minimus, habet altiorem virtutem et universaliorem quam aliquod genus corporalium. Sed est ex ordine divinae sapientiae, quae diversis rebus diversos rectores praeposuit. Nec tamen propter hoc sequitur quod sint plures ordines Angelorum quam novem, quia, sicut supra dictum est, ordines distinguuntur secundum generalia officia. Unde sicut, secundum

whose proper office it is to preside over the demons are of the order of the "powers"; so to the order of the "virtues" do those angels seem to belong who preside over purely corporeal creatures; for by their ministration miracles are sometimes performed.

Gregorium, ad ordinem potestatum pertinent omnes Angeli qui habent proprie praesidentiam super Daemones; ita ad ordinem virtutum pertinere videntur omnes Angeli qui habent praesidentiam super res pure corporeas; horum enim ministerio interdum etiam miracula fiunt.

Q. 110. A. 2. Whether corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel. For the power of an angel excels the power of the soul. But corporeal matter obeys a conception of the soul; for the body of man is changed by a conception of the soul as regards heat and cold, and sometimes even as regards health and sickness. Therefore much more is corporeal matter changed by a conception of an angel.

[33032] Iª q. 110 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod materia corporalis obediat Angelis ad nutum. Maior est enim virtus Angeli quam virtus animae. Sed conceptioni animae obedit materia corporalis, immutatur enim corpus hominis ex conceptione animae, ad calorem et frigus, et quandoque usque ad sanitatem et aegritudinem. Ergo multo magis secundum conceptionem Angeli, materia corporalis transmutatur.

Objection 2: Further, whatever can be done by an inferior power, can be done by a superior power. Now the power of an angel is superior to corporeal power. But a body by its power is able to transform corporeal matter; as appears when fire begets fire. Therefore much more efficaciously can an angel by his power transform corporeal matter.

[33033] Iª q. 110 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, quidquid potest virtus inferior, potest virtus superior. Sed virtus Angeli est superior quam virtus corporalis. Corpus autem sua virtute potest transmutare materiam corporalem ad formam aliquam; sicut cum ignis generat ignem. Ergo multo fortius virtute sua Angeli possunt materiam corporalem transmutare ad aliquam formam.

Objection 3: Further, all corporeal nature is under angelic administration, as appears above (A[1]), and thus it appears that bodies are as instruments to the angels, for an instrument is essentially a mover moved. Now in effects there is something that is due to the power of their principal agents, and which cannot be due to the power of the instrument; and this it is that takes the principal place in the effect. For example, digestion is due to the force of natural heat, which is the instrument of the nutritive soul: but that living flesh is thus generated is due to the power of the soul. Again the cutting of the wood is from the saw; but that it assumes the length the form of a bed is from the design of the [joiner's] art. Therefore the substantial form which takes the principal place in the corporeal effects, is due to the angelic power. Therefore matter obeys the angels in receiving its form.

[33034] Iª q. 110 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, tota natura corporalis administratur per Angelos, ut dictum est, et sic videtur quod corpora se habet ad Angelos sicut instrumenta; nam ratio instrumenti est quod sit movens motum. Sed in effectibus aliquid invenitur ex virtute principalium agentium, quod non potest esse per virtutem instrumenti; et hoc est id quod est principalius in effectu. Sicut digestio nutrimenti est per virtutem caloris naturalis, qui est instrumentum animae nutritivae; sed quod generetur caro viva, est ex virtute animae. Similiter quod secetur lignum, pertinet ad serram; sed quod perveniatur ad formam lecti, est ex ratione artis. Ergo forma substantialis, quae est principalius in effectibus corporalibus, est ex virtute Angelorum. Materia ergo obedit, ad sui informationem, Angelis.

On the contrary, Augustine says "It is not to be thought, that this visible matter obeys these rebel angels; for it obeys God alone."

[33035] Iª q. 110 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., *non est putandum istis transgressoribus Angelis ad nutum servire hanc visibilium rerum materiam, sed soli Deo*.

I answer that, The Platonists [*Phaedo. xlix: Tim. (Did.) vol. ii, p. 218] asserted that the forms which are in matter are caused by immaterial forms, because they said that the material forms are participations of immaterial forms. Avicenna followed them in this opinion to some extent, for he said that all forms which are in matter proceed from the concept of the "intellect"; and that corporeal agents only dispose [matter] for the forms. They seem to have been deceived on this point, through supposing a form to be something made "per se," so that it would be the effect of a formal principle. But, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8), what is made, properly speaking, is the "composite": for this properly speaking, is, as it were, what subsists. Whereas the form is called a being, not as that which is, but as that by which something is; and consequently neither is a form, properly speaking, made; for that is made which is; since to be is nothing but the way to existence.

Now it is manifest that what is made is like to the maker, forasmuch as every agent makes its like. So whatever makes natural things, has a likeness to the composite; either because it is composite itself, as when fire begets fire, or because the whole "composite" as to both matter and form is within its power; and this belongs to God alone. Therefore every informing of matter is either immediately from God, or form some corporeal agent; but not immediately from an angel.

[33036] Iª q. 110 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod Platonici posuerunt formas quae sunt in materia, causari ex immaterialibus formis, quia formas materiales ponebant esse participationes quasdam immaterialium formarum. Et hos, quantum ad aliquid, secutus est Avicenna, qui posuit omnes formas quae sunt in materia, procedere a conceptione intelligentiae, et quod agentia corporalia sunt solum disponentia ad formas. Qui in hoc videntur fuisse decepti, quia existimaverunt formam quasi aliquid per se factum, ut sic ab aliquo formali principio procederet. Sed sicut philosophus probat in VII Metaphys., hoc quod proprie fit, est compositum, hoc enim proprie est quasi subsistens. Forma autem non dicitur ens quasi ipsa sit, sed sicut quo aliquid est, et sic per consequens nec forma proprie fit; eius enim est fieri, cuius est esse, cum fieri nihil aliud sit quam via in esse. Manifestum est autem quod factum est simile facienti, quia omne agens agit sibi simile. Et ideo id quod facit res naturales, habet similitudinem cum composito, vel quia est compositum, sicut ignis generat ignem; vel quia totum compositum, et quantum ad materiam et quantum ad formam, est in virtute ipsius; quod est proprium Dei. Sic igitur omnis informatio materiae vel est a Deo immediate, vel ab aliquo agente corporali; non autem immediate ab Angelo.

Reply to Objection 1: Our soul is united to the body as the form; and so it is not surprising for the body to be formally changed by the soul's concept; especially as the movement of the sensitive appetite, which is accompanied with a certain bodily change, is subject to the command of reason. An angel, however, has not the same connection with natural bodies; and hence the argument does not hold.

[33037] Iª q. 110 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod anima nostra unitur corpori ut

forma; et sic non est mirum, si formaliter transmutatur ex conceptione ipsius; praesertim cum motus sensitivi appetitus, qui fit cum quadam transmutatione corporali, subdatur imperio rationis. Angelus autem non sic se habet ad corpora naturalia. Unde ratio non sequitur.

Reply to Objection 2: Whatever an inferior power can do, that a superior power can do, not in the same way, but in a more excellent way; for example, the intellect knows sensible things in a more excellent way than sense knows them. So an angel can change corporeal matter in a more excellent way than can corporeal agents, that is by moving the corporeal agents themselves, as being the superior cause.

[33038] Iª q. 110 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod id quod potest virtus inferior, potest superior non eodem, sed excellentiori modo, sicut intellectus cognoscit sensibilia excellentiori modo quam sensus. Et sic Angelus excellentiori modo transmutat materiam corporalem quam agentia corporalia, scilicet movendo ipsa agentia corporalia, tanquam causa superior.

Reply to Objection 3: There is nothing to prevent some natural effect taking place by angelic power, for which the power of corporeal agents would not suffice. This, however, is not to obey an angel's will (as neither does matter obey the mere will of a cook, when by regulating the fire according to the prescription of his art he produces a dish that the fire could not have produced by itself); since to reduce matter to the act of the substantial form does not exceed the power of a corporeal agent; for it is natural for like to make like.

[33039] Iª q. 110 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil prohibet ex virtute Angelorum aliquos effectus sequi in rebus naturalibus, ad quae agentia corporalia non sufficerent. Sed hoc non est obedire materiam Angelis ad nutum; sicut nec coquis obedit materia ad nutum, quia aliquem modum decoctionis operantur per ignem secundum aliquam artis moderationem, quam ignis per se non faceret, cum reducere materiam in actum formae substantialis, non excedat virtutem corporalis agentis, quia simile natum est sibi simile facere.

Q. 110. A. 3. Whether bodies obey the angels as regards local motion?

Objection 1: It would seem that bodies do not obey the angels in local motion. For the local motion of natural bodies follows on their forms. But the angels do not cause the forms of natural bodies, as stated above (A[2]). Therefore neither can they cause in them local motion.

[33040] Iª q. 110 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpora non obediant Angelis ad motum localem. Motus enim localis corporum naturalium sequitur formas eorum. Sed Angeli non causant formas corporum naturalium, ut dictum est. Ergo neque possunt causare in eis motum localem.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 7) proves that local motion is the first of all movements. But the angels cannot cause other movements by a formal change of the matter. Therefore neither can they cause local motion.

[33041] Iª q. 110 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, in VIII Physic. probatur quod motus localis est primus motuum. Sed Angeli non possunt causare alios motus, transmutando materiam formaliter. Ergo neque etiam possunt causare motum localem.

Objection 3: Further, the corporeal members obey the concept of the soul as regards local

[33042] Iª q. 110 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, membra corporalia obediunt conceptioni animae ad motum

movement, as having in themselves some principle of life. In natural bodies, however, there is not vital principle. Therefore they do not obey the angels in local motion.

localem, inquantum habent in seipsis aliquod principium vitae. In corporibus autem naturalibus non est aliquod principium vitae. Ergo non obediunt Angelis ad motum localem.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9) that the angels use corporeal seed to produce certain effects. But they cannot do this without causing local movement. Therefore bodies obey them in local motion.

[33043] Iª q. 110 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod Angeli adhibent semina corporalia ad aliquos effectus producendos. Sed hoc non possunt facere nisi localiter movendo. Ergo corpora obediunt eis ad motum localem.

I answer that, As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "Divine wisdom has joined the ends of the first to the principles of the second." Hence it is clear that the inferior nature at its highest point is in conjunction with superior nature. Now corporeal nature is below the spiritual nature. But among all corporeal movements the most perfect is local motion, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 7). The reason of this is that what is moved locally is not as such in potentiality to anything intrinsic, but only to something extrinsic---that is, to place. Therefore the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved immediately by the spiritual nature as regards place. Hence also the philosophers asserted that the supreme bodies are moved locally by the spiritual substances; whence we see that the soul moves the body first and chiefly by a local motion.

[33044] Iª q. 110 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Dionysius dicit VII cap. de Div. Nom., *divina sapientia coniungit fines primorum principiis secundorum*, ex quo patet quod natura inferior in sui supremo attingitur a natura superiori. Natura autem corporalis est infra naturam spiritualem. Inter omnes autem motus corporeos perfectior est motus localis, ut probatur in VIII Physic., cuius ratio est, quia mobile secundum locum non est in potentia ad aliquid intrinsecum, inquantum huiusmodi, sed solum ad aliquid extrinsecum, scilicet ad locum. Et ideo natura corporalis nata est moveri immediate a natura spirituali secundum locum. Unde et philosophi posuerunt suprema corpora moveri localiter a spiritualibus substantiis. Unde videmus quod anima movet corpus primo et principaliter locali motu.

Reply to Objection 1: There are in bodies other local movements besides those which result from the forms; for instance, the ebb and flow of the sea does not follow from the substantial form of the water, but from the influence of the moon; and much more can local movements result from the power of spiritual substances.

[33045] Iª q. 110 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in corporibus sunt alii motus locales praeter eos qui consequuntur formas, sicut fluxus et refluxus maris non consequitur formam substantialem aquae, sed virtutem lunae. Et multo magis aliqui motus locales consequi possunt virtutem spiritualium substantiarum.

Reply to Objection 2: The angels, by causing local motion, as the first motion, can thereby cause other movements; that is, by employing corporeal agents to produce these effects, as a workman employs fire to soften iron.

[33046] Iª q. 110 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Angeli, causando motum localem tanquam priorem, per eum causare possunt alios motus, adhibendo scilicet agentia corporalia ad huiusmodi effectus producendos; sicut faber adhibet ignem ad emollitionem ferri.

Reply to Objection 3: The power of an angel is not so limited as is the power of the soul. Hence

[33047] Iª q. 110 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Angeli habent virtutem minus contractam

the motive power of the soul is limited to the body united to it, which is vivified by it, and by which it can move other things. But an angel's power is not limited to any body; hence it can move locally bodies not joined to it.

quam animae. Unde virtus motiva animae contrahitur ad corpus unitum, quod per eam vivificatur, quo mediante alia potest movere. Sed virtus Angeli non est contracta ad aliquod corpus. Unde potest corpora non coniuncta localiter movere.

Q. 110. A. 4. Whether angels can work miracles?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels can work miracles. For Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): "Those spirits are called virtues by whom signs and miracles are usually done."

[33048] Iª q. 110 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli possunt facere miracula. Dicit enim Gregorius, *virtutes vocantur illi spiritus, per quos signa et miracula frequentius fiunt*.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79) that "magicians work miracles by private contracts; good Christians by public justice, bad Christians by the signs of public justice." But magicians work miracles because they are "heard by the demons," as he says elsewhere in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent., sent. 4: among the suppositious works of St. Augustine]. Therefore the demons can work miracles. Therefore much more can the good angels.

[33049] Iª q. 110 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaestionum, *quod magi faciunt miracula per privatos contractus, boni Christiani per publicam iustitiam, mali Christiani per signa publicae iustitiae*. Sed magi faciunt miracula per hoc quod exaudiuntur a Daemonibus, ut ipse alibi in eodem libro dicit. Ergo Daemones miracula possunt facere. Ergo multo magis Angeli boni.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent., sent. 4: among the suppositious works of St. Augustine] that "it is not absurd to believe that all the things we see happen may be brought about by the lower powers that dwell in our atmosphere." But when an effect of natural causes is produced outside the order of the natural cause, we call it a miracle, as, for instance, when anyone is cured of a fever without the operation of nature. Therefore the angels and demons can work miracles.

[33050] Iª q. 110 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, Augustinus in eodem libro dicit quod *omnia quae visibiliter fiunt, etiam per inferiores potestates aeris huius non absurde fieri posse creduntur*. Sed quando effectus aliquis naturalium causarum producitur absque ordine naturalis causae, hoc dicimus esse miraculum; puta cum aliquis sanatur a febre, non per operationem naturae. Ergo Angeli et Daemones possunt facere miracula.

Objection 4: Further, superior power is not subject to the order of an inferior cause. But corporeal nature is inferior to an angel. Therefore an angel can work outside the order of corporeal agents; which is to work miracles.

[33051] Iª q. 110 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, virtus superior non subditur ordini inferioris causae. Sed natura corporalis est inferior Angelo. Ergo Angelus potest operari praeter ordinem corporalium agentium. Quod est miracula facere.

On the contrary, It is written of God (Ps. 135:4): "Who alone doth great wonders."

[33052] Iª q. 110 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod de Deo dicitur in Psalmo, *qui facit mirabilia magna solus*.

I answer that, A miracle properly so called is when something is done outside the order of nature. But it is not enough for a miracle if something is done outside the order of any particular nature; for otherwise anyone would perform a miracle by throwing a stone upwards, as such a thing is outside the order of the stone's nature. So for a miracle is required that it be against the order of the whole created nature. But God alone can do this, because, whatever an angel or any other creature does by its own power, is according to the order of created nature; and thus it is not a miracle. Hence God alone can work miracles.

[33053] Iª q. 110 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod miraculum proprie dicitur, cum aliquid fit praeter ordinem naturae. Sed non sufficit ad rationem miraculi si aliquid fiat praeter ordinem naturae alicuius particularis, quia sic, cum aliquis proiicit lapidem sursum, miraculum faceret, cum hoc sit praeter ordinem naturae lapidis. Ex hoc ergo aliquid dicitur esse miraculum, quod fit praeter ordinem totius naturae creatae. Hoc autem non potest facere nisi Deus, quia quidquid facit Angelus, vel quaecumque alia creatura, propria virtute, hoc fit secundum ordinem naturae creatae; et sic non est miraculum. Unde relinquitur quod solus Deus miracula facere possit.

Reply to Objection 1: Some angels are said to work miracles; either because God works miracles at their request, in the same way as holy men are said to work miracles; or because they exercise a kind of ministry in the miracles which take place; as in collecting the dust in the general resurrection, or by doing something of that kind.

[33054] Iª q. 110 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Angeli aliqui dicuntur miracula facere, vel quia ad eorum desiderium Deus miracula facit, sicut et sancti homines dicuntur miracula facere. Vel quia aliquod ministerium exhibent in miraculis quae fiunt; sicut colligendo pulveres in resurrectione communi, vel huiusmodi aliquid agendo.

Reply to Objection 2: Properly speaking, as said above, miracles are those things which are done outside the order of the whole created nature. But as we do not know all the power of created nature, it follows that when anything is done outside the order of created nature by a power unknown to us, it is called a miracle as regards ourselves. So when the demons do anything of their own natural power, these things are called "miracles" not in an absolute sense, but in reference to ourselves. In this way the magicians work miracles through the demons; and these are said to be done by "private contracts," forasmuch as every power of the creature, in the universe, may be compared to the power of a private person in a city. Hence when a magician does anything by compact with the devil, this is done as it were by private contract. On the other hand, the Divine justice is in the whole universe as the public law is in the city. Therefore good Christians, so far as they work miracles by Divine justice, are said to work miracles by "public justice": but bad Christians by the "signs of public justice," as by invoking the name of Christ, or by making use of other sacred signs.

[33055] Iª q. 110 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod miracula simpliciter loquendo, dicuntur, ut dictum est, cum aliqua fiunt praeter ordinem totius naturae creatae. Sed quia non omnis virtus naturae creatae est nota nobis, ideo cum aliquid fit praeter ordinem naturae creatae nobis notae, per virtutem creatam nobis ignotam, est miraculum quoad nos. Sic igitur cum Daemones aliquid faciunt sua virtute naturali, miracula dicuntur non simpliciter, sed quoad nos. Et hoc modo magi per Daemones miracula faciunt. Et dicuntur fieri per privatos contractus, quia quaelibet virtus creaturae in universo se habet ut virtus alicuius privatae personae in civitate; unde cum magus aliquid facit per pactum initum cum Daemone, hoc fit quasi per quendam privatum contractum. Sed iustitia divina est in toto universo sicut lex publica in civitate. Et ideo boni Christiani, inquantum per iustitiam divinam miracula faciunt, dicuntur facere miracula per publicam iustitiam. Mali autem Christiani per signa publicae iustitiae, sicut invocando nomen Christi, vel exhibendo aliqua sacramenta.

Reply to Objection 3: Spiritual powers are able to effect whatever happens in this visible world, by employing corporeal seeds by local movement.

[33056] Iª q. 110 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod spirituales potestates possunt facere ea quae visibiliter fiunt in hoc mundo, adhibendo corporalia semina per motum localem.

Reply to Objection 4: Although the angels can do something which is outside the order of corporeal nature, yet they cannot do anything outside the whole created order, which is essential to a miracle, as above explained.

[33057] Iª q. 110 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod, licet Angeli possint aliquid facere praeter ordinem naturae corporalis, non tamen possunt aliquid facere praeter ordinem totius creaturae, quod exigitur ad rationem miraculi, ut dictum est.

Q. 111. THE ACTION OF THE ANGELS ON MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)

We now consider the action of the angels on man, and inquire: (1) How far they can change them by their own natural power; (2) How they are sent by God to the ministry of men; (3) How they guard and protect men.

[33058] Iª q. 111 pr. Deinde considerandum est de actione Angelorum in homines. Et primo, quantum possint eos immutare sua virtute naturali; secundo, quomodo mittantur a Deo ad ministerium hominum; tertio, quomodo custodiant homines. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum Angelus possit illuminare intellectum hominis. Secundo, utrum possit immutare affectum eius. Tertio, utrum possit immutare imaginationem eius. Quarto, utrum possit immutare sensum eius.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether an angel can enlighten the human intellect?

(2) Whether he can change man's will?

(3) Whether he can change man's imagination?

(4) Whether he can change man's senses?

Q. 111. A. 1. Whether an angel can enlighten man?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot enlighten man. For man is enlightened by faith; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii) attributes enlightenment to baptism, as "the sacrament of faith." But faith is immediately from God, according to Eph. 2:8: "By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God." Therefore man is not enlightened by an angel; but immediately by God.

[33059] Iª q. 111 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus non possit illuminare hominem. Homo enim illuminatur per fidem, unde Dionysius, in Eccles. Hier., illuminationem attribuit Baptismo, qui est fidei sacramentum. Sed fides immediate est a Deo; secundum illud ad Ephes. II, *gratia estis salvati per fidem, et non ex vobis; Dei enim donum est*. Ergo homo non illuminatur ab Angelo, sed immediate a Deo.

Objection 2: Further, on the words, "God hath manifested it to them" (Rom. 1:19), the gloss observes that "not only natural reason availed for the manifestation of Divine truths to men, but God also revealed them by His work," that is, by His creature. But both are immediately from God--that is, natural reason and the creature. Therefore God enlightens man immediately.

[33060] Iª q. 111 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, super illud Rom. I, *Deus illis manifestavit*, dicit Glossa quod *non solum ratio naturalis ad hoc profuit ut divina hominibus manifestarentur, sed etiam Deus illis revelavit per opus suum*, scilicet per creaturam. Sed utrumque est a Deo immediate, scilicet ratio naturalis, et creatura. Ergo Deus immediate illuminat hominem.

Objection 3: Further, whoever is enlightened is conscious of being enlightened. But man is not conscious of being enlightened by angels. Therefore he is not enlightened by them.

[33061] Iª q. 111 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, quicumque illuminatur, cognoscit suam illuminationem. Sed homines non percipiunt se ab Angelis illuminari. Ergo non illuminantur ab eis.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that the revelation of Divine things reaches men through the ministry of the angels. But such

[33062] Iª q. 111 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Dionysius probat, in IV cap. Cael. Hier., quod revelationes divinorum perveniunt ad homines

revelation is an enlightenment as we have stated (Q[106], A[1]; Q[107], A[2]). Therefore men are enlightened by the angels.

mediantibus Angelis. Huiusmodi autem revelationes sunt illuminationes, ut supra dictum est. Ergo homines illuminantur per Angelos.

I answer that, Since the order of Divine Providence disposes that lower things be subject to the actions of higher, as explained above (Q[109], A[2]); as the inferior angels are enlightened by the superior, so men, who are inferior to the angels, are enlightened by them.

[33063] Iª q. 111 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum divinae providentiae ordo habeat ut actionibus superiorum inferiora subdantur, ut supra dictum est; sicut inferiores Angeli illuminantur per superiores, ita homines qui sunt Angelis inferiores, per eos illuminantur. Sed modus utriusque illuminationis quodammodo est similis, et quodammodo diversus. Dictum est enim supra quod illuminatio, quae est manifestatio divinae veritatis, secundum duo attenditur, scilicet secundum quod intellectus inferior confortatur per actionem intellectus superioris; et secundum quod proponuntur intellectui inferiori species intelligibiles quae sunt in superiori, ut capi possint ab inferiori. Et hoc quidem in Angelis fit, secundum quod superior Angelus veritatem universalem conceptam dividit secundum capacitatem inferioris Angeli, ut supra dictum est. Sed intellectus humanus non potest ipsam intelligibilem veritatem nudam capere, quia connaturale est ei ut intelligat per conversionem ad phantasmata, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo intelligibilem veritatem proponunt Angeli hominibus sub similitudinibus sensibilium; secundum illud quod dicit Dionysius, I cap. Cael. Hier., quod *impossibile est aliter nobis lucere divinum radium, nisi varietate sacrorum velaminum circumvelatum*. Ex alia vero parte, intellectus humanus, tanquam inferior, fortificatur per actionem intellectus angelici. Et secundum haec duo attenditur illuminatio qua homo illuminatur ab Angelo.

The modes of each of these kinds of enlightenment are in one way alike and in another way unlike. For, as was shown above (Q[106], A[1]), the enlightenment which consists in making known Divine truth has two functions; namely, according as the inferior intellect is strengthened by the action of the superior intellect, and according as the intelligible species which are in the superior intellect are proposed to the inferior so as to be grasped thereby. This takes place in the angels when the superior angel divides his universal concept of the truth according to the capacity of the inferior angel, as explained above (Q[106], A[1]).

The human intellect, however, cannot grasp the universal truth itself unveiled; because its nature requires it to understand by turning to the phantasms, as above explained (Q[84], A[7]). So the angels propose the intelligible truth to men under the similitudes of sensible things, according to what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i), that, "It is impossible for the divine ray to shine on us, otherwise than shrouded by the variety of the sacred veils." On the other hand, the human intellect as the inferior, is strengthened by the action of the angelic intellect. And in these two ways man is enlightened by an angel.

Reply to Objection 1: Two dispositions concur in the virtue of faith; first, the habit of the intellect whereby it is disposed to obey the will tending to Divine truth. For the intellect assents to the truth of faith, not as convinced by the reason, but as commanded by the will; hence Augustine says, "No one believes except willingly." In this respect faith comes from God alone. Secondly, faith requires that what is to be believed be proposed to the believer; which is accomplished by man, according to Rom. 10:17, "Faith cometh by

hearing"; principally, however, by the angels, by whom Divine things are revealed to men. Hence the angels have some part in the enlightenment of faith. Moreover, men are enlightened by the angels not only concerning what is to be believed; but also as regards what is to be done.

[33064] Iª q. 111 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad fidem duo concurrunt. Primo quidem habitus intellectus, quo disponitur ad obediendum voluntati tendenti in divinam veritatem, intellectus enim assentit veritati fidei, non quasi convictus ratione, sed quasi imperatus a voluntate; nullus enim credit nisi volens, ut Augustinus dicit. Et quantum ad hoc, fides est a solo Deo. Secundo requiritur ad fidem, quod credibilia proponantur credenti. Et hoc quidem fit per hominem, secundum quod fides est ex auditu, ut dicitur Rom. X; sed per Angelos principaliter, per quos hominibus revelantur divina. Unde Angeli operantur aliquid ad illuminationem fidei. Et tamen homines illuminantur ab Angelis non solum de credendis, sed etiam de agendis.

Reply to Objection 2: Natural reason, which is immediately from God, can be strengthened by an angel, as we have said above. Again, the more the human intellect is strengthened, so much higher an intelligible truth can be elicited from the species derived from creatures. Thus man is assisted by an angel so that he may obtain from creatures a more perfect knowledge of God.

[33065] Iª q. 111 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio naturalis, quae est immediate a Deo, potest per Angelum confortari, ut dictum est. Et similiter ex speciebus a creaturis acceptis, tanto altior elicitur intelligibilis veritas, quanto intellectus humanus fuerit fortior. Et sic per Angelum adiuvatur homo, ut ex creaturis perfectius in divinam cognitionem deveniat.

Reply to Objection 3: Intellectual operation and enlightenment can be understood in two ways. First, on the part of the object understood; thus whoever understands or is enlightened, knows that he understands or is enlightened, because he knows that the object is made known to him. Secondly, on the part of the principle; and thus it does not follow that whoever understands a truth, knows what the intellect is, which is the principle of the intellectual operation. In like manner not everyone who is enlightened by an angel, knows that he is enlightened by him.

[33066] Iª q. 111 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod operatio intellectualis, et illuminatio, dupliciter possunt considerari. Uno modo, ex parte rei intellectae, et sic quicumque intelligit vel illuminatur, cognoscit se intelligere vel illuminari; quia cognoscit rem sibi esse manifestam. Alio modo, ex parte principii, et sic non quicumque intelligit aliquam veritatem, cognoscit quid sit intellectus, qui est principium intellectualis operationis. Et similiter non quicumque illuminatur ab Angelo, cognoscit se ab Angelo illuminari.

Q. 111. A. 2. Whether the angels can change the will of man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels can change the will of man. For, upon the text, "Who maketh His angels spirits and His ministers a flame of fire" (Heb. 1:7), the gloss notes that "they are fire, as being spiritually fervent, and as burning away our vices." This could not be, however, unless they changed the will. Therefore the angels can change the will.

[33067] Iª q. 111 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli possint immutare voluntatem hominis. Quia super illud Heb. I, *qui facit Angelos suos spiritus, et ministros suos flammam ignis*, dicit Glossa quod *ignis sunt, dum spiritu fervent, et vitia nostra urunt*. Sed hoc non esset, nisi voluntatem immutarent. Ergo Angeli possunt immutare voluntatem.

Objection 2: Further, Bede says (Super Matth. xv, 11), that, "the devil does not send wicked thoughts, but kindles them." Damascene, however, says that he also sends them; for he remarks that "every malicious act and unclean passion is contrived by the demons and put into men" (De Fide Orth. ii, 4); in like manner also the good angels introduce and kindle good thoughts. But this could only be if they changed the will. Therefore the will is changed by them.

[33068] Iª q. 111 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, Beda dicit quod *Diabolus non est immissor malarum cogitationum, sed incensor*. Damascenus autem ulterius dicit quod etiam est immissor, dicit enim in II libro, quod *omnis malitia et immundae passiones ex Daemonibus excogitatae sunt, et immittere homini sunt concessi*. Et pari ratione, Angeli boni immittunt et incendunt bonas cogitationes. Sed hoc non possent facere, nisi immutarent voluntatem. Ergo immutant voluntatem.

Objection 3: Further, the angel, as above explained, enlightens the human intellect by means of the phantasms. But as the imagination which serves the intellect can be changed by an angel, so can the sensitive appetite which serves the will, because it also is a faculty using a corporeal organ. Therefore as the angel enlightens the mind, so can he change the will.

[33069] Iª q. 111 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, Angelus, sicut est dictum, illuminat intellectum hominis mediantibus phantasmatibus. Sed sicut phantasia, quae deservit intellectui, potest immutari ab Angelo; ita et appetitus sensitivus qui deservit voluntati, quia et ipse etiam est vis utens organo corporali. Ergo sicut illuminat intellectum, ita potest immutare voluntatem.

On the contrary, To change the will belongs to God alone, according to Prov. 21:1: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, whithersoever He will He shall turn it."

[33070] Iª q. 111 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod immutare voluntatem est proprium Dei; secundum illud Prov. XXI, *cor regis in manu domini; quocumque voluerit, vertet illud*.

I answer that, The will can be changed in two ways. First, from within; in which way, since the movement of the will is nothing but the inclination of the will to the thing willed, God alone can thus change the will, because He gives the power of such an inclination to the intellectual nature. For as the natural inclination is from God alone Who gives the nature, so the inclination of the will is from God alone, Who causes the will.

Secondly, the will is moved from without. As regards an angel, this can be only in one way---by the good apprehended by the intellect. Hence in as far as anyone may be the cause why anything be apprehended as an appetible good, so far does he move the will. In this way also God alone can move the will efficaciously; but an angel and man move the will by way of persuasion, as above explained (Q[106], A[2]).

In addition to this mode the human will can be moved from without in another way; namely, by the passion residing in the sensitive appetite: thus by concupiscence or anger the will is inclined to

[33071] Iª q. 111 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod voluntas potest immutari dupliciter. Uno modo, ab interiori. Et sic cum motus voluntatis non sit aliud quam inclinatio voluntatis in rem volitam, solius Dei est sic immutare voluntatem, qui dat naturae intellectuali virtutem talis inclinationis. Sicut enim inclinatio naturalis non est nisi a Deo qui dat naturam; ita inclinatio voluntaria non est nisi a Deo, qui causat voluntatem. Alio modo movetur voluntas ab exteriori. Et hoc in Angelo est quidem uno modo tantum, scilicet a bono apprehenso per intellectum. Unde secundum quod aliquis est causa quod aliquid apprehendatur ut bonum ad appetendum, secundum hoc movet voluntatem. Et sic etiam solus Deus efficaciter potest movere voluntatem; Angelus autem et homo per modum suadentis, ut supra dictum est. Sed praeter hunc modum, etiam aliter movetur in hominibus voluntas ab exteriori, scilicet ex passione existente circa appetitum sensitivum; sicut ex concupiscentia vel ira inclinatur voluntas ad aliquid volendum. Et sic etiam Angeli, inquantum possunt concitare huiusmodi passiones, possunt

will something. In this manner the angels, as being able to rouse these passions, can move the will, not however by necessity, for the will ever remains free to consent to, or to resist, the passion.

voluntatem movere. Non tamen ex necessitate, quia voluntas semper remanet libera ad consentiendum vel resistendum passioni.

Reply to Objection 1: Those who act as God's ministers, either men or angels, are said to burn away vices, and to incite to virtue by way of persuasion.

[33072] Iª q. 111 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ministri Dei, vel homines vel Angeli, dicuntur urere vitia, et inflammare ad virtutes, per modum persuasionis.

Reply to Objection 2: The demon cannot put thoughts in our minds by causing them from within, since the act of the cogitative faculty is subject to the will; nevertheless the devil is called the kindler of thoughts, inasmuch as he incites to thought, by the desire of the things thought of, by way of persuasion, or by rousing the passions. Damascene calls this kindling "a putting in" because such a work is accomplished within. But good thoughts are attributed to a higher principle, namely, God, though they may be procured by the ministry of the angels.

[33073] Iª q. 111 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Daemones non possunt immittere cogitationes, interius eas causando, cum usus cogitativae virtutis subiaceat voluntati. Dicitur tamen Diabolus incensor cogitationum, inquantum incitat ad cogitandum, vel ad appetendum cogitata, per modum persuadentis, vel passionem concitantis. Et hoc ipsum incendere Damascenus vocat immittere, quia talis operatio interius fit. Sed bonae cogitationes attribuuntur altiori principio, scilicet Deo; licet Angelorum ministerio procurentur.

Reply to Objection 3: The human intellect in its present state can understand only by turning to the phantasms; but the human will can will something following the judgment of reason rather than the passion of the sensitive appetite. Hence the comparison does not hold.

[33074] Iª q. 111 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod intellectus humanus, secundum praesentem statum, non potest intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata; sed voluntas humana potest aliquid velle ex iudicio rationis, non sequendo passionem appetitus sensitivi. Unde non est simile.

Q. 111. A. 3. Whether an angel can change man's imagination?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot change man's imagination. For the phantasy, as is said De Anima iii, is "a motion caused by the sense in act." But if this motion were caused by an angel, it would not be caused by the sense in act. Therefore it is contrary to the nature of the phantasy, which is the act of the imaginative faculty, to be changed by an angel.

[33075] Iª q. 111 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus non possit immutare imaginationem hominis. Phantasia enim, ut dicitur in libro de anima, est motus factus a sensu secundum actum. Sed si fieret per immutationem Angeli, non fieret a sensu secundum actum. Ergo est contra rationem phantasiae, quae est actus imaginativae virtutis, ut sit per immutationem Angeli.

Objection 2: Further, since the forms in the imagination are spiritual, they are nobler than the forms existing in sensible matter. But an angel cannot impress forms upon sensible matter (

[33076] Iª q. 111 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, formae quae sunt in imaginatione, cum sint spirituales, sunt nobiliores formis quae sunt in materia sensibili. Sed Angelus non potest imprimere

Q[110], A[2]). Therefore he cannot impress forms on the imagination, and so he cannot change it.

formas in materia sensibili, ut dictum est. Ergo non potest imprimere formas in imaginatione. Et ita non potest eam immutare.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 12): "One spirit by intermingling with another can communicate his knowledge to the other spirit by these images, so that the latter either understands it himself, or accepts it as understood by the other." But it does not seem that an angel can be mingled with the human imagination, nor that the imagination can receive the knowledge of an angel. Therefore it seems that an angel cannot change the imagination.

[33077] Iª q. 111 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, XII super Gen. ad Litt., *commixtione alterius spiritus fieri potest ut ea quae ipse scit, per huiusmodi imagines ei cui miscetur ostendat, sive intelligenti, sive ut ab alio intellecta pandantur*. Sed non videtur quod Angelus possit misceri imaginationi humanae; neque quod imaginatio possit capere intelligibilia, quae Angelus cognoscit. Ergo videtur quod Angelus non possit mutare imaginationem.

Objection 4: Further, in the imaginative vision man cleaves to the similitudes of the things as to the things themselves. But in this there is deception. So as a good angel cannot be the cause of deception, it seems that he cannot cause the imaginative vision, by changing the imagination.

[33078] Iª q. 111 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, in visione imaginaria homo adhaeret similitudinibus rerum quasi ipsis rebus. Sed in hoc est quaedam deceptio. Cum ergo Angelus bonus non possit esse causa deceptionis, videtur quod non possit causare imaginariam visionem, imaginationem immutando.

On the contrary, Those things which are seen in dreams are seen by imaginative vision. But the angels reveal things in dreams, as appears from Mat. 1:20;[2]:13,[19] in regard to the angel who appeared to Joseph in dreams. Therefore an angel can move the imagination.

[33079] Iª q. 111 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod ea quae apparent in somnis, videntur imaginaria visione. Sed Angeli revelant aliqua in somnis; ut patet Matth. I et II, de Angelo qui Ioseph in somnis apparuit. Ergo Angelus potest imaginationem movere.

I answer that, Both a good and a bad angel by their own natural power can move the human imagination. This may be explained as follows. For it was said above (Q[110], A[3]), that corporeal nature obeys the angel as regards local movement, so that whatever can be caused by the local movement of bodies is subject to the natural power of the angels. Now it is manifest that imaginative apparitions are sometimes caused in us by the local movement of animal spirits and humors. Hence Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.) [*De Insomniis iii.], when assigning the cause of visions in dreams, that "when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and movements descend with it," that is, the impressions left from the movements are preserved in the animal spirits, "and move the sensitive principle"; so that a certain appearance ensues, as if the sensitive principle were being

[33080] Iª q. 111 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod Angelus, tam bonus quam malus, virtute naturae suae potest movere imaginationem hominis. Quod quidem sic considerari potest. Dictum est enim supra quod natura corporalis obedit Angelo ad motum localem. Illa ergo quae ex motu locali aliquorum corporum possunt causari, subsunt virtuti naturali Angelorum. Manifestum est autem quod apparitiones imaginariae causantur interdum in nobis ex locali mutatione corporalium spirituum et humorum. Unde Aristoteles, in Lib. de Somn. et Vig., assignans causam apparitionis somniorum, dicit quod, cum animal dormit, descendente plurimo sanguine ad principium sensitivum, simul descendunt motus, idest impressiones relictae ex sensibilium motionibus, quae in spiritibus sensualibus conservantur, et movent principium sensitivum, ita quod fit quaedam apparitio, ac si

then changed by the external objects themselves. Indeed, the commotion of the spirits and humors may be so great that such appearances may even occur to those who are awake, as is seen in mad people, and the like. So, as this happens by a natural disturbance of the humors, and sometimes also by the will of man who voluntarily imagines what he previously experienced, so also the same may be done by the power of a good or a bad angel, sometimes with alienation from the bodily senses, sometimes without such alienation.

tunc principium sensitivum a rebus ipsis exterioribus mutaretur. Et tanta potest esse commotio spirituum et humorum, quod huiusmodi apparitiones etiam vigilantibus fiant; sicut patet in phreneticis, et in aliis huiusmodi. Sicut igitur hoc fit per naturalem commotionem humorum; et quandoque etiam per voluntatem hominis, qui voluntarie imaginatur quod prius senserat, ita etiam hoc potest fieri virtute Angeli boni vel mali, quandoque quidem cum alienatione a corporeis sensibus, quandoque autem absque tali alienatione.

Reply to Objection 1: The first principle of the imagination is from the sense in act. For we cannot imagine what we have never perceived by the senses, either wholly or partly; as a man born blind cannot imagine color. Sometimes, however, the imagination is informed in such a way that the act of the imaginative movement arises from the impressions preserved within.

[33081] Iª q. 111 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod primum principium phantasiae est a sensu secundum actum, non enim possumus imaginari quae nullo modo sensimus, vel secundum totum vel secundum partem; sicut caecus natus non potest imaginari colorem. Sed aliquando imaginatio informatur, ut actus phantastici motus consurgat, ab impressionibus interius conservatis, ut dictum est.

Reply to Objection 2: An angel changes the imagination, not indeed by the impression of an imaginative form in no way previously received from the senses (for he cannot make a man born blind imagine color), but by local movement of the spirits and humors, as above explained.

[33082] Iª q. 111 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Angelus transmutat imaginationem, non quidem imprimendo aliquam formam imaginariam nullo modo per sensum prius acceptam (non enim posset facere quod caecus imaginaretur colores), sed hoc facit per motum localem spirituum et humorum, ut dictum est.

Reply to Objection 3: The commingling of the angelic spirit with the human imagination is not a mingling of essences, but by reason of an effect which he produces in the imagination in the way above stated; so that he shows man what he [the angel] knows, but not in the way he knows.

[33083] Iª q. 111 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod commixtio illa spiritus angelici ad imaginationem humanam, non est per essentiam, sed per effectum quem praedicto modo in imaginatione facit; cui demonstrat quae ipse novit, non tamen eo modo quo ipse novit.

Reply to Objection 4: An angel causing an imaginative vision, sometimes enlightens the intellect at the same time, so that it knows what these images signify; and then there is not deception. But sometimes by the angelic operation the similitudes of things only appear in the imagination; but neither then is deception caused by the angel, but by the defect in the intellect to whom such things appear. Thus neither was Christ a cause of deception when He spoke

[33084] Iª q. 111 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod Angelus causans aliquam imaginariam visionem, quandoque quidem simul intellectum illuminat, ut cognoscat quid per huiusmodi similitudines significetur, et tunc nulla est deceptio. Quandoque vero per operationem Angeli solummodo similitudines rerum apparent in imaginatione, nec tamen tunc causatur deceptio ab Angelo, sed ex defectu intellectus eius cui talia apparent. Sicut nec Christus fuit causa deceptionis

many things to the people in parables, which He did not explain to them.

in hoc quod multa turbis in parabolis proposuit, quae non exposuit eis.

Q. 111. A. 4. Whether an angel can change the human senses?

Objection 1: It seems that an angel cannot change the human senses. For the sensitive operation is a vital operation. But such an operation does not come from an extrinsic principle. Therefore the sensitive operation cannot be caused by an angel.

[33085] Iª q. 111 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus non possit immutare sensum humanum. Operatio enim sensitiva est operatio vitae. Huiusmodi autem operatio non est a principio extrinseco. Non ergo operatio sensitiva potest causari ab Angelo.

Objection 2: Further, the sensitive operation is nobler than the nutritive. But the angel cannot change the nutritive power, nor other natural forms. Therefore neither can he change the sensitive power.

[33086] Iª q. 111 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, virtus sensitiva est nobilior quam nutritiva. Sed Angelus, ut videtur, non potest mutare virtutem nutritivam; sicut nec alias formas naturales. Ergo neque virtutem sensitivam immutare potest.

Objection 3: Further, the senses are naturally moved by the sensible objects. But an angel cannot change the order of nature (Q[110], A[4]). Therefore an angel cannot change the senses; but these are changed always by the sensible object.

[33087] Iª q. 111 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, sensus naturaliter movetur a sensibili. Sed Angelus non potest immutare naturae ordinem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo Angelus non potest immutare sensum, sed semper sensus a sensibili immutatur.

On the contrary, The angels who overturned Sodom, "struck the people of Sodom with blindness or {aorasia}, so that they could not find the door" (Gn. 19:11). [*It is worth noting that these are the only two passages in the Greek version where the word {aorasia} appears. It expresses, in fact, the effect produced on the people of Sodom---namely, dazzling (French version, "eblouissement"), which the Latin "caecitas" (blindness) does not necessarily imply.] The same is recorded of the Syrians whom Eliseus led into Samaria (4 Kings 6:18).

[33088] Iª q. 111 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Angeli qui subverterunt Sodomam, *percusserunt Sodomitas caecitate (vel aorasia), ut ostium domus invenire non possent*, ut dicitur Gen. XIX. Et simile legitur IV Reg. VI, de Syris quos Elisaeus duxit in Samariam.

I answer that, The senses may be changed in a twofold manner; from without, as when affected by the sensible object: and from within, for we see that the senses are changed when the spirits and humors are disturbed; as for example, a sick man's tongue, charged with choleric humor, tastes everything as bitter, and the like with the other senses. Now an angel, by his natural power, can work a change in the senses both ways. For an angel can offer the senses a sensible object from without, formed by nature or by the angel himself,

[33089] Iª q. 111 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod sensus immutatur dupliciter. Uno modo, ab exteriori; sicut cum mutatur a sensibili. Alio modo, ab interiori, videmus enim quod, perturbatis spiritibus et humoribus immutatur sensus; lingua enim infirmi, quia plena est cholerico humore, omnia sentit ut amara; et simile contingit in aliis sensibus. Utroque autem modo Angelus potest immutare sensum hominis sua naturali virtute. Potest enim Angelus opponere exterius sensui sensibile aliquod, vel a natura

as when he assumes a body, as we have said above (Q[51], A[2]). Likewise he can move the spirits and humors from within, as above remarked, whereby the senses are changed in various ways.

formatum, vel aliquod de novo formando; sicut facit dum corpus assumit, ut supra dictum est. Similiter etiam potest interius commovere spiritus et humores, ut supra dictum est, ex quibus sensus diversimode immutentur.

Reply to Objection 1: The principle of the sensitive operation cannot be without the interior principle which is the sensitive power; but this interior principle can be moved in many ways by the exterior principle, as above explained.

[33090] Iª q. 111 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod principium sensitivae operationis non potest esse absque principio interiori, quod est potentia sensitiva, sed illud interius principium potest multipliciter ab exteriori principio commoveri, ut dictum est.

Reply to Objection 2: By the interior movement of the spirits and humors an angel can do something towards changing the act of the nutritive power, and also of the appetitive and sensitive power, and of any other power using a corporeal organ.

[33091] Iª q. 111 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam per commotionem interiorem spirituum et humorum, potest Angelus aliquid operari ad immutandum actum potentiae nutritivae. Et similiter potentiae appetitivae, et sensitivae, et cuiuscumque potentiae corporali organo utentis.

Reply to Objection 3: An angel can do nothing outside the entire order of creatures; but he can outside some particular order of nature, since he is not subject to that order; thus in some special way an angel can work a change in the senses outside the common mode of nature.

[33092] Iª q. 111 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod praeter ordinem totius creaturae Angelus facere non potest, sed praeter ordinem alicuius particularis naturae facere potest, cum tali ordini non subdatur. Et sic quodam singulari modo potest sensum immutare, praeter modum communem.

Q. 112. THE MISSION OF THE ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We next consider the mission of the angels. Under this head arise four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether any angels are sent on works of ministry?

(2) Whether all are sent?

(3) Whether those who are sent, assist?

(4) From what orders they are sent.

[33093] Iª q. 112 pr. Deinde considerandum est de missione Angelorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum aliqui Angeli mittantur in ministerium. Secundo, utrum omnes mittantur. Tertio, utrum illi qui mittuntur, assistant. Quarto, de quibus ordinibus mittantur.

Q. 112. A. 1. Whether the angels are sent on works of ministry?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not sent on works of ministry. For every mission is to some determinate place. But intellectual actions do not determine a place, for intellect abstracts from the "here" and "now." Since therefore the angelic actions are intellectual, it appears that the angels are not sent to perform their own actions.

[33094] Iª q. 112 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli in ministerium non mittantur. Omnis enim missio est ad aliquem determinatum locum. Sed actiones intellectuales non determinant aliquem locum, quia intellectus abstrahit ab hic et nunc. Cum igitur actiones angelicae sint intellectuales, videtur quod Angeli ad suas actiones agendas non mittantur.

Objection 2: Further, the empyrean heaven is the place that beseems the angelic dignity. Therefore if they are sent to us in ministry, it seems that something of their dignity would be lost; which is unseemly.

[33095] Iª q. 112 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, caelum Empyreum est locus pertinens ad dignitatem Angelorum. Si igitur ad nos mittantur in ministerium, videtur quod eorum dignitati aliquid depereat. Quod est inconveniens.

Objection 3: Further, external occupation hinders the contemplation of wisdom; hence it is said: "He that is less in action, shall receive wisdom" (Ecclus. 38:25). So if some angels are sent on external ministrations, they would seemingly be hindered from contemplation. But the whole of their beatitude consists in the contemplation of God. So if they were sent, their beatitude would be lessened; which is unfitting.

[33096] Iª q. 112 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, exterior occupatio impedit sapientiae contemplationem, unde dicitur Eccli. XXXVIII, *qui minoratur actu, percipiet sapientiam*. Si igitur Angeli aliqui mittuntur ad exteriora ministeria, videtur quod retardentur a contemplatione. Sed tota eorum beatitudo in contemplatione Dei consistit. Si ergo mitterentur, eorum beatitudo minueretur. Quod est inconveniens.

Objection 4: Further, to minister is the part of an inferior; hence it is written (Lk. 22:27): "Which is the greater, he that sitteth at table, or he that serveth? is not he that sitteth at table?" But the angels are naturally greater than we are. Therefore they are not sent to administer to us.

[33097] Iª q. 112 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, ministrare est inferioris, unde dicitur Lucae XXII, *quis maior est, qui recumbit, an ille qui ministrat? Nonne qui recumbit?* Sed Angeli sunt maiores nobis ordine naturae. Ergo non mittuntur in ministerium nostrum.

On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 23:20): "Behold I will send My angels who shall go before thee."

[33098] Iª q. 112 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Exod. XXIII, *ecce ego mittam Angelum meum, qui praecedat te*.

I answer that, From what has been said above (Q[108], A[6]), it may be shown that some angels are sent in ministry by God. For, as we have already stated (Q[43], A[1]), in treating of the mission of the Divine Persons, he is said to be sent who in any way proceeds from another so as to begin to be where he was not, or to be in another way, where he already was. Thus the Son, or the Holy Ghost is said to be sent as proceeding from the Father by origin; and begins to be in a new way, by grace or by the nature assumed, where He was before by the presence of His Godhead; for it belongs to God to be present everywhere, because, since He is the universal agent, His power reaches to all being, and hence He exists in all things (Q[8], A[1]). An angel's power, however, as a particular agent, does not reach to the whole universe, but reaches to one thing in such a way as not to reach another; and so he is "here" in such a manner as not to be "there." But it is clear from what was above stated (Q[110], A[1]), that the corporeal creature is governed by the angels. Hence, whenever an angel has to perform any work concerning a corporeal creature, the angel applies himself anew to that body by his power; and in that way begins to be there afresh. Now all this takes place by Divine command. Hence it follows that an angel is sent by God.

Yet the action performed by the angel who is sent, proceeds from God as from its first principle, at Whose nod and by Whose authority the angels work; and is reduced to God as to its last end. Now this is what is meant by a minister: for a minister is an intelligent instrument; while an instrument is moved by another, and its action is ordered to another. Hence angels' actions are called 'ministries'; and for this reason they are said to be sent in ministry.

[33099] Iª q. 112 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ex supra dictis manifestum esse potest quod aliqui Angeli in ministerium mittuntur a Deo. Ut enim supra dictum est, cum de missione divinarum personarum ageretur, ille mitti dicitur, qui aliquo modo ab alio procedit, ut incipiat esse ubi prius non erat, vel ubi prius erat, per alium modum. Filius enim aut spiritus sanctus mitti dicitur, ut a patre procedens per originem; et incipit esse novo modo, idest per gratiam vel per naturam assumptam, ubi prius erat per deitatis praesentiam. Dei enim proprium est ubique esse, quia cum sit universale agens, eius virtus attingit omnia entia; unde est in omnibus rebus, ut supra dictum est. Virtus autem Angeli, cum sit particulare agens, non attingit totum universum; sed sic attingit unum, quod non attingit aliud. Et ideo ita est hic, quod non alibi. Manifestum est autem per supra dicta, quod creatura corporalis per Angelos administratur. Cum igitur aliquid est fiendum per aliquem Angelum circa aliquam creaturam corpoream, de novo applicatur Angelus illi corpori sua virtute; et sic Angelus de novo incipit ibi esse. Et hoc totum procedit ex imperio divino. Unde sequitur, secundum praemissa, quod Angelus a Deo mittatur. Sed actio quam Angelus missus exercet, procedit a Deo sicut a primo principio, cuius nutu et auctoritate Angeli operantur; et in Deum reducitur sicut in ultimum finem. Et hoc facit rationem ministri, nam minister est sicut instrumentum intelligens; instrumentum autem ab alio movetur, et eius actio ad aliud ordinatur. Unde actiones Angelorum ministeria vocantur; et propter hoc dicuntur in ministerium mitti.

Reply to Objection 1: An operation can be intellectual in two ways. In one way, as dwelling in the intellect itself, as contemplation; such an operation does not demand to occupy a place; indeed, as Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "Even

[33100] Iª q. 112 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliqua operatio dupliciter dicitur intellectualis. Uno modo, quasi in ipso intellectu consistens, ut contemplatio. Et talis operatio non determinat sibi locum, immo, ut Augustinus dicit

we ourselves as mentally tasting something eternal, are not in this world." In another sense an action is said to be intellectual because it is regulated and commanded by some intellect; in that sense the intellectual operations evidently have sometimes a determinate place.

IV de Trin., *etiam nos, secundum quod aliquid aeternum mente sapimus, non in hoc mundo sumus*. Alio modo dicitur aliqua actio intellectualis, quia est ab aliquo intellectu regulata et imperata. Et sic manifestum est quod operationes intellectuales interdum determinant sibi loca.

Reply to Objection 2: The empyrean heaven belongs to the angelic dignity by way of congruity; forasmuch as it is congruous that the higher body should be attributed to that nature which occupies a rank above bodies. Yet an angel does not derive his dignity from the empyrean heaven; so when he is not actually in the empyrean heaven, nothing of his dignity is lost, as neither does a king lessen his dignity when not actually sitting on his regal throne, which suits his dignity.

[33101] Iª q. 112 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod caelum Empyreum pertinet ad dignitatem Angeli secundum congruentiam quandam, quia congruum est ut supremum corporum naturae quae est supra omnia corpora, attribuatur. Non tamen Angelus aliquid dignitatis accipit a caelo Empyreo. Et ideo quando actu non est in caelo Empyreo, nihil eius dignitati subtrahitur, sicut nec regi, quando non actu sedet in regali solio, quod congruit eius dignitati.

Reply to Objection 3: In ourselves the purity of contemplation is obscured by exterior occupation; because we give ourselves to action through the sensitive faculties, the action of which when intense impedes the action of the intellectual powers. An angel, on the contrary, regulates his exterior actions by intellectual operation alone. Hence it follows that his external occupations in no respect impede his contemplation; because given two actions, one of which is the rule and the reason of the other, one does not hinder but helps the other. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "the angels do not go abroad in such a manner as to lose the delights of inward contemplation."

[33102] Iª q. 112 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in nobis exterior occupatio puritatem contemplationis impedit, quia actioni insistimus secundum sensitivas vires, quarum actiones cum intenduntur, retardantur actiones intellectivae virtutis. Sed Angelus per solam intellectualem operationem regulat suas actiones exteriores. Unde actiones exteriores in nullo impediunt eius contemplationem, quia duarum actionum quarum una est regula et ratio alterius, una non impedit, sed iuvat aliam. Unde Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., quod *Angeli non sic foris exeunt, ut internae contemplationis gaudiis priventur*.

Reply to Objection 4: In their external actions the angels chiefly minister to God, and secondarily to us; not because we are superior to them, absolutely speaking, but because, since every man or angel by cleaving to God is made one spirit with God, he is thereby superior to every creature. Hence the Apostle says (Phil. 2:3): "Esteeming others better than themselves."

[33103] Iª q. 112 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod Angeli in suis actionibus exterioribus ministrant principaliter Deo, et secundario nobis. Non quia nos sumus superiores eis, simpliciter loquendo, sed quilibet homo vel Angelus, inquantum adhaerendo Deo fit unus spiritus cum Deo, est superior omni creatura. Unde apostolus, ad Philipp. II, dicit, *superiores sibi invicem arbitrantes*.

Q. 112. A. 2. Whether all the angels are sent in ministry?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels are sent in ministry. For the Apostle says (Heb.

[33104] Iª q. 112 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnes Angeli in

1:14): "All are ministering spirits, sent to minister" [Vulg. 'Are they not all . . . ?'].

ministerium mittantur. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Heb. I, *omnes sunt administratorii spiritus, in ministerium missi*.

Objection 2: Further, among the orders, the highest is that of the Seraphim, as stated above (Q[108], A[6]). But a Seraph was sent to purify the lips of the prophet (Is. 6:6,7). Therefore much more are the inferior orders sent.

[33105] Iª q. 112 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, inter ordines supremus est ordo Seraphim, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed Seraphim est missus ad purgandum labia prophetae, ut habetur Isaiae VI. Ergo multo magis inferiores Angeli mittuntur.

Objection 3: Further, the Divine Persons infinitely excel all the angelic orders. But the Divine Persons are sent. Therefore much more are even the highest angels sent.

[33106] Iª q. 112 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, divinae personae in infinitum excedunt omnes ordines Angelorum. Sed divinae personae mittuntur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo multo magis quicumque supremi Angeli.

Objection 4: Further, if the superior angels are not sent to the external ministries, this can only be because the superior angels execute the Divine ministries by means of the inferior angels. But as all the angels are unequal, as stated above (Q[50], A[4]), each angel has an angel inferior to himself except the last one. Therefore only the last angel would be sent in ministry; which contradicts the words, "Thousands of thousands ministered to Him" (Dan. 7:10).

[33107] Iª q. 112 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, si superiores Angeli non mittuntur ad exterius ministerium, hoc non est nisi quia superiores Angeli exequuntur divina ministeria per inferiores. Sed cum omnes Angeli sint inaequales, ut supra dictum est, quilibet Angelus habet inferiorem Angelum, praeter ultimum. Ergo unus Angelus solus ministraret in ministerium missus. Quod est contra id quod dicitur Daniel VII, *millia millium ministrabant ei*.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), quoting the statement of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), that "the higher ranks fulfil no exterior service."

[33108] Iª q. 112 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, referens sententiam Dionysii, *superiora agmina usum exterioris ministerii nequaquam habent*.

I answer that, As appears from what has been said above (Q[106], A[3]; Q[110], A[1]), the order of Divine Providence has so disposed not only among the angels, but also in the whole universe, that inferior things are administered by the superior. But the Divine dispensation, however, this order is sometimes departed from as regards corporeal things, for the sake of a higher order, that is, according as it is suitable for the manifestation of grace. That the man born blind was enlightened, that Lazarus was raised from the dead, was accomplished immediately by God without the action of the heavenly bodies. Moreover both good and bad angels can work some effect in these bodies independently of the heavenly bodies, by the condensation of the

[33109] Iª q. 112 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, hoc habet ordo divinae providentiae, non solum in Angelis, sed etiam in toto universo, quod inferiora per superiora administrantur, sed ab hoc ordine in rebus corporalibus aliquando ex divina dispensatione receditur, propter altiorem ordinem, secundum scilicet quod expedit ad gratiae manifestationem. Quod enim caecus natus fuit illuminatus, quod Lazarus fuit suscitatus, immediate a Deo factum est, absque aliqua actione caelestium corporum. Sed et Angeli boni et mali possunt aliquid in istis corporibus operari praeter actionem caelestium corporum, condensando nubes in pluvias, et aliqua huiusmodi faciendo. Neque alicui debet esse

clouds to rain, and by producing some such effects. Nor can anyone doubt that God can immediately reveal things to men without the help of the angels, and the superior angels without the inferior. From this standpoint some have said that according to the general law the superior angels are not sent, but only the inferior; yet that sometimes, by Divine dispensation, the superior angels also are sent.

dubium quin Deus immediate hominibus aliqua revelare posset, non mediantibus Angelis; et superiores Angeli, non mediantibus inferioribus. Et secundum hanc considerationem, quidam dixerunt quod, secundum communem legem, superiores non mittuntur, sed inferiores tantum; sed ex aliqua dispensatione divina, interdum etiam superiores mittuntur. Sed hoc non videtur rationabile. Quia ordo angelicus attenditur secundum dona gratiarum. Ordo autem gratiae non habet alium superiorem ordinem, propter quem praetermitti debeat, sicut praetermittitur ordo naturae propter ordinem gratiae. Considerandum est etiam quod ordo naturae in operationibus miraculorum praetermittitur, propter fidei confirmationem. Ad quam nihil valeret, si praetermitteretur ordo angelicus, quia hoc a nobis percipi non posset. Nihil etiam est ita magnum in ministeriis divinis, quod per inferiores ordines exerceri non possit. Unde Gregorius dicit quod *qui summa annuntiant, Archangeli vocantur. Hinc est quod ad virginem Mariam Gabriel Archangelus mittitur*. Quod tamen fuit summum inter omnia divina ministeria, ut ibidem subditur. Et ideo simpliciter dicendum est, cum Dionysio, quod superiores Angeli nunquam ad exterius ministerium mittuntur.

It may also be said that the Apostle wishes to prove that Christ is greater than the angels who were chosen as the messengers of the law; in order that He might show the excellence of the new over the old law. Hence there is no need to apply this to any other angels besides those who were sent to give the law.

[33110] Iª q. 112 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut in missionibus divinarum personarum aliqua est visibilis, quae attenditur secundum creaturam corpoream; aliqua invisibilis, quae fit secundum spiritualem effectum, ita in missionibus Angelorum aliqua dicitur exterior, quae scilicet est ad aliquod ministerium circa corporalia exhibendum, et secundum hanc missionem non omnes mittuntur; alia est interior, secundum intellectuales effectus, prout scilicet unus Angelus illuminat alium, et sic omnes Angeli mittuntur. Vel aliter dicendum quod apostolus inducit illud ad probandum quod Christus sit maior Angelis per quos data est lex; ut sic ostendat excellentiam novae legis ad veterem. Unde non oportet quod intelligatur nisi de Angelis ministerii, per quos data est lex.

Reply to Objection 2: According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), the angel who was sent to purify the prophet's lips was one of the inferior order; but was called a "Seraph," that is, "kindling " in

[33111] Iª q. 112 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum, secundum Dionysium, quod ille Angelus qui missus est ad purgandum labia prophetae, fuit de inferioribus Angelis; sed dictus

an equivocal sense, because he came to "kindle" the lips of the prophet. It may also be said that the superior angels communicate their own proper gifts whereby they are denominated, through the ministry of the inferior angels. Thus one of the Seraphim is described as purifying by fire the prophet's lips, not as if he did so immediately, but because an inferior angel did so by his power; as the Pope is said to absolve a man when he gives absolution by means of someone else.

est Seraphim, idest incendens, aequivoce, propter hoc quod venerat ad incendendum labia prophetae. Vel dicendum quod superiores Angeli communicant propria dona, a quibus denominantur, mediantibus inferioribus Angelis. Sic igitur unus de Seraphim dictus est purgasse incendio labia prophetae, non quia hoc ipse immediate fecerit, sed quia inferior Angelus virtute eius hoc fecit. Sicut Papa dicitur absolvere aliquem, etiam si per alium officium absolutionis impendat.

Reply to Objection 3: The Divine Persons are not sent in ministry, but are said to be sent in an equivocal sense, as appears from what has been said (Q[43], A[1]).

[33112] Iª q. 112 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod divinae personae non mittuntur in ministerium, sed aequivoce mitti dicuntur; ut ex praedictis patet.

Reply to Objection 4: A manifold grade exists in the Divine ministries. Hence there is nothing to prevent angels though unequal from being sent immediately in ministry, in such a manner however that the superior are sent to the higher ministries, and the lower to the inferior ministries.

[33113] Iª q. 112 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod in divinis ministeriis est multiplex gradus. Unde nihil prohibet etiam inaequales Angelos immediate ad ministeria mitti; ita tamen quod superiores mittantur ad altiora ministeria, inferiores vero ad inferiora.

Q. 112. A. 3. Whether all the angels who are sent, assist?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels who are sent also assist. For Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): "So the angels are sent, and assist; for, though the angelic spirit is limited, yet the supreme Spirit, God, is not limited."

[33114] Iª q. 112 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod etiam Angeli qui mittuntur, assistant. Dicit enim Gregorius, in homilia, *et mittuntur igitur Angeli, et assistunt, quia etsi circumscriptus est angelicus spiritus, summus tamen spiritus ipse, qui Deus est, circumscriptus non est*.

Objection 2: Further, the angel was sent to administer to Tobias. Yet he said, "I am the angel Raphael, one of the seven who stand before the Lord" (Tob. 12:15). Therefore the angels who are sent, assist.

[33115] Iª q. 112 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, Angelus Tobiae in ministerium missus fuit. Sed tamen ipse dixit, *ego sum Raphael Angelus, unus ex septem qui adstamus ante Deum*, ut habetur Tobiae XII. Ergo Angeli qui mittuntur, assistunt.

Objection 3: Further, every holy angel is nearer to God than Satan is. Yet Satan assisted God, according to Job 1:6: "When the sons of God came to stand before the Lord, Satan also was present among them." Therefore much more do the angels, who are sent to minister, assist.

[33116] Iª q. 112 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, quilibet Angelus beatus propinquior est Deo quam Satan. Sed Satan assistit Deo; secundum quod dicitur Iob I, *cum assisterent filii Dei coram domino, affuit inter eos et Satan*. Ergo multo magis Angeli qui mittuntur in ministerium, assistunt.

Objection 4: Further, if the inferior angels do not assist, the reason is because they receive the Divine enlightenment, not immediately, but through the superior angels. But every angel receives the Divine enlightenment from a superior, except the one who is highest of all. Therefore only the highest angel would assist; which is contrary to the text of Dan. 7:10: "Ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before Him." Therefore the angels who are sent also assist.

[33117] Iª q. 112 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, si inferiores Angeli non assistunt, hoc non est nisi quia non immediate, sed per superiores Angelos divinas illuminationes recipiunt. Sed quilibet Angelus per superiorem divinas illuminationes suscipit, excepto eo qui est inter omnes supremus. Ergo solus supremus Angelus assisteret. Quod est contra illud quod habetur Dan. VII, *decies millies centena millia assistebant ei*. Ergo etiam illi qui ministrant, assistunt.

On the contrary, Gregory says, on Job 25:3: "Is there any numbering of His soldiers?" (Moral. xvii): "Those powers assist, who do not go forth as messengers to men." Therefore those who are sent in ministry do not assist.

[33118] Iª q. 112 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, XVII Moral., super illud Iob, *numquid est numerus militum eius? Assistunt, inquit, illae potestates, quae ad quaedam hominibus nuntianda non exeunt*. Ergo illi qui in ministerium mittuntur, non assistunt.

I answer that, The angels are spoken of as "assisting" and "administering," after the likeness of those who attend upon a king; some of whom ever wait upon him, and hear his commands immediately; while others there are to whom the royal commands are conveyed by those who are in attendance---for instance, those who are placed at the head of the administration of various cities; these are said to administer, not to assist.

[33119] Iª q. 112 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod Angeli introducuntur assistentes et administrantes, ad similitudinem eorum qui alicui regi famulantur. Quorum aliqui semper ei assistunt, et eius praecepta immediate audiunt. Alii vero sunt, ad quos praecepta regalia per assistentes nuntiantur, sicut illi qui administrationi civitatum praeficiuntur, et hi dicuntur ministrantes, sed non assistentes.

We must therefore observe that all the angels gaze upon the Divine Essence immediately; in regard to which all, even those who minister, are said to assist. Hence Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "those who are sent on the external ministry of our salvation can always assist and see the face of the Father." Yet not all the angels can perceive the secrets of the Divine mysteries in the clearness itself of the Divine Essence; but only the superior angels who announce them to the inferior: and in that respect only the superior angels belonging to the highest hierarchy are said to assist, whose special prerogative it is to be enlightened immediately by God.

Considerandum est ergo quod omnes Angeli divinam essentiam immediate vident, et quantum ad hoc, omnes etiam qui ministrant, assistere dicuntur. Unde Gregorius dicit in II Moral., quod *semper assistere, aut videre faciem patris possunt, qui ad ministerium exterius mittuntur pro nostra salute*. Sed non omnes Angeli secreta divinorum mysteriorum in ipsa claritate divinae essentiae percipere possunt; sed soli superiores, per quos inferioribus denuntiantur. Et secundum hoc, soli superiores, qui sunt primae hierarchiae, assistere dicuntur, cuius proprium dicit esse Dionysius immediate a Deo illuminari.

From this may be deduced the reply to the first and second objections, which are based on the first mode of assisting.

[33120] Iª q. 112 a. 3 ad 1 Et per hoc patet solutio ad primum et secundum, quae procedunt de primo modo assistendi.

Reply to Objection 3: Satan is not described as having assisted, but as present among the assistants; for, as Gregory says (Moral. ii), "though he has lost beatitude, still he has retained a nature like to the angels."

[33121] Iª q. 112 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Satan non dicitur astitisse, sed inter assistentes affuisse describitur, quia, ut Gregorius dicit II Moral., *etsi beatitudinem perdidit, naturam tamen Angelis similem non amisit*.

Reply to Objection 4: All the assistants see some things immediately in the glory of the Divine Essence; and so it may be said that it is the prerogative of the whole of the highest hierarchy to be immediately enlightened by God; while the higher ones among them see more than is seen by the inferior; some of whom enlighten others: as also among those who assist the king, one knows more of the king's secrets than another.

[33122] Iª q. 112 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod omnes assistentes aliqua immediate vident in claritate divinae essentiae; et ideo totius primae hierarchiae proprium esse dicitur immediate illuminari a Deo. Sed superiores eorum plura percipiunt quam inferiores, de quibus illuminant alios, sicut etiam inter eos qui assistunt regi, plura scit de secretis regis unus quam alius.

Q. 112. A. 4. Whether all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent. For all the angels either assist, or minister, according to Dan. 7:10. But the angels of the second hierarchy do not assist; for they are enlightened by the angels of the first hierarchy, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii). Therefore all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent in ministry.

[33123] Iª q. 112 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli secundae hierarchiae omnes mittantur. Angeli enim omnes vel assistunt vel ministrant; secundum quod habetur Dan. VII. Sed Angeli secundae hierarchiae non assistunt, illuminantur enim per Angelos primae hierarchiae, sicut dicit Dionysius VIII cap. Cael. Hier. Omnes ergo Angeli secundae hierarchiae in ministerium mittuntur.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xvii) that "there are more who minister than who assist." This would not be the case if the angels of the second hierarchy were not sent in ministry. Therefore all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent to minister.

[33124] Iª q. 112 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, XVII Moral., quod *plures sunt qui ministrant, quam qui assistunt*. Sed hoc non esset, si Angeli secundae hierarchiae in ministerium non mitterentur. Ergo omnes Angeli secundae hierarchiae in ministerium mittuntur.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the "Dominations are above all subjection." But to be sent implies subjection. Therefore the dominations are not sent to minister.

[33125] Iª q. 112 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, quod *dominationes sunt maiores omni subiectione*. Sed mitti in ministerium, ad subiectionem pertinet. Ergo dominationes in ministerium non mittuntur.

I answer that, As above stated (A[1]), to be sent to external ministry properly belongs to an angel according as he acts by Divine command in respect of any corporeal creature; which is part of the execution of the Divine ministry. Now the angelic properties are manifested by their names, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii); and therefore

[33126] Iª q. 112 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, mitti ad exterius ministerium proprie convenit Angelo, secundum quod ex divino imperio operatur circa aliquam creaturam corporalem; quod quidem pertinet ad executionem divini ministerii. Proprietates autem Angelorum ex eorum nominibus manifestantur, ut

the angels of those orders are sent to external ministry whose names signify some kind of administration. But the name "dominations" does not signify any such administration, but only disposition and command in administering. On the other hand, the names of the inferior orders imply administration, for the "Angels" and "Archangels" are so called from "announcing"; the "Virtues" and "Powers" are so called in respect of some act; and it is right that the "Prince," according to what Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), "be first among the workers." Hence it belongs to these five orders to be sent to external ministry; not to the four superior orders.

Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Et ideo Angeli illorum ordinum ad exterius ministerium mittuntur, ex quorum nominibus aliqua executio datur intelligi. In nomine autem dominationum non importatur aliqua executio, sed sola dispositio et imperium de exequendis. Sed in nominibus inferiorum ordinum intelligitur aliqua executio, nam Angeli et Archangeli denominantur a denuntiando; virtutes et potestates dicuntur per respectum ad aliquem actum; principis etiam est, ut Gregorius dicit, inter alios operantes priorem existere. Unde ad hos quinque ordines pertinet in exterius ministerium mitti, non autem ad quatuor superiores.

Reply to Objection 1: The Dominations are reckoned among the ministering angels, not as exercising but as disposing and commanding what is to be done by others; thus an architect does not put his hands to the production of his art, but only disposes and orders what others are to do.

[33127] Iª q. 112 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominationes computantur quidem inter Angelos ministrantes, non sicut exequentes ministerium, sed sicut disponentes et mandantes quid per alios fieri debeat. Sicut architectores in artificiis nihil manu operantur, sed solum disponunt et praecipiunt quid alii debeant operari.

Reply to Objection 2: A twofold reason may be given in assigning the number of the assisting and ministering angels. For Gregory says that those who minister are more numerous than those who assist; because he takes the words (Dan. 7:10) "thousands of thousands ministered to Him," not in a multiple but in a partitive sense, to mean "thousands out of thousands"; thus the number of those who minister is indefinite, and signifies excess; while the number of assistants is finite as in the words added, "and ten thousand times a hundred thousand assisted Him." This explanation rests on the opinion of the Platonists, who said that the nearer things are to the one first principle, the smaller they are in number; as the nearer a number is to unity, the lesser it is than multitude. This opinion is verified as regards the number of orders, as six administer and three assist.

Dionysius, however, (Coel. Hier. xiv) declares that the multitude of angels surpasses all the multitude of material things; so that, as the superior bodies exceed the inferior in magnitude to an immeasurable degree, so the superior incorporeal natures surpass all corporeal natures in multitude; because whatever is better is more

[33128] Iª q. 112 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod de numero assistentium et ministrantium duplex ratio haberi potest. Gregorius enim dicit plures esse ministrantes quam assistentes. Intelligit enim quod dicitur, millia millium ministrabant ei, non esse dictum multiplicative, sed partitive; ac si diceretur, millia de numero millium. Et sic ministrantium numerus ponitur indefinitus, ad significandum excessum; assistentium vero finitus, cum subditur, et decies millies centena millia assistebant ei. Et hoc procedit secundum rationem Platonicorum, qui dicebant quod quanto aliqua sunt uni primo principio propinquiora, tanto sunt minoris multitudinis, sicut quanto numerus est propinquior unitati, tanto est multitudine minor. Et haec opinio salvatur quantum ad numerum ordinum, dum sex ministrant, et tres assistunt. Sed Dionysius ponit, XIV cap. Cael. Hier., quod multitudo Angelorum transcendit omnem materialem multitudinem; ut scilicet, sicut corpora superiora transcendunt corpora inferiora magnitudine quasi in immensum, ita superiores naturae incorporeae transcendunt multitudine omnes naturas corporeas; quia quod est melius, est magis a Deo intentum et multiplicatum. Et

intended and more multiplied by God. Hence, as the assistants are superior to the ministers there will be more assistants than ministers. In this way, the words "thousands of thousands" are taken by way of multiplication, to signify "a thousand times a thousand." And because ten times a hundred is a thousand, if it were said "ten times a hundred thousand" it would mean that there are as many assistants as ministers: but since it is written "ten thousand times a hundred thousand," we are given to understand that the assistants are much more numerous than the ministers. Nor is this said to signify that this is the precise number of angels, but rather that it is much greater, in that it exceeds all material multitude. This is signified by the multiplication together of all the greatest numbers, namely ten, a hundred, and a thousand, as Dionysius remarks in the same passage.

secundum hoc, cum assistentes sint superiores ministrantibus, plures erunt assistentes quam ministrantes. Unde secundum hoc, millia millium legitur multiplicativae, ac si diceretur, millies millia. Et quia decies centum sunt mille, si diceretur, decies centena millia, daretur intelligi quod tot essent assistentes, quot ministrantes, sed quia dicitur, decies millies centena millia, multo plures dicuntur esse assistentes quam ministrantes. Nec tamen hoc pro tanto dicitur, quia tantus solum sit Angelorum numerus, sed multo maior, quia omnem materialem multitudinem excedit. Quod significatur per multiplicationem maximorum numerorum supra seipsos, scilicet denarii, centenarii et millenarii; ut Dionysius ibidem dicit.

Q. 113. OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE GOOD ANGELS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We next consider the guardianship exercised by the good angels; and their warfare against the bad angels. Under the first head eight points of inquiry arise:

(1) Whether men are guarded by the angels?

(2) Whether to each man is assigned a single guardian angel?

(3) Whether the guardianship belongs only to the lowest order of angels?

(4) Whether it is fitting for each man to have an angel guardian?

(5) When does an angel's guardianship of a man begin?

(6) Whether the angel guardians always watch over men?

(7) Whether the angel grieves over the loss of the one guarded?

(8) Whether rivalry exists among the angels as regards their guardianship?

[33129] Iª q. 113 pr. Deinde considerandum est de custodia bonorum Angelorum, et de impugnatione malorum. Et circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum homines ab Angelis custodiantur. Secundo, utrum singulis hominibus singuli Angeli ad custodiam deputentur. Tertio, utrum custodia pertineat solum ad ultimum ordinem Angelorum. Quarto, utrum omni homini conveniat habere Angelum custodem. Quinto, quando incipiat custodia Angeli circa hominem. Sexto, utrum Angelus semper custodiat hominem. Septimo, utrum doleat de perditione custoditi. Octavo, utrum inter Angelos sit pugna ratione custodiae.

Q. 113. A. 1. Whether men are guarded by the angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that men are not guarded by the angels. For guardians are deputed to some because they either know not how, or are not able, to guard themselves, as children and the sick. But man is able to guard himself by his free-will; and knows how by his natural knowledge of natural law. Therefore man is not guarded by an angel.

[33130] Iª q. 113 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homines non custodiantur ab Angelis. Custodes enim deputantur aliquibus vel quia nesciunt, vel quia non possunt custodire seipsos; sicut pueris et infirmis. Sed homo potest custodire seipsum per liberum arbitrium; et scit, per naturalem cognitionem legis naturalis. Ergo homo non custoditur ab Angelo.

Objection 2: Further, a strong guard makes a weaker one superfluous. But men are guarded by God, according to Ps. 120:4: "He shall neither slumber nor sleep, that keepeth Israel." Therefore man does not need to be guarded by an angel.

[33131] Iª q. 113 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, ubi adest fortior custodia, infirmior superfluere videtur. Sed homines custodiuntur a Deo; secundum illud Psalmi CXX, *non dormitabit neque dormiet qui custodit Israel*. Ergo non est necessarium quod homo custodiatur ab Angelo.

Objection 3: Further, the loss of the guarded redounds to the negligence of the guardian; hence

[33132] Iª q. 113 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, perditio custoditi redundat in negligentiam custodis, unde

it was said to a certain one: "Keep this man; and if he shall slip away, thy life shall be for his life" (3 Kings 20:39). Now many perish daily through falling into sin; whom the angels could help by visible appearance, or by miracles, or in some such-like way. The angels would therefore be negligent if men are given to their guardianship. But that is clearly false. Therefore the angels are not the guardians of men.

dicitur cuidam, III Reg. XX, *custodi virum istum, qui si lapsus fuerit, erit anima tua pro anima eius*. Sed multi homines quotidie pereunt, in peccatum cadentes, quibus Angeli subvenire possent vel visibiliter apparendo, vel miracula faciendo, vel aliquo simili modo. Essent ergo negligentes Angeli, si eorum custodiae homines essent commissi, quod patet esse falsum. Non igitur Angeli sunt hominum custodes.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 90:11): "He hath given His angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways."

[33133] Iª q. 113 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo, *Angelis suis mandavit de te, ut custodiant te in omnibus viis tuis*.

I answer that, According to the plan of Divine Providence, we find that in all things the movable and variable are moved and regulated by the immovable and invariable; as all corporeal things by immovable spiritual substances, and the inferior bodies by the superior which are invariable in substance. We ourselves also are regulated as regards conclusions, about which we may have various opinions, by the principles which we hold in an invariable manner. It is moreover manifest that as regards things to be done human knowledge and affection can vary and fail from good in many ways; and so it was necessary that angels should be deputed for the guardianship of men, in order to regulate them and move them to good.

[33134] Iª q. 113 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum rationem divinae providentiae, hoc in rebus omnibus invenitur, quod mobilia et variabilia per immobilia et invariabilia moventur et regulantur; sicut omnia corporalia per substantias spirituales immobiles, et corpora inferiora per corpora superiora, quae sunt invariabilia secundum substantiam. Sed et nos ipsi regulamur circa conclusiones in quibus possumus diversimode opinari, per principia quae invariabiliter tenemus. Manifestum est autem quod in rebus agendis cognitio et affectus hominis multipliciter variari et deficere possunt a bono. Et ideo necessarium fuit quod hominibus Angeli ad custodiam deputarentur, per quos regularentur et moverentur ad bonum.

Reply to Objection 1: By free-will man can avoid evil to a certain degree, but not in any sufficient degree; forasmuch as he is weak in affection towards good on account of the manifold passions of the soul. Likewise universal natural knowledge of the law, which by nature belongs to man, to a certain degree directs man to good, but not in a sufficient degree; because in the application of the universal principles of law to particular actions man happens to be deficient in many ways. Hence it is written (Wis. 9:14): "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Thus man needs to be guarded by the angels.

[33135] Iª q. 113 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per liberum arbitrium potest homo aliqualiter malum vitare, sed non sufficienter, quia infirmatur circa affectum boni, propter multiplices animae passiones. Similiter etiam universalis cognitio naturalis legis, quae homini naturaliter adest, aliqualiter dirigit hominem ad bonum, sed non sufficienter, quia in applicando universalia principia iuris ad particularia opera, contingit hominem multipliciter deficere. Unde dicitur Sap. IX, *cogitationes mortalium timidae, et incertae providentiae nostrae*. Et ideo necessaria fuit homini custodia Angelorum.

Reply to Objection 2: Two things are required for a good action; first, that the affection be inclined to good, which is effected in us by the

[33136] Iª q. 113 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ad bene operandum duo requiruntur. Primo quidem, quod affectus

habit of mortal virtue. Secondly, that reason should discover the proper methods to make perfect the good of virtue; this the Philosopher (Ethic. vi) attributes to prudence. As regards the first, God guards man immediately by infusing into him grace and virtues; as regards the second, God guards man as his universal instructor, Whose precepts reach man by the medium of the angels, as above stated (Q[111], A[1]).

inclinetur ad bonum, quod quidem fit in nobis per habitum virtutis moralis. Secundo autem, quod ratio inveniat congruas vias ad perficiendum bonum virtutis, quod quidem philosophus attribuit prudentiae. Quantum ergo ad primum, Deus immediate custodit hominem, infundendo ei gratiam et virtutes. Quantum autem ad secundum, Deus custodit hominem sicut universalis instructor, cuius instructio ad hominem provenit mediantibus Angelis, ut supra habitum est.

Reply to Objection 3: As men depart from the natural instinct of good by reason of a sinful passion, so also do they depart from the instigation of the good angels, which takes place invisibly when they enlighten man that he may do what is right. Hence that men perish is not to be imputed to the negligence of the angels but to the malice of men. That they sometimes appear to men visibly outside the ordinary course of nature comes from a special grace of God, as likewise that miracles occur outside the order of nature.

[33137] Iª q. 113 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut homines a naturali instinctu boni discedunt propter passionem peccati; ita etiam discedunt ab instigatione bonorum Angelorum, quae fit invisibiliter per hoc quod homines illuminant ad bene agendum. Unde quod homines pereunt, non est imputandum negligentiae Angelorum, sed malitiae hominum. Quod autem aliquando, praeter legem communem, hominibus visibiliter apparent, ex speciali Dei gratia est, sicut etiam quod praeter ordinem naturae miracula fiunt.

Q. 113. A. 2. Whether each man is guarded by an angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that each man is not guarded by an angel. For an angel is stronger than a man. But one man suffices to guard many men. Therefore much more can one angel guard many men.

[33138] Iª q. 113 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non singuli homines a singulis Angelis custodiantur. Angelus enim est virtuosior quam homo. Sed unus homo sufficit ad custodiam multorum hominum. Ergo multo magis unus Angelus multos homines potest custodire.

Objection 2: Further, the lower things are brought to God through the medium of the higher, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, xiii). But as all the angels are unequal (Q[50], A[4]), there is only one angel between whom and men there is no medium. Therefore there is only one angel who immediately keeps men.

[33139] Iª q. 113 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, inferiora reducuntur in Deum a superioribus per media, ut Dionysius dicit. Sed cum omnes Angeli sint inaequales, ut supra dictum est, solus unus Angelus est inter quem et homines non est aliquis medius. Ergo unus Angelus solus est qui immediate custodit homines.

Objection 3: Further, the greater angels are deputed to the greater offices. But it is not a greater office to keep one man more than another; since all men are naturally equal. Since therefore of all the angels one is greater than another, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x), it seems that different men are not guarded by different angels.

[33140] Iª q. 113 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, maiores Angeli maioribus officiis deputantur. Sed non est maius officium custodire unum hominem quam alium, cum omnes homines natura sint pares. Cum ergo omnium Angelorum sit unus maior alio, secundum Dionysium, videtur quod diversi homines non custodiantur a diversis Angelis.

On the contrary, On the text, "Their angels in heaven," etc. (Mat. 8:10), Jerome says: "Great is the dignity of souls, for each one to have an angel deputed to guard it from its birth."

[33141] Iª q. 113 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Hieronymus, exponens illud Matth. XVIII, *Angeli eorum in caelis*, dicit, *magna est dignitas animarum, ut unaquaeque habeat, ab ortu nativitatis, in custodiam sui Angelum delegatum*.

I answer that, Each man has an angel guardian appointed to him. This rests upon the fact that the guardianship of angels belongs to the execution of Divine providence concerning men. But God's providence acts differently as regards men and as regards other corruptible creatures, for they are related differently to incorruptibility. For men are not only incorruptible in the common species, but also in the proper forms of each individual, which are the rational souls, which cannot be said of other incorruptible things. Now it is manifest that the providence of God is chiefly exercised towards what remains for ever; whereas as regards things which pass away, the providence of God acts so as to order their existence to the things which are perpetual. Thus the providence of God is related to each man as it is to every genus or species of things corruptible. But, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), the different orders are deputed to the different "genera" of things, for instance, the "Powers" to coerce the demons, the "Virtues" to work miracles in things corporeal; while it is probable that the different species are presided over by different angels of the same order. Hence it is also reasonable to suppose that different angels are appointed to the guardianship of different men.

[33142] Iª q. 113 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod singulis hominibus singuli Angeli ad custodiam deputantur. Cuius ratio est, quia Angelorum custodia est quaedam executio divinae providentiae circa homines. Providentia autem Dei aliter se habet ad homines, et ad alias corruptibiles creaturas, quia aliter se habent ad incorruptibilitatem. Homines enim non solum sunt incorruptibiles quantum ad communem speciem, sed etiam quantum ad proprias formas singulorum, quae sunt animae rationales, quod de aliis rebus corruptibilibus dici non potest. Manifestum est autem quod providentia Dei principaliter est circa illa quae perpetuo manent, circa ea vero quae transeunt, providentia Dei est inquantum ordinat ipsa ad res perpetuas. Sic igitur providentia Dei comparatur ad singulos homines, sicut comparatur ad singula genera vel species corruptibilium rerum. Sed secundum Gregorium, diversi ordines deputantur diversis rerum generibus; puta potestates ad arcendos Daemones, virtutes ad miracula facienda in rebus corporeis. Et probabile est quod diversis speciebus rerum diversi Angeli eiusdem ordinis praeficiantur. Unde etiam rationabile est ut diversis hominibus diversi Angeli ad custodiam deputentur.

Reply to Objection 1: A guardian may be assigned to a man for two reasons: first, inasmuch as a man is an individual, and thus to one man one guardian is due; and sometimes several are appointed to guard one. Secondly, inasmuch as a man is part of a community, and thus one man is appointed as guardian of a whole community; to whom it belongs to provide what concerns one man in his relation to the whole community, such as external works, which are sources of strength or weakness to others. But angel guardians are given to men also as regards invisible and occult things, concerning the salvation of each one in his own regard. Hence individual angels are appointed to guard individual men.

[33143] Iª q. 113 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod alicui homini adhibetur custos dupliciter. Uno modo, inquantum est homo singularis, et sic uni homini debetur unus custos, et interdum plures deputantur ad custodiam unius. Alio modo, inquantum est pars alicuius collegii, et sic toti collegio unus homo ad custodiam praeponitur, ad quem pertinet providere ea quae pertinent ad unum hominem in ordine ad totum collegium; sicut sunt ea quae exterius aguntur, de quibus alii aedificantur vel scandalizantur. Angelorum autem custodia deputatur hominibus etiam quantum ad invisibilia et occulta, quae pertinent ad singulorum salutem secundum seipsos. Unde singulis hominibus singuli Angeli deputantur ad custodiam.

Reply to Objection 2: As above stated (Q[112], A[3], ad 4), all the angels of the first hierarchy are, as to some things, enlightened by God directly; but as to other things, only the superior are directly enlightened by God, and these reveal them to the inferior. And the same also applies to the inferior orders: for a lower angel is enlightened in some respects by one of the highest, and in other respects by the one immediately above him. Thus it is possible that some one angel enlightens a man immediately, and yet has other angels beneath him whom he enlightens.

[33144] Iª q. 113 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, Angeli primae hierarchiae omnes quantum ad aliqua illuminantur immediate a Deo, sed quaedam sunt de quibus illuminantur superiores tantum immediate a Deo, quae inferioribus revelant. Et idem etiam in inferioribus ordinibus considerandum est, nam aliquis infimus Angelus illuminatur quantum ad quaedam ab aliquo supremo, et quantum ad aliqua ab eo qui immediate sibi praefertur. Et sic etiam possibile est quod aliquis Angelus immediate illuminet hominem, qui tamen habet aliquos Angelos sub se, quos illuminat.

Reply to Objection 3: Although men are equal in nature, still inequality exists among them, according as Divine Providence orders some to the greater, and others to the lesser things, according to Ecclus. 33:11,12: "With much knowledge the Lord hath divided them, and diversified their ways: some of them hath He blessed and exalted, and some of them hath He cursed and brought low." Thus it is a greater office to guard one man than another.

[33145] Iª q. 113 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, quamvis homines natura sint pares, tamen inaequalitas in eis invenitur, secundum quod ex divina providentia quidam ordinantur ad maius, et quidam ad minus; secundum illud quod dicitur Eccli. XXXIII, *in multitudine disciplinae domini separavit eos, ex ipsis benedixit et exaltavit, ex ipsis maledixit et humiliavit*. Et sic maius officium est custodire unum hominem quam alium.

Q. 113. A. 3. Whether to guard men belongs only to the lowest order of angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that the guardianship of men does not belong only to the lowest order of the angels. For Chrysostom says that the text (Mat. 18:10), "Their angels in heaven," etc. is to be understood not of any angels but of the highest. Therefore the superior angels guard men.

[33146] Iª q. 113 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod custodire homines non pertineat solum ad infimum ordinem Angelorum. Dicit enim Chrysostomus quod hoc quod dicitur Matth. XVIII, *Angeli eorum in caelo etc., intelligitur non de quibuscumque Angelis, sed de supereminentibus*. Ergo supereminentes Angeli custodiunt homines.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says that angels "are sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation" (Heb. 1:14); and thus it seems that the mission of the angels is directed to the guardianship of men. But five orders are sent in external ministry (Q[112], A[4]). Therefore all the angels of the five orders are deputed to the guardianship of men.

[33147] Iª q. 113 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, apostolus, ad Heb. I, dicit quod *Angeli sunt in ministerium missi propter eos qui haereditatem capiunt salutis*, et sic videtur quod missio Angelorum ad custodiam hominum ordinetur. Sed quinque ordines in exterius ministerium mittuntur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo omnes Angeli quinque ordinum custodiae hominum deputantur.

Objection 3: Further, for the guardianship of men it seems especially necessary to coerce the demons, which belongs most of all to the Powers, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.);

[33148] Iª q. 113 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, ad custodiam hominum maxime videtur esse necessarium arcere Daemones, quod pertinet ad potestates, secundum Gregorium; et miracula

and to work miracles, which belongs to the Virtues. Therefore these orders are also deputed to the work of guardianship, and not only the lowest order.

facere, quod pertinet ad virtutes. Ergo illi etiam ordines deputantur ad custodiam, et non solum infimus.

On the contrary, In the Psalm (90) the guardianship of men is attributed to the angels; who belong to the lowest order, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. v, ix).

[33149] Iª q. 113 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod in Psalmo custodia hominum attribuitur Angelis; quorum ordo est infimus, secundum Dionysium.

I answer that, As above stated (A[2]), man is guarded in two ways; in one way by particular guardianship, according as to each man an angel is appointed to guard him; and such guardianship belongs to the lowest order of the angels, whose place it is, according to Gregory, to announce the "lesser things"; for it seems to be the least of the angelic offices to procure what concerns the salvation of only one man. The other kind of guardianship is universal, multiplied according to the different orders. For the more universal an agent is, the higher it is. Thus the guardianship of the human race belongs to the order of "Principalities," or perhaps to the "Archangels," whom we call the angel princes. Hence, Michael, whom we call an archangel, is also styled "one of the princes" (Dan. 10:13). Moreover all corporeal creatures are guarded by the "Virtues"; and likewise the demons by the "Powers," and the good spirits by the "Principalities," according to Gregory's opinion (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.).

[33150] Iª q. 113 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, homini custodia dupliciter adhibetur. Uno modo custodia particularis, secundum quod singulis hominibus singuli Angeli ad custodiam deputantur. Et talis custodia pertinet ad infimum ordinem Angelorum, quorum, secundum Gregorium, est minima nuntiare; hoc autem videtur esse minimum in officiis Angelorum, procurare ea quae ad unius hominis tantum salutem pertinent. Alia vero est custodia universalis. Et haec multiplicatur secundum diversos ordines, nam quanto agens fuerit universalius, tanto est superius. Sic igitur custodia humanae multitudinis pertinet ad ordinem principatuum, vel forte ad Archangelos, qui dicuntur principes Angeli, unde et Michael, quem Archangelum dicimus, unus de principibus dicitur Dan. X. Ulterius autem super omnes naturas corporeas habent custodiam virtutes. Et ulterius etiam super Daemones habent custodiam potestates. Et ulterius etiam super bonos spiritus habent custodiam principatus, secundum Gregorium.

Reply to Objection 1: Chrysostom can be taken to mean the highest in the lowest order of angels; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) in each order there are first, middle, and last. It is, however, probable that the greater angels are deputed to keep those chosen by God for the higher degree of glory.

[33151] Iª q. 113 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum Chrysostomi potest intelligi, ut loquatur de supremis in ordine infimo Angelorum, quia, ut Dionysius dicit, in quolibet ordine sunt primi, medii et ultimi. Est autem probabile quod maiores Angeli deputentur ad custodiam eorum qui sunt ad maiorem gradum gloriae a Deo electi.

Reply to Objection 2: Not all the angels who are sent have guardianship of individual men; but some orders have a universal guardianship, greater or less, as above explained.

[33152] Iª q. 113 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod non omnes Angeli qui mittuntur, habent particularem custodiam super singulos homines; sed quidam ordines habent universalem custodiam, magis vel minus, ut dictum est.

Reply to Objection 3: Even inferior angels exercise the office of the superior, as they share in their gifts, and they are executors of the superiors' power; and in this way all the angels of the lowest order can coerce the demons, and work miracles.

[33153] Iª q. 113 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam inferiores Angeli exercent officia superiorum, inquantum aliquid de dono eorum participant, et se habent ad superiores sicut executores virtutis eorum. Et per hunc modum etiam Angeli infimi ordinis possunt et arcere Daemones, et miracula facere.

Q. 113. A. 4. Whether angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men?

Objection 1: It would seem that angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men. For it is written of Christ (Phil. 2:7) that "He was made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man." If therefore angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men, Christ also would have had an angel guardian. But this is unseemly, for Christ is greater than all the angels. Therefore angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men.

[33154] Iª q. 113 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnibus hominibus Angeli ad custodiam deputentur. Dicitur enim de Christo, Philipp. II, quod est *in similitudinem hominum factus, et habitu inventus ut homo*. Si igitur omnibus hominibus Angeli ad custodiam deputantur, etiam Christus Angelum custodem habuisset. Sed hoc videtur inconveniens, cum Christus sit maior omnibus Angelis. Non ergo omnibus hominibus Angeli ad custodiam deputantur.

Objection 2: Further, Adam was the first of all men. But it was not fitting that he should have an angel guardian, at least in the state of innocence: for then he was not beset by any dangers. Therefore angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men.

[33155] Iª q. 113 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, omnium hominum primus fuit Adam. Sed sibi non competebat habere Angelum custodem, ad minus in statu innocentiae, quia tunc nullis periculis angustiabatur. Ergo Angeli non praeficiuntur ad custodiam omnibus hominibus.

Objection 3: Further, angels are appointed to the guardianship of men, that they may take them by the hand and guide them to eternal life, encourage them to good works, and protect them against the assaults of the demons. But men who are foreknown to damnation, never attain to eternal life. Infidels, also, though at times they perform good works, do not perform them well, for they have not a right intention: for "faith directs the intention" as Augustine says (Enarr. ii in Ps. 31). Moreover, the coming of Antichrist will be "according to the working of Satan," as it is written (2 Thess. 2:9). Therefore angels are not deputed to the guardianship of all men.

[33156] Iª q. 113 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, hominibus Angeli ad custodiam deputantur, ut per eos manuducantur ad vitam aeternam, et incitentur ad bene operandum, et muniantur contra insultus Daemonum. Sed homines praesciti ad damnationem, nunquam perveniunt ad vitam aeternam. Infideles etiam, etsi interdum bona opera faciant, non tamen bene faciunt, quia non recta intentione faciunt, fides enim intentionem dirigit, ut Augustinus dicit. Antichristi etiam adventus erit secundum operationem Satanae, ut dicitur II ad Thessal. II. Non ergo omnibus hominibus Angeli ad custodiam deputantur.

On the contrary, is the authority of Jerome quoted above (A[2]), for he says that "each soul has an angel appointed to guard it."

[33157] Iª q. 113 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est auctoritas Hieronymi supra inducta, qui dicit quod *unaquaeque anima ad sui custodiam habet Angelum deputatum*.

I answer that, Man while in this state of life, is, as it were, on a road by which he should journey towards heaven. On this road man is threatened by many dangers both from within and from without, according to Ps. 159:4: "In this way wherein I walked, they have hidden a snare for me." And therefore as guardians are appointed for men who have to pass by an unsafe road, so an angel guardian is assigned to each man as long as he is a wayfarer. When, however, he arrives at the end of life he no longer has a guardian angel; but in the kingdom he will have an angel to reign with him, in hell a demon to punish him.

[33158] Iª q. 113 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod homo in statu vitae istius constitutus, est quasi in quadam via, qua debet tendere ad patriam. In qua quidem via multa pericula homini imminent, tum ab interiori, tum ab exteriori; secundum illud Psalmi CXLI, *in via hac qua ambulabam, absconderunt laqueum mihi*. Et ideo sicut hominibus per viam non tutam ambulantibus dantur custodes, ita et cuilibet homini, quandiu viator est, custos Angelus deputatur. Quando autem iam ad terminum viae pervenerit, iam non habebit Angelum custodem; sed habebit in regno Angelum conregnantem, in Inferno Daemonem punientem.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ as man was guided immediately by the Word of God: wherefore He needed not be guarded by an angel. Again as regards His soul, He was a comprehensor, although in regard to His passible body, He was a wayfarer. In this latter respect it was right that He should have not a guardian angel as superior to Him, but a ministering angel as inferior to Him. Whence it is written (Mat. 4:11) that "angels came and ministered to Him."

[33159] Iª q. 113 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus, secundum quod homo, immediate regulabatur a verbo Dei, unde non indigebat custodia Angelorum. Et iterum secundum animam erat comprehensor; sed ratione passibilitatis corporis, erat viator. Et secundum hoc, non debebatur ei Angelus custos, tanquam superior; sed Angelus minister, tanquam inferior. Unde dicitur Matth. IV, quod *accesserunt Angeli et ministrabant ei*.

Reply to Objection 2: In the state of innocence man was not threatened by any peril from within: because within him all was well ordered, as we have said above (Q[95], AA[1],3). But peril threatened from without on account of the snares of the demons; as was proved by the event. For this reason he needed a guardian angel.

[33160] Iª q. 113 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod homo in statu innocentiae non patiebatur aliquod periculum ab interiori, quia interius erant omnia ordinata, ut supra dictum est, sed imminebat ei periculum ab exteriori, propter insidias Daemonum; ut rei probavit eventus. Et ideo indigebat custodia Angelorum.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as the foreknown, the infidels, and even Anti-christ, are not deprived of the interior help of natural reason; so neither are they deprived of that exterior help granted by God to the whole human race---namely the guardianship of the angels. And although the help which they receive therefrom does not result in their deserving eternal life by good works, it does nevertheless conduce to their being protected from certain evils which would hurt both themselves and others. For even the demons are held off by the good angels, lest they hurt as much as they would. In like manner Antichrist will not do as much harm as he would wish.

[33161] Iª q. 113 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut praesciti et infideles, et etiam Antichristus, non privantur interiori auxilio naturalis rationis; ita etiam non privantur exteriori auxilio toti naturae humanae divinitus concesso, scilicet custodia Angelorum. Per quam etsi non iuventur quantum ad hoc quod vitam aeternam bonis operibus mereantur, iuvantur tamen quantum ad hoc, quod ab aliquibus malis retrahuntur, quibus et sibi ipsis et aliis nocere possunt. Nam et ipsi Daemones arcentur per bonos Angelos, ne noceant quantum volunt. Et similiter Antichristus non tantum nocebit, quantum vellet.

Q. 113. A. 5. Whether an angel is appointed to guard a man from his birth?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not appointed to guard a man from his birth. For angels are "sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation," as the Apostle says (Heb. 1:14). But men begin to receive the inheritance of salvation, when they are baptized. Therefore an angel is appointed to guard a man from the time of his baptism, not of his birth.

[33162] Iª q. 113 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus non deputetur homini ad custodiam a sua nativitate. Angeli enim mittuntur *in ministerium, propter eos qui haereditatem capiunt salutis*, ut apostolus, ad Heb. dicit. Sed homines incipiunt haereditatem capere salutis, quando baptizantur. Ergo Angelus deputatur homini ad custodiam a tempore Baptismi, et non a tempore nativitatis.

Objection 2: Further, men are guarded by angels in as far as angels enlighten and instruct them. But children are not capable of instruction as soon as they are born, for they have not the use of reason. Therefore angels are not appointed to guard children as soon as they are born.

[33163] Iª q. 113 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, homines ab Angelis custodiuntur, inquantum ab eis illuminantur per modum doctrinae. Sed pueri mox nati non sunt capaces doctrinae, quia non habent usum rationis. Ergo pueris mox natis non deputantur Angeli custodes.

Objection 3: Further, a child has a rational soul for some time before birth, just as well as after. But it does not appear that an angel is appointed to guard a child before its birth, for they are not then admitted to the sacraments of the Church. Therefore angels are not appointed to guard men from the moment of their birth.

[33164] Iª q. 113 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, pueri in materno utero existentes habent animam rationalem aliquo tempore, sicut et post nativitatem ex utero. Sed cum sunt in materno utero, non deputantur eis Angeli ad custodiam, ut videtur, quia neque etiam ministri Ecclesiae eos sacramentis imbuunt. Non ergo statim a nativitate hominibus Angeli ad custodiam deputantur.

On the contrary, Jerome says (vide A, 4) that "each soul has an angel appointed to guard it from its birth."

[33165] Iª q. 113 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod Hieronymus dicit, quod *unaquaeque anima, ab ortu nativitatis, habet in custodiam sui Angelum deputatum*.

I answer that, as Origen observes (Tract. v, super Matt.) there are two opinions on this matter. For some have held that the angel guardian is appointed at the time of baptism, others, that he is appointed at the time of birth. The latter opinion Jerome approves (vide A, 4), and with reason. For those benefits which are conferred by God on man as a Christian, begin with his baptism; such as receiving the Eucharist, and the like. But those which are conferred by God on man as a rational being, are bestowed on him at his birth, for then it is that he receives that nature. Among the latter benefits we must count the guardianship of angels, as we have said above (AA[1],4). Wherefore from the very moment of his birth man has an angel guardian appointed to him.

[33166] Iª q. 113 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Origenes dicit super Matthaeum, super hoc est duplex opinio. Quidam enim dixerunt quod Angelus ad custodiam homini deputatur a tempore Baptismi, alii vero quod a tempore nativitatis. Et hanc opinionem Hieronymus approbat; et rationabiliter. Beneficia enim quae dantur homini divinitus ex eo quod est Christianus, incipiunt a tempore Baptismi; sicut perceptio Eucharistiae, et alia huiusmodi. Sed ea quae providentur homini a Deo, inquantum habet naturam rationalem, ex tunc ei exhibentur, ex quo nascendo talem naturam accipit. Et tale beneficium est custodia Angelorum, ut ex praemissis patet. Unde statim a nativitate habet homo Angelum ad sui custodiam deputatum.

Reply to Objection 1: Angels are sent to minister, and that efficaciously indeed, for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation, if we consider the ultimate effect of their guardianship, which is the realizing of that inheritance. But for all that, the angelic ministrations are not withdrawn for others although they are not so efficacious as to bring them to salvation: efficacious, nevertheless, they are, inasmuch as they ward off many evils.

[33167] Iª q. 113 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Angeli mittuntur in ministerium, efficaciter quidem propter eos solos qui haereditatem capiunt salutis, si consideretur ultimus effectus custodiae, qui est perceptio haereditatis. Nihilominus tamen et aliis ministerium Angelorum non subtrahitur, quamvis in eis hanc efficaciam non habeat, quod perducantur ad salutem. Efficax tamen est circa eos Angelorum ministerium, inquantum a multis malis retrahuntur.

Reply to Objection 2: Guardianship is ordained to enlightenment by instruction, as to its ultimate and principal effect. Nevertheless it has many other effects consistent with childhood; for instance to ward off the demons, and to prevent both bodily and spiritual harm.

[33168] Iª q. 113 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod officium custodiae ordinatur quidem ad illuminationem doctrinae, sicut ad ultimum et principalem effectum. Nihilominus tamen multos alios effectus habet, qui pueris competunt, scilicet arcere Daemones, et alia nocumenta tam corporalia quam spiritualia prohibere.

Reply to Objection 3: As long as the child is in the mother's womb it is not entirely separate, but by reason of a certain intimate tie, is still part of her: just as the fruit while hanging on the tree is part of the tree. And therefore it can be said with some degree of probability, that the angel who guards the mother guards the child while in the womb. But at its birth, when it becomes separate from the mother, an angel guardian is appointed to it; as Jerome, above quoted, says.

[33169] Iª q. 113 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod puer quandiu est in materno utero, non totaliter est a matre separatus, sed per quandam colligationem est quodammodo adhuc aliquid eius, sicut et fructus pendens in arbore, est aliquid arboris. Et ideo probabiliter dici potest quod Angelus qui est in custodia matris, custodiat prolem in matris utero existentem. Sed in nativitate, quando separatur a matre, Angelus ei ad custodiam deputatur, ut Hieronymus dicit.

Q. 113. A. 6. Whether the angel guardian ever forsakes a man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel guardian sometimes forsakes the man whom he is appointed to guard. For it is said (Jer. 51:9) in the person of the angels: "We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed: let us forsake her." And (Is. 5:5) it is written: "I will take away the hedge"---that is, "the guardianship of the angels" [gloss]---"and it shall be wasted."

[33170] Iª q. 113 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus custos quandoque deserat hominem cuius custodiae deputatur. Dicitur enim Ierem. li, ex persona Angelorum, *curavimus Babylonem, et non est curata, derelinquamus ergo eam*. Et Isaiae V, *auferam sepem eius, et erit in conculcationem*; Glossa, *idest Angelorum custodiam*.

Objection 2: Further, God's guardianship excels that of the angels. But God forsakes man at times, according to Ps. 21:2: "O God, my God, look upon me: why hast Thou forsaken me?" Much rather therefore does an angel guardian forsake man.

[33171] Iª q. 113 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, principalius custodit Deus quam Angelus. Sed Deus aliquando hominem derelinquit; secundum illud Psalmi XXI, *Deus, Deus meus, respice in me, quare me dereliquisti?* Ergo multo magis Angelus custos hominem derelinquit.

Objection 3: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 3), "When the angels are here with us, they are not in heaven." But sometimes they are in heaven. Therefore sometimes they forsake us.

[33172] Iª q. 113 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut dicit Damascenus, *Angeli, cum sunt hic nobiscum, non sunt in caelo*. Sed aliquando sunt in caelo. Ergo aliquando nos derelinquunt.

On the contrary, The demons are ever assailing us, according to 1 Pet. 5:8: "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour." Much more therefore do the good angels ever guard us.

[33173] Iª q. 113 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra, Daemones nos semper impugnant; secundum illud I Petri V, *adversarius vester Diabolus tanquam leo rugiens circuit, quaerens quem devoret*. Ergo multo magis boni Angeli semper nos custodiunt.

I answer that, As appears above (A[2]), the guardianship of the angels is an effect of Divine providence in regard to man. Now it is evident that neither man, nor anything at all, is entirely withdrawn from the providence of God: for in as far as a thing participates being, so far is it subject to the providence that extends over all being. God indeed is said to forsake man, according to the ordering of His providence, but only in so far as He allows man to suffer some defect of punishment or of fault. In like manner it must be said that the angel guardian never forsakes a man entirely, but sometimes he leaves him in some particular, for instance by not preventing him from being subject to some trouble, or even from falling into sin, according to the ordering of Divine judgments. In this sense Babylon and the House of Israel are said to have been forsaken by the angels, because their angel guardians did not prevent them from being subject to tribulation.

[33174] Iª q. 113 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod custodia Angelorum, ut ex supra dictis patet, est quaedam executio divinae providentiae circa homines facta. Manifestum est autem quod nec homo, nec res aliqua, totaliter divinae providentiae subtrahitur, inquantum enim aliquid participat de esse, intantum subditur universali providentiae entium. Sed intantum Deus, secundum ordinem suae providentiae, dicitur hominem derelinquere, inquantum permittit hominem pati aliquem defectum vel poenae vel culpae. Similiter etiam dicendum est quod Angelus custos nunquam totaliter dimittit hominem, sed ad aliquid interdum eum dimittit; prout scilicet non impedit quin subdatur alicui tribulationi, vel etiam quin cadat in peccatum, secundum ordinem divinorum iudiciorum. Et secundum hoc Babylon et domus Israel ab Angelis derelictae dicuntur, quia Angeli earum custodes non impediverunt quin tribulationibus subderentur.

From this the answers are clear to the first and second objections.

[33175] Iª q. 113 a. 6 ad 1 Et per hoc patet solutio ad primum et secundum.

Reply to Objection 3: Although an angel may forsake a man sometimes locally, he does not for that reason forsake him as to the effect of his guardianship: for even when he is in heaven he knows what is happening to man; nor does he need time for his local motion, for he can be with man in an instant.

[33176] Iª q. 113 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Angelus, etsi interdum derelinquat hominem loco, non tamen derelinquit eum quantum ad effectum custodiae, quia etiam cum est in caelo, cognoscit quid circa hominem agatur; nec indiget mora temporis ad motum localem, sed statim potest adesse.

Q. 113. A. 7. Whether angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard?

Objection 1: It would seem that angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard. For it is written (Is. 33:7): "The angels of peace shall weep bitterly." But weeping is a sign of grief and sorrow. Therefore angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard.

[33177] Iª q. 113 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli doleant de malis eorum quos custodiunt. Dicitur enim Isaiae XXXIII, *Angeli pacis amare flebunt*. Sed fletus est signum doloris et tristitiae. Ergo Angeli tristantur de malis hominum quos custodiunt.

Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15), "sorrow is for those things that happen against our will." But the loss of the man whom he has guarded is against the guardian angel's will. Therefore angels grieve for the loss of men.

[33178] Iª q. 113 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, tristitia est, ut Augustinus dicit, *de his quae nobis nolentibus accidunt*. Sed perditio hominis custoditi est contra voluntatem Angeli custodis. Ergo tristantur Angeli de perditione hominum.

Objection 3: Further, as sorrow is contrary to joy, so penance is contrary to sin. But angels rejoice about one sinner doing penance, as we are told, Lk. 15:7. Therefore they grieve for the just man who falls into sin.

[33179] Iª q. 113 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut gaudio contrariatur tristitia, ita poenitentiae contrariatur peccatum. Sed Angeli gaudent de peccatore poenitentiam agente, ut habetur Lucae XV. Ergo tristantur de iusto in peccatum cadente.

Objection 4: Further, on Numbers 18:12: "Whatsoever first-fruits they offer," etc. the gloss of Origen says: "The angels are brought to judgment as to whether men have fallen through their negligence or through their own fault." But it is reasonable for anyone to grieve for the ills which have brought him to judgment. Therefore angels grieve for men's sins.

[33180] Iª q. 113 a. 7 arg. 4 Praeterea, super illud Num. XVIII; quidquid offerunt primitiarum etc., dicit Glossa Origenis; *trahuntur Angeli in iudicium, utrum ex ipsorum negligentia, an hominum ignavia lapsi sint*. Sed quilibet rationabiliter dolet de malis propter quae in iudicium tractus est. Ergo Angeli dolent de peccatis hominum.

On the contrary, Where there is grief and sorrow, there is not perfect happiness: wherefore it is written (Apoc. 21:4): "Death shall be no more, nor mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow." But the angels are perfectly happy. Therefore they have no cause for grief.

[33181] Iª q. 113 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra, ubi est tristitia et dolor, non est perfecta felicitas, unde dicitur Apoc. XXI, *mors ultra non erit, neque luctus, neque clamor, neque ullus dolor*. Sed Angeli sunt perfecte beati. Ergo de nullo dolent.

I answer that, Angels do not grieve, either for sins or for the pains inflicted on men. For grief and sorrow, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15) are for those things which occur against our will. But nothing happens in the world contrary to the will of the angels and the other blessed, because they will cleaves entirely to the ordering of Divine justice; while nothing happens in the world save what is effected or permitted by Divine justice. Therefore simply speaking,

[33182] Iª q. 113 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod Angeli non dolent neque de peccatis, neque de poenis hominum. Tristitia enim et dolor, secundum Augustinum, non est nisi de his quae contrariantur voluntati. Nihil autem accidit in mundo quod sit contrarium voluntati Angelorum et aliorum beatorum, quia voluntas eorum totaliter inhaeret ordini divinae iustitiae; nihil autem fit in mundo, nisi quod per divinam iustitiam fit aut permittitur. Et ideo, simpliciter loquendo, nihil fit

nothing occurs in the world against the will of the blessed. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that is called simply voluntary, which a man wills in a particular case, and at a particular time, having considered all the circumstances; although universally speaking, such a thing would not be voluntary: thus the sailor does not will the casting of his cargo into the sea, considered universally and absolutely, but on account of the threatened danger of his life, he wills it. Wherefore this is voluntary rather than involuntary, as stated in the same passage. Therefore universally and absolutely speaking the angels do not will sin and the pains inflicted on its account: but they do will the fulfilment of the ordering of Divine justice in this matter, in respect of which some are subjected to pains and are allowed to fall into sin.

in mundo contra voluntatem beatorum. Ut enim philosophus dicit in III Ethic. illud dicitur simpliciter voluntarium, quod aliquis vult in particulari, secundum quod agitur, consideratis scilicet omnibus quae circumstant, quamvis in universali consideratum non esset voluntarium, sicut nauta non vult proiectionem mercium in mare, absolute et universaliter considerando, sed imminente periculo salutis hoc vult. Unde magis est hoc voluntarium quam involuntarium, ut ibidem dicitur. Sic igitur Angeli peccata et poenas hominum, universaliter et absolute loquendo, non volunt, volunt tamen quod circa hoc ordo divinae iustitiae servetur, secundum quem quidam poenis subduntur, et peccare permittuntur.

Reply to Objection 1: These words of Isaias may be understood of the angels, i.e. the messengers, of Ezechias, who wept on account of the words of Rabsaces, as related Is. 37:2 seqq.: this would be the literal sense. According to the allegorical sense the "angels of peace" are the apostles and preachers who weep for men's sins. If according to the anagogical sense this passage be expounded of the blessed angels, then the expression is metaphorical, and signifies that universally speaking the angels will the salvation of mankind: for in this sense we attribute passions to God and the angels.

[33183] Iª q. 113 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum illud Isaiae potest intelligi de Angelis, idest nuntiis, Ezechiae, qui fleverunt propter verba Rabsacis; de quibus habetur Isaiae XXXVII. Et hoc secundum litteralem sensum. Secundum vero allegoricum, Angeli pacis sunt apostoli et alii praedicatores, qui flent pro peccatis hominum. Si vero secundum sensum anagogicum exponatur de Angelis beatis, tunc metaphorica erit locutio, ad designandum quod Angeli volunt in universali hominum salutem. Sic enim Deo et Angelis huiusmodi passiones attribuuntur.

The reply to the second objection appears from what has been said.

[33184] Iª q. 113 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum patet solutio per ea quae dicta sunt.

Reply to Objection 3: Both in man's repentance and in man's sin there is one reason for the angel's joy, namely the fulfilment of the ordering of the Divine Providence.

[33185] Iª q. 113 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod tam in poenitentia hominum, quam in peccato, manet una ratio gaudii Angelis, scilicet impletio ordinis divinae providentiae.

Reply to Objection 4: The angels are brought into judgment for the sins of men, not as guilty, but as witnesses to convict man of weakness.

[33186] Iª q. 113 a. 7 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod Angeli ducuntur in iudicium pro peccatis hominum, non quasi rei, sed quasi testes, ad convincendum homines de eorum ignavia.

Q. 113. A. 8. Whether there can be strife or discord among the angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be strife or discord among the angels. For it is written (Job 25:2): "Who maketh peace in His high places." But strife is opposed to peace. Therefore among the high angels there is no strife.

[33187] Iª q. 113 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inter Angelos non possit esse pugna seu discordia. Dicitur enim Iob XXV, *qui facit concordiam in sublimibus*. Sed pugna opponitur concordiae. Ergo in sublimibus Angelis non est pugna.

Objection 2: Further, where there is perfect charity and just authority there can be no strife. But all this exists among the angels. Therefore there is no strife among the angels.

[33188] Iª q. 113 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, ubi est perfecta caritas et iusta praelatio, non potest esse pugna. Sed hoc totum est in Angelis. Ergo in Angelis non est pugna.

Objection 3: Further, if we say that angels strive for those whom they guard, one angel must needs take one side, and another angel the opposite side. But if one side is in the right the other side is in the wrong. It will follow therefore, that a good angel is a compounder of wrong; which is unseemly. Therefore there is no strife among good angels.

[33189] Iª q. 113 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, si Angeli dicuntur pugnare pro eis quos custodiunt, necesse est quod unus Angelus foveat unam partem, et alius aliam. Sed si una pars habet iustitiam, e contra alia pars habet iniustitiam. Ergo sequitur quod Angelus bonus sit fautor iniustitiae, quod est inconveniens. Ergo inter bonos Angelos non est pugna.

On the contrary, It is written (Dan. 10:13): "The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me one and twenty days." But this prince of the Persians was the angel deputed to the guardianship of the kingdom of the Persians. Therefore one good angel resists the others; and thus there is strife among them.

[33190] Iª q. 113 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Dan. X, ex persona Gabrielis, *princeps regni Persarum restitit mihi viginti et uno diebus*. Hic autem princeps Persarum erat Angelus regno Persarum in custodiam deputatus. Ergo unus bonus Angelus resistit alii, et sic inter eos est pugna.

I answer that, The raising of this question is occasioned by this passage of Daniel. Jerome explains it by saying that the prince of the kingdom of the Persians is the angel who opposed the setting free of the people of Israel, for whom Daniel was praying, his prayers being offered to God by Gabriel. And this resistance of his may have been caused by some prince of the demons having led the Jewish captives in Persia into sin; which sin was an impediment to the efficacy of the prayer which Daniel put up for that same people.

[33191] Iª q. 113 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ista quaestio movetur occasione horum verborum Danielis. Quae quidem Hieronymus exponit, dicens principem regni Persarum esse Angelum qui se opposuit liberationi populi Israelitici, pro quo Daniel orabat, Gabriele preces eius Deo praesentante. Haec autem resistentia potuit fieri, quia princeps aliquis Daemonum Iudaeos in Persidem ductos ad peccatum induxerat, per quod impedimentum praestabatur orationi Danielis, pro eodem populo deprecantis.

But according to Gregory (Moral. xvii), the prince of the kingdom of Persia was a good angel appointed to the guardianship of that kingdom. To see therefore how one angel can be said to resist

Sed secundum Gregorium, XVII Moral., princeps regni Persarum bonus Angelus fuit, custodiae regni illius deputatus. Ad videndum igitur qualiter unus Angelus alteri resistere dicitur,

another, we must note that the Divine judgments in regard to various kingdoms and various men are executed by the angels. Now in their actions, the angels are ruled by the Divine decree. But it happens at times in various kingdoms or various men there are contrary merits or demerits, so that one of them is subject to or placed over another. As to what is the ordering of Divine wisdom on such matters, the angels cannot know it unless God reveal it to them: and so they need to consult Divine wisdom thereupon. Wherefore forasmuch as they consult the Divine will concerning various contrary and opposing merits, they are said to resist one another: not that their wills are in opposition, since they are all of one mind as to the fulfilment of the Divine decree; but that the things about which they seek knowledge are in opposition.

considerandum est quod divina iudicia circa diversa regna et diversos homines, per Angelos exercentur. In suis autem actionibus Angeli secundum divinam sententiam regulantur. Contingit autem quandoque quod in diversis regnis, vel in diversis hominibus, contraria merita vel demerita inveniuntur, ut unus alteri subdatur aut praesit. Quid autem super hoc ordo divinae sapientiae habeat, cognoscere non possunt nisi Deo revelante, unde necesse habent super his sapientiam Dei consulere. Sic igitur inquantum de contrariis meritis et sibi repugnantibus, divinam consulunt voluntatem, resistere sibi invicem dicuntur, non quia sint eorum contrariae voluntates, cum in hoc omnes concordent, quod Dei sententia impleatur; sed quia ea de quibus consulunt, sunt repugnantia.

From this the answers to the objections are clear.

[33192] Iª q. 113 a. 8 ad arg. Et per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta.

Q. 114. OF THE ASSAULTS OF THE DEMONS (FIVE ARTICLES)

We now consider the assaults of the demons. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether men are assailed by the demons?

(2) Whether to tempt is proper to the devil?

(3) Whether all the sins of men are to be set down to the assaults or temptations of the demons?

(4) Whether they can work real miracles for the purpose of leading men astray?

(5) Whether the demons who are overcome by men, are hindered from making further assaults?

[33193] Iª q. 114 pr. Deinde considerandum est de impugnatione Daemonum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum homines a Daemonibus impugnentur. Secundo, utrum tentare sit proprium Diaboli. Tertio, utrum omnia peccata hominum ex impugnatione sive tentatione Daemonum proveniant. Quarto, utrum possint vera miracula facere ad seducendum. Quinto, utrum Daemones qui ab hominibus superantur, ab impugnatione hominum arceantur.

Q. 114. A. 1. Whether men are assailed by the demons?

Objection 1: It would seem that men are not assailed by the demons. For angels are sent by God to guard man. But demons are not sent by God: for the demons' intention is the loss of souls; whereas God's is the salvation of souls. Therefore demons are not deputed to assail man.

[33194] Iª q. 114 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homines non impugnentur a Daemonibus. Angeli enim deputantur ad hominum custodiam, missi a Deo. Sed Daemones non mittuntur a Deo, cum Daemonum intentio sit perdere animas, Dei autem salvare. Ergo Daemones non deputantur ad hominum impugnationem.

Objection 2: Further, it is not a fair fight, for the weak to be set against the strong, and the ignorant against the astute. But men are weak and ignorant, whereas the demons are strong and astute. It is not therefore to be permitted by God, the author of all justice, that men should be assailed by demons.

[33195] Iª q. 114 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, non est aequa conditio pugnae, ut infirmus contra fortem, ignarus contra astutum exponatur ad bellum. Sed homines sunt infirmi et ignari; Daemones autem potentes et astuti. Non est ergo permittendum a Deo, qui est omnis iustitiae auctor, ut homines a Daemonibus impugnentur.

Objection 3: Further, the assaults of the flesh and the world are enough for man's exercise. But God permits His elect to be assailed that they may be exercised. Therefore there is no need for them to be assailed by the demons.

[33196] Iª q. 114 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, ad exercitium hominum sufficit impugnatio carnis et mundi. Sed Deus permittit electos suos impugnari propter eorum exercitium. Ergo non videtur necessarium quod a Daemonibus impugnentur.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 6:12): "Our wrestling is not against flesh and blood; but against Principalities and Powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in the high places."

[33197] Iª q. 114 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. VI, quod *non est nobis colluctatio adversus carnem et sanguinem, sed adversus principes et potestates, adversus mundi rectores tenebrarum harum, contra spiritualia nequitiae in caelestibus*.

I answer that, Two things may be considered in the assault of the demons---the assault itself, and the ordering thereof. The assault itself is due to the malice of the demons, who through envy endeavor to hinder man's progress; and through pride usurp a semblance of Divine power, by deputing certain ministers to assail man, as the angels of God in their various offices minister to man's salvation. But the ordering of the assault is from God, Who knows how to make orderly use of evil by ordering it to good. On the other hand, in regard to the angels, both their guardianship and the ordering thereof are to be referred to God as their first author.

[33198] Iª q. 114 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod circa impugnationem Daemonum duo est considerare, scilicet ipsam impugnationem, et impugnationis ordinem. Impugnatio quidem ipsa ex Daemonum malitia procedit, qui propter invidiam profectum hominum impedire nituntur; et propter superbiam divinae potestatis similitudinem usurpant, deputando sibi ministros determinatos ad hominum impugnationem, sicut et Angeli Deo ministrant in determinatis officiis ad hominum salutem. Sed ordo impugnationis ipsius est a Deo, qui ordinate novit malis uti, ad bona ea ordinando. Sed ex parte Angelorum, tam ipsa custodia quam ordo custodiae reducitur ad Deum, sicut ad primum auctorem.

Reply to Objection 1: The wicked angels assail men in two ways. Firstly by instigating them to sin; and thus they are not sent by God to assail us, but are sometimes permitted to do so according to God's just judgments. But sometimes their assault is a punishment to man: and thus they are sent by God; as the lying spirit was sent to punish Achab, King of Israel, as is related in 3 Kings 22:20. For punishment is referred to God as its first author. Nevertheless the demons who are sent to punish, do so with an intention other than that for which they are sent; for they punish from hatred or envy; whereas they are sent by God on account of His justice.

[33199] Iª q. 114 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod mali Angeli impugnant homines dupliciter. Uno modo, instigando ad peccatum. Et sic non mittuntur a Deo ad impugnandum, sed aliquando permittuntur, secundum Dei iusta iudicia. Aliquando autem impugnant homines puniendo. Et sic mittuntur a Deo; sicut missus est spiritus mendax ad puniendum Achab regem Israel, ut dicitur III Reg. ult. Poena enim refertur in Deum, sicut in primum auctorem. Et tamen Daemones ad puniendum missi, alia intentione puniunt, quam mittantur, nam ipsi puniunt ex odio vel invidia; mittuntur autem a Deo propter eius iustitiam.

Reply to Objection 2: In order that the conditions of the fight be not unequal, there is as regards man the promised recompense, to be gained principally through the grace of God, secondarily through the guardianship of the angels. Wherefore (4 Kings 6:16), Eliseus said to his servant: "Fear not, for there are more with us than with them."

[33200] Iª q. 114 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ad hoc quod non sit inaequalis pugnae conditio, fit ex parte hominis recompensatio, principaliter quidem per auxilium divinae gratiae; secundario autem per custodiam Angelorum. Unde IV Reg., Elisaeus dixit ad ministrum suum, *noli timere, plures enim nobiscum sunt, quam cum illis*.

Reply to Objection 3: The assault of the flesh and the world would suffice for the exercise of human weakness: but it does not suffice for the demon's malice, which makes use of both the above in assailing men. But by the Divine ordinance this tends to the glory of the elect.

[33201] Iª q. 114 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod infirmitati humanae sufficeret ad exercitium impugnatio quae est a carne et mundo, sed malitiae Daemonum non sufficit, quae utroque utitur ad hominum impugnationem. Sed tamen ex divina ordinatione hoc provenit in gloriam electorum.

Q. 114. A. 2. Whether to tempt is proper to the devil?

Objection 1: It would seem that to tempt is not proper to the devil. For God is said to tempt, according to Gn. 22:1, "God tempted Abraham." Moreover man is tempted by the flesh and the world. Again, man is said to tempt God, and to tempt man. Therefore it is not proper to the devil to tempt.

[33202] Iª q. 114 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod tentare non sit proprium Diaboli. Dicitur enim Deus tentare; secundum illud Gen. XXII, *tentavit Deus Abraham*. Tentat etiam caro, et mundus. Et etiam homo dicitur tentare Deum, et hominem. Ergo non est proprium Daemonis tentare.

Objection 2: Further, to tempt is a sign of ignorance. But the demons know what happens among men. Therefore the demons do not tempt.

[33203] Iª q. 114 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, tentare est ignorantis. Sed Daemones sciunt quid circa homines agatur. Ergo Daemones non tentant.

Objection 3: Further, temptation is the road to sin. Now sin dwells in the will. Since therefore the demons cannot change man's will, as appears from what has been said above (Q[111], A[2]), it seems that it is not in their province to tempt.

[33204] Iª q. 114 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, tentatio est via in peccatum. Peccatum autem in voluntate consistit. Cum ergo Daemones non possint voluntatem hominis immutare, ut per supra dicta patet; videtur quod ad eos non pertineat tentare.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Thess. 3:5): "Lest perhaps he that tempteth should have tempted you": to which the gloss adds, "that is, the devil, whose office it is to tempt."

[33205] Iª q. 114 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur I ad Thessal. III, *ne forte tentaverit vos is qui tentat*; Glossa, idest Diabolus, cuius officium est tentare.

I answer that, To tempt is, properly speaking, to make trial of something. Now we make trial of something in order to know something about it: hence the immediate end of every tempter is knowledge. But sometimes another end, either good or bad, is sought to be acquired through that knowledge; a good end, when, for instance, one desires to know of someone, what sort of a man he is as to knowledge, or virtue, with a view to his promotion; a bad end, when that knowledge is sought with the purpose of deceiving or ruining him.

From this we can gather how various beings are said to tempt in various ways. For man is said to tempt, sometimes indeed merely for the sake of knowing something; and for this reason it is a sin to tempt God; for man, being uncertain as it were, presumes to make an experiment of God's power. Sometimes too he tempts in order to help, sometimes in order to hurt. The devil, however, always tempts in order to hurt by urging man into sin. In this sense it is said to be his proper office to tempt: for thought at times man tempts thus, he

[33206] Iª q. 114 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod tentare est proprie experimentum sumere de aliquo. Experimentum autem sumitur de aliquo, ut sciatur aliquid circa ipsum, et ideo proximus finis cuiuslibet tentantis est scientia. Sed quandoque ulterius ex scientia quaeritur aliquis alius finis, vel bonus vel malus, bonus quidem, sicut cum aliquis vult scire qualis aliquis sit, vel quantum ad scientiam vel quantum ad virtutem, ut eum promoveat; malus autem, quando hoc scire vult, ut eum decipiat vel subvertat. Et per hunc modum potest accipi quomodo tentare diversis diversimode attribuatur. Homo enim tentare dicitur, quandoque quidem ut sciat tantum, et propter hoc, tentare Deum dicitur esse peccatum; quia homo, quasi incertus, experiri praesumit Dei virtutem. Quandoque vero tentat ut iuvet, quandoque vero, ut noceat. Diabolus autem semper tentat ut noceat, in peccatum praecipitando. Et secundum hoc, dicitur proprium officium eius tentare, nam etsi homo aliquando sic tentet, hoc agit inquantum est minister Diaboli. Deus autem tentare dicitur ut sciat, eo modo loquendi quo dicitur scire quod facit alios scire.

does this as minister of the devil. God is said to tempt that He may know, in the same sense as that is said to know which makes others to know. Hence it is written (Dt. 13:3): "The Lord your God trieth you, that it may appear whether you love him."

The flesh and the world are said to tempt as the instruments or matter of temptations; inasmuch as one can know what sort of man someone is, according as he follows or resists the desires of the flesh, and according as he despises worldly advantages and adversity: of which things the devil also makes use in tempting.

Unde dicitur Deut. XII, *tentat vos dominus Deus vester, ut palam fiat utrum diligatis eum*. Caro autem et mundus dicuntur tentare instrumentaliter, seu materialiter, inquantum scilicet potest cognosci qualis sit homo, ex hoc quod sequitur vel repugnat concupiscentiis carnis, et ex hoc quod contemnit prospera mundi et adversa; quibus etiam Diabolus utitur ad tentandum.

Reply to Objection 1: Thus the reply to the first objection is clear.

[33207] Iª q. 114 a. 2 ad 1 Et sic patet solutio ad primum.

Reply to Objection 2: The demons know what happens outwardly among men; but the inward disposition of man God alone knows, Who is the "weigher of spirits" (Prov. 16:2). It is this disposition that makes man more prone to one vice than to another: hence the devil tempts, in order to explore this inward disposition of man, so that he may tempt him to that vice to which he is most prone.

[33208] Iª q. 114 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Daemones sciunt ea quae exterius aguntur circa homines, sed interiorem hominis conditionem solus Deus novit, qui est spirituum ponderator, ex qua aliqui sunt magis proni ad unum vitium quam ad aliud. Et ideo Diabolus tentat explorando interiorem conditionem hominis, ut de illo vitio tentet, ad quod homo magis pronus est.

Reply to Objection 3: Although a demon cannot change the will, yet, as stated above (Q[111], A[3]), he can change the inferior powers of man, in a certain degree: by which powers, though the will cannot be forced, it can nevertheless be inclined.

[33209] Iª q. 114 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Daemon, etsi non possit immutare voluntatem, potest tamen, ut supra dictum est, aliqualiter immutare inferiores hominis vires; ex quibus etsi non cogitur voluntas, tamen inclinatur.

Q. 114. A. 3. Whether all sins are due to the temptation of the devil?

Objection 1: It would seem that all sins are due to the temptation of the devil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the multitude of demons is the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others." And Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that "all malice and all uncleanness have been devised by the devil."

[33210] Iª q. 114 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia peccata procedant ex tentatione Diaboli. Dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod *multitudo Daemonum est causa omnium malorum et sibi et aliis*. Et Damascenus dicit quod *omnis malitia et omnis immunditia a Diabolo excogitatae sunt*.

Objection 2: Further, of every sinner can be said what the Lord said of the Jews (Jn. 8:44): "You are of your father the devil." But this was in as far

[33211] Iª q. 114 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, de quolibet peccatore dici posset quod dominus de Iudaeis dicit, Ioan. VIII, *vos ex patre Diabolo estis*. Hoc

as they sinned through the devil's instigation. Therefore every sin is due to the devil's instigation.

autem est inquantum ipsi ex Diaboli suggestione peccabant. Omne ergo peccatum est ex suggestione Diaboli.

Objection 3: Further, as angels are deputed to guard men, so demons are deputed to assail men. But every good thing we do is due to the suggestion of the good angels: because the Divine gifts are borne to us by the angels. Therefore all the evil we do, is due to the instigation of the devil.

[33212] Iª q. 114 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut Angeli deputantur ad custodiam hominum, ita Daemones ad impugnationem. Sed omnia bona quae facimus, ex suggestione bonorum Angelorum procedunt, quia divina ad nos mediantibus Angelis perferuntur. Ergo et omnia mala quae facimus, proveniunt ex suggestione Diaboli.

On the contrary, It is written (De Eccl. Dogmat. xlix): "Not all our evil thoughts are stirred up by the devil, but sometimes they arise from the movement of our free-will."

[33213] Iª q. 114 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de Eccles. Dogmat., *non omnes cogitationes nostrae malae a Diabolo excitantur, sed aliquoties ex nostri arbitrii motu emergunt*.

I answer that, One thing can be the cause of another in two ways; directly and indirectly. Indirectly as when an agent is the cause of a disposition to a certain effect, it is said to be the occasional and indirect cause of that effect: for instance, we might say that he who dries the wood is the cause of the wood burning. In this way we must admit that the devil is the cause of all our sins; because he it was who instigated the first man to sin, from whose sin there resulted a proneness to sin in the whole human race: and in this sense we must take the words of Damascene and Dionysius.

But a thing is said to be the direct cause of something, when its action tends directly thereunto. And in this way the devil is not the cause of every sin: for all sins are not committed at the devil's instigation, but some are due to the free-will and the corruption of the flesh. For, as Origen says (Peri Archon iii), even if there were no devil, men would have the desire for food and love and such like pleasures; with regard to which many disorders may arise unless those desires are curbed by reason, especially if we presuppose the corruption of our natures. Now it is in the power of the free-will to curb this appetite and keep it in order. Consequently there is no need for all sins to be due to the instigation of the devil. But those sins which are due thereto man perpetrates "through being deceived by the same

[33214] Iª q. 114 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod causa alicuius potest dici aliquid dupliciter, uno modo, directe, alio modo, indirecte. Indirecte quidem, sicut cum aliquod agens causans aliquam dispositionem ad aliquem effectum, dicitur esse occasionaliter et indirecte causa illius effectus; sicut si dicatur quod ille qui siccat ligna, est causa combustionis eorum. Et hoc modo dicendum est quod Diabolus est causa omnium peccatorum nostrorum, quia ipse instigavit primum hominem ad peccandum, ex cuius peccato consecuta est in toto genere humano quaedam pronitas ad omnia peccata. Et per hunc modum intelligenda sunt verba Damasceni et Dionysii. Directe autem dicitur esse aliquid causa alicuius, quod operatur directe ad illud. Et hoc modo Diabolus non est causa omnis peccati non enim omnia peccata committuntur Diabolo instigante, sed quaedam ex libertate arbitrii et carnis corruptione. Quia, ut Origenes dicit, etiam si Diabolus non esset, homines haberent appetitum ciborum et venereorum et huiusmodi; circa quae multa inordinatio contingit, nisi per rationem talis appetitus refraenetur; et maxime, supposita corruptione naturae. Refraenare autem et ordinare huiusmodi appetitum, subiacet libero arbitrio. Sic ergo non est necessarium omnia peccata ex instinctu Diaboli provenire. Si qua tamen ex instinctu eius proveniunt, ad ea complenda *eo blandimento decipiuntur homines nunc, quo primi parentes*, ut Isidorus dicit.

blandishments as were our first parents," as Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii).

Reply to Objection 1: Thus the answer to the first objection is clear.

[33215] Iª q. 114 a. 3 ad 1 Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum.

Reply to Objection 2: When man commits sin without being thereto instigated by the devil, he nevertheless becomes a child of the devil thereby, in so far as he imitates him who was the first to sin.

[33216] Iª q. 114 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, si qua peccata absque instinctu Diaboli perpetrantur, per ea tamen fiunt homines filii Diaboli, inquantum ipsum primo peccantem imitantur.

Reply to Objection 3: Man can of his own accord fall into sin: but he cannot advance in merit without the Divine assistance, which is borne to man by the ministry of the angels. For this reason the angels take part in all our good works: whereas all our sins are not due to the demons' instigation. Nevertheless there is no kind of sin which is not sometimes due to the demons' suggestion.

[33217] Iª q. 114 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod homo potest per seipsum ruere in peccatum, sed ad meritum proficere non potest nisi auxilio divino, quod homini exhibetur mediante ministerio Angelorum. Et ideo ad omnia bona nostra cooperantur Angeli, non tamen omnia nostra peccata procedunt ex Daemonum suggestione. Quamvis nullum genus peccati sit, quod non interdum ex Daemonum suggestione proveniat.

Q. 114. A. 4. Whether demons can lead men astray by means of real miracles?

Objection 1: It would seem that the demons cannot lead men astray by means of real miracles. For the activity of the demons will show itself especially in the works of Antichrist. But as the Apostle says (2 Thess. 2:9), his "coming is according to the working of Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders." Much more therefore at other times do the demons perform lying wonders.

[33218] Iª q. 114 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Daemones non possint homines seducere per aliqua miracula vera. Operatio enim Daemonum maxime vigebit in operibus Antichristi. Sed sicut apostolus dicit II ad Thessal. II, *eius adventus est secundum operationem Satanae, in omni virtute et signis et prodigiis mendacibus*. Ergo multo magis alio tempore per Daemones non fiunt nisi signa mendacia.

Objection 2: Further, true miracles are wrought by some corporeal change. But demons are unable to change the nature of a body; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18): "I cannot believe that the human body can receive the limbs of a beast by means of a demon's art or power." Therefore the demons cannot work real miracles.

[33219] Iª q. 114 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, vera miracula per aliquam corporum immutationem fiunt. Sed Daemones non possunt immutare corpus in aliam naturam, dicit enim Augustinus, XVIII de Civ. Dei, *nec corpus quidem humanum ulla ratione crediderim Daemonum arte vel potestate in membra bestialia posse converti*. Ergo Daemones vera miracula facere non possunt.

Objection 3: Further, an argument is useless which may prove both ways. If therefore real miracles can be wrought by demons, to persuade

[33220] Iª q. 114 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, argumentum efficaciam non habet, quod se habet ad opposita. Si ergo miracula vera possunt fieri a

one of what is false, they will be useless to confirm the teaching of the faith. This is unfitting; for it is written (Mk. 16:20): "The Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed."

Daemonibus ad falsitatem persuadendam, non erunt efficacia ad veritatem fidei confirmandam. Quod est inconveniens, cum dicatur Marci ult., *domino cooperante, et sermonem confirmante sequentibus signis*.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Q[83]; [*Lib. xxi, Sent. sent 4, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]): "Often by means of the magic art miracles are wrought like those which are wrought by the servants of God."

[33221] Iª q. 114 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, libro octoginta trium quaest., quod *magicis artibus fiunt miracula plerumque similia illis miraculis quae fiunt per servos Dei*.

I answer that, As is clear from what has been said above (Q[110], A[4]), if we take a miracle in the strict sense, the demons cannot work miracles, nor can any creature, but God alone: since in the strict sense a miracle is something done outside the order of the entire created nature, under which order every power of a creature is contained. But sometimes miracle may be taken in a wide sense, for whatever exceeds the human power and experience. And thus demons can work miracles, that is, things which rouse man's astonishment, by reason of their being beyond his power and outside his sphere of knowledge. For even a man by doing what is beyond the power and knowledge of another, leads him to marvel at what he has done, so that in a way he seems to that man to have worked a miracle.

It is to be noted, however, that although these works of demons which appear marvelous to us are not real miracles, they are sometimes nevertheless something real. Thus the magicians of Pharaoh by the demons' power produced real serpents and frogs. And "when fire came down from heaven and at one blow consumed Job's servants and sheep; when the storm struck down his house and with it his children---these were the work of Satan, not phantoms"; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 19).

[33222] Iª q. 114 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, si miraculum proprie accipiatur, Daemones miracula facere non possunt, nec aliqua creatura, sed solus Deus, quia miraculum proprie dicitur quod fit praeter ordinem totius naturae creatae, sub quo ordine continetur omnis virtus creaturae. Dicitur tamen quandoque miraculum large, quod excedit humanam facultatem et considerationem. Et sic Daemones possunt facere miracula, quae scilicet homines mirantur, inquantum eorum facultatem et cognitionem excedunt. Nam et unus homo, inquantum facit aliquid quod est supra facultatem et cognitionem alterius, ducit alium in admirationem sui operis, ut quodammodo miraculum videatur operari. Sciendum est tamen quod, quamvis huiusmodi opera Daemonum, quae nobis miracula videntur, ad veram rationem miraculi non pertingant; sunt tamen quandoque verae res. Sicut magi Pharaonis per virtutem Daemonum veros serpentes et ranas fecerunt. *Et quando ignis de caelo cecidit et familiam Iob cum gregibus pecorum uno impetu consumpsit, et turbo domum deiiciens filios eius occidit, quae fuerunt opera Satanae, phantasmata non fuerunt*, ut Augustinus dicit, XX de Civ. Dei.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says in the same place, the works of Antichrist may be called lying wonders, "either because he will deceive men's senses by means of phantoms, so that he will not really do what he will seem to do; or because, if he work real prodigies, they will lead those into falsehood who believe in him."

[33223] Iª q. 114 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit ibidem, Antichristi opera possunt dici esse signa mendacii, *vel quia mortales sensus per phantasmata decepturus est, ut quod non facit, videatur facere, vel quia, si sint vera prodigia, ad mendacium tamen pertrahent crediturus*.

Reply to Objection 2: As we have said above (Q[110], A[2]), corporeal matter does not obey either good or bad angels at their will, so that demons be able by their power to transmute matter from one form to another; but they can employ certain seeds that exist in the elements of the world, in order to produce these effects, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9). Therefore it must be admitted that all the transformation of corporeal things which can be produced by certain natural powers, to which we must assign the seeds above mentioned, can alike be produced by the operation of the demons, by the employment of these seeds; such as the transformation of certain things into serpents or frogs, which can be produced by putrefaction. On the contrary, those transformations which cannot be produced by the power of nature, cannot in reality be effected by the operation of the demons; for instance, that the human body be changed into the body of a beast, or that the body of a dead man return to life. And if at times something of this sort seems to be effected by the operation of demons, it is not real but a mere semblance of reality.

Now this may happen in two ways. Firstly, from within; in this way a demon can work on man's imagination and even on his corporeal senses, so that something seems otherwise that it is, as explained above (Q[111], AA[3],4). It is said indeed that this can be done sometimes by the power of certain bodies. Secondly, from without: for just as he can from the air form a body of any form and shape, and assume it so as to appear in it visibly: so, in the same way he can clothe any corporeal thing with any corporeal form, so as to appear therein. This is what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18): "Man's imagination, which whether thinking or dreaming, takes the forms of an innumerable number of things, appears to other men's senses, as it were embodied in the semblance of some animal." This not to be understood as though the imagination itself or the

[33224] Iª q. 114 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, materia corporalis non obedit Angelis bonis seu malis ad nutum, ut Daemones sua virtute possint transmutare materiam de forma in formam, sed possunt adhibere quaedam semina quae in elementis mundi inveniuntur, ad huiusmodi effectus complendos, ut Augustinus dicit III de Trin. Et ideo dicendum est quod omnes transmutationes corporalium rerum quae possunt fieri per aliquas virtutes naturales, ad quas pertinent praedicta semina, possunt fieri per operationem Daemonum, huiusmodi seminibus adhibitis; sicut cum aliquae res transmutantur in serpentes vel ranas, quae per putrefactionem generari possunt. Illae vero transmutationes corporalium rerum quae non possunt virtute naturae fieri, nullo modo operatione Daemonum, secundum rei veritatem, perfici possunt; sicut quod corpus humanum mutetur in corpus bestiale, aut quod corpus hominis mortuum reviviscat. Et si aliquando aliquid tale operatione Daemonum fieri videatur, hoc non est secundum rei veritatem, sed secundum apparentiam tantum. Quod quidem potest dupliciter contingere. Uno modo, ab interiori; secundum quod Daemon potest mutare phantasiam hominis, et etiam sensus corporeos, ut aliquid videatur aliter quam sit, sicut supra dictum est. Et hoc etiam interdum fieri dicitur virtute aliquarum rerum corporalium. Alio modo, ab exteriori. Cum enim ipse possit formare corpus ex aere cuiuscumque formae et figurae, ut illud assumens in eo visibiliter appareat; potest eadem ratione circumponere cuicumque rei corporeae quamcumque formam corpoream, ut in eius specie videatur. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit XVIII de Civ. Dei, quod *phantasticum hominis, quod etiam cogitando sive somniando per rerum innumerabilium genera variatur, velut corporatum in alicuius animalis effigie, sensibus apparet alienis*. Quod non est sic intelligendum, quod ipsa vis phantastica hominis, aut species eius, eadem numero incorporata alterius sensibus

images formed therein were identified with that which appears embodied to the senses of another man: but that the demon, who forms an image in a man's imagination, can offer the same picture to another man's senses.

ostendatur, sed quia Daemon qui in phantasia unius hominis format aliquam speciem, ipse etiam potest similem speciem alterius sensibus offerre.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79): "When magicians do what holy men do, they do it for a different end and by a different right. The former do it for their own glory; the latter, for the glory of God: the former, by certain private compacts; the latter by the evident assistance and command of God, to Whom every creature is subject."

[33225] Iª q. 114 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest., *cum talia faciunt magi qualia sancti, diverso fine et diverso iure fiunt. Illi enim faciunt, quaerentes gloriam suam, isti, quaerentes gloriam Dei. Et illi faciunt per quaedam privata commercia; isti autem publica administratione, et iussu Dei, cui cuncta creatura subiecta est*.

Q. 114. A. 5. Whether a demon who is overcome by man, is for this reason hindered from making further assaults?

Objection 1: It would seem that a demon who is overcome by a man, is not for that reason hindered from any further assault. For Christ overcame the tempter most effectively. Yet afterwards the demon assailed Him by instigating the Jews to kill Him. Therefore it is not true that the devil when conquered ceases his assaults.

[33226] Iª q. 114 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Daemon qui superatur ab aliquo, non propter hoc ab impugnatione arceatur. Christus enim efficacissime suum tentatorem vicit. Sed tamen postea eum impugnavit, ad occisionem eius Iudaeos incitando. Ergo non est verum quod Diabolus victus ab impugnatione cesset.

Objection 2: Further, to inflict punishment on one who has been worsted in a fight, is to incite him to a sharper attack. But this is not befitting God's mercy. Therefore the conquered demons are not prevented from further assaults.

[33227] Iª q. 114 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, infligere poenam ei qui in pugna succumbit, est incitare ad acrius impugnandum. Hoc autem non pertinet ad Dei misericordiam. Ergo Daemones superati non arcentur.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 4:11): "Then the devil left Him," i.e. Christ Who overcame.

[33228] Iª q. 114 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. IV, tunc reliquit eum Diabolus, scilicet Christum superantem.

I answer that, Some say that when once a demon has been overcome he can no more tempt any man at all, neither to the same nor to any other sin. And others say that he can tempt others, but not the same man. This seems more probable as long as we understand it to be so for a certain definite time: wherefore (Lk. 4:13) it is written: "All temptation being ended, the devil departed from Him for a time." There are two reasons for this. One is on the part of God's clemency; for as Chrysostom says (Super Matt. Hom. v) [*In the

[33229] Iª q. 114 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod Daemon superatus nullum hominum potest de cetero tentare, nec de eodem nec de alio peccato. Quidam autem dicunt quod potest alios tentare, sed non eundem. Et hoc probabilius dicitur, si tamen intelligatur usque ad aliquod tempus, unde et Lucae IV dicitur quod, *consummata omni tentatione, Diabolus recessit a Christo usque ad tempus*. Et huius ratio est duplex. Una est ex parte divinae clementiae, quia, ut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., *non tandiu*

Opus Imperfectum, among his supposititious works], "the devil does not tempt man for just as long as he likes, but for as long as God allows; for although He allows him to tempt for a short time, He orders him off on account of our weakness." The other reason is taken from the astuteness of the devil. As to this, Ambrose says on Lk. 4:13: "The devil is afraid of persisting, because he shrinks from frequent defeat." That the devil does nevertheless sometimes return to the assault, is apparent from Mat. 12:44: "I will return into my house from whence I came out."

homines Diabolus tentat, quandiu vult, sed quandiu Deus permittit; quia etsi permittat paulisper tentare, tamen repellit, propter infirmam naturam. Alia ratio sumitur ex astutia Diaboli, unde Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, quod *Diabolus instare formidat, quia frequentius refugit triumphari*. Quod tamen aliquando Diabolus redeat ad eum quem dimisit, patet per illud quod dicitur Matth. XII, *revertar in domum meam, unde exivi*.

From what has been said, the objections can easily be solved.

[33230] Iª q. 114 a. 5 ad arg. Et per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta.

Q. 115. OF THE ACTION OF THE CORPOREAL CREATURE (SIX ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the action of the corporeal creature; and fate, which is ascribed to certain bodies. Concerning corporeal actions there are six points of inquiry:

[33231] Iª q. 115 pr. Consequenter considerandum est de actione corporalis creaturae; et fato, quod aliquibus corporibus attribuitur. Circa actiones corporales quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum aliquod corpus sit activum. Secundo, utrum in corporibus sint aliquae seminales rationes. Tertio, utrum corpora caelestia sint causa eorum quae hic per inferiora corpora fiunt. Quarto, utrum sint causa humanorum actuum. Quinto, utrum eorum actionibus Daemones subdantur. Sexto, utrum caelestia corpora imponant necessitatem his quae eorum actionibus subduntur.

(1) Whether a body can be active?

(2) Whether there exist in bodies certain seminal virtues?

(3) Whether the heavenly bodies are the causes of what is done here by the inferior bodies?

(4) Whether they are the cause of human acts?

(5) Whether demons are subject to their influence?

(6) Whether the heavenly bodies impose necessity on those things which are subject to their influence?

Q. 115. A. 1. Whether a body can be active?

Objection 1: It would seem that no bodies are active. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 9): "There are things that are acted upon, but do not act; such are bodies: there is one Who acts but is not acted upon; this is God: there are things that both act and are acted upon; these are the spiritual substances."

[33232] Iª q. 115 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullum corpus sit activum. Dicit enim Augustinus quod *in rebus invenitur aliquid actum et non agens, sicut sunt corpora; aliquid agens et non actum, sicut Deus; aliquid agens et actum, sicut substantiae spirituales*.

Objection 2: Further, every agent except the first agent requires in its work a subject susceptible of its action. But there is not substance below the corporeal substance which can be susceptible of the latter's action; since it belongs to the lowest degree of beings. Therefore corporeal substance is not active.

[33233] Iª q. 115 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, omne agens, excepto primo agente, in suo opere indiget subiecto quod sit susceptibile suae actionis. Sed infra substantiam corporalem non est substantia quae sit susceptibilis suae actionis, quia haec substantia tenet infimum gradum in entibus. Ergo substantia corporalis non est activa.

Objection 3: Further, every corporeal substance is limited by quantity. But quantity hinders substance from movement and action, because it surrounds it and penetrates it: just as a cloud hinders the air from receiving light. A proof of this is that the more a body increases in quantity, the heavier it is and the more difficult to move. Therefore no corporeal substance is active.

[33234] Iª q. 115 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, omnis substantia corporalis concluditur quantitate. Sed quantitas impedit substantiam a motu et actione, quia comprehendit eam, et mergitur in ea, sicut impeditur aer nubilosus a perceptione luminis. Et huius signum est, quod quanto magis accreverit quantitas corporis, tanto est ponderosius et gravius ad hoc quod moveatur. Ergo nulla substantia corporalis est activa.

Objection 4: Further, the power of action in every agent is according to its propinquity to the first active cause. But bodies, being most composite, are most remote from the first active cause, which is most simple. Therefore no bodies are active.

[33235] Iª q. 115 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, omne agens habet virtutem agendi ex propinquitate ad primum activum. Sed a primo activo, quod est simplicissimum, remotissima sunt corpora, quae sunt maxime composita. Ergo nullum corpus est agens.

Objection 5: Further, if a body is an agent, the term of its action is either a substantial, or an accidental form. But it is not a substantial form; for it is not possible to find in a body any principle of action, save an active quality, which is an accident; and an accident cannot be the cause of a substantial form, since the cause is always more excellent than the effect. Likewise, neither is it an accidental form, for "an accident does not extend beyond its subject," as Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4). Therefore no bodies are active.

[33236] Iª q. 115 a. 1 arg. 5 Praeterea, si aliquod corpus est agens, aut agit ad formam substantialem; aut ad formam accidentalem. Sed non ad formam substantialem, quia non invenitur in corporibus principium actionis nisi aliqua qualitas activa, quae est accidens; accidens autem non potest esse causa formae substantialis, cum causa sit potior quam effectus. Similiter etiam neque ad formam accidentalem, *quia accidens non se extendit ultra suum subiectum*, ut Augustinus dicit IX de Trin. Ergo nullum corpus est activum.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv) that among other qualities of corporeal fire, "it shows its greatness in its action and power on that of which it lays hold."

[33237] Iª q. 115 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Dionysius, XV cap. Cael. Hier., inter ceteras proprietates corporei ignis, dicit quod *ad susceptas materias manifestat sui ipsius magnitudinem activus et potens*.

I answer that, It is apparent to the senses that some bodies are active. But concerning the action of bodies there have been three errors. For some denied all action to bodies. This is the opinion of Avicebron in his book on The Fount of Life, where, by the arguments mentioned above, he endeavors to prove that no bodies act, but that all the actions which seem to be the actions of bodies, are the actions of some spiritual power that penetrates all bodies: so that, according to him, it is not fire that heats, but a spiritual power which penetrates, by means of the fire. And this opinion seems to be derived from that of Plato. For Plato held that all forms existing in corporeal matter are participated thereby, and determined and limited thereto; and that separate forms are absolute and as it were universal; wherefore he said that these separate forms are the causes of forms that exist in matter. Therefore inasmuch as the form which is in corporeal matter is determined to this matter individualized by quantity, Avicebron held that the corporeal form is held back and imprisoned by quantity, as the principle of individuality, so as to be unable by

[33238] Iª q. 115 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod sensibiliter apparet aliqua corpora esse activa. Sed circa corporum actiones tripliciter aliqui erraverunt. Fuerunt enim aliqui qui totaliter corporibus actiones subtraxerunt. Et haec est opinio Avicebron in libro fontis vitae, ubi per rationes quae tactae sunt, probare nititur quod nullum corpus agit, sed omnes actiones quae videntur esse corporum, sunt actiones cuiusdam virtutis spiritualis quae penetrat per omnia corpora; ita quod ignis, secundum eum, non calefacit, sed virtus spiritualis penetrans per ipsum. Et videtur haec opinio derivata esse ab opinione Platonis. Nam Plato posuit omnes formas quae sunt in materia corporali, esse participatas et determinatas et contractas ad hanc materiam; formas vero separatas esse absolutas et quasi universales; et ideo illas formas separatas dicebat esse causas formarum quae sunt in materia. Secundum hoc ergo quod forma quae est in materia corporali, determinata est ad hanc materiam individuatam per quantitatem, ponebat Avicebron quod a quantitate, prout est individuationis principium, retinetur et arcetur

action to extend to any other matter: and that the spiritual and immaterial form alone, which is not hedged in by quantity, can issue forth by acting on something else.

But this does not prove that the corporeal form is not an agent, but that it is not a universal agent. For in proportion as a thing is participated, so, of necessity, must that be participated which is proper thereto; thus in proportion to the participation of light is the participation of visibility. But to act, which is nothing else than to make something to be in act, is essentially proper to an act as such; wherefore every agent produces its like. So therefore to the fact of its being a form not determined by matter subject to quantity, a thing owes its being an agent indeterminate and universal: but to the fact that it is determined to this matter, it owes its being an agent limited and particular. Wherefore if the form of fire were separate, as the Platonists supposed, it would be, in a fashion, the cause of every ignition. But this form of fire which is in this corporeal matter, is the cause of this ignition which passes from this body to that. Hence such an action is effected by the contact of two bodies.

But this opinion of Avicebron goes further than that of Plato. For Plato held only substantial forms to be separate; while he referred accidents to the material principles which are "the great" and "the small," which he considered to be the first contraries, by others considered to the "the rare" and "the dense." Consequently both Plato and Avicenna, who follows him to a certain extent, held that corporeal agents act through their accidental forms, by disposing matter for the substantial form; but that the ultimate perfection attained by the introduction of the substantial form is due to an immaterial principle. And this is the second opinion concerning the action of bodies; of which we have spoken above when treating of the creation (Q[45], A[8]).

The third opinion is that of Democritus, who held that action takes place through the issue of atoms from the corporeal agent, while passion consists in the reception of the atoms in the pores of the passive body. This opinion is disproved by Aristotle (De Gener. i, 8,9). For it would follow that a body would not be passive as a whole, and the quantity of the active body would be

forma corporalis, ne possit se extendere per actionem in aliam materiam; sed solum forma spiritualis et immaterialis, quae non est coarctata per quantitatem, potest effluere per actionem in aliud. Sed ista ratio non concludit quod forma corporalis non sit agens, sed quod non sit agens universale. Secundum enim quod participatur aliquid, secundum hoc est necessarium quod participetur id quod est proprium ei, sicut quantum participatur de lumine, tantum participatur de ratione visibilis. Agere autem, quod nihil est aliud quam facere aliquid actu, est per se proprium actus, inquantum est actus, unde et omne agens agit sibi simile. Sic ergo ex hoc quod aliquid est forma non determinata per materiam quantitati subiectam, habet quod sit agens indeterminatum et universale, ex hoc vero quod est determinata ad hanc materiam, habet quod sit agens contractum et particulare. Unde si esset forma ignis separata, ut Platonici posuerunt, esset aliquo modo causa omnis ignitionis. Sed haec forma ignis quae est in hac materia corporali, est causa huius ignitionis quae est ab hoc corpore in hoc corpus. Unde et fit talis actio per contactum duorum corporum. Sed tamen haec opinio Avicebron superexcedit opinionem Platonis. Nam Plato ponebat solum formas substantiales separatas; accidentia vero reducebat ad principia materialia quae sunt magnum et parvum, quae ponebat esse prima contraria, sicut et alii rarum et densum. Et ideo tam Plato quam Avicenna, in aliquo ipsum sequens, ponebant quod agentia corporalia agunt secundum formas accidentales, disponendo materiam ad formam substantialem; sed ultima perfectio, quae est per introductionem formae substantialis est a principio immateriali. Et haec est secunda opinio de actione corporum, de qua supra dictum est, cum de creatione ageretur. Tertia vero opinio fuit Democriti, qui ponebat actionem esse per effluxionem atomorum a corpore agente, et passionem esse per receptionem eorundem in poris corporis patientis. Quam opinionem improbat Aristoteles in I de Generat. Sequeretur enim quod corpus non pateretur per totum, et quod quantitas corporis agentis diminueretur ex hoc quod agit, quae sunt manifeste falsa. Dicendum est ergo quod corpus agit secundum quod est actu, in aliud corpus secundum quod est in potentia.

diminished through its action; which things are manifestly untrue.

We must therefore say that a body acts forasmuch as it is in act, on a body forasmuch as it is in potentiality.

Reply to Objection 1: This passage of Augustine is to be understood of the whole corporeal nature considered as a whole, while thus has no nature inferior to it, on which it can act; as the spiritual nature acts on the corporeal, and the uncreated nature on the created. Nevertheless one body is inferior to another, forasmuch as it is in potentiality to that which the other has in act.

[33239] Iª q. 115 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dictum Augustini est intelligendum de tota natura corporali simul accepta, quae non habet aliquam inferiorem naturam infra se, in quam agat, sicut natura spiritualis in corporalem, et natura increata in creatam. Sed tamen unum corpus est infra alterum, inquantum est in potentia ad id quod habet aliud in actu.

Reply to Objection 2: From this follows the solution of the second objection. But it must be observed, when Avicebron argues thus, "There is a mover who is not moved, to wit, the first maker of all; therefore, on the other hand, there exists something moved which is purely passive," that this is to be conceded. But this latter is primary matter, which is a pure potentiality, just as God is pure act. Now a body is composed of potentiality and act; and therefore it is both active and passive.

[33240] Iª q. 115 a. 1 ad 2 Et per hoc patet solutio ad secundum. Sciendum est tamen quod, cum Avicebron sic argumentatur, est aliquid quod est movens non motum, scilicet primus factor rerum, ergo, ex opposito, est aliquid quod est motum et patiens tantum, quod concedendum est. Sed hoc est materia prima, quae est potentia pura, sicut Deus est actus purus. Corpus autem componitur ex potentia et actu, et ideo est agens et patiens.

Reply to Objection 3: Quantity does not entirely hinder the corporeal form from action, as stated above; but from being a universal agent, forasmuch as a form is individualized through being in matter subject to quantity. The proof taken from the weight of bodies is not to the purpose. First, because addition of quantity does not cause weight; as is proved (De Coelo et Mundo iv, 2). Secondly, it is false that weight retards movement; on the contrary, the heavier a thing, the greater its movement, if we consider the movement proper thereto. Thirdly, because action is not effected by local movement, as Democritus held: but by something being reduced from potentiality to act.

[33241] Iª q. 115 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod quantitas non impedit formam corporalem omnino ab actione, sicut dictum est, sed impedit eam ne sit agens universale, inquantum forma individuatur prout est in materia quantitati subiecta. Signum tamen quod inducitur de ponderositate corporum, non est ad propositum. Primo quidem, quia additio quantitatis non est causa gravitatis; ut probatur in IV de caelo et mundo. Secundo, quia falsum est quod ponderositas facit tardiorem motum, immo quanto aliquid est gravius, tanto magis movetur motu proprio. Tertio, quia actio non fit per motum localem, ut Democritus posuit; sed per hoc quod aliquid reducitur de potentia in actum.

Reply to Objection 4: A body is not that which is most distant from God; for it participates something of a likeness to the Divine Being, forasmuch as it has a form. That which is most

[33242] Iª q. 115 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod corpus non est id quod maxime distat a Deo, participat enim aliquid de similitudine divini esse, secundum formam quam habet. Sed id quod

distant from God is primary matter; which is in no way active, since it is a pure potentiality.

maxime distat a Deo, est materia prima; quae nullo modo est agens, cum sit in potentia tantum.

Reply to Objection 5: The term of a body's action is both an accidental form and a substantial form. For the active quality, such as heat, although itself an accident, acts nevertheless by virtue of the substantial form, as its instrument: wherefore its action can terminate in a substantial form; thus natural heat, as the instrument of the soul, has an action terminating in the generation of flesh. But by its own virtue it produces an accident. Nor is it against the nature of an accident to surpass its subject in acting, but it is to surpass it in being; unless indeed one were to imagine that an accident transfers its identical self from the agent to the patient; thus Democritus explained action by an issue of atoms.

[33243] Iª q. 115 a. 1 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod corpus agit et ad formam accidentalem, et ad formam substantialem. Qualitas enim activa, ut calor, etsi sit accidens, agit tamen in virtute formae substantialis, sicut eius instrumentum; et ideo potest agere ad formam substantialem; sicut et calor naturalis, inquantum est instrumentum animae, agit ad generationem carnis. Ad accidens vero agit propria virtute. Nec est contra rationem accidentis, quod excedat suum subiectum in agendo, sed quod excedat in essendo, nisi forsan quis imaginetur idem accidens numero defluere ab agente in patiens, sicut Democritus ponebat fieri actionem per defluxum atomorum.

Q. 115. A. 2. Whether there are any seminal virtues in corporeal matter?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. For virtue [ratio] implies something of a spiritual order. But in corporeal matter nothing exists spiritually, but only materially, that is, according to the mode of that in which it is. Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

[33244] Iª q. 115 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in materia corporali non sint aliquae rationes seminales. Ratio enim importat aliquid secundum esse spirituale. Sed in materia corporali non est aliquid spiritualiter, sed materialiter tantum, secundum scilicet modum eius in quo est. Ergo in materia corporali non sunt seminales rationes.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8,9) says that demons produce certain results by employing with a hidden movement certain seeds, which they know to exist in matter. But bodies, not virtues, can be employed with local movement. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

[33245] Iª q. 115 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod Daemones quaedam opera faciunt adhibendo occultis motibus quaedam semina, quae in elementis cognoscunt. Sed ea quae per motum localem adhibentur, sunt corpora, non rationes. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur quod sunt in corporali materia seminales rationes.

Objection 3: Further, seeds are active principles. But there are no active principles in corporeal matter; since, as we have said above, matter is not competent to act (A[1], ad 2,4). Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

[33246] Iª q. 115 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, semen est principium activum. Sed in materia corporali non est aliquod principium activum, cum materiae non competat agere, ut dictum est. Ergo in materia corporali non sunt seminales rationes.

Objection 4: Further, there are said to be certain "causal virtues" (Augustine, De Gen. ad lit. v, 4) which seem to suffice for the production of things. But seminal virtues are not causal virtues:

[33247] Iª q. 115 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, in materia corporali dicuntur esse quaedam causales rationes, quae videntur sufficere ad rerum productionem. Sed seminales rationes sunt aliae a

for miracles are outside the scope of seminal virtues, but not of causal virtues. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

causalibus, quia praeter seminales rationes fiunt miracula, non autem praeter causales. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur quod seminales rationes sunt in materia corporali.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Of all the things which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion, certain seeds lie hidden in the corporeal things of this world."

[33248] Iª q. 115 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., *omnium rerum quae corporaliter visibiliterque nascuntur, occulta quaedam semina in istis corporeis mundi huius elementis latent*.

I answer that, It is customary to name things after what is more perfect, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). Now in the whole corporeal nature, living bodies are the most perfect: wherefore the word "nature" has been transferred from living things to all natural things. For the word itself, "nature," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 4), was first applied to signify the generation of living things, which is called "nativity": and because living things are generated from a principle united to them, as fruit from a tree, and the offspring from the mother, to whom it is united, consequently the word "nature" has been applied to every principle of movement existing in that which is moved. Now it is manifest that the active and passive principles of the generation of living things are the seeds from which living things are generated. Therefore Augustine fittingly gave the name of "seminal virtues" [seminales rationes] to all those active and passive virtues which are the principles of natural generation and movement.

These active and passive virtues may be considered in several orders. For in the first place, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 10), they are principally and originally in the Word of God, as "typal ideas." Secondly, they are in the elements of the world, where they were produced altogether at the beginning, as in "universal causes." Thirdly, they are in those things which, in the succession of time, are produced by universal causes, for instance in this plant, and in that animal, as in "particular causes." Fourthly, they are in the "seeds" produced from animals and plants. And these again are compared to further particular effects, as the primordial universal causes to the first effects produced.

[33249] Iª q. 115 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod denominationes consueverunt fieri a perfectiori, ut dicitur in II de anima. In tota autem natura corporea perfectiora sunt corpora viva, unde et ipsum nomen naturae translatum est a rebus viventibus ad omnes res naturales. Nam ipsum nomen naturae, ut philosophus dicit in V Metaphys., primo impositum fuit ad significandum generationem viventium, quae nativitas dicitur, et quia viventia generantur ex principio coniuncto, sicut fructus ex arbore, et foetus ex matre, cui colligatur, consequenter tractum est nomen naturae ad omne principium motus quod est in eo quod movetur. Manifestum est autem quod principium activum et passivum generationis rerum viventium sunt semina ex quibus viventia generantur. Et ideo convenienter Augustinus omnes virtutes activas et passivas quae sunt principia generationum et motuum naturalium, seminales rationes vocat. Huiusmodi autem virtutes activae et passivae in multiplici ordine considerari possunt. Nam primo quidem, ut Augustinus dicit VI super Gen. ad Litt., sunt principaliter et originaliter in ipso verbo Dei, secundum rationes ideales. Secundo vero, sunt in elementis mundi, ubi simul a principio productae sunt, sicut in universalibus causis. Tertio vero modo, sunt in iis quae ex universalibus causis secundum successiones temporum producuntur, sicut in hac planta et in hoc animali, tanquam in particularibus causis. Quarto modo, sunt in seminibus quae ex animalibus et plantis producuntur. Quae iterum comparantur ad alios effectus particulares, sicut primordiales causae universales ad primos effectus productos.

Reply to Objection 1: These active and passive virtues of natural things, thought not called "virtues" [rationes] by reason of their being in corporeal matter, can nevertheless be so called in respect of their origin, forasmuch as they are the effect of the typal ideas [rationes ideales].

[33250] Iª q. 115 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod huiusmodi virtutes activae et passivae rerum naturalium, etsi non possint dici rationes secundum quod sunt in materia corporali; possunt tamen dici rationes per comparationem ad suam originem, secundum quod deducuntur a rationibus idealibus.

Reply to Objection 2: These active and passive virtues are in certain parts of corporeal things: and when they are employed with local movement for the production of certain results, we speak of the demons as employing seeds.

[33251] Iª q. 115 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod huiusmodi virtutes activae vel passivae sunt in aliquibus partibus corporalibus; quae dum adhibentur per motum localem ad aliquos effectus complendos, dicuntur semina adhiberi per Daemones.

Reply to Objection 3: The seed of the male is the active principle in the generation of an animal. But that can be called seed also which the female contributes as the passive principle. And thus the word "seed" covers both active and passive principles.

[33252] Iª q. 115 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod semen maris est principium activum in generatione animalis. Sed potest etiam dici semen id quod est ex parte feminae, quod est principium passivum. Et sic sub semine comprehendi possunt vires activae et passivae.

Reply to Objection 4: From the words of Augustine when speaking of these seminal virtues, it is easy to gather that they are also causal virtues, just as seed is a kind of cause: for he says (De Trin. iii, 9) that, "as a mother is pregnant with the unborn offspring, so is the world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn things." Nevertheless, the "typal ideas" can be called "causal virtues," but not, strictly speaking, "seminal virtues," because seed is not a separate principle; and because miracles are not wrought outside the scope of causal virtues. Likewise neither are miracles wrought outside the scope of the passive virtues so implanted in the creature, that the latter can be used to any purpose that God commands. But miracles are said to be wrought outside the scope of the natural active virtues, and the passive potentialities which are ordered to such active virtues, and this is what is meant when we say that they are wrought outside the scope of seminal virtues.

[33253] Iª q. 115 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod ex verbis Augustini de huiusmodi rationibus seminalibus loquentis, satis accipi potest quod ipsae rationes seminales sunt etiam rationes causales, sicut et semen est quaedam causa, dicit enim in III de Trin., quod *sicut matres gravidae sunt foetibus, sic ipse mundus est gravidus causis nascentium*. Sed tamen rationes ideales possunt dici causales, non autem proprie loquendo seminales, quia semen non est principium separatum, et praeter huiusmodi rationes non fiunt miracula. Similiter etiam neque praeter virtutes passivas creaturae inditas, ut ex ea fieri possit quidquid Deus mandaverit. Sed praeter virtutes activas naturales, et potentias passivas quae ordinantur ad huiusmodi virtutes activas, dicuntur fieri miracula, dum dicitur quod fiunt praeter rationes seminales.

Q. 115. A. 3. Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of what is produced in bodies here below?

Objection 1: It would seem that the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced in bodies here below. For Damascene says (De Fide

[33254] Iª q. 115 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpora caelestia non sint causa eorum quae hic in inferioribus

Orth. ii, 7): "We say that they"---namely, the heavenly bodies---"are not the cause of generation or corruption: they are rather signs of storms and atmospheric changes."

corporibus fiunt. Dicit enim Damascenus, nos autem dicimus quoniam ipsa, scilicet corpora caelestia, *non sunt causa alicuius eorum quae fiunt, neque corruptionis eorum quae corrumpuntur, signa autem sunt magis imbrium et aeris transmutationis*.

Objection 2: Further, for the production of anything, an agent and matter suffice. But in things here below there is passive matter; and there are contrary agents---heat and cold, and the like. Therefore for the production of things here below, there is no need to ascribe causality to the heavenly bodies.

[33255] Iª q. 115 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, ad faciendum aliquid, sufficit agens et materia. Sed in istis inferioribus invenitur materia patiens, inveniuntur etiam contraria agentia, scilicet calidum et frigidum et huiusmodi. Ergo non est necessarium, ad causandum ea quae hic inferius fiunt, causalitatem caelestibus corporibus attribuere.

Objection 3: Further, the agent produces its like. Now it is to be observed that everything which is produced here below is produced through the action of heat and cold, moisture and dryness, and other such qualities, which do not exist in heavenly bodies. Therefore the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced here below.

[33256] Iª q. 115 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, agens agit sibi simile. Sed videmus quod omnia quae fiunt hic inferius, fiunt per hoc quod calefiunt et frigidantur, et humectantur et desiccantur, et aliis huiusmodi qualitatibus alterantur, quae non inveniuntur in corporibus caelestibus. Ergo corpora caelestia non sunt causa eorum quae hic fiunt.

Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 6): "Nothing is more corporeal than sex." But sex is not caused by the heavenly bodies: a sign of this is that of twins born under the same constellation, one may be male, the other female. Therefore the heavenly bodies are not the cause of things produced in bodies here below.

[33257] Iª q. 115 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit V de Civ. Dei, *nihil est magis corporeum quam corporis sexus*. Sed corporis sexus non causatur ex corporibus caelestibus, cuius signum esse videtur, quod duorum geminorum sub una constellatione natorum, unus est masculus et alter est femina. Ergo corpora caelestia non sunt causa rerum corporalium quae hic fiunt.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "Bodies of a grosser and inferior nature are ruled in a certain order by those of a more subtle and powerful nature." And Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that "the light of the sun conduces to the generation of sensible bodies, moves them to life, gives them nourishment, growth, and perfection."

[33258] Iª q. 115 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod *corpora crassiora et inferiora per subtiliora et potentiora quodam ordine reguntur*. Et Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod *lumen solis ad generationem sensibilium corporum confert, et ad vitam ipsa movet, et nutrit et auget et perficit*.

I answer that, Since every multitude proceeds from unity; and since what is immovable is always in the same way of being, whereas what is moved has many ways of being: it must be observed that throughout the whole of nature, all

[33259] Iª q. 115 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum omnis multitudo ab unitate procedat; quod autem immobile est, uno modo se habet, quod vero movetur, multiformiter, considerandum est, in tota natura, quod omnis motus ab immobili

movement proceeds from the immovable. Therefore the more immovable certain things are, the more are they the cause of those things which are most movable. Now the heavenly bodies are of all bodies the most immovable, for they are not moved save locally. Therefore the movements of bodies here below, which are various and multiform, must be referred to the movement of the heavenly bodies, as to their cause.

procedit. Et ideo quanto aliqua sunt immobiliora, tanto sunt magis causa eorum quae sunt magis mobilia. Corpora autem caelestia sunt inter alia corpora magis immobilia, non enim moventur nisi motu locali. Et ideo motus horum inferiorum corporum qui sunt varii et multiformes, reducuntur in motum corporis caelestis, sicut in causam.

Reply to Objection 1: These words of Damascene are to be understood as denying that the heavenly bodies are the first cause of generation and corruption here below; for this was affirmed by those who held that the heavenly bodies are gods.

[33260] Iª q. 115 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dictum Damasceni intelligendum est, quod corpora caelestia non sunt prima causa generationis et corruptionis eorum quae hic fiunt; sicut dicebant illi qui ponebant corpora caelestia esse deos.

Reply to Objection 2: The active principles of bodies here below are only the active qualities of the elements, such as hot and cold and the like. If therefore the substantial forms of inferior bodies were not diversified save according to accidents of that kind, the principles of which the early natural philosophers held to be the "rare" and the "dense"; there would be no need to suppose some principle above these inferior bodies, for they would be of themselves sufficient to act. But to anyone who considers the matter aright, it is clear that those accidents are merely material dispositions in regard to the substantial forms of natural bodies. Now matter is not of itself sufficient to act. And therefore it is necessary to suppose some active principle above these material dispositions.

This is why the Platonists maintained the existence of separate species, by participation of which the inferior bodies receive their substantial forms. But this does not seem enough. For the separate species, since they are supposed to be immovable, would always have the same mode of being: and consequently there would be no variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies: which is clearly false.

Therefore it is necessary, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 10), to suppose a movable principle, which by reason of its presence or absence causes variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies. Such are the heavenly bodies. Consequently whatever

[33261] Iª q. 115 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod principia activa in istis inferioribus corporibus non inveniuntur nisi qualitates activae elementorum, quae sunt calidum et frigidum et huiusmodi. Et si sic esset quod formae substantiales inferiorum corporum non diversificarentur nisi secundum huiusmodi accidentia, quorum principia rarum et densum antiqui naturales posuerunt; non oporteret super haec inferiora corpora aliquod principium activum ponere, sed ipsa sufficerent ad agendum. Sed recte considerantibus apparet quod huiusmodi accidentia se habent sicut materiales dispositiones ad formas substantiales naturalium corporum. Materia autem non sufficit ad agendum. Et ideo oportet super has materiales dispositiones ponere aliquod principium activum. Unde Platonici posuerunt species separatas, secundum quarum participationem inferiora corpora substantiales formas consequuntur. Sed hoc non videtur sufficere. Quia species separatae semper eodem modo se haberent, cum ponantur immobiles, et sic sequeretur quod non esset aliqua variatio circa generationem et corruptionem inferiorum corporum; quod patet esse falsum. Unde secundum philosophum, in II de Gen., necesse est ponere aliquod principium activum mobile, quod per sui praesentiam et absentiam causet varietatem circa generationem et corruptionem inferiorum corporum. Et huiusmodi sunt corpora caelestia. Et ideo quidquid in istis inferioribus generat, movet ad speciem sicut instrumentum

generates here below, moves to the production of the species, as the instrument of a heavenly body: thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2) that "man and the sun generate man."

caelestis corporis; secundum quod dicitur in II Physic., quod *homo generat hominem, et sol*.

Reply to Objection 3: The heavenly bodies have not a specific likeness to the bodies here below. Their likeness consists in this, that by reason of their universal power, whatever is generated in inferior bodies, is contained in them. In this way also we say that all things are like God.

[33262] Iª q. 115 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod corpora caelestia inferioribus corporibus non sunt similia similitudine speciei; sed inquantum sua universali virtute continent in se quidquid in inferioribus corporibus generatur; secundum quem modum dicimus etiam omnia esse Deo similia.

Reply to Objection 4: The actions of heavenly bodies are variously received in inferior bodies, according to the various dispositions of matter. Now it happens at times that the matter in the human conception is not wholly disposed to the male sex; wherefore it is formed sometimes into a male, sometimes into a female. Augustine quotes this as an argument against divination by stars: because the effects of the stars are varied even in corporeal things, according to the various dispositions of matter.

[33263] Iª q. 115 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod actiones corporum caelestium diversimode recipiuntur in inferioribus corporibus secundum diversam materiae dispositionem. Contingit autem quandoque quod materia conceptus humani non est disposita totaliter ad masculinum sexum; unde partim formatur in masculum, partim in feminam. Unde ad hoc introducitur ab Augustino, ad repellendum scilicet divinationem quae fit per astra, quia effectus astrorum variantur etiam in rebus corporeis, secundum diversam materiae dispositionem.

Q. 115. A. 4. Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions?

Objection 1: It would seem that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions. For since the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual substances, as stated above (Q[110], A[3]), they act by virtue thereof as their instruments. But those spiritual substances are superior to our souls. Therefore it seems that they can cause impressions on our souls, and thereby cause human actions.

[33264] Iª q. 115 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpora caelestia sint causa humanorum actuum. Corpora enim caelestia, cum moveantur a spiritualibus substantiis, sicut supra dictum est, agunt in virtute earum quasi instrumenta. Sed illae substantiae spirituales sunt superiores animabus nostris. Ergo videtur quod possint imprimere in animas nostras, et sic causare actus humanos.

Objection 2: Further, every multiform is reducible to a uniform principle. But human actions are various and multiform. Therefore it seems that they are reducible to the uniform movements of heavenly bodies, as to their principles.

[33265] Iª q. 115 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, omne multiforme reducitur in aliquod uniforme principium. Sed actus humani sunt varii et multiformes. Ergo videtur quod reducantur in uniformes motus caelestium corporum, sicut in sua principia.

Objection 3: Further, astrologers often foretell the truth concerning the outcome of wars, and other human actions, of which the intellect and

[33266] Iª q. 115 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, astrologi frequenter vera annuntiant de eventibus bellorum, et aliis humanis actibus, quorum principia sunt

will are the principles. But they could not do this by means of the heavenly bodies, unless these were the cause of human actions. Therefore the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions.

intellectus et voluntas. Quod facere non possent secundum caelestia corpora, nisi essent humanorum actuum causa. Sunt ergo corpora caelestia humanorum actuum causa.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the heavenly bodies are by no means the cause of human actions."

[33267] Iª q. 115 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, quod *corpora caelestia humanorum actuum nequaquam sunt causa*.

I answer that, The heavenly bodies can directly and of themselves act on bodies, as stated above (A[3]). They can act directly indeed on those powers of the soul which are the acts of corporeal organs, but accidentally: because the acts of such powers must needs be hindered by obstacles in the organs; thus an eye when disturbed cannot see well. Wherefore if the intellect and will were powers affixed to corporeal organs, as some maintained, holding that intellect does not differ from sense; it would follow of necessity that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human choice and action. It would also follow that man is led by natural instinct to his actions, just as other animals, in which there are powers other than those which are affixed to corporeal organs: for whatever is done here below in virtue of the action of heavenly bodies, is done naturally. It would therefore follow that man has no free-will, and that he would have determinate actions, like other natural things. All of which is manifestly false, and contrary to human habit. It must be observed, however, that indirectly and accidentally, the impressions of heavenly bodies can reach the intellect and will, forasmuch, namely, as both intellect and will receive something from the inferior powers which are affixed to corporeal organs. But in this the intellect and will are differently situated. For the intellect, of necessity, receives from the inferior apprehensive powers: wherefore if the imaginative, cogitative, or memorative powers be disturbed, the action of the intellect is, of necessity, disturbed also. The will, on the contrary, does not, of necessity, follow the inclination of the inferior appetite; for although the passions in the irascible and concupiscible have a certain force in inclining the will; nevertheless the will retains the power of following the passions or repressing them. Therefore the impressions of the heavenly bodies,

[33268] Iª q. 115 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod corpora caelestia in corpora quidem imprimunt directe et per se, sicut iam dictum est. In vires autem animae quae sunt actus organorum corporeorum, directe quidem, sed per accidens, quia necesse est huiusmodi actus harum potentiarum impediri secundum impedimenta organorum, sicut oculus turbatus non bene videt. Unde si intellectus et voluntas essent vires corporeis organis alligatae, sicut posuerunt aliqui, dicentes quod intellectus non differt a sensu; ex necessitate sequeretur quod corpora caelestia essent causa electionum et actuum humanorum. Et ex hoc sequeretur quod homo naturali instinctu ageretur ad suas actiones, sicut cetera animalia, in quibus non sunt nisi vires animae corporeis organis alligatae, nam illud quod fit in istis inferioribus ex impressione corporum caelestium, naturaliter agitur. Et ita sequeretur quod homo non esset liberi arbitrii, sed haberet actiones determinatas, sicut et ceterae res naturales. Quae manifeste sunt falsa, et conversationi humanae contraria. Sciendum est tamen quod indirecte et per accidens impressiones corporum caelestium ad intellectum et voluntatem pertingere possunt; inquantum scilicet tam intellectus quam voluntas aliquo modo ab inferioribus viribus accipiunt, quae organis corporeis alligantur. Sed circa hoc diversimode se habent intellectus et voluntas. Nam intellectus ex necessitate accipit ab inferioribus viribus apprehensivis, unde turbata vi imaginativa vel cogitativa vel memorativa, ex necessitate turbatur actio intellectus. Sed voluntas non ex necessitate sequitur inclinationem appetitus inferioris, licet enim passiones quae sunt in irascibili et concupiscibili, habeant quandam vim ad inclinandam voluntatem; tamen in potestate voluntatis remanet sequi passiones, vel eas refutare. Et ideo impressio caelestium corporum, secundum quam immutari possunt inferiores vires, minus pertingit ad voluntatem,

by virtue of which the inferior powers can be changed, has less influence on the will, which is the proximate cause of human actions, than on the intellect.

To maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions is proper to those who hold that intellect does not differ from sense. Wherefore some of these said that "such is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods brings on" (Odyssey xviii 135). Since, therefore, it is manifest that intellect and will are not acts of corporeal organs, it is impossible that heavenly bodies be the cause of human actions.

quae est proxima causa humanorum actuum, quam ad intellectum. Ponere igitur caelestia corpora esse causam humanorum actuum, est proprium illorum qui dicunt intellectum non differre a sensu. Unde quidam eorum dicebant quod *talis est voluntas in hominibus, qualem in diem inducit pater virorum deorumque*. Quia ergo constat intellectum et voluntatem non esse actus organorum corporeorum, impossibile est quod corpora caelestia sint causa humanorum actuum.

Reply to Objection 1: The spiritual substances, that move the heavenly bodies, do indeed act on corporeal things by means of the heavenly bodies; but they act immediately on the human intellect by enlightening it. On the other hand, they cannot compel the will, as stated above (Q[111], A[2]).

[33269] Iª q. 115 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod spirituales substantiae quae caelestia corpora movent, in corporalia quidem agunt mediantibus caelestibus corporibus, sed in intellectum humanum agunt immediate illuminando. Voluntatem autem immutare non possunt, ut supra habitum est.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as the multiformity of corporeal movements is reducible to the uniformity of the heavenly movement as to its cause: so the multiformity of actions proceeding from the intellect and the will is reduced to a uniform principle which is the Divine intellect and will.

[33270] Iª q. 115 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut multiformitas corporalium motuum reducitur sicut in causam in uniformitatem motuum caelestium; ita multiformitas actuum qui sunt ab intellectu et voluntate, reducitur in principium uniforme quod est intellectus et voluntas divina.

Reply to Objection 3: The majority of men follow their passions, which are movements of the sensitive appetite, in which movements of the heavenly bodies can cooperate: but few are wise enough to resist these passions. Consequently astrologers are able to foretell the truth in the majority of cases, especially in a general way. But not in particular cases; for nothing prevents man resisting his passions by his free-will. Wherefore the astrologers themselves are wont to say that "the wise man is stronger than the stars" [*Ptolemy, Centiloquium, prop. 5], forasmuch as, to wit, he conquers his passions.

[33271] Iª q. 115 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod plures hominum sequuntur passiones, quae sunt motus sensitivi appetitus, ad quas cooperari possunt corpora caelestia, pauci autem sunt sapientes, qui huiusmodi passionibus resistant. Et ideo astrologi ut in pluribus vera possunt praedicere, et maxime in communi. Non autem in speciali, quia nihil prohibet aliquem hominem per liberum arbitrium passionibus resistere. Unde et ipsi astrologi dicunt quod sapiens homo dominatur astris, inquantum scilicet dominatur suis passionibus.

Q. 115. A. 5. Whether heavenly bodies can act on the demons?

Objection 1: It would seem that heavenly bodies can act on the demons. For the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, can harass men, who on that account are called lunatics, as appears from Mat. 4:24 and 17:14. But this would not be if they were not subject to the heavenly bodies. Therefore the demons are subject to them.

[33272] Iª q. 115 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpora caelestia possint imprimere in ipsos Daemones. Daemones enim secundum certa augmenta lunae aliquos homines vexant, qui et propter hoc lunatici dicuntur; ut patet Matth. IV et XVII. Sed hoc non esset, nisi corporibus caelestibus subiacerent. Ergo Daemones subiacent actionibus caelestium corporum.

Objection 2: Further, necromancers observe certain constellations in order to invoke the demons. But these would not be invoked through the heavenly bodies unless they were subject to them. Therefore they are subject to them.

[33273] Iª q. 115 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, necromantici observant certas constellationes ad invocandos Daemones. Non autem per corpora caelestia invocarentur, si non eis subiacerent. Ergo Daemones subiacent actionibus caelestium corporum.

Objection 3: Further, heavenly bodies are more powerful than inferior bodies. But the demons are confined to certain inferior bodies, namely, "herbs, stones, animals, and to certain sounds and words, forms and figures," as Porphyry says, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11). Much more therefore are the demons subject to the action of heavenly bodies.

[33274] Iª q. 115 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, corpora caelestia virtuosiora sunt quam corpora inferiora. Sed quibusdam inferioribus corporibus Daemones arcentur, scilicet herbis et lapidibus et animantibus, et quibusdam *sonis certis ac vocibus, et figurationibus atque figmentis*, ut a Porphyrio dictum Augustinus introducit in X de Civ. Dei. Ergo multo magis Daemones subduntur actioni caelestium corporum.

On the contrary, The demons are superior in the order of nature, to the heavenly bodies. But the "agent is superior to the patient," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore the demons are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies.

[33275] Iª q. 115 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod Daemones sunt superiores ordine naturae quam corpora caelestia. Agens autem est superius patiente, ut Augustinus dicit XII super Gen. ad Litt. Ergo Daemones non subiiciuntur actioni corporum caelestium.

I answer that, There have been three opinions about the demons. In the first place the Peripatetics denied the existence of demons; and held that what is ascribed to the demons, according to the necromantic art, is effected by the power of the heavenly bodies. This is what Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) relates as having been held by Porphyry, namely, that "on earth men fabricate certain powers useful in producing certain effects of the stars." But this opinion is manifestly false. For we know by experience that many things are done by demons, for which the power of heavenly bodies would in no way

[33276] Iª q. 115 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod circa Daemones fuit triplex opinio. Prima Peripateticorum, qui posuerunt Daemones non esse; sed ea quae attribuuntur Daemonibus, secundum artem necromanticam, fiunt virtute caelestium corporum. Et hoc est quod Augustinus, X de Civ. Dei, introducit dictum a Porphyrio, quod *fabricantur in terra ab hominibus potestates idoneae siderum variis effectibus exequendis*. Sed haec positio est manifeste falsa. Experimento enim scitur multa per Daemones fieri, ad quae nullo modo virtus caelestium corporum sufficeret; puta quod arreptitii loquuntur lingua ignota, quod

suffice: for instance, that a man in a state of delirium should speak an unknown tongue, recite poetry and authors of whom he has no previous knowledge; that necromancers make statues to speak and move, and other like things.

For this reason the Platonists were led to hold that demons are "animals with an aerial body and a passive soul," as Apuleius says, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei viii, 16). And this is the second of the opinions mentioned above: according to which it could be said that demons are subject to heavenly bodies in the same way as we have said man is subject thereto (A[4]). But this opinion is proved to be false from what we have said above (Q[51], A[1]): for we hold that demons are spiritual substances not united to bodies. Hence it is clear that they are subject to the action of heavenly bodies neither essentially nor accidentally, neither directly nor indirectly.

recitant versus et auctoritates quas nunquam sciverunt, quod necromantici faciunt statuas loqui et moveri, et similia. Ex quibus Platonici moti fuerunt ut ponerent Daemones esse animalia corpore aerea, animo passiva; ut ab Apuleio dictum Augustinus introducit VIII de Civ. Dei. Et haec est secunda opinio, secundum quam dici posset quod Daemones hoc modo subduntur corporibus caelestibus, sicut et de hominibus dictum est. Sed haec opinio ex superioribus patet esse falsa, dicimus enim Daemones esse substantias intellectuales corporibus non unitas. Unde patet quod non subduntur actioni caelestium corporum, nec per se nec per accidens, nec directe nec indirecte.

Reply to Objection 1: That demons harass men, according to certain phases of the moon, happens in two ways. Firstly, they do so in order to "defame God's creature," namely, the moon; as Jerome (In Matt. iv, 24) and Chrysostom (Hom. lvii in Matt.) say. Secondly, because as they are unable to effect anything save by means of the natural forces, as stated above (Q[114], A[4], ad 2) they take into account the aptitude of bodies for the intended result. Now it is manifest that "the brain is the most moist of all the parts of the body," as Aristotle says [*De Part. Animal. ii, 7: De Sens. et Sensato ii: De Somn. et Vigil. iii]: wherefore it is the most subject to the action of the moon, the property of which is to move what is moist. And it is precisely in the brain that animal forces culminate: wherefore the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, disturb man's imagination, when they observe that the brain is thereto disposed.

[33277] Iª q. 115 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc quod Daemones secundum certa augmenta lunae homines vexant, contingit propter duo. Primo quidem, ad hoc quod infament creaturam Dei, scilicet lunam, ut Hieronymus et Chrysostomus dicunt. Secundo quia, cum non possint operari nisi mediantibus naturalibus virtutibus, ut supra dictum est; in suis operibus considerant corporum aptitudines ad effectus intentos. Manifestum est autem quod *cerebrum humidissimum est omnium partium corporis*, ut Aristoteles dicit, et ideo maxime subiicitur operationi lunae, quae ex sua proprietate habet movere humorem. In cerebro autem perficiuntur vires animales, et ideo Daemones secundum certa augmenta lunae perturbant hominis phantasiam, quando considerant cerebrum ad hoc esse dispositum.

Reply to Objection 2: Demons when summoned through certain constellations, come for two reasons. Firstly, in order to lead man into the error of believing that there is some Divine power in the stars. Secondly, because they consider that under certain constellations corporeal matter is better disposed for the result for which they are summoned.

[33278] Iª q. 115 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Daemones advocati in certis constellationibus, propter duo veniunt. Primo quidem, ut homines in hunc errorem inducant, quod credant aliquod numen esse in stellis. Secundo, quia considerant secundum aliquas certas constellationes materiam corporalem magis esse dispositam ad effectus pro quibus advocantur.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6), the "demons are enticed through various kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals, songs, rites, not as an animal is enticed by food, but as a spirit by signs"; that is to say, forasmuch as these things are offered to them in token of the honor due to God, of which they are covetous.

[33279] Iª q. 115 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XXI de Civ. Dei, *Daemones alliciuntur per varia genera lapidum, herbarum, lignorum, animalium, carminum, rituum, non ut animalia cibis, sed ut spiritus signis*; inquantum scilicet haec eis exhibentur in signum divini honoris, cuius ipsi sunt cupidi.

Q. 115. A. 6. Whether heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action?

Objection 1: It would seem that heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action. For given a sufficient cause, the effect follows of necessity. But heavenly bodies are a sufficient cause of their effects. Since, therefore, heavenly bodies, with their movements and dispositions, are necessary beings; it seems that their effects follow of necessity.

[33280] Iª q. 115 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpora caelestia imponant necessitatem iis quae eorum actioni subduntur. Causa enim sufficienti posita, necesse est effectum poni. Sed corpora caelestia sunt sufficiens causa suorum effectuum. Cum igitur corpora caelestia, cum suis motibus et dispositionibus, ponantur sicut ex necessitate entia; videtur quod effectus eorum ex necessitate consequantur.

Objection 2: Further, an agent's effect results of necessity in matter, when the power of the agent is such that it can subject the matter to itself entirely. But the entire matter of inferior bodies is subject to the power of heavenly bodies, since this is a higher power than theirs. Therefore the effect of the heavenly bodies is of necessity received in corporeal matter.

[33281] Iª q. 115 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, effectus agentis ex necessitate sequitur in materia, quando virtus agentis tanta fuerit quod possit sibi subiicere totaliter materiam. Sed tota materia inferiorum corporum subiicitur virtuti caelestium corporum, tanquam excellentiori. Ergo ex necessitate effectus caelestium corporum recipitur in materia corporali.

Objection 3: Further, if the effect of the heavenly body does not follow of necessity, this is due to some hindering cause. But any corporeal cause, that might possibly hinder the effect of a heavenly body, must of necessity be reducible to some heavenly principle: since the heavenly bodies are the causes of all that takes place here below. Therefore, since also that heavenly principle is necessary, it follows that the effect of the

[33282] Iª q. 115 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, si effectus caelestis corporis non ex necessitate proveniat, hoc est propter aliquam causam impedientem. Sed quamlibet causam corpoream quae impedire posset effectum caelestis corporis, necesse est reduci in aliquod caeleste principium, cum caelestia corpora sint causa omnium quae hic fiunt. Ergo, cum et illud caeleste principium sit necessarium, sequitur quod necesse sit impediri

heavenly body is necessarily hindered. Consequently it would follow that all that takes place here below happens of necessity.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*De Divin. per Somn. ii]): "It is not incongruous that many of the signs observed in bodies, of occurrences in the heavens, such as rain and wind, should not be fulfilled." Therefore not all the effects of heavenly bodies take place of necessity.

I answer that, This question is partly solved by what was said above (A[4]); and in part presents some difficulty. For it was shown that although the action of heavenly bodies produces certain inclinations in corporeal nature, the will nevertheless does not of necessity follow these inclinations. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the effect of heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of the will, not only in man himself, but also in other things to which human action extends.

But in natural things there is no such principle, endowed with freedom to follow or not to follow the impressions produced by heavenly agents. Wherefore it seems that in such things at least, everything happens of necessity; according to the reasoning of some of the ancients who supposing that everything that is, has a cause; and that, given the cause, the effect follows of necessity; concluded that all things happen of necessity. This opinion is refuted by Aristotle (Metaph. vi, Did. v, 3) as to this double supposition.

For in the first place it is not true that, given any cause whatever, the effect must follow of necessity. For some causes are so ordered to their effects, as to produce them, not of necessity, but in the majority of cases, and in the minority to fail in producing them. But that such cases do fail in the minority of cases is due to some hindering cause; consequently the above-mentioned difficulty seems not to be avoided, since the cause in question is hindered of necessity.

Therefore we must say, in the second place, that everything that is a being "per se," has a cause; but what is accidentally, has not a cause, because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one. For

effectum alterius corporis caelestis. Et sic omnia quae hic contingunt, ex necessitate eveniunt.

[33283] Iª q. 115 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in libro de Somn. et Vigil., *quod neque eorum quae in corporibus sunt signorum caelestium, velut aquarum et ventorum, inconveniens est multa non evenire*. Sic ergo non omnes effectus caelestium corporum ex necessitate eveniunt.

[33284] Iª q. 115 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ista quaestio partim quidem absoluta est, secundum praemissa; partim autem difficultatem habet. Ostensum enim est quod, quamvis ex impressione corporum caelestium fiant aliquae inclinationes in natura corporali, voluntas tamen non ex necessitate sequitur has inclinationes. Et ideo nihil prohibet per voluntariam actionem impediri effectum caelestium corporum, non solum in ipso homine, sed etiam in aliis rebus ad quas hominum operatio se extendit. Sed nullum tale principium invenitur in rebus naturalibus, quod habeat libertatem sequendi vel non sequendi impressiones caelestes. Unde videtur quod in talibus, ad minus, omnia ex necessitate proveniant, secundum antiquam quorundam rationem, qui, supponentes omne quod est causam habere, et quod, posita causa, ex necessitate ponitur effectus, concludebant, quod omnia ex necessitate contingant. Quam quidem opinionem repellit Aristoteles in VI Metaphys., secundum duo quae ipsi supponunt. Primo enim, non est verum quod, posita quacumque causa, necesse sit effectum poni. Sunt enim quaedam causae quae ordinantur ad suos effectus non ex necessitate, sed ut in pluribus, quae quandoque deficiunt in minori parte. Sed quia huiusmodi causae non deficiunt in minori parte, nisi propter aliquam causam impedientem, videtur adhuc praedictum inconveniens non vitari, quia et ipsum impedimentum talis causae ex necessitate contingit. Et ideo, secundo, oportet dicere quod omne quod est per se, habet causam, quod autem est per accidens, non habet causam, quia non est vere ens, cum non sit vere unum. Album enim causam habet, similiter et musicum; sed album musicum non habet causam, quia non est vere ens, neque vere unum. Manifestum est autem

(that a thing is) "white" has a cause, likewise (that a man is) "musical" has not a cause, but (that a being is) "white-musical" has not a cause, because it is not truly a being, nor truly one. Now it is manifest that a cause which hinders the action of a cause so ordered to its effect as to produce it in the majority of cases, clashes sometimes with this cause by accident: and the clashing of these two causes, inasmuch as it is accidental, has no cause. Consequently what results from this clashing of causes is not to be reduced to a further pre-existing cause, from which it follows of necessity. For instance, that some terrestrial body take fire in the higher regions of the air and fall to the earth, is caused by some heavenly power: again, that there be on the surface of the earth some combustible matter, is reducible to some heavenly principle. But that the burning body should alight on this matter and set fire to it, is not caused by a heavenly body, but is accidental. Consequently not all the effects of heavenly bodies result of necessity.

quod causa impediens actionem alicuius causae ordinatae ad suum effectum ut in pluribus, concurrit ei interdum per accidens, unde talis concursus non habet causam, inquantum est per accidens. Et propter hoc, id quod ex tali concursu sequitur, non reducitur in aliquam causam praeexistentem, ex qua ex necessitate sequatur. Sicut quod aliquod corpus terrestre ignitum in superiori parte aeris generetur et deorsum cadat, habet causam aliquam virtutem caelestem, et similiter etiam quod in superficie terrae sit aliqua materia combustibilis, potest reduci in aliquod caeleste principium. Sed quod ignis cadens huic materiae occurrat et comburat eam, non habet causam aliquod caeleste corpus, sed est per accidens. Et sic patet quod non omnes effectus caelestium corporum sunt ex necessitate.

Reply to Objection 1: The heavenly bodies are causes of effects that take place here below, through the means of particular inferior causes, which can fail in their effects in the minority of cases.

[33285] Iª q. 115 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod corpora caelestia sunt causa inferiorum effectuum mediantibus causis particularibus inferioribus, quae deficere possunt in minori parte.

Reply to Objection 2: The power of a heavenly body is not infinite. Wherefore it requires a determinate disposition in matter, both as to local distance and as to other conditions, in order to produce its effect. Therefore as local distance hinders the effect of a heavenly body (for the sun has not the same effect in heat in Dacia as in Ethiopia); so the grossness of matter, its low or high temperature or other such disposition, can hinder the effect of a heavenly body.

[33286] Iª q. 115 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod virtus corporis caelestis non est infinita. Unde requirit determinatam dispositionem in materia ad inducendum suum effectum, et quantum ad distantiam loci, et quantum ad alias conditiones. Et ideo sicut distantia loci impedit effectum caelestis corporis (non enim sol eundem caloris effectum habet in Dacia, quem habet in Aethiopia); ita et grossities materiae, vel frigiditas aut caliditas, aut alia huiusmodi dispositio, impedire potest effectum corporis caelestis.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the cause that hinders the effect of another cause can be reduced to a heavenly body as its cause; nevertheless the clashing of two causes, being accidental, is not reduced to the causality of a heavenly body, as stated above.

[33287] Iª q. 115 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod licet causa impediens effectum alterius causae, reducatur in aliquod caeleste corpus sicut in causam; tamen concursus duarum causarum, cum sit per accidens, non reducitur in causam caelestem, ut dictum est.

Q. 116. ON FATE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We come now to the consideration of fate. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Is there such a thing as fate?

(2) Where is it?

(3) Is it unchangeable?

(4) Are all things subject to fate?

[33288] Iª q. 116 pr. Deinde considerandum est de fato. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, an fatum sit. Secundo, in quo sit. Tertio, utrum sit immobile. Quarto, utrum omnia subsint fato.

Q. 116. A. 1. Whether there be such a thing as fate?

Objection 1: It would seem that fate is nothing. For Gregory says in a homily for the Epiphany (Hom. x in Evang.): "Far be it from the hearts of the faithful to think that fate is anything real."

[33289] Iª q. 116 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fatum nihil sit. Dicit enim Gregorius, in homilia Epiphaniae, *absit a fidelium cordibus ut fatum esse aliquid dicant*.

Objection 2: Further, what happens by fate is not unforeseen, for as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 4), "fate is understood to be derived from the verb 'fari' which means to speak"; as though things were said to happen by fate, which are "fore-spoken" by one who decrees them to happen. Now what is foreseen is neither lucky nor chance-like. If therefore things happen by fate, there will be neither luck nor chance in the world.

[33290] Iª q. 116 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, ea quae fato aguntur, non sunt improvisa, quia, ut Augustinus dicit V de Civ. Dei, *fatum a fando dictum intelligimus, idest a loquendo*; ut ea fato fieri dicantur, quae ab aliquo determinante sunt ante praelocuta. Quae autem sunt provisa, non sunt fortuita neque casualia. Si igitur res fato aguntur, excludetur casus et fortuna a rebus.

On the contrary, What does not exist cannot be defined. But Boethius (De Consol. iv) defines fate thus: "Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things, by which Providence connects each one with its proper order."

[33291] Iª q. 116 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra quod non est, non definitur. Sed Boetius, in IV de Consol., definit fatum, dicens quod *fatum est inhaerens rebus mobilibus dispositio, per quam providentia suis quaeque nectit ordinibus*. Ergo fatum aliquid est.

I answer that, In this world some things seem to happen by luck or chance. Now it happens sometimes that something is lucky or chance-like as compared to inferior causes, which, if compared to some higher cause, is directly intended. For instance, if two servants are sent by their master to the same place; the meeting of the two servants in regard to themselves is by chance; but as compared to the master, who had ordered it, it is directly intended.

So there were some who refused to refer to a higher cause such events which by luck or chance

[33292] Iª q. 116 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in rebus inferioribus videntur quaedam a fortuna vel casu provenire. Contingit autem quandoque quod aliquid, ad inferiores causas relatum, est fortuitum vel casuale, quod tamen, relatum ad causam aliquam superiorem, invenitur esse per se intentum. Sicut si duo servi alicuius domini mittantur ab eo ad eundem locum, uno de altero ignorante; concursus duorum servorum, si ad ipsos servos referatur, casualis est, quia accidit praeter utriusque intentionem; si autem referatur ad dominum, qui hoc praeordinavit, non est casuale, sed per se intentum. Fuerunt igitur aliqui

take place here below. These denied the existence of fate and Providence, as Augustine relates of Tully (De Civ. Dei v, 9). And this is contrary to what we have said above about Providence (Q[22], A[2]).

On the other hand, some have considered that everything that takes place here below by luck or by chance, whether in natural things or in human affairs, is to be reduced to a superior cause, namely, the heavenly bodies. According to these fate is nothing else than "a disposition of the stars under which each one is begotten or born" [*Cf. St. Augustine De Civ. Dei v, 1,8,9]. But this will not hold. First, as to human affairs: because we have proved above (Q[115], A[4]) that human actions are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies, save accidentally and indirectly. Now the cause of fate, since it has the ordering of things that happen by fate, must of necessity be directly and of itself the cause of what takes place. Secondly, as to all things that happen accidentally: for it has been said (Q[115], A[6]) that what is accidental, is properly speaking neither a being, nor a unity. But every action of nature terminates in some one thing. Wherefore it is impossible for that which is accidental to be the proper effect of an active natural principle. No natural cause can therefore have for its proper effect that a man intending to dig a grace finds a treasure. Now it is manifest that a heavenly body acts after the manner of a natural principle: wherefore its effects in this world are natural. It is therefore impossible that any active power of a heavenly body be the cause of what happens by accident here below, whether by luck or by chance.

We must therefore say that what happens here by accident, both in natural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a preordaining cause, which is Divine Providence. For nothing hinders that which happens by accident being considered as one by an intellect: otherwise the intellect could not form this proposition: "The digger of a grave found a treasure." And just as an intellect can apprehend this so can it effect it; for instance, someone who knows a place where a treasure is hidden, might instigate a rustic, ignorant of this, to dig a grave there. Consequently, nothing hinders what happens here by accident, by luck or by chance, being reduced to some ordering cause

qui huiusmodi casualia et fortuita, quae in his inferioribus accidunt, in nullam superiorem causam reducere voluerunt. Et hi fatum et providentiam negaverunt; ut de Tullio Augustinus recitat in V de Civ. Dei. Quod est contra ea quae superius de providentia dicta sunt. Quidam vero omnia fortuita et casualia quae in istis inferioribus accidunt, sive in rebus naturalibus sive in rebus humanis, reducere voluerunt in superiorem causam, idest in caelestia corpora. Et secundum hos, fatum nihil aliud est quam *dispositio siderum in qua quisque conceptus est vel natus*. Sed hoc stare non potest, propter duo. Primo quidem, quantum ad res humanas. Quia iam ostensum est quod humani actus non subduntur actioni caelestium corporum, nisi per accidens et indirecte. Causa autem fatalis, cum habeat ordinationem super ea quae fato aguntur, necesse est quod sit directe et per se causa eius quod agitur. Secundo, quantum ad omnia quae per accidens aguntur. Dictum est enim supra quod id quod est per accidens, non est proprie ens neque unum. Omnis autem naturae actio terminatur ad aliquid unum. Unde impossibile est quod id quod est per accidens, sit effectus per se alicuius naturalis principii agentis. Nulla ergo natura per se hoc facere potest, quod intendens fodere sepulcrum, inveniat thesaurum. Manifestum est autem quod corpus caeleste agit per modum naturalis principii, unde et effectus eius in hoc mundo sunt naturales. Impossibile est ergo quod aliqua virtus activa caelestis corporis sit causa eorum quae hic aguntur per accidens, sive a casu sive a fortuna. Et ideo dicendum est quod ea quae hic per accidens aguntur, sive in rebus naturalibus sive in rebus humanis, reducuntur in aliquam causam praeordinantem, quae est providentia divina. Quia nihil prohibet id quod est per accidens, accipi ut unum ab aliquo intellectu, alioquin intellectus formare non posset hanc propositionem, fodiens sepulcrum invenit thesaurum. Et sicut hoc potest intellectus apprehendere, ita potest efficere, sicut si aliquis sciens in quo loco sit thesaurus absconditus, instiget aliquem rusticum hoc ignorantem, ut ibi fodiat sepulcrum. Et sic nihil prohibet ea quae hic per accidens aguntur, ut fortuita vel casualia, reduci in aliquam causam ordinantem, quae per intellectum agat; et praecipue intellectum divinum. Nam solus Deus potest voluntatem immutare, ut supra habitum est. Et per consequens ordinatio humanorum actuum, quorum principium

which acts by the intellect, especially the Divine intellect. For God alone can change the will, as shown above (Q[105], A[4]). Consequently the ordering of human actions, the principle of which is the will, must be ascribed to God alone.

So therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to Divine Providence, as being pre-ordained, and as it were "fore-spoken," we can admit the existence of fate: although the holy doctors avoided the use of this word, on account of those who twisted its application to a certain force in the position of the stars. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1): "If anyone ascribes human affairs to fate, meaning thereby the will or power of God, let him keep to his opinion, but hold his tongue."

est voluntas, soli Deo attribui debet. Sic igitur inquantum omnia quae hic aguntur, divinae providentiae subduntur, tanquam per eam praeordinata et quasi praelocuta, fatum ponere possumus, licet hoc nomine sancti doctores uti recusaverint, propter eos qui ad vim positionis siderum hoc nomen retorquebant. Unde Augustinus dicit, in V de Civ. Dei, *si propterea quisquam res humanas fato tribuit, quia ipsam Dei voluntatem vel potestatem fati nomine appellat, sententiam teneat, linguam corrigat*. Et sic etiam Gregorius fatum esse negat.

Reply to Objection 1: For this reason Gregory denies the existence of fate: wherefore the first objection's solution is manifest.

[33293] Iª q. 116 a. 1 ad 1 Unde patet solutio ad primum.

Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders certain things happening by luck or by chance, if compared to their proximate causes: but not if compared to Divine Providence, whereby "nothing happens at random in the world," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 24).

[33294] Iª q. 116 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliqua esse fortuita vel casualia per comparationem ad causas proximas, non tamen per comparationem ad divinam providentiam, sic enim nihil temere fit in mundo, ut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest.

Q. 116. A. 2. Whether fate is in created things?

Objection 1: It would seem that fate is not in created things. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that the "Divine will or power is called fate." But the Divine will or power is not in creatures, but in God. Therefore fate is not in creatures but in God.

[33295] Iª q. 116 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fatum non sit in rebus creatis. Dicit enim Augustinus, V de Civ. Dei, quod *ipsa Dei voluntas vel potestas fati nomine appellatur*. Sed voluntas et potestas Dei non est in creaturis, sed in Deo. Ergo fatum non est in rebus creatis, sed in Deo.

Objection 2: Further, fate is compared to things that happen by fate, as their cause; as the very use of the word proves. But the universal cause that of itself effects what takes place by accident here below, is God alone, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore fate is in God, and not in creatures.

[33296] Iª q. 116 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, fatum comparatur ad ea quae ex fato aguntur, ut causa; ut ipse modus loquendi ostendit. Sed causa universalis per se eorum quae hic per accidens aguntur, est solus Deus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo fatum est in Deo, et non in rebus creatis.

Objection 3: Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a substance or an accident: and whichever it is it must be multiplied according to the number of creatures. Since, therefore, fate seems to be one thing only, it seems that fate is not in creatures, but in God.

[33297] Iª q. 116 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, si fatum est in creaturis, aut est substantia, aut accidens, et quodcumque horum detur, oportet quod multiplicetur secundum creaturarum multitudinem. Cum ergo fatum videatur esse unum tantum, videtur quod fatum non sit in creaturis, sed in Deo.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things."

[33298] Iª q. 116 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Boetius dicit, in IV de Consol. quod *fatum est dispositio rebus mobilibus inhaerens*.

I answer that, As is clear from what has been stated above (Q[22], A[3]; Q[103], A[6]), Divine Providence produces effects through mediate causes. We can therefore consider the ordering of the effects in two ways. Firstly, as being in God Himself: and thus the ordering of the effects is called Providence. But if we consider this ordering as being in the mediate causes ordered by God to the production of certain effects, thus it has the nature of fate. This is what Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is worked out when Divine Providence is served by certain spirits; whether by the soul, or by all nature itself which obeys Him, whether by the heavenly movements of the stars, whether by the angelic power, or by the ingenuity of the demons, whether by some of these, or by all, the chain of fate is forged." Of each of these things we have spoken above (A[1]; Q[104], A[2] ; Q[110], A[1]; Q[113]; Q[114]). It is therefore manifest that fate is in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God to the production of their effects.

[33299] Iª q. 116 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, divina providentia per causas medias suos effectus exequitur. Potest ergo ipsa ordinatio effectuum dupliciter considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod est in ipso Deo, et sic ipsa ordinatio effectuum vocatur providentia. Secundum vero quod praedicta ordinatio consideratur in mediis causis a Deo ordinatis ad aliquos effectus producendos, sic habet rationem fati. Et hoc est quod Boetius dicit, IV de Consol., *sive famulantibus quibusdam providentiae divinae spiritibus fatum exercetur; seu anima, seu tota inserviente natura, sive caelestibus siderum motibus, seu angelica virtute, seu Daemonum varia solertia, seu aliquibus eorum, seu omnibus, fatalis series texitur*, de quibus omnibus per singula in praecedentibus dictum est. Sic ergo est manifestum quod fatum est in ipsis causis creatis, inquantum sunt ordinatae a Deo ad effectus producendos.

Reply to Objection 1: The ordering itself of second causes, which Augustine (De Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the "series of causes," has not the nature of fate, except as dependent on God. Wherefore the Divine power or will can be called fate, as being the cause of fate. But essentially fate is the very disposition or "series," i.e. order, of second causes.

[33300] Iª q. 116 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ipsa ordinatio causarum secundarum, quam Augustinus seriem causarum nominat, non habet rationem fati, nisi secundum quod dependet a Deo. Et ideo causaliter Dei potestas vel voluntas dici potest fatum. Essentialiter vero fatum est ipsa dispositio seu series, idest ordo, causarum secundarum.

Reply to Objection 2: Fate has the nature of a cause, just as much as the second causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate.

[33301] Iª q. 116 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod intantum fatum habet rationem causae, inquantum et ipsae causae secundae, quarum ordinatio fatum vocatur.

Reply to Objection 3: Fate is called a disposition, not that disposition which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it signifies order, which is not a substance, but a relation. And if this order be considered in relation to its principle, it is one; and thus fate is one. But if it be considered in relation to its effects, or to the mediate causes, this fate is multiple. In this sense the poet wrote: "Thy fate draws thee."

[33302] Iª q. 116 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod fatum dicitur dispositio, non quae est in genere qualitatis; sed secundum quod dispositio designat ordinem, qui non est substantia, sed relatio. Qui quidem ordo, si consideretur per comparationem ad suum principium, est unus, et sic dicitur unum fatum. Si autem consideretur per comparationem ad effectus, vel ad ipsas causas medias, sic multiplicatur, per quem modum poeta dixit, *te tua fata trahunt*.

Q. 116. A. 3. Whether fate is unchangeable?

Objection 1: It seems that fate is not unchangeable. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "As reasoning is to the intellect, as the begotten is to that which is, as time to eternity, as the circle to its centre; so is the fickle chain of fate to the unwavering simplicity of Providence."

[33303] Iª q. 116 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod fatum non sit immobile. Dicit enim Boetius, in IV de Consol., *uti est ad intellectum ratiocinatio, ad id quod est id quod gignitur, ad aeternitatem tempus, ad punctum medium circulus; ita est fati series mobilis ad providentiae stabilem simplicitatem*.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7): "If we be moved, what is in us is moved." But fate is a "disposition inherent to changeable things," as Boethius says (De Consol. iv). Therefore fate is changeable.

[33304] Iª q. 116 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut philosophus dicit in II Topic., *motis nobis, moventur ea quae in nobis sunt. Sed fatum est dispositio inhaerens rebus mobilibus*, ut Boetius dicit. Ergo fatum est mobile.

Objection 3: Further, if fate is unchangeable, what is subject to fate happens unchangeably and of necessity. But things ascribed to fate seem principally to be contingencies. Therefore there would be no contingencies in the world, but all things would happen of necessity.

[33305] Iª q. 116 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, si fatum est immobile, ea quae subduntur fato, immobiliter et ex necessitate eveniunt. Sed talia maxime videntur esse contingentia, quae fato attribuuntur. Ergo nihil erit contingens in rebus, sed omnia ex necessitate evenient.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate is an unchangeable disposition.

[33306] Iª q. 116 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Boetius dicit, quod fatum est immobilis dispositio.

I answer that, The disposition of second causes which we call fate, can be considered in two ways: firstly, in regard to the second causes, which are thus disposed or ordered; secondly, in regard to the first principle, namely, God, by Whom they are ordered. Some, therefore, have held that the series itself or dispositions of causes is in itself necessary, so that all things would happen of necessity; for this reason that each effect has a cause, and given a cause the effect

[33307] Iª q. 116 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod dispositio secundarum causarum, quam fatum dicimus, potest dupliciter considerari, uno modo, secundum ipsas causas secundas, quae sic disponuntur seu ordinantur; alio modo, per relationem ad primum principium a quo ordinantur, scilicet Deum. Quidam ergo posuerunt ipsam seriem seu dispositionem causarum esse secundum se necessariam, ita quod omnia ex necessitate contingerent; propter hoc, quod

must follow of necessity. But this is false, as proved above (Q[115], A[6]).

Others, on the other hand, held that fate is changeable, even as dependent on Divine Providence. Wherefore the Egyptians said that fate could be changed by certain sacrifices, as Gregory of Nyssa says (Nemesius, De Homine). This too has been disproved above for the reason that it is repugnant to Divine Providence.

We must therefore say that fate, considered in regard to second causes, is changeable; but as subject to Divine Providence, it derives a certain unchangeableness, not of absolute but of conditional necessity. In this sense we say that this conditional is true and necessary: "If God foreknew that this would happen, it will happen." Wherefore Boethius, having said that the chain of fate is fickle, shortly afterwards adds---"which, since it is derived from an unchangeable Providence must also itself be unchangeable."

quilibet effectus habet causam, et causa posita necesse est effectum poni. Sed hoc patet esse falsum, per ea quae supra dicta sunt. Alii vero e contrario posuerunt fatum esse mobile, etiam secundum quod a divina providentia dependet. Unde Aegyptii dicebant quibusdam sacrificiis fatum posse mutari, ut Gregorius Nyssenus dicit. Sed hoc supra exclusum est, quia immobilitati divinae providentiae repugnat. Et ideo dicendum est quod fatum, secundum considerationem secundarum causarum, mobile est, sed secundum quod subest divinae providentiae, immobilitatem sortitur, non quidem absolutae necessitatis, sed conditionatae; secundum quod dicimus hanc conditionalem esse veram vel necessariam, si Deus praescivit hoc futurum, erit. Unde cum Boetius dixisset fati seriem esse mobilem, post pauca subdit, *quae cum ab immobilis providentiae proficiscatur exordiis, ipsam quoque immutabilem esse necesse est*.

Reply to Objections: From this the answers to the objections are clear.

[33308] Iª q. 116 a. 3 ad arg. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.

Q. 116. A. 4. Whether all things are subject to fate?

Objection 1: It seems that all things are subject to fate. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "The chain of fate moves the heaven and the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a reciprocal transformation. By fate all things that are born into the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring and seed." Nothing therefore seems to be excluded from the domain of fate.

[33309] Iª q. 116 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia fato subdantur. Dicit enim Boetius, in IV de Consol., *series fati caelum et sidera movet, elementa in se invicem temperat, et alterna format transmutatione; eadem nascentia occidentiaque omnia per similes foetuum seminumque renovat progressus; haec actus fortunasque hominum indissolubili causarum connexione constringit*. Nihil ergo excipi videtur, quod sub fati serie non contineatur.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that fate is something real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the Divine will is cause of all things that happen, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 1 seqq.). Therefore all things are subject to fate.

[33310] Iª q. 116 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in V de Civ. Dei, quod fatum aliquid est, secundum quod ad voluntatem et potestatem Dei refertur. Sed voluntas Dei est causa omnium quae fiunt, ut Augustinus dicit in III de Trin. Ergo omnia subduntur fato.

Objection 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate "is a disposition inherent to changeable things." But all creatures are

[33311] Iª q. 116 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, fatum, secundum Boetium, est *dispositio rebus mobilibus inhaerens*. Sed omnes creaturae sunt mutabiles, et

changeable, and God alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above (Q[9], A[2]). Therefore fate is in all things.

solus Deus vere immutabilis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo in omnibus creaturis est fatum.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "some things subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate."

[33312] Iª q. 116 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Boetius dicit, in IV de Consol., quod *quaedam quae sub providentia locata sunt, fati seriem superant*.

I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), fate is the ordering of second causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is subject to second causes, is subject also to fate. But whatever is done immediately by God, since it is not subject to second causes, neither is it subject to fate; such are creation, the glorification of spiritual substances, and the like. And this is what Boethius says (De Consol. iv): viz. that "those things which are nigh to God have a state of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate." Hence it is clear that "the further a thing is from the First Mind, the more it is involved in the chain of fate"; since so much the more it is bound up with second causes.

[33313] Iª q. 116 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, fatum est ordinatio secundarum causarum ad effectus divinitus provisos. Quaecumque igitur causis secundis subduntur, ea subduntur et fato. Si qua vero sunt quae immediate a Deo fiunt, cum non subdantur secundis causis, non subduntur fato; sicut creatio rerum, glorificatio spiritualium substantiarum, et alia huiusmodi. Et hoc est quod Boetius dicit, quod *ea quae sunt primae divinitati propinqua, stabiliter fixa, fatalis ordinem mobilitatis excedunt. Ex quo etiam patet quod quanto aliquid longius a prima mente discedit, nexibus fati maioribus implicatur*; quia magis subiicitur necessitati secundarum causarum.

Reply to Objection 1: All the things mentioned in this passage are done by God by means of second causes; for this reason they are contained in the order of fate. But it is not the same with everything else, as stated above.

[33314] Iª q. 116 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnia illa quae ibi tanguntur, fiunt a Deo mediantibus causis secundis; et ideo sub fati serie continentur. Sed non est eadem ratio de omnibus aliis, ut supra dictum est.

Reply to Objection 2: Fate is to be referred to the Divine will and power, as to its first principle. Consequently it does not follow that whatever is subject to the Divine will or power, is subject also to fate, as already stated.

[33315] Iª q. 116 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod fatum refertur ad voluntatem et potestatem Dei, sicut ad primum principium. Unde non oportet quod quidquid subiicitur voluntati divinae vel potestati, subiiciatur fato, ut dictum est.

Reply to Objection 3: Although all creatures are in some way changeable, yet some of them do not proceed from changeable created causes. And these, therefore, are not subject to fate, as stated above.

[33316] Iª q. 116 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, quamvis omnes creaturae sint aliquo modo mutabiles, tamen aliquae earum non procedunt a causis creatis mutabilibus. Et ideo non subiiciuntur fato, ut dictum est.

Q. 117. OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE ACTION OF MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)

We have next to consider those things which pertain to the action of man, who is composed of a created corporeal and spiritual nature. In the first place we shall consider that action (in general) and secondly in regard to the propagation of man from man. As to the first, there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether one man can teach another, as being the cause of his knowledge?

(2) Whether man can teach an angel?

(3) Whether by the power of his soul man can change corporeal matter?

(4) Whether the separate soul of man can move bodies by local movement?

[33317] Iª q. 117 pr. Postea considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad actionem hominis, qui est compositus ex spirituali et corporali creatura. Et primo considerandum est de actione hominis; secundo, de propagatione hominis ex homine. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum unus homo possit docere alium, causando in ipso scientiam. Secundo, utrum homo possit docere Angelum. Tertio, utrum homo per virtutem suae animae possit immutare materiam corporalem. Quarto, utrum anima hominis separata possit movere corpora motu locali.

Q. 117. A. 1. Whether one man can teach another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot teach another. For the Lord says (Mat. 22:8): "Be not you called Rabbi": on which the gloss of Jerome says, "Lest you give to men the honor due to God." Therefore to be a master is properly an honor due to God. But it belongs to a master to teach. Therefore man cannot teach, and this is proper to God.

[33318] Iª q. 117 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non possit alium docere. Dicit enim dominus, Matth. XXIII, *nolite vocari Rabbi*; ubi dicit Glossa Hieronymi, *ne divinum honorem hominibus tribuatis*. Esse ergo magistrum pertinet proprie ad divinum honorem. Sed docere est proprium magistri. Homo ergo non potest docere, sed hoc est proprium Dei.

Objection 2: Further, if one man teaches another this is only inasmuch as he acts through his own knowledge, so as to cause knowledge in the other. But a quality through which anyone acts so as to produce his like, is an active quality. Therefore it follows that knowledge is an active quality just as heat is.

[33319] Iª q. 117 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, si homo alium docet, hoc non est nisi inquantum agit per scientiam suam ad causandum scientiam in alio. Sed qualitas per quam aliquis agit ad faciendum sibi simile, est qualitas activa. Ergo sequitur quod scientia sit qualitas activa, sicut et calor.

Objection 3: Further, for knowledge we require intellectual light, and the species of the thing understood. But a man cannot cause either of these in another man. Therefore a man cannot by teaching cause knowledge in another man.

[33320] Iª q. 117 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, ad scientiam requiritur lumen intelligibile, et species rei intellectae. Sed neutrum istorum potest causare unus homo in alio. Ergo unus homo non potest docendo causare scientiam in alio.

Objection 4: Further, the teacher does nothing in regard to a disciple save to propose to him certain signs, so as to signify something by words or gestures. But it is not possible to teach anyone so

[33321] Iª q. 117 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, doctor nihil agit ad discipulum nisi quod proponit ei quaedam signa, vel vocibus aliquid significando, vel nutibus. Sed proponendo signa non potest aliquis

as to cause knowledge in him, by putting signs before him. For these are signs either of things that he knows, or of things he does not know. If of things that he knows, he to whom these signs are proposed is already in the possession of knowledge, and does not acquire it from the master. If they are signs of things that he does not know, he can learn nothing therefrom: for instance, if one were to speak Greek to a man who only knows Latin, he would learn nothing thereby. Therefore in no way can a man cause knowledge in another by teaching him.

alium docere, causando in eo scientiam. Quia aut proponit signa rerum notarum; aut rerum ignotarum. Si rerum notarum, ille ergo cui signa proponuntur, iam habet scientiam, et eam non acquirit a magistro. Si autem rerum ignotarum, per huiusmodi signa nihil addiscit, sicut si aliquis proponeret alicui Latino verba Graeca, quorum significationem ignoraret, per hoc eum docere non posset. Nullo ergo modo unus homo potest, alium docendo, scientiam in eo causare.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:7): "Whereunto I am appointed a preacher and an apostle . . . a doctor of the Gentiles in faith and truth."

[33322] Iª q. 117 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. II, *in quo positus sum ego praedicator et apostolus, doctor gentium in fide et veritate*.

I answer that, On this question there have been various opinions. For Averroes, commenting on De Anima iii, maintains that all men have one passive intellect in common, as stated above (Q[76], A[2]). From this it follows that the same intelligible species belong to all men. Consequently he held that one man does not cause another to have a knowledge distinct from that which he has himself; but that he communicates the identical knowledge which he has himself, by moving him to order rightly the phantasms in his soul, so that they be rightly disposed for intelligible apprehension. This opinion is true so far as knowledge is the same in disciple and master, if we consider the identity of the thing known: for the same objective truth is known by both of them. But so far as he maintains that all men have but one passive intellect, and the same intelligible species, differing only as to various phantasms, his opinion is false, as stated above (Q[76], A[2]).

Besides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists, who held that our souls are possessed of knowledge from the very beginning, through the participation of separate forms, as stated above (Q[84], AA[3],4); but that the soul is hindered, through its union with the body, from the free consideration of those things which it knows. According to this, the disciple does not acquire fresh knowledge from his master, but is roused by him to consider what he knows; so that to learn

[33323] Iª q. 117 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc diversae fuerunt opiniones. Averroes enim, in Comment. III de anima, posuit unum intellectum possibilem esse omnium hominum, ut supra dictum est. Et ex hoc sequebatur quod eaedem species intelligibiles sint omnium hominum. Et secundum hoc, ponit quod unus homo per doctrinam non causat aliam scientiam in altero ab ea quam ipse habet; sed communicat ei eandem scientiam quam ipse habet, per hoc quod movet eum ad ordinandum phantasmata in anima sua, ad hoc quod sint disposita convenienter ad intelligibilem apprehensionem. Quae quidem opinio quantum ad hoc vera est, quod est eadem scientia in discipulo et magistro, si consideretur identitas secundum unitatem rei scitae, eadem enim rei veritas est quam cognoscit et discipulus et magister. Sed quantum ad hoc quod ponit esse unum intellectum possibilem omnium hominum, et easdem species intelligibiles, differentes solum secundum diversa phantasmata; falsa est eius opinio, ut supra habitum est. Alia est opinio Platonicorum, qui posuerunt quod scientia inest a principio animabus nostris per participationem formarum separatarum, sicut supra habitum est; sed anima ex unione corporis impeditur ne possit considerare libere ea quorum scientiam habet. Et secundum hoc, discipulus a magistro non acquirit scientiam de novo, sed ab eo excitatur ad considerandum ea quorum scientiam habet; ut sic addiscere nihil aliud sit quam reminisci. Sicut

would be nothing else than to remember. In the same way they held that natural agents only dispose (matter) to receive forms, which matter acquires by a participation of separate substances. But against this we have proved above (Q[79], A[2]; Q[84], A[3]) that the passive intellect of the human soul is in pure potentiality to intelligible (species), as Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4).

We must therefore decide the question differently, by saying that the teacher causes knowledge in the learner, by reducing him from potentiality to act, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4). In order to make this clear, we must observe that of effects proceeding from an exterior principle, some proceed from the exterior principle alone; as the form of a house is caused to be in matter by art alone: whereas other effects proceed sometimes from an exterior principle, sometimes from an interior principle: thus health is caused in a sick man, sometimes by an exterior principle, namely by the medical art, sometimes by an interior principle as when a man is healed by the force of nature. In these latter effects two things must be noticed. First, that art in its work imitates nature for just as nature heals a man by alteration, digestion, rejection of the matter that caused the sickness, so does art. Secondly, we must remark that the exterior principle, art, acts, not as principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, which is the interior principle, by strengthening it, and by furnishing it with instruments and assistance, of which the interior principle makes use in producing the effect. Thus the physician strengthens nature, and employs food and medicine, of which nature makes use for the intended end.

Now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an interior principle, as is clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research; and from an exterior principle, as is clear in one who learns (by instruction). For in every man there is a certain principle of knowledge, namely the light of the active intellect, through which certain universal principles of all the sciences are naturally understood as soon as proposed to the intellect. Now when anyone applies these universal principles to certain particular things, the memory or experience of which he acquires through the senses; then by his own research

etiam ponebant quod agentia naturalia solummodo disponunt ad susceptionem formarum, quas acquirit materia corporalis per participationem specierum separatarum. Sed contra hoc supra ostensum est quod intellectus possibilis animae humanae est in potentia pura ad intelligibilia, secundum quod Aristoteles dicit in III de anima. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod docens causat scientiam in addiscente, reducendo ipsum de potentia in actum, sicut dicitur in VIII Physic. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod effectuum qui sunt ab exteriori principio, aliquis est ab exteriori principio tantum; sicut forma domus causatur in materia solum ab arte. Aliquis autem effectus est quandoque quidem ab exteriori principio, quandoque autem ab interiori; sicut sanitas causatur in infirmo quandoque ab exteriori principio, scilicet ab arte medicinae; quandoque autem ab interiori principio ut cum aliquis sanatur per virtutem naturae. Et in talibus effectibus sunt duo attendenda. Primo quidem, quod ars imitatur naturam in sua operatione, sicut enim natura sanat infirmum alterando, digerendo, et expellendo materiam quae causat morbum, ita et ars. Secundo attendendum est, quod principium exterius, scilicet ars, non operatur sicut principale agens, sed sicut coadiuvans agens principale, quod est principium interius, confortando ipsum, et ministrando ei instrumenta et auxilia, quibus utatur ad effectum producendum, sicut medicus confortat naturam, et adhibet ei cibos et medicinas, quibus natura utatur ad finem intentum. Scientia autem acquiritur in homine et ab interiori principio, ut patet in eo qui per inventionem propriam scientiam acquirit; et a principio exteriori, ut patet in eo qui addiscit. Inest enim unicuique homini quoddam principium scientiae, scilicet lumen intellectus agentis, per quod cognoscuntur statim a principio naturaliter quaedam universalia principia omnium scientiarum. Cum autem aliquis huiusmodi universalia principia applicat ad aliqua particularia, quorum memoriam et experimentum per sensum accipit; per inventionem propriam acquirit scientiam eorum quae nesciebat, ex notis ad ignota procedens. Unde et quilibet docens, ex his quae discipulus novit, ducit eum in cognitionem eorum quae ignorabat; secundum quod dicitur in I Poster., quod *omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina ex praeexistenti fit cognitione*. Ducit autem magister discipulum ex praecognitis in cognitionem ignotorum, dupliciter. Primo

advancing from the known to the unknown, he obtains knowledge of what he knew not before. Wherefore anyone who teaches, leads the disciple from things known by the latter, to the knowledge of things previously unknown to him; according to what the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 1): "All teaching and all learning proceed from previous knowledge."

Now the master leads the disciple from things known to knowledge of the unknown, in a twofold manner. Firstly, by proposing to him certain helps or means of instruction, which his intellect can use for the acquisition of science: for instance, he may put before him certain less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the disciple is able to judge from previous knowledge: or he may propose to him some sensible examples, either by way of likeness or of opposition, or something of the sort, from which the intellect of the learner is led to the knowledge of truth previously unknown. Secondly, by strengthening the intellect of the learner; not, indeed, by some active power as of a higher nature, as explained above (Q[106], A[1]; Q[111], A[1]) of the angelic enlightenment, because all human intellects are of one grade in the natural order; but inasmuch as he proposes to the disciple the order of principles to conclusions, by reason of his not having sufficient collating power to be able to draw the conclusions from the principles. Hence the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that "a demonstration is a syllogism that causes knowledge." In this way a demonstrator causes his hearer to know.

quidem, proponendo ei aliqua auxilia vel instrumenta, quibus intellectus eius utatur ad scientiam acquirendam, puta cum proponit ei aliquas propositiones minus universales, quas tamen ex praecognitis discipulus diiudicare potest; vel cum proponit ei aliqua sensibilia exempla, vel similia, vel opposita, vel aliqua huiusmodi ex quibus intellectus addiscentis manuducitur in cognitionem veritatis ignotae. Alio modo, cum confortat intellectum addiscentis; non quidem aliqua virtute activa quasi superioris naturae, sicut supra dictum est de Angelis illuminantibus, quia omnes humani intellectus sunt unius gradus in ordine naturae; sed inquantum proponit discipulo ordinem principiorum ad conclusiones, qui forte per seipsum non haberet tantam virtutem collativam, ut ex principiis posset conclusiones deducere. Et ideo dicitur in I Poster., quod demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire. Et per hunc modum ille qui demonstrat, auditorem scientem facit.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, the teacher only brings exterior help as the physician who heals: but just as the interior nature is the principal cause of the healing, so the interior light of the intellect is the principal cause of knowledge. But both of these are from God. Therefore as of God is it written: "Who healeth all thy diseases" (Ps. 102:3); so of Him is it written: "He that teacheth man knowledge" (Ps. 93:10), inasmuch as "the light of His countenance is signed upon us" (Ps. 4:7), through which light all things are shown to us.

[33324] Iª q. 117 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, homo docens solummodo exterius ministerium adhibet, sicut medicus sanans, sed sicut natura interior est principalis causa sanationis, ita et interius lumen intellectus est principalis causa scientiae. Utrumque autem horum est a Deo. Et ideo sicut de Deo dicitur, qui sanat omnes infirmitates tuas; ita de eo dicitur, qui docet hominem scientiam, inquantum lumen vultus eius super nos signatur, per quod nobis omnia ostenduntur.

Reply to Objection 2: As Averroes argues, the teacher does not cause knowledge in the disciple after the manner of a natural active cause. Wherefore knowledge need not be an active quality: but is the principle by which one is directed in teaching, just as art is the principle by which one is directed in working.

[33325] Iª q. 117 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod doctor non causat scientiam in discipulo per modum agentis naturalis, ut Averroes obiicit. Unde non oportet quod scientia sit qualitas activa, sed est principium quo aliquis dirigitur in docendo, sicut ars est principium quo aliquis dirigitur in operando.

Reply to Objection 3: The master does not cause the intellectual light in the disciple, nor does he cause the intelligible species directly: but he moves the disciple by teaching, so that the latter, by the power of his intellect, forms intelligible concepts, the signs of which are proposed to him from without.

[33326] Iª q. 117 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod magister non causat lumen intelligibile in discipulo, nec directe species intelligibiles, sed movet discipulum per suam doctrinam ad hoc, quod ipse per virtutem sui intellectus formet intelligibiles conceptiones, quarum signa sibi proponit exterius.

Reply to Objection 4: The signs proposed by the master to the disciple are of things known in a general and confused manner; but not known in detail and distinctly. Therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by himself, he cannot be called self-taught, or be said to have his own master because perfect knowledge did not precede in him, such as is required in a master.

[33327] Iª q. 117 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod signa quae magister discipulo proponit, sunt rerum notarum in universali, et sub quadam confusione; sed ignotarum in particulari, et sub quadam distinctione. Et ideo cum quisque per seipsum scientiam acquirit, non potest dici docere seipsum, vel esse sui ipsius magister, quia non praeexistit in eo scientia completa, qualis requiritur in magistro.

Q. 117. A. 2. Whether man can teach the angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that men teach angels. For the Apostle says (Eph. 3:10): "That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places through the Church." But the Church is the union of all the faithful. Therefore some things are made known to angels through men.

[33328] Iª q. 117 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homines possint docere Angelos. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Ephes. III, *ut innotescat principibus et potestatibus in caelestibus per Ecclesiam multiformis sapientia Dei*. Sed Ecclesia est congregatio hominum fidelium. Ergo Angelis per homines aliqua innotescunt.

Objection 2: Further, the superior angels, who are enlightened immediately concerning Divine things by God, can instruct the inferior angels, as stated above (Q[116], A[1]; Q[112], A[3]). But some men are instructed immediately concerning Divine things by the Word of God; as appears principally of the apostles from Heb. 1:1,2: "Last of all, in these days (God) hath spoken to us by His Son." Therefore some men have been able to teach the angels.

[33329] Iª q. 117 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, Angeli superiores, qui immediate de divinis a Deo illuminantur, inferiores Angelos instruere possunt, ut supra dictum est. Sed aliqui homines immediate de divinis per Dei verbum sunt instructi; sicut maxime patet de apostolis, secundum illud ad Heb. I, *novissime, diebus istis, locutus est nobis in filio*. Ergo aliqui homines aliquos Angelos docere potuerunt.

Objection 3: Further, the inferior angels are instructed by the superior. But some men are higher than some angels; since some men are taken up to the highest angelic orders, as Gregory says in a homily (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.). Therefore some of the inferior angels can be instructed by men concerning Divine things.

[33330] Iª q. 117 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, inferiores Angeli a superioribus instruuntur. Sed quidam homines superiores sunt aliquibus Angelis, cum ad supremos ordines Angelorum aliqui homines assumantur, ut Gregorius dicit in quadam homilia. Ergo aliqui inferiores Angeli per aliquos homines de divinis instrui possunt.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every Divine enlightenment to the superior angels, by making their thoughts known to them; but concerning Divine things superior angels are never enlightened by inferior angels. Now it is manifest that in the same way as inferior angels are subject to the superior, the highest men are subject even to the lowest angels. This is clear from Our Lord's words (Mat. 11:11): "There hath not risen among them that are born of woman a greater than John the Baptist; yet he that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he." Therefore angels are never enlightened by men concerning Divine things. But men can by means of speech make known to angels the thoughts of their hearts: because it belongs to God alone to know the heart's secrets.

[33331] Iª q. 117 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod omnes divinae illuminationes perferuntur ad homines mediantibus Angelis. Non ergo Angeli instruuntur per homines de divinis.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) thus explains this passage of the Apostle, who in the preceding verses says: "To me, the least of all the saints, is given this grace . . . to enlighten all men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from eternity in God. Hidden, yet so that the multiform wisdom of God was made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places---that is, through the Church." As though he were to say: This mystery was hidden from men, but not from the Church in heaven, which is contained in the principalities and powers who knew it "from all ages, but not before all ages: because the Church was at first there, where after the resurrection this Church composed of men will be gathered together."

[33332] Iª q. 117 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra habitum est, inferiores Angeli loqui quidem possunt superioribus Angelis, manifestando eis suas cogitationes; sed de rebus divinis superiores ab inferioribus nunquam illuminantur. Manifestum est autem quod eo modo quo inferiores Angeli superioribus subduntur, supremi homines subduntur etiam infimis Angelorum. Quod patet per id quod dominus dicit, Matth. XI, *inter natos mulierum non surrexit maior Ioanne Baptista; sed qui minor est in regno caelorum, maior est illo*. Sic igitur de rebus divinis ab hominibus Angeli nunquam illuminantur. Cogitationes tamen suorum cordium homines Angelis per modum locutionis manifestare possunt, quia secreta cordium scire solius Dei est.

It can also be explained otherwise that "what is hidden, is known by the angels, not only in God, but also here where when it takes place and is made public," as Augustine says further on (Gen. ad lit. v, 19). Thus when the mysteries of Christ and the Church were fulfilled by the apostles,

[33333] Iª q. 117 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus, V super Gen. ad Litt., sic exponit illam apostoli auctoritatem. Praemiserat enim apostolus, *mihi, omnium sanctorum minimo, data est gratia haec, illuminare omnes quae sit dispensatio sacramenti*

some things concerning these mysteries became apparent to the angels, which were hidden from them before. In this way we can understand what Jerome says (Comment. in Ep. ad Eph.)---that from the preaching of the apostles the angels learned certain mysteries; that is to say, through the preaching of the apostles, the mysteries were realized in the things themselves: thus by the preaching of Paul the Gentiles were converted, of which mystery the Apostle is speaking in the passage quoted.

absconditi a saeculis in Deo. Ita dico absconditi, ut tamen innotesceret principibus et potestatibus in caelestibus, per Ecclesiam scilicet, multiformis sapientia Dei. Quasi dicat, ita hoc sacramentum erat absconditum hominibus, ut tamen Ecclesiae caelesti, quae continetur in principibus et potestatibus, hoc sacramentum notum esset *a saeculis, non ante saecula, quia ibi primitus Ecclesia fuit, quo post resurrectionem et ista Ecclesia hominum congreganda est*. Potest tamen et aliter dici, quod *illud quod absconditum est, non tantum in Deo innotescit Angelis, verum etiam hic eis apparet, cum efficitur atque propalatur*, ut Augustinus ibidem subdit. Et sic dum per apostolos impleta sunt Christi et Ecclesiae mysteria, Angelis aliqua apparuerunt de huiusmodi mysteriis, quae ante erant eis occulta. Et per hunc modum potest intelligi quod Hieronymus dicit, quod, apostolis praedicantibus, Angeli aliqua mysteria cognoverunt, quia scilicet per praedicationem apostolorum huiusmodi mysteria explebantur in rebus ipsis, sicut praedicante Paulo convertebantur gentes; de quo apostolus ibi loquitur.

Reply to Objection 2: The apostles were instructed immediately by the Word of God, not according to His Divinity, but according as He spoke in His human nature. Hence the argument does not prove.

[33334] Iª q. 117 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod apostoli instruebantur immediate a verbo Dei, non secundum eius divinitatem, sed inquantum eius humanitas loquebatur. Unde ratio non sequitur.

Reply to Objection 3: Certain men in this state of life are greater than certain angels, not actually, but virtually; forasmuch as they have such great charity that they can merit a higher degree of beatitude than that possessed by certain angels. In the same way we might say that the seed of a great tree is virtually greater than a small tree, though actually it is much smaller.

[33335] Iª q. 117 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod aliqui homines, etiam in statu viae, sunt maiores aliquibus Angelis, non quidem actu, sed virtute; inquantum scilicet habent caritatem tantae virtutis, ut possint mereri maiorem beatitudinis gradum quam quidam Angeli habeant. Sicut si dicamus semen alicuius magnae arboris esse maius virtute quam aliquam parvam arborem, cum tamen multo minus sit in actu.

Q. 117. A. 3. Whether man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter?

Objection 1: It would seem that man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter. For Gregory says (Dialog. ii, 30): "Saints work miracles sometimes by prayer, sometimes by their power: thus Peter, by prayer, raised the dead Tabitha to life, and by his reproof delivered to death the lying Ananias and Saphira." But in the

[33336] Iª q. 117 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo per virtutem animae possit corporalem materiam immutare. Dicit enim Gregorius, II Dialog., quod *sancti miracula aliquando ex prece faciunt, aliquando ex potestate, sicut Petrus, qui Tabitham mortuam orando suscitavit, Ananiam et Saphiram*

working of miracles a change is wrought in corporeal matter. Therefore men, by the power of the soul, can change corporeal matter.

mentientes morti increpando tradidit. Sed in operatione miraculorum fit aliqua immutatio materiae corporalis. Ergo homines virtute suae animae possunt materiam corporalem immutare.

Objection 2: Further, on these words (Gal. 3:1): "Who hath bewitched you, that you should not obey the truth?" the gloss says that "some have blazing eyes, who by a single look bewitch others, especially children." But this would not be unless the power of the soul could change corporeal matter. Therefore man can change corporeal matter by the power of his soul.

[33337] Iª q. 117 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, super illud ad Gal. III, *quis vos fascinavit veritati non obedire?* Dicit Glossa quod *quidam habent* oculos urentes, qui solo aspectu inficiunt alios, et maxime pueros. Sed hoc non esset, nisi virtus animae posset materiam corporalem immutare. Ergo homo per virtutem suae animae potest materiam corporalem immutare.

Objection 3: Further, the human body is nobler than other inferior bodies. But by the apprehension of the human soul the human body is changed to heat and cold, as appears when a man is angry or afraid: indeed this change sometimes goes so far as to bring on sickness and death. Much more, then, can the human soul by its power change corporeal matter.

[33338] Iª q. 117 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, corpus humanum est nobilius quam alia inferiora corpora. Sed per apprehensionem animae humanae immutatur corpus humanum ad calorem et frigus, ut patet in irascentibus et timentibus; et quandoque etiam haec immutatio pervenit usque ad aegritudinem et mortem. Ergo multo magis anima hominis potest sua virtute materiam corporalem immutare.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Corporeal matter obeys God alone at will."

[33339] Iª q. 117 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in III de Trin., quod *materia corporalis soli Deo obedit ad nutum*.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[110], A[2]), corporeal matter is not changed to (the reception of) a form save either by some agent composed of matter and form, or by God Himself, in whom both matter and form pre-exist virtually, as in the primordial cause of both. Wherefore of the angels also we have stated (Q[110], A[2]) that they cannot change corporeal matter by their natural power, except by employing corporeal agents for the production of certain effects. Much less therefore can the soul, by its natural power, change corporeal matter, except by means of bodies.

[33340] Iª q. 117 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est materia corporalis non immutatur ad formam, nisi vel ab agente aliquo composito ex materia et forma; vel ab ipso Deo, in quo virtualiter et materia et forma praeexistit, sicut in primordiali causa utriusque. Unde et de Angelis supra dictum est quod materiam corporalem immutare non possunt naturali virtute, nisi applicando corporalia agentia ad effectus aliquos producendos. Multo igitur minus anima sua virtute naturali potest immutare materiam corporalem, nisi mediantibus aliquibus corporibus.

Reply to Objection 1: The saints are said to work miracles by the power of grace, not of nature. This is clear from what Gregory says in the same place: "Those who are sons of God, in power, as John says---what wonder is there that they should work miracles by that power?"

[33341] Iª q. 117 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sancti dicuntur miracula facere ex potestate gratiae, non naturae. Quod patet per illud quod Gregorius ibidem dicit, *qui filii Dei ex potestate sunt, ut dicit Ioannes, quid mirum si signa facere ex potestate valeant?*

Reply to Objection 2: Avicenna assigns the cause of bewitchment to the fact that corporeal matter has a natural tendency to obey spiritual substance rather than natural contrary agents. Therefore when the soul is of strong imagination, it can change corporeal matter. This he says is the cause of the "evil eye."

But it has been shown above (Q[110], A[2]) that corporeal matter does not obey spiritual substances at will, but the Creator alone. Therefore it is better to say, that by a strong imagination the (corporeal) spirits of the body united to that soul are changed, which change in the spirits takes place especially in the eyes, to which the more subtle spirits can reach. And the eyes infect the air which is in contact with them to a certain distance: in the same way as a new and clear mirror contracts a tarnish from the look of a "menstruata," as Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.; [*De Insomniis ii]).

Hence then when a soul is vehemently moved to wickedness, as occurs mostly in little old women, according to the above explanation, the countenance becomes venomous and hurtful, especially to children, who have a tender and most impressionable body. It is also possible that by God's permission, or from some hidden deed, the spiteful demons co-operate in this, as the witches may have some compact with them.

[33342] Iª q. 117 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod fascinationis causam assignavit Avicenna ex hoc, quod materia corporalis nata est obedire spirituali substantiae magis quam contrariis agentibus in natura. Et ideo quando anima fuerit fortis in sua imaginatione, corporalis materia immutatur secundum eam. Et hanc dicit esse causam oculi fascinantis. Sed supra ostensum est quod materia corporalis non obedit substantiae spirituali ad nutum, nisi soli creatori. Et ideo melius dicendum est, quod ex forti imaginatione animae immutantur spiritus corporis coniuncti. Quae quidem immutatio spirituum maxime fit in oculis, ad quos subtiliores spiritus perveniunt. Oculi autem inficiunt aerem continuum usque ad determinatum spatium, per quem modum specula, si fuerint nova et pura, contrahunt quandam impuritatem ex aspectu mulieris menstruatae, ut Aristoteles dicit in libro de Somn. et Vig. Sic igitur cum aliqua anima fuerit vehementer commota ad malitiam, sicut maxime in vetulabus contingit, efficitur secundum modum praedictum aspectus eius venenosus et noxius, et maxime pueris, qui habent corpus tenerum, et de facili receptivum impressionis. Possibile est etiam quod ex Dei permissione, vel etiam ex aliquo facto occulto, cooperetur ad hoc malignitas Daemonum, cum quibus vetulae sortilegae aliquod foedus habent.

Reply to Objection 3: The soul is united to the body as its form; and the sensitive appetite, which obeys the reason in a certain way, as stated above (Q[81], A[3]), it is the act of a corporeal organ. Therefore at the apprehension of the human soul, the sensitive appetite must needs be moved with an accompanying corporeal operation. But the apprehension of the human soul does not suffice to work a change in exterior bodies, except by means of a change in the body united to it, as stated above (ad 2).

[33343] Iª q. 117 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod anima corpori humano unitur ut forma, et appetitus sensitivus, qui obedit aliqualiter rationi, ut supra dictum est, est actus alicuius organi corporalis. Et ideo oportet quod ad apprehensionem animae humanae, commoveatur appetitus sensitivus cum aliqua operatione corporali. Ad exteriora vero corpora immutanda apprehensio animae humanae non sufficit, nisi mediante immutatione proprii corporis, ut dictum est.

Q. 117. A. 4. Whether the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally?

Objection 1: It seems that the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally. For a body naturally obeys a spiritual substance as to local motion, as stated above (Q[110], A[5]). But the

[33344] Iª q. 117 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima hominis separata possit corpora saltem localiter movere. Substantiae enim spirituali naturaliter obedit corpus ad motum localem, ut supra dictum est.

separate soul is a spiritual substance. Therefore it can move exterior bodies by its command.

Sed anima separata est substantia spiritualis. Ergo suo imperio potest exteriora corpora movere.

Objection 2: Further, in the Itinerary of Clement it is said in the narrative of Nicetas to Peter, that Simon Magus, by sorcery retained power over the soul of a child that he had slain, and that through this soul he worked magical wonders. But this could not have been without some corporeal change at least as to place. Therefore, the separate soul has the power to move bodies locally.

[33345] Iª q. 117 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, in itinerario Clementis dicitur, narrante Niceta ad Petrum, quod Simon magus per magicas artes pueri a se interfecti animam retinebat, per quam magicas operationes efficiebat. Sed hoc esse non potuisset sine aliqua corporum transmutatione, ad minus locali. Ergo anima separata habet virtutem localiter movendi corpora.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 3) that the soul cannot move any other body whatsoever but its own.

[33346] Iª q. 117 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in libro de anima quod anima non potest movere quodcumque corpus, sed solummodo proprium.

I answer that, The separate soul cannot by its natural power move a body. For it is manifest that, even while the soul is united to the body, it does not move the body except as endowed with life: so that if one of the members become lifeless, it does not obey the soul as to local motion. Now it is also manifest that no body is quickened by the separate soul. Therefore within the limits of its natural power the separate soul cannot command the obedience of a body; though, by the power of God, it can exceed those limits.

[33347] Iª q. 117 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod anima separata sua naturali virtute non potest movere aliquod corpus. Manifestum est enim quod, cum anima est corpori unita, non movet corpus nisi vivificatum, unde si aliquod membrum corporis mortificetur, non obedit animae ad motum localem. Manifestum est autem quod ab anima separata nullum corpus vivificatur. Unde nullum corpus obedit ei ad motum localem, quantum est ex virtute suae naturae, supra quam potest aliquid ei conferri virtute divina.

Reply to Objection 1: There are certain spiritual substances whose powers are not determinate to certain bodies; such are the angels who are naturally unfettered by a body; consequently various bodies may obey them as to movement. But if the motive power of a separate substance is naturally determinate to move a certain body, that substance will not be able to move a body of higher degree, but only one of lower degree: thus according to philosophers the mover of the lower heaven cannot move the higher heaven. Wherefore, since the soul is by its nature determinate to move the body of which it is the form, it cannot by its natural power move any other body.

[33348] Iª q. 117 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod substantiae quaedam spirituales sunt, quarum virtutes non determinantur ad aliqua corpora, sicut sunt Angeli, qui sunt naturaliter a corporibus absoluti, et ideo diversa corpora eis possunt obedire ad motum. Si tamen alicuius substantiae separatae virtus motiva determinetur naturaliter ad movendum aliquod corpus, non poterit illa substantia movere aliquod corpus maius, sed minus, sicut, secundum philosophos, motor inferioris caeli non posset movere caelum superius. Unde cum anima secundum suam naturam determinetur ad movendum corpus cuius est forma, nullum aliud corpus sua naturali virtute movere potest.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) and Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matt.) say, the demons often pretend to be the souls of the

[33349] Iª q. 117 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus X de Civ. Dei, et Chrysostomus super Matth., frequenter

dead, in order to confirm the error of heathen superstition. It is therefore credible that Simon Magus was deceived by some demon who pretended to be the soul of the child whom the magician had slain.

Daemones simulant se esse animas mortuorum, ad confirmandum gentilium errorem, qui hoc credebant. Et ideo credibile est quod Simon magus illudebatur ab aliquo Daemone, qui simulabat se esse animam pueri quem ipse occiderat.

Q. 118. OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN FROM MAN AS TO THE SOUL (THREE ARTICLES)

We next consider the production of man from man: first, as to the soul; secondly, as to the body.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?

(2) Whether the intellectual soul is thus transmitted?

(3) Whether all souls were created at the same time?

[33350] Iª q. 118 pr. Deinde considerandum est de traductione hominis ex homine. Et primo, quantum ad animam; secundo, quantum ad corpus. Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum anima sensitiva traducatur cum semine. Secundo, utrum anima intellectiva. Tertio, utrum omnes animae fuerint simul creatae.

Q. 118. A. 1. Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive soul is not transmitted with the semen, but created by God. For every perfect substance, not composed of matter and form, that begins to exist, acquires existence not by generation, but by creation: for nothing is generated save from matter. But the sensitive soul is a perfect substance, otherwise it could not move the body; and since it is the form of a body, it is not composed of matter and form. Therefore it begins to exist not by generation but by creation.

[33351] Iª q. 118 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima sensitiva non traducatur cum semine, sed sit per creationem a Deo. Omnis enim substantia perfecta quae non est composita ex materia et forma, si esse incipiat, hoc non est per generationem, sed per creationem, quia nihil generatur nisi ex materia. Sed anima sensitiva est substantia perfecta, alioquin non posset movere corpus, et cum sit forma corporis, non est ex materia et forma composita. Ergo non incipit esse per generationem, sed per creationem.

Objection 2: Further, in living things the principle of generation is the generating power; which, since it is one of the powers of the vegetative soul, is of a lower order than the sensitive soul. Now nothing acts beyond its species. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot be caused by the animal's generating power.

[33352] Iª q. 118 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, principium generationis in rebus viventibus est per potentiam generativam; quae, cum numeretur inter vires animae vegetabilis, est infra animam sensitivam. Nihil autem agit ultra suam speciem. Ergo anima sensitiva non potest causari per vim generativam animalis.

Objection 3: Further, the generator begets its like: so that the form of the generator must be actually in the cause of generation. But neither the sensitive soul itself nor any part thereof is actually in the semen, for no part of the sensitive soul is elsewhere than in some part of the body; while in the semen there is not even a particle of the body, because there is not a particle of the body which is not made from the semen and by the power thereof. Therefore the sensitive soul is not produced through the semen.

[33353] Iª q. 118 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, generans generat sibi simile, et sic oportet quod forma generati sit actu in causa generationis. Sed anima sensitiva non est actu in semine, nec ipsa nec aliqua pars eius, quia nulla pars animae sensitivae est nisi in aliqua parte corporis; in semine autem non est aliqua corporis particula, quia nulla particula corporis est quae non fiat ex semine, et per virtutem seminis. Ergo anima sensitiva non causatur ex semine.

Objection 4: Further, if there be in the semen any principle productive of the sensitive soul, this principle either remains after the animal is begotten, or it does not remain. Now it cannot remain. For either it would be identified with the sensitive soul of the begotten animal; which is impossible, for thus there would be identity between begetter and begotten, maker and made: or it would be distinct therefrom; and again this is impossible, for it has been proved above (Q[76], A[4]) that in one animal there is but one formal principle, which is the soul. If on the other hand the aforesaid principle does not remain, this again seems to be impossible: for thus an agent would act to its own destruction, which cannot be. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot be generated from the semen.

[33354] Iª q. 118 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, si in semine est aliquod principium activum animae sensitivae, aut illud principium manet, generato iam animali; aut non manet. Sed manere non potest. Quia vel esset idem cum anima sensitiva animalis generati, et hoc est impossibile, quia sic esset idem generans et generatum, faciens et factum. Vel esset aliquid aliud, et hoc etiam est impossibile, quia supra ostensum est quod in uno animali non est nisi unum principium formale, quod est una anima. Si autem non manet, hoc etiam videtur impossibile, quia sic aliquod agens ageret ad corruptionem sui ipsius, quod est impossibile. Non ergo anima sensitiva potest generari ex semine.

On the contrary, The power in the semen is to the animal seminally generated, as the power in the elements of the world is to animals produced from these elements---for instance by putrefaction. But in the latter animals the soul is produced by the elemental power, according to Gn. 1:20: "Let the waters bring forth the creeping creatures having life." Therefore also the souls of animals seminally generated are produced by the seminal power.

[33355] Iª q. 118 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, ita se habet virtus quae est in semine, ad animalia quae ex semine generantur, sicut se habet virtus quae est in elementis mundi, ad animalia quae ex elementis mundi producuntur, sicut quae ex putrefactione generantur. Sed in huiusmodi animalibus animae producuntur ex virtute quae est in elementis; secundum illud Gen. I, *producant aquae reptile animae viventis*. Ergo et animalium quae generantur ex semine, animae producuntur ex virtute quae est in semine.

I answer that, Some have held that the sensitive souls of animals are created by God (Q[65], A[4]). This opinion would hold if the sensitive soul were subsistent, having being and operation of itself. For thus, as having being and operation of itself, to be made would needs be proper to it. And since a simple and subsistent thing cannot be made except by creation, it would follow that the sensitive soul would arrive at existence by creation.

But this principle is false---namely, that being and operation are proper to the sensitive soul, as has been made clear above (Q[75], A[3]): for it would not cease to exist when the body perishes. Since, therefore, it is not a subsistent form, its relation to existence is that of the corporeal forms, to which existence does not belong as proper to them, but which are said to exist forasmuch as the subsistent composites exist through them.

[33356] Iª q. 118 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt animas sensitivas animalium a Deo creari. Quae quidem positio conveniens esset, si anima sensitiva esset res subsistens, habens per se esse et operationem. Sic enim, sicut per se haberet esse et operationem, ita per se deberetur ei fieri. Et cum res simplex et subsistens non possit fieri nisi per creationem, sequeretur quod anima sensitiva procederet in esse per creationem. Sed ista radix est falsa, scilicet quod anima sensitiva per se habeat esse et operationem, ut ex superioribus patet, non enim corrumperetur, corrupto corpore. Et ideo, cum non sit forma subsistens, habet se in essendo ad modum aliarum formarum corporalium, quibus per se non debetur esse, sed esse dicuntur inquantum composita subsistentia per eas sunt. Unde et ipsis compositis debetur fieri. Et quia generans est simile generato, necesse est quod naturaliter tam anima sensitiva, quam aliae

Wherefore to be made is proper to composites. And since the generator is like the generated, it follows of necessity that both the sensitive soul, and all other like forms are naturally brought into existence by certain corporeal agents that reduce the matter from potentiality to act, through some corporeal power of which they are possessed.

Now the more powerful an agent, the greater scope its action has: for instance, the hotter a body, the greater the distance to which its heat carries. Therefore bodies not endowed with life, which are the lowest in the order of nature, generate their like, not through some medium, but by themselves; thus fire by itself generates fire. But living bodies, as being more powerful, act so as to generate their like, both without and with a medium. Without a medium---in the work of nutrition, in which flesh generates flesh: with a medium---in the act of generation, because the semen of the animal or plant derives a certain active force from the soul of the generator, just as the instrument derives a certain motive power from the principal agent. And as it matters not whether we say that something is moved by the instrument or by the principal agent, so neither does it matter whether we say that the soul of the generated is caused by the soul of the generator, or by some seminal power derived therefrom.

huiusmodi formae, producantur in esse ab aliquibus corporalibus agentibus transmutantibus materiam de potentia in actum, per aliquam virtutem corpoream quae est in eis. Quanto autem aliquod agens est potentius, tanto potest suam actionem diffundere ad magis distans, sicut quanto aliquod corpus est magis calidum, tanto ad remotius calefactionem producit. Corpora igitur non viventia, quae sunt inferiora naturae ordine, generant quidem sibi simile, non per aliquod medium, sed per seipsa; sicut ignis per seipsum generat ignem. Sed corpora viventia, tanquam potentiora, agunt ad generandum sibi simile et sine medio, et per medium. Sine medio quidem, in opere nutritionis, in quo caro generat carnem, cum medio vero, in actu generationis, quia ex anima generantis derivatur quaedam virtus activa ad ipsum semen animalis vel plantae, sicut et a principali agente derivatur quaedam vis motiva ad instrumentum. Et sicut non refert dicere quod aliquid moveatur ab instrumento, vel a principali agente; ita non refert dicere quod anima generati causetur ab anima generantis, vel a virtute derivata ab ipsa, quae est in semine.

Reply to Objection 1: The sensitive soul is not a perfect self-subsistent substance. We have said enough (Q[25], A[3]) on this point, nor need we repeat it here.

[33357] Iª q. 118 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod anima sensitiva non est substantia perfecta per se subsistens. Et de hoc supra dictum est, nec oportet hic iterare.

Reply to Objection 2: The generating power begets not only by its own virtue but by that of the whole soul, of which it is a power. Therefore the generating power of a plant generates a plant, and that of an animal begets an animal. For the more perfect the soul is, to so much a more perfect effect is its generating power ordained.

[33358] Iª q. 118 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod virtus generativa non generat solum in virtute propria, sed in virtute totius animae, cuius est potentia. Et ideo virtus generativa plantae generat plantam; virtus vero generativa animalis generat animal. Quanto enim anima fuerit perfectior, tanto virtus eius generativa ordinatur ad perfectiorem effectum.

Reply to Objection 3: This active force which is in the semen, and which is derived from the soul of the generator, is, as it were, a certain movement of this soul itself: nor is it the soul or a part of the soul, save virtually; thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or the axe, but a certain movement

[33359] Iª q. 118 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod illa vis activa quae est in semine, ex anima generantis derivata, est quasi quaedam motio ipsius animae generantis, nec est anima, aut pars animae, nisi in virtute; sicut in serra vel securi non est forma lecti, sed motio quaedam ad talem

towards that form. Consequently there is no need for this active force to have an actual organ; but it is based on the (vital) spirit in the semen which is frothy, as is attested by its whiteness. In which spirit, moreover, there is a certain heat derived from the power of the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior bodies also act towards the production of the species as stated above (Q[115], A[3], ad 2). And since in this (vital) spirit the power of the soul is concurrent with the power of a heavenly body, it has been said that "man and the sun generate man." Moreover, elemental heat is employed instrumentally by the soul's power, as also by the nutritive power, as stated (De Anima ii, 4).

formam. Et ideo non oportet quod ista vis activa habeat aliquod organum in actu; sed fundatur in ipso spiritu incluso in semine, quod est spumosum, ut attestatur eius albedo. In quo etiam spiritu est quidam calor ex virtute caelestium corporum, quorum etiam virtute agentia inferiora agunt ad speciem, ut supra dictum est. Et quia in huiusmodi spiritu concurrit virtus animae cum virtute caelesti, dicitur quod homo generat hominem, et sol. Calidum autem elementare se habet instrumentaliter ad virtutem animae, sicut etiam ad virtutem nutritivam, ut dicitur in II de anima.

Reply to Objection 4: In perfect animals, generated by coition, the active force is in the semen of the male, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3); but the foetal matter is provided by the female. In this matter, the vegetative soul exists from the very beginning, not as to the second act, but as to the first act, as the sensitive soul is in one who sleeps. But as soon as it begins to attract nourishment, then it already operates in act. This matter therefore is transmuted by the power which is in the semen of the male, until it is actually informed by the sensitive soul; not as though the force itself which was in the semen becomes the sensitive soul; for thus, indeed, the generator and generated would be identical; moreover, this would be more like nourishment and growth than generation, as the Philosopher says. And after the sensitive soul, by the power of the active principle in the semen, has been produced in one of the principal parts of the thing generated, then it is that the sensitive soul of the offspring begins to work towards the perfection of its own body, by nourishment and growth. As to the active power which was in the semen, it ceases to exist, when the semen is dissolved and the (vital) spirit thereof vanishes. Nor is there anything unreasonable in this, because this force is not the principal but the instrumental agent; and the movement of an instrument ceases when once the effect has been produced.

[33360] Iª q. 118 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod in animalibus perfectis, quae generantur ex coitu, virtus activa est in semine maris, secundum philosophum in libro de Generat. Animal.; materia autem foetus est illud quod ministratur a femina. In qua quidem materia statim a principio est anima vegetabilis, non quidem secundum actum secundum, sed secundum actum primum, sicut anima sensitiva est in dormientibus. Cum autem incipit attrahere alimentum, tunc iam actu operatur. Huiusmodi igitur materia transmutatur a virtute quae est in semine maris, quousque perducatur in actum animae sensitivae, non ita quod ipsamet vis quae erat in semine, fiat anima sensitiva; quia sic idem esset generans et generatum; et hoc magis esset simile nutritioni et augmento, quam generationi, ut philosophus dicit. Postquam autem per virtutem principii activi quod erat in semine, producta est anima sensitiva in generato quantum ad aliquam partem eius principalem, tunc iam illa anima sensitiva prolis incipit operari ad complementum proprii corporis, per modum nutritionis et augmenti. Virtus autem activa quae erat in semine, esse desinit, dissoluto semine, et evanescente spiritu qui inerat. Nec hoc est inconveniens, quia vis ista non est principale agens, sed instrumentale; motio autem instrumenti cessat, effectu iam producto in esse.

Q. 118. A. 2. Whether the intellectual soul is produced from the semen?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is produced from the semen. For it is written (Gn. 46:26): "All the souls that came out of [Jacob's] thigh, sixty-six." But nothing is produced from the thigh of a man, except from the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul is produced from the semen.

[33361] Iª q. 118 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima intellectiva causetur ex semine. Dicitur enim Gen. XLVI, *cunctae animae quae egressae sunt de femore Iacob, sexaginta sex*. Sed nihil egreditur de femore hominis, nisi inquantum causatur ex semine. Ergo anima intellectiva causatur ex semine.

Objection 2: Further, as shown above (Q[76], A[3]), the intellectual, sensitive, and nutritive souls are, in substance, one soul in man. But the sensitive soul in man is generated from the semen, as in other animals; wherefore the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3) that the animal and the man are not made at the same time, but first of all the animal is made having a sensitive soul. Therefore also the intellectual soul is produced from the semen.

[33362] Iª q. 118 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut supra ostensum est, in homine est una et eadem anima secundum substantiam, intellectiva, sensitiva et nutritiva. Sed anima sensitiva in homine generatur ex semine, sicut in aliis animalibus, unde et philosophus dicit in libro de Generat. Animal., quod non simul fit animal et homo, sed prius fit animal habens animam sensitivam. Ergo et anima intellectiva causatur ex semine.

Objection 3: Further, it is one and the same agent whose action is directed to the matter and to the form: else from the matter and the form there would not result something simply one. But the intellectual soul is the form of the human body, which is produced by the power of the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul also is produced by the power of the semen.

[33363] Iª q. 118 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, unum et idem agens, est cuius actio terminatur ad formam, et materiam, alioquin ex forma et materia non fieret unum simpliciter. Sed anima intellectiva est forma corporis humani, quod formatur per virtutem seminis. Ergo et anima intellectiva per virtutem seminis causatur.

Objection 4: Further, man begets his like in species. But the human species is constituted by the rational soul. Therefore the rational soul is from the begetter.

[33364] Iª q. 118 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, homo generat sibi simile secundum speciem. Sed species humana constituitur per animam rationalem. Ergo anima rationalis est a generante.

Objection 5: Further, it cannot be said that God concurs in sin. But if the rational soul be created by God, sometimes God concurs in the sin of adultery, since sometimes offspring is begotten of illicit intercourse. Therefore the rational soul is not created by God.

[33365] Iª q. 118 a. 2 arg. 5 Praeterea, inconveniens est dicere quod Deus cooperetur peccantibus. Sed si animae rationales crearentur a Deo, Deus interdum cooperaretur adulteris, de quorum illicito coitu proles interdum generatur. Non ergo animae rationales creantur a Deo.

On the contrary, It is written in De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv that "the rational soul is not engendered by coition."

[33366] Iª q. 118 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de Eccles. Dogmat., quod *animae rationales non seminantur per coitum*.

I answer that, It is impossible for an active power existing in matter to extend its action to the production of an immaterial effect. Now it is manifest that the intellectual principle in man transcends matter; for it has an operation in which the body takes no part whatever. It is therefore impossible for the seminal power to produce the intellectual principle.

Again, the seminal power acts by virtue of the soul of the begetter according as the soul of the begetter is the act of the body, making use of the body in its operation. Now the body has nothing whatever to do in the operation of the intellect. Therefore the power of the intellectual principle, as intellectual, cannot reach the semen. Hence the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3): "It follows that the intellect alone comes from without."

Again, since the intellectual soul has an operation independent of the body, it is subsistent, as proved above (Q[75], A[2]): therefore to be and to be made are proper to it. Moreover, since it is an immaterial substance it cannot be caused through generation, but only through creation by God. Therefore to hold that the intellectual soul is caused by the begetter, is nothing else than to hold the soul to be non-subsistent and consequently to perish with the body. It is therefore heretical to say that the intellectual soul is transmitted with the semen.

[33367] Iª q. 118 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est virtutem activam quae est in materia, extendere suam actionem ad producendum immaterialem effectum. Manifestum est autem quod principium intellectivum in homine est principium transcendens materiam, habet enim operationem in qua non communicat corpus. Et ideo impossibile est quod virtus quae est in semine, sit productiva intellectivi principii. Similiter etiam quia virtus quae est in semine agit in virtute animae generantis, secundum quod anima generantis est actus corporis, utens ipso corpore in sua operatione. In operatione autem intellectus non communicat corpus. Unde virtus intellectivi principii, prout intellectivum est, non potest ad semen pervenire. Et ideo philosophus, in libro de Generat. Animal., dicit, *relinquitur intellectus solus de foris advenire*. Similiter etiam anima intellectiva, cum habeat operationem sine corpore, est subsistens, ut supra habitum est, et ita sibi debetur esse et fieri. Et cum sit immaterialis substantia, non potest causari per generationem, sed solum per creationem a Deo. Ponere ergo animam intellectivam a generante causari, nihil est aliud quam ponere eam non subsistentem; et per consequens corrumpi eam cum corpore. Et ideo haereticum est dicere quod anima intellectiva traducatur cum semine.

Reply to Objection 1: In the passage quoted, the part is put instead of the whole, the soul for the whole man, by the figure of synecdoche.

[33368] Iª q. 118 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in auctoritate illa ponitur per synecdochen pars pro toto, idest anima pro toto homine.

Reply to Objection 2: Some say that the vital functions observed in the embryo are not from its soul, but from the soul of the mother; or from the formative power of the semen. Both of these explanations are false; for vital functions such as feeling, nourishment, and growth cannot be from an extrinsic principle. Consequently it must be said that the soul is in the embryo; the nutritive soul from the beginning, then the sensitive, lastly the intellectual soul.

Therefore some say that in addition to the vegetative soul which existed first, another,

[33369] Iª q. 118 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod aliqui dixerunt quod operationes vitae quae apparent in embryone, non sunt ab anima eius, sed ab anima matris; vel a virtute formativa quae est in semine. Quorum utrumque falsum est, opera enim vitae non possunt esse a principio extrinseco, sicut sentire, nutriri et augeri. Et ideo dicendum est quod anima praeexistit in embryone a principio quidem nutritiva, postmodum autem sensitiva, et tandem intellectiva. Dicunt ergo quidam quod supra animam vegetabilem quae primo inerat, supervenit alia anima, quae est sensitiva; et supra

namely the sensitive, soul supervenes; and in addition to this, again another, namely the intellectual soul. Thus there would be in man three souls of which one would be in potentiality to another. This has been disproved above (Q[76], A[3]).

Therefore others say that the same soul which was at first merely vegetative, afterwards through the action of the seminal power, becomes a sensitive soul; and finally this same soul becomes intellectual, not indeed through the active seminal power, but by the power of a higher agent, namely God enlightening (the soul) from without. For this reason the Philosopher says that the intellect comes from without. But this will not hold. First, because no substantial form is susceptible of more or less; but addition of greater perfection constitutes another species, just as the addition of unity constitutes another species of number. Now it is not possible for the same identical form to belong to different species. Secondly, because it would follow that the generation of an animal would be a continuous movement, proceeding gradually from the imperfect to the perfect, as happens in alteration. Thirdly, because it would follow that the generation of a man or an animal is not generation simply, because the subject thereof would be a being in act. For if the vegetative soul is from the beginning in the matter of offspring, and is subsequently gradually brought to perfection; this will imply addition of further perfection without corruption of the preceding perfection. And this is contrary to the nature of generation properly so called. Fourthly, because either that which is caused by the action of God is something subsistent: and thus it must needs be essentially distinct from the pre-existing form, which was non-subsistent; and we shall then come back to the opinion of those who held the existence of several souls in the body---or else it is not subsistent, but a perfection of the pre-existing soul: and from this it follows of necessity that the intellectual soul perishes with the body, which cannot be admitted.

There is again another explanation, according to those who held that all men have but one intellect in common: but this has been disproved above (Q[76], A[2]).

illam iterum alia, quae est intellectiva. Et sic sunt in homine tres animae, quarum una est in potentia ad aliam. Quod supra improbatum est. Et ideo alii dicunt quod illa eadem anima quae primo fuit vegetativa tantum, postmodum, per actionem virtutis quae est in semine, perducitur ad hoc quod fiat etiam sensitiva; et tandem perducitur ad hoc ut ipsa eadem fiat intellectiva, non quidem per virtutem activam seminis, sed per virtutem superioris agentis, scilicet Dei deforis illustrantis. Et propter hoc dicit philosophus quod intellectus venit ab extrinseco. Sed hoc stare non potest. Primo quidem, quia nulla forma substantialis recipit magis et minus; sed superadditio maioris perfectionis facit aliam speciem, sicut additio unitatis facit aliam speciem in numeris. Non est autem possibile ut una et eadem forma numero sit diversarum specierum. Secundo, quia sequeretur quod generatio animalis esset motus continuus, paulatim procedens de imperfecto ad perfectum; sicut accidit in alteratione. Tertio, quia sequeretur quod generatio hominis aut animalis non sit generatio simpliciter, quia subiectum eius esset ens actu. Si enim a principio in materia prolis est anima vegetabilis, et postmodum usque ad perfectum paulatim perducitur; erit semper additio perfectionis sequentis sine corruptione perfectionis praecedentis. Quod est contra rationem generationis simpliciter. Quarto, quia aut id quod causatur ex actione Dei, est aliquid subsistens, et ita oportet quod sit aliud per essentiam a forma praeexistente, quae non erat subsistens; et sic redibit opinio ponentium plures animas in corpore. Aut non est aliquid subsistens, sed quaedam perfectio animae praeexistentis, et sic ex necessitate sequitur quod anima intellectiva corrumpatur, corrupto corpore; quod est impossibile. Est autem et alius modus dicendi, secundum eos qui ponunt unum intellectum in omnibus. Quod supra improbatum est. Et ideo dicendum est quod, cum generatio unius semper sit corruptio alterius, necesse est dicere quod tam in homine quam in animalibus aliis, quando perfectior forma advenit, fit corruptio prioris, ita tamen quod sequens forma habet quidquid habebat prima, et adhuc amplius. Et sic per multas generationes et corruptiones pervenitur ad ultimam formam substantialem, tam in homine quam in aliis animalibus. Et hoc ad sensum apparet in animalibus ex putrefactione generatis. Sic igitur dicendum est quod anima intellectiva creatur a Deo in fine generationis humanae, quae

We must therefore say that since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, it follows of necessity that both in men and in other animals, when a more perfect form supervenes the previous form is corrupted: yet so that the supervening form contains the perfection of the previous form, and something in addition. It is in this way that through many generations and corruptions we arrive at the ultimate substantial form, both in man and other animals. This indeed is apparent to the senses in animals generated from putrefaction. We conclude therefore that the intellectual soul is created by God at the end of human generation, and this soul is at the same time sensitive and nutritive, the pre-existing forms being corrupted.

simul est et sensitiva et nutritiva, corruptis formis praeexistentibus.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument holds in the case of diverse agents not ordered to one another. But where there are many agents ordered to one another, nothing hinders the power of the higher agent from reaching to the ultimate form; while the powers of the inferior agents extend only to some disposition of matter: thus in the generation of an animal, the seminal power disposes the matter, but the power of the soul gives the form. Now it is manifest from what has been said above (Q[105], A[5]; Q[110], A[1]) that the whole of corporeal nature acts as the instrument of a spiritual power, especially of God. Therefore nothing hinders the formation of the body from being due to a corporeal power, while the intellectual soul is from God alone.

[33370] Iª q. 118 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa locum habet in diversis agentibus non ordinatis ad invicem. Sed si sint multa agentia ordinata, nihil prohibet virtutem superioris agentis pertingere ad ultimam formam; virtutes autem inferiorum agentium pertingere solum ad aliquam materiae dispositionem; sicut virtus seminis disponit materiam, virtus autem animae dat formam, in generatione animalis. Manifestum est autem ex praemissis quod tota natura corporalis agit ut instrumentum spiritualis virtutis; et praecipue Dei. Et ideo nihil prohibet quin formatio corporis sit ab aliqua virtute corporali, anima autem intellectiva sit a solo Deo.

Reply to Objection 4: Man begets his like, forasmuch as by his seminal power the matter is disposed for the reception of a certain species of form.

[33371] Iª q. 118 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod homo generat sibi simile, inquantum per virtutem seminis eius disponitur materia ad susceptionem talis formae.

Reply to Objection 5: In the action of the adulterer, what is of nature is good; in this God concurs. But what there is of inordinate lust is evil; in this God does not concur.

[33372] Iª q. 118 a. 2 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod in actione adulterorum, illud quod est naturae, bonum est, et huic cooperatur Deus. Quod vero est inordinatae voluptatis, malum est, et huic Deus non cooperatur.

Q. 118. A. 3. Whether human souls were created together at the beginning of the world?

Objection 1: It would seem that human souls were created together at the beginning of the

[33373] Iª q. 118 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod animae humanae fuerint

world. For it is written (Gn. 2:2): "God rested Him from all His work which He had done." This would not be true if He created new souls every day. Therefore all souls were created at the same time.

createe simul a principio mundi. Dicitur enim Gen. II, *requievit Deus ab omni opere quod patrarat*. Hoc autem non esset, si quotidie novas animas crearet. Ergo omnes animae sunt simul creatae.

Objection 2: Further, spiritual substances before all others belong to the perfection of the universe. If therefore souls were created with the bodies, every day innumerable spiritual substances would be added to the perfection of the universe: consequently at the beginning the universe would have been imperfect. This is contrary to Gn. 2:2, where it is said that "God ended" all "His work."

[33374] Iª q. 118 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, ad perfectionem universi maxime pertinent substantiae spirituales. Si igitur animae simul crearentur cum corporibus, quotidie innumerabiles spirituales substantiae perfectioni universi adderentur, et sic universum a principio fuisset imperfectum. Quod est contra illud quod dicitur Gen. II, *Deum omne opus suum complesse*.

Objection 3: Further, the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning. But the intellectual soul remains, when the body perishes. Therefore it began to exist before the body.

[33375] Iª q. 118 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, finis rei respondet eius principio. Sed anima intellectiva remanet, destructo corpore. Ergo incoepit esse ante corpus.

On the contrary, It is said (De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv, xviii) that "the soul is created together with the body."

[33376] Iª q. 118 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de Eccles. Dogmat., quod *simul anima creatur cum corpore*.

I answer that, Some have maintained that it is accidental to the intellectual soul to be united to the body, asserting that the soul is of the same nature as those spiritual substances which are not united to a body. These, therefore, stated that the souls of men were created together with the angels at the beginning. But this statement is false. Firstly, in the very principle on which it is based. For if it were accidental to the soul to be united to the body, it would follow that man who results from this union is a being by accident; or that the soul is a man, which is false, as proved above (Q[75], A[4]). Moreover, that the human soul is not of the same nature as the angels, is proved from the different mode of understanding, as shown above (Q[55], A[2]; Q[85], A[1]): for man understands through receiving from the senses, and turning to phantasms, as stated above (Q[84], AA[6],7; Q[85], A[1]). For this reason the soul needs to be united to the body, which is necessary to it for the operation of the sensitive part: whereas this cannot be said of an angel.

Secondly, this statement can be proved to be false in itself. For if it is natural to the soul to be united

[33377] Iª q. 118 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt quod animae intellectivae accidat uniri corpori, ponentes eam esse eiusdem conditionis cum substantiis spiritualibus quae corpori non uniuntur. Et ideo posuerunt animas hominum simul a principio cum Angelis creatas. Sed haec opinio falsa est. Primo quidem, quantum ad radicem. Si enim accidentaliter conveniret animae corpori uniri, sequeretur quod homo, qui ex ista unione constituitur, esset ens per accidens; vel quod anima esset homo, quod falsum est, ut supra ostensum est. Quod etiam anima humana non sit eiusdem naturae cum Angelis, ipse diversus modus intelligendi ostendit, ut supra ostensum est, homo enim intelligit a sensibus accipiendo, et convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut supra ostensum est. Et ideo indiget uniri corpori, quo indiget ad operationem sensitivae partis. Quod de Angelo dici non potest. Secundo apparet falsitas in ipsa positione. Si enim animae naturale est corpori uniri, esse sine corpore est sibi contra naturam, et sine corpore existens non habet suae naturae perfectionem. Non fuit autem conveniens ut Deus ab imperfectis suum opus inchoaret, et ab his quae sunt praeter naturam, non enim fecit

to the body, it is unnatural to it to be without a body, and as long as it is without a body it is deprived of its natural perfection. Now it was not fitting that God should begin His work with things imperfect and unnatural, for He did not make man without a hand or a foot, which are natural parts of a man. Much less, therefore, did He make the soul without a body.

But if someone say that it is not natural to the soul to be united to the body, he must give the reason why it is united to a body. And the reason must be either because the soul so willed, or for some other reason. If because the soul willed it---this seems incongruous. First, because it would be unreasonable of the soul to wish to be united to the body, if it did not need the body: for if it did need it, it would be natural for it to be united to it, since "nature does not fail in what is necessary." Secondly, because there would be no reason why, having been created from the beginning of the world, the soul should, after such a long time, come to wish to be united to the body. For a spiritual substance is above time, and superior to the heavenly revolutions. Thirdly, because it would seem that this body was united to this soul by chance: since for this union to take place two wills would have to concur---to wit, that of the incoming soul, and that of the begetter. If, however, this union be neither voluntary nor natural on the part of the soul, then it must be the result of some violent cause, and to the soul would have something of a penal and afflicting nature. This is in keeping with the opinion of Origen, who held that souls were embodies in punishment of sin. Since, therefore, all these opinions are unreasonable, we must simply confess that souls were not created before bodies, but are created at the same time as they are infused into them.

hominem sine manu aut sine pede, quae sunt partes naturales hominis. Multo igitur minus fecit animam sine corpore. Si vero aliquis dicat quod non est naturale animae corpori uniri, oportet inquirere causam quare sint corporibus unitae. Oportet autem dicere quod aut hoc sit factum ex eius voluntate; aut ex alia causa. Si ex eius voluntate, videtur hoc esse inconveniens. Primo quidem, quia haec voluntas irrationabilis esset, si non indigeret corpore, et vellet ei uniri, si enim eo indigeret, naturale esset ei quod corpori uniretur, quia natura non deficit in necessariis. Secundo, quia nulla ratio esset quare animae a principio mundi creatae, post tot tempora voluntas accesserit ut nunc corpori uniatur. Est enim substantia spiritualis supra tempus, utpote revolutiones caeli excedens. Tertio quia videretur a casu esse quod haec anima huic corpori uniretur, cum ad hoc requiratur concursus duarum voluntatum, scilicet animae advenientis, et hominis generantis. Si autem praeter voluntatem ipsius corpori unitur, et praeter eius naturam; oportet quod hoc sit ex causa violentiam inferente, et sic erit ei poenale et triste. Quod est secundum errorem Origenis, qui posuit animas incorporari propter poenam peccati. Unde cum haec omnia sint inconvenientia, simpliciter confitendum est quod animae non sunt creatae ante corpora, sed simul creantur cum corporibus infunduntur.

Reply to Objection 1: God is said to have rested on the seventh day, not from all work, since we read (Jn. 5:17): "My Father worketh until now"; but from the creation of any new genera and species, which may not have already existed in the first works. For in this sense, the souls which are created now, existed already, as to the likeness of the species, in the first works, which included the creation of Adam's soul.

[33378] Iª q. 118 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus dicitur cessasse die septimo, non quidem ab omni opere, cum dicatur Ioan. V, *pater meus usque modo operatur*; sed a novis rerum generibus et speciebus condendis, quae in operibus primis non aliquo modo praeextiterint. Sic enim animae quae nunc creantur, praeextiterunt secundum similitudinem speciei in primis operibus, in quibus anima Adae creata fuit.

Reply to Objection 2: Something can be added every day to the perfection of the universe, as to the number of individuals, but not as to the number of species.

[33379] Iª q. 118 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod perfectioni universi, quantum ad numerum individuorum, quotidie potest addi aliquid, non autem quantum ad numerum specierum.

Reply to Objection 3: That the soul remains without the body is due to the corruption of the body, which was a result of sin. Consequently it was not fitting that God should make the soul without the body from the beginning: for as it is written (Wis. 1:13, 16): "God made not death . . . but the wicked with works and words have called it to them."

[33380] Iª q. 118 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc quod anima remanet sine corpore, contingit per corporis corruptionem, quae consecuta est ex peccato. Unde non fuit conveniens quod ab hoc inciperent Dei opera, quia, sicut scriptum est Sap. I, *Deus mortem non fecit, sed impii manibus et verbis accersierunt eam*.

Q. 119. OF THE PROPAGATION OF MAN AS TO THE BODY (TWO ARTICLES)

We now consider the propagation of man, as to the body. Concerning this there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether any part of the food is changed into true human nature?

(2) Whether the semen, which is the principle of human generation, is produced from the surplus food?

[33381] Iª q. 119 pr. Deinde considerandum est de propagatione hominis quantum ad corpus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum aliquid de alimento convertatur in veritatem humanae naturae. Secundo, utrum semen, quod est humanae generationis principium, sit de superfluo alimenti.

Q. 119. A. 1. Whether some part of the food is changed into true human nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that none of the food is changed into true human nature. For it is written (Mat. 15:17): "Whatsoever entereth into the mouth, goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the privy." But what is cast out is not changed into the reality of human nature. Therefore none of the food is changed into true human nature.

[33382] Iª q. 119 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nihil de alimento transeat in veritatem humanae naturae. Dicitur enim Matth. XV, *omne quod in os intrat, in ventrem vadit, et per secessum emittitur*. Sed quod emittitur, non transit in veritatem humanae naturae. Ergo nihil de alimento in veritatem humanae naturae transit.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 5) distinguishes flesh belonging to the "species" from flesh belonging to "matter"; and says that the latter "comes and goes." Now what is formed from food comes and goes. Therefore what is produced from food is flesh belonging to matter, not to the species. But what belongs to true human nature belongs to the species. Therefore the food is not changed into true human nature.

[33383] Iª q. 119 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, philosophus, in I de Generat., distinguit carnem secundum speciem, et secundum materiam; et dicit quod caro secundum materiam advenit et recedit. Quod autem ex alimento generatur, advenit et recedit. Ergo id in quod alimentum convertitur, est caro secundum materiam, non autem caro secundum speciem. Sed hoc pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae, quod pertinet ad speciem eius. Ergo alimentum non transit in veritatem humanae naturae.

Objection 3: Further, the "radical humor" seems to belong to the reality of human nature; and if it be lost, it cannot be recovered, according to physicians. But it could be recovered if the food were changed into the humor. Therefore food is not changed into true human nature.

[33384] Iª q. 119 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, ad veritatem humanae naturae pertinere videtur humidum radicale; quod si deperdatur, restitui non potest, ut medici dicunt. Posset autem restitui, si alimentum converteretur in ipsum humidum. Ergo nutrimentum non convertitur in veritatem humanae naturae.

Objection 4: Further, if the food were changed into true human nature, whatever is lost in man could be restored. But man's death is due only to the loss of something. Therefore man would be able by taking food to insure himself against death in perpetuity.

[33385] Iª q. 119 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, si alimentum transiret in veritatem humanae naturae, quidquid in homine deperditur, restaurari posset. Sed mors hominis non accidit nisi per deperditionem alicuius. Posset igitur homo per

sumptionem alimenti in perpetuum se contra mortem tueri.

Objection 5: Further, if the food is changed into true human nature, there is nothing in man which may not recede or be repaired: for what is generated in a man from his food can both recede and be repaired. If therefore a man lived long enough, it would follow that in the end nothing would be left in him of what belonged to him at the beginning. Consequently he would not be numerically the same man throughout his life; since for the thing to be numerically the same, identity of matter is necessary. But this is incongruous. Therefore the food is not changed into true human nature.

[33386] Iª q. 119 a. 1 arg. 5 Praeterea, si alimentum in veritatem humanae naturae transiret, nihil esset in homine quod non posset recedere et reparari, quia id quod in homine generatur ex alimento, et recedere et reparari potest. Si ergo homo diu viveret, sequeretur quod nihil quod in eo fuit materialiter in principio suae generationis, finaliter remaneret in ipso. Et sic non esset idem homo numero per totam vitam suam, cum ad hoc quod aliquid sit idem numero, requiratur identitas materiae. Hoc autem est inconveniens. Non ergo alimentum transit in veritatem humanae naturae.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xi): "The bodily food when corrupted, that is, having lost its form, is changed into the texture of the members." But the texture of the members belongs to true human nature. Therefore the food is changed into the reality of human nature.

[33387] Iª q. 119 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., *alimenta carnis corrupta, idest amittentia formam suam, in membrorum fabricam migrant*. Sed fabrica membrorum pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae. Ergo alimenta transeunt in veritatem humanae naturae.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii), "The relation of a thing to truth is the same as its relation to being." Therefore that belongs to the true nature of any thing which enters into the constitution of that nature. But nature can be considered in two ways: firstly, in general according to the species; secondly, as in the individual. And whereas the form and the common matter belong to a thing's true nature considered in general; individual signate matter, and the form individualized by that matter belong to the true nature considered in this particular individual. Thus a soul and body belong to the true human nature in general, but to the true human nature of Peter and Martin belong this soul and this body.

Now there are certain things whose form cannot exist but in one individual matter: thus the form of the sun cannot exist save in the matter in which it actually is. And in this sense some have said that the human form cannot exist but in a certain individual matter, which, they said, was given that form at the very beginning in the first man. So that whatever may have been added to that which

[33388] Iª q. 119 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, II Metaphys., *hoc modo se habet unumquodque ad veritatem, sicut se habet ad esse*. Illud ergo pertinet ad veritatem naturae alicuius, quod est de constitutione naturae ipsius. Sed natura dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, in communi, secundum rationem speciei; alio modo, secundum quod est in hoc individuo. Ad veritatem igitur naturae alicuius in communi consideratae, pertinet forma et materia eius in communi accepta, ad veritatem autem naturae in hoc particulari consideratae, pertinet materia individualis signata, et forma per huiusmodi materiam individuata. Sicut de veritate humanae naturae in communi, est anima humana et corpus, sed de veritate humanae naturae in Petro et Martino, est haec anima et hoc corpus. Sunt autem quaedam, quorum formae non possunt salvari nisi in una materia signata, sicut forma solis non potest salvari nisi in materia quae actu sub ea continetur. Et secundum hunc modum, aliqui posuerunt quod forma humana non potest salvari nisi in materia quadam signata, quae scilicet a principio fuit tali forma formata in primo homine. Ita quod quidquid aliud praeter

was derived by posterity from the first parent, does not belong to the truth of human nature, as not receiving in truth the form of human nature.

But, said they, that matter which, in the first man, was the subject of the human form, was multiplied in itself: and in this way the multitude of human bodies is derived from the body of the first man. According to these, the food is not changed into true human nature; we take food, they stated, in order to help nature to resist the action of natural heat, and prevent the consumption of the "radical humor"; just as lead or tin is mixed with silver to prevent its being consumed by fire.

But this is unreasonable in many ways. Firstly, because it comes to the same that a form can be produced in another matter, or that it can cease to be in its proper matter; wherefore all things that can be generated are corruptible, and conversely. Now it is manifest that the human form can cease to exist in this (particular) matter which is its subject: else the human body would not be corruptible. Consequently it can begin to exist in another matter, so that something else be changed into true human nature. Secondly, because in all beings whose entire matter is contained in one individual there is only one individual in the species: as is clearly the case with the sun, moon and such like. Thus there would only be one individual of the human species. Thirdly, because multiplication of matter cannot be understood otherwise than either in respect of quantity only, as in things which are rarefied, so that their matter increases in dimensions; or in respect of the substance itself of the matter. But as long as the substance alone of matter remains, it cannot be said to be multiplied; for multitude cannot consist in the addition of a thing to itself, since of necessity it can only result from division. Therefore some other substance must be added to matter, either by creation, or by something else being changed into it. Consequently no matter can be multiplied save either by rarefaction as when air is made from water; or by the change of some other things, as fire is multiplied by the addition of wood; or lastly by creation. Now it is manifest that the multiplication of matter in the human body does not occur by rarefaction: for thus the body of a man of perfect age would be more imperfect than the body of a child. Nor does it

illud quod ex primo parente in posteros derivatur, additum fuerit, non pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae, quasi non vere accipiat formam humanae naturae. Sed illa materia quae in primo homine formae humanae fuit subiecta, in seipsa multiplicatur, et hoc modo multitudo humanorum corporum a corpore primi hominis derivatur. Et secundum hos, alimentum non convertitur in veritatem humanae naturae, sed dicunt quod alimentum accipitur ut quoddam fomentum naturae, idest ut resistat actioni caloris naturalis, ne consumat humidum radicale; sicut plumbum vel stannum adiungitur argento, ne consumatur per ignem. Sed haec positio est multipliciter irrationabilis. Primo quidem, quia eiusdem rationis est quod aliqua forma possit fieri in alia materia, et quod possit propriam materiam deserere, et ideo omnia generabilia sunt corruptibilia, et e converso. Manifestum est autem quod forma humana potest deficere ab hac materia quae ei subiicitur, alioquin corpus humanum corruptibile non esset. Unde relinquitur quod et alii materiae advenire possit, aliquo alio in veritatem humanae naturae transeunte. Secundo, quia in omnibus quorum materia invenitur tota sub uno individuo, non est nisi unum individuum in una specie, sicut patet in sole et luna, et huiusmodi. Sic igitur non esset nisi unum individuum humanae speciei. Tertio, quia non est possibile quod multiplicatio materiae attendatur nisi vel secundum quantitatem tantum, sicut accidit in rarefactis, quorum materia suscipit maiores dimensiones; vel etiam secundum substantiam materiae. Sola autem eadem substantia materiae manente, non potest dici quod sit multiplicata, quia idem ad seipsum non constituit multitudinem, cum necesse sit omnem multitudinem ex aliqua divisione causari. Unde oportet quod aliqua alia substantia materiae adveniat, vel per creationem, vel per conversionem alterius in ipsam. Unde relinquitur quod non potest aliqua materia multiplicari, nisi vel per rarefactionem, sicut cum ex aqua fit aer; vel per conversionem alterius rei, sicut multiplicatur ignis per additionem lignorum; vel per creationem materiae. Sed manifestum est multiplicationem materiae in humanis corporibus non accidere per rarefactionem, quia sic corpora hominum perfectae aetatis essent imperfectiora quam corpora puerorum. Nec iterum per creationem novae materiae, quia secundum Gregorium, *omnia sunt simul creata secundum*

occur by creation of flesh matter: for, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxii): "All things were created together as to the substance of matter, but not as to the specific form." Consequently the multiplication of the human body can only be the result of the food being changed into the true human nature. Fourthly, because, since man does not differ from animals and plants in regard to the vegetative soul, it would follow that the bodies of animals and plants do not increase through a change of nourishment into the body so nourished, but through some kind of multiplication. Which multiplication cannot be natural: since the matter cannot naturally extend beyond a certain fixed quantity; nor again does anything increase naturally, save either by rarefaction or the change of something else into it. Consequently the whole process of generation and nourishment, which are called "natural forces," would be miraculous. Which is altogether inadmissible.

Wherefore others have said that the human form can indeed begin to exist in some other matter, if we consider the human nature in general: but not if we consider it as in this individual. For in the individual the form remains confined to a certain determinate matter, on which it is first imprinted at the generation of that individual, so that it never leaves that matter until the ultimate dissolution of the individual. And this matter, say they, principally belongs to the true human nature. But since this matter does not suffice for the requisite quantity, some other matter must be added, through the change of food into the substance of the individual partaking thereof, in such a quantity as suffices for the increase required. And this matter, they state, belongs secondarily to the true human nature: because it is not required for the primary existence of the individual, but for the quantity due to him. And if anything further is produced from the food, this does not belong to true human nature, properly speaking. However, this also is inadmissible. First, because this opinion judges of living bodies as of inanimate bodies; in which, although there be a power of generating their like in species, there is not the power of generating their like in the individual; which power in living bodies is the nutritive power. Nothing, therefore, would be added to living bodies by their nutritive power, if their food were not changed into their true nature.

substantiam materiae, licet non secundum speciem formae. Unde relinquitur quod multiplicatio corporis humani non fit nisi per hoc, quod alimentum convertitur in veritatem humani corporis. Quarto, quia cum homo non differat ab animalibus et plantis secundum animam vegetabilem, sequeretur quod etiam corpora animalium et plantarum non multiplicarentur per conversionem alimenti in corpus nutritum, sed per quandam multiplicationem. Quae non potest esse naturalis, cum materia secundum naturam non extendatur nisi usque ad certam quantitatem; nec iterum inveniatur aliquid naturaliter crescere, nisi per rarefactionem, vel conversionem alterius in ipsum. Et sic totum opus generativae et nutritivae, quae dicuntur vires naturales, esset miraculosum. Quod est omnino inconveniens. Unde alii dixerunt quod forma humana potest quidem fieri de novo in aliqua alia materia, si consideretur natura humana in communi, non autem si accipiatur prout est in hoc individuo, in quo forma humana fixa manet in quadam materia determinata, cui primo imprimitur in generatione huius individui, ita quod illam materiam nunquam deserit usque ad ultimam individui corruptionem. Et hanc materiam dicunt principaliter pertinere ad veritatem humanae naturae. Sed quia huiusmodi materia non sufficit ad quantitatem debitam, requiritur ut adveniat alia materia per conversionem alimenti in substantiam nutriti, quantum sufficiat ad debitum augmentum. Et hanc materiam dicunt secundario pertinere ad veritatem humanae naturae, quia non requiritur ad primum esse individui, sed ad quantitatem eius. Iam vero si quid aliud advenit ex alimento, non pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae, proprie loquendo. Sed hoc etiam est inconveniens. Primo quidem, quia haec opinio iudicat de materia corporum viventium, ad modum corporum inanimatorum; in quibus etsi sit virtus ad generandum simile in specie, non tamen est virtus in eis ad generandum aliquid sibi simile secundum individuum; quae quidem virtus in corporibus viventibus est virtus nutritiva. Nihil ergo per virtutem nutritivam adderetur corporibus viventibus, si alimentum in veritatem naturae ipsorum non converteretur. Secundo quia virtus activa quae est in semine, est quaedam impressio derivata ab anima generantis, sicut supra dictum est. Unde non potest esse maioris virtutis in agendo, quam ipsa anima a qua derivatur. Si ergo ex virtute seminis vere assumit aliqua materia

Secondly, because the active seminal power is a certain impression derived from the soul of the begetter, as stated above (Q[118], A[1]). Hence it cannot have a greater power in acting, than the soul from which it is derived. If, therefore, by the seminal power a certain matter truly assumes the form of human nature, much more can the soul, by the nutritive power, imprint the true form of human nature on the food which is assimilated. Thirdly, because food is needed not only for growth, else at the term of growth, food would be needful no longer; but also to renew that which is lost by the action of natural heat. But there would be no renewal, unless what is formed from the food, took the place of what is lost. Wherefore just as that which was there previously belonged to true human nature, so also does that which is formed from the food.

formam naturae humanae, multo magis anima in nutrimentum coniunctum poterit veram formam naturae humanae imprimere per potentiam nutritivam. Tertio, quia nutrimento indigetur non solum ad augmentum, alioquin terminato augmento necessarium non esset, sed etiam ad restaurandum illud quod deperditur per actionem caloris naturalis. Non autem esset restauratio, nisi id quod ex alimento generatur, succederet in locum deperditi. Unde sicut id quod primo inerat, est de veritate humanae naturae, ita et id quod ex alimento generatur. Et ideo, secundum alios, dicendum est quod alimentum vere convertitur in veritatem humanae naturae, inquantum vere accipit speciem carnis et ossis et huiusmodi partium. Et hoc est quod dicit philosophus in II de anima, quod *alimentum nutrit inquantum est potentia caro*.

Therefore, according to others, it must be said that the food is really changed into the true human nature by reason of its assuming the specific form of flesh, bones and such like parts. This is what the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4): "Food nourishes inasmuch as it is potentially flesh."

Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord does not say that the "whole" of what enters into the mouth, but "all"---because something from every kind of food is cast out into the privy. It may also be said that whatever is generated from food, can be dissolved by natural heat, and be cast aside through the pores, as Jerome expounds the passage.

[33389] Iª q. 119 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus non dicit quod totum quod in os intrat, per secessum emittatur, sed omne, quia de quolibet cibo aliquid impurum per secessum emittitur. Vel potest dici quod quidquid ex alimento generatur, potest etiam per calorem naturalem resolvi, et per poros quosdam occultos emitti, ut Hieronymus exponit.

Reply to Objection 2: By flesh belonging to the species, some have understood that which first receives the human species, which is derived from the begetter: this, they say, lasts as long as the individual does. By flesh belonging to the matter these understand what is generated from food: and this, they say, does not always remain, but as it comes so it goes. But this is contrary to the mind of Aristotle. For he says there, that "just as in things which have their species in matter"---for instance, wood or stone---"so in flesh, there is something belonging to the species, and something belonging to matter." Now it is clear that this distinction has no place in inanimate things, which are not generated seminally, or

[33390] Iª q. 119 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod aliqui per carnem secundum speciem intellexerunt id quod primo accipit speciem humanam, quod sumitur a generante, et hoc dicunt semper manere, quousque individuum durat. Carnem vero secundum materiam dicunt esse quae generatur ex alimento, et hanc dicunt non semper permanere, sed quod sicut advenit, ita abscedit. Sed hoc est contra intentionem Aristotelis. Dicit enim ibi quod, sicut in unoquoque habentium speciem in materia, puta in ligno et lapide, *ita et in carne hoc est secundum speciem, et illud secundum materiam*. Manifestum est autem quod praedicta distinctio locum non habet in rebus inanimatis, quae non generantur ex

nourished. Again, since what is generated from food is united to, by mixing with, the body so nourished, just as water is mixed with wine, as the Philosopher says there by way of example: that which is added, and that to which it is added, cannot be different natures, since they are already made one by being mixed together. Therefore there is no reason for saying that one is destroyed by natural heat, while the other remains.

It must therefore be said that this distinction of the Philosopher is not of different kinds of flesh, but of the same flesh considered from different points of view. For if we consider the flesh according to the species, that is, according to that which is formed therein, thus it remains always: because the nature of flesh always remains together with its natural disposition. But if we consider flesh according to matter, then it does not remain, but is gradually destroyed and renewed: thus in the fire of a furnace, the form of fire remains, but the matter is gradually consumed, and other matter is substituted in its place.

semine, nec nutriuntur. Et iterum, cum id quod ex alimento generatur, adiungatur corpori nutrito per modum mixtionis, sicut aqua miscetur vino, ut ponit exemplum ibidem philosophus; non potest alia esse natura eius quod advenit, et eius cui advenit, cum iam sit factum unum per veram mixtionem. Unde nulla ratio est quod unum consumatur per calorem naturalem, et alterum maneat. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod haec distinctio philosophi non est secundum diversas carnes, sed est eiusdem carnis secundum diversam considerationem. Si enim consideretur caro secundum speciem, idest secundum id quod est formale in ipsa, sic semper manet, quia semper manet natura carnis, et dispositio naturalis ipsius. Sed si consideretur caro secundum materiam, sic non manet, sed paulatim consumitur et restauratur, sicut patet in igne fornacis, cuius forma manet, sed materia paulatim consumitur, et alia in locum eius substituitur.

Reply to Objection 3: The "radical humor" is said to comprise whatever the virtue of the species is founded on. If this be taken away it cannot be renewed; as when a man's hand or foot is amputated. But the "nutritive humor" is that which has not yet received perfectly the specific nature, but is on the way thereto; such is the blood, and the like. Wherefore if such be taken away, the virtue of the species remains in its root, which is not destroyed.

[33391] Iª q. 119 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ad humidum radicale intelligitur pertinere totum id in quo fundatur virtus speciei. Quod si subtrahatur, restitui non potest, sicut si amputetur manus aut pes, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Sed humidum nutrimentale est quod nondum pervenit ad suscipiendum perfecte naturam speciei, sed est in via ad hoc; sicut est sanguis, et alia huiusmodi. Unde si talia subtrahantur, remanet adhuc virtus speciei in radice, quae non tollitur.

Reply to Objection 4: Every virtue of a passible body is weakened by continuous action, because such agents are also patient. Therefore the transforming virtue is strong at first so as to be able to transform not only enough for the renewal of what is lost, but also for growth. Later on it can only transform enough for the renewal of what is lost, and then growth ceases. At last it cannot even do this; and then begins decline. In fine, when this virtue fails altogether, the animal dies. Thus the virtue of wine that transforms the water added to it, is weakened by further additions of water, so as to become at length watery, as the Philosopher says by way of example (De Gener. i, 5).

[33392] Iª q. 119 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod omnis virtus in corpore passibili per continuam actionem debilitatur, quia huiusmodi agentia etiam patiuntur. Et ideo virtus conversiva in principio quidem tam fortis est, ut possit convertere non solum quod sufficit ad restaurationem deperditi, sed etiam ad augmentum. Postea vero non potest convertere nisi quantum sufficit ad restaurationem deperditi, et tunc cessat augmentum. Demum nec hoc potest, et tunc fit diminutio. Deinde, deficiente huiusmodi virtute totaliter, animal moritur. Sicut virtus vini convertentis aquam admixtam, paulatim per admixtionem aquae debilitatur, ut

tandem totum fiat aquosum, ut philosophus exemplificat in I de Generat.

Reply to Objection 5: As the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), when a certain matter is directly transformed into fire, then fire is said to be generated anew: but when matter is transformed into a fire already existing, then fire is said to be fed. Wherefore if the entire matter together loses the form of fire, and another matter transformed into fire, there will be another distinct fire. But if, while one piece of wood is burning, other wood is laid on, and so on until the first piece is entirely consumed, the same identical fire will remain all the time: because that which is added passes into what pre-existed. It is the same with living bodies, in which by means of nourishment that is renewed which was consumed by natural heat.

[33393] Iª q. 119 a. 1 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in I de Generat. quando aliqua materia per se convertitur in ignem, tunc dicitur ignis de novo generari, quando vero aliqua materia convertitur in ignem praeexistentem, dicitur ignis nutriri. Unde si tota materia simul amittat speciem ignis, et alia materia convertatur in ignem, erit alius ignis numero. Si vero, paulatim combusto uno ligno, aliud substituatur, et sic deinceps quousque omnia prima consumantur, semper remanet idem ignis numero, quia semper quod additur, transit in praeexistens. Et similiter est intelligendum in corporibus viventibus, in quibus ex nutrimento restauratur id quod per calorem naturalem consumitur.

Q. 119. A. 2. Whether the semen is produced from surplus food?

Objection 1: It would seem that the semen is not produced from the surplus food, but from the substance of the begetter. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 8) that "generation is a work of nature, producing, from the substance of the begetter, that which is begotten." But that which is generated is produced from the semen. Therefore the semen is produced from the substance of the begetter.

[33394] Iª q. 119 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod semen non sit de superfluo alimenti, sed de substantia generantis. Dicit enim Damascenus quod *generatio est opus naturae ex substantia generantis producens quod generatur*. Sed id quod generatur, generatur ex semine. Ergo semen est de substantia generantis.

Objection 2: Further, the son is like his father, in respect of that which he receives from him. But if the semen from which something is generated, is produced from the surplus food, a man would receive nothing from his grandfather and his ancestors in whom the food never existed. Therefore a man would not be more like to his grandfather or ancestors, than to any other men.

[33395] Iª q. 119 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, secundum hoc filius assimilatur patri, quod ab eo aliquid accipit. Sed si semen ex quo aliquid generatur, sit de superfluo alimenti; nihil acciperet aliquis ab avo et praecedentibus, in quibus hoc alimentum nullo modo fuit. Ergo non assimilaretur aliquis avo et praecedentibus, magis quam aliis hominibus.

Objection 3: Further, the food of the generator is sometimes the flesh of cows, pigs and suchlike. If therefore, the semen were produced from surplus food, the man begotten of such semen would be more akin to the cow and the pig, than to his father or other relations.

[33396] Iª q. 119 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, alimentum hominis generantis quandoque est ex carnibus bovis, vel porci, et aliorum huiusmodi. Si igitur semen esset de superfluo alimenti, homo generatus ex semine maiorem affinitatem haberet cum bove et porco, quam cum patre et aliis consanguineis.

Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x, 20) that we were in Adam "not only by seminal virtue, but also in the very substance of the body." But this would not be, if the semen were produced from surplus food. Therefore the semen is not produced therefrom.

[33397] Iª q. 119 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, X super Gen. ad Litt., quod nos fuimus in Adam non solum secundum *seminalem rationem, sed etiam secundum corpulentam substantiam*. Hoc autem non esset, si semen esset ex superfluo alimenti. Ergo semen non est superfluo alimenti.

On the contrary, The Philosopher proves in many ways (De Gener. Animal. i, 18) that "the semen is surplus food."

[33398] Iª q. 119 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus probat multipliciter, in libro de Generat. Animal., *quod semen est superfluum alimenti*.

I answer that, This question depends in some way on what has been stated above (A[1]; Q[118], A[1]). For if human nature has a virtue for the communication of its form to alien matter not only in another, but also in its own subject; it is clear that the food which at first is dissimilar, becomes at length similar through the form communicated to it. Now it belongs to the natural order that a thing should be reduced from potentiality to act gradually: hence in things generated we observe that at first each is imperfect and is afterwards perfected. But it is clear that the common is to the proper and determinate, as imperfect is to perfect: therefore we see that in the generation of an animal, the animal is generated first, then the man or the horse. So therefore food first of all receives a certain common virtue in regard to all the parts of the body, which virtue is subsequently determinate to this or that part.

Now it is not possible that the semen be a kind of solution from what is already transformed into the substance of the members. For this solution, if it does not retain the nature of the member it is taken from, it would no longer be of the nature of the begetter, and would be due to a process of corruption; and consequently it would not have the power of transforming something else into the likeness of that nature. But if it retained the nature of the member it is taken from, then, since it is limited to a certain part of the body, it would not have the power of moving towards (the production of) the whole nature, but only the nature of that part. Unless one were to say that the solution is taken from all the parts of the body, and that it retains the nature of each part. Thus the semen would be a small animal in act; and

[33399] Iª q. 119 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ista quaestio aliqualiter dependet ex praemissis. Si enim in natura humana est virtus ad communicandum suam formam materiae alienae non solum in alio, sed etiam in ipso; manifestum est quod alimentum, quod est in principio dissimile, in fine fit simile per formam communicatam. Est autem naturalis ordo ut aliquid gradatim de potentia reducatur in actum, et ideo in his quae generantur, invenimus quod primo unumquodque est imperfectum, et postea perficitur. Manifestum est autem quod commune se habet ad proprium et determinatum, ut imperfectum ad perfectum, et ideo videmus quod in generatione animalis prius generatur animal, quam homo vel equus. Sic igitur et ipsum alimentum primo quidem accipit quandam virtutem communem respectu omnium partium corporis, et in fine determinatur ad hanc partem vel ad illam. Non autem est possibile quod accipiatur pro semine id quod iam conversum est in substantiam membrorum, per quandam resolutionem. Quia illud resolutum, si non retineret naturam eius a quo resolvitur, tunc iam esset recedens a natura generantis, quasi in via corruptionis existens; et sic non haberet virtutem convertendi aliud in similem naturam. Si vero retineret naturam eius a quo resolvitur, tunc, cum esset contractum ad determinatam partem, non haberet virtutem movendi ad naturam totius, sed solum ad naturam partis. Nisi forte quis dicat quod esset resolutum ab omnibus partibus corporis, et quod retineat naturam omnium partium. Et sic semen esset quasi quoddam parvum animal in actu; et generatio animalis ex animali non esset nisi per divisionem, sicut lutum generatur ex luto, et sicut accidit in animalibus quae decisa vivunt. Hoc autem est inconveniens.

generation of animal from animal would be a mere division, as mud is generated from mud, and as animals which continue to live after being cut in two: which is inadmissible.

It remains to be said, therefore, that the semen is not something separated from what was before the actual whole; rather is it the whole, though potentially, having the power, derived from the soul of the begetter, to produce the whole body, as stated above (A[1]; Q[108], A[1]). Now that which is in potentiality to the whole, is that which is generated from the food, before it is transformed into the substance of the members. Therefore the semen is taken from this. In this sense the nutritive power is said to serve the generative power: because what is transformed by the nutritive power is employed as semen by the generative power. A sign of this, according to the Philosopher, is that animals of great size, which require much food, have little semen in proportion to the size of their bodies, and generated seldom; in like manner fat men, and for the same reason.

Relinquitur ergo quod semen non sit decisum ab eo quod erat actu totum; sed magis sit in potentia totum, habens virtutem ad productionem totius corporis, derivatam an anima generantis, ut supra dictum est. Hoc autem quod est in potentia ad totum, est illud quod generatur ex alimento, antequam convertatur in substantiam membrorum. Et ideo ex hoc semen accipitur. Et secundum hoc, virtus nutritiva dicitur deservire generativae, quia id quod est conversum per virtutem nutritivam, accipitur a virtute generativa ut semen. Et huius signum ponit philosophus, quod animalia magni corporis, quae indigent multo nutrimento, sunt pauci seminis secundum quantitatem sui corporis, et paucae generationis; et similiter homines pingues sunt pauci seminis, propter eandem causam.

Reply to Objection 1: Generation is from the substance of the begetter in animals and plants, inasmuch as the semen owes its virtue to the form of the begetter, and inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the substance.

[33400] Iª q. 119 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod generatio est de substantia generantis in animalibus et plantis, inquantum semen habet virtutem ex forma generantis, et inquantum est in potentia ad substantiam ipsius.

Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of the begetter to the begotten is on account not of the matter, but of the form of the agent that generates its like. Wherefore in order for a man to be like his grandfather, there is no need that the corporeal seminal matter should have been in the grandfather; but that there be in the semen a virtue derived from the soul of the grandfather through the father.

[33401] Iª q. 119 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod assimilatio generantis ad genitum non fit propter materiam, sed propter formam agentis, quod generat sibi simile. Unde non oportet ad hoc quod aliquis assimiletur avo, quod materia corporalis seminis fuerit in avo; sed quod sit in semine aliqua virtus derivata ab anima avi, mediante patre.

Reply to Objection 3: In like manner the third objection is answered. For kinship is not in relation to matter, but rather to the derivation of the forms.

[33402] Iª q. 119 a. 2 ad 3 Et similiter dicendum est ad tertium. Nam affinitas non attenditur secundum materiam, sed magis secundum derivationem formae.

Reply to Objection 4: These words of Augustine are not to be understood as though the immediate seminal virtue, or the corporeal substance from which this individual was formed were actually in

[33403] Iª q. 119 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod verbum Augustini non est sic intelligendum, quasi in Adam actu fuerit aut seminalis ratio huius hominis propinqua, aut corpulenta eius substantia,

Adam: but so that both were in Adam as in principle. For even the corporeal matter, which is supplied by the mother, and which he calls the corporeal substance, is originally derived from Adam: and likewise the active seminal power of the father, which is the immediate seminal virtue (in the production) of this man.

But Christ is said to have been in Adam according to the "corporeal substance," not according to the seminal virtue. Because the matter from which His Body was formed, and which was supplied by the Virgin Mother, was derived from Adam; whereas the active virtue was not derived from Adam, because His Body was not formed by the seminal virtue of a man, but by the operation of the Holy Ghost. For "such a birth was becoming to Him," [*Hymn for Vespers at Christmas; Breviary, O. P.], WHO IS ABOVE ALL GOD FOR EVER BLESSED. Amen.

sed utrumque fuit in Adam secundum originem. Nam et materia corporalis, quae ministrata est a matre, quam vocat corpulentam substantiam, derivatur originaliter ab Adam, et similiter virtus activa existens in semine patris, quae est huius hominis propinqua ratio seminalis. Sed Christus dicitur fuisse in Adam secundum corpulentam substantiam, sed non secundum seminalem rationem. Quia materia corporis eius, quae ministrata est a matre virgine, derivata est ab Adam, sed virtus activa non est derivata ab Adam, quia corpus eius non est formatum per virtutem virilis seminis, sed operatione spiritus sancti. Talis enim partus decebat eum, qui est super omnia benedictus Deus in saecula. Amen.