Mercurial > hg > Aquinas


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            <h2 id="FP.ii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ[2]-26)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FP_Q2">Q. 2. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q3">Q. 3. OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q4">Q. 4. THE PERFECTION OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q5">Q. 5. OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q6">Q. 6. THE GOODNESS OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q7">Q. 7. THE INFINITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q8">Q. 8. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q9">Q. 9. THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD (TWO ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q10">Q. 10. THE ETERNITY OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q11">Q. 11. THE UNITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q12">Q. 12. HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q13">Q. 13. THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q14">Q. 14. OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q15">Q. 15. OF IDEAS (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q16">Q. 16. OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q17">Q. 17. CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q18">Q. 18. THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q19">Q. 19. THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q20">Q. 20. GOD'S LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q21">Q. 21. THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q22">Q. 22. THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q23">Q. 23. OF PREDESTINATION (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q24">Q. 24. THE BOOK OF LIFE (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q25">Q. 25. THE POWER OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q26">Q. 26. OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES) </a><br/></div>
            <div id="FP_Q2" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q2-p0.1">Q. 2. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q2-p2"> Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is
                  the beginning of things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures, as is clear from what has been already said,
                  therefore, in our endeavor to expound this science, we shall treat: (1) Of God; (2) Of the rational creature's advance towards
                  God; (3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way to God.
               </p><p id="FP_Q2-p3"> In treating of God there will be a threefold division, for we shall consider: (1) Whatever concerns the Divine Essence; (2)
                  Whatever concerns the distinctions of Persons; (3) Whatever concerns the procession of creatures from Him.
               </p><p id="FP_Q2-p4"> Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider: (1) Whether God exists? (2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what
                  is NOT the manner of His existence; (3) Whatever concerns His operations---namely, His knowledge, will, power.
               </p><p id="FP_Q2-p5"> Concerning the first, there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q2-p6"><a href="#FP_Q2_A1"> (1) Whether the proposition "God exists" is self-evident?</a></p><p id="FP_Q2-p7"><a href="#FP_Q2_A2"> (2) Whether it is demonstrable?</a></p><p id="FP_Q2-p8"><a href="#FP_Q2_A3"> (3) Whether God exists?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 pr."><a name="28298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28298]
Iª q. 2 pr.</span></a> Quia igitur principalis intentio huius
sacrae doctrinae est Dei cognitionem tradere, et non solum secundum
quod in se est, sed etiam secundum quod est principium rerum et
finis earum, et specialiter rationalis creaturae, ut ex dictis est
manifestum; ad huius doctrinae expositionem intendentes, primo
tractabimus de Deo; secundo, de motu rationalis creaturae in Deum;
tertio, de Christo, qui, secundum quod homo, via est nobis tendendi
in Deum. Consideratio autem de Deo tripartita erit. Primo namque
considerabimus ea quae ad essentiam divinam pertinent; secundo, ea
quae pertinent ad distinctionem personarum; tertio, ea quae
pertinent ad processum creaturarum ab ipso. Circa essentiam vero
divinam, primo considerandum est an Deus sit; secundo, quomodo sit,
vel potius quomodo non sit; tertio considerandum erit de his quae
ad operationem ipsius pertinent, scilicet de scientia et de
voluntate et potentia. Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum
Deum esse sit per se notum. Secundo, utrum sit demonstrabile.
Tertio, an Deus sit.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q2_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q2_A1-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 1. Whether the existence of God is self-evident?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the existence of God is self-evident. Now those things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which
                     is naturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to first principles. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), "the
                     knowledge of God is naturally implanted in all." Therefore the existence of God is self-evident.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28299] Iª q. 2 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deum esse sit per se notum. Illa enim
nobis dicuntur per se nota, quorum cognitio nobis naturaliter
inest, sicut patet de primis principiis. Sed, sicut dicit
Damascenus in principio libri sui, <i>omnibus cognitio existendi
Deum naturaliter est inserta</i>. Ergo Deum esse est per se
notum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1
                     Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known,
                     it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word "God" is
                     understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than
                     which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only
                     mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word "God" is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually.
                     Therefore the proposition "God exists" is self-evident.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28300] Iª q. 2 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, illa
dicuntur esse per se nota, quae statim, cognitis terminis,
cognoscuntur, quod philosophus attribuit primis demonstrationis
principiis, in I Poster., scito enim quid est totum et quid pars,
statim scitur quod omne totum maius est sua parte. Sed intellecto
quid significet hoc nomen Deus, statim habetur quod Deus est.
Significatur enim hoc nomine id quo maius significari non potest,
maius autem est quod est in re et intellectu, quam quod est in
intellectu tantum, unde cum, intellecto hoc nomine Deus, statim sit
in intellectu, sequitur etiam quod sit in re. Ergo Deum esse est
per se notum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist:
                     and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition "Truth does not exist" is true: and if there is anything true, there must
                     be truth. But God is truth itself: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.6" target="asv">Jn. 14:6</a>) Therefore "God exists" is self-evident.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28301] Iª q. 2 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
veritatem esse est per se notum, quia qui negat veritatem esse,
concedit veritatem esse, si enim veritas non est, verum est
veritatem non esse. Si autem est aliquid verum, oportet quod
veritas sit. Deus autem est ipsa veritas, Ioann. XIV, <i>ego sum
via, veritas et vita</i>. Ergo Deum esse est per se notum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states concerning
                     the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the proposition "God is" can be mentally admitted: "The fool said
                     in his heart, There is no God" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.52.1" target="asv">Ps. 52:1</a>). Therefore, that God exists is not self-evident.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28302] Iª q. 2 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, nullus
potest cogitare oppositum eius quod est per se notum ut patet per
philosophum, in IV Metaphys. et I Poster., circa prima
demonstrationis principia. Cogitari autem potest oppositum eius
quod est Deum esse, secundum illud Psalmi LII, <i>dixit insipiens
in corde suo, non est Deus</i>. Ergo Deum esse non est per se
notum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other,
                     self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject,
                     as "Man is an animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject
                     be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with
                     regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of, such as
                     being and non-being, whole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject
                     is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate
                     and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: "Whether all that
                     is,
                     is good"), "that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in
                     space." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the
                     subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (
                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A4" id="FP_Q2_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated
                     by things that are more
                     known to us, though less known in their nature---namely, by effects.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 1 co."><a name="28303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28303] Iª q. 2 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod contingit aliquid esse per se notum dupliciter, uno modo,
secundum se et non quoad nos; alio modo, secundum se et quoad nos.
Ex hoc enim aliqua propositio est per se nota, quod praedicatum
includitur in ratione subiecti, ut homo est animal, nam animal est
de ratione hominis. Si igitur notum sit omnibus de praedicato et de
subiecto quid sit, propositio illa erit omnibus per se nota, sicut
patet in primis demonstrationum principiis, quorum termini sunt
quaedam communia quae nullus ignorat, ut ens et non ens, totum et
pars, et similia. Si autem apud aliquos notum non sit de praedicato
et subiecto quid sit, propositio quidem quantum in se est, erit per
se nota, non tamen apud illos qui praedicatum et subiectum
propositionis ignorant. Et ideo contingit, ut dicit Boetius in
libro de hebdomadibus, quod quaedam sunt communes animi
conceptiones et per se notae, apud sapientes tantum, ut
incorporalia in loco non esse. Dico ergo quod haec propositio, Deus
est, quantum in se est, per se nota est, quia praedicatum est idem
cum subiecto; Deus enim est suum esse, ut infra patebit. Sed quia
nos non scimus de Deo quid est, non est nobis per se nota, sed
indiget demonstrari per ea quae sunt magis nota quoad nos, et minus
nota quoad naturam, scilicet per effectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude. For
                     man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not
                     to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching,
                     even though it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are who
                     imagine that man's perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and others in pleasures, and others in something else.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28304] Iª q. 2 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod cognoscere Deum esse in aliquo communi, sub quadam
confusione, est nobis naturaliter insertum, inquantum scilicet Deus
est hominis beatitudo, homo enim naturaliter desiderat
beatitudinem, et quod naturaliter desideratur ab homine,
naturaliter cognoscitur ab eodem. Sed hoc non est simpliciter
cognoscere Deum esse; sicut cognoscere venientem, non est
cognoscere Petrum, quamvis sit Petrus veniens, multi enim perfectum
hominis bonum, quod est beatitudo, existimant divitias; quidam vero
voluptates; quidam autem aliquid aliud.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God" understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought,
                     seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified
                     something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what
                     the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can
                     it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater
                     can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28305] Iª q. 2 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod forte ille qui audit hoc nomen Deus, non intelligit
significari aliquid quo maius cogitari non possit, cum quidam
crediderint Deum esse corpus. Dato etiam quod quilibet intelligat
hoc nomine Deus significari hoc quod dicitur, scilicet illud quo
maius cogitari non potest; non tamen propter hoc sequitur quod
intelligat id quod significatur per nomen, esse in rerum natura;
sed in apprehensione intellectus tantum. Nec potest argui quod sit
in re, nisi daretur quod sit in re aliquid quo maius cogitari non
potest, quod non est datum a ponentibus Deum non esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The existence of truth in general is self-evident but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28306] Iª q. 2 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
quod veritatem esse in communi, est per se notum, sed primam
veritatem esse, hoc non est per se notum quoad nos.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q2_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q2_A2-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 2. Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated. For it is an article of faith that God exists. But what is of
                     faith cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration produces scientific knowledge; whereas faith is of the unseen (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>). Therefore it cannot be demonstrated that God exists.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28307] Iª q. 2 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deum esse non sit demonstrabile. Deum enim
esse est articulus fidei. Sed ea quae sunt fidei, non sunt
demonstrabilia, quia demonstratio facit scire, fides autem de non
apparentibus est, ut patet per apostolum, ad Hebr. XI. Ergo Deum
esse non est demonstrabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the essence is the middle term of demonstration. But we cannot know in what God's essence consists, but solely in
                     what it does not consist; as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4). Therefore we cannot demonstrate that God exists.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28308] Iª q. 2 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, medium
demonstrationis est quod quid est. Sed de Deo non possumus scire
quid est, sed solum quid non est, ut dicit Damascenus. Ergo non
possumus demonstrare Deum esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the existence of God were demonstrated, this could only be from His effects. But His effects are not proportionate
                     to Him, since He is infinite and His effects are finite; and between the finite and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore,
                     since a cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28309] Iª q. 2 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
demonstraretur Deum esse, hoc non esset nisi ex effectibus eius.
Sed effectus eius non sunt proportionati ei, cum ipse sit
infinitus, et effectus finiti; finiti autem ad infinitum non est
proportio. Cum ergo causa non possit demonstrari per effectum sibi
non proportionatum, videtur quod Deum esse non possit
demonstrari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says: "The invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv">Rom. 1:20</a>). But this would not be unless the existence of God could be demonstrated through the things that are made; for the first
                     thing we must know of anything is whether it exists.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28310] Iª q. 2 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod apostolus dicit, ad Rom. I, <i>invisibilia Dei per ea quae
facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur</i>. Sed hoc non esset, nisi
per ea quae facta sunt, posset demonstrari Deum esse, primum enim
quod oportet intelligi de aliquo, est an sit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through the cause, and is called "a priori," and this is to argue from what
                     is prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration "a posteriori"; this is to argue from
                     what is prior relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the
                     knowledge of the cause. And from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be
                     demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect
                     exists, the cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated
                     from those of His effects which are known to us.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 2 co."><a name="28311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28311] Iª q. 2 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod duplex est demonstratio. Una quae est per causam, et dicitur
propter quid, et haec est per priora simpliciter. Alia est per
effectum, et dicitur demonstratio quia, et haec est per ea quae
sunt priora quoad nos, cum enim effectus aliquis nobis est
manifestior quam sua causa, per effectum procedimus ad cognitionem
causae. Ex quolibet autem effectu potest demonstrari propriam
causam eius esse (si tamen eius effectus sint magis noti quoad
nos), quia, cum effectus dependeant a causa, posito effectu necesse
est causam praeexistere. Unde Deum esse, secundum quod non est per
se notum quoad nos, demonstrabile est per effectus nobis notos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but
                     are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes
                     something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as
                     a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically
                     known and demonstrated.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28312] Iª q. 2 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Deum esse, et alia huiusmodi quae per rationem
naturalem nota possunt esse de Deo, ut dicitur Rom. I non sunt
articuli fidei, sed praeambula ad articulos, sic enim fides
praesupponit cognitionem naturalem, sicut gratia naturam, et ut
perfectio perfectibile. Nihil tamen prohibet illud quod secundum se
demonstrabile est et scibile, ab aliquo accipi ut credibile, qui
demonstrationem non capit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the cause
                     in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case in regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence
                     of anything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word, and not its essence, for the question of
                     its essence follows on the question of its existence. Now the names given to God are
                     derived from His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from His effects, we may take for the middle
                     term the meaning of the word "God".
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28313] Iª q. 2 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod cum demonstratur causa per effectum, necesse est uti
effectu loco definitionis causae, ad probandum causam esse, et hoc
maxime contingit in Deo. Quia ad probandum aliquid esse, necesse
est accipere pro medio quid significet nomen non autem quod quid
est, quia quaestio quid est, sequitur ad quaestionem an est. Nomina
autem Dei imponuntur ab effectibus, ut postea ostendetur, unde,
demonstrando Deum esse per effectum, accipere possumus pro medio
quid significet hoc nomen Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From effects not proportionate to the cause no perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect the
                     existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though
                     from them we cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28314] Iª q. 2 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
quod per effectus non proportionatos causae, non potest perfecta
cognitio de causa haberi, sed tamen ex quocumque effectu potest
manifeste nobis demonstrari causam esse, ut dictum est. Et sic ex
effectibus Dei potest demonstrari Deum esse, licet per eos non
perfecte possimus eum cognoscere secundum suam essentiam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q2_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q2_A3-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 3. Whether God exists?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed.
                     But the word "God" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but
                     there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28315] Iª q. 2 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit. Quia si unum contrariorum
fuerit infinitum, totaliter destruetur aliud. Sed hoc intelligitur
in hoc nomine Deus, scilicet quod sit quoddam bonum infinitum. Si
ergo Deus esset, nullum malum inveniretur. Invenitur autem malum in
mundo. Ergo Deus non est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it
                     seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural
                     things can be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle which is
                     human reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose God's existence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28316] Iª q. 2 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod
potest compleri per pauciora principia, non fit per plura. Sed
videtur quod omnia quae apparent in mundo, possunt compleri per
alia principia, supposito quod Deus non sit, quia ea quae sunt
naturalia, reducuntur in principium quod est natura; ea vero quae
sunt a proposito, reducuntur in principium quod est ratio humana
vel voluntas. Nulla igitur necessitas est ponere Deum esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A3-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in the person of God: "I am Who am." (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.3.14" target="asv">Ex. 3:14</a>)
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28317] Iª q. 2 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Exodi III, ex persona Dei, <i>ego sum qui sum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q2_A3-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The existence of God can be proved in five ways.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q2_A3-p6"> The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world
                     some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is
                     in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing
                     else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality
                     to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is
                     potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be
                     at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot
                     simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same
                     respect
                     and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion
                     must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs
                     be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no
                     first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion
                     by the
                     first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first
                     mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q2_A3-p7"> The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes.
                     There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for
                     so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because
                     in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the
                     intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away
                     the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate,
                     nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient
                     cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false.
                     Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q2_A3-p8"> The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and
                     not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be.
                     But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything
                     is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true,
                     even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already
                     existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to
                     exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence---which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but
                     there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused
                     by
                     another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another,
                     as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having
                     of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men
                     speak of as God.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q2_A3-p9"> The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true,
                     noble and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different
                     ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest;
                     so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently,
                     something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in
                     Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause
                     of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every
                     other perfection; and this we call God.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q2_A3-p10"> The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies,
                     act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best
                     result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence
                     cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the
                     arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to
                     their end; and this being we call God.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 3 co."><a name="28318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28318] Iª q. 2 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod Deum esse quinque viis probari potest. Prima autem et
manifestior via est, quae sumitur ex parte motus. Certum est enim,
et sensu constat, aliqua moveri in hoc mundo. Omne autem quod
movetur, ab alio movetur. Nihil enim movetur, nisi secundum quod
est in potentia ad illud ad quod movetur, movet autem aliquid
secundum quod est actu. Movere enim nihil aliud est quam educere
aliquid de potentia in actum, de potentia autem non potest aliquid
reduci in actum, nisi per aliquod ens in actu, sicut calidum in
actu, ut ignis, facit lignum, quod est calidum in potentia, esse
actu calidum, et per hoc movet et alterat ipsum. Non autem est
possibile ut idem sit simul in actu et potentia secundum idem, sed
solum secundum diversa, quod enim est calidum in actu, non potest
simul esse calidum in potentia, sed est simul frigidum in potentia.
Impossibile est ergo quod, secundum idem et eodem modo, aliquid sit
movens et motum, vel quod moveat seipsum. Omne ergo quod movetur,
oportet ab alio moveri. Si ergo id a quo movetur, moveatur, oportet
et ipsum ab alio moveri et illud ab alio. Hic autem non est
procedere in infinitum, quia sic non esset aliquod primum movens;
et per consequens nec aliquod aliud movens, quia moventia secunda
non movent nisi per hoc quod sunt mota a primo movente, sicut
baculus non movet nisi per hoc quod est motus a manu. Ergo necesse
est devenire ad aliquod primum movens, quod a nullo movetur, et hoc
omnes intelligunt Deum. Secunda via est ex ratione causae
efficientis. Invenimus enim in istis sensibilibus esse ordinem
causarum efficientium, nec tamen invenitur, nec est possibile, quod
aliquid sit causa efficiens sui ipsius; quia sic esset prius
seipso, quod est impossibile. Non autem est possibile quod in
causis efficientibus procedatur in infinitum. Quia in omnibus
causis efficientibus ordinatis, primum est causa medii, et medium
est causa ultimi, sive media sint plura sive unum tantum, remota
autem causa, removetur effectus, ergo, si non fuerit primum in
causis efficientibus, non erit ultimum nec medium. Sed si
procedatur in infinitum in causis efficientibus, non erit prima
causa efficiens, et sic non erit nec effectus ultimus, nec causae
efficientes mediae, quod patet esse falsum. Ergo est necesse ponere
aliquam causam efficientem primam, quam omnes Deum nominant. Tertia
via est sumpta ex possibili et necessario, quae talis est.
Invenimus enim in rebus quaedam quae sunt possibilia esse et non
esse, cum quaedam inveniantur generari et corrumpi, et per
consequens possibilia esse et non esse. Impossibile est autem omnia
quae sunt, talia esse, quia quod possibile est non esse, quandoque
non est. Si igitur omnia sunt possibilia non esse, aliquando nihil
fuit in rebus. Sed si hoc est verum, etiam nunc nihil esset, quia
quod non est, non incipit esse nisi per aliquid quod est; si igitur
nihil fuit ens, impossibile fuit quod aliquid inciperet esse, et
sic modo nihil esset, quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo omnia entia
sunt possibilia, sed oportet aliquid esse necessarium in rebus.
Omne autem necessarium vel habet causam suae necessitatis aliunde,
vel non habet. Non est autem possibile quod procedatur in infinitum
in necessariis quae habent causam suae necessitatis, sicut nec in
causis efficientibus, ut probatum est. Ergo necesse est ponere
aliquid quod sit per se necessarium, non habens causam necessitatis
aliunde, sed quod est causa necessitatis aliis, quod omnes dicunt
Deum. Quarta via sumitur ex gradibus qui in rebus inveniuntur.
Invenitur enim in rebus aliquid magis et minus bonum, et verum, et
nobile, et sic de aliis huiusmodi. Sed magis et minus dicuntur de
diversis secundum quod appropinquant diversimode ad aliquid quod
maxime est, sicut magis calidum est, quod magis appropinquat maxime
calido. Est igitur aliquid quod est verissimum, et optimum, et
nobilissimum, et per consequens maxime ens, nam quae sunt maxime
vera, sunt maxime entia, ut dicitur II Metaphys. Quod autem dicitur
maxime tale in aliquo genere, est causa omnium quae sunt illius
generis, sicut ignis, qui est maxime calidus, est causa omnium
calidorum, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo est aliquid quod omnibus
entibus est causa esse, et bonitatis, et cuiuslibet perfectionis,
et hoc dicimus Deum. Quinta via sumitur ex gubernatione rerum.
Videmus enim quod aliqua quae cognitione carent, scilicet corpora
naturalia, operantur propter finem, quod apparet ex hoc quod semper
aut frequentius eodem modo operantur, ut consequantur id quod est
optimum; unde patet quod non a casu, sed ex intentione perveniunt
ad finem. Ea autem quae non habent cognitionem, non tendunt in
finem nisi directa ab aliquo cognoscente et intelligente, sicut
sagitta a sagittante. Ergo est aliquid intelligens, a quo omnes res
naturales ordinantur ad finem, et hoc dicimus Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): "Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless
                     His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil." This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that
                     He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28319] Iª q. 2 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus in Enchiridio, <i>Deus, cum
sit summe bonus, nullo modo sineret aliquid mali esse in operibus
suis, nisi esset adeo omnipotens et bonus, ut bene faceret etiam de
malo</i>. Hoc ergo ad infinitam Dei bonitatem pertinet, ut esse
permittat mala, et ex eis eliciat bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A3-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be
                     traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause
                     other than human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect
                     must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown
                     in the body of the Article.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28320] Iª q. 2 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, cum natura propter determinatum finem operetur ex
directione alicuius superioris agentis, necesse est ea quae a
natura fiunt, etiam in Deum reducere, sicut in primam causam.
Similiter etiam quae ex proposito fiunt, oportet reducere in
aliquam altiorem causam, quae non sit ratio et voluntas humana,
quia haec mutabilia sunt et defectibilia; oportet autem omnia
mobilia et deficere possibilia reduci in aliquod primum principium
immobile et per se necessarium, sicut ostensum est.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q3" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q3-p0.1">Q. 3. OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q3-p2"> When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the further question of the manner of its existence, in
                  order that we may know its essence. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather what He is not, we have no means for
                  considering how God is, but rather how He is not.
               </p><p id="FP_Q3-p3"> Therefore, we must consider: (1) How He is not; (2) How He is known by us; (3) How He is named.</p><p id="FP_Q3-p4"> Now it can be shown how God is not, by denying Him whatever is opposed to the idea of Him, viz. composition, motion, and
                  the like. Therefore (1) we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we deny composition in Him; and because whatever is simple
                  in material things is imperfect and a part of something else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection; (3) His infinity; (4) His
                  immutability; (5) His unity.
               </p><p id="FP_Q3-p5"> Concerning His simplicity, there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q3-p6"><a href="#FP_Q3_A1"> (1) Whether God is a body?</a></p><p id="FP_Q3-p7"><a href="#FP_Q3_A2"> (2) Whether He is composed of matter and form?</a></p><p id="FP_Q3-p8"><a href="#FP_Q3_A3"> (3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence or nature, and subject?</a></p><p id="FP_Q3-p9"><a href="#FP_Q3_A4"> (4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence?</a></p><p id="FP_Q3-p10"><a href="#FP_Q3_A5"> (5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference?</a></p><p id="FP_Q3-p11"><a href="#FP_Q3_A6"> (6) Whether He is composed of subject and accident?</a></p><p id="FP_Q3-p12"><a href="#FP_Q3_A7"> (7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple?</a></p><p id="FP_Q3-p13"><a href="#FP_Q3_A8"> (8) Whether He enters into composition with other things?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 pr."><a name="28321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28321]
Iª q. 3 pr.</span></a> Cognito de aliquo an sit, inquirendum
restat quomodo sit, ut sciatur de eo quid sit. Sed quia de Deo
scire non possumus quid sit, sed quid non sit, non possumus
considerare de Deo quomodo sit, sed potius quomodo non sit. Primo
ergo considerandum est quomodo non sit; secundo, quomodo a nobis
cognoscatur; tertio, quomodo nominetur. Potest autem ostendi de Deo
quomodo non sit, removendo ab eo ea quae ei non conveniunt, utpote
compositionem, motum, et alia huiusmodi. Primo ergo inquiratur de
simplicitate ipsius, per quam removetur ab eo compositio. Et quia
simplicia in rebus corporalibus sunt imperfecta et partes, secundo
inquiretur de perfectione ipsius; tertio, de infinitate eius;
quarto, de immutabilitate; quinto, de unitate. Circa primum
quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum Deus sit corpus. Secundo, utrum sit
in eo compositio formae et materiae. Tertio, utrum sit in eo
compositio quidditatis, sive essentiae, vel naturae, et subiecti.
Quarto, utrum sit in eo compositio quae est ex essentia et esse.
Quinto, utrum sit in eo compositio generis et differentiae. Sexto,
utrum sit in eo compositio subiecti et accidentis. Septimo, utrum
sit quocumque modo compositus, vel totaliter simplex. Octavo, utrum
veniat in compositionem cum aliis.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q3_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q3_A1-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 1. Whether God is a body?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three dimensions
                     to God, for it is written: "He is higher than Heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know?
                     The measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.11.8" target="asv">Job 11:8,9</a>). Therefore God is a body.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28322] Iª q. 3 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit corpus. Corpus enim est quod
habet trinam dimensionem. Sed sacra Scriptura attribuit Deo trinam
dimensionem, dicitur enim Iob XI, <i>excelsior caelo est, et quid
facies? Profundior Inferno, et unde cognosces? Longior terra
mensura eius, et latior mari</i>. Ergo Deus est corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything that has figure is a body, since figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for it
                     is written: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>). Now a figure is called an image, according to the text: "Who being the brightness of His glory and the figure," i.e. the
                     image, "of His substance" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.3" target="asv">Heb. 1:3</a>). Therefore God is a body.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28323] Iª q. 3 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
figuratum est corpus, cum figura sit qualitas circa quantitatem.
Sed Deus videtur esse figuratus, cum scriptum sit Gen. I,
<i>faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram</i>,
figura enim imago dicitur, secundum illud Hebr. I, <i>cum sit
splendor gloriae, et figura substantiae eius</i>, idest imago. Ergo
Deus est corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now Scripture attributes corporeal parts to God. "Hast thou an arm like
                     God?" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.40.4" target="asv">Job 40:4</a>); and "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.16" target="asv">Ps. 33:16</a>); and "The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.117.16" target="asv">Ps. 117:16</a>). Therefore God is a body.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28324] Iª q. 3 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
quod habet partes corporeas, est corpus. Sed Scriptura attribuit
Deo partes corporeas, dicitur enim Iob XL, <i>si habes brachium ut
Deus</i>; et in Psalmo, <i>oculi domini super iustos; et, dextera
domini fecit virtutem</i>. Ergo Deus est corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, posture belongs only to bodies. But something which supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: "I saw the
                     Lord sitting" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.1" target="asv">Is. 6:1</a>), and "He standeth up to judge" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.3.13" target="asv">Is. 3:13</a>). Therefore God is a body.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="28325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28325] Iª q. 3 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, situs
non convenit nisi corpori. Sed ea quae ad situm pertinent, in
Scripturis dicuntur de Deo, dicitur enim Isaiae VI, <i>vidi dominum
sedentem</i>; et Isaiae III, <i>stat ad iudicandum dominus</i>.
Ergo Deus est corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local term "wherefrom" or "whereto." But in the Scriptures God is spoken
                     of as a local term "whereto," according to the words, "Come ye to Him and be enlightened" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.6" target="asv">Ps. 33:6</a>), and as a term "wherefrom": "All they that depart from Thee shall be written in the earth" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.17.13" target="asv">Jer. 17:13</a>). Therefore God is a body.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="28326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28326] Iª q. 3 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, nihil
potest esse terminus localis a quo vel ad quem, nisi sit corpus vel
aliquod corporeum. Sed Deus in Scriptura dicitur esse terminus
localis ut ad quem, secundum illud Psalmi, <i>accedite ad eum, et
illuminamini</i>; et ut a quo, secundum illud Hierem. XVII,
recedentes a te in terra scribentur. Ergo Deus est corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p7">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written in the Gospel of St. John (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.24" target="asv">Jn. 4:24</a>): "God is a spirit."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28327] Iª q. 3 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Ioan. IV, <i>spiritus est Deus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this can be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless
                     it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been already proved (
                     <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q3_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>), that God is the First Mover, and is Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body. Secondly, because the
                     first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. For although in any
                     single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless,
                     absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only
                     by some being in actuality. Now it has been already proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in
                     God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in potentiality because the continuous, as such, is divisible to
                     infinity; it is therefore impossible that God should be a body. Thirdly, because God is the most noble of beings. Now it is
                     impossible for a body to be the most noble of beings; for a body must be either animate or inanimate; and an animate body
                     is manifestly nobler than any inanimate body. But an animate body is not animate precisely as body; otherwise all bodies would
                     be animate. Therefore its animation depends upon some other thing, as our body depends for its animation on the soul. Hence
                     that by which a body becomes animated must be nobler than the body. Therefore it is impossible that God should be a body.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 co."><a name="28328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28328] Iª q. 3 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
absolute Deum non esse corpus. Quod tripliciter ostendi potest.
Primo quidem, quia nullum corpus movet non motum, ut patet
inducendo per singula. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus est
primum movens immobile. Unde manifestum est quod Deus non est
corpus. Secundo, quia necesse est id quod est primum ens, esse in
actu, et nullo modo in potentia. Licet enim in uno et eodem quod
exit de potentia in actum, prius sit potentia quam actus tempore,
simpliciter tamen actus prior est potentia, quia quod est in
potentia, non reducitur in actum nisi per ens actu. Ostensum est
autem supra quod Deus est primum ens. Impossibile est igitur quod
in Deo sit aliquid in potentia. Omne autem corpus est in potentia,
quia continuum, inquantum huiusmodi, divisibile est in infinitum.
Impossibile est igitur Deum esse corpus. Tertio, quia Deus est id
quod est nobilissimum in entibus, ut ex dictis patet. Impossibile
est autem aliquod corpus esse nobilissimum in entibus. Quia corpus
aut est vivum, aut non vivum. Corpus autem vivum, manifestum est
quod est nobilius corpore non vivo. Corpus autem vivum non vivit
inquantum corpus, quia sic omne corpus viveret, oportet igitur quod
vivat per aliquid aliud, sicut corpus nostrum vivit per animam.
Illud autem per quod vivit corpus, est nobilius quam corpus.
Impossibile est igitur Deum esse corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As we have said above (
                     <a href="FP_i.html#FP_Q1_A9" id="FP_Q3_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[9]</a>), Holy Writ puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes
                     to God the three dimensions under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His virtual quantity; thus, by depth, it
                     signifies His power of knowing hidden things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by length, the duration
                     of His existence; by
                     breadth, His act of love for all. Or, as says Dionysius (Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is meant the incomprehensibility
                     of His essence; by length, the procession of His all-pervading power; by breadth, His overspreading all things, inasmuch as
                     all things lie under His protection.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28329] Iª q. 3 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, sacra Scriptura tradit nobis
spiritualia et divina sub similitudinibus corporalium. Unde, cum
trinam dimensionem Deo attribuit, sub similitudine quantitatis
corporeae, quantitatem virtualem ipsius designat, utpote per
profunditatem, virtutem ad cognoscendum occulta; per altitudinem,
excellentiam virtutis super omnia; per longitudinem, durationem sui
esse; per latitudinem, affectum dilectionis ad omnia. Vel, ut dicit
Dionysius, cap. IX de Div. Nom., per profunditatem Dei intelligitur
incomprehensibilitas ipsius essentiae; per longitudinem, processus
virtutis eius, omnia penetrantis; per latitudinem vero,
superextensio eius ad omnia, inquantum scilicet sub eius
protectione omnia continentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man is said to be after the image of God, not as regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals. Hence,
                     when it is said, "Let us make man to our image and likeness", it is added, "And let him have dominion over the fishes of the
                     sea" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>). Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence; hence it is according to his intelligence and reason, which
                     are incorporeal, that man is said to be according to the image of
                     God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28330] Iª q. 3 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod homo dicitur esse ad imaginem Dei, non secundum
corpus, sed secundum id quo homo excellit alia animalia, unde, Gen.
I, postquam dictum est, <i>faciamus hominem ad imaginem et
similitudinem nostram</i>, subditur, <i>ut praesit piscibus
maris,</i> et cetera. Excellit autem homo omnia animalia quantum ad
rationem et intellectum. Unde secundum intellectum et rationem,
quae sunt incorporea, homo est ad imaginem Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Corporeal parts are attributed to God in Scripture on account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain parallel. For
                     instance the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye attributed to God signifies His power of seeing intellectually, not sensibly;
                     and so on with the other parts.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28331] Iª q. 3 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
quod partes corporeae attribuuntur Deo in Scripturis ratione suorum
actuum, secundum quandam similitudinem. Sicut actus oculi est
videre, unde oculus de Deo dictus, significat virtutem eius ad
videndum modo intelligibili, non sensibili. Et simile est de aliis
partibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Whatever pertains to posture, also, is only attributed to God by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as sitting, on account
                     of His unchangeableness and dominion; and as standing, on account of His power of overcoming whatever withstands Him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="28332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28332] Iª q. 3 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
quod etiam ea quae ad situm pertinent, non attribuuntur Deo nisi
secundum quandam similitudinem, sicut dicitur sedens, propter suam
immobilitatem et auctoritatem; et stans, propter suam fortitudinem
ad debellandum omne quod adversatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> We draw near to God by no corporeal steps, since He is everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by the actions
                     of that same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near to or to withdraw signifies merely spiritual actions based on
                     the metaphor of local motion.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="28333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28333] Iª q. 3 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum
quod ad Deum non acceditur passibus corporalibus, cum ubique sit,
sed affectibus mentis, et eodem modo ab eo receditur. Et sic
accessus et recessus, sub similitudine localis motus, designant
spiritualem affectum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q3_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q3_A2-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 2. Whether God is composed of matter and form?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is composed of matter and form. For whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul
                     is the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it is mentioned in Hebrews (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.38" target="asv">Heb. 10:38</a>), where God says: "But My just man liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My soul." Therefore God
                     is composed of matter and form.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28334] Iª q. 3 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo sit compositio formae et materiae.
Omne enim quod habet animam, est compositum ex materia et forma,
quia anima est forma corporis. Sed Scriptura attribuit animam Deo,
introducitur enim ad Hebr. X, ex persona Dei, <i>iustus autem meus
ex fide vivit; quod si subtraxerit se, non placebit animae
meae</i>. Ergo Deus est compositus ex materia et forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, anger, joy and the like are passions of the composite. But these are attributed to God in Scripture: "The Lord was
                     exceeding angry with His people" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.105.40" target="asv">Ps. 105:40</a>). Therefore God is composed of matter and form.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28335] Iª q. 3 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ira,
gaudium, et huiusmodi, sunt passiones coniuncti, ut dicitur I de
anima. Sed huiusmodi attribuuntur Deo in Scriptura dicitur enim in
Psalmo, <i>iratus est furore dominus in populum suum</i>. Ergo Deus
ex materia et forma est compositus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, matter is the principle of individualization. But God seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many.
                     Therefore He is composed of matter and form.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28336] Iª q. 3 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
materia est principium individuationis. Sed Deus videtur esse
individuum, non enim de multis praedicatur. Ergo est compositus ex
materia et forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body; for dimensive quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not
                     a body as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not composed of matter and form.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28337] Iª q. 3 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne
compositum ex materia et forma est corpus, quantitas enim dimensiva
est quae primo inhaeret materiae. Sed Deus non est corpus, ut
ostensum est. Ergo Deus non est compositus ex materia et forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible that matter should exist in God. First, because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown (
                     <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q3_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>) that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly,
                     because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form; therefore its goodness is participated,
                     inasmuch as matter participates the form. Now the
                     first good and the best---viz. God---is not a participated good, because the essential good is prior to the participated good.
                     Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form; hence
                     the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially
                     an agent must be primarily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, since He is the first efficient cause. He is
                     therefore of His essence a form; and not composed of matter and form.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 2 co."><a name="28338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28338] Iª q. 3 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod impossibile est in Deo esse materiam. Primo quidem, quia
materia est id quod est in potentia. Ostensum est autem quod Deus
est purus actus, non habens aliquid de potentialitate. Unde
impossibile est quod Deus sit compositus ex materia et forma.
Secundo, quia omne compositum ex materia et forma est perfectum et
bonum per suam formam, unde oportet quod sit bonum per
participationem, secundum quod materia participat formam. Primum
autem quod est bonum et optimum, quod Deus est, non est bonum per
participationem, quia bonum per essentiam, prius est bono per
participationem. Unde impossibile est quod Deus sit compositus ex
materia et forma. Tertio, quia unumquodque agens agit per suam
formam, unde secundum quod aliquid se habet ad suam formam, sic se
habet ad hoc quod sit agens. Quod igitur primum est et per se
agens, oportet quod sit primo et per se forma. Deus autem est
primum agens, cum sit prima causa efficiens, ut ostensum est. Est
igitur per essentiam suam forma; et non compositus ex materia et
forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A soul is attributed to God because His acts resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our soul.
                     Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His soul.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28339] Iª q. 3 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod anima attribuitur Deo per similitudinem actus. Quod
enim volumus aliquid nobis, ex anima nostra est, unde illud dicitur
esse placitum animae Dei, quod est placitum voluntati ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Anger and the like are attributed to God on account of a similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly the act
                     of an angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of as His anger.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28340] Iª q. 3 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ira et huiusmodi attribuuntur Deo secundum
similitudinem effectus, quia enim proprium est irati punire, ira
eius punitio metaphorice vocatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Forms which can be received in matter are individualized by matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject since it is
                     the first underlying subject; although form of itself, unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that
                     form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is individualized precisely because it cannot be received
                     in a subject; and such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in
                     God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28341] Iª q. 3 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
quod formae quae sunt receptibiles in materia individuantur per
materiam, quae non potest esse in alio, cum sit primum subiectum
substans, forma vero, quantum est de se, nisi aliquid aliud
impediat, recipi potest a pluribus. Sed illa forma quae non est
receptibilis in materia, sed est per se subsistens, ex hoc ipso
individuatur, quod non potest recipi in alio, et huiusmodi forma
est Deus. Unde non sequitur quod habeat materiam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q3_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q3_A3-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 3. Whether God is the same as His essence or nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of
                     God---i.e. the Godhead---is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28342] Iª q. 3 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod non sit idem Deus quod sua essentia vel
natura. Nihil enim est in seipso. Sed essentia vel natura Dei, quae
est deitas, dicitur esse in Deo. Ergo videtur quod Deus non sit
idem quod sua essentia vel natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause; for every agent produces its like. But in created things the "suppositum"
                     is not identical with its nature; for a man is not the same as his humanity. Therefore God is not the same as His Godhead.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28343] Iª q. 3 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
effectus assimilatur suae causae, quia omne agens agit sibi simile.
Sed in rebus creatis non est idem suppositum quod sua natura, non
enim idem est homo quod sua humanitas. Ergo nec Deus est idem quod
sua deitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A3-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said of God that He is life itself, and not only that He is a living thing: "I am the way, the truth, and the life"
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.6" target="asv">Jn. 14:6</a>). Now the relation between Godhead and God is the same as the relation between life and a living thing. Therefore God is
                     His very Godhead.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28344] Iª q. 3 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Contra, de Deo
dicitur quod est vita, et non solum quod est vivens, ut patet Ioan.
XIV, <i>ego sum via, veritas et vita</i>. Sicut autem se habet vita
ad viventem, ita deitas ad Deum. Ergo Deus est ipsa deitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A3-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form,
                     the nature or essence must differ from the "suppositum," because the essence or nature connotes only what is included in the
                     definition of the species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the definition of man, for it is by this that man
                     is man, and it is this that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now
                     individual matter, with all the individualizing accidents, is not included in the definition of the species. For this particular
                     flesh, these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc., are not included in the definition of a man. Therefore this flesh,
                     these bones, and the accidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are not included in humanity; and yet they
                     are included in the thing which is man. Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has humanity.
                     Consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical; but humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because
                     the principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal constituent in regard to the individualizing matter.
                     On the other hand, in things not composed of matter and form, in which individualization is not due to individual matter---that
                     is to say, to "this" matter---the very forms being individualized of themselves---it is necessary the forms themselves should
                     be subsisting "supposita." Therefore "suppositum" and nature in them are identified. Since God then is not composed of matter
                     and form, He must be His own Godhead, His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 3 co."><a name="28345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28345] Iª q. 3 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod Deus est idem quod sua essentia vel natura. Ad cuius
intellectum sciendum est, quod in rebus compositis ex materia et
forma, necesse est quod differant natura vel essentia et
suppositum. Quia essentia vel natura comprehendit in se illa tantum
quae cadunt in definitione speciei, sicut humanitas comprehendit in
se ea quae cadunt in definitione hominis, his enim homo est homo,
et hoc significat humanitas, hoc scilicet quo homo est homo. Sed
materia individualis, cum accidentibus omnibus individuantibus
ipsam, non cadit in definitione speciei, non enim cadunt in
definitione hominis hae carnes et haec ossa, aut albedo vel
nigredo, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Unde hae carnes et haec ossa, et
accidentia designantia hanc materiam, non concluduntur in
humanitate. Et tamen in eo quod est homo, includuntur, unde id quod
est homo, habet in se aliquid quod non habet humanitas. Et propter
hoc non est totaliter idem homo et humanitas, sed humanitas
significatur ut pars formalis hominis; quia principia definientia
habent se formaliter, respectu materiae individuantis. In his
igitur quae non sunt composita ex materia et forma, in quibus
individuatio non est per materiam individualem, idest per hanc
materiam, sed ipsae formae per se individuantur, oportet quod ipsae
formae sint supposita subsistentia. Unde in eis non differt
suppositum et natura. Et sic, cum Deus non sit compositus ex
materia et forma, ut ostensum est, oportet quod Deus sit sua
deitas, sua vita, et quidquid aliud sic de Deo praedicatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A3-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We can speak of simple things only as though they were like the composite things from which we derive our knowledge. Therefore
                     in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence, because with us only those things subsist which are
                     composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are
                     in God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands, but not
                     that there is any composition in God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28346] Iª q. 3 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod de rebus simplicibus loqui non possumus, nisi per
modum compositorum, a quibus cognitionem accipimus. Et ideo, de Deo
loquentes, utimur nominibus concretis, ut significemus eius
subsistentiam, quia apud nos non subsistunt nisi composita, et
utimur nominibus abstractis, ut significemus eius simplicitatem.
Quod ergo dicitur deitas vel vita, vel aliquid huiusmodi, esse in
Deo, referendum est ad diversitatem quae est in acceptione
intellectus nostri; et non ad aliquam diversitatem rei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The effects of God do not imitate Him perfectly, but only as far as they are able; and the imitation is here defective, precisely
                     because what is simple and one, can only be represented by divers things; consequently, composition is accidental to them,
                     and therefore, in them "suppositum" is not the same as nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28347] Iª q. 3 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod effectus Dei imitantur ipsum, non perfecte, sed
secundum quod possunt. Et hoc ad defectum imitationis pertinet,
quod id quod est simplex et unum, non potest repraesentari nisi per
multa, et sic accidit in eis compositio, ex qua provenit quod in
eis non est idem suppositum quod natura.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q3_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q3_A4-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 4. Whether essence and existence are the same in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that essence and existence are not the same in God. For if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to
                     it. Now being to which no addition is made is universal being which is predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that
                     God is being in general which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: "For men gave the incommunicable name to
                     stones and wood" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.21" target="asv">Wis. 14:21</a>). Therefore God's existence is not His
                     essence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28348] Iª q. 3 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sit idem essentia et esse. Si
enim hoc sit, tunc ad esse divinum nihil additur. Sed esse cui
nulla fit additio, est esse commune quod de omnibus praedicatur,
sequitur ergo quod Deus sit ens commune praedicabile de omnibus.
Hoc autem est falsum, secundum illud Sap. XIV, <i>incommunicabile
nomen lignis et lapidibus imposuerunt</i>. Ergo esse Dei non est
eius essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we can know "whether" God exists as said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q2_A2" id="FP_Q3_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[2]</a>); but we cannot know "what" He is. Therefore God's existence is not the same as His essence---that is, as His quiddity or
                     nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28349] Iª q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, de Deo
scire possumus an sit, ut supra dictum est. Non autem possumus
scire quid sit. Ergo non est idem esse Dei, et quod quid est eius,
sive quidditas vel natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A4-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (Trin. vii): "In God existence is not an accidental quality, but subsisting truth." Therefore what subsists in
                     God is His existence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28350] Iª q. 3 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Hilarius dicit in VII de Trin., <i>esse non est accidens in
Deo, sed subsistens veritas</i>. Id ergo quod subsistit in Deo, est
suum esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A4-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God is not only His own essence, as shown in the preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in several
                     ways. First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either by the constituent principles of that essence
                     (like a property that necessarily accompanies the species---as the faculty of laughing is proper to a man---and is caused
                     by the constituent principles of the species), or by some exterior agent---as heat is caused
                     in water by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs from its essence, this existence must be caused either by
                     some exterior agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible for a thing's existence to be caused by its essential
                     constituent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its existence is caused. Therefore
                     that thing, whose existence differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by another. But this cannot be true of
                     God; because we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from
                     His essence. Secondly, existence is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spoken of
                     as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing. Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is
                     a distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as shown above

                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A1" id="FP_Q3_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, it follows that in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence. Thirdly, because,
                     just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that which has existence but is not existence,
                     is a being by participation. But God is His own essence, as shown above
                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A3" id="FP_Q3_A4-p5.2" shape="rect">(A[3])</a> if, therefore, He is not His own existence He will be not essential, but participated being. He will not
                     therefore be the first being---which is absurd. Therefore God is His own existence, and not merely His own essence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 4 co."><a name="28351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28351] Iª q. 3 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod Deus non solum est sua essentia, ut ostensum est, sed etiam
suum esse. Quod quidem multipliciter ostendi potest. Primo quidem,
quia quidquid est in aliquo quod est praeter essentiam eius,
oportet esse causatum vel a principiis essentiae, sicut accidentia
propria consequentia speciem, ut risibile consequitur hominem et
causatur ex principiis essentialibus speciei; vel ab aliquo
exteriori, sicut calor in aqua causatur ab igne. Si igitur ipsum
esse rei sit aliud ab eius essentia, necesse est quod esse illius
rei vel sit causatum ab aliquo exteriori, vel a principiis
essentialibus eiusdem rei. Impossibile est autem quod esse sit
causatum tantum ex principiis essentialibus rei, quia nulla res
sufficit quod sit sibi causa essendi, si habeat esse causatum.
Oportet ergo quod illud cuius esse est aliud ab essentia sua,
habeat esse causatum ab alio. Hoc autem non potest dici de Deo,
quia Deum dicimus esse primam causam efficientem. Impossibile est
ergo quod in Deo sit aliud esse, et aliud eius essentia. Secundo,
quia esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae, non enim bonitas
vel humanitas significatur in actu, nisi prout significamus eam
esse. Oportet igitur quod ipsum esse comparetur ad essentiam quae
est aliud ab ipso, sicut actus ad potentiam. Cum igitur in Deo
nihil sit potentiale, ut ostensum est supra, sequitur quod non sit
aliud in eo essentia quam suum esse. Sua igitur essentia est suum
esse. Tertio, quia sicut illud quod habet ignem et non est ignis,
est ignitum per participationem, ita illud quod habet esse et non
est esse, est ens per participationem. Deus autem est sua essentia,
ut ostensum est. Si igitur non sit suum esse, erit ens per
participationem, et non per essentiam. Non ergo erit primum ens,
quod absurdum est dicere. Est igitur Deus suum esse, et non solum
sua essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A4-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing that has nothing added to it can be of two kinds. Either its essence precludes any addition; thus, for example, it
                     is of the essence of an irrational animal to be without reason. Or we may understand a thing to have nothing added to it,
                     inasmuch as its essence does not require that anything should be added to it; thus the genus animal is without reason, because
                     it is not of the essence of animal in general to have reason; but neither is it to
                     lack reason. And so the divine being has nothing added to it in the first sense; whereas universal being has nothing added
                     to it in the second sense.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28352] Iª q. 3 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod aliquid cui non fit additio potest intelligi
dupliciter. Uno modo, ut de ratione eius sit quod non fiat ei
additio; sicut de ratione animalis irrationalis est, ut sit sine
ratione. Alio modo intelligitur aliquid cui non fit additio, quia
non est de ratione eius quod sibi fiat additio, sicut animal
commune est sine ratione, quia non est de ratione animalis communis
ut habeat rationem; sed nec de ratione eius est ut careat ratione.
Primo igitur modo, esse sine additione, est esse divinum, secundo
modo, esse sine additione, est esse commune.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "To be" can mean either of two things. It may mean the act of essence, or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected
                     by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject. Taking "to be" in the first sense, we cannot understand God's existence nor
                     His essence; but only in the second sense. We know that this proposition which we form about God when we say "God is," is
                     true; and this we know from His effects (
                     <a href="#FP_Q2_A2" id="FP_Q3_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[2],
                        A[2]
                     </a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28353] Iª q. 3 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod esse dupliciter dicitur, uno modo, significat actum
essendi; alio modo, significat compositionem propositionis, quam
anima adinvenit coniungens praedicatum subiecto. Primo igitur modo
accipiendo esse, non possumus scire esse Dei, sicut nec eius
essentiam, sed solum secundo modo. Scimus enim quod haec propositio
quam formamus de Deo, cum dicimus Deus est, vera est. Et hoc scimus
ex eius effectibus, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q3_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q3_A5-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 5. Whether God is contained in a genus?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is contained in a genus. For a substance is a being that subsists of itself. But this is especially true
                     of God. Therefore God is in a genus of substance.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28354] Iª q. 3 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit in genere aliquo. Substantia enim
est ens per se subsistens. Hoc autem maxime convenit Deo. Ergo Deus
est in genere substantiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing can be measured save by something of its own genus; as length is measured by length and numbers by number.
                     But God is the measure of all substances, as the Commentator shows (Metaph. x). Therefore God is in the genus of substance.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28355] Iª q. 3 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
unumquodque mensuratur per aliquid sui generis; sicut longitudines
per longitudinem, et numeri per numerum. Sed Deus est mensura
omnium substantiarum, ut patet per Commentatorem, X Metaphys. Ergo
Deus est in genere substantiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A5-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> In the mind, genus is prior to what it contains. But nothing is prior to God either really or mentally. Therefore God is
                     not in any genus.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28356] Iª q. 3 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, genus
est prius, secundum intellectum, eo quod in genere continetur. Sed
nihil est prius Deo, nec secundum rem, nec secundum intellectum.
Ergo Deus non est in aliquo genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A5-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either absolutely and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as being
                     reducible to it, as principles and privations. For example, a point and unity are reduced to the genus of quantity, as its
                     principles; while blindness and all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit. But in neither way is God in a genus.
                     That He cannot be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways. First, because a
                     species is constituted of genus and difference. Now that from which the difference constituting the species is derived, is
                     always related to that from which the genus is derived, as actuality is related to potentiality. For animal is derived from
                     sensitive nature, by concretion as it were, for that is animal, which has a sensitive nature. Rational being, on the other
                     hand, is derived from intellectual nature, because that is rational, which has an intellectual nature, and intelligence is
                     compared to sense, as actuality is to potentiality. The same argument holds good in other things. Hence since in God actuality
                     is not added to potentiality, it is impossible that He should be in any genus as a species. Secondly, since the existence
                     of God is His essence, if God were in any genus, He would be the genus "being", because, since genus is predicated as an essential
                     it refers to the essence of a thing. But the Philosopher has shown (Metaph. iii) that being cannot be a genus, for
                     every genus has differences distinct from its generic essence. Now no difference can exist distinct from being; for non-being
                     cannot be a difference. It follows then that God is not in a genus. Thirdly, because all in one genus agree in the quiddity
                     or essence of the genus which is predicated of them as an essential, but they differ in their existence. For the existence
                     of man and of horse is not the same; as also of this man and that man: thus in every member of a genus, existence and
                     quiddity---i.e. essence---must differ. But in God they do not differ, as shown in the preceding article. Therefore it is plain
                     that God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this it is also plain that He has no genus nor difference, nor can
                     there be any definition of Him; nor, save through His effects, a demonstration of Him: for a definition is from genus and
                     difference; and the mean of a demonstration is a definition. That God is not in a genus, as reducible to it as its principle,
                     is clear from this, that a principle reducible to any genus does not extend beyond that genus; as, a point is the principle
                     of continuous quantity alone; and unity, of discontinuous quantity. But God is the principle of all being. Therefore He is
                     not contained in any genus as its principle.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 5 co."><a name="28357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28357] Iª q. 3 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod aliquid est in genere dupliciter. Uno modo simpliciter et
proprie; sicut species, quae sub genere continentur. Alio modo, per
reductionem, sicut principia et privationes, sicut punctus et
unitas reducuntur ad genus quantitatis, sicut principia; caecitas
autem, et omnis privatio, reducitur ad genus sui habitus. Neutro
autem modo Deus est in genere. Quod enim non possit esse species
alicuius generis, tripliciter ostendi potest. Primo quidem, quia
species constituitur ex genere et differentia. Semper autem id a
quo sumitur differentia constituens speciem, se habet ad illud unde
sumitur genus, sicut actus ad potentiam. Animal enim sumitur a
natura sensitiva per modum concretionis; hoc enim dicitur animal,
quod naturam sensitivam habet, rationale vero sumitur a natura
intellectiva, quia rationale est quod naturam intellectivam habet,
intellectivum autem comparatur ad sensitivum, sicut actus ad
potentiam. Et similiter manifestum est in aliis. Unde, cum in Deo
non adiungatur potentia actui, impossibile est quod sit in genere
tanquam species. Secundo, quia, cum esse Dei sit eius essentia, ut
ostensum est, si Deus esset in aliquo genere, oporteret quod genus
eius esset ens, nam genus significat essentiam rei, cum praedicetur
in eo quod quid est. Ostendit autem philosophus in III Metaphys.,
quod ens non potest esse genus alicuius, omne enim genus habet
differentias quae sunt extra essentiam generis; nulla autem
differentia posset inveniri, quae esset extra ens; quia non ens non
potest esse differentia. Unde relinquitur quod Deus non sit in
genere. Tertio, quia omnia quae sunt in genere uno, communicant in
quidditate vel essentia generis, quod praedicatur de eis in eo quod
quid est. Differunt autem secundum esse, non enim idem est esse
hominis et equi, nec huius hominis et illius hominis. Et sic
oportet quod quaecumque sunt in genere, differant in eis esse et
quod quid est, idest essentia. In Deo autem non differt, ut
ostensum est. Unde manifestum est quod Deus non est in genere sicut
species. Et ex hoc patet quod non habet genus, neque differentias;
neque est definitio ipsius; neque demonstratio, nisi per effectum,
quia definitio est ex genere et differentia, demonstrationis autem
medium est definitio. Quod autem Deus non sit in genere per
reductionem ut principium, manifestum est ex eo quod principium
quod reducitur in aliquod genus, non se extendit ultra genus illud,
sicut punctum non est principium nisi quantitatis continuae, et
unitas quantitatis discretae. Deus autem est principium totius
esse, ut infra ostendetur. Unde non continetur in aliquo genere
sicut principium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A5-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The word substance signifies not only what exists of itself---for existence cannot of itself be a genus, as shown in the
                     body of the article; but, it also signifies an essence that has the property of existing in this way---namely, of existing
                     of itself; this existence, however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that God is not in the genus of substance.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28358] Iª q. 3 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod substantiae nomen non significat hoc solum quod est
per se esse, quia hoc quod est esse, non potest per se esse genus,
ut ostensum est. Sed significat essentiam cui competit sic esse,
idest per se esse, quod tamen esse non est ipsa eius essentia. Et
sic patet quod Deus non est in genere substantiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A5-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection turns upon proportionate measure which must be homogeneous with what is measured. Now, God is not a measure
                     proportionate to anything. Still, He is called the measure of all things, in the sense that everything has being only according
                     as it resembles Him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28359] Iª q. 3 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de mensura proportionata, hanc
enim oportet esse homogeneam mensurato. Deus autem non est mensura
proportionata alicui. Dicitur tamen mensura omnium, ex eo quod
unumquodque tantum habet de esse, quantum ei appropinquat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q3_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q3_A6-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 6. Whether in God there are any accidents?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are accidents in God. For substance cannot be an accident, as Aristotle says (Phys. i). Therefore that
                     which is an accident in one, cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus it is proved that heat cannot be the substantial form
                     of fire, because it is an accident in other things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like, which are accidents in us, are attributes
                     of God. Therefore in God there are accidents.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28360] Iª q. 3 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo sint aliqua accidentia. Substantia
enim nulli est accidens, ut dicitur in I Physic. Quod ergo in uno
est accidens, non potest in alio esse substantia, sicut probatur
quod calor non sit forma substantialis ignis, quia in aliis est
accidens. Sed sapientia, virtus, et huiusmodi, quae in nobis sunt
accidentia, Deo attribuuntur. Ergo et in Deo sunt accidentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in every genus there is a first principle. But there are many "genera" of accidents. If, therefore, the primal members
                     of these genera are not in God, there will be many primal beings other than God---which is absurd.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28361] Iª q. 3 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in
quolibet genere est unum primum. Multa autem sunt genera
accidentium. Si igitur prima illorum generum non sunt in Deo, erunt
multa prima extra Deum, quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A6-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Every accident is in a subject. But God cannot be a subject, for "no simple form can be a subject", as Boethius says (De
                     Trin.). Therefore in God there cannot be any accident.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28362] Iª q. 3 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne
accidens in subiecto est. Deus autem non potest esse subiectum,
quia <i>forma simplex non potest esse subiectum</i>, ut dicit
Boetius in Lib. de Trin. Ergo in Deo non potest esse accidens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A6-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> From all we have said, it is clear there can be no accident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents
                     as potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made actual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality
                     in God, as was shown (
                     <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q3_A6-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Secondly, because God is His own existence; and as Boethius says (Hebdom.), although every essence may have something superadded
                     to it, this cannot apply to
                     absolute being: thus a heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to it, as whiteness, nevertheless absolute
                     heat can have nothing else than heat. Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is accidental. Whence as God is
                     absolute primal being, there can be in Him nothing accidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents (as the capability
                     of laughing is an essential accident of man), because such accidents are caused by the constituent principles of the
                     subject. Now there can be nothing caused in God, since He is the first cause. Hence it follows that there is no accident in
                     God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 6 co."><a name="28363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28363] Iª q. 3 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, secundum praemissa, manifeste apparet quod in Deo accidens
esse non potest. Primo quidem, quia subiectum comparatur ad
accidens, sicut potentia ad actum, subiectum enim secundum accidens
est aliquo modo in actu. Esse autem in potentia, omnino removetur a
Deo, ut ex praedictis patet. Secundo, quia Deus est suum esse, et,
ut Boetius dicit in Lib. de Hebdomad., <i>licet id quod est,
aliquid aliud possit habere adiunctum, tamen ipsum esse nihil aliud
adiunctum habere potest</i>, sicut quod est calidum, potest habere
aliquid extraneum quam calidum, ut albedinem; sed ipse calor nihil
habet praeter calorem. Tertio, quia omne quod est per se, prius est
eo quod est per accidens. Unde, cum Deus sit simpliciter primum
ens, in eo non potest esse aliquid per accidens. Sed nec accidentia
per se in eo esse possunt, sicut risibile est per se accidens
hominis. Quia huiusmodi accidentia causantur ex principiis
subiecti, in Deo autem nihil potest esse causatum, cum sit causa
prima. Unde relinquitur quod in Deo nullum sit accidens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A6-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue and wisdom are not predicated of God and of us univocally. Hence it does not follow that there are accidents in God
                     as there are in us.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28364] Iª q. 3 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod virtus et sapientia non univoce dicuntur de Deo et de
nobis, ut infra patebit. Unde non sequitur quod accidentia sint in
Deo, sicut in nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since substance is prior to its accidents, the principles of accidents are reducible to the principles of the substance as
                     to that which is prior; although God is not first as if contained in the genus of substance; yet He is first in respect to
                     all being, outside of every genus.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28365] Iª q. 3 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, cum substantia sit prior accidentibus, principia
accidentium reducuntur in principia substantiae sicut in priora.
Quamvis Deus non sit primum contentum in genere substantiae, sed
primum extra omne genus, respectu totius esse.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q3_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q3_A7-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 7. Whether God is altogether simple?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not altogether simple. For whatever is from God must imitate Him. Thus from the first being are all
                     beings; and from the first good is all good. But in the things which God has made, nothing is altogether simple. Therefore
                     neither is God altogether simple.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="28366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28366] Iª q. 3 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit omnino simplex. Ea enim quae
sunt a Deo, imitantur ipsum, unde a primo ente sunt omnia entia, et
a primo bono sunt omnia bona. Sed in rebus quae sunt a Deo, nihil
est omnino simplex. Ergo Deus non est omnino simplex.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is best must be attributed to God. But with us that which is composite is better than that which is simple;
                     thus, chemical compounds are better than simple elements, and animals than the parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot
                     be said that God is altogether simple.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="28367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28367] Iª q. 3 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
quod est melius, Deo attribuendum est. Sed, apud nos, composita
sunt meliora simplicibus, sicut corpora mixta elementis, et
elementa suis partibus. Ergo non est dicendum quod Deus sit omnino
simplex.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A7-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7): "God is truly and absolutely simple."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 7 s. c."><a name="28368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28368] Iª q. 3 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., quod Deus vere et summe simplex
est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A7-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many ways. First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is
                     neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His
                     nature differ from His "suppositum"; nor His essence from His existence; neither is there in Him composition of genus and
                     difference, nor of subject and accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite,
                     but is altogether simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to its component parts, and is dependent on them;
                     but God is the first being, as shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q3_A7-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Thirdly, because every composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite unless something causes them
                     to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q3_A7-p5.2" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>), since He is the first efficient cause. Fourthly, because in every composite there must
                     be potentiality and actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts actuates another, or at least all
                     the parts are potential to the whole. Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one of its parts.
                     And this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts of the foot,
                     a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a
                     part (as a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water), nevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which
                     cannot be predicated of any of the parts; for instance, if the whole volume of water is two cubits, no part of it can be two
                     cubits. Thus in every composite there is something which is not it itself. But, even if this could be said of whatever has
                     a form, viz. that it has something which is not it itself, as in a white object there is something which does not belong to
                     the essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself, there is nothing besides itself. And so, since God is absolute form,
                     or rather absolute being, He can be in no way composite. Hilary implies this argument, when he says (De Trin. vii): "God,
                     Who is strength, is not made up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is light, composed of things that are dim."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 7 co."><a name="28369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28369] Iª q. 3 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod Deum omnino esse simplicem, multipliciter potest esse
manifestum. Primo quidem per supradicta. Cum enim in Deo non sit
compositio, neque quantitativarum partium, quia corpus non est;
neque compositio formae et materiae, neque in eo sit aliud natura
et suppositum; neque aliud essentia et esse, neque in eo sit
compositio generis et differentiae; neque subiecti et accidentis,
manifestum est quod Deus nullo modo compositus est, sed est omnino
simplex. Secundo, quia omne compositum est posterius suis
componentibus, et dependens ex eis. Deus autem est primum ens, ut
supra ostensum est. Tertio, quia omne compositum causam habet, quae
enim secundum se diversa sunt, non conveniunt in aliquod unum nisi
per aliquam causam adunantem ipsa. Deus autem non habet causam, ut
supra ostensum est, cum sit prima causa efficiens. Quarto, quia in
omni composito oportet esse potentiam et actum, quod in Deo non
est, quia vel una partium est actus respectu alterius; vel saltem
omnes partes sunt sicut in potentia respectu totius. Quinto, quia
omne compositum est aliquid quod non convenit alicui suarum
partium. Et quidem in totis dissimilium partium, manifestum est,
nulla enim partium hominis est homo, neque aliqua partium pedis est
pes. In totis vero similium partium, licet aliquid quod dicitur de
toto, dicatur de parte, sicut pars aeris est aer, et aquae aqua;
aliquid tamen dicitur de toto, quod non convenit alicui partium,
non enim si tota aqua est bicubita, et pars eius. Sic igitur in
omni composito est aliquid quod non est ipsum. Hoc autem etsi
possit dici de habente formam, quod scilicet habeat aliquid quod
non est ipsum (puta in albo est aliquid quod non pertinet ad
rationem albi), tamen in ipsa forma nihil est alienum. Unde, cum
Deus sit ipsa forma, vel potius ipsum esse, nullo modo compositus
esse potest. Et hanc rationem tangit Hilarius, VII de Trin.,
dicens, <i>Deus, qui virtus est, ex infirmis non continetur, neque
qui lux est, ex obscuris coaptatur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A7-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to be in
                     some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from its essence, as will be shown hereafter, (
                     <a href="#FP_Q4_A3" id="FP_Q3_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[3]</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="28370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28370] Iª q. 3 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod ea quae sunt a Deo, imitantur Deum sicut causata
primam causam. Est autem hoc de ratione causati, quod sit aliquo
modo compositum, quia ad minus esse eius est aliud quam quod quid
est, ut infra patebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A7-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> With us composite things are better than simple things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in one
                     simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine goodness is found in one simple thing (
                     <a href="#FP_Q4_A1" id="FP_Q3_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[1]</a> and
                     <a href="#FP_Q6_A2" id="FP_Q3_A7-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[6], A[2]</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="28371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28371] Iª q. 3 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod apud nos composita sunt meliora simplicibus, quia
perfectio bonitatis creaturae non invenitur in uno simplici, sed in
multis. Sed perfectio divinae bonitatis invenitur in uno simplici,
ut infra ostendetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q3_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q3_A8-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 8. Whether God enters into the composition of other things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God enters into the composition of other things, for Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The being of all things
                     is that which is above being---the Godhead." But the being of all things enters into the composition of everything. Therefore
                     God enters into the composition of other things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="28372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28372] Iª q. 3 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus in compositionem aliorum veniat.
Dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. Cael. Hier., <i>esse omnium est, quae
super esse est deitas</i>. Sed esse omnium intrat compositionem
uniuscuiusque. Ergo Deus in compositionem aliorum venit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is a form; for Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., [*Serm. xxxviii]) that, "the word of God, which is God, is an
                     uncreated form." But a form is part of a compound. Therefore God is part of some compound.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="28373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28373] Iª q. 3 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
est forma, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de verbis domini, quod
verbum Dei (quod est Deus) est forma quaedam non formata. Sed forma
est pars compositi. Ergo Deus est pars alicuius compositi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever things exist, in no way differing from each other, are the same. But God and primary matter exist, and
                     in no way differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same. But primary matter enters into the composition things.
                     Therefore also does God. Proof of the minor---whatever things differ, they differ by some differences, and therefore must
                     be composite. But God and primary matter are altogether simple. Therefore they nowise differ
                     from each other.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="28374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28374] Iª q. 3 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
quaecumque sunt et nullo modo differunt, sunt idem. Sed Deus et
materia prima sunt, et nullo modo differunt. Ergo penitus sunt
idem. Sed materia prima intrat compositionem rerum. Ergo et Deus.
Probatio mediae, quaecumque differunt, aliquibus differentiis
differunt, et ita oportet ea esse composita; sed Deus et materia
prima sunt omnino simplicia; ergo nullo modo differunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q3_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "There can be no touching Him," i.e. God, "nor any other union with Him by mingling part with
                     part."
                  </p><p id="FP_Q3_A8-p6"> Further, the first cause rules all things without commingling with them, as the Philosopher says (De Causis).</p></div></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I q. 3 a. 8 s. c. 1"><a name="28375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28375] Iª q. 3 a. 8 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Dionysius, II cap. de Div. Nom., quod neque tactus est
eius (scilicet Dei), <i>neque alia quaedam ad partes commiscendi
communio</i>.</p><p title="I q. 3 a. 8 s. c. 2"><a name="28376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28376] Iª q. 3 a. 8 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
dicitur in libro de causis, quod <i>causa prima regit omnes res,
praeterquam commisceatur eis</i>.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A8-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> On this point there have been three errors. Some have affirmed that God is the world-soul, as is clear from Augustine (De
                     Civ. Dei vii, 6). This is practically the same as the opinion of those who assert that God is the soul of the highest heaven.
                     Again, others have said that God is the formal principle of all things; and this was the theory of the Almaricians. The third
                     error is that of David of Dinant, who most absurdly taught that God was primary matter.
                     Now all these contain manifest untruth; since it is not possible for God to enter into the composition of anything, either
                     as a formal or a material principle. First, because God is the first efficient cause. Now the efficient cause is not identical
                     numerically with the form of the thing caused, but only specifically: for man begets man. But primary matter can be neither
                     numerically nor specifically identical with an efficient cause; for the former is merely potential, while the latter is
                     actual. Secondly, because, since God is the first efficient cause, to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially. But that
                     which enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and essentially, but rather the composite so acts; for
                     the hand does not act, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence God cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly,
                     because no part of a compound can be absolutely primal among beings---not even matter, nor form, though they are the primal
                     parts of every compound. For matter is merely potential; and potentiality is absolutely posterior to actuality, as is clear
                     from the foregoing (
                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A1" id="FP_Q3_A8-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[1]</a>): while a form which is part of a compound is a participated form; and as that which participates is posterior to that which
                     is essential, so likewise is that which is participated; as fire in ignited objects is posterior to fire that is essentially
                     such. Now it has been proved that God is absolutely primal being (
                     <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q3_A8-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 8 co."><a name="28377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28377] Iª q. 3 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod circa hoc fuerunt tres errores. Quidam enim posuerunt quod
Deus esset anima mundi, ut patet per Augustinum in Lib. VII de
civitate Dei, et ad hoc etiam reducitur, quod quidam dixerunt Deum
esse animam primi caeli. Alii autem dixerunt Deum esse principium
formale omnium rerum. Et haec dicitur fuisse opinio Almarianorum.
Sed tertius error fuit David de Dinando, qui stultissime posuit
Deum esse materiam primam. Omnia enim haec manifestam continent
falsitatem, neque est possibile Deum aliquo modo in compositionem
alicuius venire, nec sicut principium formale, nec sicut principium
materiale. Primo quidem, quia supra diximus Deum esse primam causam
efficientem. Causa autem efficiens cum forma rei factae non incidit
in idem numero, sed solum in idem specie, homo enim generat
hominem. Materia vero cum causa efficiente non incidit in idem
numero, nec in idem specie, quia hoc est in potentia, illud vero in
actu. Secundo, quia cum Deus sit prima causa efficiens, eius est
primo et per se agere. Quod autem venit in compositionem alicuius,
non est primo et per se agens, sed magis compositum, non enim manus
agit, sed homo per manum; et ignis calefacit per calorem. Unde Deus
non potest esse pars alicuius compositi. Tertio, quia nulla pars
compositi potest esse simpliciter prima in entibus; neque etiam
materia et forma, quae sunt primae partes compositorum. Nam materia
est in potentia, potentia autem est posterior actu simpliciter, ut
ex dictis patet. Forma autem quae est pars compositi, est forma
participata, sicut autem participans est posterius eo quod est per
essentiam, ita et ipsum participatum; sicut ignis in ignitis est
posterior eo quod est per essentiam. Ostensum est autem quod Deus
est primum ens simpliciter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Godhead is called the being of all things, as their efficient and exemplar cause, but not as being their essence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="28378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28378] Iª q. 3 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod deitas dicitur esse omnium effective et exemplariter,
non autem per essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Word is an exemplar form; but not a form that is part of a compound.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="28379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28379] Iª q. 3 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod verbum est forma exemplaris, non autem forma quae est
pars compositi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A8-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Simple things do not differ by added differences---for this is the property of compounds. Thus man and horse differ by their
                     differences, rational and irrational; which differences, however, do not differ from each other by other differences. Hence,
                     to be quite accurate, it is better to say that they are, not different, but diverse. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph.
                     x), "things which are diverse are absolutely distinct, but things which are
                     different differ by something." Therefore, strictly speaking, primary matter and God do not differ, but are by their very
                     being, diverse. Hence it does not follow they are the same.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="28380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28380] Iª q. 3 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
quod simplicia non differunt aliquibus aliis differentiis, hoc enim
compositorum est. Homo enim et equus differunt rationali et
irrationali differentiis, quae quidem differentiae non differunt
amplius ab invicem aliis differentiis. Unde, si fiat vis in verbo,
non proprie dicuntur differre, sed diversa esse, nam, secundum
philosophum X Metaphys., diversum absolute dicitur, sed omne
differens aliquo differt. Unde, si fiat vis in verbo, materia prima
et Deus non differunt, sed sunt diversa seipsis. Unde non sequitur
quod sint idem.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q4" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q4-p0.1">Q. 4. THE PERFECTION OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q4-p2"> Having considered the divine simplicity, we treat next of God's perfection. Now because everything in so far as it is perfect
                  is called good, we shall speak first of the divine perfection; secondly of the divine goodness.
               </p><p id="FP_Q4-p3"> Concerning the first there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q4-p4"><a href="#FP_Q4_A1"> (1) Whether God is perfect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q4-p5"><a href="#FP_Q4_A2"> (2) Whether God is perfect universally, as having in Himself the perfections of all things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q4-p6"><a href="#FP_Q4_A3"> (3) Whether creatures can be said to be like God?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 pr."><a name="28381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28381]
Iª q. 4 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem divinae
simplicitatis, de perfectione ipsius Dei dicendum est. Et quia
unumquodque, secundum quod perfectum est, sic dicitur bonum, primo
agendum est de perfectione divina; secundo de eius bonitate. Circa
primum quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum Deus sit perfectus. Secundo,
utrum Deus sit universaliter perfectus omnium in se perfectiones
habens. Tertio, utrum creaturae similes Deo dici possint.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q4_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q4_A1-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 1. Whether God is perfect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that perfection does not belong to God. For we say a thing is perfect if it is completely made. But it does not
                     befit God to be made. Therefore He is not perfect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28382] Iª q. 4 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod esse perfectum non conveniat Deo.
Perfectum enim dicitur quasi totaliter factum. Sed Deo non convenit
esse factum. Ergo nec esse perfectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is the first beginning of things. But the beginnings of things seem to be imperfect, as seed is the beginning
                     of animal and vegetable life. Therefore God is imperfect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28383] Iª q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
est primum rerum principium. Sed principia rerum videntur esse
imperfecta, semen enim est principium animalium et plantarum. Ergo
Deus est imperfectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A4" id="FP_Q4_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>), God's essence is existence. But existence seems most imperfect, since it is most universal and receptive of all modification.
                     Therefore God is imperfect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28384] Iª q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
ostensum est supra quod essentia Dei est ipsum esse. Sed ipsum esse
videtur esse imperfectissimum, cum sit communissimum, et recipiens
omnium additiones. Ergo Deus est imperfectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "Be you perfect as also your heavenly Father is perfect" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.48" target="asv">Mat. 5:48</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28385] Iª q. 4 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Matt. V, <i>estote perfecti, sicut et pater vester
caelestis perfectus est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher relates (Metaph. xii), some ancient philosophers, namely, the Pythagoreans and Leucippus, did not predicate
                     "best" and "most perfect" of the first principle. The reason was that the ancient philosophers considered only a material
                     principle; and a material principle is most imperfect. For since matter as such is merely potential, the first material principle
                     must be simply potential, and thus most imperfect. Now God is the first principle,
                     not material, but in the order of efficient cause, which must be most perfect. For just as matter, as such, is merely potential,
                     an agent, as such, is in the state of actuality. Hence, the first active principle must needs be most actual, and therefore
                     most perfect; for a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing
                     of the mode of its perfection.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 co."><a name="28386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28386] Iª q. 4 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut philosophus narrat in XII Metaphys., quidam antiqui
philosophi, scilicet Pythagorici et Speusippus, non attribuerunt
optimum et perfectissimum primo principio. Cuius ratio est, quia
philosophi antiqui consideraverunt principium materiale tantum,
primum autem principium materiale imperfectissimum est. Cum enim
materia, inquantum huiusmodi, sit in potentia, oportet quod primum
principium materiale sit maxime in potentia; et ita maxime
imperfectum. Deus autem ponitur primum principium, non materiale,
sed in genere causae efficientis, et hoc oportet esse
perfectissimum. Sicut enim materia, inquantum huiusmodi, est in
potentia; ita agens, inquantum huiusmodi, est in actu. Unde primum
principium activum oportet maxime esse in actu, et per consequens
maxime esse perfectum. Secundum hoc enim dicitur aliquid esse
perfectum, secundum quod est actu, nam perfectum dicitur, cui nihil
deest secundum modum suae perfectionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Gregory says (Moral. v, 26,29): "Though our lips can only stammer, we yet chant the high things of God." For that which
                     is not made is improperly called perfect. Nevertheless because created things are then called perfect, when from potentiality
                     they are brought into actuality, this word "perfect" signifies whatever is not wanting in actuality, whether this be by way
                     of perfection or not.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28387] Iª q. 4 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, sicut dicit Gregorius, <i>balbutiendo ut possumus,
excelsa Dei resonamus, quod enim factum non est, perfectum proprie
dici non potest</i>. Sed quia in his quae fiunt, tunc dicitur esse
aliquid perfectum, cum de potentia educitur in actum; transumitur
hoc nomen perfectum ad significandum omne illud cui non deest esse
in actu, sive hoc habeat per modum factionis, sive non.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The material principle which with us is found to be imperfect, cannot be absolutely primal; but must be preceded by something
                     perfect. For seed, though it be the principle of animal life reproduced through seed, has previous to it, the animal or plant
                     from which is came. Because, previous to that which is potential, must be that which is actual; since a potential being can
                     only be reduced into act by some being already actual.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28388] Iª q. 4 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod principium materiale, quod apud nos imperfectum
invenitur, non potest esse simpliciter primum, sed praeceditur ab
alio perfecto. Nam semen, licet sit principium animalis generati ex
semine, tamen habet ante se animal vel plantam unde deciditur.
Oportet enim ante id quod est in potentia, esse aliquid actu, cum
ens in potentia non reducatur in actum, nisi per aliquod ens in
actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Existence is the most perfect of all things, for it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual; for
                     nothing has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence existence is that which actuates all things, even their forms. Therefore
                     it is not compared to other things as the receiver is to the received; but rather as the received to the receiver. When therefore
                     I speak of the existence of man, or horse, or anything else, existence is
                     considered a formal principle, and as something received; and not as that which exists.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28389] Iª q. 4 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
quod ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium, comparatur enim ad omnia
ut actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est, unde
ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum.
Unde non comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad receptum, sed magis
sicut receptum ad recipiens. Cum enim dico esse hominis, vel equi,
vel cuiuscumque alterius, ipsum esse consideratur ut formale et
receptum, non autem ut illud cui competit esse.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q4_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q4_A2-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 2. Whether the perfections of all things are in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the perfections of all things are not in God. For God is simple, as shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A7" id="FP_Q4_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[7]</a>); whereas the perfections of things are many and diverse. Therefore the perfections of all things are not in God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28390] Iª q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sint perfectiones omnium rerum.
Deus enim simplex est, ut ostensum est. Sed perfectiones rerum sunt
multae et diversae. Ergo in Deo non sunt omnes perfectiones
rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, opposites cannot coexist. Now the perfections of things are opposed to each other, for each thing is perfected by
                     its specific difference. But the differences by which "genera" are divided, and "species" constituted, are opposed to each
                     other. Therefore because opposites cannot coexist in the same subject, it seems that the perfections of all things are not
                     in God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28391] Iª q. 4 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
opposita non possunt esse in eodem. Sed perfectiones rerum sunt
oppositae, unaquaeque enim species perficitur per suam differentiam
specificam; differentiae autem quibus dividitur genus et
constituuntur species, sunt oppositae. Cum ergo opposita non
possint simul esse in eodem, videtur quod non omnes rerum
perfectiones sint in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists; and an intelligent thing than what merely lives. Therefore
                     life is more perfect than existence; and knowledge than life. But the essence of God is existence itself. Therefore He has
                     not the perfections of life, and knowledge, and other similar perfections.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28392] Iª q. 4 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, vivens
est perfectius quam ens, et sapiens quam vivens, ergo et vivere est
perfectius quam esse, et sapere quam vivere. Sed essentia Dei est
ipsum esse. Ergo non habet in se perfectionem vitae et sapientiae,
et alias huiusmodi perfectiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that "God in His one existence prepossesses all things."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28393] Iª q. 4 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Dionysius, cap. V de Div. Nom., quod Deus in uno
existentia omnia praehabet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> All created perfections are in God. Hence He is spoken of as universally perfect, because He lacks not (says the Commentator,
                     Metaph. v) any excellence which may be found in any genus. This may be seen from two considerations. First, because whatever
                     perfection exists in an effect must be found in the effective cause: either in the same formality, if it is a univocal agent---as
                     when man reproduces man; or in a more eminent degree, if it is an equivocal
                     agent---thus in the sun is the likeness of whatever is generated by the sun's power. Now it is plain that the effect pre-exists
                     virtually in the efficient cause: and although to pre-exist in the potentiality of a material cause is to pre-exist in a more
                     imperfect way, since matter as such is imperfect, and an agent as such is perfect; still to pre-exist virtually in the efficient
                     cause is to pre-exist not in a more imperfect, but in a more perfect way. Since therefore God is the first effective
                     cause of things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in God in a more eminent way. Dionysius implies the same line
                     of argument by saying of God (Div. Nom. v): "It is not that He is this and not that, but that He is all, as the cause of all."
                     Secondly, from what has been already proved, God is existence itself, of itself subsistent (
                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A4" id="FP_Q4_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Consequently, He must contain within Himself the whole perfection of being. For it is clear that if some hot thing has
                     not the whole perfection of heat, this is because heat is not participated in its full perfection; but if this heat were self-subsisting,
                     nothing of the virtue of heat would be wanting to it. Since therefore God is subsisting being itself, nothing of the perfection
                     of being can be wanting to Him. Now all created perfections are included in the perfection of being; for things are perfect,
                     precisely so far as they have being after some fashion. It follows therefore that the perfection of no one
                     thing is wanting to God. This line of argument, too, is implied by Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), when he says that, "God exists
                     not in any single mode, but embraces all being within Himself, absolutely, without limitation, uniformly;" and afterwards
                     he adds that, "He is the very existence to subsisting things."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 2 co."><a name="28394" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28394] Iª q. 4 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod in Deo sunt perfectiones omnium rerum. Unde et dicitur
universaliter perfectus, quia non deest ei aliqua nobilitas quae
inveniatur in aliquo genere, ut dicit Commentator in V Metaphys. Et
hoc quidem ex duobus considerari potest. Primo quidem, per hoc quod
quidquid perfectionis est in effectu, oportet inveniri in causa
effectiva, vel secundum eandem rationem, si sit agens univocum, ut
homo generat hominem; vel eminentiori modo, si sit, agens
aequivocum, sicut in sole est similitudo eorum quae generantur per
virtutem solis. Manifestum est enim quod effectus praeexistit
virtute in causa agente, praeexistere autem in virtute causae
agentis, non est praeexistere imperfectiori modo, sed perfectiori;
licet praeexistere in potentia causae materialis, sit praeexistere
imperfectiori modo, eo quod materia, inquantum huiusmodi, est
imperfecta; agens vero, inquantum huiusmodi, est perfectum. Cum
ergo Deus sit prima causa effectiva rerum, oportet omnium rerum
perfectiones praeexistere in Deo secundum eminentiorem modum. Et
hanc rationem tangit Dionysius, cap. V de Div. Nom., dicens de Deo
quod <i>non hoc quidem est, hoc autem non est, sed omnia est, ut
omnium causa</i>. Secundo vero, ex hoc quod supra ostensum est,
quod Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens, ex quo oportet quod
totam perfectionem essendi in se contineat. Manifestum est enim
quod, si aliquod calidum non habeat totam perfectionem calidi, hoc
ideo est, quia calor non participatur secundum perfectam rationem,
sed si calor esset per se subsistens, non posset ei aliquid deesse
de virtute caloris. Unde, cum Deus sit ipsum esse subsistens, nihil
de perfectione essendi potest ei deesse. Omnium autem perfectiones
pertinent ad perfectionem essendi, secundum hoc enim aliqua
perfecta sunt, quod aliquo modo esse habent. Unde sequitur quod
nullius rei perfectio Deo desit. Et hanc etiam rationem tangit
Dionysius, cap. V de Div. Nom., dicens quod <i>Deus non quodammodo
est existens, sed simpliciter et incircumscripte totum in seipso
uniformiter esse praeaccipit</i>, et postea subdit quod <i>ipse est
esse subsistentibus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as the sun (as Dionysius remarks, (Div. Nom. v)), while remaining one and shining uniformly, contains within itself
                     first and uniformly the substances of sensible things, and many and diverse qualities; "a fortiori" should all things in a
                     kind of natural unity pre-exist in the cause of all things; and thus things diverse and in themselves opposed to each other,
                     pre-exist in God as one, without injury to His simplicity.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28395" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28395] Iª q. 4 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, <i>sicut sol</i>, ut dicit Dionysius, cap. V de Div.
Nom., <i>sensibilium substantias et qualitates multas et
differentes, ipse unus existens et uniformiter lucendo, in seipso
uniformiter praeaccipit; ita multo magis in causa omnium necesse
est praeexistere omnia secundum naturalem unionem</i>. Et sic, quae
sunt diversa et opposita in seipsis, in Deo praeexistunt ut unum,
absque detrimento simplicitatis ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p7a">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This suffices for the Reply
                     to the Second Objection.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28396] Iª q. 4 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc patet
solutio ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that, although existence is more perfect than life, and life than wisdom, if they are
                     considered as distinguished in idea; nevertheless, a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists, because living
                     things also exist and intelligent things both exist and live. Although therefore existence does not include life and wisdom,
                     because that which participates in existence need not participate in every mode of
                     existence; nevertheless God's existence includes in itself life and wisdom, because nothing of the perfection of being can
                     be wanting to Him who is subsisting being itself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28397] Iª q. 4 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
quod, sicut in eodem capite idem Dionysius dicit, licet ipsum esse
sit perfectius quam vita, et ipsa vita quam ipsa sapientia, si
considerentur secundum quod distinguuntur ratione, tamen vivens est
perfectius quam ens tantum, quia vivens etiam est ens; et sapiens
est ens et vivens. Licet igitur ens non includat in se vivens et
sapiens, quia non oportet quod illud quod participat esse,
participet ipsum secundum omnem modum essendi, tamen ipsum esse Dei
includit in se vitam et sapientiam; quia nulla de perfectionibus
essendi potest deesse ei quod est ipsum esse subsistens.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q4_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q4_A3-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 3. Whether any creature can be like God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no creature can be like God. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.85.8" target="asv">Ps. 85:8</a>): "There is none among the gods like unto Thee, O Lord." But of all creatures the most excellent are those which are called
                     participation gods. Therefore still less can other creatures be said to be like God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28398" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28398] Iª q. 4 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod nulla creatura possit esse similis Deo.
Dicitur enim in Psalmo, <i>non est similis tui in diis, domine</i>.
Sed inter omnes creaturas, excellentiores sunt quae dicuntur dii
participative. Multo ergo minus aliae creaturae possunt dici Deo
similes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, likeness implies comparison. But there can be no comparison between things in a different "genus." Therefore neither
                     can there be any likeness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like whiteness. But no creature is in the same "genus" as
                     God: since God is no "genus," as shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A5" id="FP_Q4_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Therefore no creature is like God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28399] Iª q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
similitudo est comparatio quaedam. Non est autem comparatio eorum
quae sunt diversorum generum; ergo nec similitudo, non enim dicimus
quod dulcedo sit similis albedini. Sed nulla creatura est eiusdem
generis cum Deo, cum Deus non sit in genere, ut supra ostensum est.
Ergo nulla creatura est similis Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we speak of those things as like which agree in form. But nothing can agree with God in form; for, save in God alone,
                     essence and existence differ. Therefore no creature can be like to God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28400" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28400] Iª q. 4 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
similia dicuntur quae conveniunt in forma. Sed nihil convenit cum
Deo in forma, nullius enim rei essentia est ipsum esse, nisi solius
Dei. Ergo nulla creatura potest esse similis Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, among like things there is mutual likeness; for like is like to like. If therefore any creature is like God, God
                     will be like some creature, which is against what is said by Isaias: "To whom have you likened God?" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.40.18" target="asv">Is. 40:18</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="28401" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28401] Iª q. 4 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in
similibus est mutua similitudo, nam simile est simili simile. Si
igitur aliqua creatura est similis Deo, et Deus erit similis alicui
creaturae. Quod est contra id quod dicitur Isaiae XL, <i>cui
similem fecistis Deum?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>), and: "When He shall appear we shall be like to Him" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28402" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28402] Iª q. 4 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Gen. I, <i>faciamus hominem ad imaginem et
similitudinem nostram</i>; et I Ioann. III, <i>cum apparuerit,
similes ei erimus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since likeness is based upon agreement or communication in form, it varies according to the many modes of communication in
                     form. Some things are said to be like, which communicate in the same form according to the same formality, and according to
                     the same mode; and these are said to be not merely like, but equal in their likeness; as two things equally white are said
                     to be alike in whiteness; and this is the most perfect likeness. In another way, we speak of
                     things as alike which communicate in form according to the same formality, though not according to the same measure, but according
                     to more or less, as something less white is said to be like another thing more white; and this is imperfect likeness. In a
                     third way some things are said to be alike which communicate in the same form, but not according to the same formality; as
                     we see in non-univocal agents. For since every agent reproduces itself so far as it is an agent, and everything acts
                     according to the manner of its form, the effect must in some way resemble the form of the agent. If therefore the agent is
                     contained in the same species as its effect, there will be a likeness in form between that which makes and that which is made,
                     according to the same formality of the species; as man reproduces man. If, however, the agent and its effect are not contained
                     in the same species, there will be a likeness, but not according to the formality of the same species; as things generated
                     by the sun's heat may be in some sort spoken of as like the sun, not as though they received the form of the sun in its specific
                     likeness, but in its generic likeness. Therefore if there is an agent not contained in any "genus," its effect will still
                     more distantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so as to participate in the likeness of the agent's form according
                     to the same specific or generic formality, but only according to some sort of analogy; as existence is common to all.
                     In this way all created things, so far as they are beings, are like God as the first and universal principle of all being.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 co."><a name="28403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28403] Iª q. 4 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, cum similitudo attendatur secundum convenientiam vel
communicationem in forma, multiplex est similitudo, secundum multos
modos communicandi in forma. Quaedam enim dicuntur similia, quae
communicant in eadem forma secundum eandem rationem, et secundum
eundem modum, et haec non solum dicuntur similia, sed aequalia in
sua similitudine; sicut duo aequaliter alba, dicuntur similia in
albedine. Et haec est perfectissima similitudo. Alio modo dicuntur
similia, quae communicant in forma secundum eandem rationem, et non
secundum eundem modum, sed secundum magis et minus; ut minus album
dicitur simile magis albo. Et haec est similitudo imperfecta.
Tertio modo dicuntur aliqua similia, quae communicant in eadem
forma, sed non secundum eandem rationem; ut patet in agentibus non
univocis. Cum enim omne agens agat sibi simile inquantum est agens,
agit autem unumquodque secundum suam formam, necesse est quod in
effectu sit similitudo formae agentis. Si ergo agens sit contentum
in eadem specie cum suo effectu, erit similitudo inter faciens et
factum in forma, secundum eandem rationem speciei; sicut homo
generat hominem. Si autem agens non sit contentum in eadem specie,
erit similitudo, sed non secundum eandem rationem speciei, sicut ea
quae generantur ex virtute solis, accedunt quidem ad aliquam
similitudinem solis, non tamen ut recipiant formam solis secundum
similitudinem speciei, sed secundum similitudinem generis. Si
igitur sit aliquod agens, quod non in genere contineatur, effectus
eius adhuc magis accedent remote ad similitudinem formae agentis,
non tamen ita quod participent similitudinem formae agentis
secundum eandem rationem speciei aut generis, sed secundum
aliqualem analogiam, sicut ipsum esse est commune omnibus. Et hoc
modo illa quae sunt a Deo, assimilantur ei inquantum sunt entia, ut
primo et universali principio totius esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix), when Holy Writ declares that nothing is like God, it does not mean to deny all likeness
                     to Him. For, "the same things can be like and unlike to God: like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not
                     perfectly imitable, can be imitated; unlike according as they fall short of their cause," not merely in intensity and remission,
                     as that which is less white falls short of that which is more white; but because
                     they are not in agreement, specifically or generically.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28404] Iª q. 4 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, sicut dicit Dionysius cap. IX de Div. Nom., cum
sacra Scriptura dicit aliquid non esse simile Deo, <i>non est
contrarium assimilationi ad ipsum. Eadem enim sunt similia Deo, et
dissimilia, similia quidem secundum quod imitantur ipsum, prout
contingit eum imitari qui non perfecte imitabilis est dissimilia
vero, secundum quod deficiunt a sua causa</i>; non solum secundum
intensionem et remissionem, sicut minus album deficit a magis albo;
sed quia non est convenientia nec secundum speciem nec secundum
genus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is not related to creatures as though belonging to a different "genus," but as transcending every "genus," and as the
                     principle of all "genera."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28405] Iª q. 4 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod Deus non se habet ad creaturas sicut res diversorum
generum, sed sicut id quod est extra omne genus, et principium
omnium generum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Likeness of creatures to God is not affirmed on account of agreement in form according to the formality of the same genus
                     or species, but solely according to analogy, inasmuch as God is essential being, whereas other things are beings by participation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28406] Iª q. 4 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
quod non dicitur esse similitudo creaturae ad Deum propter
communicantiam in forma secundum eandem rationem generis et
speciei, sed secundum analogiam tantum; prout scilicet Deus est ens
per essentiam, et alia per participationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although it may be admitted that creatures are in some sort like God, it must nowise be admitted that God is like creatures;
                     because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "A mutual likeness may be found between things of the same order, but not between
                     a cause and that which is caused." For, we say that a statue is like a man, but not conversely; so also a creature can be
                     spoken of as in some sort like God; but not that God is like a creature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="28407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28407] Iª q. 4 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
quod, licet aliquo modo concedatur quod creatura sit similis Deo,
nullo tamen modo concedendum est quod Deus sit similis creaturae,
quia, ut dicit Dionysius cap. IX de Div. Nom., <i>in his quae unius
ordinis sunt, recipitur mutua similitudo, non autem in causa et
causato</i>, dicimus enim quod imago sit similis homini, et non e
converso. Et similiter dici potest aliquo modo quod creatura sit
similis Deo, non tamen quod Deus sit similis creaturae.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q5" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q5-p0.1">Q. 5. OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q5-p2"> We next consider goodness: First, goodness in general. Secondly, the goodness of God.</p><p id="FP_Q5-p3"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q5-p4"><a href="#FP_Q5_A1"> (1) Whether goodness and being are the same really?</a></p><p id="FP_Q5-p5"><a href="#FP_Q5_A2"> (2) Granted that they differ only in idea, which is prior in thought?</a></p><p id="FP_Q5-p6"><a href="#FP_Q5_A3"> (3) Granted that being is prior, whether every being is good?</a></p><p id="FP_Q5-p7"><a href="#FP_Q5_A4"> (4) To what cause should goodness be reduced?</a></p><p id="FP_Q5-p8"><a href="#FP_Q5_A5"> (5) Whether goodness consists in mode, species, and order?</a></p><p id="FP_Q5-p9"><a href="#FP_Q5_A6"> (6) Whether goodness is divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 pr."><a name="28408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28408]
Iª q. 5 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de bono, et primo de
bono in communi; secundo de bonitate Dei. Circa primum quaeruntur
sex. Primo, utrum bonum et ens sint idem secundum rem. Secundo,
supposito quod differant ratione tantum, quid sit prius secundum
rationem, utrum bonum vel ens. Tertio, supposito quod ens sit
prius, utrum omne ens sit bonum. Quarto, ad quam causam ratio boni
reducatur. Quinto, utrum ratio boni consistat in modo, specie et
ordine. Sexto, quomodo dividatur bonum in honestum, utile et
delectabile.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q5_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q5_A1-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 1. Whether goodness differs really from being?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goodness differs really from being. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "I perceive that in nature the fact that
                     things are good is one thing: that they are is another." Therefore goodness and being really differ.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28409] Iª q. 5 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod bonum differat secundum rem ab ente. Dicit
enim Boetius, in libro de Hebdom., <i>intueor in rebus aliud esse
quod sunt bona, et aliud esse quod sunt</i>. Ergo bonum et ens
differunt secundum rem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing can be its own form. "But that is called good which has the form of being", according to the commentary
                     on De Causis. Therefore goodness differs really from being.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28410] Iª q. 5 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nihil
informatur seipso. Sed bonum dicitur per informationem entis, ut
habetur in commento libri de causis. Ergo bonum differt secundum
rem ab ente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, goodness can be more or less. But being cannot be more or less. Therefore goodness differs really from being.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28411] Iª q. 5 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, bonum
suscipit magis et minus. Esse autem non suscipit magis et minus.
Ergo bonum differt secundum rem ab ente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 42) that, "inasmuch as we exist we are good."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28412] Iª q. 5 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de doctrina Christiana, quod
<i>inquantum sumus, boni sumus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence
                     of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. i): "Goodness is what all
                     desire." Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection. But
                     everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect
                     so far as it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is clear from the foregoing (
                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A4" id="FP_Q5_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>;
                     <a href="#FP_Q4_A1" id="FP_Q5_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[4], A[1]</a>). Hence it is clear that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the aspect of desirableness, which
                     being does not present.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 1 co."><a name="28413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28413] Iª q. 5 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed differunt secundum
rationem tantum. Quod sic patet. Ratio enim boni in hoc consistit,
quod aliquid sit appetibile, unde philosophus, in I Ethic., dicit
quod <i>bonum est quod omnia appetunt</i>. Manifestum est autem
quod unumquodque est appetibile secundum quod est perfectum, nam
omnia appetunt suam perfectionem. Intantum est autem perfectum
unumquodque, inquantum est actu, unde manifestum est quod intantum
est aliquid bonum, inquantum est ens, esse enim est actualitas
omnis rei, ut ex superioribus patet. Unde manifestum est quod bonum
et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed bonum dicit rationem
appetibilis, quam non dicit ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although goodness and being are the same really, nevertheless since they differ in thought, they are not predicated of a
                     thing absolutely in the same way. Since being properly signifies that something actually is, and actuality properly correlates
                     to potentiality; a thing is, in consequence, said simply to have being, accordingly as it is primarily distinguished from
                     that which is only in potentiality; and this is precisely each thing's substantial
                     being. Hence by its substantial being, everything is said to have being simply; but by any further actuality it is said to
                     have being relatively. Thus to be white implies relative being, for to be white does not take a thing out of simply potential
                     being; because only a thing that actually has being can receive this mode of being. But goodness signifies perfection which
                     is desirable; and consequently of ultimate perfection. Hence that which has ultimate perfection is said to be simply good;
                     but
                     that which has not the ultimate perfection it ought to have (although, in so far as it is at all actual, it has some perfection),
                     is not said to be perfect simply nor good simply, but only relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in its primal (i.e.
                     substantial) being a thing is said to be simply, and to be good relatively (i.e. in so far as it has being) but viewed in
                     its complete actuality, a thing is said to be relatively, and to be good simply. Hence the saying of Boethius (De Hebrom.),
                     "I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing; that they are is another," is to be referred to a thing's
                     goodness simply, and having being simply. Because, regarded in its primal actuality, a thing simply exists; and regarded in
                     its complete actuality, it is good simply---in such sort that even in its primal actuality, it is in some sort good, and even
                     in its complete actuality, it in some sort has being.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28414] Iª q. 5 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, licet bonum et ens sint idem secundum rem, quia
tamen differunt secundum rationem, non eodem modo dicitur aliquid
ens simpliciter, et bonum simpliciter. Nam cum ens dicat aliquid
proprie esse in actu; actus autem proprie ordinem habeat ad
potentiam; secundum hoc simpliciter aliquid dicitur ens, secundum
quod primo discernitur ab eo quod est in potentia tantum. Hoc autem
est esse substantiale rei uniuscuiusque; unde per suum esse
substantiale dicitur unumquodque ens simpliciter. Per actus autem
superadditos, dicitur aliquid esse secundum quid, sicut esse album
significat esse secundum quid, non enim esse album aufert esse in
potentia simpliciter, cum adveniat rei iam praeexistenti in actu.
Sed bonum dicit rationem perfecti, quod est appetibile, et per
consequens dicit rationem ultimi. Unde id quod est ultimo
perfectum, dicitur bonum simpliciter. Quod autem non habet ultimam
perfectionem quam debet habere, quamvis habeat aliquam perfectionem
inquantum est actu, non tamen dicitur perfectum simpliciter, nec
bonum simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Sic ergo secundum primum
esse, quod est substantiale, dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter et
bonum secundum quid, idest inquantum est ens, secundum vero ultimum
actum dicitur aliquid ens secundum quid, et bonum simpliciter. Sic
ergo quod dicit Boetius, quod <i>in rebus aliud est quod sunt bona,
et aliud quod sunt</i>, referendum est ad esse bonum et ad esse
simpliciter, quia secundum primum actum est aliquid ens
simpliciter; et secundum ultimum, bonum simpliciter. Et tamen
secundum primum actum est quodammodo bonum, et secundum ultimum
actum est quodammodo ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness signifies complete actuality.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28415] Iª q. 5 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod bonum dicitur per informationem, prout accipitur
bonum simpliciter, secundum ultimum actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less according to a thing's superadded actuality, for example, as to knowledge or
                     virtue.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28416] Iª q. 5 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Et similiter
dicendum ad tertium, quod bonum dicitur secundum magis et minus,
secundum actum supervenientem; puta secundum scientiam vel
virtutem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q5_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q5_A2-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 2. Whether goodness is prior in idea to being?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goodness is prior in idea to being. For names are arranged according to the arrangement of the things signified
                     by the names. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) assigned the first place, amongst the other names of God, to His goodness rather
                     than to His being. Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28417] Iª q. 5 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam
ens. Ordo enim nominum est secundum ordinem rerum significatarum
per nomina. Sed Dionysius, inter alia nomina Dei, prius ponit bonum
quam ens, ut patet, in III cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo bonum secundum
rationem est prius quam ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is the more extensive is prior in idea. But goodness is more extensive than being, because, as Dionysius
                     notes (Div. Nom. v), "goodness extends to things both existing and non-existing; whereas existence extends to existing things
                     alone." Therefore goodness is in idea prior to being.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28418] Iª q. 5 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, illud
est prius secundum rationem, quod ad plura se extendit. Sed bonum
ad plura se extendit quam ens, quia, ut dicit Dionysius, V cap. de
Div. Nom., <i>bonum se extendit ad existentia et non existentia,
ens vero ad existentia tantum</i>. Ergo bonum est prius secundum
rationem quam ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is the more universal is prior in idea. But goodness seems to be more universal than being, since goodness
                     has the aspect of desirable; whereas to some non-existence is desirable; for it is said of Judas: "It were better for him,
                     if that man had not been born" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q5_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.26.24" target="asv">Mat. 26:24</a>). Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28419] Iª q. 5 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod
est universalius, est prius secundum rationem. Sed bonum videtur
universalius esse quam ens, quia bonum habet rationem appetibilis;
quibusdam autem appetibile est ipsum non esse; dicitur enim, Matth.
XXVI, de Iuda, <i>bonum erat ei, si natus non fuisset</i> et
cetera. Ergo bonum est prius quam ens, secundum rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, not only is existence desirable, but life, knowledge, and many other things besides. Thus it seems that existence
                     is a particular appetible, and goodness a universal appetible. Therefore, absolutely, goodness is prior in idea to being.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="28420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28420] Iª q. 5 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, non
solum esse est appetibile, sed et vita et sapientia, et multa
huiusmodi, et sic videtur quod esse sit quoddam particulare
appetibile, et bonum, universale. Bonum ergo simpliciter est prius
secundum rationem quam ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said by Aristotle (De Causis) that "the first of created things is being."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28421] Iª q. 5 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur in libro de causis, quod <i>prima rerum creatarum est
esse</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In idea being is prior to goodness. For the meaning signified by the name of a thing is that which the mind conceives of
                     the thing and intends by the word that stands for it. Therefore, that is prior in idea, which is first conceived by the intellect.
                     Now the first thing conceived by the intellect is being; because everything is knowable only inasmuch as it is in actuality.
                     Hence, being is the proper object of the intellect, and is primarily intelligible; as
                     sound is that which is primarily audible. Therefore in idea being is prior to goodness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 co."><a name="28422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28422] Iª q. 5 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod ens secundum rationem est prius quam bonum. Ratio enim
significata per nomen, est id quod concipit intellectus de re, et
significat illud per vocem, illud ergo est prius secundum rationem,
quod prius cadit in conceptione intellectus. Primo autem in
conceptione intellectus cadit ens, quia secundum hoc unumquodque
cognoscibile est, inquantum est actu, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys.
Unde ens est proprium obiectum intellectus, et sic est primum
intelligibile, sicut sonus est primum audibile. Ita ergo secundum
rationem prius est ens quam bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius discusses the Divine Names (Div. Nom. i, iii) as implying some causal relation in God; for we name God, as he says,
                     from creatures, as a cause from its effects. But goodness, since it has the aspect of desirable, implies the idea of a final
                     cause, the causality of which is first among causes, since an agent does not act except for some end; and by an agent matter
                     is moved to its form. Hence the end is called the cause of causes. Thus
                     goodness, as a cause, is prior to being, as is the end to the form. Therefore among the names signifying the divine causality,
                     goodness precedes being. Again, according to the Platonists, who, through not distinguishing primary matter from privation,
                     said that matter was non-being, goodness is more extensively participated than being; for primary matter participates in goodness
                     as tending to it, for all seek their like; but it does not participate in being, since it is presumed to be non-being.
                     Therefore Dionysius says that "goodness extends to non-existence" (Div. Nom. v).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28423] Iª q. 5 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Dionysius determinat de divinis nominibus secundum
quod important circa Deum habitudinem causae, nominamus enim Deum,
ut ipse dicit, ex creaturis, sicut causam ex effectibus. Bonum
autem, cum habeat rationem appetibilis, importat habitudinem causae
finalis, cuius causalitas prima est, quia agens non agit nisi
propter finem, et ab agente materia movetur ad formam, unde dicitur
quod finis est causa causarum. Et sic, in causando, bonum est prius
quam ens, sicut finis quam forma, et hac ratione, inter nomina
significantia causalitatem divinam, prius ponitur bonum quam ens.
Et iterum quia, secundum Platonicos, qui, materiam a privatione non
distinguentes, dicebant materiam esse non ens, ad plura se extendit
participatio boni quam participatio entis. Nam materia prima
participat bonum, cum appetat ipsum (nihil autem appetit nisi
simile sibi), non autem participat ens, cum ponatur non ens. Et
ideo dicit Dionysius quod <i>bonum extenditur ad non
existentia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same solution is applied to this objection. Or it may be said that goodness extends to existing and non-existing things,
                     not so far as it can be predicated of them, but so far as it can cause them---if, indeed, by non-existence we understand not
                     simply those things which do not exist, but those which are potential, and not actual. For goodness has the aspect of the
                     end, in which not only actual things find their completion, but also towards which
                     tend even those things which are not actual, but merely potential. Now being implies the habitude of a formal cause only,
                     either inherent or exemplar; and its causality does not extend save to those things which are actual.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28424] Iª q. 5 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Unde patet solutio
ad secundum. Vel dicendum quod bonum extenditur ad existentia et
non existentia, non secundum praedicationem, sed secundum
causalitatem, ut per non existentia intelligamus, non ea
simpliciter quae penitus non sunt, sed ea quae sunt in potentia et
non in actu, quia bonum habet rationem finis, in quo non solum
quiescunt quae sunt in actu, sed ad ipsum etiam ea moventur quae in
actu non sunt sed in potentia tantum. Ens autem non importat
habitudinem causae nisi formalis tantum, vel inhaerentis vel
exemplaris, cuius causalitas non se extendit nisi ad ea quae sunt
in actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Non-being is desirable, not of itself, but only relatively---i.e. inasmuch as the removal of an evil, which can only be removed
                     by non-being, is desirable. Now the removal of an evil cannot be desirable, except so far as this evil deprives a thing of
                     some being. Therefore being is desirable of itself; and non-being only relatively, inasmuch as one seeks some mode of being
                     of which one cannot bear to be deprived; thus even non-being can be spoken of as
                     relatively good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28425" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28425] Iª q. 5 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
quod non esse secundum se non est appetibile, sed per accidens,
inquantum scilicet ablatio alicuius mali est appetibilis, quod
malum quidem aufertur per non esse. Ablatio vero mali non est
appetibilis, nisi inquantum per malum privatur quodam esse. Illud
igitur quod per se est appetibile, est esse, non esse vero per
accidens tantum, inquantum scilicet quoddam esse appetitur, quo
homo non sustinet privari. Et sic etiam per accidens non esse
dicitur bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Life, wisdom, and the like, are desirable only so far as they are actual. Hence, in each one of them some sort of being is
                     desired. And thus nothing can be desired except being; and consequently nothing is good except being.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="28426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28426] Iª q. 5 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
quod vita et scientia, et alia huiusmodi, sic appetuntur ut sunt in
actu, unde in omnibus appetitur quoddam esse. Et sic nihil est
appetibile nisi ens, et per consequens nihil est bonum nisi
ens.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q5_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q5_A3-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 3. Whether every being is good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not every being is good. For goodness is something superadded to being, as is clear from A[1]. But whatever
                     is added to being limits it; as substance, quantity, quality, etc. Therefore goodness limits being. Therefore not every being
                     is good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28427" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28427] Iª q. 5 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod non omne ens sit bonum. Bonum enim addit
supra ens, ut ex dictis patet. Ea vero quae addunt aliquid supra
ens, contrahunt ipsum, sicut substantia, quantitas, qualitas, et
alia huiusmodi. Ergo bonum contrahit ens. Non igitur omne ens est
bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no evil is good: "Woe to you that call evil good and good evil" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q5_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.5.20" target="asv">Is. 5:20</a>). But some things are called evil. Therefore not every being is good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28428] Iª q. 5 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nullum
malum est bonum, Isaiae V, <i>vae qui dicitis malum bonum, et bonum
malum</i>. Sed aliquod ens dicitur malum. Ergo non omne ens est
bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, goodness implies desirability. Now primary matter does not imply desirability, but rather that which desires. Therefore
                     primary matter does not contain the formality of goodness. Therefore not every being is good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28429] Iª q. 5 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, bonum
habet rationem appetibilis. Sed materia prima non habet rationem
appetibilis, sed appetentis tantum. Ergo materia prima non habet
rationem boni. Non igitur omne ens est bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher notes (Metaph. iii) that "in mathematics goodness does not exist." But mathematics are entities;
                     otherwise there would be no science of mathematics. Therefore not every being is good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="28430" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28430] Iª q. 5 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
philosophus dicit, in III Metaphys., quod in mathematicis non est
bonum. Sed mathematica sunt quaedam entia, alioquin de eis non
esset scientia. Ergo non omne ens est bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Every being that is not God is God's creature. Now every creature of God is good (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q5_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:4</a>): and God is the greatest good. Therefore every being is good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28431] Iª q. 5 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne
ens quod non est Deus, est Dei creatura. Sed omnis creatura Dei est
bona, ut dicitur I ad Tim., IV cap., Deus vero est maxime bonus.
Ergo omne ens est bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as being, has actuality and is in some way perfect; since every act implies
                     some sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability and goodness, as is clear from A[1]. Hence it follows that every
                     being as such is good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 co."><a name="28432" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28432] Iª q. 5 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod omne ens, inquantum est ens, est bonum. Omne enim ens,
inquantum est ens, est in actu, et quodammodo perfectum, quia omnis
actus perfectio quaedam est. Perfectum vero habet rationem
appetibilis et boni, ut ex dictis patet. Unde sequitur omne ens,
inquantum huiusmodi, bonum esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Substance, quantity, quality, and everything included in them, limit being by applying it to some essence or nature. Now
                     in this sense, goodness does not add anything to being beyond the aspect of desirability and perfection, which is also proper
                     to being, whatever kind of nature it may be. Hence goodness does not limit being.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28433" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28433] Iª q. 5 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod substantia, quantitas et qualitas, et ea quae sub eis
continentur, contrahunt ens applicando ens ad aliquam quidditatem
seu naturam. Sic autem non addit aliquid bonum super ens, sed
rationem tantum appetibilis et perfectionis, quod convenit ipsi
esse in quacumque natura sit. Unde bonum non contrahit ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as being, but only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be evil, because
                     he lacks some virtue; and an eye is said to be evil, because it lacks the power to see well.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28434" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28434] Iª q. 5 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod nullum ens dicitur malum inquantum est ens, sed
inquantum caret quodam esse, sicut homo dicitur malus inquantum
caret esse virtutis, et oculus dicitur malus inquantum caret
acumine visus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As primary matter has only potential being, so it is only potentially good. Although, according to the Platonists, primary
                     matter may be said to be a non-being on account of the privation attaching to it, nevertheless, it does participate to a certain
                     extent in goodness, viz. by its relation to, or aptitude for, goodness. Consequently, to be desirable is not its property,
                     but to desire.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28435" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28435] Iª q. 5 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
quod materia prima, sicut non est ens nisi in potentia, ita nec
bonum nisi in potentia. Licet, secundum Platonicos, dici possit
quod materia prima est non ens, propter privationem adiunctam. Sed
tamen participat aliquid de bono, scilicet ipsum ordinem vel
aptitudinem ad bonum. Et ideo non convenit sibi quod sit
appetibile, sed quod appetat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Mathematical entities do not subsist as realities; because they would be in some sort good if they subsisted; but they have
                     only logical existence, inasmuch as they are abstracted from motion and matter; thus they cannot have the aspect of an end,
                     which itself has the aspect of moving another. Nor is it repugnant that there should be in some logical entity neither goodness
                     nor form of goodness; since the idea of being is prior to the idea of goodness,
                     as was said in the preceding article.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="28436" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28436] Iª q. 5 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
quod mathematica non subsistunt separata secundum esse, quia si
subsisterent, esset in eis bonum, scilicet ipsum esse ipsorum. Sunt
autem mathematica separata secundum rationem tantum, prout
abstrahuntur a motu et a materia, et sic abstrahuntur a ratione
finis, qui habet rationem moventis. Non est autem inconveniens quod
in aliquo ente secundum rationem non sit bonum vel ratio boni, cum
ratio entis sit prior quam ratio boni, sicut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q5_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q5_A4-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 4. Whether goodness has the aspect of a final cause?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goodness has not the aspect of a final cause, but rather of the other causes. For, as Dionysius says (Div.
                     Nom. iv), "Goodness is praised as beauty." But beauty has the aspect of a formal cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect
                     of a formal cause.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28437" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28437] Iª q. 5 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod bonum non habeat rationem causae finalis,
sed magis aliarum. Ut enim dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom.,
<i>bonum laudatur ut pulchrum</i>. Sed pulchrum importat rationem
causae formalis. Ergo bonum habet rationem causae formalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, goodness is self-diffusive; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that goodness is that whereby all things subsist,
                     and are. But to be self-giving implies the aspect of an efficient cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of an efficient
                     cause.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28438" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28438] Iª q. 5 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, bonum
est diffusivum sui esse, ut ex verbis Dionysii accipitur, quibus
dicit quod <i>bonum est ex quo omnia subsistunt et sunt</i>. Sed
esse diffusivum importat rationem causae efficientis. Ergo bonum
habet rationem causae efficientis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 31) that "we exist because God is good." But we owe our existence to God as
                     the efficient cause. Therefore goodness implies the aspect of an efficient cause.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28439" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28439] Iª q. 5 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, dicit
Augustinus in I de Doctr. Christ., quod <i>quia Deus bonus est, nos
sumus</i>. Sed ex Deo sumus sicut ex causa efficiente. Ergo bonum
importat rationem causae efficientis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "that is to be considered as the end and the good of other things, for the sake of which
                     something is." Therefore goodness has the aspect of a final cause.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28440" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28440] Iª q. 5 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod philosophus dicit, in II Physic., quod <i>illud cuius causa
est, est sicut finis et bonum aliorum</i>. Bonum ergo habet
rationem causae finalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since goodness is that which all things desire, and since this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies
                     the aspect of an end. Nevertheless, the idea of goodness presupposes the idea of an efficient cause, and also of a formal
                     cause. For we see that what is first in causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, e.g. heats first of all before it reproduces
                     the form of fire; though the heat in the fire follows from its substantial form. Now in
                     causing, goodness and the end come first, both of which move the agent to act; secondly, the action of the agent moving to
                     the form; thirdly, comes the form. Hence in that which is caused the converse ought to take place, so that there should be
                     first, the form whereby it is a being; secondly, we consider in it its effective power, whereby it is perfect in being, for
                     a thing is perfect when it can reproduce its like, as the Philosopher says (Meteor. iv); thirdly, there follows the formality
                     of
                     goodness which is the basic principle of its perfection.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 4 co."><a name="28441" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28441] Iª q. 5 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, cum bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, hoc autem habet rationem
finis; manifestum est quod bonum rationem finis importat. Sed tamen
ratio boni praesupponit rationem causae efficientis, et rationem
causae formalis. Videmus enim quod id quod est primum in causando,
ultimum est in causato, ignis enim primo calefacit quam formam
ignis inducat, cum tamen calor in igne consequatur formam
substantialem. In causando autem, primum invenitur bonum et finis,
qui movet efficientem; secundo, actio efficientis, movens ad
formam; tertio advenit forma. Unde e converso esse oportet in
causato, quod primum sit ipsa forma, per quam est ens; secundo
consideratur in ea virtus effectiva, secundum quod est perfectum in
esse (quia unumquodque tunc perfectum est, quando potest sibi
simile facere, ut dicit philosophus in IV Meteor.); tertio
consequitur ratio boni, per quam in ente perfectio fundatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical fundamentally; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the form; and
                     consequently goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ logically, for goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness
                     being what all things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an end (the appetite being a kind of movement towards a
                     thing). On the other hand, beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful
                     things are those which please when seen. Hence beauty consists in due proportion; for the senses delight in things duly proportioned,
                     as in what is after their own kind---because even sense is a sort of reason, just as is every cognitive faculty. Now since
                     knowledge is by assimilation, and similarity relates to form, beauty properly belongs to the nature of a formal cause.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28442" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28442] Iª q. 5 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod pulchrum et bonum in subiecto quidem sunt idem, quia
super eandem rem fundantur, scilicet super formam, et propter hoc,
bonum laudatur ut pulchrum. Sed ratione differunt. Nam bonum
proprie respicit appetitum, est enim bonum quod omnia appetunt. Et
ideo habet rationem finis, nam appetitus est quasi quidam motus ad
rem. Pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam, pulchra enim
dicuntur quae visa placent. Unde pulchrum in debita proportione
consistit, quia sensus delectatur in rebus debite proportionatis,
sicut in sibi similibus; nam et sensus ratio quaedam est, et omnis
virtus cognoscitiva. Et quia cognitio fit per assimilationem,
similitudo autem respicit formam, pulchrum proprie pertinet ad
rationem causae formalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the sense that an end is said to move.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28443" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28443] Iª q. 5 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod bonum dicitur diffusivum sui esse, eo modo quo finis
dicitur movere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He who has a will is said to be good, so far as he has a good will; because it is by our will that we employ whatever powers
                     we may have. Hence a man is said to be good, not by his good understanding; but by his good will. Now the will relates to
                     the end as to its proper object. Thus the saying, "we exist because God is good" has reference to the final cause.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28444" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28444] Iª q. 5 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
quod quilibet habens voluntatem, dicitur bonus inquantum habet
bonam voluntatem, quia per voluntatem utimur omnibus quae in nobis
sunt. Unde non dicitur bonus homo, qui habet bonum intellectum, sed
qui habet bonam voluntatem. Voluntas autem respicit finem ut
obiectum proprium, et sic, quod dicitur, quia Deus est bonus,
sumus, refertur ad causam finalem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q5_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q5_A5-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 5. Whether the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order. For goodness and being differ logically.
                     But mode, species and order seem to belong to the nature of being, for it is written: "Thou hast ordered all things in measure,
                     and number, and weight" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q5_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>). And to these three can be reduced species, mode and order, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3): "Measure fixes the mode
                     of everything, number gives it
                     its species, and weight gives it rest and stability." Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species
                     and order.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28445" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28445] Iª q. 5 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod ratio boni non consistat in modo, specie
et ordine. Bonum enim et ens ratione differunt, ut supra dictum
est. Sed modus, species et ordo pertinere ad rationem entis
videntur, quia, sicut dicitur Sap. XI, <i>omnia in numero, pondere
et mensura disposuisti</i>, ad quae tria reducuntur species, modus
et ordo, quia, ut dicit Augustinus, IV super Gen. ad litteram,
<i>mensura omni rei modum praefigit, et numerus omni rei speciem
praebet, et pondus omnem rem ad quietem et stabilitatem trahit</i>.
Ergo ratio boni non consistit in modo, specie et ordine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mode, species and order are themselves good. Therefore if the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and
                     order, then every mode must have its own mode, species and order. The same would be the case with species and order in endless
                     succession.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28446" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28446] Iª q. 5 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ipse
modus, species et ordo bona quaedam sunt. Si ergo ratio boni
consistit in modo, specie et ordine, oportet etiam quod modus
habeat modum, speciem et ordinem, et similiter species et ordo.
Ergo procederetur in infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, evil is the privation of mode, species and order. But evil is not the total absence of goodness. Therefore the essence
                     of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="28447" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28447] Iª q. 5 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, malum
est privatio modi et speciei et ordinis. Sed malum non tollit
totaliter bonum. Ergo ratio boni non consistit in modo, specie et
ordine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that wherein consists the essence of goodness cannot be spoken of as evil. Yet we can speak of an evil mode, species
                     and order. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="28448" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28448] Iª q. 5 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, illud
in quo consistit ratio boni, non potest dici malum. Sed dicitur
malus modus, mala species, malus ordo. Ergo ratio boni non
consistit in modo, specie et ordine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, mode, species and order are caused by weight, number and measure, as appears from the quotation from Augustine.
                     But not every good thing has weight, number and measure; for Ambrose says (Hexam. i, 9): "It is of the nature of light not
                     to have been created in number, weight and measure." Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and
                     order.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 5"><a name="28449" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28449] Iª q. 5 a. 5 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, modus,
species et ordo ex pondere, numero et mensura causantur, ut ex
auctoritate Augustini inducta patet. Non autem omnia bona habent
pondus, numerum et mensuram, dicit enim Ambrosius, in Hexaemeron,
quod <i>lucis natura est, ut non in numero, non in pondere, non in
mensura creata sit</i>. Non ergo ratio boni consistit in modo,
specie et ordine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p7">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. iii): "These three---mode, species and order---as common good things, are in everything God
                     has made; thus, where these three abound the things are very good; where they are less, the things are less good; where they
                     do not exist at all, there can be nothing good." But this would not be unless the essence of goodness consisted in them. Therefore
                     the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28450" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28450] Iª q. 5 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de natura boni, <i>haec tria,
modus, species et ordo, tanquam generalia bona sunt in rebus a Deo
factis, et ita, haec tria ubi magna sunt, magna bona sunt; ubi
parva, parva bona sunt; ubi nulla, nullum bonum est</i>. Quod non
esset, nisi ratio boni in eis consisteret. Ergo ratio boni
consistit in modo, specie et ordine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect; for in that way only is it desirable (as shown above
                     <a href="#FP_Q5_A1" id="FP_Q5_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,3). Now a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode of its perfection. But since everything is
                     what it is by its form (and since the form presupposes certain things, and from the form certain things necessarily follow),
                     in order for a thing to be perfect and good it must have a form, together
                     with all that precedes and follows upon that form. Now the form presupposes determination or commensuration of its principles,
                     whether material or efficient, and this is signified by the mode: hence it is said that the measure marks the mode. But the
                     form itself is signified by the species; for everything is placed in its species by its form. Hence the number is said to
                     give the species, for definitions signifying species are like numbers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x); for as a
                     unit
                     added to, or taken from a number, changes its species, so a difference added to, or taken from a definition, changes its species.
                     Further, upon the form follows an inclination to the end, or to an action, or something of the sort; for everything, in so
                     far as it is in act, acts and tends towards that which is in accordance with its form; and this belongs to weight and order.
                     Hence the essence of goodness, so far as it consists in perfection, consists also in mode, species and order.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 co."><a name="28451" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28451] Iª q. 5 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod unumquodque dicitur bonum, inquantum est perfectum, sic enim
est appetibile, ut supra dictum est. Perfectum autem dicitur, cui
nihil deest secundum modum suae perfectionis. Cum autem unumquodque
sit id quod est, per suam formam; forma autem praesupponit quaedam,
et quaedam ad ipsam ex necessitate consequuntur; ad hoc quod
aliquid sit perfectum et bonum, necesse est quod formam habeat, et
ea quae praeexiguntur ad eam, et ea quae consequuntur ad ipsam.
Praeexigitur autem ad formam determinatio sive commensuratio
principiorum, seu materialium, seu efficientium ipsam, et hoc
significatur per modum, unde dicitur quod mensura modum praefigit.
Ipsa autem forma significatur per speciem, quia per formam
unumquodque in specie constituitur. Et propter hoc dicitur quod
numerus speciem praebet, quia definitiones significantes speciem
sunt sicut numeri, secundum philosophum in VIII Metaphys.; sicut
enim unitas addita vel subtracta variat speciem numeri, ita in
definitionibus differentia apposita vel subtracta. Ad formam autem
consequitur inclinatio ad finem, aut ad actionem, aut ad aliquid
huiusmodi, quia unumquodque, inquantum est actu, agit, et tendit in
id quod sibi convenit secundum suam formam. Et hoc pertinet ad
pondus et ordinem. Unde ratio boni, secundum quod consistit in
perfectione, consistit etiam in modo, specie et ordine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These three only follow upon being, so far as it is perfect, and according to this perfection is it good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28452" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28452] Iª q. 5 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod ista tria non consequuntur ens, nisi inquantum est
perfectum, et secundum hoc est bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Mode, species and order are said to be good, and to be beings, not as though they themselves were subsistences, but because
                     it is through them that other things are both beings and good. Hence they have no need of other things whereby they are good:
                     for they are spoken of as good, not as though formally constituted so by something else, but as formally constituting others
                     good: thus whiteness is not said to be a being as though it were by anything
                     else; but because, by it, something else has accidental being, as an object that is white.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28453" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28453] Iª q. 5 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod modus, species et ordo eo modo dicuntur bona, sicut
et entia, non quia ipsa sint quasi subsistentia, sed quia eis alia
sunt et entia et bona. Unde non oportet quod ipsa habeant aliqua
alia, quibus sint bona. Non enim sic dicuntur bona, quasi
formaliter aliis sint bona; sed quia ipsis formaliter aliqua sunt
bona; sicut albedo non dicitur ens quia ipsa aliquo sit, sed quia
ipsa aliquid est secundum quid, scilicet album.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every being is due to some form. Hence, according to every being of a thing is its mode, species, order. Thus, a man has
                     a mode, species and order as he is white, virtuous, learned and so on; according to everything predicated of him. But evil
                     deprives a thing of some sort of being, as blindness deprives us of that being which is sight; yet it does not destroy every
                     mode, species and order, but only such as follow upon the being of sight.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="28454" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28454] Iª q. 5 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
quod quodlibet esse est secundum formam aliquam, unde secundum
quodlibet esse rei, consequuntur ipsam modus, species et ordo,
sicut homo habet speciem, modum et ordinem, inquantum est homo; et
similiter inquantum est albus, habet similiter modum, speciem et
ordinem; et inquantum est virtuosus, et inquantum est sciens, et
secundum omnia quae de ipso dicuntur. Malum autem privat quodam
esse, sicut caecitas privat esse visus, unde non tollit omnem
modum, speciem et ordinem; sed solum modum, speciem et ordinem quae
consequuntur esse visus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. xxiii), "Every mode, as mode, is good" (and the same can be said of species and order). "But
                     an evil mode, species and order are so called as being less than they ought to be, or as not belonging to that which they
                     ought to belong. Therefore they are called evil, because they are out of place and incongruous."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="28455" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28455] Iª q. 5 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
quod, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de natura boni, <i>omnis
modus, inquantum modus, bonus est</i> (et sic potest dici de specie
et ordine), <i>sed malus modus, vel mala species, vel malus ordo,
aut ideo dicuntur quia minora sunt quam esse debuerunt; aut quia
non his rebus accommodantur, quibus accommodanda sunt; ut ideo
dicantur mala, quia sunt aliena et incongrua</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The nature of light is spoken of as being without number, weight and measure, not absolutely, but in comparison with corporeal
                     things, because the power of light extends to all corporeal things; inasmuch as it is an active quality of the first body
                     that causes change, i.e. the heavens.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 5"><a name="28456" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28456] Iª q. 5 a. 5 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum
quod natura lucis dicitur esse sine numero et pondere et mensura,
non simpliciter, sed per comparationem ad corporalia, quia virtus
lucis ad omnia corporalia se extendit, inquantum est qualitas
activa primi corporis alterantis, scilicet caeli.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q5_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q5_A6-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 6. Whether goodness is rightly divided into the virtuous*, the useful and the pleasant? [*"Bonum honestum" is the virtuous good
                     considered as fitting. (cf. SS, Q[141], A[3]; SS, Q[145])]
                  </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goodness is not rightly divided into the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant. For goodness is divided by
                     the ten predicaments, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i). But the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant can be found under
                     one predicament. Therefore goodness is not rightly divided by them.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28457" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28457] Iª q. 5 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod non convenienter dividatur bonum per
honestum, utile et delectabile. Bonum enim, sicut dicit philosophus
in I Ethic., dividitur per decem praedicamenta. Honestum autem,
utile et delectabile inveniri possunt in uno praedicamento. Ergo
non convenienter per haec dividitur bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every division is made by opposites. But these three do not seem to be opposites; for the virtuous is pleasing,
                     and no wickedness is useful; whereas this ought to be the case if the division were made by opposites, for then the virtuous
                     and the useful would be opposed; and Tully speaks of this (De Offic. ii). Therefore this division is incorrect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28458" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28458] Iª q. 5 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis
divisio fit per opposita. Sed haec tria non videntur esse opposita,
nam honesta sunt delectabilia, nullumque inhonestum est utile (quod
tamen oportet, si divisio fieret per opposita, ut opponerentur
honestum et utile), ut etiam dicit Tullius, in libro de officiis.
Ergo praedicta divisio non est conveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, where one thing is on account of another, there is only one thing. But the useful is not goodness, except so far
                     as it is pleasing and virtuous. Therefore the useful ought not to divided against the pleasant and the virtuous.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="28459" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28459] Iª q. 5 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ubi
unum propter alterum, ibi unum tantum est. Sed utile non est bonum
nisi propter delectabile vel honestum. Ergo non debet utile dividi
contra delectabile et honestum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose makes use of this division of goodness (De Offic. i, 9)
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28460" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28460] Iª q. 5 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Ambrosius, in libro de officiis, utitur ista divisione
boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> This division properly concerns human goodness. But if we consider the nature of goodness from a higher and more universal
                     point of view, we shall find that this division properly concerns goodness as such. For everything is good so far as it is
                     desirable, and is a term of the movement of the appetite; the term of whose movement can be seen from a consideration of the
                     movement of a natural body. Now the movement of a natural body is terminated by the end
                     absolutely; and relatively by the means through which it comes to the end, where the movement ceases; so a thing is called
                     a term of movement, so far as it terminates any part of that movement. Now the ultimate term of movement can be taken in two
                     ways, either as the thing itself towards which it tends, e.g. a place or form; or a state of rest in that thing. Thus, in
                     the movement of the appetite, the thing desired that terminates the movement of the appetite relatively, as a means by which
                     something tends towards another, is called the useful; but that sought after as the last thing absolutely terminating the
                     movement of the appetite, as a thing towards which for its own sake the appetite tends, is called the virtuous; for the virtuous
                     is that which is desired for its own sake; but that which terminates the movement of the appetite in the form of rest in the
                     thing desired, is called the pleasant.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 6 co."><a name="28461" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28461] Iª q. 5 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod haec divisio proprie videtur esse boni humani. Si tamen altius
et communius rationem boni consideremus, invenitur haec divisio
proprie competere bono, secundum quod bonum est. Nam bonum est
aliquid, inquantum est appetibile, et terminus motus appetitus.
Cuius quidem motus terminatio considerari potest ex consideratione
motus corporis naturalis. Terminatur autem motus corporis
naturalis, simpliciter quidem ad ultimum; secundum quid autem etiam
ad medium, per quod itur ad ultimum quod terminat motum, et dicitur
aliquis terminus motus, inquantum aliquam partem motus terminat. Id
autem quod est ultimus terminus motus, potest accipi dupliciter,
vel ipsa res in quam tenditur, utpote locus vel forma; vel quies in
re illa. Sic ergo in motu appetitus, id quod est appetibile
terminans motum appetitus secundum quid, ut medium per quod
tenditur in aliud, vocatur utile. Id autem quod appetitur ut
ultimum, terminans totaliter motum appetitus, sicut quaedam res in
quam per se appetitus tendit, vocatur honestum, quia honestum
dicitur quod per se desideratur. Id autem quod terminat motum
appetitus ut quies in re desiderata, est delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Goodness, so far as it is identical with being, is divided by the ten predicaments. But this division belongs to it according
                     to its proper formality.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28462] Iª q. 5 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod bonum, inquantum est idem subiecto cum ente,
dividitur per decem praedicamenta, sed secundum propriam rationem,
competit sibi ista divisio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This division is not by opposite things; but by opposite aspects. Now those things are called pleasing which have no other
                     formality under which they are desirable except the pleasant, being sometimes hurtful and contrary to virtue. Whereas the
                     useful applies to such as have nothing desirable in themselves, but are desired only as helpful to something further, as the
                     taking of bitter medicine; while the virtuous is predicated of such as are desirable
                     in themselves.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28463" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28463] Iª q. 5 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod haec divisio non est per oppositas res, sed per
oppositas rationes. Dicuntur tamen illa proprie delectabilia, quae
nullam habent aliam rationem appetibilitatis nisi delectationem,
cum aliquando sint et noxia et inhonesta. Utilia vero dicuntur,
quae non habent in se unde desiderentur; sed desiderantur solum ut
sunt ducentia in alterum, sicut sumptio medicinae amarae. Honesta
vero dicuntur, quae in seipsis habent unde desiderentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Goodness is not divided into these three as something univocal to be predicated equally of them all; but as something analogical
                     to be predicated of them according to priority and posteriority. Hence it is predicated chiefly of the virtuous; then of the
                     pleasant; and lastly of the useful.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="28464" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28464] Iª q. 5 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
quod bonum non dividitur in ista tria sicut univocum aequaliter de
his praedicatum, sed sicut analogum, quod praedicatur secundum
prius et posterius. Per prius enim praedicatur de honesto; et
secundario de delectabili; tertio de utili.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q6" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q6-p0.1">Q. 6. THE GOODNESS OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q6-p2"> We next consider the goodness of God; under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q6-p3"><a href="#FP_Q6_A1"> (1) Whether goodness belongs to God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q6-p4"><a href="#FP_Q6_A2"> (2) Whether God is the supreme good?</a></p><p id="FP_Q6-p5"><a href="#FP_Q6_A3"> (3) Whether He alone is essentially good?</a></p><p id="FP_Q6-p6"><a href="#FP_Q6_A4"> (4) Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 pr."><a name="28465" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28465]
Iª q. 6 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de bonitate Dei. Et
circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum esse bonum conveniat
Deo. Secundo, utrum Deus sit summum bonum. Tertio, utrum ipse solus
sit bonus per suam essentiam. Quarto, utrum omnia sint bona
bonitate divina.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q6_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q6_A1-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 1. Whether God is good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be good does not belong to God. For goodness consists in mode, species and order. But these do not seem
                     to belong to God; since God is immense and is not ordered to anything else. Therefore to be good does not belong to God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28466" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28466] Iª q. 6 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod esse bonum non conveniat Deo. Ratio enim
boni consistit in modo, specie et ordine. Haec autem non videntur
Deo convenire, cum Deus immensus sit, et ad aliquid non ordinetur.
Ergo esse bonum non convenit Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the good is what all things desire. But all things do not desire God, because all things do not know Him; and nothing
                     is desired unless it is known. Therefore to be good does not belong to God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28467" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28467] Iª q. 6 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, bonum
est quod omnia appetunt. Sed Deum non omnia appetunt, quia non
omnia cognoscunt ipsum, nihil autem appetitur nisi notum. Ergo esse
bonum non convenit Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A1-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q6_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Lam.3.25" target="asv">Lam. 3:25</a>): "The Lord is good to them that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28468" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28468] Iª q. 6 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Thren. III, <i>bonus est dominus sperantibus in eum,
animae quaerenti illum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A1-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> To be good belongs pre-eminently to God. For a thing is good according to its desirableness. Now everything seeks after its
                     own perfection; and the perfection and form of an effect consist in a certain likeness to the agent, since every agent makes
                     its like; and hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good. For the very thing which is desirable in it
                     is the participation of its likeness. Therefore, since God is the first effective cause of
                     all things, it is manifest that the aspect of good and of desirableness belong to Him; and hence Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv)
                     attributes good to God as to the first efficient cause, saying that, God is called good "as by Whom all things subsist."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 1 co."><a name="28469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28469] Iª q. 6 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod bonum esse praecipue Deo convenit. Bonum enim aliquid est,
secundum quod est appetibile. Unumquodque autem appetit suam
perfectionem. Perfectio autem et forma effectus est quaedam
similitudo agentis, cum omne agens agat sibi simile. Unde ipsum
agens est appetibile, et habet rationem boni, hoc enim est quod de
ipso appetitur, ut eius similitudo participetur. Cum ergo Deus sit
prima causa effectiva omnium, manifestum est quod sibi competit
ratio boni et appetibilis. Unde Dionysius, in libro de Div. Nom.,
attribuit bonum Deo sicut primae causae efficienti, dicens quod
bonus dicitur Deus, <i>sicut ex quo omnia subsistunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A1-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To have mode, species and order belongs to the essence of caused good; but good is in God as in its cause, and hence it belongs
                     to Him to impose mode, species and order on others; wherefore these three things are in God as in their cause.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28470" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28470] Iª q. 6 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod habere modum, speciem et ordinem, pertinet ad
rationem boni causati. Sed bonum in Deo est sicut in causa, unde ad
eum pertinet imponere aliis modum, speciem et ordinem. Unde ista
tria sunt in Deo sicut in causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes
                     of the divine being; as appears from what is said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q4_A3" id="FP_Q6_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[4] , A[3]</a>). And so of those things which desire God, some know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature; others
                     know some participation of His goodness, and this belongs also to sensible knowledge; others have a
                     natural desire without knowledge, as being directed to their ends by a higher intelligence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28471] Iª q. 6 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod omnia, appetendo proprias perfectiones, appetunt
ipsum Deum, inquantum perfectiones omnium rerum sunt quaedam
similitudines divini esse, ut ex dictis patet. Et sic eorum quae
Deum appetunt, quaedam cognoscunt ipsum secundum seipsum, quod est
proprium creaturae rationalis. Quaedam vero cognoscunt aliquas
participationes suae bonitatis, quod etiam extenditur usque ad
cognitionem sensibilem. Quaedam vero appetitum naturalem habent
absque cognitione, utpote inclinata ad suos fines ab alio superiori
cognoscente.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q6_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q6_A2-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 2. Whether God is the supreme good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not the supreme good. For the supreme good adds something to good; otherwise it would belong to every
                     good. But everything which is an addition to anything else is a compound thing: therefore the supreme good is a compound.
                     But God is supremely simple; as was shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A7" id="FP_Q6_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore God is not the supreme good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28472] Iª q. 6 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit summum bonum. Summum enim
bonum addit aliquid supra bonum, alioquin omni bono conveniret. Sed
omne quod se habet ex additione ad aliquid, est compositum. Ergo
summum bonum est compositum. Sed Deus est summe simplex, ut supra
ostensum est. Ergo Deus non est summum bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Good is what all desire," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Now what all desire is nothing but God, Who is
                     the end of all things: therefore there is no other good but God. This appears also from what is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q6_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.18.19" target="asv">Lk. 18:19</a>): "None is good but God alone." But we use the word supreme in comparison with others, as e.g. supreme heat is used in comparison
                     with all other heats. Therefore God cannot be called the supreme good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28473" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28473] Iª q. 6 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> <i>Praeterea,
bonum est quod omnia appetunt</i>, ut dicit philosophus. Sed nihil
aliud est quod omnia appetunt, nisi solus Deus, qui est finis
omnium. Ergo nihil aliud est bonum nisi Deus. Quod etiam videtur
per id quod dicitur Matth. XIX, <i>nemo bonus nisi solus Deus</i>.
Sed summum dicitur in comparatione aliorum; sicut summum calidum in
comparatione ad omnia calida. Ergo Deus non potest dici summum
bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, supreme implies comparison. But things not in the same genus are not comparable; as, sweetness is not properly greater
                     or less than a line. Therefore, since God is not in the same genus as other good things, as appears above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A5" id="FP_Q6_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[5]</a>;
                     <a href="#FP_Q4_A3" id="FP_Q6_A2-p4.2" shape="rect">Q[4], A[3]</a>) it seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in relation to others.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28474] Iª q. 6 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, summum
comparationem importat. Sed quae non sunt unius generis, non sunt
comparabilia; sicut dulcedo inconvenienter dicitur maior vel minor
quam linea. Cum igitur Deus non sit in eodem genere cum aliis
bonis, ut ex superioribus patet, videtur quod Deus non possit dici
summum bonum respectu eorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. ii) that, the Trinity of the divine persons is "the supreme good, discerned by purified minds."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28475" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28475] Iª q. 6 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Augustinus, I de Trin., quod <i>Trinitas divinarum
personarum est summum bonum, quod purgatissimis mentibus
cernitur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God is the supreme good simply, and not only as existing in any genus or order of things. For good is attributed to God,
                     as was said in the preceding article, inasmuch as all desired perfections flow from Him as from the first cause. They do not,
                     however, flow from Him as from a univocal agent, as shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q4_A2" id="FP_Q6_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[2]</a>); but as from an agent which does not agree with its effects either in species or genus. Now the likeness of an
                     effect in the univocal cause is found uniformly; but in the equivocal cause it is found more excellently, as, heat is in the
                     sun more excellently than it is in fire. Therefore as good is in God as in the first, but not the univocal, cause of all things,
                     it must be in Him in a most excellent way; and therefore He is called the supreme good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 co."><a name="28476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28476] Iª q. 6 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod Deus est summum bonum simpliciter, et non solum in aliquo
genere vel ordine rerum. Sic enim bonum Deo attribuitur, ut dictum
est, inquantum omnes perfectiones desideratae effluunt ab eo, sicut
a prima causa. Non autem effluunt ab eo sicut ab agente univoco, ut
ex superioribus patet, sed sicut ab agente quod non convenit cum
suis effectibus, neque in ratione speciei, nec in ratione generis.
Similitudo autem effectus in causa quidem univoca invenitur
uniformiter, in causa autem aequivoca invenitur excellentius, sicut
calor excellentiori modo est in sole quam in igne. Sic ergo oportet
quod cum bonum sit in Deo sicut in prima causa omnium non univoca,
quod sit in eo excellentissimo modo. Et propter hoc dicitur summum
bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The supreme good does not add to good any absolute thing, but only a relation. Now a relation of God to creatures, is not
                     a reality in God, but in the creature; for it is in God in our idea only: as, what is knowable is so called with relation
                     to knowledge, not that it depends on knowledge, but because knowledge depends on it. Thus it is not necessary that there should
                     be composition in the supreme good, but only that other things are deficient in
                     comparison with it.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28477] Iª q. 6 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod summum bonum addit super bonum, non rem aliquam
absolutam, sed relationem tantum. Relatio autem qua aliquid de Deo
dicitur relative ad creaturas, non est realiter in Deo, sed in
creatura; in Deo vero secundum rationem; sicut scibile relative
dicitur ad scientiam, non quia ad ipsam referatur, sed quia
scientia refertur ad ipsum. Et sic non oportet quod in summo bono
sit aliqua compositio, sed solum quod alia deficiant ab ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When we say that good is what all desire, it is not to be understood that every kind of good thing is desired by all; but
                     that whatever is desired has the nature of good. And when it is said, "None is good but God alone," this is to be understood
                     of essential goodness, as will be explained in the next article.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28478" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28478] Iª q. 6 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, cum dicitur <i>bonum est quod omnia appetunt</i>,
non sic intelligitur quasi unumquodque bonum ab omnibus appetatur,
sed quia quidquid appetitur, rationem boni habet. Quod autem
dicitur, <i>nemo bonus nisi solus Deus</i>, intelligitur de bono
per essentiam, ut post dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things not of the same genus are in no way comparable to each other if indeed they are in different genera. Now we say that
                     God is not in the same genus with other good things; not that He is any other genus, but that He is outside genus, and is
                     the principle of every genus; and thus He is compared to others by excess, and it is this kind of comparison the supreme good
                     implies.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28479" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28479] Iª q. 6 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
quod ea quae non sunt in eodem genere, si quidem sint in diversis
generibus contenta, nullo modo comparabilia sunt. De Deo autem
negatur esse in eodem genere cum aliis bonis, non quod ipse sit in
quodam alio genere; sed quia ipse est extra genus, et principium
omnis generis. Et sic comparatur ad alia per excessum. Et huiusmodi
comparationem importat summum bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q6_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q6_A3-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 3. Whether to be essentially good belongs to God alone?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be essentially good does not belong to God alone. For as "one" is convertible with "being," so is "good";
                     as we said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q5_A1" id="FP_Q6_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[5], A[1]</a>). But every being is one essentially, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iv); therefore every being is good essentially.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28480] Iª q. 6 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod esse bonum per essentiam non sit proprium
Dei. Sicut enim unum convertitur cum ente, ita et bonum, ut supra
habitum est. Sed omne ens est unum per suam essentiam, ut patet per
philosophum in IV Metaphys. Ergo omne ens est bonum per suam
essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if good is what all things desire, since being itself is desired by all, then the being of each thing is its good.
                     But everything is a being essentially; therefore every being is good essentially.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28481" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28481] Iª q. 6 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si
bonum est quod omnia appetunt, cum ipsum esse sit desideratum ab
omnibus, ipsum esse cuiuslibet rei est eius bonum. Sed quaelibet
res est ens per suam essentiam. Ergo quaelibet res est bona per
suam essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything is good by its own goodness. Therefore if there is anything which is not good essentially, it is necessary
                     to say that its goodness is not its own essence. Therefore its goodness, since it is a being, must be good; and if it is good
                     by some other goodness, the same question applies to that goodness also; therefore we must either proceed to infinity, or
                     come to some goodness which is not good by any other goodness. Therefore the first
                     supposition holds good. Therefore everything is good essentially.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28482" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28482] Iª q. 6 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omnis
res per suam bonitatem est bona. Si igitur aliqua res est quae non
sit bona per suam essentiam, oportebit quod eius bonitas non sit
sua essentia. Illa ergo bonitas, cum sit ens quoddam, oportet quod
sit bona, et si quidem alia bonitate, iterum de illa bonitate
quaeretur. Aut ergo erit procedere in infinitum, aut venire ad
aliquam bonitatem quae non erit bona per aliam bonitatem. Eadem
ergo ratione standum est in primo. Res igitur quaelibet est bona
per suam essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Hebdom.), that "all things but God are good by participation." Therefore they are not good essentially.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28483" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28483] Iª q. 6 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., quod alia omnia a Deo
sunt bona per participationem. Non igitur per essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God alone is good essentially. For everything is called good according to its perfection. Now perfection of a thing is threefold:
                     first, according to the constitution of its own being; secondly, in respect of any accidents being added as necessary for
                     its perfect operation; thirdly, perfection consists in the attaining to something else as the end. Thus, for instance, the
                     first perfection of fire consists in its existence, which it has through its own
                     substantial form; its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness and dryness, and the like; its third perfection is
                     to rest in its own place. This triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own essence; it belongs to God only, in Whom
                     alone essence is existence; in Whom there are no accidents; since whatever belongs to others accidentally belongs to Him essentially;
                     as, to be powerful, wise and the like, as appears from what is stated above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A6" id="FP_Q6_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[6]</a>); and
                     He is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God
                     alone has every kind of perfection by His own essence; therefore He Himself alone is good essentially.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 co."><a name="28484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28484] Iª q. 6 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod solus Deus est bonus per suam essentiam. Unumquodque enim
dicitur bonum, secundum quod est perfectum. Perfectio autem
alicuius rei triplex est. Prima quidem, secundum quod in suo esse
constituitur. Secunda vero, prout ei aliqua accidentia
superadduntur, ad suam perfectam operationem necessaria. Tertia
vero perfectio alicuius est per hoc, quod aliquid aliud attingit
sicut finem. Utpote prima perfectio ignis consistit in esse, quod
habet per suam formam substantialem, secunda vero eius perfectio
consistit in caliditate, levitate et siccitate, et huiusmodi,
tertia vero perfectio eius est secundum quod in loco suo quiescit.
Haec autem triplex perfectio nulli creato competit secundum suam
essentiam, sed soli Deo, cuius solius essentia est suum esse; et
cui non adveniunt aliqua accidentia; sed quae de aliis dicuntur
accidentaliter, sibi conveniunt essentialiter, ut esse potentem,
sapientem, et huiusmodi, sicut ex dictis patet. Ipse etiam ad nihil
aliud ordinatur sicut ad finem, sed ipse est ultimus finis omnium
rerum. Unde manifestum est quod solus Deus habet omnimodam
perfectionem secundum suam essentiam. Et ideo ipse solus est bonus
per suam essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "One" does not include the idea of perfection, but only of indivision, which belongs to everything according to its own essence.
                     Now the essences of simple things are undivided both actually and potentially, but the essences of compounds are undivided
                     only actually; and therefore everything must be one essentially, but not good essentially, as was shown above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28485" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28485] Iª q. 6 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod unum non importat rationem perfectionis, sed
indivisionis tantum, quae unicuique rei competit secundum suam
essentiam. Simplicium autem essentiae sunt indivisae et actu et
potentia, compositorum vero essentiae sunt indivisae secundum actum
tantum. Et ideo oportet quod quaelibet res sit una per suam
essentiam, non autem bona, ut ostensum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although everything is good in that it has being, yet the essence of a creature is not very being; and therefore it does
                     not follow that a creature is good essentially.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28486" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28486] Iª q. 6 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, licet unumquodque sit bonum inquantum habet esse,
tamen essentia rei creatae non est ipsum esse, et ideo non sequitur
quod res creata sit bona per suam essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The goodness of a creature is not its very essence, but something superadded; it is either its existence, or some added perfection,
                     or the order to its end. Still, the goodness itself thus added is good, just as it is being. But for this reason is it called
                     being because by it something has being, not because it itself has being through something else: hence for this reason is
                     it called good because by it something is good, and not because it itself
                     has some other goodness whereby it is good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28487" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28487] Iª q. 6 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
quod bonitas rei creatae non est ipsa eius essentia, sed aliquid
superadditum; vel ipsum esse eius, vel aliqua perfectio
superaddita, vel ordo ad finem. Ipsa tamen bonitas sic superaddita
dicitur bona sicut et ens, hac autem ratione dicitur ens, quia ea
est aliquid, non quia ipsa aliquo alio sit. Unde hac ratione
dicitur bona, quia ea est aliquid bonum, non quia ipsa habeat
aliquam aliam bonitatem, qua sit bona.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q6_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q6_A4-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 4. Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that all things are good by the divine goodness. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii), "This and that are good; take
                     away this and that, and see good itself if thou canst; and so thou shalt see God, good not by any other good, but the good
                     of every good." But everything is good by its own good; therefore everything is good by that very good which is God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28488" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28488] Iª q. 6 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod omnia sint bona bonitate divina. Dicit
enim Augustinus, VII de Trin., <i>bonum hoc et bonum illud, tolle
hoc et tolle illud, et vide ipsum bonum, si potes, ita Deum
videbis, non alio bono bonum, sed bonum omnis boni</i>. Sed
unumquodque est bonum suo bono. Ergo unumquodque est bonum ipso
bono quod est Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), all things are called good, accordingly as they are directed to God, and this is
                     by reason of the divine goodness; therefore all things are good by the divine goodness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28489" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28489] Iª q. 6 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
dicit Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., omnia dicuntur bona inquantum
ordinantur ad Deum, et hoc ratione bonitatis divinae. Ergo omnia
sunt bona bonitate divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A4-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> All things are good, inasmuch as they have being. But they are not called beings through the divine being, but through their
                     own being; therefore all things are not good by the divine goodness, but by their own goodness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28490" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28490] Iª q. 6 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod omnia sunt bona inquantum sunt. Sed non dicuntur omnia entia
per esse divinum, sed per esse proprium. Ergo non omnia sunt bona
bonitate divina, sed bonitate propria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q6_A4-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As regards relative things, we must admit extrinsic denomination; as, a thing is denominated "placed" from "place," and "measured"
                     from "measure." But as regards absolute things opinions differ. Plato held the existence of separate ideas (
                     <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q84_A4" id="FP_Q6_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[4]</a>) of all things, and that individuals were denominated by them as participating in the separate ideas; for instance, that
                     Socrates is called man according to the separate idea of man. Now
                     just as he laid down separate ideas of man and horse which he called absolute man and absolute horse, so likewise he laid
                     down separate ideas of "being" and of "one," and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and by participation
                     of these, everything was called "being" or "one"; and what was thus absolute being and absolute one, he said was the supreme
                     good. And because good is convertible with being, as one is also; he called God the absolute good, from whom all things are
                     called good by way of participation.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q6_A4-p6"> Although this opinion appears to be unreasonable in affirming separate ideas of natural things as subsisting of themselves---as
                     Aristotle argues in many ways---still, it is absolutely true that there is first something which is essentially being and
                     essentially good, which we call God, as appears from what is shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q6_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>), and Aristotle agrees with this. Hence from the first being, essentially such, and good, everything can be called good and
                     a being, inasmuch as it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation which is far removed and defective; as appears
                     from the above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q4_A3" id="FP_Q6_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[4], A[3]</a>).
                  </p><p id="FP_Q6_A4-p7"> Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from the first exemplary effective and final principle of
                     all goodness. Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the similitude of the divine goodness belonging to it,
                     which is formally its own goodness, whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there is one goodness, and yet many
                     goodnesses.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 4 co."><a name="28491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28491] Iª q. 6 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod nihil prohibet in his quae relationem important, aliquid ab
extrinseco denominari; sicut aliquid denominatur locatum a loco, et
mensuratum a mensura. Circa vero ea quae absolute dicuntur, diversa
fuit opinio. Plato enim posuit omnium rerum species separatas; et
quod ab eis individua denominantur, quasi species separatas
participando; ut puta quod Socrates dicitur homo secundum ideam
hominis separatam. Et sicut ponebat ideam hominis et equi
separatam, quam vocabat per se hominem et per se equum, ita ponebat
ideam entis et ideam unius separatam, quam dicebat per se ens et
per se unum, et eius participatione unumquodque dicitur ens vel
unum. Hoc autem quod est per se bonum et per se unum, ponebat esse
summum Deum, a quo omnia dicuntur bona per modum participationis.
Et quamvis haec opinio irrationabilis videatur quantum ad hoc, quod
ponebat species rerum naturalium separatas per se subsistentes, ut
Aristoteles multipliciter probat; tamen hoc absolute verum est,
quod est aliquod unum per essentiam suam bonum, quod dicimus Deum,
ut ex superioribus patet. Huic etiam sententiae concordat
Aristoteles. A primo igitur per suam essentiam ente et bono,
unumquodque potest dici bonum et ens, inquantum participat ipsum
per modum cuiusdam assimilationis, licet remote et deficienter, ut
ex superioribus patet. Sic ergo unumquodque dicitur bonum bonitate
divina, sicut primo principio exemplari, effectivo et finali totius
bonitatis. Nihilominus tamen unumquodque dicitur bonum similitudine
divinae bonitatis sibi inhaerente, quae est formaliter sua bonitas
denominans ipsum. Et sic est bonitas una omnium; et etiam multae
bonitates.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A4-p8"><b>Reply to objections.</b> This is a sufficient Reply to the Objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 4 ad arg."><a name="28492" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28492] Iª q. 6 a. 4 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc patet
responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q7" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q7-p0.1">Q. 7. THE INFINITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q7-p2"> After considering the divine perfection we must consider the divine infinity, and God's existence in things: for God is everywhere,
                  and in all things, inasmuch as He is boundless and infinite.
               </p><p id="FP_Q7-p3"> Concerning the first, there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q7-p4"><a href="#FP_Q7_A1"> (1) Whether God is infinite?</a></p><p id="FP_Q7-p5"><a href="#FP_Q7_A2"> (2) Whether anything besides Him is infinite in essence?</a></p><p id="FP_Q7-p6"><a href="#FP_Q7_A3"> (3) Whether anything can be infinitude in magnitude?</a></p><p id="FP_Q7-p7"><a href="#FP_Q7_A4"> (4) Whether an infinite multitude can exist?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 pr."><a name="28493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28493]
Iª q. 7 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem divinae
perfectionis, considerandum est de eius infinitate, et de
existentia eius in rebus, attribuitur enim Deo quod sit ubique et
in omnibus rebus, inquantum est incircumscriptibilis et infinitus.
Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum Deus sit infinitus.
Secundo, utrum aliquid praeter ipsum sit infinitum secundum
essentiam. Tertio, utrum aliquid possit esse infinitum secundum
magnitudinem. Quarto, utrum possit esse infinitum in rebus secundum
multitudinem.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q7_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q7_A1-p0.1">Q. 7. A. 1. Whether God is infinite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not infinite. For everything infinite is imperfect, as the Philosopher says; because it has parts and
                     matter, as is said in Phys. iii. But God is most perfect; therefore He is not infinite.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28494" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28494] Iª q. 7 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit infinitus. Omne enim
infinitum est imperfectum, quia habet rationem partis et materiae,
ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed Deus est perfectissimus. Ergo non est
infinitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i), finite and infinite belong to quantity. But there is no quantity in God,
                     for He is not a body, as was shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A1" id="FP_Q7_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[1]</a>). Therefore it does not belong to Him to be infinite.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28495] Iª q. 7 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
secundum philosophum in I Physic., finitum et infinitum conveniunt
quantitati. Sed in Deo non est quantitas, cum non sit corpus, ut
supra ostensum est. Ergo non competit sibi esse infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is here in such a way as not to be elsewhere, is finite according to place. Therefore that which is a thing
                     in such a way as not to be another thing, is finite according to substance. But God is this, and not another; for He is not
                     a stone or wood. Therefore God is not infinite in substance.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28496" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28496] Iª q. 7 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod
ita est hic quod non alibi, est finitum secundum locum, ergo quod
ita est hoc quod non est aliud, est finitum secundum substantiam.
Sed Deus est hoc, et non est aliud, non enim est lapis nec lignum.
Ergo Deus non est infinitus secundum substantiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4) that "God is infinite and eternal, and boundless."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28497" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28497] Iª q. 7 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Damascenus, quod <i>Deus est infinitus et aeternus et
incircumscriptibilis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q7_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> All the ancient philosophers attribute infinitude to the first principle, as is said (Phys. iii), and with reason; for they
                     considered that things flow forth infinitely from the first principle. But because some erred concerning the nature of the
                     first principle, as a consequence they erred also concerning its infinity; forasmuch as they asserted that matter was the
                     first principle; consequently they attributed to the first principle a material infinity to
                     the effect that some infinite body was the first principle of things.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q7_A1-p7"> We must consider therefore that a thing is called infinite because it is not finite. Now matter is in a way made finite by
                     form, and the form by matter. Matter indeed is made finite by form, inasmuch as matter, before it receives its form, is in
                     potentiality to many forms; but on receiving a form, it is terminated by that one. Again, form is made finite by matter, inasmuch
                     as form, considered in itself, is common to many; but when received in matter, the form is determined to
                     this one particular thing. Now matter is perfected by the form by which it is made finite; therefore infinite as attributed
                     to matter, has the nature of something imperfect; for it is as it were formless matter. On the other hand, form is not made
                     perfect by matter, but rather is contracted by matter; and hence the infinite, regarded on the part of the form not determined
                     by matter, has the nature of something perfect. Now being is the most formal of all things, as appears from what is shown
                     above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q4_A1" id="FP_Q7_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[1]</a>, OBJ[3]). Since therefore the divine being is not a being received in anything, but He is His own subsistent being as was
                     shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A4" id="FP_Q7_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it is clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 co."><a name="28498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28498] Iª q. 7 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod omnes antiqui philosophi attribuunt infinitum primo principio,
ut dicitur in III Physic., et hoc rationabiliter, considerantes res
effluere a primo principio in infinitum. Sed quia quidam erraverunt
circa naturam primi principii, consequens fuit ut errarent circa
infinitatem ipsius. Quia enim ponebant primum principium materiam,
consequenter attribuerunt primo principio infinitatem materialem;
dicentes aliquod corpus infinitum esse primum principium rerum.
Considerandum est igitur quod infinitum dicitur aliquid ex eo quod
non est finitum. Finitur autem quodammodo et materia per formam, et
forma per materiam. Materia quidem per formam, inquantum materia,
antequam recipiat formam, est in potentia ad multas formas, sed cum
recipit unam, terminatur per illam. Forma vero finitur per
materiam, inquantum forma, in se considerata, communis est ad
multa, sed per hoc quod recipitur in materia, fit forma determinate
huius rei. Materia autem perficitur per formam per quam finitur, et
ideo infinitum secundum quod attribuitur materiae, habet rationem
imperfecti; est enim quasi materia non habens formam. Forma autem
non perficitur per materiam, sed magis per eam eius amplitudo
contrahitur, unde infinitum secundum quod se tenet ex parte formae
non determinatae per materiam, habet rationem perfecti. Illud autem
quod est maxime formale omnium, est ipsum esse, ut ex superioribus
patet. Cum igitur esse divinum non sit esse receptum in aliquo, sed
ipse sit suum esse subsistens, ut supra ostensum est; manifestum
est quod ipse Deus sit infinitus et perfectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A1-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From this appears the Reply to the First Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28499" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28499] Iª q. 7 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet
responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Quantity is terminated by its form, which can be seen in the fact that a figure which consists in quantity terminated, is
                     a kind of quantitative form. Hence the infinite of quantity is the infinite of matter; such a kind of infinite cannot be attributed
                     to God; as was said above, in this article.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28500" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28500] Iª q. 7 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod terminus quantitatis est sicut forma ipsius, cuius
signum est, quod figura, quae consistit in terminatione
quantitatis, est quaedam forma circa quantitatem. Unde infinitum
quod competit quantitati, est infinitum quod se tenet ex parte
materiae, et tale infinitum non attribuitur Deo, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact that the being of God is self-subsisting, not received in any other, and is thus called infinite, shows Him to be
                     distinguished from all other beings, and all others to be apart from Him. Even so, were there such a thing as a self-subsisting
                     whiteness, the very fact that it did not exist in anything else, would make it distinct from every other whiteness existing
                     in a subject.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28501" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28501] Iª q. 7 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
quod, ex hoc ipso quod esse Dei est per se subsistens non receptum
in aliquo, prout dicitur infinitum, distinguitur ab omnibus aliis,
et alia removentur ab eo, sicut, si esset albedo subsistens, ex hoc
ipso quod non esset in alio, differret ab omni albedine existente
in subiecto.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q7_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q7_A2-p0.1">Q. 7. A. 2. Whether anything but God can be essentially infinite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that something else besides God can be essentially infinite. For the power of anything is proportioned to its essence.
                     Now if the essence of God is infinite, His power must also be infinite. Therefore He can produce an infinite effect, since
                     the extent of a power is known by its effect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28502" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28502] Iª q. 7 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid aliud quam Deus possit esse
infinitum per essentiam. Virtus enim rei proportionatur essentiae
eius. Si igitur essentia Dei est infinita, oportet quod eius virtus
sit infinita. Ergo potest producere effectum infinitum, cum
quantitas virtutis per effectum cognoscatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever has infinite power, has an infinite essence. Now the created intellect has an infinite power; for it apprehends
                     the universal, which can extend itself to an infinitude of singular things. Therefore every created intellectual substance
                     is infinite.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28503] Iª q. 7 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
quidquid habet virtutem infinitam, habet essentiam infinitam. Sed
intellectus creatus habet virtutem infinitam, apprehendit enim
universale, quod se potest extendere ad infinita singularia. Ergo
omnis substantia intellectualis creata est infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, primary matter is something other than God, as was shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A8" id="FP_Q7_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[8]</a>). But primary matter is infinite. Therefore something besides God can be infinite.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28504] Iª q. 7 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
materia prima aliud est a Deo, ut supra ostensum est. Sed materia
prima est infinita. Ergo aliquid aliud praeter Deum potest esse
infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The infinite cannot have a beginning, as said in Phys. iii. But everything outside God is from God as from its first principle.
                     Therefore besides God nothing can be infinite.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28505] Iª q. 7 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod infinitum non potest esse ex principio aliquo, ut dicitur in
III Physic. Omne autem quod est praeter Deum, est ex Deo sicut ex
primo principio. Ergo nihil quod est praeter Deum, potest esse
infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Things other than God can be relatively infinite, but not absolutely infinite. For with regard to infinite as applied to
                     matter, it is manifest that everything actually existing possesses a form; and thus its matter is determined by form. But
                     because matter, considered as existing under some substantial form, remains in potentiality to many accidental forms, which
                     is absolutely finite can be relatively infinite; as, for example, wood is finite according to
                     its own form, but still it is relatively infinite, inasmuch as it is in potentiality to an infinite number of shapes. But
                     if we speak of the infinite in reference to form, it is manifest that those things, the forms of which are in matter, are
                     absolutely finite, and in no way infinite. If, however, any created forms are not received into matter, but are self-subsisting,
                     as some think is the case with angels, these will be relatively infinite, inasmuch as such kinds of forms are not terminated,
                     nor contracted by any matter. But because a created form thus subsisting has being, and yet is not its own being, it follows
                     that its being is received and contracted to a determinate nature. Hence it cannot be absolutely infinite.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 2 co."><a name="28506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28506] Iª q. 7 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod aliquid praeter Deum potest esse infinitum secundum quid, sed
non simpliciter. Si enim loquamur de infinito secundum quod
competit materiae, manifestum est quod omne existens in actu, habet
aliquam formam, et sic materia eius est terminata per formam. Sed
quia materia, secundum quod est sub una forma substantiali, remanet
in potentia ad multas formas accidentales; quod est finitum
simpliciter, potest esse infinitum secundum quid, utpote lignum est
finitum secundum suam formam, sed tamen est infinitum secundum
quid, inquantum est in potentia ad figuras infinitas. Si autem
loquamur de infinito secundum quod convenit formae, sic manifestum
est quod illa quorum formae sunt in materia, sunt simpliciter
finita, et nullo modo infinita. Si autem sint aliquae formae
creatae non receptae in materia, sed per se subsistentes, ut quidam
de Angelis opinantur, erunt quidem infinitae secundum quid,
inquantum huiusmodi formae non terminantur neque contrahuntur per
aliquam materiam, sed quia forma creata sic subsistens habet esse,
et non est suum esse, necesse est quod ipsum eius esse sit receptum
et contractum ad determinatam naturam. Unde non potest esse
infinitum simpliciter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is against the nature of a made thing for its essence to be its existence; because subsisting being is not a created being;
                     hence it is against the nature of a made thing to be absolutely infinite. Therefore, as God, although He has infinite power,
                     cannot make a thing to be not made (for this would imply that two contradictories are true at the same time), so likewise
                     He cannot make anything to be absolutely infinite.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28507" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28507] Iª q. 7 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod hoc est contra rationem facti, quod essentia rei sit
ipsum esse eius, quia esse subsistens non est esse creatum, unde
contra rationem facti est, quod sit simpliciter infinitum. Sicut
ergo Deus, licet habeat potentiam infinitam, non tamen potest
facere aliquid non factum (hoc enim esset contradictoria esse
simul); ita non potest facere aliquid infinitum simpliciter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that the power of the intellect extends itself in a way to infinite things, is because the intellect is a form not
                     in matter, but either wholly separated from matter, as is the angelic substance, or at least an intellectual power, which
                     is not the act of any organ, in the intellectual soul joined to a body.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28508] Iª q. 7 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod virtus intellectus extendit se
quodammodo ad infinita, procedit ex hoc quod intellectus est forma
non in materia; sed vel totaliter separata, sicut sunt substantiae
Angelorum; vel ad minus potentia intellectiva, quae non est actus
alicuius organi, in anima intellectiva corpori coniuncta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Primary matter does not exist by itself in nature, since it is not actually being, but potentially only; hence it is something
                     concreated rather than created. Nevertheless, primary matter even as a potentiality is not absolutely infinite, but relatively,
                     because its potentiality extends only to natural forms.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28509" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28509] Iª q. 7 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
quod materia prima non existit in rerum natura per seipsam, cum non
sit ens in actu, sed potentia tantum, unde magis est aliquid
concreatum, quam creatum. Nihilominus tamen materia prima, etiam
secundum potentiam, non est infinita simpliciter, sed secundum
quid, quia eius potentia non se extendit nisi ad formas
naturales.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q7_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q7_A3-p0.1">Q. 7. A. 3. Whether an actually infinite magnitude can exist?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there can be something actually infinite in magnitude. For in mathematics there is no error, since "there is
                     no lie in things abstract," as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii). But mathematics uses the infinite in magnitude; thus, the
                     geometrician in his demonstrations says, "Let this line be infinite." Therefore it is not impossible for a thing to be infinite
                     in magnitude.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28510" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28510] Iª q. 7 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod possit esse aliquid infinitum actu
secundum magnitudinem. In scientiis enim mathematicis non invenitur
falsum, <i>quia abstrahentium non est mendacium</i>, ut dicitur in
II Physic. Sed scientiae mathematicae utuntur infinito secundum
magnitudinem, dicit enim geometra in suis demonstrationibus, sit
linea talis infinita. Ergo non est impossibile aliquid esse
infinitum secundum magnitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is not against the nature of anything, can agree with it. Now to be infinite is not against the nature of magnitude;
                     but rather both the finite and the infinite seem to be properties of quantity. Therefore it is not impossible for some magnitude
                     to be infinite.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28511" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28511] Iª q. 7 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id
quod non est contra rationem alicuius, non est impossibile
convenire sibi. Sed esse infinitum non est contra rationem
magnitudinis, sed magis finitum et infinitum videntur esse
passiones quantitatis. Ergo non est impossibile aliquam
magnitudinem esse infinitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, magnitude is infinitely divisible, for the continuous is defined that which is infinitely divisible, as is clear
                     from Phys. iii. But contraries are concerned about one and the same thing. Since therefore addition is opposed to division,
                     and increase opposed to diminution, it appears that magnitude can be increased to infinity. Therefore it is possible for magnitude
                     to be infinite.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28512" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28512] Iª q. 7 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
magnitudo divisibilis est in infinitum, sic enim definitur
continuum, quod est in infinitum divisibile, ut patet in III
Physic. Sed contraria nata sunt fieri circa idem. Cum ergo
divisioni opponatur additio, et diminutioni augmentum, videtur quod
magnitudo possit crescere in infinitum. Ergo possibile est esse
magnitudinem infinitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, movement and time have quantity and continuity derived from the magnitude over which movement passes, as is said
                     in Phys. iv. But it is not against the nature of time and movement to be infinite, since every determinate indivisible in
                     time and circular movement is both a beginning and an end. Therefore neither is it against the nature of magnitude to be infinite.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="28513" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28513] Iª q. 7 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, motus
et tempus habent quantitatem et continuitatem a magnitudine super
quam transit motus, ut dicitur in IV Physic. Sed non est contra
rationem temporis et motus quod sint infinita, cum unumquodque
indivisibile signatum in tempore et motu circulari, sit principium
et finis. Ergo nec contra rationem magnitudinis erit quod sit
infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A3-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Every body has a surface. But every body which has a surface is finite; because surface is the term of a finite body. Therefore
                     all bodies are finite. The same applies both to surface and to a line. Therefore nothing is infinite in magnitude.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28514] Iª q. 7 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne
corpus superficiem habet. Sed omne corpus superficiem habens est
finitum, quia superficies est terminus corporis finiti. Ergo omne
corpus est finitum. Et similiter potest dici de superficie et
linea. Nihil est ergo infinitum secundum magnitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q7_A3-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is one thing to be infinite in essence, and another to be infinite in magnitude. For granted that a body exists infinite
                     in magnitude, as fire or air, yet this could not be infinite in essence, because its essence would be terminated in a species
                     by its form, and confined to individuality by matter. And so assuming from these premises that no creature is infinite in
                     essence, it still remains to inquire whether any creature can be infinite in
                     magnitude.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q7_A3-p8"> We must therefore observe that a body, which is a complete magnitude, can be considered in two ways; mathematically, in respect
                     to its quantity only; and naturally, as regards its matter and form.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q7_A3-p9"> Now it is manifest that a natural body cannot be actually infinite. For every natural body has some determined substantial
                     form. Since therefore the accidents follow upon the substantial form, it is necessary that determinate accidents should follow
                     upon a determinate form; and among these accidents is quantity. So every natural body has a greater or smaller determinate
                     quantity. Hence it is impossible for a natural body to be infinite. The same appears from movement; because
                     every natural body has some natural movement; whereas an infinite body could not have any natural movement; neither direct,
                     because nothing moves naturally by a direct movement unless it is out of its place; and this could not happen to an infinite
                     body, for it would occupy every place, and thus every place would be indifferently its own place. Neither could it move circularly;
                     forasmuch as circular motion requires that one part of the body is necessarily transferred to a place occupied by
                     another part, and this could not happen as regards an infinite circular body: for if two lines be drawn from the centre, the
                     farther they extend from the centre, the farther they are from each other; therefore, if a body were infinite, the lines would
                     be infinitely distant from each other; and thus one could never occupy the place belonging to any other.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q7_A3-p10"> The same applies to a mathematical body. For if we imagine a mathematical body actually existing, we must imagine it under
                     some form, because nothing is actual except by its form; hence, since the form of quantity as such is figure, such a body
                     must have some figure, and so would be finite; for figure is confined by a term or boundary.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 co."><a name="28515" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28515] Iª q. 7 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod aliud est esse infinitum secundum suam essentiam, et secundum
magnitudinem. Dato enim quod esset aliquod corpus infinitum
secundum magnitudinem, utpote ignis vel aer, non tamen esset
infinitum secundum essentiam, quia essentia sua esset terminata ad
aliquam speciem per formam, et ad aliquod individuum per materiam.
Et ideo, habito ex praemissis quod nulla creatura est infinita
secundum essentiam, adhuc restat inquirere utrum aliquid creatum
sit infinitum secundum magnitudinem. Sciendum est igitur quod
corpus, quod est magnitudo completa, dupliciter sumitur, scilicet
mathematice, secundum quod consideratur in eo sola quantitas; et
naturaliter, secundum quod consideratur in eo materia et forma. Et
de corpore quidem naturali, quod non possit esse infinitum in actu,
manifestum est. Nam omne corpus naturale aliquam formam
substantialem habet determinatam, cum igitur ad formam
substantialem consequantur accidentia, necesse est quod ad
determinatam formam consequantur determinata accidentia; inter quae
est quantitas. Unde omne corpus naturale habet determinatam
quantitatem et in maius et in minus. Unde impossibile est aliquod
corpus naturale infinitum esse. Hoc etiam ex motu patet. Quia omne
corpus naturale habet aliquem motum naturalem. Corpus autem
infinitum non posset habere aliquem motum naturalem, nec rectum,
quia nihil movetur naturaliter motu recto, nisi cum est extra suum
locum, quod corpori infinito accidere non posset; occuparet enim
omnia loca, et sic indifferenter quilibet locus esset locus eius.
Et similiter etiam neque secundum motum circularem. Quia in motu
circulari oportet quod una pars corporis transferatur ad locum in
quo fuit alia pars; quod in corpore circulari, si ponatur
infinitum, esse non posset, quia duae lineae protractae a centro,
quanto longius protrahuntur a centro, tanto longius distant ab
invicem; si ergo corpus esset infinitum, in infinitum lineae
distarent ab invicem, et sic una nunquam posset pervenire ad locum
alterius. De corpore etiam mathematico eadem ratio est. Quia si
imaginemur corpus mathematicum existens actu, oportet quod
imaginemur ipsum sub aliqua forma, quia nihil est actu nisi per
suam formam. Unde, cum forma quanti, inquantum huiusmodi, sit
figura, oportebit quod habeat aliquam figuram. Et sic erit finitum,
est enim figura, quae termino vel terminis comprehenditur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A geometrician does not need to assume a line actually infinite, but takes some actually finite line, from which he subtracts
                     whatever he finds necessary; which line he calls infinite.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28516] Iª q. 7 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod geometer non indiget sumere aliquam lineam esse
infinitam actu, sed indiget accipere aliquam lineam finitam actu, a
qua possit subtrahi quantum necesse est, et hanc nominat lineam
infinitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A3-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the infinite is not against the nature of magnitude in general, still it is against the nature of any species of
                     it; thus, for instance, it is against the nature of a bicubical or tricubical magnitude, whether circular or triangular, and
                     so on. Now what is not possible in any species cannot exist in the genus; hence there cannot be any infinite magnitude, since
                     no species of magnitude is infinite.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28517] Iª q. 7 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, licet infinitum non sit contra rationem magnitudinis
in communi, est tamen contra rationem cuiuslibet speciei eius,
scilicet contra rationem magnitudinis bicubitae vel tricubitae,
sive circularis vel triangularis, et similium. Non autem est
possibile in genere esse quod in nulla specie est. Unde non est
possibile esse aliquam magnitudinem infinitam, cum nulla species
magnitudinis sit infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A3-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The infinite in quantity, as was shown above, belongs to matter. Now by division of the whole we approach to matter, forasmuch
                     as parts have the aspect of matter; but by addition we approach to the whole which has the aspect of a form. Therefore the
                     infinite is not in the addition of magnitude, but only in division.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28518" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28518] Iª q. 7 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
quod infinitum quod convenit quantitati, ut dictum est, se tenet ex
parte materiae. Per divisionem autem totius acceditur ad materiam,
nam partes se habent in ratione materiae, per additionem autem
acceditur ad totum, quod se habet in ratione formae. Et ideo non
invenitur infinitum in additione magnitudinis, sed in divisione
tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A3-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Movement and time are whole, not actually but successively; hence they have potentiality mixed with actuality. But magnitude
                     is an actual whole; therefore the infinite in quantity refers to matter, and does not agree with the totality of magnitude;
                     yet it agrees with the totality of time and movement: for it is proper to matter to be in potentiality.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="28519" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28519] Iª q. 7 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
quod motus et tempus non sunt secundum totum in actu, sed
successive, unde habent potentiam permixtam actui. Sed magnitudo
est tota in actu. Et ideo infinitum quod convenit quantitati, et se
tenet ex parte materiae, repugnat totalitati magnitudinis, non
autem totalitati temporis vel motus, esse enim in potentia convenit
materiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q7_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q7_A4-p0.1">Q. 7. A. 4. Whether an infinite multitude can exist?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that an actually infinite multitude is possible. For it is not impossible for a potentiality to be made actual.
                     But number can be multiplied to infinity. Therefore it is possible for an infinite multitude actually to exist.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28520" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28520] Iª q. 7 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod possibile sit esse multitudinem infinitam
secundum actum. Non enim est impossibile id quod est in potentia
reduci ad actum. Sed numerus est in infinitum multiplicabilis. Ergo
non est impossibile esse multitudinem infinitam in actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is possible for any individual of any species to be made actual. But the species of figures are infinite. Therefore
                     an infinite number of actual figures is possible.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28521] Iª q. 7 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
cuiuslibet speciei possibile est esse aliquod individuum in actu.
Sed species figurae sunt infinitae. Ergo possibile est esse
infinitas figuras in actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things not opposed to each other do not obstruct each other. But supposing a multitude of things to exist, there
                     can still be many others not opposed to them. Therefore it is not impossible for others also to coexist with them, and so
                     on to infinitude; therefore an actual infinite number of things is possible.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28522" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28522] Iª q. 7 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ea
quae non opponuntur ad invicem, non impediunt se invicem. Sed,
posita aliqua multitudine rerum, adhuc possunt fieri alia multa
quae eis non opponuntur, ergo non est impossibile aliqua iterum
simul esse cum eis, et sic in infinitum. Ergo possibile est esse
infinita in actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q7_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28523" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28523] Iª q. 7 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Sap. XI, <i>omnia in pondere, numero et mensura
disposuisti</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q7_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some, as Avicenna and Algazel, said that it was impossible for an actually infinite
                     multitude to exist absolutely; but that an accidentally infinite multitude was not impossible. A multitude is said to be infinite
                     absolutely, when an infinite multitude is necessary that something may exist. Now this is impossible; because it would entail
                     something dependent on an infinity for its existence; and hence its generation
                     could never come to be, because it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q7_A4-p7"> A multitude is said to be accidentally infinite when its existence as such is not necessary, but accidental. This can be
                     shown, for example, in the work of a carpenter requiring a certain absolute multitude; namely, art in the soul, the movement
                     of the hand, and a hammer; and supposing that such things were infinitely multiplied, the carpentering work would never be
                     finished, forasmuch as it would depend on an infinite number of causes. But the multitude of hammers, inasmuch as
                     one may be broken and another used, is an accidental multitude; for it happens by accident that many hammers are used, and
                     it matters little whether one or two, or many are used, or an infinite number, if the work is carried on for an infinite time.
                     In this way they said that there can be an accidentally infinite multitude.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q7_A4-p8"> This, however, is impossible; since every kind of multitude must belong to a species of multitude. Now the species of multitude
                     are to be reckoned by the species of numbers. But no species of number is infinite; for every number is multitude measured
                     by one. Hence it is impossible for there to be an actually infinite multitude, either absolute or accidental. Likewise multitude
                     in nature is created; and everything created is comprehended under some clear intention of the Creator;
                     for no agent acts aimlessly. Hence everything created must be comprehended in a certain number. Therefore it is impossible
                     for an actually infinite multitude to exist, even accidentally. But a potentially infinite multitude is possible; because
                     the increase of multitude follows upon the division of magnitude; since the more a thing is divided, the greater number of
                     things result. Hence, as the infinite is to be found potentially in the division of the continuous, because we thus approach
                     matter, as was shown in the preceding article, by the same rule, the infinite can be also found potentially in the addition
                     of multitude.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 4 co."><a name="28524" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28524] Iª q. 7 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod circa hoc fuit duplex opinio. Quidam enim, sicut Avicenna et
Algazel, dixerunt quod impossibile est esse multitudinem actu
infinitam per se, sed infinitam per accidens multitudinem esse, non
est impossibile. Dicitur enim multitudo esse infinita per se,
quando requiritur ad aliquid ut multitudo infinita sit. Et hoc est
impossibile esse, quia sic oporteret quod aliquid dependeret ex
infinitis; unde eius generatio nunquam compleretur, cum non sit
infinita pertransire. Per accidens autem dicitur multitudo
infinita, quando non requiritur ad aliquid infinitas multitudinis,
sed accidit ita esse. Et hoc sic manifestari potest in operatione
fabri, ad quam quaedam multitudo requiritur per se, scilicet quod
sit ars in anima, et manus movens, et martellus. Et si haec in
infinitum multiplicarentur, nunquam opus fabrile compleretur, quia
dependeret ex infinitis causis. Sed multitudo martellorum quae
accidit ex hoc quod unum frangitur et accipitur aliud, est
multitudo per accidens, accidit enim quod multis martellis
operetur; et nihil differt utrum uno vel duobus vel pluribus
operetur, vel infinitis, si infinito tempore operaretur. Per hunc
igitur modum, posuerunt quod possibile est esse actu multitudinem
infinitam per accidens. Sed hoc est impossibile. Quia omnem
multitudinem oportet esse in aliqua specie multitudinis. Species
autem multitudinis sunt secundum species numerorum. Nulla autem
species numeri est infinita, quia quilibet numerus est multitudo
mensurata per unum. Unde impossibile est esse multitudinem
infinitam actu, sive per se, sive per accidens. Item, multitudo in
rerum natura existens est creata, et omne creatum sub aliqua certa
intentione creantis comprehenditur, non enim in vanum agens aliquod
operatur. Unde necesse est quod sub certo numero omnia creata
comprehendantur. Impossibile est ergo esse multitudinem infinitam
in actu, etiam per accidens. Sed esse multitudinem infinitam in
potentia, possibile est. Quia augmentum multitudinis consequitur
divisionem magnitudinis, quanto enim aliquid plus dividitur, tanto
plura secundum numerum resultant. Unde, sicut infinitum invenitur
in potentia in divisione continui, quia proceditur ad materiam, ut
supra ostensum est; eadem ratione etiam infinitum invenitur in
potentia in additione multitudinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Every potentiality is made actual according to its mode of being; for instance, a day is reduced to act successively, and
                     not all at once. Likewise the infinite in multitude is reduced to act successively, and not all at once; because every multitude
                     can be succeeded by another multitude to infinity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28525" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28525] Iª q. 7 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod unumquodque quod est in potentia, reducitur in actum
secundum modum sui esse, dies enim non reducitur in actum ut sit
tota simul, sed successive. Et similiter infinitum multitudinis non
reducitur in actum ut sit totum simul, sed successive, quia post
quamlibet multitudinem, potest sumi alia multitudo in
infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Species of figures are infinite by infinitude of number. Now there are various species of figures, such as trilateral, quadrilateral
                     and so on; and as an infinitely numerable multitude is not all at once reduced to act, so neither is the multitude of figures.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28526" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28526] Iª q. 7 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod species figurarum habent infinitatem ex infinitate
numeri, sunt enim species figurarum, trilaterum, quadrilaterum, et
sic inde. Unde, sicut multitudo infinita numerabilis non reducitur
in actum quod sit tota simul, ita nec multitudo figurarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the supposition of some things does not preclude the supposition of others, still the supposition of an infinite
                     number is opposed to any single species of multitude. Hence it is not possible for an actually infinite multitude to exist.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28527" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28527] Iª q. 7 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
quod, licet, quibusdam positis, alia poni non sit eis oppositum;
tamen infinita poni opponitur cuilibet speciei multitudinis. Unde
non est possibile esse aliquam multitudinem actu infinitam.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q8" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q8-p0.1">Q. 8. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q8-p2"> Since it evidently belongs to the infinite to be present everywhere, and in all things, we now consider whether this belongs
                  to God; and concerning this there arise four points of inquiry:
               </p><p id="FP_Q8-p3"><a href="#FP_Q8_A1"> (1) Whether God is in all things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q8-p4"><a href="#FP_Q8_A2"> (2) Whether God is everywhere?</a></p><p id="FP_Q8-p5"><a href="#FP_Q8_A3"> (3) Whether God is everywhere by essence, power, and presence?</a></p><p id="FP_Q8-p6"><a href="#FP_Q8_A4"> (4) Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 pr."><a name="28528" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28528]
Iª q. 8 pr.</span></a> Quia vero infinito convenire videtur
quod ubique et in omnibus sit, considerandum est utrum hoc Deo
conveniat. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum Deus sit
in omnibus rebus. Secundo, utrum Deus sit ubique. Tertio, utrum
Deus sit ubique per essentiam et potentiam et praesentiam. Quarto,
utrum esse ubique sit proprium Dei.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q8_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q8_A1-p0.1">Q. 8. A. 1. Whether God is in all things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not in all things. For what is above all things is not in all things. But God is above all, according
                     to the Psalm (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.112.4" target="asv">Ps. 112:4</a>), "The Lord is high above all nations," etc. Therefore God is not in all things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28529" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28529] Iª q. 8 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit in omnibus rebus. Quod enim
est supra omnia, non est in omnibus rebus. Sed Deus est supra
omnia, secundum illud Psalmi, <i>excelsus super omnes gentes
dominus,</i> et cetera. Ergo Deus non est in omnibus rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is in anything is thereby contained. Now God is not contained by things, but rather does He contain them. Therefore
                     God is not in things but things are rather in Him. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 20), that "in Him things
                     are, rather than He is in any place."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28530" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28530] Iª q. 8 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod
est in aliquo, continetur ab eo. Sed Deus non continetur a rebus,
sed magis continet res. Ergo Deus non est in rebus, sed magis res
sunt in eo. Unde Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest.,
dicit quod <i>in ipso potius sunt omnia, quam ipse alicubi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more powerful an agent is, the more extended is its action. But God is the most powerful of all agents. Therefore
                     His action can extend to things which are far removed from Him; nor is it necessary that He should be in all things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28531" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28531] Iª q. 8 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quanto
aliquod agens est virtuosius, tanto ad magis distans eius actio
procedit. Sed Deus est virtuosissimum agens. Ergo eius actio
pertingere potest ad ea etiam quae ab ipso distant, nec oportet
quod sit in omnibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the demons are beings. But God is not in the demons; for there is no fellowship between light and darkness (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.14" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:14</a>). Therefore God is not in all things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="28532" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28532] Iª q. 8 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
Daemones res aliquae sunt. Nec tamen Deus est in Daemonibus, non
enim est conventio lucis ad tenebras, ut dicitur II ad Cor. VI.
Ergo Deus non est in omnibus rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A thing is wherever it operates. But God operates in all things, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.26.12" target="asv"> Is. 26:12, </a> "Lord . . . Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us." Therefore God is in all things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28533" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28533] Iª q. 8 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
ubicumque operatur aliquid, ibi est. Sed Deus operatur in omnibus,
secundum illud Isaiae XXVI, <i>omnia opera nostra operatus es in
nobis, domine</i>. Ergo Deus est in omnibus rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon
                     which it works. For an agent must be joined to that wherein it acts immediately and touch it by its power; hence it is proved
                     in Phys. vii that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Now since God is very being by His own essence, created
                     being must be His proper effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now God
                     causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as they are preserved in being; as light is
                     caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing has being, God must be present
                     to it, according to its mode of being. But being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all things
                     since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as was shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q8_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Hence
                     it must be that God is in all things, and innermostly.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 co."><a name="28534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28534] Iª q. 8 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod Deus est in omnibus rebus, non quidem sicut pars essentiae,
vel sicut accidens, sed sicut agens adest ei in quod agit. Oportet
enim omne agens coniungi ei in quod immediate agit, et sua virtute
illud contingere, unde in VII Physic. probatur quod motum et movens
oportet esse simul. Cum autem Deus sit ipsum esse per suam
essentiam, oportet quod esse creatum sit proprius effectus eius;
sicut ignire est proprius effectus ignis. Hunc autem effectum
causat Deus in rebus, non solum quando primo esse incipiunt, sed
quandiu in esse conservantur; sicut lumen causatur in aere a sole
quandiu aer illuminatus manet. Quandiu igitur res habet esse,
tandiu oportet quod Deus adsit ei, secundum modum quo esse habet.
Esse autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet, et quod
profundius omnibus inest, cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in
re sunt, ut ex supra dictis patet. Unde oportet quod Deus sit in
omnibus rebus, et intime.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is above all things by the excellence of His nature; nevertheless, He is in all things as the cause of the being of all
                     things; as was shown above in this article.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28535" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28535] Iª q. 8 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Deus est supra omnia per excellentiam suae naturae,
et tamen est in omnibus rebus, ut causans omnium esse, ut supra
dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although corporeal things are said to be in another as in that which contains them, nevertheless, spiritual things contain
                     those things in which they are; as the soul contains the body. Hence also God is in things containing them; nevertheless,
                     by a certain similitude to corporeal things, it is said that all things are in God; inasmuch as they are contained by Him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28536" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28536] Iª q. 8 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, licet corporalia dicantur esse in aliquo sicut in
continente, tamen spiritualia continent ea in quibus sunt, sicut
anima continet corpus. Unde et Deus est in rebus sicut continens
res. Tamen, per quandam similitudinem corporalium, dicuntur omnia
esse in Deo, inquantum continentur ab ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No action of an agent, however powerful it may be, acts at a distance, except through a medium. But it belongs to the great
                     power of God that He acts immediately in all things. Hence nothing is distant from Him, as if it could be without God in itself.
                     But things are said to be distant from God by the unlikeness to Him in nature or grace; as also He is above all by the excellence
                     of His own nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28537" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28537] Iª q. 8 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
quod nullius agentis, quantumcumque virtuosi, actio procedit ad
aliquid distans, nisi inquantum in illud per media agit. Hoc autem
ad maximam virtutem Dei pertinet, quod immediate in omnibus agit.
Unde nihil est distans ab eo, quasi in se illud Deum non habeat.
Dicuntur tamen res distare a Deo per dissimilitudinem naturae vel
gratiae, sicut et ipse est super omnia per excellentiam suae
naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the demons there is their nature which is from God, and also the deformity of sin which is not from Him; therefore, it
                     is not to be absolutely conceded that God is in the demons, except with the addition, "inasmuch as they are beings." But in
                     things not deformed in their nature, we must say absolutely that God is.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="28538" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28538] Iª q. 8 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
quod in Daemonibus intelligitur et natura, quae est a Deo, et
deformitas culpae, quae non est ab ipso. Et ideo non est absolute
concedendum quod Deus sit in Daemonibus, sed cum hac additione,
inquantum sunt res quaedam. In rebus autem quae nominant naturam
non deformatam, absolute dicendum est Deum esse.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q8_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q8_A2-p0.1">Q. 8. A. 2. Whether God is everywhere?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not everywhere. For to be everywhere means to be in every place. But to be in every place does not belong
                     to God, to Whom it does not belong to be in place at all; for "incorporeal things," as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), "are not
                     in a place." Therefore God is not everywhere.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28539" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28539] Iª q. 8 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit ubique. Esse enim ubique
significat esse in omni loco. Sed esse in omni loco non convenit
Deo, cui non convenit esse in loco, nam incorporalia, ut dicit
Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., non sunt in loco. Ergo Deus non est
ubique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the relation of time to succession is the same as the relation of place to permanence. But one indivisible part
                     of action or movement cannot exist in different times; therefore neither can one indivisible part in the genus of permanent
                     things be in every place. Now the divine being is not successive but permanent. Therefore God is not in many places; and thus
                     He is not everywhere.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28540" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28540] Iª q. 8 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
se habet tempus ad successiva, ita se habet locus ad permanentia.
Sed unum indivisibile actionis vel motus, non potest esse in
diversis temporibus. Ergo nec unum indivisibile in genere rerum
permanentium, potest esse in omnibus locis. Esse autem divinum non
est successivum, sed permanens. Ergo Deus non est in pluribus
locis. Et ita non est ubique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is wholly in any one place is not in part elsewhere. But if God is in any one place He is all there; for He
                     has no parts. No part of Him then is elsewhere; and therefore God is not everywhere.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28541" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28541] Iª q. 8 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod
est totum alicubi, nihil eius est extra locum illum. Sed Deus, si
est in aliquo loco, totus est ibi, non enim habet partes. Ergo
nihil eius est extra locum illum. Ergo Deus non est ubique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "I fill heaven and earth." (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.23.24" target="asv">Jer. 23:24</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28542" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28542] Iª q. 8 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Ierem. XXIII, <i>caelum et terram ego impleo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since place is a thing, to be in place can be understood in a twofold sense; either by way of other things---i.e. as one
                     thing is said to be in another no matter how; and thus the accidents of a place are in place; or by a way proper to place;
                     and thus things placed are in a place. Now in both these senses, in some way God is in every place; and this is to be everywhere.
                     First, as He is in all things giving them being, power and operation; so He is in every
                     place as giving it existence and locative power. Again, things placed are in place, inasmuch as they fill place; and God fills
                     every place; not, indeed, like a body, for a body is said to fill place inasmuch as it excludes the co-presence of another
                     body; whereas by God being in a place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed, by the very fact that He gives being
                     to the things that fill every place, He Himself fills every place.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 2 co."><a name="28543" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28543] Iª q. 8 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, cum locus sit res quaedam, esse aliquid in loco potest
intelligi dupliciter, vel per modum aliarum rerum, idest sicut
dicitur aliquid esse in aliis rebus quocumque modo, sicut
accidentia loci sunt in loco; vel per modum proprium loci, sicut
locata sunt in loco. Utroque autem modo, secundum aliquid, Deus est
in omni loco, quod est esse ubique. Primo quidem, sicut est in
omnibus rebus, ut dans eis esse et virtutem et operationem, sic
enim est in omni loco, ut dans ei esse et virtutem locativam. Item,
locata sunt in loco inquantum replent locum, et Deus omnem locum
replet. Non sicut corpus, corpus enim dicitur replere locum,
inquantum non compatitur secum aliud corpus; sed per hoc quod Deus
est in aliquo loco, non excluditur quin alia sint ibi, imo per hoc
replet omnia loca, quod dat esse omnibus locatis, quae replent
omnia loca.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Incorporeal things are in place not by contact of dimensive quantity, as bodies are but by contact of power.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28544" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28544] Iª q. 8 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod incorporalia non sunt in loco per contactum
quantitatis dimensivae, sicut corpora, sed per contactum
virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The indivisible is twofold. One is the term of the continuous; as a point in permanent things, and as a moment in succession;
                     and this kind of the indivisible in permanent things, forasmuch as it has a determinate site, cannot be in many parts of place,
                     or in many places; likewise the indivisible of action or movement, forasmuch as it has a determinate order in movement or
                     action, cannot be in many parts of time. Another kind of the indivisible is
                     outside of the whole genus of the continuous; and in this way incorporeal substances, like God, angel and soul, are called
                     indivisible. Such a kind of indivisible does not belong to the continuous, as a part of it, but as touching it by its power;
                     hence, according as its power can extend itself to one or to many, to a small thing, or to a great one, in this way it is
                     in one or in many places, and in a small or large place.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28545" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28545] Iª q. 8 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod indivisibile est duplex. Unum quod est terminus
continui, ut punctus in permanentibus, et momentum in successivis.
Et huiusmodi indivisibile, in permanentibus, quia habet
determinatum situm, non potest esse in pluribus partibus loci, vel
in pluribus locis, et similiter indivisibile actionis vel motus,
quia habet determinatum ordinem in motu vel actione, non potest
esse in pluribus partibus temporis. Aliud autem indivisibile est,
quod est extra totum genus continui, et hoc modo substantiae
incorporeae, ut Deus, Angelus et anima, dicuntur esse
indivisibiles. Tale igitur indivisibile non applicatur ad continuum
sicut aliquid eius, sed inquantum contingit illud sua virtute. Unde
secundum quod virtus sua se potest extendere ad unum vel multa, ad
parvum vel magnum, secundum hoc est in uno vel pluribus locis, et
in loco parvo vel magno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A whole is so called with reference to its parts. Now part is twofold: viz. a part of the essence, as the form and the matter
                     are called parts of the composite, while genus and difference are called parts of species. There is also part of quantity
                     into which any quantity is divided. What therefore is whole in any place by totality of quantity, cannot be outside of that
                     place, because the quantity of anything placed is commensurate to the quantity of
                     the place; and hence there is no totality of quantity without totality of place. But totality of essence is not commensurate
                     to the totality of place. Hence it is not necessary for that which is whole by totality of essence in a thing, not to be at
                     all outside of it. This appears also in accidental forms which have accidental quantity; as an example, whiteness is whole
                     in each part of the surface if we speak of its totality of essence; because according to the perfect idea of its species it
                     is
                     found to exist in every part of the surface. But if its totality be considered according to quantity which it has accidentally,
                     then it is not whole in every part of the surface. On the other hand, incorporeal substances have no totality either of themselves
                     or accidentally, except in reference to the perfect idea of their essence. Hence, as the soul is whole in every part of the
                     body, so is God whole in all things and in each one.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28546" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28546] Iª q. 8 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
quod totum dicitur respectu partium. Est autem duplex pars,
scilicet pars essentiae, ut forma et materia dicuntur partes
compositi, et genus et differentia partes speciei; et etiam pars
quantitatis, in quam scilicet dividitur aliqua quantitas. Quod ergo
est totum in aliquo loco totalitate quantitatis, non potest esse
extra locum illum, quia quantitas locati commensuratur quantitati
loci, unde non est totalitas quantitatis, si non sit totalitas
loci. Sed totalitas essentiae non commensuratur totalitati loci.
Unde non oportet quod illud quod est totum totalitate essentiae in
aliquo, nullo modo sit extra illud. Sicut apparet etiam in formis
accidentalibus, quae secundum accidens quantitatem habent, albedo
enim est tota in qualibet parte superficiei, si accipiatur
totalitas essentiae, quia secundum perfectam rationem suae speciei
invenitur in qualibet parte superficiei, si autem accipiatur
totalitas secundum quantitatem, quam habet per accidens, sic non
est tota in qualibet parte superficiei. In substantiis autem
incorporeis non est totalitas, nec per se nec per accidens, nisi
secundum perfectam rationem essentiae. Et ideo, sicut anima est
tota in qualibet parte corporis, ita Deus totus est in omnibus et
singulis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q8_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q8_A3-p0.1">Q. 8. A. 3. Whether God is everywhere by essence, presence and power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the mode of God's existence in all things is not properly described by way of essence, presence and power.
                     For what is by essence in anything, is in it essentially. But God is not essentially in things; for He does not belong to
                     the essence of anything. Therefore it ought not to be said that God is in things by essence, presence and power.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28547" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28547] Iª q. 8 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod male assignentur modi existendi Deum in
rebus, cum dicitur quod Deus est in omnibus rebus per essentiam,
potentiam et praesentiam. Id enim per essentiam est in aliquo, quod
essentialiter est in eo. Deus autem non est essentialiter in rebus,
non enim est de essentia alicuius rei. Ergo non debet dici quod
Deus sit in rebus per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to be present in anything means not to be absent from it. Now this is the meaning of God being in things by His
                     essence, that He is not absent from anything. Therefore the presence of God in all things by essence and presence means the
                     same thing. Therefore it is superfluous to say that God is present in things by His essence, presence and power.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28548" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28548] Iª q. 8 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, hoc
est esse praesentem alicui rei, scilicet non deesse illi. Sed hoc
est Deum esse per essentiam in rebus, scilicet non deesse alicui
rei. Ergo idem est esse Deum in omnibus per essentiam et
praesentiam. Superfluum ergo fuit dicere quod Deus sit in rebus per
essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as God by His power is the principle of all things, so He is the same likewise by His knowledge and will. But it
                     is not said that He is in things by knowledge and will. Therefore neither is He present by His power.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28549] Iª q. 8 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
Deus est principium omnium rerum per suam potentiam, ita per
scientiam et voluntatem. Sed non dicitur Deus esse in rebus per
scientiam et voluntatem. Ergo nec per potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as grace is a perfection added to the substance of a thing, so many other perfections are likewise added. Therefore
                     if God is said to be in certain persons in a special way by grace, it seems that according to every perfection there ought
                     to be a special mode of God's existence in things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="28550" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28550] Iª q. 8 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
gratia est quaedam perfectio superaddita substantiae rei, ita
multae sunt aliae perfectiones superadditae. Si ergo Deus dicitur
esse speciali modo in quibusdam per gratiam, videtur quod secundum
quamlibet perfectionem debeat accipi specialis modus essendi Deum
in rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on the Canticle of Canticles (5) says that, "God by a common mode is in all things by His presence, power and substance;
                     still He is said to be present more familiarly in some by grace" [*The quotation is from St. Gregory, (Hom. viii in Ezech.)].
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28551" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28551] Iª q. 8 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Gregorius dicit, super Cant. Cantic., quod <i>Deus communi
modo est in omnibus rebus praesentia, potentia et substantia, tamen
familiari modo dicitur esse in aliquibus per gratiam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things
                     created by Him; in another way he is in things as the object of operation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations
                     of the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and the thing desired in the one desiring. In this second
                     way God is especially in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually or
                     habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this prerogative by grace, as will be shown later
                     <a href="#FP_Q12" id="FP_Q8_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">(Q[12])</a>. He is said to be thus in the saints by grace.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 co."><a name="28552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28552] Iª q. 8 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod Deus dicitur esse in re aliqua dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum
causae agentis, et sic est in omnibus rebus creatis ab ipso. Alio
modo, sicut obiectum operationis est in operante, quod proprium est
in operationibus animae, secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente,
et desideratum in desiderante. Hoc igitur secundo modo, Deus
specialiter est in rationali creatura, quae cognoscit et diligit
illum actu vel habitu. Et quia hoc habet rationalis creatura per
gratiam, ut infra patebit, dicitur esse hoc modo in sanctis per
gratiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p8"> But how He is in other things created by Him, may be considered from human affairs. A king, for example, is said to be in
                     the whole kingdom by his power, although he is not everywhere present. Again a thing is said to be by its presence in other
                     things which are subject to its inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who nevertheless may not
                     be in substance in every part of the house. Lastly, a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that
                     place in which its substance may be. Now there were some (the Manichees) who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were
                     subject to the divine power; but that visible and corporeal things were subject to the power of a contrary principle. Therefore
                     against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His power.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">In rebus vero aliis ab ipso creatis quomodo sit,
considerandum est ex his quae in rebus humanis esse dicuntur. Rex
enim dicitur esse in toto regno suo per suam potentiam, licet non
sit ubique praesens. Per praesentiam vero suam, dicitur aliquid
esse in omnibus quae in prospectu ipsius sunt; sicut omnia quae
sunt in aliqua domo, dicuntur esse praesentia alicui, qui tamen non
est secundum substantiam suam in qualibet parte domus. Secundum
vero substantiam vel essentiam, dicitur aliquid esse in loco in quo
eius substantia habetur. Fuerunt ergo aliqui, scilicet Manichaei,
qui dixerunt divinae potestati subiecta spiritualia esse et
incorporalia, visibilia vero et corporalia subiecta esse dicebant
potestati principii contrarii. Contra hos ergo oportet dicere quod
Deus sit in omnibus per potentiam suam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p9"> But others, though they believed that all things were subject to the divine power, still did not allow that divine providence
                     extended to these inferior bodies, and in the person of these it is said, "He walketh about the poles of the heavens; and
                     He doth not consider our things [*Vulg.: 'He doth not consider . . . and He walketh,' etc.]" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Job.22.14" target="asv">Job 22:14</a>). Against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His presence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Fuerunt vero alii, qui
licet crederent omnia esse subiecta divinae potentiae, tamen
providentiam divinam usque ad haec inferiora corpora non
extendebant, ex quorum persona dicitur Iob XXII, <i>circa cardines
caeli perambulat, nec nostra considerat</i>. Et contra hos oportuit
dicere quod sit in omnibus per suam praesentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p10"> Further, others said that, although all things are subject to God's providence, still all things are not immediately created
                     by God; but that He immediately created the first creatures, and these created the others. Against these it is necessary to
                     say that He is in all things by His essence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Fuerunt vero alii,
qui licet dicerent omnia ad Dei providentiam pertinere, tamen
posuerunt omnia non immediate esse a Deo creata, sed quod immediate
creavit primas creaturas, et illae creaverunt alias. Et contra hos
oportet dicere quod sit in omnibus per essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p11"> Therefore, God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things are subject to His power; He is by His presence in all
                     things, as all things are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His essence, inasmuch as He is present to all
                     as the cause of their being.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Sic ergo est in
omnibus per potentiam, inquantum omnia eius potestati subduntur.
Est per praesentiam in omnibus, inquantum omnia nuda sunt et aperta
oculis eius. Est in omnibus per essentiam, inquantum adest omnibus
ut causa essendi, sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to be in all things by essence, not indeed by the essence of the things themselves, as if He were of their essence;
                     but by His own essence; because His substance is present to all things as the cause of their being.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28553" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28553] Iª q. 8 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Deus dicitur esse in omnibus per essentiam, non
quidem rerum, quasi sit de essentia earum, sed per essentiam suam,
quia substantia sua adest omnibus ut causa essendi, sicut dictum
est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing can be said to be present to another, when in its sight, though the thing may be distant in substance, as was shown
                     in this article; and therefore two modes of presence are necessary; viz. by essence and by presence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28554" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28554] Iª q. 8 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod aliquid potest dici praesens alicui, inquantum
subiacet eius conspectui, quod tamen distat ab eo secundum suam
substantiam, ut dictum est. Et ideo oportuit duos modos poni,
scilicet per essentiam, et praesentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Knowledge and will require that the thing known should be in the one who knows, and the thing willed in the one who wills.
                     Hence by knowledge and will things are more truly in God than God in things. But power is the principle of acting on another;
                     hence by power the agent is related and applied to an external thing; thus by power an agent may be said to be present to
                     another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28555" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28555] Iª q. 8 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
quod de ratione scientiae et voluntatis est, quod scitum sit in
sciente, et volitum in volente, unde secundum scientiam et
voluntatem, magis res sunt in Deo, quam Deus in rebus. Sed de
ratione potentiae est, quod sit principium agendi in aliud, unde
secundum potentiam agens comparatur et applicatur rei exteriori. Et
sic per potentiam potest dici agens esse in altero.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> No other perfection, except grace, added to substance, renders God present in anything as the object known and loved; therefore
                     only grace constitutes a special mode of God's existence in things. There is, however, another special mode of God's existence
                     in man by union, which will be treated of in its own place (TP).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="28556" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28556] Iª q. 8 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
quod nulla alia perfectio superaddita substantiae, facit Deum esse
in aliquo sicut obiectum cognitum et amatum, nisi gratia, et ideo
sola gratia facit singularem modum essendi Deum in rebus. Est autem
alius singularis modus essendi Deum in homine per unionem, de quo
modo suo loco agetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q8_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q8_A4-p0.1">Q. 8. A. 4. Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. For the universal, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i),
                     is everywhere, and always; primary matter also, since it is in all bodies, is everywhere. But neither of these is God, as
                     appears from what is said above
                     <a href="#FP_Q3" id="FP_Q8_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(Q[3])</a>. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28557] Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod esse ubique non sit proprium Dei.
Universale enim, secundum philosophum, est ubique et semper,
materia etiam prima, cum sit in omnibus corporibus, est ubique.
Neutrum autem horum est Deus, ut ex praemissis patet. Ergo esse
ubique non est proprium Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, number is in things numbered. But the whole universe is constituted in number, as appears from the Book of Wisdom
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>). Therefore there is some number which is in the whole universe, and is thus everywhere.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28558" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28558] Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
numerus est in numeratis. Sed totum universum est constitutum in
numero, ut patet Sap. XI. Ergo aliquis numerus est, qui est in toto
universo, et ita ubique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the universe is a kind of "whole perfect body" (Coel. et Mund. i). But the whole universe is everywhere, because
                     there is no place outside it. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28559" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28559] Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, totum
universum est quoddam totum corpus perfectum, ut dicitur in I caeli
et mundi. Sed totum universum est ubique, quia extra ipsum nullus
locus est. Non ergo solus Deus est ubique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if any body were infinite, no place would exist outside of it, and so it would be everywhere. Therefore to be everywhere
                     does not appear to belong to God alone.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="28560" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28560] Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, si
aliquod corpus esset infinitum, nullus locus esset extra ipsum.
Ergo esset ubique. Et sic, esse ubique non videtur proprium
Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the soul, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), is "whole in the whole body, and whole in every one of its parts."
                     Therefore if there was only one animal in the world, its soul would be everywhere; and thus to be everywhere does not belong
                     to God alone.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="28561" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28561] Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> <i>Praeterea,
anima</i>, ut dicit Augustinus, in VI de Trin., <i>est tota in toto
corpore, et tota in qualibet eius parte</i>. Si ergo non esset in
mundo nisi unum solum animal, anima eius esset ubique. Et sic, esse
ubique non est proprium Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p7">
                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, as Augustine says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">Ep. 137</a>), "The soul feels where it sees, and lives where it feels, and is where it lives." But the soul sees as it were everywhere:
                     for in a succession of glances it comprehends the entire space of the heavens in its sight. Therefore the soul is everywhere.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 6"><a name="28562" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28562] Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, ut
Augustinus dicit in epistola ad Volusianum, <i>anima ubi videt, ibi
sentit; et ubi sentit, ibi vivit; et ubi vivit, ibi est</i>. Sed
anima videt quasi ubique, quia successive videt etiam totum caelum.
Ergo anima est ubique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p8">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Who dares to call the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all things, and everywhere, and
                     always is, which assuredly belongs to the divinity alone?"
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28563" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28563] Iª q. 8 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Ambrosius dicit, in libro de spiritu sancto, <i>quis audeat
creaturam dicere spiritum sanctum, qui in omnibus et ubique et
semper est; quod utique divinitatis est proprium?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p9">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> To be everywhere primarily and absolutely, is proper to God. Now to be everywhere primarily is said of that which in its
                     whole self is everywhere; for if a thing were everywhere according to its parts in different places, it would not be primarily
                     everywhere, forasmuch as what belongs to anything according to part does not belong to it primarily; thus if a man has white
                     teeth, whiteness belongs primarily not to the man but to his teeth. But a thing is
                     everywhere absolutely when it does not belong to it to be everywhere accidentally, that is, merely on some supposition; as
                     a grain of millet would be everywhere, supposing that no other body existed. It belongs therefore to a thing to be everywhere
                     absolutely when, on any supposition, it must be everywhere; and this properly belongs to God alone. For whatever number of
                     places be supposed, even if an infinite number be supposed besides what already exist, it would be necessary that God should
                     be
                     in all of them; for nothing can exist except by Him. Therefore to be everywhere primarily and absolutely belongs to God and
                     is proper to Him: because whatever number of places be supposed to exist, God must be in all of them, not as to a part of
                     Him, but as to His very self.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 co."><a name="28564" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28564] Iª q. 8 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod esse ubique primo et per se, est proprium Dei. Dico autem esse
ubique primo, quod secundum se totum est ubique. Si quid enim esset
ubique, secundum diversas partes in diversis locis existens, non
esset primo ubique, quia quod convenit alicui ratione partis suae,
non convenit ei primo; sicut si homo est albus dente, albedo non
convenit primo homini, sed denti. Esse autem ubique per se dico id
cui non convenit esse ubique per accidens, propter aliquam
suppositionem factam, quia sic granum milii esset ubique, supposito
quod nullum aliud corpus esset. Per se igitur convenit esse ubique
alicui, quando tale est quod, qualibet positione facta, sequitur
illud esse ubique. Et hoc proprie convenit Deo. Quia quotcumque
loca ponantur, etiam si ponerentur infinita praeter ista quae sunt,
oporteret in omnibus esse Deum, quia nihil potest esse nisi per
ipsum. Sic igitur esse ubique primo et per se convenit Deo, et est
proprium eius, quia quotcumque loca ponantur, oportet quod in
quolibet sit Deus, non secundum partem, sed secundum seipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The universal, and also primary matter are indeed everywhere; but not according to the same mode of existence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28565] Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod universale et materia prima sunt quidem ubique, sed
non secundum idem esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Number, since it is an accident, does not, of itself, exist in place, but accidentally; neither is the whole but only part
                     of it in each of the things numbered; hence it does not follow that it is primarily and absolutely everywhere.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28566" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28566] Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod numerus, cum sit accidens, non est per se sed per
accidens, in loco. Nec est totus in quolibet numeratorum, sed
secundum partem. Et sic non sequitur quod sit primo et per se
ubique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The whole body of the universe is everywhere, but not primarily; forasmuch as it is not wholly in each place, but according
                     to its parts; nor again is it everywhere absolutely, because, supposing that other places existed besides itself, it would
                     not be in them.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28567" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28567] Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
quod totum corpus universi est ubique, sed non primo, quia non
totum est in quolibet loco, sed secundum suas partes. Nec iterum
per se, quia si ponerentur aliqua alia loca, non esset in eis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> If an infinite body existed, it would be everywhere; but according to its parts.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="28568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28568] Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum
quod, si esset corpus infinitum, esset ubique; sed secundum suas
partes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Were there one animal only, its soul would be everywhere primarily indeed, but only accidentally.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="28569" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28569] Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum
quod, si esset unum solum animal, anima eius esset ubique primo
quidem, sed per accidens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> When it is said that the soul sees anywhere, this can be taken in two senses. In one sense the adverb "anywhere" determines
                     the act of seeing on the part of the object; and in this sense it is true that while it sees the heavens, it sees in the heavens;
                     and in the same way it feels in the heavens; but it does not follow that it lives or exists in the heavens, because to live
                     and to exist do not import an act passing to an exterior object. In another
                     sense it can be understood according as the adverb determines the act of the seer, as proceeding from the seer; and thus it
                     is true that where the soul feels and sees, there it is, and there it lives according to this mode of speaking; and thus it
                     does not follow that it is everywhere.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 6"><a name="28570" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28570] Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum
quod, cum dicitur anima alicubi videre, potest intelligi
dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod hoc adverbium alicubi
determinat actum videndi ex parte obiecti. Et sic verum est quod,
dum caelum videt, in caelo videt, et eadem ratione in caelo sentit.
Non tamen sequitur quod in caelo vivat vel sit, quia vivere et esse
non important actum transeuntem in exterius obiectum. Alio modo
potest intelligi secundum quod adverbium determinat actum videntis,
secundum quod exit a vidente. Et sic verum est quod anima ubi
sentit et videt, ibi est et vivit, secundum istum modum loquendi.
Et ita non sequitur quod sit ubique.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q9" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q9-p0.1">Q. 9. THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q9-p2"> We next consider God's immutability, and His eternity following on His immutability. On the immutability of God there are
                  two points of inquiry:
               </p><p id="FP_Q9-p3"><a href="#FP_Q9_A1"> (1) Whether God is altogether immutable?</a></p><p id="FP_Q9-p4"><a href="#FP_Q9_A2"> (2) Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 pr."><a name="28571" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28571]
Iª q. 9 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de
immutabilitate et aeternitate divina, quae immutabilitatem
consequitur. Circa immutabilitatem vero quaeruntur duo. Primo,
utrum Deus sit omnino immutabilis. Secundo, utrum esse immutabile
sit proprium Dei.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q9_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q9_A1-p0.1">Q. 9. A. 1. Whether God is altogether immutable?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not altogether immutable. For whatever moves itself is in some way mutable. But, as Augustine says (Gen.
                     ad lit viii, 20), "The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by time, nor by place." Therefore God is in some way mutable.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28572" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28572] Iª q. 9 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit omnino immutabilis. Quidquid
enim movet seipsum, est aliquo modo mutabile. Sed, sicut dicit
Augustinus, VIII super Genesim ad litteram, <i>spiritus creator
movet se nec per tempus nec per locum</i>. Ergo Deus est aliquo
modo mutabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said of Wisdom, that "it is more mobile than all things active [Vulg.'mobilior']" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q9_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.24" target="asv">Wis. 7:24</a>). But God is wisdom itself; therefore God is movable.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28573" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28573] Iª q. 9 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Sap.
VII dicitur de sapientia quod est <i>mobilior omnibus
mobilibus</i>. Sed Deus est ipsa sapientia. Ergo Deus est
mobilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to approach and to recede signify movement. But these are said of God in Scripture, "Draw nigh to God and He will
                     draw nigh to you" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q9_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.8" target="asv">James 4:8</a>). Therefore God is mutable.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28574" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28574] Iª q. 9 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
appropinquari et elongari motum significant. Huiusmodi autem
dicuntur de Deo in Scriptura, Iac. IV, <i>appropinquate Deo, et
appropinquabit vobis</i>. Ergo Deus est mutabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "I am the Lord, and I change not" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q9_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.3.6" target="asv">Malachi 3:6</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28575" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28575] Iª q. 9 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Malach. III, <i>ego Deus, et non mutor</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> From what precedes, it is shown that God is altogether immutable. First, because it was shown above that there is some first
                     being, whom we call God; and that this first being must be pure act, without the admixture of any potentiality, for the reason
                     that, absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality.
                     Hence it is evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable.
                     Secondly, because everything which is moved, remains as it was in part, and passes away in part; as what is moved from whiteness
                     to blackness, remains the same as to substance; thus in everything which is moved, there is some kind of composition to be
                     found. But it has been shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A7" id="FP_Q9_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[7]</a>) that in God there is no composition, for He is altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that God cannot be moved. Thirdly,
                     because everything which is moved acquires something
                     by its movement, and attains to what it had not attained previously. But since God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all
                     the plenitude of perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything new, nor extend Himself to anything whereto He was not
                     extended previously. Hence movement in no way belongs to Him. So, some of the ancients, constrained, as it were, by the truth,
                     decided that the first principle was immovable.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 1 co."><a name="28576" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28576] Iª q. 9 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod ex praemissis ostenditur Deum esse omnino immutabilem. Primo
quidem, quia supra ostensum est esse aliquod primum ens, quod Deum
dicimus, et quod huiusmodi primum ens oportet esse purum actum
absque permixtione alicuius potentiae, eo quod potentia simpliciter
est posterior actu. Omne autem quod quocumque modo mutatur, est
aliquo modo in potentia. Ex quo patet quod impossibile est Deum
aliquo modo mutari. Secundo, quia omne quod movetur, quantum ad
aliquid manet, et quantum ad aliquid transit, sicut quod movetur de
albedine in nigredinem, manet secundum substantiam. Et sic in omni
eo quod movetur, attenditur aliqua compositio. Ostensum est autem
supra quod in Deo nulla est compositio, sed est omnino simplex.
Unde manifestum est quod Deus moveri non potest. Tertio, quia omne
quod movetur, motu suo aliquid acquirit, et pertingit ad illud ad
quod prius non pertingebat. Deus autem, cum sit infinitus,
comprehendens in se omnem plenitudinem perfectionis totius esse,
non potest aliquid acquirere, nec extendere se in aliquid ad quod
prius non pertingebat. Unde nullo modo sibi competit motus. Et inde
est quod quidam antiquorum, quasi ab ipsa veritate coacti,
posuerunt primum principium esse immobile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine there speaks in a similar way to Plato, who said that the first mover moves Himself; calling every operation a
                     movement, even as the acts of understanding, and willing, and loving, are called movements. Therefore because God understands
                     and loves Himself, in that respect they said that God moves Himself, not, however, as movement and change belong to a thing
                     existing in potentiality, as we now speak of change and movement.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28577" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28577] Iª q. 9 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur secundum modum quo Plato
dicebat primum movens movere seipsum, omnem operationem nominans
motum; secundum quod etiam ipsum intelligere et velle et amare
motus quidam dicuntur. Quia ergo Deus intelligit et amat seipsum,
secundum hoc dixerunt quod Deus movet seipsum, non autem secundum
quod motus et mutatio est existentis in potentia, ut nunc loquimur
de mutatione et motu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Wisdom is called mobile by way of similitude, according as it diffuses its likeness even to the outermost of things; for
                     nothing can exist which does not proceed from the divine wisdom by way of some kind of imitation, as from the first effective
                     and formal principle; as also works of art proceed from the wisdom of the artist. And so in the same way, inasmuch as the
                     similitude of the divine wisdom proceeds in degrees from the highest things, which
                     participate more fully of its likeness, to the lowest things which participate of it in a lesser degree, there is said to
                     be a kind of procession and movement of the divine wisdom to things; as when we say that the sun proceeds to the earth, inasmuch
                     as the ray of light touches the earth. In this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. i) expounds the matter, that every procession of
                     the divine manifestation comes to us from the movement of the Father of light.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28578" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28578] Iª q. 9 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod sapientia dicitur mobilis esse similitudinarie,
secundum quod suam similitudinem diffundit usque ad ultima rerum.
Nihil enim esse potest, quod non procedat a divina sapientia per
quandam imitationem, sicut a primo principio effectivo et formali;
prout etiam artificiata procedunt a sapientia artificis. Sic igitur
inquantum similitudo divinae sapientiae gradatim procedit a
supremis, quae magis participant de eius similitudine, usque ad
infima rerum, quae minus participant dicitur esse quidam processus
et motus divinae sapientiae in res, sicut si dicamus solem
procedere usque ad terram, inquantum radius luminis eius usque ad
terram pertingit. Et hoc modo exponit Dionysius, cap. I Cael.
Hier., dicens quod <i>omnis processus divinae manifestationis venit
ad nos a patre luminum moto</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These things are said of God in Scripture metaphorically. For as the sun is said to enter a house, or to go out, according
                     as its rays reach the house, so God is said to approach to us, or to recede from us, when we receive the influx of His goodness,
                     or decline from Him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28579" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28579] Iª q. 9 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
quod huiusmodi dicuntur de Deo in Scripturis metaphorice. Sicut
enim dicitur sol intrare domum vel exire, inquantum radius eius
pertingit ad domum; sic dicitur Deus appropinquare ad nos vel
recedere a nobis, inquantum percipimus influentiam bonitatis
ipsius, vel ab eo deficimus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q9_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q9_A2-p0.1">Q. 9. A. 2. Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be immutable does not belong to God alone. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that "matter is in everything
                     which is moved." But, according to some, certain created substances, as angels and souls, have not matter. Therefore to be
                     immutable does not belong to God alone.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28580" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28580] Iª q. 9 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod esse immutabile non sit proprium Dei.
Dicit enim philosophus, in II Metaphys., quod materia est in omni
eo quod movetur. Sed substantiae quaedam creatae, sicut Angeli et
animae, non habent materiam, ut quibusdam videtur. Ergo esse
immutabile non est proprium Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything in motion moves to some end. What therefore has already attained its ultimate end, is not in motion.
                     But some creatures have already attained to their ultimate end; as all the blessed in heaven. Therefore some creatures are
                     immovable.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28581" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28581] Iª q. 9 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
quod movetur, movetur propter aliquem finem, quod ergo iam pervenit
ad ultimum finem, non movetur. Sed quaedam creaturae iam
pervenerunt ad ultimum finem, sicut omnes beati. Ergo aliquae
creaturae sunt immobiles.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything which is mutable is variable. But forms are invariable; for it is said (Sex Princip. i) that "form is
                     essence consisting of the simple and invariable." Therefore it does not belong to God alone to be immutable.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28582" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28582] Iª q. 9 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
quod est mutabile, est variabile. Sed formae sunt invariabiles,
dicitur enim in libro sex principiorum, quod <i>forma est simplici
et invariabili essentia consistens</i>. Ergo non est solius Dei
proprium esse immutabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. i), "God alone is immutable; and whatever things He has made, being from nothing, are mutable."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28583" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28583] Iª q. 9 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de natura boni, <i>solus Deus
immutabilis est; quae autem fecit, quia ex nihilo sunt, mutabilia
sunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God alone is altogether immutable; whereas every creature is in some way mutable. Be it known therefore that a mutable thing
                     can be called so in two ways: by a power in itself; and by a power possessed by another. For all creatures before they existed,
                     were possible, not by any created power, since no creature is eternal, but by the divine power alone, inasmuch as God could
                     produce them into existence. Thus, as the production of a thing into existence
                     depends on the will of God, so likewise it depends on His will that things should be preserved; for He does not preserve them
                     otherwise than by ever giving them existence; hence if He took away His action from them, all things would be reduced to nothing,
                     as appears from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12). Therefore as it was in the Creator's power to produce them before they existed
                     in themselves, so likewise it is in the Creator's power when they exist in themselves to bring them to nothing. In
                     this way therefore, by the power of another---namely, of God---they are mutable, inasmuch as they are producible from nothing
                     by Him, and are by Him reducible from existence to non-existence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 2 co."><a name="28584" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28584] Iª q. 9 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod solus Deus est omnino immutabilis, omnis autem creatura aliquo
modo est mutabilis. Sciendum est enim quod mutabile potest aliquid
dici dupliciter, uno modo, per potentiam quae in ipso est; alio
modo, per potentiam quae in altero est. Omnes enim creaturae,
antequam essent, non erant possibiles esse per aliquam potentiam
creatam, cum nullum creatum sit aeternum, sed per solam potentiam
divinam, inquantum Deus poterat eas in esse producere. Sicut autem
ex voluntate Dei dependet quod res in esse producit, ita ex
voluntate eius dependet quod res in esse conservat, non enim aliter
eas in esse conservat, quam semper eis esse dando; unde si suam
actionem eis subtraheret, omnia in nihilum redigerentur, ut patet
per Augustinum, IV super Gen. ad Litt. Sicut igitur in potentia
creatoris fuit ut res essent, antequam essent in seipsis, ita in
potentia creatoris est, postquam sunt in seipsis, ut non sint. Sic
igitur per potentiam quae est in altero, scilicet in Deo, sunt
mutabiles, inquantum ab ipso ex nihilo potuerunt produci in esse,
et de esse possunt reduci in non esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p7"> If, however, a thing is called mutable by a power in itself, thus also in some manner every creature is mutable. For every
                     creature has a twofold power, active and passive; and I call that power passive which enables anything to attain its perfection
                     either in being, or in attaining to its end. Now if the mutability of a thing be considered according to its power for being,
                     in that way all creatures are not mutable, but those only in which what is potential in them is consistent
                     with non-being. Hence, in the inferior bodies there is mutability both as regards substantial being, inasmuch as their matter
                     can exist with privation of their substantial form, and also as regards their accidental being, supposing the subject to coexist
                     with privation of accident; as, for example, this subject "man" can exist with "not-whiteness" and can therefore be changed
                     from white to not-white. But supposing the accident to be such as to follow on the essential principles of the subject,
                     then the privation of such an accident cannot coexist with the subject. Hence the subject cannot be changed as regards that
                     kind of accident; as, for example, snow cannot be made black. Now in the celestial bodies matter is not consistent with privation
                     of form, because the form perfects the whole potentiality of the matter; therefore these bodies are not mutable as to substantial
                     being, but only as to locality, because the subject is consistent with privation of this or that place. On the
                     other hand incorporeal substances, being subsistent forms which, although with respect to their own existence are as potentiality
                     to act, are not consistent with the privation of this act; forasmuch as existence is consequent upon form, and nothing corrupts
                     except it lose its form. Hence in the form itself there is no power to non-existence; and so these kinds of substances are
                     immutable and invariable as regards their existence. Wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "intellectual
                     created substances are pure from generation and from every variation, as also are incorporeal and immaterial substances."
                     Still, there remains in them a twofold mutability: one as regards their potentiality to their end; and in that way there is
                     in them a mutability according to choice from good to evil, as Damascene says (De Fide ii, 3,4); the other as regards place,
                     inasmuch as by their finite power they attain to certain fresh places---which cannot be said of God, who by His infinity fills
                     all places, as was shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q8_A2" id="FP_Q9_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[8], A[2]</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Si autem dicatur aliquid
mutabile per potentiam in ipso existentem, sic etiam aliquo modo
omnis creatura est mutabilis. Est enim in creatura duplex potentia,
scilicet activa et passiva. Dico autem potentiam passivam, secundum
quam aliquid assequi potest suam perfectionem, vel in essendo vel
in consequendo finem. Si igitur attendatur mutabilitas rei secundum
potentiam ad esse, sic non in omnibus creaturis est mutabilitas,
sed in illis solum in quibus illud quod est possibile in eis,
potest stare cum non esse. Unde in corporibus inferioribus est
mutabilitas et secundum esse substantiale, quia materia eorum
potest esse cum privatione formae substantialis ipsorum, et quantum
ad esse accidentale, si subiectum compatiatur secum privationem
accidentis; sicut hoc subiectum, homo, compatitur secum non album,
et ideo potest mutari de albo in non album. Si vero sit tale
accidens quod consequatur principia essentialia subiecti, privatio
illius accidentis non potest stare cum subiecto, unde subiectum non
potest mutari secundum illud accidens, sicut nix non potest fieri
nigra. In corporibus vero caelestibus, materia non compatitur secum
privationem formae, quia forma perficit totam potentialitatem
materiae, et ideo non sunt mutabilia secundum esse substantiale;
sed secundum esse locale, quia subiectum compatitur secum
privationem huius loci vel illius. Substantiae vero incorporeae,
quia sunt ipsae formae subsistentes, quae tamen se habent ad esse
ipsarum sicut potentia ad actum, non compatiuntur secum privationem
huius actus, quia esse consequitur formam, et nihil corrumpitur
nisi per hoc quod amittit formam. Unde in ipsa forma non est
potentia ad non esse, et ideo huiusmodi substantiae sunt
immutabiles et invariabiles secundum esse. Et hoc est quod dicit
Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>substantiae intellectuales
creatae mundae sunt a generatione et ab omni variatione, sicut
incorporales et immateriales</i>. Sed tamen remanet in eis duplex
mutabilitas. Una secundum quod sunt in potentia ad finem, et sic
est in eis mutabilitas secundum electionem de bono in malum, ut
Damascenus dicit. Alia secundum locum, inquantum virtute sua finita
possunt attingere quaedam loca quae prius non attingebant, quod de
Deo dici non potest, qui sua infinitate omnia loca replet, ut supra
dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p8"> Thus in every creature there is a potentiality to change either as regards substantial being as in the case of things corruptible;
                     or as regards locality only, as in the case of the celestial bodies; or as regards the order to their end, and the application
                     of their powers to divers objects, as in the case with the angels; and universally all creatures generally are mutable by
                     the power of the Creator, in Whose power is their existence and non-existence. Hence since God is in
                     none of these ways mutable, it belongs to Him alone to be altogether immutable.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Sic igitur in omni creatura est potentia ad mutationem,
vel secundum esse substantiale, sicut corpora corruptibilia; vel
secundum esse locale tantum, sicut corpora caelestia, vel secundum
ordinem ad finem et applicationem virtutis ad diversa, sicut in
Angelis. Et universaliter omnes creaturae communiter sunt mutabiles
secundum potentiam creantis, in cuius potestate est esse et non
esse earum. Unde, cum Deus nullo istorum modorum sit mutabilis,
proprium eius est omnino immutabilem esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection proceeds from mutability as regards substantial or accidental being; for philosophers treated of such movement.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28585" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28585] Iª q. 9 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de eo quod est mutabile
secundum esse substantiale vel accidentale, de tali enim motu
philosophi tractaverunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good angels, besides their natural endowment of immutability of being, have also immutability of election by divine power;
                     nevertheless there remains in them mutability as regards place.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28586" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28586] Iª q. 9 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod Angeli boni, supra immutabilitatem essendi, quae
competit eis secundum naturam, habent immutabilitatem electionis ex
divina virtute, tamen remanet in eis mutabilitas secundum
locum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Forms are called invariable, forasmuch as they cannot be subjects of variation; but they are subject to variation because
                     by them their subject is variable. Hence it is clear that they vary in so far as they are; for they are not called beings
                     as though they were the subject of being, but because through them something has being.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28587" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28587] Iª q. 9 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum
quod formae dicuntur invariabiles, quia non possunt esse subiectum
variationis, subiiciuntur tamen variationi, inquantum subiectum
secundum eas variatur. Unde patet quod secundum quod sunt, sic
variantur, non enim dicuntur entia quasi sint subiectum essendi,
sed quia eis aliquid est.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q10" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q10-p0.1">Q. 10. THE ETERNITY OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q10-p2"> We must now consider the eternity of God, concerning which arise six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q10-p3"><a href="#FP_Q10_A1"> (1) What is eternity?</a></p><p id="FP_Q10-p4"><a href="#FP_Q10_A2"> (2) Whether God is eternal?</a></p><p id="FP_Q10-p5"><a href="#FP_Q10_A3"> (3) Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?</a></p><p id="FP_Q10-p6"><a href="#FP_Q10_A4"> (4) Whether eternity differs from time?</a></p><p id="FP_Q10-p7"><a href="#FP_Q10_A5"> (5) The difference of aeviternity, as there is one time, and one eternity?</a></p><p id="FP_Q10-p8"><a href="#FP_Q10_A6"> (6) Whether there is only one aeviternity?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 pr."><a name="28588" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28588]
Iª q. 10 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de aeternitate. Et
circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, quid sit aeternitas. Secundo,
utrum Deus sit aeternus. Tertio, utrum esse aeternum sit proprium
Dei. Quarto, utrum aeternitas differat a tempore. Quinto, de
differentia aevi et temporis. Sexto, utrum sit unum aevum tantum,
sicut est unum tempus et una aeternitas.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q10_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q10_A1-p0.1">Q. 10. A. 1. Whether this is a good definition of eternity, "The simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life"?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the definition of eternity given by Boethius (De Consol. v) is not a good one: "Eternity is the simultaneously-whole
                     and perfect possession of interminable life." For the word "interminable" is a negative one. But negation only belongs to
                     what is defective, and this does not belong to eternity. Therefore in the definition of eternity the word "interminable" ought
                     not to be found.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28589" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28589] Iª q. 10 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod non sit conveniens definitio aeternitatis,
quam Boetius ponit V de consolatione, dicens quod <i>aeternitas est
interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio</i>.
Interminabile enim negative dicitur. Sed negatio non est de ratione
nisi eorum quae sunt deficientia, quod aeternitati non competit.
Ergo in definitione aeternitatis non debet poni interminabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, eternity signifies a certain kind of duration. But duration regards existence rather than life. Therefore the word
                     "life" ought not to come into the definition of eternity; but rather the word "existence."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28590" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28590] Iª q. 10 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
aeternitas durationem quandam significat. Duratio autem magis
respicit esse quam vitam. Ergo non debuit poni in definitione
aeternitatis vita, sed magis esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a whole is what has parts. But this is alien to eternity which is simple. Therefore it is improperly said to be
                     "whole."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28591" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28591] Iª q. 10 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, totum
dicitur quod habet partes. Hoc autem aeternitati non convenit, cum
sit simplex. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur tota.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Many days cannot occur together, nor can many times exist all at once. But in eternity, days and times are in the plural,
                     for it is said, "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Mic.5.2" target="asv">Micah 5:2</a>); and also it is said, "According to the revelation of the mystery hidden from eternity" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.16.25" target="asv">Rom. 16:25</a>). Therefore eternity is not omni-simultaneous.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="28592" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28592] Iª q. 10 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
plures dies non possunt esse simul, nec plura tempora. Sed in
aeternitate pluraliter dicuntur dies et tempora, dicitur enim
Micheae V, <i>egressus eius ab initio, a diebus aeternitatis</i>;
et ad Rom., XVI cap., <i>secundum revelationem mysterii temporibus
aeternis taciti</i>. Ergo aeternitas non est tota simul.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the whole and the perfect are the same thing. Supposing, therefore, that it is "whole," it is superfluously described
                     as "perfect."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="28593" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28593] Iª q. 10 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, totum
et perfectum sunt idem. Posito igitur quod sit tota, superflue
additur quod sit perfecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p7">
                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, duration does not imply "possession." But eternity is a kind of duration. Therefore eternity is not possession.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 6"><a name="28594" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28594] Iª q. 10 a. 1 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea,
possessio ad durationem non pertinet. Aeternitas autem quaedam
duratio est. Ergo aeternitas non est possessio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way of compound things, so must we reach to the knowledge of eternity by
                     means of time, which is nothing but the numbering of movement by "before" and "after." For since succession occurs in every
                     movement, and one part comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and after in movement, makes us apprehend time,
                     which is nothing else but the measure of before and after in movement. Now in a thing bereft
                     of movement, which is always the same, there is no before or after. As therefore the idea of time consists in the numbering
                     of before and after in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity of what is outside of movement, consists
                     the idea of eternity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 co."><a name="28595" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28595] Iª q. 10 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut in cognitionem simplicium oportet nos venire per
composita, ita in cognitionem aeternitatis oportet nos venire per
tempus; quod nihil aliud est quam numerus motus secundum prius et
posterius. Cum enim in quolibet motu sit successio, et una pars
post alteram, ex hoc quod numeramus prius et posterius in motu,
apprehendimus tempus; quod nihil aliud est quam numerus prioris et
posterioris in motu. In eo autem quod caret motu, et semper eodem
modo se habet, non est accipere prius et posterius. Sicut igitur
ratio temporis consistit in numeratione prioris et posterioris in
motu, ita in apprehensione uniformitatis eius quod est omnino extra
motum, consistit ratio aeternitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p9"> Further, those things are said to be measured by time which have a beginning and an end in time, because in everything which
                     is moved there is a beginning, and there is an end. But as whatever is wholly immutable can have no succession, so it has
                     no beginning, and no end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Item, ea dicuntur tempore
mensurari, quae principium et finem habent in tempore, ut dicitur
in IV Physic., et hoc ideo, quia in omni eo quod movetur est
accipere aliquod principium et aliquem finem. Quod vero est omnino
immutabile, sicut nec successionem, ita nec principium aut finem
habere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p10"> Thus eternity is known from two sources: first, because what is eternal is interminable---that is, has no beginning nor end
                     (that is, no term either way); secondly, because eternity has no succession, being simultaneously whole.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Sic ergo ex duobus notificatur aeternitas. Primo, ex
hoc quod id quod est in aeternitate, est interminabile, idest
principio et fine carens (ut terminus ad utrumque referatur).
Secundo, per hoc quod ipsa aeternitas successione caret, tota simul
existens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Simple things are usually defined by way of negation; as "a point is that which has no parts." Yet this is not to be taken
                     as if the negation belonged to their essence, but because our intellect which first apprehends compound things, cannot attain
                     to the knowledge of simple things except by removing the opposite.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28596" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28596] Iª q. 10 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod simplicia consueverunt per negationem definiri, sicut
punctus est cuius pars non est. Quod non ideo est, quod negatio sit
de essentia eorum, sed quia intellectus noster, qui primo
apprehendit composita, in cognitionem simplicium pervenire non
potest, nisi per remotionem compositionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What is truly eternal, is not only being, but also living; and life extends to operation, which is not true of being. Now
                     the protraction of duration seems to belong to operation rather than to being; hence time is the numbering of movement.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28597" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28597] Iª q. 10 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod illud quod est vere aeternum, non solum est ens, sed
vivens, et ipsum vivere se extendit quodammodo ad operationem, non
autem esse. Protensio autem durationis videtur attendi secundum
operationem, magis quam secundum esse, unde et tempus est numerus
motus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Eternity is called whole, not because it has parts, but because it is wanting in nothing.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28598" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28598] Iª q. 10 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod aeternitas dicitur tota, non quia habet partes, sed
inquantum nihil ei deest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As God, although incorporeal, is named in Scripture metaphorically by corporeal names, so eternity though simultaneously
                     whole, is called by names implying time and succession.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="28599" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28599] Iª q. 10 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod, sicut Deus, cum sit incorporeus, nominibus rerum
corporalium metaphorice in Scripturis nominatur, sic aeternitas,
tota simul existens, nominibus temporalibus successivis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Two things are to be considered in time: time itself, which is successive; and the "now" of time, which is imperfect. Hence
                     the expression "simultaneously-whole" is used to remove the idea of time, and the word "perfect" is used to exclude the "now"
                     of time.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="28600" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28600] Iª q. 10 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
dicendum quod in tempore est duo considerare, scilicet ipsum
tempus, quod est successivum; et nunc temporis, quod est
imperfectum. Dicit ergo tota simul, ad removendum tempus, et
perfecta, ad excludendum nunc temporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p16">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Whatever is possessed, is held firmly and quietly; therefore to designate the immutability and permanence of eternity, we
                     use the word "possession."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 6"><a name="28601" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28601] Iª q. 10 a. 1 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum
quod illud quod possidetur, firmiter et quiete habetur. Ad
designandam ergo immutabilitatem et indeficientiam aeternitatis,
usus est nomine possessionis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q10_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q10_A2-p0.1">Q. 10. A. 2. Whether God is eternal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not eternal. For nothing made can be predicated of God; for Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "The now
                     that flows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity;" and Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 28) "that
                     God is the author of eternity." Therefore God is not eternal.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28602" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28602] Iª q. 10 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit aeternus. Nihil enim factum
potest dici de Deo. Sed aeternitas est aliquid factum, dicit enim
Boetius quod <i>nunc fluens facit tempus, nunc stans facit
aeternitatem</i>; et Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium
quaest., quod Deus est auctor aeternitatis. Ergo Deus non est
aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is before eternity, and after eternity, is not measured by eternity. But, as Aristotle says (De Causis), "God
                     is before eternity and He is after eternity": for it is written that "the Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond [*Douay:
                     'for ever and ever']" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.15.18" target="asv">Ex. 15:18</a>). Therefore to be eternal does not belong to God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28603" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28603] Iª q. 10 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod
est ante aeternitatem et post aeternitatem, non mensuratur
aeternitate. Sed Deus est ante aeternitatem, ut dicitur in libro de
causis, et post aeternitatem; dicitur enim Exod. XV, quod
<i>dominus regnabit in aeternum et ultra</i>. Ergo esse aeternum
non convenit Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, eternity is a kind of measure. But to be measured belongs not to God. Therefore it does not belong to Him to be
                     eternal.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28604" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28604] Iª q. 10 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
aeternitas mensura quaedam est. Sed Deo non convenit esse
mensuratum. Ergo non competit ei esse aeternum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in eternity, there is no present, past or future, since it is simultaneously whole; as was said in the preceding
                     article. But words denoting present, past and future time are applied to God in Scripture. Therefore God is not eternal.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="28605" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28605] Iª q. 10 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in
aeternitate non est praesens, praeteritum vel futurum cum sit tota
simul, ut dictum est. Sed de Deo dicuntur in Scripturis verba
praesentis temporis, praeteriti vel futuri. Ergo Deus non est
aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Athanasius says in his Creed: "The Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28606" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28606] Iª q. 10 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Athanasius, <i>aeternus pater, aeternus filius, aeternus
spiritus sanctus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea of time follows movement, as appears from the preceding article. Hence,
                     as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity;
                     whereas, no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own being. Now God is His own uniform being; and hence as
                     He is His own essence, so He is His own eternity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 co."><a name="28607" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28607] Iª q. 10 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod ratio aeternitatis consequitur immutabilitatem, sicut ratio
temporis consequitur motum, ut ex dictis patet. Unde, cum Deus sit
maxime immutabilis, sibi maxime competit esse aeternum. Nec solum
est aeternus, sed est sua aeternitas, cum tamen nulla alia res sit
sua duratio, quia non est suum esse. Deus autem est suum esse
uniforme, unde, sicut est sua essentia, ita est sua aeternitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The "now" that stands still, is said to make eternity according to our apprehension. As the apprehension of time is caused
                     in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the "now," so the apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending
                     the "now" standing still. When Augustine says that "God is the author of eternity," this is to be understood of participated
                     eternity. For God communicates His eternity to some in the same way as He
                     communicates His immutability.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28608" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28608] Iª q. 10 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod nunc stans dicitur facere aeternitatem, secundum
nostram apprehensionem. Sicut enim causatur in nobis apprehensio
temporis, eo quod apprehendimus fluxum ipsius nunc, ita causatur in
nobis apprehensio aeternitatis, inquantum apprehendimus nunc stans.
Quod autem dicit Augustinus, quod <i>Deus est auctor
aeternitatis</i>, intelligitur de aeternitate participata, eo enim
modo communicat Deus suam aeternitatem aliquibus, quo et suam
immutabilitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From this appears the answer to the Second Objection. For God is said to be before eternity, according as it is shared by
                     immaterial substances. Hence, also, in the same book, it is said that "intelligence is equal to eternity." In the words of
                     Exodus, "The Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond," eternity stands for age, as another rendering has it. Thus it is
                     said that the Lord will reign beyond eternity, inasmuch as He endures beyond every age,
                     i.e. beyond every kind of duration. For age is nothing more than the period of each thing, as is said in the book De Coelo
                     i. Or to reign beyond eternity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were conceived to exist for ever, as the movement
                     of the heavens according to some philosophers, then God would still reign beyond, inasmuch as His reign is simultaneously
                     whole.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28609" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28609] Iª q. 10 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc patet
solutio ad secundum. Nam Deus dicitur esse ante aeternitatem, prout
participatur a substantiis immaterialibus. Unde et ibidem dicitur,
quod <i>intelligentia parificatur aeternitati</i>. Quod autem
dicitur in Exodo, <i>dominus regnabit in aeternum et ultra</i>
sciendum quod aeternum accipitur ibi pro saeculo, sicut habet alia
translatio. Sic igitur dicitur quod regnabit ultra aeternum, quia
durat ultra quodcumque saeculum, idest ultra quamcumque durationem
datam, nihil est enim aliud saeculum quam periodus cuiuslibet rei,
ut dicitur in libro I de caelo. Vel dicitur etiam ultra aeternum
regnare, quia, si etiam aliquid aliud semper esset (ut motus caeli
secundum quosdam philosophos), tamen Deus ultra regnat, inquantum
eius regnum est totum simul.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Eternity is nothing else but God Himself. Hence God is not called eternal, as if He were in any way measured; but the idea
                     of measurement is there taken according to the apprehension of our mind alone.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28610" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28610] Iª q. 10 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod aeternitas non est aliud quam ipse Deus. Unde non
dicitur Deus aeternus, quasi sit aliquo modo mensuratus, sed
accipitur ibi ratio mensurae secundum apprehensionem nostram
tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Words denoting different times are applied to God, because His eternity includes all times; not as if He Himself were altered
                     through present, past and future.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="28611" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28611] Iª q. 10 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod verba diversorum temporum attribuuntur Deo, inquantum
eius aeternitas omnia tempora includit, non quod ipse varietur per
praesens, praeteritum et futurum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q10_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q10_A3-p0.1">Q. 10. A. 3. Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that it does not belong to God alone to be eternal. For it is written that "those who instruct many to justice,"
                     shall be "as stars unto perpetual eternities [*Douay: 'for all eternity']" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.12.3" target="asv">Dan. 12:3</a>). Now if God alone were eternal, there could not be many eternities. Therefore God alone is not the only eternal.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28612" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28612] Iª q. 10 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod esse aeternum non sit soli Deo proprium.
Dicitur enim Danielis XII, quod <i>qui ad iustitiam erudiunt
plurimos, erunt quasi stellae in perpetuas aeternitates</i>. Non
autem essent plures aeternitates, si solus Deus esset aeternus. Non
igitur solus Deus est aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written "Depart, ye cursed into eternal [Douay: 'everlasting'] fire" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.41" target="asv">Mat. 25:41</a>). Therefore God is not the only eternal.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28613" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28613] Iª q. 10 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Matth. XXV dicitur, <i>ite, maledicti, in ignem aeternum</i>. Non
igitur solus Deus est aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every necessary thing is eternal. But there are many necessary things; as, for instance, all principles of demonstration
                     and all demonstrative propositions. Therefore God is not the only eternal.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28614" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28614] Iª q. 10 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
necessarium est aeternum. Sed multa sunt necessaria; sicut omnia
principia demonstrationis, et omnes propositiones demonstrativae.
Ergo non solus Deus est aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome says (Ep. ad Damasum. xv) that "God is the only one who has no beginning." Now whatever has a beginning, is not eternal.
                     Therefore God is the only one eternal.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28615" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28615] Iª q. 10 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Hieronymus, ad Marcellam, <i>Deus solus est qui exordium
non habet</i>. Quidquid autem exordium habet, non est aeternum.
Solus ergo Deus est aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone, because eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first
                     article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q9_A1" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability from Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability
                     from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is said of the earth, "it standeth for ever"
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Eccl.1.4" target="asv">Eccles. 1:4</a>). Again, some things are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their duration, although they are in nature
                     corruptible; thus (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.75.5" target="asv">Ps. 75:5</a>) the hills are called "eternal" and we read "of the fruits of the eternal hills." (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Deut.33.15" target="asv">Dt. 33:15</a>). Some again, share more fully than others in the nature of eternity, inasmuch as they possess unchangeableness either in
                     being or further still in operation; like the angels, and
                     the blessed, who enjoy the Word, because "as regards that vision of the Word, no changing thoughts exist in the Saints," as
                     Augustine says (De Trin. xv). Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life; according to that text, "This is eternal
                     life, that they may know Thee the only true God," etc. (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.5" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv">Jn. 17:3</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 3 co."><a name="28616" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28616] Iª q. 10 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod aeternitas vere et proprie in solo Deo est. Quia aeternitas
immutabilitatem consequitur, ut ex dictis patet. Solus autem Deus
est omnino immutabilis, ut est superius ostensum. Secundum tamen
quod aliqua ab ipso immutabilitatem percipiunt, secundum hoc aliqua
eius aeternitatem participant. Quaedam ergo quantum ad hoc
immutabilitatem sortiuntur a Deo, quod nunquam esse desinunt, et
secundum hoc dicitur Eccle. I de terra, quod in aeternum stat.
Quaedam etiam aeterna in Scripturis dicuntur propter diuturnitatem
durationis, licet corruptibilia sint, sicut in Psalmo dicuntur
montes aeterni; et Deuter. XXXIII etiam dicitur, de pomis collium
aeternorum. Quaedam autem amplius participant de ratione
aeternitatis, inquantum habent intransmutabilitatem vel secundum
esse, vel ulterius secundum operationem, sicut Angeli et beati, qui
verbo fruuntur, quia quantum ad illam visionem verbi, non sunt in
sanctis volubiles cogitationes, ut dicit Augustinus, XV de Trin.
Unde et videntes Deum dicuntur habere vitam aeternam, secundum
illud Ioann. XVII, <i>haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant</i> et
cetera.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are said to be many eternities, accordingly as many share in eternity, by the contemplation of God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28617" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28617] Iª q. 10 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod dicuntur multae aeternitates, secundum quod sunt
multi participantes aeternitatem ex ipsa Dei contemplatione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fire of hell is called eternal, only because it never ends. Still, there is change in the pains of the lost, according
                     to the words "To extreme heat they will pass from snowy waters" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Job.24.19" target="asv">Job 24:19</a>). Hence in hell true eternity does not exist, but rather time; according to the text of the Psalm "Their time will be for
                     ever" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.80.16" target="asv">Ps. 80:16</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28618" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28618] Iª q. 10 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ignis Inferni dicitur aeternus propter
interminabilitatem tantum. Est tamen in poenis eorum transmutatio,
secundum illud Iob XXIV, <i>ad nimium calorem transibunt ab aquis
nivium</i>. Unde in Inferno non est vera aeternitas, sed magis
tempus; secundum illud Psalmi, <i>erit tempus eorum in
saecula</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Necessary means a certain mode of truth; and truth, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi), is in the mind. Therefore
                     in this sense the true and necessary are eternal, because they are in the eternal mind, which is the divine intellect alone;
                     hence it does not follow that anything beside God is eternal.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28619" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28619] Iª q. 10 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod necessarium significat quendam modum veritatis. Verum
autem, secundum philosophum, VI Metaphys., est in intellectu.
Secundum hoc igitur vera et necessaria sunt aeterna, quia sunt in
intellectu aeterno, qui est intellectus divinus solus. Unde non
sequitur quod aliquid extra Deum sit aeternum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q10_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q10_A4-p0.1">Q. 10. A. 4. Whether eternity differs from time?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that eternity does not differ from time. For two measures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part
                     of the other; for instance two days or two hours cannot be together; nevertheless, we may say that a day or an hour are together,
                     considering hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur together, each of which imports a certain measure of duration.
                     Since therefore eternity is not a part of time, forasmuch as eternity exceeds time, and
                     includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity, and is not a different thing from eternity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28620" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28620] Iª q. 10 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod aeternitas non sit aliud a tempore.
Impossibile est enim duas esse mensuras durationis simul, nisi una
sit pars alterius, non enim sunt simul duo dies vel duae horae; sed
dies et hora sunt simul, quia hora est pars diei. Sed aeternitas et
tempus sunt simul, quorum utrumque mensuram quandam durationis
importat. Cum igitur aeternitas non sit pars temporis, quia
aeternitas excedit tempus et includit ipsum; videtur quod tempus
sit pars aeternitatis, et non aliud ab aeternitate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv), the "now" of time remains the same in the whole of time. But the nature
                     of eternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the whole space of time. Therefore eternity is the "now"
                     of time. But the "now" of time is not substantially different from time. Therefore eternity is not substantially different
                     from time.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28621" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28621] Iª q. 10 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
secundum philosophum in IV Physic., nunc temporis manet idem in
toto tempore. Sed hoc videtur constituere rationem aeternitatis,
quod sit idem indivisibiliter se habens in toto decursu temporis.
Ergo aeternitas est nunc temporis. Sed nunc temporis non est aliud
secundum substantiam a tempore. Ergo aeternitas non est aliud
secundum substantiam a tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the measure of the first movement is the measure of every movement, as said in Phys. iv, it thus appears that
                     the measure of the first being is that of every being. But eternity is the measure of the first being---that is, of the divine
                     being. Therefore eternity is the measure of every being. But the being of things corruptible is measured by time. Time therefore
                     is either eternity or is a part of eternity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28622" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28622] Iª q. 10 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
mensura primi motus est mensura omnium motuum, ut dicitur in IV
Physic., ita videtur quod mensura primi esse sit mensura omnis
esse. Sed aeternitas est mensura primi esse, quod est esse divinum.
Ergo aeternitas est mensura omnis esse. Sed esse rerum
corruptibilium mensuratur tempore. Ergo tempus vel est aeternitas,
vel aliquid aeternitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Eternity is simultaneously whole. But time has a "before" and an "after." Therefore time and eternity are not the same thing.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28623" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28623] Iª q. 10 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod aeternitas est tota simul, in tempore autem est prius et
posterius. Ergo tempus et aeternitas non sunt idem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same. Some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has neither
                     beginning nor an end; whereas time has a beginning and an end. This, however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute
                     difference because, granted that time always was and always will be, according to the idea of those who think the movement
                     of the heavens goes on for ever, there would yet remain a difference between eternity
                     and time, as Boethius says (De Consol. v), arising from the fact that eternity is simultaneously whole; which cannot be applied
                     to time: for eternity is the measure of a permanent being; while time is a measure of movement. Supposing, however, that the
                     aforesaid difference be considered on the part of the things measured, and not as regards the measures, then there is some
                     reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is measured by time which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if the movement of
                     the heavens lasted always, time would not be of its measure as regards the whole of its duration, since the infinite is not
                     measurable; but it would be the measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning and end in time.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 4 co."><a name="28624" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28624] Iª q. 10 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod manifestum est tempus et aeternitatem non esse idem. Sed huius
diversitatis rationem quidam assignaverunt ex hoc quod aeternitas
caret principio et fine, tempus autem habet principium et finem.
Sed haec est differentia per accidens, et non per se. Quia dato
quod tempus semper fuerit et semper futurum sit, secundum
positionem eorum qui motum caeli ponunt sempiternum, adhuc
remanebit differentia inter aeternitatem et tempus, ut dicit
Boetius in libro de Consolat., ex hoc quod aeternitas est tota
simul, quod tempori non convenit, quia aeternitas est mensura esse
permanentis, tempus vero est mensura motus. Si tamen praedicta
differentia attendatur quantum ad mensurata, et non quantum ad
mensuras, sic habet aliquam rationem, quia solum illud mensuratur
tempore, quod habet principium et finem in tempore, ut dicitur in
IV Physic. Unde si motus caeli semper duraret, tempus non
mensuraret ipsum secundum suam totam durationem, cum infinitum non
sit mensurabile; sed mensuraret quamlibet circulationem, quae habet
principium et finem in tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A4-p7"> Another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in themselves, if we consider the end and the beginning as potentialities;
                     because, granted also that time always goes on, yet it is possible to note in time both the beginning and the end, by considering
                     its parts: thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year; which cannot be applied to eternity. Still these
                     differences follow upon the essential and primary differences, that eternity is
                     simultaneously whole, but that time is not so.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Potest tamen et aliam rationem
habere ex parte istarum mensurarum, si accipiatur finis et
principium in potentia. Quia etiam dato quod tempus semper duret,
tamen possibile est signare in tempore et principium et finem,
accipiendo aliquas partes ipsius, sicut dicimus principium et finem
diei vel anni, quod non contingit in aeternitate. Sed tamen istae
differentiae consequuntur eam quae est per se et primo,
differentiam, per hoc quod aeternitas est tota simul, non autem
tempus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Such a reason would be a valid one if time and eternity were the same kind of measure; but this is seen not to be the case
                     when we consider those things of which the respective measures are time and eternity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28625" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28625] Iª q. 10 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si tempus et aeternitas essent
mensurae unius generis, quod patet esse falsum, ex his quorum est
tempus et aeternitas mensura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The "now" of time is the same as regards its subject in the whole course of time, but it differs in aspect; for inasmuch
                     as time corresponds to movement, its "now" corresponds to what is movable; and the thing movable has the same one subject
                     in all time, but differs in aspect a being here and there; and such alteration is movement. Likewise the flow of the "now"
                     as alternating in aspect is time. But eternity remains the same according to both subject
                     and aspect; and hence eternity is not the same as the "now" of time.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28626" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28626] Iª q. 10 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod nunc temporis est idem subiecto in toto tempore, sed
differens ratione, eo quod, sicut tempus respondet motui, ita nunc
temporis respondet mobili; mobile autem est idem subiecto in toto
decursu temporis, sed differens ratione, inquantum est hic et ibi.
Et ista alternatio est motus. Similiter fluxus ipsius nunc,
secundum quod alternatur ratione, est tempus. Aeternitas autem
manet eadem et subiecto et ratione. Unde aeternitas non est idem
quod nunc temporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As eternity is the proper measure of permanent being, so time is the proper measure of movement; and hence, according as
                     any being recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to change, it recedes from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore
                     the being of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured by eternity, but by time; for time measures not
                     only things actually changed, but also things changeable; hence it not only
                     measures movement but it also measures repose, which belongs to whatever is naturally movable, but is not actually in motion.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28627" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28627] Iª q. 10 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, sicut aeternitas est propria mensura ipsius esse,
ita tempus est propria mensura motus. Unde secundum quod aliquod
esse recedit a permanentia essendi et subditur transmutationi,
secundum hoc recedit ab aeternitate et subditur tempori. Esse ergo
rerum corruptibilium, quia est transmutabile, non mensuratur
aeternitate, sed tempore. Tempus enim mensurat non solum quae
transmutantur in actu, sed quae sunt transmutabilia. Unde non solum
mensurat motum, sed etiam quietem; quae est eius quod natum est
moveri, et non movetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q10_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q10_A5-p0.1">Q. 10. A. 5. The difference of aeviternity and time</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that aeviternity is the same as time. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23), that "God moves the spiritual
                     through time." But aeviternity is said to be the measure of spiritual substances. Therefore time is the same as aeviternity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28628" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28628] Iª q. 10 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod aevum non sit aliud a tempore. Dicit enim
Augustinus, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., quod <i>Deus movet creaturam
spiritualem per tempus</i>. Sed aevum dicitur esse mensura
spiritualium substantiarum. Ergo tempus non differt ab aevo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is essential to time to have "before" and "after"; but it is essential to eternity to be simultaneously whole,
                     as was shown above in the first article. Now aeviternity is not eternity; for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.1" target="asv">Ecclus. 1:1</a>) that eternal "Wisdom is before age." Therefore it is not simultaneously whole but has "before" and "after"; and thus it
                     is the same as time.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28629" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28629] Iª q. 10 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, de
ratione temporis est quod habeat prius et posterius, de ratione
vero aeternitatis est quod sit tota simul, ut dictum est. Sed aevum
non est aeternitas, dicitur enim Eccli. I, quod sapientia aeterna
est ante aevum. Ergo non est totum simul, sed habet prius et
posterius, et ita est tempus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if there is no "before" and "after" in aeviternity, it follows that in aeviternal things there is no difference
                     between being, having been, or going to be. Since then it is impossible for aeviternal things not to have been, it follows
                     that it is impossible for them not to be in the future; which is false, since God can reduce them to nothing.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="28630" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28630] Iª q. 10 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si in
aevo non est prius et posterius, sequitur quod in aeviternis non
differat esse vel fuisse vel futurum esse. Cum igitur sit
impossibile aeviterna non fuisse, sequitur quod impossibile sit ea
non futura esse. Quod falsum est, cum Deus possit ea reducere in
nihilum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, since the duration of aeviternal things is infinite as to subsequent duration, if aeviternity is simultaneously
                     whole, it follows that some creature is actually infinite; which is impossible. Therefore aeviternity does not differ from
                     time.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="28631" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28631] Iª q. 10 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, cum
duratio aeviternorum sit infinita ex parte post, si aevum sit totum
simul, sequitur quod aliquod creatum sit infinitum in actu, quod
est impossibile. Non igitur aevum differt a tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iii) "Who commandest time to be separate from aeviternity."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28632" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28632] Iª q. 10 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Boetius, <i>qui tempus ab aevo ire iubes</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Aeviternity differs from time, and from eternity, as the mean between them both. This difference is explained by some to
                     consist in the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor end, aeviternity, a beginning but no end, and time both beginning
                     and end. This difference, however, is but an accidental one, as was shown above, in the preceding article; because even if
                     aeviternal things had always been, and would always be, as some think, and even if they
                     might sometimes fail to be, which is possible to God to allow; even granted this, aeviternity would still be distinguished
                     from eternity, and from time.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 co."><a name="28633" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28633] Iª q. 10 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod aevum differt a tempore et ab aeternitate, sicut medium
existens inter illa. Sed horum differentiam aliqui sic assignant,
dicentes quod aeternitas principio et fine caret; aevum habet
principium, sed non finem; tempus autem habet principium et finem.
Sed haec differentia est per accidens, sicut supra dictum est, quia
si etiam semper aeviterna fuissent et semper futura essent, ut
aliqui ponunt; vel etiam si quandoque deficerent, quod Deo
possibile esset, adhuc aevum distingueretur ab aeternitate et
tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p8"> Others assign the difference between these three to consist in the fact that eternity has no "before" and "after"; but that
                     time has both, together with innovation and veteration; and that aeviternity has "before" and "after" without innovation and
                     veteration. This theory, however, involves a contradiction; which manifestly appears if innovation and veteration be referred
                     to the measure itself. For since "before" and "after" of duration cannot exist together, if aeviternity has
                     "before" and "after," it must follow that with the receding of the first part of aeviternity, the after part of aeviternity
                     must newly appear; and thus innovation would occur in aeviternity itself, as it does in time. And if they be referred to the
                     things measured, even then an incongruity would follow. For a thing which exists in time grows old with time, because it has
                     a changeable existence, and from the changeableness of a thing measured, there follows "before" and "after" in the measure,
                     as is clear from Phys. iv. Therefore the fact that an aeviternal thing is neither inveterate, nor subject to innovation, comes
                     from its changelessness; and consequently its measure does not contain "before" and "after." We say then that since eternity
                     is the measure of a permanent being, in so far as anything recedes from permanence of being, it recedes from eternity. Now
                     some things recede from permanence of being, so that their being is subject to change, or consists in change; and these
                     things are measured by time, as are all movements, and also the being of all things corruptible. But others recede less from
                     permanence of being, forasmuch as their being neither consists in change, nor is the subject of change; nevertheless they
                     have change annexed to them either actually or potentially. This appears in the heavenly bodies, the substantial being of
                     which is unchangeable; and yet with unchangeable being they have changeableness of place. The same applies to the angels,
                     who have
                     an unchangeable being as regards their nature with changeableness as regards choice; moreover they have changeableness of
                     intelligence, of affections and of places in their own degree. Therefore these are measured by aeviternity which is a mean
                     between eternity and time. But the being that is measured by eternity is not changeable, nor is it annexed to change. In this
                     way time has "before" and "after"; aeviternity in itself has no "before" and "after," which can, however, be annexed to it;
                     while eternity has neither "before" nor "after," nor is it compatible with such at all.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Alii vero assignant differentiam inter haec tria, per hoc
quod aeternitas non habet prius et posterius; tempus autem habet
prius et posterius cum innovatione et veteratione; aevum habet
prius et posterius sine innovatione et veteratione. Sed haec
positio implicat contradictoria. Quod quidem manifeste apparet, si
innovatio et veteratio referantur ad ipsam mensuram. Cum enim prius
et posterius durationis non possint esse simul, si aevum habet
prius et posterius, oportet quod, priore parte aevi recedente,
posterior de novo adveniat, et sic erit innovatio in ipso aevo,
sicut in tempore. Si vero referantur ad mensurata, adhuc sequitur
inconveniens. Ex hoc enim res temporalis inveteratur tempore, quod
habet esse transmutabile, et ex transmutabilitate mensurati, est
prius et posterius in mensura, ut patet ex IV Physic. Si igitur
ipsum aeviternum non sit inveterabile nec innovabile, hoc erit quia
esse eius est intransmutabile. Mensura ergo eius non habebit prius
et posterius. Est ergo dicendum quod, cum aeternitas sit mensura
esse permanentis, secundum quod aliquid recedit a permanentia
essendi, secundum hoc recedit ab aeternitate. Quaedam autem sic
recedunt a permanentia essendi, quod esse eorum est subiectum
transmutationis, vel in transmutatione consistit, et huiusmodi
mensurantur tempore; sicut omnis motus, et etiam esse omnium
corruptibilium. Quaedam vero recedunt minus a permanentia essendi,
quia esse eorum nec in transmutatione consistit, nec est subiectum
transmutationis, tamen habent transmutationem adiunctam, vel in
actu vel in potentia. Sicut patet in corporibus caelestibus, quorum
esse substantiale est intransmutabile; tamen esse intransmutabile
habent cum transmutabilitate secundum locum. Et similiter patet de
Angelis, quod habent esse intransmutabile cum transmutabilitate
secundum electionem, quantum ad eorum naturam pertinet; et cum
transmutabilitate intelligentiarum et affectionum, et locorum suo
modo. Et ideo huiusmodi mensurantur aevo, quod est medium inter
aeternitatem et tempus. Esse autem quod mensurat aeternitas, nec
est mutabile, nec mutabilitati adiunctum. Sic ergo tempus habet
prius et posterius, aevum autem non habet in se prius et posterius,
sed ei coniungi possunt, aeternitas autem non habet prius neque
posterius, neque ea compatitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Spiritual creatures as regards successive affections and intelligences are measured by time. Hence also Augustine says (Gen.
                     ad lit. viii, 20,22,23) that to be moved through time, is to be moved by affections. But as regards their nature they are
                     measured by aeviternity; whereas as regards the vision of glory, they have a share of eternity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28634" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28634] Iª q. 10 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod creaturae spirituales, quantum ad affectiones et
intelligentias, in quibus est successio, mensurantur tempore. Unde
et Augustinus ibidem dicit quod per tempus moveri, est per
affectiones moveri. Quantum vero ad eorum esse naturale,
mensurantur aevo. Sed quantum ad visionem gloriae, participant
aeternitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Aeviternity is simultaneously whole; yet it is not eternity, because "before" and "after" are compatible with it.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28635" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28635] Iª q. 10 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod aevum est totum simul, non tamen est aeternitas, quia
compatitur secum prius et posterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the very being of an angel considered absolutely, there is no difference of past and future, but only as regards accidental
                     change. Now to say that an angel was, or is, or will be, is to be taken in a different sense according to the acceptation
                     of our intellect, which apprehends the angelic existence by comparison with different parts of time. But when we say that
                     an angel is, or was, we suppose something, which being supposed, its opposite is not
                     subject to the divine power. Whereas when we say he will be, we do not as yet suppose anything. Hence, since the existence
                     and non-existence of an angel considered absolutely is subject to the divine power, God can make the existence of an angel
                     not future; but He cannot cause him not to be while he is, or not to have been, after he has been.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="28636" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28636] Iª q. 10 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod in ipso esse Angeli in se considerato, non est
differentia praeteriti et futuri, sed solum secundum adiunctas
mutationes. Sed quod dicimus Angelum esse vel fuisse vel futurum
esse, differt secundum acceptionem intellectus nostri, qui accipit
esse Angeli per comparationem ad diversas partes temporis. Et cum
dicit Angelum esse vel fuisse, supponit aliquid cum quo eius
oppositum non subditur divinae potentiae, cum vero dicit futurum
esse, nondum supponit aliquid. Unde, cum esse et non esse Angeli
subsit divinae potentiae, absolute considerando, potest Deus facere
quod esse Angeli non sit futurum, tamen non potest facere quod non
sit dum est, vel quod non fuerit postquam fuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The duration of aeviternity is infinite, forasmuch as it is not finished by time. Hence, there is no incongruity in saying
                     that a creature is infinite, inasmuch as it is not ended by any other creature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="28637" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28637] Iª q. 10 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod duratio aevi est infinita, quia non finitur tempore.
Sic autem esse aliquod creatum infinitum, quod non finiatur quodam
alio, non est inconveniens.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q10_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q10_A6-p0.1">Q. 10. A. 6. Whether there is only one aeviternity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is not only one aeviternity; for it is written in the apocryphal books of Esdras: "Majesty and power
                     of ages are with Thee, O Lord."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28638" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28638] Iª q. 10 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod non sit tantum unum aevum. Dicitur enim in
apocryphis Esdrae, <i>maiestas et potestas aevorum est apud te,
domine</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different genera have different measures. But some aeviternal things belong to the corporeal genus, as the heavenly
                     bodies; and others are spiritual substances, as are the angels. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28639" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28639] Iª q. 10 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
diversorum generum diversae sunt mensurae. Sed quaedam aeviterna
sunt in genere corporalium, scilicet corpora caelestia, quaedam
vero sunt spirituales substantiae, scilicet Angeli. Non ergo est
unum aevum tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since aeviternity is a term of duration, where there is one aeviternity, there is also one duration. But not all
                     aeviternal things have one duration, for some begin to exist after others; as appears in the case especially of human souls.
                     Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="28640" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28640] Iª q. 10 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, cum
aevum sit nomen durationis, quorum est unum aevum, est una duratio.
Sed non omnium aeviternorum est una duratio, quia quaedam post alia
esse incipiunt, ut maxime patet in animabus humanis. Non est ergo
unum aevum tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, things not dependent on each other do not seem to have one measure of duration; for there appears to be one time
                     for all temporal things; since the first movement, measured by time, is in some way the cause of all movement. But aeviternal
                     things do not depend on each other, for one angel is not the cause of another angel. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 arg. 4"><a name="28641" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28641] Iª q. 10 a. 6 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, ea
quae non dependent ab invicem, non videntur habere unam mensuram
durationis, propter hoc enim omnium temporalium videtur esse unum
tempus, quia omnium motuum quodammodo causa est primus motus, qui
prius tempore mensuratur. Sed aeviterna non dependent ab invicem,
quia unus Angelus non est causa alterius. Non ergo est unum aevum
tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Aeviternity is a more simple thing than time, and is nearer to eternity. But time is one only. Therefore much more is aeviternity
                     one only.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28642" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28642] Iª q. 10 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, aevum
est simplicius tempore, et propinquius se habens ad aeternitatem.
Sed tempus est unum tantum. Ergo multo magis aevum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some say there is only one aeviternity; others that there are many aeviternities.
                     Which of these is true, may be considered from the cause why time is one; for we can rise from corporeal things to the knowledge
                     of spiritual things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 co."><a name="28643" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28643] Iª q. 10 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod circa hoc est duplex opinio, quidam enim dicunt quod est unum
aevum tantum; quidam quod multa. Quid autem horum verius sit,
oportet considerare ex causa unitatis temporis, in cognitionem enim
spiritualium per corporalia devenimus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p8"> Now some say that there is only one time for temporal things, forasmuch as one number exists for all things numbered; as
                     time is a number, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv). This, however, is not a sufficient reason; because time is not
                     a number abstracted from the thing numbered, but existing in the thing numbered; otherwise it would not be continuous; for
                     ten ells of cloth are continuous not by reason of the number, but by reason of the thing numbered. Now number as it
                     exists in the thing numbered, is not the same for all; but it is different for different things. Hence, others assert that
                     the unity of eternity as the principle of all duration is the cause of the unity of time. Thus all durations are one in that
                     view, in the light of their principle, but are many in the light of the diversity of things receiving duration from the influx
                     of the first principle. On the other hand others assign primary matter as the cause why time is one; as it is the first
                     subject of movement, the measure of which is time. Neither of these reasons, however, is sufficient; forasmuch as things which
                     are one in principle, or in subject, especially if distant, are not one absolutely, but accidentally. Therefore the true reason
                     why time is one, is to be found in the oneness of the first movement by which, since it is most simple, all other movements
                     are measured. Therefore time is referred to that movement, not only as a measure is to the thing measured, but also as
                     accident is to subject; and thus receives unity from it. Whereas to other movements it is compared only as the measure is
                     to the thing measured. Hence it is not multiplied by their multitude, because by one separate measure many things can be measured.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Dicunt autem quidam esse
unum tempus omnium temporalium, propter hoc quod est unus numerus
omnium numeratorum, cum tempus sit numerus, secundum philosophum.
Sed hoc non sufficit, quia tempus non est numerus ut abstractus
extra numeratum, sed ut in numerato existens, alioquin non esset
continuus; quia decem ulnae panni continuitatem habent, non ex
numero, sed ex numerato. Numerus autem in numerato existens non est
idem omnium, sed diversus diversorum. Unde alii assignant causam
unitatis temporis ex unitate aeternitatis, quae est principium
omnis durationis. Et sic, omnes durationes sunt unum, si
consideretur earum principium, sunt vero multae, si consideretur
diversitas eorum quae recipiunt durationem ex influxu primi
principii. Alii vero assignant causam unitatis temporis ex parte
materiae primae, quae est primum subiectum motus, cuius mensura est
tempus. Sed neutra assignatio sufficiens videtur, quia ea quae sunt
unum principio vel subiecto, et maxime remoto, non sunt unum
simpliciter sed secundum quid. Est ergo ratio unitatis temporis,
unitas primi motus, secundum quem, cum sit simplicissimus, omnes
alii mensurantur, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sic ergo tempus ad
illum motum comparatur non solum ut mensura ad mensuratum, sed
etiam ut accidens ad subiectum; et sic ab eo recipit unitatem. Ad
alios autem motus comparatur solum ut mensura ad mensuratum. Unde
secundum eorum multitudinem non multiplicatur, quia una mensura
separata multa mensurari possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p9"> This being established, we must observe that a twofold opinion existed concerning spiritual substances. Some said that all
                     proceeded from God in a certain equality, as Origen said (Peri Archon. i); or at least many of them, as some others thought.
                     Others said that all spiritual substances proceeded from God in a certain degree and order; and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. x)
                     seems to have thought so, when he said that among spiritual substances there are the first, the middle and the
                     last; even in one order of angels. Now according to the first opinion, it must be said that there are many aeviternities as
                     there are many aeviternal things of first degree. But according to the second opinion, it would be necessary to say that there
                     is one aeviternity only; because since each thing is measured by the most simple element of its genus, it must be that the
                     existence of all aeviternal things should be measured by the existence of the first aeviternal thing, which is all the more
                     simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore because the second opinion is truer, as will be shown later (
                     <a href="FP_v.html#FP_Q47_A2" id="FP_Q10_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[47], A[2]</a>); we concede at present that there is only one aeviternity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Hoc igitur habito, sciendum quod
de substantiis spiritualibus duplex fuit opinio. Quidam enim
dixerunt quod omnes processerunt a Deo in quadam aequalitate, ut
Origenes dixit; vel etiam multae earum, ut quidam posuerunt. Alii
vero dixerunt quod omnes substantiae spirituales processerunt a Deo
quodam gradu et ordine et hoc videtur sentire Dionysius, qui dicit,
cap. X Cael. Hier., quod inter substantias spirituales sunt primae,
mediae et ultimae, etiam in uno ordine Angelorum. Secundum igitur
primam opinionem, necesse est dicere quod sunt plura aeva, secundum
quod sunt plura aeviterna prima aequalia. Secundum autem secundam
opinionem, oportet dicere quod sit unum aevum tantum, quia, cum
unumquodque mensuretur simplicissimo sui generis, ut dicitur in X
Metaphys., oportet quod esse omnium aeviternorum mensuretur esse
primi aeviterni, quod tanto est simplicius, quanto prius. Et quia
secunda opinio verior est, ut infra ostendetur, concedimus ad
praesens unum esse aevum tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Aeviternity is sometimes taken for age, that is, a space of a thing's duration; and thus we say many aeviternities when we
                     mean ages.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28644" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28644] Iª q. 10 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod aevum aliquando accipitur pro saeculo, quod est
periodus durationis alicuius rei, et sic dicuntur multa aeva, sicut
multa saecula.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the heavenly bodies and spiritual things differ in the genus of their nature, still they agree in having a changeless
                     being, and are thus measured by aeviternity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28645" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28645] Iª q. 10 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, licet corpora caelestia et spiritualia differant in
genere naturae, tamen conveniunt in hoc, quod habent esse
intransmutabile. Et sic mensurantur aevo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All temporal things did not begin together; nevertheless there is one time for all of them, by reason of the first measured
                     by time; and thus all aeviternal things have one aeviternity by reason of the first, though all did not begin together.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="28646" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28646] Iª q. 10 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod nec omnia temporalia simul incipiunt, et tamen omnium
est unum tempus, propter primum quod mensuratur tempore. Et sic
omnia aeviterna habent unum aevum propter primum, etiam si non
omnia simul incipiant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> For things to be measured by one, it is not necessary that the one should be the cause of all, but that it be more simple
                     than the rest.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 ad 4"><a name="28647" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28647] Iª q. 10 a. 6 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod ad hoc quod aliqua mensurentur per aliquod unum, non
requiritur quod illud unum sit causa omnium eorum; sed quod sit
simplicius.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q11" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q11-p0.1">Q. 11. THE UNITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q11-p2"> After the foregoing, we consider the divine unity; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q11-p3"><a href="#FP_Q11_A1"> (1) Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?</a></p><p id="FP_Q11-p4"><a href="#FP_Q11_A2"> (2) Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other?</a></p><p id="FP_Q11-p5"><a href="#FP_Q11_A3"> (3) Whether God is one?</a></p><p id="FP_Q11-p6"><a href="#FP_Q11_A4"> (4) Whether He is in the highest degree one?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 pr."><a name="28648" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28648]
Iª q. 11 pr.</span></a> Post praemissa, considerandum est de
divina unitate. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum unum
addat aliquid supra ens. Secundo, utrum opponantur unum et multa.
Tertio, utrum Deus sit unus. Quarto, utrum sit maxime unus.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q11_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q11_A1-p0.1">Q. 11. A. 1. Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that "one" adds something to "being." For everything is in a determinate genus by addition to being, which penetrates
                     all "genera." But "one" is a determinate genus, for it is the principle of number, which is a species of quantity. Therefore
                     "one" adds something to "being."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28649" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28649] Iª q. 11 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod unum addat aliquid supra ens. Omne enim
quod est in aliquo genere determinato, se habet ex additione ad
ens, quod circuit omnia genera. Sed unum est in genere determinato,
est enim principium numeri, qui est species quantitatis. Ergo unum
addit aliquid supra ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what divides a thing common to all, is an addition to it. But "being" is divided by "one" and by "many." Therefore
                     "one" is an addition to "being."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28650" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28650] Iª q. 11 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod
dividit aliquod commune, se habet ex additione ad illud. Sed ens
dividitur per unum et multa. Ergo unum addit aliquid supra ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if "one" is not an addition to "being," "one" and "being" must have the same meaning. But it would be nugatory to
                     call "being" by the name of "being"; therefore it would be equally so to call being "one." Now this is false. Therefore "one"
                     is an addition to "being."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28651" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28651] Iª q. 11 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
unum non addit supra ens, idem esset dicere unum et ens. Sed
nugatorie dicitur ens ens. Ergo nugatio esset dicere ens unum, quod
falsum est. Addit igitur unum supra ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 5, ult.): "Nothing which exists is not in some way one," which would be false if "one" were an
                     addition to "being," in the sense of limiting it. Therefore "one" is not an addition to "being."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28652" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28652] Iª q. 11 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Dionysius, ult. cap. de Div. Nom., <i>nihil est
existentium non participans uno</i>, quod non esset, si unum
adderet supra ens quod contraheret ipsum. Ergo unum non habet se ex
additione ad ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> "One" does not add any reality to "being"; but is only a negation of division; for "one" means undivided "being." This is
                     the very reason why "one" is the same as "being." Now every being is either simple or compound. But what is simple is undivided,
                     both actually and potentially. Whereas what is compound, has not being whilst its parts are divided, but after they make up
                     and compose it. Hence it is manifest that the being of anything consists in undivision;
                     and hence it is that everything guards its unity as it guards its being.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 1 co."><a name="28653" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28653] Iª q. 11 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod unum non addit supra ens rem aliquam, sed tantum negationem
divisionis, unum enim nihil aliud significat quam ens indivisum. Et
ex hoc ipso apparet quod unum convertitur cum ente. Nam omne ens
aut est simplex, aut compositum. Quod autem est simplex, est
indivisum et actu et potentia. Quod autem est compositum, non habet
esse quandiu partes eius sunt divisae, sed postquam constituunt et
componunt ipsum compositum. Unde manifestum est quod esse
cuiuslibet rei consistit in indivisione. Et inde est quod
unumquodque, sicut custodit suum esse, ita custodit suam
unitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some, thinking that the "one" convertible with "being" is the same as the "one" which is the principle of number, were divided
                     into contrary opinions. Pythagoras and Plato, seeing that the "one" convertible with "being" did not add any reality to "being,"
                     but signified the substance of "being" as undivided, thought that the same applied to the "one" which is the principle of
                     number. And because number is composed of unities, they thought that numbers
                     were the substances of all things. Avicenna, however, on the contrary, considering that "one" which is the principle of number,
                     added a reality to the substance of "being" (otherwise number made of unities would not be a species of quantity), thought
                     that the "one" convertible with "being" added a reality to the substance of beings; as "white" to "man." This, however, is
                     manifestly false, inasmuch as each thing is "one" by its substance. For if a thing were "one" by anything else but by its
                     substance, since this again would be "one," supposing it were again "one" by another thing, we should be driven on to infinity.
                     Hence we must adhere to the former statement; therefore we must say that the "one" which is convertible with "being," does
                     not add a reality to being; but that the "one" which is the principle of number, does add a reality to "being," belonging
                     to the genus of quantity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28654" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28654] Iª q. 11 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum igitur
dicendum quod quidam, putantes idem esse unum quod convertitur cum
ente, et quod est principium numeri, divisi sunt in contrarias
positiones. Pythagoras enim et Plato, videntes quod unum quod
convertitur cum ente, non addit aliquam rem supra ens, sed
significat substantiam entis prout est indivisa, existimaverunt sic
se habere de uno quod est principium numeri. Et quia numerus
componitur ex unitatibus, crediderunt quod numeri essent
substantiae omnium rerum. E contrario autem Avicenna, considerans
quod unum quod est principium numeri, addit aliquam rem supra
substantiam entis (alias numerus ex unitatibus compositus non esset
species quantitatis), credidit quod unum quod convertitur cum ente,
addat rem aliquam supra substantiam entis, sicut album supra
hominem. Sed hoc manifeste falsum est, quia quaelibet res est una
per suam substantiam. Si enim per aliquid aliud esset una quaelibet
res, cum illud iterum sit unum, si esset iterum unum per aliquid
aliud, esset abire in infinitum. Unde standum est in primo. Sic
igitur dicendum est quod unum quod convertitur cum ente, non addit
aliquam rem supra ens, sed unum quod est principium numeri, addit
aliquid supra ens, ad genus quantitatis pertinens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There is nothing to prevent a thing which in one way is divided, from being another way undivided; as what is divided in
                     number, may be undivided in species; thus it may be that a thing is in one way "one," and in another way "many." Still, if
                     it is absolutely undivided, either because it is so according to what belongs to its essence, though it may be divided as
                     regards what is outside its essence, as what is one in subject may have many accidents;
                     or because it is undivided actually, and divided potentially, as what is "one" in the whole, and is "many" in parts; in such
                     a case a thing will be "one" absolutely and "many" accidentally. On the other hand, if it be undivided accidentally, and divided
                     absolutely, as if it were divided in essence and undivided in idea or in principle or cause, it will be "many" absolutely
                     and "one" accidentally; as what are "many" in number and "one" in species or "one" in principle. Hence in that way, being
                     is divided by "one" and by "many"; as it were by "one" absolutely and by "many" accidentally. For multitude itself would not
                     be contained under "being," unless it were in some way contained under "one." Thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. cap. ult.) that
                     "there is no kind of multitude that is not in a way one. But what are many in their parts, are one in their whole; and what
                     are many in accidents, are one in subject; and what are many in number, are one in species; and what are many in species,
                     are
                     one in genus; and what are many in processions, are one in principle."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28655" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28655] Iª q. 11 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod nihil prohibet id quod est uno modo divisum, esse
alio modo indivisum; sicut quod est divisum numero, est indivisum
secundum speciem, et sic contingit aliquid esse uno modo unum, alio
modo multa. Sed tamen si sit indivisum simpliciter; vel quia est
indivisum secundum id quod pertinet ad essentiam rei, licet sit
divisum quantum ad ea quae sunt extra essentiam rei, sicut quod est
unum subiecto et multa secundum accidentia; vel quia est indivisum
in actu, et divisum in potentia, sicut quod est unum toto et multa
secundum partes, huiusmodi erit unum simpliciter, et multa secundum
quid. Si vero aliquid e converso sit indivisum secundum quid, et
divisum simpliciter; utpote quia est divisum secundum essentiam, et
indivisum secundum rationem, vel secundum principium sive causam,
erit multa simpliciter, et unum secundum quid; ut quae sunt multa
numero et unum specie, vel unum principio. Sic igitur ens dividitur
per unum et multa, quasi per unum simpliciter, et multa secundum
quid. Nam et ipsa multitudo non contineretur sub ente, nisi
contineretur aliquo modo sub uno. Dicit enim Dionysius, ult. cap.
de Div. Nom., quod <i>non est multitudo non participans uno, sed
quae sunt multa partibus, sunt unum toto; et quae sunt multa
accidentibus, sunt unum subiecto; et quae sunt multa numero, sunt
unum specie; et quae sunt speciebus multa, sunt unum genere; et
quae sunt multa processibus, sunt unum principio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It does not follow that it is nugatory to say "being" is "one"; forasmuch as "one" adds an idea to "being."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28656" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28656] Iª q. 11 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod ideo non est nugatio cum dicitur ens unum, quia unum
addit aliquid secundum rationem supra ens.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q11_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q11_A2-p0.1">Q. 11. A. 2. Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that "one" and "many" are not mutually opposed. For no opposite thing is predicated of its opposite. But every "multitude"
                     is in a certain way "one," as appears from the preceding article. Therefore "one" is not opposed to "multitude."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28657" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28657] Iª q. 11 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod unum et multa non opponantur. Nullum enim
oppositum praedicatur de suo opposito. Sed omnis multitudo est
quodammodo unum, ut ex praedictis patet. Ergo unum non opponitur
multitudini.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no opposite thing is constituted by its opposite. But "multitude" is constituted by "one." Therefore it is not opposed
                     to "multitude."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28658" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28658] Iª q. 11 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
nullum oppositum constituitur ex suo opposito. Sed unum constituit
multitudinem. Ergo non opponitur multitudini.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "one" is opposed to "one." But the idea of "few" is opposed to "many." Therefore "one" is not opposed to "many."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28659" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28659] Iª q. 11 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, unum
uni est oppositum. Sed multo opponitur paucum. Ergo non opponitur
ei unum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if "one" is opposed to "multitude," it is opposed as the undivided is to the divided; and is thus opposed to it
                     as privation is to habit. But this appears to be incongruous; because it would follow that "one" comes after "multitude,"
                     and is defined by it; whereas, on the contrary, "multitude" is defined by "one." Hence there would be a vicious circle in
                     the definition; which is inadmissible. Therefore "one" and "many" are not opposed.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="28660" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28660] Iª q. 11 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, si
unum opponitur multitudini, opponitur ei sicut indivisum diviso, et
sic opponetur ei ut privatio habitui. Hoc autem videtur
inconveniens, quia sequeretur quod unum sit posterius multitudine,
et definiatur per eam; cum tamen multitudo definiatur per unum.
Unde erit circulus in definitione, quod est inconveniens. Non ergo
unum et multa sunt opposita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Things which are opposed in idea, are themselves opposed to each other. But the idea of "one" consists in indivisibility;
                     and the idea of "multitude" contains division. Therefore "one" and "many" are opposed to each other.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28661" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28661] Iª q. 11 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
quorum rationes sunt oppositae, ipsa sunt opposita. Sed ratio unius
consistit in indivisibilitate, ratio vero multitudinis divisionem
continet. Ergo unum et multa sunt opposita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> "One" is opposed to "many," but in various ways. The "one" which is the principle of number is opposed to "multitude" which
                     is number, as the measure is to the thing measured. For "one" implies the idea of a primary measure; and number is "multitude"
                     measured by "one," as is clear from Metaph. x. But the "one" which convertible with "being" is opposed to "multitude" by way
                     of privation; as the undivided is to the thing divided.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 co."><a name="28662" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28662] Iª q. 11 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod unum opponitur multis, sed diversimode. Nam unum quod est
principium numeri, opponitur multitudini quae est numerus, ut
mensura mensurato, unum enim habet rationem primae mensurae, et
numerus est multitudo mensurata per unum, ut patet ex X Metaphys.
Unum vero quod convertitur cum ente, opponitur multitudini per
modum privationis, ut indivisum diviso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> No privation entirely takes away the being of a thing, inasmuch as privation means "negation in the subject," according to
                     the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Nevertheless every privation takes away some being; and so in being, by reason of its universality,
                     the privation of being has its foundation in being; which is not the case in privations of special forms, as of sight, or
                     of whiteness and the like. And what applies to being applies also to one and
                     to good, which are convertible with being, for the privation of good is founded in some good; likewise the removal of unity
                     is founded in some one thing. Hence it happens that multitude is some one thing; and evil is some good thing, and non-being
                     is some kind of being. Nevertheless, opposite is not predicated of opposite; forasmuch as one is absolute, and the other is
                     relative; for what is relative being (as a potentiality) is non-being absolutely, i.e. actually; or what is absolute being
                     in
                     the genus of substance is non-being relatively as regards some accidental being. In the same way, what is relatively good
                     is absolutely bad, or vice versa; likewise what is absolutely "one" is relatively "many," and vice versa.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28663" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28663] Iª q. 11 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod nulla privatio tollit totaliter esse, quia privatio
est negatio in subiecto, secundum philosophum. Sed tamen omnis
privatio tollit aliquod esse. Et ideo in ente, ratione suae
communitatis, accidit quod privatio entis fundatur in ente, quod
non accidit in privationibus formarum specialium, ut visus vel
albedinis, vel alicuius huiusmodi. Et sicut est de ente, ita est de
uno et bono, quae convertuntur cum ente, nam privatio boni fundatur
in aliquo bono, et similiter remotio unitatis fundatur in aliquo
uno. Et exinde contingit quod multitudo est quoddam unum, et malum
est quoddam bonum, et non ens est quoddam ens. Non tamen oppositum
praedicatur de opposito, quia alterum horum est simpliciter, et
alterum secundum quid. Quod enim secundum quid est ens, ut in
potentia, est non ens simpliciter, idest actu, vel quod est ens
simpliciter in genere substantiae, est non ens secundum quid,
quantum ad aliquod esse accidentale. Similiter ergo quod est bonum
secundum quid, est malum simpliciter; vel e converso. Et similiter
quod est unum simpliciter, est multa secundum quid; et e
converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A "whole" is twofold. In one sense it is homogeneous, composed of like parts; in another sense it is heterogeneous, composed
                     of dissimilar parts. Now in every homogeneous whole, the whole is made up of parts having the form of the whole; as, for instance,
                     every part of water is water; and such is the constitution of a continuous thing made up of its parts. In every heterogeneous
                     whole, however, every part is wanting in the form belonging to the whole;
                     as, for instance, no part of a house is a house, nor is any part of a man a man. Now multitude is such a kind of a whole.
                     Therefore inasmuch as its part has not the form of the multitude, the latter is composed of unities, as a house is composed
                     of not houses; not, indeed, as if unities constituted multitude so far as they are undivided, in which way they are opposed
                     to multitude; but so far as they have being, as also the parts of a house make up the house by the fact that they are beings,
                     not
                     by the fact that they are not houses.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28664" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28664] Iª q. 11 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod duplex est totum, quoddam homogeneum, quod componitur
ex similibus partibus; quoddam vero heterogeneum, quod componitur
ex dissimilibus partibus. In quolibet autem toto homogeneo, totum
constituitur ex partibus habentibus formam totius, sicut quaelibet
pars aquae est aqua, et talis est constitutio continui ex suis
partibus. In quolibet autem toto heterogeneo, quaelibet pars caret
forma totius, nulla enim pars domus est domus, nec aliqua pars
hominis est homo. Et tale totum est multitudo. Inquantum ergo pars
eius non habet formam multitudinis, componitur multitudo ex
unitatibus, sicut domus ex non domibus, non quod unitates
constituant multitudinem secundum id quod habent de ratione
indivisionis, prout opponuntur multitudini; sed secundum hoc quod
habent de entitate, sicut et partes domus constituunt domum per hoc
quod sunt quaedam corpora, non per hoc quod sunt non domus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "Many" is taken in two ways: absolutely, and in that sense it is opposed to "one"; in another way as importing some kind
                     of excess, in which sense it is opposed to "few"; hence in the first sense two are many but not in the second sense.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28665" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28665] Iª q. 11 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod multum accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo, absolute, et
sic opponitur uni. Alio modo, secundum quod importat excessum
quendam, et sic opponitur pauco. Unde primo modo duo sunt multa;
non autem secundo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> "One" is opposed to "many" privatively, inasmuch as the idea of "many" involves division. Hence division must be prior to
                     unity, not absolutely in itself, but according to our way of apprehension. For we apprehend simple things by compound things;
                     and hence we define a point to be, "what has no part," or "the beginning of a line." "Multitude" also, in idea, follows on
                     "one"; because we do not understand divided things to convey the idea of multitude
                     except by the fact that we attribute unity to every part. Hence "one" is placed in the definition of "multitude"; but "multitude"
                     is not placed in the definition of "one." But division comes to be understood from the very negation of being: so what first
                     comes to mind is being; secondly, that this being is not that being, and thus we apprehend division as a consequence; thirdly,
                     comes the notion of one; fourthly, the notion of multitude.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="28666" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28666] Iª q. 11 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod unum opponitur privative multis, inquantum in ratione
multorum est quod sint divisa. Unde oportet quod divisio sit prius
unitate, non simpliciter, sed secundum rationem nostrae
apprehensionis. Apprehendimus enim simplicia per composita, unde
definimus punctum, cuius pars non est, vel principium lineae. Sed
multitudo, etiam secundum rationem, consequenter se habet ad unum,
quia divisa non intelligimus habere rationem multitudinis, nisi per
hoc quod utrique divisorum attribuimus unitatem. Unde unum ponitur
in definitione multitudinis, non autem multitudo in definitione
unius. Sed divisio cadit in intellectu ex ipsa negatione entis. Ita
quod primo cadit in intellectu ens; secundo, quod hoc ens non est
illud ens, et sic secundo apprehendimus divisionem; tertio, unum;
quarto, multitudinem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q11_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q11_A3-p0.1">Q. 11. A. 3. Whether God is one?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not one. For it is written "For there be many gods and many lords" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q11_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.8.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 8:5</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28667" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28667] Iª q. 11 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit unus. Dicitur enim I ad Cor.
VIII, <i>siquidem sunt dii multi et domini multi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "One," as the principle of number, cannot be predicated of God, since quantity is not predicated of God; likewise,
                     neither can "one" which is convertible with "being" be predicated of God, because it imports privation, and every privation
                     is an imperfection, which cannot apply to God. Therefore God is not one.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28668" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28668] Iª q. 11 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, unum
quod est principium numeri, non potest praedicari de Deo, cum nulla
quantitas de Deo praedicetur. Similiter nec unum quod convertitur
cum ente, quia importat privationem, et omnis privatio imperfectio
est, quae Deo non competit. Non est igitur dicendum quod Deus sit
unus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A3-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q11_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.4" target="asv">Dt. 6:4</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28669" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28669] Iª q. 11 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Deut. VI, <i>audi, Israel, dominus Deus tuus unus
est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A3-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It can be shown from these three sources that God is one. First from His simplicity. For it is manifest that the reason why
                     any singular thing is "this particular thing" is because it cannot be communicated to many: since that whereby Socrates is
                     a man, can be communicated to many; whereas, what makes him this particular man, is only communicable to one. Therefore, if
                     Socrates were a man by what makes him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many
                     Socrates, so there could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs to God alone; for God Himself is His own nature, as
                     was shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A3" id="FP_Q11_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[3]</a>). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He is this God. Impossible is it therefore that many Gods should exist.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 3 co."><a name="28670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28670] Iª q. 11 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod Deum esse unum, ex tribus demonstratur. Primo quidem ex eius
simplicitate. Manifestum est enim quod illud unde aliquod singulare
est hoc aliquid, nullo modo est multis communicabile. Illud enim
unde Socrates est homo, multis communicari potest, sed id unde est
hic homo, non potest communicari nisi uni tantum. Si ergo Socrates
per id esset homo, per quod est hic homo, sicut non possunt esse
plures Socrates, ita non possent esse plures homines. Hoc autem
convenit Deo, nam ipse Deus est sua natura, ut supra ostensum est.
Secundum igitur idem est Deus, et hic Deus. Impossibile est igitur
esse plures deos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A3-p6"> Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it was shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q4_A2" id="FP_Q11_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that God comprehends in Himself the whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would necessarily differ
                     from each other. Something therefore would belong to one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation, one
                     of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one of them would be without it. So it is impossible
                     for many gods to exist. Hence also the ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by truth, when they asserted an infinite
                     principle, asserted likewise that there was only one such principle.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Secundo vero, ex infinitate eius perfectionis.
Ostensum est enim supra quod Deus comprehendit in se totam
perfectionem essendi. Si ergo essent plures dii, oporteret eos
differre. Aliquid ergo conveniret uni, quod non alteri. Et si hoc
esset privatio, non esset simpliciter perfectus, si autem hoc esset
perfectio, alteri eorum deesset. Impossibile est ergo esse plures
deos. Unde et antiqui philosophi, quasi ab ipsa coacti veritate,
ponentes principium infinitum, posuerunt unum tantum principium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A3-p7"> Thirdly, this is shown from the unity of the world. For all things that exist are seen to be ordered to each other since
                     some serve others. But things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same order, unless they are ordered thereto by one.
                     For many are reduced into one order by one better than by many: because one is the "per se" cause of one, and many are only
                     the accidental cause of one, inasmuch as they are in some way one. Since therefore what is first is most perfect,
                     and is so "per se" and not accidentally, it must be that the first which reduces all into one order should be only one. And
                     this one is God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Tertio, ab unitate mundi. Omnia enim quae sunt, inveniuntur esse
ordinata ad invicem, dum quaedam quibusdam deserviunt. Quae autem
diversa sunt, in unum ordinem non convenirent, nisi ab aliquo uno
ordinarentur. Melius enim multa reducuntur in unum ordinem per
unum, quam per multa, quia per se unius unum est causa, et multa
non sunt causa unius nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet sunt
aliquo modo unum. Cum igitur illud quod est primum, sit
perfectissimum et per se, non per accidens, oportet quod primum
reducens omnia in unum ordinem, sit unum tantum. Et hoc est
Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gods are called many by the error of some who worshipped many deities, thinking as they did that the planets and other stars
                     were gods, and also the separate parts of the world. Hence the Apostle adds: "Our God is one," etc.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28671" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28671] Iª q. 11 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod dicuntur dii multi secundum errorem quorundam qui
multos deos colebant, existimantes planetas et alias stellas esse
deos, vel etiam singulas partes mundi. Unde subdit, <i>nobis autem
unus Deus,</i> et cetera.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "One" which is the principle of number is not predicated of God, but only of material things. For "one" the principle of
                     number belongs to the "genus" of mathematics, which are material in being, and abstracted from matter only in idea. But "one"
                     which is convertible with being is a metaphysical entity and does not depend on matter in its being. And although in God there
                     is no privation, still, according to the mode of our apprehension, He is known to
                     us by way only of privation and remotion. Thus there is no reason why a certain kind of privation should not be predicated
                     of God; for instance, that He is incorporeal and infinite; and in the same way it is said of God that He is one.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28672" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28672] Iª q. 11 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod unum secundum quod est principium numeri, non
praedicatur de Deo; sed solum de his quae habent esse in materia.
Unum enim quod est principium numeri, est de genere mathematicorum;
quae habent esse in materia, sed sunt secundum rationem a materia
abstracta. Unum vero quod convertitur cum ente, est quoddam
metaphysicum, quod secundum esse non dependet a materia. Et licet
in Deo non sit aliqua privatio, tamen, secundum modum
apprehensionis nostrae, non cognoscitur a nobis nisi per modum
privationis et remotionis. Et sic nihil prohibet aliqua privative
dicta de Deo praedicari; sicut quod est incorporeus, infinitus. Et
similiter de Deo dicitur quod sit unus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q11_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q11_A4-p0.1">Q. 11. A. 4. Whether God is supremely one?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not supremely "one." For "one" is so called from the privation of division. But privation cannot be
                     greater or less. Therefore God is not more "one" than other things which are called "one."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28673" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28673] Iª q. 11 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit maxime unus. Unum enim
dicitur secundum privationem divisionis. Sed privatio non recipit
magis et minus. Ergo Deus non dicitur magis unus quam alia quae
sunt unum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing seems to be more indivisible than what is actually and potentially indivisible; such as a point and unity.
                     But a thing is said to be more "one" according as it is indivisible. Therefore God is not more "one" than unity is "one" and
                     a point is "one."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28674" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28674] Iª q. 11 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nihil
videtur esse magis indivisibile quam id quod est indivisibile actu
et potentia, cuiusmodi est punctus et unitas. Sed intantum dicitur
aliquid magis unum, inquantum est indivisibile. Ergo Deus non est
magis unum quam unitas et punctus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is essentially good is supremely good. Therefore what is essentially "one" is supremely "one." But every being
                     is essentially "one," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv). Therefore every being is supremely "one"; and therefore God is
                     not "one" more than any other being is "one."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28675" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28675] Iª q. 11 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod
est per essentiam bonum, est maxime bonum, ergo quod est per
essentiam suam unum, est maxime unum. Sed omne ens est unum per
suam essentiam, ut patet per philosophum in IV Metaphys. Ergo omne
ens est maxime unum. Deus igitur non est magis unum quam alia
entia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Bernard says (De Consid. v): "Among all things called one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds the first place."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28676" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28676] Iª q. 11 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Bernardus, quod <i>inter omnia quae unum dicuntur, arcem
tenet unitas divinae Trinitatis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since "one" is an undivided being, if anything is supremely "one" it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided. Now
                     both of these belong to God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch as His being is not determined by any nature to which it
                     is adjoined; since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is
                     divided neither actually nor potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether
                     simple, as was shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A7" id="FP_Q11_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Hence it is manifest that God is "one" in the supreme degree.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 4 co."><a name="28677" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28677] Iª q. 11 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, cum unum sit ens indivisum, ad hoc quod aliquid sit maxime
unum, oportet quod sit et maxime ens et maxime indivisum. Utrumque
autem competit Deo. Est enim maxime ens, inquantum est non habens
aliquod esse determinatum per aliquam naturam cui adveniat, sed est
ipsum esse subsistens, omnibus modis indeterminatum. Est autem
maxime indivisum, inquantum neque dividitur actu neque potentia,
secundum quemcunque modum divisionis, cum sit omnibus modis
simplex, ut supra ostensum est. Unde manifestum est quod Deus est
maxime unus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although privation considered in itself is not susceptive of more or less, still according as its opposite is subject to
                     more or less, privation also can be considered itself in the light of more and less. Therefore according as a thing is more
                     divided, or is divisible, either less or not at all, in the degree it is called more, or less, or supremely, "one."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28678" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28678] Iª q. 11 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, licet privatio secundum se non recipiat magis et
minus, tamen secundum quod eius oppositum recipit magis et minus,
etiam ipsa privativa dicuntur secundum magis et minus. Secundum
igitur quod aliquid est magis divisum vel divisibile, vel minus,
vel nullo modo, secundum hoc aliquid dicitur magis et minus vel
maxime unum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A point and unity which is the principle of number, are not supremely being, inasmuch as they have being only in some subject.
                     Hence neither of them can be supremely "one." For as a subject cannot be supremely "one," because of the difference within
                     it of accident and subject, so neither can an accident.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28679" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28679] Iª q. 11 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod punctus et unitas quae est principium numeri, non
sunt maxime entia, cum non habeant esse nisi in subiecto aliquo.
Unde neutrum eorum est maxime unum. Sicut enim subiectum non est
maxime unum, propter diversitatem accidentis et subiecti, ita nec
accidens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although every being is "one" by its substance, still every such substance is not equally the cause of unity; for the substance
                     of some things is compound and of others simple.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28680" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28680] Iª q. 11 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, licet omne ens sit unum per suam substantiam, non
tamen se habet aequaliter substantia cuiuslibet ad causandam
unitatem, quia substantia quorundam est ex multis composita,
quorundam vero non.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q12" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q12-p0.1">Q. 12. HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q12-p2"> As hitherto we have considered God as He is in Himself, we now go on to consider in what manner He is in the knowledge of
                  creatures; concerning which there are thirteen points of inquiry:
               </p><p id="FP_Q12-p3"><a href="#FP_Q12_A1"> (1) Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q12-p4"><a href="#FP_Q12_A2"> (2) Whether the essence of God is seen by the intellect through any created image?</a></p><p id="FP_Q12-p5"><a href="#FP_Q12_A3"> (3) Whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye?</a></p><p id="FP_Q12-p6"><a href="#FP_Q12_A4"> (4) Whether any created intellectual substance is sufficient by its own natural powers to see the essence of God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q12-p7"><a href="#FP_Q12_A5"> (5) Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q12-p8"><a href="#FP_Q12_A6"> (6) Whether of those who see God, one sees Him more perfectly than another?</a></p><p id="FP_Q12-p9"><a href="#FP_Q12_A7"> (7) Whether any created intellect can comprehend the essence of God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q12-p10"><a href="#FP_Q12_A8"> (8) Whether the created intellect seeing the essence of God, knows all things in it?</a></p><p id="FP_Q12-p11"><a href="#FP_Q12_A9"> (9) Whether what is there known is known by any similitudes?</a></p><p id="FP_Q12-p12"><a href="#FP_Q12_A10"> (10) Whether the created intellect knows at once what it sees in God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q12-p13"><a href="#FP_Q12_A11"> (11) Whether in the state of this life any man can see the essence of God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q12-p14"><a href="#FP_Q12_A12"> (12) Whether by natural reason we can know God in this life?</a></p><p id="FP_Q12-p15"><a href="#FP_Q12_A13"> (13) Whether there is in this life any knowledge of God through grace above the knowledge of natural reason?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 pr."><a name="28681" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28681]
Iª q. 12 pr.</span></a> Quia in superioribus consideravimus
qualiter Deus sit secundum seipsum, restat considerandum qualiter
sit in cognitione nostra, idest quomodo cognoscatur a creaturis. Et
circa hoc quaeruntur tredecim. Primo, utrum aliquis intellectus
creatus possit videre essentiam Dei. Secundo, utrum Dei essentia
videatur ab intellectu per aliquam speciem creatam. Tertio, utrum
oculo corporeo Dei essentia possit videri. Quarto, utrum aliqua
substantia intellectualis creata ex suis naturalibus sufficiens sit
videre Dei essentiam. Quinto, utrum intellectus creatus ad videndam
Dei essentiam indigeat aliquo lumine creato. Sexto, utrum videntium
essentiam Dei unus alio perfectius videat. Septimo, utrum aliquis
intellectus creatus possit comprehendere Dei essentiam. Octavo,
utrum intellectus creatus videns Dei essentiam, omnia in ipsa
cognoscat. Nono, utrum ea quae ibi cognoscit, per aliquas
similitudines cognoscat. Decimo, utrum simul cognoscat omnia quae
in Deo videt. Undecimo, utrum in statu huius vitae possit aliquis
homo essentiam Dei videre. Duodecimo, utrum per rationem naturalem
Deum in hac vita possimus cognoscere. Tertiodecimo, utrum, supra
cognitionem naturalis rationis, sit in praesenti vita aliqua
cognitio Dei per gratiam.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q12_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A1-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 1. Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no created intellect can see the essence of God. For Chrysostom (Hom. xiv. in Joan.) commenting on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.18" target="asv"> Jn. 1:18, </a> "No man hath seen God at any time," says: "Not prophets only, but neither angels nor archangels have seen God. For how can
                     a creature see what is increatable?" Dionysius also says (Div. Nom. i), speaking of God: "Neither is there sense, nor image,
                     nor opinion, nor reason, nor knowledge of Him."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28682" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28682] Iª q. 12 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod nullus intellectus creatus possit Deum per
essentiam videre. Chrysostomus enim, super Ioannem, exponens illud
quod dicitur Ioan. I, <i>Deum nemo vidit unquam</i>, sic dicit,
<i>ipsum quod est Deus, non solum prophetae, sed nec Angeli
viderunt nec Archangeli, quod enim creabilis est naturae, qualiter
videre poterit quod increabile est?</i> Dionysius etiam, I cap. de
Div. Nom., loquens de Deo, dicit, <i>neque sensus est eius, neque
phantasia, neque opinio, nec ratio, nec scientia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything infinite, as such, is unknown. But God is infinite, as was shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q12_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Therefore in Himself He is unknown.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28683] Iª q. 12 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
infinitum, inquantum huiusmodi, est ignotum. Sed Deus est
infinitus, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo secundum se est ignotus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the created intellect knows only existing things. For what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is
                     being. Now God is not something existing; but He is rather super-existence, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore God
                     is not intelligible; but above all intellect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28684" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28684] Iª q. 12 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
intellectus creatus non est cognoscitivus nisi existentium, primum
enim quod cadit in apprehensione intellectus, est ens. Sed Deus non
est existens, sed supra existentia. Ut dicit Dionysius. Ergo non
est intelligibilis; sed est supra omnem intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there must be some proportion between the knower and the known, since the known is the perfection of the knower.
                     But no proportion exists between the created intellect and God; for there is an infinite distance between them. Therefore
                     the created intellect cannot see the essence of God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="28685" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28685] Iª q. 12 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
cognoscentis ad cognitum oportet esse aliquam proportionem, cum
cognitum sit perfectio cognoscentis. Sed nulla est proportio
intellectus creati ad Deum, quia in infinitum distant. Ergo
intellectus creatus non potest videre essentiam Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "We shall see Him as He is" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:2</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28686" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28686] Iª q. 12 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur I Ioan. III, <i>videbimus eum sicuti est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q12_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since everything is knowable according as it is actual, God, Who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, is in
                     Himself supremely knowable. But what is supremely knowable in itself, may not be knowable to a particular intellect, on account
                     of the excess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for example, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot
                     be seen by the bat by reason of its excess of light.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q12_A1-p8"> Therefore some who considered this, held that no created intellect can see the essence of God. This opinion, however, is
                     not tenable. For as the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest function, which is the operation of his
                     intellect; if we suppose that the created intellect could never see God, it would either never attain to beatitude, or its
                     beatitude would consist in something else beside God; which is opposed to faith. For the ultimate perfection of
                     the rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of its being; since a thing is perfect so far as it attains
                     to its principle. Further the same opinion is also against reason. For there resides in every man a natural desire to know
                     the cause of any effect which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect of the rational creature could
                     not reach so far as to the first cause of things, the natural desire would remain void.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q12_A1-p9"> Hence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of God.</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 co."><a name="28687" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28687] Iª q. 12 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, cum unumquodque sit cognoscibile secundum quod est in actu,
Deus, qui est actus purus absque omni permixtione potentiae,
quantum in se est, maxime cognoscibilis est. Sed quod est maxime
cognoscibile in se, alicui intellectui cognoscibile non est,
propter excessum intelligibilis supra intellectum, sicut sol, qui
est maxime visibilis, videri non potest a vespertilione, propter
excessum luminis. Hoc igitur attendentes, quidam posuerunt quod
nullus intellectus creatus essentiam Dei videre potest. Sed hoc
inconvenienter dicitur. Cum enim ultima hominis beatitudo in
altissima eius operatione consistat, quae est operatio intellectus,
si nunquam essentiam Dei videre potest intellectus creatus, vel
nunquam beatitudinem obtinebit, vel in alio eius beatitudo
consistet quam in Deo. Quod est alienum a fide. In ipso enim est
ultima perfectio rationalis creaturae, quia est ei principium
essendi, intantum enim unumquodque perfectum est, inquantum ad suum
principium attingit. Similiter etiam est praeter rationem. Inest
enim homini naturale desiderium cognoscendi causam, cum intuetur
effectum; et ex hoc admiratio in hominibus consurgit. Si igitur
intellectus rationalis creaturae pertingere non possit ad primam
causam rerum, remanebit inane desiderium naturae. Unde simpliciter
concedendum est quod beati Dei essentiam videant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Both of these authorities speak of the vision of comprehension. Hence Dionysius premises immediately before the words cited,
                     "He is universally to all incomprehensible," etc. Chrysostom likewise after the words quoted says: "He says this of the most
                     certain vision of the Father, which is such a perfect consideration and comprehension as the Father has of the Son."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28688" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28688] Iª q. 12 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod utraque auctoritas loquitur de visione
comprehensionis. Unde praemittit Dionysius immediate ante verba
proposita, dicens, <i>omnibus ipse est universaliter
incomprehensibilis, et nec sensus est</i>, et cetera. Et
Chrysostomus parum post verba praedicta subdit, <i>visionem hic
dicit certissimam patris considerationem et comprehensionem, tantam
quantam pater habet de filio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The infinity of matter not made perfect by form, is unknown in itself, because all knowledge comes by the form; whereas the
                     infinity of the form not limited by matter, is in itself supremely known. God is Infinite in this way, and not in the first
                     way: as appears from what was said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q12_A1-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28689] Iª q. 12 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod infinitum quod se tenet ex parte materiae non
perfectae per formam, ignotum est secundum se, quia omnis cognitio
est per formam. Sed infinitum quod se tenet ex parte formae non
limitatae per materiam, est secundum se maxime notum. Sic autem
Deus est infinitus, et non primo modo, ut ex superioribus
patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is not said to be not existing as if He did not exist at all, but because He exists above all that exists; inasmuch as
                     He is His own existence. Hence it does not follow that He cannot be known at all, but that He exceeds every kind of knowledge;
                     which means that He is not comprehended.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28690" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28690] Iª q. 12 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod Deus non sic dicitur non existens, quasi nullo modo
sit existens, sed quia est supra omne existens, inquantum est suum
esse. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod nullo modo possit cognosci, sed
quod omnem cognitionem excedat, quod est ipsum non comprehendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a certain relation of one quantity to another, according as double, treble and
                     equal are species of proportion. In another sense every relation of one thing to another is called proportion. And in this
                     sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is related to Him as the effect of its cause, and as
                     potentiality to its act; and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned
                     to know God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="28691" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28691] Iª q. 12 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod proportio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, certa
habitudo unius quantitatis ad alteram; secundum quod duplum,
triplum et aequale sunt species proportionis. Alio modo, quaelibet
habitudo unius ad alterum proportio dicitur. Et sic potest esse
proportio creaturae ad Deum, inquantum se habet ad ipsum ut
effectus ad causam, et ut potentia ad actum. Et secundum hoc,
intellectus creatus proportionatus esse potest ad cognoscendum
Deum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A2-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 2. Whether the essence of God is seen by the created intellect through an image?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the essence of God is seen through an image by the created intellect. For it is written: "We know that when
                     He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall see Him as He is" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28692" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28692] Iª q. 12 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod essentia Dei ab intellectu creato per
aliquam similitudinem videatur. Dicitur enim I Ioan. III, <i>scimus
quoniam, cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, et videbimus eum sicuti
est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v): "When we know God, some likeness of God is made in us."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28693" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28693] Iª q. 12 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Augustinus dicit, IX de Trin., <i>cum Deum novimus, fit aliqua Dei
similitudo in nobis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect in act is the actual intelligible; as sense in act is the actual sensible. But this comes about inasmuch
                     as sense is informed with the likeness of the sensible object, and the intellect with the likeness of the thing understood.
                     Therefore, if God is seen by the created intellect in act, it must be that He is seen by some similitude.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28694" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28694] Iª q. 12 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
intellectus in actu est intelligibile in actu, sicut sensus in actu
est sensibile in actu. Hoc autem non est nisi inquantum informatur
sensus similitudine rei sensibilis, et intellectus similitudine rei
intellectae. Ergo, si Deus ab intellectu creato videtur in actu,
oportet quod per aliquam similitudinem videatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xv) that when the Apostle says, "We see through a glass and in an enigma [*Douay: 'in a dark manner'],"
                     "by the terms 'glass' and 'enigma' certain similitudes are signified by him, which are accommodated to the vision of God."
                     But to see the essence of God is not an enigmatic nor a speculative vision, but is, on the contrary, of an opposite kind.
                     Therefore the divine essence is not seen through a similitude.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28695" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28695] Iª q. 12 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Augustinus, XV de Trin., quod cum apostolus dicit
<i>videmus nunc per speculum et in aenigmate, speculi et aenigmatis
nomine, quaecumque similitudines ab ipso significatae intelligi
possunt, quae accommodatae sunt ad intelligendum Deum</i>. Sed
videre Deum per essentiam non est visio aenigmatica vel specularis,
sed contra eam dividitur. Ergo divina essentia non videtur per
similitudines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q12_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Two things are required both for sensible and for intellectual vision---viz. power of sight, and union of the thing seen
                     with the sight. For vision is made actual only when the thing seen is in a certain way in the seer. Now in corporeal things
                     it is clear that the thing seen cannot be by its essence in the seer, but only by its likeness; as the similitude of a stone
                     is in the eye, whereby the vision is made actual; whereas the substance of the stone is not
                     there. But if the principle of the visual power and the thing seen were one and the same thing, it would necessarily follow
                     that the seer would receive both the visual power and the form whereby it sees, from that one same thing.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q12_A2-p7"> Now it is manifest both that God is the author of the intellect power, and that He can be seen by the intellect. And since
                     the intellective power of the creature is not the essence of God, it follows that it is some kind of participated likeness
                     of Him who is the first intellect. Hence also the intellectual power of the creature is called an intelligible light, as it
                     were, derived from the first light, whether this be understood of the natural power, or of some perfection
                     superadded of grace or of glory. Therefore, in order to see God, there must be some similitude of God on the part of the visual
                     faculty, whereby the intellect is made capable of seeing God. But on the part of the object seen, which must necessarily be
                     united to the seer, the essence of God cannot be seen by any created similitude. First, because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
                     i), "by the similitudes of the inferior order of things, the superior can in no way be known;" as by the likeness of a
                     body the essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known. Much less therefore can the essence of God be seen by any created
                     likeness whatever. Secondly, because the essence of God is His own very existence, as was shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A4" id="FP_Q12_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>), which cannot be said of any created form; and so no created form can be the similitude representing the essence of God
                     to the seer. Thirdly, because the divine essence is uncircumscribed, and contains in itself super-eminently whatever
                     can be signified or understood by the created intellect. Now this cannot in any way be represented by any created likeness;
                     for every created form is determined according to some aspect of wisdom, or of power, or of being itself, or of some like
                     thing. Hence to say that God is seen by some similitude, is to say that the divine essence is not seen at all; which is false.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q12_A2-p8"> Therefore it must be said that to see the essence of God, there is required some similitude in the visual faculty, namely,
                     the light of glory strengthening the intellect to see God, which is spoken of in the
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.10" target="asv"> Ps. 35:10, </a> "In Thy light we shall see light." The essence of God, however, cannot be seen by any created similitude representing the
                     divine essence itself as it really is.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 2 co."><a name="28696" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28696] Iª q. 12 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod ad visionem, tam sensibilem quam intellectualem, duo
requiruntur, scilicet virtus visiva, et unio rei visae cum visu,
non enim fit visio in actu, nisi per hoc quod res visa quodammodo
est in vidente. Et in rebus quidem corporalibus, apparet quod res
visa non potest esse in vidente per suam essentiam, sed solum per
suam similitudinem, sicut similitudo lapidis est in oculo, per quam
fit visio in actu, non autem ipsa substantia lapidis. Si autem
esset una et eadem res, quae esset principium visivae virtutis, et
quae esset res visa, oporteret videntem ab illa re et virtutem
visivam habere, et formam per quam videret. Manifestum est autem
quod Deus et est auctor intellectivae virtutis, et ab intellectu
videri potest. Et cum ipsa intellectiva virtus creaturae non sit
Dei essentia, relinquitur quod sit aliqua participata similitudo
ipsius, qui est primus intellectus. Unde et virtus intellectualis
creaturae lumen quoddam intelligibile dicitur, quasi a prima luce
derivatum, sive hoc intelligatur de virtute naturali, sive de
aliqua perfectione superaddita gratiae vel gloriae. Requiritur ergo
ad videndum Deum aliqua Dei similitudo ex parte visivae potentiae,
qua scilicet intellectus sit efficax ad videndum Deum. Sed ex parte
visae rei, quam necesse est aliquo modo uniri videnti per nullam
similitudinem creatam Dei essentia videri potest. Primo quidem,
quia, sicut dicit Dionysius, I cap. de Div. Nom., per similitudines
inferioris ordinis rerum nullo modo superiora possunt cognosci,
sicut per speciem corporis non potest cognosci essentia rei
incorporeae. Multo igitur minus per speciem creatam quamcumque
potest essentia Dei videri. Secundo, quia essentia Dei est ipsum
esse eius, ut supra ostensum est, quod nulli formae creatae
competere potest. Non potest igitur aliqua forma creata esse
similitudo repraesentans videnti Dei essentiam. Tertio, quia divina
essentia est aliquod incircumscriptum, continens in se
supereminenter quidquid potest significari vel intelligi ab
intellectu creato. Et hoc nullo modo per aliquam speciem creatam
repraesentari potest, quia omnis forma creata est determinata
secundum aliquam rationem vel sapientiae, vel virtutis, vel ipsius
esse, vel alicuius huiusmodi. Unde dicere Deum per similitudinem
videri, est dicere divinam essentiam non videri, quod est erroneum.
Dicendum ergo quod ad videndum Dei essentiam requiritur aliqua
similitudo ex parte visivae potentiae, scilicet lumen gloriae,
confortans intellectum ad videndum Deum, de quo dicitur in Psalmo,
<i>in lumine tuo videbimus lumen</i>. Non autem per aliquam
similitudinem creatam Dei essentia videri potest, quae ipsam
divinam essentiam repraesentet ut in se est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That authority speaks of the similitude which is caused by participation of the light of glory.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28697" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28697] Iª q. 12 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod auctoritas illa loquitur de similitudine quae est per
participationem luminis gloriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine speaks of the knowledge of God here on earth.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28698" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28698] Iª q. 12 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de cognitione Dei quae
habetur in via.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The divine essence is existence itself. Hence as other intelligible forms which are not their own existence are united to
                     the intellect by means of some entity, whereby the intellect itself is informed, and made in act; so the divine essence is
                     united to the created intellect, as the object actually understood, making the intellect in act by and of itself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28699" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28699] Iª q. 12 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod divina essentia est ipsum esse. Unde, sicut aliae
formae intelligibiles quae non sunt suum esse, uniuntur intellectui
secundum aliquod esse quo informant ipsum intellectum et faciunt
ipsum in actu; ita divina essentia unitur intellectui creato ut
intellectum in actu, per seipsam faciens intellectum in actu.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A3-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 3. Whether the essence of God can be seen with the bodily eye?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.19.26" target="asv">Job 19:26</a>): "In my flesh I shall see . . . God," and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Job.42.5" target="asv">Job 42:5</a>), "With the hearing of the ear I have heard Thee, but now my eye seeth Thee."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28700" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28700] Iª q. 12 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod essentia Dei videri possit oculo
corporali. Dicitur enim Iob XIX, <i>in carne mea videbo Deum,</i>
etc.; et XLII, <i>auditu auris audivi te, nunc autem oculus meus
videt te</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxix, 29): "Those eyes" (namely the glorified) "will therefore have a greater power
                     of sight, not so much to see more keenly, as some report of the sight of serpents or of eagles (for whatever acuteness of
                     vision is possessed by these creatures, they can see only corporeal things) but to see even incorporeal things." Now whoever
                     can see incorporeal things, can be raised up to see God. Therefore the glorified eye can see
                     God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28701" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28701] Iª q. 12 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Augustinus dicit, ultimo de civitate Dei, cap. XXIX, <i>vis itaque
praepollentior oculorum erit illorum</i> (scilicet glorificatorum),
<i>non ut acutius videant quam quidam perhibentur videre serpentes
vel aquilae (quantalibet enim acrimonia cernendi eadem animalia
vigeant, nihil aliud possunt videre quam corpora), sed ut videant
et incorporalia</i>. Quicumque autem potest videre incorporalia,
potest elevari ad videndum Deum. Ergo oculus glorificatus potest
videre Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God can be seen by man through a vision of the imagination. For it is written: "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne,"
                     etc. (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.1" target="asv">Is. 6:1</a>). But an imaginary vision originates from sense; for the imagination is moved by sense to act. Therefore God can be seen
                     by a vision of sense.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28702" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28702] Iª q. 12 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
potest videri ab homine visione imaginaria, dicitur enim Isaiae VI,
<i>vidi dominum sedentem super solium,</i> et cetera. Sed visio
imaginaria a sensu originem habet, <i>phantasia enim est motus
factus a sensu secundum actum</i>, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo
Deus sensibili visione videri potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "No one has ever seen God either in this life, as He is, nor in the angelic life,
                     as visible things are seen by corporeal vision."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28703" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28703] Iª q. 12 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de videndo Deum ad Paulinam,
<i>Deum nemo vidit unquam, vel in hac vita, sicut ipse est; vel in
Angelorum vita, sicut visibilia ista quae corporali visione
cernuntur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of sight, or by any other sense, or faculty of the sensitive power. For
                     every such kind of power is the act of a corporeal organ, as will be shown later
                     <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q78" id="FP_Q12_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(Q[78])</a>. Now act is proportional to the nature which possesses it. Hence no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal things. For
                     God is incorporeal, as was shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A1" id="FP_Q12_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[3], A[1]</a>). Hence He cannot be seen by the
                     sense or the imagination, but only by the intellect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 3 co."><a name="28704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28704] Iª q. 12 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod impossibile est Deum videri sensu visus, vel quocumque alio
sensu aut potentia sensitivae partis. Omnis enim potentia huiusmodi
est actus corporalis organi, ut infra dicetur. Actus autem
proportionatur ei cuius est actus. Unde nulla huiusmodi potentia
potest se extendere ultra corporalia. Deus autem incorporeus est,
ut supra ostensum est. Unde nec sensu nec imaginatione videri
potest, sed solo intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words, "In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour," do not mean that God will be seen with the eye of the flesh, but that
                     man existing in the flesh after the resurrection will see God. Likewise the words, "Now my eye seeth Thee," are to be understood
                     of the mind's eye, as the Apostle says: "May He give unto you the spirit of wisdom . . . in the knowledge of Him, that the
                     eyes of your heart" may be "enlightened" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.17" target="asv">Eph.
                        1:17,18
                     </a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28705" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28705] Iª q. 12 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, cum dicitur <i>in carne mea videbo Deum, salvatorem
meum</i>, non intelligitur quod oculo carnis sit Deum visurus, sed
quod in carne existens, post resurrectionem, visurus sit Deum.
Similiter quod dicitur, <i>nunc oculus meus videt te</i>,
intelligitur de oculo mentis, sicut Ephes. I dicit apostolus,
<i>det vobis spiritum sapientiae in agnitione eius, illuminatos
oculos cordis vestri</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine speaks as one inquiring, and conditionally. This appears from what he says previously: "Therefore they will have
                     an altogether different power (viz. the glorified eyes), if they shall see that incorporeal nature;" and afterwards he explains
                     this, saying: "It is very credible, that we shall so see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see
                     most clearly God everywhere present, governing all corporeal things, not as we
                     now see the invisible things of God as understood by what is made; but as when we see men among whom we live, living and exercising
                     the functions of human life, we do not believe they live, but see it." Hence it is evident how the glorified eyes will see
                     God, as now our eyes see the life of another. But life is not seen with the corporeal eye, as a thing in itself visible, but
                     as the indirect object of the sense; which indeed is not known by sense, but at once, together with sense, by some
                     other cognitive power. But that the divine presence is known by the intellect immediately on the sight of, and through, corporeal
                     things, happens from two causes---viz. from the perspicuity of the intellect, and from the refulgence of the divine glory
                     infused into the body after its renovation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28706" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28706] Iª q. 12 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur inquirendo in verbis illis, et
sub conditione. Quod patet ex hoc quod praemittitur, longe itaque
potentiae alterius erunt (scilicet oculi glorificati), si per eos
videbitur incorporea illa natura. Sed postmodum hoc determinat,
dicens, <i>valde credibile est sic nos visuros mundana tunc corpora
caeli novi et terrae novae, ut Deum ubique praesentem, et universa
etiam corporalia gubernantem, clarissima perspicuitate videamus;
non sicut nunc invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta
conspiciuntur; sed sicut homines, inter quos viventes motusque
vitales exerentes vivimus, mox ut aspicimus, non credimus vivere,
sed videmus</i>. Ex quo patet quod hoc modo intelligit oculos
glorificatos Deum visuros, sicut nunc oculi nostri vident alicuius
vitam. Vita autem non videtur oculo corporali, sicut per se
visibile, sed sicut sensibile per accidens, quod quidem a sensu non
cognoscitur, sed statim cum sensu ab aliqua alia virtute
cognoscitiva. Quod autem statim, visis corporibus, divina
praesentia ex eis cognoscatur per intellectum, ex duobus contingit,
scilicet ex perspicacitate intellectus; et ex refulgentia divinae
claritatis in corporibus innovatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The essence of God is not seen in a vision of the imagination; but the imagination receives some form representing God according
                     to some mode of similitude; as in the divine Scripture divine things are metaphorically described by means of sensible things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28707" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28707] Iª q. 12 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod in visione imaginaria non videtur Dei essentia, sed
aliqua forma in imaginatione formatur, repraesentans Deum secundum
aliquem modum similitudinis, prout in Scripturis divinis divina per
res sensibiles metaphorice describuntur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A4-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 4. Whether any created intellect by its natural powers can see the Divine essence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that a created intellect can see the Divine essence by its own natural power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv):
                     "An angel is a pure mirror, most clear, receiving, if it is right to say so, the whole beauty of God." But if a reflection
                     is seen, the original thing is seen. Therefore since an angel by his natural power understands himself, it seems that by his
                     own natural power he understands the Divine essence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28708" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28708] Iª q. 12 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis intellectus creatus per sua
naturalia divinam essentiam videre possit. Dicit enim Dionysius,
cap. IV de Div. Nom., quod Angelus est speculum purum, clarissimum,
<i>suscipiens totam, si fas est dicere, pulchritudinem Dei</i>. Sed
unumquodque videtur dum videtur eius speculum. Cum igitur Angelus
per sua naturalia intelligat seipsum, videtur quod etiam per sua
naturalia intelligat divinam essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is supremely visible, is made less visible to us by reason of our defective corporeal or intellectual sight.
                     But the angelic intellect has no such defect. Therefore, since God is supremely intelligible in Himself, it seems that in
                     like manner He is supremely so to an angel. Therefore, if he can understand other intelligible things by his own natural power,
                     much more can he understand God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28709" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28709] Iª q. 12 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, illud
quod est maxime visibile, fit minus visibile nobis propter defectum
nostri visus, vel corporalis vel intellectualis. Sed intellectus
Angeli non patitur aliquem defectum. Cum ergo Deus secundum se sit
maxime intelligibilis, videtur quod ab Angelo sit maxime
intelligibilis. Si igitur alia intelligibilia per sua naturalia
intelligere potest, multo magis Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, corporeal sense cannot be raised up to understand incorporeal substance, which is above its nature. Therefore if
                     to see the essence of God is above the nature of every created intellect, it follows that no created intellect can reach up
                     to see the essence of God at all. But this is false, as appears from what is said above
                     <a href="#FP_Q12_A1" id="FP_Q12_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it seems that it is natural for a created intellect to see the Divine essence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28710] Iª q. 12 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
sensus corporeus non potest elevari ad intelligendam substantiam
incorpoream, quia est supra eius naturam. Si igitur videre Deum per
essentiam sit supra naturam cuiuslibet intellectus creati, videtur
quod nullus intellectus creatus ad videndum Dei essentiam
pertingere possit, quod est erroneum, ut ex supradictis patet.
Videtur ergo quod intellectui creato sit naturale divinam essentiam
videre.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The grace of God is life everlasting" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.23" target="asv">Rom. 6:23</a>). But life everlasting consists in the vision of the Divine essence, according to the words: "This is eternal life, that
                     they may know Thee the only true God," etc. (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv">Jn. 17:3</a>). Therefore to see the essence of God is possible to the created intellect by grace, and not by nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28711" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28711] Iª q. 12 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Rom. VI, <i>gratia Dei vita aeterna</i>. Sed vita
aeterna consistit in visione divinae essentiae, secundum illud
Ioan. XVII, <i>haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te solum verum
Deum,</i> et cetera. Ergo videre Dei essentiam convenit intellectui
creato per gratiam, et non per naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for any created intellect to see the essence of God by its own natural power. For knowledge is regulated
                     according as the thing known is in the knower. But the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence
                     the knowledge of every knower is ruled according to its own nature. If therefore the mode of anything's being exceeds the
                     mode of the knower, it must result that the knowledge of the object is above the nature of
                     the knower. Now the mode of being of things is manifold. For some things have being only in this one individual matter; as
                     all bodies. But others are subsisting natures, not residing in matter at all, which, however, are not their own existence,
                     but receive it; and these are the incorporeal beings, called angels. But to God alone does it belong to be His own subsistent
                     being. Therefore what exists only in individual matter we know naturally, forasmuch as our soul, whereby we know, is the form
                     of certain matter. Now our soul possesses two cognitive powers; one is the act of a corporeal organ, which naturally knows
                     things existing in individual matter; hence sense knows only the singular. But there is another kind of cognitive power in
                     the soul, called the intellect; and this is not the act of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the intellect naturally knows natures
                     which exist only in individual matter; not as they are in such individual matter, but according as they are abstracted
                     therefrom by the considering act of the intellect; hence it follows that through the intellect we can understand these objects
                     as universal; and this is beyond the power of the sense. Now the angelic intellect naturally knows natures that are not in
                     matter; but this is beyond the power of the intellect of our soul in the state of its present life, united as it is to the
                     body. It follows therefore that to know self-subsistent being is natural to the divine intellect alone; and this is beyond
                     the
                     natural power of any created intellect; for no creature is its own existence, forasmuch as its existence is participated.
                     Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of God, unless God by His grace unites Himself to the created intellect,
                     as an object made intelligible to it.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 co."><a name="28712" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28712] Iª q. 12 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod impossibile est quod aliquis intellectus creatus per sua
naturalia essentiam Dei videat. Cognitio enim contingit secundum
quod cognitum est in cognoscente. Cognitum autem est in cognoscente
secundum modum cognoscentis. Unde cuiuslibet cognoscentis cognitio
est secundum modum suae naturae. Si igitur modus essendi alicuius
rei cognitae excedat modum naturae cognoscentis, oportet quod
cognitio illius rei sit supra naturam illius cognoscentis. Est
autem multiplex modus essendi rerum. Quaedam enim sunt, quorum
natura non habet esse nisi in hac materia individuali, et huiusmodi
sunt omnia corporalia. Quaedam vero sunt, quorum naturae sunt per
se subsistentes, non in materia aliqua, quae tamen non sunt suum
esse, sed sunt esse habentes, et huiusmodi sunt substantiae
incorporeae, quas Angelos dicimus. Solius autem Dei proprius modus
essendi est, ut sit suum esse subsistens. Ea igitur quae non habent
esse nisi in materia individuali, cognoscere est nobis connaturale,
eo quod anima nostra, per quam cognoscimus, est forma alicuius
materiae. Quae tamen habet duas virtutes cognoscitivas. Unam, quae
est actus alicuius corporei organi. Et huic connaturale est
cognoscere res secundum quod sunt in materia individuali, unde
sensus non cognoscit nisi singularia. Alia vero virtus cognoscitiva
eius est intellectus, qui non est actus alicuius organi corporalis.
Unde per intellectum connaturale est nobis cognoscere naturas, quae
quidem non habent esse nisi in materia individuali; non tamen
secundum quod sunt in materia individuali, sed secundum quod
abstrahuntur ab ea per considerationem intellectus. Unde secundum
intellectum possumus cognoscere huiusmodi res in universali, quod
est supra facultatem sensus. Intellectui autem angelico connaturale
est cognoscere naturas non in materia existentes. Quod est supra
naturalem facultatem intellectus animae humanae, secundum statum
praesentis vitae, quo corpori unitur. Relinquitur ergo quod
cognoscere ipsum esse subsistens, sit connaturale soli intellectui
divino, et quod sit supra facultatem naturalem cuiuslibet
intellectus creati, quia nulla creatura est suum esse, sed habet
esse participatum. Non igitur potest intellectus creatus Deum per
essentiam videre, nisi inquantum Deus per suam gratiam se
intellectui creato coniungit, ut intelligibile ab ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This mode of knowing God is natural to an angel---namely, to know Him by His own likeness refulgent in the angel himself.
                     But to know God by any created similitude is not to know the essence of God, as was shown above
                     <a href="#FP_Q12_A2" id="FP_Q12_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Hence it does not follow that an angel can know the essence of God by his own power.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28713] Iª q. 12 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod iste modus cognoscendi Deum, est Angelo connaturalis,
ut scilicet cognoscat eum per similitudinem eius in ipso Angelo
refulgentem. Sed cognoscere Deum per aliquam similitudinem creatam,
non est cognoscere essentiam Dei, ut supra ostensum est. Unde non
sequitur quod Angelus per sua naturalia possit cognoscere essentiam
Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angelic intellect is not defective, if defect be taken to mean privation, as if it were without anything which it ought
                     to have. But if the defect be taken negatively, in that sense every creature is defective, when compared with God; forasmuch
                     as it does not possess the excellence which is in God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28714" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28714] Iª q. 12 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod intellectus Angeli non habet defectum, si defectus
accipiatur privative, ut scilicet careat eo quod habere debet. Si
vero accipiatur negative, sic quaelibet creatura invenitur
deficiens, Deo comparata, dum non habet illam excellentiam quae
invenitur in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sense of sight, as being altogether material, cannot be raised up to immateriality. But our intellect, or the angelic
                     intellect, inasmuch as it is elevated above matter in its own nature, can be raised up above its own nature to a higher level
                     by grace. The proof is, that sight cannot in any way know abstractedly what it knows concretely; for in no way can it perceive
                     a nature except as this one particular nature; whereas our intellect is able to
                     consider abstractedly what it knows concretely. Now although it knows things which have a form residing in matter, still it
                     resolves the composite into both of these elements; and it considers the form separately by itself. Likewise, also, the intellect
                     of an angel, although it naturally knows the concrete in any nature, still it is able to separate that existence by its intellect;
                     since it knows that the thing itself is one thing, and its existence is another. Since therefore the created
                     intellect is naturally capable of apprehending the concrete form, and the concrete being abstractedly, by way of a kind of
                     resolution of parts; it can by grace be raised up to know separate subsisting substance, and separate subsisting existence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28715" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28715] Iª q. 12 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod sensus visus, quia omnino materialis est, nullo modo
elevari potest ad aliquid immateriale. Sed intellectus noster vel
angelicus, quia secundum naturam a materia aliqualiter elevatus
est, potest ultra suam naturam per gratiam ad aliquid altius
elevari. Et huius signum est, quia visus nullo modo potest in
abstractione cognoscere id quod in concretione cognoscit, nullo
enim modo potest percipere naturam, nisi ut hanc. Sed intellectus
noster potest in abstractione considerare quod in concretione
cognoscit. Etsi enim cognoscat res habentes formam in materia,
tamen resolvit compositum in utrumque, et considerat ipsam formam
per se. Et similiter intellectus Angeli, licet connaturale sit ei
cognoscere esse concretum in aliqua natura, tamen potest ipsum esse
secernere per intellectum, dum cognoscit quod aliud est ipse, et
aliud est suum esse. Et ideo, cum intellectus creatus per suam
naturam natus sit apprehendere formam concretam et esse concretum
in abstractione, per modum resolutionis cuiusdam, potest per
gratiam elevari ut cognoscat substantiam separatam subsistentem, et
esse separatum subsistens.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A5-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 5. Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the created intellect does not need any created light in order to see the essence of God. For what is of itself
                     lucid in sensible things does not require any other light in order to be seen. Therefore the same applies to intelligible
                     things. Now God is intelligible light. Therefore He is not seen by means of any created light.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28716" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28716] Iª q. 12 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus creatus ad videndum essentiam
Dei aliquo lumine creato non indigeat. Illud enim quod est per se
lucidum in rebus sensibilibus, alio lumine non indiget ut videatur,
ergo nec in intelligibilibus. Sed Deus est lux intelligibilis. Ergo
non videtur per aliquod lumen creatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if God is seen through a medium, He is not seen in His essence. But if seen by any created light, He is seen through
                     a medium. Therefore He is not seen in His essence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28717" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28717] Iª q. 12 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, cum
Deus videtur per medium, non videtur per suam essentiam. Sed cum
videtur per aliquod lumen creatum, videtur per medium. Ergo non
videtur per suam essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is created can be natural to some creature. Therefore if the essence of God is seen through any created light,
                     such a light can be made natural to some other creature; and thus, that creature would not need any other light to see God;
                     which is impossible. Therefore it is not necessary that every creature should require a superadded light in order to see the
                     essence of God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="28718" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28718] Iª q. 12 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, illud
quod est creatum, nihil prohibet alicui creaturae esse naturale. Si
ergo per aliquod lumen creatum Dei essentia videtur, poterit illud
lumen esse naturale alicui creaturae. Et ita illa creatura non
indigebit aliquo alio lumine ad videndum Deum, quod est
impossibile. Non est ergo necessarium quod omnis creatura ad
videndum Dei essentiam lumen superadditum requirat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "In Thy light we shall see light" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.10" target="asv">Ps. 35:10</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28719" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28719] Iª q. 12 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur in Psalmo, <i>in lumine tuo videbimus lumen</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Everything which is raised up to what exceeds its nature, must be prepared by some disposition above its nature; as, for
                     example, if air is to receive the form of fire, it must be prepared by some disposition for such a form. But when any created
                     intellect sees the essence of God, the essence of God itself becomes the intelligible form of the intellect. Hence it is necessary
                     that some supernatural disposition should be added to the intellect in order that it
                     may be raised up to such a great and sublime height. Now since the natural power of the created intellect does not avail to
                     enable it to see the essence of God, as was shown in the preceding article, it is necessary that the power of understanding
                     should be added by divine grace. Now this increase of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of the intellect,
                     as we also call the intelligible object itself by the name of light of illumination. And this is the light spoken of in the
                     Apocalypse (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.23" target="asv">Apoc. 21:23</a>): "The glory of God hath enlightened it"---viz. the society of the blessed who see God. By this light the blessed are made
                     "deiform"---i.e. like to God, according to the saying: "When He shall appear we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.: 'because']
                     we shall see Him as He is" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:2</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 5 co."><a name="28720" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28720] Iª q. 12 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod omne quod elevatur ad aliquid quod excedit suam naturam,
oportet quod disponatur aliqua dispositione quae sit supra suam
naturam, sicut, si aer debeat accipere formam ignis, oportet quod
disponatur aliqua dispositione ad talem formam. Cum autem aliquis
intellectus creatus videt Deum per essentiam, ipsa essentia Dei fit
forma intelligibilis intellectus. Unde oportet quod aliqua
dispositio supernaturalis ei superaddatur, ad hoc quod elevetur in
tantam sublimitatem. Cum igitur virtus naturalis intellectus creati
non sufficiat ad Dei essentiam videndam, ut ostensum est, oportet
quod ex divina gratia superaccrescat ei virtus intelligendi. Et hoc
augmentum virtutis intellectivae illuminationem intellectus
vocamus; sicut et ipsum intelligibile vocatur lumen vel lux. Et
istud est lumen de quo dicitur Apoc. XXI, <i>quod claritas Dei
illuminabit eam</i>, scilicet societatem beatorum Deum videntium.
Et secundum hoc lumen efficiuntur deiformes, idest Deo similes;
secundum illud I Ioan. III, <i>cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus,
et videbimus eum sicuti est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A5-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The created light is necessary to see the essence of God, not in order to make the essence of God intelligible, which is
                     of itself intelligible, but in order to enable the intellect to understand in the same way as a habit makes a power abler
                     to act. Even so corporeal light is necessary as regards external sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium actually transparent,
                     and susceptible of color.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28721" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28721] Iª q. 12 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod lumen creatum est necessarium ad videndum Dei
essentiam, non quod per hoc lumen Dei essentia intelligibilis fiat,
quae secundum se intelligibilis est, sed ad hoc quod intellectus
fiat potens ad intelligendum, per modum quo potentia fit potentior
ad operandum per habitum, sicut etiam et lumen corporale
necessarium est in visu exteriori, inquantum facit medium
transparens in actu, ut possit moveri a colore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This light is required to see the divine essence, not as a similitude in which God is seen, but as a perfection of the intellect,
                     strengthening it to see God. Therefore it may be said that this light is to be described not as a medium in which God is seen,
                     but as one by which He is seen; and such a medium does not take away the immediate vision of God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28722" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28722] Iª q. 12 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod lumen istud non requiritur ad videndum Dei essentiam
quasi similitudo in qua Deus videatur, sed quasi perfectio quaedam
intellectus, confortans ipsum ad videndum Deum. Et ideo potest dici
quod non est medium in quo Deus videatur, sed sub quo videtur. Et
hoc non tollit immediatam visionem Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The disposition to the form of fire can be natural only to the subject of that form. Hence the light of glory cannot be natural
                     to a creature unless the creature has a divine nature; which is impossible. But by this light the rational creature is made
                     deiform, as is said in this article.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="28723" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28723] Iª q. 12 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod dispositio ad formam ignis non potest esse naturalis
nisi habenti formam ignis. Unde lumen gloriae non potest esse
naturale creaturae, nisi creatura esset naturae divinae, quod est
impossibile. Per hoc enim lumen fit creatura rationalis deiformis,
ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A6-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 6. Whether of those who see the essence of God, one sees more perfectly than another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that of those who see the essence of God, one does not see more perfectly than another. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>): "We shall see Him as He is." But He is only in one way. Therefore He will be seen by all in one way only; and therefore
                     He will not be seen more perfectly by one and less perfectly by another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28724" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28724] Iª q. 12 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod videntium essentiam Dei unus alio
perfectius non videat. Dicitur enim I Ioan. III, <i>videbimus eum
sicuti est</i>. Sed ipse uno modo est. Ergo uno modo videbitur ab
omnibus. Non ergo perfectius et minus perfecte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xxxii): "One person cannot see one and the same thing more perfectly than
                     another." But all who see the essence of God, understand the Divine essence, for God is seen by the intellect and not by sense,
                     as was shown above (A[3] ). Therefore of those who see the divine essence, one does not see more clearly than another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28725" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28725] Iª q. 12 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium qq., quod unam rem non
potest unus alio plus intelligere. Sed omnes videntes Deum per
essentiam, intelligunt Dei essentiam, intellectu enim videtur Deus,
non sensu, ut supra habitum est. Ergo videntium divinam essentiam
unus alio non clarius videt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, That anything be seen more perfectly than another can happen in two ways: either on the part of the visible object,
                     or on the part of the visual power of the seer. On the part of the object, it may so happen because the object is received
                     more perfectly in the seer, that is, according to the greater perfection of the similitude; but this does not apply to the
                     present question, for God is present to the intellect seeing Him not by way of similitude,
                     but by His essence. It follows then that if one sees Him more perfectly than another, this happens according to the difference
                     of the intellectual power; thus it follows too that the one whose intellectual power is higher, will see Him the more clearly;
                     and this is incongruous; since equality with angels is promised to men as their beatitude.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="28726" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28726] Iª q. 12 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod
aliquid altero perfectius videatur, ex duobus contingere potest,
vel ex parte obiecti visibilis; vel ex parte potentiae visivae
videntis. Ex parte autem obiecti, per hoc quod obiectum perfectius
in vidente recipitur, scilicet secundum perfectiorem similitudinem.
Quod in proposito locum non habet, Deus enim non per aliquam
similitudinem, sed per eius essentiam praesens est intellectui
essentiam eius videnti. Relinquitur ergo quod, si unus alio
perfectius eum videat, quod hoc sit secundum differentiam potentiae
intellectivae. Et ita sequitur quod cuius potentia intellectiva
naturaliter est sublimior, clarius eum videat. Quod est
inconveniens, cum hominibus promittatur in beatitudine aequalitas
Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Eternal life consists in the vision of God, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv"> Jn. 17:3</a>: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God," etc. Therefore if all saw the essence of God equally
                     in eternal life, all would be equal; the contrary to which is declared by the Apostle: "Star differs from star in glory" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A6-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.41" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:41</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28727" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28727] Iª q. 12 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod vita aeterna in visione Dei consistit, secundum illud Ioan.
XVII, <i>haec est vita aeterna,</i> et cetera. Ergo, si omnes
aequaliter Dei essentiam vident, in vita aeterna omnes erunt
aequales. Cuius contrarium dicit apostolus, I Cor. XV, <i>stella
differt a stella in claritate</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q12_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Of those who see the essence of God, one sees Him more perfectly than another. This, indeed, does not take place as if one
                     had a more perfect similitude of God than another, since that vision will not spring from any similitude; but it will take
                     place because one intellect will have a greater power or faculty to see God than another. The faculty of seeing God, however,
                     does not belong to the created intellect naturally, but is given to it by the light of
                     glory, which establishes the intellect in a kind of "deiformity," as appears from what is said above, in the preceding article.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q12_A6-p7"> Hence the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God the more perfectly; and he will have a fuller participation
                     of the light of glory who has more charity; because where there is the greater charity, there is the more desire; and desire
                     in a certain degree makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object desired. Hence he who possesses the more
                     charity, will see God the more perfectly, and will be the more beatified.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 6 co."><a name="28728" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28728] Iª q. 12 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod videntium Deum per essentiam unus alio perfectius eum videbit.
Quod quidem non erit per aliquam Dei similitudinem perfectiorem in
uno quam in alio, cum illa visio non sit futura per aliquam
similitudinem, ut ostensum est. Sed hoc erit per hoc, quod
intellectus unius habebit maiorem virtutem seu facultatem ad
videndum Deum, quam alterius. Facultas autem videndi Deum non
competit intellectui creato secundum suam naturam, sed per lumen
gloriae, quod intellectum in quadam deiformitate constituit, ut ex
superioribus patet. Unde intellectus plus participans de lumine
gloriae, perfectius Deum videbit. Plus autem participabit de lumine
gloriae, qui plus habet de caritate, quia ubi est maior caritas,
ibi est maius desiderium; et desiderium quodammodo facit
desiderantem aptum et paratum ad susceptionem desiderati. Unde qui
plus habebit de caritate, perfectius Deum videbit, et beatior
erit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the words,"We shall see Him as He is," the conjunction "as" determines the mode of vision on the part of the object seen,
                     so that the meaning is, we shall see Him to be as He is, because we shall see His existence, which is His essence. But it
                     does not determine the mode of vision on the part of the one seeing; as if the meaning was that the mode of seeing God will
                     be as perfect as is the perfect mode of God's existence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28729" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28729] Iª q. 12 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, cum dicitur videbimus eum sicuti est, hoc adverbium
sicuti determinat modum visionis ex parte rei visae ut sit sensus,
videbimus eum ita esse sicuti est, quia ipsum esse eius videbimus,
quod est eius essentia. Non autem determinat modum visionis ex
parte videntis, ut sit sensus, quod ita erit perfectus modus
videndi, sicut est in Deo perfectus modus essendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A6-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Thus appears the answer to the Second Objection. For when it is said that one intellect does not understand one and the same
                     thing better than another, this would be true if referred to the mode of the thing understood, for whoever understands it
                     otherwise than it really is, does not truly understand it, but not if referred to the mode of understanding, for the understanding
                     of one is more perfect than the understanding of another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28730" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28730] Iª q. 12 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc etiam
patet solutio ad secundum. Cum enim dicitur quod rem unam unus alio
melius non intelligit, hoc habet veritatem si referatur ad modum
rei intellectae, quia quicumque intelligit rem esse aliter quam
sit, non vere intelligit. Non autem si referatur ad modum
intelligendi, quia intelligere unius est perfectius quam
intelligere alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The diversity of seeing will not arise on the part of the object seen, for the same object will be presented to all---viz.
                     the essence of God; nor will it arise from the diverse participation of the object seen by different similitudes; but it will
                     arise on the part of the diverse faculty of the intellect, not, indeed, the natural faculty, but the glorified faculty.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="28731" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28731] Iª q. 12 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod diversitas videndi non erit ex parte obiecti, quia
idem obiectum omnibus praesentabitur, scilicet Dei essentia, nec ex
diversa participatione obiecti per differentes similitudines, sed
erit per diversam facultatem intellectus, non quidem naturalem, sed
gloriosam, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A7-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 7. Whether those who see the essence of God comprehend Him?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that those who see the divine essence, comprehend God. For the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.12" target="asv">Phil. 3:12</a>): "But I follow after, if I may by any means comprehend [Douay: 'apprehend']." But the Apostle did not follow in vain; for
                     he said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A7-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.26" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:26</a>): "I . . . so run, not as at an uncertainty." Therefore he comprehended; and in the same way, others also, whom he invites
                     to do the same, saying: "So run that you may
                     comprehend."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="28732" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28732] Iª q. 12 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod videntes Deum per essentiam ipsum
comprehendant. Dicit enim apostolus, Philipp. III, <i>sequor autem
si quo modo comprehendam</i>. Non autem frustra sequebatur, dicit
enim ipse, I Cor. IX, <i>sic curro, non quasi in incertum</i>. Ergo
ipse comprehendit, et eadem ratione alii, quos ad hoc invitat,
dicens, <i>sic currite, ut comprehendatis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "That is comprehended which is so seen as a whole, that nothing of it
                     is hidden from the seer." But if God is seen in His essence, He is seen whole, and nothing of Him is hidden from the seer,
                     since God is simple. Therefore whoever sees His essence, comprehends Him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="28733" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28733] Iª q. 12 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ut
dicit Augustinus in libro de videndo Deum ad Paulinam, <i>illud
comprehenditur, quod ita totum videtur, ut nihil eius lateat
videntem</i>. Sed si Deus per essentiam videtur, totus videtur, et
nihil eius latet videntem; cum Deus sit simplex. Ergo a quocumque
videtur per essentiam, comprehenditur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if we say that He is seen as a "whole," but not "wholly," it may be contrarily urged that "wholly" refers either
                     to the mode of the seer, or to the mode of the thing seen. But he who sees the essence of God, sees Him wholly, if the mode
                     of the thing seen is considered; forasmuch as he sees Him as He is; also, likewise, he sees Him wholly if the mode of the
                     seer is meant, forasmuch as the intellect will with its full power see the Divine essence.
                     Therefore all who see the essence of God see Him wholly; therefore they comprehend Him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="28734" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28734] Iª q. 12 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Si dicatur quod
videtur totus, sed non totaliter, contra, totaliter vel dicit modum
videntis, vel modum rei visae. Sed ille qui videt Deum per
essentiam, videt eum totaliter, si significetur modus rei visae,
quia videt eum sicuti est, ut dictum est. Similiter videt eum
totaliter, si significetur modus videntis, quia tota virtute sua
intellectus Dei essentiam videbit. Quilibet ergo videns Deum per
essentiam, totaliter eum videbit. Ergo eum comprehendet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A7-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "O most mighty, great, and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Thy Name. Great in counsel, and incomprehensible
                     in thought" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.32.18" target="asv">Jer. 32:18,19</a>). Therefore He cannot be comprehended.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 7 s. c."><a name="28735" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28735] Iª q. 12 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Ierem. XXXII, <i>fortissime, magne, potens, dominus
exercituum nomen tibi; magnus consilio, et incomprehensibilis
cogitatu</i>. Ergo comprehendi non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q12_A7-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend God; yet "for the mind to attain to God in some degree is great
                     beatitude," as Augustine says (De Verb. Dim., Serm. xxxvii).
                  </p><p id="FP_Q12_A7-p7"> In proof of this we must consider that what is comprehended is perfectly known; and that is perfectly known which is known
                     so far as it can be known. Thus, if anything which is capable of scientific demonstration is held only by an opinion resting
                     on a probably proof, it is not comprehended; as, for instance, if anyone knows by scientific demonstration that a triangle
                     has three angles equal to two right angles, he comprehends that truth; whereas if anyone accepts it as a
                     probable opinion because wise men or most men teach it, he cannot be said to comprehend the thing itself, because he does
                     not attain to that perfect mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable. But no created intellect can attain to
                     that perfect mode of the knowledge of the Divine intellect whereof it is intrinsically capable. Which thus appears---Everything
                     is knowable according to its actuality. But God, whose being is infinite, as was shown above
                     <a href="#FP_Q7" id="FP_Q12_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">(Q[7])</a> is
                     infinitely knowable. Now no created intellect can know God infinitely. For the created intellect knows the Divine essence
                     more or less perfectly in proportion as it receives a greater or lesser light of glory. Since therefore the created light
                     of glory received into any created intellect cannot be infinite, it is clearly impossible for any created intellect to know
                     God in an infinite degree. Hence it is impossible that it should comprehend God.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 7 co."><a name="28736" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28736] Iª q. 12 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod comprehendere Deum impossibile est cuicumque intellectui
creato, <i>attingere vero mente Deum qualitercumque, magna est
beatitudo</i>, ut dicit Augustinus. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum
est quod illud comprehenditur, quod perfecte cognoscitur. Perfecte
autem cognoscitur, quod tantum cognoscitur, quantum est
cognoscibile. Unde si id quod est cognoscibile per scientiam
demonstrativam, opinione teneatur ex aliqua ratione probabili
concepta, non comprehenditur. Puta, si hoc quod est triangulum
habere tres angulos aequales duobus rectis, aliquis sciat per
demonstrationem, comprehendit illud, si vero aliquis eius opinionem
accipiat probabiliter, per hoc quod a sapientibus vel pluribus ita
dicitur, non comprehendet ipsum, quia non pertingit ad illum
perfectum modum cognitionis, quo cognoscibilis est. Nullus autem
intellectus creatus pertingere potest ad illum perfectum modum
cognitionis divinae essentiae, quo cognoscibilis est. Quod sic
patet. Unumquodque enim sic cognoscibile est, secundum quod est ens
actu. Deus igitur, cuius esse est infinitum, ut supra ostensum est,
infinite cognoscibilis est. Nullus autem intellectus creatus potest
Deum infinite cognoscere. Intantum enim intellectus creatus divinam
essentiam perfectius vel minus perfecte cognoscit, inquantum maiori
vel minori lumine gloriae perfunditur. Cum igitur lumen gloriae
creatum, in quocumque intellectu creato receptum, non possit esse
infinitum, impossibile est quod aliquis intellectus creatus Deum
infinite cognoscat. Unde impossibile est quod Deum
comprehendat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Comprehension" is twofold: in one sense it is taken strictly and properly, according as something is included in the one
                     comprehending; and thus in no way is God comprehended either by intellect, or in any other way; forasmuch as He is infinite
                     and cannot be included in any finite being; so that no finite being can contain Him infinitely, in the degree of His own infinity.
                     In this sense we now take comprehension. But in another sense "comprehension"
                     is taken more largely as opposed to "non-attainment"; for he who attains to anyone is said to comprehend him when he attains
                     to him. And in this sense God is comprehended by the blessed, according to the words, "I held him, and I will not let him
                     go" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Song.3.4" target="asv">Cant 3:4</a>); in this sense also are to be understood the words quoted from the Apostle concerning comprehension. And in this way "comprehension"
                     is one of the three prerogatives of the soul, responding to hope, as vision
                     responds to faith, and fruition responds to charity. For even among ourselves not everything seen is held or possessed, forasmuch
                     as things either appear sometimes afar off, or they are not in our power of attainment. Neither, again, do we always enjoy
                     what we possess; either because we find no pleasure in them, or because such things are not the ultimate end of our desire,
                     so as to satisfy and quell it. But the blessed possess these three things in God; because they see Him, and in seeing Him,
                     possess Him as present, having the power to see Him always; and possessing Him, they enjoy Him as the ultimate fulfilment
                     of desire.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="28737" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28737] Iª q. 12 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod comprehensio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, stricte et
proprie, secundum quod aliquid includitur in comprehendente. Et sic
nullo modo Deus comprehenditur, nec intellectu nec aliquo alio,
quia, cum sit infinitus, nullo finito includi potest, ut aliquid
finitum eum infinite capiat, sicut ipse infinite est. Et sic de
comprehensione nunc quaeritur. Alio modo comprehensio largius
sumitur, secundum quod comprehensio insecutioni opponitur. Qui enim
attingit aliquem, quando iam tenet ipsum, comprehendere eum
dicitur. Et sic Deus comprehenditur a beatis, secundum illud Cant.
III, <i>tenui eum, nec dimittam</i>. Et sic intelliguntur
auctoritates apostoli de comprehensione. Et hoc modo comprehensio
est una de tribus dotibus animae, quae respondet spei; sicut visio
fidei, et fruitio caritati. Non enim, apud nos, omne quod videtur,
iam tenetur vel habetur, quia videntur interdum distantia, vel quae
non sunt in potestate nostra. Neque iterum omnibus quae habemus,
fruimur, vel quia non delectamur in eis; vel quia non sunt ultimus
finis desiderii nostri, ut desiderium nostrum impleant et quietent.
Sed haec tria habent beati in Deo, quia et vident ipsum; et
videndo, tenent sibi praesentem, in potestate habentes semper eum
videre; et tenentes, fruuntur sicut ultimo fine desiderium
implente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is called incomprehensible not because anything of Him is not seen; but because He is not seen as perfectly as He is
                     capable of being seen; thus when any demonstrable proposition is known by probable reason only, it does not follow that any
                     part of it is unknown, either the subject, or the predicate, or the composition; but that it is not as perfectly known as
                     it is capable of being known. Hence Augustine, in his definition of comprehension, says
                     the whole is comprehended when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer, or when its boundaries
                     can be completely viewed or traced; for the boundaries of a thing are said to be completely surveyed when the end of the knowledge
                     of it is attained.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="28738" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28738] Iª q. 12 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod non propter hoc Deus incomprehensibilis dicitur,
quasi aliquid eius sit quod non videatur, sed quia non ita perfecte
videtur, sicut visibilis est. Sicut cum aliqua demonstrabilis
propositio per aliquam probabilem rationem cognoscitur, non est
aliquid eius quod non cognoscatur, nec subiectum, nec praedicatum,
nec compositio, sed tota non ita perfecte cognoscitur, sicut
cognoscibilis est. Unde Augustinus, definiendo comprehensionem,
dicit quod <i>totum comprehenditur videndo, quod ita videtur, ut
nihil eius lateat videntem; aut cuius fines circumspici
possunt</i>, tunc enim fines alicuius circumspiciuntur, quando ad
finem in modo cognoscendi illam rem pervenitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A7-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The word "wholly" denotes a mode of the object; not that the whole object does not come under knowledge, but that the mode
                     of the object is not the mode of the one who knows. Therefore he who sees God's essence, sees in Him that He exists infinitely,
                     and is infinitely knowable; nevertheless, this infinite mode does not extend to enable the knower to know infinitely; thus,
                     for instance, a person can have a probable opinion that a proposition is
                     demonstrable, although he himself does not know it as demonstrated.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="28739" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28739] Iª q. 12 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod totaliter dicit modum obiecti, non quidem ita quod
totus modus obiecti non cadat sub cognitione; sed quia modus
obiecti non est modus cognoscentis. Qui igitur videt Deum per
essentiam, videt hoc in eo, quod infinite existit, et infinite
cognoscibilis est, sed hic infinitus modus non competit ei, ut
scilicet ipse infinite cognoscat, sicut aliquis probabiliter scire
potest aliquam propositionem esse demonstrabilem, licet ipse eam
demonstrative non cognoscat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A8-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 8. Whether those who see the essence of God see all in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that those who see the essence of God see all things in God. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv): "What do they not see,
                     who see Him Who sees all things?" But God sees all things. Therefore those who see God see all things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="28740" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28740] Iª q. 12 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod videntes Deum per essentiam omnia in Deo
videant. Dicit enim Gregorius, in IV Dialog. <i>quid est quod non
videant, qui videntem omnia vident?</i> Sed Deus est videns omnia.
Ergo qui vident Deum, omnia vident.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever sees a mirror, sees what is reflected in the mirror. But all actual or possible things shine forth in God
                     as in a mirror; for He knows all things in Himself. Therefore whoever sees God, sees all actual things in Him, and also all
                     possible things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="28741" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28741] Iª q. 12 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Item, quicumque
videt speculum, videt ea quae in speculo resplendent. Sed omnia
quaecumque fiunt vel fieri possunt, in Deo resplendent sicut in
quodam speculo, ipse enim omnia in seipso cognoscit. Ergo quicumque
videt Deum, videt omnia quae sunt et quae fieri possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever understands the greater, can understand the least, as is said in De Anima iii. But all that God does, or
                     can do, are less than His essence. Therefore whoever understands God, can understand all that God does, or can do.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="28742" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28742] Iª q. 12 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, qui
intelligit id quod est maius, potest intelligere minima, ut dicitur
III de anima. Sed omnia quae Deus facit vel facere potest, sunt
minus quam eius essentia. Ergo quicumque intelligit Deum, potest
intelligere omnia quae Deus facit vel facere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the rational creature naturally desires to know all things. Therefore if in seeing God it does not know all things,
                     its natural desire will not rest satisfied; thus, in seeing God it will not be fully happy; which is incongruous. Therefore
                     he who sees God knows all things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="28743" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28743] Iª q. 12 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
rationalis creatura omnia naturaliter scire desiderat. Si igitur
videndo Deum non omnia sciat, non quietatur eius naturale
desiderium, et ita, videndo Deum non erit beata. Quod est
inconveniens. Videndo igitur Deum, omnia scit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The angels see the essence of God; and yet do not know all things. For as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), "the inferior
                     angels are cleansed from ignorance by the superior angels." Also they are ignorant of future contingent things, and of secret
                     thoughts; for this knowledge belongs to God alone. Therefore whosoever sees the essence of God, does not know all things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 s. c."><a name="28744" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28744] Iª q. 12 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Angeli vident Deum per essentiam, et tamen non omnia sciunt.
Inferiores enim Angeli purgantur a superioribus a nescientia, ut
dicit Dionysius, VII cap. Cael. Hier. Ipsi etiam nesciunt futura
contingentia et cogitationes cordium, hoc enim solius Dei est. Non
ergo quicumque vident Dei essentiam, vident omnia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The created intellect, in seeing the divine essence, does not see in it all that God does or can do. For it is manifest that
                     things are seen in God as they are in Him. But all other things are in God as effects are in the power of their cause. Therefore
                     all things are seen in God as an effect is seen in its cause. Now it is clear that the more perfectly a cause is seen, the
                     more of its effects can be seen in it. For whoever has a lofty understanding, as soon
                     as one demonstrative principle is put before him can gather the knowledge of many conclusions; but this is beyond one of a
                     weaker intellect, for he needs things to be explained to him separately. And so an intellect can know all the effects of a
                     cause and the reasons for those effects in the cause itself, if it comprehends the cause wholly. Now no created intellect
                     can comprehend God wholly, as shown above
                     <a href="#FP_Q12_A7" id="FP_Q12_A8-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>. Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know
                     all that God does or can do, for this would be to comprehend His power; but of what God does or can do any intellect can know
                     the more, the more perfectly it sees God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 co."><a name="28745" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28745] Iª q. 12 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod intellectus creatus, videndo divinam essentiam, non videt in
ipsa omnia quae facit Deus vel facere potest. Manifestum est enim
quod sic aliqua videntur in Deo, secundum quod sunt in ipso. Omnia
autem alia sunt in Deo, sicut effectus sunt virtute in sua causa.
Sic igitur videntur alia in Deo, sicut effectus in sua causa. Sed
manifestum est quod quanto aliqua causa perfectius videtur, tanto
plures eius effectus in ipsa videri possunt. Qui enim habet
intellectum elevatum, statim uno principio demonstrativo proposito,
ex ipso multarum conclusionum cognitionem accipit, quod non
convenit ei qui debilioris intellectus est, sed oportet quod ei
singula explanentur. Ille igitur intellectus potest in causa
cognoscere omnes causae effectus, et omnes rationes effectuum, qui
causam totaliter comprehendit. Nullus autem intellectus creatus
totaliter Deum comprehendere potest, ut ostensum est. Nullus igitur
intellectus creatus, videndo Deum, potest cognoscere omnia quae
Deus facit vel potest facere, hoc enim esset comprehendere eius
virtutem. Sed horum quae Deus facit vel facere potest, tanto
aliquis intellectus plura cognoscit, quanto perfectius Deum
videt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory speaks as regards the object being sufficient, namely, God, who in Himself sufficiently contains and shows forth
                     all things; but it does not follow that whoever sees God knows all things, for he does not perfectly comprehend Him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="28746" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28746] Iª q. 12 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Gregorius loquitur quantum ad sufficientiam obiecti,
scilicet Dei, quod, quantum in se est, sufficienter continet omnia
et demonstrat. Non tamen sequitur quod unusquisque videns Deum
omnia cognoscat, quia non perfecte comprehendit ipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not necessary that whoever sees a mirror should see all that is in the mirror, unless his glance comprehends the mirror
                     itself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="28747" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28747] Iª q. 12 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod videns speculum, non est necessarium quod omnia in
speculo videat, nisi speculum visu suo comprehendat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although it is more to see God than to see all things else, still it is a greater thing to see Him so that all things are
                     known in Him, than to see Him in such a way that not all things, but the fewer or the more, are known in Him. For it has been
                     shown in this article that the more things are known in God according as He is seen more or less perfectly.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="28748" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28748] Iª q. 12 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, licet maius sit videre Deum quam omnia alia, tamen
maius est videre sic Deum quod omnia in eo cognoscantur, quam
videre sic ipsum quod non omnia, sed pauciora vel plura
cognoscantur in eo. Iam enim ostensum est quod multitudo cognitorum
in Deo, consequitur modum videndi ipsum vel magis perfectum vel
minus perfectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The natural desire of the rational creature is to know everything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect, namely,
                     the species and the genera of things and their types, and these everyone who sees the Divine essence will see in God. But
                     to know other singulars, their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to the perfection of the created intellect nor does
                     its natural desire go out to these things; neither, again, does it desire to know
                     things that exist not as yet, but which God can call into being. Yet if God alone were seen, Who is the fount and principle
                     of all being and of all truth, He would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that nothing else would be desired, and the
                     seer would be completely beatified. Hence Augustine says (Confess. v): "Unhappy the man who knoweth all these" (i.e. all creatures)
                     "and knoweth not Thee! but happy whoso knoweth Thee although he know not these. And whoso knoweth both Thee and them is
                     not the happier for them, but for Thee alone."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="28749" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28749] Iª q. 12 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod naturale desiderium rationalis creaturae est ad
sciendum omnia illa quae pertinent ad perfectionem intellectus; et
haec sunt species et genera rerum, et rationes earum, quae in Deo
videbit quilibet videns essentiam divinam. Cognoscere autem alia
singularia, et cogitata et facta eorum, non est de perfectione
intellectus creati, nec ad hoc eius naturale desiderium tendit, nec
iterum cognoscere illa quae nondum sunt, sed fieri a Deo possunt.
Si tamen solus Deus videretur, qui est fons et principium totius
esse et veritatis, ita repleret naturale desiderium sciendi, quod
nihil aliud quaereretur, et beatus esset. Unde dicit Augustinus, V
Confess., infelix homo qui scit omnia illa (scilicet creaturas),
<i>te autem nescit, beatus autem qui te scit, etiam si illa
nesciat. Qui vero te et illa novit, non propter illa beatior est,
sed propter te solum beatus</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A9-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 9. Whether what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen through any similitude?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A9-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen by means of some similitude. For every kind
                     of knowledge comes about by the knower being assimilated to the object known. For thus the intellect in act becomes the actual
                     intelligible, and the sense in act becomes the actual sensible, inasmuch as it is informed by a similitude of the object,
                     as the eye by the similitude of color. Therefore if the intellect of one who sees the Divine
                     essence understands any creatures in God, it must be informed by their similitudes.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="28750" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28750] Iª q. 12 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod ea quae videntur in Deo, a videntibus
divinam essentiam per aliquas similitudines videantur. Omnis enim
cognitio est per assimilationem cognoscentis ad cognitum, sic enim
intellectus in actu fit intellectum in actu, et sensus in actu
sensibile in actu, inquantum eius similitudine informatur, ut
pupilla similitudine coloris. Si igitur intellectus videntis Deum
per essentiam intelligat in Deo aliquas creaturas, oportet quod
earum similitudinibus informetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A9-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what we have seen, we keep in memory. But Paul, seeing the essence of God whilst in ecstasy, when he had ceased
                     to see the Divine essence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 28,34), remembered many of the things he had seen in the rapture;
                     hence he said: "I have heard secret words which it is not granted to man to utter" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A9-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.4" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:4</a>). Therefore it must be said that certain similitudes of what he remembered, remained in his mind; and in the same way,
                     when he actually saw the essence of God, he had certain similitudes or ideas of what he actually saw in it.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="28751" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28751] Iª q. 12 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ea
quae prius vidimus, memoriter tenemus. Sed Paulus, videns in raptu
essentiam Dei, ut dicit Augustinus XII super Gen. ad litteram,
postquam desiit essentiam Dei videre, recordatus est multorum quae
in illo raptu viderat, unde ipse dicit quod <i>audivit arcana
verba, quae non licet homini loqui</i>, II Cor. XII. Ergo oportet
dicere quod aliquae similitudines eorum quae recordatus est, in
eius intellectu remanserint. Et eadem ratione, quando
praesentialiter videbat Dei essentiam, eorum quae in ipsa videbat,
aliquas similitudines vel species habebat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A9-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A mirror and what is in it are seen by means of one likeness. But all things are seen in God as in an intelligible mirror.
                     Therefore if God Himself is not seen by any similitude but by His own essence, neither are the things seen in Him seen by
                     any similitudes or ideas.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 9 s. c."><a name="28752" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28752] Iª q. 12 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod per unam speciem videtur speculum, et ea quae in speculo
apparent. Sed omnia sic videntur in Deo sicut in quodam speculo
intelligibili. Ergo, si ipse Deus non videtur per aliquam
similitudinem, sed per suam essentiam; nec ea quae in ipso
videntur, per aliquas similitudines sive species videntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A9-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Those who see the divine essence see what they see in God not by any likeness, but by the divine essence itself united to
                     their intellect. For each thing is known in so far as its likeness is in the one who knows. Now this takes place in two ways.
                     For as things which are like one and the same thing are like to each other, the cognitive faculty can be assimilated to any
                     knowable object in two ways. In one way it is assimilated by the object itself, when it is
                     directly informed by a similitude, and then the object is known in itself. In another way when informed by a similitude which
                     resembles the object; and in this way, the knowledge is not of the thing in itself, but of the thing in its likeness. For
                     the knowledge of a man in himself differs from the knowledge of him in his image. Hence to know things thus by their likeness
                     in the one who knows, is to know them in themselves or in their own nature; whereas to know them by their similitudes
                     pre-existing in God, is to see them in God. Now there is a difference between these two kinds of knowledge. Hence, according
                     to the knowledge whereby things are known by those who see the essence of God, they are seen in God Himself not by any other
                     similitudes but by the Divine essence alone present to the intellect; by which also God Himself is seen.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 9 co."><a name="28753" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28753] Iª q. 12 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod videntes Deum per essentiam, ea quae in ipsa essentia Dei
vident, non vident per aliquas species, sed per ipsam essentiam
divinam intellectui eorum unitam. Sic enim cognoscitur unumquodque,
secundum quod similitudo eius est in cognoscente. Sed hoc contingit
dupliciter. Cum enim quaecumque uni et eidem sunt similia, sibi
invicem sint similia, virtus cognoscitiva dupliciter assimilari
potest alicui cognoscibili. Uno modo, secundum se, quando directe
eius similitudine informatur, et tunc cognoscitur illud secundum
se. Alio modo, secundum quod informatur specie alicuius quod est ei
simile, et tunc non dicitur res cognosci in seipsa, sed in suo
simili. Alia enim est cognitio qua cognoscitur aliquis homo in
seipso, et alia qua cognoscitur in sua imagine. Sic ergo,
cognoscere res per earum similitudines in cognoscente existentes,
est cognoscere eas in seipsis, seu in propriis naturis, sed
cognoscere eas prout earum similitudines praeexistunt in Deo, est
videre eas in Deo. Et hae duae cognitiones differunt. Unde secundum
illam cognitionem qua res cognoscuntur a videntibus Deum per
essentiam in ipso Deo, non videntur per aliquas similitudines
alias; sed per solam essentiam divinam intellectui praesentem, per
quam et Deus videtur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A9-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The created intellect of one who sees God is assimilated to what is seen in God, inasmuch as it is united to the Divine essence,
                     in which the similitudes of all things pre-exist.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="28754" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28754] Iª q. 12 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod intellectus videntis Deum assimilatur rebus quae
videntur in Deo, inquantum unitur essentiae divinae, in qua rerum
omnium similitudines praeexistunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A9-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some of the cognitive faculties form other images from those first conceived; thus the imagination from the preconceived
                     images of a mountain and of gold can form the likeness of a golden mountain; and the intellect, from the preconceived ideas
                     of genus and difference, forms the idea of species; in like manner from the similitude of an image we can form in our minds
                     the similitude of the original of the image. Thus Paul, or any other person who sees
                     God, by the very vision of the divine essence, can form in himself the similitudes of what is seen in the divine essence,
                     which remained in Paul even when he had ceased to see the essence of God. Still this kind of vision whereby things are seen
                     by this likeness thus conceived, is not the same as that whereby things are seen in God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="28755" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28755] Iª q. 12 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod aliquae potentiae cognoscitivae sunt, quae ex
speciebus primo conceptis alias formare possunt. Sicut imaginatio
ex praeconceptis speciebus montis et auri, format speciem montis
aurei, et intellectus ex praeconceptis speciebus generis et
differentiae, format rationem speciei. Et similiter ex similitudine
imaginis formare possumus in nobis similitudinem eius cuius est
imago. Et sic Paulus, vel quicumque alius videns Deum, ex ipsa
visione essentiae divinae potest formare in se similitudines rerum
quae in essentia divina videntur, quae remanserunt in Paulo etiam
postquam desiit Dei essentiam videre. Ista tamen visio, qua
videntur res per huiusmodi species sic conceptas, est alia a
visione qua videntur res in Deo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A10-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 10. Whether those who see the essence of God see all they see in it at the same time?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A10-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that those who see the essence of God do not see all they see in Him at one and the same time. For according to
                     the Philosopher (Topic. ii): "It may happen that many things are known, but only one is understood." But what is seen in God,
                     is understood; for God is seen by the intellect. Therefore those who see God do not see all in Him at the same time.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="28756" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28756] Iª q. 12 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod videntes Deum per essentiam non simul
videant omnia quae in ipso vident. Quia, secundum philosophum,
contingit multa scire, intelligere vero unum. Sed ea quae videntur
in Deo, intelliguntur, intellectu enim videtur Deus. Ergo non
contingit a videntibus Deum simul multa videri in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A10-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 22,23), "God moves the spiritual creature according to time"---i.e. by intelligence
                     and affection. But the spiritual creature is the angel who sees God. Therefore those who see God understand and are affected
                     successively; for time means succession.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="28757" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28757] Iª q. 12 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad litteram, quod <i>Deus movet
creaturam spiritualem per tempus</i>, hoc est per intelligentiam et
affectionem. Sed creatura spiritualis est Angelus, qui Deum videt.
Ergo videntes Deum, successive intelligunt et afficiuntur, tempus
enim successionem importat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A10-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xvi): "Our thoughts will not be unstable, going to and fro from one thing to another; but we shall
                     see all we know at one glance."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 10 s. c."><a name="28758" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28758] Iª q. 12 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Augustinus dicit, ultimo de Trin., <i>non erunt volubiles
nostrae cogitationes, ab aliis in alia euntes atque redeuntes; sed
omnem scientiam nostram uno simul conspectu videbimus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A10-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> What is seen in the Word is seen not successively, but at the same time. In proof whereof, we ourselves cannot know many
                     things all at once, forasmuch as understand many things by means of many ideas. But our intellect cannot be actually informed
                     by many diverse ideas at the same time, so as to understand by them; as one body cannot bear different shapes simultaneously.
                     Hence, when many things can be understood by one idea, they are understood at the same
                     time; as the parts of a whole are understood successively, and not all at the same time, if each one is understood by its
                     own idea; whereas if all are understood under the one idea of the whole, they are understood simultaneously. Now it was shown
                     above that things seen in God, are not seen singly by their own similitude; but all are seen by the one essence of God. Hence
                     they are seen simultaneously, and not successively.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 10 co."><a name="28759" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28759] Iª q. 12 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod ea quae videntur in verbo, non successive, sed simul videntur.
Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est, quod ideo nos simul non
possumus multa intelligere, quia multa per diversas species
intelligimus; diversis autem speciebus non potest intellectus unus
simul actu informari ad intelligendum per eas, sicut nec unum
corpus potest simul diversis figuris figurari. Unde contingit quod,
quando aliqua multa una specie intelligi possunt, simul
intelliguntur, sicut diversae partes alicuius totius, si singulae
propriis speciebus intelligantur, successive intelliguntur, et non
simul; si autem omnes intelligantur una specie totius, simul
intelliguntur. Ostensum est autem quod ea quae videntur in Deo, non
videntur singula per suas similitudines, sed omnia per unam
essentiam Dei. Unde simul, et non successive videntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A10-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We understand one thing only when we understand by one idea; but many things understood by one idea are understood simultaneously,
                     as in the idea of a man we understand "animal" and "rational"; and in the idea of a house we understand the wall and the roof.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="28760" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28760] Iª q. 12 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod sic unum tantum intelligimus, inquantum una specie
intelligimus. Sed multa una specie intellecta simul intelliguntur,
sicut in specie hominis intelligimus animal et rationale, et in
specie domus parietem et tectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A10-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As regards their natural knowledge, whereby they know things by diverse ideas given them, the angels do not know all things
                     simultaneously, and thus they are moved in the act of understanding according to time; but as regards what they see in God,
                     they see all at the same time.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="28761" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28761] Iª q. 12 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod Angeli, quantum ad cognitionem naturalem qua
cognoscunt res per species diversas eis inditas, non simul omnia
cognoscunt, et sic moventur, secundum intelligentiam, per tempus.
Sed secundum quod vident res in Deo, simul eas vident.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A11" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A11-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 11. Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that one can in this life see the Divine essence. For Jacob said: "I have seen God face to face" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A11-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.32.30" target="asv">Gn. 32:30</a>). But to see Him face to face is to see His essence, as appears from the words: "We see now in a glass and in a dark manner,
                     but then face to face" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A11-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:12</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="28762" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28762] Iª q. 12 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis in hac vita possit Deum per
essentiam videre. Dicit enim Iacob, Gen. XXXII, <i>vidi Deum facie
ad faciem</i>. Sed videre facie ad faciem, est videre per
essentiam, ut patet per illud quod dicitur I Cor. XIII, <i>videmus
nunc per speculum et in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem</i>.
Ergo Deus in hac vita per essentiam videri potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Lord said to Moses: "I speak to him mouth to mouth, and plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he see
                     the Lord" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A11-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Num.12.8" target="asv">Num. 12:8</a>); but this is to see God in His essence. Therefore it is possible to see the essence of God in this life.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="28763" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28763] Iª q. 12 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Num.
XII dicit dominus de Moyse, <i>ore ad os loquor ei, et palam, et
non per aenigmata et figuras, videt Deum</i>. Sed hoc est videre
Deum per essentiam. Ergo aliquis in statu huius vitae potest Deum
per essentiam videre.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that wherein we know all other things, and whereby we judge of other things, is known in itself to us. But even
                     now we know all things in God; for Augustine says (Confess. viii): "If we both see that what you say is true, and we both
                     see that what I say is true; where, I ask, do we see this? neither I in thee, nor thou in me; but both of us in the very incommutable
                     truth itself above our minds." He also says (De Vera Relig. xxx) that, "We judge of all
                     things according to the divine truth"; and (De Trin. xii) that, "it is the duty of reason to judge of these corporeal things
                     according to the incorporeal and eternal ideas; which unless they were above the mind could not be incommutable." Therefore
                     even in this life we see God Himself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 arg. 3"><a name="28764" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28764] Iª q. 12 a. 11 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
illud in quo alia omnia cognoscimus, et per quod de aliis
iudicamus, est nobis secundum se notum. Sed omnia etiam nunc in Deo
cognoscimus. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII Conf., <i>si ambo videmus
verum esse quod dicis, et ambo videmus verum esse quod dico, ubi
quaeso illud videmus? Nec ego in te, nec tu in me, sed ambo in ipsa
quae supra mentes nostras est, incommutabili veritate</i>. Idem
etiam, in libro de vera religione, dicit quod secundum veritatem
divinam de omnibus iudicamus. Et XII de Trin. dicit quod
<i>rationis est iudicare de istis corporalibus secundum rationes
incorporales et sempiternas, quae nisi supra mentem essent,
incommutabiles profecto non essent</i>. Ergo et in hac vita ipsum
Deum videmus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24, 25), those things that are in the soul by their essence are seen by
                     intellectual vision. But intellectual vision is of intelligible things, not by similitudes, but by their very essences, as
                     he also says (Gen. ad lit. xiii, 24,25). Therefore since God is in our soul by His essence, it follows that He is seen by
                     us in His essence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 arg. 4"><a name="28765" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28765] Iª q. 12 a. 11 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
secundum Augustinum, XII super Gen. ad Litt., visione intellectuali
videntur ea quae sunt in anima per suam essentiam. Sed visio
intellectualis est de rebus intelligibilibus, non per aliquas
similitudines, sed per suas essentias, ut ipse ibidem dicit. Ergo,
cum Deus sit per essentiam suam in anima nostra, per essentiam suam
videtur a nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "Man shall not see Me, and live" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A11-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.32.20" target="asv">Ex. 32:20</a>), and a gloss upon this says, "In this mortal life God can be seen by certain images, but not by the likeness itself of His
                     own nature."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 s. c."><a name="28766" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28766] Iª q. 12 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Exod. XXXIII, <i>non videbit me homo et vivet</i>.
Glossa, <i>quandiu hic mortaliter vivitur, videri per quasdam
imagines Deus potest; sed per ipsam naturae suae speciem non
potest</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human being, except he be separated from this mortal life. The reason is because,
                     as was said above
                     <a href="#FP_Q12_A4" id="FP_Q12_A11-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, the mode of knowledge follows the mode of the nature of the knower. But our soul, as long as we live in this life, has its
                     being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it knows only what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a form. Now
                     it is evident that the Divine essence
                     cannot be known through the nature of material things. For it was shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q12_A2" id="FP_Q12_A11-p7.2" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,9) that the knowledge of God by means of any created similitude is not the vision of His essence. Hence it is impossible
                     for the soul of man in this life to see the essence of God. This can be seen in the fact that the more our soul is abstracted
                     from corporeal things, the more it is capable of receiving abstract intelligible things. Hence in dreams and alienations of
                     the bodily senses
                     divine revelations and foresight of future events are perceived the more clearly. It is not possible, therefore, that the
                     soul in this mortal life should be raised up to the supreme of intelligible objects, i.e. to the divine essence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 co."><a name="28767" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28767] Iª q. 12 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod ab homine puro Deus videri per essentiam non potest, nisi ab
hac vita mortali separetur. Cuius ratio est quia, sicut supra
dictum est, modus cognitionis sequitur modum naturae rei
cognoscentis. Anima autem nostra, quandiu in hac vita vivimus,
habet esse in materia corporali, unde naturaliter non cognoscit
aliqua nisi quae habent formam in materia, vel quae per huiusmodi
cognosci possunt. Manifestum est autem quod per naturas rerum
materialium divina essentia cognosci non potest. Ostensum est enim
supra quod cognitio Dei per quamcumque similitudinem creatam, non
est visio essentiae ipsius. Unde impossibile est animae hominis
secundum hanc vitam viventis, essentiam Dei videre. Et huius signum
est, quod anima nostra, quanto magis a corporalibus abstrahitur,
tanto intelligibilium abstractorum fit capacior. Unde in somniis et
alienationibus a sensibus corporis, magis divinae revelationes
percipiuntur, et praevisiones futurorum. Quod ergo anima elevetur
usque ad supremum intelligibilium, quod est essentia divina, esse
non potest quandiu hac mortali vita utitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv) a man is said in the Scriptures to see God in the sense that certain figures are
                     formed in the senses or imagination, according to some similitude representing in part the divinity. So when Jacob says, "I
                     have seen God face to face," this does not mean the Divine essence, but some figure representing God. And this is to be referred
                     to some high mode of prophecy, so that God seems to speak, though in an imaginary
                     vision; as will later be explained (SS,
                     <a href="unknown.html#FP_Q174" id="FP_Q12_A11-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[174])</a> in treating of the degrees of prophecy. We may also say that Jacob spoke thus to designate some exalted intellectual contemplation,
                     above the ordinary state.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="28768" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28768] Iª q. 12 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, secundum Dionysium, IV cap. Cael. Hier., sic in
Scripturis dicitur aliquis Deum vidisse, inquantum formatae sunt
aliquae figurae, vel sensibiles vel imaginariae, secundum aliquam
similitudinem aliquod divinum repraesentantes. Quod ergo dicit
Iacob, vidi Deum facie ad faciem, referendum est, non ad ipsam
divinam essentiam, sed ad figuram in qua repraesentabatur Deus. Et
hoc ipsum ad quandam prophetiae eminentiam pertinet, ut videatur
persona Dei loquentis, licet imaginaria visione, ut infra patebit,
cum de gradibus prophetiae loquemur. Vel hoc dicit Iacob ad
designandam quandam eminentiam intelligibilis contemplationis,
supra communem statum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God works miracles in corporeal things, so also He does supernatural wonders above the common order, raising the minds
                     of some living in the flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to the vision of His own essence; as Augustine says (Gen. ad
                     lit. xii, 26,27,28) of Moses, the teacher of the Jews; and of Paul, the teacher of the Gentiles. This will be treated more
                     fully in the question of rapture (SS,
                     <a href="unknown.html#FP_Q175" id="FP_Q12_A11-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[175])</a>.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="28769" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28769] Iª q. 12 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, sicut Deus miraculose aliquid supernaturaliter in
rebus corporeis operatur, ita etiam et supernaturaliter, et praeter
communem ordinem, mentes aliquorum in hac carne viventium, sed non
sensibus carnis utentium, usque ad visionem suae essentiae
elevavit; ut dicit Augustinus, XII super Genes. ad Litt., et in
libro de videndo Deum de Moyse, qui fuit magister Iudaeorum, et
Paulo, qui fuit magister gentium. Et de hoc plenius tractabitur,
cum de raptu agemus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All things are said to be seen in God and all things are judged in Him, because by the participation of His light, we know
                     and judge all things; for the light of natural reason itself is a participation of the divine light; as likewise we are said
                     to see and judge of sensible things in the sun, i.e., by the sun's light. Hence Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 8), "The lessons
                     of instruction can only be seen as it were by their own sun," namely God. As
                     therefore in order to see a sensible object, it is not necessary to see the substance of the sun, so in like manner to see
                     any intelligible object, it is not necessary to see the essence of God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 ad 3"><a name="28770" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28770] Iª q. 12 a. 11 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod omnia dicimur in Deo videre, et secundum ipsum de
omnibus iudicare, inquantum per participationem sui luminis omnia
cognoscimus et diiudicamus, nam et ipsum lumen naturale rationis
participatio quaedam est divini luminis; sicut etiam omnia
sensibilia dicimus videre et iudicare in sole, idest per lumen
solis. Unde dicit Augustinus, I Soliloquiorum, <i>disciplinarum
spectamina videri non possunt, nisi aliquo velut suo sole
illustrentur, videlicet Deo</i>. Sicut ergo ad videndum aliquid
sensibiliter, non est necesse quod videatur substantia solis, ita
ad videndum aliquid intelligibiliter, non est necessarium quod
videatur essentia Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Intellectual vision is of the things which are in the soul by their essence, as intelligible things are in the intellect.
                     And thus God is in the souls of the blessed; not thus is He in our soul, but by presence, essence and power.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 ad 4"><a name="28771" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28771] Iª q. 12 a. 11 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod visio intellectualis est eorum quae sunt in anima per
suam essentiam sicut intelligibilia in intellectu. Sic autem Deus
est in anima beatorum, non autem in anima nostra; sed per
praesentiam, essentiam, et potentiam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A12" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A12-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 12. Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A12-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that by natural reason we cannot know God in this life. For Boethius says (De Consol. v) that "reason does not grasp
                     simple form." But God is a supremely simple form, as was shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A7" id="FP_Q12_A12-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[7]</a> ). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="28772" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28772] Iª q. 12 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod per naturalem rationem Deum in hac
vita cognoscere non possimus. Dicit enim Boetius, in libro de
Consol., quod <i>ratio non capit simplicem formam</i>. Deus autem
maxime est simplex forma, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo ad eius
cognitionem ratio naturalis pervenire non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A12-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the soul understands nothing by natural reason without the use of the imagination. But we cannot have an imagination
                     of God, Who is incorporeal. Therefore we cannot know God by natural knowledge.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 12 arg. 2"><a name="28773" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28773] Iª q. 12 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
ratione naturali sine phantasmate nihil intelligit anima, ut
dicitur in III de anima. Sed Dei, cum sit incorporeus, phantasma in
nobis esse non potest. Ergo cognosci non potest a nobis cognitione
naturali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A12-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of natural reason belongs to both good and evil, inasmuch as they have a common nature. But the knowledge
                     of God belongs only to the good; for Augustine says (De Trin. i): "The weak eye of the human mind is not fixed on that excellent
                     light unless purified by the justice of faith." Therefore God cannot be known by natural reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="28774" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28774] Iª q. 12 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
cognitio quae est per rationem naturalem, communis est bonis et
malis, sicut natura eis communis est. Sed cognitio Dei competit
tantum bonis, dicit enim Augustinus, I de Trin., quod <i>mentis
humanae acies in tam excellenti luce non figitur, nisi per
iustitiam fidei emundetur</i>. Ergo Deus per rationem naturalem
cognosci non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A12-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A12-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.19" target="asv">Rom. 1:19</a>), "That which is known of God," namely, what can be known of God by natural reason, "is manifest in them."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 12 s. c."><a name="28775" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28775] Iª q. 12 a. 12 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Rom. I, <i>quod notum est Dei, manifestum est in
illis</i>, idest, quod cognoscibile est de Deo per rationem
naturalem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q12_A12-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things. But
                     our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of God; because the sensible effects of God do not equal the
                     power of God as their cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole power of God cannot be known; nor therefore
                     can His essence be seen. But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we
                     can be led from them so far as to know of God "whether He exists," and to know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him,
                     as the first cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by Him.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q12_A12-p7"> Hence we know that His relationship with creatures so far as to be the cause of them all; also that creatures differ from
                     Him, inasmuch as He is not in any way part of what is caused by Him; and that creatures are not removed from Him by reason
                     of any defect on His part, but because He superexceeds them all.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 12 co."><a name="28776" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28776] Iª q. 12 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod naturalis nostra cognitio a sensu principium sumit, unde
tantum se nostra naturalis cognitio extendere potest, inquantum
manuduci potest per sensibilia. Ex sensibilibus autem non potest
usque ad hoc intellectus noster pertingere, quod divinam essentiam
videat, quia creaturae sensibiles sunt effectus Dei virtutem causae
non adaequantes. Unde ex sensibilium cognitione non potest tota Dei
virtus cognosci, et per consequens nec eius essentia videri. Sed
quia sunt eius effectus a causa dependentes, ex eis in hoc perduci
possumus, ut cognoscamus de Deo an est; et ut cognoscamus de ipso
ea quae necesse est ei convenire secundum quod est prima omnium
causa, excedens omnia sua causata. Unde cognoscimus de ipso
habitudinem ipsius ad creaturas, quod scilicet omnium est causa; et
differentiam creaturarum ab ipso, quod scilicet ipse non est
aliquid eorum quae ab eo causantur; et quod haec non removentur ab
eo propter eius defectum, sed quia superexcedit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A12-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reason cannot reach up to simple form, so as to know "what it is"; but it can know "whether it is."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="28777" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28777] Iª q. 12 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod ratio ad formam simplicem pertingere non potest, ut
sciat de ea quid est, potest tamen de ea cognoscere, ut sciat an
est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A12-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is known by natural knowledge through the images of His effects.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 12 ad 2"><a name="28778" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28778] Iª q. 12 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod Deus naturali cognitione cognoscitur per phantasmata
effectus sui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A12-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the knowledge of God's essence is by grace, it belongs only to the good; but the knowledge of Him by natural reason can
                     belong to both good and bad; and hence Augustine says (Retract. i), retracting what he had said before: "I do not approve
                     what I said in prayer, 'God who willest that only the pure should know truth.' For it can be answered that many who are not
                     pure can know many truths," i.e. by natural reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 12 ad 3"><a name="28779" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28779] Iª q. 12 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod cognitio Dei per essentiam, cum sit per gratiam, non
competit nisi bonis, sed cognitio eius quae est per rationem
naturalem, potest competere bonis et malis. Unde dicit Augustinus,
in libro Retractationum, <i>non approbo quod in oratione dixi,
Deus, qui non nisi mundos verum scire voluisti, responderi enim
potest, multos etiam non mundos multa scire vera</i>, scilicet per
rationem naturalem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A13" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A13-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 13. Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than by natural reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A13-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that by grace a higher knowledge of God is not obtained than by natural reason. For Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol.
                     i) that whoever is the more united to God in this life, is united to Him as to one entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses,
                     who nevertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge conferred by grace. But to be united to God while ignoring
                     of Him "what He is," comes about also by natural reason. Therefore God is not more
                     known to us by grace than by natural reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 13 arg. 1"><a name="28780" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28780] Iª q. 12 a. 13 arg. 1</span></a> Ad
decimumtertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod per gratiam non
habeatur altior cognitio Dei, quam ea quae habetur per naturalem
rationem. Dicit enim Dionysius, in libro de mystica theologia, quod
ille qui melius unitur Deo in hac vita, unitur ei sicut omnino
ignoto, quod etiam de Moyse dicit, qui tamen excellentiam quandam
obtinuit in gratiae cognitione. Sed coniungi Deo ignorando de eo
quid est, hoc contingit etiam per rationem naturalem. Ergo per
gratiam non plenius cognoscitur a nobis Deus, quam per rationem
naturalem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A13-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we can acquire the knowledge of divine things by natural reason only through the imagination; and the same applies
                     to the knowledge given by grace. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that "it is impossible for the divine ray to shine upon
                     us except as screened round about by the many colored sacred veils." Therefore we cannot know God more fully by grace than
                     by natural reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 13 arg. 2"><a name="28781" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28781] Iª q. 12 a. 13 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, per
rationem naturalem in cognitionem divinorum pervenire non possumus,
nisi per phantasmata, sic etiam nec secundum cognitionem gratiae.
Dicit enim Dionysius, I cap. de Cael. Hier., quod <i>impossibile
est nobis aliter lucere divinum radium, nisi varietate sacrorum
velaminum circumvelatum</i>. Ergo per gratiam non plenius
cognoscimus Deum, quam per rationem naturalem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A13-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, our intellect adheres to God by grace of faith. But faith does not seem to be knowledge; for Gregory says (Hom.
                     xxvi in Ev.) that "things not seen are the objects of faith, and not of knowledge." Therefore there is not given to us a more
                     excellent knowledge of God by grace.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 13 arg. 3"><a name="28782" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28782] Iª q. 12 a. 13 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
intellectus noster per gratiam fidei Deo adhaeret. Fides autem non
videtur esse cognitio, dicit enim Gregorius, in Homil., quod ea
quae non videntur fidem habent, et non agnitionem. Ergo per gratiam
non additur nobis aliqua excellentior cognitio de Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A13-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says that "God hath revealed to us His spirit," what "none of the princes of this world knew" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A13-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:10</a>), namely, the philosophers, as the gloss expounds.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 13 s. c."><a name="28783" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28783] Iª q. 12 a. 13 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit apostolus, I Cor. II, <i>nobis revelavit Deus per
spiritum suum</i>, illa scilicet quae nemo principum huius saeculi
novit, idest philosophorum, ut exponit Glossa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q12_A13-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> We have a more perfect knowledge of God by grace than by natural reason. Which is proved thus. The knowledge which we have
                     by natural reason contains two things: images derived from the sensible objects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling
                     us to abstract from them intelligible conceptions.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q12_A13-p7"> Now in both of these, human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of grace. For the intellect's natural light is strengthened
                     by the infusion of gratuitous light; and sometimes also the images in the human imagination are divinely formed, so as to
                     express divine things better than those do which we receive from sensible objects, as appears in prophetic visions; while
                     sometimes sensible things, or even voices, are divinely formed to express some divine meaning; as in the
                     Baptism, the Holy Ghost was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice of the Father was heard, "This is My beloved Son" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A13-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.3.17" target="asv">Mat. 3:17</a>).
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 13 co."><a name="28784" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28784] Iª q. 12 a. 13 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod per gratiam perfectior cognitio de Deo habetur a nobis, quam
per rationem naturalem. Quod sic patet. Cognitio enim quam per
naturalem rationem habemus, duo requirit, scilicet, phantasmata ex
sensibilibus accepta, et lumen naturale intelligibile, cuius
virtute intelligibiles conceptiones ab eis abstrahimus. Et quantum
ad utrumque, iuvatur humana cognitio per revelationem gratiae. Nam
et lumen naturale intellectus confortatur per infusionem luminis
gratuiti. Et interdum etiam phantasmata in imaginatione hominis
formantur divinitus, magis exprimentia res divinas, quam ea quae
naturaliter a sensibilibus accipimus; sicut apparet in visionibus
prophetalibus. Et interdum etiam aliquae res sensibiles formantur
divinitus, aut etiam voces, ad aliquid divinum exprimendum; sicut
in Baptismo visus est spiritus sanctus in specie columbae, et vox
patris audita est, <i>hic est filius meus dilectus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A13-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although by the revelation of grace in this life we cannot know of God "what He is," and thus are united to Him as to one
                     unknown; still we know Him more fully according as many and more excellent of His effects are demonstrated to us, and according
                     as we attribute to Him some things known by divine revelation, to which natural reason cannot reach, as, for instance, that
                     God is Three and One.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 13 ad 1"><a name="28785" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28785] Iª q. 12 a. 13 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, licet per revelationem gratiae in hac vita non
cognoscamus de Deo quid est, et sic ei quasi ignoto coniungamur;
tamen plenius ipsum cognoscimus, inquantum plures et excellentiores
effectus eius nobis demonstrantur; et inquantum ei aliqua
attribuimus ex revelatione divina, ad quae ratio naturalis non
pertingit, ut Deum esse trinum et unum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A13-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the images either received from sense in the natural order, or divinely formed in the imagination, we have so much the
                     more excellent intellectual knowledge, the stronger the intelligible light is in man; and thus through the revelation given
                     by the images a fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of the divine light.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 13 ad 2"><a name="28786" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28786] Iª q. 12 a. 13 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ex phantasmatibus, vel a sensu acceptis secundum
naturalem ordinem, vel divinitus in imaginatione formatis, tanto
excellentior cognitio intellectualis habetur, quanto lumen
intelligibile in homine fortius fuerit. Et sic per revelationem ex
phantasmatibus plenior cognitio accipitur, ex infusione divini
luminis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A13-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Faith is a kind of knowledge, inasmuch as the intellect is determined by faith to some knowable object. But this determination
                     to one object does not proceed from the vision of the believer, but from the vision of Him who is believed. Thus as far as
                     faith falls short of vision, it falls short of the knowledge which belongs to science, for science determines the intellect
                     to one object by the vision and understanding of first principles.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 13 ad 3"><a name="28787" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28787] Iª q. 12 a. 13 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod fides cognitio quaedam est, inquantum intellectus
determinatur per fidem ad aliquod cognoscibile. Sed haec
determinatio ad unum non procedit ex visione credentis, sed a
visione eius cui creditur. Et sic, inquantum deest visio, deficit a
ratione cognitionis quae est in scientia, nam scientia determinat
intellectum ad unum per visionem et intellectum primorum
principiorum.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q13" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q13-p0.1">Q. 13. THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q13-p2"> After the consideration of those things which belong to the divine knowledge, we now proceed to the consideration of the
                  divine names. For everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it.
               </p><p id="FP_Q13-p3"> Under this head, there are twelve points for inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q13-p4"><a href="#FP_Q13_A1"> (1) Whether God can be named by us?</a></p><p id="FP_Q13-p5"><a href="#FP_Q13_A2"> (2) Whether any names applied to God are predicated of Him substantially?</a></p><p id="FP_Q13-p6"><a href="#FP_Q13_A3"> (3) Whether any names applied to God are said of Him literally, or are all to be taken metaphorically?</a></p><p id="FP_Q13-p7"><a href="#FP_Q13_A4"> (4) Whether any names applied to God are synonymous?</a></p><p id="FP_Q13-p8"><a href="#FP_Q13_A5"> (5) Whether some names are applied to God and to creatures univocally or equivocally?</a></p><p id="FP_Q13-p9"><a href="#FP_Q13_A6"> (6) Whether, supposing they are applied analogically, they are applied first to God or to creatures?</a></p><p id="FP_Q13-p10"><a href="#FP_Q13_A7"> (7) Whether any names are applicable to God from time?</a></p><p id="FP_Q13-p11"><a href="#FP_Q13_A8"> (8) Whether this name "God" is a name of nature, or of the operation?</a></p><p id="FP_Q13-p12"><a href="#FP_Q13_A9"> (9) Whether this name "God" is a communicable name?</a></p><p id="FP_Q13-p13"><a href="#FP_Q13_A10"> (10) Whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as signifying God, by nature, by participation, and by opinion?</a></p><p id="FP_Q13-p14"><a href="#FP_Q13_A11"> (11) Whether this name, "Who is," is the supremely appropriate name of God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q13-p15"><a href="#FP_Q13_A12"> (12) Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 pr."><a name="28788" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28788]
Iª q. 13 pr.</span></a> Consideratis his quae ad divinam
cognitionem pertinent, procedendum est ad considerationem divinorum
nominum, unumquodque enim nominatur a nobis, secundum quod ipsum
cognoscimus. Circa hoc ergo quaeruntur duodecim. Primo, utrum Deus
sit nominabilis a nobis. Secundo, utrum aliqua nomina dicta de Deo,
praedicentur de ipso substantialiter. Tertio, utrum aliqua nomina
dicta de Deo, proprie dicantur de ipso; an omnia attribuantur ei
metaphorice. Quarto, utrum multa nomina dicta de Deo, sint
synonyma. Quinto, utrum nomina aliqua dicantur de Deo et creaturis
univoce, vel aequivoce. Sexto, supposito quod dicantur analogice,
utrum dicantur de Deo per prius, vel de creaturis. Septimo, utrum
aliqua nomina dicantur de Deo ex tempore. Octavo, utrum hoc nomen
Deus sit nomen naturae, vel operationis. Nono, utrum hoc nomen Deus
sit nomen communicabile. Decimo, utrum accipiatur univoce vel
aequivoce, secundum quod significat Deum per naturam, et per
participationem, et secundum opinionem. Undecimo, utrum hoc nomen
qui est sit maxime proprium nomen Dei. Duodecimo, utrum
propositiones affirmativae possint formari de Deo.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q13_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A1-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 1. Whether a name can be given to God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no name can be given to God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that, "Of Him there is neither name, nor can
                     one be found of Him;" and it is written: "What is His name, and what is the name of His Son, if thou knowest?" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.30.4" target="asv">Prov. 30:4</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28789" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28789] Iª q. 13 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod nullum nomen Deo conveniat. Dicit enim
Dionysius, I cap. de Div. Nom., quod neque nomen eius est, neque
opinio. Et Prov. XXX dicitur, <i>quod nomen eius, et quod nomen
filii eius, si nosti?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every name is either abstract or concrete. But concrete names do not belong to God, since He is simple, nor do abstract
                     names belong to Him, forasmuch as they do not signify any perfect subsisting thing. Therefore no name can be said of God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28790" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28790] Iª q. 13 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
nomen aut dicitur in abstracto, aut in concreto. Sed nomina
significantia in concreto, non competunt Deo, cum simplex sit,
neque nomina significantia in abstracto, quia non significant
aliquid perfectum subsistens. Ergo nullum nomen potest dici de
Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nouns are taken to signify substance with quality; verbs and participles signify substance with time; pronouns the
                     same with demonstration or relation. But none of these can be applied to God, for He has no quality, nor accident, nor time;
                     moreover, He cannot be felt, so as to be pointed out; nor can He be described by relation, inasmuch as relations serve to
                     recall a thing mentioned before by nouns, participles, or demonstrative pronouns. Therefore
                     God cannot in any way be named by us.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28791" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28791] Iª q. 13 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
nomina significant substantiam cum qualitate; verba autem et
participia significant cum tempore; pronomina autem cum
demonstratione vel relatione. Quorum nihil competit Deo, quia sine
qualitate est et sine omni accidente, et sine tempore; et sentiri
non potest, ut demonstrari possit; nec relative significari, cum
relativa sint aliquorum antedictorum recordativa, vel nominum, vel
participiorum, vel pronominum demonstrativorum. Ergo Deus nullo
modo potest nominari a nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.15.3" target="asv">Ex. 15:3</a>): "The Lord is a man of war, Almighty is His name."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28792" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28792] Iª q. 13 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Exod. XV, <i>dominus quasi vir pugnator, omnipotens
nomen eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), words are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is evident
                     that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore
                     that we can give a name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now it was shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q12_A11" id="FP_Q13_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[12], AA[11]</a>,12) that in this life we cannot see the essence of God; but we know God
                     from creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way therefore He can be named by us
                     from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus the name "man" expresses
                     the essence of man in himself, since it signifies the definition of man by manifesting his essence; for the idea expressed
                     by the name is the definition.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 1 co."><a name="28793" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28793] Iª q. 13 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, secundum philosophum, voces sunt signa intellectuum, et
intellectus sunt rerum similitudines. Et sic patet quod voces
referuntur ad res significandas, mediante conceptione intellectus.
Secundum igitur quod aliquid a nobis intellectu cognosci potest,
sic a nobis potest nominari. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus in
hac vita non potest a nobis videri per suam essentiam; sed
cognoscitur a nobis ex creaturis, secundum habitudinem principii,
et per modum excellentiae et remotionis. Sic igitur potest nominari
a nobis ex creaturis, non tamen ita quod nomen significans ipsum,
exprimat divinam essentiam secundum quod est, sicut hoc nomen homo
exprimit sua significatione essentiam hominis secundum quod est,
significat enim eius definitionem, declarantem eius essentiam;
ratio enim quam significat nomen, est definitio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The reason why God has no name, or is said to be above being named, is because His essence is above all that we understand
                     about God, and signify in word.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28794" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28794] Iª q. 13 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod ea ratione dicitur Deus non habere nomen, vel esse
supra nominationem, quia essentia eius est supra id quod de Deo
intelligimus et voce significamus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because we know and name God from creatures, the names we attribute to God signify what belongs to material creatures, of
                     which the knowledge is natural to us. And because in creatures of this kind what is perfect and subsistent is compound; whereas
                     their form is not a complete subsisting thing, but rather is that whereby a thing is; hence it follows that all names used
                     by us to signify a complete subsisting thing must have a concrete meaning as
                     applicable to compound things; whereas names given to signify simple forms, signify a thing not as subsisting, but as that
                     whereby a thing is; as, for instance, whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white. And as God is simple, and subsisting,
                     we attribute to Him abstract names to signify His simplicity, and concrete names to signify His substance and perfection,
                     although both these kinds of names fail to express His mode of being, forasmuch as our intellect does not know Him in this
                     life
                     as He is.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28795" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28795] Iª q. 13 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, quia ex creaturis in Dei cognitionem venimus, et ex
ipsis eum nominamus, nomina quae Deo attribuimus, hoc modo
significant, secundum quod competit creaturis materialibus, quarum
cognitio est nobis connaturalis, ut supra dictum est. Et quia in
huiusmodi creaturis, ea quae sunt perfecta et subsistentia sunt
composita; forma autem in eis non est aliquid completum subsistens,
sed magis quo aliquid est, inde est quod omnia nomina a nobis
imposita ad significandum aliquid completum subsistens, significant
in concretione, prout competit compositis; quae autem imponuntur ad
significandas formas simplices, significant aliquid non ut
subsistens, sed ut quo aliquid est, sicut albedo significat ut quo
aliquid est album. Quia igitur et Deus simplex est, et subsistens
est, attribuimus ei et nomina abstracta, ad significandam
simplicitatem eius; et nomina concreta, ad significandum
subsistentiam et perfectionem ipsius, quamvis utraque nomina
deficiant a modo ipsius, sicut intellectus noster non cognoscit eum
ut est, secundum hanc vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To signify substance with quality is to signify the "suppositum" with a nature or determined form in which it subsists. Hence,
                     as some things are said of God in a concrete sense, to signify His subsistence and perfection, so likewise nouns are applied
                     to God signifying substance with quality. Further, verbs and participles which signify time, are applied to Him because His
                     eternity includes all time. For as we can apprehend and signify simple
                     subsistences only by way of compound things, so we can understand and express simple eternity only by way of temporal things,
                     because our intellect has a natural affinity to compound and temporal things. But demonstrative pronouns are applied to God
                     as describing what is understood, not what is sensed. For we can only describe Him as far as we understand Him. Thus, according
                     as nouns, participles and demonstrative pronouns are applicable to God, so far can He be signified by relative
                     pronouns.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28796" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28796] Iª q. 13 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod significare substantiam cum qualitate, est
significare suppositum cum natura vel forma determinata in qua
subsistit. Unde, sicut de Deo dicuntur aliqua in concretione, ad
significandum subsistentiam et perfectionem ipsius, sicut iam
dictum est, ita dicuntur de Deo nomina significantia substantiam
cum qualitate. Verba vero et participia consignificantia tempus
dicuntur de ipso, ex eo quod aeternitas includit omne tempus, sicut
enim simplicia subsistentia non possumus apprehendere et
significare nisi per modum compositorum, ita simplicem aeternitatem
non possumus intelligere vel voce exprimere, nisi per modum
temporalium rerum; et hoc propter connaturalitatem intellectus
nostri ad res compositas et temporales. Pronomina vero
demonstrativa dicuntur de Deo, secundum quod faciunt
demonstrationem ad id quod intelligitur, non ad id quod sentitur,
secundum enim quod a nobis intelligitur, secundum hoc sub
demonstratione cadit. Et sic, secundum illum modum quo nomina et
participia et pronomina demonstrativa de Deo dicuntur, secundum hoc
et pronominibus relativis significari potest.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A2-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 2. Whether any name can be applied to God substantially?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no name can be applied to God substantially. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 9): "Everything said of God
                     signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what He is not; or expresses some relation, or something following from
                     His nature or operation."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28797" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28797] Iª q. 13 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod nullum nomen dicatur de Deo
substantialiter. Dicit enim Damascenus, <i>oportet singulum eorum
quae de Deo dicuntur, non quid est secundum substantiam
significare, sed quid non est ostendere, aut habitudinem quandam,
aut aliquid eorum quae assequuntur naturam vel operationem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "You will find a chorus of holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly
                     and praiseworthily the divine processions in the denomination of God." Thus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising
                     God are distinguished according to the divine processions themselves. But what expresses the procession of anything, does
                     not signify its essence. Therefore the names applied to God are not said of Him
                     substantially.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28798" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28798] Iª q. 13 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, dicit
Dionysius, I cap. de Div. Nom., <i>omnem sanctorum theologorum
hymnum invenies, ad bonos thearchiae processus, manifestative et
laudative Dei nominationes dividentem</i>, et est sensus, quod
nomina quae in divinam laudem sancti doctores assumunt, secundum
processus ipsius Dei distinguuntur. Sed quod significat processum
alicuius rei, nihil significat ad eius essentiam pertinens. Ergo
nomina dicta de Deo, non dicuntur de ipso substantialiter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing is named by us according as we understand it. But God is not understood by us in this life in His substance.
                     Therefore neither is any name we can use applied substantially to God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28799" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28799] Iª q. 13 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
secundum hoc nominatur aliquid a nobis, secundum quod intelligitur.
Sed non intelligitur Deus a nobis in hac vita secundum suam
substantiam. Ergo nec aliquod nomen impositum a nobis, dicitur de
Deo secundum suam substantiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi): "The being of God is the being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say of that
                     simplicity whereby His substance is signified." Therefore all names of this kind signify the divine substance.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28800" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28800] Iª q. 13 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Augustinus, VI de Trin., <i>Deo hoc est esse, quod
fortem esse vel sapientem esse, et si quid de illa simplicitate
dixeris, quo eius substantia significatur</i>. Ergo omnia nomina
huiusmodi significant divinam substantiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Negative names applied to God, or signifying His relation to creatures manifestly do not at all signify His substance, but
                     rather express the distance of the creature from Him, or His relation to something else, or rather, the relation of creatures
                     to Himself.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q13_A2-p7"> But as regards absolute and affirmative names of God, as "good," "wise," and the like, various and many opinions have been
                     given. For some have said that all such names, although they are applied to God affirmatively, nevertheless have been brought
                     into use more to express some remotion from God, rather than to express anything that exists positively in Him. Hence they
                     assert that when we say that God lives, we mean that God is not like an inanimate thing; and the same in like
                     manner applies to other names; and this was taught by Rabbi Moses. Others say that these names applied to God signify His
                     relationship towards creatures: thus in the words, "God is good," we mean, God is the cause of goodness in things; and the
                     same rule applies to other names.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q13_A2-p8"> Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue for three reasons. First because in neither of them can a reason be assigned
                     why some names more than others are applied to God. For He is assuredly the cause of bodies in the same way as He is the cause
                     of good things; therefore if the words "God is good," signified no more than, "God is the cause of good things," it might
                     in like manner be said that God is a body, inasmuch as He is the cause of bodies. So also to say that He
                     is a body implies that He is not a mere potentiality, as is primary matter. Secondly, because it would follow that all names
                     applied to God would be said of Him by way of being taken in a secondary sense, as healthy is secondarily said of medicine,
                     forasmuch as it signifies only the cause of the health in the animal which primarily is called healthy. Thirdly, because this
                     is against the intention of those who speak of God. For in saying that God lives, they assuredly mean more than to say the
                     He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from inanimate bodies.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q13_A2-p9"> Therefore we must hold a different doctrine---viz. that these names signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially
                     of God, although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is proved thus. For these names express God, so far
                     as our intellects know Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him.
                     Now it is shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q4_A2" id="FP_Q13_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that God prepossesses in Himself all the
                     perfections of creatures, being Himself simply and universally perfect. Hence every creature represents Him, and is like Him
                     so far as it possesses some perfection; yet it represents Him not as something of the same species or genus, but as the excelling
                     principle of whose form the effects fall short, although they derive some kind of likeness thereto, even as the forms of inferior
                     bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q4_A3" id="FP_Q13_A2-p9.2" shape="rect">Q[4], A[3]</a>), in treating
                     of the divine perfection. Therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as
                     creatures represent it imperfectly. So when we say, "God is good," the meaning is not, "God is the cause of goodness," or
                     "God is not evil"; but the meaning is, "Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God," and in a more excellent
                     and higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is good, because He causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He causes
                     goodness in things because He is good; according to what Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because He is good, we
                     are."
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 2 co."><a name="28801" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28801] Iª q. 13 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod de nominibus quae de Deo dicuntur negative, vel quae
relationem ipsius ad creaturam significant, manifestum est quod
substantiam eius nullo modo significant; sed remotionem alicuius ab
ipso, vel relationem eius ad alium, vel potius alicuius ad ipsum.
Sed de nominibus quae absolute et affirmative de Deo dicuntur,
sicut bonus, sapiens, et huiusmodi, multipliciter aliqui sunt
opinati. Quidam enim dixerunt quod haec omnia nomina, licet
affirmative de Deo dicantur, tamen magis inventa sunt ad aliquid
removendum a Deo, quam ad aliquid ponendum in ipso. Unde dicunt
quod, cum dicimus Deum esse viventem, significamus quod Deus non
hoc modo est, sicut res inanimatae, et similiter accipiendum est in
aliis. Et hoc posuit Rabbi Moyses. Alii vero dicunt quod haec
nomina imposita sunt ad significandum habitudinem eius ad creata,
ut, cum dicimus Deus est bonus, sit sensus, Deus est causa
bonitatis in rebus. Et eadem ratio est in aliis. Sed utrumque
istorum videtur esse inconveniens, propter tria. Primo quidem, quia
secundum neutram harum positionum posset assignari ratio quare
quaedam nomina magis de Deo dicerentur quam alia. Sic enim est
causa corporum, sicut est causa bonorum, unde, si nihil aliud
significatur, cum dicitur Deus est bonus, nisi Deus est causa
bonorum, poterit similiter dici quod Deus est corpus, quia est
causa corporum. Item, per hoc quod dicitur quod est corpus,
removetur quod non sit ens in potentia tantum, sicut materia prima.
Secundo, quia sequeretur quod omnia nomina dicta de Deo, per
posterius dicerentur de ipso, sicut sanum per posterius dicitur de
medicina, eo quod significat hoc tantum quod sit causa sanitatis in
animali, quod per prius dicitur sanum. Tertio, quia hoc est contra
intentionem loquentium de Deo. Aliud enim intendunt dicere, cum
dicunt Deum viventem, quam quod sit causa vitae nostrae, vel quod
differat a corporibus inanimatis. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod
huiusmodi quidem nomina significant substantiam divinam, et
praedicantur de Deo substantialiter, sed deficiunt a
repraesentatione ipsius. Quod sic patet. Significant enim sic
nomina Deum, secundum quod intellectus noster cognoscit ipsum.
Intellectus autem noster, cum cognoscat Deum ex creaturis, sic
cognoscit ipsum, secundum quod creaturae ipsum repraesentant.
Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus in se praehabet omnes
perfectiones creaturarum, quasi simpliciter et universaliter
perfectus. Unde quaelibet creatura intantum eum repraesentat, et
est ei similis, inquantum perfectionem aliquam habet, non tamen ita
quod repraesentet eum sicut aliquid eiusdem speciei vel generis,
sed sicut excellens principium, a cuius forma effectus deficiunt,
cuius tamen aliqualem similitudinem effectus consequuntur; sicut
formae corporum inferiorum repraesentant virtutem solarem. Et hoc
supra expositum est, cum de perfectione divina agebatur. Sic igitur
praedicta nomina divinam substantiam significant, imperfecte tamen,
sicut et creaturae imperfecte eam repraesentant. Cum igitur dicitur
Deus est bonus, non est sensus, Deus est causa bonitatis, vel Deus
non est malus, sed est sensus, id quod bonitatem dicimus in
creaturis, praeexistit in Deo, et hoc quidem secundum modum
altiorem. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod Deo competat esse bonum
inquantum causat bonitatem, sed potius e converso, quia est bonus,
bonitatem rebus diffundit, secundum illud Augustini, de Doct.
Christ., <i>inquantum bonus est, sumus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Damascene says that these names do not signify what God is, forasmuch as by none of these names is perfectly expressed what
                     He is; but each one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent Him imperfectly.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28802" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28802] Iª q. 13 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Damascenus ideo dicit quod haec nomina non
significant quid est Deus, quia a nullo istorum nominum exprimitur
quid est Deus perfecte, sed unumquodque imperfecte eum significat,
sicut et creaturae imperfecte eum repraesentant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the significance of names, that from which the name is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to signify,
                     as for instance, this name "stone" [lapis] is imposed from the fact that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem], but it is not imposed
                     to signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a certain kind of body; otherwise everything that hurts the foot
                     would be a stone [*This refers to the Latin etymology of the word "lapis"
                     which has no place in English]. So we must say that these kinds of divine names are imposed from the divine processions; for
                     as according to the diverse processions of their perfections, creatures are the representations of God, although in an imperfect
                     manner; so likewise our intellect knows and names God according to each kind of procession; but nevertheless these names are
                     not imposed to signify the procession themselves, as if when we say "God lives," the sense were, "life proceeds from
                     Him"; but to signify the principle itself of things, in so far as life pre-exists in Him, although it pre-exists in Him in
                     a more eminent way than can be understood or signified.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28803" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28803] Iª q. 13 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod in significatione nominum, aliud est quandoque a quo
imponitur nomen ad significandum, et id ad quod significandum nomen
imponitur, sicut hoc nomen lapis imponitur ab eo quod laedit pedem,
non tamen imponitur ad hoc significandum quod significet laedens
pedem, sed ad significandam quandam speciem corporum; alioquin omne
laedens pedem esset lapis. Sic igitur dicendum est quod huiusmodi
divina nomina imponuntur quidem a processibus deitatis, sicut enim
secundum diversos processus perfectionum, creaturae Deum
repraesentant, licet imperfecte; ita intellectus noster, secundum
unumquemque processum, Deum cognoscit et nominat. Sed tamen haec
nomina non imponit ad significandum ipsos processus, ut, cum
dicitur Deus est vivens, sit sensus, ab eo procedit vita, sed ad
significandum ipsum rerum principium, prout in eo praeexistit vita,
licet eminentiori modo quam intelligatur vel significetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A2-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We cannot know the essence of God in this life, as He really is in Himself; but we know Him accordingly as He is represented
                     in the perfections of creatures; and thus the names imposed by us signify Him in that manner only.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28804" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28804] Iª q. 13 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod essentiam Dei in hac vita cognoscere non possumus
secundum quod in se est, sed cognoscimus eam secundum quod
repraesentatur in perfectionibus creaturarum. Et sic nomina a nobis
imposita eam significant.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A3-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 3. Whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no name is applied literally to God. For all names which we apply to God are taken from creatures; as was explained
                     above
                     <a href="#FP_Q13_A1" id="FP_Q13_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But the names of creatures are applied to God metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the like. Therefore
                     names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28805" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28805] Iª q. 13 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod nullum nomen dicatur de Deo proprie. Omnia
enim nomina quae de Deo dicimus, sunt a creaturis accepta, ut
dictum est. Sed nomina creaturarum metaphorice dicuntur de Deo,
sicut cum dicitur Deus est lapis, vel leo, vel aliquid huiusmodi.
Ergo omnia nomina dicta de Deo, dicuntur metaphorice.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no name can be applied literally to anything if it should be withheld from it rather than given to it. But all such
                     names as "good," "wise," and the like are more truly withheld from God than given to Him; as appears from Dionysius says (Coel.
                     Hier. ii). Therefore none of these names belong to God in their literal sense.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28806" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28806] Iª q. 13 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
nullum nomen proprie dicitur de aliquo, a quo verius removetur quam
de eo praedicetur. Sed omnia huiusmodi nomina, bonus sapiens, et
similia, verius removentur a Deo quam de eo praedicentur, ut patet
per Dionysium, II cap. Cael. Hier. Ergo nullum istorum nominum
proprie dicitur de Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, corporeal names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense only; since He is incorporeal. But all such names imply
                     some kind of corporeal condition; for their meaning is bound up with time and composition and like corporeal conditions. Therefore
                     all these names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28807" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28807] Iª q. 13 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
nomina corporum non dicuntur de Deo nisi metaphorice, cum sit
incorporeus. Sed omnia huiusmodi nomina implicant quasdam
corporales conditiones, significant enim cum tempore, et cum
compositione, et cum aliis huiusmodi, quae sunt conditiones
corporum. Ergo omnia huiusmodi nomina dicuntur de Deo
metaphorice.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii), "Some names there are which express evidently the property of the divinity, and some which express
                     the clear truth of the divine majesty, but others there are which are applied to God metaphorically by way of similitude."
                     Therefore not all names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense, but there are some which are said of Him in their literal
                     sense.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28808" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28808] Iª q. 13 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Ambrosius, in Lib. II de fide, <i>sunt quaedam nomina,
quae evidenter proprietatem divinitatis ostendunt; et quaedam quae
perspicuam divinae maiestatis exprimunt veritatem; alia vero sunt,
quae translative per similitudinem de Deo dicuntur</i>. Non igitur
omnia nomina dicuntur de Deo metaphorice, sed aliqua dicuntur
proprie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to the preceding article, our knowledge of God is derived from the perfections which flow from Him to creatures,
                     which perfections are in God in a more eminent way than in creatures. Now our intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures,
                     and as it apprehends them it signifies them by names. Therefore as to the names applied to God---viz. the perfections which
                     they signify, such as goodness, life and the like, and their mode of signification.
                     As regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to God, and more properly than they belong to creatures,
                     and are applied primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of signification, they do not properly and strictly apply to God;
                     for their mode of signification applies to creatures.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 3 co."><a name="28809" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28809] Iª q. 13 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut dictum est, Deum cognoscimus ex perfectionibus
procedentibus in creaturas ab ipso; quae quidem perfectiones in Deo
sunt secundum eminentiorem modum quam in creaturis. Intellectus
autem noster eo modo apprehendit eas, secundum quod sunt in
creaturis, et secundum quod apprehendit, ita significat per nomina.
In nominibus igitur quae Deo attribuimus, est duo considerare,
scilicet, perfectiones ipsas significatas, ut bonitatem, vitam, et
huiusmodi; et modum significandi. Quantum igitur ad id quod
significant huiusmodi nomina, proprie competunt Deo, et magis
proprie quam ipsis creaturis, et per prius dicuntur de eo. Quantum
vero ad modum significandi, non proprie dicuntur de Deo, habent
enim modum significandi qui creaturis competit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are some names which signify these perfections flowing from God to creatures in such a way that the imperfect way in
                     which creatures receive the divine perfection is part of the very signification of the name itself as "stone" signifies a
                     material being, and names of this kind can be applied to God only in a metaphorical sense. Other names, however, express these
                     perfections absolutely, without any such mode of participation being part of their
                     signification as the words "being," "good," "living," and the like, and such names can be literally applied to God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28810" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28810] Iª q. 13 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod quaedam nomina significant huiusmodi perfectiones a
Deo procedentes in res creatas, hoc modo quod ipse modus
imperfectus quo a creatura participatur divina perfectio, in ipso
nominis significato includitur, sicut lapis significat aliquid
materialiter ens, et huiusmodi nomina non possunt attribui Deo nisi
metaphorice. Quaedam vero nomina significant ipsas perfectiones
absolute, absque hoc quod aliquis modus participandi claudatur in
eorum significatione, ut ens, bonum vivens, et huiusmodi, et talia
proprie dicuntur de Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Such names as these, as Dionysius shows, are denied of God for the reason that what the name signifies does not belong to
                     Him in the ordinary sense of its signification, but in a more eminent way. Hence Dionysius says also that God is above all
                     substance and all life.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28811" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28811] Iª q. 13 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ideo huiusmodi nomina dicit Dionysius negari a Deo,
quia id quod significatur per nomen, non convenit eo modo ei, quo
nomen significat, sed excellentiori modo. Unde ibidem dicit
Dionysius quod Deus est super omnem substantiam et vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These names which are applied to God literally imply corporeal conditions not in the thing signified, but as regards their
                     mode of signification; whereas those which are applied to God metaphorically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing
                     signified.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28812" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28812] Iª q. 13 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod ista nomina quae proprie dicuntur de Deo important
conditiones corporales, non in ipso significato nominis, sed
quantum ad modum significandi. Ea vero quae metaphorice de Deo
dicuntur, important conditionem corporalem in ipso suo
significato.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A4-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 4. Whether names applied to God are synonymous?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that these names applied to God are synonymous names. For synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same.
                     But these names applied to God mean entirely the same thing in God; for the goodness of God is His essence, and likewise it
                     is His wisdom. Therefore these names are entirely synonymous.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28813" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28813] Iª q. 13 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod ista nomina dicta de Deo, sint nomina
synonyma. Synonyma enim nomina dicuntur, quae omnino idem
significant. Sed ista nomina dicta de Deo, omnino idem significant
in Deo, quia bonitas Dei est eius essentia, et similiter sapientia.
Ergo ista nomina sunt omnino synonyma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it be said these names signify one and the same thing in reality, but differ in idea, it can be objected that
                     an idea to which no reality corresponds is a vain notion. Therefore if these ideas are many, and the thing is one, it seems
                     also that all these ideas are vain notions.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28814" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28814] Iª q. 13 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Si dicatur quod
ista nomina significant idem secundum rem, sed secundum rationes
diversas, contra, ratio cui non respondet aliquid in re, est vana;
si ergo istae rationes sunt multae, et res est una, videtur quod
rationes istae sint vanae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea, is more one than what is one in reality and many in idea. But God is
                     supremely one. Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality and many in idea; and thus the names applied to God do not
                     signify different ideas; and thus they are synonymous.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28815" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28815] Iª q. 13 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, magis
est unum quod est unum re et ratione, quam quod est unum re et
multiplex ratione. Sed Deus est maxime unus. Ergo videtur quod non
sit unus re et multiplex ratione. Et sic nomina dicta de Deo non
significant rationes diversas, et ita sunt synonyma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> All synonyms united with each other are redundant, as when we say, "vesture clothing." Therefore if all names applied to
                     God are synonymous, we cannot properly say "good God" or the like, and yet it is written, "O most mighty, great and powerful,
                     the Lord of hosts is Thy name" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.32.18" target="asv">Jer. 32:18</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28816" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28816] Iª q. 13 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omnia
synonyma, sibi invicem adiuncta, nugationem adducunt, sicut si
dicatur vestis indumentum. Si igitur omnia nomina dicta de Deo sunt
synonyma, non posset convenienter dici Deus bonus, vel aliquid
huiusmodi; cum tamen scriptum sit Ierem. XXXII, <i>fortissime,
magne, potens, dominus exercituum nomen tibi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This would be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to remove,
                     or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it would follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse
                     things denied of God, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But even according to what was said above
                     <a href="#FP_Q13_A2" id="FP_Q13_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, that these names signify the divine substance, although in an
                     imperfect manner, it is also clear from what has been said (AA 1,2) that they have diverse meanings. For the idea signified
                     by the name is the conception in the intellect of the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since it knows God from
                     creatures, in order to understand God, forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures, which
                     perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are received and divided and multiplied. As
                     therefore, to the different perfections of creatures, there corresponds one simple principle represented by different perfections
                     of creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to the various and multiplied conceptions of our intellect, there corresponds
                     one altogether simple principle, according to these conceptions, imperfectly understood. Therefore although the names applied
                     to God signify one thing, still because they signify that under many and different aspects, they are not
                     synonymous.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 4 co."><a name="28817" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28817] Iª q. 13 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod huiusmodi nomina dicta de Deo, non sunt synonyma. Quod quidem
facile esset videre, si diceremus quod huiusmodi nomina sunt
inducta ad removendum, vel ad designandum habitudinem causae
respectu creaturarum, sic enim essent diversae rationes horum
nominum secundum diversa negata, vel secundum diversos effectus
connotatos. Sed secundum quod dictum est huiusmodi nomina
substantiam divinam significare, licet imperfecte, etiam plane
apparet, secundum praemissa, quod habent rationes diversas. Ratio
enim quam significat nomen, est conceptio intellectus de re
significata per nomen. Intellectus autem noster, cum cognoscat Deum
ex creaturis, format ad intelligendum Deum conceptiones
proportionatas perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas.
Quae quidem perfectiones in Deo praeexistunt unite et simpliciter,
in creaturis vero recipiuntur divise et multipliciter. Sicut igitur
diversis perfectionibus creaturarum respondet unum simplex
principium, repraesentatum per diversas perfectiones creaturarum
varie et multipliciter; ita variis et multiplicibus conceptibus
intellectus nostri respondet unum omnino simplex, secundum
huiusmodi conceptiones imperfecte intellectum. Et ideo nomina Deo
attributa, licet significent unam rem, tamen, quia significant eam
sub rationibus multis et diversis, non sunt synonyma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A4-p7"> Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, since synonymous terms signify one thing under one aspect; for words which
                     signify different aspects of one things, do not signify primarily and absolutely one thing; because the term only signifies
                     the thing through the medium of the intellectual conception, as was said above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28818" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28818] Iª q. 13 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Et sic patet
solutio ad primum, quia nomina synonyma dicuntur, quae significant
unum secundum unam rationem. Quae enim significant rationes
diversas unius rei, non primo et per se unum significant, quia
nomen non significat rem, nisi mediante conceptione intellectus, ut
dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The many aspects of these names are not empty and vain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality represented
                     by them in a manifold and imperfect manner.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28819" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28819] Iª q. 13 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod rationes plures horum nominum non sunt cassae et
vanae, quia omnibus eis respondet unum quid simplex, per omnia
huiusmodi multipliciter et imperfecte repraesentatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The perfect unity of God requires that what are manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and unitedly. Thus
                     it comes about that He is one in reality, and yet multiple in idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold manner,
                     as things represent Him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28820" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28820] Iª q. 13 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod hoc ipsum ad perfectam Dei unitatem pertinet, quod ea
quae sunt multipliciter et divisim in aliis, in ipso sunt
simpliciter et unite. Et ex hoc contingit quod est unus re et
plures secundum rationem, quia intellectus noster ita multipliciter
apprehendit eum, sicut res multipliciter ipsum repraesentant.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A5-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 5. Whether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally predicated of them?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the things attributed to God and creatures are univocal. For every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal,
                     as many are reduced to one; for if the name "dog" be said equivocally of the barking dog, and of the dogfish, it must be said
                     of some univocally---viz. of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to infinitude. Now there are some univocal agents which
                     agree with their effects in name and definition, as man generates man; and there are some
                     agents which are equivocal, as the sun which causes heat, although the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense. Therefore it
                     seems that the first agent to which all other agents are reduced, is an univocal agent: and thus what is said of God and creatures,
                     is predicated univocally.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28821" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28821] Iª q. 13 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod ea quae dicuntur de Deo et creaturis,
univoce de ipsis dicantur. Omne enim aequivocum reducitur ad
univocum, sicut multa ad unum. Nam si hoc nomen canis aequivoce
dicitur de latrabili et marino, oportet quod de aliquibus univoce
dicatur, scilicet de omnibus latrabilibus, aliter enim esset
procedere in infinitum. Inveniuntur autem quaedam agentia univoca,
quae conveniunt cum suis effectibus in nomine et definitione, ut
homo generat hominem; quaedam vero agentia aequivoca, sicut sol
causat calidum, cum tamen ipse non sit calidus nisi aequivoce.
Videtur igitur quod primum agens, ad quod omnia agentia reducuntur,
sit agens univocum. Et ita, quae de Deo et creaturis dicuntur,
univoce praedicantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no similitude among equivocal things. Therefore as creatures have a certain likeness to God, according
                     to the word of Genesis (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>), "Let us make man to our image and likeness," it seems that something can be said of God and creatures univocally.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28822" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28822] Iª q. 13 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
secundum aequivoca non attenditur aliqua similitudo. Cum igitur
creaturae ad Deum sit aliqua similitudo, secundum illud Genes. I,
<i>faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram</i>,
videtur quod aliquid univoce de Deo et creaturis dicatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, measure is homogeneous with the thing measured. But God is the first measure of all beings. Therefore God is homogeneous
                     with creatures; and thus a word may be applied univocally to God and to creatures.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="28823" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28823] Iª q. 13 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
mensura est homogenea mensurato, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed Deus
est prima mensura omnium entium, ut ibidem dicitur. Ergo Deus est
homogeneus creaturis. Et ita aliquid univoce de Deo et creaturis
dici potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> whatever is predicated of various things under the same name but not in the same sense, is predicated equivocally. But no
                     name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures; for instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not
                     in God. Now a different genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the definition; and the same applies to other
                     things. Therefore whatever is said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q13_A5-p6"> Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from each other. But the distance of some creatures makes
                     any univocal predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which are not in the same genus. Therefore much
                     less can anything be predicated univocally of God and creatures; and so only equivocal predication can be applied to them.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I q. 13 a. 5 s. c. 1"><a name="28824" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28824] Iª q. 13 a. 5 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra,
quidquid praedicatur de aliquibus secundum idem nomen et non
secundum eandem rationem, praedicatur de eis aequivoce. Sed nullum
nomen convenit Deo secundum illam rationem, secundum quam dicitur
de creatura, nam sapientia in creaturis est qualitas, non autem in
Deo; genus autem variatum mutat rationem, cum sit pars
definitionis. Et eadem ratio est in aliis. Quidquid ergo de Deo et
creaturis dicitur, aequivoce dicitur.</p><p title="I q. 13 a. 5 s. c. 2"><a name="28825" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28825] Iª q. 13 a. 5 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
plus distat a creaturis, quam quaecumque creaturae ab invicem. Sed
propter distantiam quarundam creaturarum, contingit quod nihil
univoce de eis praedicari potest; sicut de his quae non conveniunt
in aliquo genere. Ergo multo minus de Deo et creaturis aliquid
univoce praedicatur, sed omnia praedicantur aequivoce.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A5-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an adequate
                     result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure
                     that falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner;
                     as for example the sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms
                     in all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the preceding article, all perfections existing in creatures divided and
                     multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly. Thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to a creature, it signifies that
                     perfection distinct in idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by the term "wise" applied to man, we signify some perfection
                     distinct from a man's essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when we
                     apply to it God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence, or power, or existence. Thus also this term
                     "wise" applied to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when
                     it is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name.
                     Hence it is evident that this term "wise" is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same rule applies to other
                     terms.
                     Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q13_A5-p8"> Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because
                     if that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all; for the reasoning
                     would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who proved many things about
                     God, and also against what the Apostle says: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by
                     the things that are made" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv">Rom. 1:20</a>). Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e. according to proportion.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q13_A5-p9"> Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things are proportionate to one, thus for example "healthy"
                     predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body, of which the former is the sign and the
                     latter the cause: or according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is said of medicine and animal, since
                     medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures
                     analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures
                     <a href="#FP_Q13_A1" id="FP_Q13_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Thus whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and
                     cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure
                     equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the
                     same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various
                     proportions to some one thing; thus "healthy" applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine
                     signifies the cause of the same health.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 5 co."><a name="28826" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28826] Iª q. 13 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod impossibile est aliquid praedicari de Deo et creaturis
univoce. Quia omnis effectus non adaequans virtutem causae agentis,
recipit similitudinem agentis non secundum eandem rationem, sed
deficienter, ita ut quod divisim et multipliciter est in
effectibus, in causa est simpliciter et eodem modo; sicut sol
secundum unam virtutem, multiformes et varias formas in istis
inferioribus producit. Eodem modo, ut supra dictum est, omnes rerum
perfectiones, quae sunt in rebus creatis divisim et multipliciter,
in Deo praeexistunt unite. Sic igitur, cum aliquod nomen ad
perfectionem pertinens de creatura dicitur, significat illam
perfectionem ut distinctam secundum rationem definitionis ab aliis,
puta cum hoc nomen sapiens de homine dicitur, significamus aliquam
perfectionem distinctam ab essentia hominis, et a potentia et ab
esse ipsius, et ab omnibus huiusmodi. Sed cum hoc nomen de Deo
dicimus, non intendimus significare aliquid distinctum ab essentia
vel potentia vel esse ipsius. Et sic, cum hoc nomen sapiens de
homine dicitur, quodammodo circumscribit et comprehendit rem
significatam, non autem cum dicitur de Deo, sed relinquit rem
significatam ut incomprehensam, et excedentem nominis
significationem. Unde patet quod non secundum eandem rationem hoc
nomen sapiens de Deo et de homine dicitur. Et eadem ratio est de
aliis. Unde nullum nomen univoce de Deo et creaturis praedicatur.
Sed nec etiam pure aequivoce, ut aliqui dixerunt. Quia secundum
hoc, ex creaturis nihil posset cognosci de Deo, nec demonstrari;
sed semper incideret fallacia aequivocationis. Et hoc est tam
contra philosophos, qui multa demonstrative de Deo probant, quam
etiam contra apostolum dicentem, Rom. I, <i>invisibilia Dei per ea
quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur</i>. Dicendum est igitur
quod huiusmodi nomina dicuntur de Deo et creaturis secundum
analogiam, idest proportionem. Quod quidem dupliciter contingit in
nominibus, vel quia multa habent proportionem ad unum, sicut sanum
dicitur de medicina et urina, inquantum utrumque habet ordinem et
proportionem ad sanitatem animalis, cuius hoc quidem signum est,
illud vero causa; vel ex eo quod unum habet proportionem ad
alterum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et animali, inquantum
medicina est causa sanitatis quae est in animali. Et hoc modo
aliqua dicuntur de Deo et creaturis analogice, et non aequivoce
pure, neque univoce. Non enim possumus nominare Deum nisi ex
creaturis, ut supra dictum est. Et sic, quidquid dicitur de Deo et
creaturis, dicitur secundum quod est aliquis ordo creaturae ad
Deum, ut ad principium et causam, in qua praeexistunt excellenter
omnes rerum perfectiones. Et iste modus communitatis medius est
inter puram aequivocationem et simplicem univocationem. Neque enim
in his quae analogice dicuntur, est una ratio, sicut est in
univocis; nec totaliter diversa, sicut in aequivocis; sed nomen
quod sic multipliciter dicitur, significat diversas proportiones ad
aliquid unum; sicut sanum, de urina dictum, significat signum
sanitatis animalis, de medicina vero dictum, significat causam
eiusdem sanitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although equivocal predications must be reduced to univocal, still in actions, the non-univocal agent must precede the univocal
                     agent. For the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of the whole species, as for instance the sun is the cause of the
                     generation of all men; whereas the univocal agent is not the universal efficient cause of the whole species (otherwise it
                     would be the cause of itself, since it is contained in the species), but is a
                     particular cause of this individual which it places under the species by way of participation. Therefore the universal cause
                     of the whole species is not an univocal agent; and the universal cause comes before the particular cause. But this universal
                     agent, whilst it is not univocal, nevertheless is not altogether equivocal, otherwise it could not produce its own likeness,
                     but rather it is to be called an analogical agent, as all univocal predications are reduced to one first non-univocal
                     analogical predication, which is being.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28827" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28827] Iª q. 13 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, licet in praedicationibus oporteat aequivoca ad
univoca reduci, tamen in actionibus agens non univocum ex
necessitate praecedit agens univocum. Agens enim non univocum est
causa universalis totius speciei, ut sol est causa generationis
omnium hominum. Agens vero univocum non est causa agens universalis
totius speciei (alioquin esset causa sui ipsius, cum sub specie
contineatur), sed est causa particularis respectu huius individui,
quod in participatione speciei constituit. Causa igitur universalis
totius speciei non est agens univocum. Causa autem universalis est
prior particulari. Hoc autem agens universale, licet non sit
univocum, non tamen est omnino aequivocum, quia sic non faceret
sibi simile; sed potest dici agens analogicum, sicut in
praedicationibus omnia univoca reducuntur ad unum primum, non
univocum, sed analogicum, quod est ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The likeness of the creature to God is imperfect, for it does not represent one and the same generic thing (
                     <a href="#FP_Q4_A3" id="FP_Q13_A5-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[3]</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28828" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28828] Iª q. 13 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod similitudo creaturae ad Deum est imperfecta, quia
etiam nec idem secundum genus repraesentat, ut supra dictum
est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A5-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is not the measure proportioned to things measured; hence it is not necessary that God and creatures should be in the
                     same genus.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="28829" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28829] Iª q. 13 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod Deus non est mensura proportionata mensuratis. Unde
non oportet quod Deus et creaturae sub uno genere contineantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A5-p13"><b>Reply to Objections:</b> The arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove indeed that these names are not predicated univocally of God and creatures;
                     yet they do not prove that they are predicated equivocally.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="28830" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28830] Iª q. 13 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ea vero quae sunt
in contrarium, concludunt quod non univoce huiusmodi nomina de Deo
et creaturis praedicentur, non autem quod aequivoce.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A6-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 6. Whether names predicated of God are predicated primarily of creatures?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God. For we name anything accordingly as we know
                     it, since "names", as the Philosopher says, "are signs of ideas." But we know creatures before we know God. Therefore the
                     names imposed by us are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28831" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28831] Iª q. 13 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod nomina per prius dicantur de creaturis
quam de Deo. Secundum enim quod cognoscimus aliquid, secundum hoc
illud nominamus; cum nomina, secundum philosophum, sint signa
intellectuum. Sed per prius cognoscimus creaturam quam Deum. Ergo
nomina a nobis imposita, per prius conveniunt creaturis quam
Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We name God from creatures." But names transferred from creatures to God, are said
                     primarily of creatures rather than of God, as "lion," "stone," and the like. Therefore all names applied to God and creatures
                     are applied primarily to creatures rather than to God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28832" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28832] Iª q. 13 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
secundum Dionysium, in libro de Div. Nom., Deum ex creaturis
nominamus. Sed nomina a creaturis translata in Deum, per prius
dicuntur de creaturis quam de Deo; sicut leo, lapis, et huiusmodi.
Ergo omnia nomina quae de Deo et de creaturis dicuntur, per prius
de creaturis quam de Deo dicuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all names equally applied to God and creatures, are applied to God as the cause of all creatures, as Dionysius says
                     (De Mystica Theol.). But what is applied to anything through its cause, is applied to it secondarily, for "healthy" is primarily
                     predicated of animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of health. Therefore these names are said primarily of creatures
                     rather than of God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="28833" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28833] Iª q. 13 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omnia
nomina quae communiter de Deo et creaturis dicuntur, dicuntur de
Deo sicut de causa omnium, ut dicit Dionysius. Sed quod dicitur de
aliquo per causam, per posterius de illo dicitur, per prius enim
dicitur animal sanum quam medicina, quae est causa sanitatis. Ergo
huiusmodi nomina per prius dicuntur de creaturis quam de Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "I bow my knees to the Father, of our Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named"
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.14" target="asv">Eph. 3:14,15</a>); and the same applies to the other names applied to God and creatures. Therefore these names are applied primarily to God
                     rather than to creatures.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28834" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28834] Iª q. 13 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Ephes. III, <i>flecto genua mea ad patrem domini
nostri Iesu, ex quo omnis paternitas in caelo et in terra
nominatur</i>. Et eadem ratio videtur de nominibus aliis quae de
Deo et creaturis dicuntur. Ergo huiusmodi nomina per prius de Deo
quam de creaturis dicuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In names predicated of many in an analogical sense, all are predicated because they have reference to some one thing; and
                     this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And since that expressed by the name is the definition, as the
                     Philosopher says (Metaph. iv), such a name must be applied primarily to that which is put in the definition of such other
                     things, and secondarily to these others according as they approach more or less to that first.
                     Thus, for instance, "healthy" applied to animals comes into the definition of "healthy" applied to medicine, which is called
                     healthy as being the cause of health in the animal; and also into the definition of "healthy" which is applied to urine, which
                     is called healthy in so far as it is the sign of the animal's health. Thus all names applied metaphorically to God, are applied
                     to creatures primarily rather than to God, because when said of God they mean only similitudes to such creatures. For
                     as "smiling" applied to a field means only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like the beauty of the human smile
                     by proportionate likeness, so the name of "lion" applied to God means only that God manifests strength in His works, as a
                     lion in his. Thus it is clear that applied to God the signification of names can be defined only from what is said of creatures.
                     But to other names not applied to God in a metaphorical sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as
                     the cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, "God is good," it would then only mean "God is the cause of the
                     creature's goodness"; thus the term good applied to God would included in its meaning the creature's goodness. Hence "good"
                     would apply primarily to creatures rather than to God. But as was shown above
                     <a href="#FP_Q13_A2" id="FP_Q13_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, these names are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially. For the words, "God is good," or "wise," signify
                     not only that
                     He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name
                     signifies, these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures;
                     but as regards the imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to creatures which we know first. Hence they
                     have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures, as said above
                     <a href="#FP_Q13_A3" id="FP_Q13_A6-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 6 co."><a name="28835" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28835] Iª q. 13 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod in omnibus nominibus quae de pluribus analogice dicuntur,
necesse est quod omnia dicantur per respectum ad unum, et ideo
illud unum oportet quod ponatur in definitione omnium. Et quia
ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio, ut dicitur in IV
Metaphys., necesse est quod illud nomen per prius dicatur de eo
quod ponitur in definitione aliorum, et per posterius de aliis,
secundum ordinem quo appropinquant ad illud primum vel magis vel
minus, sicut sanum quod dicitur de animali, cadit in definitione
sani quod dicitur de medicina, quae dicitur sana inquantum causat
sanitatem in animali; et in definitione sani quod dicitur de urina,
quae dicitur sana inquantum est signum sanitatis animalis. Sic ergo
omnia nomina quae metaphorice de Deo dicuntur, per prius de
creaturis dicuntur quam de Deo, quia dicta de Deo, nihil aliud
significant quam similitudines ad tales creaturas. Sicut enim
ridere, dictum de prato, nihil aliud significat quam quod pratum
similiter se habet in decore cum floret, sicut homo cum ridet,
secundum similitudinem proportionis; sic nomen leonis, dictum de
Deo, nihil aliud significat quam quod Deus similiter se habet ut
fortiter operetur in suis operibus, sicut leo in suis. Et sic patet
quod, secundum quod dicuntur de Deo, eorum significatio definiri
non potest, nisi per illud quod de creaturis dicitur. De aliis
autem nominibus, quae non metaphorice dicuntur de Deo, esset etiam
eadem ratio, si dicerentur de Deo causaliter tantum, ut quidam
posuerunt. Sic enim. Cum dicitur Deus est bonus, nihil aliud esset
quam Deus est causa bonitatis creaturae, et sic hoc nomen bonum,
dictum de Deo, clauderet in suo intellectu bonitatem creaturae.
Unde bonum per prius diceretur de creatura quam de Deo. Sed supra
ostensum est quod huiusmodi nomina non solum dicuntur de Deo
causaliter, sed etiam essentialiter. Cum enim dicitur Deus est
bonus, vel sapiens, non solum significatur quod ipse sit causa
sapientiae vel bonitatis, sed quod haec in eo eminentius
praeexistunt. Unde, secundum hoc, dicendum est quod, quantum ad rem
significatam per nomen, per prius dicuntur de Deo quam de
creaturis, quia a Deo huiusmodi perfectiones in creaturas manant.
Sed quantum ad impositionem nominis, per prius a nobis imponuntur
creaturis, quas prius cognoscimus. Unde et modum significandi
habent qui competit creaturis, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection refers to the imposition of the name.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28836" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28836] Iª q. 13 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit quantum ad impositionem
nominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and to other names, as said above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28837" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28837] Iª q. 13 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod non est eadem ratio de nominibus quae metaphorice de
Deo dicuntur, et de aliis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection would be valid if these names were applied to God only as cause, and not also essentially, for instance as
                     "healthy" is applied to medicine.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="28838" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28838] Iª q. 13 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod obiectio illa procederet, si huiusmodi nomina solum
de Deo causaliter dicerentur et non essentialiter, sicut sanum de
medicina.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A7-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 7. Whether names which imply relation to creatures are predicated of God temporally?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that names which imply relation to creatures are not predicated of God temporally. For all such names signify the
                     divine substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose (De Fide i) that this name "Lord" is the name of power, which
                     is the divine substance; and "Creator" signifies the action of God, which is His essence. Now the divine substance is not
                     temporal, but eternal. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally, but
                     eternally.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="28839" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28839] Iª q. 13 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod nomina quae important relationem ad
creaturas, non dicantur de Deo ex tempore. Omnia enim huiusmodi
nomina significant divinam substantiam, ut communiter dicitur. Unde
et Ambrosius dicit quod hoc nomen dominus est nomen potestatis,
quae est divina substantia, et creator significat Dei actionem,
quae est eius essentia. Sed divina substantia non est temporalis,
sed aeterna. Ergo huiusmodi nomina non dicuntur de Deo ex tempore,
sed ab aeterno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that to which something applies temporally can be described as made; for what is white temporally is made white.
                     But to make does no apply to God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of God temporally.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="28840" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28840] Iª q. 13 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
cuicumque convenit aliquid ex tempore, potest dici factum, quod
enim ex tempore est album, fit album. Sed Deo non convenit esse
factum. Ergo de Deo nihil praedicatur ex tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if any names are applied to God temporally as implying relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all things
                     that imply relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of God implying relation of God to creatures from eternity; for
                     from eternity He knew and loved the creature, according to the word: "I have loved thee with an everlasting love" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.3" target="asv">Jer. 31:3</a>). Therefore also other names implying relation to creatures, as
                     "Lord" and "Creator," are applied to God from eternity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="28841" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28841] Iª q. 13 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
aliqua nomina dicuntur de Deo ex tempore propter hoc quod important
relationem ad creaturas, eadem ratio videtur de omnibus quae
relationem ad creaturas important. Sed quaedam nomina importantia
relationem ad creaturas, dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno, ab aeterno
enim scivit creaturam et dilexit, secundum illud Ierem. XXXI, <i>in
caritate perpetua dilexi te</i>. Ergo et alia nomina quae important
relationem ad creaturas, ut dominus et creator, dicuntur de Deo ab
aeterno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, names of this kind signify relation. Therefore that relation must be something in God, or in the creature only.
                     But it cannot be that it is something in the creature only, for in that case God would be called "Lord" from the opposite
                     relation which is in creatures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore the relation must be something in God also.
                     But nothing temporal can be in God, for He is above time. Therefore these names are not applied
                     to God temporally.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="28842" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28842] Iª q. 13 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
huiusmodi nomina relationem significant. Oportet igitur quod
relatio illa vel sit aliquid in Deo, vel in creatura tantum. Sed
non potest esse quod sit in creatura tantum, quia sic Deus
denominaretur dominus a relatione opposita, quae est in creaturis;
nihil autem denominatur a suo opposito. Relinquitur ergo quod
relatio est etiam aliquid in Deo. Sed in Deo nihil potest esse ex
tempore, cum ipse sit supra tempus. Ergo videtur quod huiusmodi
nomina non dicantur de Deo ex tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, a thing is called relative from relation; for instance lord from lordship, as white from whiteness. Therefore if
                     the relation of lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it follows that God is not really Lord, which is plainly
                     false.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 arg. 5"><a name="28843" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28843] Iª q. 13 a. 7 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
secundum relationem dicitur aliquid relative, puta secundum
dominium dominus, sicut secundum albedinem albus. Si igitur relatio
dominii non est in Deo secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem,
sequitur quod Deus non sit realiter dominus, quod patet esse
falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p7">
                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in nature, one can exist without the other; as a thing knowable can
                     exist without the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). But relative things which are said of God and creatures
                     are not simultaneous in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God to the creature even without the existence of
                     the creature; and thus these names "Lord" and "Creator" are predicated of God from
                     eternity, and not temporally.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 arg. 6"><a name="28844" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28844] Iª q. 13 a. 7 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, in
relativis quae non sunt simul natura, unum potest esse, altero non
existente, sicut scibile existit, non existente scientia, ut
dicitur in praedicamentis. Sed relativa quae dicuntur de Deo et
creaturis, non sunt simul natura. Ergo potest aliquid dici relative
de Deo ad creaturam, etiam creatura non existente. Et sic huiusmodi
nomina, dominus et creator, dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno, et non ex
tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p8">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this relative appellation "Lord" is applied to God temporally.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 s. c."><a name="28845" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28845] Iª q. 13 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Augustinus, V de Trin., quod haec relativa appellatio
dominus Deo convenit ex tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A7-p9">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The names which import relation to creatures are applied to God temporally, and not from eternity.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q13_A7-p10"> To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly seen
                     to be false from the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and habitude. Nevertheless it is necessary
                     to know that since relation has two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or logical. Sometimes from
                     both extremes it is an idea only, as when mutual order or habitude can only go between things in the apprehension
                     of reason; as when we say a thing "the same as itself." For reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it
                     apprehends a certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same applies to relations between "being" and "non-being" formed
                     by reason, apprehending "non-being" as an extreme. The same is true of relations that follow upon an act of reason, as genus
                     and species, and the like.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q13_A7-p11"> Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between
                     two things according to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all relations, consequent upon quantity; as great
                     and small, double and half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes: and the same applies to relations consequent
                     upon action and passion, as motive power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q13_A7-p12"> Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in the other extreme it is an idea only; and this happens
                     whenever two extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively to sensible things and to intellectual
                     things; which, inasmuch as they are realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible and intellectual existence.
                     Therefore in science and in sense a real relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge
                     or to the sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in themselves are outside this order, and hence in them
                     there is no real relation to science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the intellect apprehends them as terms of the
                     relations of science and sense. Hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that they are called relative, not forasmuch as they
                     are related to other things, but as others are related to them. Likewise for instance, "on the right" is not applied to a
                     column, unless it stands as regards an animal on the right side; which relation is not really in the column, but in the animal.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q13_A7-p13"> Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it
                     is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a
                     relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent these names which import
                     relation to the creature from being predicated of God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason
                     of the change of the creature; as a column is on the right of an animal, without change in itself, but by change in the animal.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 co."><a name="28846" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28846] Iª q. 13 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod quaedam nomina importantia relationem ad creaturam, ex tempore
de Deo dicuntur, et non ab aeterno. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum
est quod quidam posuerunt relationem non esse rem naturae, sed
rationis tantum. Quod quidem apparet esse falsum, ex hoc quod ipsae
res naturalem ordinem et habitudinem habent ad invicem. Veruntamen
sciendum est quod, cum relatio requirat duo extrema, tripliciter se
habere potest ad hoc quod sit res naturae et rationis. Quandoque
enim ex utraque parte est res rationis tantum, quando scilicet ordo
vel habitudo non potest esse inter aliqua, nisi secundum
apprehensionem rationis tantum, utpote cum dicimus idem eidem idem.
Nam secundum quod ratio apprehendit bis aliquod unum, statuit illud
ut duo; et sic apprehendit quandam habitudinem ipsius ad seipsum.
Et similiter est de omnibus relationibus quae sunt inter ens et non
ens; quas format ratio, inquantum apprehendit non ens ut quoddam
extremum. Et idem est de omnibus relationibus quae consequuntur
actum rationis, ut genus et species, et huiusmodi. Quaedam vero
relationes sunt, quantum ad utrumque extremum, res naturae, quando
scilicet est habitudo inter aliqua duo secundum aliquid realiter
conveniens utrique. Sicut patet de omnibus relationibus quae
consequuntur quantitatem, ut magnum et parvum, duplum et dimidium,
et huiusmodi, nam quantitas est in utroque extremorum. Et simile
est de relationibus quae consequuntur actionem et passionem, ut
motivum et mobile, pater et filius, et similia. Quandoque vero
relatio in uno extremorum est res naturae, et in altero est res
rationis tantum. Et hoc contingit quandocumque duo extrema non sunt
unius ordinis. Sicut sensus et scientia referuntur ad sensibile et
scibile, quae quidem, inquantum sunt res quaedam in esse naturali
existentes, sunt extra ordinem esse sensibilis et intelligibilis,
et ideo in scientia quidem et sensu est relatio realis, secundum
quod ordinantur ad sciendum vel sentiendum res; sed res ipsae in se
consideratae, sunt extra ordinem huiusmodi. Unde in eis non est
aliqua relatio realiter ad scientiam et sensum; sed secundum
rationem tantum, inquantum intellectus apprehendit ea ut terminos
relationum scientiae et sensus. Unde philosophus dicit, in V
Metaphys., quod non dicuntur relative eo quod ipsa referantur ad
alia, sed quia alia referuntur ad ipsa. Et similiter dextrum non
dicitur de columna, nisi inquantum ponitur animali ad dextram, unde
huiusmodi relatio non est realiter in columna, sed in animali. Cum
igitur Deus sit extra totum ordinem creaturae, et omnes creaturae
ordinentur ad ipsum, et non e converso, manifestum est quod
creaturae realiter referuntur ad ipsum Deum; sed in Deo non est
aliqua realis relatio eius ad creaturas, sed secundum rationem
tantum, inquantum creaturae referuntur ad ipsum. Et sic nihil
prohibet huiusmodi nomina importantia relationem ad creaturam,
praedicari de Deo ex tempore, non propter aliquam mutationem
ipsius, sed propter creaturae mutationem; sicut columna fit dextera
animali, nulla mutatione circa ipsam existente, sed animali
translato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some relative names are imposed to signify the relative habitudes themselves, as "master" and "servant," "father," and "son,"
                     and the like, and these relatives are called predicamental [secundum esse]. But others are imposed to signify the things from
                     which ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing moved, the head and the thing that has a head, and the like: and
                     these relatives are called transcendental [secundum dici]. Thus, there is the
                     same two-fold difference in divine names. For some signify the habitude itself to the creature, as "Lord," and these do not
                     signify the divine substance directly, but indirectly, in so far as they presuppose the divine substance; as dominion presupposes
                     power, which is the divine substance. Others signify the divine essence directly, and consequently the corresponding habitudes,
                     as "Saviour," "Creator," and suchlike; and these signify the action of God, which is His essence. Yet both names are
                     said of God temporarily so far as they imply a habitude either principally or consequently, but not as signifying the essence,
                     either directly or indirectly.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="28847" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28847] Iª q. 13 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod relativa quaedam sunt imposita ad significandum ipsas
habitudines relativas, ut dominus, servus, pater et filius, et
huiusmodi, et haec dicuntur relativa secundum esse. Quaedam vero
sunt imposita ad significandas res quas consequuntur quaedam
habitudines, sicut movens et motum, caput et capitatum, et alia
huiusmodi, quae dicuntur relativa secundum dici. Sic igitur et
circa nomina divina haec differentia est consideranda. Nam quaedam
significant ipsam habitudinem ad creaturam, ut dominus. Et
huiusmodi non significant substantiam divinam directe, sed
indirecte, inquantum praesupponunt ipsam, sicut dominium
praesupponit potestatem, quae est divina substantia. Quaedam vero
significant directe essentiam divinam, et ex consequenti important
habitudinem; sicut salvator, creator, et huiusmodi, significant
actionem Dei, quae est eius essentia. Utraque tamen nomina ex
tempore de Deo dicuntur quantum ad habitudinem quam important, vel
principaliter vel consequenter, non autem quantum ad hoc quod
significant essentiam, vel directe vel indirecte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As relations applied to God temporally are only in God in our idea, so, "to become" or "to be made" are applied to God only
                     in idea, with no change in Him, as for instance when we say, "Lord, Thou art become [Douay: 'hast been'] our refuge" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A7-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.89.1" target="asv">Ps. 89:1</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="28848" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28848] Iª q. 13 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, sicut relationes quae de Deo dicuntur ex tempore,
non sunt in Deo nisi secundum rationem, ita nec fieri nec factum
esse dicitur de Deo, nisi secundum rationem, nulla mutatione circa
ipsum existente, sicut est id, <i>domine refugium factus es
nobis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p16">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The operation of the intellect and the will is in the operator, therefore names signifying relations following upon the action
                     of the intellect or will, are applied to God from eternity; whereas those following upon the actions proceeding according
                     to our mode of thinking to external effects are applied to God temporally, as "Saviour," "Creator," and the like.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="28849" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28849] Iª q. 13 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod operatio intellectus et voluntatis est in operante,
et ideo nomina quae significant relationes consequentes actionem
intellectus vel voluntatis, dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno. Quae vero
consequuntur actiones procedentes, secundum modum intelligendi, ad
exteriores effectus, dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, ut salvator,
creator, et huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p17">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Relations signified by these names which are applied to God temporally, are in God only in idea; but the opposite relations
                     in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God should be denominated from relations really existing in the thing, yet
                     so that the opposite relations in God should also be understood by us at the same time; in the sense that God is spoken of
                     relatively to the creature, inasmuch as the creature is related to Him: thus the
                     Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that the object is said to be knowable relatively because knowledge relates to it.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="28850" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28850] Iª q. 13 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod relationes significatae per huiusmodi nomina quae
dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, sunt in Deo secundum rationem tantum,
oppositae autem relationes in creaturis sunt secundum rem. Nec est
inconveniens quod a relationibus realiter existentibus in re, Deus
denominetur, tamen secundum quod cointelliguntur per intellectum
nostrum oppositae relationes in Deo. Ut sic Deus dicatur relative
ad creaturam, quia creatura refertur ad ipsum, sicut philosophus
dicit, in V Metaphys., quod scibile dicitur relative, quia scientia
refertur ad ipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p18">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since God is related to the creature for the reason that the creature is related to Him: and since the relation of subjection
                     is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not in idea only, but in reality; for He is called Lord according to
                     the manner in which the creature is subject to Him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 ad 5"><a name="28851" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28851] Iª q. 13 a. 7 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
dicendum quod, cum ea ratione referatur Deus ad creaturam, qua
creatura refertur ad ipsum; cum relatio subiectionis realiter sit
in creatura, sequitur quod Deus non secundum rationem tantum, sed
realiter sit dominus. Eo enim modo dicitur dominus, quo creatura ei
subiecta est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p19">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> To know whether relations are simultaneous by nature or otherwise, it is not necessary by nature or otherwise of things to
                     which they belong but the meaning of the relations themselves. For if one in its idea includes another, and vice versa, then
                     they are simultaneous by nature: as double and half, father and son, and the like. But if one in its idea includes another,
                     and not vice versa, they are not simultaneous by nature. This applies to science
                     and its object; for the object knowable is considered as a potentiality, and the science as a habit, or as an act. Hence the
                     knowable object in its mode of signification exists before science, but if the same object is considered in act, then it is
                     simultaneous with science in act; for the object known is nothing as such unless it is known. Thus, though God is prior to
                     the creature, still because the signification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and vice versa, these two relative terms,
                     "Lord" and "servant," are simultaneous by nature. Hence, God was not "Lord" until He had a creature subject to Himself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 ad 6"><a name="28852" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28852] Iª q. 13 a. 7 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum
quod, ad cognoscendum utrum relativa sint simul natura vel non, non
oportet considerare ordinem rerum de quibus relativa dicuntur, sed
significationes ipsorum relativorum. Si enim unum in sui intellectu
claudat aliud et e converso, tunc sunt simul natura, sicut duplum
et dimidium, pater et filius, et similia. Si autem unum in sui
intellectu claudat aliud, et non e converso, tunc non sunt simul
natura. Et hoc modo se habent scientia et scibile. Nam scibile
dicitur secundum potentiam, scientia autem secundum habitum, vel
secundum actum. Unde scibile, secundum modum suae significationis,
praeexistit scientiae. Sed si accipiatur scibile secundum actum,
tunc est simul cum scientia secundum actum, nam scitum non est
aliquid nisi sit eius scientia. Licet igitur Deus sit prior
creaturis, quia tamen in significatione domini clauditur quod
habeat servum, et e converso, ista duo relativa, dominus et servus,
sunt simul natura. Unde Deus non fuit dominus, antequam haberet
creaturam sibi subiectam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A8-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 8. Whether this name "God" is a name of the nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name, "God," is not a name of the nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 1) that "God {Theos} is so
                     called from the {theein} [which means to care of] and to cherish all things; or from the {aithein}, that is to burn, for our
                     God is a fire consuming all malice; or from {theasthai}, which means to consider all things." But all these names belong to
                     operation. Therefore this name "God" signifies His operation and not His nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="28853" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28853] Iª q. 13 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen Deus non sit nomen naturae.
Dicit enim Damascenus, in I libro, quod <i>Deus dicitur a
theein</i>, quod est currere, et fovere universa; <i>vel ab
aethein, idest ardere (Deus enim noster ignis consumens est omnem
malitiam); vel a theasthai</i>, quod est considerare, omnia. Haec
autem omnia ad operationem pertinent. Ergo hoc nomen Deus
operationem significat, et non naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is named by us as we know it. But the divine nature is unknown to us. Therefore this name "God" does not
                     signify the divine nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="28854" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28854] Iª q. 13 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
secundum hoc aliquid nominatur a nobis, secundum quod cognoscitur.
Sed divina natura est nobis ignota. Ergo hoc nomen Deus non
significat naturam divinam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A8-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide i) that "God" is a name of the nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 8 s. c."><a name="28855" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28855] Iª q. 13 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Ambrosius, in libro I de fide, quod Deus est nomen
naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A8-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Whence a name is imposed, and what the name signifies are not always the same thing. For as we know substance from its properties
                     and operations, so we name substance sometimes for its operation, or its property; e.g. we name the substance of a stone from
                     its act, as for instance that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem]; but still this name is not meant to signify the particular
                     action, but the stone's substance. The things, on the other hand, known to us in
                     themselves, such as heat, cold, whiteness and the like, are not named from other things. Hence as regards such things the
                     meaning of the name and its source are the same.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q13_A8-p6"> Because therefore God is not known to us in His nature, but is made known to us from His operations or effects, we name Him
                     from these, as said in A[1]; hence this name "God" is a name of operation so far as relates to the source of its meaning.
                     For this name is imposed from His universal providence over all things; since all who speak of God intend to name God as exercising
                     providence over all; hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii), "The Deity watches over all with perfect
                     providence and goodness." But taken from this operation, this name "God" is imposed to signify the divine nature.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 8 co."><a name="28856" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28856] Iª q. 13 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod non est semper idem id a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum,
et id ad quod significandum nomen imponitur. Sicut enim substantiam
rei ex proprietatibus vel operationibus eius cognoscimus, ita
substantiam rei denominamus quandoque ab aliqua eius operatione vel
proprietate, sicut substantiam lapidis denominamus ab aliqua
actione eius, quia laedit pedem; non tamen hoc nomen impositum est
ad significandum hanc actionem, sed substantiam lapidis. Si qua
vero sunt quae secundum se sunt nota nobis, ut calor, frigus,
albedo, et huiusmodi, non ab aliis denominantur. Unde in talibus
idem est quod nomen significat, et id a quo imponitur nomen ad
significandum. Quia igitur Deus non est notus nobis in sui natura,
sed innotescit nobis ex operationibus vel effectibus eius, ex his
possumus eum nominare, ut supra dictum est. Unde hoc nomen Deus est
nomen operationis, quantum ad id a quo imponitur ad significandum.
Imponitur enim hoc nomen ab universali rerum providentia, omnes
enim loquentes de Deo, hoc intendunt nominare Deum, quod habet
providentiam universalem de rebus. Unde dicit Dionysius, XII cap.
de Div. Nom., quod <i>deitas est quae omnia videt providentia et
bonitate perfecta</i>. Ex hac autem operatione hoc nomen Deus
assumptum, impositum est ad significandum divinam naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A8-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All that Damascene says refers to providence; which is the source of the signification of the name "God."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="28857" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28857] Iª q. 13 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod omnia quae posuit Damascenus, pertinent ad
providentiam, a qua imponitur hoc nomen Deus ad significandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We can name a thing according to the knowledge we have of its nature from its properties and effects. Hence because we can
                     know what stone is in itself from its property, this name "stone" signifies the nature of the stone itself; for it signifies
                     the definition of stone, by which we know what it is, for the idea which the name signifies is the definition, as is said
                     in Metaph. iv. Now from the divine effects we cannot know the divine nature in
                     itself, so as to know what it is; but only by way of eminence, and by way of causality, and of negation as stated above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q12_A12" id="FP_Q13_A8-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[12], A[12]</a>). Thus the name "God" signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to signify something existing above all things,
                     the principle of all things and removed from all things; for those who name God intend to signify all this.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="28858" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28858] Iª q. 13 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, secundum quod naturam alicuius rei ex eius
proprietatibus et effectibus cognoscere possumus, sic eam nomine
possumus significare. Unde, quia substantiam lapidis ex eius
proprietate possumus cognoscere secundum seipsam, sciendo quid est
lapis, hoc nomen lapis ipsam lapidis naturam, secundum quod in se
est, significat, significat enim definitionem lapidis, per quam
scimus quid est lapis. Ratio enim quam significat nomen, est
definitio, ut dicitur in IV Metaphys. Sed ex effectibus divinis
divinam naturam non possumus cognoscere secundum quod in se est, ut
sciamus de ea quid est; sed per modum eminentiae et causalitatis et
negationis, ut supra dictum est. Et sic hoc nomen Deus significat
naturam divinam. Impositum est enim nomen hoc ad aliquid
significandum supra omnia existens, quod est principium omnium, et
remotum ab omnibus. Hoc enim intendunt significare nominantes
Deum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A9-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 9. Whether this name "God" is communicable?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A9-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name "God" is communicable. For whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name itself.
                     But this name "God" signifies the divine nature, which is communicable to others, according to the words, "He hath given us
                     great [Vulg.: 'most great'] and precious promises, that by these we [Vulg.: 'ye'] may be made partakers of the divine nature"
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.1.4" target="asv">2 Pet. 1:4</a>). Therefore this name "God" can be communicated to
                     others.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="28859" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28859] Iª q. 13 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen Deus sit communicabile.
Cuicumque enim communicatur res significata per nomen, communicatur
et nomen ipsum. Sed hoc nomen Deus, ut dictum est, significat
divinam naturam, quae est communicabilis aliis, secundum illud II
Pet. I, <i>magna et pretiosa promissa nobis donavit, ut per hoc
efficiamur divinae consortes naturae</i>. Ergo hoc nomen Deus est
communicabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A9-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this name "God" is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which appears
                     from the fact that it has a plural, according to the text, "I have said, You are gods" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.81.6" target="asv">Ps. 81:6</a>). Therefore this name "God" is communicable.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="28860" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28860] Iª q. 13 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sola
nomina propria non sunt communicabilia. Sed hoc nomen Deus non est
nomen proprium, sed appellativum, quod patet ex hoc quod habet
plurale, secundum illud Psalmi LXXXI, <i>ego dixi, dii estis</i>.
Ergo hoc nomen Deus est communicabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A9-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, this name "God" comes from operation, as explained. But other names given to God from His operations or effects
                     are communicable; as "good," "wise," and the like. Therefore this name "God" is communicable.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="28861" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28861] Iª q. 13 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, hoc
nomen Deus imponitur ab operatione, ut dictum est. Sed alia nomina
quae imponuntur Deo ab operationibus, sive ab effectibus, sunt
communicabilia, ut bonus, sapiens et huiusmodi. Ergo et hoc nomen
Deus est communicabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A9-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "They gave the incommunicable name to wood and stones" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.21" target="asv">Wis. 14:21</a>), in reference to the divine name. Therefore this name "God" is incommunicable.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 9 s. c."><a name="28862" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28862] Iª q. 13 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Sap. XIV, <i>incommunicabile nomen lignis et lapidibus
imposuerunt</i>; et loquitur de nomine deitatis. Ergo hoc nomen
Deus est nomen incommunicabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A9-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A name is communicable in two ways: properly, and by similitude. It is properly communicable in the sense that its whole
                     signification can be given to many; by similitude it is communicable according to some part of the signification of the name.
                     For instance this name "lion" is properly communicable to all things of the same nature as "lion"; by similitude it is communicable
                     to those who participate in the nature of a lion, as for instance by courage, or
                     strength, and those who thus participate are called lions metaphorically. To know, however, what names are properly communicable,
                     we must consider that every form existing in the singular subject, by which it is individualized, is common to many either
                     in reality, or in idea; as human nature is common to many in reality, and in idea; whereas the nature of the sun is not common
                     to many in reality, but only in idea; for the nature of the sun can be understood as existing in many subjects; and the
                     reason is because the mind understands the nature of every species by abstraction from the singular. Hence to be in one singular
                     subject or in many is outside the idea of the nature of the species. So, given the idea of a species, it can be understood
                     as existing in many. But the singular, from the fact that it is singular, is divided off from all others. Hence every name
                     imposed to signify any singular thing is incommunicable both in reality and idea; for the plurality of this individual thing
                     cannot be; nor can it be conceived in idea. Hence no name signifying any individual thing is properly communicable to many,
                     but only by way of similitude; as for instance a person can be called "Achilles" metaphorically, forasmuch as he may possess
                     something of the properties of Achilles, such as strength. On the other hand, forms which are individualized not by any "suppositum,"
                     but by and of themselves, as being subsisting forms, if understood as they are in themselves, could not be
                     communicable either in reality or in idea; but only perhaps by way of similitude, as was said of individuals. Forasmuch as
                     we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms as they really are, we understand them as compound things having
                     forms in matter; therefore, as was said in the first article, we give them concrete names signifying a nature existing in
                     some "suppositum." Hence, so far as concerns images, the same rules apply to names we impose to signify the nature of compound
                     things as to names given to us to signify simple subsisting natures.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q13_A9-p7"> Since, then, this name "God" is given to signify the divine nature as stated above
                     <a href="#FP_Q13_A8" id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[8])</a>, and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied as shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q11_A3" id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[11], A[3]</a>), it follows that this name "God" is incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the same way as this
                     name "sun" would be communicable according to the opinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is written:
                     "You served them who
                     by nature are not gods," (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.8" target="asv">Gal. 4:8</a>), and a gloss adds, "Gods not in nature, but in human opinion." Nevertheless this name "God" is communicable, not in its
                     whole signification, but in some part of it by way of similitude; so that those are called gods who share in divinity by likeness,
                     according to the text, "I have said, You are gods" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.81.6" target="asv">Ps. 81:6</a>).
                  </p><p id="FP_Q13_A9-p8"> But if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as to His "suppositum," accordingly as He is considered
                     as "this something," that name would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for instance, perhaps the Tetragrammaton among the
                     Hebrew; and this is like giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 9 co."><a name="28863" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28863] Iª q. 13 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod aliquod nomen potest esse communicabile dupliciter, uno modo,
proprie; alio modo, per similitudinem. Proprie quidem communicabile
est, quod secundum totam significationem nominis, est communicabile
multis. Per similitudinem autem communicabile est, quod est
communicabile secundum aliquid eorum quae includuntur in nominis
significatione. Hoc enim nomen leo proprie communicatur omnibus
illis in quibus invenitur natura quam significat hoc nomen leo, per
similitudinem vero communicabile est illis qui participant aliquid
leoninum, ut puta audaciam vel fortitudinem, qui metaphorice leones
dicuntur. Ad sciendum autem quae nomina proprie sunt
communicabilia, considerandum est quod omnis forma in supposito
singulari existens, per quod individuatur, communis est multis, vel
secundum rem vel secundum rationem saltem, sicut natura humana
communis est multis secundum rem et rationem, natura autem solis
non est communis multis secundum rem, sed secundum rationem tantum;
potest enim natura solis intelligi ut in pluribus suppositis
existens. Et hoc ideo, quia intellectus intelligit naturam
cuiuslibet speciei per abstractionem a singulari, unde esse in uno
supposito singulari vel in pluribus, est praeter intellectum
naturae speciei, unde, servato intellectu naturae speciei, potest
intelligi ut in pluribus existens. Sed singulare, ex hoc ipso quod
est singulare, est divisum ab omnibus aliis. Unde omne nomen
impositum ad significandum aliquod singulare, est incommunicabile
et re et ratione, non enim potest nec in apprehensione cadere
pluralitas huius individui. Unde nullum nomen significans aliquod
individuum, est communicabile multis proprie, sed solum secundum
similitudinem; sicut aliquis metaphorice potest dici Achilles,
inquantum habet aliquid de proprietatibus Achillis, scilicet
fortitudinem. Formae vero quae non individuantur per aliquod
suppositum, sed per seipsas (quia scilicet sunt formae
subsistentes), si intelligerentur secundum quod sunt in seipsis,
non possent communicari nec re neque ratione; sed forte per
similitudinem, sicut dictum est de individuis. Sed quia formas
simplices per se subsistentes non possumus intelligere secundum
quod sunt, sed intelligimus eas ad modum rerum compositarum
habentium formas in materia; ideo, ut dictum est, imponimus eis
nomina concreta significantia naturam in aliquo supposito. Unde,
quantum pertinet ad rationem nominum, eadem ratio est de nominibus
quae a nobis imponuntur ad significandum naturas rerum
compositarum, et de nominibus quae a nobis imponuntur ad
significandum naturas simplices subsistentes. Unde, cum hoc nomen
Deus impositum sit ad significandum naturam divinam, ut dictum est;
natura autem divina multiplicabilis non est, ut supra ostensum est,
sequitur quod hoc nomen Deus incommunicabile quidem sit secundum
rem, sed communicabile sit secundum opinionem, quemadmodum hoc
nomen sol esset communicabile secundum opinionem ponentium multos
soles. Et secundum hoc dicitur Gal. IV, <i>his qui natura non sunt
dii, serviebatis</i>; Glossa, <i>non sunt dii natura, sed opinione
hominum</i>. Est nihilominus communicabile hoc nomen Deus, non
secundum suam totam significationem, sed secundum aliquid eius, per
quandam similitudinem, ut dii dicantur, qui participant aliquid
divinum per similitudinem, secundum illud, <i>ego dixi, dii
estis</i>. Si vero esset aliquod nomen impositum ad significandum
Deum non ex parte naturae, sed ex parte suppositi, secundum quod
consideratur ut hoc aliquid, illud nomen esset omnibus modis
incommunicabile, sicut forte est nomen tetragrammaton apud
Hebraeos. Et est simile si quis imponeret nomen soli designans hoc
individuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A9-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine nature is only communicable according to the participation of some similitude.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="28864" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28864] Iª q. 13 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod natura divina non est communicabilis nisi secundum
similitudinis participationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A9-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This name "God" is an appellative name, and not a proper name, for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor; although
                     God Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular. For names do not follow upon the mode of being in things, but
                     upon the mode of being as it is in our mind. And yet it is incommunicable according to the truth of the thing, as was said
                     above concerning the name "sun."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="28865" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28865] Iª q. 13 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod hoc nomen Deus est nomen appellativum, et non
proprium, quia significat naturam divinam ut in habente; licet ipse
Deus, secundum rem, non sit nec universalis nec particularis.
Nomina enim non sequuntur modum essendi qui est in rebus, sed modum
essendi secundum quod in cognitione nostra est. Et tamen, secundum
rei veritatem, est incommunicabile, secundum quod dictum est de hoc
nomine sol.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A9-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These names "good," "wise," and the like, are imposed from the perfections proceeding from God to creatures; but they do
                     not signify the divine nature, but rather signify the perfections themselves absolutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable
                     to many. But this name "God" is given to God from His own proper operation, which we experience continually, to signify the
                     divine nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="28866" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28866] Iª q. 13 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod haec nomina bonus, sapiens, et similia, imposita
quidem sunt a perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas, non
tamen sunt imposita ad significandum divinam naturam, sed ad
significandum ipsas perfectiones absolute. Et ideo etiam secundum
rei veritatem sunt communicabilia multis. Sed hoc nomen Deus
impositum est ab operatione propria Deo, quam experimur continue,
ad significandum divinam naturam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A10-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 10. Whether this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A10-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion. For where
                     a diverse signification exists, there is no contradiction of affirmation and negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction.
                     But a Catholic who says: "An idol is not God," contradicts a pagan who says: "An idol is God." Therefore GOD in both senses
                     is spoken of univocally.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="28867" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28867] Iª q. 13 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen Deus univoce dicatur de Deo per
naturam, et per participationem, et secundum opinionem. Ubi enim
est diversa significatio, non est contradictio affirmantis et
negantis, aequivocatio enim impedit contradictionem sed Catholicus
dicens idolum non est Deus, contradicit Pagano dicenti idolum est
Deus. Ergo Deus utrobique sumptum univoce dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A10-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in truth, so the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion,
                     and not in truth. But this name "beatitude" is applied univocally to this supposed happiness, and also to true happiness.
                     Therefore also this name "God" is applied univocally to the true God, and to God also in opinion.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="28868" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28868] Iª q. 13 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
sicut idolum est Deus secundum opinionem et non secundum veritatem,
ita fruitio carnalium delectationum dicitur felicitas secundum
opinionem, et non secundum veritatem. Sed hoc nomen beatitudo
univoce dicitur de hac beatitudine opinata, et de hac beatitudine
vera. Ergo et hoc nomen Deus univoce dicitur de Deo secundum
veritatem, et de Deo secundum opinionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A10-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, names are called univocal because they contain one idea. Now when a Catholic says: "There is one God," he understands
                     by the name God an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while the heathen understands the same when he says: "An
                     idol is God." Therefore this name "God" is applied univocally to both.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="28869" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28869] Iª q. 13 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
univoca dicuntur quorum est ratio una. Sed Catholicus, cum dicit
unum esse Deum, intelligit nomine Dei rem omnipotentem, et super
omnia venerandam, et hoc idem intelligit gentilis, cum dicit idolum
esse Deum. Ergo hoc nomen Deus univoce dicitur utrobique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A10-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is in the thing as is said in Peri Herm. i. But the word "animal" applied
                     to a true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore this name "God" applied to the true God and to God in opinion
                     is applied equivocally.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q13_A10-p6"> Further, No one can signify what he does not know. But the heathen does not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol
                     is God, he does not signify the true Deity. On the other hand, A Catholic signifies the true Deity when he says that there
                     is one God. Therefore this name "God" is not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true God, and to God according to
                     opinion.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 1"><a name="28870" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28870] Iª q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra,
illud quod est in intellectu, est similitudo eius quod est in re,
ut dicitur in I Periherm. Sed animal, dictum de animali vero et de
animali picto, aequivoce dicitur. Ergo hoc nomen Deus, dictum de
Deo vero et de Deo secundum opinionem, aequivoce dicitur.</p><p title="I q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 2"><a name="28871" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28871] Iª q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
nullus potest significare id quod non cognoscit, sed gentilis non
cognoscit naturam divinam, ergo, cum dicit idolum est Deus, non
significat veram deitatem. Hanc autem significat Catholicus dicens
unum esse Deum. Ergo hoc nomen Deus non dicitur univoce, sed
aequivoce, de Deo vero, et de Deo secundum opinionem.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A10-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> This name "God" in the three aforesaid significations is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. This
                     is apparent from this reason: Univocal terms mean absolutely the same thing, but equivocal terms absolutely different; whereas
                     in analogical terms a word taken in one signification must be placed in the definition of the same word taken in other senses;
                     as, for instance, "being" which is applied to "substance" is placed in the definition
                     of being as applied to "accident"; and "healthy" applied to animal is placed in the definition of healthy as applied to urine
                     and medicine. For urine is the sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the cause of health.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q13_A10-p8"> The same applies to the question at issue. For this name "God," as signifying the true God, includes the idea of God when
                     it is used to denote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone god by participation, we understand by the
                     name of god some likeness of the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god we understand and signify
                     something which men think is God; thus it is manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is
                     comprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said analogically.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 10 co."><a name="28872" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28872] Iª q. 13 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod hoc nomen Deus, in praemissis tribus significationibus, non
accipitur neque univoce neque aequivoce, sed analogice. Quod ex hoc
patet. Quia univocorum est omnino eadem ratio, aequivocorum est
omnino ratio diversa, in analogicis vero, oportet quod nomen
secundum unam significationem acceptum, ponatur in definitione
eiusdem nominis secundum alias significationes accepti. Sicut ens
de substantia dictum, ponitur in definitione entis secundum quod de
accidente dicitur; et sanum dictum de animali, ponitur in
definitione sani secundum quod dicitur de urina et de medicina;
huius enim sani quod est in animali, urina est significativa, et
medicina factiva. Sic accidit in proposito. Nam hoc nomen Deus,
secundum quod pro Deo vero sumitur, in ratione Dei sumitur secundum
quod dicitur Deus secundum opinionem vel participationem. Cum enim
aliquem nominamus Deum secundum participationem, intelligimus
nomine Dei aliquid habens similitudinem veri Dei. Similiter cum
idolum nominamus Deum, hoc nomine Deus intelligimus significari
aliquid, de quo homines opinantur quod sit Deus. Et sic manifestum
est quod alia et alia est significatio nominis, sed una illarum
significationum clauditur in significationibus aliis. Unde
manifestum est quod analogice dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A10-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The multiplication of names does not depend on the predication of the name, but on the signification: for this name "man,"
                     of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is predicated in one sense. But it would be multiplied if by the
                     name "man" we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one meant to signify by this name "man" what man really
                     is, and another meant to signify by the same name a stone, or something else. Hence it
                     is evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not God contradicts the pagan asserting that it is God; because each of
                     them uses this name GOD to signify the true God. For when the pagan says an idol is God, he does not use this name as meaning
                     God in opinion, for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics sometimes use the name in the sense, as in the Psalm,
                     "All the gods of the Gentiles are demons" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A10-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.95.5" target="asv">Ps. 95:5</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="28873" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28873] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod nominum multiplicitas non attenditur secundum nominis
praedicationem, sed secundum significationem, hoc enim nomen homo,
de quocumque praedicetur, sive vere sive false, dicitur uno modo.
Sed tunc multipliciter diceretur, si per hoc nomen homo
intenderemus significare diversa, puta, si unus intenderet
significare per hoc nomen homo id quod vere est homo, et alius
intenderet significare eodem nomine lapidem, vel aliquid aliud.
Unde patet quod Catholicus dicens idolum non esse Deum, contradicit
Pagano hoc asserenti, quia uterque utitur hoc nomine Deus ad
significandum verum Deum. Cum enim Paganus dicit idolum esse Deum,
non utitur hoc nomine secundum quod significat Deum opinabilem, sic
enim verum diceret, cum etiam Catholici interdum in tali
significatione hoc nomine utantur, ut cum dicitur, <i>omnes dii
gentium Daemonia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A10-p10"><b>Reply to Objections 2 and 3:</b> The same remark applies to the Second and Third Objections. For these reasons proceed from the different predication of the
                     name, and not from its various significations.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="28874" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28874] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Et similiter
dicendum ad secundum et tertium. Nam illae rationes procedunt
secundum diversitatem praedicationis nominis, et non secundum
diversam significationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A10-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The term "animal" applied to a true and a pictured animal is not purely equivocal; for the Philosopher takes equivocal names
                     in a large sense, including analogous names; because also being, which is predicated analogically, is sometimes said to be
                     predicated equivocally of different predicaments.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 4"><a name="28875" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28875] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod animal dictum de animali vero et de picto, non
dicitur pure aequivoce; sed philosophus largo modo accipit
aequivoca, secundum quod includunt in se analoga. Quia et ens, quod
analogice dicitur, aliquando dicitur aequivoce praedicari de
diversis praedicamentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A10-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one knows it according to some idea
                     of causality, or excellence, or remotion (
                     <a href="#FP_Q12_A12" id="FP_Q13_A10-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[12], A[12]</a>). So a pagan can take this name "God" in the same way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying an idol
                     is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use
                     names the meaning of which we know not.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 5"><a name="28876" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28876] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
dicendum quod ipsam naturam Dei prout in se est, neque Catholicus
neque Paganus cognoscit, sed uterque cognoscit eam secundum aliquam
rationem causalitatis vel excellentiae vel remotionis, ut supra
dictum est. Et secundum hoc, in eadem significatione accipere
potest gentilis hoc nomen Deus, cum dicit idolum est Deus, in qua
accipit ipsum Catholicus dicens idolum non est Deus. Si vero
aliquis esset qui secundum nullam rationem Deum cognosceret, nec
ipsum nominaret, nisi forte sicut proferimus nomina quorum
significationem ignoramus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A11" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A11-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 11. Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A11-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of God. For this name "God" is an incommunicable name. But
                     this name HE WHO IS, is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="28877" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28877] Iª q. 13 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen qui est non sit maxime
proprium nomen Dei. Hoc enim nomen Deus est nomen incommunicabile,
ut dictum est. Sed hoc nomen qui est non est nomen incommunicabile.
Ergo hoc nomen qui est non est maxime proprium nomen Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A11-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "the name of good excellently manifests all the processions of God." But it
                     especially belongs to God to be the universal principle of all things. Therefore this name "good" is supremely proper to God,
                     and not this name HE WHO IS.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="28878" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28878] Iª q. 13 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Dionysius dicit, III cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>boni nominatio est
manifestativa omnium Dei processionum</i>. Sed hoc maxime Deo
convenit, quod sit universale rerum principium. Ergo hoc nomen
bonum est maxime proprium Dei, et non hoc nomen qui est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A11-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every divine name seems to imply relation to creatures, for God is known to us only through creatures. But this
                     name HE WHO IS imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not the most applicable to God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 11 arg. 3"><a name="28879" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28879] Iª q. 13 a. 11 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
nomen divinum videtur importare relationem ad creaturas, cum Deus
non cognoscatur a nobis nisi per creaturas. Sed hoc nomen qui est
nullam importat habitudinem ad creaturas. Ergo hoc nomen qui est
non est maxime proprium nomen Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A11-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written that when Moses asked, "If they should say to me, What is His name? what shall I say to them?" The Lord answered
                     him, "Thus shalt thou say to them, HE WHO IS hath sent me to you" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A11-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.3.13" target="asv">Ex. 3:13,14</a>). Therefor this name HE WHO IS most properly belongs to God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 11 s. c."><a name="28880" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28880] Iª q. 13 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Exod. III, quod Moysi quaerenti, <i>si dixerint mihi,
quod est nomen eius? Quid dicam eis?</i> Et respondit ei dominus,
<i>sic dices eis, qui est misit me ad vos</i>. Ergo hoc nomen qui
est est maxime proprium nomen Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A11-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God, for three reasons:
                  </p><p id="FP_Q13_A11-p7"> First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the existence
                     of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other (
                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A4" id="FP_Q13_A11-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for everything is denominated by its form.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q13_A11-p8"> Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add
                     something above it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine it. Now our intellect cannot know the
                     essence of God itself in this life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining what it understands about
                     God, it falls short of the mode of what God is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the
                     more universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are applied to God. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i) that,
                     "HE WHO IS, is the principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending all in itself, it contains existence itself as
                     an infinite and indeterminate sea of substance." Now by any other name some mode of substance is determined, whereas this
                     name HE WHO IS, determines no mode of being, but is indeterminate to all; and therefore it denominates the "infinite ocean
                     of
                     substance."
                  </p><p id="FP_Q13_A11-p9"> Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present existence; and this above all properly applies to God, whose
                     existence knows not past or future, as Augustine says (De Trin. v).
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 11 co."><a name="28881" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28881] Iª q. 13 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod hoc nomen qui est triplici ratione est maxime proprium nomen
Dei. Primo quidem, propter sui significationem. Non enim significat
formam aliquam, sed ipsum esse. Unde, cum esse Dei sit ipsa eius
essentia, et hoc nulli alii conveniat, ut supra ostensum est,
manifestum est quod inter alia nomina hoc maxime proprie nominat
Deum, unumquodque enim denominatur a sua forma. Secundo, propter
eius universalitatem. Omnia enim alia nomina vel sunt minus
communia; vel, si convertantur cum ipso, tamen addunt aliqua supra
ipsum secundum rationem; unde quodammodo informant et determinant
ipsum. Intellectus autem noster non potest ipsam Dei essentiam
cognoscere in statu viae, secundum quod in se est, sed quemcumque
modum determinet circa id quod de Deo intelligit, deficit a modo
quo Deus in se est. Et ideo, quanto aliqua nomina sunt minus
determinata, et magis communia et absoluta, tanto magis proprie
dicuntur de Deo a nobis. Unde et Damascenus dicit quod
<i>principalius omnibus quae de Deo dicuntur nominibus, est qui
est, totum enim in seipso comprehendens, habet ipsum esse velut
quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum et indeterminatum</i>.
Quolibet enim alio nomine determinatur aliquis modus substantiae
rei, sed hoc nomen qui est nullum modum essendi determinat, sed se
habet indeterminate ad omnes; et ideo nominat ipsum <i>pelagus
substantiae infinitum</i>. Tertio vero, ex eius consignificatione.
Significat enim esse in praesenti, et hoc maxime proprie de Deo
dicitur, cuius esse non novit praeteritum vel futurum, ut dicit
Augustinus in V de Trin.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A11-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This name HE WHO IS is the name of God more properly than this name "God," as regards its source, namely, existence; and
                     as regards the mode of signification and consignification, as said above. But as regards the object intended by the name,
                     this name "God" is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the divine nature; and still more proper is the Tetragrammaton,
                     imposed to signify the substance of God itself, incommunicable and, if one may so speak,
                     singular.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="28882" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28882] Iª q. 13 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod hoc nomen qui est est magis proprium nomen Dei quam
hoc nomen Deus, quantum ad id a quo imponitur, scilicet ab esse, et
quantum ad modum significandi et consignificandi, ut dictum est.
Sed quantum ad id ad quod imponitur nomen ad significandum, est
magis proprium hoc nomen Deus, quod imponitur ad significandum
naturam divinam. Et adhuc magis proprium nomen est tetragrammaton,
quod est impositum ad significandam ipsam Dei substantiam
incommunicabilem, et, ut sic liceat loqui, singularem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A11-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This name "good" is the principal name of God in so far as He is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered absolutely
                     comes before the idea of cause.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="28883" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28883] Iª q. 13 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod hoc nomen bonum est principale nomen Dei inquantum
est causa, non tamen simpliciter, nam esse absolute
praeintelligitur causae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A11-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not necessary that all the divine names should import relation to creatures, but it suffices that they be imposed from
                     some perfections flowing from God to creatures. Among these the first is existence, from which comes this name, HE WHO IS.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 11 ad 3"><a name="28884" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28884] Iª q. 13 a. 11 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod non est necessarium quod omnia nomina divina
importent habitudinem ad creaturas; sed sufficit quod imponantur ab
aliquibus perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas. Inter
quas prima est ipsum esse, a qua sumitur hoc nomen qui est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A12" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A12-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 12. Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A12-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed about God. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that "negations about
                     God are true; but affirmations are vague."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="28885" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28885] Iª q. 13 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod propositiones affirmativae non possunt
formari de Deo. Dicit enim Dionysius, II cap. Cael. Hier., quod
<i>negationes de Deo sunt verae, affirmationes autem
incompactae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A12-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that "a simple form cannot be a subject." But God is the most absolutely simple form,
                     as shown (Q[3] ): therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about which an affirmative proposition is made is taken
                     as a subject. Therefore an affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 12 arg. 2"><a name="28886" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28886] Iª q. 13 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Boetius dicit, in libro de Trin., quod <i>forma simplex subiectum
esse non potest</i>. Sed Deus maxime est forma simplex, ut supra
ostensum est. Ergo non potest esse subiectum. Sed omne illud de quo
propositio affirmativa formatur, accipitur ut subiectum. Ergo de
Deo propositio affirmativa formari non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A12-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise than as it is. But God has existence without any composition
                     as shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A7" id="FP_Q13_A12-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore since every affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows that a true affirmative proposition
                     about God cannot be made.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="28887" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28887] Iª q. 13 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
omnis intellectus intelligens rem aliter quam sit, est falsus. Sed
Deus habet esse absque omni compositione, ut supra probatum est.
Cum igitur omnis intellectus affirmativus intelligat aliquid cum
compositione, videtur quod propositio affirmativa vere de Deo
formari non possit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A12-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> What is of faith cannot be false. But some affirmative propositions are of faith; as that God is Three and One; and that
                     He is omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can be formed about God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 12 s. c."><a name="28888" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28888] Iª q. 13 a. 12 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod fidei non subest falsum. Sed propositiones quaedam
affirmativae subduntur fidei, utpote quod Deus est trinus et unus,
et quod est omnipotens. Ergo propositiones affirmativae possunt
vere formari de Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A12-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> True affirmative propositions can be formed about God. To prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition
                     the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in reality, and different things in idea. And this appears
                     to be the case both in propositions which have an accidental predicate, and in those which have an essential predicate. For
                     it is manifest that "man" and "white" are the same in subject, and different in idea; for
                     the idea of man is one thing, and that of whiteness is another. The same applies when I say, "man is an animal"; since the
                     same thing which is man is truly animal; for in the same "suppositum" there is sensible nature by reason of which he is called
                     animal, and the rational nature by reason of which he is called man; hence here again predicate and subject are the same as
                     to "suppositum," but different as to idea. But in propositions where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same rule
                     in
                     some way applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to the "suppositum" what it places in the subject; and what it places in
                     the predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the "suppositum"; according to the saying that "predicates are
                     to be taken formally, and subjects materially." To this diversity in idea corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject,
                     while the intellect signifies the identity of the thing by the composition itself.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q13_A12-p7"> God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple, yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions
                     because it cannot see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him under different conceptions, it knows
                     that one and the same simple object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of predicate and subject represents
                     the plurality of idea; and the intellect represents the unity by composition.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 12 co."><a name="28889" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28889] Iª q. 13 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod propositiones affirmativae possunt vere formari de Deo. Ad
cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod in qualibet propositione
affirmativa vera, oportet quod praedicatum et subiectum significent
idem secundum rem aliquo modo, et diversum secundum rationem. Et
hoc patet tam in propositionibus quae sunt de praedicato
accidentali, quam in illis quae sunt de praedicato substantiali.
Manifestum est enim quod homo et albus sunt idem subiecto, et
differunt ratione, alia enim est ratio hominis, et alia ratio albi.
Et similiter cum dico homo est animal, illud enim ipsum quod est
homo, vere animal est; in eodem enim supposito est et natura
sensibilis, a qua dicitur animal, et rationalis, a qua dicitur
homo. Unde hic etiam praedicatum et subiectum sunt idem supposito,
sed diversa ratione. Sed et in propositionibus in quibus idem
praedicatur de seipso, hoc aliquo modo invenitur; inquantum
intellectus id quod ponit ex parte subiecti, trahit ad partem
suppositi, quod vero ponit ex parte praedicati, trahit ad naturam
formae in supposito existentis, secundum quod dicitur quod
praedicata tenentur formaliter, et subiecta materialiter. Huic vero
diversitati quae est secundum rationem, respondet pluralitas
praedicati et subiecti, identitatem vero rei significat intellectus
per ipsam compositionem. Deus autem, in se consideratus, est omnino
unus et simplex, sed tamen intellectus noster secundum diversas
conceptiones ipsum cognoscit, eo quod non potest ipsum ut in seipso
est, videre. Sed tamen, quamvis intelligat ipsum sub diversis
conceptionibus, cognoscit tamen quod omnibus suis conceptionibus
respondet una et eadem res simpliciter. Hanc ergo pluralitatem quae
est secundum rationem, repraesentat per pluralitatem praedicati et
subiecti, unitatem vero repraesentat intellectus per
compositionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A12-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius says that the affirmations about God are vague or, according to another translation, "incongruous," inasmuch as
                     no name can be applied to God according to its mode of signification.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="28890" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28890] Iª q. 13 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Dionysius dicit affirmationes de Deo esse
incompactas, vel inconvenientes secundum aliam translationem,
inquantum nullum nomen Deo competit secundum modum significandi, ut
supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A12-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting forms, as they really are in themselves; but it apprehends them as compound
                     things in which there is something taken as subject and something that is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form
                     as a subject, and attributes something else to it.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 12 ad 2"><a name="28891" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28891] Iª q. 13 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod intellectus noster non potest formas simplices
subsistentes secundum quod in seipsis sunt, apprehendere, sed
apprehendit eas secundum modum compositorum, in quibus est aliquid
quod subiicitur, et est aliquid quod inest. Et ideo apprehendit
formam simplicem in ratione subiecti, et attribuit ei aliquid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A12-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This proposition, "The intellect understanding anything otherwise than it is, is false," can be taken in two senses, accordingly
                     as this adverb "otherwise" determines the word "understanding" on the part of the thing understood, or on the part of the
                     one who understands. Taken as referring to the thing understood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any intellect
                     which understands that the thing is otherwise than it is, is false. But this
                     does not hold in the present case; because our intellect, when forming a proposition about God, does not affirm that He is
                     composite, but that He is simple. But taken as referring to the one who understands, the proposition is false. For the mode
                     of the intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing in its essence. Since it is clear that our intellect
                     understands material things below itself in an immaterial manner; not that it understands them to be immaterial things; but
                     its manner of understanding is immaterial. Likewise, when it understands simple things above itself, it understands them according
                     to its own mode, which is in a composite manner; yet not so as to understand them to be composite things. And thus our intellect
                     is not false in forming composition in its ideas concerning God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 12 ad 3"><a name="28892" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28892] Iª q. 13 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod haec propositio, intellectus intelligens rem aliter
quam sit, est falsus, est duplex, ex eo quod hoc adverbium aliter
potest determinare hoc verbum intelligit ex parte intellecti, vel
ex parte intelligentis. Si ex parte intellecti, sic propositio vera
est, et est sensus, quicumque intellectus intelligit rem esse
aliter quam sit, falsus est. Sed hoc non habet locum in proposito,
quia intellectus noster, formans propositionem de Deo, non dicit
eum esse compositum, sed simplicem. Si vero ex parte intelligentis,
sic propositio falsa est. Alius est enim modus intellectus in
intelligendo, quam rei in essendo. Manifestum est enim quod
intellectus noster res materiales infra se existentes intelligit
immaterialiter; non quod intelligat eas esse immateriales, sed
habet modum immaterialem in intelligendo. Et similiter, cum
intelligit simplicia quae sunt supra se, intelligit ea secundum
modum suum, scilicet composite, non tamen ita quod intelligat ea
esse composita. Et sic intellectus noster non est falsus, formans
compositionem de Deo.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q14" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q14-p0.1">Q. 14. OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q14-p2"> Having considered what belongs to the divine substance, we have now to treat of God's operation. And since one kind of operation
                  is immanent, and another kind of operation proceeds to the exterior effect, we treat first of knowledge and of will (for understanding
                  abides in the intelligent agent, and will is in the one who wills); and afterwards of the power of God, the principle of the
                  divine operation as proceeding to the exterior effect. Now because to understand is a kind of
                  life, after treating of the divine knowledge, we consider truth and falsehood. Further, as everything known is in the knower,
                  and the types of things as existing in the knowledge of God are called ideas, to the consideration of knowledge will be added
                  the treatment of ideas.
               </p><p id="FP_Q14-p3"> Concerning knowledge, there are sixteen points for inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q14-p4"><a href="#FP_Q14_A1"> (1) Whether there is knowledge in God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q14-p5"><a href="#FP_Q14_A2"> (2) Whether God understands Himself?</a></p><p id="FP_Q14-p6"><a href="#FP_Q14_A3"> (3) Whether He comprehends Himself?</a></p><p id="FP_Q14-p7"><a href="#FP_Q14_A4"> (4) Whether His understanding is His substance?</a></p><p id="FP_Q14-p8"><a href="#FP_Q14_A5"> (5) Whether He understands other things besides Himself?</a></p><p id="FP_Q14-p9"><a href="#FP_Q14_A6"> (6) Whether He has a proper knowledge of them?</a></p><p id="FP_Q14-p10"><a href="#FP_Q14_A7"> (7) Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?</a></p><p id="FP_Q14-p11"><a href="#FP_Q14_A8"> (8) Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q14-p12"><a href="#FP_Q14_A9"> (9) Whether God has knowledge of non-existing things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q14-p13"><a href="#FP_Q14_A10"> (10) Whether He has knowledge of evil?</a></p><p id="FP_Q14-p14"><a href="#FP_Q14_A11"> (11) Whether He has knowledge of individual things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q14-p15"><a href="#FP_Q14_A12"> (12) Whether He knows the infinite?</a></p><p id="FP_Q14-p16"><a href="#FP_Q14_A13"> (13) Whether He knows future contingent things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q14-p17"><a href="#FP_Q14_A14"> (14) Whether He knows enunciable things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q14-p18"><a href="#FP_Q14_A15"> (15) Whether the knowledge of God is variable?</a></p><p id="FP_Q14-p19"><a href="#FP_Q14_A16"> (16) Whether God has speculative or practical knowledge of things?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 pr."><a name="28893" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28893]
Iª q. 14 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem eorum quae ad
divinam substantiam pertinent, restat considerandum de his quae
pertinent ad operationem ipsius. Et quia operatio quaedam est quae
manet in operante, quaedam vero quae procedit in exteriorem
effectum, primo agemus de scientia et voluntate (nam intelligere in
intelligente est, et velle in volente); et postmodum de potentia
Dei, quae consideratur ut principium operationis divinae in
effectum exteriorem procedentis. Quia vero intelligere quoddam
vivere est, post considerationem divinae scientiae, considerandum
erit de vita divina. Et quia scientia verorum est, erit etiam
considerandum de veritate et falsitate. Rursum, quia omne cognitum
in cognoscente est, rationes autem rerum secundum quod sunt in Deo
cognoscente, ideae vocantur, cum consideratione scientiae erit
etiam adiungenda consideratio de ideis. Circa scientiam vero
quaeruntur sexdecim. Primo, utrum in Deo sit scientia. Secundo,
utrum Deus intelligat seipsum. Tertio, utrum comprehendat se.
Quarto, utrum suum intelligere sit sua substantia. Quinto, utrum
intelligat alia a se. Sexto, utrum habeat de eis propriam
cognitionem. Septimo, utrum scientia Dei sit discursiva. Octavo,
utrum scientia Dei sit causa rerum. Nono, utrum scientia Dei sit
eorum quae non sunt. Decimo, utrum sit malorum. Undecimo, utrum sit
singularium. Duodecimo, utrum sit infinitorum. Decimotertio, utrum
sit contingentium futurorum. Decimoquarto, utrum sit enuntiabilium.
Decimoquinto, utrum scientia Dei sit variabilis. Decimosexto, utrum
Deus de rebus habeat speculativam scientiam vel practicam.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q14_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A1-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 1. Whether there is knowledge [*Scientia]?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that in God there is not knowledge. For knowledge is a habit; and habit does not belong to God, since it is the
                     mean between potentiality and act. Therefore knowledge is not in God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28894" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28894] Iª q. 14 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sit scientia. Scientia enim
habitus est, qui Deo non competit, cum sit medius inter potentiam
et actum. Ergo scientia non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since science is about conclusions, it is a kind of knowledge caused by something else which is the knowledge of
                     principles. But nothing is caused in God; therefore science is not in God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28895" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28895] Iª q. 14 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
scientia, cum sit conclusionum, est quaedam cognitio ab alio
causata, scilicet ex cognitione principiorum. Sed nihil causatum
est in Deo. Ergo scientia non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all knowledge is universal, or particular. But in God there is no universal or particular (
                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A5" id="FP_Q14_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Therefore in God there is not knowledge.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28896" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28896] Iª q. 14 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omnis
scientia vel universalis vel particularis est. Sed in Deo non est
universale et particulare, ut ex superioribus patet; ergo in Deo
non est scientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says, "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.33" target="asv">Rom. 11:33</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28897" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28897] Iª q. 14 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod apostolus dicit Rom. XI, <i>o altitudo divitiarum sapientiae
et scientiae Dei</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In God there exists the most perfect knowledge. To prove this, we must note that intelligent beings are distinguished from
                     non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted
                     to have also the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the knower. Hence it is manifest that the
                     nature of a non-intelligent being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of
                     intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that "the soul is
                     in a sense all things." Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we have said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q14_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>) forms according as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore it is clear that
                     the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive; and according to the mode of immateriality is
                     the mode of knowledge. Hence it is said in De Anima ii that plants do not know, because they are wholly material. But sense
                     is cognitive because it can receive images free from matter, and the intellect is still further cognitive, because it is more
                     separated from matter and unmixed, as said in De Anima iii. Since therefore God is in the highest degree of immateriality
                     as stated above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q14_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>), it follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 co."><a name="28898" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28898] Iª q. 14 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod in Deo perfectissime est scientia. Ad cuius evidentiam,
considerandum est quod cognoscentia a non cognoscentibus in hoc
distinguuntur, quia non cognoscentia nihil habent nisi formam suam
tantum; sed cognoscens natum est habere formam etiam rei alterius,
nam species cogniti est in cognoscente. Unde manifestum est quod
natura rei non cognoscentis est magis coarctata et limitata, natura
autem rerum cognoscentium habet maiorem amplitudinem et
extensionem. Propter quod dicit philosophus, III de anima, quod
<i>anima est quodammodo omnia</i>. Coarctatio autem formae est per
materiam. Unde et supra diximus quod formae, secundum quod sunt
magis immateriales, secundum hoc magis accedunt ad quandam
infinitatem. Patet igitur quod immaterialitas alicuius rei est
ratio quod sit cognoscitiva; et secundum modum immaterialitatis est
modus cognitionis. Unde in II de anima dicitur quod plantae non
cognoscunt, propter suam materialitatem. Sensus autem cognoscitivus
est, quia receptivus est specierum sine materia, et intellectus
adhuc magis cognoscitivus, quia magis separatus est a materia et
immixtus, ut dicitur in III de anima. Unde, cum Deus sit in summo
immaterialitatis, ut ex superioribus patet, sequitur quod ipse sit
in summo cognitionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because perfections flowing from God to creatures exist in a higher state in God Himself (
                     <a href="#FP_Q4_A2" id="FP_Q14_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[2]</a>), whenever a name taken from any created perfection is attributed to God, it must be separated in its signification from
                     anything that belongs to that imperfect mode proper to creatures. Hence knowledge is not a quality of God, nor a habit; but
                     substance and pure act.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28899" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28899] Iª q. 14 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, quia perfectiones procedentes a Deo in creaturas,
altiori modo sunt in Deo, ut supra dictum est, oportet quod,
quandocumque aliquod nomen sumptum a quacumque perfectione
creaturae Deo attribuitur, secludatur ab eius significatione omne
illud quod pertinet ad imperfectum modum qui competit creaturae.
Unde scientia non est qualitas in Deo vel habitus, sed substantia
et actus purus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whatever is divided and multiplied in creatures exists in God simply and unitedly (
                     <a href="#FP_Q13_A4" id="FP_Q14_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[4]</a>). Now man has different kinds of knowledge, according to the different objects of His knowledge. He has "intelligence" as
                     regards the knowledge of principles; he has "science" as regards knowledge of conclusions; he has "wisdom," according as he
                     knows the highest cause; he has "counsel" or "prudence," according as he knows what is to
                     be done. But God knows all these by one simple act of knowledge, as will be shown
                     <a href="#FP_Q14_A7" id="FP_Q14_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>. Hence the simple knowledge of God can be named by all these names; in such a way, however, that there must be removed from
                     each of them, so far as they enter into divine predication, everything that savors of imperfection; and everything that expresses
                     perfection is to be retained in them. Hence it is said, "With Him is wisdom and strength, He hath counsel and understanding"
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A1-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Job.12.13" target="asv">Job 12:13</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28900" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28900] Iª q. 14 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ea quae sunt divisim et multipliciter in creaturis,
in Deo sunt simpliciter et unite, ut supra dictum est. Homo autem,
secundum diversa cognita, habet diversas cognitiones, nam secundum
quod cognoscit principia, dicitur habere intelligentiam; scientiam
vero, secundum quod cognoscit conclusiones; sapientiam, secundum
quod cognoscit causam altissimam; consilium vel prudentiam,
secundum quod cognoscit agibilia. Sed haec omnia Deus una et
simplici cognitione cognoscit, ut infra patebit. Unde simplex Dei
cognitio omnibus istis nominibus nominari potest, ita tamen quod ab
unoquoque eorum, secundum quod in divinam praedicationem venit,
secludatur quidquid imperfectionis est, et retineatur quidquid
perfectionis est. Et secundum hoc dicitur Iob XII, <i>apud ipsum
est sapientia et fortitudo; ipse habet consilium et
intelligentiam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Knowledge is according to the mode of the one who knows; for the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the
                     knower. Now since the mode of the divine essence is higher than that of creatures, divine knowledge does not exist in God
                     after the mode of created knowledge, so as to be universal or particular, or habitual, or potential, or existing according
                     to any such mode.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28901" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28901] Iª q. 14 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod scientia est secundum modum cognoscentis, scitum enim
est in sciente secundum modum scientis. Et ideo, cum modus divinae
essentiae sit altior quam modus quo creaturae sunt, scientia divina
non habet modum creatae scientiae, ut scilicet sit universalis vel
particularis, vel in habitu vel in potentia, vel secundum aliquem
talem modum disposita.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A2-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 2. Whether God understands Himself?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not understand Himself. For it is said by the Philosopher (De Causis), "Every knower who knows his
                     own essence, returns completely to his own essence." But God does not go out from His own essence, nor is He moved at all;
                     thus He cannot return to His own essence. Therefore He does not know His own essence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28902" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28902] Iª q. 14 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non intelligat se. Dicitur enim in
libro de causis, quod <i>omnis sciens qui scit suam essentiam, est
rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa</i>. Sed Deus non exit
extra essentiam suam, nec aliquo modo movetur, et sic non competit
sibi redire ad essentiam suam. Ergo ipse non est sciens essentiam
suam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to understand is a kind of passion and movement, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii); and knowledge also is a
                     kind of assimilation to the object known; and the thing known is the perfection of the knower. But nothing is moved, or suffers,
                     or is made perfect by itself, "nor," as Hilary says (De Trin. iii), "is a thing its own likeness." Therefore God does not
                     understand Himself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28903" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28903] Iª q. 14 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
intelligere est quoddam pati et moveri, ut dicitur in III de anima,
scientia etiam est assimilatio ad rem scitam, et scitum etiam est
perfectio scientis. Sed nihil movetur, vel patitur, vel perficitur
a seipso; neque similitudo sibi est, ut Hilarius dicit. Ergo Deus
non est sciens seipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we are like to God chiefly in our intellect, because we are the image of God in our mind, as Augustine says (Gen.
                     ad lit. vi). But our intellect understands itself, only as it understands other things, as is said in De Anima iii. Therefore
                     God understands Himself only so far perchance as He understands other things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28904" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28904] Iª q. 14 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
praecipue Deo sumus similes secundum intellectum, quia secundum
mentem sumus ad imaginem Dei, ut dicit Augustinus. Sed intellectus
noster non intelligit se, nisi sicut intelligit alia, ut dicitur in
III de anima. Ergo nec Deus intelligit se, nisi forte intelligendo
alia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:11</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28905" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28905] Iª q. 14 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur I ad Cor. II, <i>quae sunt Dei, nemo novit nisi
spiritus Dei</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God understands Himself through Himself. In proof whereof it must be known that although in operations which pass to an external
                     effect, the object of the operation, which is taken as the term, exists outside the operator; nevertheless in operations that
                     remain in the operator, the object signified as the term of operation, resides in the operator; and accordingly as it is in
                     the operator, the operation is actual. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima iii)
                     that "the sensible in act is sense in act, and the intelligible in act is intellect in act." For the reason why we actually
                     feel or know a thing is because our intellect or sense is actually informed by the sensible or intelligible species. And because
                     of this only, it follows that sense or intellect is distinct from the sensible or intelligible object, since both are in potentiality.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q14_A2-p7"> Since therefore God has nothing in Him of potentiality, but is pure act, His intellect and its object are altogether the
                     same; so that He neither is without the intelligible species, as is the case with our intellect when it understands potentially;
                     nor does the intelligible species differ from the substance of the divine intellect, as it differs in our intellect when it
                     understands actually; but the intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself, and thus God
                     understands Himself through Himself.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 2 co."><a name="28906" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28906] Iª q. 14 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod Deus se per seipsum intelligit. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum
est quod, licet in operationibus quae transeunt in exteriorem
effectum, obiectum operationis, quod significatur ut terminus, sit
aliquid extra operantem; tamen in operationibus quae sunt in
operante, obiectum quod significatur ut terminus operationis, est
in ipso operante; et secundum quod est in eo, sic est operatio in
actu. Unde dicitur in libro de anima, quod sensibile in actu est
sensus in actu, et intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu.
Ex hoc enim aliquid in actu sentimus vel intelligimus, quod
intellectus noster vel sensus informatur in actu per speciem
sensibilis vel intelligibilis. Et secundum hoc tantum sensus vel
intellectus aliud est a sensibili vel intelligibili, quia utrumque
est in potentia. Cum igitur Deus nihil potentialitatis habeat, sed
sit actus purus, oportet quod in eo intellectus et intellectum sint
idem omnibus modis, ita scilicet, ut neque careat specie
intelligibili, sicut intellectus noster cum intelligit in potentia;
neque species intelligibilis sit aliud a substantia intellectus
divini, sicut accidit in intellectu nostro, cum est actu
intelligens; sed ipsa species intelligibilis est ipse intellectus
divinus. Et sic seipsum per seipsum intelligit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Return to its own essence means only that a thing subsists in itself. Inasmuch as the form perfects the matter by giving
                     it existence, it is in a certain way diffused in it; and it returns to itself inasmuch as it has existence in itself. Therefore
                     those cognitive faculties which are not subsisting, but are the acts of organs, do not know themselves, as in the case of
                     each of the senses; whereas those cognitive faculties which are subsisting, know
                     themselves; hence it is said in De Causis that, "whoever knows his essence returns to it." Now it supremely belongs to God
                     to be self-subsisting. Hence according to this mode of speaking, He supremely returns to His own essence, and knows Himself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28907" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28907] Iª q. 14 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod redire ad essentiam suam nihil aliud est quam rem
subsistere in seipsa. Forma enim, inquantum perficit materiam dando
ei esse, quodammodo supra ipsam effunditur, inquantum vero in
seipsa habet esse, in seipsam redit. Virtutes igitur cognoscitivae
quae non sunt subsistentes, sed actus aliquorum organorum, non
cognoscunt seipsas; sicut patet in singulis sensibus. Sed virtutes
cognoscitivae per se subsistentes, cognoscunt seipsas. Et propter
hoc dicitur in libro de causis, quod <i>sciens essentiam suam,
redit ad essentiam suam</i>. Per se autem subsistere maxime
convenit Deo. Unde secundum hunc modum loquendi, ipse est maxime
rediens ad essentiam suam, et cognoscens seipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Movement and passion are taken equivocally, according as to understand is described as a kind of movement or passion, as
                     stated in De Anima iii. For to understand is not a movement that is an act of something imperfect passing from one to another,
                     but it is an act, existing in the agent itself, of something perfect. Likewise that the intellect is perfected by the intelligible
                     object, i.e. is assimilated to it, this belongs to an intellect which is
                     sometimes in potentiality; because the fact of its being in a state of potentiality makes it differ from the intelligible
                     object and assimilates it thereto through the intelligible species, which is the likeness of the thing understood, and makes
                     it to be perfected thereby, as potentiality is perfected by act. On the other hand, the divine intellect, which is no way
                     in potentiality, is not perfected by the intelligible object, nor is it assimilated thereto, but is its own perfection, and
                     its
                     own intelligible object.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28908" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28908] Iª q. 14 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod moveri et pati sumuntur aequivoce secundum quod
intelligere dicitur esse quoddam moveri vel pati, ut dicitur in III
de anima. Non enim intelligere est motus qui est actus imperfecti,
qui est ab alio in aliud, sed actus perfecti, existens in ipso
agente. Similiter etiam quod intellectus perficiatur ab
intelligibili vel assimiletur ei, hoc convenit intellectui qui
quandoque est in potentia, quia per hoc quod est in potentia,
differt ab intelligibili, et assimilatur ei per speciem
intelligibilem, quae est similitudo rei intellectae; et perficitur
per ipsam, sicut potentia per actum. Sed intellectus divinus, qui
nullo modo est in potentia, non perficitur per intelligibile, neque
assimilatur ei, sed est sua perfectio et suum intelligibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Existence in nature does not belong to primary matter, which is a potentiality, unless it is reduced to act by a form. Now
                     our passive intellect has the same relation to intelligible objects as primary matter has to natural things; for it is in
                     potentiality as regards intelligible objects, just as primary matter is to natural things. Hence our passive intellect can
                     be exercised concerning intelligible objects only so far as it is perfected by the
                     intelligible species of something; and in that way it understands itself by an intelligible species, as it understands other
                     things: for it is manifest that by knowing the intelligible object it understands also its own act of understanding, and by
                     this act knows the intellectual faculty. But God is a pure act in the order of existence, as also in the order of intelligible
                     objects; therefore He understands Himself through Himself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28909" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28909] Iª q. 14 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod esse naturale non est materiae primae, quae est in
potentia, nisi secundum quod est reducta in actum per formam.
Intellectus autem noster possibilis se habet in ordine
intelligibilium, sicut materia prima in ordine rerum naturalium, eo
quod est in potentia ad intelligibilia, sicut materia prima ad
naturalia. Unde intellectus noster possibilis non potest habere
intelligibilem operationem, nisi inquantum perficitur per speciem
intelligibilem alicuius. Et sic intelligit seipsum per speciem
intelligibilem, sicut et alia, manifestum est enim quod ex eo quod
cognoscit intelligibile, intelligit ipsum suum intelligere, et per
actum cognoscit potentiam intellectivam. Deus autem est sicut actus
purus tam in ordine existentium, quam in ordine intelligibilium, et
ideo per seipsum, seipsum intelligit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A3-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 3. Whether God comprehends Himself?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not comprehend Himself. For Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that "whatever comprehends itself
                     is finite as regards itself." But God is in all ways infinite. Therefore He does not comprehend Himself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28910" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28910] Iª q. 14 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non comprehendat seipsum. Dicit enim
Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod id quod
comprehendit se, finitum est sibi. Sed Deus est omnibus modis
infinitus. Ergo non comprehendit se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> If it is said that God is infinite to us, and finite to Himself, it can be urged to the contrary, that everything in God
                     is truer than it is in us. If therefore God is finite to Himself, but infinite to us, then God is more truly finite than infinite;
                     which is against what was laid down above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q14_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Therefore God does not comprehend Himself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28911" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28911] Iª q. 14 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Si dicatur quod
Deus infinitus est nobis, sed sibi finitus, contra, verius est
unumquodque secundum quod est apud Deum, quam secundum quod est
apud nos. Si igitur Deus sibi ipsi est finitus, nobis autem
infinitus, verius est Deum esse finitum, quam infinitum. Quod est
contra prius determinata. Non ergo Deus comprehendit seipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A3-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that "Everything that understands itself, comprehends itself." But God understands
                     Himself. Therefore He comprehends Himself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28912" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28912] Iª q. 14 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Augustinus dicit ibidem, <i>omne quod intelligit se,
comprehendit se</i>. Sed Deus intelligit se. Ergo comprehendit
se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A3-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God perfectly comprehends Himself, as can be thus proved. A thing is said to be comprehended when the end of the knowledge
                     of it is attained, and this is accomplished when it is known as perfectly as it is knowable; as, for instance, a demonstrable
                     proposition is comprehended when known by demonstration, not, however, when it is known by some probable reason. Now it is
                     manifest that God knows Himself as perfectly as He is perfectly knowable. For everything
                     is knowable according to the mode of its own actuality; since a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality, but
                     in so far as it is in actuality, as said in Metaph. ix. Now the power of God in knowing is as great as His actuality in existing;
                     because it is from the fact that He is in act and free from all matter and potentiality, that God is cognitive, as shown above
                     (
                     <a href="#FP_Q14_A1" id="FP_Q14_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2). Whence it is manifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable; and for that
                     reason He perfectly comprehends Himself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 3 co."><a name="28913" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28913] Iª q. 14 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod Deus perfecte comprehendit seipsum. Quod sic patet. Tunc enim
dicitur aliquid comprehendi, quando pervenitur ad finem cognitionis
ipsius, et hoc est quando res cognoscitur ita perfecte, sicut
cognoscibilis est. Sicut propositio demonstrabilis comprehenditur,
quando scitur per demonstrationem, non autem quando cognoscitur per
aliquam rationem probabilem. Manifestum est autem quod Deus ita
perfecte cognoscit seipsum, sicut perfecte cognoscibilis est. Est
enim unumquodque cognoscibile secundum modum sui actus, non enim
cognoscitur aliquid secundum quod in potentia est, sed secundum
quod est in actu, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys. Tanta est autem virtus
Dei in cognoscendo, quanta est actualitas eius in existendo, quia
per hoc quod actu est, et ab omni materia et potentia separatus,
Deus cognoscitivus est, ut ostensum est. Unde manifestum est quod
tantum seipsum cognoscit, quantum cognoscibilis est. Et propter hoc
seipsum perfecte comprehendit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A3-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The strict meaning of "comprehension" signifies that one thing holds and includes another; and in this sense everything comprehended
                     is finite, as also is everything included in another. But God is not said to be comprehended by Himself in this sense, as
                     if His intellect were a faculty apart from Himself, and as if it held and included Himself; for these modes of speaking are
                     to be taken by way of negation. But as God is said to be in Himself,
                     forasmuch as He is not contained by anything outside of Himself; so He is said to be comprehended by Himself, forasmuch as
                     nothing in Himself is hidden from Himself. For Augustine says (De Vid. Deum. ep. cxii), "The whole is comprehended when seen,
                     if it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28914" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28914] Iª q. 14 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod comprehendere, si proprie accipiatur, significat
aliquid habens et includens alterum. Et sic oportet quod omne
comprehensum sit finitum, sicut omne inclusum. Non sic autem
comprehendi dicitur Deus a seipso, ut intellectus suus sit aliud
quam ipse, et capiat ipsum et includat. Sed huiusmodi locutiones
per negationem sunt exponendae. Sicut enim Deus dicitur esse in
seipso, quia a nullo exteriori continetur; ita dicitur comprehendi
a seipso, quia nihil est sui quod lateat ipsum dicit enim
Augustinus, in libro de videndo Deum, quod <i>totum comprehenditur
videndo, quod ita videtur, ut nihil eius lateat videntem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When it is said, "God is finite to Himself," this is to be understood according to a certain similitude of proportion, because
                     He has the same relation in not exceeding His intellect, as anything finite has in not exceeding finite intellect. But God
                     is not to be called finite to Himself in this sense, as if He understood Himself to be something finite.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28915" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28915] Iª q. 14 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, cum dicitur Deus finitus est sibi, intelligendum est
secundum quandam similitudinem proportionis; quia sic se habet in
non excedendo intellectum suum, sicut se habet aliquod finitum in
non excedendo intellectum finitum. Non autem sic dicitur Deus sibi
finitus, quod ipse intelligat se esse aliquid finitum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A4-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 4. Whether the act of God's intellect is His substance?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the act of God's intellect is not His substance. For to understand is an operation. But an operation signifies
                     something proceeding from the operator. Therefore the act of God's intellect is not His substance.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28916" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28916] Iª q. 14 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod ipsum intelligere Dei non sit eius
substantia. Intelligere enim est quaedam operatio. Operatio autem
aliquid significat procedens ab operante. Ergo ipsum intelligere
Dei non est ipsa Dei substantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to understand one's act of understanding, is to understand something that is neither great nor chiefly understood,
                     and but secondary and accessory. If therefore God be his own act of understanding, His act of understanding will be as when
                     we understand our act of understanding: and thus God's act of understanding will not be something great.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28917" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28917] Iª q. 14 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, cum
aliquis intelligit se intelligere, hoc non est intelligere aliquid
magnum vel principale intellectum, sed intelligere quoddam
secundarium et accessorium. Si igitur Deus sit ipsum intelligere,
intelligere Deum erit sicut cum intelligimus intelligere. Et sic
non erit aliquid magnum intelligere Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every act of understanding means understanding something. When therefore God understands Himself, if He Himself
                     is not distinct from this act of understanding, He understands that He understands Himself; and so on to infinity. Therefore
                     the act of God's intellect is not His substance.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28918" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28918] Iª q. 14 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
intelligere est aliquid intelligere. Cum ergo Deus intelligit se,
si ipsemet non est aliud quam suum intelligere, intelligit se
intelligere, et intelligere se intelligere se, et sic in infinitum.
Non ergo ipsum intelligere Dei est eius substantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vii), "In God to be is the same as to be wise." But to be wise is the same thing as to understand.
                     Therefore in God to be is the same thing as to understand. But God's existence is His substance, as shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A4" id="FP_Q14_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Therefore the act of God's intellect is His substance.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28919" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28919] Iª q. 14 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Augustinus, Lib. VII de Trin., <i>Deo hoc est esse, quod
sapientem esse</i>. Hoc autem est sapientem esse, quod intelligere.
Ergo Deo hoc est esse, quod intelligere. Sed esse Dei est eius
substantia, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo intelligere Dei est eius
substantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It must be said that the act of God's intellect is His substance. For if His act of understanding were other than His substance,
                     then something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii), would be the act and perfection of the divine substance, to which
                     the divine substance would be related, as potentiality is to act, which is altogether impossible; because the act of understanding
                     is the perfection and act of the one understanding. Let us now consider how
                     this is. As was laid down above
                     <a href="#FP_Q14_A2" id="FP_Q14_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, to understand is not an act passing to anything extrinsic; for it remains in the operator as his own act and perfection;
                     as existence is the perfection of the one existing: just as existence follows on the form, so in like manner to understand
                     follows on the intelligible species. Now in God there is no form which is something other than His existence, as shown above

                     <a href="#FP_Q3" id="FP_Q14_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">(Q[3])</a>. Hence as His essence itself is also
                     His intelligible species, it necessarily follows that His act of understanding must be His essence and His existence.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q14_A4-p7"> Thus it follows from all the foregoing that in God, intellect, and the object understood, and the intelligible species, and
                     His act of understanding are entirely one and the same. Hence when God is said to be understanding, no kind of multiplicity
                     is attached to His substance.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 co."><a name="28920" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28920] Iª q. 14 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod est necesse dicere quod intelligere Dei est eius substantia.
Nam si intelligere Dei sit aliud quam eius substantia, oporteret,
ut dicit philosophus in XII Metaphys., quod aliquid aliud esset
actus et perfectio substantiae divinae, ad quod se haberet
substantia divina sicut potentia ad actum (quod est omnino
impossibile), nam intelligere est perfectio et actus intelligentis.
Hoc autem qualiter sit, considerandum est. Sicut enim supra dictum
est, intelligere non est actio progrediens ad aliquid extrinsecum,
sed manet in operante sicut actus et perfectio eius, prout esse est
perfectio existentis, sicut enim esse consequitur formam, ita
intelligere sequitur speciem intelligibilem. In Deo autem non est
forma quae sit aliud quam suum esse, ut supra ostensum est. Unde,
cum ipsa sua essentia sit etiam species intelligibilis, ut dictum
est, ex necessitate sequitur quod ipsum eius intelligere sit eius
essentia et eius esse. Et sic patet ex omnibus praemissis quod in
Deo intellectus, et id quod intelligitur, et species
intelligibilis, et ipsum intelligere, sunt omnino unum et idem.
Unde patet quod per hoc quod Deus dicitur intelligens, nulla
multiplicitas ponitur in eius substantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To understand is not an operation proceeding out of the operator, but remaining in him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28921" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28921] Iª q. 14 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod intelligere non est operatio exiens ab ipso operante,
sed manens in ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When that act of understanding which is not subsistent is understood, something not great is understood; as when we understand
                     our act of understanding; and so this cannot be likened to the act of the divine understanding which is subsistent.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28922" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28922] Iª q. 14 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, cum intelligitur illud intelligere quod non est
subsistens, non intelligitur aliquid magnum; sicut cum intelligimus
intelligere nostrum. Et ideo non est simile de ipso intelligere
divino, quod est subsistens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A4-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Thus appears the Reply to the Third Objection. For the act of divine understanding subsists in itself, and belongs to its
                     very self and is not another's; hence it need not proceed to infinity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28923" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28923] Iª q. 14 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Et per hoc patet
responsio ad tertium. Nam intelligere divinum, quod est in seipso
subsistens, est sui ipsius; et non alicuius alterius, ut sic
oporteat procedere in infinitum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A5-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 5. Whether God knows things other than Himself?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know things besides Himself. For all other things but God are outside of God. But Augustine says
                     (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi) that "God does not behold anything out of Himself." Therefore He does not know things other
                     than Himself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28924" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28924] Iª q. 14 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat alia a se. Quaecumque
enim sunt alia a Deo, sunt extra ipsum. Sed Augustinus dicit, in
libro octoginta trium qu., quod <i>neque quidquam Deus extra
seipsum intuetur</i>. Ergo non cognoscit alia a se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object understood is the perfection of the one who understands. If therefore God understands other things besides
                     Himself, something else will be the perfection of God, and will be nobler than He; which is impossible.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28925" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28925] Iª q. 14 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
intellectum est perfectio intelligentis. Si ergo Deus intelligat
alia a se, aliquid aliud erit perfectio Dei, et nobilius ipso. Quod
est impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the act of understanding is specified by the intelligible object, as is every other act from its own object. Hence
                     the intellectual act is so much the nobler, the nobler the object understood. But God is His own intellectual act. If therefore
                     God understands anything other than Himself, then God Himself is specified by something else than Himself; which cannot be.
                     Therefore He does not understand things other than Himself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="28926" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28926] Iª q. 14 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ipsum
intelligere speciem habet ab intelligibili, sicut et omnis alius
actus a suo obiecto, unde et ipsum intelligere tanto est nobilius,
quanto etiam nobilius est ipsum quod intelligitur. Sed Deus est
ipsum suum intelligere, ut ex dictis patet. Si igitur Deus
intelligit aliquid aliud a se, ipse Deus specificatur per aliquid
aliud a se, quod est impossibile. Non igitur intelligit alia a
se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "All things are naked and open to His eyes" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.4.13" target="asv">Heb. 4:13</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28927" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28927] Iª q. 14 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Hebr. IV, <i>omnia nuda et aperta sunt oculis
eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For it is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His
                     existence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows
                     of necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its
                     power extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by the very fact
                     that it is the first effective cause of all things, as is clear from the aforesaid (
                     <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q14_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>), God must necessarily know things other than Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we add that the every existence
                     of the first effective cause---viz. God---is His own act of understanding. Hence whatever effects pre-exist in God, as in
                     the first cause, must be in His act of understanding, and all things must be in Him according to an intelligible mode: for
                     everything which is in another, is in it according to the mode of that in which it is.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q14_A5-p7"> Now in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must consider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself,
                     and in another. A thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species adequate to the knowable object; as when
                     the eye sees a man through the image of a man. A thing is seen in another through the image of that which contains it; as
                     when a part is seen in the whole by the image of the whole; or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in the
                     mirror, or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in another.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q14_A5-p8"> So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself through His essence; and He sees other things not in
                     themselves, but in Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of things other than Himself.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 5 co."><a name="28928" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28928] Iª q. 14 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod necesse est Deum cognoscere alia a se. Manifestum est enim
quod seipsum perfecte intelligit, alioquin suum esse non esset
perfectum, cum suum esse sit suum intelligere. Si autem perfecte
aliquid cognoscitur, necesse est quod virtus eius perfecte
cognoscatur. Virtus autem alicuius rei perfecte cognosci non
potest, nisi cognoscantur ea ad quae virtus se extendit. Unde, cum
virtus divina se extendat ad alia, eo quod ipsa est prima causa
effectiva omnium entium, ut ex supradictis patet; necesse est quod
Deus alia a se cognoscat. Et hoc etiam evidentius fit, si
adiungatur quod ipsum esse causae agentis primae, scilicet Dei, est
eius intelligere. Unde quicumque effectus praeexistunt in Deo sicut
in causa prima, necesse est quod sint in ipso eius intelligere; et
quod omnia in eo sint secundum modum intelligibilem, nam omne quod
est in altero, est in eo secundum modum eius in quo est. Ad
sciendum autem qualiter alia a se cognoscat, considerandum est quod
dupliciter aliquid cognoscitur, uno modo, in seipso; alio modo, in
altero. In seipso quidem cognoscitur aliquid, quando cognoscitur
per speciem propriam adaequatam ipsi cognoscibili, sicut cum oculus
videt hominem per speciem hominis. In alio autem videtur id quod
videtur per speciem continentis, sicut cum pars videtur in toto per
speciem totius, vel cum homo videtur in speculo per speciem
speculi, vel quocumque alio modo contingat aliquid in alio videri.
Sic igitur dicendum est quod Deus seipsum videt in seipso, quia
seipsum videt per essentiam suam. Alia autem a se videt non in
ipsis, sed in seipso, inquantum essentia sua continet similitudinem
aliorum ab ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage of Augustine in which it is said that God "sees nothing outside Himself" is not to be taken in such a way, as
                     if God saw nothing outside Himself, but in the sense that what is outside Himself He does not see except in Himself, as above
                     explained.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28929" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28929] Iª q. 14 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod verbum Augustini dicentis quod Deus nihil extra se
intuetur, non est sic intelligendum, quasi nihil quod sit extra se
intueatur, sed quia id quod est extra seipsum, non intuetur nisi in
seipso, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object understood is a perfection of the one understanding not by its substance, but by its image, according to which
                     it is in the intellect, as its form and perfection, as is said in De Anima iii. For "a stone is not in the soul, but its image."
                     Now those things which are other than God are understood by God, inasmuch as the essence of God contains their images as above
                     explained; hence it does not follow that there is any perfection in the
                     divine intellect other than the divine essence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28930" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28930] Iª q. 14 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod intellectum est perfectio intelligentis non quidem
secundum suam substantiam, sed secundum suam speciem, secundum quam
est in intellectu, ut forma et perfectio eius, <i>lapis enim non
est in anima, sed species eius</i>, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ea
vero quae sunt alia a Deo, intelliguntur a Deo inquantum essentia
Dei continet species eorum, ut dictum est. Unde non sequitur quod
aliquid aliud sit perfectio divini intellectus, quam ipsa essentia
Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellectual act is not specified by what is understood in another, but by the principal object understood in which other
                     things are understood. For the intellectual act is specified by its object, inasmuch as the intelligible form is the principle
                     of the intellectual operation: since every operation is specified by the form which is its principle of operation; as heating
                     by heat. Hence the intellectual operation is specified by that intelligible
                     form which makes the intellect in act. And this is the image of the principal thing understood, which in God is nothing but
                     His own essence in which all images of things are comprehended. Hence it does not follow that the divine intellectual act,
                     or rather God Himself, is specified by anything else than the divine essence itself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="28931" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28931] Iª q. 14 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod ipsum intelligere non specificatur per id quod in
alio intelligitur, sed per principale intellectum, in quo alia
intelliguntur. Intantum enim ipsum intelligere specificatur per
obiectum suum, inquantum forma intelligibilis est principium
intellectualis operationis, nam omnis operatio specificatur per
formam quae est principium operationis, sicut calefactio per
calorem. Unde per illam formam intelligibilem specificatur
intellectualis operatio, quae facit intellectum in actu. Et haec
est species principalis intellecti, quae in Deo nihil est aliud
quam essentia sua, in qua omnes species rerum comprehenduntur. Unde
non oportet quod ipsum intelligere divinum, vel potius ipse Deus,
specificetur per aliud quam per essentiam divinam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A6-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 6. Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know things other than Himself by proper knowledge. For, as was shown
                     <a href="#FP_Q14_A5" id="FP_Q14_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>, God knows things other than Himself, according as they are in Himself. But other things are in Him as in their common and
                     universal cause, and are known by God as in their first and universal cause. This is to know them by general, and not by proper
                     knowledge. Therefore God knows things besides Himself by general, and not by proper
                     knowledge.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28932" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28932] Iª q. 14 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat alia a se propria
cognitione. Sic enim cognoscit alia a se, ut dictum est, secundum
quod alia ab ipso in eo sunt. Sed alia ab eo sunt in ipso sicut in
prima causa communi et universali. Ergo et alia cognoscuntur a Deo,
sicut in causa prima et universali. Hoc autem est cognoscere in
universali, et non secundum propriam cognitionem. Ergo Deus
cognoscit alia a se in universali, et non secundum propriam
cognitionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the created essence is as distant from the divine essence, as the divine essence is distant from the created essence.
                     But the divine essence cannot be known by the created essence, as said above (Q[12]/A[2]). Therefore neither can the created
                     essence be known by the divine essence. Thus as God knows only by His essence, it follows that He does not know what the creature
                     is in its essence, so as to know "what it is," which is to have proper knowledge
                     of it.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28933" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28933] Iª q. 14 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
quantum distat essentia creaturae ab essentia divina, tantum distat
essentia divina ab essentia creaturae. Sed per essentiam creaturae
non potest cognosci essentia divina, ut supra dictum est. Ergo nec
per essentiam divinam potest cognosci essentia creaturae. Et sic,
cum Deus nihil cognoscat nisi per essentiam suam, sequitur quod non
cognoscat creaturam secundum eius essentiam, ut cognoscat de ea
quid est, quod est propriam cognitionem de re habere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, proper knowledge of a thing can come only through its proper ratio. But as God knows all things by His essence,
                     it seems that He does not know each thing by its proper ratio; for one thing cannot be the proper ratio of many and diverse
                     things. Therefore God has not a proper knowledge of things, but a general knowledge; for to know things otherwise than by
                     their proper ratio is to have only a common and general knowledge of them.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="28934" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28934] Iª q. 14 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
propria cognitio non habetur de re, nisi per propriam eius
rationem. Sed cum Deus cognoscat omnia per essentiam suam, non
videtur quod unumquodque per propriam rationem cognoscat, idem enim
non potest esse propria ratio multorum et diversorum. Non ergo
habet propriam cognitionem Deus de rebus, sed communem, nam
cognoscere res non secundum propriam rationem, est cognoscere res
solum in communi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> To have a proper knowledge of things is to know them not only in general, but as they are distinct from each other. Now God
                     knows things in that manner. Hence it is written that He reaches "even to the division of the soul and the spirit, of the
                     joints also and the marrow, and is a discerner of thoughts and intents of the heart; neither is there any creature invisible
                     in His sight" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.4.12" target="asv">Heb. 4:12,13</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28935" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28935] Iª q. 14 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
habere propriam cognitionem de rebus, est cognoscere res non solum
in communi, sed secundum quod sunt ab invicem distinctae. Sic autem
Deus cognoscit res. Unde dicitur Heb. IV, quod <i>pertingit usque
ad divisionem spiritus et animae, compagum quoque et medullarum; et
discretor cogitationum et intentionum cordis; et non est ulla
creatura invisibilis in conspectu eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some have erred on this point, saying that God knows things other than Himself only in general, that is, only as beings.
                     For as fire, if it knew the nature of heat, and all things else in so far as they are hot; so God, through knowing Himself
                     as the principle of being, knows the nature of being, and all other things in so far as they are beings.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q14_A6-p7"> But this cannot be. For to know a thing in general and not in particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge. Hence our intellect,
                     when it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a universal and confused knowledge of things, before it knows
                     them in particular; as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is clear from Phys. i. If therefore the knowledge
                     of God regarding things other than Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow that His
                     understanding would not be absolutely perfect; therefore neither would His being be perfect; and this is against what was
                     said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q4_A1" id="FP_Q14_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[1]</a>). We must therefore hold that God knows things other than Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far as being is
                     common to them, but in so far as one is distinguished from the other. In proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to
                     show that God knows many things by one, bring forward some examples, as, for
                     instance, that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines that proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it
                     would know all colors.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q14_A6-p8"> Now these examples although they are similar in part, namely, as regards universal causality, nevertheless they fail in this
                     respect, that multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal principle, not as regards that which is the principle
                     of distinction, but only as regards that in which they communicate. For the diversity of colors is not caused by the light
                     only, but by the different disposition of the diaphanous medium which receives it; and likewise, the diversity
                     of the lines is caused by their different position. Hence it is that this kind of diversity and multitude cannot be known
                     in its principle by proper knowledge, but only in a general way. In God, however, it is otherwise. For it was shown above
                     (
                     <a href="#FP_Q4_A2" id="FP_Q14_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that whatever perfection exists in any creature, wholly pre-exists and is contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not
                     only what is common to creatures--viz. being---belongs to their perfection, but also what makes
                     them distinguished from each other; as living and understanding, and the like, whereby living beings are distinguished from
                     the non-living, and the intelligent from the non-intelligent. Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its
                     own species, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God, not only as regards what is common to all, but also as
                     regards what distinguishes one thing from another. And therefore as God contains all perfections in Himself, the essence of
                     God
                     is compared to all other essences of things, not as the common to the proper, as unity is to numbers, or as the centre (of
                     a circle) to the (radiating) lines; but as perfect acts to imperfect; as if I were to compare man to animal; or six, a perfect
                     number, to the imperfect numbers contained under it. Now it is manifest that by a perfect act imperfect acts can be known
                     not only in general, but also by proper knowledge; thus, for example, whoever knows a man, knows an animal by proper knowledge;
                     and whoever knows the number six, knows the number three also by proper knowledge.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q14_A6-p9"> As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the perfection contained in the essence of any other being, and far
                     more, God can know in Himself all of them with proper knowledge. For the nature proper to each thing consists in some degree
                     of participation in the divine perfection. Now God could not be said to know Himself perfectly unless He knew all the ways
                     in which His own perfection can be shared by others. Neither could He know the very nature of being perfectly,
                     unless He knew all modes of being. Hence it is manifest that God knows all things with proper knowledge, in their distinction
                     from each other.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 6 co."><a name="28936" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28936] Iª q. 14 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod circa hoc quidam erraverunt, dicentes quod Deus alia a se non
cognoscit nisi in communi, scilicet inquantum sunt entia. Sicut
enim ignis, si cognosceret seipsum ut est principium caloris,
cognosceret naturam caloris, et omnia alia inquantum sunt calida;
ita Deus, inquantum cognoscit se ut principium essendi, cognoscit
naturam entis, et omnia alia inquantum sunt entia. Sed hoc non
potest esse. Nam intelligere aliquid in communi, et non in
speciali, est imperfecte aliquid cognoscere. Unde intellectus
noster, dum de potentia in actum reducitur, pertingit prius ad
cognitionem universalem et confusam de rebus, quam ad propriam
rerum cognitionem, sicut de imperfecto ad perfectum procedens, ut
patet in I Physic. Si igitur cognitio Dei de rebus aliis a se,
esset in universali tantum, et non in speciali, sequeretur quod
eius intelligere non esset omnibus modis perfectum, et per
consequens nec eius esse, quod est contra ea quae superius ostensa
sunt. Oportet igitur dicere quod alia a se cognoscat propria
cognitione; non solum secundum quod communicant in ratione entis,
sed secundum quod unum ab alio distinguitur. Et ad huius
evidentiam, considerandum est quod quidam, volentes ostendere quod
Deus per unum cognoscit multa, utuntur quibusdam exemplis, ut puta
quod, si centrum cognosceret seipsum, cognosceret omnes lineas
progredientes a centro; vel lux, si cognosceret seipsam,
cognosceret omnes colores. Sed haec exempla, licet quantum ad
aliquid similia sint, scilicet quantum ad universalem causalitatem;
tamen deficiunt quantum ad hoc, quod multitudo et diversitas non
causantur ab illo uno principio universali, quantum ad id quod
principium distinctionis est, sed solum quantum ad id in quo
communicant. Non enim diversitas colorum causatur ex luce solum,
sed ex diversa dispositione diaphani recipientis, et similiter
diversitas linearum ex diverso situ. Et inde est quod huiusmodi
diversitas et multitudo non potest cognosci in suo principio
secundum propriam cognitionem, sed solum in communi. Sed in Deo non
sic est. Supra enim ostensum est quod quidquid perfectionis est in
quacumque creatura, totum praeexistit et continetur in Deo secundum
modum excellentem. Non solum autem id in quo creaturae communicant,
scilicet ipsum esse, ad perfectionem pertinet; sed etiam ea per
quae creaturae ad invicem distinguuntur, sicut vivere, et
intelligere, et huiusmodi, quibus viventia a non viventibus, et
intelligentia a non intelligentibus distinguuntur. Et omnis forma,
per quam quaelibet res in propria specie constituitur, perfectio
quaedam est. Et sic omnia in Deo praeexistunt, non solum quantum ad
id quod commune est omnibus, sed etiam quantum ad ea secundum quae
res distinguuntur. Et sic, cum Deus in se omnes perfectiones
contineat, comparatur Dei essentia ad omnes rerum essentias, non
sicut commune ad propria, ut unitas ad numeros, vel centrum ad
lineas; sed sicut perfectus actus ad imperfectos, ut si dicerem,
homo ad animal, vel senarius, qui est numerus perfectus, ad numeros
imperfectos sub ipso contentos. Manifestum est autem quod per actum
perfectum cognosci possunt actus imperfecti, non solum in communi,
sed etiam propria cognitione. Sicut qui cognoscit hominem,
cognoscit animal propria cognitione, et qui cognoscit senarium,
cognoscit trinarium propria cognitione. Sic igitur, cum essentia
Dei habeat in se quidquid perfectionis habet essentia cuiuscumque
rei alterius, et adhuc amplius, Deus in seipso potest omnia propria
cognitione cognoscere. Propria enim natura uniuscuiusque consistit,
secundum quod per aliquem modum divinam perfectionem participat.
Non autem Deus perfecte seipsum cognosceret, nisi cognosceret
quomodocumque participabilis est ab aliis sua perfectio, nec etiam
ipsam naturam essendi perfecte sciret, nisi cognosceret omnes modos
essendi. Unde manifestum est quod Deus cognoscit omnes res propria
cognitione, secundum quod ab aliis distinguuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> So to know a thing as it is in the knower, may be understood in two ways. In one way this adverb "so" imports the mode of
                     knowledge on the part of the thing known; and in that sense it is false. For the knower does not always know the object known
                     according to the existence it has in the knower; since the eye does not know a stone according to the existence it has in
                     the eye; but by the image of the stone which is in the eye, the eye knows the stone
                     according to its existence outside the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge of the object known according to the (mode of)
                     existence it has in the knower, the knower nevertheless knows it according to its (mode of) existence outside the knower;
                     thus the intellect knows a stone according to the intelligible existence it has in the intellect, inasmuch as it knows that
                     it understands; while nevertheless it knows what a stone is in its own nature. If however the adverb 'so' be understood to
                     import the mode (of knowledge) on the part of the knower, in that sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge of the
                     object known as it is in the knower; for the more perfectly the thing known is in the knower, the more perfect is the mode
                     of knowledge.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q14_A6-p11"> We must say therefore that God not only knows that all things are in Himself; but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows
                     them in their own nature and all the more perfectly, the more perfectly each one is in Him.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28937" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28937] Iª q. 14 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod sic cognoscere aliquid sicut in cognoscente est,
potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo, secundum quod hoc adverbium
sic importat modum cognitionis ex parte rei cognitae. Et sic falsum
est. Non enim semper cognoscens cognoscit cognitum secundum illud
esse quod habet in cognoscente, oculus enim non cognoscit lapidem
secundum esse quod habet in oculo; sed per speciem lapidis quam
habet in se, cognoscit lapidem secundum esse quod habet extra
oculum. Et si aliquis cognoscens cognoscat cognitum secundum esse
quod habet in cognoscente, nihilominus cognoscit ipsum secundum
esse quod habet extra cognoscentem, sicut intellectus cognoscit
lapidem secundum esse intelligibile quod habet in intellectu,
inquantum cognoscit se intelligere; sed nihilominus cognoscit esse
lapidis in propria natura. Si vero intelligatur secundum quod hoc
adverbium sic importat modum ex parte cognoscentis, verum est quod
sic solum cognoscens cognoscit cognitum, secundum quod est in
cognoscente, quia quanto perfectius est cognitum in cognoscente,
tanto perfectior est modus cognitionis. Sic igitur dicendum est
quod Deus non solum cognoscit res esse in seipso; sed per id quod
in seipso continet res, cognoscit eas in propria natura; et tanto
perfectius, quanto perfectius est unumquodque in ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A6-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The created essence is compared to the essence of God as the imperfect to the perfect act. Therefore the created essence
                     cannot sufficiently lead us to the knowledge of the divine essence, but rather the converse.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28938" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28938] Iª q. 14 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod essentia creaturae comparatur ad essentiam Dei, ut
actus imperfectus ad perfectum. Et ideo essentia creaturae non
sufficienter ducit in cognitionem essentiae divinae, sed e
converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A6-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same thing cannot be taken in an equal manner as the ratio of different things. But the divine essence excels all creatures.
                     Hence it can be taken as the proper ration of each thing according to the diverse ways in which diverse creatures participate
                     in, and imitate it.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="28939" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28939] Iª q. 14 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod idem non potest accipi ut ratio diversorum per modum
adaequationis. Sed divina essentia est aliquid excedens omnes
creaturas. Unde potest accipi ut propria ratio uniuscuiusque,
secundum quod diversimode est participabilis vel imitabilis a
diversis creaturis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A7-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 7. Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is discursive. For the knowledge of God is not habitual knowledge, but actual knowledge.
                     Now the Philosopher says (Topic. ii): "The habit of knowledge may regard many things at once; but actual understanding regards
                     only one thing at a time." Therefore as God knows many things, Himself and others, as shown above (AA 2,5), it seems that
                     He does not understand all at once, but discourses from one to another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="28940" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28940] Iª q. 14 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei sit discursiva. Scientia enim
Dei non est secundum scire in habitu, sed secundum intelligere in
actu. Sed secundum philosophum, in II Topic., scire in habitu
contingit multa simul, sed intelligere actu unum tantum. Cum ergo
Deus multa cognoscat, quia et se et alia, ut ostensum est, videtur
quod non simul omnia intelligat, sed de uno in aliud discurrat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, discursive knowledge is to know the effect through its cause. But God knows things through Himself; as an effect
                     (is known) through its cause. Therefore His knowledge is discursive.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="28941" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28941] Iª q. 14 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
cognoscere effectum per causam est scire discurrentis. Sed Deus
cognoscit alia per seipsum, sicut effectum per causam. Ergo
cognitio sua est discursiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knows each creature more perfectly than we know it. But we know the effects in their created causes; and thus
                     we go discursively from causes to things caused. Therefore it seems that the same applies to God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="28942" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28942] Iª q. 14 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
perfectius Deus scit unamquamque creaturam quam nos sciamus. Sed
nos in causis creatis cognoscimus earum effectus, et sic de causis
ad causata discurrimus. Ergo videtur similiter esse in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A7-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "God does not see all things in their particularity or separately, as if He saw alternately
                     here and there; but He sees all things together at once."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 7 s. c."><a name="28943" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28943] Iª q. 14 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Augustinus dicit, in XV de Trin., quod <i>Deus non
particulatim vel singillatim omnia videt, velut alternante
conspectu hinc illuc, et inde huc; sed omnia videt simul</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A7-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In the divine knowledge there is no discursion; the proof of which is as follows. In our knowledge there is a twofold discursion:
                     one is according to succession only, as when we have actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand something
                     else; while the other mode of discursion is according to causality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge
                     of conclusions. The first kind of discursion cannot belong to God. For many things,
                     which we understand in succession if each is considered in itself, we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one
                     thing; if, for instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see different things in a mirror. Now God sees all things
                     in one (thing), which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and not successively. Likewise the second mode of
                     discursion cannot be applied to God. First, because this second mode of discursion presupposes the first mode; for whosoever
                     proceeds from principles to conclusions does not consider both at once; secondly, because to discourse thus is to proceed
                     from the known to the unknown. Hence it is manifest that when the first is known, the second is still unknown; and thus the
                     second is known not in the first, but from the first. Now the term discursive reasoning is attained when the second is seen
                     in the first, by resolving the effects into their causes; and then the discursion ceases. Hence as God sees His effects in
                     Himself as their cause, His knowledge is not discursive.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 7 co."><a name="28944" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28944] Iª q. 14 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod in scientia divina nullus est discursus. Quod sic patet. In
scientia enim nostra duplex est discursus. Unus secundum
successionem tantum, sicut cum, postquam intelligimus aliquid in
actu, convertimus nos ad intelligendum aliud. Alius discursus est
secundum causalitatem, sicut cum per principia pervenimus in
cognitionem conclusionum. Primus autem discursus Deo convenire non
potest. Multa enim, quae successive intelligimus si unumquodque
eorum in seipso consideretur, omnia simul intelligimus si in aliquo
uno ea intelligamus, puta si partes intelligamus in toto, vel si
diversas res videamus in speculo. Deus autem omnia videt in uno,
quod est ipse, ut habitum est. Unde simul, et non successive omnia
videt. Similiter etiam et secundus discursus Deo competere non
potest. Primo quidem, quia secundus discursus praesupponit primum,
procedentes enim a principiis ad conclusiones, non simul utrumque
considerant. Deinde, quia discursus talis est procedentis de noto
ad ignotum. Unde manifestum est quod, quando cognoscitur primum,
adhuc ignoratur secundum. Et sic secundum non cognoscitur in primo,
sed ex primo. Terminus vero discursus est, quando secundum videtur
in primo, resolutis effectibus in causas, et tunc cessat discursus.
Unde, cum Deus effectus suos in seipso videat sicut in causa, eius
cognitio non est discursiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A7-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Altogether there is only one act of understanding in itself, nevertheless many things may be understood in one (medium),
                     as shown above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="28945" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28945] Iª q. 14 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, licet sit unum tantum intelligere in seipso, tamen
contingit multa intelligere in aliquo uno, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God does not know by their cause, known, as it were previously, effects unknown; but He knows the effects in the cause; and
                     hence His knowledge is not discursive, as was shown above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="28946" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28946] Iª q. 14 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod Deus non cognoscit per causam quasi prius cognitam,
effectus incognitos, sed eos cognoscit in causa. Unde eius cognitio
est sine discursu, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God sees the effects of created causes in the causes themselves, much better than we can; but still not in such a manner
                     that the knowledge of the effects is caused in Him by the knowledge of the created causes, as is the case with us; and hence
                     His knowledge is not discursive.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="28947" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28947] Iª q. 14 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod effectus causarum creatarum videt quidem Deus in
ipsis causis, multo melius quam nos, non tamen ita quod cognitio
effectuum causetur in ipso ex cognitione causarum creatarum, sicut
in nobis. Unde eius scientia non est discursiva.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A8-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 8. Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is not the cause of things. For Origen says, on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.30" target="asv"> Rom. 8:30, </a> "Whom He called, them He also justified," etc.: "A thing will happen not because God knows it as future; but because it is
                     future, it is on that account known by God, before it exists."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="28948" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28948] Iª q. 14 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei non sit causa rerum. Dicit
enim Origenes, super epistolam ad Rom., <i>non propterea aliquid
erit, quia id scit Deus futurum; sed quia futurum est, ideo scitur
a Deo antequam fiat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, given the cause, the effect follows. But the knowledge of God is eternal. Therefore if the knowledge of God is the
                     cause of things created, it seems that creatures are eternal.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="28949" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28949] Iª q. 14 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
posita causa ponitur effectus. Sed scientia Dei est aeterna. Si
ergo scientia Dei est causa rerum creatarum, videtur quod creaturae
sint ab aeterno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "The thing known is prior to knowledge, and is its measure," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x). But what is posterior
                     and measured cannot be a cause. Therefore the knowledge of God is not the cause of things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="28950" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28950] Iª q. 14 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
scibile est prius scientia, et mensura eius, ut dicitur in X
Metaphys. Sed id quod est posterius et mensuratum, non potest esse
causa. Ergo scientia Dei non est causa rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "Not because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He knows
                     them, therefore they are."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 8 s. c."><a name="28951" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28951] Iª q. 14 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Augustinus, XV de Trin., <i>universas creaturas, et
spirituales et corporales, non quia sunt, ideo novit Deus; sed ideo
sunt, quia novit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer
                     is to things made by his art. Now the knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact
                     that the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the intellect must be the principle of action; as heat is the
                     principle of heating. Nevertheless, we must observe that a natural form, being a form that
                     remains in that to which it gives existence, denotes a principle of action according only as it has an inclination to an effect;
                     and likewise, the intelligible form does not denote a principle of action in so far as it resides in the one who understands
                     unless there is added to it the inclination to an effect, which inclination is through the will. For since the intelligible
                     form has a relation to opposite things (inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to opposites), it would not produce a
                     determinate effect unless it were determined to one thing by the appetite, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. ix). Now it is
                     manifest that God causes things by His intellect, since His being is His act of understanding; and hence His knowledge must
                     be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined to it. Hence the knowledge of God as the cause of things is usually
                     called the "knowledge of approbation."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 8 co."><a name="28952" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28952] Iª q. 14 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod scientia Dei est causa rerum. Sic enim scientia Dei se habet
ad omnes res creatas, sicut scientia artificis se habet ad
artificiata. Scientia autem artificis est causa artificiatorum, eo
quod artifex operatur per suum intellectum, unde oportet quod forma
intellectus sit principium operationis, sicut calor est principium
calefactionis. Sed considerandum est quod forma naturalis,
inquantum est forma manens in eo cui dat esse, non nominat
principium actionis; sed secundum quod habet inclinationem ad
effectum. Et similiter forma intelligibilis non nominat principium
actionis secundum quod est tantum in intelligente, nisi adiungatur
ei inclinatio ad effectum, quae est per voluntatem. Cum enim forma
intelligibilis ad opposita se habeat (cum sit eadem scientia
oppositorum), non produceret determinatum effectum, nisi
determinaretur ad unum per appetitum, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys.
Manifestum est autem quod Deus per intellectum suum causat res, cum
suum esse sit suum intelligere. Unde necesse est quod sua scientia
sit causa rerum, secundum quod habet voluntatem coniunctam. Unde
scientia Dei, secundum quod est causa rerum, consuevit nominari
scientia approbationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A8-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Origen spoke in reference to that aspect of knowledge to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is joined
                     to it, as is said above.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q14_A8-p8"> But when he says the reason why God foreknows some things is because they are future, this must be understood according to
                     the cause of consequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things are in the future, it follows that God
                     knows them; but not that the futurity of things is the cause why God knows them.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="28953" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28953] Iª q. 14 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Origenes locutus est attendens rationem scientiae,
cui non competit ratio causalitatis, nisi adiuncta voluntate, ut
dictum est. Sed quod dicit ideo praescire Deum aliqua, quia sunt
futura, intelligendum est secundum causam consequentiae, non
secundum causam essendi. Sequitur enim, si aliqua sunt futura, quod
Deus ea praescierit, non tamen res futurae sunt causa quod Deus
sciat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The knowledge of God is the cause of things according as things are in His knowledge. Now that things should be eternal was
                     not in the knowledge of God; hence although the knowledge of God is eternal, it does not follow that creatures are eternal.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="28954" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28954] Iª q. 14 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod scientia Dei est causa rerum, secundum quod res sunt
in scientia. Non fuit autem in scientia Dei, quod res essent ab
aeterno. Unde, quamvis scientia Dei sit aeterna, non sequitur tamen
quod creaturae sint ab aeterno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A8-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God and our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things, of
                     which God is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its
                     measure, so, the knowledge of God is prior to natural things, and is the measure of them; as, for instance, a house is midway
                     between the knowledge of the builder who made it, and the knowledge of the one who
                     gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already built.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="28955" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28955] Iª q. 14 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod res naturales sunt mediae inter scientiam Dei et
scientiam nostram, nos enim scientiam accipimus a rebus
naturalibus, quarum Deus per suam scientiam causa est. Unde, sicut
scibilia naturalia sunt priora quam scientia nostra, et mensura
eius, ita scientia Dei est prior quam res naturales, et mensura
ipsarum. Sicut aliqua domus est media inter scientiam artificis qui
eam fecit, et scientiam illius qui eius cognitionem ex ipsa iam
facta capit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A9-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 9. Whether God has knowledge of things that are not?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A9-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not knowledge of things that are not. For the knowledge of God is of true things. But "truth" and "being"
                     are convertible terms. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of things that are not.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="28956" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28956] Iª q. 14 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non habeat scientiam non entium.
Scientia enim Dei non est nisi verorum. Sed verum et ens
convertuntur. Ergo scientia Dei non est non entium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A9-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, knowledge requires likeness between the knower and the thing known. But those things that are not cannot have any
                     likeness to God, Who is very being. Therefore what is not, cannot be known by God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="28957" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28957] Iª q. 14 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
scientia requirit similitudinem inter scientem et scitum. Sed ea
quae non sunt, non possunt habere aliquam similitudinem ad Deum,
qui est ipsum esse. Ergo ea quae non sunt, non possunt sciri a
Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A9-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of God is the cause of what is known by Him. But it is not the cause of things that are not, because
                     a thing that is not, has no cause. Therefore God has no knowledge of things that are not.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="28958" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28958] Iª q. 14 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
scientia Dei est causa scitorum ab ipso. Sed non est causa non
entium, quia non ens non habet causam. Ergo Deus non habet
scientiam de non entibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A9-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says: "Who . . . calleth those things that are not as those that are" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.17" target="asv">Rom. 4:17</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 9 s. c."><a name="28959" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28959] Iª q. 14 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit apostolus ad Rom. IV, <i>qui vocat ea quae non sunt,
tanquam ea quae sunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A9-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God knows all things whatsoever that in any way are. Now it is possible that things that are not absolutely, should be in
                     a certain sense. For things absolutely are which are actual; whereas things which are not actual, are in the power either
                     of God Himself or of a creature, whether in active power, or passive; whether in power of thought or of imagination, or of
                     any other manner of meaning whatsoever. Whatever therefore can be made, or thought, or said by
                     the creature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to God, although they are not actual. And in so far it can
                     be said that He has knowledge even of things that are not.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q14_A9-p7"> Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those things that are not actual. For though some of them
                     may not be in act now, still they were, or they will be; and God is said to know all these with the knowledge of vision: for
                     since God's act of understanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and since eternity is without succession, comprehending
                     all time, the present glance of God extends over all time, and to all things which exist in any time,
                     as to objects present to Him. But there are other things in God's power, or the creature's, which nevertheless are not, nor
                     will be, nor were; and as regards these He is said to have knowledge, not of vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so
                     called because the things we see around us have distinct being outside the seer.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 9 co."><a name="28960" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28960] Iª q. 14 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod Deus scit omnia quaecumque sunt quocumque modo. Nihil autem
prohibet ea quae non sunt simpliciter, aliquo modo esse.
Simpliciter enim sunt, quae actu sunt. Ea vero quae non sunt actu,
sunt in potentia vel ipsius Dei, vel creaturae; sive in potentia
activa, sive in passiva, sive in potentia opinandi, vel imaginandi,
vel quocumque modo significandi. Quaecumque igitur possunt per
creaturam fieri vel cogitari vel dici, et etiam quaecumque ipse
facere potest, omnia cognoscit Deus, etiam si actu non sint. Et pro
tanto dici potest quod habet etiam non entium scientiam. Sed horum
quae actu non sunt, est attendenda quaedam diversitas. Quaedam
enim, licet non sint nunc in actu, tamen vel fuerunt vel erunt, et
omnia ista dicitur Deus scire scientia visionis. Quia, cum
intelligere Dei, quod est eius esse, aeternitate mensuretur, quae
sine successione existens totum tempus comprehendit, praesens
intuitus Dei fertur in totum tempus, et in omnia quae sunt in
quocumque tempore, sicut in subiecta sibi praesentialiter. Quaedam
vero sunt, quae sunt in potentia Dei vel creaturae, quae tamen nec
sunt nec erunt neque fuerunt. Et respectu horum non dicitur habere
scientiam visionis, sed simplicis intelligentiae. Quod ideo
dicitur, quia ea quae videntur apud nos, habent esse distinctum
extra videntem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A9-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those things that are not actual are true in so far as they are in potentiality; for it is true that they are in potentiality;
                     and as such they are known by God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="28961" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28961] Iª q. 14 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, secundum quod sunt in potentia, sic habent veritatem
ea quae non sunt actu, verum est enim ea esse in potentia. Et sic
sciuntur a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A9-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since God is very being everything is, in so far as it participates in the likeness of God; as everything is hot in so far
                     as it participates in heat. So, things in potentiality are known by God, although they are not in act.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="28962" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28962] Iª q. 14 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, cum Deus sit ipsum esse, intantum unumquodque est,
inquantum participat de Dei similitudine, sicut unumquodque
intantum est calidum, inquantum participat calorem. Sic et ea quae
sunt in potentia, etiam si non sunt in actu, cognoscuntur a
Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A9-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge of God, joined to His will is the cause of things. Hence it is not necessary that what ever God knows, is,
                     or was, or will be; but only is this necessary as regards what He wills to be, or permits to be. Further, it is in the knowledge
                     of God not that they be, but that they be possible.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="28963" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28963] Iª q. 14 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod Dei scientia est causa rerum, voluntate adiuncta.
Unde non oportet quod quaecumque scit Deus, sint vel fuerint vel
futura sint, sed solum ea quae vult esse, vel permittit esse. Et
iterum, non est in scientia Dei ut illa sint, sed quod esse
possint.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A10-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 10. Whether God knows evil things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know evil things. For the Philosopher (De Anima iii) says that the intellect which is not in potentiality
                     does not know privation. But "evil is the privation of good," as Augustine says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as the intellect
                     of God is never in potentiality, but is always in act, as is clear from the foregoing (A[2] ), it seems that God does not
                     know evil things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="28964" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28964] Iª q. 14 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat mala. Dicit enim
philosophus, in III de anima, quod intellectus qui non est in
potentia, non cognoscit privationem. Sed malum est privatio boni,
ut dicit Augustinus. Igitur, cum intellectus Dei nunquam sit in
potentia, sed semper actu, ut ex dictis patet, videtur quod Deus
non cognoscat mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all knowledge is either the cause of the thing known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge of God is not the cause
                     of evil, nor is it caused by evil. Therefore God does not know evil things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="28965" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28965] Iª q. 14 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
omnis scientia vel est causa sciti, vel causatur ab eo. Sed
scientia Dei non est causa mali, nec causatur a malo. Ergo scientia
Dei non est malorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything known is known either by its likeness, or by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He knows through His
                     essence, as is clear from the foregoing
                     <a href="#FP_Q14_A5" id="FP_Q14_A10-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Now the divine essence neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it; for to the divine essence there is no
                     contrary, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore God does not know evil things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="28966" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28966] Iª q. 14 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
quod cognoscitur, cognoscitur per suam similitudinem, vel per suum
oppositum. Quidquid autem cognoscit Deus, cognoscit per suam
essentiam, ut ex dictis patet. Divina autem essentia neque est
similitudo mali, neque ei malum opponitur, divinae enim essentiae
nihil est contrarium, ut dicit Augustinus, XII de Civ. Dei. Ergo
Deus non cognoscit mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what is known through another and not through itself, is imperfectly known. But evil is not known by God; for the
                     thing known must be in the knower. Therefore if evil is known through another, namely, through good, it would be known by
                     Him imperfectly; which cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not imperfect. Therefore God does not know evil things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 4"><a name="28967" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28967] Iª q. 14 a. 10 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, quod
cognoscitur non per seipsum, sed per aliud, imperfecte cognoscitur.
Sed malum non cognoscitur a Deo per seipsum, quia sic oporteret
quod malum esset in Deo; oportet enim cognitum esse in cognoscente.
Si ergo cognoscitur per aliud, scilicet per bonum, imperfecte
cognoscetur ab ipso, quod est impossibile, quia nulla cognitio Dei
est imperfecta. Ergo scientia Dei non est malorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A10-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.11" target="asv">Prov. 15:11</a>), "Hell and destruction are before God [Vulg: 'the Lord']."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 s. c."><a name="28968" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28968] Iª q. 14 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Proverb. XV, <i>Infernus et perditio coram
Deo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must know all that can be accidental to it. Now there are some good things to which corruption
                     by evil may be accidental. Hence God would not know good things perfectly, unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is
                     knowable in the degree in which it is; hence since this is the essence of evil that it is the privation of good, by the fact
                     that God knows good things, He knows evil things also; as by light is known darkness.
                     Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "God through Himself receives the vision of darkness, not otherwise seeing darkness
                     except through light."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 co."><a name="28969" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28969] Iª q. 14 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod quicumque perfecte cognoscit aliquid, oportet quod cognoscat
omnia quae possunt illi accidere. Sunt autem quaedam bona, quibus
accidere potest ut per mala corrumpantur. Unde Deus non perfecte
cognosceret bona, nisi etiam cognosceret mala. Sic autem est
cognoscibile unumquodque, secundum quod est. Unde, cum hoc sit esse
mali, quod est privatio boni, per hoc ipsum quod Deus cognoscit
bona, cognoscit etiam mala; sicut per lucem cognoscuntur tenebrae.
Unde dicit Dionysius, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>Deus per
semetipsum tenebrarum accipit visionem, non aliunde videns tenebras
quam a lumine</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as meaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality, does not know
                     privation by privation existing in it; and this agrees with what he said previously, that a point and every indivisible thing
                     are known by privation of division. This is because simple and indivisible forms are in our intellect not actually, but only
                     potentially; for were they actually in our intellect, they would not be known by
                     privation. It is thus that simple things are known by separate substances. God therefore knows evil, not by privation existing
                     in Himself, but by the opposite good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="28970" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28970] Iª q. 14 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod verbum philosophi est sic intelligendum, quod
intellectus qui non est in potentia, non cognoscit privationem per
privationem in ipso existentem. Et hoc congruit cum eo quod supra
dixerat, quod punctum et omne indivisibile per privationem
divisionis cognoscitur. Quod contingit ex hoc, quia formae
simplices et indivisibiles non sunt actu in intellectu nostro, sed
in potentia tantum, nam si essent actu in intellectu nostro, non
per privationem cognoscerentur. Et sic cognoscuntur simplicia a
substantiis separatis. Deus igitur non cognoscit malum per
privationem in se existentem, sed per bonum oppositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil; but is the cause of the good whereby evil is known.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="28971" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28971] Iª q. 14 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod scientia Dei non est causa mali, sed est causa boni,
per quod cognoscitur malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although evil is not opposed to the divine essence, which is not corruptible by evil; it is opposed to the effects of God,
                     which He knows by His essence; and knowing them, He knows the opposite evils.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 ad 3"><a name="28972" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28972] Iª q. 14 a. 10 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, licet malum non opponatur essentiae divinae, quae
non est corruptibilis per malum, opponitur tamen effectibus Dei;
quos per essentiam suam cognoscit, et eos cognoscens, mala opposita
cognoscit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> To know a thing by something else only, belongs to imperfect knowledge, if that thing is of itself knowable; but evil is
                     not of itself knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of evil means the privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined
                     nor known except by good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 ad 4"><a name="28973" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28973] Iª q. 14 a. 10 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod cognoscere aliquid per aliud tantum, est imperfectae
cognitionis, si illud sit cognoscibile per se. Sed malum non est
per se cognoscibile, quia de ratione mali est, quod sit privatio
boni. Et sic neque definiri, neque cognosci potest, nisi per
bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A11" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A11-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 11. Whether God knows singular things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A11-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know singular things. For the divine intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect. Now
                     the human intellect by reason of its immateriality does not know singular things; but as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii),
                     "reason has to do with universals, sense with singular things." Therefore God does not know singular things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="28974" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28974] Iª q. 14 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat singularia.
Intellectus enim divinus immaterialior est quam intellectus
humanus. Sed intellectus humanus, propter suam immaterialitatem,
non cognoscit singularia, sed, sicut dicitur in II de anima,
<i>ratio est universalium, sensus vero singularium</i>. Ergo Deus
non cognoscit singularia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A11-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in us those faculties alone know the singular, which receive the species not abstracted from material conditions.
                     But in God things are in the highest degree abstracted from all materiality. Therefore God does not know singular things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="28975" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28975] Iª q. 14 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
illae solae virtutes in nobis sunt singularium cognoscitivae, quae
recipiunt species non abstractas a materialibus conditionibus. Sed
res in Deo sunt maxime abstractae ab omni materialitate. Ergo Deus
non cognoscit singularia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A11-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all knowledge comes about through the medium of some likeness. But the likeness of singular things in so far as
                     they are singular, does not seem to be in God; for the principle of singularity is matter, which, since it is in potentiality
                     only, is altogether unlike God, Who is pure act. Therefore God cannot know singular things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 11 arg. 3"><a name="28976" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28976] Iª q. 14 a. 11 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
omnis cognitio est per aliquam similitudinem. Sed similitudo
singularium, inquantum sunt singularia, non videtur esse in Deo,
quia principium singularitatis est materia, quae, cum sit ens in
potentia tantum, omnino est dissimilis Deo, qui est actus purus.
Non ergo Deus potest cognoscere singularia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A11-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A11-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.2" target="asv">Prov. 16:2</a>), "All the ways of a man are open to His eyes."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 11 s. c."><a name="28977" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28977] Iª q. 14 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur, Proverb. XVI, <i>omnes viae hominum patent oculis
eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A11-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God knows singular things. For all perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the
                     foregoing (
                     <a href="#FP_Q4_A2" id="FP_Q14_A11-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[2]</a>). Now to know singular things is part of our perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher considers
                     it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and Metaph.
                     iii) that God would be most ignorant if
                     He did not know discord. Now the perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and unitedly in God; hence,
                     although by one faculty we know the universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material things, nevertheless
                     God knows both by His simple intellect.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q14_A11-p7"> Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows singular things by universal causes. For nothing exists in
                     any singular thing, that does not arise from some universal cause. They give the example of an astrologer who knows all the
                     universal movements of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that are to come. This, however, is not enough; for
                     singular things from universal causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however they may be joined
                     together, are not individualized except by individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates because he is white, or because
                     he is the son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that kind, would not know him in so far as he is this particular
                     man. Hence according to the aforesaid mode, God would not know
                  </p><p id="FP_Q14_A11-p8"> singular things in their singularity.</p><p id="FP_Q14_A11-p9"> On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by the application of universal causes to particular effects.
                     But this will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that thing; hence the said
                     application cannot be the reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of singular things.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q14_A11-p10"> Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of things by His knowledge, as stated above
                     <a href="#FP_Q14_A8" id="FP_Q14_A11-p10.1" shape="rect">(A[8])</a>, His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of God extends not only to forms, which
                     are the source of universality, but also to matter, as we shall prove further on (
                     <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q44_A2" id="FP_Q14_A11-p10.2" shape="rect">Q[44], A[2]</a>), the knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are individualized by matter. For since
                     He knows things other than Himself by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their active principle, His essence
                     must be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. The
                     same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer, if it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 11 co."><a name="28978" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28978] Iª q. 14 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod Deus cognoscit singularia. Omnes enim perfectiones in
creaturis inventae, in Deo praeexistunt secundum altiorem modum, ut
ex dictis patet. Cognoscere autem singularia pertinet ad
perfectionem nostram. Unde necesse est quod Deus singularia
cognoscat. Nam et philosophus pro inconvenienti habet, quod aliquid
cognoscatur a nobis, quod non cognoscatur a Deo. Unde contra
Empedoclem arguit, in I de anima et in III Metaphys., quod
accideret Deum esse insipientissimum, si discordiam ignoraret. Sed
perfectiones quae in inferioribus dividuntur, in Deo simpliciter et
unite existunt. Unde, licet nos per aliam potentiam cognoscamus
universalia et immaterialia, et per aliam singularia et materialia;
Deus tamen per suum simplicem intellectum utraque cognoscit. Sed
qualiter hoc esse possit, quidam manifestare volentes, dixerunt
quod Deus cognoscit singularia per causas universales, nam nihil
est in aliquo singularium, quod non ex aliqua causa oriatur
universali. Et ponunt exemplum, sicut si aliquis astrologus
cognosceret omnes motus universales caeli, posset praenuntiare
omnes eclipses futuras. Sed istud non sufficit. Quia singularia ex
causis universalibus sortiuntur quasdam formas et virtutes, quae,
quantumcumque ad invicem coniungantur, non individuantur nisi per
materiam individualem. Unde qui cognosceret Socratem per hoc quod
est albus vel Sophronisci filius, vel quidquid aliud sic dicatur,
non cognosceret ipsum inquantum est hic homo. Unde secundum modum
praedictum, Deus non cognosceret singularia in sua singularitate.
Alii vero dixerunt quod Deus cognoscit singularia, applicando
causas universales ad particulares effectus. Sed hoc nihil est.
Quia nullus potest applicare aliquid ad alterum, nisi illud
praecognoscat, unde dicta applicatio non potest esse ratio
cognoscendi particularia, sed cognitionem singularium praesupponit.
Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod, cum Deus sit causa rerum per
suam scientiam, ut dictum est, intantum se extendit scientia Dei,
inquantum se extendit eius causalitas. Unde, cum virtus activa Dei
se extendat non solum ad formas, a quibus accipitur ratio
universalis, sed etiam usque ad materiam, ut infra ostendetur;
necesse est quod scientia Dei usque ad singularia se extendat, quae
per materiam individuantur. Cum enim sciat alia a se per essentiam
suam, inquantum est similitudo rerum velut principium activum
earum, necesse est quod essentia sua sit principium sufficiens
cognoscendi omnia quae per ipsum fiunt, non solum in universali,
sed etiam in singulari. Et esset simile de scientia artificis, si
esset productiva totius rei, et non formae tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A11-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the individualizing principles; hence the intelligible species in our
                     intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and on that account our intellect does not know the singular.
                     But the intelligible species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of
                     itself, being the principle of all the principles which enter into the composition
                     of things, whether principles of the species or principles of the individual; hence by it God knows not only universal, but
                     also singular things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="28979" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28979] Iª q. 14 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod intellectus noster speciem intelligibilem abstrahit a
principiis individuantibus, unde species intelligibilis nostri
intellectus non potest esse similitudo principiorum individualium.
Et propter hoc, intellectus noster singularia non cognoscit. Sed
species intelligibilis divini intellectus, quae est Dei essentia,
non est immaterialis per abstractionem, sed per seipsam, principium
existens omnium principiorum quae intrant rei compositionem, sive
sint principia speciei, sive principia individui. Unde per eam Deus
cognoscit non solum universalia, sed etiam singularia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A11-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although as regards the species in the divine intellect its being has no material conditions like the images received in
                     the imagination and sense, yet its power extends to both immaterial and material things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="28980" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28980] Iª q. 14 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, quamvis species intellectus divini secundum esse
suum non habeat conditiones materiales, sicut species receptae in
imaginatione et sensu; tamen virtute se extendit ad immaterialia et
materialia, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A11-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although matter as regards its potentiality recedes from likeness to God, yet, even in so far as it has being in this wise,
                     it retains a certain likeness to the divine being.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 11 ad 3"><a name="28981" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28981] Iª q. 14 a. 11 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod materia, licet recedat a Dei similitudine secundum
suam potentialitatem, tamen inquantum vel sic esse habet,
similitudinem quandam retinet divini esse.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A12" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A12-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 12. Whether God can know infinite things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A12-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot know infinite things. For the infinite, as such, is unknown; since the infinite is that which, "to
                     those who measure it, leaves always something more to be measured," as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii). Moreover, Augustine
                     says (De Civ. Dei xii) that "whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is bounded by the comprehension of the knower." Now infinite
                     things have no boundary. Therefore they cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of
                     God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="28982" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28982] Iª q. 14 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit cognoscere infinita.
Infinitum enim, secundum quod est infinitum, est ignotum, quia
infinitum est cuius quantitatem accipientibus semper est aliquid
extra assumere, ut dicitur in III Physic. Augustinus etiam dicit,
XII de Civ. Dei, quod <i>quidquid scientia comprehenditur, scientis
comprehensione finitur</i>. Sed infinita non possunt finiri. Ergo
non possunt scientia Dei comprehendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A12-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if we say that things infinite in themselves are finite in God's knowledge, against this it may be urged that the
                     essence of the infinite is that it is untraversable, and the finite that it is traversable, as said in Phys. iii. But the
                     infinite is not traversable either by the finite or by the infinite, as is proved in Phys. vi. Therefore the infinite cannot
                     be bounded by the finite, nor even by the infinite; and so the infinite cannot be finite in
                     God's knowledge, which is infinite.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 arg. 2"><a name="28983" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28983] Iª q. 14 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Si dicatur quod
ea quae in se sunt infinita, scientiae Dei finita sunt, contra,
ratio infiniti est quod sit impertransibile; et finiti quod sit
pertransibile, ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed infinitum non potest
transiri nec a finito, nec ab infinito, ut probatur in VI Physic.
Ergo infinitum non potest esse finitum finito, neque etiam
infinito. Et ita infinita non sunt finita scientiae Dei, quae est
infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A12-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of God is the measure of what is known. But it is contrary to the essence of the infinite that it
                     be measured. Therefore infinite things cannot be known by God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="28984" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28984] Iª q. 14 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
scientia Dei est mensura scitorum. Sed contra rationem infiniti
est, quod sit mensuratum. Ergo infinita non possunt sciri a
Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A12-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii), "Although we cannot number the infinite, nevertheless it can be comprehended by Him whose
                     knowledge has no bounds."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 s. c."><a name="28985" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28985] Iª q. 14 a. 12 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Augustinus, XII de Civ. Dei, <i>quamvis infinitorum
numerorum nullus sit numerus, non est tamen incomprehensibilis ei,
cuius scientiae non est numerus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A12-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since God knows not only things actual but also things possible to Himself or to created things, as shown above
                     <a href="#FP_Q14_A9" id="FP_Q14_A12-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[9])</a>, and as these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows infinite things. Although the knowledge of vision which has
                     relation only to things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite things, as some say, for we do not say that the
                     world is eternal, nor that generation and movement will go on for ever, so
                     that individuals be infinitely multiplied; yet, if we consider more attentively, we must hold that God knows infinite things
                     even by the knowledge of vision. For God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts, which will be multiplied to infinity
                     as rational creatures go on for ever.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q14_A12-p7"> The reason of this is to be found in the fact that the knowledge of every knower is measured by the mode of the form which
                     is the principle of knowledge. For the sensible image in sense is the likeness of only one individual thing, and can give
                     the knowledge of only one individual. But the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of the thing as regards
                     its specific nature, which is participable by infinite particulars; hence our intellect by the intelligible
                     species of man in a certain way knows infinite men; not however as distinguished from each other, but as communicating in
                     the nature of the species; and the reason is because the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of man not
                     as to the individual principles, but as to the principles of the species. On the other hand, the divine essence, whereby the
                     divine intellect understands, is a sufficing likeness of all things that are, or can be, not only as regards the universal
                     principles, but also as regards the principles proper to each one, as shown above. Hence it follows that the knowledge of
                     God extends to infinite things, even as distinct from each other.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 co."><a name="28986" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28986] Iª q. 14 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, cum Deus sciat non solum ea quae sunt actu, sed etiam ea quae
sunt in potentia vel sua vel creaturae, ut ostensum est; haec autem
constat esse infinita; necesse est dicere quod Deus sciat infinita.
Et licet scientia visionis, quae est tantum eorum quae sunt vel
erunt vel fuerunt, non sit infinitorum, ut quidam dicunt, cum non
ponamus mundum ab aeterno fuisse, nec generationem et motum in
aeternum mansura, ut individua in infinitum multiplicentur, tamen,
si diligentius consideretur, necesse est dicere quod Deus etiam
scientia visionis sciat infinita. Quia Deus scit etiam cogitationes
et affectiones cordium, quae in infinitum multiplicabuntur,
creaturis rationalibus permanentibus absque fine. Hoc autem ideo
est, quia cognitio cuiuslibet cognoscentis se extendit secundum
modum formae quae est principium cognitionis. Species enim
sensibilis, quae est in sensu, est similitudo solum unius
individui, unde per eam solum unum individuum cognosci potest.
Species autem intelligibilis intellectus nostri est similitudo rei
quantum ad naturam speciei, quae est participabilis a
particularibus infinitis, unde intellectus noster per speciem
intelligibilem hominis, cognoscit quodammodo homines infinitos. Sed
tamen non inquantum distinguuntur ab invicem, sed secundum quod
communicant in natura speciei; propter hoc quod species
intelligibilis intellectus nostri non est similitudo hominum
quantum ad principia individualia, sed solum quantum ad principia
speciei. Essentia autem divina, per quam intellectus divinus
intelligit, est similitudo sufficiens omnium quae sunt vel esse
possunt, non solum quantum ad principia communia, sed etiam quantum
ad principia propria uniuscuiusque, ut ostensum est. Unde sequitur
quod scientia Dei se extendat ad infinita, etiam secundum quod sunt
ab invicem distincta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A12-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The idea of the infinite pertains to quantity, as the Philosopher says (Phys. i). But the idea of quantity implies the order
                     of parts. Therefore to know the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to know part after part; and in this way
                     the infinite cannot be known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken, there will always remain something else outside. But
                     God does not know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after
                     part; since He knows all things simultaneously, and not successively, as said above
                     <a href="#FP_Q14_A7" id="FP_Q14_A12-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>. Hence there is nothing to prevent Him from knowing infinite things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="28987" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28987] Iª q. 14 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod <i>infiniti ratio congruit quantitati</i>, secundum
philosophum in I Physic. De ratione autem quantitatis est ordo
partium. Cognoscere ergo infinitum secundum modum infiniti, est
cognoscere partem post partem. Et sic nullo modo contingit cognosci
infinitum, quia quantacumque quantitas partium accipiatur, semper
remanet aliquid extra accipientem. Deus autem non sic cognoscit
infinitum vel infinita, quasi enumerando partem post partem; cum
cognoscat omnia simul, non successive, ut supra dictum est. Unde
nihil prohibet ipsum cognoscere infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A12-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Transition imports a certain succession of parts; and hence it is that the infinite cannot be traversed by the finite, nor
                     by the infinite. But equality suffices for comprehension, because that is said to be comprehended which has nothing outside
                     the comprehender. Hence it is not against the idea of the infinite to be comprehended by the infinite. And so, what is infinite
                     in itself can be called finite to the knowledge of God as comprehended; but not
                     as if it were traversable.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 ad 2"><a name="28988" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28988] Iª q. 14 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod transitio importat quandam successionem in partibus,
et inde est quod infinitum transiri non potest, neque a finito
neque ab infinito. Sed ad rationem comprehensionis sufficit
adaequatio, quia id comprehendi dicitur, cuius nihil est extra
comprehendentem. Unde non est contra rationem infiniti, quod
comprehendatur ab infinito. Et sic, quod in se est infinitum,
potest dici finitum scientiae Dei, tanquam comprehensum, non tamen
tanquam pertransibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A12-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge of God is the measure of things, not quantitatively, for the infinite is not subject to this kind of measure;
                     but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things. For everything has truth of nature according to the degree in which
                     it imitates the knowledge of God, as the thing made by art agrees with the art. Granted, however, an actually infinite number
                     of things, for instance, an infinitude of men, or an infinitude in continuous
                     quantity, as an infinitude of air, as some of the ancients held; yet it is manifest that these would have a determinate and
                     finite being, because their being would be limited to some determinate nature. Hence they would be measurable as regards the
                     knowledge of God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 ad 3"><a name="28989" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28989] Iª q. 14 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod scientia Dei est mensura rerum, non quantitativa, qua
quidem mensura carent infinita; sed quia mensurat essentiam et
veritatem rei. Unumquodque enim intantum habet de veritate suae
naturae, inquantum imitatur Dei scientiam; sicut artificiatum
inquantum concordat arti. Dato autem quod essent aliqua infinita
actu secundum numerum, puta infiniti homines; vel secundum
quantitatem continuam, ut si esset aer infinitus, ut quidam antiqui
dixerunt, tamen manifestum est quod haberent esse determinatum et
finitum, quia esse eorum esset limitatum ad aliquas determinatas
naturas. Unde mensurabilia essent secundum scientiam Dei.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A13" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A13-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 13. Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A13-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future contingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary effect.
                     But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said above
                     <a href="#FP_Q14_A8" id="FP_Q14_A13-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[8])</a>. Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not
                     of contingent things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 arg. 1"><a name="28990" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28990] Iª q. 14 a. 13 arg. 1</span></a> Ad
decimumtertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei non sit
futurorum contingentium. A causa enim necessaria procedit effectus
necessarius. Sed scientia Dei est causa scitorum, ut supra dictum
est. Cum ergo ipsa sit necessaria, sequitur scita eius esse
necessaria. Non ergo scientia Dei est contingentium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A13-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every conditional proposition of which the antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary
                     consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only
                     a necessary conclusion can follow, as is proved in Poster. i. But this is a true conditional proposition, "If God knew that
                     this thing will be, it will be," for the knowledge of God is only of true things. Now the
                     antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it is eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore
                     the consequent is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God knows, is necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not
                     of contingent things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 arg. 2"><a name="28991" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28991] Iª q. 14 a. 13 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
omnis conditionalis cuius antecedens est necessarium absolute,
consequens est necessarium absolute. Sic enim se habet antecedens
ad consequens, sicut principia ad conclusionem, ex principiis autem
necessariis non sequitur conclusio nisi necessaria, ut in I Poster.
probatur. Sed haec est quaedam conditionalis vera, si Deus scivit
hoc futurum esse, hoc erit, quia scientia Dei non est nisi verorum.
Huius autem conditionalis antecedens est necessarium absolute, tum
quia est aeternum; tum quia significatur ut praeteritum. Ergo et
consequens est necessarium absolute. Igitur quidquid scitur a Deo,
est necessarium. Et sic scientia Dei non est contingentium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A13-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything known by God must necessarily be, because even what we ourselves know, must necessarily be; and, of course,
                     the knowledge of God is much more certain than ours. But no future contingent things must necessarily be. Therefore no contingent
                     future thing is known by God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 arg. 3"><a name="28992" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28992] Iª q. 14 a. 13 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
scitum a Deo necesse est esse, quia etiam omne scitum a nobis
necesse est esse, cum tamen scientia Dei certior sit quam scientia
nostra. Sed nullum contingens futurum necesse est esse. Ergo nullum
contingens futurum est scitum a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A13-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A13-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.32.15" target="asv">Ps. 32:15</a>), "He Who hath made the hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works," i.e. of men. Now the works of men
                     are contingent, being subject to free will. Therefore God knows future contingent things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 s. c."><a name="28993" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28993] Iª q. 14 a. 13 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur in Psalmo XXXII, <i>qui finxit singillatim corda
eorum, qui intelligit omnia opera eorum</i>, scilicet hominum. Sed
opera hominum sunt contingentia, utpote libero arbitrio subiecta.
Ergo Deus scit futura contingentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A13-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since as was shown above
                     <a href="#FP_Q14_A9" id="FP_Q14_A13-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[9])</a>, God knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and creature; and since some of these are future
                     contingent to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q14_A13-p7"> In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far
                     as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present; neither is it considered as contingent
                     (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this it can be infallibly the object
                     of certain knowledge, for instance to the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In
                     another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as
                     a contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation to opposite things: and in this
                     sense a contingent thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a contingent effect in its cause only,
                     has merely a conjectural knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also
                     as
                     each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows
                     contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because His
                     knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said
                     above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q10_A2" id="FP_Q14_A13-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[10], A[2]</a> ). Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only
                     because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all
                     things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch
                     as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their
                     own causes.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 co."><a name="28994" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28994] Iª q. 14 a. 13 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, cum supra ostensum sit quod Deus sciat omnia non solum quae
actu sunt, sed etiam quae sunt in potentia sua vel creaturae; horum
autem quaedam sunt contingentia nobis futura; sequitur quod Deus
contingentia futura cognoscat. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum
est quod contingens aliquod dupliciter potest considerari. Uno
modo, in seipso, secundum quod iam actu est. Et sic non
consideratur ut futurum, sed ut praesens, neque ut ad utrumlibet
contingens, sed ut determinatum ad unum. Et propter hoc, sic
infallibiliter subdi potest certae cognitioni, utpote sensui visus,
sicut cum video Socratem sedere. Alio modo potest considerari
contingens, ut est in sua causa. Et sic consideratur ut futurum, et
ut contingens nondum determinatum ad unum, quia causa contingens se
habet ad opposita. Et sic contingens non subditur per certitudinem
alicui cognitioni. Unde quicumque cognoscit effectum contingentem
in causa sua tantum, non habet de eo nisi coniecturalem
cognitionem. Deus autem cognoscit omnia contingentia, non solum
prout sunt in suis causis, sed etiam prout unumquodque eorum est
actu in seipso. Et licet contingentia fiant in actu successive, non
tamen Deus successive cognoscit contingentia, prout sunt in suo
esse, sicut nos, sed simul. Quia sua cognitio mensuratur
aeternitate, sicut etiam suum esse, aeternitas autem, tota simul
existens, ambit totum tempus, ut supra dictum est. Unde omnia quae
sunt in tempore, sunt Deo ab aeterno praesentia, non solum ea
ratione qua habet rationes rerum apud se praesentes, ut quidam
dicunt, sed quia eius intuitus fertur ab aeterno super omnia, prout
sunt in sua praesentialitate. Unde manifestum est quod contingentia
et infallibiliter a Deo cognoscuntur, inquantum subduntur divino
conspectui secundum suam praesentialitatem, et tamen sunt futura
contingentia, suis causis comparata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A13-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as
                     the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which
                     is the first cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are contingent on account of their proximate causes, while
                     the knowledge of God, which is the first cause, is necessary.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 ad 1"><a name="28995" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28995] Iª q. 14 a. 13 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, licet causa suprema sit necessaria, tamen effectus
potest esse contingens, propter causam proximam contingentem, sicut
germinatio plantae est contingens propter causam proximam
contingentem, licet motus solis, qui est causa prima, sit
necessarius. Et similiter scita a Deo sunt contingentia propter
causas proximas, licet scientia Dei, quae est causa prima, sit
necessaria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A13-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some say that this antecedent, "God knew this contingent to be future," is not necessary, but contingent; because, although
                     it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This however does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had
                     relation to the future, must have had it, although the future sometimes does not follow. On the other hand some say that this
                     antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and contingent; as
                     this saying is contingent, "Socrates is a white man." But this also is to no purpose; for when we say, "God knew this contingent
                     to be future," contingent is used here only as the matter of the word, and not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence
                     its contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or
                     false. For it may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I said Socrates runs, or God is: and the same applies
                     to necessary and contingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely necessary. Nor does it follow, as some
                     say, that the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of the consequent, which is contingent
                     by reason of the proximate cause. But this is to no purpose. For the conditional would be false were its antecedent the remote
                     necessary cause, and the consequent a contingent effect; as, for example, if I said, "if the sun moves, the grass
                     will grow."
                  </p><p id="FP_Q14_A13-p10"> Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent
                     must be taken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the existence of a thing in itself is different from the
                     existence of a thing in the soul. For example, when I say, "What the soul understands is immaterial," this is to be understood
                     that it is immaterial as it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself. Likewise if I say, "If God knew
                     anything, it will be," the consequent must be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, i.e. as it is in its presentiality.
                     And thus it is necessary, as also is the antecedent: "For everything that is, while it is, must be necessarily be," as the
                     Philosopher says in Peri Herm. i.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 ad 2"><a name="28996" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28996] Iª q. 14 a. 13 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod hoc antecedens, Deus scivit hoc
contingens futurum, non est necessarium, sed contingens, quia,
licet sit praeteritum, tamen importat respectum ad futurum. Sed hoc
non tollit ei necessitatem, quia id quod habuit respectum ad
futurum, necesse est habuisse, licet etiam futurum non sequatur
quandoque. Alii vero dicunt hoc antecedens esse contingens, quia
est compositum ex necessario et contingenti; sicut istud dictum est
contingens, Socratem esse hominem album. Sed hoc etiam nihil est.
Quia cum dicitur, Deus scivit esse futurum hoc contingens,
contingens non ponitur ibi nisi ut materia verbi, et non sicut
principalis pars propositionis, unde contingentia eius vel
necessitas nihil refert ad hoc quod propositio sit necessaria vel
contingens, vera vel falsa. Ita enim potest esse verum me dixisse
hominem esse asinum, sicut me dixisse Socratem currere, vel Deum
esse, et eadem ratio est de necessario et contingenti. Unde
dicendum est quod hoc antecedens est necessarium absolute. Nec
tamen sequitur, ut quidam dicunt, quod consequens sit necessarium
absolute, quia antecedens est causa remota consequentis, quod
propter causam proximam contingens est. Sed hoc nihil est. Esset
enim conditionalis falsa, cuius antecedens esset causa remota
necessaria, et consequens effectus contingens, ut puta si dicerem,
si sol movetur, herba germinabit. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod
quando in antecedente ponitur aliquid pertinens ad actum animae,
consequens est accipiendum non secundum quod in se est, sed
secundum quod est in anima, aliud enim est esse rei in seipsa, et
esse rei in anima. Ut puta, si dicam, si anima intelligit aliquid,
illud est immateriale, intelligendum est quod illud est immateriale
secundum quod est in intellectu, non secundum quod est in seipso.
Et similiter si dicam, si Deus scivit aliquid, illud erit,
consequens intelligendum est prout subest divinae scientiae,
scilicet prout est in sua praesentialitate. Et sic necessarium est,
sicut et antecedens, <i>quia omne quod est, dum est, necesse est
esse</i>, ut dicitur in I Periherm.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A13-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things reduced to act in time, as known by us successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is above time.
                     Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God
                     alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who goes along the road, does not see those who come after
                     him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling
                     by the way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself,
                     cannot be known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the
                     divine knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes. Hence also this proposition, "Everything
                     known by God must necessarily be," is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or to the saying. If it
                     refers to the thing, it is divided and false; for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary." If understood of
                     the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense is, "This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary."
                  </p><p id="FP_Q14_A13-p12"> Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good with regard to forms that are separable from the subject;
                     thus if I said, "It is possible for a white thing to be black," it is false as applied to the saying, and true as applied
                     to the thing: for a thing which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, " a white thing is black" can never be true.
                     But in forms that are inseparable from the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said,
                     "A black crow can be white"; for in both senses it is false. Now to be known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what
                     is known by God cannot be known. This objection, however, would hold if these words "that which is known" implied any disposition
                     inherent to the subject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be attributed to the thing known, in itself
                     (even if it always be known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under actual knowledge; thus
                     material existence is attributed to a stone in itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 ad 3"><a name="28997" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28997] Iª q. 14 a. 13 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod ea quae temporaliter in actum reducuntur, a nobis
successive cognoscuntur in tempore, sed a Deo in aeternitate, quae
est supra tempus. Unde nobis, quia cognoscimus futura contingentia
inquantum talia sunt, certa esse non possunt, sed soli Deo, cuius
intelligere est in aeternitate supra tempus. Sicut ille qui vadit
per viam, non videt illos qui post eum veniunt, sed ille qui ab
aliqua altitudine totam viam intuetur, simul videt omnes
transeuntes per viam. Et ideo illud quod scitur a nobis, oportet
esse necessarium etiam secundum quod in se est, quia ea quae in se
sunt contingentia futura, a nobis sciri non possunt. Sed ea quae
sunt scita a Deo, oportet esse necessaria secundum modum quo
subsunt divinae scientiae, ut dictum est, non autem absolute,
secundum quod in propriis causis considerantur. Unde et haec
propositio, omne scitum a Deo necessarium est esse, consuevit
distingui. Quia potest esse de re, vel de dicto. Si intelligatur de
re, est divisa et falsa, et est sensus, omnis res quam Deus scit,
est necessaria. Vel potest intelligi de dicto, et sic est composita
et vera; et est sensus, hoc dictum, scitum a Deo esse, est
necessarium. Sed obstant quidam, dicentes quod ista distinctio
habet locum in formis separabilibus a subiecto; ut si dicam, album
possibile est esse nigrum. Quae quidem de dicto est falsa, et de re
est vera, res enim quae est alba, potest esse nigra; sed hoc
dictum, album esse nigrum, nunquam potest esse verum. In formis
autem inseparabilibus a subiecto, non habet locum praedicta
distinctio; ut si dicam, corvum nigrum possibile est esse album,
quia in utroque sensu est falsa. Esse autem scitum a Deo, est
inseparabile a re, quia quod est scitum a Deo, non potest esse non
scitum. Haec autem instantia locum haberet, si hoc quod dico
scitum, importaret aliquam dispositionem subiecto inhaerentem. Sed
cum importet actum scientis, ipsi rei scitae, licet semper sciatur,
potest aliquid attribui secundum se, quod non attribuitur ei
inquantum stat sub actu sciendi, sicut esse materiale attribuitur
lapidi secundum se, quod non attribuitur ei secundum quod est
intelligibile.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A14" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A14-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 14. Whether God knows enunciable things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A14-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know enunciable things. For to know enunciable things belongs to our intellect as it composes
                     and divides. But in the divine intellect, there is no composition. Therefore God does not know enunciable things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 14 arg. 1"><a name="28998" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28998] Iª q. 14 a. 14 arg. 1</span></a> Ad
decimumquartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat
enuntiabilia. Cognoscere enim enuntiabilia convenit intellectui
nostro, secundum quod componit et dividit. Sed in intellectu divino
nulla est compositio. Ergo Deus non cognoscit enuntiabilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A14-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every kind of knowledge is made through some likeness. But in God there is no likeness of enunciable things, since
                     He is altogether simple. Therefore God does not know enunciable things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 14 arg. 2"><a name="28999" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28999] Iª q. 14 a. 14 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
omnis cognitio fit per aliquam similitudinem. Sed in Deo nulla est
similitudo enuntiabilium, cum sit omnino simplex. Ergo Deus non
cognoscit enuntiabilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A14-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A14-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.93.11" target="asv">Ps. 93:11</a>). But enunciable things are contained in the thoughts of men. Therefore God knows enunciable things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 14 s. c."><a name="29000" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29000] Iª q. 14 a. 14 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur in Psalmo XCIII, <i>dominus scit cogitationes
hominum</i>. Sed enuntiabilia continentur in cogitationibus
hominum. Ergo Deus cognoscit enuntiabilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A14-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since it is in the power of our intellect to form enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in that
                     of creatures, as said above
                     <a href="#FP_Q14_A9" id="FP_Q14_A14-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[9])</a>, it follows of necessity that God knows all enunciations that can be formed.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q14_A14-p6"> Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite things simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not
                     after the manner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were composition or division of enunciations; for He knows
                     each thing by simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if we by the very fact that we understand
                     what man is, were to understand all that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in our
                     intellect, which discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch as the intelligible species represents one thing in such
                     a way as not to represent another. Hence when we understand what man is, we do not forthwith understand other things which
                     belong to him, but we understand them one by one, according to a certain succession. On this account the things we understand
                     as separated, we must reduce to one by way of composition or division, by forming an enunciation. Now the species of the divine
                     intellect, which is God's essence, suffices to represent all things. Hence by understanding His essence, God knows the essences
                     of all things, and also whatever can be accidental to them.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 14 co."><a name="29001" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29001] Iª q. 14 a. 14 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, cum formare enuntiabilia sit in potestate intellectus nostri;
Deus autem scit quidquid est in potentia sua vel creaturae, ut
supra dictum est; necesse est quod Deus sciat omnia enuntiabilia
quae formari possunt. Sed, sicut scit materialia immaterialiter, et
composita simpliciter, ita scit enuntiabilia non per modum
enuntiabilium, quasi scilicet in intellectu eius sit compositio vel
divisio enuntiabilium; sed unumquodque cognoscit per simplicem
intelligentiam, intelligendo essentiam uniuscuiusque. Sicut si nos
in hoc ipso quod intelligimus quid est homo, intelligeremus omnia
quae de homine praedicari possunt. Quod quidem in intellectu nostro
non contingit, qui de uno in aliud discurrit, propter hoc quod
species intelligibilis sic repraesentat unum, quod non repraesentat
aliud. Unde, intelligendo quid est homo, non ex hoc ipso alia quae
ei insunt, intelligimus; sed divisim, secundum quandam
successionem. Et propter hoc, ea quae seorsum intelligimus, oportet
nos in unum redigere per modum compositionis vel divisionis,
enuntiationem formando. Sed species intellectus divini, scilicet
eius essentia, sufficit ad demonstrandum omnia. Unde, intelligendo
essentiam suam, cognoscit essentias omnium, et quaecumque eis
accidere possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A14-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection would avail if God knew enunciable things after the manner of enunciable things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 14 ad 1"><a name="29002" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29002] Iª q. 14 a. 14 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si Deus cognosceret
enuntiabilia per modum enuntiabilium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A14-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Enunciatory composition signifies some existence of a thing; and thus God by His existence, which is His essence, is the
                     similitude of all those things which are signified by enunciation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 14 ad 2"><a name="29003" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29003] Iª q. 14 a. 14 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod compositio enuntiabilis significat aliquod esse rei,
et sic Deus per suum esse, quod est eius essentia, est similitudo
omnium eorum quae per enuntiabilia significantur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A15" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A15-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 15. Whether the knowledge of God is variable?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is variable. For knowledge is related to what is knowable. But whatever imports relation
                     to the creature is applied to God from time, and varies according to the variation of creatures. Therefore the knowledge of
                     God is variable according to the variation of creatures.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 arg. 1"><a name="29004" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29004] Iª q. 14 a. 15 arg. 1</span></a> Ad
decimumquintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei sit
variabilis. Scientia enim relative dicitur ad scibile. Sed ea quae
important relationem ad creaturam, dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, et
variantur secundum variationem creaturarum. Ergo scientia Dei est
variabilis, secundum variationem creaturarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever God can make, He can know. But God can make more than He does. Therefore He can know more than He knows.
                     Thus His knowledge can vary according to increase and diminution.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 arg. 2"><a name="29005" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29005] Iª q. 14 a. 15 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
quidquid potest Deus facere, potest scire. Sed Deus potest plura
facere quam faciat. Ergo potest plura scire quam sciat. Et sic
scientia sua potest variari secundum augmentum et diminutionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knew that Christ would be born. But He does not know now that Christ will be born; because Christ is not to
                     be born in the future. Therefore God does not know everything He once knew; and thus the knowledge of God is variable.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 arg. 3"><a name="29006" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29006] Iª q. 14 a. 15 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
scivit Christum nasciturum. Nunc autem nescit Christum nasciturum,
quia Christus nasciturus non est. Ergo non quidquid Deus scivit,
scit. Et ita scientia Dei videtur esse variabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said, that in God "there is no change nor shadow of alteration" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A15-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.17" target="asv">James 1:17</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 s. c."><a name="29007" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29007] Iª q. 14 a. 15 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Iac. I, quod <i>apud Deum non est transmutatio, neque
vicissitudinis obumbratio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is clear from the foregoing
                     <a href="#FP_Q14_A4" id="FP_Q14_A15-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, just as His substance is altogether immutable, as shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q9_A1" id="FP_Q14_A15-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>), so His knowledge likewise must be altogether invariable.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 co."><a name="29008" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29008] Iª q. 14 a. 15 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, cum scientia Dei sit eius substantia, ut ex dictis patet;
sicut substantia eius est omnino immutabilis, ut supra ostensum
est, ita oportet scientiam eius omnino invariabilem esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import relations to creatures in so far as they are in themselves. But the knowledge of God
                     imports relation to creatures in so far as they are in God; because everything is actually understood according as it is in
                     the one who understands. Now created things are in God in an invariable manner; while they exist variably in themselves. We
                     may also say that "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import the relations consequent
                     upon the acts which are understood as terminating in the creatures themselves, as they are in themselves; and thus these relations
                     are attributed to God variously, according to the variation of creatures. But "knowledge" and "love," and the like, import
                     relations consequent upon the acts which are understood to be in God; and therefore these are predicated of God in an invariable
                     manner.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 ad 1"><a name="29009" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29009] Iª q. 14 a. 15 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod dominus et creator, et huiusmodi, important
relationes ad creaturas secundum quod in seipsis sunt. Sed scientia
Dei importat relationem ad creaturas secundum quod sunt in Deo,
quia secundum hoc est unumquodque intellectum in actu quod est in
intelligente. Res autem creatae sunt in Deo invariabiliter, in
seipsis autem variabiliter. Vel aliter dicendum est, quod dominus
et creator, et huiusmodi, important relationes quae consequuntur
actus qui intelliguntur terminari ad ipsas creaturas secundum quod
in seipsis sunt, et ideo huiusmodi relationes varie de Deo
dicuntur, secundum variationem creaturarum. Sed scientia et amor,
et huiusmodi, important relationes quae consequuntur actus qui
intelliguntur in Deo esse, et ideo invariabiliter praedicantur de
Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God knows also what He can make, and does not make. Hence from the fact that He can make more than He makes, it does not
                     follow that He can know more than He knows, unless this be referred to the knowledge of vision, according to which He is said
                     to know those things which are in act in some period of time. But from the fact that He knows some things might be which are
                     not, or that some things might not be which are, it does not follow that His
                     knowledge is variable, but rather that He knows the variability of things. If, however, anything existed which God did not
                     previously know, and afterwards knew, then His knowledge would be variable. But this could not be; for whatever is, or can
                     be in any period of time, is known by God in His eternity. Therefore from the fact that a thing exists in some period of time,
                     it follows that it is known by God from eternity. Therefore it cannot be granted that God can know more than He knows; because
                     such a proposition implies that first of all He did not know, and then afterwards knew.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 ad 2"><a name="29010" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29010] Iª q. 14 a. 15 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod Deus scit etiam ea quae potest facere et non facit.
Unde ex hoc quod potest plura facere quam facit, non sequitur quod
possit plura scire quam sciat, nisi hoc referatur ad scientiam
visionis, secundum quam dicitur scire ea quae sunt in actu secundum
aliquod tempus. Ex hoc tamen quod scit quod aliqua possunt esse
quae non sunt, vel non esse quae sunt, non sequitur quod scientia
sua sit variabilis, sed quod cognoscat rerum variabilitatem. Si
tamen aliquid esset quod prius Deus nescivisset et postea sciret,
esset eius scientia variabilis. Sed hoc esse non potest, quia
quidquid est vel potest esse secundum aliquod tempus, Deus in
aeterno suo scit. Et ideo ex hoc ipso quod ponitur aliquid esse
secundum quodcumque tempus, oportet poni quod ab aeterno sit scitum
a Deo. Et ideo non debet concedi quod Deus possit plura scire quam
sciat, quia haec propositio implicat quod ante nesciverit et postea
sciat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The ancient Nominalists said that it was the same thing to say "Christ is born" and "will be born" and "was born"; because
                     the same thing is signified by these three---viz. the nativity of Christ. Therefore it follows, they said, that whatever God
                     knew, He knows; because now He knows that Christ is born, which means the same thing as that Christ will be born. This opinion,
                     however, is false; both because the diversity in the parts of a sentence causes
                     a diversity of enunciations; and because it would follow that a proposition which is true once would be always true; which
                     is contrary to what the Philosopher lays down (Categor. iii) when he says that this sentence, "Socrates sits," is true when
                     he is sitting, and false when he rises up. Therefore, it must be conceded that this proposition is not true, "Whatever God
                     knew He knows," if referred to enunciable propositions. But because of this, it does not follow that the knowledge of God
                     is
                     variable. For as it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows one and the same thing sometime to be, and
                     sometime not to be, so it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows an enunciable proposition is sometime
                     true, and sometime false. The knowledge of God, however, would be variable if He knew enunciable things by way of enunciation,
                     by composition and division, as occurs in our intellect. Hence our knowledge varies either as regards truth and falsity, for
                     example, if when either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if when a thing suffers change we retained the same opinion
                     about it; or as regards diverse opinions, as if we first thought that anyone was sitting, and afterwards thought that he was
                     not sitting; neither of which can be in God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 ad 3"><a name="29011" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29011] Iª q. 14 a. 15 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod antiqui nominales dixerunt idem esse enuntiabile,
Christum nasci, et esse nasciturum, et esse natum, quia eadem res
significatur per haec tria, scilicet nativitas Christi. Et secundum
hoc sequitur quod Deus quidquid scivit, sciat, quia modo scit
Christum natum, quod significat idem ei quod est Christum esse
nasciturum. Sed haec opinio falsa est. Tum quia diversitas partium
orationis diversitatem enuntiabilium causat. Tum etiam quia
sequeretur quod propositio quae semel est vera, esset semper vera,
quod est contra philosophum, qui dicit quod haec oratio, Socrates
sedet, vera est eo sedente, et eadem falsa est, eo surgente. Et
ideo concedendum est quod haec non est vera, quidquid Deus scivit,
scit, si ad enuntiabilia referatur. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod
scientia Dei sit variabilis. Sicut enim absque variatione divinae
scientiae est, quod sciat unam et eandem rem quandoque esse et
quandoque non esse; ita absque variatione divinae scientiae est,
quod scit aliquod enuntiabile quandoque esse verum, et quandoque
esse falsum. Esset autem ex hoc scientia Dei variabilis, si
enuntiabilia cognosceret per modum enuntiabilium, componendo et
dividendo, sicut accidit in intellectu nostro. Unde cognitio nostra
variatur, vel secundum veritatem et falsitatem, puta si, mutata re,
eandem opinionem de re illa retineamus, vel secundum diversas
opiniones, ut si primo opinemur aliquem sedere, et postea opinemur
eum non sedere. Quorum neutrum potest esse in Deo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A16" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A16-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 16. Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A16-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not a speculative knowledge of things. For the knowledge of God is the cause of things, as shown above

                     <a href="#FP_Q14_A8" id="FP_Q14_A16-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[8])</a>. But speculative knowledge is not the cause of the things known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 16 arg. 1"><a name="29012" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29012] Iª q. 14 a. 16 arg. 1</span></a> Ad
decimumsextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus de rebus non habeat
scientiam speculativam. Scientia enim Dei est causa rerum, ut supra
ostensum est. Sed scientia speculativa non est causa rerum
scitarum. Ergo scientia Dei non est speculativa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A16-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, speculative knowledge comes by abstraction from things; which does not belong to the divine knowledge. Therefore
                     the knowledge of God is not speculative.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 16 arg. 2"><a name="29013" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29013] Iª q. 14 a. 16 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea.
Scientia speculativa est per abstractionem a rebus, quod divinae
scientiae non competit. Ergo scientia Dei non est speculativa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A16-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is the more excellent must be attributed to God. But speculative knowledge is more excellent than practical knowledge,
                     as the Philosopher says in the beginning of Metaphysics. Therefore God has a speculative knowledge of things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 16 s. c."><a name="29014" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29014] Iª q. 14 a. 16 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne
quod est nobilius, Deo est attribuendum. Sed scientia speculativa
est nobilior quam practica, ut patet per philosophum, in principio
Metaphys. Ergo Deus habet de rebus scientiam speculativam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A16-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some knowledge is speculative only; some is practical only; and some is partly speculative and partly practical. In proof
                     whereof it must be observed that knowledge can be called speculative in three ways: first, on the part of the things known,
                     which are not operable by the knower; such is the knowledge of man about natural or divine thing. Secondly, as regards the
                     manner of knowing---as, for instance, if a builder consider a house by defining and dividing,
                     and considering what belongs to it in general: for this is to consider operable things in a speculative manner, and not as
                     practically operable; for operable means the application of form to matter, and not the resolution of the composite into its
                     universal formal principles. Thirdly, as regards the end; "for the practical intellect differs in its end from the speculative,"
                     as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii). For the practical intellect is ordered to the end of the operation; whereas the
                     end of the speculative intellect is the consideration of truth. Hence if a builder should consider how a house can be made,
                     not ordering this to the end of operation, but only to know (how to do it), this would be only a speculative considerations
                     as regards the end, although it concerns an operable thing. Therefore knowledge which is speculative by reason of the thing
                     itself known, is merely speculative. But that which is speculative either in its mode or as to its end is partly speculative
                     and partly practical: and when it is ordained to an operative end it is simply practical.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q14_A16-p6"> In accordance with this, therefore, it must be said that God has of Himself a speculative knowledge only; for He Himself
                     is not operable. But of all other things He has both speculative and practical knowledge. He has speculative knowledge as
                     regards the mode; for whatever we know speculatively in things by defining and dividing, God knows all this much more perfectly.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q14_A16-p7"> Now of things which He can make, but does not make at any time, He has not a practical knowledge, according as knowledge
                     is called practical from the end. But He has a practical knowledge of what He makes in some period of time. And, as regards
                     evil things, although they are not operable by Him, yet they fall under His practical knowledge, like good things, inasmuch
                     as He permits, or impedes, or directs them; as also sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of the
                     physician, inasmuch as he cures them by his art.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 16 co."><a name="29015" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29015] Iª q. 14 a. 16 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod aliqua scientia est speculativa tantum, aliqua practica
tantum, aliqua vero secundum aliquid speculativa et secundum
aliquid practica. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod aliqua
scientia potest dici speculativa tripliciter. Primo, ex parte rerum
scitarum, quae non sunt operabiles a sciente, sicut est scientia
hominis de rebus naturalibus vel divinis. Secundo, quantum ad modum
sciendi, ut puta si aedificator consideret domum definiendo et
dividendo et considerando universalia praedicata ipsius. Hoc
siquidem est operabilia modo speculativo considerare, et non
secundum quod operabilia sunt, operabile enim est aliquid per
applicationem formae ad materiam, non per resolutionem compositi in
principia universalia formalia. Tertio, quantum ad finem, <i>nam
intellectus practicus differt fine a speculativo</i>, sicut dicitur
in III de anima. Intellectus enim practicus ordinatur ad finem
operationis, finis autem intellectus speculativi est consideratio
veritatis. Unde, si quis aedificator consideret qualiter posset
fieri aliqua domus, non ordinans ad finem operationis, sed ad
cognoscendum tantum, erit, quantum ad finem, speculativa
consideratio, tamen de re operabili. Scientia igitur quae est
speculativa ratione ipsius rei scitae, est speculativa tantum. Quae
vero speculativa est vel secundum modum vel secundum finem, est
secundum quid speculativa et secundum quid practica. Cum vero
ordinatur ad finem operationis, est simpliciter practica. Secundum
hoc ergo, dicendum est quod Deus de seipso habet scientiam
speculativam tantum, ipse enim operabilis non est. De omnibus vero
aliis habet scientiam et speculativam et practicam. Speculativam
quidem, quantum ad modum, quidquid enim in rebus nos speculative
cognoscimus definiendo et dividendo, hoc totum Deus multo
perfectius novit. Sed de his quae potest quidem facere, sed
secundum nullum tempus facit, non habet practicam scientiam,
secundum quod practica scientia dicitur a fine. Sic autem habet
practicam scientiam de his quae secundum aliquod tempus facit. Mala
vero, licet ab eo non sint operabilia, tamen sub cognitione
practica ipsius cadunt, sicut et bona, inquantum permittit vel
impedit vel ordinat ea, sicut et aegritudines cadunt sub practica
scientia medici, inquantum per artem suam curat eas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A16-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The knowledge of God is the cause, not indeed of Himself, but of other things. He is actually the cause of some, that is,
                     of things that come to be in some period of time; and He is virtually the cause of others, that is, of things which He can
                     make, and which nevertheless are never made.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 16 ad 1"><a name="29016" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29016] Iª q. 14 a. 16 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod scientia Dei est causa, non quidem sui ipsius, sed
aliorum, quorundam quidem actu, scilicet eorum quae secundum
aliquod tempus fiunt; quorundam vero virtute, scilicet eorum quae
potest facere, et tamen nunquam fiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A16-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that knowledge is derived from things known does not essentially belong to speculative knowledge, but only accidentally
                     in so far as it is human.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 16 ad 2"><a name="29017" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29017] Iª q. 14 a. 16 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod scientiam esse acceptam a rebus scitis, non per se
convenit scientiae speculativae, sed per accidens, inquantum est
humana.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A16-p10"><b>Reply to Objections:</b>
	In answer to what is objected on the contrary, we must say that perfect knowledge of operable things is obtainable only if
                     they are known in so far as they are operable. Therefore, since the knowledge of God is in every way perfect, He must know
                     what is operable by Him, formally as such, and not only in so far as they are speculative. Nevertheless this does not impair
                     the nobility of His speculative knowledge, forasmuch as He sees all things other than Himself in Himself, and He
                     knows Himself speculatively; and so in the speculative knowledge of Himself, he possesses both speculative and practical knowledge
                     of all other things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 16 ad 3"><a name="29018" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29018] Iª q. 14 a. 16 ad 3</span></a> Ad id vero quod
in contrarium obiicitur, dicendum quod de operabilibus perfecta
scientia non habetur, nisi sciantur inquantum operabilia sunt. Et
ideo, cum scientia Dei sit omnibus modis perfecta, oportet quod
sciat ea quae sunt a se operabilia, inquantum huiusmodi, et non
solum secundum quod sunt speculabilia. Sed tamen non receditur a
nobilitate speculativae scientiae, quia omnia alia a se videt in
seipso, seipsum autem speculative cognoscit; et sic in speculativa
sui ipsius scientia, habet cognitionem et speculativam et practicam
omnium aliorum.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q15" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q15-p0.1">Q. 15. OF IDEAS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q15-p2"> After considering the knowledge of God, it remains to consider ideas. And about this there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q15-p3"><a href="#FP_Q15_A1"> (1) Whether there are ideas?</a></p><p id="FP_Q15-p4"><a href="#FP_Q15_A2"> (2) Whether they are many, or one only?</a></p><p id="FP_Q15-p5"><a href="#FP_Q15_A3"> (3) Whether there are ideas of all things known by God?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 pr."><a name="29019" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29019]
Iª q. 15 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem de scientia Dei,
restat considerare de ideis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo,
an sint ideae. Secundo, utrum sint plures, vel una tantum. Tertio,
utrum sint omnium quae cognoscuntur a Deo.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q15_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q15_A1-p0.1">Q. 15. A. 1. Whether there are ideas?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), that God does not know things by ideas. But ideas are
                     for nothing else except that things may be known through them. Therefore there are no ideas.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29020" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29020] Iª q. 15 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod ideae non sint. Dicit enim Dionysius, VII
cap. de Div. Nom., quod Deus non cognoscit res secundum ideam. Sed
ideae non ponuntur ad aliud, nisi ut per eas cognoscantur res. Ergo
ideae non sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been already said (
                     <a href="#FP_Q14_A5" id="FP_Q15_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[14], A[5]</a>). But He does not know Himself through an idea; neither therefore other things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29021" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29021] Iª q. 15 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
in seipso cognoscit omnia, ut supra dictum est. Sed seipsum non
cognoscit per ideam. Ergo nec alia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an idea is considered to be the principle of knowledge and action. But the divine essence is a sufficient principle
                     of knowing and effecting all things. It is not therefore necessary to suppose ideas.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29022" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29022] Iª q. 15 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, idea
ponitur ut principium cognoscendi et operandi. Sed essentia divina
est sufficiens principium cognoscendi et operandi omnia. Non ergo
necesse est ponere ideas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi),"Such is the power inherent in ideas, that no one can be wise unless they are
                     understood."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29023" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29023] Iª q. 15 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>tanta
vis in ideis constituitur, ut, nisi his intellectis, sapiens esse
nemo possit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q15_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind. For the Greek word {Idea} is in Latin "forma." Hence by ideas are understood
                     the forms of things, existing apart from the things themselves. Now the form of anything existing apart from the thing itself
                     can be for one of two ends: either to be the type of that of which it is called the form, or to be the principle of the knowledge
                     of that thing, inasmuch as the forms of things knowable are said to be in
                     him who knows them. In either case we must suppose ideas, as is clear for the following reason:
                  </p><p id="FP_Q15_A1-p7"> In all things not generated by chance, the form must be the end of any generation whatsoever. But an agent does not act on
                     account of the form, except in so far as the likeness of the form is in the agent, as may happen in two ways. For in some
                     agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists according to its natural being, as in those that act by their nature; as
                     a man generates a man, or fire generates fire. Whereas in other agents (the form of the thing to be made
                     pre-exists) according to intelligible being, as in those that act by the intellect; and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists
                     in the mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends to build his house like
                     to the form conceived in his mind. As then the world was not made by chance, but by God acting by His intellect, as will appear
                     later (
                     <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q46_A1" id="FP_Q15_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[46], A[1]</a>), there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which the
                     world was made. And in this the notion of an idea consists.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 co."><a name="29024" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29024] Iª q. 15 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod necesse est ponere in mente divina ideas. Idea enim Graece,
Latine forma dicitur, unde per ideas intelliguntur formae aliarum
rerum, praeter ipsas res existentes. Forma autem alicuius rei
praeter ipsam existens, ad duo esse potest, vel ut sit exemplar
eius cuius dicitur forma; vel ut sit principium cognitionis ipsius,
secundum quod formae cognoscibilium dicuntur esse in cognoscente.
Et quantum ad utrumque est necesse ponere ideas. Quod sic patet. In
omnibus enim quae non a casu generantur, necesse est formam esse
finem generationis cuiuscumque. Agens autem non ageret propter
formam, nisi inquantum similitudo formae est in ipso. Quod quidem
contingit dupliciter. In quibusdam enim agentibus praeexistit forma
rei fiendae secundum esse naturale, sicut in his quae agunt per
naturam; sicut homo generat hominem, et ignis ignem. In quibusdam
vero secundum esse intelligibile, ut in his quae agunt per
intellectum; sicut similitudo domus praeexistit in mente
aedificatoris. Et haec potest dici idea domus, quia artifex
intendit domum assimilare formae quam mente concepit. Quia igitur
mundus non est casu factus, sed est factus a Deo per intellectum
agente, ut infra patebit, necesse est quod in mente divina sit
forma, ad similitudinem cuius mundus est factus. Et in hoc
consistit ratio ideae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God does not understand things according to an idea existing outside Himself. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. ix) rejects the opinion
                     of Plato, who held that ideas existed of themselves, and not in the intellect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29025" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29025] Iª q. 15 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Deus non intelligit res secundum ideam extra se
existentem. Et sic etiam Aristoteles improbat opinionem Platonis de
ideis, secundum quod ponebat eas per se existentes, non in
intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although God knows Himself and all else by His own essence, yet His essence is the operative principle of all things, except
                     of Himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with respect to other things; though not with respect to Himself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29026" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29026] Iª q. 15 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, licet Deus per essentiam suam se et alia cognoscat,
tamen essentia sua est principium operativum aliorum, non autem sui
ipsius, et ideo habet rationem ideae secundum quod ad alia
comparatur, non autem secundum quod comparatur ad ipsum Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is the similitude of all things according to His essence; therefore an idea in God is identical with His essence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29027" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29027] Iª q. 15 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod Deus secundum essentiam suam est similitudo omnium
rerum. Unde idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam Dei essentia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q15_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q15_A2-p0.1">Q. 15. A. 2. Whether ideas are many?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in God is His essence. But God's essence is one only. Therefore there is only
                     one idea.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29028" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29028] Iª q. 15 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod non sint plures ideae. Idea enim in Deo
est eius essentia. Sed essentia Dei est una tantum. Ergo et idea
est una.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and operating, so are art and wisdom. But in God there are not several arts
                     or wisdoms. Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29029" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29029] Iª q. 15 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
idea est principium cognoscendi et operandi, ita ars et sapientia.
Sed in Deo non sunt plures artes et sapientiae. Ergo nec plures
ideae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be said that ideas are multiplied according to their relations to different creatures, it may be argued on
                     the contrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal. If, then, ideas are many, but creatures temporal, then the temporal must
                     be the cause of the eternal.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29030" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29030] Iª q. 15 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Si dicatur quod
ideae multiplicantur secundum respectus ad diversas creaturas,
contra, pluralitas idearum est ab aeterno. Si ergo ideae sunt
plures, creaturae autem sunt temporales, ergo temporale erit causa
aeterni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, these relations are either real in creatures only, or in God also. If in creatures only, since creatures are not
                     from eternity, the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity, if ideas are multiplied only according to these relations.
                     But if they are real in God, it follows that there is a real plurality in God other than the plurality of Persons: and this
                     is against the teaching of Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 10), who says, in God all things are one,
                     except "ingenerability, generation, and procession." Ideas therefore are not many.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="29031" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29031] Iª q. 15 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
respectus isti aut sunt secundum rem in creaturis tantum, aut etiam
in Deo. Si in creaturis tantum, cum creaturae non sint ab aeterno,
pluralitas idearum non erit ab aeterno, si multiplicentur solum
secundum huiusmodi respectus. Si autem realiter sunt in Deo,
sequitur quod alia pluralitas realis sit in Deo quam pluralitas
personarum, quod est contra Damascenum, dicentem quod in divinis
omnia unum sunt, praeter ingenerationem, generationem et
processionem. Sic igitur non sunt plures ideae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "Ideas are certain principal forms, or permanent and immutable types of things,
                     they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal, and existing always in the same manner, as being contained in the
                     divine intelligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come into being nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with
                     them everything is formed that can rise or decay, and all that actually does so."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29032" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29032] Iª q. 15 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>ideae
sunt principales quaedam formae vel rationes rerum stabiles atque
incommutabiles, quia ipsae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae
ac semper eodem modo se habentes, quae divina intelligentia
continentur. Sed cum ipsae neque oriantur neque intereant, secundum
eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interire potest, et
omne quod oritur et interit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It must necessarily be held that ideas are many. In proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the ultimate
                     end is the proper intention of the principal agent, as the order of an army (is the proper intention) of the general. Now
                     the highest good existing in things is the good of the order of the universe, as the Philosopher clearly teaches in Metaph.
                     xii. Therefore the order of the universe is properly intended by God, and is not the
                     accidental result of a succession of agents, as has been supposed by those who have taught that God created only the first
                     creature, and that this creature created the second creature, and so on, until this great multitude of beings was produced.
                     According to this opinion God would have the idea of the first created thing alone; whereas, if the order itself of the universe
                     was created by Him immediately, and intended by Him, He must have the idea of the order of the universe. Now there cannot
                     be an idea of any whole, unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which the whole is made; just as a builder cannot
                     conceive the idea of a house unless he has the idea of each of its parts. So, then, it must needs be that in the divine mind
                     there are the proper ideas of all things. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "that each thing was created
                     by God according to the idea proper to it," from which it follows that in the divine mind ideas are many. Now it can easily
                     be seen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of God, if we consider that the idea of a work is in the mind of the operator
                     as that which is understood, and not as the image whereby he understands, which is a form that makes the intellect in act.
                     For the form of the house in the mind of the builder, is something understood by him, to the likeness of which he forms the
                     house in matter. Now, it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it understand many things; though it
                     would be repugnant to its simplicity were His understanding to be formed by a plurality of images. Hence many ideas exist
                     in the divine mind, as things understood by it; as can be proved thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own essence perfectly, He
                     knows it according to every mode in which it can be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in itself, but as it can
                     be participated in by creatures according to some degree of likeness. But every creature has its own proper species, according
                     to
                     which it participates in some degree in likeness to the divine essence. So far, therefore, as God knows His essence as capable
                     of such imitation by any creature, He knows it as the particular type and idea of that creature; and in like manner as regards
                     other creatures. So it is clear that God understands many particular types of things and these are many ideas.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 co."><a name="29033" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29033] Iª q. 15 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod necesse est ponere plures ideas. Ad cuius evidentiam,
considerandum est quod in quolibet effectu illud quod est ultimus
finis, proprie est intentum a principali agente; sicut ordo
exercitus a duce. Illud autem quod est optimum in rebus existens,
est bonum ordinis universi, ut patet per philosophum in XII
Metaphys. Ordo igitur universi est proprie a Deo intentus, et non
per accidens proveniens secundum successionem agentium, prout
quidam dixerunt quod Deus creavit primum creatum tantum, quod
creatum creavit secundum creatum, et sic inde quousque producta est
tanta rerum multitudo, secundum quam opinionem, Deus non haberet
nisi ideam primi creati. Sed si ipse ordo universi est per se
creatus ab eo, et intentus ab ipso, necesse est quod habeat ideam
ordinis universi. Ratio autem alicuius totius haberi non potest,
nisi habeantur propriae rationes eorum ex quibus totum
constituitur, sicut aedificator speciem domus concipere non posset,
nisi apud ipsum esset propria ratio cuiuslibet partium eius. Sic
igitur oportet quod in mente divina sint propriae rationes omnium
rerum. Unde dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest.,
quod <i>singula propriis rationibus a Deo creata sunt</i>. Unde
sequitur quod in mente divina sint plures ideae. Hoc autem quomodo
divinae simplicitati non repugnet, facile est videre, si quis
consideret ideam operati esse in mente operantis sicut quod
intelligitur; non autem sicut species qua intelligitur, quae est
forma faciens intellectum in actu. Forma enim domus in mente
aedificatoris est aliquid ab eo intellectum, ad cuius similitudinem
domum in materia format. Non est autem contra simplicitatem divini
intellectus, quod multa intelligat, sed contra simplicitatem eius
esset, si per plures species eius intellectus formaretur. Unde
plures ideae sunt in mente divina ut intellectae ab ipso. Quod hoc
modo potest videri. Ipse enim essentiam suam perfecte cognoscit,
unde cognoscit eam secundum omnem modum quo cognoscibilis est.
Potest autem cognosci non solum secundum quod in se est, sed
secundum quod est participabilis secundum aliquem modum
similitudinis a creaturis. Unaquaeque autem creatura habet propriam
speciem, secundum quod aliquo modo participat divinae essentiae
similitudinem. Sic igitur inquantum Deus cognoscit suam essentiam
ut sic imitabilem a tali creatura, cognoscit eam ut propriam
rationem et ideam huius creaturae. Et similiter de aliis. Et sic
patet quod Deus intelligit plures rationes proprias plurium rerum;
quae sunt plures ideae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine essence is not called an idea in so far as it is that essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or type
                     of this or that thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch as many types are understood through the self-same essence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29034" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29034] Iª q. 15 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod idea non nominat divinam essentiam inquantum est
essentia, sed inquantum est similitudo vel ratio huius vel illius
rei. Unde secundum quod sunt plures rationes intellectae ex una
essentia, secundum hoc dicuntur plures ideae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By wisdom and art we signify that by which God understands; but an idea, that which God understands. For God by one understands
                     many things, and that not only according to what they are in themselves, but also according as they are understood, and this
                     is to understand the several types of things. In the same way, an architect is said to understand a house, when he understands
                     the form of the house in matter. But if he understands the form of a house,
                     as devised by himself, from the fact that he understands that he understands it, he thereby understands the type or idea of
                     the house. Now not only does God understand many things by His essence, but He also understands that He understands many things
                     by His essence. And this means that He understands the several types of things; or that many ideas are in His intellect as
                     understood by Him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29035" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29035] Iª q. 15 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod sapientia et ars significantur ut quo Deus
intelligit, sed idea ut quod Deus intelligit. Deus autem uno
intelligit multa; et non solum secundum quod in seipsis sunt, sed
etiam secundum quod intellecta sunt; quod est intelligere plures
rationes rerum. Sicut artifex, dum intelligit formam domus in
materia, dicitur intelligere domum, dum autem intelligit formam
domus ut a se speculatam, ex eo quod intelligit se intelligere eam,
intelligit ideam vel rationem domus. Deus autem non solum
intelligit multas res per essentiam suam, sed etiam intelligit se
intelligere multa per essentiam suam. Sed hoc est intelligere
plures rationes rerum; vel, plures ideas esse in intellectu eius ut
intellectas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Such relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are caused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect comparing
                     its own essence with these things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29036" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29036] Iª q. 15 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod huiusmodi respectus, quibus multiplicantur ideae, non
causantur a rebus, sed ab intellectu divino, comparante essentiam
suam ad res.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in created things, but in God. Yet they are not real relations, such as those whereby
                     the Persons are distinguished, but relations understood by God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="29037" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29037] Iª q. 15 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod respectus multiplicantes ideas, non sunt in rebus
creatis, sed in Deo. Non tamen sunt reales respectus, sicut illi
quibus distinguuntur personae, sed respectus intellecti a Deo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q15_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q15_A3-p0.1">Q. 15. A. 3. Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would
                     follow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God. Therefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29038" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29038] Iª q. 15 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod non omnium quae cognoscit Deus, sint ideae
in ipso. Mali enim idea non est in Deo, quia sequeretur malum esse
in Deo. Sed mala cognoscuntur a Deo. Ergo non omnium quae
cognoscuntur a Deo, sunt ideae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be, nor have been, as has been said above
                     <a href="#FP_Q15_A9" id="FP_Q15_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[9])</a>. But of such things there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): "Acts of the divine will are the determining
                     and effective types of things." Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29039" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29039] Iª q. 15 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
cognoscit ea quae nec sunt nec erunt nec fuerunt, ut supra dictum
est. Sed horum non sunt ideae, quia dicit Dionysius, V cap. de Div.
Nom., quod <i>exemplaria sunt divinae voluntates, determinativae et
effectivae rerum</i>. Ergo non omnium quae a Deo cognoscuntur, sunt
ideae in ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knows primary matter, of which there can be no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29040" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29040] Iª q. 15 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
cognoscit materiam primam, quae non potest habere ideam, cum nullam
habeat formam. Ergo idem quod prius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is certain that God knows not only species, but also genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are not ideas
                     of these, according to Plato's teaching, who first taught ideas, as Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore
                     there are not ideas in God of all things known by Him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="29041" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29041] Iª q. 15 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
constat quod Deus scit non solum species, sed etiam genera et
singularia et accidentia. Sed horum non sunt ideae, secundum
positionem Platonis, qui primus ideas introduxit, ut dicit
Augustinus. Non ergo omnium cognitorum a Deo sunt ideae in
ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But God has the proper
                     types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas of all things known by Him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29042" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29042] Iª q. 15 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, ideae
sunt rationes in mente divina existentes, ut per Augustinum patet.
Sed omnium quae cognoscit, Deus habet proprias rationes. Ergo
omnium quae cognoscit, habet ideam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold
                     office, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the principle of the making of things, it may be called an
                     "exemplar," and belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of knowledge, it is properly called a "type,"
                     and may belong to speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect to
                     everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a principle of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God,
                     even though they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows according to their proper type, in so far as they
                     are known by Him in a speculative manner.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 co."><a name="29043" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29043] Iª q. 15 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, cum ideae a Platone ponerentur principia cognitionis rerum et
generationis ipsarum, ad utrumque se habet idea, prout in mente
divina ponitur. Et secundum quod est principium factionis rerum,
exemplar dici potest, et ad practicam cognitionem pertinet.
Secundum autem quod principium cognoscitivum est, proprie dicitur
ratio; et potest etiam ad scientiam speculativam pertinere.
Secundum ergo quod exemplar est, secundum hoc se habet ad omnia
quae a Deo fiunt secundum aliquod tempus. Secundum vero quod
principium cognoscitivum est, se habet ad omnia quae cognoscuntur a
Deo, etiam si nullo tempore fiant; et ad omnia quae a Deo
cognoscuntur secundum propriam rationem, et secundum quod
cognoscuntur ab ipso per modum speculationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil is known by God not through its own type, but through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God, neither
                     in so far as an idea is an "exemplar" nor as a "type."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29044" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29044] Iª q. 15 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod malum cognoscitur a Deo non per propriam rationem,
sed per rationem boni. Et ideo malum non habet in Deo ideam, neque
secundum quod idea est exemplar, neque secundum quod est ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God has no practical knowledge, except virtually, of things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with respect
                     to these there is no idea in God in so far as idea signifies an "exemplar" but only in so far as it denotes a "type."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29045" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29045] Iª q. 15 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod eorum quae neque sunt neque erunt neque fuerunt, Deus
non habet practicam cognitionem, nisi virtute tantum. Unde respectu
eorum non est idea in Deo, secundum quod idea significat exemplar,
sed solum secundum quod significat rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a concause
                     with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God;
                     but not apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in itself can neither exist, nor be known.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29046" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29046] Iª q. 15 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod Plato, secundum quosdam, posuit materiam non creatam,
et ideo non posuit ideam esse materiae, sed materiae concausam. Sed
quia nos ponimus materiam creatam a Deo, non tamen sine forma,
habet quidem materia ideam in Deo, non tamen aliam ab idea
compositi. Nam materia secundum se neque esse habet, neque
cognoscibilis est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species, in so far as idea denotes an "exemplar"; for genus cannot exist except
                     in some species. The same is the case with those accidents that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being
                     along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the subject, have their special idea. For an architect produces
                     through the form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it;
                     whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such as painting, or any other such thing, are produced through
                     some other form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea than that of species; both because particular
                     things are individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated and the concause with the idea; and because
                     the intention of nature regards the species, and produces individuals only that in them the species may be preserved.
                     However, divine providence extends not merely to species; but to individuals as will be shown later (
                     <a href="#FP_Q22_A3" id="FP_Q15_A3-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a> ).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="29047" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29047] Iª q. 15 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod genera non possunt habere ideam aliam ab idea
speciei, secundum quod idea significat exemplar, quia nunquam genus
fit nisi in aliqua specie. Similiter etiam est de accidentibus quae
inseparabiliter concomitantur subiectum, quia haec simul fiunt cum
subiecto. Accidentia autem quae superveniunt subiecto, specialem
ideam habent. Artifex enim per formam domus facit omnia accidentia
quae a principio concomitantur domum, sed ea quae superveniunt
domui iam factae, ut picturae vel aliquid aliud, facit per aliquam
aliam formam. Individua vero, secundum Platonem, non habebant aliam
ideam quam ideam speciei, tum quia singularia individuantur per
materiam, quam ponebat esse increatam, ut quidam dicunt, et
concausam ideae; tum quia intentio naturae consistit in speciebus,
nec particularia producit, nisi ut in eis species salventur. Sed
providentia divina non solum se extendit ad species, sed ad
singularia, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q16" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q16-p0.1">Q. 16. OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q16-p2"> Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration of the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth.
                  About this there are eight points of inquiry:
               </p><p id="FP_Q16-p3"><a href="#FP_Q16_A1"> (1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q16-p4"><a href="#FP_Q16_A2"> (2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?</a></p><p id="FP_Q16-p5"><a href="#FP_Q16_A3"> (3) On the comparison of the true to being.</a></p><p id="FP_Q16-p6"><a href="#FP_Q16_A4"> (4) On the comparison of the true to the good.</a></p><p id="FP_Q16-p7"><a href="#FP_Q16_A5"> (5) Whether God is truth?</a></p><p id="FP_Q16-p8"><a href="#FP_Q16_A6"> (6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many?</a></p><p id="FP_Q16-p9"><a href="#FP_Q16_A7"> (7) On the eternity of truth.</a></p><p id="FP_Q16-p10"><a href="#FP_Q16_A8"> (8) On the unchangeableness of truth.</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 pr."><a name="29048" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29048]
Iª q. 16 pr.</span></a> Quoniam autem scientia verorum est,
post considerationem scientiae Dei, de veritate inquirendum est.
Circa quam quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum veritas sit in re, vel
tantum in intellectu. Secundo, utrum sit tantum in intellectu
componente et dividente. Tertio, de comparatione veri ad ens.
Quarto, de comparatione veri ad bonum. Quinto, utrum Deus sit
veritas. Sexto, utrum omnia sint vera veritate una, vel pluribus.
Septimo, de aeternitate veritatis. Octavo, de incommutabilitate
ipsius.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q16_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q16_A1-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 1. Whether truth resides only in the intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns
                     this definition of truth, "That is true which is seen"; since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth
                     would not be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, "That is true which is as it appears to the
                     knower, who is willing and able to know," for hence it would follow that nothing would be true,
                     unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: "That is true which is." It seems, then, that truth resides
                     in things, and not in the intellect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29049" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29049] Iª q. 16 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod veritas non sit tantum in intellectu, sed
magis in rebus. Augustinus enim, in libro Soliloq., reprobat hanc
notificationem veri, verum est id quod videtur, quia secundum hoc,
lapides qui sunt in abditissimo terrae sinu, non essent veri
lapides, quia non videntur. Reprobat etiam istam, verum est quod
ita se habet ut videtur cognitori, si velit et possit cognoscere,
quia secundum hoc sequeretur quod nihil esset verum, si nullus
posset cognoscere. Et definit sic verum, verum est id quod est. Et
sic videtur quod veritas sit in rebus, et non in intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If, then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except
                     in so far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true
                     is so. Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as seen by different persons at the same time.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29050" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29050] Iª q. 16 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
quidquid est verum, veritate verum est. Si igitur veritas est in
intellectu solo, nihil erit verum nisi secundum quod intelligitur,
quod est error antiquorum philosophorum, qui dicebant omne quod
videtur, esse verum. Ad quod sequitur contradictoria simul esse
vera, cum contradictoria simul a diversis vera esse videantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "that, on account of which a thing is so, is itself more so," as is evident from the Philosopher (Poster. i). But
                     it is from the fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is true or false, as the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam.
                     iii). Therefore truth resides rather in things than in the intellect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29051" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29051] Iª q. 16 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> <i>Praeterea,
propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis</i>, ut patet I Poster.
<i>Sed ex eo quod res est vel non est, est opinio vel oratio vera
vel falsa</i>, secundum philosophum in praedicamentis. Ergo veritas
magis est in rebus quam in intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), " The true and the false reside not in things, but in the intellect."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29052" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29052] Iª q. 16 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod philosophus dicit, VI Metaphys., quod <i>verum et falsum non
sunt in rebus, sed in intellectu</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q16_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As the good denotes that towards which the appetite tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now
                     there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according
                     as the thing known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends towards the thing desired. Thus the
                     term of the appetite, namely good, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect,
                     namely true, is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is related to the appetite---and
                     hence the aspect of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far as the appetite is called good
                     if its object is good; so, since the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object understood, the aspect
                     of the true must needs pass from the intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood is said to be
                     true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect. Now a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either
                     essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect on which it depends as regards its essence; but accidentally
                     to an intellect by which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is related essentially to the intellect of the architect,
                     but accidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q16_A1-p7"> Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said
                     to be true absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it depends; and thus it is that artificial things
                     are said to be true a being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the form
                     in the architect's mind; and words are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the
                     intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so far as they express the likeness of the species that are
                     in the divine mind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to a stone, according to the preconception
                     in the divine intellect. Thus, then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things according as they
                     are related to the intellect as their principle. Consequently there are various definitions of truth. Augustine says (De Vera
                     Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is;" and Hilary says (De Trin. v) that "Truth makes being
                     clear and evident" and this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as
                     they are related to the intellect, we have Augustine's definition (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is a supreme likeness without
                     any unlikeness to a principle": also Anselm's definition (De Verit. xii), "Truth is rightness, perceptible by the mind alone";
                     for that is right which is in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna's definition (Metaph. viii, 6), "The truth of each
                     thing is a property of the essence which is immutably attached to it." The definition that "Truth is the equation of thought
                     and thing" is applicable to it under either aspect.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 1 co."><a name="29053" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29053] Iª q. 16 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut bonum nominat id in quod tendit appetitus, ita verum
nominat id in quod tendit intellectus. Hoc autem distat inter
appetitum et intellectum, sive quamcumque cognitionem, quia
cognitio est secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente, appetitus
autem est secundum quod appetens inclinatur in ipsam rem appetitam.
Et sic terminus appetitus, quod est bonum, est in re appetibili,
sed terminus cognitionis, quod est verum, est in ipso intellectu.
Sicut autem bonum est in re, inquantum habet ordinem ad appetitum;
et propter hoc ratio bonitatis derivatur a re appetibili in
appetitum, secundum quod appetitus dicitur bonus, prout est boni,
ita, cum verum sit in intellectu secundum quod conformatur rei
intellectae, necesse est quod ratio veri ab intellectu ad rem
intellectam derivetur, ut res etiam intellecta vera dicatur,
secundum quod habet aliquem ordinem ad intellectum. Res autem
intellecta ad intellectum aliquem potest habere ordinem vel per se,
vel per accidens. Per se quidem habet ordinem ad intellectum a quo
dependet secundum suum esse, per accidens autem ad intellectum a
quo cognoscibilis est. Sicut si dicamus quod domus comparatur ad
intellectum artificis per se, per accidens autem comparatur ad
intellectum a quo non dependet. Iudicium autem de re non sumitur
secundum id quod inest ei per accidens, sed secundum id quod inest
ei per se. Unde unaquaeque res dicitur vera absolute, secundum
ordinem ad intellectum a quo dependet. Et inde est quod res
artificiales dicuntur verae per ordinem ad intellectum nostrum,
dicitur enim domus vera, quae assequitur similitudinem formae quae
est in mente artificis; et dicitur oratio vera, inquantum est
signum intellectus veri. Et similiter res naturales dicuntur esse
verae, secundum quod assequuntur similitudinem specierum quae sunt
in mente divina, dicitur enim verus lapis, qui assequitur propriam
lapidis naturam, secundum praeconceptionem intellectus divini. Sic
ergo veritas principaliter est in intellectu; secundario vero in
rebus, secundum quod comparantur ad intellectum ut ad principium.
Et secundum hoc, veritas diversimode notificatur. Nam Augustinus,
in libro de vera Relig., dicit quod <i>veritas est, qua ostenditur
id quod est</i>. Et Hilarius dicit quod <i>verum est declarativum
aut manifestativum esse</i>. Et hoc pertinet ad veritatem secundum
quod est in intellectu. Ad veritatem autem rei secundum ordinem ad
intellectum, pertinet definitio Augustini in libro de vera Relig.,
<i>veritas est summa similitudo principii, quae sine ulla
dissimilitudine est</i>. Et quaedam definitio Anselmi, <i>veritas
est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis</i>; nam rectum est, quod
principio concordat. Et quaedam definitio Avicennae, <i>veritas
uniuscuiusque rei est proprietas sui esse quod stabilitum est
ei</i>. Quod autem dicitur quod veritas est adaequatio rei et
intellectus potest ad utrumque pertinere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking about the truth of things, and excludes from the notion of this truth, relation to our intellect; for
                     what is accidental is excluded from every definition.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29054" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29054] Iª q. 16 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de veritate rei; et excludit a
ratione huius veritatis, comparationem ad intellectum nostrum. Nam
id quod est per accidens, ab unaquaque definitione excluditur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The ancient philosophers held that the species of natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by
                     chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they were compelled to base the truth of things on their
                     relation to our intellect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph.
                     iv). Such, however, do not follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their
                     relation to the divine intellect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29055" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29055] Iª q. 16 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod antiqui philosophi species rerum naturalium non
dicebant procedere ab aliquo intellectu, sed eas provenire a casu,
et quia considerabant quod verum importat comparationem ad
intellectum, cogebantur veritatem rerum constituere in ordine ad
intellectum nostrum. Ex quo inconvenientia sequebantur quae
philosophus prosequitur in IV Metaphys. Quae quidem inconvenientia
non accidunt, si ponamus veritatem rerum consistere in comparatione
ad intellectum divinum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing, yet it is not necessary that truth should be there primarily,
                     any more than that health should be primarily in medicine, rather than in the animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not
                     its health, is the cause of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the same way, the being of the thing, not its truth,
                     is the cause of truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a thought
                     or a word is true "from the fact that a thing is, not because a thing is true."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29056" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29056] Iª q. 16 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, licet veritas intellectus nostri a re causetur, non
tamen oportet quod in re per prius inveniatur ratio veritatis,
sicut neque in medicina per prius invenitur ratio sanitatis quam in
animali; virtus enim medicinae, non sanitas eius, causat sanitatem,
cum non sit agens univocum. Et similiter esse rei, non veritas
eius, causat veritatem intellectus. Unde philosophus dicit quod
opinio et oratio vera est <i>ex eo quod res est, non ex eo quod res
vera est</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q16_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q16_A2-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 2. Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii)
                     that as the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible objects, so is the intellect as regards "what a thing
                     is." Now composition and division are neither in the senses nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is." Therefore truth
                     does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29057" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29057] Iª q. 16 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod veritas non sit solum in intellectu
componente et dividente. Dicit enim philosophus, in III de anima,
quod sicut sensus propriorum sensibilium semper veri sunt, ita et
intellectus eius quod quid est. Sed compositio et divisio non est
neque in sensu, neque in intellectu cognoscente quod quid est. Ergo
veritas non solum est in compositione et divisione intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isaac says in his book On Definitions that truth is the equation of thought and thing. Now just as the intellect
                     with regard to complex things can be equated to things, so also with regard to simple things; and this is true also of sense
                     apprehending a thing as it is. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29058" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29058] Iª q. 16 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Isaac
dicit, in libro de definitionibus, quod veritas est adaequatio rei
et intellectus. Sed sicut intellectus complexorum potest adaequari
rebus, ita intellectus incomplexorum, et etiam sensus sentiens rem
ut est. Ergo veritas non est solum in compositione et divisione
intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A2-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi) that with regard to simple things and "what a thing is," truth is "found neither in the
                     intellect nor in things."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29059" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29059] Iª q. 16 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit philosophus, in VI Metaphys., quod circa simplicia et
quod quid est non est veritas, nec in intellectu neque in
rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A2-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect, in the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has
                     the form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing, must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the
                     thing known, this being its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the conformity of intellect and thing; and
                     hence to know this conformity is to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For
                     although sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the comparison which exists between the thing seen
                     and that which itself apprehends concerning it. But the intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing;
                     yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of a thing "what a thing is." When, however, it judges that a thing corresponds to
                     the form which it apprehends about that thing, then first it knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and dividing:
                     for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes from the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by
                     the predicate: and this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing, as is also the intellect, when it knows "what a
                     thing is"; but it does not thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like manner the case with complex or non-complex words.
                     Truth therefore may be in the senses, or in the intellect knowing "what a thing is," as in anything that is true; yet not
                     as the
                     thing known in the knower, which is implied by the word "truth"; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as known. Therefore,
                     properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect composing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect knowing
                     "what a thing is."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 2 co."><a name="29060" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29060] Iª q. 16 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod verum, sicut dictum est, secundum sui primam rationem est in
intellectu. Cum autem omnis res sit vera secundum quod habet
propriam formam naturae suae, necesse est quod intellectus,
inquantum est cognoscens, sit verus inquantum habet similitudinem
rei cognitae, quae est forma eius inquantum est cognoscens. Et
propter hoc per conformitatem intellectus et rei veritas definitur.
Unde conformitatem istam cognoscere, est cognoscere veritatem. Hanc
autem nullo modo sensus cognoscit, licet enim visus habeat
similitudinem visibilis, non tamen cognoscit comparationem quae est
inter rem visam et id quod ipse apprehendit de ea. Intellectus
autem conformitatem sui ad rem intelligibilem cognoscere potest,
sed tamen non apprehendit eam secundum quod cognoscit de aliquo
quod quid est; sed quando iudicat rem ita se habere sicut est forma
quam de re apprehendit, tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum. Et hoc
facit componendo et dividendo, nam in omni propositione aliquam
formam significatam per praedicatum, vel applicat alicui rei
significatae per subiectum, vel removet ab ea. Et ideo bene
invenitur quod sensus est verus de aliqua re, vel intellectus
cognoscendo quod quid est, sed non quod cognoscat aut dicat verum.
Et similiter est de vocibus complexis aut incomplexis. Veritas
quidem igitur potest esse in sensu, vel in intellectu cognoscente
quod quid est, ut in quadam re vera, non autem ut cognitum in
cognoscente, quod importat nomen veri; perfectio enim intellectus
est verum ut cognitum. Et ideo, proprie loquendo, veritas est in
intellectu componente et dividente, non autem in sensu, neque in
intellectu cognoscente quod quid est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A2-p6"> And thus the Objections given are solved.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 2 ad arg."><a name="29061" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29061] Iª q. 16 a. 2 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc
patet solutio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q16_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q16_A3-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 3. Whether the true and being are convertible terms?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated
                     <a href="#FP_Q16_A1" id="FP_Q16_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>; but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not convertible.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29062" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29062] Iª q. 16 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod verum et ens non convertantur. Verum enim
est proprie in intellectu, ut dictum est. Ens autem proprie est in
rebus. Ergo non convertuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being;
                     for it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not. Therefore the true and being are not convertible.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29063" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29063] Iª q. 16 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id
quod se extendit ad ens et non ens, non convertitur cum ente. Sed
verum se extendit ad ens et non ens, nam verum est quod est esse,
et quod non est non esse. Ergo verum et ens non convertuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true
                     appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are
                     not convertible.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29064" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29064] Iª q. 16 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quae
se habent secundum prius et posterius, non videntur converti. Sed
verum videtur prius esse quam ens, nam ens non intelligitur nisi
sub ratione veri. Ergo videtur quod non sint convertibilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the same disposition of things in being and in truth.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29065" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29065] Iª q. 16 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit philosophus, II Metaphys., quod eadem est dispositio
rerum in esse et veritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being,
                     so far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in De Anima iii that "the soul is in some manner all things," through the senses
                     and the intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the true. But as good adds to being the notion
                     of desirable, so the true adds relation to the intellect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 co."><a name="29066" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29066] Iª q. 16 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut bonum habet rationem appetibilis, ita verum habet
ordinem ad cognitionem. Unumquodque autem inquantum habet de esse,
intantum est cognoscibile. Et propter hoc dicitur in III de anima,
quod anima est quodammodo omnia secundum sensum et intellectum. Et
ideo, sicut bonum convertitur cum ente, ita et verum. Sed tamen,
sicut bonum addit rationem appetibilis supra ens, ita et verum
comparationem ad intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said before
                     <a href="#FP_Q16_A1" id="FP_Q16_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible
                     with being, as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already
                     <a href="#FP_Q16_A1" id="FP_Q16_A3-p7.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. It may, however, be said that being also is in the things and in the
                     intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in idea.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29067" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29067] Iª q. 16 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod verum est in rebus et in intellectu, ut dictum est.
Verum autem quod est in rebus, convertitur cum ente secundum
substantiam. Sed verum quod est in intellectu, convertitur cum
ente, ut manifestativum cum manifestato. Hoc enim est de ratione
veri, ut dictum est. Quamvis posset dici quod etiam ens est in
rebus et in intellectu, sicut et verum; licet verum principaliter
in intellectu, ens vero principaliter in rebus. Et hoc accidit
propter hoc, quod verum et ens differunt ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be known; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable.
                     Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29068" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29068] Iª q. 16 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod non ens non habet in se unde cognoscatur, sed
cognoscitur inquantum intellectus facit illud cognoscibile. Unde
verum fundatur in ente, inquantum non ens est quoddam ens rationis,
apprehensum scilicet a ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways.
                     In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and
                     this is true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended
                     also; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be
                     apprehended also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object
                     with being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility
                     is not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by understanding being.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29069" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29069] Iª q. 16 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, cum dicitur quod ens non potest apprehendi sine
ratione veri, hoc potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo, ita quod
non apprehendatur ens, nisi ratio veri assequatur apprehensionem
entis. Et sic locutio habet veritatem. Alio modo posset sic
intelligi, quod ens non posset apprehendi, nisi apprehenderetur
ratio veri. Et hoc falsum est. Sed verum non potest apprehendi,
nisi apprehendatur ratio entis, quia ens cadit in ratione veri. Et
est simile sicut si comparemus intelligibile ad ens. Non enim
potest intelligi ens, quin ens sit intelligibile, sed tamen potest
intelligi ens, ita quod non intelligatur eius intelligibilitas. Et
similiter ens intellectum est verum, non tamen intelligendo ens,
intelligitur verum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q16_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q16_A4-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 4. Whether good is logically prior to the true?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For what is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from Phys.
                     i. But the good is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the
                     good is logically prior to the true.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29070" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29070] Iª q. 16 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam
verum. Quod enim est universalius, secundum rationem prius est, ut
patet ex I Physic. Sed bonum est universalius quam verum, nam verum
est quoddam bonum, scilicet intellectus. Ergo bonum prius est
secundum rationem quam verum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect composing and dividing as said above
                     <a href="#FP_Q16_A2" id="FP_Q16_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. But that which is in things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is logically prior to the true.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29071" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29071] Iª q. 16 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, bonum
est in rebus, verum autem in compositione et divisione intellectus,
ut dictum est. Sed ea quae sunt in re, sunt priora his quae sunt in
intellectu. Ergo prius est secundum rationem bonum quam verum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from Ethic. iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine
                     says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind. Therefore the good is prior to the true.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29072" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29072] Iª q. 16 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
veritas est quaedam species virtutis, ut patet in IV Ethic. Sed
virtus continetur sub bono, est enim bona qualitas mentis, ut dicit
Augustinus. Ergo bonum est prius quam verum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> What is in more things is prior logically. But the true is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in mathematics.
                     Therefore the true is prior to good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29073" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29073] Iª q. 16 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, quod
est in pluribus, est prius secundum rationem. Sed verum est in
quibusdam in quibus non est bonum, scilicet in mathematicis. Ergo
verum est prius quam bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Although the good and the true are convertible with being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner
                     the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two reasons. First, because the true is more closely related
                     to being than is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately; while the nature of good follows being in
                     so far as being is in some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident
                     from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the true regards knowledge, but the good regards the
                     appetite, the true must be prior in idea to the good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 co."><a name="29074" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29074] Iª q. 16 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, licet bonum et verum supposito convertantur cum ente, tamen
ratione differunt. Et secundum hoc verum, absolute loquendo, prius
est quam bonum. Quod ex duobus apparet. Primo quidem ex hoc, quod
verum propinquius se habet ad ens, quod est prius, quam bonum. Nam
verum respicit ipsum esse simpliciter et immediate, ratio autem
boni consequitur esse, secundum quod est aliquo modo perfectum; sic
enim appetibile est. Secundo apparet ex hoc, quod cognitio
naturaliter praecedit appetitum. Unde, cum verum respiciat
cognitionem, bonum autem appetitum, prius erit verum quam bonum
secundum rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will and the intellect mutually include one another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the intellect
                     to understand. So then, among things directed to the object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the intellect;
                     and conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas
                     in the order of intelligible things the converse of the case. From the
                     fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good is prior in the order of things desirable; but not that
                     it is prior absolutely.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29075" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29075] Iª q. 16 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod voluntas et intellectus mutuo se includunt, nam
intellectus intelligit voluntatem, et voluntas vult intellectum
intelligere. Sic ergo inter illa quae ordinantur ad obiectum
voluntatis, continentur etiam ea quae sunt intellectus; et e
converso. Unde in ordine appetibilium, bonum se habet ut
universale, et verum ut particulare, in ordine autem
intelligibilium est e converso. Ex hoc ergo quod verum est quoddam
bonum, sequitur quod bonum sit prius in ordine appetibilium, non
autem quod sit prius simpliciter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing is prior logically in so far as it is prior to the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself;
                     secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly, it apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being
                     is first, that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29076" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29076] Iª q. 16 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod secundum hoc est aliquid prius ratione, quod prius
cadit in intellectu. Intellectus autem per prius apprehendit ipsum
ens; et secundario apprehendit se intelligere ens; et tertio
apprehendit se appetere ens. Unde primo est ratio entis, secundo
ratio veri, tertio ratio boni, licet bonum sit in rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself
                     in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to "life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills
                     in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has been said that truth exists in other things
                     <a href="#FP_Q16_A1" id="FP_Q16_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Whereas the truth of "justice" is found in man as he
                     fulfills his duty to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in general.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29077" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29077] Iª q. 16 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod virtus quae dicitur veritas, non est veritas
communis, sed quaedam veritas secundum quam homo in dictis et
factis ostendit se ut est. Veritas autem vitae dicitur
particulariter, secundum quod homo in vita sua implet illud ad quod
ordinatur per intellectum divinum, sicut etiam dictum est veritatem
esse in ceteris rebus. Veritas autem iustitiae est secundum quod
homo servat id quod debet alteri secundum ordinem legum. Unde ex
his particularibus veritatibus non est procedendum ad veritatem
communem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q16_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q16_A5-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 5. Whether God is truth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the intellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition
                     and division. Therefore in Him there is not truth.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="29078" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29078] Iª q. 16 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit veritas. Veritas enim
consistit in compositione et divisione intellectus. Sed in Deo non
est compositio et divisio. Ergo non est ibi veritas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxvi) is a "likeness to the principle." But in God there is no likeness
                     to a principle. Therefore in God there is not truth.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="29079" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29079] Iª q. 16 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
veritas, secundum Augustinum, in libro de vera Relig., est
similitudo principii. Sed Dei non est similitudo ad principium.
Ergo in Deo non est veritas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the first cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause
                     of all being; and His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is truth in God, all truth will be from Him. But
                     it is true that someone sins. Therefore this will be from God; which is evidently false.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="29080" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29080] Iª q. 16 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
quidquid dicitur de Deo, dicitur de eo ut de prima causa omnium,
sicut esse Dei est causa omnis esse, et bonitas eius est causa
omnis boni. Si ergo in Deo sit veritas, ergo omne verum erit ab
ipso. Sed aliquem peccare est verum. Ergo hoc erit a Deo. Quod
patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord says, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.6" target="asv">Jn. 14:6</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 5 s. c."><a name="29081" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29081] Iª q. 16 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit dominus, Ioan. XIV, <i>ego sum via, veritas et
vita</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As said above
                     <a href="#FP_Q16_A1" id="FP_Q16_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things according as they have being
                     conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His intellect,
                     but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of
                     every other intellect, and He Himself is His
                     own existence and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but that He is truth itself, and
                     the sovereign and first truth.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 5 co."><a name="29082" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29082] Iª q. 16 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut dictum est, veritas invenitur in intellectu secundum
quod apprehendit rem ut est, et in re secundum quod habet esse
conformabile intellectui. Hoc autem maxime invenitur in Deo. Nam
esse suum non solum est conforme suo intellectui, sed etiam est
ipsum suum intelligere; et suum intelligere est mensura et causa
omnis alterius esse, et omnis alterius intellectus; et ipse est
suum esse et intelligere. Unde sequitur quod non solum in ipso sit
veritas, sed quod ipse sit ipsa summa et prima veritas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A5-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although in the divine intellect there is neither composition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He judges
                     of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is truth in His intellect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="29083" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29083] Iª q. 16 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, licet in intellectu divino non sit compositio et
divisio, tamen secundum suam simplicem intelligentiam iudicat de
omnibus, et cognoscit omnia complexa. Et sic in intellectu eius est
veritas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The truth of our intellect is according to its conformity with its principle, that is to say, to the things from which it
                     receives knowledge. The truth also of things is according to their conformity with their principle, namely, the divine intellect.
                     Now this cannot be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless perhaps in so far as truth is appropriated to the Son,
                     Who has a principle. But if we speak of divine truth in its essence, we cannot
                     understand this unless the affirmative must be resolved into the negative, as when one says: "the Father is of Himself, because
                     He is not from another." Similarly, the divine truth can be called a "likeness to the principle," inasmuch as His existence
                     is not dissimilar to His intellect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="29084" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29084] Iª q. 16 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod verum intellectus nostri est secundum quod
conformatur suo principio, scilicet rebus, a quibus cognitionem
accipit. Veritas etiam rerum est secundum quod conformantur suo
principio, scilicet intellectui divino. Sed hoc, proprie loquendo,
non potest dici in veritate divina, nisi forte secundum quod
veritas appropriatur filio, qui habet principium. Sed si de
veritate essentialiter dicta loquamur, non potest intelligi, nisi
resolvatur affirmativa in negativam, sicut cum dicitur, pater est a
se, quia non est ab alio. Et similiter dici potest similitudo
principii veritas divina, inquantum esse suum non est suo
intellectui dissimile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not-being and privation have no truth of themselves, but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all apprehension
                     of the intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that exists in the statement---"that a person commits fornication is true"---is
                     entirely from God. But to argue, "Therefore that this person fornicates is from God", is a fallacy of Accident.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="29085" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29085] Iª q. 16 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod non ens et privationes non habent ex seipsis
veritatem, sed solum ex apprehensione intellectus. Omnis autem
apprehensio intellectus a Deo est, unde quidquid est veritatis in
hoc quod dico, istum fornicari est verum, totum est a Deo. Sed si
arguatur, ergo istum fornicari est a Deo, est fallacia
accidentis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q16_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q16_A6-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 6. Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is only one truth, according to which all things are true. For according to Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1),
                     "nothing is greater than the mind of man, except God." Now truth is greater than the mind of man; otherwise the mind would
                     be the judge of truth: whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth, and not according to its own measure. Therefore
                     God alone is truth. Therefore there is no other truth but God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="29086" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29086] Iª q. 16 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod una sola sit veritas, secundum quam omnia
sunt vera. Quia, secundum Augustinum, nihil est maius mente humana,
nisi Deus. Sed veritas est maior mente humana, alioquin mens
iudicaret de veritate; nunc autem omnia iudicat secundum veritatem,
et non secundum seipsam. Ergo solus Deus est veritas. Ergo non est
alia veritas quam Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Anselm says (De Verit. xiv), that, "as is the relation of time to temporal things, so is that of truth to true things."
                     But there is only one time for all temporal things. Therefore there is only one truth, by which all things are true.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="29087" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29087] Iª q. 16 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Anselmus dicit, in libro de veritate, quod sicut tempus se habet ad
temporalia, ita veritas ad res veras. Sed unum est tempus omnium
temporalium. Ergo una est veritas, qua omnia vera sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A6-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.11.2" target="asv">Ps. 11:2</a>), "Truths are decayed from among the children of men."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 6 s. c."><a name="29088" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29088] Iª q. 16 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod in Psalmo XI dicitur, <i>diminutae sunt veritates a filiis
hominum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A6-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is one, and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must consider
                     that when anything is predicated of many things univocally, it is found in each of them according to its proper nature; as
                     animal is found in each species of animal. But when anything is predicated of many things analogically, it is found in only
                     one of them according to its proper nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So
                     healthiness is predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is only in the animal; but from the health
                     of the animal, medicine is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and urine is called healthy, in so far
                     as it indicates health. And although health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something whereby
                     the one causes, and the other indicates health. Now we have said
                     <a href="#FP_Q16_A1" id="FP_Q16_A6-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that truth resides primarily in the
                     intellect; and secondarily in things, according as they are related to the divine intellect. If therefore we speak of truth,
                     as it exists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many truths in many created intellects; and
                     even in one and the same intellect, according to the number of things known. Whence a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A6-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.11.2" target="asv"> Ps. 11:2, </a> "Truths are decayed from among the children of men," says: "As from one man's face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror,
                     so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth." But if we speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are
                     true by one primary truth; to which each one is assimilated according to its own entity. And thus, although the essences or
                     forms of things are many, yet the truth of the divine intellect is one, in conformity to which all things are said to be true.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 6 co."><a name="29089" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29089] Iª q. 16 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod quodammodo una est veritas, qua omnia sunt vera, et quodammodo
non. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod, quando aliquid
praedicatur univoce de multis, illud in quolibet eorum secundum
propriam rationem invenitur, sicut animal in qualibet specie
animalis. Sed quando aliquid dicitur analogice de multis, illud
invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum, a quo
alia denominantur. Sicut sanum dicitur de animali et urina et
medicina, non quod sanitas sit nisi in animali tantum, sed a
sanitate animalis denominatur medicina sana, inquantum est illius
sanitatis effectiva, et urina, inquantum est illius sanitatis
significativa. Et quamvis sanitas non sit in medicina neque in
urina, tamen in utroque est aliquid per quod hoc quidem facit,
illud autem significat sanitatem. Dictum est autem quod veritas per
prius est in intellectu, et per posterius in rebus, secundum quod
ordinantur ad intellectum divinum. Si ergo loquamur de veritate
prout existit in intellectu, secundum propriam rationem, sic in
multis intellectibus creatis sunt multae veritates; etiam in uno et
eodem intellectu, secundum plura cognita. Unde dicit Glossa super
illud Psalmi XI, <i>diminutae sunt veritates a filiis hominum</i>
etc., quod sicut ab una facie hominis resultant plures
similitudines in speculo, sic ab una veritate divina resultant
plures veritates. Si vero loquamur de veritate secundum quod est in
rebus, sic omnes sunt verae una prima veritate, cui unumquodque
assimilatur secundum suam entitatem. Et sic, licet plures sint
essentiae vel formae rerum, tamen una est veritas divini
intellectus, secundum quam omnes res denominantur verae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A6-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The soul does not judge of things according to any kind of truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it is reflected
                     in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first principles of the understanding. It follows, therefore, that the primary
                     truth is greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth, which resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not
                     simply, but in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even as
                     science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it is true that nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul,
                     except God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="29090" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29090] Iª q. 16 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod anima non secundum quamcumque veritatem iudicat de
rebus omnibus; sed secundum veritatem primam, inquantum resultat in
ea sicut in speculo, secundum prima intelligibilia. Unde sequitur
quod veritas prima sit maior anima. Et tamen etiam veritas creata,
quae est in intellectu nostro, est maior anima, non simpliciter,
sed secundum quid, inquantum est perfectio eius; sicut etiam
scientia posset dici maior anima. Sed verum est quod nihil
subsistens est maius mente rationali, nisi Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The saying of Anselm is correct in so far as things are said to be true by their relation to the divine intellect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="29091" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29091] Iª q. 16 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod dictum Anselmi veritatem habet, secundum quod res
dicuntur verae per comparationem ad intellectum divinum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q16_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q16_A7-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 7. Whether created truth is eternal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) "Nothing is more eternal than the nature
                     of a circle, and that two added to three make five." But the truth of these is a created truth. Therefore created truth is
                     eternal.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="29092" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29092] Iª q. 16 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod veritas creata sit aeterna. Dicit enim
Augustinus, in libro de libero arbitrio, quod nihil est magis
aeternum quam ratio circuli, et duo et tria esse quinque. Sed horum
veritas est veritas creata. Ergo veritas creata est aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals are always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore
                     is truth, which is the most universal.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="29093" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29093] Iª q. 16 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
quod est semper, est aeternum. Sed universalia sunt ubique et
semper. Ergo sunt aeterna. Ergo et verum, quod est maxime
universale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it was always true that what is true in the present was to be in the future. But as the truth of a proposition regarding
                     the present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition regarding the future. Therefore some created truth is eternal.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="29094" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29094] Iª q. 16 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, id
quod est verum in praesenti, semper fuit verum esse futurum. Sed
sicut veritas propositionis de praesenti est veritas creata, ita
veritas propositionis de futuro. Ergo aliqua veritas creata est
aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal. But the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end; for
                     if their truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true that truth was not, and true, of course, by reason of
                     truth; so that truth was before it began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that truth has an end, it follows that it is
                     after it has ceased to be, for it will still be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is
                     eternal.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="29095" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29095] Iª q. 16 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, omne
quod caret principio et fine, est aeternum. Sed veritas
enuntiabilium caret principio et fine. Quia, si veritas incoepit
cum ante non esset, verum erat veritatem non esse, et utique aliqua
veritate verum erat, et sic veritas erat antequam inciperet. Et
similiter si ponatur veritatem habere finem, sequitur quod sit
postquam desierit, verum enim erit veritatem non esse. Ergo veritas
est aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> God alone is eternal, as laid down before (
                     <a href="#FP_Q10_A3" id="FP_Q16_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[10], A[3]</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 s. c."><a name="29096" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29096] Iª q. 16 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod solus Deus est aeternus, ut supra habitum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in
                     speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself: but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable
                     truth, according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on account of any truth residing in the enunciation, as
                     though in a subject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health within it but
                     from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it has been already said that things are called true from
                     the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal. Now because only the divine intellect
                     is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else but God is eternal; since the
                     truth of the divine intellect is God Himself, as shown already
                     <a href="#FP_Q16_A5" id="FP_Q16_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 co."><a name="29097" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29097] Iª q. 16 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod veritas enuntiabilium non est aliud quam veritas intellectus.
Enuntiabile enim et est in intellectu, et est in voce. Secundum
autem quod est in intellectu, habet per se veritatem. Sed secundum
quod est in voce, dicitur verum enuntiabile, secundum quod
significat aliquam veritatem intellectus; non propter aliquam
veritatem in enuntiabili existentem sicut in subiecto. Sicut urina
dicitur sana, non a sanitate quae in ipsa sit, sed a sanitate
animalis, quam significat. Similiter etiam supra dictum est quod
res denominantur verae a veritate intellectus. Unde si nullus
intellectus esset aeternus, nulla veritas esset aeterna. Sed quia
solus intellectus divinus est aeternus, in ipso solo veritas
aeternitatem habet. Nec propter hoc sequitur quod aliquid aliud sit
aeternum quam Deus, quia veritas intellectus divini est ipse Deus,
ut supra ostensum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and three make five, have eternity in the mind of God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="29098" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29098] Iª q. 16 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod ratio circuli, et duo et tria esse quinque, habent
aeternitatem in mente divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That something is always and everywhere, can be understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of extension
                     to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself
                     determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of
                     all distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be everywhere
                     and always, in so far as universals are independent of place and time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are
                     eternal, except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="29099" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29099] Iª q. 16 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod aliquid esse semper et ubique, potest intelligi
dupliciter. Uno modo, quia habet in se unde se extendat ad omne
tempus et ad omnem locum, sicut Deo competit esse ubique et semper.
Alio modo, quia non habet in se quo determinetur ad aliquem locum
vel tempus, sicut materia prima dicitur esse una, non quia habet
unam formam, sicut homo est unus ab unitate unius formae, sed per
remotionem omnium formarum distinguentium. Et per hunc modum,
quodlibet universale dicitur esse ubique et semper, inquantum
universalia abstrahunt ab hic et nunc. Sed ex hoc non sequitur ea
esse aeterna, nisi in intellectu, si quis sit aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which now is, was future, before it (actually) was; because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the cause
                     were removed, that thing's coming to be was not future. But the first cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that
                     it was always true that what now is would be, except in so far as its future being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone
                     is such a cause.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="29100" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29100] Iª q. 16 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod illud quod nunc est, ex eo futurum fuit antequam
esset, quia in causa sua erat ut fieret. Unde, sublata causa, non
esset futurum illud fieri. Sola autem causa prima est aeterna. Unde
ex hoc non sequitur quod ea quae sunt, semper fuerit verum ea esse
futura, nisi quatenus in causa sempiterna fuit ut essent futura.
Quae quidem causa solus Deus est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal, but
                     it had a beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was not true to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason
                     of the divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now to say that that truth did not then exist: and
                     this is true only by reason of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not by
                     reason of any truth in the things. For this is truth concerning not-being; and not-being has not truth of itself, but only
                     so far as our intellect apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did not exist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being
                     as preceding its being.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="29101" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29101] Iª q. 16 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod, quia intellectus noster non est aeternus, nec
veritas enuntiabilium quae a nobis formantur, est aeterna, sed
quandoque incoepit. Et antequam huiusmodi veritas esset, non erat
verum dicere veritatem talem non esse, nisi ab intellectu divino,
in quo solum veritas est aeterna. Sed nunc verum est dicere
veritatem tunc non fuisse. Quod quidem non est verum nisi veritate
quae nunc est in intellectu nostro, non autem per aliquam veritatem
ex parte rei. Quia ista est veritas de non ente; non ens autem non
habet ex se ut sit verum, sed solummodo ex intellectu apprehendente
ipsum. Unde intantum est verum dicere veritatem non fuisse,
inquantum apprehendimus non esse ipsius ut praecedens esse
eius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q16_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q16_A8-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 8. Whether truth is immutable?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that "Truth and mind do not rank as equals,
                     otherwise truth would be mutable, as the mind is."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="29102" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29102] Iª q. 16 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod veritas sit immutabilis. Dicit enim
Augustinus, in libro II de libero arbitrio, quod veritas non est
aequalis menti, quia esset mutabilis, sicut et mens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as primary matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains
                     after all generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change; for after every change it is true to say that a thing
                     is, or is not. Therefore truth is immutable.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="29103" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29103] Iª q. 16 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id
quod remanet post omnem mutationem, est immutabile, sicut prima
materia est ingenita et incorruptibilis, quia remanet post omnem
generationem et corruptionem. Sed veritas remanet post omnem
mutationem, quia post omnem mutationem verum est dicere esse vel
non esse. Ergo veritas est immutabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the truth of an enunciation changes, it changes mostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus change.
                     For truth, according to Anselm (De Verit. viii), "is a certain rightness" in so far as a thing answers to that which is in
                     the divine mind concerning it. But this proposition that "Socrates sits", receives from the divine mind the signification
                     that Socrates does sit; and it has the same signification even though he does not sit.
                     Therefore the truth of the proposition in no way changes.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="29104" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29104] Iª q. 16 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
veritas enuntiationis mutatur, maxime mutatur ad mutationem rei.
Sed sic non mutatur. Veritas enim, secundum Anselmum, est rectitudo
quaedam, inquantum aliquid implet id quod est de ipso in mente
divina. Haec autem propositio, Socrates sedet, accipit a mente
divina ut significet Socratem sedere, quod significat etiam eo non
sedente. Ergo veritas propositionis nullo modo mutatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, where there is the same cause, there is the same effect. But the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three
                     propositions, "Socrates sits, will sit, sat." Therefore the truth of each is the same. But one or other of these must be the
                     true one. Therefore the truth of these propositions remains immutable; and for the same reason that of any other.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="29105" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29105] Iª q. 16 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, ubi
est eadem causa, et idem effectus. Sed eadem res est causa
veritatis harum trium propositionum Socrates sedet, sedebit, et
sedit. Ergo eadem est harum veritas. Sed oportet quod alterum horum
sit verum. Ergo veritas harum propositionum immutabiliter manet. Et
eadem ratione cuiuslibet alterius propositionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.11.2" target="asv">Ps. 11:2</a>),"Truths are decayed from among the children of men."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 s. c."><a name="29106" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29106] Iª q. 16 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur in Psalmo XI, <i>diminutae sunt veritates a filiis
hominum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect, as said before
                     <a href="#FP_Q16_A1" id="FP_Q16_A8-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>; but things are called true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be regarded
                     from the point of view of the intellect, the truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity
                     may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness, through change in one of the two extremes. Hence in
                     one way truth varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing which in itself
                     has not changed, and in another way, when the thing is changed, but not the opinion; and in either way there can be a change
                     from true to false. If, then, there is an intellect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and the knowledge of
                     which nothing can escape, in this is immutable truth. Now such is the divine intellect, as is clear from what has been said
                     before (
                     <a href="#FP_Q14_A15" id="FP_Q16_A8-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Hence the truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But the truth of our intellect is mutable; not because it is itself
                     the subject of change, but in so far as our intellect changes from truth to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable.
                     Whereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether
                     immutable.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 co."><a name="29107" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29107] Iª q. 16 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut supra dictum est, veritas proprie est in solo
intellectu, res autem dicuntur verae a veritate quae est in aliquo
intellectu. Unde mutabilitas veritatis consideranda est circa
intellectum. Cuius quidem veritas in hoc consistit, quod habeat
conformitatem ad res intellectas. Quae quidem conformitas variari
potest dupliciter, sicut et quaelibet alia similitudo, ex mutatione
alterius extremi. Unde uno modo variatur veritas ex parte
intellectus, ex eo quod de re eodem modo se habente aliquis aliam
opinionem accipit, alio modo si, opinione eadem manente, res
mutetur. Et utroque modo fit mutatio de vero in falsum. Si ergo sit
aliquis intellectus in quo non possit esse alternatio opinionum,
vel cuius acceptionem non potest subterfugere res aliqua, in eo est
immutabilis veritas. Talis autem est intellectus divinus, ut ex
superioribus patet. Unde veritas divini intellectus est
immutabilis. Veritas autem intellectus nostri mutabilis est. Non
quod ipsa sit subiectum mutationis, sed inquantum intellectus
noster mutatur de veritate in falsitatem; sic enim formae mutabiles
dici possunt. Veritas autem intellectus divini est secundum quam
res naturales dicuntur verae, quae est omnino immutabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of divine truth.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="29108" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29108] Iª q. 16 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de veritate divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The true and being are convertible terms. Hence just as being is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but accidentally,
                     in so far as this being or that is corrupted or generated, as is said in Phys. i, so does truth change, not so as that no
                     truth remains, but because that truth does not remain which was before.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="29109" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29109] Iª q. 16 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod verum et ens sunt convertibilia. Unde, sicut ens non
generatur neque corrumpitur per se, sed per accidens, inquantum hoc
vel illud ens corrumpitur vel generatur, ut dicitur in I Physic.;
ita veritas mutatur, non quod nulla veritas remaneat, sed quia non
remanet illa veritas quae prius erat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which
                     is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but it said to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates
                     the truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing. When this disappears, the truth
                     of an opinion changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore
                     this proposition, "Socrates sits," is true, as long as he is sitting, both with the truth of the thing, in so far as the expression
                     is significative, and with the truth of signification, in so far as it signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the
                     first truth remains, but the second is changed.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="29110" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29110] Iª q. 16 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod propositio non solum habet veritatem sicut res aliae
veritatem habere dicuntur, inquantum implent id quod de eis est
ordinatum ab intellectu divino; sed dicitur habere veritatem quodam
speciali modo, inquantum significat veritatem intellectus. Quae
quidem consistit in conformitate intellectus et rei. Qua quidem
subtracta, mutatur veritas opinionis, et per consequens veritas
propositionis. Sic igitur haec propositio, Socrates sedet, eo
sedente vera est et veritate rei, inquantum est quaedam vox
significativa; et veritate significationis, inquantum significat
opinionem veram. Socrate vero surgente, remanet prima veritas, sed
mutatur secunda.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of the truth of the proposition, "Socrates sits," has not the same meaning when
                     Socrates sits, after he sits, and before he sits. Hence the truth which results, varies, and is variously signified by these
                     propositions concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not follow, though one of the three propositions is true, that
                     the same truth remains invariable.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="29111" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29111] Iª q. 16 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod sessio Socratis, quae est causa veritatis huius
propositionis, Socrates sedet, non eodem modo se habet dum Socrates
sedet, et postquam sederit, et antequam sederet. Unde et veritas ab
hoc causata, diversimode se habet; et diversimode significatur
propositionibus de praesenti, praeterito et futuro. Unde non
sequitur quod, licet altera trium propositionum sit vera, quod
eadem veritas invariabilis maneat.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q17" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q17-p0.1">Q. 17. CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q17-p2"> We next consider falsity. About this four points of inquiry arise:</p><p id="FP_Q17-p3"><a href="#FP_Q17_A1"> (1) Whether falsity exists in things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q17-p4"><a href="#FP_Q17_A2"> (2) Whether it exists in the sense?</a></p><p id="FP_Q17-p5"><a href="#FP_Q17_A3"> (3) Whether it exists in the intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q17-p6"><a href="#FP_Q17_A4"> (4) Concerning the opposition of the true and the false.</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 pr."><a name="29112" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29112]
Iª q. 17 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de falsitate. Et
circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum falsitas sit in rebus.
Secundo, utrum sit in sensu. Tertio, utrum sit in intellectu.
Quarto, de oppositione veri et falsi.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q17_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q17_A1-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 1. Whether falsity exists in things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), "If the true is that which is, it
                     will be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may appear to the contrary."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29113" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29113] Iª q. 17 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod falsitas non sit in rebus. Dicit enim
Augustinus, in libro Soliloq., <i>si verum est id quod est, falsum
non esse uspiam concludetur, quovis repugnante</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, false is derived from "fallere" [to deceive]. But things do not deceive; for, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig.
                     33), they show nothing but their own species. Therefore the false is not found in things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29114" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29114] Iª q. 17 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
falsum dicitur a fallendo. Sed res non fallunt, ut dicit Augustinus
in libro de vera Relig., <i>quia non ostendunt aliud quam suam
speciem</i>. Ergo falsum in rebus non invenitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the true is said to exist in things by conformity to the divine intellect, as stated above
                     <a href="#FP_Q16" id="FP_Q17_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">(Q[16])</a>. But everything, in so far as it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true without admixture of falsity; and thus
                     nothing is false.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29115" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29115] Iª q. 17 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, verum
dicitur in rebus per comparationem ad intellectum divinum, ut supra
dictum est. Sed quaelibet res, inquantum est, imitatur Deum. Ergo
quaelibet res vera est, absque falsitate. Et sic nulla res est
falsa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 34): "Every body is a true body and a false unity: for it imitates unity without being unity."
                     But everything imitates the divine unity yet falls short of it. Therefore in all things falsity exists.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29116" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29116] Iª q. 17 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., quod <i>omne corpus
est verum corpus et falsa unitas</i>; quia imitatur unitatem, et
non est unitas. Sed quaelibet res imitatur divinam bonitatem, et ab
ea deficit. Ergo in omnibus rebus est falsitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q17_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since true and false are opposed, and since opposites stand in relation to the same thing, we must needs seek falsity, where
                     primarily we find truth; that is to say, in the intellect. Now, in things, neither truth nor falsity exists, except in relation
                     to the intellect. And since every thing is denominated simply by what belongs to it "per se," but is denominated relatively
                     by what belongs to it accidentally; a thing indeed may be called false simply when
                     compared with the intellect on which it depends, and to which it is compared "per se" but may be called false relatively as
                     directed to another intellect, to which it is compared accidentally. Now natural things depend on the divine intellect, as
                     artificial things on the human. Wherefore artificial things are said to be false simply and in themselves, in so far as they
                     fall short of the form of the art; whence a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if it falls short of the proper
                     operation of his art.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q17_A1-p7"> In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be found, in so far as they are compared with the divine intellect; since
                     whatever takes place in things proceeds from the ordinance of that intellect, unless perhaps in the case of voluntary agents
                     only, who have it in their power to withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; wherein consists the evil of sin. Thus sins
                     themselves are called untruths and lies in the Scriptures, according to the words of the text, "Why do you love
                     vanity, and seek after lying?" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q17_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.3" target="asv">Ps. 4:3</a>): as on the other hand virtuous deeds are called the "truth of life" as being obedient to the order of the divine intellect.
                     Thus it is said, "He that doth truth, cometh to the light" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q17_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#John.3.21" target="asv">Jn. 3:21</a>).
                  </p><p id="FP_Q17_A1-p8"> But in relation to our intellect, natural things which are compared thereto accidentally, can be called false; not simply,
                     but relatively; and that in two ways. In one way according to the thing signified, and thus a thing is said to be false as
                     being signified or represented by word or thought that is false. In this respect anything can be said to be false as regards
                     any quality not possessed by it; as if we should say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing, as the
                     Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34). So, too, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 10): "The true tragedian is a false Hector": even
                     as, on the contrary, anything can be called true, in regard to that which is becoming to it. In another way a thing can be
                     called false, by way of cause---and thus a thing is said to be false that naturally begets a false opinion. And whereas it
                     is innate in us to judge things by external appearances, since our knowledge takes its rise from sense, which principally
                     and
                     naturally deals with external accidents, therefore those external accidents, which resemble things other than themselves,
                     are said to be false with respect to those things; thus gall is falsely honey; and tin, false gold. Regarding this, Augustine
                     says (Soliloq. ii, 6): "We call those things false that appear to our apprehension like the true:" and the Philosopher says
                     (Metaph. v, 34): "Things are called false that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not, or what they are not." In
                     this
                     way a man is called false as delighting in false opinions or words, and not because he can invent them; for in this way many
                     wise and learned persons might be called false, as stated in Metaph. v, 34.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 co."><a name="29117" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29117] Iª q. 17 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, cum verum et falsum opponantur; opposita autem sunt circa
idem; necesse est ut ibi prius quaeratur falsitas, ubi primo
veritas invenitur, hoc est in intellectu. In rebus autem neque
veritas neque falsitas est, nisi per ordinem ad intellectum. Et
quia unumquodque secundum id quod convenit ei per se, simpliciter
nominatur; secundum autem id quod convenit ei per accidens, non
nominatur nisi secundum quid; res quidem simpliciter falsa dici
posset per comparationem ad intellectum a quo dependet, cui
comparatur per se; in ordine autem ad alium intellectum, cui
comparatur per accidens, non posset dici falsa nisi secundum quid.
Dependent autem ab intellectu divino res naturales, sicut ab
intellectu humano res artificiales. Dicuntur igitur res
artificiales falsae simpliciter et secundum se, inquantum deficiunt
a forma artis, unde dicitur aliquis artifex opus falsum facere,
quando deficit ab operatione artis. Sic autem in rebus
dependentibus a Deo, falsitas inveniri non potest per comparationem
ad intellectum divinum, cum quidquid in rebus accidit, ex
ordinatione divini intellectus procedat, nisi forte in voluntariis
agentibus tantum, in quorum potestate est subducere se ab
ordinatione divini intellectus; in quo malum culpae consistit,
secundum quod ipsa peccata falsitates et mendacia dicuntur in
Scripturis, secundum illud Psalmi IV, <i>ut quid diligitis
vanitatem et quaeritis mendacium?</i> Sicut per oppositum operatio
virtuosa veritas vitae nominatur, inquantum subditur ordini divini
intellectus; sicut dicitur Ioan. III, <i>qui facit veritatem, venit
ad lucem</i>. Sed per ordinem ad intellectum nostrum, ad quem
comparantur res naturales per accidens, possunt dici falsae, non
simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo,
secundum rationem significati, ut dicatur illud esse falsum in
rebus, quod significatur vel repraesentatur oratione vel intellectu
falso. Secundum quem modum quaelibet res potest dici esse falsa,
quantum ad id quod ei non inest, sicut si dicamus diametrum esse
falsum commensurabile, ut dicit philosophus in V Metaphys.; et
sicut dicit Augustinus, in libro Soliloq., quod <i>tragoedus est
falsus Hector</i>. Sicut e contrario potest unumquodque dici verum,
secundum id quod competit ei. Alio modo, per modum causae. Et sic
dicitur res esse falsa, quae nata est facere de se opinionem
falsam. Et quia innatum est nobis per ea quae exterius apparent de
rebus iudicare, eo quod nostra cognitio a sensu ortum habet, qui
primo et per se est exteriorum accidentium; ideo ea quae in
exterioribus accidentibus habent similitudinem aliarum rerum,
dicuntur esse falsa secundum illas res; sicut fel est falsum mel,
et stannum est falsum argentum. Et secundum hoc dicit Augustinus,
in libro Soliloq., quod <i>eas res falsas nominamus, quae
verisimilia apprehendimus</i>. Et philosophus dicit, in V
Metaphys., quod <i>falsa dicuntur quaecumque apta nata sunt
apparere aut qualia non sunt, aut quae non sunt</i>. Et per hunc
modum etiam dicitur homo falsus, inquantum est amativus falsarum
opinionum vel locutionum. Non autem ex hoc quod potest eas
confingere, quia sic etiam sapientes et scientes falsi dicerentur,
ut dicitur in V Metaphys.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing compared with the intellect is said to be true in respect to what it is; and false in respect to what it is not.
                     Hence, "The true tragedian is a false Hector," as stated in Soliloq. ii, 6. As, therefore, in things that are is found a certain
                     non-being, so in things that are is found a degree of falseness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29118" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29118] Iª q. 17 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod res comparata ad intellectum, secundum id quod est,
dicitur vera, secundum id quod non est, dicitur falsa. <i>Unde
verus tragoedus est falsus Hector</i>, ut dicitur in II Soliloq.
Sicut igitur in his quae sunt, invenitur quoddam non esse; ita in
his quae sunt, invenitur quaedam ratio falsitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things do not deceive by their own nature, but by accident. For they give occasion to falsity, by the likeness they bear
                     to things which they actually are not.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29119" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29119] Iª q. 17 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod res per se non fallunt, sed per accidens. Dant enim
occasionem falsitatis, eo quod similitudinem eorum gerunt, quorum
non habent existentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things are said to be false, not as compared with the divine intellect, in which case they would be false simply, but as
                     compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only relatively.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29120" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29120] Iª q. 17 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod per comparationem ad intellectum divinum non dicuntur
res falsae, quod esset eas esse falsas simpliciter, sed per
comparationem ad intellectum nostrum, quod est eas esse falsas
secundum quid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A1-p12"><b>Reply to further objection:</b> To the argument which is urged on the contrary, likeness or defective representation does not involve the idea of falsity
                     except in so far as it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always said to be false, because it resembles
                     another thing; but only when the resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not in any one case, but in
                     the majority of instances.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="29121" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29121] Iª q. 17 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum, quod
in oppositum obiicitur, dicendum quod similitudo vel repraesentatio
deficiens non inducit rationem falsitatis, nisi inquantum praestat
occasionem falsae opinionis. Unde non ubicumque est similitudo,
dicitur res falsa, sed ubicumque est talis similitudo, quae nata
est facere opinionem falsam, non cuicumque, sed ut in pluribus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q17_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q17_A2-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 2. Whether there is falsity in the senses?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that falsity is not in the senses. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33): "If all the bodily senses report as they
                     are affected, I do not know what more we can require from them." Thus it seems that we are not deceived by the senses; and
                     therefore that falsity is not in them.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29122" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29122] Iª q. 17 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod in sensu non sit falsitas. Dicit enim
Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., <i>si omnes corporis sensus
ita nuntiant ut afficiuntur, quid ab eis amplius exigere debemus,
ignoro</i>. Et sic videtur quod ex sensibus non fallamur. Et sic
falsitas in sensu non est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 24) that falsity is not proper to the senses, but to the imagination.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29123" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29123] Iª q. 17 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
philosophus dicit, in IV Metaphys., quod <i>falsitas non est
propria sensui, sed phantasiae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in non-complex things there is neither true nor false, but in complex things only. But affirmation and negation
                     do not belong to the senses. Therefore in the senses there is no falsity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29124" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29124] Iª q. 17 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in
incomplexis non est verum nec falsum, sed solum in complexis. Sed
componere et dividere non pertinet ad sensum. Ergo in sensu non est
falsitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6), "It appears that the senses entrap us into error by their deceptive similitudes."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29125" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29125] Iª q. 17 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Augustinus, in libro Soliloq., <i>apparet nos in omnibus
sensibus similitudine lenocinante falli</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q17_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as truth is in them. Now truth is not in them in such a way as that the
                     senses know truth, but in so far as they apprehend sensible things truly, as said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q16_A2" id="FP_Q17_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[16], A[2]</a>), and this takes place through the senses apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that falsity exists in the
                     senses through their apprehending or judging things to be otherwise than they really
                     are.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q17_A2-p7"> The knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the existence of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness
                     of a thing can exist in the senses in three ways. In the first way, primarily and of its own nature, as in sight there is
                     the likeness of colors, and of other sensible objects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature, though not primarily; as
                     in sight there is the likeness of shape, size, and of other sensible objects common to more than one sense. Thirdly,
                     neither primarily nor of its own nature, but accidentally, as in sight, there is the likeness of a man, not as man, but in
                     so far as it is accidental to the colored object to be a man.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q17_A2-p8"> Sense, then, has no false knowledge about its proper objects, except accidentally and rarely, and then, because of the unsound
                     organ it does not receive the sensible form rightly; just as other passive subjects because of their indisposition receive
                     defectively the impressions of the agent. Hence, for instance, it happens that on account of an unhealthy tongue sweet seems
                     bitter to a sick person. But as to common objects of sense, and accidental objects, even a rightly disposed
                     sense may have a false judgment, because it is referred to them not directly, but accidentally, or as a consequence of being
                     directed to other things.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 2 co."><a name="29126" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29126] Iª q. 17 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod falsitas non est quaerenda in sensu, nisi sicut ibi est
veritas. Veritas autem non sic est in sensu, ut sensus cognoscat
veritatem; sed inquantum veram apprehensionem habet de
sensibilibus, ut supra dictum est. Quod quidem contingit eo quod
apprehendit res ut sunt. Unde contingit falsitatem esse in sensu,
ex hoc quod apprehendit vel iudicat res aliter quam sint. Sic autem
se habet ad cognoscendum res, inquantum similitudo rerum est in
sensu. Similitudo autem alicuius rei est in sensu tripliciter. Uno
modo, primo et per se; sicut in visu est similitudo colorum et
aliorum propriorum sensibilium. Alio modo, per se, sed non primo;
sicut in visu est similitudo figurae vel magnitudinis, et aliorum
communium sensibilium. Tertio modo, nec primo nec per se, sed per
accidens; sicut in visu est similitudo hominis, non inquantum est
homo, sed inquantum huic colorato accidit esse hominem. Et circa
propria sensibilia sensus non habet falsam cognitionem, nisi per
accidens, et ut in paucioribus, ex eo scilicet quod, propter
indispositionem organi, non convenienter recipit formam sensibilem,
sicut et alia passiva, propter suam indispositionem, deficienter
recipiunt impressionem agentium. Et inde est quod, propter
corruptionem linguae, infirmis dulcia amara esse videntur. De
sensibilibus vero communibus et per accidens, potest esse falsum
iudicium etiam in sensu recte disposito, quia sensus non directe
refertur ad illa, sed per accidens, vel ex consequenti, inquantum
refertur ad alia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The affection of sense is its sensation itself. Hence, from the fact that sense reports as it is affected, it follows that
                     we are not deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we experience sensation. Since, however, sense is sometimes affected
                     erroneously of that object, it follows that it sometimes reports erroneously of that object; and thus we are deceived by sense
                     about the object, but not about the fact of sensation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29127" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29127] Iª q. 17 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod sensum affici, est ipsum eius sentire. Unde per hoc
quod sensus ita nuntiant sicut afficiuntur, sequitur quod non
decipiamur in iudicio quo iudicamus nos sentire aliquid. Sed ex eo
quod sensus aliter afficitur interdum quam res sit, sequitur quod
nuntiet nobis aliquando rem aliter quam sit. Et ex hoc fallimur per
sensum circa rem, non circa ipsum sentire.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Falsity is said not to be proper to sense, since sense is not deceived as to its proper object. Hence in another translation
                     it is said more plainly, "Sense, about its proper object, is never false." Falsity is attributed to the imagination, as it
                     represents the likeness of something even in its absence. Hence, when anyone perceives the likeness of a thing as if it were
                     the thing itself, falsity results from such an apprehension; and for this reason
                     the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34) that shadows, pictures, and dreams are said to be false inasmuch as they convey the likeness
                     of things that are not present in substance.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29128" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29128] Iª q. 17 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod falsitas dicitur non esse propria sensui, quia non
decipitur circa proprium obiectum. Unde in alia translatione
planius dicitur, quod <i>sensus proprii sensibilis falsus non
est</i>. Phantasiae autem attribuitur falsitas, quia repraesentat
similitudinem rei etiam absentis; unde quando aliquis convertitur
ad similitudinem rei tanquam ad rem ipsam, provenit ex tali
apprehensione falsitas. Unde etiam philosophus, in V Metaphys.,
dicit quod umbrae et picturae et somnia dicuntur falsa, inquantum
non subsunt res quarum habent similitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument proves that the false is not in the sense, as in that which knows the true and the false.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29129" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29129] Iª q. 17 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod ratio illa procedit, quod falsitas non sit in sensu
sicut in cognoscente verum et falsum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q17_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q17_A3-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 3. Whether falsity is in the intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that falsity is not in the intellect. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 32), "Everyone who is deceived, understands
                     not that in which he is deceived." But falsity is said to exist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived therein. Therefore
                     falsity does not exist in the intellect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29130" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29130] Iª q. 17 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod falsitas non sit in intellectu. Dicit enim
Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>omnis qui
fallitur, id in quo fallitur, non intelligit</i>. Sed falsum
dicitur esse in aliqua cognitione, secundum quod per eam fallimur.
Ergo in intellectu non est falsitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 51) that the intellect is always right. Therefore there is no falsity in the
                     intellect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29131" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29131] Iª q. 17 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod intellectus semper est
rectus. Non ergo in intellectu est falsitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A3-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in De Anima iii, 21,[22] that "where there is composition of objects understood, there is truth and falsehood."
                     But such composition is in the intellect. Therefore truth and falsehood exist in the intellect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29132" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29132] Iª q. 17 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur in III de anima, quod <i>ubi compositio intellectuum
est, ibi verum et falsum est</i>. Sed compositio intellectuum est
in intellectu. Ergo verum et falsum est in intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q17_A3-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as a thing has being by its proper form, so the knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known. Hence,
                     as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs to them by their form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent
                     qualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail to be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in
                     knowledge of the thing with the likeness of which it is informed; but may fail
                     with regard to something consequent upon that form, or accidental thereto. For it has been said
                     <a href="#FP_Q17_A2" id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a> that sight is not deceived in its proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent to that object; or about
                     accidental objects of sense. Now as the sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so is the intellect
                     by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither the
                     sense about its proper object. But in affirming and denying, the intellect may be deceived, by attributing to the thing of
                     which it understands the essence, something which is not consequent upon it, or is opposed to it. For the intellect is in
                     the same position as regards judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common, or accidental, sensible objects.
                     There is, however, this difference, as before mentioned regarding truth (
                     <a href="#FP_Q16_A2" id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.2" shape="rect">Q[16], A[2]</a>), that falsity can
                     exist in the intellect not only because the intellect is conscious of that knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas
                     in sense falsity does not exist as known, as stated above
                     <a href="#FP_Q17_A2" id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.3" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q17_A3-p6"> But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs
                     also accidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of a thing, in so far as composition of
                     the intellect is mixed up in it. This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying to one thing the definition
                     proper to another; as that of a circle to a man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is false of another.
                     In another way, by composing a definition of parts which are mutually exclusive. For thus the definition is not only false
                     of the thing, but false in itself. A definition such as " a reasonable four-footed animal" would be of this kind, and the
                     intellect false in making it; for such a statement as "some reasonable animals are four-footed" is false in itself. For this
                     reason the intellect cannot be false in its knowledge of simple essences; but it is either true, or it understands nothing
                     at
                     all.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 3 co."><a name="29133" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29133] Iª q. 17 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut res habet esse per propriam formam, ita virtus
cognoscitiva habet cognoscere per similitudinem rei cognitae. Unde,
sicut res naturalis non deficit ab esse quod sibi competit secundum
suam formam, potest autem deficere ab aliquibus accidentalibus vel
consequentibus; sicut homo ab hoc quod est habere duos pedes, non
autem ab hoc quod est esse hominem, ita virtus cognoscitiva non
deficit in cognoscendo respectu illius rei cuius similitudine
informatur; potest autem deficere circa aliquid consequens ad
ipsam, vel accidens ei. Sicut est dictum quod visus non decipitur
circa sensibile proprium, sed circa sensibilia communia, quae
consequenter se habent ad illud, et circa sensibilia per accidens.
Sicut autem sensus informatur directe similitudine propriorum
sensibilium, ita intellectus informatur similitudine quidditatis
rei. Unde circa quod quid est intellectus non decipitur, sicut
neque sensus circa sensibilia propria. In componendo vero vel
dividendo potest decipi, dum attribuit rei cuius quidditatem
intelligit, aliquid quod eam non consequitur, vel quod ei
opponitur. Sic enim se habet intellectus ad iudicandum de
huiusmodi, sicut sensus ad iudicandum de sensibilibus communibus
vel per accidens. Hac tamen differentia servata, quae supra circa
veritatem dicta est, quod falsitas in intellectu esse potest, non
solum quia cognitio intellectus falsa est, sed quia intellectus eam
cognoscit, sicut et veritatem, in sensu autem falsitas non est ut
cognita, ut dictum est. Quia vero falsitas intellectus per se solum
circa compositionem intellectus est, per accidens etiam in
operatione intellectus qua cognoscit quod quid est, potest esse
falsitas, inquantum ibi compositio intellectus admiscetur. Quod
potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod intellectus
definitionem unius attribuit alteri; ut si definitionem circuli
attribuat homini. Unde definitio unius rei est falsa de altera.
Alio modo, secundum quod partes definitionis componit ad invicem,
quae simul sociari non possunt, sic enim definitio non est solum
falsa respectu alicuius rei, sed est falsa in se. Ut si formet
talem definitionem, animal rationale quadrupes, falsus est
intellectus sic definiendo, propterea quod falsus est in formando
hanc compositionem, aliquod animal rationale est quadrupes. Et
propter hoc, in cognoscendo quidditates simplices non potest esse
intellectus falsus, sed vel est verus, vel totaliter nihil
intelligit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because the essence of a thing is the proper object of the intellect, we are properly said to understand a thing when we
                     reduce it to its essence, and judge of it thereby; as takes place in demonstrations, in which there is no falsity. In this
                     sense Augustine's words must be understood, "that he who is deceived, understands not that wherein he is deceived;" and not
                     in the sense that no one is ever deceived in any operation of the intellect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29134" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29134] Iª q. 17 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, quia quidditas rei est proprium obiectum
intellectus, propter hoc tunc proprie dicimur aliquid intelligere,
quando, reducentes illud in quod quid est, sic de eo iudicamus,
sicut accidit in demonstrationibus, in quibus non est falsitas. Et
hoc modo intelligitur verbum Augustini, quod omnis qui fallitur,
non intelligit id in quo fallitur, non autem ita, quod in nulla
operatione intellectus aliquis fallatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellect is always right as regards first principles; since it is not deceived about them for the same reason that it
                     is not deceived about what a thing is. For self-known principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are understood,
                     from the fact that the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29135" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29135] Iª q. 17 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod intellectus semper est rectus, secundum quod
intellectus est principiorum, circa quae non decipitur, ex eadem
causa qua non decipitur circa quod quid est. Nam principia per se
nota sunt illa quae statim, intellectis terminis, cognoscuntur, ex
eo quod praedicatum ponitur in definitione subiecti.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q17_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q17_A4-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 4. Whether true and false are contraries?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that true and false are not contraries. For true and false are opposed, as that which is to that which is not; for
                     "truth," as Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 5), "is that which is." But that which is and that which is not are not opposed as
                     contraries. Therefore true and false are not contrary things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29136" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29136] Iª q. 17 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod verum et falsum non sint contraria. Verum
enim et falsum opponuntur sicut quod est et quod non est, <i>nam
verum est id quod est</i>, ut dicit Augustinus. Sed quod est et
quod non est, non opponuntur ut contraria. Ergo verum et falsum non
sunt contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one of two contraries is not in the other. But falsity is in truth, because, as Augustine says, (Soliloq. ii, 10),
                     "A tragedian would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true tragedian." Therefore true and false are not contraries.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29137" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29137] Iª q. 17 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, unum
contrariorum non est in alio. Sed falsum est in vero, quia, sicut
dicit Augustinus in libro Soliloq., <i>tragoedus non esset falsus
Hector, si non esset verus tragoedus</i>. Ergo verum et falsum non
sunt contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in God there is no contrariety, for "nothing is contrary to the Divine Substance," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
                     xii, 2). But falsity is opposed to God, for an idol is called in Scripture a lie, "They have laid hold on lying" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q17_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.8.5" target="asv">Jer. 8:5</a>), that is to say, "an idol," as a gloss says. Therefore false and true are not contraries.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29138" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29138] Iª q. 17 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in
Deo non est contrarietas aliqua, nihil enim divinae substantiae est
contrarium, ut dicit Augustinus, XII de Civit. Dei. Sed Deo
opponitur falsitas, nam idolum in Scriptura mendacium nominatur,
Ierem. VIII, <i>apprehenderunt mendacium</i>; Glossa, <i>idest
idola</i>. Ergo verum et falsum non sunt contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Peri Herm. ii), that a false opinion is contrary to a true one.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29139" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29139] Iª q. 17 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit philosophus, in II Periherm., ponit enim falsam
opinionem verae contrariam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as some have said, as affirmation and negation. In proof of which it must
                     be considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines any subject, and can therefore be said of being as of
                     not-being, for instance not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation asserts nothing, whereas it determines its subject, for it
                     is "negation in a subject," as stated in Metaph. iv, 4: v. 27; for blindness is not said
                     except of one whose nature it is to see. Contraries, however, both assert something and determine the subject, for blackness
                     is a species of color. Falsity asserts something, for a thing is false, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 27), inasmuch
                     as something is said or seems to be something that it is not, or not to be what it really is. For as truth implies an adequate
                     apprehension of a thing, so falsity implies the contrary. Hence it is clear that true and false are contraries.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 4 co."><a name="29140" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29140] Iª q. 17 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod verum et falsum opponuntur ut contraria, et non sicut
affirmatio et negatio, ut quidam dixerunt. Ad cuius evidentiam,
sciendum est quod negatio neque ponit aliquid, neque determinat
sibi aliquod subiectum. Et propter hoc, potest dici tam de ente
quam de non ente; sicut non videns, et non sedens. Privatio autem
non ponit aliquid, sed determinat sibi subiectum. Est enim negatio
in subiecto, ut dicitur IV Metaphys., caecum enim non dicitur nisi
de eo quod est natum videre. Contrarium vero et aliquid ponit, et
subiectum determinat, nigrum enim est aliqua species coloris.
Falsum autem aliquid ponit. Est enim falsum, ut dicit philosophus,
IV Metaphys., ex eo quod dicitur vel videtur aliquid esse quod non
est, vel non esse quod est. Sicut enim verum ponit acceptionem
adaequatam rei, ita falsum acceptionem rei non adaequatam. Unde
manifestum est quod verum et falsum sunt contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> What is in things is the truth of the thing; but what is apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth primarily
                     resides. Hence the false is that which is not as apprehended. To apprehend being, and not-being, implies contrariety; for,
                     as the Philosopher proves (Peri Herm. ii), the contrary of this statement "God is good," is, "God is not good."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29141" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29141] Iª q. 17 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod id quod est in rebus, est veritas rei sed id quod est
ut apprehensum, est verum intellectus, in quo primo est veritas.
Unde et falsum est id quod non est ut apprehensum. Apprehendere
autem esse et non esse, contrarietatem habet, sicut probat
philosophus, in II Periherm., quod huic opinioni, bonum est bonum,
contraria est, bonum non est bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Falsity is not founded in the truth which is contrary to it, just as evil is not founded in the good which is contrary to
                     it, but in that which is its proper subject. This happens in either, because true and good are universals, and convertible
                     with being. Hence, as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a being, so every evil is founded in some good, and
                     every falsity in some truth.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29142" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29142] Iª q. 17 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod falsum non fundatur in vero sibi contrario, sicut nec
malum in bono sibi contrario; sed in eo quod sibi subiicitur. Et
hoc ideo in utroque accidit, quia verum et bonum communia sunt, et
convertuntur cum ente, unde, sicut omnis privatio fundatur in
subiecto quod est ens, ita omne malum fundatur in aliquo bono, et
omne falsum in aliquo vero.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Because contraries, and opposites by way of privation, are by nature about one and the same thing, therefore there is nothing
                     contrary to God, considered in Himself, either with respect to His goodness or His truth, for in His intellect there can be
                     nothing false. But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for the false opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true.
                     So idols are called lies, opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch as the false
                     opinion concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the divine unity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29143" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29143] Iª q. 17 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, quia contraria et opposita privative nata sunt fieri
circa idem, ideo Deo, prout in se consideratur, non est aliquid
contrarium, neque ratione suae bonitatis, neque ratione suae
veritatis, quia in intellectu eius non potest esse falsitas aliqua.
Sed in apprehensione nostra habet aliquid contrarium, nam verae
opinioni de ipso contrariatur falsa opinio. Et sic idola mendacia
dicuntur opposita veritati divinae, inquantum falsa opinio de
idolis contrariatur verae opinioni de unitate Dei.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q18" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q18-p0.1">Q. 18. THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q18-p2"> Since to understand belongs to living beings, after considering the divine knowledge and intellect, we must consider the
                  divine life. About this, four points of inquiry arise:
               </p><p id="FP_Q18-p3"><a href="#FP_Q18_A1"> (1) To whom does it belong to live?</a></p><p id="FP_Q18-p4"><a href="#FP_Q18_A2"> (2) What is life?</a></p><p id="FP_Q18-p5"><a href="#FP_Q18_A3"> (3) Whether life is properly attributed to God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q18-p6"><a href="#FP_Q18_A4"> (4) Whether all things in God are life?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 pr."><a name="29144" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29144]
Iª q. 18 pr.</span></a> Quoniam autem intelligere viventium
est, post considerationem de scientia et intellectu divino,
considerandum est de vita ipsius. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.
Primo, quorum sit vivere. Secundo, quid sit vita. Tertio, utrum
vita Deo conveniat. Quarto, utrum omnia in Deo sint vita.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q18_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q18_A1-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 1. Whether to live belongs to all natural things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to live belongs to all natural things. For the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 1) that "Movement is like a kind
                     of life possessed by all things existing in nature." But all natural things participate in movement. Therefore all natural
                     things partake of life.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29145" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29145] Iª q. 18 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod omnium rerum naturalium sit vivere. Dicit
enim philosophus, in VIII Physic., quod motus est ut vita quaedam
natura existentibus omnibus. Sed omnes res naturales participant
motum. Ergo omnes res naturales participant vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, plants are said to live, inasmuch as they in themselves a principle of movement of growth and decay. But local movement
                     is naturally more perfect than, and prior to, movement of growth and decay, as the Philosopher shows (Phys. viii, 56,57).
                     Since then, all natural bodies have in themselves some principle of local movement, it seems that all natural bodies live.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29146" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29146] Iª q. 18 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
plantae dicuntur vivere, inquantum habent in seipsis principium
motus augmenti et decrementi. Sed motus localis est perfectior et
prior secundum naturam quam motus augmenti et decrementi, ut
probatur in VIII Physic. Cum igitur omnia corpora naturalia habeant
aliquod principium motus localis, videtur quod omnia corpora
naturalia vivant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, amongst natural bodies the elements are the less perfect. Yet life is attributed to them, for we speak of "living
                     waters." Much more, therefore, have other natural bodies life.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29147" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29147] Iª q. 18 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, inter
corpora naturalia imperfectiora sunt elementa. Sed eis attribuitur
vita, dicuntur enim aquae vivae. Ergo multo magis alia corpora
naturalia vitam habent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vi, 1) that "The last echo of life is heard in the plants," whereby it is inferred that their life
                     is life in its lowest degree. But inanimate bodies are inferior to plants. Therefore they have not life.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29148" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29148] Iª q. 18 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Dionysius, VI cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>plantae
secundum ultimam resonantiam vitae habent vivere</i>, ex quo potest
accipi quod ultimum gradum vitae obtinent plantae. Sed corpora
inanimata sunt infra plantas. Ergo eorum non est vivere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> We can gather to what things life belongs, and to what it does not, from such things as manifestly possess life. Now life
                     manifestly belongs to animals, for it said in De Vegetab. i [*De Plantis i, 1] that in animals life is manifest. We must,
                     therefore, distinguish living from lifeless things, by comparing them to that by reason of which animals are said to live:
                     and this it is in which life is manifested first and remains last. We say then that an animal
                     begins to live when it begins to move of itself: and as long as such movement appears in it, so long as it is considered to
                     be alive. When it no longer has any movement of itself, but is only moved by another power, then its life is said to fail,
                     and the animal to be dead. Whereby it is clear that those things are properly called living that move themselves by some kind
                     of movement, whether it be movement properly so called, as the act of an imperfect being, i.e. of a thing in potentiality,
                     is
                     called movement; or movement in a more general sense, as when said of the act of a perfect thing, as understanding and feeling
                     are called movement. Accordingly all things are said to be alive that determine themselves to movement or operation of any
                     kind: whereas those things that cannot by their nature do so, cannot be called living, unless by a similitude.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 1 co."><a name="29149" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29149] Iª q. 18 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod ex his quae manifeste vivunt, accipere possumus quorum sit
vivere, et quorum non sit vivere. Vivere autem manifeste animalibus
convenit, dicitur enim in libro de vegetabilibus, quod <i>vita in
animalibus manifesta est</i>. Unde secundum illud oportet
distinguere viventia a non viventibus secundum quod animalia
dicuntur vivere. Hoc autem est in quo primo manifestatur vita, et
in quo ultimo remanet. Primo autem dicimus animal vivere, quando
incipit ex se motum habere; et tandiu iudicatur animal vivere,
quandiu talis motus in eo apparet; quando vero iam ex se non habet
aliquem motum, sed movetur tantum ab alio tunc dicitur animal
mortuum, per defectum vitae. Ex quo patet quod illa proprie sunt
viventia, quae seipsa secundum aliquam speciem motus movent; sive
accipiatur motus proprie, sicut motus dicitur actus imperfecti,
idest existentis in potentia; sive motus accipiatur communiter,
prout motus dicitur actus perfecti, prout intelligere et sentire
dicitur moveri, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ut sic viventia
dicantur quaecumque se agunt ad motum vel operationem aliquam, ea
vero in quorum natura non est ut se agant ad aliquem motum vel
operationem, viventia dici non possunt, nisi per aliquam
similitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Philosopher may be understood either of the first movement, namely, that of the celestial bodies, or of
                     the movement in its general sense. In either way is movement called the life, as it were, of natural bodies, speaking by a
                     similitude, and not attributing it to them as their property. The movement of the heavens is in the universe of corporeal
                     natures as the movement of the heart, whereby life is preserved, is in animals.
                     Similarly also every natural movement in respect to natural things has a certain similitude to the operations of life. Hence,
                     if the whole corporeal universe were one animal, so that its movement came from an "intrinsic moving force," as some in fact
                     have held, in that case movement would really be the life of all natural bodies.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29150" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29150] Iª q. 18 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod verbum illud philosophi potest intelligi vel de motu
primo, scilicet corporum caelestium; vel de motu communiter. Et
utroque modo motus dicitur quasi vita corporum naturalium, per
similitudinem; et non per proprietatem. Nam motus caeli est in
universo corporalium naturarum, sicut motus cordis in animali, quo
conservatur vita. Similiter etiam quicumque motus naturalis hoc
modo se habet ad res naturales, ut quaedam similitudo vitalis
operationis. Unde, si totum universum corporale esset unum animal,
ita quod iste motus esset a movente intrinseco, ut quidam
posuerunt, sequeretur quod motus esset vita omnium naturalium
corporum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To bodies, whether heavy or light, movement does not belong, except in so far as they are displaced from their natural conditions,
                     and are out of their proper place; for when they are in the place that is proper and natural to them, then they are at rest.
                     Plants and other living things move with vital movement, in accordance with the disposition of their nature, but not by approaching
                     thereto, or by receding from it, for in so far as they recede from
                     such movement, so far do they recede from their natural disposition. Heavy and light bodies are moved by an extrinsic force,
                     either generating them and giving them form, or removing obstacles from their way. They do not therefore move themselves,
                     as do living bodies.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29151" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29151] Iª q. 18 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod corporibus gravibus et levibus non competit moveri,
nisi secundum quod sunt extra dispositionem suae naturae, utpote
cum sunt extra locum proprium, cum enim sunt in loco proprio et
naturali, quiescunt. Sed plantae et aliae res viventes moventur
motu vitali, secundum hoc quod sunt in sua dispositione naturali,
non autem in accedendo ad eam vel in recedendo ab ea, imo secundum
quod recedunt a tali motu, recedunt a naturali dispositione. Et
praeterea, corpora gravia et levia moventur a motore extrinseco,
vel generante, qui dat formam, vel removente prohibens, ut dicitur
in VIII Physic., et ita non movent seipsa, sicut corpora
viventia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Waters are called living that have a continuous current: for standing waters, that are not connected with a continually flowing
                     source, are called dead, as in cisterns and ponds. This is merely a similitude, inasmuch as the movement they are seen to
                     possess makes them look as if they were alive. Yet this is not life in them in its real sense, since this movement of theirs
                     is not from themselves but from the cause that generates them. The same is the
                     case with the movement of other heavy and light bodies.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29152" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29152] Iª q. 18 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod aquae vivae dicuntur, quae habent continuum fluxum,
aquae enim stantes, quae non continuantur ad principium continue
fluens, dicuntur mortuae, ut aquae cisternarum et lacunarum. Et hoc
dicitur per similitudinem, inquantum enim videntur se movere,
habent similitudinem vitae. Sed tamen non est in eis vera ratio
vitae, quia hunc motum non habent a seipsis, sed a causa generante
eas; sicut accidit circa motum aliorum gravium et levium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q18_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q18_A2-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 2. Whether life is an operation?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is an operation. For nothing is divided except into parts of the same genus. But life is divided by certain
                     operations, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 13), who distinguishes four kinds of life, namely, nourishment,
                     sensation, local movement and understanding. Therefore life is an operation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29153" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29153] Iª q. 18 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod vita sit quaedam operatio. Nihil enim
dividitur nisi per ea quae sunt sui generis. Sed vivere dividitur
per operationes quasdam, ut patet per philosophum in II libro de
anima, qui distinguit vivere per quatuor, scilicet alimento uti,
sentire, moveri secundum locum, et intelligere. Ergo vita est
operatio quaedam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the active life is said to be different from the contemplative. But the contemplative is only distinguished from
                     the active by certain operations. Therefore life is an operation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29154" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29154] Iª q. 18 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, vita
activa dicitur alia esse a contemplativa. Sed contemplativi ab
activis non diversificantur nisi secundum operationes quasdam. Ergo
vita est quaedam operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to know God is an operation. But this is life, as is clear from the words of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q18_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.18.3" target="asv"> Jn. 18:3, </a> "Now this is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God." Therefore life is an operation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29155" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29155] Iª q. 18 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
cognoscere Deum est operatio quaedam. Haec autem est vita, ut patet
per illud Ioan. XVII, <i>haec est autem vita aeterna, ut cognoscant
te solum verum Deum</i>. Ergo vita est operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 37), "In living things, to live is to be."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29156" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29156] Iª q. 18 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit philosophus, in II de anima, <i>vivere viventibus est
esse</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q18_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said (
                     <a href="#FP_Q17_A3" id="FP_Q18_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[17], A[3]</a>), our intellect, which takes cognizance of the essence of a thing as its proper object, gains knowledge from sense, of which
                     the proper objects are external accidents. Hence from external appearances we come to the knowledge of the essence of things.
                     And because we name a thing in accordance with our knowledge of it, as is clear from what has already been said (
                     <a href="#FP_Q13_A1" id="FP_Q18_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[13], A[1]</a>), so from external properties names are often imposed to signify essences. Hence such names are sometimes taken strictly
                     to denote the essence itself, the signification of which is their principal object; but sometimes, and less strictly, to denote
                     the properties by reason of which they are imposed. And so we see that the word "body" is used to denote a genus of substances
                     from the fact of their possessing three dimensions: and is sometimes taken to denote the
                     dimensions themselves; in which sense body is said to be a species of quantity. The same must be said of life. The name is
                     given from a certain external appearance, namely, self-movement, yet not precisely to signify this, but rather a substance
                     to which self-movement and the application of itself to any kind of operation, belong naturally. To live, accordingly, is
                     nothing else than to exist in this or that nature; and life signifies this, though in the abstract, just as the word "running"
                     denotes "to run" in the abstract.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q18_A2-p7"> Hence "living" is not an accidental but an essential predicate. Sometimes, however, life is used less properly for the operations
                     from which its name is taken, and thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is principally to sense or to understand.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 2 co."><a name="29157" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29157] Iª q. 18 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut ex dictis patet, intellectus noster, qui proprie est
cognoscitivus quidditatis rei ut proprii obiecti, accipit a sensu,
cuius propria obiecta sunt accidentia exteriora. Et inde est quod
ex his quae exterius apparent de re, devenimus ad cognoscendam
essentiam rei. Et quia sic nominamus aliquid sicut cognoscimus
illud, ut ex supradictis patet, inde est quod plerumque a
proprietatibus exterioribus imponuntur nomina ad significandas
essentias rerum. Unde huiusmodi nomina quandoque accipiuntur
proprie pro ipsis essentiis rerum, ad quas significandas
principaliter sunt imposita, aliquando autem sumuntur pro
proprietatibus a quibus imponuntur, et hoc minus proprie. Sicut
patet quod hoc nomen corpus impositum est ad significandum quoddam
genus substantiarum, ex eo quod in eis inveniuntur tres
dimensiones, et ideo aliquando ponitur hoc nomen corpus ad
significandas tres dimensiones, secundum quod corpus ponitur
species quantitatis. Sic ergo dicendum est et de vita. Nam vitae
nomen sumitur ex quodam exterius apparenti circa rem, quod est
movere seipsum, non tamen est impositum hoc nomen ad hoc
significandum, sed ad significandam substantiam cui convenit
secundum suam naturam movere seipsam, vel agere se quocumque modo
ad operationem. Et secundum hoc, vivere nihil aliud est quam esse
in tali natura, et vita significat hoc ipsum, sed in abstracto;
sicut hoc nomen cursus significat ipsum currere in abstracto. Unde
vivum non est praedicatum accidentale, sed substantiale. Quandoque
tamen vita sumitur minus proprie pro operationibus vitae, a quibus
nomen vitae assumitur; sicut dicit philosophus, IX Ethic., quod
<i>vivere principaliter est sentire vel intelligere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher here takes "to live" to mean an operation of life. Or it would be better to say that sensation and intelligence
                     and the like, are sometimes taken for the operations, sometimes for the existence itself of the operator. For he says (Ethic.
                     ix, 9) that to live is to sense or to understand---in other words, to have a nature capable of sensation or understanding.
                     Thus, then, he distinguishes life by the four operations mentioned. For in
                     this lower world there are four kinds of living things. It is the nature of some to be capable of nothing more than taking
                     nourishment, and, as a consequence, of growing and generating. Others are able, in addition, to sense, as we see in the case
                     of shellfish and other animals without movement. Others have the further power of moving from place to place, as perfect animals,
                     such as quadrupeds, and birds, and so on. Others, as man, have the still higher faculty of understanding.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29158" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29158] Iª q. 18 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod philosophus ibi accipit vivere pro operatione vitae.
Vel dicendum est melius, quod sentire et intelligere, et huiusmodi,
quandoque sumuntur pro quibusdam operationibus; quandoque autem pro
ipso esse sic operantium. Dicitur enim IX Ethic., quod <i>esse est
sentire vel intelligere</i>, idest habere naturam ad sentiendum vel
intelligendum. Et hoc modo distinguit philosophus vivere per illa
quatuor. Nam in istis inferioribus quatuor sunt genera viventium.
Quorum quaedam habent naturam solum ad utendum alimento, et ad
consequentia, quae sunt augmentum et generatio; quaedam ulterius ad
sentiendum, ut patet in animalibus immobilibus, sicut sunt ostrea;
quaedam vero, cum his, ulterius ad movendum se secundum locum,
sicut animalia perfecta, ut quadrupedia et volatilia et huiusmodi;
quaedam vero ulterius ad intelligendum, sicut homines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By vital operations are meant those whose principles are within the operator, and in virtue of which the operator produces
                     such operations of itself. It happens that there exist in men not merely such natural principles of certain operations as
                     are their natural powers, but something over and above these, such as habits inclining them like a second nature to particular
                     kinds of operations, so that the operations become sources of pleasure. Thus, as by
                     a similitude, any kind of work in which a man takes delight, so that his bent is towards it, his time spent in it, and his
                     whole life ordered with a view to it, is said to be the life of that man. Hence some are said to lead to life of self-indulgence,
                     others a life of virtue. In this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the active, and thus to know God is said
                     to be life eternal.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29159" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29159] Iª q. 18 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod opera vitae dicuntur, quorum principia sunt in
operantibus, ut seipsos inducant in tales operationes. Contingit
autem aliquorum operum inesse hominibus non solum principia
naturalia, ut sunt potentiae naturales; sed etiam quaedam
superaddita, ut sunt habitus inclinantes ad quaedam operationum
genera quasi per modum naturae, et facientes illas operationes esse
delectabiles. Et ex hoc dicitur, quasi per quandam similitudinem,
quod illa operatio quae est homini delectabilis, et ad quam
inclinatur, et in qua conversatur, et ordinat vitam suam ad ipsam,
dicitur vita hominis, unde quidam dicuntur agere vitam luxuriosam,
quidam vitam honestam. Et per hunc modum vita contemplativa ab
activa distinguitur. Et per hunc etiam modum cognoscere Deum
dicitur vita aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29160" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29160] Iª q. 18 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Unde patet solutio
ad tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q18_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q18_A3-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 3. Whether life is properly attributed to God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is not properly attributed to God. For things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as previously
                     stated
                     <a href="#FP_Q18_A2" id="FP_Q18_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. But movement does not belong to God. Neither therefore does life.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29161" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29161] Iª q. 18 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deo non conveniat vita. Vivere enim
dicuntur aliqua secundum quod movent seipsa, ut dictum est. Sed Deo
non competit moveri. Ergo neque vivere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in all living things we must needs suppose some principle of life. Hence it is said by the Philosopher (De Anima
                     ii, 4) that "the soul is the cause and principle of the living body." But God has no principle. Therefore life cannot be attributed
                     to Him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29162" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29162] Iª q. 18 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in
omnibus quae vivunt, est accipere aliquod vivendi principium, unde
dicitur in II de anima, quod <i>anima est viventis corporis causa
et principium</i>. Sed Deus non habet aliquod principium. Ergo sibi
non competit vivere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the principle of life in the living things that exist among us is the vegetative soul. But this exists only in corporeal
                     things. Therefore life cannot be attributed to incorporeal things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29163" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29163] Iª q. 18 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
principium vitae in rebus viventibus quae apud nos sunt, est anima
vegetabilis, quae non est nisi in rebus corporalibus. Ergo rebus
incorporalibus non competit vivere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q18_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.3" target="asv">Ps. 83:3</a>): "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29164" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29164] Iª q. 18 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur in Psalmo LXXXIII, <i>cor meum et caro mea
exultaverunt in Deum vivum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q18_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Life is in the highest degree properly in God. In proof of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to live
                     in so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another, the more perfectly this power is found in anything, the more
                     perfect is the life of that thing. In things that move and are moved, a threefold order is found. In the first place, the
                     end moves the agent: and the principal agent is that which acts through its form, and
                     sometimes it does so through some instrument that acts by virtue not of its own form, but of the principal agent, and does
                     no more than execute the action. Accordingly there are things that move themselves, not in respect of any form or end naturally
                     inherent in them, but only in respect of the executing of the movement; the form by which they act, and the end of the action
                     being alike determined for them by their nature. Of this kind are plants, which move themselves according to their
                     inherent nature, with regard only to executing the movements of growth and decay.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q18_A3-p7"> Other things have self-movement in a higher degree, that is, not only with regard to executing the movement, but even as
                     regards to the form, the principle of movement, which form they acquire of themselves. Of this kind are animals, in which
                     the principle of movement is not a naturally implanted form; but one received through sense. Hence the more perfect is their
                     sense, the more perfect is their power of self-movement. Such as have only the sense of touch, as shellfish, move
                     only with the motion of expansion and contraction; and thus their movement hardly exceeds that of plants. Whereas such as
                     have the sensitive power in perfection, so as to recognize not only connection and touch, but also objects apart from themselves,
                     can move themselves to a distance by progressive movement. Yet although animals of the latter kind receive through sense the
                     form that is the principle of their movement, nevertheless they cannot of themselves propose to themselves the end of
                     their operation, or movement; for this has been implanted in them by nature; and by natural instinct they are moved to any
                     action through the form apprehended by sense. Hence such animals as move themselves in respect to an end they themselves propose
                     are superior to these. This can only be done by reason and intellect; whose province it is to know the proportion between
                     the end and the means to that end, and duly coordinate them. Hence a more perfect degree of life is that of intelligible
                     beings; for their power of self-movement is more perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one and the same man the intellectual
                     faculty moves the sensitive powers; and these by their command move the organs of movement. Thus in the arts we see that the
                     art of using a ship, i.e. the art of navigation, rules the art of ship-designing; and this in its turn rules the art that
                     is only concerned with preparing the material for the ship.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q18_A3-p8"> But although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are supplied by nature, as are first principles, which
                     it cannot doubt; and the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with respect to some things it moves itself,
                     yet with regard to other things it must be moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is its very nature,
                     and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most perfect
                     degree. Such is God; and hence in Him principally is life. From this the Philosopher concludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after showing
                     God to be intelligent, that God has life most perfect and eternal, since His intellect is most perfect and always in act.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 3 co."><a name="29165" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29165] Iª q. 18 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod vita maxime proprie in Deo est. Ad cuius evidentiam,
considerandum est quod, cum vivere dicantur aliqua secundum quod
operantur ex seipsis, et non quasi ab aliis mota; quanto perfectius
competit hoc alicui, tanto perfectius in eo invenitur vita. In
moventibus autem et motis tria per ordinem inveniuntur. Nam primo,
finis movet agentem; agens vero principale est quod per suam formam
agit; et hoc interdum agit per aliquod instrumentum, quod non agit
ex virtute suae formae, sed ex virtute principalis agentis; cui
instrumento competit sola executio actionis. Inveniuntur igitur
quaedam, quae movent seipsa, non habito respectu ad formam vel
finem, quae inest eis a natura, sed solum quantum ad executionem
motus, sed forma per quam agunt, et finis propter quem agunt,
determinantur eis a natura. Et huiusmodi sunt plantae, quae
secundum formam inditam eis a natura, movent seipsas secundum
augmentum et decrementum. Quaedam vero ulterius movent seipsa, non
solum habito respectu ad executionem motus, sed etiam quantum ad
formam quae est principium motus, quam per se acquirunt. Et
huiusmodi sunt animalia, quorum motus principium est forma non a
natura indita, sed per sensum accepta. Unde quanto perfectiorem
sensum habent, tanto perfectius movent seipsa. Nam ea quae non
habent nisi sensum tactus, movent solum seipsa motu dilatationis et
constrictionis, ut ostrea, parum excedentia motum plantae. Quae
vero habent virtutem sensitivam perfectam, non solum ad
cognoscendum coniuncta et tangentia, sed etiam ad cognoscendum
distantia, movent seipsa in remotum motu processivo. Sed quamvis
huiusmodi animalia formam quae est principium motus, per sensum
accipiant, non tamen per seipsa praestituunt sibi finem suae
operationis, vel sui motus; sed est eis inditus a natura, cuius
instinctu ad aliquid agendum moventur per formam sensu apprehensam.
Unde supra talia animalia sunt illa quae movent seipsa, etiam
habito respectu ad finem, quem sibi praestituunt. Quod quidem non
fit nisi per rationem et intellectum, cuius est cognoscere
proportionem finis et eius quod est ad finem, et unum ordinare in
alterum. Unde perfectior modus vivendi est eorum quae habent
intellectum, haec enim perfectius movent seipsa. Et huius est
signum, quod in uno et eodem homine virtus intellectiva movet
potentias sensitivas; et potentiae sensitivae per suum imperium
movent organa, quae exequuntur motum. Sicut etiam in artibus,
videmus quod ars ad quam pertinet usus navis, scilicet ars
gubernatoria, praecipit ei quae inducit formam navis, et haec
praecipit illi quae habet executionem tantum, in disponendo
materiam. Sed quamvis intellectus noster ad aliqua se agat, tamen
aliqua sunt ei praestituta a natura; sicut sunt prima principia,
circa quae non potest aliter se habere, et ultimus finis, quem non
potest non velle. Unde, licet quantum ad aliquid moveat se, tamen
oportet quod quantum ad aliqua ab alio moveatur. Illud igitur cuius
sua natura est ipsum eius intelligere, et cui id quod naturaliter
habet, non determinatur ab alio, hoc est quod obtinet summum gradum
vitae. Tale autem est Deus. Unde in Deo maxime est vita. Unde
philosophus, in XII Metaphys., ostenso quod Deus sit intelligens,
concludit quod habeat vitam perfectissimam et sempiternam, quia
intellectus eius est perfectissimus, et semper in actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in Metaph. ix, 16, action is twofold. Actions of one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat or to cut; whilst
                     actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand, to sense and to will. The difference between them is this,
                     that the former action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of the thing moved; whereas the latter action is
                     the perfection of the agent. Hence, because movement is an act of the thing in
                     movement, the latter action, in so far as it is the act of the operator, is called its movement, by this similitude, that
                     as movement is an act of the thing moved, so an act of this kind is the act of the agent, although movement is an act of the
                     imperfect, that is, of what is in potentiality; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that is to say, of what is
                     in act as stated in De Anima iii, 28. In the sense, therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which understands
                     itself
                     is said to move itself. It is in this sense that Plato also taught that God moves Himself; not in the sense in which movement
                     is an act of the imperfect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29166" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29166] Iª q. 18 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in IX Metaphys., duplex est actio,
una, quae transit in exteriorem materiam, ut calefacere et secare;
alia, quae manet in agente, ut intelligere, sentire et velle.
Quarum haec est differentia, quia prima actio non est perfectio
agentis quod movet, sed ipsius moti; secunda autem actio est
perfectio agentis. Unde, quia motus est actus mobilis, secunda
actio, inquantum est actus operantis, dicitur motus eius; ex hac
similitudine, quod, sicut motus est actus mobilis, ita huiusmodi
actio est actus agentis; licet motus sit actus imperfecti, scilicet
existentis in potentia, huiusmodi autem actio est actus perfecti,
idest existentis in actu, ut dicitur in III de anima. Hoc igitur
modo quo intelligere est motus, id quod se intelligit, dicitur se
movere. Et per hunc modum etiam Plato posuit quod Deus movet
seipsum, non eo modo quo motus est actus imperfecti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God is His own very existence and understanding, so is He His own life; and therefore He so lives that He has not principle
                     of life.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29167" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29167] Iª q. 18 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, sicut Deus est ipsum suum esse et suum intelligere,
ita est suum vivere. Et propter hoc, sic vivit, quod non habet
vivendi principium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Life in this lower world is bestowed on a corruptible nature, that needs generation to preserve the species, and nourishment
                     to preserve the individual. For this reason life is not found here below apart from a vegetative soul: but this does not hold
                     good with incorruptible natures.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29168" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29168] Iª q. 18 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod vita in istis inferioribus recipitur in natura
corruptibili, quae indiget et generatione ad conservationem
speciei, et alimento ad conservationem individui. Et propter hoc,
in istis inferioribus non invenitur vita sine anima vegetabili. Sed
hoc non habet locum in rebus incorruptibilibus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q18_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q18_A4-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 4. Whether all things are life in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not all things are life in God. For it is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q18_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.17.28" target="asv">Acts 17:28</a>), "In Him we live, and move, and be." But not all things in God are movement. Therefore not all things are life in Him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29169" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29169] Iª q. 18 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia sint vita in Deo. Dicitur enim
Act. XVII, <i>in ipso vivimus, movemur et sumus</i>. Sed non omnia
in Deo sunt motus. Ergo non omnia in ipso sunt vita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all things are in God as their first model. But things modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not
                     all things have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life in God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29170" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29170] Iª q. 18 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnia
sunt in Deo sicut in primo exemplari. Sed exemplata debent
conformari exemplari. Cum igitur non omnia vivant in seipsis,
videtur quod non omnia in Deo sint vita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29), a living substance is better than a substance that does not live. If, therefore,
                     things which in themselves have not life, are life in God, it seems that things exist more truly in God than themselves. But
                     this appears to be false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in God potentially.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29171" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29171] Iª q. 18 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
Augustinus dicit in libro de vera Relig., substantia vivens est
melior qualibet substantia non vivente. Si igitur ea quae in
seipsis non vivunt, in Deo sunt vita, videtur quod verius sint res
in Deo quam in seipsis. Quod tamen videtur esse falsum, cum in
seipsis sint in actu, in Deo vero in potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as good things and things made in time are known by God, so are bad things, and things that God can make, but
                     never will be made. If, therefore, all things are life in God, inasmuch as known by Him, it seems that even bad things and
                     things that will never be made are life in God, as known by Him, and this appears inadmissible.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="29172" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29172] Iª q. 18 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
sciuntur a Deo bona, et ea quae fiunt secundum aliquod tempus; ita
mala, et ea quae Deus potest facere, sed nunquam fiunt. Si ergo
omnia sunt vita in Deo, inquantum sunt scita ab ipso, videtur quod
etiam mala, et quae nunquam fiunt, sunt vita in Deo, inquantum sunt
scita ab eo. Quod videtur inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q18_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.3" target="asv">Jn. 1:3,4</a>), it is said, "What was made, in Him was life." But all things were made, except God. Therefore all things are life in God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29173" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29173] Iª q. 18 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Ioan. I, <i>quod factum est, in ipso vita erat</i>.
Sed omnia praeter Deum facta sunt. Ergo omnia in Deo sunt vita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In God to live is to understand, as before stated
                     <a href="#FP_Q18_A3" id="FP_Q18_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as
                     understood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been made by God are in Him as things
                     understood, it follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 co."><a name="29174" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29174] Iª q. 18 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut dictum est, vivere Dei est eius intelligere. In Deo
autem est idem intellectus et quod intelligitur, et ipsum
intelligere eius. Unde quidquid est in Deo ut intellectum, est
ipsum vivere vel vita eius. Unde, cum omnia quae facta sunt a Deo,
sint in ipso ut intellecta, sequitur quod omnia in ipso sunt ipsa
vita divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold sense. In one way, so far are they are held together and preserved by the divine
                     power; even as we say that things that are in our power are in us. And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they
                     exist in their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the Apostle when he says, "In Him we live, move,
                     and be"; since our being, living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In
                     another sense things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows them, in which sense they are in God through their proper
                     ideas, which in God are not distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they are in God are the divine essence. And
                     since the divine essence is life and not movement, it follows that things existing in God in this manner are not movement,
                     but life.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29175" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29175] Iª q. 18 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod creaturae in Deo esse dicuntur dupliciter. Uno modo,
inquantum continentur et conservantur virtute divina, sicut dicimus
ea esse in nobis, quae sunt in nostra potestate. Et sic creaturae
dicuntur esse in Deo, etiam prout sunt in propriis naturis. Et hoc
modo intelligendum est verbum apostoli dicentis, <i>in ipso
vivimus, movemur et sumus</i>, quia et nostrum vivere, et nostrum
esse, et nostrum moveri causantur a Deo. Alio modo dicuntur res
esse in Deo sicut in cognoscente. Et sic sunt in Deo per proprias
rationes, quae non sunt aliud in Deo ab essentia divina. Unde res,
prout sic in Deo sunt, sunt essentia divina. Et quia essentia
divina est vita, non autem motus, inde est quod res, hoc modo
loquendi, in Deo non sunt motus, sed vita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The thing modelled must be like the model according to the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form has being
                     of another kind in the model from that which it has in the thing modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the
                     architect immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that exists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence
                     the ideas of things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine mind,
                     as having a divine existence in that mind.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29176" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29176] Iª q. 18 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod exemplata oportet conformari exemplari secundum
rationem formae, non autem secundum modum essendi. Nam alterius
modi esse habet quandoque forma in exemplari et in exemplato, sicut
forma domus in mente artificis habet esse immateriale et
intelligibile, in domo autem quae est extra animam, habet esse
materiale et sensibile. Unde et rationes rerum quae in seipsis non
vivunt, in mente divina sunt vita, quia in mente divina habent esse
divinum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in the
                     divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which reason, in fact, Plato held that the "separate" man was the
                     true man; and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by participation. But since matter enters into the being of natural
                     things, we must say that those things have simply being in the divine mind more
                     truly than in themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated being, but in themselves a created being: whereas this
                     particular being, a man, or horse, for example, has this being more truly in its own nature than in the divine mind, because
                     it belongs to human nature to be material, which, as existing in the divine mind, it is not. Even so a house has nobler being
                     in the architect's mind than in matter; yet a material house is called a house more truly than the one which exists in the
                     mind; since the former is actual, the latter only potential.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29177" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29177] Iª q. 18 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, si de ratione rerum naturalium non esset materia,
sed tantum forma, omnibus modis veriori modo essent res naturales
in mente divina per suas ideas, quam in seipsis. Propter quod et
Plato posuit quod homo separatus erat verus homo, homo autem
materialis est homo per participationem. Sed quia de ratione rerum
naturalium est materia, dicendum quod res naturales verius esse
habent simpliciter in mente divina, quam in seipsis, quia in mente
divina habent esse increatum, in seipsis autem esse creatum. Sed
esse hoc, utpote homo vel equus, verius habent in propria natura
quam in mente divina, quia ad veritatem hominis pertinet esse
materiale, quod non habent in mente divina. Sicut domus nobilius
esse habet in mente artificis, quam in materia, sed tamen verius
dicitur domus quae est in materia, quam quae est in mente; quia
haec est domus in actu, illa autem domus in potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although bad things are in God's knowledge, as being comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as created by
                     Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him. They are known by God through the types of good things. Hence it
                     cannot be said that bad things are life in God. Those things that are not in time may be called life in God in so far as life
                     means understanding only, and inasmuch as they are understood by God; but not in so
                     far as life implies a principle of operation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="29178" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29178] Iª q. 18 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod, licet mala sint in Dei scientia, inquantum sub Dei
scientia comprehenduntur, non tamen sunt in Deo sicut creata a Deo
vel conservata ab ipso, neque sicut habentia rationem in Deo,
cognoscuntur enim a Deo per rationes bonorum. Unde non potest dici
quod mala sint vita in Deo. Ea vero quae secundum nullum tempus
sunt, possunt dici esse vita in Deo, secundum quod vivere nominat
intelligere tantum, inquantum intelliguntur a Deo, non autem
secundum quod vivere importat principium operationis.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q19" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q19-p0.1">Q. 19. THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q19-p2"> After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration
                  is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect
                  in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry:
               </p><p id="FP_Q19-p3"><a href="#FP_Q19_A1"> (1) Whether there is will in God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q19-p4"><a href="#FP_Q19_A2"> (2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</a></p><p id="FP_Q19-p5"><a href="#FP_Q19_A3"> (3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?</a></p><p id="FP_Q19-p6"><a href="#FP_Q19_A4"> (4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q19-p7"><a href="#FP_Q19_A5"> (5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</a></p><p id="FP_Q19-p8"><a href="#FP_Q19_A6"> (6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?</a></p><p id="FP_Q19-p9"><a href="#FP_Q19_A7"> (7) Whether the will of God is mutable?</a></p><p id="FP_Q19-p10"><a href="#FP_Q19_A8"> (8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</a></p><p id="FP_Q19-p11"><a href="#FP_Q19_A9"> (9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?</a></p><p id="FP_Q19-p12"><a href="#FP_Q19_A10"> (10) Whether God has free will?</a></p><p id="FP_Q19-p13"><a href="#FP_Q19_A11"> (11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q19-p14"><a href="#FP_Q19_A12"> (12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 pr."><a name="29179" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29179]
Iª q. 19 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem eorum quae ad
divinam scientiam pertinent, considerandum est de his quae
pertinent ad voluntatem divinam, ut sit prima consideratio de ipsa
Dei voluntate; secunda, de his quae ad voluntatem absolute
pertinent; tertia, de his quae ad intellectum in ordine ad
voluntatem pertinent. Circa ipsam autem voluntatem quaeruntur
duodecim. Primo, utrum in Deo sit voluntas. Secundo, utrum Deus
velit alia a se. Tertio, utrum quidquid Deus vult, ex necessitate
velit. Quarto, utrum voluntas Dei sit causa rerum. Quinto, utrum
voluntatis divinae sit assignare aliquam causam. Sexto, utrum
voluntas divina semper impleatur. Septimo, utrum voluntas Dei sit
mutabilis. Octavo, utrum voluntas Dei necessitatem rebus volitis
imponat. Nono, utrum in Deo sit voluntas malorum. Decimo, utrum
Deus habeat liberum arbitrium. Undecimo, utrum sit distinguenda in
Deo voluntas signi. Duodecimo, utrum convenienter circa divinam
voluntatem ponantur quinque signa.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q19_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A1-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 1. Whether there is will in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is not will in God. For the object of will is the end and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end.
                     Therefore there is not will in God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29180" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29180] Iª q. 19 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sit voluntas. Obiectum enim
voluntatis est finis et bonum. Sed Dei non est assignare aliquem
finem. Ergo voluntas non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, will is a kind of appetite. But appetite, as it is directed to things not possessed, implies imperfection, which
                     cannot be imputed to God. Therefore there is not will in God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29181" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29181] Iª q. 19 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
voluntas est appetitus quidam. Appetitus autem, cum sit rei non
habitae, imperfectionem designat, quae Deo non competit. Ergo
voluntas non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 54), the will moves, and is moved. But God is the first cause of movement,
                     and Himself is unmoved, as proved in Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there is not will in God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29182" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29182] Iª q. 19 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
secundum philosophum, in III de anima, voluntas est movens motum.
Sed Deus est primum movens immobile. Ut probatur VIII Physic. Ergo
in Deo non est voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.2" target="asv">Rom. 12:2</a>): "That you may prove what is the will of God."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29183" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29183] Iª q. 19 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit apostolus, Rom. XII, <i>ut probetis quae sit voluntas
Dei</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> There is will in God, as there is intellect: since will follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual existence
                     by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards
                     its natural form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when it has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same
                     with every natural perfection, which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things
                     without knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also intellectual natures have a like aptitude as apprehended through
                     its intelligible form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain
                     to the will. Hence in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there is animal appetite. And
                     so there must be will in God, since there is intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own existence, so is His
                     will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 1 co."><a name="29184" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29184] Iª q. 19 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
in Deo voluntatem esse, sicut et in eo est intellectus, voluntas
enim intellectum consequitur. Sicut enim res naturalis habet esse
in actu per suam formam, ita intellectus intelligens actu per suam
formam intelligibilem. Quaelibet autem res ad suam formam naturalem
hanc habet habitudinem, ut quando non habet ipsam, tendat in eam;
et quando habet ipsam, quiescat in ea. Et idem est de qualibet
perfectione naturali, quod est bonum naturae. Et haec habitudo ad
bonum, in rebus carentibus cognitione, vocatur appetitus naturalis.
Unde et natura intellectualis ad bonum apprehensum per formam
intelligibilem, similem habitudinem habet, ut scilicet, cum habet
ipsum, quiescat in illo; cum vero non habet, quaerat ipsum. Et
utrumque pertinet ad voluntatem. Unde in quolibet habente
intellectum, est voluntas; sicut in quolibet habente sensum, est
appetitus animalis. Et sic oportet in Deo esse voluntatem, cum sit
in eo intellectus. Et sicut suum intelligere est suum esse, ita
suum velle.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this by
                     His essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q6_A3" id="FP_Q19_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[6], A[3]</a>): for the end has the aspect of good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29185" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29185] Iª q. 19 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, licet nihil aliud a Deo sit finis Dei, tamen ipsemet
est finis respectu omnium quae ab eo fiunt. Et hoc per suam
essentiam, cum per suam essentiam sit bonus, ut supra ostensum est,
finis enim habet rationem boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which, although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking what
                     it does not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in what it does possess. In this respect will is said to be in
                     God, as having always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is not distinct from His essence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29186" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29186] Iª q. 19 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod voluntas in nobis pertinet ad appetitivam partem,
quae licet ab appetendo nominetur, non tamen hunc solum habet
actum, ut appetat quae non habet; sed etiam ut amet quod habet, et
delectetur in illo. Et quantum ad hoc voluntas in Deo ponitur; quae
semper habet bonum quod est eius obiectum, cum sit indifferens ab
eo secundum essentiam, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A will of which the principal object is a good outside itself, must be moved by another; but the object of the divine will
                     is His goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since the will of God is His essence, it is not moved by another than itself,
                     but by itself alone, in the same sense as understanding and willing are said to be movement. This is what Plato meant when
                     he said that the first mover moves itself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29187" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29187] Iª q. 19 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod voluntas cuius obiectum principale est bonum quod est
extra voluntatem, oportet quod sit mota ab aliquo. Sed obiectum
divinae voluntatis est bonitas sua, quae est eius essentia. Unde,
cum voluntas Dei sit eius essentia, non movetur ab alio a se, sed a
se tantum, eo modo loquendi quo intelligere et velle dicitur motus.
Et secundum hoc Plato dixit quod primum movens movet seipsum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A2-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 2. Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not will things apart from Himself. For the divine will is the divine existence. But God is not other
                     than Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than Himself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29188" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29188] Iª q. 19 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non velit alia a se. Velle enim
divinum est eius esse. Sed Deus non est aliud a se. Ergo non vult
aliud a se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, 54. If, therefore, God wills
                     anything apart from Himself, His will must be moved by another; which is impossible.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29189" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29189] Iª q. 19 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
volitum movet voluntatem, sicut appetibile appetitum, ut dicitur in
III de anima. Si igitur Deus velit aliquid aliud a se, movebitur
eius voluntas ab aliquo alio, quod est impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks nothing beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely
                     satisfies His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from Himself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29190" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29190] Iª q. 19 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
cuicumque voluntati sufficit aliquod volitum, nihil quaerit extra
illud. Sed Deo sufficit sua bonitas, et voluntas eius ex ea
satiatur. Ergo Deus non vult aliquid aliud a se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, acts of will are multiplied in proportion to the number of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and things
                     apart from Himself, it follows that the act of His will is manifold, and consequently His existence, which is His will. But
                     this is impossible. Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="29191" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29191] Iª q. 19 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, actus
voluntatis multiplicatur secundum volita. Si igitur Deus velit se
et alia a se, sequitur quod actus voluntatis eius sit multiplex, et
per consequens eius esse, quod est eius velle. Hoc autem est
impossibile. Non ergo vult alia a se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.4.3" target="asv">1 Thess. 4:3</a>): "This is the will of God, your sanctification."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29192" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29192] Iª q. 19 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod apostolus dicit, I Thess. IV, <i>haec est voluntas Dei,
sanctificatio vestra</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above
                     <a href="#FP_Q19_A1" id="FP_Q19_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. For natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and,
                     if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that
                     every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces
                     its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed;
                     and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence,
                     if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the divine
                     will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other
                     things to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness
                     that other things should be partakers therein.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 co."><a name="29193" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29193] Iª q. 19 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod Deus non solum se vult, sed etiam alia a se. Quod apparet a
simili prius introducto. Res enim naturalis non solum habet
naturalem inclinationem respectu proprii boni, ut acquirat ipsum
cum non habet, vel ut quiescat in illo cum habet; sed etiam ut
proprium bonum in alia diffundat, secundum quod possibile est. Unde
videmus quod omne agens, inquantum est actu et perfectum, facit
sibi simile. Unde et hoc pertinet ad rationem voluntatis, ut bonum
quod quis habet, aliis communicet, secundum quod possibile est. Et
hoc praecipue pertinet ad voluntatem divinam, a qua, per quandam
similitudinem, derivatur omnis perfectio. Unde, si res naturales,
inquantum perfectae sunt, suum bonum aliis communicant, multo magis
pertinet ad voluntatem divinam, ut bonum suum aliis per
similitudinem communicet, secundum quod possibile est. Sic igitur
vult et se esse, et alia. Sed se ut finem, alia vero ut ad finem,
inquantum condecet divinam bonitatem etiam alia ipsam
participare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine will is God's own existence essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of understanding
                     them and expressing them, as is clear from what has already been said (
                     <a href="#FP_Q13_A4" id="FP_Q19_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[4]</a>). For when we say that God exists, no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say that God wills.
                     Therefore, although He is not anything apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart from
                     Himself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29194" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29194] Iª q. 19 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, licet divinum velle sit eius esse secundum rem,
tamen differt ratione, secundum diversum modum intelligendi et
significandi, ut ex superioribus patet. In hoc enim quod dico Deum
esse, non importatur habitudo ad aliquid, sicut in hoc quod dico
Deum velle. Et ideo, licet non sit aliquid aliud a se, vult tamen
aliquid aliud a se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things willed for the sake of the end, the whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves the
                     will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing
                     so wills nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant,
                     which anyone may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its
                     own sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only for the sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it
                     does not follow that anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He understands things apart from Himself by
                     understanding His own essence, so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own goodness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29195" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29195] Iª q. 19 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod in his quae volumus propter finem, tota ratio movendi
est finis, et hoc est quod movet voluntatem. Et hoc maxime apparet
in his quae volumus tantum propter finem. Qui enim vult sumere
potionem amaram, nihil in ea vult nisi sanitatem, et hoc solum est
quod movet eius voluntatem. Secus autem est in eo qui sumit
potionem dulcem, quam non solum propter sanitatem, sed etiam
propter se aliquis velle potest. Unde, cum Deus alia a se non velit
nisi propter finem qui est sua bonitas, ut dictum est, non sequitur
quod aliquid aliud moveat voluntatem eius nisi bonitas sua. Et sic,
sicut alia a se intelligit intelligendo essentiam suam, ita alia a
se vult, volendo bonitatem suam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From the fact that His own goodness suffices the divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from itself,
                     but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its goodness. Thus, too, the divine intellect, though its perfection
                     consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that essence knows other things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29196" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29196] Iª q. 19 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod ex hoc quod voluntati divinae sufficit sua bonitas,
non sequitur quod nihil aliud velit, sed quod nihil aliud vult nisi
ratione suae bonitatis. Sicut etiam intellectus divinus, licet sit
perfectus ex hoc ipso quod essentiam divinam cognoscit, tamen in ea
cognoscit alia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the many only in the one, in the same way the divine will is one and simple, as
                     willing the many only through the one, that is, through its own goodness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="29197" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29197] Iª q. 19 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod, sicut intelligere divinum est unum, quia multa non
videt nisi in uno; ita velle divinum est unum et simplex, quia
multa non vult nisi per unum, quod est bonitas sua.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A3-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 3. Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills
                     from eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29198" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29198] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod quidquid Deus vult, ex necessitate velit.
Omne enim aeternum est necessarium. Sed quidquid Deus vult, ab
aeterno vult, alias, voluntas eius esset mutabilis. Ergo quidquid
vult, ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His own goodness necessarily.
                     Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29199" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29199] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
vult alia a se, inquantum vult bonitatem suam. Sed Deus bonitatem
suam ex necessitate vult. Ergo alia a se ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of
                     all necessity, as above shown (
                     <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q19_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing over and above His nature as
                     stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29200" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29200] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
quidquid est Deo naturale, est necessarium, quia Deus est per se
necesse esse, et principium omnis necessitatis, ut supra ostensum
est. Sed naturale est ei velle quidquid vult, quia in Deo nihil
potest esse praeter naturam, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Ergo
quidquid vult, ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God
                     does not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore possible for Him to
                     will what He does not will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two things, and imperfect, since
                     everything contingent is imperfect and mutable.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="29201" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29201] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, non
necesse esse, et possibile non esse, aequipollent. Si igitur non
necesse est Deum velle aliquid eorum quae vult, possibile est eum
non velle illud; et possibile est eum velle illud quod non vult.
Ergo voluntas divina est contingens ad utrumlibet. Et sic
imperfecta, quia omne contingens est imperfectum et mutabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one or the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined
                     to one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator [*Averroes] says in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent
                     with regard to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from another; and thus He has some cause prior to
                     Himself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 5"><a name="29202" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29202] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, ab eo
quod est ad utrumlibet, non sequitur aliqua actio, nisi ab aliquo
alio inclinetur ad unum, ut dicit Commentator, in II Physic. Si
ergo voluntas Dei in aliquibus se habet ad utrumlibet, sequitur
quod ab aliquo alio determinetur ad effectum. Et sic habet aliquam
causam priorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p7">
                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as the divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore
                     whatever God wills, He wills necessarily.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 6"><a name="29203" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29203] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea,
quidquid Deus scit, ex necessitate scit. Sed sicut scientia divina
est eius essentia, ita voluntas divina. Ergo quidquid Deus vult, ex
necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p8">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.11" target="asv">Eph. 1:11</a>): "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will." Now, what we work according to the counsel of the will,
                     we do not will necessarily. Therefore God does not will necessarily whatever He wills.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29204" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29204] Iª q. 19 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit apostolus, Ephes. I, <i>qui operatur omnia secundum
consilium voluntatis suae</i>. Quod autem operamur ex consilio
voluntatis, non ex necessitate volumus. Non ergo quidquid Deus
vult, ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p9">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> There are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to
                     be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the predicate forms part of the definition of the subject:
                     thus it is absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the subject forms part of the notion of the predicate;
                     thus it is absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it is not
                     necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that
                     he is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe
                     that He wills something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will has a necessary
                     relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we
                     will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for
                     instance the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God wills things apart from Himself in so far as
                     they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to
                     it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take
                     ship
                     in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for
                     a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since
                     the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them,
                     it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition,
                     for
                     supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 co."><a name="29205" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29205] Iª q. 19 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod necessarium dicitur aliquid dupliciter, scilicet absolute, et
ex suppositione. Necessarium absolute iudicatur aliquid ex
habitudine terminorum, utpote quia praedicatum est in definitione
subiecti, sicut necessarium est hominem esse animal; vel quia
subiectum est de ratione praedicati, sicut hoc est necessarium,
numerum esse parem vel imparem. Sic autem non est necessarium
Socratem sedere. Unde non est necessarium absolute, sed potest dici
necessarium ex suppositione, supposito enim quod sedeat, necesse
est eum sedere dum sedet. Circa divina igitur volita hoc
considerandum est, quod aliquid Deum velle est necessarium
absolute, non tamen hoc est verum de omnibus quae vult. Voluntas
enim divina necessariam habitudinem habet ad bonitatem suam, quae
est proprium eius obiectum. Unde bonitatem suam esse Deus ex
necessitate vult; sicut et voluntas nostra ex necessitate vult
beatitudinem. Sicut et quaelibet alia potentia necessariam
habitudinem habet ad proprium et principale obiectum, ut visus ad
colorem; quia de sui ratione est, ut in illud tendat. Alia autem a
se Deus vult, inquantum ordinantur ad suam bonitatem ut in finem.
Ea autem quae sunt ad finem, non ex necessitate volumus volentes
finem, nisi sint talia, sine quibus finis esse non potest, sicut
volumus cibum, volentes conservationem vitae; et navem, volentes
transfretare. Non sic autem ex necessitate volumus ea sine quibus
finis esse potest, sicut equum ad ambulandum, quia sine hoc
possumus ire; et eadem ratio est in aliis. Unde, cum bonitas Dei
sit perfecta, et esse possit sine aliis, cum nihil ei perfectionis
ex aliis accrescat; sequitur quod alia a se eum velle, non sit
necessarium absolute. Et tamen necessarium est ex suppositione,
supposito enim quod velit, non potest non velle, quia non potest
voluntas eius mutari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From the fact that God wills from eternity whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily; except by
                     supposition.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29206" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29206] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod ex hoc quod Deus ab aeterno vult aliquid, non
sequitur quod necesse est eum illud velle, nisi ex
suppositione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although God necessarily wills His own goodness, He does not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness; for
                     it can exist without other things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29207" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29207] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, licet Deus ex necessitate velit bonitatem suam, non
tamen ex necessitate vult ea quae vult propter bonitatem suam, quia
bonitas eius potest esse sine aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not natural to God to will any of those other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not unnatural
                     or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29208" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29208] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod non est naturale Deo velle aliquid aliorum, quae non
ex necessitate vult. Neque tamen innaturale, aut contra naturam,
sed est voluntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in the
                     cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not
                     in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily
                     will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the
                     divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely, that the perfect goodness of God can be
                     without it; and such defect accompanies all created good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="29209" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29209] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod aliquando aliqua causa necessaria habet non
necessariam habitudinem ad aliquem effectum, quod est propter
defectum effectus, et non propter defectum causae. Sicut virtus
solis habet non necessariam habitudinem ad aliquid eorum quae
contingenter hic eveniunt, non propter defectum virtutis solaris,
sed propter defectum effectus non necessario ex causa provenientis.
Et similiter, quod Deus non ex necessitate velit aliquid eorum quae
vult, non accidit ex defectu voluntatis divinae, sed ex defectu qui
competit volito secundum suam rationem, quia scilicet est tale, ut
sine eo esse possit perfecta bonitas Dei. Qui quidem defectus
consequitur omne bonum creatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A naturally contingent cause must be determined to act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is necessary,
                     determines itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 5"><a name="29210" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29210] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum ergo
dicendum quod causa quae est ex se contingens, oportet quod
determinetur ab aliquo exteriori ad effectum. Sed voluntas divina,
quae ex se necessitatem habet, determinat seipsam ad volitum, ad
quod habet habitudinem non necessariam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has
                     a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is
                     of things as they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves. Since then all other
                     things have necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute
                     necessity so as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily
                     whatever He wills, but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 6"><a name="29211" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29211] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum
quod, sicut divinum esse in se est necessarium, ita et divinum
velle et divinum scire, sed divinum scire habet necessariam
habitudinem ad scita, non autem divinum velle ad volita. Quod ideo
est, quia scientia habetur de rebus, secundum quod sunt in sciente,
voluntas autem comparatur ad res, secundum quod sunt in seipsis.
Quia igitur omnia alia habent necessarium esse secundum quod sunt
in Deo; non autem secundum quod sunt in seipsis, habent
necessitatem absolutam ita quod sint per seipsa necessaria; propter
hoc Deus quaecumque scit, ex necessitate scit, non autem quaecumque
vult, ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A4-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 4. Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "As our sun, not by reason
                     nor by pre-election, but by its very being, enlightens all things that can participate in its light, so the divine good by
                     its very essence pours the rays of goodness upon everything that exists." But every voluntary agent acts by reason and pre-election.
                     Therefore God does not act by will; and so His will is not the cause of things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29212" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29212] Iª q. 19 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei non sit causa rerum. Dicit
enim Dionysius, cap. IV de Div. Nom., <i>sicut noster sol, non
ratiocinans aut praeeligens, sed per ipsum esse illuminat omnia
participare lumen ipsius valentia; ita et bonum divinum per ipsam
essentiam omnibus existentibus immittit bonitatis suae radios</i>.
Sed omne quod agit per voluntatem, agit ut ratiocinans et
praeeligens. Ergo Deus non agit per voluntatem. Ergo voluntas Dei
non est causa rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, The first in any order is that which is essentially so, thus in the order of burning things, that comes first which
                     is fire by its essence. But God is the first agent. Therefore He acts by His essence; and that is His nature. He acts then
                     by nature, and not by will. Therefore the divine will is not the cause of things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29213" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29213] Iª q. 19 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id
quod est per essentiam, est primum in quolibet ordine sicut in
ordine ignitorum est primum, quod est ignis per essentiam sed Deus
est primum agens. Ergo est agens per essentiam suam, quae est
natura eius. Agit igitur per naturam, et non per voluntatem.
Voluntas igitur divina non est causa rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Whatever is the cause of anything, through being "such" a thing, is the cause by nature, and not by will. For fire
                     is the cause of heat, as being itself hot; whereas an architect is the cause of a house, because he wills to build it. Now
                     Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because God is good, we exist." Therefore God is the cause of things by His nature,
                     and not by His will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29214" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29214] Iª q. 19 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
quidquid est causa alicuius per hoc quod est tale, est causa per
naturam, et non per voluntatem, ignis enim causa est calefactionis,
quia est calidus; sed artifex est causa domus, quia vult eam
facere. Sed Augustinus dicit, in I de Doct. Christ., quod <i>quia
Deus bonus est, sumus</i>. Ergo Deus per suam naturam est causa
rerum, et non per voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the created things is the knowledge of God, as said before (
                     <a href="#FP_Q14_A8" id="FP_Q19_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[14], A[8]</a>). Therefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="29215" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29215] Iª q. 19 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, unius
rei una est causa. Sed rerum creatarum est causa scientia Dei, ut
supra dictum est. Ergo voluntas Dei non debet poni causa rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.26" target="asv">Wis. 11:26</a>), "How could anything endure, if Thou wouldst not?"
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29216" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29216] Iª q. 19 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Sap. XI, <i>quomodo posset aliquid permanere, nisi tu
voluisses?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q19_A4-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> We must hold that the will of God is the cause of things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed, by
                     a necessity of His nature.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q19_A4-p8"> This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an
                     end, as proved in Phys. ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary means predetermined for it by some higher
                     intellect; as the end and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence the intellectual and voluntary
                     agent must precede the agent that acts by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of agents, He
                     must act by intellect and will.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q19_A4-p9"> This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of which the property is to produce one and the same effect;
                     for nature operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of the act is according to
                     the nature of the agent; and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance with that nature; for every
                     natural agent has a determinate being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself
                     the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined
                     and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown (
                     <a href="#FP_Q7_A2" id="FP_Q19_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[2]</a>). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection
                     according to the determination of His will and intellect.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q19_A4-p10"> Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so
                     far as they pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode
                     of the cause. Wherefore since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him after the mode of intellect,
                     and therefore proceed from Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will,
                     for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived appertains to the will. Therefore the will of God is the
                     cause of things.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 co."><a name="29217" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29217] Iª q. 19 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod necesse est dicere voluntatem Dei esse causam rerum, et Deum
agere per voluntatem, non per necessitatem naturae, ut quidam
existimaverunt. Quod quidem apparere potest tripliciter. Primo
quidem, ex ipso ordine causarum agentium. Cum enim propter finem
agat et intellectus et natura, ut probatur in II Physic., necesse
est ut agenti per naturam praedeterminetur finis, et media
necessaria ad finem, ab aliquo superiori intellectu; sicut sagittae
praedeterminatur finis et certus modus a sagittante. Unde necesse
est quod agens per intellectum et voluntatem, sit prius agente per
naturam. Unde, cum primum in ordine agentium sit Deus, necesse est
quod per intellectum et voluntatem agat. Secundo, ex ratione
naturalis agentis, ad quod pertinet ut unum effectum producat, quia
natura uno et eodem modo operatur, nisi impediatur. Et hoc ideo,
quia secundum quod est tale, agit, unde, quandiu est tale, non
facit nisi tale. Omne enim agens per naturam, habet esse
determinatum. Cum igitur esse divinum non sit determinatum, sed
contineat in se totam perfectionem essendi, non potest esse quod
agat per necessitatem naturae, nisi forte causaret aliquid
indeterminatum et infinitum in essendo; quod est impossibile, ut ex
superioribus patet. Non igitur agit per necessitatem naturae sed
effectus determinati ab infinita ipsius perfectione procedunt
secundum determinationem voluntatis et intellectus ipsius. Tertio,
ex habitudine effectuum ad causam. Secundum hoc enim effectus
procedunt a causa agente, secundum quod praeexistunt in ea, quia
omne agens agit sibi simile. Praeexistunt autem effectus in causa
secundum modum causae. Unde, cum esse divinum sit ipsum eius
intelligere, praeexistunt in eo effectus eius secundum modum
intelligibilem. Unde et per modum intelligibilem procedunt ab eo.
Et sic, per consequens, per modum voluntatis, nam inclinatio eius
ad agendum quod intellectu conceptum est, pertinet ad voluntatem.
Voluntas igitur Dei est causa rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius in these words does not intend to exclude election from God absolutely; but only in a certain sense, in so far,
                     that is, as He communicates His goodness not merely to certain things, but to all; and as election implies a certain distinction.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29218" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29218] Iª q. 19 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Dionysius per verba illa non intendit excludere
electionem a Deo simpliciter, sed secundum quid, inquantum
scilicet, non quibusdam solum bonitatem suam communicat, sed
omnibus, prout scilicet electio discretionem quandam importat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because the essence of God is His intellect and will, from the fact of His acting by His essence, it follows that He acts
                     after the mode of intellect and will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29219" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29219] Iª q. 19 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, quia essentia Dei est eius intelligere et velle, ex
hoc ipso quod per essentiam suam agit, sequitur quod agat per modum
intellectus et voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Good is the object of the will. The words, therefore, "Because God is good, we exist," are true inasmuch as His goodness
                     is the reason of His willing all other things, as said before (A[2], ad 2).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29220" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29220] Iª q. 19 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod bonum est obiectum voluntatis. Pro tanto ergo
dicitur, quia Deus bonus est, sumus, inquantum sua bonitas est ei
ratio volendi omnia alia, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even in us the cause of one and the same effect is knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is conceived,
                     and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the
                     effect, except by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to operation. But the power is cause, as executing
                     the effect, since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in God
                     all these things are one.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="29221" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29221] Iª q. 19 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod unius et eiusdem effectus, etiam in nobis, est causa
scientia ut dirigens, qua concipitur forma operis, et voluntas ut
imperans, quia forma, ut est in intellectu tantum, non determinatur
ad hoc quod sit vel non sit in effectu, nisi per voluntatem. Unde
intellectus speculativus nihil dicit de operando. Sed potentia est
causa ut exequens, quia nominat immediatum principium operationis.
Sed haec omnia in Deo unum sunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A5-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 5. Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that some cause can be assigned to the divine will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46): "Who would venture to
                     say that God made all things irrationally?" But to a voluntary agent, what is the reason of operating, is the cause of willing.
                     Therefore the will of God has some cause.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="29222" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29222] Iª q. 19 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod voluntatis divinae sit assignare aliquam
causam. Dicit enim Augustinus, libro octoginta trium quaest.,
<i>quis audeat dicere Deum irrationabiliter omnia condidisse?</i>
Sed agenti voluntario, quod est ratio operandi, est etiam causa
volendi. Ergo voluntas Dei habet aliquam causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned
                     except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause of all things, as has been already shown
                     <a href="#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q19_A5-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. If, then, there is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause, except the divine will alone. Thus
                     all science would be in vain, since science seeks to assign causes
                     to effects. This seems inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="29223" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29223] Iª q. 19 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in
his quae fiunt a volente qui propter nullam causam aliquid vult,
non oportet aliam causam assignare nisi voluntatem volentis. Sed
voluntas Dei est causa omnium rerum, ut ostensum est. Si igitur
voluntatis eius non sit aliqua causa, non oportebit in omnibus
rebus naturalibus aliam causam quaerere, nisi solam voluntatem
divinam. Et sic omnes scientiae essent supervacuae, quae causas
aliquorum effectuum assignare nituntur, quod videtur inconveniens.
Est igitur assignare aliquam causam voluntatis divinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no cause, depends simply on his will. If, therefore, the will of God has
                     no cause, it follows that all things made depend simply on His will, and have no other cause. But this also is not admissible.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="29224" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29224] Iª q. 19 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod
fit a volente non propter aliquam causam, dependet ex simplici
voluntate eius. Si igitur voluntas Dei non habeat aliquam causam,
sequitur quod omnia quae fiunt, dependeant ex simplici eius
voluntate, et non habeant aliquam aliam causam. Quod est
inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 28): "Every efficient cause is greater than the thing effected." But nothing is greater than
                     the will of God. We must not then seek for a cause of it.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 5 s. c."><a name="29225" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29225] Iª q. 19 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>omnis
causa efficiens maior est eo quod efficitur; nihil tamen maius est
voluntate Dei; non ergo causa eius quaerenda est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q19_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In no wise has the will of God a cause. In proof of which we must consider that, since the will follows from the intellect,
                     there is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the same way as there is a cause of the understanding, in the person
                     that understands. The case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its conclusion are understood separately
                     from each other, the understanding the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is known.
                     If the understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself, apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance,
                     in this case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding the premisses, since a thing cannot be its
                     own cause; and yet, it would be true that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the cause of the conclusion. It
                     is the same with the will, with respect to which the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end, as do the
                     premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q19_A5-p7"> Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means to that end, his willing the end will be the cause
                     of his willing the means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and means; for a thing cannot be its own
                     cause. Yet it will be true to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by one act understands
                     all things in His essence, so by one act He wills all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the
                     cause is not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an
                     end is not the cause of His willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end. Therefore, He wills this
                     to be as means to that; but does not will this on account of that.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 5 co."><a name="29226" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29226] Iª q. 19 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod nullo modo voluntas Dei causam habet. Ad cuius evidentiam,
considerandum est quod, cum voluntas sequatur intellectum, eodem
modo contingit esse causam alicuius volentis ut velit, et alicuius
intelligentis ut intelligat. In intellectu autem sic est quod, si
seorsum intelligat principium, et seorsum conclusionem,
intelligentia principii est causa scientiae conclusionis. Sed si
intellectus in ipso principio inspiceret conclusionem, uno intuitu
apprehendens utrumque, in eo scientia conclusionis non causaretur
ab intellectu principiorum, quia idem non est causa sui ipsius. Sed
tamen intelligeret principia esse causas conclusionis. Similiter
est ex parte voluntatis, circa quam sic se habet finis ad ea quae
sunt ad finem, sicut in intellectu principia ad conclusiones. Unde,
si aliquis uno actu velit finem, et alio actu ea quae sunt ad
finem, velle finem erit ei causa volendi ea quae sunt ad finem. Sed
si uno actu velit finem et ea quae sunt ad finem, hoc esse non
poterit, quia idem non est causa sui ipsius. Et tamen erit verum
dicere quod velit ordinare ea quae sunt ad finem, in finem. Deus
autem, sicut uno actu omnia in essentia sua intelligit, ita uno
actu vult omnia in sua bonitate. Unde, sicut in Deo intelligere
causam non est causa intelligendi effectus, sed ipse intelligit
effectus in causa; ita velle finem non est ei causa volendi ea quae
sunt ad finem, sed tamen vult ea quae sunt ad finem, ordinari in
finem. Vult ergo hoc esse propter hoc, sed non propter hoc vult
hoc.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will of God is reasonable, not because anything is to God a cause of willing, but in so far as He wills one thing to
                     be on account of another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="29227" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29227] Iª q. 19 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod voluntas Dei rationabilis est, non quod aliquid sit
Deo causa volendi, sed inquantum vult unum esse propter aliud.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since God wills effects to proceed from definite causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not unreasonable
                     to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It would, however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary,
                     and not as dependent on the will of God. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 2): "Philosophers in their vanity have
                     thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes, being utterly
                     unable to perceive the cause that is shown above all others, the will of God."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="29228" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29228] Iª q. 19 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, cum velit Deus effectus sic esse, ut ex causis
certis proveniant, ad hoc quod servetur ordo in rebus; non est
supervacuum, etiam cum voluntate Dei, alias causas quaerere. Esset
tamen supervacuum, si aliae causae quaererentur ut primae, et non
dependentes a divina voluntate. Et sic loquitur Augustinus in III
de Trin., <i>placuit vanitati philosophorum etiam aliis causis
effectus contingentes tribuere, cum omnino videre non possent
superiorem ceteris omnibus causam, idest voluntatem Dei</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since God wills effects to come from causes, all effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the will
                     of God, but on something else besides: but the first effect depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say
                     that God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work, and intellect, that he might be man; and willed him
                     to be man that he might enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this
                     cannot be reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things depend on the simple will of God; but the others on the
                     order of other causes.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="29229" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29229] Iª q. 19 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, cum Deus velit effectus esse propter causas,
quicumque effectus praesupponunt aliquem alium effectum, non
dependent ex sola Dei voluntate, sed ex aliquo alio. Sed primi
effectus ex sola divina voluntate dependent. Utpote si dicamus quod
Deus voluit hominem habere manus, ut deservirent intellectui,
operando diversa opera, et voluit eum habere intellectum, ad hoc
quod esset homo, et voluit eum esse hominem, ut frueretur ipso, vel
ad complementum universi. Quae quidem non est reducere ad alios
fines creatos ulteriores. Unde huiusmodi dependent ex simplici
voluntate Dei, alia vero ex ordine etiam aliarum causarum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A6-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 6. Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled. For the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:4</a>): "God will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." But this does not happen. Therefore the
                     will of God is not always fulfilled.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="29230" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29230] Iª q. 19 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei non semper impleatur. Dicit
enim apostolus, I ad Tim. II, quod <i>Deus vult omnes homines
salvos fieri, et ad agnitionem veritatis venire</i>. Sed hoc non
ita evenit. Ergo voluntas Dei non semper impletur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is that of the will to good. Now God knows all truth. Therefore He
                     wills all good. But not all good actually exists; for much more good might exist. Therefore the will of God is not always
                     fulfilled.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="29231" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29231] Iª q. 19 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
se habet scientia ad verum, ita voluntas ad bonum. Sed Deus scit
omne verum. Ergo vult omne bonum. Sed non omne bonum fit, multa
enim bona possunt fieri, quae non fiunt. Non ergo voluntas Dei
semper impletur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since the will of God is the first cause, it does not exclude intermediate causes. But the effect of a first cause
                     may be hindered by a defect of a secondary cause; as the effect of the motive power may be hindered by the weakness of the
                     limb. Therefore the effect of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the secondary causes. The will of God, therefore,
                     is not always fulfilled.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="29232" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29232] Iª q. 19 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
voluntas Dei, cum sit causa prima, non excludit causas medias, ut
dictum est. Sed effectus causae primae potest impediri per defectum
causae secundae, sicut effectus virtutis motivae impeditur propter
debilitatem tibiae. Ergo et effectus divinae voluntatis potest
impediri propter defectum secundarum causarum. Non ergo voluntas
Dei semper impletur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.113.11" target="asv">Ps. 113:11</a>): "God hath done all things, whatsoever He would."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 6 s. c."><a name="29233" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29233] Iª q. 19 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur in Psalmo CXIII, <i>omnia quaecumque voluit Deus,
fecit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In proof of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the
                     agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active causes as with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that
                     although a thing may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the universal form. For though a thing may
                     fail to be, for example, a man or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence
                     the same must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the order of any particular active cause, but not outside
                     the order of the universal cause; under which all particular causes are included: and if any particular cause fails of its
                     effect, this is because of the hindrance of some other particular cause, which is included in the order of the universal cause.
                     Therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen.
                     For it may happen that a star is hindered from producing its effects; yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things,
                     from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred through intermediate causes to the universal influence of the first
                     heaven. Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will should not
                     produce its effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in another order;
                     as
                     does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the divine will as much as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that
                     will, when by its justice he is punished.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 6 co."><a name="29234" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29234] Iª q. 19 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod necesse est voluntatem Dei semper impleri. Ad cuius
evidentiam, considerandum est quod, cum effectus conformetur agenti
secundum suam formam, eadem ratio est in causis agentibus, quae est
in causis formalibus. In formis autem sic est quod, licet aliquid
possit deficere ab aliqua forma particulari, tamen a forma
universali nihil deficere potest, potest enim esse aliquid quod non
est homo vel vivum, non autem potest esse aliquid quod non sit ens.
Unde et hoc idem in causis agentibus contingere oportet. Potest
enim aliquid fieri extra ordinem alicuius causae particularis
agentis, non autem extra ordinem alicuius causae universalis, sub
qua omnes causae particulares comprehenduntur. Quia, si aliqua
causa particularis deficiat a suo effectu, hoc est propter aliquam
aliam causam particularem impedientem, quae continetur sub ordine
causae universalis, unde effectus ordinem causae universalis nullo
modo potest exire. Et hoc etiam patet in corporalibus. Potest enim
impediri quod aliqua stella non inducat suum effectum, sed tamen
quicumque effectus ex causa corporea impediente in rebus
corporalibus consequatur, oportet quod reducatur per aliquas causas
medias in universalem virtutem primi caeli. Cum igitur voluntas Dei
sit universalis causa omnium rerum, impossibile est quod divina
voluntas suum effectum non consequatur. Unde quod recedere videtur
a divina voluntate secundum unum ordinem, relabitur in ipsam
secundum alium, sicut peccator, qui, quantum est in se, recedit a
divina voluntate peccando, incidit in ordinem divinae voluntatis,
dum per eius iustitiam punitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q19_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a restricted
                     application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men
                     to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish saved, but because there is no man saved whose
                     salvation He does not will." Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every
                     class of individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case they mean that God wills some men of every class
                     and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition. Thirdly,
                     according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent will.
                     This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent,
                     but to the things willed.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q19_A6-p8"> To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary
                     sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account,
                     by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and that a man should
                     be killed is evil, absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or
                     dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently
                     he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men
                     to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently,
                     but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in
                     themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular
                     circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills
                     simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such
                     a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills
                     takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="29235" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29235] Iª q. 19 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod illud verbum apostoli, quod Deus vult omnes homines
salvos fieri etc., potest tripliciter intelligi. Uno modo, ut sit
accommoda distributio, secundum hunc sensum, Deus vult salvos fieri
omnes homines qui salvantur, non quia nullus homo sit quem salvum
fieri non velit, sed quia nullus salvus fit, quem non velit salvum
fieri, ut dicit Augustinus secundo potest intelligi, ut fiat
distributio pro generibus singulorum, et non pro singulis generum,
secundum hunc sensum, Deus vult de quolibet statu hominum salvos
fieri, mares et feminas, Iudaeos et gentiles, parvos et magnos; non
tamen omnes de singulis statibus. Tertio, secundum Damascenum,
intelligitur de voluntate antecedente, non de voluntate
consequente. Quae quidem distinctio non accipitur ex parte ipsius
voluntatis divinae, in qua nihil est prius vel posterius; sed ex
parte volitorum. Ad cuius intellectum, considerandum est quod
unumquodque, secundum quod bonum est, sic est volitum a Deo.
Aliquid autem potest esse in prima sui consideratione, secundum
quod absolute consideratur, bonum vel malum, quod tamen, prout cum
aliquo adiuncto consideratur, quae est consequens consideratio
eius, e contrario se habet. Sicut hominem vivere est bonum, et
hominem occidi est malum, secundum absolutam considerationem, sed
si addatur circa aliquem hominem, quod sit homicida, vel vivens in
periculum multitudinis, sic bonum est eum occidi, et malum est eum
vivere. Unde potest dici quod iudex iustus antecedenter vult omnem
hominem vivere; sed consequenter vult homicidam suspendi. Similiter
Deus antecedenter vult omnem hominem salvari; sed consequenter vult
quosdam damnari, secundum exigentiam suae iustitiae. Neque tamen id
quod antecedenter volumus, simpliciter volumus, sed secundum quid.
Quia voluntas comparatur ad res, secundum quod in seipsis sunt, in
seipsis autem sunt in particulari, unde simpliciter volumus
aliquid, secundum quod volumus illud consideratis omnibus
circumstantiis particularibus, quod est consequenter velle. Unde
potest dici quod iudex iustus simpliciter vult homicidam suspendi,
sed secundum quid vellet eum vivere, scilicet inquantum est homo.
Unde magis potest dici velleitas, quam absoluta voluntas. Et sic
patet quod quidquid Deus simpliciter vult, fit; licet illud quod
antecedenter vult, non fiat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An act of the cognitive faculty is according as the thing known is in the knower; while an act of the appetite faculty is
                     directed to things as they exist in themselves. But all that can have the nature of being and truth virtually exists in God,
                     though it does not all exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth; but does not will all good, except in so far
                     as He wills Himself, in Whom all good virtually exists.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="29236" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29236] Iª q. 19 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod actus cognoscitivae virtutis est secundum quod
cognitum est in cognoscente, actus autem virtutis appetitivae est
ordinatus ad res, secundum quod in seipsis sunt. Quidquid autem
potest habere rationem entis et veri, totum est virtualiter in Deo;
sed non totum existit in rebus creatis. Et ideo Deus cognoscit omne
verum, non tamen vult omne bonum, nisi inquantum vult se, in quo
virtualiter omne bonum existit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A first cause can be hindered in its effect by deficiency in the secondary cause, when it is not the universal first cause,
                     including within itself all causes; for then the effect could in no way escape its order. And thus it is with the will of
                     God, as said above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="29237" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29237] Iª q. 19 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod causa prima tunc potest impediri a suo effectu per
defectum causae secundae, quando non est universaliter prima, sub
se omnes causas comprehendens, quia sic effectus nullo modo posset
suum ordinem evadere. Et sic est de voluntate Dei, ut dictum
est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A7-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 7. Whether the will of God is changeable?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.6.7" target="asv">Gn. 6:7</a>): "It repenteth Me that I have made man." But whoever repents of what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has
                     a changeable will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="29238" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29238] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei sit mutabilis. Dicit enim
dominus Genes. VI, <i>poenitet me fecisse hominem</i>. Sed
quemcumque poenitet de eo quod fecit, habet mutabilem voluntatem.
Ergo Deus habet mutabilem voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: "I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to
                     pull down, and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought
                     to do to them" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.18.7" target="asv">Jer. 18:7,8</a>) Therefore God has a changeable will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="29239" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29239] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Ierem. XVIII, ex persona domini dicitur, <i>loquar adversus gentem
et adversus regnum, ut eradicem et destruam et disperdam illud; sed
si poenitentiam egerit gens illa a malo suo, agam et ego
poenitentiam super malo quod cogitavi ut facerem ei</i>. Ergo Deus
habet mutabilem voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God does not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the
                     law to be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="29240" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29240] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
quidquid Deus facit, voluntarie facit. Sed Deus non semper eadem
facit, nam quandoque praecepit legalia observari, quandoque
prohibuit. Ergo habet mutabilem voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as said before
                     <a href="#FP_Q19_A3" id="FP_Q19_A7-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Therefore He can both will and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is changeable
                     substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable
                     as regards His will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="29241" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29241] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
non ex necessitate vult quod vult, ut supra dictum est. Ergo potest
velle et non velle idem. Sed omne quod habet potentiam ad opposita,
est mutabile, sicut quod potest esse et non esse, est mutabile
secundum substantiam; et quod potest esse hic et non esse hic, est
mutabile secundum locum. Ergo Deus est mutabilis secundum
voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son of man, that He should be changed" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Num.23.19" target="asv">Num. 23:19</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 s. c."><a name="29242" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29242] Iª q. 19 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Num. XXIII, <i>non est Deus, quasi homo, ut mentiatur;
neque ut filius hominis, ut mutetur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that
                     certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and
                     yet for the will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if one should begin to will what before
                     he had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless
                     we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will regards
                     good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not
                     take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not
                     so before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before;
                     hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both the substance of God and
                     His knowledge are entirely unchangeable (
                     <a href="#FP_Q9_A1" id="FP_Q19_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>;
                     <a href="#FP_Q14_A15" id="FP_Q19_A7-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 co."><a name="29243" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29243] Iª q. 19 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod voluntas Dei est omnino immutabilis. Sed circa hoc
considerandum est, quod aliud est mutare voluntatem; et aliud est
velle aliquarum rerum mutationem. Potest enim aliquis, eadem
voluntate immobiliter permanente, velle quod nunc fiat hoc, et
postea fiat contrarium. Sed tunc voluntas mutaretur, si aliquis
inciperet velle quod prius non voluit, vel desineret velle quod
voluit. Quod quidem accidere non potest, nisi praesupposita
mutatione vel ex parte cognitionis, vel circa dispositionem
substantiae ipsius volentis. Cum enim voluntas sit boni, aliquis de
novo dupliciter potest incipere aliquid velle. Uno modo sic, quod
de novo incipiat sibi illud esse bonum. Quod non est absque
mutatione eius, sicut adveniente frigore, incipit esse bonum sedere
ad ignem, quod prius non erat. Alio modo sic, quod de novo
cognoscat illud esse sibi bonum, cum prius hoc ignorasset, ad hoc
enim consiliamur, ut sciamus quid nobis sit bonum. Ostensum est
autem supra quod tam substantia Dei quam eius scientia est omnino
immutabilis. Unde oportet voluntatem eius omnino esse
immutabilem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when we repent,
                     we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at
                     the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of
                     acting, in so far as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom
                     He had made.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="29244" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29244] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod illud verbum domini metaphorice intelligendum est,
secundum similitudinem nostram, cum enim nos poenitet, destruimus
quod fecimus. Quamvis hoc esse possit absque mutatione voluntatis,
cum etiam aliquis homo, absque mutatione voluntatis, interdum velit
aliquid facere, simul intendens postea illud destruere. Sic igitur
Deus poenituisse dicitur, secundum similitudinem operationis,
inquantum hominem quem fecerat, per diluvium a facie terrae
delevit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will of God, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce
                     certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in
                     the divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising
                     of Lazarus, one who looked only on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not
                     rise again," but looking at the divine first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise again." And God wills both: that is,
                     that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen;
                     or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under
                     the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine
                     and higher cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A7-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.38.1" target="asv">Is. 38:1</a>). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, which is unchangeable.
                     Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5): "The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel"---that is to say, the counsel of His
                     will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent," His words must be understood metaphorically. For
                     men seem to repent, when they do not fulfill what they have threatened.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="29245" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29245] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod voluntas Dei, cum sit causa prima et universalis, non
excludit causas medias, in quarum virtute est ut aliqui effectus
producantur. Sed quia omnes causae mediae non adaequant virtutem
causae primae, multa sunt in virtute et scientia et voluntate
divina, quae non continentur sub ordine causarum inferiorum; sicut
resuscitatio Lazari. Unde aliquis respiciens ad causas inferiores,
dicere poterat, Lazarus non resurget, respiciens vero ad causam
primam divinam, poterat dicere, Lazarus resurget. Et utrumque horum
Deus vult, scilicet quod aliquid quandoque sit futurum secundum
causam inferiorem, quod tamen futurum non sit secundum causam
superiorem; vel e converso. Sic ergo dicendum est quod Deus
aliquando pronuntiat aliquid futurum, secundum quod continetur in
ordine causarum inferiorum, ut puta secundum dispositionem naturae
vel meritorum; quod tamen non fit, quia aliter est in causa
superiori divina. Sicut cum praedixit Ezechiae, <i>dispone domui
tuae, quia morieris et non vives</i>, ut habetur Isaiae XXXVIII;
neque tamen ita evenit, quia ab aeterno aliter fuit in scientia et
voluntate divina, quae immutabilis est. Propter quod dicit
Gregorius, quod <i>Deus immutat sententiam, non tamen mutat
consilium</i>, scilicet voluntatis suae. Quod ergo dicit,
poenitentiam agam ego, intelligitur metaphorice dictum, nam homines
quando non implent quod comminati sunt, poenitere videntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It does not follow from this argument that God has a will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should change.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="29246" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29246] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod ex ratione illa non potest concludi quod Deus habeat
mutabilem voluntatem; sed quod mutationem velit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the unchangeableness
                     of the divine will, as has been said above
                     <a href="#FP_Q19_A3" id="FP_Q19_A7-p11.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="29247" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29247] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod, licet Deum velle aliquid non sit necessarium
absolute, tamen necessarium est ex suppositione, propter
immutabilitatem divinae voluntatis, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A8-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 8. Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved,
                     except whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="29248" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29248] Iª q. 19 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei rebus volitis necessitatem
imponat. Dicit enim Augustinus, in Enchirid., <i>nullus fit salvus,
nisi quem Deus voluerit salvari. Et ideo rogandus est ut velit,
quia necesse est fieri, si voluerit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii,
                     84) "Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder it." But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the
                     Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.19" target="asv">Rom. 9:19</a>): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="29249" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29249] Iª q. 19 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis
causa quae non potest impediri, ex necessitate suum effectum
producit, quia et natura semper idem operatur, nisi aliquid
impediat, ut dicitur in II Physic. Sed voluntas Dei non potest
impediri, dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. IX, <i>voluntati enim eius
quis resistit?</i> Ergo voluntas Dei imponit rebus volitis
necessitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should
                     die, being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause,
                     whereby they have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every
                     true conditional statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is
                     necessary absolutely.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="29250" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29250] Iª q. 19 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, illud
quod habet necessitatem ex priori, est necessarium absolute, sicut
animal mori est necessarium, quia est ex contrariis compositum. Sed
res creatae a Deo, comparantur ad voluntatem divinam sicut ad
aliquid prius, a quo habent necessitatem, cum haec conditionalis
sit vera, si aliquid Deus vult, illud est; omnis autem
conditionalis vera est necessaria. Sequitur ergo quod omne quod
Deus vult, sit necessarium absolute.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> All good things that exist God wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that all
                     good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will, counsel, and all other such things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 8 s. c."><a name="29251" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29251] Iª q. 19 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omnia
bona quae fiunt, Deus vult fieri. Si igitur eius voluntas imponat
rebus volitis necessitatem, sequitur quod omnia bona ex necessitate
eveniunt. Et sic perit liberum arbitrium et consilium, et omnia
huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q19_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to
                     intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes
                     contingent.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q19_A8-p7"> This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent
                     on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second
                     cause, as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God's will from
                     producing its effect. Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be
                     referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is
                     better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to
                     act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being.
                     Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that
                     belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done,
                     which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily,
                     some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has
                     attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise
                     contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently,
                     but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 8 co."><a name="29252" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29252] Iª q. 19 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod divina voluntas quibusdam volitis necessitatem imponit, non
autem omnibus. Cuius quidem rationem aliqui assignare voluerunt ex
causis mediis quia ea quae producit per causas necessarias, sunt
necessaria; ea vero quae producit per causas contingentes, sunt
contingentia. Sed hoc non videtur sufficienter dictum, propter duo.
Primo quidem, quia effectus alicuius primae causae est contingens
propter causam secundam, ex eo quod impeditur effectus causae
primae per defectum causae secundae; sicut virtus solis per
defectum plantae impeditur. Nullus autem defectus causae secundae
impedire potest quin voluntas Dei effectum suum producat. Secundo,
quia, si distinctio contingentium a necessariis referatur solum in
causas secundas, sequitur hoc esse praeter intentionem et
voluntatem divinam, quod est inconveniens. Et ideo melius dicendum
est, quod hoc contingit propter efficaciam divinae voluntatis. Cum
enim aliqua causa efficax fuerit ad agendum, effectus consequitur
causam non tantum secundum id quod fit, sed etiam secundum modum
fiendi vel essendi, ex debilitate enim virtutis activae in semine,
contingit quod filius nascitur dissimilis patri in accidentibus,
quae pertinent ad modum essendi. Cum igitur voluntas divina sit
efficacissima, non solum sequitur quod fiant ea quae Deus vult
fieri; sed quod eo modo fiant, quo Deus ea fieri vult. Vult autem
quaedam fieri Deus necessario, et quaedam contingenter, ut sit ordo
in rebus, ad complementum universi. Et ideo quibusdam effectibus
aptavit causas necessarias, quae deficere non possunt, ex quibus
effectus de necessitate proveniunt, quibusdam autem aptavit causas
contingentes defectibiles, ex quibus effectus contingenter
eveniunt. Non igitur propterea effectus voliti a Deo, eveniunt
contingenter, quia causae proximae sunt contingentes, sed propterea
quia Deus voluit eos contingenter evenire, contingentes causas ad
eos praeparavit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the words of Augustine we must understand a necessity in things willed by God that is not absolute, but conditional. For
                     the conditional statement that if God wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily true.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="29253" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29253] Iª q. 19 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod per illud verbum Augustini intelligenda est
necessitas in rebus volitis a Deo, non absoluta, sed conditionalis,
necesse est enim hanc conditionalem veram esse, si Deus hoc vult,
necesse est hoc esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen,
                     but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="29254" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29254] Iª q. 19 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, ex hoc ipso quod nihil voluntati divinae resistit,
sequitur quod non solum fiant ea quae Deus vult fieri; sed quod
fiant contingenter vel necessario, quae sic fieri vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A8-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Consequents have necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the
                     divine will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore,
                     are absolute necessities.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="29255" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29255] Iª q. 19 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod posteriora habent necessitatem a prioribus, secundum
modum priorum. Unde et ea quae fiunt a voluntate divina, talem
necessitatem habent, qualem Deus vult ea habere, scilicet, vel
absolutam, vel conditionalem tantum. Et sic, non omnia sunt
necessaria absolute.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A9-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 9. Whether God wills evils?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A9-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God wills evils. For every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine
                     says (Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should
                     exist, but also evil things." Therefore God wills evil things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="29256" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29256] Iª q. 19 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei sit malorum. Omne enim bonum
quod fit, Deus vult. Sed mala fieri bonum est, dicit enim
Augustinus, in Enchirid., <i>quamvis ea quae mala sunt, inquantum
mala sunt, non sint bona; tamen, ut non solum bona, sed etiam ut
sint mala, bonum est</i>. Ergo Deus vult mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A9-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. And
                     Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that
                     which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy
                     when contrasted with evil." But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and
                     beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="29257" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29257] Iª q. 19 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, dicit
Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., erit malum ad omnis (idest
universi) perfectionem conferens. Et Augustinus dicit, in
Enchirid., <i>ex omnibus consistit universitatis admirabilis
pulchritudo; in qua etiam illud quod malum dicitur, bene ordinatum,
et loco suo positum, eminentius commendat bona; ut magis placeant,
et laudabiliora sint, dum comparantur malis</i>. Sed Deus vult omne
illud quod pertinet ad perfectionem et decorem universi, quia hoc
est quod Deus maxime vult in creaturis. Ergo Deus vult mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A9-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should
                     not exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil
                     should exist.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="29258" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29258] Iª q. 19 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, mala
fieri, et non fieri, sunt contradictorie opposita. Sed Deus non
vult mala non fieri, quia, cum mala quaedam fiant, non semper
voluntas Dei impleretur. Ergo Deus vult mala fieri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A9-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom.
                     Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to
                     will it." Therefore it is not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore
                     God wills not evil things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 9 s. c."><a name="29259" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29259] Iª q. 19 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>nullo
sapiente homine auctore, fit homo deterior; est autem Deus omni
sapiente homine praestantior; multo igitur minus, Deo auctore, fit
aliquis deterior. Illo autem auctore cum dicitur, illo volente
dicitur</i>. Non ergo volente Deo, fit homo deterior. Constat autem
quod quolibet malo fit aliquid deterius. Ergo Deus non vult
mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A9-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before (
                     <a href="#FP_Q5_A1" id="FP_Q19_A9-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[5], A[1]</a>), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either
                     natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far
                     as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or
                     corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies
                     the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is
                     only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment.
                     Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not
                     even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation.
                     Now God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills
                     the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment,
                     He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in
                     willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 9 co."><a name="29260" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29260] Iª q. 19 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, cum ratio boni sit ratio appetibilis, ut supra dictum est,
malum autem opponatur bono; impossibile est quod aliquod malum,
inquantum huiusmodi, appetatur, neque appetitu naturali, neque
animali, neque intellectuali, qui est voluntas. Sed aliquod malum
appetitur per accidens, inquantum consequitur ad aliquod bonum. Et
hoc apparet in quolibet appetitu. Non enim agens naturale intendit
privationem vel corruptionem; sed formam, cui coniungitur privatio
alterius formae; et generationem unius, quae est corruptio
alterius. Leo etiam, occidens cervum, intendit cibum, cui
coniungitur occisio animalis. Similiter fornicator intendit
delectationem, cui coniungitur deformitas culpae. Malum autem quod
coniungitur alicui bono, est privatio alterius boni. Nunquam igitur
appeteretur malum, nec per accidens, nisi bonum cui coniungitur
malum, magis appeteretur quam bonum quod privatur per malum. Nullum
autem bonum Deus magis vult quam suam bonitatem, vult tamen aliquod
bonum magis quam aliud quoddam bonum. Unde malum culpae, quod
privat ordinem ad bonum divinum, Deus nullo modo vult. Sed malum
naturalis defectus, vel malum poenae vult, volendo aliquod bonum,
cui coniungitur tale malum, sicut, volendo iustitiam, vult poenam;
et volendo ordinem naturae servari, vult quaedam naturaliter
corrumpi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A9-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil
                     is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered
                     to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that evil should be or be done." This, however,
                     is not correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is
                     beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from his sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that
                     the patience of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot therefore be said that such an ordering
                     to good is implied in the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done, since nothing is judged of by
                     that which appertains to it accidentally, but by that which belongs to it essentially.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="29261" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29261] Iª q. 19 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod, licet Deus non velit mala, vult
tamen mala esse vel fieri, quia, licet mala non sint bona, bonum
tamen est mala esse vel fieri. Quod ideo dicebant, quia ea quae in
se mala sunt, ordinantur ad aliquod bonum, quem quidem ordinem
importari credebant in hoc quod dicitur, mala esse vel fieri. Sed
hoc non recte dicitur. Quia malum non ordinatur ad bonum per se,
sed per accidens. Praeter intentionem enim peccantis est, quod ex
hoc sequatur aliquod bonum; sicut praeter intentionem tyrannorum
fuit, quod ex eorum persecutionibus claresceret patientia martyrum.
Et ideo non potest dici quod talis ordo ab bonum importetur per hoc
quod dicitur, quod malum esse vel fieri sit bonum, quia nihil
iudicatur secundum illud quod competit ei per accidens, sed
secundum illud quod competit ei per se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A9-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore
                     Dionysius in saying that "evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe," draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="29262" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29262] Iª q. 19 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod malum non operatur ad perfectionem et decorem
universi nisi per accidens, ut dictum est. Unde et hoc quod dicit
Dionysius, quod malum est ad universi perfectionem conferens,
concludit inducendo quasi ad inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A9-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The statements that evil exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that anyone
                     wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affirmative. God therefore neither
                     wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="29263" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29263] Iª q. 19 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, licet mala fieri, et mala non fieri, contradictorie
opponantur; tamen velle mala fieri, et velle mala non fieri, non
opponuntur contradictorie, cum utrumque sit affirmativum. Deus
igitur neque vult mala fieri, neque vult mala non fieri, sed vult
permittere mala fieri. Et hoc est bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A10-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 10. Whether God has free-will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A10-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; "God alone is
                     He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either side."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="29264" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29264] Iª q. 19 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non habeat liberum arbitrium. Dicit
enim Hieronymus, in homilia de filio prodigo, <i>solus Deus est, in
quem peccatum non cadit, nec cadere potest; cetera, cum sint liberi
arbitrii, in utramque partem flecti possunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A10-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil,
                     as has been said
                     <a href="#FP_Q19_A9" id="FP_Q19_A10-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[9])</a>. Therefore there is not free-will in God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="29265" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29265] Iª q. 19 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
liberum arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis, qua bonum et
malum eligitur. Sed Deus non vult malum, ut dictum est. Ergo
liberum arbitrium non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A10-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of
                     the will, not in obedience to necessity."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 10 s. c."><a name="29266" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29266] Iª q. 19 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Ambrosius, in libro de fide, <i>spiritus sanctus dividit
singulis prout vult, idest pro liberae voluntatis arbitrio, non
necessitatis obsequio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A10-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not
                     appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said
                     to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above

                     <a href="#FP_Q19_A3" id="FP_Q19_A10-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, He has free will with respect to what He does not
                     necessarily will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 10 co."><a name="29267" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29267] Iª q. 19 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod liberum arbitrium habemus respectu eorum quae non necessario
volumus, vel naturali instinctu. Non enim ad liberum arbitrium
pertinet quod volumus esse felices, sed ad naturalem instinctum.
Unde et alia animalia, quae naturali instinctu moventur ad aliquid,
non dicuntur libero arbitrio moveri. Cum igitur Deus ex necessitate
suam bonitatem velit, alia vero non ex necessitate, ut supra
ostensum est; respectu illorum quae non ex necessitate vult,
liberum arbitrium habet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A10-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply, but only as regards the inclination to sin.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="29268" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29268] Iª q. 19 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Hieronymus videtur excludere a Deo liberum arbitrium,
non simpliciter, sed solum quantum ad hoc quod est deflecti in
peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A10-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown (De
                     Fide ii, 3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites,
                     inasmuch as He can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can will to sit down, and
                     not will to sit down.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="29269" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29269] Iª q. 19 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, cum malum culpae dicatur per aversionem a bonitate
divina, per quam Deus omnia vult, ut supra ostensum est, manifestum
est quod impossibile est eum malum culpae velle. Et tamen ad
opposita se habet, inquantum velle potest hoc esse vel non esse.
Sicut et nos, non peccando, possumus velle sedere, et non velle
sedere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A11" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A11-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 11. Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A11-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so
                     is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the
                     divine will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="29270" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29270] Iª q. 19 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit distinguenda in Deo voluntas
signi. Sicut enim voluntas Dei est causa rerum, ita et scientia.
Sed non assignantur aliqua signa ex parte divinae scientiae. Ergo
neque debent assignari aliqua signa ex parte divinae
voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A11-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the
                     expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are
                     superfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="29271" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29271] Iª q. 19 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
signum quod non concordat ei cuius est signum, est falsum. Si
igitur signa quae assignantur circa voluntatem divinam, non
concordant divinae voluntati, sunt falsa, si autem concordant,
superflue assignantur. Non igitur sunt aliqua signa circa
voluntatem divinam assignanda.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A11-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The will of God is one, since it is the very essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A11-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.110.2" target="asv"> Ps. 110:2</a>: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills." Therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for
                     the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 11 s. c."><a name="29272" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29272] Iª q. 19 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod voluntas Dei est una, cum ipsa sit Dei essentia. Quandoque
autem pluraliter significatur, ut cum dicitur, <i>magna opera
domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius</i>. Ergo oportet quod
aliquando signum voluntatis pro voluntate accipiatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A11-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (
                     <a href="#FP_Q13_A3" id="FP_Q19_A11-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[3]</a>). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect.
                     Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus
                     with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that
                     punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed
                     to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just
                     as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called
                     by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A11-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.10" target="asv">Mat.
                        6:10
                     </a>). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its
                     primary meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished
                     will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure;
                     and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called
                     will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 11 co."><a name="29273" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29273] Iª q. 19 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod in Deo quaedam dicuntur proprie, et quaedam secundum
metaphoram, ut ex supradictis patet. Cum autem aliquae passiones
humanae in divinam praedicationem metaphorice assumuntur, hoc fit
secundum similitudinem effectus, unde illud quod est signum talis
passionis in nobis, in Deo nomine illius passionis metaphorice
significatur. Sicut, apud nos, irati punire consueverunt, unde ipsa
punitio est signum irae, et propter hoc, ipsa punitio nomine irae
significatur, cum Deo attribuitur. Similiter id quod solet esse in
nobis signum voluntatis, quandoque metaphorice in Deo voluntas
dicitur. Sicut, cum aliquis praecipit aliquid, signum est quod
velit illud fieri, unde praeceptum divinum quandoque metaphorice
voluntas Dei dicitur, secundum illud Matth. VI, <i>fiat voluntas
tua, sicut in caelo et in terra</i>. Sed hoc distat inter
voluntatem et iram, quia ira de Deo nunquam proprie dicitur, cum in
suo principali intellectu includat passionem, voluntas autem
proprie de Deo dicitur. Et ideo in Deo distinguitur voluntas
proprie, et metaphorice dicta. Voluntas enim proprie dicta, vocatur
voluntas beneplaciti, voluntas autem metaphorice dicta, est
voluntas signi, eo quod ipsum signum voluntatis voluntas
dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A11-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless
                     we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge, but to will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="29274" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29274] Iª q. 19 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod scientia non est causa eorum quae fiunt, nisi per
voluntatem, non enim quae scimus facimus, nisi velimus. Et ideo
signum non attribuitur scientiae, sicut attribuitur voluntati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A11-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the usual
                     expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it
                     is called anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="29275" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29275] Iª q. 19 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod signa voluntatis dicuntur voluntates divinae, non
quia sint signa quod Deus velit, sed quia ea quae in nobis solent
esse signa volendi, in Deo divinae voluntates dicuntur. Sicut
punitio non est signum quod in Deo sit ira, sed punitio, ex eo ipso
quod in nobis est signum irae, in Deo dicitur ira.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A12" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A12-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 12. Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A12-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that five expressions of will---namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission---are not rightly
                     assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates
                     in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="29276" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29276] Iª q. 19 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter circa divinam
voluntatem ponantur quinque signa, scilicet, prohibitio,
praeceptum, consilium, operatio et permissio. Nam eadem quae nobis
praecipit Deus vel consulit, in nobis quandoque operatur, et eadem
quae prohibet, quandoque permittit. Ergo non debent ex opposito
dividi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A12-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God works nothing unless He wills it, as the Scripture says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A12-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.26" target="asv">Wis. 11:26</a>). But the will of expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be comprehended
                     in the will of expression.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 12 arg. 2"><a name="29277" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29277] Iª q. 19 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
nihil Deus operatur, nisi volens, ut dicitur Sap. XI. Sed voluntas
signi distinguitur a voluntate beneplaciti. Ergo operatio sub
voluntate signi comprehendi non debet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A12-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, operation and permission appertain to all creatures in common, since God works in them all, and permits some action
                     in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly under
                     one division, not being of one order.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="29278" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29278] Iª q. 19 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
operatio et permissio communiter ad omnes creaturas pertinent, quia
in omnibus Deus operatur, et in omnibus aliquid fieri permittit.
Sed praeceptum, consilium et prohibitio pertinent ad solam
rationalem creaturam. Ergo non veniunt convenienter in unam
divisionem, cum non sint unius ordinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A12-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, evil happens in more ways than good, since "good happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of ways," as declared
                     by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not right therefore to assign one expression only
                     in the case of evil---namely, prohibition---and two---namely, counsel and precept---in the case of good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 12 arg. 4"><a name="29279" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29279] Iª q. 19 a. 12 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
malum pluribus modis contingit quam bonum, quia bonum contingit uno
modo, sed malum omnifariam, ut patet per philosophum in II Ethic.,
et per Dionysium in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Inconvenienter igitur
respectu mali assignatur unum signum tantum, scilicet prohibitio;
respectu vero boni, duo signa, scilicet consilium et
praeceptum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q19_A12-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> By these signs we name the expression of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may show that
                     he wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may show it by himself, by doing something either directly,
                     or indirectly and accidentally. He shows it directly when he works in his own person; in that way the expression of his will
                     is his own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering the doing of a thing; for
                     what removes an impediment is called an accidental mover. In this respect the expression is called permission. He declares
                     his will by means of another when he orders another to perform a work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept,
                     and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of man makes itself
                     known, the same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will, as the expression of that will. That precept,
                     counsel, and prohibition are called the will of God is clear from the words of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A12-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.10" target="asv">Mat. 6:10</a>: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." That permission and operation are called the will of God is clear from Augustine
                     (Enchiridion 95), who says: "Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually
                     doing it."
                  </p><p id="FP_Q19_A12-p7"> Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, operation with
                     regard to good. Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is necessary and counsel
                     to good that is of supererogation.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 12 co."><a name="29280" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29280] Iª q. 19 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod huiusmodi signa voluntatis dicuntur ea, quibus consuevimus
demonstrare nos aliquid velle. Potest autem aliquis declarare se
velle aliquid, vel per seipsum, vel per alium. Per seipsum quidem,
inquantum facit aliquid, vel directe, vel indirecte et per
accidens. Directe quidem, cum per se aliquid operatur, et quantum
ad hoc, dicitur esse signum operatio. Indirecte autem, inquantum
non impedit operationem, nam removens prohibens dicitur movens per
accidens, ut dicitur in VIII Physic. Et quantum ad hoc, dicitur
signum permissio. Per alium autem declarat se aliquid velle,
inquantum ordinat alium ad aliquid faciendum; vel necessaria
inductione, quod fit praecipiendo quod quis vult, et prohibendo
contrarium; vel aliqua persuasoria inductione, quod pertinet ad
consilium. Quia igitur his modis declaratur aliquem velle aliquid,
propter hoc ista quinque nominantur interdum nomine voluntatis
divinae, tanquam signa voluntatis. Quod enim praeceptum, consilium
et prohibitio dicantur Dei voluntas, patet per id quod dicitur
Matth. VI <i>fiat voluntas tua, sicut in caelo et in terra</i>.
Quod autem permissio vel operatio dicantur Dei voluntas patet per
Augustinum, qui dicit in Enchirid., <i>nihil fit, nisi omnipotens
fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel faciendo</i>. Vel potest dici
quod permissio et operatio referuntur ad praesens permissio quidem
ad malum, operatio vero ad bonum. Ad futurum vero, prohibitio,
respectu mali; respectu vero boni necessarii, praeceptum; respectu
vero superabundantis boni, consilium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A12-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will about the same matter in different ways; thus we find many words that
                     mean the same thing. Hence there is not reason why the same thing should not be the subject of precept, operation, and counsel;
                     or of prohibition or permission.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="29281" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29281] Iª q. 19 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod nihil prohibet, circa eandem rem, aliquem diversimode
declarare se aliquid velle, sicut inveniuntur multa nomina idem
significantia. Unde nihil prohibet idem subiacere praecepto et
consilio et operationi, et prohibitioni vel permissioni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A12-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God may by metaphor be said to will what by His will, properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be said to
                     will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing to prevent the same thing being the object of the will
                     of good pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is always the same as the will of good pleasure; while precept
                     and counsel are not; both because the former regards the present, and the two latter
                     the future; and because the former is of itself the effect of the will; the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 12 ad 2"><a name="29282" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29282] Iª q. 19 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, sicut Deus potest significari metaphorice velle id
quod non vult voluntate proprie accepta, ita potest metaphorice
significari velle id quod proprie vult. Unde nihil prohibet de
eodem esse voluntatem beneplaciti, et voluntatem signi. Sed
operatio semper est eadem cum voluntate beneplaciti, non autem
praeceptum vel consilium, tum quia haec est de praesenti, illud de
futuro; tum quia haec per se est effectus voluntatis, illud autem
per alium, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A12-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Rational creatures are masters of their own acts; and for this reason certain special expressions of the divine will are
                     assigned to their acts, inasmuch as God ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily and of themselves. Other creatures act
                     only as moved by the divine operation; therefore only operation and permission are concerned with these.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 12 ad 3"><a name="29283" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29283] Iª q. 19 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod creatura rationalis est domina sui actus, et ideo
circa ipsam specialia quaedam signa divinae voluntatis assignantur,
inquantum rationalem creaturam Deus ordinat ad agendum voluntarie
et per se. Sed aliae creaturae non agunt nisi motae ex operatione
divina, et ideo circa alias non habent locum nisi operatio et
permissio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A12-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All evil of sin, though happening in many ways, agrees in being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard to
                     evil, only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. On the other hand, good stands in various relations to the divine
                     goodness, since there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject
                     of precept; and there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and
                     these are the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is not only concerned with the obtaining of greater good;
                     but also with the avoiding of lesser evils.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 12 ad 4"><a name="29284" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29284] Iª q. 19 a. 12 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod omne malum culpae, licet multipliciter contingat,
tamen in hoc convenit, quod discordat a voluntate divina et ideo
unum signum respectu malorum assignatur, scilicet prohibitio. Sed
diversimode bona se habent ad bonitatem divinam. Quia quaedam sunt,
sine quibus fruitionem divinae bonitatis consequi non possumus, et
respectu horum est praeceptum. Quaedam vero sunt, quibus perfectius
consequimur, et respectu horum est consilium. Vel dicendum quod
consilium est non solum de melioribus bonis assequendis, sed etiam
de minoribus malis vitandis.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q20" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q20-p0.1">Q. 20. GOD'S LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q20-p2"> We next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of God. In the appetitive part of the soul there are found
                  in ourselves both the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the habits of the moral virtues, as justice, fortitude
                  and the like. Hence we shall first consider the love of God, and secondly His justice and mercy. About the first there are
                  four points of inquiry:
               </p><p id="FP_Q20-p3"><a href="#FP_Q20_A1"> (1) Whether love exists in God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q20-p4"><a href="#FP_Q20_A2"> (2) Whether He loves all things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q20-p5"><a href="#FP_Q20_A3"> (3) Whether He loves one thing more than another?</a></p><p id="FP_Q20-p6"><a href="#FP_Q20_A4"> (4) Whether He loves more the better things?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 pr."><a name="29285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29285]
Iª q. 20 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de his quae
absolute ad voluntatem Dei pertinent. In parte autem appetitiva
inveniuntur in nobis et passiones animae, ut gaudium, amor, et
huiusmodi; et habitus moralium virtutum, ut iustitia, fortitudo, et
huiusmodi. Unde primo considerabimus de amore Dei; secundo, de
iustitia Dei, et misericordia eius. Circa primum quaeruntur
quatuor. Primo, utrum in Deo sit amor. Secundo, utrum amet omnia.
Tertio, utrum magis amet unum quam aliud. Quarto, utrum meliora
magis amet.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q20_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q20_A1-p0.1">Q. 20. A. 1. Whether love exists in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that love does not exist in God. For in God there are no passions. Now love is a passion. Therefore love is not
                     in God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29286] Iª q. 20 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit in Deo. Nulla enim passio est
in Deo. Amor est passio. Ergo amor non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love, anger, sorrow and the like, are mutually divided against one another. But sorrow and anger are not attributed
                     to God, unless by metaphor. Therefore neither is love attributed to Him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29287] Iª q. 20 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, amor,
ira, tristitia, et huiusmodi, contra se dividuntur. Sed tristitia
et ira non dicuntur de Deo nisi metaphorice. Ergo nec amor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a uniting and binding force." But this cannot take place in God, since He
                     is simple. Therefore love does not exist in God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29288] Iª q. 20 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., <i>amor est vis unitiva et
concretiva</i>. Hoc autem in Deo locum habere non potest, cum sit
simplex. Ergo in Deo non est amor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "God is love" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.16" target="asv">Jn. 4:16</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29289" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29289] Iª q. 20 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur I Ioan. IV, <i>Deus caritas est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> We must needs assert that in God there is love: because love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty.
                     For since the acts of the will and of every appetitive faculty tend towards good and evil, as to their proper objects: and
                     since good is essentially and especially the object of the will and the appetite, whereas evil is only the object secondarily
                     and indirectly, as opposed to good; it follows that the acts of the will and appetite
                     that regard good must naturally be prior to those that regard evil; thus, for instance, joy is prior to sorrow, love to hate:
                     because what exists of itself is always prior to that which exists through another. Again, the more universal is naturally
                     prior to what is less so. Hence the intellect is first directed to universal truth; and in the second place to particular
                     and special truths. Now there are certain acts of the will and appetite that regard good under some special condition, as
                     joy
                     and delight regard good present and possessed; whereas desire and hope regard good not as yet possessed. Love, however, regards
                     good universally, whether possessed or not. Hence love is naturally the first act of the will and appetite; for which reason
                     all the other appetite movements presuppose love, as their root and origin. For nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything,
                     except as a good that is loved: nor is anything an object of hate except as opposed to the object of love.
                     Similarly, it is clear that sorrow, and other things like to it, must be referred to love as to their first principle. Hence,
                     in whomsoever there is will and appetite, there must also be love: since if the first is wanting, all that follows is also
                     wanting. Now it has been shown that will is in God (
                     <a href="#FP_Q19_A1" id="FP_Q20_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[1]</a>), and hence we must attribute love to Him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 co."><a name="29290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29290] Iª q. 20 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod necesse est ponere amorem in Deo. Primus enim motus
voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitivae virtutis, est amor. Cum enim
actus voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitivae virtutis tendat in
bonum et malum, sicut in propria obiecta; bonum autem principalius
et per se est obiectum voluntatis et appetitus, malum autem
secundario et per aliud, inquantum scilicet opponitur bono, oportet
naturaliter esse priores actus voluntatis et appetitus qui
respiciunt bonum, his qui respiciunt malum; ut gaudium quam
tristitia, et amor quam odium. Semper enim quod est per se, prius
est eo quod est per aliud. Rursus, quod est communius, naturaliter
est prius, unde et intellectus per prius habet ordinem ad verum
commune, quam ad particularia quaedam vera. Sunt autem quidam actus
voluntatis et appetitus, respicientes bonum sub aliqua speciali
conditione, sicut gaudium et delectatio est de bono praesenti et
habito; desiderium autem et spes, de bono nondum adepto. Amor autem
respicit bonum in communi, sive sit habitum, sive non habitum. Unde
amor naturaliter est primus actus voluntatis et appetitus. Et
propter hoc, omnes alii motus appetitivi praesupponunt amorem,
quasi primam radicem. Nullus enim desiderat aliquid, nisi bonum
amatum, neque aliquis gaudet, nisi de bono amato. Odium etiam non
est nisi de eo quod contrariatur rei amatae. Et similiter
tristitiam, et cetera huiusmodi, manifestum est in amorem referri,
sicut in primum principium. Unde in quocumque est voluntas vel
appetitus, oportet esse amorem, remoto enim primo, removentur alia.
Ostensum est autem in Deo esse voluntatem. Unde necesse est in eo
ponere amorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The cognitive faculty does not move except through the medium of the appetitive: and just as in ourselves the universal reason
                     moves through the medium of the particular reason, as stated in De Anima iii, 58,75, so in ourselves the intellectual appetite,
                     or the will as it is called, moves through the medium of the sensitive appetite. Hence, in us the sensitive appetite is the
                     proximate motive-force of our bodies. Some bodily change therefore always
                     accompanies an act of the sensitive appetite, and this change affects especially the heart, which, as the Philosopher says
                     (De part. animal. iii, 4), is the first principle of movement in animals. Therefore acts of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch
                     as they have annexed to them some bodily change, are called passions; whereas acts of the will are not so called. Love, therefore,
                     and joy and delight are passions; in so far as they denote acts of the intellective appetite, they are not passions. It
                     is in this latter sense that they are in God. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii): "God rejoices by an operation that
                     is one and simple," and for the same reason He loves without passion.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29291" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29291] Iª q. 20 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod vis cognitiva non movet, nisi mediante appetitiva. Et
sicut in nobis ratio universalis movet mediante ratione
particulari, ut dicitur in III de anima; ita appetitus
intellectivus, qui dicitur voluntas, movet in nobis mediante
appetitu sensitivo. Unde proximum motivum corporis in nobis est
appetitus sensitivus. Unde semper actum appetitus sensitivi
concomitatur aliqua transmutatio corporis; et maxime circa cor,
quod est primum principium motus in animali. Sic igitur actus
appetitus sensitivi, inquantum habent transmutationem corporalem
annexam, passiones dicuntur, non autem actus voluntatis. Amor
igitur et gaudium et delectatio, secundum quod significant actus
appetitus sensitivi, passiones sunt, non autem secundum quod
significant actus appetitus intellectivi. Et sic ponuntur in Deo.
Unde dicit philosophus, in VII Ethic., quod <i>Deus una et simplici
operatione gaudet</i>. Et eadem ratione, sine passione amat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the passions of the sensitive appetite there may be distinguished a certain material element---namely, the bodily change---and
                     a certain formal element, which is on the part of the appetite. Thus in anger, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 15,63,64),
                     the material element is the kindling of the blood about the heart; but the formal, the appetite for revenge. Again, as regards
                     the formal element of certain passions a certain imperfection is
                     implied, as in desire, which is of the good we have not, and in sorrow, which is about the evil we have. This applies also
                     to anger, which supposes sorrow. Certain other passions, however, as love and joy, imply no imperfection. Since therefore
                     none of these can be attributed to God on their material side, as has been said (ad 1); neither can those that even on their
                     formal side imply imperfection be attributed to Him; except metaphorically, and from likeness of effects, as already show
                     (
                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A2" id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[2]</a> , ad 2;
                     <a href="#FP_Q19_A11" id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[19], A[11]</a>). Whereas, those that do not imply imperfection, such as love and joy, can be properly predicated of God, though without
                     attributing passion to Him, as said before (
                     <a href="#FP_Q19_A11" id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.3" shape="rect">Q[19], A[11]</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29292] Iª q. 20 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod in passionibus sensitivi appetitus, est considerare
aliquid quasi materiale, scilicet corporalem transmutationem; et
aliquid quasi formale, quod est ex parte appetitus. Sicut in ira,
ut dicitur in I de anima, materiale est accensio sanguinis circa
cor, vel aliquid huiusmodi; formale vero, appetitus vindictae. Sed
rursus, ex parte eius quod est formale, in quibusdam horum
designatur aliqua imperfectio; sicut in desiderio, quod est boni
non habiti; et in tristitia, quae est mali habiti. Et eadem ratio
est de ira, quae tristitiam supponit. Quaedam vero nullam
imperfectionem designant, ut amor et gaudium. Cum igitur nihil
horum Deo conveniat secundum illud quod est materiale in eis, ut
dictum est; illa quae imperfectionem important etiam formaliter,
Deo convenire non possunt nisi metaphorice, propter similitudinem
effectus, ut supra dictum est. Quae autem imperfectionem non
important, de Deo proprie dicuntur, ut amor et gaudium, tamen sine
passione, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An act of love always tends towards two things; to the good that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it: since
                     to love a person is to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as we love ourselves, we wish ourselves good; and, so far as
                     possible, union with that good. So love is called the unitive force, even in God, yet without implying composition; for the
                     good that He wills for Himself, is no other than Himself, Who is good by His essence,
                     as above shown (
                     <a href="#FP_Q6_A1" id="FP_Q20_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,3). And by the fact that anyone loves another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, in the place
                     of himself; and regards the good done to him as done to himself. So far love is a binding force, since it aggregates another
                     to ourselves, and refers his good to our own. And then again the divine love is a binding force, inasmuch as God wills good
                     to others; yet it implies no composition in God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29293] Iª q. 20 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod actus amoris semper tendit in duo, scilicet in bonum
quod quis vult alicui; et in eum cui vult bonum. Hoc enim est
proprie amare aliquem, velle ei bonum. Unde in eo quod aliquis amat
se, vult bonum sibi. Et sic illud bonum quaerit sibi unire,
inquantum potest. Et pro tanto dicitur amor vis unitiva, etiam in
Deo, sed absque compositione, quia illud bonum quod vult sibi, non
est aliud quam ipse, qui est per suam essentiam bonus, ut supra
ostensum est. In hoc vero quod aliquis amat alium, vult bonum illi.
Et sic utitur eo tanquam seipso, referens bonum ad illum, sicut ad
seipsum. Et pro tanto dicitur amor vis concretiva, quia alium
aggregat sibi habens se ad eum sicut ad seipsum. Et sic etiam amor
divinus est vis concretiva, absque compositione quae sit in Deo,
inquantum aliis bona vult.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q20_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q20_A2-p0.1">Q. 20. A. 2. Whether God loves all things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not love all things. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1), love places the lover outside himself,
                     and causes him to pass, as it were, into the object of his love. But it is not admissible to say that God is placed outside
                     of Himself, and passes into other things. Therefore it is inadmissible to say that God loves things other than Himself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29294" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29294] Iª q. 20 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non omnia amet. Quia, secundum
Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom., amor amantem extra se ponit, et
eum quodammodo in amatum transfert. Inconveniens autem est dicere
quod Deus, extra se positus, in alia transferatur. Ergo
inconveniens est dicere quod Deus alia a se amet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the love of God is eternal. But things apart from God are not from eternity; except in God. Therefore God does not
                     love anything, except as it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it is no other than Himself. Therefore God does not
                     love things other than Himself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29295] Iª q. 20 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, amor
Dei aeternus est. Sed ea quae sunt alia a Deo, non sunt ab aeterno
nisi in Deo. Ergo Deus non amat ea nisi in seipso. Sed secundum
quod sunt in eo, non sunt aliud ab eo. Ergo Deus non amat alia a
seipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love is twofold---the love, namely, of desire, and the love of friendship. Now God does not love irrational creatures
                     with the love of desire, since He needs no creature outside Himself. Nor with the love of friendship; since there can be no
                     friendship with irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. viii, 2). Therefore God does not love all things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29296] Iª q. 20 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
duplex est amor, scilicet concupiscentiae, et amicitiae. Sed Deus
creaturas irrationales non amat amore concupiscentiae, quia nullius
extra se eget, nec etiam amore amicitiae, quia non potest ad res
irrationales haberi, ut patet per philosophum, in VIII Ethic. Ergo
Deus non omnia amat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.5.7" target="asv">Ps. 5:7</a>): "Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity." Now nothing is at the same time hated and loved. Therefore God does not love
                     all things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="29297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29297] Iª q. 20 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in
Psalmo dicitur, <i>odisti omnes qui operantur iniquitatem</i>.
Nihil autem simul odio habetur et amatur. Ergo Deus non omnia
amat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.25" target="asv">Wis. 11:25</a>): "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29298] Iª q. 20 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Sap. XI, <i>diligis omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti
eorum quae fecisti</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a thing
                     is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses. Now it has been shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q20_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that God's will is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good,
                     only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some
                     good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything
                     that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as
                     by its object, our love, whereby we will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness,
                     whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides
                     the good it has not, and to this end we direct our actions: whereas the love of God infuses and creates goodness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 co."><a name="29299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29299] Iª q. 20 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod Deus omnia existentia amat. Nam omnia existentia, inquantum
sunt, bona sunt, ipsum enim esse cuiuslibet rei quoddam bonum est,
et similiter quaelibet perfectio ipsius. Ostensum est autem supra
quod voluntas Dei est causa omnium rerum et sic oportet quod
intantum habeat aliquid esse, aut quodcumque bonum, inquantum est
volitum a Deo. Cuilibet igitur existenti Deus vult aliquod bonum.
Unde, cum amare nil aliud sit quam velle bonum alicui, manifestum
est quod Deus omnia quae sunt, amat. Non tamen eo modo sicut nos.
Quia enim voluntas nostra non est causa bonitatis rerum, sed ab ea
movetur sicut ab obiecto, amor noster, quo bonum alicui volumus,
non est causa bonitatis ipsius, sed e converso bonitas eius, vel
vera vel aestimata, provocat amorem, quo ei volumus et bonum
conservari quod habet, et addi quod non habet, et ad hoc operamur.
Sed amor Dei est infundens et creans bonitatem in rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A lover is placed outside himself, and made to pass into the object of his love, inasmuch as he wills good to the beloved;
                     and works for that good by his providence even as he works for his own. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "On behalf
                     of the truth we must make bold to say even this, that He Himself, the cause of all things, by His abounding love and goodness,
                     is placed outside Himself by His providence for all existing things."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29300] Iª q. 20 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod amans sic fit extra se in amatum translatus,
inquantum vult amato bonum, et operatur per suam providentiam,
sicut et sibi. Unde et Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom.,
<i>audendum est autem et hoc pro veritate dicere, quod et ipse
omnium causa, per abundantiam amativae bonitatis, extra seipsum fit
ad omnia existentia providentiis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although creatures have not existed from eternity, except in God, yet because they have been in Him from eternity, God has
                     known them eternally in their proper natures; and for that reason has loved them, even as we, by the images of things within
                     us, know things existing in themselves.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29301] Iª q. 20 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, licet creaturae ab aeterno non fuerint nisi in Deo,
tamen per hoc quod ab aeterno in Deo fuerunt, ab aeterno Deus
cognovit res in propriis naturis, et eadem ratione amavit. Sicut et
nos per similitudines rerum, quae in nobis sunt, cognoscimus res in
seipsis existentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Friendship cannot exist except towards rational creatures, who are capable of returning love, and communicating one with
                     another in the various works of life, and who may fare well or ill, according to the changes of fortune and happiness; even
                     as to them is benevolence properly speaking exercised. But irrational creatures cannot attain to loving God, nor to any share
                     in the intellectual and beatific life that He lives. Strictly speaking, therefore,
                     God does not love irrational creatures with the love of friendship; but as it were with the love of desire, in so far as He
                     orders them to rational creatures, and even to Himself. Yet this is not because He stands in need of them; but only on account
                     of His goodness, and of the services they render to us. For we can desire a thing for others as well as for ourselves.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29302] Iª q. 20 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod amicitia non potest haberi nisi ad rationales
creaturas, in quibus contingit esse redamationem, et
communicationem in operibus vitae, et quibus contingit bene evenire
vel male, secundum fortunam et felicitatem, sicut et ad eas proprie
benevolentia est. Creaturae autem irrationales non possunt
pertingere ad amandum Deum, neque ad communicationem intellectualis
et beatae vitae, qua Deus vivit. Sic igitur Deus, proprie loquendo,
non amat creaturas irrationales amore amicitiae, sed amore quasi
concupiscentiae; inquantum ordinat eas ad rationales creaturas, et
etiam ad seipsum; non quasi eis indigeat, sed propter suam
bonitatem et nostram utilitatem. Concupiscimus enim aliquid et
nobis et aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Nothing prevents one and the same thing being loved under one aspect, while it is hated under another. God loves sinners
                     in so far as they are existing natures; for they have existence and have it from Him. In so far as they are sinners, they
                     have not existence at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from God. Hence under this aspect, they are hated
                     by Him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="29303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29303] Iª q. 20 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod nihil prohibet unum et idem secundum aliquid amari,
et secundum aliquid odio haberi. Deus autem peccatores, inquantum
sunt naturae quaedam, amat, sic enim et sunt, et ab ipso sunt.
Inquantum vero peccatores sunt, non sunt, sed ab esse deficiunt, et
hoc in eis a Deo non est. Unde secundum hoc ab ipso odio
habentur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q20_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q20_A3-p0.1">Q. 20. A. 3. Whether God loves all things equally?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God loves all things equally. For it is said: "He hath equally care of all" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.8" target="asv">Wis. 6:8</a>). But God's providence over things comes from the love wherewith He loves them. Therefore He loves all things equally.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29304] Iª q. 20 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus aequaliter diligat omnia. Dicitur
enim Sap. VI, <i>aequaliter est ei cura de omnibus</i>. Sed
providentia Dei, quam habet de rebus, est ex amore quo amat res.
Ergo aequaliter amat omnia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the love of God is His essence. But God's essence does not admit of degree; neither therefore does His love. He
                     does not therefore love some things more than others.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29305] Iª q. 20 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, amor
Dei est eius essentia. Sed essentia Dei magis et minus non recipit.
Ergo nec amor eius. Non igitur quaedam aliis magis amat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as God's love extends to created things, so do His knowledge and will extend. But God is not said to know some things
                     more than others; nor will one thing more than another. Neither therefore does He love some things more than others.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29306] Iª q. 20 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
amor Dei se extendit ad res creatas, ita et scientia et voluntas.
Sed Deus non dicitur scire quaedam magis quam alia, neque magis
velle. Ergo nec magis quaedam aliis diligit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. cx): "God loves all things that He has made, and amongst them rational creatures more, and
                     of these especially those who are members of His only-begotten Son Himself."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29307] Iª q. 20 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Augustinus, super Ioann., <i>omnia diligit Deus quae
fecit; et inter ea magis diligit creaturas rationales; et de illis
eas amplius, quae sunt membra unigeniti sui; et multo magis ipsum
unigenitum suum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since to love a thing is to will it good, in a twofold way anything may be loved more, or less. In one way on the part of
                     the act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. In this way God does not love some things more than others, because
                     He loves all things by an act of the will that is one, simple, and always the same. In another way on the part of the good
                     itself that a person wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that one more
                     than another, for whom we will a greater good, though our will is not more intense. In this way we must needs say that God
                     loves some things more than others. For since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, as has been said
                     <a href="#FP_Q20_A2" id="FP_Q20_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 3 co."><a name="29308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29308] Iª q. 20 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, cum amare sit velle bonum alicui, duplici ratione potest
aliquid magis vel minus amari. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius actus
voluntatis, qui est magis vel minus intensus. Et sic Deus non magis
quaedam aliis amat, quia omnia amat uno et simplici actu
voluntatis, et semper eodem modo se habente. Alio modo, ex parte
ipsius boni quod aliquis vult amato. Et sic dicimur aliquem magis
alio amare, cui volumus maius bonum; quamvis non magis intensa
voluntate. Et hoc modo necesse est dicere quod Deus quaedam aliis
magis amat. Cum enim amor Dei sit causa bonitatis rerum, ut dictum
est, non esset aliquid alio melius, si Deus non vellet uni maius
bonum quam alteri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to have equally care of all, not because by His care He deals out equal good to all, but because He administers
                     all things with a like wisdom and goodness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29309] Iª q. 20 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod dicitur Deo aequaliter esse cura de omnibus, non quia
aequalia bona sua cura omnibus dispenset; sed quia ex aequali
sapientia et bonitate omnia administrat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument is based on the intensity of love on the part of the act of the will, which is the divine essence. But the
                     good that God wills for His creatures, is not the divine essence. Therefore there is no reason why it may not vary in degree.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29310] Iª q. 20 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de intensione amoris ex parte
actus voluntatis, qui est divina essentia. Bonum autem quod Deus
creaturae vult, non est divina essentia. Unde nihil prohibet illud
intendi vel remitti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To understand and to will denote the act alone, and do not include in their meaning objects from the diversity of which God
                     may be said to know or will more or less, as has been said with respect to God's love.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29311] Iª q. 20 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod intelligere et velle significant solum actus, non
autem in sua significatione includunt aliqua obiecta, ex quorum
diversitate possit dici Deus magis vel minus scire aut velle; sicut
circa amorem dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q20_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q20_A4-p0.1">Q. 20. A. 4. Whether God always loves more the better things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not always love more the better things. For it is manifest that Christ is better than the whole human
                     race, being God and man. But God loved the human race more than He loved Christ; for it is said: "He spared not His own Son,
                     but delivered Him up for us all" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.32" target="asv">Rom. 8:32</a>). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29312] Iª q. 20 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non semper magis diligat meliora.
Manifestum est enim quod Christus est melior toto genere humano,
cum sit Deus et homo. Sed Deus magis dilexit genus humanum quam
Christum, quia dicitur Rom. VIII, <i>proprio filio suo non
pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum</i>. Ergo Deus non
semper magis diligit meliora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an angel is better than a man. Hence it is said of man: "Thou hast made him a little less than the angels" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.8.6" target="asv">Ps. 8:6</a>). But God loved men more than He loved the angels, for it is said: "Nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed
                     of Abraham He taketh hold" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.2.16" target="asv">Heb. 2:16</a>). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29313] Iª q. 20 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Angelus est melior homine, unde in Psalmo VIII dicitur de homine,
<i>minuisti eum paulo minus ab Angelis</i>. Sed Deus plus dilexit
hominem quam Angelum, dicitur enim Hebr. II, <i>nusquam Angelos
apprehendit, sed semen Abrahae apprehendit</i>. Ergo Deus non
semper magis diligit meliora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Peter was better than John, since he loved Christ more. Hence the Lord, knowing this to be true, asked Peter, saying:
                     "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me more than these?" Yet Christ loved John more than He loved Peter. For as Augustine says,
                     commenting on the words, "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me?": "By this very mark is John distinguished from the other disciples,
                     not that He loved him only, but that He loved him more than the rest." Therefore
                     God does not always love more the better things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29314] Iª q. 20 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
Petrus fuit melior Ioanne, quia plus Christum diligebat. Unde
dominus, sciens hoc esse verum, interrogavit Petrum, dicens,
<i>Simon Ioannis, diligis me plus his?</i> Sed tamen Christus plus
dilexit Ioannem quam Petrum, ut enim dicit Augustinus, super illud
Ioan. XXI, <i>Simon Ioannis diligis me? Hoc ipso signo Ioannes a
ceteris discipulis discernitur; non quod solum eum, sed quod plus
eum ceteris diligebat</i>. Non ergo semper magis diligit
meliora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the innocent man is better than the repentant, since repentance is, as Jerome says (Cap. 3 in Isa.), "a second plank
                     after shipwreck." But God loves the penitent more than the innocent; since He rejoices over him the more. For it is said:
                     "I say to you that there shall be joy in heaven upon the one sinner that doth penance, more than upon ninety-nine just who
                     need not penance" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.15.7" target="asv">Lk. 15:7</a>). Therefore God does not always love more
                     the better things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="29315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29315] Iª q. 20 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
melior est innocens poenitente; <i>cum poenitentia sit secunda
tabula post naufragium</i>, ut dicit Hieronymus. Sed Deus plus
diligit poenitentem quam innocentem, quia plus de eo gaudet,
dicitur enim Luc. XV, <i>dico vobis quod maius gaudium erit in
caelo super uno peccatore poenitentiam agente, quam super nonaginta
novem iustis, qui non indigent poenitentia</i>. Ergo Deus non
semper magis diligit meliora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the just man who is foreknown is better than the predestined sinner. Now God loves more the predestined sinner,
                     since He wills for him a greater good, life eternal. Therefore God does not always love more the better things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="29316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29316] Iª q. 20 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
melior est iustus praescitus, quam peccator praedestinatus. Sed
Deus plus diligit peccatorem praedestinatum, quia vult ei maius
bonum, scilicet vitam aeternam. Ergo Deus non semper magis diligit
meliora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p7">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Everything loves what is like it, as appears from (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.13.19" target="asv">Ecclus. 13:19</a>): "Every beast loveth its like." Now the better a thing is, the more like is it to God. Therefore the better things are more
                     loved by God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29317] Iª q. 20 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
unumquodque diligit sibi simile; ut patet per illud quod habetur
Eccli. XIII, <i>omne animal diligit sibi simile</i>. Sed intantum
aliquid est melius, inquantum est Deo similius. Ergo meliora magis
diliguntur a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It must needs be, according to what has been said before, that God loves more the better things . For it has been shown (
                     <a href="#FP_Q20_A2" id="FP_Q20_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3), that God's loving one thing more than another is nothing else than His willing for that thing a greater good: because
                     God's will is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some things are better than others, is that God wills for
                     them a greater good. Hence it follows that He loves more the
                     better things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 co."><a name="29318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29318] Iª q. 20 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod necesse est dicere, secundum praedicta, quod Deus magis
diligat meliora. Dictum est enim quod Deum diligere magis aliquid,
nihil aliud est quam ei maius bonum velle, voluntas enim Dei est
causa bonitatis in rebus. Et sic, ex hoc sunt aliqua meliora, quod
Deus eis maius bonum vult. Unde sequitur quod meliora plus
amet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God loves Christ not only more than He loves the whole human race, but more than He loves the entire created universe: because
                     He willed for Him the greater good in giving Him "a name that is above all names," in so far as He was true God. Nor did anything
                     of His excellence diminish when God delivered Him up to death for the salvation of the human race; rather did He become thereby
                     a glorious conqueror: "The government was placed upon His shoulder,"
                     according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.9.6" target="asv"> Is. 9:6.</a>
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29319] Iª q. 20 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Deus Christum diligit, non solum plus quam totum
humanum genus, sed etiam magis quam totam universitatem
creaturarum, quia scilicet ei maius bonum voluit, quia dedit ei
nomen, quod est super omne nomen, ut verus Deus esset. Nec eius
excellentiae deperiit ex hoc quod Deus dedit eum in mortem pro
salute humani generis, quinimo ex hoc factus est victor gloriosus;
<i>factus enim est principatus super humerum eius</i>, ut dicitur
Isaiae IX.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God loves the human nature assumed by the Word of God in the person of Christ more than He loves all the angels; for that
                     nature is better, especially on the ground of the union with the Godhead. But speaking of human nature in general, and comparing
                     it with the angelic, the two are found equal, in the order of grace and of glory: since according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.17" target="asv"> Rev 21:17, </a> the measure of a man and of an angel is the same. Yet so that, in this
                     respect, some angels are found nobler than some men, and some men nobler than some angels. But as to natural condition an
                     angel is better than a man. God therefore did not assume human nature because He loved man, absolutely speaking, more; but
                     because the needs of man were greater; just as the master of a house may give some costly delicacy to a sick servant, that
                     he does not give to his own son in sound health.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29320] Iª q. 20 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod naturam humanam assumptam a Dei verbo in persona
Christi, secundum praedicta, Deus plus amat quam omnes Angelos, et
melior est, maxime ratione unionis. Sed loquendo de humana natura
communiter, eam angelicae comparando, secundum ordinem ad gratiam
et gloriam, aequalitas invenitur; cum eadem sit mensura hominis et
Angeli, ut dicitur Apoc. XXI; ita tamen quod quidam Angeli
quibusdam hominibus, et quidam homines quibusdam Angelis, quantum
ad hoc, potiores inveniuntur. Sed quantum ad conditionem naturae,
Angelus est melior homine. Nec ideo naturam humanam assumpsit Deus,
quia hominem absolute plus diligeret, sed quia plus indigebat.
Sicut bonus paterfamilias aliquid pretiosius dat servo aegrotanti,
quod non dat filio sano.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q20_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This doubt concerning Peter and John has been solved in various ways. Augustine interprets it mystically, and says that the
                     active life, signified by Peter, loves God more than the contemplative signified by John, because the former is more conscious
                     of the miseries of this present life, and therefore the more ardently desires to be freed from them, and depart to God. God,
                     he says, loves more the contemplative life, since He preserves it longer. For
                     it does not end, as the active life does, with the life of the body.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q20_A4-p12"> Some say that Peter loved Christ more in His members, and therefore was loved more by Christ also, for which reason He gave
                     him the care of the Church; but that John loved Christ more in Himself, and so was loved more by Him; on which account Christ
                     commended His mother to his care. Others say that it is uncertain which of them loved Christ more with the love of charity,
                     and uncertain also which of them God loved more and ordained to a greater degree of glory in eternal life.
                     Peter is said to have loved more, in regard to a certain promptness and fervor; but John to have been more loved, with respect
                     to certain marks of familiarity which Christ showed to him rather than to others, on account of his youth and purity. While
                     others say that Christ loved Peter more, from his more excellent gift of charity; but John more, from his gifts of intellect.
                     Hence, absolutely speaking, Peter was the better and more beloved; but, in a certain sense, John was the better, and was
                     loved the more. However, it may seem presumptuous to pass judgment on these matters; since "the Lord" and no other "is the
                     weigher of spirits" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.2" target="asv">Prov. 16:2</a>).
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29321] Iª q. 20 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod haec dubitatio de Petro et Ioanne multipliciter
solvitur. Augustinus namque refert hoc ad mysterium, dicens quod
vita activa, quae significatur per Petrum, plus diligit Deum quam
vita contemplativa, quae significatur per Ioannem, quia magis
sentit praesentis vitae angustias, et aestuantius ab eis liberari
desiderat, et ad Deum ire. Contemplativam vero vitam Deus plus
diligit, quia magis eam conservat; non enim finitur simul cum vita
corporis, sicut vita activa. Quidam vero dicunt quod Petrus plus
dilexit Christum in membris; et sic etiam a Christo plus fuit
dilectus; unde ei Ecclesiam commendavit. Ioannes vero plus dilexit
Christum in seipso; et sic etiam plus ab eo fuit dilectus; unde ei
commendavit matrem. Alii vero dicunt quod incertum est quis horum
plus Christum dilexerit amore caritatis, et similiter quem Deus
plus dilexerit in ordine ad maiorem gloriam vitae aeternae. Sed
Petrus dicitur plus dilexisse, quantum ad quandam promptitudinem
vel fervorem, Ioannes vero plus dilectus, quantum ad quaedam
familiaritatis indicia, quae Christus ei magis demonstrabat,
propter eius iuventutem et puritatem. Alii vero dicunt quod
Christus plus dilexit Petrum, quantum ad excellentius donum
caritatis, Ioannem vero plus, quantum ad donum intellectus. Unde
simpliciter Petrus fuit melior, et magis dilectus, sed Ioannes
secundum quid. Praesumptuosum tamen videtur hoc diiudicare, quia,
ut dicitur Prov. XVI, <i>spirituum ponderator est dominus</i>, et
non alius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q20_A4-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The penitent and the innocent are related as exceeding and exceeded. For whether innocent or penitent, those are the better
                     and better loved who have most grace. Other things being equal, innocence is the nobler thing and the more beloved. God is
                     said to rejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent, because often penitents rise from sin more cautious, humble,
                     and fervent. Hence Gregory commenting on these words (Hom. 34 in Ev.) says that, "In
                     battle the general loves the soldier who after flight returns and bravely pursues the enemy, more than him who has never fled,
                     but has never done a brave deed."
                  </p><p id="FP_Q20_A4-p14"> Or it may be answered that gifts of grace, equal in themselves, are more as conferred on the penitent, who deserved punishment,
                     than as conferred on the innocent, to whom no punishment was due; just as a hundred pounds [marcoe] are a greater gift to
                     a poor man than to a king.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="29322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29322] Iª q. 20 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod poenitentes et innocentes se habent sicut excedentia
et excessa. Nam sive sint innocentes, sive poenitentes, illi sunt
meliores et magis dilecti, qui plus habent de gratia. Ceteris tamen
paribus, innocentia dignior est et magis dilecta. Dicitur tamen
Deus plus gaudere de poenitente quam de innocente, quia plerumque
poenitentes cautiores, humiliores et ferventiores resurgunt. Unde
Gregorius dicit ibidem, quod <i>dux in praelio eum militem plus
diligit, qui post fugam conversus, fortiter hostem premit, quam qui
nunquam fugit, nec unquam fortiter fecit</i>. Vel, alia ratione,
quia aequale donum gratiae plus est, comparatum poenitenti, qui
meruit poenam, quam innocenti, qui non meruit. Sicut centum marcae
maius donum est, si dentur pauperi, quam si dentur regi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since God's will is the cause of goodness in things, the goodness of one who is loved by God is to be reckoned according
                     to the time when some good is to be given to him by divine goodness. According therefore to the time, when there is to be
                     given by the divine will to the predestined sinner a greater good, the sinner is better; although according to some other
                     time he is the worse; because even according to some time he is neither good nor bad.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="29323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29323] Iª q. 20 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
dicendum quod, cum voluntas Dei sit causa bonitatis in rebus,
secundum illud tempus pensanda est bonitas eius qui amatur a Deo,
secundum quod dandum est ei ex bonitate divina aliquod bonum.
Secundum ergo illud tempus quo praedestinato peccatori dandum est
ex divina voluntate maius bonum, melior est; licet secundum aliquod
aliud tempus, sit peior; quia et secundum aliquod tempus, non est
nec bonus neque malus.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q21" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q21-p0.1">Q. 21. THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q21-p2"> After considering the divine love, we must treat of God's justice and mercy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q21-p3"><a href="#FP_Q21_A1"> (1) Whether there is justice in God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q21-p4"><a href="#FP_Q21_A2"> (2) Whether His justice can be called truth?</a></p><p id="FP_Q21-p5"><a href="#FP_Q21_A3"> (3) Whether there is mercy in God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q21-p6"><a href="#FP_Q21_A4"> (4) Whether in every work of God there are justice and mercy?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 pr."><a name="29324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29324]
Iª q. 21 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem divini amoris, de
iustitia et misericordia eius agendum est. Et circa hoc quaeruntur
quatuor. Primo, utrum in Deo sit iustitia. Secundo, utrum iustitia
eius veritas dici possit. Tertio, utrum in Deo sit misericordia.
Quarto, utrum in omni opere Dei sit iustitia et misericordia.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q21_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q21_A1-p0.1">Q. 21. A. 1. Whether there is justice in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is not justice in God. For justice is divided against temperance. But temperance does not exist in God:
                     neither therefore does justice.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29325] Iª q. 21 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sit iustitia. Iustitia enim
contra temperantiam dividitur. Temperantia autem non est in Deo.
Ergo nec iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who does whatsoever he wills and pleases does not work according to justice. But, as the Apostle says: "God worketh
                     all things according to the counsel of His will" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.11" target="asv">Eph. 1:11</a>). Therefore justice cannot be attributed to Him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29326] Iª q. 21 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
quicumque facit omnia pro libito suae voluntatis, non secundum
iustitiam operatur. Sed, sicut dicit apostolus, ad Ephes. I, Deus
<i>operatur omnia secundum consilium suae voluntatis</i>. Non ergo
ei iustitia debet attribui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the act of justice is to pay what is due. But God is no man's debtor. Therefore justice does not belong to God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29327] Iª q. 21 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, actus
iustitiae est reddere debitum. Sed Deus nulli est debitor. Ergo Deo
non competit iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whatever is in God, is His essence. But justice cannot belong to this. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "Good regards
                     the essence; justice the act." Therefore justice does not belong to God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="29328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29328] Iª q. 21 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
quidquid est in Deo, est eius essentia. Sed hoc non competit
iustitiae, dicit enim Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., quod <i>bonum
essentiam, iustum vero actum respicit</i>. Ergo iustitia non
competit Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.10.8" target="asv">Ps. 10:8</a>): "The Lord is just, and hath loved justice."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29329] Iª q. 21 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur in Psalmo X, <i>iustus dominus, et iustitias
dilexit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> There are two kinds of justice. The one consists in mutual giving and receiving, as in buying and selling, and other kinds
                     of intercourse and exchange. This the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) calls commutative justice, that directs exchange and intercourse
                     of business. This does not belong to God, since, as the Apostle says: "Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be
                     made him?" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.35" target="asv">Rom. 11:35</a>). The other consists in distribution, and
                     is called distributive justice; whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank deserves. As then the proper order
                     displayed in ruling a family or any kind of multitude evinces justice of this kind in the ruler, so the order of the universe,
                     which is seen both in effects of nature and in effects of will, shows forth the justice of God. Hence Dionysius says (Div.
                     Nom. viii, 4): "We must needs see that God is truly just, in seeing how He gives to all existing things what is proper to
                     the
                     condition of each; and preserves the nature of each in the order and with the powers that properly belong to it."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 co."><a name="29330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29330] Iª q. 21 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod duplex est species iustitiae. Una, quae consistit in mutua
datione et acceptione, ut puta quae consistit in emptione et
venditione, et aliis huiusmodi communicationibus vel
commutationibus. Et haec dicitur a philosopho, in V Ethic.,
iustitia commutativa, vel directiva commutationum sive
communicationum. Et haec non competit Deo, quia, ut dicit
apostolus, Rom. XI, <i>quis prior dedit illi, et retribuetur
ei?</i> Alia, quae consistit in distribuendo, et dicitur
distributiva iustitia, secundum quam aliquis gubernator vel
dispensator dat unicuique secundum suam dignitatem. Sicut igitur
ordo congruus familiae, vel cuiuscumque multitudinis gubernatae,
demonstrat huiusmodi iustitiam in gubernante; ita ordo universi,
qui apparet tam in rebus naturalibus quam in rebus voluntariis,
demonstrat Dei iustitiam. Unde dicit Dionysius, VIII cap. de Div.
Nom., <i>oportet videre in hoc veram Dei esse iustitiam, quod
omnibus tribuit propria, secundum uniuscuiusque existentium
dignitatem; et uniuscuiusque naturam in proprio salvat ordine et
virtute</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Certain of the moral virtues are concerned with the passions, as temperance with concupiscence, fortitude with fear and daring,
                     meekness with anger. Such virtues as these can only metaphorically be attributed to God; since, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q20_A1" id="FP_Q21_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[20], A[1]</a> ), in God there are no passions; nor a sensitive appetite, which is, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), the subject
                     of those virtues. On the other hand, certain moral
                     virtues are concerned with works of giving and expending; such as justice, liberality, and magnificence; and these reside
                     not in the sensitive faculty, but in the will. Hence, there is nothing to prevent our attributing these virtues to God; although
                     not in civil matters, but in such acts as are not unbecoming to Him. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8), it would
                     be absurd to praise God for His political virtues.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29331] Iª q. 21 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod virtutum moralium quaedam sunt circa passiones; sicut
temperantia circa concupiscentias, fortitudo circa timores et
audacias, mansuetudo circa iram. Et huiusmodi virtutes Deo attribui
non possunt, nisi secundum metaphoram, quia in Deo neque passiones
sunt, ut supra dictum est; neque appetitus sensitivus, in quo sunt
huiusmodi virtutes sicut in subiecto, ut dicit philosophus in III
Ethic. Quaedam vero virtutes morales sunt circa operationes; ut
puta circa dationes et sumptus, ut iustitia et liberalitas et
magnificentia; quae etiam non sunt in parte sensitiva, sed in
voluntate. Unde nihil prohibet huiusmodi virtutes in Deo ponere,
non tamen circa actiones civiles sed circa actiones Deo
convenientes. Ridiculum est enim secundum virtutes politicas Deum
laudare, ut dicit philosophus in X Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since good as perceived by intellect is the object of the will, it is impossible for God to will anything but what His wisdom
                     approves. This is, as it were, His law of justice, in accordance with which His will is right and just. Hence, what He does
                     according to His will He does justly: as we do justly what we do according to law. But whereas law comes to us from some higher
                     power, God is a law unto Himself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29332] Iª q. 21 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, cum bonum intellectum sit obiectum voluntatis,
impossibile est Deum velle nisi quod ratio suae sapientiae habet.
Quae quidem est sicut lex iustitiae, secundum quam eius voluntas
recta et iusta est. Unde quod secundum suam voluntatem facit, iuste
facit, sicut et nos quod secundum legem facimus, iuste facimus. Sed
nos quidem secundum legem alicuius superioris, Deus autem sibi ipsi
est lex.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To each one is due what is his own. Now that which is directed to a man is said to be his own. Thus the master owns the servant,
                     and not conversely, for that is free which is its own cause. In the word debt, therefore, is implied a certain exigence or
                     necessity of the thing to which it is directed. Now a twofold order has to be considered in things: the one, whereby one created
                     thing is directed to another, as the parts of the whole, accident to
                     substance, and all things whatsoever to their end; the other, whereby all created things are ordered to God. Thus in the divine
                     operations debt may be regarded in two ways, as due either to God, or to creatures, and in either way God pays what is due.
                     It is due to God that there should be fulfilled in creatures what His will and wisdom require, and what manifests His goodness.
                     In this respect, God's justice regards what befits Him; inasmuch as He renders to Himself what is due to Himself. It is
                     also due to a created thing that it should possess what is ordered to it; thus it is due to man to have hands, and that other
                     animals should serve him. Thus also God exercises justice, when He gives to each thing what is due to it by its nature and
                     condition. This debt however is derived from the former; since what is due to each thing is due to it as ordered to it according
                     to the divine wisdom. And although God in this way pays each thing its due, yet He Himself is not the debtor, since He is
                     not directed to other things, but rather other things to Him. Justice, therefore, in God is sometimes spoken of as the fitting
                     accompaniment of His goodness; sometimes as the reward of merit. Anselm touches on either view where he says (Prosolog. 10):
                     "When Thou dost punish the wicked, it is just, since it agrees with their deserts; and when Thou dost spare the wicked, it
                     is also just; since it befits Thy goodness."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29333] Iª q. 21 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod unicuique debetur quod suum est. Dicitur autem esse
suum alicuius, quod ad ipsum ordinatur; sicut servus est domini, et
non e converso; nam liberum est quod sui causa est. In nomine ergo
debiti, importatur quidam ordo exigentiae vel necessitatis alicuius
ad quod ordinatur. Est autem duplex ordo considerandus in rebus.
Unus, quo aliquid creatum ordinatur ad aliud creatum, sicut partes
ordinantur ad totum, et accidentia ad substantias, et unaquaeque
res ad suum finem. Alius ordo, quo omnia creata ordinantur in Deum.
Sic igitur et debitum attendi potest dupliciter in operatione
divina, aut secundum quod aliquid debetur Deo; aut secundum quod
aliquid debetur rei creatae. Et utroque modo Deus debitum reddit.
Debitum enim est Deo, ut impleatur in rebus id quod eius sapientia
et voluntas habet, et quod suam bonitatem manifestat, et secundum
hoc iustitia Dei respicit decentiam ipsius, secundum quam reddit
sibi quod sibi debetur. Debitum etiam est alicui rei creatae, quod
habeat id quod ad ipsam ordinatur, sicut homini, quod habeat manus,
et quod ei alia animalia serviant. Et sic etiam Deus operatur
iustitiam, quando dat unicuique quod ei debetur secundum rationem
suae naturae et conditionis. Sed hoc debitum dependet ex primo,
quia hoc unicuique debetur, quod est ordinatum ad ipsum secundum
ordinem divinae sapientiae. Et licet Deus hoc modo debitum alicui
det, non tamen ipse est debitor, quia ipse ad alia non ordinatur,
sed potius alia in ipsum. Et ideo iustitia quandoque dicitur in Deo
condecentia suae bonitatis; quandoque vero retributio pro meritis.
Et utrumque modum tangit Anselmus, dicens, <i>cum punis malos,
iustum est, quia illorum meritis convenit; cum vero parcis malis,
iustum est, quia bonitati tuae condecens est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although justice regards act, this does not prevent its being the essence of God; since even that which is of the essence
                     of a thing may be the principle of action. But good does not always regard act; since a thing is called good not merely with
                     respect to act, but also as regards perfection in its essence. For this reason it is said (De Hebdom.) that the good is related
                     to the just, as the general to the special.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="29334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29334] Iª q. 21 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod, licet iustitia respiciat actum, non tamen per hoc
excluditur quin sit essentia Dei, quia etiam id quod est de
essentia rei, potest esse principium actionis. Sed bonum non semper
respicit actum, quia aliquid dicitur esse bonum, non solum secundum
quod agit, sed etiam secundum quod in sua essentia perfectum est.
Et propter hoc ibidem dicitur quod bonum comparatur ad iustum,
sicut generale ad speciale.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q21_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q21_A2-p0.1">Q. 21. A. 2. Whether the justice of God is truth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the justice of God is not truth. For justice resides in the will; since, as Anselm says (Dial. Verit. 13),
                     it is a rectitude of the will, whereas truth resides in the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi; Ethic. vi, 2,6).
                     Therefore justice does not appertain to truth.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29335] Iª q. 21 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod iustitia Dei non sit veritas. Iustitia
enim est in voluntate, est enim rectitudo voluntatis, ut dicit
Anselmus. Veritas autem est in intellectu, secundum philosophum in
VI Metaphys. et in VI Ethic. Ergo iustitia non pertinet ad
veritatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), truth is a virtue distinct from justice. Truth therefore does not appertain
                     to the idea of justice.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29336] Iª q. 21 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
veritas, secundum philosophum in IV Ethic., est quaedam alia virtus
a iustitia. Non ergo veritas pertinet ad rationem iustitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A2-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> it is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.84.11" target="asv">Ps. 84:11</a>): "Mercy and truth have met each other": where truth stands for justice.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29337] Iª q. 21 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod in Psalmo LXXXIV dicitur, <i>misericordia et veritas
obviaverunt sibi</i>; et ponitur ibi veritas pro iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q21_A2-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Truth consists in the equation of mind and thing, as said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q16_A1" id="FP_Q21_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[16], A[1]</a>). Now the mind, that is the cause of the thing, is related to it as its rule and measure; whereas the converse is the case
                     with the mind that receives its knowledge from things. When therefore things are the measure and rule of the mind, truth consists
                     in the equation of the mind to the thing, as happens in ourselves. For according as a thing is, or is not,
                     our thoughts or our words about it are true or false. But when the mind is the rule or measure of things, truth consists in
                     the equation of the thing to the mind; just as the work of an artist is said to be true, when it is in accordance with his
                     art.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q21_A2-p6"> Now as works of art are related to art, so are works of justice related to the law with which they accord. Therefore God's
                     justice, which establishes things in the order conformable to the rule of His wisdom, which is the law of His justice, is
                     suitably called truth. Thus we also in human affairs speak of the truth of justice.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 2 co."><a name="29338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29338] Iª q. 21 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod veritas consistit in adaequatione intellectus et rei, sicut
supra dictum est. Intellectus autem qui est causa rei, comparatur
ad ipsam sicut regula et mensura, e converso autem est de
intellectu qui accipit scientiam a rebus. Quando igitur res sunt
mensura et regula intellectus, veritas consistit in hoc, quod
intellectus adaequatur rei, ut in nobis accidit, ex eo enim quod
res est vel non est, opinio nostra et oratio vera vel falsa est.
Sed quando intellectus est regula vel mensura rerum, veritas
consistit in hoc, quod res adaequantur intellectui, sicut dicitur
artifex facere verum opus, quando concordat arti. Sicut autem se
habent artificiata ad artem, ita se habent opera iusta ad legem cui
concordant. Iustitia igitur Dei, quae constituit ordinem in rebus
conformem rationi sapientiae suae, quae est lex eius, convenienter
veritas nominatur. Et sic etiam dicitur in nobis veritas
iustitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Justice, as to the law that governs, resides in the reason or intellect; but as to the command whereby our actions are governed
                     according to the law, it resides in the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29339] Iª q. 21 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod iustitia, quantum ad legem regulantem, est in ratione
vel intellectu, sed quantum ad imperium, quo opera regulantur
secundum legem, est in voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The truth of which the Philosopher is speaking in this passage, is that virtue whereby a man shows himself in word and deed
                     such as he really is. Thus it consists in the conformity of the sign with the thing signified; and not in that of the effect
                     with its cause and rule: as has been said regarding the truth of justice.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29340] Iª q. 21 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod veritas illa de qua loquitur philosophus ibi, est
quaedam virtus per quam aliquis demonstrat se talem in dictis vel
factis, qualis est. Et sic consistit in conformitate signi ad
significatum, non autem in conformitate effectus ad causam et
regulam, sicut de veritate iustitiae dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q21_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q21_A3-p0.1">Q. 21. A. 3. Whether mercy can be attributed to God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that mercy cannot be attributed to God. For mercy is a kind of sorrow, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14).
                     But there is no sorrow in God; and therefore there is no mercy in Him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29341] Iª q. 21 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod misericordia Deo non competat.
Misericordia enim est species tristitiae, ut dicit Damascenus. Sed
tristitia non est in Deo. Ergo nec misericordia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mercy is a relaxation of justice. But God cannot remit what appertains to His justice. For it is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.13" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:13</a>): "If we believe not, He continueth faithful: He cannot deny Himself." But He would deny Himself, as a gloss says, if He
                     should deny His words. Therefore mercy is not becoming to God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29342] Iª q. 21 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
misericordia est relaxatio iustitiae. Sed Deus non potest
praetermittere id quod ad iustitiam suam pertinet. Dicitur enim II
ad Tim. II, <i>si non credimus, ille fidelis permanet, seipsum
negare non potest</i>, negaret autem seipsum, ut dicit Glossa
ibidem, si dicta sua negaret. Ergo misericordia Deo non
competit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A3-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> it is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.110.4" target="asv">Ps. 110:4</a>): "He is a merciful and gracious Lord."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29343] Iª q. 21 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur in Psalmo CX, <i>miserator et misericors
dominus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A3-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Mercy is especially to be attributed to God, as seen in its effect, but not as an affection of passion. In proof of which
                     it must be considered that a person is said to be merciful [misericors], as being, so to speak, sorrowful at heart [miserum
                     cor]; being affected with sorrow at the misery of another as though it were his own. Hence it follows that he endeavors to
                     dispel the misery of this other, as if it were his; and this is the effect of mercy. To
                     sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others belongs not to God; but it does most properly belong to Him to dispel that misery,
                     whatever be the defect we call by that name. Now defects are not removed, except by the perfection of some kind of goodness;
                     and the primary source of goodness is God, as shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q6_A4" id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[6] , A[4]</a>). It must, however, be considered that to bestow perfections appertains not only to the divine goodness, but also to His
                     justice, liberality, and
                     mercy; yet under different aspects. The communicating of perfections, absolutely considered, appertains to goodness, as shown
                     above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q6_A1" id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.2" shape="rect">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,4); in so far as perfections are given to things in proportion, the bestowal of them belongs to justice, as has been already
                     said
                     <a href="#FP_Q21_A1" id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.3" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>; in so far as God does not bestow them for His own use, but only on account of His goodness, it belongs to liberality; in
                     so far as perfections given to things by God
                     expel defects, it belongs to mercy.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 3 co."><a name="29344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29344] Iª q. 21 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod misericordia est Deo maxime attribuenda, tamen secundum
effectum, non secundum passionis affectum. Ad cuius evidentiam,
considerandum est quod misericors dicitur aliquis quasi habens
miserum cor, quia scilicet afficitur ex miseria alterius per
tristitiam, ac si esset eius propria miseria. Et ex hoc sequitur
quod operetur ad depellendam miseriam alterius, sicut miseriam
propriam, et hic est misericordiae effectus. Tristari ergo de
miseria alterius non competit Deo, sed repellere miseriam alterius,
hoc maxime ei competit, ut per miseriam quemcumque defectum
intelligamus. Defectus autem non tolluntur, nisi per alicuius
bonitatis perfectionem, prima autem origo bonitatis Deus est, ut
supra ostensum est. Sed considerandum est quod elargiri
perfectiones rebus, pertinet quidem et ad bonitatem divinam, et ad
iustitiam, et ad liberalitatem, et misericordiam, tamen secundum
aliam et aliam rationem. Communicatio enim perfectionum, absolute
considerata, pertinet ad bonitatem, ut supra ostensum est. Sed
inquantum perfectiones rebus a Deo dantur secundum earum
proportionem, pertinet ad iustitiam, ut dictum est supra. Inquantum
vero non attribuit rebus perfectiones propter utilitatem suam, sed
solum propter suam bonitatem, pertinet ad liberalitatem. Inquantum
vero perfectiones datae rebus a Deo, omnem defectum expellunt,
pertinet ad misericordiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A3-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is based on mercy, regarded as an affection of passion.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29345] Iª q. 21 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum igitur
dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de misericordia, quantum ad
passionis affectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God acts mercifully, not indeed by going against His justice, but by doing something more than justice; thus a man who pays
                     another two hundred pieces of money, though owing him only one hundred, does nothing against justice, but acts liberally or
                     mercifully. The case is the same with one who pardons an offence committed against him, for in remitting it he may be said
                     to bestow a gift. Hence the Apostle calls remission a forgiving: "Forgive one
                     another, as Christ has forgiven you" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.32" target="asv">Eph. 4:32</a>). Hence it is clear that mercy does not destroy justice, but in a sense is the fulness thereof. And thus it is said: "Mercy
                     exalteth itself above judgement" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.13" target="asv">James 2:13</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29346] Iª q. 21 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod Deus misericorditer agit, non quidem contra iustitiam
suam faciendo, sed aliquid supra iustitiam operando, sicut si
alicui cui debentur centum denarii, aliquis ducentos det de suo,
tamen non contra iustitiam facit, sed liberaliter vel
misericorditer operatur. Et similiter si aliquis offensam in se
commissam remittat. Qui enim aliquid remittit, quodammodo donat
illud, unde apostolus remissionem donationem vocat, Ephes. V,
<i>donate invicem, sicut et Christus vobis donavit</i>. Ex quo
patet quod misericordia non tollit iustitiam, sed est quaedam
iustitiae plenitudo. Unde dicitur Iac. II, quod <i>misericordia
superexaltat iudicium</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q21_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q21_A4-p0.1">Q. 21. A. 4. Whether in every work of God there are mercy and justice?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not in every work of God are mercy and justice. For some works of God are attributed to mercy, as the justification
                     of the ungodly; and others to justice, as the damnation of the wicked. Hence it is said: "Judgment without mercy to him that
                     hath not done mercy" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.13" target="asv">James 2:13</a>). Therefore not in every work of God do mercy and justice appear.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29347] Iª q. 21 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod non in omnibus Dei operibus sit
misericordia et iustitia. Quaedam enim opera Dei attribuuntur
misericordiae, ut iustificatio impii, quaedam vero iustitiae, ut
damnatio impiorum. Unde dicitur Iac. II, <i>iudicium sine
misericordia fiet ei qui non fecerit misericordiam</i>. Non ergo in
omni opere Dei apparet misericordia et iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle attributes the conversion of the Jews to justice and truth, but that of the Gentiles to mercy (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.15" target="asv">Rom. 15</a>). Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29348] Iª q. 21 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
apostolus, ad Rom. XV, conversionem Iudaeorum attribuit iustitiae
et veritati; conversionem autem gentium, misericordiae. Ergo non in
quolibet opere Dei est iustitia et misericordia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, many just persons are afflicted in this world; which is unjust. Therefore not in every work of God are justice and
                     mercy.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29349] Iª q. 21 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, multi
iusti in hoc mundo affliguntur. Hoc autem est iniustum. Non ergo in
omni opere Dei est iustitia et misericordia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is the part of justice to pay what is due, but of mercy to relieve misery. Thus both justice and mercy presuppose
                     something in their works: whereas creation presupposes nothing. Therefore in creation neither mercy nor justice is found.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="29350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29350] Iª q. 21 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
iustitiae est reddere debitum, misericordiae autem sublevare
miseriam, et sic tam iustitia quam misericordia aliquid
praesupponit in suo opere. Sed creatio nihil praesupponit. Ergo in
creatione neque misericordia est, neque iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A4-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.24.10" target="asv">Ps. 24:10</a>): "All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29351] Iª q. 21 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur in Psalmo XXIV, <i>omnes viae domini misericordia et
veritas</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A4-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Mercy and truth are necessarily found in all God's works, if mercy be taken to mean the removal of any kind of defect. Not
                     every defect, however, can properly be called a misery; but only defect in a rational nature whose lot is to be happy; for
                     misery is opposed to happiness. For this necessity there is a reason, because since a debt paid according to the divine justice
                     is one due either to God, or to some creature, neither the one nor the other can be
                     lacking in any work of God: because God can do nothing that is not in accord with His wisdom and goodness; and it is in this
                     sense, as we have said, that anything is due to God. Likewise, whatever is done by Him in created things, is done according
                     to proper order and proportion wherein consists the idea of justice. Thus justice must exist in all God's works. Now the work
                     of divine justice always presupposes the work of mercy; and is founded thereupon. For nothing is due to creatures, except
                     for something pre-existing in them, or foreknown. Again, if this is due to a creature, it must be due on account of something
                     that precedes. And since we cannot go on to infinity, we must come to something that depends only on the goodness of the divine
                     will---which is the ultimate end. We may say, for instance, that to possess hands is due to man on account of his rational
                     soul; and his rational soul is due to him that he may be man; and his being man is on account of the divine goodness. So
                     in every work of God, viewed at its primary source, there appears mercy. In all that follows, the power of mercy remains,
                     and works indeed with even greater force; as the influence of the first cause is more intense than that of second causes.
                     For this reason does God out of abundance of His goodness bestow upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully than
                     is proportionate to their deserts: since less would suffice for preserving the order of justice than what the divine goodness
                     confers; because between creatures and God's goodness there can be no proportion.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 co."><a name="29352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29352] Iª q. 21 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod necesse est quod in quolibet opere Dei misericordia et veritas
inveniantur; si tamen misericordia pro remotione cuiuscumque
defectus accipiatur; quamvis non omnis defectus proprie possit dici
miseria, sed solum defectus rationalis naturae, quam contingit esse
felicem; nam miseria felicitati opponitur. Huius autem necessitatis
ratio est, quia, cum debitum quod ex divina iustitia redditur, sit
vel debitum Deo, vel debitum alicui creaturae, neutrum potest in
aliquo opere Dei praetermitti. Non enim potest facere aliquid Deus,
quod non sit conveniens sapientiae et bonitati ipsius; secundum
quem modum diximus aliquid esse debitum Deo. Similiter etiam
quidquid in rebus creatis facit, secundum convenientem ordinem et
proportionem facit; in quo consistit ratio iustitiae. Et sic
oportet in omni opere Dei esse iustitiam. Opus autem divinae
iustitiae semper praesupponit opus misericordiae, et in eo
fundatur. Creaturae enim non debetur aliquid, nisi propter aliquid
in eo praeexistens, vel praeconsideratum, et rursus, si illud
creaturae debetur, hoc erit propter aliquid prius. Et cum non sit
procedere in infinitum, oportet devenire ad aliquid quod ex sola
bonitate divinae voluntatis dependeat, quae est ultimus finis.
Utpote si dicamus quod habere manus debitum est homini propter
animam rationalem; animam vero rationalem habere, ad hoc quod sit
homo; hominem vero esse, propter divinam bonitatem. Et sic in
quolibet opere Dei apparet misericordia, quantum ad primam radicem
eius. Cuius virtus salvatur in omnibus consequentibus; et etiam
vehementius in eis operatur, sicut causa primaria vehementius
influit quam causa secunda. Et propter hoc etiam ea quae alicui
creaturae debentur, Deus, ex abundantia suae bonitatis, largius
dispensat quam exigat proportio rei. Minus enim est quod sufficeret
ad conservandum ordinem iustitiae, quam quod divina bonitas
confert, quae omnem proportionem creaturae excedit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q21_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Certain works are attributed to justice, and certain others to mercy, because in some justice appears more forcibly and in
                     others mercy. Even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen, which, though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat
                     alleviates, in punishing short of what is deserved.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q21_A4-p9"> In the justification of the ungodly, justice is seen, when God remits sins on account of love, though He Himself has mercifully
                     infused that love. So we read of Magdalen: "Many sins are forgiven her, because she hath loved much" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.7.47" target="asv">Lk. 7:47</a>).
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29353] Iª q. 21 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod quaedam opera attribuuntur iustitiae et quaedam
misericordiae, quia in quibusdam vehementius apparet iustitia, in
quibusdam misericordia. Et tamen in damnatione reproborum apparet
misericordia, non quidem totaliter relaxans, sed aliqualiter
allevians, dum punit citra condignum. Et in iustificatione impii
apparet iustitia, dum culpas relaxat propter dilectionem, quam
tamen ipse misericorditer infundit, sicut de Magdalena legitur,
Luc. VII, <i>dimissa sunt ei peccata multa, quoniam dilexit
multum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's justice and mercy appear both in the conversion of the Jews and of the Gentiles. But an aspect of justice appears in
                     the conversion of the Jews which is not seen in the conversion of the Gentiles; inasmuch as the Jews were saved on account
                     of the promises made to the fathers.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29354] Iª q. 21 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod iustitia et misericordia Dei apparet in conversione
Iudaeorum et gentium, sed aliqua ratio iustitiae apparet in
conversione Iudaeorum, quae non apparet in conversione gentium,
sicut quod salvati sunt propter promissiones patribus factas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Justice and mercy appear in the punishment of the just in this world, since by afflictions lesser faults are cleansed in
                     them, and they are the more raised up from earthly affections to God. As to this Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 9): "The evils
                     that press on us in this world force us to go to God."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29355] Iª q. 21 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod in hoc etiam quod iusti puniuntur in hoc mundo,
apparet iustitia et misericordia; inquantum per huiusmodi
afflictiones aliqua levia in eis purgantur, et ab affectu
terrenorum in Deum magis eriguntur; secundum illud Gregorii,
<i>mala quae in hoc mundo nos premunt, ad Deum nos ire
compellunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A4-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although creation presupposes nothing in the universe; yet it does presuppose something in the knowledge of God. In this
                     way too the idea of justice is preserved in creation; by the production of beings in a manner that accords with the divine
                     wisdom and goodness. And the idea of mercy, also, is preserved in the change of creatures from non-existence to existence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="29356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29356] Iª q. 21 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod, licet creationi non praesupponatur aliquid in rerum
natura, praesupponitur tamen aliquid in Dei cognitione. Et secundum
hoc etiam salvatur ibi ratio iustitiae, inquantum res in esse
producitur, secundum quod convenit divinae sapientiae et bonitati.
Et salvatur quodammodo ratio misericordiae, inquantum res de non
esse in esse mutatur.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q22" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q22-p0.1">Q. 22. THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q22-p2"> Having considered all that relates to the will absolutely, we must now proceed to those things which have relation to both
                  the intellect and the will, namely providence, in respect to all created things; predestination and reprobation and all that
                  is connected with these acts in respect especially of man as regards his eternal salvation. For in the science of morals,
                  after the moral virtues themselves, comes the consideration of prudence, to which providence would seem to belong.
                  Concerning God's providence there are four points of inquiry:
               </p><p id="FP_Q22-p3"><a href="#FP_Q22_A1"> (1) Whether providence is suitably assigned to God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q22-p4"><a href="#FP_Q22_A2"> (2) Whether everything comes under divine providence?</a></p><p id="FP_Q22-p5"><a href="#FP_Q22_A3"> (3) Whether divine providence is immediately concerned with all things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q22-p6"><a href="#FP_Q22_A4"> (4) Whether divine providence imposes any necessity upon things foreseen?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 pr."><a name="29357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29357]
Iª q. 22 pr.</span></a> Consideratis autem his quae ad
voluntatem absolute pertinent, procedendum est ad ea quae
respiciunt simul intellectum et voluntatem. Huiusmodi autem est
providentia quidem respectu omnium; praedestinatio vero et
reprobatio, et quae ad haec consequuntur, respectu hominum
specialiter, in ordine ad aeternam salutem. Nam et post morales
virtutes, in scientia morali, consideratur de prudentia, ad quam
providentia pertinere videtur. Circa providentiam autem Dei
quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum Deo conveniat providentia.
Secundo, utrum omnia divinae providentiae subsint. Tertio, utrum
divina providentia immediate sit de omnibus. Quarto, utrum
providentia divina imponat necessitatem rebus provisis.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q22_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q22_A1-p0.1">Q. 22. A. 1. Whether providence can suitably be attributed to God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that providence is not becoming to God. For providence, according to Tully (De Invent. ii), is a part of prudence.
                     But prudence, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5,9,18), it gives good counsel, cannot belong to God, Who never
                     has any doubt for which He should take counsel. Therefore providence cannot belong to God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29358] Iª q. 22 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod providentia Deo non conveniat. Providentia
enim, secundum Tullium, est pars prudentiae. Prudentia autem, cum
sit bene consiliativa, secundum philosophum in VI Ethic., Deo
competere non potest, qui nullum dubium habet, unde eum consiliari
oporteat. Ergo providentia Deo non competit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in God, is eternal. But providence is not anything eternal, for it is concerned with existing things
                     that are not eternal, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29). Therefore there is no providence in God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29359] Iª q. 22 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
quidquid est in Deo, est aeternum. Sed providentia non est aliquid
aeternum, est enim circa existentia, quae non sunt aeterna,
secundum Damascenum. Ergo providentia non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there is nothing composite in God. But providence seems to be something composite, because it includes both the
                     intellect and the will. Therefore providence is not in God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29360] Iª q. 22 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
nullum compositum est in Deo. Sed providentia videtur esse aliquid
compositum, quia includit in se voluntatem et intellectum. Ergo
providentia non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.3" target="asv">Wis. 14:3</a>): "But Thou, Father, governest all things by providence [*Vulg. But 'Thy providence, O Father, governeth it.']."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29361] Iª q. 22 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Sap. XIV, <i>tu autem, pater, gubernas omnia
providentia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to attribute providence to God. For all the good that is in created things has been created by God, as was
                     shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q6_A4" id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[6], A[4]</a>). In created things good is found not only as regards their substance, but also as regards their order towards an end and
                     especially their last end, which, as was said above, is the divine goodness (
                     <a href="#FP_Q21_A4" id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[21], A[4]</a>). This good of order existing in things created, is
                     itself created by God. Since, however, God is the cause of things by His intellect, and thus it behooves that the type of
                     every effect should pre-exist in Him, as is clear from what has gone before (
                     <a href="#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>), it is necessary that the type of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and the type
                     of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking, providence. For it is the chief part of prudence, to which two other
                     parts are
                     directed---namely, remembrance of the past, and understanding of the present; inasmuch as from the remembrance of what is
                     past and the understanding of what is present, we gather how to provide for the future. Now it belongs to prudence, according
                     to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), to direct other things towards an end whether in regard to oneself---as for instance,
                     a man is said to be prudent, who orders well his acts towards the end of life--or in regard to others subject to him, in a
                     family, city or kingdom; in which sense it is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.45" target="asv">Mat. 24:45</a>), "a faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family." In this way prudence or providence may suitably
                     be attributed to God. For in God Himself there can be nothing ordered towards an end, since He is the last end. This type
                     of order in things towards an end is therefore in God called providence. Whence Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6) that "Providence
                     is the divine type itself, seated in
                     the Supreme Ruler; which disposeth all things": which disposition may refer either to the type of the order of things towards
                     an end, or to the type of the order of parts in the whole.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 co."><a name="29362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29362] Iª q. 22 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod necesse est ponere providentiam in Deo. Omne enim bonum quod
est in rebus, a Deo creatum est, ut supra ostensum est. In rebus
autem invenitur bonum, non solum quantum ad substantiam rerum, sed
etiam quantum ad ordinem earum in finem, et praecipue in finem
ultimum, qui est bonitas divina, ut supra habitum est. Hoc igitur
bonum ordinis in rebus creatis existens, a Deo creatum est. Cum
autem Deus sit causa rerum per suum intellectum, et sic cuiuslibet
sui effectus oportet rationem in ipso praeexistere, ut ex
superioribus patet; necesse est quod ratio ordinis rerum in finem
in mente divina praeexistat. Ratio autem ordinandorum in finem,
proprie providentia est. Est enim principalis pars prudentiae, ad
quam aliae duae partes ordinantur, scilicet memoria praeteritorum,
et intelligentia praesentium; prout ex praeteritis memoratis, et
praesentibus intellectis, coniectamus de futuris providendis.
Prudentiae autem proprium est, secundum philosophum in VI Ethic.,
ordinare alia in finem; sive respectu sui ipsius, sicut dicitur
homo prudens, qui bene ordinat actus suos ad finem vitae suae; sive
respectu aliorum sibi subiectorum in familia vel civitate vel
regno, secundum quem modum dicitur Matt. XXIV, <i>fidelis servus et
prudens, quem constituit dominus super familiam suam</i>. Secundum
quem modum prudentia vel providentia Deo convenire potest, nam in
ipso Deo nihil est in finem ordinabile, cum ipse sit finis ultimus.
Ipsa igitur ratio ordinis rerum in finem, providentia in Deo
nominatur. Unde Boetius, IV de Consol., dicit quod <i>providentia
est ipsa divina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta, quae
cuncta disponit</i>. Dispositio autem potest dici tam ratio ordinis
rerum in finem, quam ratio ordinis partium in toto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9,10), "Prudence is what, strictly speaking, commands all that 'ebulia' has rightly
                     counselled and 'synesis' rightly judged" [*Cf.
                     <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q57_A6" id="FP_Q22_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">FS, Q[57], A[6]</a>]. Whence, though to take counsel may not be fitting to God, from the fact that counsel is an inquiry into matters that are
                     doubtful, nevertheless to give a command as to the ordering of things towards an end, the right reason of which He
                     possesses, does belong to God, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.148.6" target="asv"> Ps. 148:6</a>: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away." In this manner both prudence and providence belong to God. Although
                     at the same time it may be said that the very reason of things to be done is called counsel in God; not because of any inquiry
                     necessitated, but from the certitude of the knowledge, to which those who take counsel come by inquiry. Whence it is said:
                     "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of
                     His will" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A1-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.11" target="asv">Eph. 1:11</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29363] Iª q. 22 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, secundum philosophum in VI Ethic., prudentia proprie
est praeceptiva eorum, de quibus eubulia recte consiliatur, et
synesis recte iudicat. Unde, licet consiliari non competat Deo,
secundum quod consilium est inquisitio de rebus dubiis; tamen
praecipere de ordinandis in finem, quorum rectam rationem habet,
competit Deo, secundum illud Psalmi, <i>praeceptum posuit, et non
praeteribit</i>. Et secundum hoc competit Deo ratio prudentiae et
providentiae. Quamvis etiam dici possit, quod ipsa ratio rerum
agendarum consilium in Deo dicitur; non propter inquisitionem, sed
propter certitudinem cognitionis, ad quam consiliantes inquirendo
perveniunt. Unde dicitur Ephes. I, <i>qui operatur omnia secundum
consilium voluntatis suae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Two things pertain to the care of providence---namely, the "reason of order," which is called providence and disposition;
                     and the execution of order, which is termed government. Of these, the first is eternal, and the second is temporal.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29364] Iª q. 22 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ad curam duo pertinent, scilicet ratio ordinis, quae
dicitur providentia et dispositio; et executio ordinis, quae
dicitur gubernatio. Quorum primum est aeternum, secundum
temporale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Providence resides in the intellect; but presupposes the act of willing the end. Nobody gives a precept about things done
                     for an end; unless he will that end. Hence prudence presupposes the moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty
                     is directed towards good, as the Philosopher says. Even if Providence has to do with the divine will and intellect equally,
                     this would not affect the divine simplicity, since in God both the will and intellect
                     are one and the same thing, as we have said above
                     <a href="#FP_Q19" id="FP_Q22_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">(Q[19])</a>.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29365] Iª q. 22 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod providentia est in intellectu, sed praesupponit
voluntatem finis, nullus enim praecipit de agendis propter finem,
nisi velit finem. Unde et prudentia praesupponit virtutes morales,
per quas appetitus se habet ad bonum, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Et
tamen si providentia ex aequali respiceret voluntatem et
intellectum divinum, hoc esset absque detrimento divinae
simplicitatis; cum voluntas et intellectus in Deo sint idem, ut
supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q22_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q22_A2-p0.1">Q. 22. A. 2. Whether everything is subject to the providence of God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that everything is not subject to divine providence. For nothing foreseen can happen by chance. If then everything
                     was foreseen by God, nothing would happen by chance. And thus hazard and luck would disappear; which is against common opinion.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29366] Iª q. 22 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia sint subiecta divinae
providentiae. Nullum enim provisum est fortuitum. Si ergo omnia
sunt provisa a Deo, nihil erit fortuitum, et sic perit casus et
fortuna. Quod est contra communem opinionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a wise provider excludes any defect or evil, as far as he can, from those over whom he has a care. But we see many
                     evils existing. Either, then, God cannot hinder these, and thus is not omnipotent; or else He does not have care for everything.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29367] Iª q. 22 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis
sapiens provisor excludit defectum et malum, quantum potest, ab his
quorum curam gerit. Videmus autem multa mala in rebus esse. Aut
igitur Deus non potest ea impedire, et sic non est omnipotens, aut
non de omnibus curam habet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever happens of necessity does not require providence or prudence. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
                     vi, 5,9, 10,11): "Prudence is the right reason of things contingent concerning which there is counsel and choice." Since,
                     then, many things happen from necessity, everything cannot be subject to providence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29368] Iª q. 22 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quae
ex necessitate eveniunt, providentiam seu prudentiam non requirunt,
unde, secundum philosophum in VI Ethic., prudentia est recta ratio
contingentium, de quibus est consilium et electio. Cum igitur multa
in rebus ex necessitate eveniant, non omnia providentiae
subduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whatsoever is left to itself cannot be subject to the providence of a governor. But men are left to themselves by
                     God in accordance with the words: "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 15:14</a>). And particularly in reference to the wicked: "I let them go according to the desires of their heart" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.80.13" target="asv">Ps. 80:13</a>). Everything, therefore, cannot be subject to divine
                     providence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="29369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29369] Iª q. 22 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
quicumque dimittitur sibi, non subest providentiae alicuius
gubernantis. Sed homines sibi ipsis dimittuntur a Deo, secundum
illud Eccli. XV, <i>Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et reliquit
eum in manu consilii sui</i>; et specialiter mali, secundum illud,
<i>dimisit illos secundum desideria cordis eorum</i>. Non igitur
omnia divinae providentiae subsunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:9</a>): "God doth not care for oxen [*Vulg. 'Doth God take care for oxen?']": and we may say the same of other irrational creatures.
                     Thus everything cannot be under the care of divine providence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 arg. 5"><a name="29370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29370] Iª q. 22 a. 2 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
apostolus, I Cor. IX, dicit quod <i>non est Deo cura de bobus</i>,
et eadem ratione, de aliis creaturis irrationalibus. Non igitur
omnia subsunt divinae providentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p7">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said of Divine Wisdom: "She reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.1" target="asv">Wis. 8:1</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29371] Iª q. 22 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Sap. VIII, de divina sapientia, quod <i>attingit a
fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q22_A2-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Certain persons totally denied the existence of providence, as Democritus and the Epicureans, maintaining that the world
                     was made by chance. Others taught that incorruptible things only were subject to providence and corruptible things not in
                     their individual selves, but only according to their species; for in this respect they are incorruptible. They are represented
                     as saying (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Job.22.14" target="asv">Job 22:14</a>): "The clouds are His covert; and He doth not
                     consider our things; and He walketh about the poles of heaven." Rabbi Moses, however, excluded men from the generality of
                     things corruptible, on account of the excellence of the intellect which they possess, but in reference to all else that suffers
                     corruption he adhered to the opinion of the others.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q22_A2-p9"> We must say, however, that all things are subject to divine providence, not only in general, but even in their own individual
                     selves. This is mad evident thus. For since every agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects towards that end extends
                     as far as the causality of the first agent extends. Whence it happens that in the effects of an agent something takes place
                     which has no reference towards the end, because the effect comes from a cause other than, and outside the
                     intention of the agent. But the causality of God, Who is the first agent, extends to all being, not only as to constituent
                     principles of species, but also as to the individualizing principles; not only of things incorruptible, but also of things
                     corruptible. Hence all things that exist in whatsoever manner are necessarily directed by God towards some end; as the Apostle
                     says: "Those things that are of God are well ordered [*Vulg.'Those powers that are, are ordained of God': 'Quae autem sunt,
                     a
                     Deo ordinatae sunt.' St. Thomas often quotes this passage, and invariably reads: 'Quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt.']" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1</a>). Since, therefore, as the providence of God is nothing less than the type of the order of things towards an end, as we have
                     said; it necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as they participate in existence, must likewise be subject to divine
                     providence. It has also been shown (
                     <a href="#FP_Q14_A6" id="FP_Q22_A2-p9.2" shape="rect">Q[14], AA[6]</a>,11) that God knows all
                     things, both universal and particular. And since His knowledge may be compared to the things themselves, as the knowledge
                     of art to the objects of art, all things must of necessity come under His ordering; as all things wrought by art are subject
                     to the ordering of that art.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 co."><a name="29372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29372] Iª q. 22 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod quidam totaliter providentiam negaverunt, sicut Democritus et
Epicurei, ponentes mundum factum esse casu. Quidam vero posuerunt
incorruptibilia tantum providentiae subiacere; corruptibilia vero,
non secundum individua, sed secundum species; sic enim
incorruptibilia sunt. Ex quorum persona dicitur Iob XXII, <i>nubes
latibulum eius, et circa cardines caeli perambulat, neque nostra
considerat</i>. A corruptibilium autem generalitate excepit Rabbi
Moyses homines, propter splendorem intellectus, quem participant,
in aliis autem individuis corruptibilibus, aliorum opinionem est
secutus. Sed necesse est dicere omnia divinae providentiae
subiacere, non in universali tantum, sed etiam in singulari. Quod
sic patet. Cum enim omne agens agat propter finem, tantum se
extendit ordinatio effectuum in finem, quantum se extendit
causalitas primi agentis. Ex hoc enim contingit in operibus
alicuius agentis aliquid provenire non ad finem ordinatum, quia
effectus ille consequitur ex aliqua alia causa, praeter intentionem
agentis. Causalitas autem Dei, qui est primum agens, se extendit
usque ad omnia entia, non solum quantum ad principia speciei, sed
etiam quantum ad individualia principia, non solum
incorruptibilium, sed etiam corruptibilium. Unde necesse est omnia
quae habent quocumque modo esse, ordinata esse a Deo in finem,
secundum illud apostoli, ad Rom. XIII, <i>quae a Deo sunt, ordinata
sunt</i>. Cum ergo nihil aliud sit Dei providentia quam ratio
ordinis rerum in finem, ut dictum est, necesse est omnia, inquantum
participant esse, intantum subdi divinae providentiae. Similiter
etiam supra ostensum est quod Deus omnia cognoscit, et universalia
et particularia. Et cum cognitio eius comparetur ad res sicut
cognitio artis ad artificiata, ut supra dictum est, necesse est
quod omnia supponantur suo ordini, sicut omnia artificiata
subduntur ordini artis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is a difference between universal and particular causes. A thing can escape the order of a particular cause; but not
                     the order of a universal cause. For nothing escapes the order of a particular cause, except through the intervention and hindrance
                     of some other particular cause; as, for instance, wood may be prevented from burning, by the action of water. Since then,
                     all particular causes are included under the universal cause, it could not be
                     that any effect should take place outside the range of that universal cause. So far then as an effect escapes the order of
                     a particular cause, it is said to be casual or fortuitous in respect to that cause; but if we regard the universal cause,
                     outside whose range no effect can happen, it is said to be foreseen. Thus, for instance, the meeting of two servants, although
                     to them it appears a chance circumstance, has been fully foreseen by their master, who has purposely sent to meet at the one
                     place, in such a way that the one knows not about the other.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29373] Iª q. 22 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod aliter est de causa universali, et de causa
particulari. Ordinem enim causae particularis aliquid potest exire,
non autem ordinem causae universalis. Non enim subducitur aliquid
ab ordine causae particularis, nisi per aliquam aliam causam
particularem impedientem, sicut lignum impeditur a combustione per
actionem aquae. Unde, cum omnes causae particulares concludantur
sub universali causa, impossibile est aliquem effectum ordinem
causae universalis effugere. Inquantum igitur aliquis effectus
ordinem alicuius causae particularis effugit, dicitur esse casuale
vel fortuitum, respectu causae particularis, sed respectu causae
universalis, a cuius ordine subtrahi non potest, dicitur esse
provisum. Sicut et concursus duorum servorum, licet sit casualis
quantum ad eos, est tamen provisus a domino, qui eos scienter sic
ad unum locum mittit, ut unus de alio nesciat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is otherwise with one who has care of a particular thing, and one whose providence is universal, because a particular
                     provider excludes all defects from what is subject to his care as far as he can; whereas, one who provides universally allows
                     some little defect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be hindered. Hence, corruption and defects in natural things
                     are said to be contrary to some particular nature; yet they are in keeping with the
                     plan of universal nature; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields to the good of another, or even to the universal good:
                     for the corruption of one is the generation of another, and through this it is that a species is kept in existence. Since
                     God, then, provides universally for all being, it belongs to His providence to permit certain defects in particular effects,
                     that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much good would be absent from
                     the
                     universe. A lion would cease to live, if there were no slaying of animals; and there would be no patience of martyrs if there
                     were no tyrannical persecution. Thus Augustine says (Enchiridion 2): "Almighty God would in no wise permit evil to exist in
                     His works, unless He were so almighty and so good as to produce good even from evil." It would appear that it was on account
                     of these two arguments to which we have just replied, that some were persuaded to consider corruptible things---e.g. casual
                     and evil things---as removed from the care of divine providence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29374] Iª q. 22 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod aliter de eo est qui habet curam alicuius
particularis, et de provisore universali. Quia provisor
particularis excludit defectum ab eo quod eius curae subditur,
quantum potest, sed provisor universalis permittit aliquem defectum
in aliquo particulari accidere, ne impediatur bonum totius. Unde
corruptiones et defectus in rebus naturalibus, dicuntur esse contra
naturam particularem; sed tamen sunt de intentione naturae
universalis, inquantum defectus unius cedit in bonum alterius, vel
etiam totius universi; nam corruptio unius est generatio alterius,
per quam species conservatur. Cum igitur Deus sit universalis
provisor totius entis, ad ipsius providentiam pertinet ut permittat
quosdam defectus esse in aliquibus particularibus rebus, ne
impediatur bonum universi perfectum. Si enim omnia mala
impedirentur, multa bona deessent universo, non enim esset vita
leonis, si non esset occisio animalium; nec esset patientia
martyrum, si non esset persecutio tyrannorum. Unde dicit Augustinus
in Enchirid. <i>Deus omnipotens nullo modo sineret malum aliquod
esse in operibus suis, nisi usque adeo esset omnipotens et bonus,
ut bene faceret etiam de malo</i>. Ex his autem duabus rationibus
quas nunc solvimus, videntur moti fuisse, qui divinae providentiae
subtraxerunt corruptibilia, in quibus inveniuntur casualia et
mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man is not the author of nature; but he uses natural things in applying art and virtue to his own use. Hence human providence
                     does not reach to that which takes place in nature from necessity; but divine providence extends thus far, since God is the
                     author of nature. Apparently it was this argument that moved those who withdrew the course of nature from the care of divine
                     providence, attributing it rather to the necessity of matter, as Democritus, and
                     others of the ancients.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29375] Iª q. 22 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod homo non est institutor naturae, sed utitur in
operibus artis et virtutis, ad suum usum, rebus naturalibus. Unde
providentia humana non se extendit ad necessaria, quae ex natura
proveniunt. Ad quae tamen se extendit providentia Dei, qui est
auctor naturae. Et ex hac ratione videntur moti fuisse, qui cursum
rerum naturalium subtraxerunt divinae providentiae, attribuentes
ipsum necessitati materiae; ut Democritus, et alii naturales
antiqui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When it is said that God left man to himself, this does not mean that man is exempt from divine providence; but merely that
                     he has not a prefixed operating force determined to only the one effect; as in the case of natural things, which are only
                     acted upon as though directed by another towards an end; and do not act of themselves, as if they directed themselves towards
                     an end, like rational creatures, through the possession of free will, by which
                     these are able to take counsel and make a choice. Hence it is significantly said: "In the hand of his own counsel." But since
                     the very act of free will is traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily follows that everything happening from the exercise
                     of free will must be subject to divine providence. For human providence is included under the providence of God, as a particular
                     under a universal cause. God, however, extends His providence over the just in a certain more excellent way than over
                     the wicked; inasmuch as He prevents anything happening which would impede their final salvation. For "to them that love God,
                     all things work together unto good" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.28" target="asv">Rom. 8:28</a>). But from the fact that He does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin, He is said to abandon them: not that He altogether
                     withdraws His providence from them; otherwise they would return to nothing, if they were not preserved in existence by His
                     providence. This was the reason that had weight with
                     Tully, who withdrew from the care of divine providence human affairs concerning which we take counsel.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="29376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29376] Iª q. 22 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod in hoc quod dicitur Deum hominem sibi reliquisse, non
excluditur homo a divina providentia, sed ostenditur quod non
praefigitur ei virtus operativa determinata ad unum, sicut rebus
naturalibus; quae aguntur tantum, quasi ab altero directae in
finem, non autem seipsa agunt, quasi se dirigentia in finem, ut
creaturae rationales per liberum arbitrium, quo consiliantur et
eligunt. Unde signanter dicit, <i>in manu consilii sui</i>. Sed
quia ipse actus liberi arbitrii reducitur in Deum sicut in causam,
necesse est ut ea quae ex libero arbitrio fiunt, divinae
providentiae subdantur, providentia enim hominis continetur sub
providentia Dei, sicut causa particularis sub causa universali.
Hominum autem iustorum quodam excellentiori modo Deus habet
providentiam quam impiorum, inquantum non permittit contra eos
evenire aliquid, quod finaliter impediat salutem eorum, nam
<i>diligentibus Deum omnia cooperantur in bonum</i>, ut dicitur
Rom. VIII. Sed ex hoc ipso quod impios non retrahit a malo culpae,
dicitur eos dimittere. Non tamen ita, quod totaliter ab eius
providentia excludantur, alioquin in nihilum deciderent, nisi per
eius providentiam conservarentur. Et ex hac ratione videtur motus
fuisse Tullius, qui res humanas, de quibus consiliamur, divinae
providentiae subtraxit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since a rational creature has, through its free will, control over its actions, as was said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q19_A10" id="FP_Q22_A2-p14.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[10]</a>), it is subject to divine providence in an especial manner, so that something is imputed to it as a fault, or as a merit;
                     and there is given it accordingly something by way of punishment or reward. In this way, the Apostle withdraws oxen from the
                     care of God: not, however, that individual irrational creatures escape
                     the care of divine providence; as was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="29377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29377] Iª q. 22 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
dicendum quod, quia creatura rationalis habet per liberum arbitrium
dominium sui actus, ut dictum est, speciali quodam modo subditur
divinae providentiae; ut scilicet ei imputetur aliquid ad culpam
vel ad meritum, et reddatur ei aliquid ut poena vel praemium. Et
quantum ad hoc curam Dei apostolus a bobus removet. Non tamen ita
quod individua irrationalium creaturarum ad Dei providentiam non
pertineant, ut Rabbi Moyses existimavit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q22_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q22_A3-p0.1">Q. 22. A. 3. Whether God has immediate providence over everything?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not immediate providence over all things. For whatever is contained in the notion of dignity, must
                     be attributed to God. But it belongs to the dignity of a king, that he should have ministers; through whose mediation he provides
                     for his subjects. Therefore much less has God Himself immediate providence over all things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29378] Iª q. 22 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non immediate omnibus provideat.
Quidquid enim est dignitatis, Deo est attribuendum. Sed ad
dignitatem alicuius regis pertinet, quod habeat ministros, quibus
mediantibus subditis provideat. Ergo multo magis Deus non immediate
omnibus providet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to providence to order all things to an end. Now the end of everything is its perfection and its good.
                     But it appertains to every cause to direct its effect to good; wherefore every active cause is a cause of the effect of providence.
                     If therefore God were to have immediate providence over all things, all secondary causes would be withdrawn.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29379] Iª q. 22 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad
providentiam pertinet res in finem ordinare. Finis autem cuiuslibet
rei est eius perfectio et bonum. Ad quamlibet autem causam pertinet
effectum suum perducere ad bonum. Quaelibet igitur causa agens est
causa effectus providentiae. Si igitur Deus omnibus immediate
providet, subtrahuntur omnes causae secundae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 17) that, "It is better to be ignorant of some things than to know them, for example,
                     vile things": and the Philosopher says the same (Metaph. xii, 51). But whatever is better must be assigned to God. Therefore
                     He has not immediate providence over bad and vile things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29380] Iª q. 22 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod <i>melius est quaedam nescire
quam scire, ut vilia</i>, et idem dicit philosophus, in XII
Metaphys. Sed omne quod est melius, Deo est attribuendum. Ergo Deus
non habet immediate providentiam quorundam vilium et malorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.34.13" target="asv">Job 34:13</a>): "What other hath He appointed over the earth? or whom hath He set over the world which He made?" On which passage Gregory
                     says (Moral. xxiv, 20): "Himself He ruleth the world which He Himself hath made."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29381] Iª q. 22 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Iob XXXIV, <i>quem constituit alium super terram? Aut
quem posuit super orbem quem fabricatus est?</i> Super quo dicit
Gregorius, <i>mundum per seipsum regit, quem per seipsum
condidit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Two things belong to providence---namely, the type of the order of things foreordained towards an end; and the execution
                     of this order, which is called government. As regards the first of these, God has immediate providence over everything, because
                     He has in His intellect the types of everything, even the smallest; and whatsoever causes He assigns to certain effects, He
                     gives them the power to produce those effects. Whence it must be that He has beforehand
                     the type of those effects in His mind. As to the second, there are certain intermediaries of God's providence; for He governs
                     things inferior by superior, not on account of any defect in His power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness; so
                     that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures. Thus Plato's opinion, as narrated by Gregory of Nyssa (De Provid.
                     viii, 3), is exploded. He taught a threefold providence. First, one which belongs to the supreme Deity, Who first and
                     foremost has provision over spiritual things, and thus over the whole world as regards genus, species, and universal causes.
                     The second providence, which is over the individuals of all that can be generated and corrupted, he attributed to the divinities
                     who circulate in the heavens; that is, certain separate substances, which move corporeal things in a circular direction. The
                     third providence, over human affairs, he assigned to demons, whom the Platonic philosophers placed between us and the
                     gods, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei, 1, 2: viii, 14).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 3 co."><a name="29382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29382] Iª q. 22 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod ad providentiam duo pertinent, scilicet ratio ordinis rerum
provisarum in finem; et executio huius ordinis, quae gubernatio
dicitur. Quantum igitur ad primum horum, Deus immediate omnibus
providet. Quia in suo intellectu habet rationem omnium, etiam
minimorum, et quascumque causas aliquibus effectibus praefecit,
dedit eis virtutem ad illos effectus producendos. Unde oportet quod
ordinem illorum effectuum in sua ratione praehabuerit. Quantum
autem ad secundum, sunt aliqua media divinae providentiae. Quia
inferiora gubernat per superiora; non propter defectum suae
virtutis, sed propter abundantiam suae bonitatis, ut dignitatem
causalitatis etiam creaturis communicet. Et secundum hoc excluditur
opinio Platonis, quam narrat Gregorius Nyssenus, triplicem
providentiam ponentis. Quarum prima est summi Dei, qui primo et
principaliter providet rebus spiritualibus; et consequenter toti
mundo, quantum ad genera, species et causas universales. Secunda
vero providentia est, qua providetur singularibus generabilium et
corruptibilium, et hanc attribuit diis qui circumeunt caelos, idest
substantiis separatis, quae movent corpora caelestia circulariter.
Tertia vero providentia est rerum humanarum, quam attribuebat
Daemonibus, quos Platonici ponebant medios inter nos et deos, ut
narrat Augustinus IX de Civ. Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It pertains to a king's dignity to have ministers who execute his providence. But the fact that he has not the plan of those
                     things which are done by them arises from a deficiency in himself. For every operative science is the more perfect, the more
                     it considers the particular things with which its action is concerned.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29383] Iª q. 22 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod habere ministros executores suae providentiae,
pertinet ad dignitatem regis, sed quod non habeat rationem eorum
quae per eos agenda sunt, est ex defectu ipsius. Omnis enim
scientia operativa tanto perfectior est, quanto magis particularia
considerat, in quibus est actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's immediate provision over everything does not exclude the action of secondary causes; which are the executors of His
                     order, as was said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q19_A5" id="FP_Q22_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[19], AA[5]</a>,8).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29384] Iª q. 22 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod per hoc quod Deus habet immediate providentiam de
rebus omnibus, non excluduntur causae secundae, quae sunt
executrices huius ordinis, ut ex supra dictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is better for us not to know low and vile things, because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is better and
                     higher; for we cannot understand many things simultaneously; because the thought of evil sometimes perverts the will towards
                     evil. This does not hold with God, Who sees everything simultaneously at one glance, and whose will cannot turn in the direction
                     of evil.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29385] Iª q. 22 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod nobis melius est non cognoscere mala et vilia,
inquantum per ea impedimur a consideratione meliorum, quia non
possumus simul multa intelligere, et inquantum cogitatio malorum
pervertit interdum voluntatem in malum. Sed hoc non habet locum in
Deo, qui simul omnia uno intuitu videt, et cuius voluntas ad malum
flecti non potest.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q22_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q22_A4-p0.1">Q. 22. A. 4. Whether providence imposes any necessity on things foreseen?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that divine providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen. For every effect that has a "per se" cause, either
                     present or past, which it necessarily follows, happens from necessity; as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vi, 7). But the
                     providence of God, since it is eternal, pre-exists; and the effect flows from it of necessity, for divine providence cannot
                     be frustrated. Therefore divine providence imposes a necessity upon things foreseen.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29386] Iª q. 22 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod divina providentia necessitatem rebus
provisis imponat. Omnis enim effectus qui habet aliquam causam per
se, quae iam est vel fuit, ad quam de necessitate sequitur,
provenit ex necessitate, ut philosophus probat in VI Metaphys. Sed
providentia Dei, cum sit aeterna, praeexistit; et ad eam sequitur
effectus de necessitate; non enim potest divina providentia
frustrari. Ergo providentia divina necessitatem rebus provisis
imponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every provider makes his work as stable as he can, lest it should fail. But God is most powerful. Therefore He assigns
                     the stability of necessity to things provided.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29387] Iª q. 22 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
unusquisque provisor stabilit opus suum quantum potest, ne
deficiat. Sed Deus est summe potens. Ergo necessitatis firmitatem
rebus a se provisis tribuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6): "Fate from the immutable source of providence binds together human acts and fortunes
                     by the indissoluble connection of causes." It seems therefore that providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29388] Iª q. 22 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
Boetius dicit, IV de Consol., quod fatum, <i>ab immobilis
providentiae proficiscens exordiis, actus fortunasque hominum
indissolubili causarum connexione constringit</i>. Videtur ergo
quod providentia necessitatem rebus provisis imponat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says that (Div. Nom. iv, 23) "to corrupt nature is not the work of providence." But it is in the nature of some
                     things to be contingent. Divine providence does not therefore impose any necessity upon things so as to destroy their contingency.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29389] Iª q. 22 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>corrumpere
naturam non est providentiae</i>. Hoc autem habet quarundam rerum
natura, quod sint contingentia. Non igitur divina providentia
necessitatem rebus imponit, contingentiam excludens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Divine providence imposes necessity upon some things; not upon all, as some formerly believed. For to providence it belongs
                     to order things towards an end. Now after the divine goodness, which is an extrinsic end to all things, the principal good
                     in things themselves is the perfection of the universe; which would not be, were not all grades of being found in things.
                     Whence it pertains to divine providence to produce every grade of being. And thus it has
                     prepared for some things necessary causes, so that they happen of necessity; for others contingent causes, that they may happen
                     by contingency, according to the nature of their proximate causes.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 4 co."><a name="29390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29390] Iª q. 22 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod providentia divina quibusdam rebus necessitatem imponit, non
autem omnibus, ut quidam crediderunt. Ad providentiam enim pertinet
ordinare res in finem. Post bonitatem autem divinam, quae est finis
a rebus separatus, principale bonum in ipsis rebus existens, est
perfectio universi, quae quidem non esset, si non omnes gradus
essendi invenirentur in rebus. Unde ad divinam providentiam
pertinet omnes gradus entium producere. Et ideo quibusdam
effectibus praeparavit causas necessarias, ut necessario evenirent;
quibusdam vero causas contingentes, ut evenirent contingenter,
secundum conditionem proximarum causarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The effect of divine providence is not only that things should happen somehow; but that they should happen either by necessity
                     or by contingency. Therefore whatsoever divine providence ordains to happen infallibly and of necessity happens infallibly
                     and of necessity; and that happens from contingency, which the plan of divine providence conceives to happen from contingency.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29391] Iª q. 22 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod effectus divinae providentiae non solum est aliquid
evenire quocumque modo; sed aliquid evenire vel contingenter vel
necessario. Et ideo evenit infallibiliter et necessario, quod
divina providentia disponit evenire infallibiliter et necessario,
et evenit contingenter, quod divinae providentiae ratio habet ut
contingenter eveniat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The order of divine providence is unchangeable and certain, so far as all things foreseen happen as they have been foreseen,
                     whether from necessity or from contingency.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29392] Iª q. 22 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod in hoc est immobilis et certus divinae providentiae
ordo, quod ea quae ab ipso providentur, cuncta eveniunt eo modo quo
ipse providet, sive necessario sive contingenter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That indissolubility and unchangeableness of which Boethius speaks, pertain to the certainty of providence, which fails not
                     to produce its effect, and that in the way foreseen; but they do not pertain to the necessity of the effects. We must remember
                     that properly speaking 'necessary' and "contingent" are consequent upon being, as such. Hence the mode both of necessity and
                     of contingency falls under the foresight of God, who provides universally for
                     all being; not under the foresight of causes that provide only for some particular order of things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29393] Iª q. 22 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod indissolubilitas illa et immutabilitas quam Boetius
tangit, pertinet ad certitudinem providentiae, quae non deficit a
suo effectu, neque a modo eveniendi quem providit, non autem
pertinet ad necessitatem effectuum. Et considerandum est quod
necessarium et contingens proprie consequuntur ens, inquantum
huiusmodi. Unde modus contingentiae et necessitatis cadit sub
provisione Dei, qui est universalis provisor totius entis, non
autem sub provisione aliquorum particularium provisorum.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q23" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q23-p0.1">Q. 23. OF PREDESTINATION (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q23-p2"> After consideration of divine providence, we must treat of predestination and the book of life. Concerning predestination
                  there are eight points of inquiry:
               </p><p id="FP_Q23-p3"><a href="#FP_Q23_A1"> (1) Whether predestination is suitably attributed to God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q23-p4"><a href="#FP_Q23_A2"> (2) What is predestination, and whether it places anything in the predestined?</a></p><p id="FP_Q23-p5"><a href="#FP_Q23_A3"> (3) Whether to God belongs the reprobation of some men?</a></p><p id="FP_Q23-p6"><a href="#FP_Q23_A4"> (4) On the comparison of predestination to election; whether, that is to say, the predestined are chosen?</a></p><p id="FP_Q23-p7"><a href="#FP_Q23_A5"> (5) Whether merits are the cause or reason of predestination, or reprobation, or election?</a></p><p id="FP_Q23-p8"><a href="#FP_Q23_A6"> (6) of the certainty of predestination; whether the predestined will infallibly be saved?</a></p><p id="FP_Q23-p9"><a href="#FP_Q23_A7"> (7) Whether the number of the predestined is certain?</a></p><p id="FP_Q23-p10"><a href="#FP_Q23_A8"> (8) Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 pr."><a name="29394" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29394]
Iª q. 23 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem divinae
providentiae, agendum est de praedestinatione, et de libro vitae.
Et circa praedestinationem quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum Deo
conveniat praedestinatio. Secundo, quid sit praedestinatio; et
utrum ponat aliquid in praedestinato. Tertio, utrum Deo competat
reprobatio aliquorum hominum. Quarto, de comparatione
praedestinationis ad electionem; utrum scilicet praedestinati
eligantur. Quinto, utrum merita sint causa vel ratio
praedestinationis, vel reprobationis, aut electionis. Sexto, de
certitudine praedestinationis; utrum scilicet praedestinati
infallibiliter salventur. Septimo, utrum numerus praedestinatorum
sit certus. Octavo, utrum praedestinatio possit iuvari precibus
sanctorum.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q23_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q23_A1-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 1. Whether men are predestined by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that men are not predestined by God, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): "It must be borne in mind that God
                     foreknows but does not predetermine everything, since He foreknows all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all." But
                     human merit and demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts by free will. All that pertains therefore
                     to merit or demerit is not predestined by God; and thus man's predestination is done
                     away.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29395" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29395] Iª q. 23 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod homines non praedestinentur a Deo. Dicit
enim Damascenus, in II libro, <i>oportet cognoscere quod omnia
quidem praecognoscit Deus, non autem omnia praedeterminat.
Praecognoscit enim ea quae in nobis sunt; non autem praedeterminat
ea</i>. Sed merita et demerita humana sunt in nobis, inquantum
sumus nostrorum actuum domini per liberum arbitrium. Ea ergo quae
pertinent ad meritum vel demeritum, non praedestinantur a Deo. Et
sic hominum praedestinatio tollitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all creatures are directed to their end by divine providence, as was said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q22_A1" id="FP_Q23_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2). But other creatures are not said to be predestined by God. Therefore neither are men.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29396] Iª q. 23 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnes
creaturae ordinantur ad suos fines per divinam providentiam, ut
supra dictum est. Sed aliae creaturae non dicuntur praedestinari a
Deo. Ergo nec homines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angels are capable of beatitude, as well as men. But predestination is not suitable to angels, since in them
                     there never was any unhappiness (miseria); for predestination, as Augustine says (De praedest. sanct. 17), is the "purpose
                     to take pity [miserendi]" [*See
                     <a href="#FP_Q22_A3" id="FP_Q23_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>]. Therefore men are not predestined.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29397] Iª q. 23 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
Angeli sunt capaces beatitudinis, sicut et homines. Sed Angelis non
competit praedestinari, ut videtur, cum in eis nunquam fuerit
miseria; praedestinatio autem est propositum miserendi, ut dicit
Augustinus. Ergo homines non praedestinantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the benefits God confers upon men are revealed by the Holy Ghost to holy men according to the saying of the Apostle
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:12</a>): "Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God: that we may know the things that are
                     given us from God." Therefore if man were predestined by God, since predestination is a benefit from God, his predestination
                     would be made known to each predestined; which is clearly false.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="29398" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29398] Iª q. 23 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
beneficia hominibus a Deo collata, per spiritum sanctum viris
sanctis revelantur, secundum illud apostoli, I Cor. II, <i>nos
autem non spiritum huius mundi accepimus, sed spiritum qui ex Deo
est, ut sciamus quae a Deo donata sunt nobis</i>. Si ergo homines
praedestinarentur a Deo, cum praedestinatio sit Dei beneficium,
esset praedestinatis nota sua praedestinatio. Quod patet esse
falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.30" target="asv">Rom. 8:30</a>): "Whom He predestined, them He also called."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29399] Iª q. 23 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Rom. VIII, <i>quos praedestinavit, hos et
vocavit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is fitting that God should predestine men. For all things are subject to His providence, as was shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q22_A2" id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end, as was also said (
                     <a href="#FP_Q22_A1" id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2). The end towards which created things are directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of
                     created nature; and this end is life eternal, that consists in seeing
                     God which is above the nature of every creature, as shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q12_A4" id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.3" shape="rect">Q[12], A[4]</a>). The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power
                     of its nature. Now if a thing cannot attain to something by the power of its nature, it must be directed thereto by another;
                     thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of eternal
                     life, is led towards it,
                     directed, as it were, by God. The reason of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him is the type of the order of all things
                     towards an end, which we proved above to be providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be done, is a
                     kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done. Hence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards
                     the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that
                     predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of providence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 co."><a name="29400" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29400] Iª q. 23 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod Deo conveniens est homines praedestinare. Omnia enim divinae
providentiae subiacent, ut supra ostensum est. Ad providentiam
autem pertinet res in finem ordinare, ut dictum est. Finis autem ad
quem res creatae ordinantur a Deo, est duplex. Unus, qui excedit
proportionem naturae creatae et facultatem, et hic finis est vita
aeterna, quae in divina visione consistit, quae est supra naturam
cuiuslibet creaturae, ut supra habitum est. Alius autem finis est
naturae creatae proportionatus, quem scilicet res creata potest
attingere secundum virtutem suae naturae. Ad illud autem ad quod
non potest aliquid virtute suae naturae pervenire, oportet quod ab
alio transmittatur; sicut sagitta a sagittante mittitur ad signum.
Unde, proprie loquendo, rationalis creatura, quae est capax vitae
aeternae, perducitur in ipsam quasi a Deo transmissa. Cuius quidem
transmissionis ratio in Deo praeexistit; sicut et in eo est ratio
ordinis omnium in finem, quam diximus esse providentiam. Ratio
autem alicuius fiendi in mente actoris existens, est quaedam
praeexistentia rei fiendae in eo. Unde ratio praedictae
transmissionis creaturae rationalis in finem vitae aeternae,
praedestinatio nominatur, nam destinare est mittere. Et sic patet
quod praedestinatio, quantum ad obiecta, est quaedam pars
providentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Damascene calls predestination an imposition of necessity, after the manner of natural things which are predetermined towards
                     one end. This is clear from his adding: "He does not will malice, nor does He compel virtue." Whence predestination is not
                     excluded by Him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29401" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29401] Iª q. 23 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Damascenus nominat praedeterminationem impositionem
necessitatis; sicut est in rebus naturalibus, quae sunt
praedeterminatae ad unum. Quod patet ex eo quod subdit, <i>non enim
vult malitiam, neque compellit virtutem</i>. Unde praedestinatio
non excluditur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Irrational creatures are not capable of that end which exceeds the faculty of human nature. Whence they cannot be properly
                     said to be predestined; although improperly the term is used in respect of any other end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29402" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29402] Iª q. 23 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod creaturae irrationales non sunt capaces illius finis
qui facultatem humanae naturae excedit. Unde non proprie dicuntur
praedestinari, etsi aliquando abusive praedestinatio nominetur
respectu cuiuscumque alterius finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Predestination applies to angels, just as it does to men, although they have never been unhappy. For movement does not take
                     its species from the term "wherefrom" but from the term "whereto." Because it matters nothing, in respect of the notion of
                     making white, whether he who is made white was before black, yellow or red. Likewise it matters nothing in respect of the
                     notion of predestination whether one is predestined to life eternal from the state of
                     misery or not. Although it may be said that every conferring of good above that which is due pertains to mercy; as was shown
                     previously (
                     <a href="#FP_Q21_A3" id="FP_Q23_A1-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[21], AA[3]</a>,4).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29403] Iª q. 23 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod praedestinari convenit Angelis, sicut et hominibus,
licet nunquam fuerint miseri. Nam motus non accipit speciem a
termino a quo, sed a termino ad quem, nihil enim refert, quantum ad
rationem dealbationis, utrum ille qui dealbatur, fuerit niger aut
pallidus vel rubeus. Et similiter nihil refert ad rationem
praedestinationis, utrum aliquis praedestinetur in vitam aeternam a
statu miseriae, vel non. Quamvis dici possit quod omnis collatio
boni supra debitum eius cui confertur, ad misericordiam pertineat,
ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even if by a special privilege their predestination were revealed to some, it is not fitting that it should be revealed to
                     everyone; because, if so, those who were not predestined would despair; and security would beget negligence in the predestined.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="29404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29404] Iª q. 23 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod, etiam si aliquibus ex speciali privilegio sua
praedestinatio reveletur, non tamen convenit ut reveletur omnibus,
quia sic illi qui non sunt praedestinati, desperarent; et securitas
in praedestinatis negligentiam pareret.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q23_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q23_A2-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 2. Whether predestination places anything in the predestined?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that predestination does place something in the predestined. For every action of itself causes passion. If therefore
                     predestination is action in God, predestination must be passion in the predestined.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29405] Iª q. 23 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod praedestinatio ponat aliquid in
praedestinato. Omnis enim actio ex se passionem infert. Si ergo
praedestinatio actio est in Deo, oportet quod praedestinatio passio
sit in praedestinatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Origen says on the text, "He who was predestined," etc. (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.4" target="asv">Rom. 1:4</a>): "Predestination is of one who is not; destination, of one who is." And Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct.): "What is predestination
                     but the destination of one who is?" Therefore predestination is only of one who actually exists; and it thus places something
                     in the predestined.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29406] Iª q. 23 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Origenes dicit, super illud Rom. I, <i>qui praedestinatus est etc.,
praedestinatio est eius qui non est, sed destinatio eius est qui
est</i>. Sed Augustinus dicit, in libro de praedestinatione
sanctorum, <i>quid est praedestinatio, nisi destinatio
alicuius?</i> Ergo praedestinatio non est nisi alicuius existentis.
Et ita ponit aliquid in praedestinato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, preparation is something in the thing prepared. But predestination is the preparation of God's benefits, as Augustine
                     says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14). Therefore predestination is something in the predestined.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29407] Iª q. 23 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
praeparatio est aliquid in praeparato. Sed praedestinatio est
praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, ut dicit Augustinus, in libro de
Praedest. Sanct. Ergo praedestinatio est aliquid in
praedestinatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, nothing temporal enters into the definition of eternity. But grace, which is something temporal, is found in the
                     definition of predestination. For predestination is the preparation of grace in the present; and of glory in the future. Therefore
                     predestination is not anything eternal. So it must needs be that it is in the predestined, and not in God; for whatever is
                     in Him is eternal.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="29408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29408] Iª q. 23 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
temporale non ponitur in definitione aeterni. Sed gratia, quae est
aliquid temporale, ponitur in definitione praedestinationis, nam
praedestinatio dicitur esse <i>praeparatio gratiae in praesenti, et
gloriae in futuro</i>. Ergo praedestinatio non est aliquid
aeternum. Et ita oportet quod non sit in Deo, sed in
praedestinatis, nam quidquid est in Deo, est aeternum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14) that "predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits." But foreknowledge
                     is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who foreknows them. Therefore, predestination is in the one who predestines,
                     and not in the predestined.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29409] Iª q. 23 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Augustinus dicit, quod praedestinatio est praescientia
beneficiorum Dei. Sed praescientia non est in praescitis, sed in
praesciente. Ergo nec praedestinatio est in praedestinatis, sed in
praedestinante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Predestination is not anything in the predestined; but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that predestination
                     is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the provider,
                     as was proved above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q22_A1" id="FP_Q23_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[1]</a>). But the execution of providence which is called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed, and in an active
                     way in the governor.
                     Whence it is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing
                     in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God. The
                     execution of predestination is the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.30" target="asv">Rom. 8:30</a>): "Whom He predestined, them He also called and whom He called, them He also magnified [Vulg. 'justified']."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 co."><a name="29410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29410] Iª q. 23 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod praedestinatio non est aliquid in praedestinatis, sed in
praedestinante tantum. Dictum est enim quod praedestinatio est
quaedam pars providentiae providentia autem non est in rebus
provisis; sed est quaedam ratio in intellectu provisoris, ut supra
dictum est. Sed executio providentiae, quae gubernatio dicitur,
passive quidem est in gubernatis; active autem est in gubernante.
Unde manifestum est quod praedestinatio est quaedam ratio ordinis
aliquorum in salutem aeternam, in mente divina existens. Executio
autem huius ordinis est passive quidem in praedestinatis; active
autem est in Deo. Est autem executio praedestinationis vocatio et
magnificatio, secundum illud apostoli, ad Rom. VIII, <i>quos
praedestinavit, hos et vocavit; et quos vocavit, hos et
magnificavit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Actions passing out to external matter imply of themselves passion---for example, the actions of warming and cutting; but
                     not so actions remaining in the agent, as understanding and willing, as said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q14_A2" id="FP_Q23_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[14], A[2]</a>;
                     <a href="#FP_Q18_A3" id="FP_Q23_A2-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[18], A[3]</a>, ad 1). Predestination is an action of this latter class. Wherefore, it does not put anything in the predestined. But its
                     execution, which passes out to external things, has
                     an effect in them.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29411] Iª q. 23 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod actiones in exteriorem materiam transeuntes, inferunt
ex se passionem, ut calefactio et secatio, non autem actiones in
agente manentes, ut sunt intelligere et velle, ut supra dictum est.
Et talis actio est praedestinatio. Unde praedestinatio non ponit
aliquid in praedestinato. Sed executio eius, quae transit in
exteriores res, ponit in eis aliquem effectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Destination sometimes denotes a real mission of someone to a given end; thus, destination can only be said of someone actually
                     existing. It is taken, however, in another sense for a mission which a person conceives in the mind; and in this manner we
                     are said to destine a thing which we firmly propose in our mind. In this latter way it is said that Eleazar "determined not
                     to do any unlawful things for the love of life" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.6.20" target="asv">2 Macc.
                        6:20
                     </a>). Thus destination can be of a thing which does not exist. Predestination, however, by reason of the antecedent nature it
                     implies, can be attributed to a thing which does not actually exist; in whatsoever way destination is accepted.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29412] Iª q. 23 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod destinatio aliquando sumitur pro reali missione
alicuius ad aliquem terminum, et sic destinatio non est nisi eius
quod est. Alio modo sumitur destinatio pro missione quam aliquis
mente concipit, secundum quod dicimur destinare, quod mente
firmiter proponimus, et hoc secundo modo dicitur II Machab. cap.
VI, <i>Eleazarus destinavit non admittere illicita propter vitae
amorem</i>. Et sic destinatio potest esse eius quod non est. Tamen
praedestinatio, ratione antecessionis quam importat, potest esse
eius quod non est, qualitercumque destinatio sumatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Preparation is twofold: of the patient in respect to passion and this is in the thing prepared; and of the agent to action,
                     and this is in the agent. Such a preparation is predestination, and as an agent by intellect is said to prepare itself to
                     act, accordingly as it preconceives the idea of what is to be done. Thus, God from all eternity prepared by predestination,
                     conceiving the idea of the order of some towards salvation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29413] Iª q. 23 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod duplex est praeparatio. Quaedam patientis, ut
patiatur, et haec praeparatio est in praeparato. Quaedam alia est
agentis, ut agat, et haec est in agente. Et talis praeparatio est
praedestinatio; prout aliquod agens per intellectum dicitur se
praeparare ad agendum, inquantum praeconcipit rationem operis
fiendi. Et sic Deus ab aeterno praeparavit praedestinando,
concipiens rationem ordinis aliquorum in salutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Grace does not come into the definition of predestination, as something belonging to its essence, but inasmuch as predestination
                     implies a relation to grace, as of cause to effect, and of act to its object. Whence it does not follow that predestination
                     is anything temporal.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="29414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29414] Iª q. 23 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod gratia non ponitur in definitione praedestinationis,
quasi aliquid existens de essentia eius, sed inquantum
praedestinatio importat respectum ad gratiam, ut causae ad
effectum, et actus ad obiectum. Unde non sequitur quod
praedestinatio sit aliquid temporale.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q23_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q23_A3-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 3. Whether God reprobates any man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God reprobates no man. For nobody reprobates what he loves. But God loves every man, according to (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.25" target="asv">Wis. 11:25</a>): "Thou lovest all things that are, and Thou hatest none of the things Thou hast made." Therefore God reprobates no man.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29415] Iª q. 23 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus nullum hominem reprobet. Nullus enim
reprobat quem diligit. Sed Deus omnem hominem diligit, secundum
illud Sap. XI, <i>diligis omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti eorum
quae fecisti</i>. Ergo Deus nullum hominem reprobat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if God reprobates any man, it would be necessary for reprobation to have the same relation to the reprobates as
                     predestination has to the predestined. But predestination is the cause of the salvation of the predestined. Therefore reprobation
                     will likewise be the cause of the loss of the reprobate. But this false. For it is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.13.9" target="asv">Osee 13:9</a>): "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; Thy help is only in Me." God does not, then, reprobate
                     any man.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29416] Iª q. 23 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si
Deus aliquem hominem reprobat, oportet quod sic se habeat
reprobatio ad reprobatos, sicut praedestinatio ad praedestinatos.
Sed praedestinatio est causa salutis praedestinatorum. Ergo
reprobatio erit causa perditionis reproborum. Hoc autem est falsum,
dicitur enim Osee XIII, <i>perditio tua, Israel, ex te est;
tantummodo ex me auxilium tuum</i>. Non ergo Deus aliquem
reprobat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to no one ought anything be imputed which he cannot avoid. But if God reprobates anyone, that one must perish. For
                     it is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.14" target="asv">Eccles. 7:14</a>): "Consider the works of God, that no man can correct whom He hath despised." Therefore it could not be imputed to any man,
                     were he to perish. But this is false. Therefore God does not reprobate anyone.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29417] Iª q. 23 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, nulli
debet imputari quod vitare non potest. Sed si Deus aliquem
reprobat, non potest vitare quin ipse pereat, dicitur enim Eccle.
VII, <i>considera opera Dei, quod nemo possit corrigere quem ipse
despexerit</i>. Ergo non esset hominibus imputandum quod pereunt.
Hoc autem est falsum. Non ergo Deus aliquem reprobat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.1.2" target="asv">Malachi 1:2,3</a>): "I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29418] Iª q. 23 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Malach. I, <i>Iacob dilexi, Esau autem odio
habui</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God does reprobate some. For it was said above
                     <a href="#FP_Q23_A1" id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things
                     which are subject to providence, as was said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q22_A2" id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit
                     some to fall away from that end; this is called
                     reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation
                     is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge,
                     but also something more, as does providence, as was said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q22_A1" id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[22], A[1]</a>). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit
                     a person to fall into
                     sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 co."><a name="29419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29419] Iª q. 23 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod Deus aliquos reprobat. Dictum enim est supra quod
praedestinatio est pars providentiae. Ad providentiam autem
pertinet permittere aliquem defectum in rebus quae providentiae
subduntur, ut supra dictum est. Unde, cum per divinam providentiam
homines in vitam aeternam ordinentur, pertinet etiam ad divinam
providentiam, ut permittat aliquos ab isto fine deficere. Et hoc
dicitur reprobare. Sic igitur, sicut praedestinatio est pars
providentiae respectu eorum qui divinitus ordinantur in aeternam
salutem; ita reprobatio est pars providentiae respectu illorum qui
ab hoc fine decidunt. Unde reprobatio non nominat praescientiam
tantum, sed aliquid addit secundum rationem, sicut et providentia,
ut supra dictum est. Sicut enim praedestinatio includit voluntatem
conferendi gratiam et gloriam, ita reprobatio includit voluntatem
permittendi aliquem cadere in culpam, et inferendi damnationis
poenam pro culpa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them all.
                     So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular good---namely, eternal life---He is said to hate or reprobated them.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29420] Iª q. 23 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Deus omnes homines diligit, et etiam omnes creaturas,
inquantum omnibus vult aliquod bonum, non tamen quodcumque bonum
vult omnibus. Inquantum igitur quibusdam non vult hoc bonum quod
est vita aeterna, dicitur eos habere odio, vel reprobare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reprobation differs in its causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future
                     life by the predestined---namely, glory---and of what is received in this life---namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not
                     the cause of what is in the present---namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of
                     what is assigned in the future---namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from
                     the free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way, the word of the prophet is true---namely,
                     "Destruction is thy own, O Israel."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29421] Iª q. 23 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod aliter se habet reprobatio in causando, quam
praedestinatio. Nam praedestinatio est causa et eius quod
expectatur in futura vita a praedestinatis, scilicet gloriae; et
eius quod percipitur in praesenti, scilicet gratiae. Reprobatio
vero non est causa eius quod est in praesenti, scilicet culpae; sed
est causa derelictionis a Deo. Est tamen causa eius quod redditur
in futuro, scilicet poenae aeternae. Sed culpa provenit ex libero
arbitrio eius qui reprobatur et a gratia deseritur. Et secundum hoc
verificatur dictum prophetae, scilicet, <i>perditio tua, Israel, ex
te</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the reprobated
                     cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as implying absolute impossibility: but only conditional impossibility: as
                     was said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q19_A3" id="FP_Q23_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[3]</a>), that the predestined must necessarily be saved; yet a conditional necessity, which does not do away with the liberty of
                     choice. Whence, although
                     anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the
                     use of his free-will. Hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29422] Iª q. 23 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod reprobatio Dei non subtrahit aliquid de potentia
reprobati. Unde, cum dicitur quod reprobatus non potest gratiam
adipisci, non est hoc intelligendum secundum impossibilitatem
absolutam, sed secundum impossibilitatem conditionatam, sicut supra
dictum est quod praedestinatum necesse est salvari, necessitate
conditionata, quae non tollit libertatem arbitrii. Unde, licet
aliquis non possit gratiam adipisci qui reprobatur a Deo, tamen
quod in hoc peccatum vel illud labatur, ex eius libero arbitrio
contingit. Unde et merito sibi imputatur in culpam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q23_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q23_A4-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 4. Whether the predestined are chosen by God? [*"Eligantur."]</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the predestined are not chosen by God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1) that as the corporeal sun sends
                     his rays upon all without selection, so does God His goodness. But the goodness of God is communicated to some in an especial
                     manner through a participation of grace and glory. Therefore God without any selection communicates His grace and glory; and
                     this belongs to predestination.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29423] Iª q. 23 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod praedestinati non eligantur a Deo. Dicit
enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod, sicut sol corporeus non
eligendo omnibus corporibus lumen immittit, ita et Deus suam
bonitatem. Sed bonitas divina communicatur praecipue aliquibus
secundum participationem gratiae et gloriae. Ergo Deus absque
electione gratiam et gloriam communicat. Quod ad praedestinationem
pertinet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, election is of things that exist. But predestination from all eternity is also of things which do not exist. Therefore,
                     some are predestined without election.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29424] Iª q. 23 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
electio est eorum quae sunt. Sed praedestinatio ab aeterno est
etiam eorum quae non sunt. Ergo praedestinantur aliqui absque
electione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, election implies some discrimination. Now God "wills all men to be saved" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:4</a>). Therefore, predestination which ordains men towards eternal salvation, is without election.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29425" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29425] Iª q. 23 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
electio quandam discretionem importat. <i>Sed Deus vult omnes
homines salvos fieri</i>, ut dicitur I Tim. II. Ergo
praedestinatio, quae praeordinat homines in salutem, est absque
electione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.4" target="asv">Eph. 1:4</a>): "He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29426] Iª q. 23 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Ephes. I, <i>elegit nos in ipso ante mundi
constitutionem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Predestination presupposes election in the order of reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that predestination,
                     as stated above
                     <a href="#FP_Q23_A1" id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering
                     of some things towards an end; as was proved above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q22_A2" id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[22], A[2]</a>). But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end
                     already exists. Whence the predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that God wills
                     their salvation; and to this belong both election and love:---love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of eternal
                     salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q20_A2" id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[20], AA[2]</a>,3):---election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated above

                     <a href="#FP_Q23_A3" id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.4" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Election and love, however, are differently ordered in God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not
                     cause good, but we are incited to love by the good which already exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election
                     in us precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the
                     cause of that good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love
                     precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects of
                     election and love.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 co."><a name="29427" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29427] Iª q. 23 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod praedestinatio, secundum rationem, praesupponit electionem; et
electio dilectionem. Cuius ratio est, quia praedestinatio, ut
dictum est, est pars providentiae. Providentia autem, sicut et
prudentia, est ratio in intellectu existens, praeceptiva
ordinationis aliquorum in finem, ut supra dictum est. Non autem
praecipitur aliquid ordinandum in finem, nisi praeexistente
voluntate finis. Unde praedestinatio aliquorum in salutem aeternam,
praesupponit, secundum rationem, quod Deus illorum velit salutem.
Ad quod pertinet electio et dilectio. Dilectio quidem, inquantum
vult eis hoc bonum salutis aeternae, nam diligere est velle alicui
bonum, ut supra dictum est. Electio autem, inquantum hoc bonum
aliquibus prae aliis vult, cum quosdam reprobet, ut supra dictum
est. Electio tamen et dilectio aliter ordinantur in nobis et in
Deo, eo quod in nobis voluntas diligendo non causat bonum; sed ex
bono praeexistente incitamur ad diligendum. Et ideo eligimus
aliquem, quem diligamus, et sic electio dilectionem praecedit in
nobis. In Deo autem est e converso. Nam voluntas eius, qua vult
bonum alicui diligendo, est causa quod illud bonum ab eo prae aliis
habeatur. Et sic patet quod dilectio praesupponitur electioni,
secundum rationem; et electio praedestinationi. Unde omnes
praedestinati sunt electi et dilecti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered, God communicates His goodness without election; inasmuch
                     as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness, as we said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q6_A4" id="FP_Q23_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[6], A[4]</a>). But if we consider the communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it without election; since He gives
                     certain goods to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus in the
                     conferring of grace and glory election is implied.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29428] Iª q. 23 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, si consideretur communicatio bonitatis divinae in
communi, absque electione bonitatem suam communicat; inquantum
scilicet nihil est, quod non participet aliquid de bonitate eius,
ut supra dictum est. Sed si consideretur communicatio istius vel
illius boni, non absque electione tribuit, quia quaedam bona dat
aliquibus, quae non dat aliis. Et sic in collatione gratiae et
gloriae attenditur electio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the will of the person choosing is incited to make a choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen, the
                     choice must needs be of those things which already exist, as happens in our choice. In God it is otherwise; as was said above
                     (
                     <a href="#FP_Q20_A2" id="FP_Q23_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[20], A[2]</a>). Thus, as Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11): "Those are chosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does not err in His
                     choice."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29429] Iª q. 23 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, quando voluntas eligentis provocatur ad eligendum a
bono in re praeexistente, tunc oportet quod electio sit eorum quae
sunt; sicut accidit in electione nostra. Sed in Deo est aliter, ut
dictum est. Et ideo, sicut dicit Augustinus, <i>eliguntur a Deo qui
non sunt, neque tamen errat qui eligit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will, which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent
                     will, which is to will simply.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29430" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29430] Iª q. 23 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Deus vult omnes homines
salvos fieri antecedenter, quod non est simpliciter velle, sed
secundum quid, non autem consequenter, quod est simpliciter
velle.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q23_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q23_A5-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 5. Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. For the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.29" target="asv">Rom. 8:29</a>): "Whom He foreknew, He also predestined." Again a gloss of Ambrose on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.15" target="asv"> Rom. 9:15</a>: "I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy" says: "I will give mercy to him who, I foresee, will turn to Me with his
                     whole heart." Therefore it seems the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="29431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29431] Iª q. 23 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod praescientia meritorum sit causa
praedestinationis. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. VIII, <i>quos
praescivit, hos et praedestinavit</i>. Et Glossa Ambrosii, super
illud Rom. IX, <i>miserebor cui miserebor</i> etc., dicit,
<i>misericordiam illi dabo, quem praescio toto corde reversurum ad
me</i>. Ergo videtur quod praescientia meritorum sit causa
praedestinationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Divine predestination includes the divine will, which by no means can be irrational; since predestination is "the
                     purpose to have mercy," as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 17). But there can be no other reason for predestination than
                     the foreknowledge of merits. Therefore it must be the cause of reason of predestination.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="29432" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29432] Iª q. 23 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
praedestinatio divina includit divinam voluntatem, quae
irrationabilis esse non potest, cum praedestinatio sit propositum
miserendi, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed nulla alia ratio potest esse
praedestinationis nisi praescientia meritorum. Ergo praescientia
meritorum est causa vel ratio praedestinationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "There is no injustice in God" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.14" target="asv">Rom. 9:14</a>). Now it would seem unjust that unequal things be given to equals. But all men are equal as regards both nature and original
                     sin; and inequality in them arises from the merits or demerits of their actions. Therefore God does not prepare unequal things
                     for men by predestinating and reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and demerits.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="29433" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29433] Iª q. 23 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
<i>non est iniquitas apud Deum</i>, ut dicitur Rom. IX. Iniquum
autem esse videtur, ut aequalibus inaequalia dentur. Omnes autem
homines sunt aequales et secundum naturam, et secundum peccatum
originale, attenditur autem in eis inaequalitas secundum merita vel
demerita propriorum actuum. Non igitur inaequalia praeparat Deus
hominibus, praedestinando et reprobando, nisi propter differentium
meritorum praescientiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Titus.3.5" target="asv">Titus 3:5</a>): "Not by works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us." But as He saved us, so He predestined
                     that we should be saved. Therefore, foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of predestination.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 5 s. c."><a name="29434" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29434] Iª q. 23 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit apostolus, ad Tit. III, <i>non ex operibus iustitiae,
quae fecimus nos, sed secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos
fecit</i>. Sicut autem salvos nos fecit, ita et praedestinavit nos
salvos fieri. Non ergo praescientia meritorum est causa vel ratio
praedestinationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q23_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since predestination includes will, as was said above
                     <a href="#FP_Q23_A4" id="FP_Q23_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, the reason of predestination must be sought for in the same way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above
                     (
                     <a href="#FP_Q19_A5" id="FP_Q23_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[19], A[5]</a> ), that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the
                     part of the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on account of something else.
                     Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator.
                     But this is the question, whether, as regards the effect, predestination has any cause; or what comes to the same thing, whether
                     God pre-ordained that He would give the effect of predestination to anyone on account of any merits.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q23_A5-p7"> Accordingly there were some who held that the effect of predestination was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing
                     merits in a former life. This was the opinion of Origen, who thought that the souls of men were created in the beginning,
                     and according to the diversity of their works different states were assigned to them in this world when united with the body.
                     The Apostle, however, rebuts this opinion where he says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.11" target="asv">Rom. 9:11,12</a>): "For when they were
                     not yet born, nor had done any good or evil . . . not of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said of her: The elder shall
                     serve the younger."
                  </p><p id="FP_Q23_A5-p8"> Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians
                     taught that the beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummation from God: so that it came about that the effect
                     of predestination was granted to one, and not to another, because the one made a beginning by preparing, whereas the other
                     did not. But against this we have the saying of the Apostle (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.5" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:5</a>), that "we are not
                     sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves." Now no principle of action can be imagined previous to the act
                     of thinking. Wherefore it cannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason of the effect of predestination.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q23_A5-p9"> And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand
                     that God gives grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it, because He knows beforehand that He will make good
                     use of that grace, as if a king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make good use of it. But these
                     seem to have drawn a distinction between that which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as
                     if the same thing cannot come from both. It is, however, manifest that what is of grace is the effect of predestination; and
                     this cannot be considered as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the notion of predestination. Therefore,
                     if anything else in us be the reason of predestination, it will outside the effect of predestination. Now there is no distinction
                     between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; as there is not distinction between what flows from a
                     secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of God produces effects through the operation of secondary causes,
                     as was above shown (
                     <a href="#FP_Q22_A3" id="FP_Q23_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We must say, therefore, that the effect of predestination
                     may be considered in a twofold light---in one way, in particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of predestination
                     should not be the reason or cause of another; a subsequent
                     effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent
                     as its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the matter. Thus we might say that God pre-ordained to give
                     glory on account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace to merit glory. In another way, the effect of predestination
                     may be considered in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination in general should have
                     any cause as coming from us; because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all included under the effect
                     of predestination; even the preparation for grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by divine help, according to
                     the prophet Jeremias (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Lam.5.21" target="asv">Lam. 5:21</a>): "convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted." Yet predestination has in this way, in regard to its effect,
                     the goodness of God for its reason; towards which the whole effect of
                     predestination is directed as to an end; and from which it proceeds, as from its first moving principle.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 5 co."><a name="29435" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29435] Iª q. 23 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, cum praedestinatio includat voluntatem, ut supra dictum est,
sic inquirenda est ratio praedestinationis, sicut inquiritur ratio
divinae voluntatis. Dictum est autem supra quod non est assignare
causam divinae voluntatis ex parte actus volendi; sed potest
assignari ratio ex parte volitorum, inquantum scilicet Deus vult
esse aliquid propter aliud. Nullus ergo fuit ita insanae mentis,
qui diceret merita esse causam divinae praedestinationis, ex parte
actus praedestinantis. Sed hoc sub quaestione vertitur, utrum ex
parte effectus, praedestinatio habeat aliquam causam. Et hoc est
quaerere, utrum Deus praeordinaverit se daturum effectum
praedestinationis alicui, propter merita aliqua. Fuerunt igitur
quidam, qui dixerunt quod effectus praedestinationis praeordinatur
alicui propter merita praeexistentia in alia vita. Et haec fuit
positio Origenis, qui posuit animas humanas ab initio creatas, et
secundum diversitatem suorum operum, diversos status eas sortiri in
hoc mundo corporibus unitas. Sed hanc opinionem excludit apostolus,
Rom. IX, dicens, <i>cum nondum nati fuissent, aut aliquid egissent
boni vel mali, non ex operibus, sed ex vocante dictum est, quia
maior serviet minori</i>. Fuerunt ergo alii, qui dixerunt quod
merita praeexistentia in hac vita sunt ratio et causa effectus
praedestinationis. Posuerunt enim Pelagiani quod initium
benefaciendi sit ex nobis, consummatio autem a Deo. Et sic, ex hoc
contingit quod alicui datur praedestinationis effectus, et non
alteri, quia unus initium dedit se praeparando, et non alius. Sed
contra hoc est quod dicit apostolus, II Cor. III, quod <i>non sumus
sufficientes cogitare aliquid a nobis, quasi ex nobis</i>. Nullum
autem anterius principium inveniri potest quam cogitatio. Unde non
potest dici quod aliquod in nobis initium existat, quod sit ratio
effectus praedestinationis. Unde fuerunt alii, qui dixerunt quod
merita sequentia praedestinationis effectum, sunt ratio
praedestinationis, ut intelligatur quod ideo Deus dat gratiam
alicui, et praeordinavit se ei daturum, quia praescivit eum bene
usurum gratia; sicut si rex det alicui militi equum, quem scit eo
bene usurum. Sed isti videntur distinxisse inter id quod est ex
gratia, et id quod est ex libero arbitrio, quasi non possit esse
idem ex utroque. Manifestum est autem quod id quod est gratiae, est
praedestinationis effectus, et hoc non potest poni ut ratio
praedestinationis, cum hoc sub praedestinatione concludatur. Si
igitur aliquid aliud ex parte nostra sit ratio praedestinationis,
hoc erit praeter effectum praedestinationis. Non est autem
distinctum quod est ex libero arbitrio, et ex praedestinatione;
sicut nec est distinctum quod est ex causa secunda, et causa prima,
divina enim providentia producit effectus per operationes causarum
secundarum, ut supra dictum est. Unde et id quod est per liberum
arbitrium, est ex praedestinatione. Dicendum est ergo quod effectum
praedestinationis considerare possumus dupliciter. Uno modo, in
particulari. Et sic nihil prohibet aliquem effectum
praedestinationis esse causam et rationem alterius, posteriorem
quidem prioris, secundum rationem causae finalis; priorem vero
posterioris, secundum rationem causae meritoriae, quae reducitur ad
dispositionem materiae. Sicut si dicamus quod Deus praeordinavit se
daturum alicui gloriam ex meritis; et quod praeordinavit se daturum
alicui gratiam, ut mereretur gloriam. Alio modo potest considerari
praedestinationis effectus in communi. Et sic impossibile est quod
totus praedestinationis effectus in communi habeat aliquam causam
ex parte nostra. Quia quidquid est in homine ordinans ipsum in
salutem, comprehenditur totum sub effectu praedestinationis, etiam
ipsa praeparatio ad gratiam, neque enim hoc fit nisi per auxilium
divinum, secundum illud Thren. ultimi, <i>converte nos, domine, ad
te, et convertemur</i>. Habet tamen hoc modo praedestinatio, ex
parte effectus, pro ratione divinam bonitatem; ad quam totus
effectus praedestinationis ordinatur ut in finem, et ex qua
procedit sicut ex principio primo movente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The use of grace foreknown by God is not the cause of conferring grace, except after the manner of a final cause; as was
                     explained above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="29436" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29436] Iª q. 23 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod usus gratiae praescitus, non est ratio collationis
gratiae, nisi secundum rationem causae finalis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Predestination has its foundation in the goodness of God as regards its effects in general. Considered in its particular
                     effects, however, one effect is the reason of another; as already stated.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="29437" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29437] Iª q. 23 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod praedestinatio habet rationem ex parte effectus, in
communi, ipsam divinam bonitatem. In particulari autem, unus
effectus est ratio alterius, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A5-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He
                     is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is
                     necessary that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because
                     creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that
                     for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low
                     place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good
                     things should never happen, as was said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q22_A2" id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness
                     in men; in respect to those whom He predestines,
                     by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing
                     them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.22" target="asv">Rom. 9:22,23</a>): "What if God, willing to show His wrath [that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power known, endured [that
                     is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His
                     glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory" and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.3" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.20" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:20</a>): "But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto
                     honor, but some unto dishonor." Yet why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine
                     will. Whence Augustine says (Tract. xxvi. in Joan.): "Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou
                     dost not wish to err."
                     Thus too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it
                     was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity
                     of species in things of nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form, and that under another,
                     depends upon the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part of
                     the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place.
                     Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This
                     would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratuitously.
                     In things which are given gratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he deprives nobody
                     of his due), without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said: "Take what is thine, and go thy
                     way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.20.14" target="asv">Mat. 20:14,15</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="29438" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29438] Iª q. 23 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod ex ipsa bonitate divina ratio sumi potest
praedestinationis aliquorum, et reprobationis aliorum. Sic enim
Deus dicitur omnia propter suam bonitatem fecisse, ut in rebus
divina bonitas repraesentetur. Necesse est autem quod divina
bonitas, quae in se est una et simplex, multiformiter
repraesentetur in rebus; propter hoc quod res creatae ad
simplicitatem divinam attingere non possunt. Et inde est quod ad
completionem universi requiruntur diversi gradus rerum, quarum
quaedam altum, et quaedam infimum locum teneant in universo. Et ut
multiformitas graduum conservetur in rebus, Deus permittit aliqua
mala fieri, ne multa bona impediantur, ut supra dictum est. Sic
igitur consideremus totum genus humanum, sicut totam rerum
universitatem. Voluit igitur Deus in hominibus, quantum ad aliquos,
quos praedestinat, suam repraesentare bonitatem per modum
misericordiae, parcendo; et quantum ad aliquos, quos reprobat, per
modum iustitiae, puniendo. Et haec est ratio quare Deus quosdam
eligit, et quosdam reprobat. Et hanc causam assignat apostolus, ad
Rom. IX, dicens, volens Deus ostendere iram (idest vindictam
iustitiae), et notam facere potentiam suam, sustinuit (idest
permisit) <i>in multa patientia, vasa irae apta in interitum, ut
ostenderet divitias gloriae suae in vasa misericordiae, quae
praeparavit in gloriam</i>. Et II Tim. II dicit, <i>in magna autem
domo non solum sunt vasa aurea et argentea, sed etiam lignea et
fictilia; et quaedam quidem in honorem, quaedam in contumeliam</i>.
Sed quare hos elegit in gloriam, et illos reprobavit, non habet
rationem nisi divinam voluntatem. Unde Augustinus dicit, super
Ioannem, <i>quare hunc trahat, et illum non trahat, noli velle
diiudicare, si non vis errare</i>. Sicut etiam in rebus naturalibus
potest assignari ratio, cum prima materia tota sit in se uniformis,
quare una pars eius est sub forma ignis, et alia sub forma terrae,
a Deo in principio condita, ut scilicet sit diversitas specierum in
rebus naturalibus. Sed quare haec pars materiae est sub ista forma,
et illa sub alia, dependet ex simplici divina voluntate. Sicut ex
simplici voluntate artificis dependet, quod ille lapis est in ista
parte parietis, et ille in alia, quamvis ratio artis habeat quod
aliqui sint in hac, et aliqui sint in illa. Neque tamen propter hoc
est iniquitas apud Deum, si inaequalia non inaequalibus praeparat.
Hoc enim esset contra iustitiae rationem, si praedestinationis
effectus ex debito redderetur, et non daretur ex gratia. In his
enim quae ex gratia dantur, potest aliquis pro libito suo dare cui
vult, plus vel minus, dummodo nulli subtrahat debitum, absque
praeiudicio iustitiae. Et hoc est quod dicit paterfamilias, Matt.
XX, <i>tolle quod tuum est, et vade. An non licet mihi quod volo,
facere?</i></p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q23_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q23_A6-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 6. Whether predestination is certain?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that predestination is not certain. Because on the words "Hold fast that which thou hast, that no one take thy crown,"
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.3.11" target="asv">Rev 3:11</a>), Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 15): "Another will not receive, unless this one were to lose it." Hence the crown which
                     is the effect of predestination can be both acquired and lost. Therefore predestination cannot be certain.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="29439" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29439] Iª q. 23 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod praedestinatio non sit certa. Quia super
illud Apoc. III, <i>tene quod habes, ne alius accipiat coronam
tuam</i>, dicit Augustinus, quod <i>alius non est accepturus, nisi
iste perdiderit</i>. Potest ergo et acquiri et perdi corona, quae
est praedestinationis effectus. Non est igitur praedestinatio
certa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, granted what is possible, nothing impossible follows. But it is possible that one predestined---e.g. Peter---may
                     sin and then be killed. But if this were so, it would follow that the effect of predestination would be thwarted. This then,
                     is not impossible. Therefore predestination is not certain.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="29440" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29440] Iª q. 23 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
posito possibili, nullum sequitur impossibile. Possibile est autem
aliquem praedestinatum, ut Petrum, peccare, et tunc occidi. Hoc
autem posito, sequitur praedestinationis effectum frustrari. Hoc
igitur non est impossibile. Non ergo est praedestinatio certa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever God could do in the past, He can do now. But He could have not predestined whom He hath predestined. Therefore
                     now He is able not to predestine him. Therefore predestination is not certain.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="29441" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29441] Iª q. 23 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
quidquid Deus potuit, potest. Sed potuit non praedestinare quem
praedestinavit. Ergo nunc potest non praedestinare. Ergo
praedestinatio non est certa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.29" target="asv"> Rom. 8:29</a>: "Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated", says: "Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of
                     God, by which whosoever are freed will most certainly be freed."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 s. c."><a name="29442" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29442] Iª q. 23 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod super illud Rom. VIII, <i>quos praescivit, et
praedestinavit</i> etc., dicit Glossa, <i>praedestinatio est
praescientia et praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, qua certissime
liberantur quicumque liberantur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that, namely, its effect
                     should take place from necessity. For it was said above
                     <a href="#FP_Q23_A1" id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, that predestination is a part of providence. But not all things subject to providence are necessary; some things happening
                     from contingency, according to the nature of the proximate causes, which divine providence has ordained for such effects.
                     Yet
                     the order of providence is infallible, as was shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q22_A4" id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[22], A[4]</a>). So also the order of predestination is certain; yet free-will is not destroyed; whence the effect of predestination has
                     its contingency. Moreover all that has been said about the divine knowledge and will (
                     <a href="#FP_Q14_A13" id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[14], A[13]</a>;
                     <a href="#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.4" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>) must also be taken into consideration; since they do not destroy contingency in things, although they themselves are
                     most certain and infallible.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 co."><a name="29443" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29443] Iª q. 23 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod praedestinatio certissime et infallibiliter consequitur suum
effectum, nec tamen imponit necessitatem, ut scilicet effectus eius
ex necessitate proveniat. Dictum est enim supra quod praedestinatio
est pars providentiae. Sed non omnia quae providentiae subduntur,
necessaria sunt, sed quaedam contingenter eveniunt, secundum
conditionem causarum proximarum, quas ad tales effectus divina
providentia ordinavit. Et tamen providentiae ordo est infallibilis,
ut supra ostensum est. Sic igitur et ordo praedestinationis est
certus; et tamen libertas arbitrii non tollitur, ex qua
contingenter provenit praedestinationis effectus. Ad hoc etiam
consideranda sunt quae supra dicta sunt de divina scientia et de
divina voluntate, quae contingentiam a rebus non tollunt, licet
certissima et infallibilia sint.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The crown may be said to belong to a person in two ways; first, by God's predestination, and thus no one loses his crown:
                     secondly, by the merit of grace; for what we merit, in a certain way is ours; and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal
                     sin. Another person receives that crown thus lost, inasmuch as he takes the former's place. For God does not permit some to
                     fall, without raising others; according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Job.34.24" target="asv"> Job 34:24</a>: "He shall
                     break in pieces many and innumerable, and make others to stand in their stead." Thus men are substituted in the place of the
                     fallen angels; and the Gentiles in that of the Jews. He who is substituted for another in the state of grace, also receives
                     the crown of the fallen in that in eternal life he will rejoice at the good the other has done, in which life he will rejoice
                     at all good whether done by himself or by others.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="29444" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29444] Iª q. 23 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod corona dicitur esse alicuius, dupliciter. Uno modo,
ex praedestinatione divina, et sic nullus coronam suam amittit.
Alio modo, ex merito gratiae, quod enim meremur, quodammodo nostrum
est. Et sic suam coronam aliquis amittere potest per peccatum
mortale sequens. Alius autem illam coronam amissam accipit,
inquantum loco eius subrogatur. Non enim permittit Deus aliquos
cadere, quin alios erigat, secundum illud Iob XXXIV, <i>conteret
multos et innumerabiles, et stare faciet alios pro eis</i>. Sic
enim in locum Angelorum cadentium substituti sunt homines; et in
locum Iudaeorum, gentiles. Substitutus autem in statum gratiae,
etiam quantum ad hoc coronam cadentis accipit, quod de bonis quae
alius fecit, in aeterna vita gaudebit, in qua unusquisque gaudebit
de bonis tam a se quam ab aliis factis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although it is possible for one who is predestinated considered in himself to die in mortal sin; yet it is not possible,
                     supposed, as in fact it is supposed. that he is predestinated. Whence it does not follow that predestination can fall short
                     of its effect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="29445" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29445] Iª q. 23 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, licet sit possibile eum qui est praedestinatus, mori
in peccato mortali, secundum se consideratum; tamen hoc est
impossibile, posito (prout scilicet ponitur) eum esse
praedestinatum. Unde non sequitur quod praedestinatio falli
possit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since predestination includes the divine will as stated above
                     <a href="#FP_Q23_A4" id="FP_Q23_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>: and the fact that God wills any created thing is necessary on the supposition that He so wills, on account of the immutability
                     of the divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so the same must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not to
                     say that God is able not to predestinate one whom He has predestinated, taking it in a composite sense,
                     thought, absolutely speaking, God can predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty of predestination is not destroyed.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="29446" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29446] Iª q. 23 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, cum praedestinatio includat divinam voluntatem,
sicut supra dictum est quod Deum velle aliquid creatum est
necessarium ex suppositione, propter immutabilitatem divinae
voluntatis, non tamen absolute; ita dicendum est hic de
praedestinatione. Unde non oportet dicere quod Deus possit non
praedestinare quem praedestinavit, in sensu composito accipiendo;
licet, absolute considerando, Deus possit praedestinare vel non
praedestinare. Sed ex hoc non tollitur praedestinationis
certitudo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q23_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q23_A7-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 7. Whether the number of the predestined is certain?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the number of the predestined is not certain. For a number to which an addition can be made is not certain.
                     But there can be an addition to the number of the predestined as it seems; for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.1.11" target="asv">Dt. 1:11</a>): "The Lord God adds to this number many thousands," and a gloss adds, "fixed by God, who knows those who belong to Him."
                     Therefore the number of the predestined is not certain.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="29447" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29447] Iª q. 23 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod numerus praedestinatorum non sit certus.
Numerus enim cui potest fieri additio, non est certus. Sed numero
praedestinatorum potest fieri additio, ut videtur, dicitur enim
Deut. I, <i>dominus Deus noster addat ad hunc numerum multa
millia</i>; Glossa, <i>idest definitum apud Deum, qui novit qui
sunt eius</i>. Ergo numerus praedestinatorum non est certus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no reason can be assigned why God pre-ordains to salvation one number of men more than another. But nothing is arranged
                     by God without a reason. Therefore the number to be saved pre-ordained by God cannot be certain.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="29448" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29448] Iª q. 23 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, non
potest assignari ratio quare magis in hoc numero quam in alio, Deus
homines praeordinet ad salutem. Sed nihil a Deo sine ratione
disponitur. Ergo non est certus numerus salvandorum praeordinatus a
Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the operations of God are more perfect than those of nature. But in the works of nature, good is found in the majority
                     of things; defect and evil in the minority. If, then, the number of the saved were fixed by God at a certain figure, there
                     would be more saved than lost. Yet the contrary follows from
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.13" target="asv"> Mat. 7:13,14</a>: "For wide is the gate, and broad the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat. How narrow
                     is the gate, and strait is the way that leadeth to life; and few there are who find it!" Therefore the number of those pre-ordained
                     by God to be saved is not certain.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="29449" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29449] Iª q. 23 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
operatio Dei est perfectior quam operatio naturae. Sed in operibus
naturae bonum invenitur ut in pluribus, defectus autem et malum ut
in paucioribus. Si igitur a Deo institueretur numerus salvandorum,
plures essent salvandi quam damnandi. Cuius contrarium ostenditur
Matt. VII, ubi dicitur, <i>lata et spatiosa est via quae ducit ad
perditionem, et multi sunt qui intrant per eam, angusta est porta,
et arcta via, quae ducit ad vitam, et pauci sunt qui inveniunt
eam</i>. Non ergo est praeordinatus a Deo numerus salvandorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A7-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 13): "The number of the predestined is certain, and can neither be increased nor diminished."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 7 s. c."><a name="29450" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29450] Iª q. 23 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de correptione et gratia, <i>certus
est praedestinatorum numerus, qui neque augeri potest, neque
minui</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q23_A7-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The number of the predestined is certain. Some have said that it was formally, but not materially certain; as if we were
                     to say that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be saved; not however these or those individuals. But this destroys
                     the certainty of predestination; of which we spoke above
                     <a href="#FP_Q23_A6" id="FP_Q23_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>. Therefore we must say that to God the number of the predestined is certain, not only formally, but also materially. It
                     must, however, be observed that the number of the predestined is said to be certain to God, not by reason of His knowledge,
                     because, that is to say, He knows how many will be saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain and the sands of the
                     sea are certain to God); but by reason of His deliberate choice and determination. For the further evidence of which we must
                     remember that every agent intends to make something finite, as is clear from what has been said above when we treated of the
                     infinite (
                     <a href="#FP_Q7_A2" id="FP_Q23_A7-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[7], AA[2]</a>,3). Now whosoever intends some definite measure in his effect thinks out some definite number in the essential parts, which
                     are by their very nature required for the perfection of the whole. For of those things which are required not principally,
                     but only on account of something else, he does not select any definite number "per se"; but he accepts and uses them in such
                     numbers as are necessary on account of that other thing. For instance, a builder
                     thinks out the definite measurements of a house, and also the definite number of rooms which he wishes to make in the house;
                     and definite measurements of the walls and roof; he does not, however, select a definite number of stones, but accepts and
                     uses just so many as are sufficient for the required measurements of the wall. So also must we consider concerning God in
                     regard to the whole universe, which is His effect. For He pre-ordained the measurements of the whole of the universe, and
                     what
                     number would befit the essential parts of that universe---that is to say, which have in some way been ordained in perpetuity;
                     how many spheres, how many stars, how many elements, and how many species. Individuals, however, which undergo corruption,
                     are not ordained as it were chiefly for the good of the universe, but in a secondary way, inasmuch as the good of the species
                     is preserved through them. Whence, although God knows the total number of individuals, the number of oxen, flies and such
                     like, is not pre-ordained by God "per se"; but divine providence produces just so many as are sufficient for the preservation
                     of the species. Now of all creatures the rational creature is chiefly ordained for the good of the universe, being as such
                     incorruptible; more especially those who attain to eternal happiness, since they more immediately reach the ultimate end.
                     Whence the number of the predestined is certain to God; not only by way of knowledge, but also by way of a principal
                     pre-ordination.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q23_A7-p7"> It is not exactly the same thing in the case of the number of the reprobate, who would seem to be pre-ordained by God for
                     the good of the elect, in whose regard "all things work together unto good" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A7-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.28" target="asv">Rom. 8:28</a>). Concerning the number of all the predestined, some say that so many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as
                     there were angels left; others, as many as the number of angels created by God. It is, however, better to say that, "to God
                     alone is
                     known the number for whom is reserved eternal happiness [*From the 'secret' prayer of the missal, 'pro vivis et defunctis.']"
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 7 co."><a name="29451" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29451] Iª q. 23 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod numerus praedestinatorum est certus. Sed quidam dixerunt eum
esse certum formaliter, sed non materialiter, ut puta si diceremus
certum esse quod centum vel mille salventur, non autem quod hi vel
illi. Sed hoc tollit certitudinem praedestinationis, de qua iam
diximus. Et ideo oportet dicere quod numerus praedestinatorum sit
certus Deo non solum formaliter, sed etiam materialiter. Sed
advertendum est quod numerus praedestinatorum certus Deo dicitur,
non solum ratione cognitionis, quia scilicet scit quot sunt
salvandi (sic enim Deo certus est etiam numerus guttarum pluviae,
et arenae maris); sed ratione electionis et definitionis cuiusdam.
Ad cuius evidentiam, est sciendum quod omne agens intendit facere
aliquid finitum, ut ex supradictis de infinito apparet. Quicumque
autem intendit aliquam determinatam mensuram in suo effectu,
excogitat aliquem numerum in partibus essentialibus eius, quae per
se requiruntur ad perfectionem totius. Non enim per se eligit
aliquem numerum in his quae non principaliter requiruntur, sed
solum propter aliud, sed in tanto numero accipit huiusmodi,
inquantum sunt necessaria propter aliud. Sicut aedificator
excogitat determinatam mensuram domus, et etiam determinatum
numerum mansionum quas vult facere in domo, et determinatum numerum
mensurarum parietis vel tecti, non autem eligit determinatum
numerum lapidum, sed accipit tot, quot sufficiunt ad explendam
tantam mensuram parietis. Sic igitur considerandum est in Deo,
respectu totius universitatis quae est eius effectus. Praeordinavit
enim in qua mensura deberet esse totum universum, et quis numerus
esset conveniens essentialibus partibus universi, quae scilicet
habent aliquo modo ordinem ad perpetuitatem; quot scilicet
sphaerae, quot stellae, quot elementa, quot species rerum.
Individua vero corruptibilia non ordinantur ad bonum universi quasi
principaliter, sed quasi secundario, inquantum in eis salvatur
bonum speciei. Unde, licet Deus sciat numerum omnium individuorum,
non tamen numerus vel boum vel culicum, vel aliorum huiusmodi, est
per se praeordinatus a Deo, sed tot ex huiusmodi divina providentia
produxit, quot sufficiunt ad specierum conservationem. Inter omnes
autem creaturas, principalius ordinantur ad bonum universi
creaturae rationales, quae, inquantum huiusmodi, incorruptibiles
sunt; et potissime illae quae beatitudinem consequuntur, quae
immediatius attingunt ultimum finem. Unde certus est Deo numerus
praedestinatorum, non solum per modum cognitionis, sed etiam per
modum cuiusdam principalis praefinitionis. Non sic autem omnino est
de numero reproborum; qui videntur esse praeordinati a Deo in bonum
electorum, quibus omnia cooperantur in bonum. De numero autem
omnium praedestinatorum hominum, quis sit, dicunt quidam quod tot
ex hominibus salvabuntur, quot Angeli ceciderunt. Quidam vero, quod
tot salvabuntur, quot Angeli remanserunt. Quidam vero, quod tot ex
hominibus salvabuntur, quot Angeli ceciderunt, et insuper tot, quot
fuerunt Angeli creati. Sed melius dicitur quod <i>soli Deo est
cognitus numerus electorum in superna felicitate locandus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Deuteronomy must be taken as applied to those who are marked out by God beforehand in respect to present righteousness.
                     For their number is increased and diminished, but not the number of the predestined.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="29452" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29452] Iª q. 23 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod verbum illud Deuteronomii est intelligendum de illis
qui sunt praenotati a Deo respectu praesentis iustitiae. Horum enim
numerus et augetur et minuitur, et non numerus
praedestinatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason of the quantity of any one part must be judged from the proportion of that part of the whole. Thus in God the
                     reason why He has made so many stars, or so many species of things, or predestined so many, is according to the proportion
                     of the principal parts to the good of the whole universe.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="29453" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29453] Iª q. 23 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ratio quantitatis alicuius partis, accipienda est ex
proportione illius partis ad totum. Sic enim est apud Deum ratio
quare tot stellas fecerit, vel tot rerum species, et quare tot
praedestinavit, ex proportione partium principalium ad bonum
universi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A7-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The good that is proportionate to the common state of nature is to be found in the majority; and is wanting in the minority.
                     The good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be found in the minority, and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is
                     clear that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guidance of life; and those who have not this knowledge
                     are said to be half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a profound knowledge
                     of things intelligible are a very small minority in respect to the rest. Since their eternal happiness, consisting in the
                     vision of God, exceeds the common state of nature, and especially in so far as this is deprived of grace through the corruption
                     of original sin, those who are saved are in the minority. In this especially, however, appears the mercy of God, that He has
                     chosen some for that salvation, from which very many in accordance with the common course and tendency of nature fall
                     short.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="29454" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29454] Iª q. 23 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod bonum proportionatum communi statui naturae, accidit
ut in pluribus; et defectus ab hoc bono, ut in paucioribus. Sed
bonum quod excedit communem statum naturae, invenitur ut in
paucioribus; et defectus ab hoc bono, ut in pluribus. Sicut patet
quod plures homines sunt qui habent sufficientem scientiam ad
regimen vitae suae, pauciores autem qui hac scientia carent, qui
moriones vel stulti dicuntur, sed paucissimi sunt, respectu
aliorum, qui attingunt ad habendam profundam scientiam
intelligibilium rerum. Cum igitur beatitudo aeterna, in visione Dei
consistens, excedat communem statum naturae, et praecipue secundum
quod est gratia destituta per corruptionem originalis peccati,
pauciores sunt qui salvantur. Et in hoc etiam maxime misericordia
Dei apparet, quod aliquos in illam salutem erigit, a qua plurimi
deficiunt secundum communem cursum et inclinationem naturae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q23_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q23_A8-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 8. Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For nothing eternal can be preceded by anything
                     temporal; and in consequence nothing temporal can help towards making something else eternal. But predestination is eternal.
                     Therefore, since the prayers of the saints are temporal, they cannot so help as to cause anyone to become predestined. Predestination
                     therefore is not furthered by the prayers of the saints.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="29455" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29455] Iª q. 23 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod praedestinatio non possit iuvari precibus
sanctorum. Nullum enim aeternum praeceditur ab aliquo temporali, et
per consequens non potest temporale iuvare ad hoc quod aliquod
aeternum sit. Sed praedestinatio est aeterna. Cum igitur preces
sanctorum sint temporales, non possunt iuvare ad hoc quod aliquis
praedestinetur. Non ergo praedestinatio iuvatur precibus
sanctorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as there is no need of advice except on account of defective knowledge, so there is not need of help except through
                     defective power. But neither of these things can be said of God when He predestines. Whence it is said: "Who hath helped the
                     Spirit of the Lord? [*Vulg.: 'Who hath known the mind of the Lord?'] Or who hath been His counsellor?" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.34" target="asv">Rom. 11:34</a>). Therefore predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="29456" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29456] Iª q. 23 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
nihil indiget consilio nisi propter defectum cognitionis, ita nihil
indiget auxilio nisi propter defectum virtutis. Sed neutrum horum
competit Deo praedestinanti, unde dicitur Rom. XI, <i>quis adiuvit
spiritum domini? Aut quis consiliarius eius fuit?</i> Ergo
praedestinatio non iuvatur precibus sanctorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a thing can be helped, it can also be hindered. But predestination cannot be hindered by anything. Therefore
                     it cannot be furthered by anything.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="29457" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29457] Iª q. 23 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
eiusdem est adiuvari et impediri. Sed praedestinatio non potest
aliquo impediri. Ergo non potest aliquo iuvari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said that "Isaac besought the Lord for his wife because she was barren; and He heard him and made Rebecca to conceive"
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.25.21" target="asv">Gn. 25:21</a>). But from that conception Jacob was born, and he was predestined. Now his predestination would not have happened if he had
                     never been born. Therefore predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 8 s. c."><a name="29458" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29458] Iª q. 23 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Genes. XXV, quod <i>Isaac rogavit Deum pro Rebecca
uxore sua, et dedit conceptum Rebeccae</i>. Ex illo autem conceptu
natus est Iacob, qui praedestinatus fuit. Non autem fuisset impleta
praedestinatio, si natus non fuisset. Ergo praedestinatio iuvatur
precibus sanctorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q23_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Concerning this question, there were different errors. Some, regarding the certainty of divine predestination, said that
                     prayers were superfluous, as also anything else done to attain salvation; because whether these things were done or not, the
                     predestined would attain, and the reprobate would not attain, eternal salvation. But against this opinion are all the warnings
                     of Holy Scripture, exhorting us to prayer and other good works.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q23_A8-p7"> Others declared that the divine predestination was altered through prayer. This is stated to have the opinion of the Egyptians,
                     who thought that the divine ordination, which they called fate, could be frustrated by certain sacrifices and prayers. Against
                     this also is the authority of Scripture. For it is said: "But the triumpher in Israel will not spare and will not be moved
                     to repentance" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.15.29" target="asv">1 Kings 15:29</a>); and that "the gifts and the calling of God are
                     without repentance" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.29" target="asv">Rom. 11:29</a>).
                  </p><p id="FP_Q23_A8-p8"> Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are to be considered---namely, the divine ordination; and
                     its effect. As regards the former, in no possible way can predestination be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For it
                     is not due to their prayers that anyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter, predestination is said to be helped
                     by the prayers of the saints, and by other good works; because providence, of which predestination is a part, does
                     not do away with secondary causes but so provides effects, that the order of secondary causes falls also under providence.
                     So, as natural effects are provided by God in such a way that natural causes are directed to bring about those natural effects,
                     without which those effects would not happen; so the salvation of a person is predestined by God in such a way, that whatever
                     helps that person towards salvation falls under the order of predestination; whether it be one's own prayers or those of
                     another; or other good works, and such like, without which one would not attain to salvation. Whence, the predestined must
                     strive after good works and prayer; because through these means predestination is most certainly fulfilled. For this reason
                     it is said: "Labor more that by good works you may make sure your calling and election" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.1.10" target="asv">2 Pet. 1:10</a>).
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 8 co."><a name="29459" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29459] Iª q. 23 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod circa hanc quaestionem diversi errores fuerunt. Quidam enim,
attendentes certitudinem divinae praedestinationis, dixerunt
superfluas esse orationes, vel quidquid aliud fiat ad salutem
aeternam consequendam, quia his factis vel non factis,
praedestinati consequuntur, reprobati non consequuntur. Sed contra
hoc sunt omnes admonitiones sacrae Scripturae, exhortantes ad
orationem, et ad alia bona opera. Alii vero dixerunt quod per
orationes mutatur divina praedestinatio. Et haec dicitur fuisse
opinio Aegyptiorum, qui ponebant ordinationem divinam, quam fatum
appellabant, aliquibus sacrificiis et orationibus impediri posse.
Sed contra hoc etiam est auctoritas sacrae Scripturae. Dicitur enim
I Reg. XV, porro <i>triumphator in Israel non parcet, neque
poenitudine flectetur</i>. Et Rom. XI dicitur quod <i>sine
poenitentia sunt dona Dei et vocatio</i>. Et ideo aliter dicendum,
quod in praedestinatione duo sunt consideranda, scilicet ipsa
praeordinatio divina, et effectus eius. Quantum igitur ad primum,
nullo modo praedestinatio iuvatur precibus sanctorum, non enim
precibus sanctorum fit, quod aliquis praedestinetur a Deo. Quantum
vero ad secundum, dicitur praedestinatio iuvari precibus sanctorum,
et aliis bonis operibus, quia providentia, cuius praedestinatio est
pars, non subtrahit causas secundas, sed sic providet effectus, ut
etiam ordo causarum secundarum subiaceat providentiae. Sicut igitur
sic providentur naturales effectus, ut etiam causae naturales ad
illos naturales effectus ordinentur, sine quibus illi effectus non
provenirent; ita praedestinatur a Deo salus alicuius, ut etiam sub
ordine praedestinationis cadat quidquid hominem promovet in
salutem, vel orationes propriae, vel aliorum, vel alia bona, vel
quidquid huiusmodi, sine quibus aliquis salutem non consequitur.
Unde praedestinatis conandum est ad bene operandum et orandum, quia
per huiusmodi praedestinationis effectus certitudinaliter impletur.
Propter quod dicitur II Petr. I, <i>satagite, ut per bona opera
certam vestram vocationem et electionem faciatis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument shows that predestination is not furthered by the prayers of the saints, as regards the preordination.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="29460" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29460] Iª q. 23 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod ratio illa ostendit quod praedestinatio non iuvatur
precibus sanctorum, quantum ad ipsam praeordinationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A8-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One is said to be helped by another in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as he receives power from him: and to be helped thus
                     belongs to the weak; but this cannot be said of God, and thus we are to understand, "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord?"
                     In another way one is said to be helped by a person through whom he carries out his work, as a master through a servant. In
                     this way God is helped by us; inasmuch as we execute His orders, according to

                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:9</a>: "We are God's co-adjutors." Nor is this on account of any defect in the power of God, but because He employs intermediary
                     causes, in order that the beauty of order may be preserved in the universe; and also that He may communicate to creatures
                     the dignity of causality.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="29461" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29461] Iª q. 23 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod aliquis dicitur adiuvari per alium, dupliciter. Uno
modo, inquantum ab eo accipit virtutem, et sic adiuvari infirmi
est, unde Deo non competit. Et sic intelligitur illud, <i>quis
adiuvit spiritum domini?</i> Alio modo dicitur quis adiuvari per
aliquem, per quem exequitur suam operationem, sicut dominus per
ministrum. Et hoc modo Deus adiuvatur per nos, inquantum exequimur
suam ordinationem, secundum illud I ad Cor. III, <i>Dei enim
adiutores sumus</i>. Neque hoc est propter defectum divinae
virtutis, sed quia utitur causis mediis, ut ordinis pulchritudo
servetur in rebus, et ut etiam creaturis dignitatem causalitatis
communicet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A8-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Secondary causes cannot escape the order of the first universal cause, as has been said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q19_A6" id="FP_Q23_A8-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[6]</a>), indeed, they execute that order. And therefore predestination can be furthered by creatures, but it cannot be impeded by
                     them.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="29462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29462] Iª q. 23 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod secundae causae non possunt egredi ordinem causae
primae universalis, ut supra dictum est; sed ipsum exequuntur. Et
ideo praedestinatio per creaturas potest adiuvari, sed non
impediri.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q24" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q24-p0.1">Q. 24. THE BOOK OF LIFE (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q24-p2"> We now consider the book of life; concerning which there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q24-p3"><a href="#FP_Q24_A1"> (1) What is the book of life?</a></p><p id="FP_Q24-p4"><a href="#FP_Q24_A2"> (2) Of what life is it the book?</a></p><p id="FP_Q24-p5"><a href="#FP_Q24_A3"> (3) Whether anyone can be blotted out of the book of life?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 pr."><a name="29463" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29463]
Iª q. 24 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de libro
vitae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo, quid sit liber vitae.
Secundo, cuius vitae sit liber. Tertio, utrum aliquis possit deleri
de libro vitae.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q24_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q24_A1-p0.1">Q. 24. A. 1. Whether the book of life is the same as predestination?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the book of life is not the same thing as pre-destination. For it is said, "All things are the book of life"
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.4.32" target="asv">Ecclus. 4:32</a>)---i.e. the Old and New Testament according to a gloss. This, however, is not predestination. Therefore the book of life
                     is not predestination.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29464" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29464] Iª q. 24 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod liber vitae non sit idem quod
praedestinatio. Dicitur enim Eccli. XXIV, <i>haec omnia liber
vitae</i>; Glossa, <i>idest novum et vetus testamentum</i>. Hoc
autem non est praedestinatio. Ergo liber vitae non est idem quod
praedestinatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 14) that "the book of life is a certain divine energy, by which it happens that
                     to each one his good or evil works are recalled to memory." But divine energy belongs seemingly, not to predestination, but
                     rather to divine power. Therefore the book of life is not the same thing as predestination.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29465" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29465] Iª q. 24 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Augustinus, in libro XX de Civ. Dei, ait quod liber vitae est
quaedam vis divina, qua fiet <i>ut cuique opera sua bona vel mala
in memoriam reducantur</i>. Sed vis divina non videtur pertinere ad
praedestinationem, sed magis ad attributum potentiae. Ergo liber
vitae non est idem quod praedestinatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, reprobation is opposed to predestination. So, if the book of life were the same as predestination, there should
                     also be a book of death, as there is a book of life.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29466" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29466] Iª q. 24 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
praedestinationi opponitur reprobatio. Si igitur liber vitae esset
praedestinatio, inveniretur liber mortis, sicut liber vitae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in a gloss upon
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.68.29" target="asv"> Ps. 68:29, </a> "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living. This book is the knowledge of God, by which He hath predestined to life
                     those whom He foreknew."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29467" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29467] Iª q. 24 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur in Glossa, super illud Psalmi LXVIII, <i>deleantur de
libro viventium, liber iste est notitia Dei, qua praedestinavit ad
vitam, quos praescivit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The book of life is in God taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a comparison with human affairs. For it is usual among
                     men that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed in a book; as, for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who
                     formerly were called "conscript" fathers. Now it is clear from the preceding (
                     <a href="#FP_Q23_A4" id="FP_Q24_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>) that all the predestined are chosen by God to possess eternal life. This conscription, therefore,
                     of the predestined is called the book of life. A thing is said metaphorically to be written upon the mind of anyone when it
                     is firmly held in the memory, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.3" target="asv"> Prov. 3:3</a>: "Forget not My Law, and let thy heart keep My commandments," and further on, "Write them in the tables of thy heart." For
                     things are written down in material books to help the memory. Whence, the knowledge of God, by which He firmly remembers that
                     He has predestined some to eternal life, is called
                     the book of life. For as the writing in a book is the sign of things to be done, so the knowledge of God is a sign in Him
                     of those who are to be brought to eternal life, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#iiTim.11.19" target="asv">2 Tim. 11:19</a>: "The sure foundation of God standeth firm, having this seal; the Lord knoweth who are His."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 1 co."><a name="29468" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29468] Iª q. 24 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod liber vitae in Deo dicitur metaphorice, secundum similitudinem
a rebus humanis acceptam. Est enim consuetum apud homines, quod
illi qui ad aliquid eliguntur, conscribuntur in libro; utpote
milites vel consiliarii, qui olim dicebantur patres conscripti.
Patet autem ex praemissis quod omnes praedestinati eliguntur a Deo
ad habendum vitam aeternam. Ipsa ergo praedestinatorum conscriptio
dicitur liber vitae. Dicitur autem metaphorice aliquid conscriptum
in intellectu alicuius, quod firmiter in memoria tenet, secundum
illud Prov. III, <i>ne obliviscaris legis meae, et praecepta mea
cor tuum custodiat</i>; et post pauca sequitur, <i>describe illa in
tabulis cordis tui</i>. Nam et in libris materialibus aliquid
conscribitur ad succurrendum memoriae. Unde ipsa Dei notitia, qua
firmiter retinet se aliquos praedestinasse ad vitam aeternam,
dicitur liber vitae. Nam sicut Scriptura libri est signum eorum
quae fienda sunt ita Dei notitia est quoddam signum apud ipsum,
eorum qui sunt perducendi ad vitam aeternam; secundum illud II Tim.
II, <i>firmum fundamentum Dei stat, habens signaculum hoc, novit
dominus qui sunt eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The book of life may be understood in two senses. In one sense as the inscription of those who are chosen to life; thus we
                     now speak of the book of life. In another sense the inscription of those things which lead us to life may be called the book
                     of life; and this also is twofold, either as of things to be done; and thus the Old and New Testament are called a book of
                     life; or of things already done, and thus that divine energy by which it happens
                     that to each one his deeds will be recalled to memory, is spoken of as the book of life. Thus that also may be called the
                     book of war, whether it contains the names inscribed of those chosen for military service; or treats of the art of warfare,
                     or relates the deeds of soldiers.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29469] Iª q. 24 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod liber vitae potest dici dupliciter. Uno modo,
conscriptio eorum qui sunt electi ad vitam, et sic loquimur nunc de
libro vitae. Alio modo potest dici liber vitae, conscriptio eorum
quae ducunt in vitam. Et hoc dupliciter. Vel sicut agendorum, et
sic novum et vetus testamentum dicitur liber vitae. Vel sicut iam
factorum, et sic illa vis divina, qua fiet ut cuilibet in memoriam
reducantur facta sua, dicitur liber vitae. Sicut etiam liber
militiae potest dici, vel in quo scribuntur electi ad militiam, vel
in quo traditur ars militaris, vel in quo recitantur facta
militum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p8"> Hence the solution of the Second Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29470" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29470] Iª q. 24 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Unde patet solutio
ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is the custom to inscribe, not those who are rejected, but those who are chosen. Whence there is no book of death corresponding
                     to reprobation; as the book of life to predestination.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29471] Iª q. 24 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod non est consuetum conscribi eos qui repudiantur, sed
eos qui eliguntur. Unde reprobationi non respondet liber mortis,
sicut praedestinationi liber vitae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Predestination and the book of life are different aspects of the same thing. For this latter implies the knowledge of predestination;
                     as also is made clear from the gloss quoted above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="29472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29472] Iª q. 24 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod secundum rationem differt liber vitae a
praedestinatione. Importat enim notitiam praedestinationis, sicut
etiam ex Glossa inducta apparet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q24_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q24_A2-p0.1">Q. 24. A. 2. Whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the predestined?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the book of life does not only regard the life of glory of the predestined. For the book of life is the knowledge
                     of life. But God, through His own life, knows all other life. Therefore the book of life is so called in regard to divine
                     life; and not only in regard to the life of the predestined.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29473" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29473] Iª q. 24 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod liber vitae non sit solum respectu vitae
gloriae praedestinatorum. Liber enim vitae est notitia vitae. Sed
Deus per vitam suam cognoscit omnem aliam vitam. Ergo liber vitae
praecipue dicitur respectu vitae divinae; et non solum respectu
vitae praedestinatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the life of glory comes from God, so also does the life of nature. Therefore, if the knowledge of the life of
                     glory is called the book of life; so also should the knowledge of the life of nature be so called.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29474] Iª q. 24 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
vita gloriae est a Deo, ita vita naturae. Si igitur notitia vitae
gloriae dicitur liber vitae, etiam notitia vitae naturae dicetur
liber vitae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some are chosen to the life of grace who are not chosen to the life of glory; as it is clear from what is said:
                     "Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.6.71" target="asv">Jn. 6:71</a>). But the book of life is the inscription of the divine election, as stated above (A[1] ). Therefore it applies also to the
                     life of grace.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29475" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29475] Iª q. 24 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
aliqui eliguntur ad gratiam, qui non eliguntur ad vitam gloriae; ut
patet per id quod dicitur Ioan. VI, <i>nonne duodecim vos elegi, et
unus ex vobis Diabolus est?</i> Sed liber vitae est conscriptio
electionis divinae, ut dictum est. Ergo etiam est respectu vitae
gratiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The book of life is the knowledge of predestination, as stated above
                     <a href="#FP_Q24_A1" id="FP_Q24_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But predestination does not regard the life of grace, except so far as it is directed to glory; for those are not predestined
                     who have grace and yet fail to obtain glory. The book of life altogether is only so called in regard to the life of glory.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29476] Iª q. 24 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod liber vitae est notitia praedestinationis, ut dictum est. Sed
praedestinatio non respicit vitam gratiae, nisi secundum quod
ordinatur ad gloriam, non enim sunt praedestinati, qui habent
gratiam et deficiunt a gloria. Liber igitur vitae non dicitur nisi
respectu gloriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The book of life, as stated above
                     <a href="#FP_Q24_A1" id="FP_Q24_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, implies a conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life. Now a man is chosen for something which does not belong to
                     him by nature; and again that to which a man is chosen has the aspect of an end. For a soldier is not chosen or inscribed
                     merely to put on armor, but to fight; since this is the proper duty to which military service is directed. But the life of
                     glory is an end exceeding
                     human nature, as said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q23_A1" id="FP_Q24_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[23], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, strictly speaking, the book of life regards the life of glory.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 co."><a name="29477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29477] Iª q. 24 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod liber vitae, ut dictum est, importat conscriptionem quandam
sive notitiam electorum ad vitam. Eligitur autem aliquis ad id quod
non competit sibi secundum suam naturam. Et iterum, id ad quod
eligitur aliquis, habet rationem finis, non enim miles eligitur aut
conscribitur ad hoc quod armetur, sed ad hoc quod pugnet; hoc enim
est proprium officium ad quod militia ordinatur. Finis autem supra
naturam existens, est vita gloriae, ut supra dictum est. Unde
proprie liber vitae respicit vitam gloriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine life, even considered as a life of glory, is natural to God; whence in His regard there is no election, and in
                     consequence no book of life: for we do not say that anyone is chosen to possess the power of sense, or any of those things
                     that are consequent on nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29478" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29478] Iª q. 24 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod vita divina, etiam prout est vita gloriosa, est Deo
naturalis. Unde respectu eius non est electio, et per consequens
neque liber vitae. Non enim dicimus quod aliquis homo eligatur ad
habendum sensum, vel aliquid eorum quae consequuntur naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p8"> From this we gather the Reply to the Second Objection. For there is no election, nor a book of life, as regards the life
                     of nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29479" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29479] Iª q. 24 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Unde per hoc etiam
patet solutio ad secundum. Respectu enim vitae naturalis non est
electio, neque liber vitae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The life of grace has the aspect, not of an end, but of something directed towards an end. Hence nobody is said to be chosen
                     to the life of grace, except so far as the life of grace is directed to glory. For this reason those who, possessing grace,
                     fail to obtain glory, are not said to be chosen simply, but relatively. Likewise they are not said to be written in the book
                     of life simply, but relatively; that is to say, that it is in the ordination and
                     knowledge of God that they are to have some relation to eternal life, according to their participation in grace.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29480] Iª q. 24 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod vita gratiae non habet rationem finis, sed rationem
eius quod est ad finem. Unde ad vitam gratiae non dicitur aliquis
eligi, nisi inquantum vita gratiae ordinatur ad gloriam. Et propter
hoc, illi qui habent gratiam et excidunt a gloria, non dicuntur
esse electi simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Et similiter non
dicuntur esse scripti simpliciter in libro vitae sed secundum quid;
prout scilicet de eis in ordinatione et notitia divina existit,
quod sint habituri aliquem ordinem ad vitam aeternam, secundum
participationem gratiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q24_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q24_A3-p0.1">Q. 24. A. 3. Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no one may be blotted out of the book of life. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 15): "God's foreknowledge,
                     which cannot be deceived, is the book of life." But nothing can be taken away from the foreknowledge of God, nor from predestination.
                     Therefore neither can anyone be blotted out from the book of life.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29481" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29481] Iª q. 24 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod nullus deleatur de libro vitae. Dicit enim
Augustinus, in XX de Civ. Dei, quod <i>praescientia Dei, quae non
potest falli, liber vitae est</i>. Sed a praescientia Dei non
potest aliquid subtrahi, similiter neque a praedestinatione. Ergo
nec de libro vitae potest aliquis deleri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in a thing is in it according to the disposition of that thing. But the book of life is something eternal
                     and immutable. Therefore whatsoever is written therein, is there not in a temporary way, but immovably, and indelibly.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29482" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29482] Iª q. 24 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
quidquid est in aliquo, est in eo per modum eius in quo est. Sed
liber vitae est quid aeternum et immutabile. Ergo quidquid est in
eo, est ibi non temporaliter, sed immobiliter et indelebiliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, blotting out is the contrary to inscription. But nobody can be written a second time in the book of life. Neither
                     therefore can he be blotted out.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29483" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29483] Iª q. 24 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
deletio Scripturae opponitur. Sed aliquis non potest de novo scribi
in libro vitae. Ergo neque inde deleri potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said, "Let them be blotted out from the book of the living" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.68.29" target="asv">Ps. 68:29</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29484] Iª q. 24 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur in Psalmo LXVIII, <i>deleantur de libro
viventium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some have said that none could be blotted out of the book of life as a matter of fact, but only in the opinion of men. For
                     it is customary in the Scriptures to say that something is done when it becomes known. Thus some are said to be written in
                     the book of life, inasmuch as men think they are written therein, on account of the present righteousness they see in them;
                     but when it becomes evident, either in this world or in the next, that they have fallen from
                     that state of righteousness, they are then said to be blotted out. And thus a gloss explains the passage: "Let them be blotted
                     out of the book of the living." But because not to be blotted out of the book of life is placed among the rewards of the just,
                     according to the text, "He that shall overcome, shall thus be clothed in white garments, and I will not blot his name out
                     of the book of life" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.3.5" target="asv">Apoc. 3:5</a>) (and what is promised to holy men, is not merely something in the
                     opinion of men), it can therefore be said that to be blotted out, and not blotted out, of the book of life is not only to
                     be referred to the opinion of man, but to the reality of the fact. For the book of life is the inscription of those ordained
                     to eternal life, to which one is directed from two sources; namely, from predestination, which direction never fails, and
                     from grace; for whoever has grace, by this very fact becomes fitted for eternal life. This direction fails sometimes; because
                     some
                     are directed by possessing grace, to obtain eternal life, yet they fail to obtain it through mortal sin. Therefore those who
                     are ordained to possess eternal life through divine predestination are written down in the book of life simply, because they
                     are written therein to have eternal life in reality; such are never blotted out from the book of life. Those, however, who
                     are ordained to eternal life, not through divine predestination, but through grace, are said to be written in the book of
                     life
                     not simply, but relatively, for they are written therein not to have eternal life in itself, but in its cause only. Yet though
                     these latter can be said to be blotted out of the book of life, this blotting out must not be referred to God, as if God foreknew
                     a thing, and afterwards knew it not; but to the thing known, namely, because God knows one is first ordained to eternal life,
                     and afterwards not ordained when he falls from grace.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 3 co."><a name="29485" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29485] Iª q. 24 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod quidam dicunt quod de libro vitae nullus potest deleri
secundum rei veritatem, potest tamen aliquis deleri secundum
opinionem hominum. Est enim consuetum in Scripturis ut aliquid
dicatur fieri, quando innotescit. Et secundum hoc, aliqui dicuntur
esse scripti in libro vitae, inquantum homines opinantur eos ibi
scriptos, propter praesentem iustitiam quam in eis vident. Sed
quando apparet, vel in hoc seculo vel in futuro, quod ab hac
iustitia exciderunt, dicuntur inde deleri. Et sic etiam exponitur
in Glossa deletio talis, super illud Psalmi LXVIII, <i>deleantur de
libro viventium</i>. Sed quia non deleri de libro vitae ponitur
inter praemia iustorum, secundum illud Apoc. III, <i>qui vicerit,
sic vestietur vestimentis albis, et non delebo nomen eius de libro
vitae</i>; quod autem sanctis repromittitur, non est solum in
hominum opinione; potest dici quod deleri vel non deleri de libro
vitae, non solum ad opinionem hominum referendum est, sed etiam
quantum ad rem. Est enim liber vitae conscriptio ordinatorum in
vitam aeternam. Ad quam ordinatur aliquis ex duobus, scilicet ex
praedestinatione divina, et haec ordinatio nunquam deficit; et ex
gratia. Quicumque enim gratiam habet, ex hoc ipso est dignus vita
aeterna. Et haec ordinatio deficit interdum, quia aliqui ordinati
sunt ex gratia habita ad habendum vitam aeternam, a qua tamen
deficiunt per peccatum mortale. Illi igitur qui sunt ordinati ad
habendum vitam aeternam ex praedestinatione divina, sunt
simpliciter scripti in libro vitae, quia sunt ibi scripti ut
habituri vitam aeternam in seipsa. Et isti nunquam delentur de
libro vitae. Sed illi qui sunt ordinati ad habendum vitam aeternam,
non ex praedestinatione divina, sed solum ex gratia, dicuntur esse
scripti in libro vitae, non simpliciter, sed secundum quid, quia
sunt ibi scripti ut habituri vitam aeternam, non in seipsa, sed in
sua causa. Et tales possunt deleri de libro vitae, ut deletio non
referatur ad notitiam Dei, quasi Deus aliquid praesciat, et postea
nesciat; sed ad rem scitam, quia scilicet Deus scit aliquem prius
ordinari in vitam aeternam, et postea non ordinari, cum deficit a
gratia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The act of blotting out does not refer to the book of life as regards God's foreknowledge, as if in God there were any change;
                     but as regards things foreknown, which can change.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29486" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29486] Iª q. 24 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod deletio, ut dictum est, non refertur ad librum vitae
ex parte praescientiae, quasi in Deo sit aliqua mutabilitas, sed ex
parte praescitorum, quae sunt mutabilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although things are immutably in God, yet in themselves they are subject to change. To this it is that the blotting out of
                     the book of life refers.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29487" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29487] Iª q. 24 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, licet res in Deo sint immutabiliter, tamen in
seipsis mutabiles sunt. Et ad hoc pertinet deletio libri vitae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The way in which one is said to be blotted out of the book of life is that in which one is said to be written therein anew;
                     either in the opinion of men, or because he begins again to have relation towards eternal life through grace; which also is
                     included in the knowledge of God, although not anew.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29488" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29488] Iª q. 24 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod eo modo quo aliquis dicitur deleri de libro vitae,
potest dici quod ibi scribatur de novo; vel secundum opinionem
hominum, vel secundum quod de novo incipit habere ordinem ad vitam
aeternam per gratiam. Quod etiam sub divina notitia comprehenditur,
licet non de novo.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q25" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q25-p0.1">Q. 25. THE POWER OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q25-p2"> After considering the divine foreknowledge and will, and other things pertaining thereto, it remains for us to consider the
                  power of God. About this are six points of inquiry:
               </p><p id="FP_Q25-p3"><a href="#FP_Q25_A1"> (1) Whether there is power in God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q25-p4"><a href="#FP_Q25_A2"> (2) Whether His power is infinite?</a></p><p id="FP_Q25-p5"><a href="#FP_Q25_A3"> (3) Whether He is almighty?</a></p><p id="FP_Q25-p6"><a href="#FP_Q25_A4"> (4) Whether He could make the past not to have been?</a></p><p id="FP_Q25-p7"><a href="#FP_Q25_A5"> (5) Whether He could do what He does not, or not do what He does?</a></p><p id="FP_Q25-p8"><a href="#FP_Q25_A6"> (6) Whether what He makes He could make better?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 pr."><a name="29489" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29489]
Iª q. 25 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem divinae scientiae
et voluntatis, et eorum quae ad hoc pertinent, restat considerandum
de divina potentia. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum in
Deo sit potentia. Secundo, utrum eius potentia sit infinita.
Tertio, utrum sit omnipotens. Quarto, utrum possit facere quod ea
quae sunt praeterita, non fuerint. Quinto, utrum Deus possit facere
quae non facit, vel praetermittere quae facit. Sexto, utrum quae
facit, possit facere meliora.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q25_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q25_A1-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 1. Whether there is power in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that power is not in God. For as primary matter is to power, so God, who is the first agent, is to act. But primary
                     matter, considered in itself, is devoid of all act. Therefore, the first agent---namely, God---is devoid of power.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29490" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29490] Iª q. 25 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sit potentia. Sicut enim prima
materia se habet ad potentiam, ita Deus, qui est agens primum, se
habet ad actum. Sed prima materia, secundum se considerata, est
absque omni actu. Ergo agens primum, quod est Deus, est absque
potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 19), better than every power is its act. For form is better than matter;
                     and action than active power, since it is its end. But nothing is better than what is in God; because whatsoever is in God,
                     is God, as was shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A3" id="FP_Q25_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[3] , A[3]</a>). Therefore, there is no power in God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29491] Iª q. 25 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
secundum philosophum, in IX Metaphys., qualibet potentia melior est
eius actus, nam forma est melior quam materia, et actio quam
potentia activa; est enim finis eius. Sed nihil est melius eo quod
est in Deo, quia quidquid est in Deo, est Deus, ut supra ostensum
est. Ergo nulla potentia est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Power is the principle of operation. But the divine power is God's essence, since there is nothing accidental in
                     God: and of the essence of God there is no principle. Therefore there is no power in God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29492" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29492] Iª q. 25 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
potentia est principium operationis. Sed operatio divina est eius
essentia, cum in Deo nullum sit accidens. Essentiae autem divinae
non est aliquod principium. Ergo ratio potentiae Deo non
convenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it was shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q14_A8" id="FP_Q25_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[14], A[8]</a>;
                     <a href="#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q25_A1-p5.2" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that God's knowledge and will are the cause of things. But the cause and principle of a thing are identical. We ought not,
                     therefore, to assign power to God; but only knowledge and will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="29493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29493] Iª q. 25 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, supra
ostensum est quod scientia Dei et voluntas eius sunt causa rerum.
Causa autem et principium idem sunt. Ergo non oportet in Deo
assignare potentiam, sed solum scientiam et voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "Thou art mighty, O Lord, and Thy truth is round about Thee" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.88.9" target="asv">Ps. 88:9</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29494" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29494] Iª q. 25 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur in Psalmo LXXXVIII, <i>potens es, domine, et veritas
tua in circuitu tuo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Power is twofold---namely, passive, which exists not at all in God; and active, which we must assign to Him in the highest
                     degree. For it is manifest that everything, according as it is in act and is perfect, is the active principle of something:
                     whereas everything is passive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now it was shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A2" id="FP_Q25_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[2]</a>;
                     <a href="#FP_Q4_A1" id="FP_Q25_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[4], AA[1]</a>, 2), that God is pure act, simply and in all
                     ways perfect, nor in Him does any imperfection find place. Whence it most fittingly belongs to Him to be an active principle,
                     and in no way whatsoever to be passive. On the other hand, the notion of active principle is consistent with active power.
                     For active power is the principle of acting upon something else; whereas passive power is the principle of being acted upon
                     by something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 17). It remains, therefore, that in God there is active power in the
                     highest degree.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 co."><a name="29495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29495] Iª q. 25 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod duplex est potentia, scilicet passiva, quae nullo modo est in
Deo; et activa, quam oportet in Deo summe ponere. Manifestum est
enim quod unumquodque, secundum quod est actu et perfectum,
secundum hoc est principium activum alicuius, patitur autem
unumquodque, secundum quod est deficiens et imperfectum. Ostensum
est autem supra quod Deus est purus actus, et simpliciter et
universaliter perfectus; neque in eo aliqua imperfectio locum
habet. Unde sibi maxime competit esse principium activum, et nullo
modo pati. Ratio autem activi principii convenit potentiae activae.
Nam potentia activa est principium agendi in aliud, potentia vero
passiva est principium patiendi ab alio, ut philosophus dicit, V
Metaphys. Relinquitur ergo quod in Deo maxime sit potentia
activa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Active power is not contrary to act, but is founded upon it, for everything acts according as it is actual: but passive power
                     is contrary to act; for a thing is passive according as it is potential. Whence this potentiality is not in God, but only
                     active power.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29496" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29496] Iª q. 25 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod potentia activa non dividitur contra actum, sed
fundatur in eo, nam unumquodque agit secundum quod est actu.
Potentia vero passiva dividitur contra actum, nam unumquodque
patitur secundum quod est in potentia. Unde haec potentia
excluditur a Deo, non autem activa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whenever act is distinct from power, act must be nobler than power. But God's action is not distinct from His power, for
                     both are His divine essence; neither is His existence distinct from His essence. Hence it does not follow that there should
                     be anything in God nobler than His power.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29497" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29497] Iª q. 25 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, quandocumque actus est aliud a potentia, oportet
quod actus sit nobilior potentia. Sed actio Dei non est aliud ab
eius potentia, sed utrumque est essentia divina, quia nec esse eius
est aliud ab eius essentia. Unde non oportet quod aliquid sit
nobilius quam potentia Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In creatures, power is the principle not only of action, but likewise of effect. Thus in God the idea of power is retained,
                     inasmuch as it is the principle of an effect; not, however, as it is a principle of action, for this is the divine essence
                     itself; except, perchance, after our manner of understanding, inasmuch as the divine essence, which pre-contains in itself
                     all perfection that exists in created things, can be understood either under the
                     notion of action, or under that of power; as also it is understood under the notion of "suppositum" possessing nature, and
                     under that of nature. Accordingly the notion of power is retained in God in so far as it is the principle of an effect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29498] Iª q. 25 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod potentia in rebus creatis non solum est principium
actionis, sed etiam effectus. Sic igitur in Deo salvatur ratio
potentiae quantum ad hoc, quod est principium effectus, non autem
quantum ad hoc, quod est principium actionis, quae est divina
essentia. Nisi forte secundum modum intelligendi, prout divina
essentia, quae in se simpliciter praehabet quidquid perfectionis
est in rebus creatis, potest intelligi et sub ratione actionis, et
sub ratione potentiae; sicut etiam intelligitur et sub ratione
suppositi habentis naturam, et sub ratione naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Power is predicated of God not as something really distinct from His knowledge and will, but as differing from them logically;
                     inasmuch as power implies a notion of a principle putting into execution what the will commands, and what knowledge directs,
                     which three things in God are identified. Or we may say, that the knowledge or will of God, according as it is the effective
                     principle, has the notion of power contained in it. Hence the consideration of
                     the knowledge and will of God precedes the consideration of His power, as the cause precedes the operation and effect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="29499" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29499] Iª q. 25 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod potentia non ponitur in Deo ut aliquid differens a
scientia et voluntate secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem;
inquantum scilicet potentia importat rationem principii exequentis
id quod voluntas imperat, et ad quod scientia dirigit; quae tria
Deo secundum idem conveniunt. Vel dicendum quod ipsa scientia vel
voluntas divina, secundum quod est principium effectivum, habet
rationem potentiae. Unde consideratio scientiae et voluntatis
praecedit in Deo considerationem potentiae, sicut causa praecedit
operationem et effectum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q25_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q25_A2-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 2. Whether the power of God is infinite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the power of God is not infinite. For everything that is infinite is imperfect according to the Philosopher
                     (Phys. iii, 6). But the power of God is far from imperfect. Therefore it is not infinite.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29500" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29500] Iª q. 25 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod potentia Dei non sit infinita. Omne enim
infinitum est imperfectum, secundum philosophum, in III Physic. Sed
potentia Dei non est imperfecta. Ergo non est infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every power is made known by its effect; otherwise it would be ineffectual. If, then, the power of God were infinite,
                     it could produce an infinite effect, but this is impossible.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29501" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29501] Iª q. 25 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis
potentia manifestatur per effectum, alias frustra esset. Si igitur
potentia Dei esset infinita, posset facere effectum infinitum. Quod
est impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 79) that if the power of any corporeal thing were infinite, it would cause instantaneous
                     movement. God, however, does not cause instantaneous movement, but moves the spiritual creature in time, and the corporeal
                     creature in place and time, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 20,22,23). Therefore, His power is not infinite.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29502" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29502] Iª q. 25 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
philosophus probat in VIII Physic., quod si potentia alicuius
corporis esset infinita, moveret in instanti. Deus autem non movet
in instanti, sed movet creaturam spiritualem <i>per tempus,
creaturam vero corporalem per locum et tempus</i>, secundum
Augustinum, VIII super Genesim ad litteram. Non ergo est eius
potentia infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. viii), that "God's power is immeasurable. He is the living mighty one." Now everything that is immeasurable
                     is infinite. Therefore the power of God is infinite.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29503] Iª q. 25 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Hilarius, VIII de Trin., quod Deus est immensae
virtutis, vivens, potens. Omne autem immensum est infinitum. Ergo
virtus divina est infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
                     <a href="#FP_Q25_A1" id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, active power exists in God according to the measure in which He is actual. Now His existence is infinite, inasmuch as it
                     is not limited by anything that receives it, as is clear from what has been said, when we discussed the infinity of the divine
                     essence (
                     <a href="#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, it is necessary that the active power in God should be infinite. For in every agent is it found that the
                     more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts the greater its power to act. For instance, the hotter a thing is, the
                     greater the power has it to give heat; and it would have infinite power to give heat, were its own heat infinite. Whence,
                     since the divine essence, through which God acts, is infinite, as was shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>) it follows that His power likewise is infinite.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 co."><a name="29504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29504] Iª q. 25 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut iam dictum est, secundum hoc potentia activa invenitur
in Deo, secundum quod ipse actu est. Esse autem eius est infinitum,
inquantum non est limitatum per aliquid recipiens; ut patet per ea
quae supra dicta sunt, cum de infinitate divinae essentiae
ageretur. Unde necesse est quod activa potentia Dei sit infinita.
In omnibus enim agentibus hoc invenitur, quod quanto aliquod agens
perfectius habet formam qua agit, tanto est maior eius potentia in
agendo. Sicut quanto est aliquid magis calidum, tanto habet maiorem
potentiam ad calefaciendum, et haberet utique potentiam infinitam
ad calefaciendum, si eius calor esset infinitus. Unde, cum ipsa
essentia divina, per quam Deus agit, sit infinita, sicut supra
ostensum est, sequitur quod eius potentia sit infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is here speaking of an infinity in regard to matter not limited by any form; and such infinity belongs to
                     quantity. But the divine essence is otherwise, as was shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q25_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>); and consequently so also His power. It does not follow, therefore, that it is imperfect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29505] Iª q. 25 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de infinito quod est ex parte
materiae non terminatae per formam; cuiusmodi est infinitum quod
congruit quantitati. Sic autem non est infinita divina essentia, ut
supra ostensum est; et per consequens nec eius potentia. Unde non
sequitur quod sit imperfecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The power of a univocal agent is wholly manifested in its effect. The generative power of man, for example, is not able to
                     do more than beget man. But the power of a non-univocal agent does not wholly manifest itself in the production of its effect:
                     as, for example, the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself in the production of an animal generated from putrefaction.
                     Now it is clear that God is not a univocal agent. For nothing agrees with
                     Him either in species or in genus, as was shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q3_A5" id="FP_Q25_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[5]</a>;
                     <a href="#FP_Q4_A3" id="FP_Q25_A2-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[4], A[3]</a>). Whence it follows that His effect is always less than His power. It is not necessary, therefore, that the infinite power
                     of God should be manifested so as to produce an infinite effect. Yet even if it were to produce no effect, the power of God
                     would not be ineffectual; because a thing is ineffectual which is ordained towards an end to which it does not attain. But
                     the
                     power of God is not ordered toward its effect as towards an end; rather, it is the end of the effect produced by it.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29506] Iª q. 25 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod potentia agentis univoci tota manifestatur in suo
effectu, potentia enim generativa hominis nihil potest plus quam
generare hominem. Sed potentia agentis non univoci non tota
manifestatur in sui effectus productione, sicut potentia solis non
tota manifestatur in productione alicuius animalis ex putrefactione
generati. Manifestum est autem quod Deus non est agens univocum,
nihil enim aliud potest cum eo convenire neque in specie, neque in
genere, ut supra ostensum est. Unde relinquitur quod effectus eius
semper est minor quam potentia eius. Non ergo oportet quod
manifestetur infinita potentia Dei in hoc, quod producat effectum
infinitum. Et tamen, etiam si nullum effectum produceret, non esset
Dei potentia frustra. Quia frustra est quod ordinatur ad finem,
quem non attingit, potentia autem Dei non ordinatur ad effectum
sicut ad finem, sed magis ipsa est finis sui effectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 79) proves that if a body had infinite power, it would cause a non-temporal movement. And he
                     shows that the power of the mover of heaven is infinite, because it can move in an infinite time. It remains, therefore, according
                     to his reckoning, that the infinite power of a body, if such existed, would move without time; not, however, the power of
                     an incorporeal mover. The reason of this is that one body moving another is a
                     univocal agent; wherefore it follows that the whole power of the agent is made known in its motion. Since then the greater
                     the power of a moving body, the more quickly does it move; the necessary conclusion is that if its power were infinite, it
                     would move beyond comparison faster, and this is to move without time. An incorporeal mover, however, is not a univocal agent;
                     whence it is not necessary that the whole of its power should be manifested in motion, so as to move without time; and
                     especially since it moves in accordance with the disposition of its will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29507" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29507] Iª q. 25 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod philosophus in VIII Physic., probat, quod si aliquod
corpus haberet potentiam infinitam, quod moveret in non tempore. Et
tamen ostendit, quod potentia motoris caeli est infinita, quia
movere potest tempore infinito. Relinquitur ergo secundum eius
intentionem, quod potentia infinita corporis si esset, moveret in
non tempore, non autem potentia incorporei motoris. Cuius ratio
est, quia corpus movens aliud corpus, est agens univocum. Unde
oportet quod tota potentia agentis manifestetur in motu. Quia
igitur quanto moventis corporis potentia est maior, tanto velocius
movet, necesse est quod si fuerit infinita, moveat
improportionabiliter citius, quod est movere in non tempore. Sed
movens incorporeum est agens non univocum. Unde non oportet, quod
tota virtus eius manifestetur in motu ita, quod moveat in non
tempore. Et praesertim, quia movet secundum dispositionem suae
voluntatis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q25_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q25_A3-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 3. Whether God is omnipotent?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God,
                     for He is immovable, as was said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q25_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Therefore He is not omnipotent.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29508] Iª q. 25 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit omnipotens. Moveri enim et
pati aliquid omnium est. Sed hoc Deus non potest, est enim
immobilis, ut supra dictum est. Non igitur est omnipotens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin, nor "deny Himself" as it is said in
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.13" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:13.</a> Therefore He is not omnipotent.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29509" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29509] Iª q. 25 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
peccare aliquid agere est. Sed Deus non potest peccare, neque
seipsum negare, ut dicitur II Tim. II. Ergo Deus non est
omnipotens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is said of God that He manifests His omnipotence "especially by sparing and having mercy" [*Collect, 10th Sunday
                     after Pentecost]. Therefore the greatest act possible to the divine power is to spare and have mercy. There are things much
                     greater, however, than sparing and having mercy; for example, to create another world, and the like. Therefore God is not
                     omnipotent.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29510" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29510] Iª q. 25 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, de
Deo dicitur quod <i>omnipotentiam suam parcendo maxime et miserando
manifestat</i>. Ultimum igitur quod potest divina potentia, est
parcere et misereri. Aliquid autem est multo maius quam parcere et
misereri; sicut creare alium mundum, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Ergo
Deus non est omnipotens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, upon the text, "God hath made foolish the wisdom of this world" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.1.20" target="asv">1 Cor. 1:20</a>), a gloss says: "God hath made the wisdom of this world foolish [*Vulg.: 'Hath not God', etc.] by showing those things to
                     be possible which it judges to be impossible." Whence it would seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in
                     reference to inferior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges them; but in reference to the divine power. If
                     God, then, were omnipotent, all things would be possible; nothing, therefore impossible. But if we take away the impossible,
                     then we destroy also the necessary; for what necessarily exists is impossible not to exist. Therefore there would be nothing
                     at all that is necessary in things if God were omnipotent. But this is an impossibility. Therefore God is not omnipotent.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="29511" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29511] Iª q. 25 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, super
illud I Cor. I, <i>stultam fecit Deus sapientiam huius mundi</i>,
dicit Glossa, <i>sapientiam huius mundi fecit Deus stultam,
ostendendo possibile, quod illa impossibile iudicabat</i>. Unde
videtur quod non sit aliquid iudicandum possibile vel impossibile
secundum inferiores causas, prout sapientia huius mundi iudicat;
sed secundum potentiam divinam. Si igitur Deus sit omnipotens,
omnia erunt possibilia. Nihil ergo impossibile. Sublato autem
impossibili, tollitur necessarium, nam quod necesse est esse,
impossibile est non esse. Nihil ergo erit necessarium in rebus, si
Deus est omnipotens. Hoc autem est impossibile. Ergo Deus non est
omnipotens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "No word shall be impossible with God" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.1.37" target="asv">Lk. 1:37</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29512" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29512] Iª q. 25 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Luc. I, <i>non erit impossibile apud Deum omne
verbum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q25_A3-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for there
                     may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider
                     the matter aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase, "God can do all things," is rightly understood
                     to mean that God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said
                     to be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 17), a thing is said to be possible in two ways. First in relation
                     to some power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be possible to man. Secondly absolutely, on account of the
                     relation in which the very terms stand to each other. Now God cannot be said to be omnipotent through being able to do all
                     things that are possible to created nature; for the divine power extends farther than that. If, however, we were to say
                     that God is omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle in explaining
                     the nature of His power. For this would be saying nothing else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do all that He is
                     able to do.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q25_A3-p8"> It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible absolutely; which is the
                     second way of saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely, according to the relation
                     in which the very terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates
                     sits; and absolutely impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the subject, as, for
                     instance, that a man is a donkey.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q25_A3-p9"> It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds
                     a thing possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on which its active power is founded; for instance,
                     the power of giving warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being warmed. The divine existence,
                     however, upon which the nature of power in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of
                     being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being. Whence, whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is
                     numbered among the absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the
                     idea of being except non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the same time is repugnant to the idea
                     of an absolutely possible thing, within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under the divine omnipotence,
                     not because of any defect in the power of God, but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing. Therefore,
                     everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God
                     is called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because
                     it cannot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot
                     do
                     them. Nor is this contrary to the word of the angel, saying: "No word shall be impossible with God." For whatever implies
                     a contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 co."><a name="29513" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29513] Iª q. 25 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod communiter confitentur omnes Deum esse omnipotentem. Sed
rationem omnipotentiae assignare videtur difficile. Dubium enim
potest esse quid comprehendatur sub ista distributione, cum dicitur
omnia posse Deum. Sed si quis recte consideret, cum potentia
dicatur ad possibilia, cum Deus omnia posse dicitur, nihil rectius
intelligitur quam quod possit omnia possibilia, et ob hoc
omnipotens dicatur. Possibile autem dicitur dupliciter, secundum
philosophum, in V Metaphys. Uno modo, per respectum ad aliquam
potentiam, sicut quod subditur humanae potentiae, dicitur esse
possibile homini. Non autem potest dici quod Deus dicatur
omnipotens, quia potest omnia quae sunt possibilia naturae creatae,
quia divina potentia in plura extenditur. Si autem dicatur quod
Deus sit omnipotens, quia potest omnia quae sunt possibilia suae
potentiae, erit circulatio in manifestatione omnipotentiae, hoc
enim non erit aliud quam dicere quod Deus est omnipotens, quia
potest omnia quae potest. Relinquitur igitur quod Deus dicatur
omnipotens, quia potest omnia possibilia absolute, quod est alter
modus dicendi possibile. Dicitur autem aliquid possibile vel
impossibile absolute, ex habitudine terminorum, possibile quidem,
quia praedicatum non repugnat subiecto, ut Socratem sedere;
impossibile vero absolute, quia praedicatum repugnat subiecto, ut
hominem esse asinum. Est autem considerandum quod, cum unumquodque
agens agat sibi simile, unicuique potentiae activae correspondet
possibile ut obiectum proprium, secundum rationem illius actus in
quo fundatur potentia activa, sicut potentia calefactiva refertur,
ut ad proprium obiectum, ad esse calefactibile. Esse autem divinum,
super quod ratio divinae potentiae fundatur, est esse infinitum,
non limitatum ad aliquod genus entis, sed praehabens in se totius
esse perfectionem. Unde quidquid potest habere rationem entis,
continetur sub possibilibus absolutis, respectu quorum Deus dicitur
omnipotens. Nihil autem opponitur rationi entis, nisi non ens. Hoc
igitur repugnat rationi possibilis absoluti, quod subditur divinae
omnipotentiae, quod implicat in se esse et non esse simul. Hoc enim
omnipotentiae non subditur, non propter defectum divinae potentiae;
sed quia non potest habere rationem factibilis neque possibilis.
Quaecumque igitur contradictionem non implicant, sub illis
possibilibus continentur, respectu quorum dicitur Deus omnipotens.
Ea vero quae contradictionem implicant, sub divina omnipotentia non
continentur, quia non possunt habere possibilium rationem. Unde
convenientius dicitur quod non possunt fieri, quam quod Deus non
potest ea facere. Neque hoc est contra verbum Angeli dicentis,
<i>non erit impossibile apud Deum omne verbum</i>. Id enim quod
contradictionem implicat, verbum esse non potest, quia nullus
intellectus potest illud concipere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His active power, not to passive power, as was shown above
                     <a href="#FP_Q25_A1" id="FP_Q25_A3-p10.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Whence the fact that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to His omnipotence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29514] Iª q. 25 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Deus dicitur omnipotens secundum potentiam activam,
non secundum potentiam passivam, ut dictum est. Unde, quod non
potest moveri et pati, non repugnat omnipotentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To sin is to fall short of a perfect action; hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is repugnant
                     to omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin, because of His omnipotence. Nevertheless, the Philosopher says (Topic.
                     iv, 3) that God can deliberately do what is evil. But this must be understood either on a condition, the antecedent of which
                     is impossible---as, for instance, if we were to say that God can do evil things
                     if He will. For there is no reason why a conditional proposition should not be true, though both the antecedent and consequent
                     are impossible: as if one were to say: "If man is a donkey, he has four feet." Or he may be understood to mean that God can
                     do some things which now seem to be evil: which, however, if He did them, would then be good. Or he is, perhaps, speaking
                     after the common manner of the heathen, who thought that men became gods, like Jupiter or Mercury.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29515" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29515] Iª q. 25 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod peccare est deficere a perfecta actione, unde posse
peccare est posse deficere in agendo, quod repugnat omnipotentiae.
Et propter hoc, Deus peccare non potest, qui est omnipotens.
Quamvis philosophus dicat, in IV Topic., quod potest Deus et
studiosus prava agere. Sed hoc intelligitur vel sub conditione
cuius antecedens sit impossibile, ut puta si dicamus quod potest
Deus prava agere si velit, nihil enim prohibet conditionalem esse
veram, cuius antecedens et consequens est impossibile; sicut si
dicatur, si homo est asinus, habet quatuor pedes. Vel ut
intelligatur quod Deus potest aliqua agere, quae nunc prava
videntur; quae tamen si ageret, bona essent. Vel loquitur secundum
communem opinionem gentilium, qui homines dicebant transferri in
deos, ut Iovem vel Mercurium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God's omnipotence is particularly shown in sparing and having mercy, because in this is it made manifest that God has supreme
                     power, that He freely forgives sins. For it is not for one who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free
                     will. Or, because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads them on to the participation of an infinite good; which is
                     the ultimate effect of the divine power. Or because, as was said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q21_A4" id="FP_Q25_A3-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[21],
                        A[4]
                     </a>), the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the divine works. For nothing is due to anyone, except on account
                     of something already given him gratuitously by God. In this way the divine omnipotence is particularly made manifest, because
                     to it pertains the first foundation of all good things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29516] Iª q. 25 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod Dei omnipotentia ostenditur maxime in parcendo et
miserando, quia per hoc ostenditur Deum habere summam potestatem,
quod libere peccata dimittit, eius enim qui superioris legi
astringitur, non est libere peccata condonare. Vel quia, parcendo
hominibus et miserando, perducit eos ad participationem infiniti
boni, qui est ultimus effectus divinae virtutis. Vel quia, ut supra
dictum est, effectus divinae misericordiae est fundamentum omnium
divinorum operum, nihil enim debetur alicui nisi propter id quod
est datum ei a Deo non debitum. In hoc autem maxime divina
omnipotentia manifestatur, quod ad ipsam pertinet prima institutio
omnium bonorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The absolute possible is not so called in reference either to higher causes, or to inferior causes, but in reference to itself.
                     But the possible in reference to some power is named possible in reference to its proximate cause. Hence those things which
                     it belongs to God alone to do immediately---as, for example, to create, to justify, and the like---are said to be possible
                     in reference to a higher cause. Those things, however, which are of such kind as
                     to be done by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to those inferior causes. For it is according to the condition
                     of the proximate cause that the effect has contingency or necessity, as was shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q14_A1" id="FP_Q25_A3-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[14], A[1]</a>, ad 2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the world is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, it judges to be
                     impossible to God. So it is clear that the omnipotence of God does not take away from things their impossibility and
                     necessity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="29517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29517] Iª q. 25 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod possibile absolutum non dicitur neque secundum causas
superiores, neque secundum causas inferiores sed secundum seipsum.
Possibile vero quod dicitur secundum aliquam potentiam, nominatur
possibile secundum proximam causam. Unde ea quae immediate nata
sunt fieri a Deo solo, ut creare, iustificare, et huiusmodi,
dicuntur possibilia secundum causam superiorem, quae autem nata
sunt fieri a causis inferioribus, dicuntur possibilia secundum
causas inferiores. Nam secundum conditionem causae proximae,
effectus habet contingentiam vel necessitatem, ut supra dictum est.
In hoc autem reputatur stulta mundi sapientia, quod ea quae sunt
impossibilia naturae, etiam Deo impossibilia iudicabat. Et sic
patet quod omnipotentia Dei impossibilitatem et necessitatem a
rebus non excludit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q25_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q25_A4-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 4. Whether God can make the past not to have been?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God can make the past not to have been. For what is impossible in itself is much more impossible than that
                     which is only impossible accidentally. But God can do what is impossible in itself, as to give sight to the blind, or to raise
                     the dead. Therefore, and much more can He do what is only impossible accidentally. Now for the past not to have been is impossible
                     accidentally: thus for Socrates not to be running is accidentally impossible, from
                     the fact that his running is a thing of the past. Therefore God can make the past not to have been.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29518" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29518] Iª q. 25 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus possit facere quod praeterita non
fuerint. Quod enim est impossibile per se, magis est impossibile
quam quod est impossibile per accidens. Sed Deus potest facere id
quod est impossibile per se, ut caecum illuminare, vel mortuum
resuscitare. Ergo multo magis potest Deus facere illud quod est
impossibile per accidens. Sed praeterita non fuisse, est
impossibile per accidens, accidit enim Socratem non currere esse
impossibile, ex hoc quod praeteriit. Ergo Deus potest facere quod
praeterita non fuerint.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what God could do, He can do now, since His power is not lessened. But God could have effected, before Socrates
                     ran, that he should not run. Therefore, when he has run, God could effect that he did not run.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29519" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29519] Iª q. 25 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
quidquid Deus facere potuit, potest, cum eius potentia non
minuatur. Sed Deus potuit facere, antequam Socrates curreret, quod
non curreret. Ergo, postquam cucurrit, potest Deus facere quod non
cucurrerit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is a more excellent virtue than virginity. But God can supply charity that is lost; therefore also lost
                     virginity. Therefore He can so effect that what was corrupt should not have been corrupt.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29520" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29520] Iª q. 25 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
caritas est maior virtus quam virginitas. Sed Deus potest reparare
caritatem amissam. Ergo et virginitatem. Ergo potest facere quod
illa quae corrupta fuit, non fuerit corrupta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">Ep. 22</a> ad Eustoch.): "Although God can do all things, He cannot make a thing that is corrupt not to have been corrupted." Therefore,
                     for the same reason, He cannot effect that anything else which is past should not have been.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29521] Iª q. 25 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Hieronymus dicit, <i>cum Deus omnia possit, non potest de
corrupta facere incorruptam</i>. Ergo eadem ratione non potest
facere de quocumque alio praeterito quod non fuerit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q7_A2" id="FP_Q25_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[2]</a>), there does not fall under the scope of God's omnipotence anything that implies a contradiction. Now that the past should
                     not have been implies a contradiction. For as it implies a contradiction to say that Socrates is sitting, and is not sitting,
                     so does it to say that he sat, and did not sit. But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the past. To say
                     that he did not sit, is to say that
                     it did not happen. Whence, that the past should not have been, does not come under the scope of divine power. This is what
                     Augustine means when he says (Contra Faust. xxix, 5): "Whosoever says, If God is almighty, let Him make what is done as if
                     it were not done, does not see that this is to say: If God is almighty let Him effect that what is true, by the very fact
                     that it is true, be false": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2): "Of this one thing alone is God deprived---namely, to
                     make
                     undone the things that have been done."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 4 co."><a name="29522" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29522] Iª q. 25 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut supra dictum est, sub omnipotentia Dei non cadit
aliquid quod contradictionem implicat. Praeterita autem non fuisse,
contradictionem implicat. Sicut enim contradictionem implicat
dicere quod Socrates sedet et non sedet, ita, quod sederit et non
sederit. Dicere autem quod sederit, est dicere quod sit
praeteritum, dicere autem quod non sederit, est dicere quod non
fuerit. Unde praeterita non fuisse, non subiacet divinae potentiae.
Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, contra Faustum, <i>quisquis ita
dicit, si Deus omnipotens est, faciat ut quae facta sunt, facta non
fuerint, non videt hoc se dicere, si Deus omnipotens est, faciat ut
ea quae vera sunt, eo ipso quod vera sunt, falsa sint</i>. Et
philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod <i>hoc solo privatur Deus,
ingenita facere quae sunt facta</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although it is impossible accidentally for the past not to have been, if one considers the past thing itself, as, for instance,
                     the running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past thing is considered as past, that it should not have been is impossible,
                     not only in itself, but absolutely since it implies a contradiction. Thus, it is more impossible than the raising of the dead;
                     in which there is nothing contradictory, because this is reckoned impossible
                     in reference to some power, that is to say, some natural power; for such impossible things do come beneath the scope of divine
                     power.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29523" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29523] Iª q. 25 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, licet praeterita non fuisse sit impossibile per
accidens, si consideretur id quod est praeteritum, idest cursus
Socratis; tamen, si consideretur praeteritum sub ratione
praeteriti, ipsum non fuisse est impossibile non solum per se, sed
absolute, contradictionem implicans. Et sic est magis impossibile
quam mortuum resurgere, quod non implicat contradictionem, quod
dicitur impossibile secundum aliquam potentiam, scilicet naturalem.
Talia enim impossibilia divinae potentiae subduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God, in accordance with the perfection of the divine power, can do all things, and yet some things are not subject to
                     His power, because they fall short of being possible; so, also, if we regard the immutability of the divine power, whatever
                     God could do, He can do now. Some things, however, at one time were in the nature of possibility, whilst they were yet to
                     be done, which now fall short of the nature of possibility, when they have been done. So
                     is God said not to be able to do them, because they themselves cannot be done.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29524" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29524] Iª q. 25 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod sicut Deus, quantum est ad perfectionem divinae
potentiae, omnia potest, sed quaedam non subiacent eius potentiae,
quia deficiunt a ratione possibilium; ita, si attendatur
immutabilitas divinae potentiae, quidquid Deus potuit, potest;
aliqua tamen olim habuerunt rationem possibilium, dum erant fienda,
quae iam deficiunt a ratione possibilium, dum sunt facta. Et sic
dicitur Deus ea non posse, quia ea non possunt fieri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God can remove all corruption of the mind and body from a woman who has fallen; but the fact that she had been corrupt cannot
                     be removed from her; as also is it impossible that the fact of having sinned or having lost charity thereby can be removed
                     from the sinner.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29525" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29525] Iª q. 25 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod omnem corruptionem mentis et corporis Deus auferre
potest a muliere corrupta, hoc tamen ab ea removeri non poterit,
quod corrupta non fuerit. Sicut etiam ab aliquo peccatore auferre
non potest quod non peccaverit, et quod caritatem non amiserit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q25_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q25_A5-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 5. Whether God can do what He does not?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot do other than what He does. For God cannot do what He has not foreknown and pre-ordained that He
                     would do. But He neither foreknew nor pre-ordained that He would do anything except what He does. Therefore He cannot do except
                     what He does.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="29526" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29526] Iª q. 25 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit facere nisi ea quae facit.
Deus enim non potest facere quae non praescivit et praeordinavit se
facturum. Sed non praescivit neque praeordinavit se facturum, nisi
ea quae facit. Ergo non potest facere nisi ea quae facit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God can only do what ought to be done and what is right to be done. But God is not bound to do what He does not;
                     nor is it right that He should do what He does not. Therefore He cannot do except what He does.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="29527" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29527] Iª q. 25 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
non potest facere nisi quod debet, et quod iustum est fieri. Sed
Deus non debet facere quae non facit, nec iustum est ut faciat quae
non facit. Ergo Deus non potest facere nisi quae facit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God cannot do anything that is not good and befitting creation. But it is not good for creatures nor befitting them
                     to be otherwise than as they are. Therefore God cannot do except what He does.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="29528" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29528] Iª q. 25 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
non potest facere nisi quod bonum est, et conveniens rebus factis.
Sed rebus factis a Deo non est bonum nec conveniens aliter esse
quam sint. Ergo Deus non potest facere nisi quae facit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "Thinkest thou that I cannot ask My Father, and He will give Me presently more than twelve legions of angels?"
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.26.53" target="asv">Mat. 26:53</a>). But He neither asked for them, nor did His Father show them to refute the Jews. Therefore God can do what He does not.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 5 s. c."><a name="29529" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29529] Iª q. 25 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Matt. XXVI, <i>an non possum rogare patrem meum, et
exhibebit mihi modo plus quam duodecim legiones Angelorum?</i>
Neque autem ipse rogabat, neque pater exhibebat ad repugnandum
Iudaeis. Ergo Deus potest facere quod non facit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In this matter certain persons erred in two ways. Some laid it down that God acts from natural necessity in such way that
                     as from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually takes place---as, for instance, from the seed of
                     man, a man must come, and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the divine operation there could not result other things,
                     nor another order of things, than that which now is. But we showed above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q19_A3" id="FP_Q25_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[3]</a>) that God does not act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of all things; nor is that will naturally and
                     from any necessity determined to those things. Whence in no way at all is the present course of events produced by God from
                     any necessity, so that other things could not happen. Others, however, said that the divine power is restricted to this present
                     course of events through the order of the divine wisdom and justice without which God
                     does nothing. But since the power of God, which is His essence, is nothing else but His wisdom, it can indeed be fittingly
                     said that there is nothing in the divine power which is not in the order of the divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom includes
                     the whole potency of the divine power. Yet the order placed in creation by divine wisdom, in which order the notion of His
                     justice consists, as said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q21_A2" id="FP_Q25_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[21], A[2]</a>), is not so adequate to the divine wisdom that the divine
                     wisdom should be restricted to this present order of things. Now it is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man
                     puts into things made by him is taken from their end. So, when the end is proportionate to the things made for that end, the
                     wisdom of the maker is restricted to some definite order. But the divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all proportion
                     things created. Whence the divine wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no other course of events could
                     happen. Wherefore we must simply say that God can do other things than those He has done.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 5 co."><a name="29530" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29530] Iª q. 25 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod circa hoc quidam dupliciter erraverunt. Quidam enim posuerunt
Deum agere quasi ex necessitate naturae; ut sicut ex actione rerum
naturalium non possunt alia provenire nisi quae eveniunt, utpote ex
semine hominis homo, ex semine olivae oliva; ita ex operatione
divina non possint aliae res, vel alius ordo rerum effluere, nisi
sicut nunc est. Sed supra ostendimus Deum non agere quasi ex
necessitate naturae, sed voluntatem eius esse omnium rerum causam;
neque etiam ipsam voluntatem naturaliter et ex necessitate
determinari ad has res. Unde nullo modo iste cursus rerum sic ex
necessitate a Deo provenit, quod alia provenire non possent. Alii
vero dixerunt quod potentia divina determinatur ad hunc cursum
rerum, propter ordinem sapientiae et iustitiae divinae, sine quo
Deus nihil operatur. Cum autem potentia Dei, quae est eius
essentia, non sit aliud quam Dei sapientia, convenienter quidem
dici potest quod nihil sit in Dei potentia, quod non sit in ordine
divinae sapientiae, nam divina sapientia totum posse potentiae
comprehendit. Sed tamen ordo a divina sapientia rebus inditus, in
quo ratio iustitiae consistit, ut supra dictum est, non adaequat
divinam sapientiam, sic ut divina sapientia limitetur ad hunc
ordinem. Manifestum est enim quod tota ratio ordinis, quam sapiens
rebus a se factis imponit, a fine sumitur. Quando igitur finis est
proportionatus rebus propter finem factis, sapientia facientis
limitatur ad aliquem determinatum ordinem. Sed divina bonitas est
finis improportionabiliter excedens res creatas. Unde divina
sapientia non determinatur ad aliquem certum ordinem rerum, ut non
possit alius cursus rerum ab ipsa effluere. Unde dicendum est
simpliciter quod Deus potest alia facere quam quae facit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A5-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In ourselves, in whom power and essence are distinct from will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom, and will from
                     justice, there can be something in the power which is not in the just will nor in the wise intellect. But in God, power and
                     essence, will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Whence, there can be nothing in the divine power which
                     cannot also be in His just will or in His wise intellect. Nevertheless, because
                     His will cannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things, except upon supposition, as was said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q19_A3" id="FP_Q25_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[3]</a>), neither are the wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present order, as was shown above; so nothing prevents there
                     being something in the divine power which He does not will, and which is not included in the order which He has place in things.
                     Again, because power is considered as executing, the will as commanding, and the
                     intellect and wisdom as directing; what is attributed to His power considered in itself, God is said to be able to do in accordance
                     with His absolute power. Of such a kind is everything which has the nature of being, as was said above
                     <a href="#FP_Q25_A3" id="FP_Q25_A5-p7.2" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. What is, however, attributed to the divine power, according as it carries into execution the command of a just will, God
                     is said to be able to do by His ordinary power. In this manner, we must say that God can do other things by
                     His absolute power than those He has foreknown and pre-ordained He would do. But it could not happen that He should do anything
                     which He had not foreknown, and had not pre-ordained that He would do, because His actual doing is subject to His foreknowledge
                     and pre-ordination, though His power, which is His nature, is not so. For God does things because He wills so to do; yet the
                     power to do them does not come from His will, but from His nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="29531" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29531] Iª q. 25 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod in nobis, in quibus est aliud potentia et essentia a
voluntate et intellectu, et iterum intellectus aliud a sapientia,
et voluntas aliud a iustitia, potest esse aliquid in potentia, quod
non potest esse in voluntate iusta, vel in intellectu sapiente. Sed
in Deo est idem potentia et essentia et voluntas et intellectus et
sapientia et iustitia. Unde nihil potest esse in potentia divina,
quod non possit esse in voluntate iusta ipsius, et in intellectu
sapiente eius. Tamen, quia voluntas non determinatur ex necessitate
ad haec vel illa, nisi forte ex suppositione, ut supra dictum est;
neque sapientia Dei et iustitia determinantur ad hunc ordinem, ut
supra dictum est; nihil prohibet esse aliquid in potentia Dei, quod
non vult, et quod non continetur sub ordine quem statuit rebus. Et
quia potentia intelligitur ut exequens, voluntas autem ut imperans,
et intellectus et sapientia ut dirigens, quod attribuitur potentiae
secundum se consideratae, dicitur Deus posse secundum potentiam
absolutam. Et huiusmodi est omne illud in quo potest salvari ratio
entis, ut supra dictum est. Quod autem attribuitur potentiae
divinae secundum quod exequitur imperium voluntatis iustae, hoc
dicitur Deus posse facere de potentia ordinata. Secundum hoc ergo,
dicendum est quod Deus potest alia facere, de potentia absoluta,
quam quae praescivit et praeordinavit se facturum, non tamen potest
esse quod aliqua faciat, quae non praesciverit et praeordinaverit
se facturum. Quia ipsum facere subiacet praescientiae et
praeordinationi, non autem ipsum posse, quod est naturale. Ideo
enim Deus aliquid facit, quia vult, non tamen ideo potest, quia
vult, sed quia talis est in sua natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is bound to nobody but Himself. Hence, when it is said that God can only do what He ought, nothing else is meant by this
                     than that God can do nothing but what is befitting to Himself, and just. But these words "befitting" and "just" may be understood
                     in two ways: one, in direct connection with the verb "is"; and thus they would be restricted to the present order of things;
                     and would concern His power. Then what is said in the objection is false;
                     for the sense is that God can do nothing except what is now fitting and just. If, however, they be joined directly with the
                     verb "can" (which has the effect of extending the meaning), and then secondly with "is," the present will be signified, but
                     in a confused and general way. The sentence would then be true in this sense: "God cannot do anything except that which, if
                     He did it, would be suitable and just."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="29532" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29532] Iª q. 25 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod Deus non debet aliquid alicui nisi sibi. Unde, cum
dicitur quod Deus non potest facere nisi quod debet nihil aliud
significatur nisi quod Deus non potest facere nisi quod ei est
conveniens et iustum. Sed hoc quod dico conveniens et iustum,
potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, sic quod hoc quod dico
conveniens et iustum, prius intelligatur coniungi cum hoc verbo
est, ita quod restringatur ad standum pro praesentibus; et sic
referatur ad potentiam. Et sic falsum est quod dicitur, est enim
sensus, Deus non potest facere nisi quod modo conveniens est et
iustum. Si vero prius coniungatur cum hoc verbo potest, quod habet
vim ampliandi, et postmodum cum hoc verbo est, significabitur
quoddam praesens confusum, et erit locutio vera, sub hoc sensu,
Deus non potest facere nisi id quod, si faceret, esset conveniens
et iustum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although this order of things be restricted to what now exists, the divine power and wisdom are not thus restricted. Whence,
                     although no other order would be suitable and good to the things which now are, yet God can do other things and impose upon
                     them another order.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="29533" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29533] Iª q. 25 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, licet iste cursus rerum sit determinatus istis rebus
quae nunc sunt, non tamen ad hunc cursum limitatur divina sapientia
et potestas. Unde, licet istis rebus quae nunc sunt, nullus alius
cursus esset bonus et conveniens, tamen Deus posset alias res
facere, et alium eis imponere ordinem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q25_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q25_A6-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 6. Whether God can do better than what He does?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot do better than He does. For whatever God does, He does in a most powerful and wise way. But a thing
                     is so much the better done as it is more powerfully and wisely done. Therefore God cannot do anything better than He does.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="29534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29534] Iª q. 25 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit meliora facere ea quae
facit. Quidquid enim Deus facit, potentissime et sapientissime
facit. Sed tanto fit aliquid melius, quanto fit potentius et
sapientius. Ergo Deus non potest aliquid facere melius quam
facit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine thus argues (Contra Maximin. iii, 8): "If God could, but would not, beget a Son His equal, He would have
                     been envious." For the same reason, if God could have made better things than He has done, but was not willing so to do, He
                     would have been envious. But envy is far removed from God. Therefore God makes everything of the best. He cannot therefore
                     make anything better than He does.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="29535" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29535] Iª q. 25 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Augustinus, contra Maximinum, sic argumentatur, <i>si Deus potuit,
et noluit, gignere filium sibi aequalem, invidus fuit</i>. Eadem
ratione, si Deus potuit res meliores facere quam fecerit, et
noluit, invidus fuit. Sed invidia est omnino relegata a Deo. Ergo
Deus unumquodque fecit optimum. Non ergo Deus potest aliquid facere
melius quam fecit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is very good and the best of all cannot be bettered; because nothing is better than the best. But as Augustine
                     says (Enchiridion 10), "each thing that God has made is good, and, taken all together they are very good; because in them
                     all consists the wondrous beauty of the universe." Therefore the good in the universe could not be made better by God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="29536" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29536] Iª q. 25 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, id
quod est maxime et valde bonum, non potest melius fieri, quia
maximo nihil est maius. Sed, sicut Augustinus dicit in Enchirid.,
<i>bona sunt singula quae Deus fecit, sed simul universa valde
bona, quia ex omnibus consistit universitatis admirabilis
pulchritudo</i>. Ergo bonum universi non potest melius fieri a
Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Christ as man is full of grace and truth, and has the Spirit without measure; and so He cannot be better. Again
                     created happiness is described as the highest good, and thus cannot be better. And the Blessed Virgin Mary is raised above
                     all the choirs of angels, and so cannot be better than she is. God cannot therefore make all things better than He has made
                     them.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 arg. 4"><a name="29537" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29537] Iª q. 25 a. 6 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, homo
Christus est plenus gratia et veritate, et spiritum habet non ad
mensuram, et sic non potest esse melior. Beatitudo etiam creata
dicitur esse summum bonum, et sic non potest esse melius. Beata
etiam virgo Maria est super omnes choros Angelorum exaltata, et sic
non potest esse melior. Non igitur omnia quae fecit Deus, potest
facere meliora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.20" target="asv">Eph. 3:20</a>): "God is able to do all things more abundantly than we desire or understand."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 s. c."><a name="29538" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29538] Iª q. 25 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur ad Ephes. III, quod <i>Deus potens est omnia facere
abundantius quam petimus aut intelligimus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The goodness of anything is twofold; one, which is of the essence of it---thus, for instance, to be rational pertains to
                     the essence of man. As regards this good, God cannot make a thing better than it is itself; although He can make another thing
                     better than it; even as He cannot make the number four greater than it is; because if it were greater it would no longer be
                     four, but another number. For the addition of a substantial difference in definitions is
                     after the manner of the addition of unity of numbers (Metaph. viii, 10). Another kind of goodness is that which is over and
                     above the essence; thus, the good of a man is to be virtuous or wise. As regards this kind of goodness, God can make better
                     the things He has made. Absolutely speaking, however, God can make something else better than each thing made by Him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 co."><a name="29539" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29539] Iª q. 25 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod bonitas alicuius rei est duplex. Una quidem, quae est de
essentia rei; sicut esse rationale est de essentia hominis. Et
quantum ad hoc bonum, Deus non potest facere aliquam rem meliorem
quam ipsa sit, licet possit facere aliquam aliam ea meliorem. Sicut
etiam non potest facere quaternarium maiorem, quia, si esset maior,
iam non esset quaternarius, sed alius numerus. Sic enim se habet
additio differentiae substantialis in definitionibus, sicut additio
unitatis in numeris, ut dicitur in VIII Metaphys. Alia bonitas est,
quae est extra essentiam rei; sicut bonum hominis est esse
virtuosum vel sapientem. Et secundum tale bonum, potest Deus res a
se factas facere meliores. Simpliciter autem loquendo, qualibet re
a se facta potest Deus facere aliam meliorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When it is said that God can make a thing better than He makes it, if "better" is taken substantively, this proposition is
                     true. For He can always make something else better than each individual thing: and He can make the same thing in one way better
                     than it is, and in another way not; as was explained above. If, however, "better" is taken as an adverb, implying the manner
                     of the making; thus God cannot make anything better than He makes it, because
                     He cannot make it from greater wisdom and goodness. But if it implies the manner of the thing done, He can make something
                     better; because He can give to things made by Him a better manner of existence as regards the accidents, although not as regards
                     the substance.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="29540" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29540] Iª q. 25 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, cum dicitur Deum posse aliquid facere melius quam
facit, si ly melius sit nomen, verum est, qualibet enim re potest
facere aliam meliorem. Eandem vero potest facere meliorem
quodammodo, et quodammodo non, sicut dictum est. Si vero ly melius
sit adverbium, et importet modum ex parte facientis, sic Deus non
potest facere melius quam sicut facit, quia non potest facere ex
maiori sapientia et bonitate. Si autem importet modum ex parte
facti, sic potest facere melius, quia potest dare rebus a se factis
meliorem modum essendi quantum ad accidentalia, licet non quantum
ad essentialia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is of the nature of a son that he should be equal to his father, when he comes to maturity. But it is not of the nature
                     of anything created, that it should be better than it was made by God. Hence the comparison fails.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="29541" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29541] Iª q. 25 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod de ratione filii est quod aequetur patri, cum ad
perfectum venerit, non est autem de ratione creaturae alicuius,
quod sit melior quam a Deo facta est. Unde non est similis
ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The universe, the present creation being supposed, cannot be better, on account of the most beautiful order given to things
                     by God; in which the good of the universe consists. For if any one thing were bettered, the proportion of order would be destroyed;
                     as if one string were stretched more than it ought to be, the melody of the harp would be destroyed. Yet God could make other
                     things, or add something to the present creation; and then there would be
                     another and a better universe.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="29542" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29542] Iª q. 25 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod universum, suppositis istis rebus, non potest esse
melius; propter decentissimum ordinem his rebus attributum a Deo,
in quo bonum universi consistit. Quorum si unum aliquod esset
melius, corrumperetur proportio ordinis, sicut, si una chorda plus
debito intenderetur, corrumperetur citharae melodia. Posset tamen
Deus alias res facere, vel alias addere istis rebus factis, et sic
esset illud universum melius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The humanity of Christ, from the fact that it is united to the Godhead; and created happiness from the fact that it is the
                     fruition of God; and the Blessed Virgin from the fact that she is the mother of God; have all a certain infinite dignity from
                     the infinite good, which is God. And on this account there cannot be anything better than these; just as there cannot be anything
                     better than God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 ad 4"><a name="29543" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29543] Iª q. 25 a. 6 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod humanitas Christi ex hoc quod est unita Deo, et
beatitudo creata ex hoc quod est fruitio Dei, et beata virgo ex hoc
quod est mater Dei, habent quandam dignitatem infinitam, ex bono
infinito quod est Deus. Et ex hac parte non potest aliquid fieri
melius eis, sicut non potest aliquid melius esse Deo.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FP_Q26" class="div3">
<h3 id="FP_Q26-p0.1">Q. 26. OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES) </h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FP_Q26-p2"> After considering all that pertains to the unity of the divine essence, we come to treat of the divine beatitude. Concerning
                  this, there are four points of inquiry:
               </p><p id="FP_Q26-p3"><a href="#FP_Q26_A1"> (1) Whether beatitude belongs to God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q26-p4"><a href="#FP_Q26_A2"> (2) In regard to what is God called blessed; does this regard His act of intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q26-p5"><a href="#FP_Q26_A3"> (3) Whether He is essentially the beatitude of each of the blessed?</a></p><p id="FP_Q26-p6"><a href="#FP_Q26_A4"> (4) Whether all other beatitude is included in the divine beatitude?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 pr."><a name="29544" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29544]
Iª q. 26 pr.</span></a> Ultimo autem, post considerationem
eorum quae ad divinae essentiae unitatem pertinent, considerandum
est de divina beatitudine. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo,
utrum beatitudo Deo competat. Secundo, secundum quid dicitur Deus
esse beatus, utrum secundum actum intellectus. Tertio, utrum sit
essentialiter beatitudo cuiuslibet beati. Quarto, utrum in eius
beatitudine omnis beatitudo includatur.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP_Q26_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q26_A1-p0.1">Q. 26. A. 1. Whether beatitude belongs to God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that beatitude does not belong to God. For beatitude according to Boethius (De Consol. iv) "is a state made perfect
                     by the aggregation of all good things." But the aggregation of goods has no place in God; nor has composition. Therefore beatitude
                     does not belong to God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29545" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29545] Iª q. 26 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo Deo non conveniat. <i>Beatitudo
enim</i>, secundum Boetium, in III de Consol., <i>est status omnium
bonorum aggregatione perfectus</i>. Sed aggregatio bonorum non
habet locum in Deo, sicut nec compositio. Ergo Deo non convenit
beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, beatitude or happiness is the reward of virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9). But reward does not
                     apply to God; as neither does merit. Therefore neither does beatitude.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29546" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29546] Iª q. 26 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo, sive felicitas, est praemium virtutis, secundum
philosophum, in I Ethic. Sed Deo non convenit praemium, sicut nec
meritum. Ergo nec beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A1-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says: "Which in His times He shall show, who is the Blessed and only Almighty, the King of Kings and Lord of
                     Lords." (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q26_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.15" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:15</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29547" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29547] Iª q. 26 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit apostolus, I ad Tim. ultimo, <i>quem suis temporibus
ostendet Deus beatus et solus potens, rex regum et dominus
dominantium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A1-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Beatitude belongs to God in a very special manner. For nothing else is understood to be meant by the term beatitude than
                     the perfect good of an intellectual nature; which is capable of knowing that it has a sufficiency of the good which it possesses,
                     to which it is competent that good or ill may befall, and which can control its own actions. All of these things belong in
                     a most excellent manner to God, namely, to be perfect, and to possess intelligence.
                     Whence beatitude belongs to God in the highest degree.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 1 co."><a name="29548" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29548] Iª q. 26 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod beatitudo maxime Deo competit. Nihil enim aliud sub nomine
beatitudinis intelligitur, nisi bonum perfectum intellectualis
naturae; cuius est suam sufficientiam cognoscere in bono quod
habet; et cui competit ut ei contingat aliquid vel bene vel male,
et sit suarum operationum domina. Utrumque autem istorum
excellentissime Deo convenit, scilicet perfectum esse, et
intelligentem. Unde beatitudo maxime convenit Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A1-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Aggregation of good is in God, after the manner not of composition, but of simplicity; for those things which in creatures
                     is manifold, pre-exist in God, as was said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q4_A2" id="FP_Q26_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[2]</a>;
                     <a href="#FP_Q13_A4" id="FP_Q26_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[13], A[4]</a>), in simplicity and unity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29549] Iª q. 26 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod aggregatio bonorum est in Deo non per modum
compositionis, sed per modum simplicitatis, quia quae in creaturis
multiplicia sunt, in Deo praeexistunt simpliciter et unite, ut
supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It belongs as an accident to beatitude or happiness to be the reward of virtue, so far as anyone attains to beatitude; even
                     as to be the term of generation belongs accidentally to a being, so far as it passes from potentiality to act. As, then, God
                     has being, though not begotten; so He has beatitude, although not acquired by merit.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29550" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29550] Iª q. 26 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod esse praemium virtutis accidit beatitudini vel
felicitati, inquantum aliquis beatitudinem acquirit, sicut esse
terminum generationis accidit enti, inquantum exit de potentia in
actum. Sicut igitur Deus habet esse, quamvis non generetur; ita
habet beatitudinem, quamvis non mereatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q26_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q26_A2-p0.1">Q. 26. A. 2. Whether God is called blessed in respect of His intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not called blessed in respect to His intellect. For beatitude is the highest good. But good is said
                     to be in God in regard to His essence, because good has reference to being which is according to essence, according to Boethius
                     (De Hebdom.). Therefore beatitude also is said to be in God in regard to His essence, and not to His intellect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29551" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29551] Iª q. 26 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non dicatur beatus secundum
intellectum. Beatitudo enim est summum bonum. Sed bonum dicitur in
Deo secundum essentiam, quia bonum respicit esse, quod est secundum
essentiam, secundum Boetium, in libro de Hebdomad. Ergo et
beatitudo dicitur in Deo secundum essentiam, et non secundum
intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Beatitude implies the notion of end. Now the end is the object of the will, as also is the good. Therefore beatitude
                     is said to be in God with reference to His will, and not with reference to His intellect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29552] Iª q. 26 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo habet rationem finis. Finis autem est obiectum
voluntatis, sicut et bonum. Ergo beatitudo dicitur in Deo secundum
voluntatem, et non secundum intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A2-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxxii, 7): "He is in glory, Who whilst He rejoices in Himself, needs not further praise." To be in glory,
                     however, is the same as to be blessed. Therefore, since we enjoy God in respect to our intellect, because "vision is the whole
                     of the reward," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii), it would seem that beatitude is said to be in God in respect of His
                     intellect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29553" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29553] Iª q. 26 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Gregorius dicit, XXXII Moralium, <i>ipse gloriosus est, qui,
dum seipso perfruitur, accedentis laudis indigens non est</i>. Esse
autem gloriosum significat esse beatum. Cum igitur Deo fruamur
secundum intellectum, quia visio est tota merces, ut dicit
Augustinus, videtur quod beatitudo dicatur in Deo secundum
intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A2-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Beatitude, as stated above
                     <a href="#FP_Q26_A1" id="FP_Q26_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, is the perfect good of an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as everything desires the perfection of its nature, intellectual
                     nature desires naturally to be happy. Now that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is the intellectual operation,
                     by which in some sense it grasps everything. Whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists in understanding.
                     Now in God, to be and to
                     understand are one and the same thing; differing only in the manner of our understanding them. Beatitude must therefore be
                     assigned to God in respect of His intellect; as also to the blessed, who are called blesses [beati] by reason of the assimilation
                     to His beatitude.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 2 co."><a name="29554" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29554] Iª q. 26 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod beatitudo, sicut dictum est, significat bonum perfectum
intellectualis naturae. Et inde est quod, sicut unaquaeque res
appetit suam perfectionem, ita et intellectualis natura naturaliter
appetit esse beata. Id autem quod est perfectissimum in qualibet
intellectuali natura, est intellectualis operatio, secundum quam
capit quodammodo omnia. Unde cuiuslibet intellectualis naturae
creatae beatitudo consistit in intelligendo. In Deo autem non est
aliud esse et intelligere secundum rem, sed tantum secundum
intelligentiae rationem. Attribuenda ergo est Deo beatitudo
secundum intellectum, sicut et aliis beatis, qui per assimilationem
ad beatitudinem ipsius, beati dicuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A2-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument proves that beatitude belongs to God; not that beatitude pertains essentially to Him under the aspect of His
                     essence; but rather under the aspect of His intellect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29555" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29555] Iª q. 26 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod ex illa ratione probatur quod Deus sit beatus
secundum suam essentiam, non autem quod beatitudo ei conveniat
secundum rationem essentiae, sed magis secundum rationem
intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since beatitude is a good, it is the object of the will; now the object is understood as prior to the act of a power. Whence
                     in our manner of understanding, divine beatitude precedes the act of the will at rest in it. This cannot be other than the
                     act of the intellect; and thus beatitude is to be found in an act of the intellect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29556" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29556] Iª q. 26 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod beatitudo, cum sit bonum, est obiectum voluntatis.
Obiectum autem praeintelligitur actui potentiae. Unde, secundum
modum intelligendi, prius est beatitudo divina, quam actus
voluntatis in ea requiescentis. Et hoc non potest esse nisi actus
intellectus. Unde in actu intellectus attenditur beatitudo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q26_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q26_A3-p0.1">Q. 26. A. 3. Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is the beatitude of each of the blessed. For God is the supreme good, as was said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q6_A2" id="FP_Q26_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[6], AA[2]</a>,4). But it is quite impossible that there should be many supreme goods, as also is clear from what has been said above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q11_A3" id="FP_Q26_A3-p2.2" shape="rect">Q[11], A[3]</a>). Therefore, since it is of the essence of beatitude that it should be the supreme good, it seems that beatitude is nothing
                     else but God Himself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29557] Iª q. 26 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit beatitudo cuiuslibet beati. Deus
enim est summum bonum, ut supra ostensum est. Impossibile est autem
esse plura summa bona, ut etiam ex superioribus patet. Cum igitur
de ratione beatitudinis sit, quod sit summum bonum, videtur quod
beatitudo non sit aliud quam Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, beatitude is the last end of the rational nature. But to be the last end of the rational nature belongs only to
                     God. Therefore the beatitude of every blessed is God alone.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29558" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29558] Iª q. 26 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
beatitudo est finis rationalis naturae ultimus. Sed esse ultimum
finem rationalis naturae, soli Deo convenit. Ergo beatitudo
cuiuslibet beati est solus Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A3-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The beatitude of one is greater than that of another, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q26_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.41" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:41</a>: "Star differeth from star in glory." But nothing is greater than God. Therefore beatitude is something different from God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29559" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29559] Iª q. 26 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
beatitudo unius est maior beatitudine alterius, secundum illud I
Cor. XV, <i>stella differt a stella in claritate</i>. Sed Deo nihil
est maius. Ergo beatitudo est aliquid aliud quam Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A3-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The beatitude of an intellectual nature consists in an act of the intellect. In this we may consider two things, namely,
                     the object of the act, which is the thing understood; and the act itself which is to understand. If, then, beatitude be considered
                     on the side of the object, God is the only beatitude; for everyone is blessed from this sole fact, that he understands God,
                     in accordance with the saying of Augustine (Confess. v, 4): "Blessed is he who knoweth
                     Thee, though he know nought else." But as regards the act of understanding, beatitude is a created thing in beatified creatures;
                     but in God, even in this way, it is an uncreated thing.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 3 co."><a name="29560" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29560] Iª q. 26 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod beatitudo intellectualis naturae consistit in actu
intellectus. In quo duo possunt considerari, scilicet obiectum
actus, quod est intelligibile; et ipse actus, qui est intelligere.
Si igitur beatitudo consideretur ex parte ipsius obiecti, sic solus
Deus est beatitudo, quia ex hoc solo est aliquis beatus, quod Deum
intelligit; secundum illud Augustini, in V libro Confess.,
<i>beatus est qui te novit, etiam si alia ignoret</i>. Sed ex parte
actus intelligentis, beatitudo est quid creatum in creaturis
beatis, in Deo autem est etiam secundum hoc, aliquid increatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A3-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Beatitude, as regards its object, is the supreme good absolutely, but as regards its act, in beatified creatures it is their
                     supreme good, not absolutely, but in that kind of goods which a creature can participate.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29561" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29561] Iª q. 26 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod beatitudo, quantum ad obiectum, est summum bonum
simpliciter, sed quantum ad actum, in creaturis beatis, est summum
bonum, non simpliciter, sed in genere bonorum participabilium a
creatura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> End is twofold, namely, "objective" and "subjective," as the Philosopher says (Greater Ethics i, 3), namely, the "thing itself"
                     and "its use." Thus to a miser the end is money, and its acquisition. Accordingly God is indeed the last end of a rational
                     creature, as the thing itself; but created beatitude is the end, as the use, or rather fruition, of the thing.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29562" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29562] Iª q. 26 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod finis est duplex, scilicet cuius et quo, ut
philosophus dicit, scilicet ipsa res, et usus rei, sicut avaro est
finis pecunia, et acquisitio pecuniae. Creaturae igitur rationalis
est quidem Deus finis ultimus ut res; beatitudo autem creata ut
usus, vel magis fruitio, rei.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q26_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q26_A4-p0.1">Q. 26. A. 4. Whether all other beatitude is included in the beatitude of God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes. For there are some false beatitudes. But nothing
                     false can be in God. Therefore the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29563" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29563] Iª q. 26 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo divina non complectatur omnes
beatitudines. Sunt enim quaedam beatitudines falsae. Sed in Deo
nihil potest esse falsum. Ergo divina beatitudo non complectitur
omnem beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a certain beatitude, according to some, consists in things corporeal; as in pleasure, riches, and such like. Now
                     none of these have to do with God, since He is incorporeal. Therefore His beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29564" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29564] Iª q. 26 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
quaedam beatitudo, secundum quosdam, consistit in rebus
corporalibus, sicut in voluptatibus, divitiis, et huiusmodi, quae
quidem Deo convenire non possunt, cum sit incorporeus. Ergo
beatitudo eius non complectitur omnem beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A4-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Beatitude is a certain perfection. But the divine perfection embraces all other perfection, as was shown above (
                     <a href="#FP_Q4_A2" id="FP_Q26_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[2]</a> ). Therefore the divine beatitude embraces all other beatitudes.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29565] Iª q. 26 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod beatitudo est perfectio quaedam. Divina autem perfectio
complectitur omnem perfectionem, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo divina
beatitudo complectitur omnem beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A4-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Whatever is desirable in whatsoever beatitude, whether true or false, pre-exists wholly and in a more eminent degree in the
                     divine beatitude. As to contemplative happiness, God possesses a continual and most certain contemplation of Himself and of
                     all things else; and as to that which is active, He has the governance of the whole universe. As to earthly happiness, which
                     consists in delight, riches, power, dignity, and fame, according to Boethius (De Consol.
                     iii, 10), He possesses joy in Himself and all things else for His delight; instead of riches He has that complete self-sufficiency,
                     which is promised by riches; in place of power, He has omnipotence; for dignities, the government of all things; and in place
                     of fame, He possesses the admiration of all creatures.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 4 co."><a name="29566" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29566] Iª q. 26 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod quidquid est desiderabile in quacumque beatitudine, vel vera
vel falsa, totum eminentius in divina beatitudine praeexistit. De
contemplativa enim felicitate, habet continuam et certissimam
contemplationem sui et omnium aliorum, de activa vero,
gubernationem totius universi. De terrena vero felicitate, quae
consistit in voluptate, divitiis, potestate, dignitate et fama,
secundum Boetium, in III de Consol., habet gaudium de se et de
omnibus aliis, pro delectatione, pro divitiis, habet omnimodam
sufficientiam, quam divitiae promittunt, pro potestate,
omnipotentiam, pro dignitate, omnium regimen, pro fama vero,
admirationem totius creaturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A4-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A particular kind of beatitude is false according as it falls short of the idea of true beatitude; and thus it is not in
                     God. But whatever semblance it has, howsoever slight, of beatitude, the whole of it pre-exists in the divine beatitude.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29567" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29567] Iª q. 26 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod beatitudo aliqua secundum hoc est falsa, secundum
quod deficit a ratione verae beatitudinis, et sic non est in Deo.
Sed quidquid habet de similitudine, quantumcumque tenui,
beatitudinis, totum praeexistit in divina beatitudine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q26_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good that exists in things corporeal in a corporeal manner, is also in God, but in a spiritual manner.
                  </p><p id="FP_Q26_A4-p8"> We have now spoken enough concerning what pertains to the unity of the divine essence.</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29568] Iª q. 26 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod bona quae sunt in corporalibus corporaliter, in Deo
sunt spiritualiter, secundum modum suum. Et haec dicta sufficiant
de his quae pertinent ad divinae essentiae unitatem.</p></div></div></div></div>


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date	Tue, 05 Jan 2010 16:51:14 +0000
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