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					xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head><title>Bilingual Aquinas Questions 19--25</title><style>
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    </style></head><body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><div id="FP.ii" next="FP_Q2" prev="FP_Q1_A10" progress="0.25%" n="ii" title="Treatise on The One God (QQ[2-26])"><h2 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ19-26)</h2><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19" next="FP_Q19_A1" prev="FP_Q18_A4" progress="3.41%" n="xviii" title="Question. 19 - THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)">
<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p0.1">Question 19. THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
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<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p2" shownumber="no"> After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether there is will in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p7" shownumber="no"> (5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p8" shownumber="no"> (6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p9" shownumber="no"> (7) Whether the will of God is mutable?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p10" shownumber="no"> (8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p11" shownumber="no"> (9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p12" shownumber="no"> (10) Whether God has free will?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p13" shownumber="no"> (11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p14" shownumber="no"> (12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 pr."><a name="29179"><span class="ref">[29179]
I&ordf; q. 19 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem eorum quae ad
divinam scientiam pertinent, considerandum est de his quae
pertinent ad voluntatem divinam, ut sit prima consideratio de ipsa
Dei voluntate; secunda, de his quae ad voluntatem absolute
pertinent; tertia, de his quae ad intellectum in ordine ad
voluntatem pertinent. Circa ipsam autem voluntatem quaeruntur
duodecim. Primo, utrum in Deo sit voluntas. Secundo, utrum Deus
velit alia a se. Tertio, utrum quidquid Deus vult, ex necessitate
velit. Quarto, utrum voluntas Dei sit causa rerum. Quinto, utrum
voluntatis divinae sit assignare aliquam causam. Sexto, utrum
voluntas divina semper impleatur. Septimo, utrum voluntas Dei sit
mutabilis. Octavo, utrum voluntas Dei necessitatem rebus volitis
imponat. Nono, utrum in Deo sit voluntas malorum. Decimo, utrum
Deus habeat liberum arbitrium. Undecimo, utrum sit distinguenda in
Deo voluntas signi. Duodecimo, utrum convenienter circa divinam
voluntatem ponantur quinque signa.</p></div></div>
<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1" next="FP_Q19_A2" prev="FP_Q19"
progress="3.42%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether there is will in
God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p0.1">Whether there
is will in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
seems that there is not will in God. For the object of will is the end
and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end. Therefore there is
not will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29180"><span class=
"ref">[29180] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sit voluntas. Obiectum enim
voluntatis est finis et bonum. Sed Dei non est assignare aliquem
finem. Ergo voluntas non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p3"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, will is a kind of
appetite. But appetite, as it is directed to things not possessed,
implies imperfection, which cannot be imputed to God. Therefore there
is not will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29181"><span class=
"ref">[29181] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
voluntas est appetitus quidam. Appetitus autem, cum sit rei non
habitae, imperfectionem designat, quae Deo non competit. Ergo
voluntas non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p4"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the
Philosopher (De Anima iii, 54), the will moves, and is moved. But God
is the first cause of movement, and Himself is unmoved, as proved in
Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there is not will in God.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29182"><span class=
"ref">[29182] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
secundum philosophum, in III de anima, voluntas est movens motum.
Sed Deus est primum movens immobile. Ut probatur VIII Physic. Ergo
in Deo non est voluntas.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the
contrary,</b> The Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.12.2"
parsed="vul|Rom|12|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p5.1"
passage="Rom. 12:2">Rom. 12:2</scripRef>): "That you may prove what is
the will of God."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29183"><span class=
"ref">[29183] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit apostolus, Rom. XII, <i>ut probetis quae sit voluntas
Dei</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> There is will in God, as there is intellect: since will follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual existence by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards its natural form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when it has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same with every natural perfection, which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things
  without knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also intellectual natures have a like aptitude as apprehended through its intelligible form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain to the will. Hence in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there is animal appetite. And so there must be will in God, since there is intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own existence, so is His
  will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 co."><a name="29184"><span class=
"ref">[29184] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
in Deo voluntatem esse, sicut et in eo est intellectus, voluntas
enim intellectum consequitur. Sicut enim res naturalis habet esse
in actu per suam formam, ita intellectus intelligens actu per suam
formam intelligibilem. Quaelibet autem res ad suam formam naturalem
hanc habet habitudinem, ut quando non habet ipsam, tendat in eam;
et quando habet ipsam, quiescat in ea. Et idem est de qualibet
perfectione naturali, quod est bonum naturae. Et haec habitudo ad
bonum, in rebus carentibus cognitione, vocatur appetitus naturalis.
Unde et natura intellectualis ad bonum apprehensum per formam
intelligibilem, similem habitudinem habet, ut scilicet, cum habet
ipsum, quiescat in illo; cum vero non habet, quaerat ipsum. Et
utrumque pertinet ad voluntatem. Unde in quolibet habente
intellectum, est voluntas; sicut in quolibet habente sensum, est
appetitus animalis. Et sic oportet in Deo esse voluntatem, cum sit
in eo intellectus. Et sicut suum intelligere est suum esse, ita
suum velle.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
1:</b> Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He Himself is
the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this by His
essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above (<a
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3"
shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[6], A[3]</a>): for the end has the
aspect of good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29185"><span class=
"ref">[29185] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, licet nihil aliud a Deo sit finis Dei, tamen ipsemet
est finis respectu omnium quae ab eo fiunt. Et hoc per suam
essentiam, cum per suam essentiam sit bonus, ut supra ostensum est,
finis enim habet rationem boni.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
to Objection 2:</b> Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which,
although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking
what it does not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in
what it does possess. In this respect will is said to be in God, as
having always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is
not distinct from His essence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29186"><span class=
"ref">[29186] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod voluntas in nobis pertinet ad appetitivam partem,
quae licet ab appetendo nominetur, non tamen hunc solum habet
actum, ut appetat quae non habet; sed etiam ut amet quod habet, et
delectetur in illo. Et quantum ad hoc voluntas in Deo ponitur; quae
semper habet bonum quod est eius obiectum, cum sit indifferens ab
eo secundum essentiam, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div
style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p9"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A will of which the
principal object is a good outside itself, must be moved by another;
but the object of the divine will is His goodness, which is His
essence. Hence, since the will of God is His essence, it is not moved
by another than itself, but by itself alone, in the same sense as
understanding and willing are said to be movement. This is what Plato
meant when he said that the first mover moves itself.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29187"><span class=
"ref">[29187] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod voluntas cuius obiectum principale est bonum quod est
extra voluntatem, oportet quod sit mota ab aliquo. Sed obiectum
divinae voluntatis est bonitas sua, quae est eius essentia. Unde,
cum voluntas Dei sit eius essentia, non movetur ab alio a se, sed a
se tantum, eo modo loquendi quo intelligere et velle dicitur motus.
Et secundum hoc Plato dixit quod primum movens movet
seipsum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2"
next="FP_Q19_A3" prev="FP_Q19_A1" progress="3.44%" n="ii"
title="Article. 2 - Whether God wills things apart from Himself?"><h4
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p0.1">Whether God wills
things apart from Himself?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
seems that God does not will things apart from Himself. For the divine
will is the divine existence. But God is not other than
Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than
Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29188"><span class=
"ref">[29188] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non velit alia a se. Velle enim
divinum est eius esse. Sed Deus non est aliud a se. Ergo non vult
aliud a se.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the appetite,
as stated in De Anima iii, 54. If, therefore, God wills anything apart
from Himself, His will must be moved by another; which is
impossible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29189"><span class=
"ref">[29189] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
volitum movet voluntatem, sicut appetibile appetitum, ut dicitur in
III de anima. Si igitur Deus velit aliquid aliud a se, movebitur
eius voluntas ab aliquo alio, quod est
impossibile.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks nothing
beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely satisfies
His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from
Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29190"><span class=
"ref">[29190] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
cuicumque voluntati sufficit aliquod volitum, nihil quaerit extra
illud. Sed Deo sufficit sua bonitas, et voluntas eius ex ea
satiatur. Ergo Deus non vult aliquid aliud a se.</p></div></div><div
style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p5"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, acts of will are
multiplied in proportion to the number of their objects. If,
therefore, God wills Himself and things apart from Himself, it follows
that the act of His will is manifold, and consequently His existence,
which is His will. But this is impossible. Therefore God does not will
things apart from Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="29191"><span class=
"ref">[29191] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, actus
voluntatis multiplicatur secundum volita. Si igitur Deus velit se
et alia a se, sequitur quod actus voluntatis eius sit multiplex, et
per consequens eius esse, quod est eius velle. Hoc autem est
impossibile. Non ergo vult alia a se.</p></div></div><div
style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p6"
shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (<scripRef
osisRef="Bible.vul:1Thess.4.3" parsed="vul|1Thess|4|3|0|0"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p6.1" passage="1 Thess. 4:3">1
Thess. 4:3</scripRef>): "This is the will of God, your
sanctification."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29192"><span class=
"ref">[29192] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod apostolus dicit, I Thess. IV, <i>haec est voluntas Dei,
sanctificatio vestra</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. For natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces
  its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed; and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other
  things to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained
to that end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other
things should be partakers therein.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 co."><a name="29193"><span class=
"ref">[29193] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod Deus non solum se vult, sed etiam alia a se. Quod apparet a
simili prius introducto. Res enim naturalis non solum habet
naturalem inclinationem respectu proprii boni, ut acquirat ipsum
cum non habet, vel ut quiescat in illo cum habet; sed etiam ut
proprium bonum in alia diffundat, secundum quod possibile est. Unde
videmus quod omne agens, inquantum est actu et perfectum, facit
sibi simile. Unde et hoc pertinet ad rationem voluntatis, ut bonum
quod quis habet, aliis communicet, secundum quod possibile est. Et
hoc praecipue pertinet ad voluntatem divinam, a qua, per quandam
similitudinem, derivatur omnis perfectio. Unde, si res naturales,
inquantum perfectae sunt, suum bonum aliis communicant, multo magis
pertinet ad voluntatem divinam, ut bonum suum aliis per
similitudinem communicet, secundum quod possibile est. Sic igitur
vult et se esse, et alia. Sed se ut finem, alia vero ut ad finem,
inquantum condecet divinam bonitatem etiam alia ipsam
participare.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine will is God's own existence essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of understanding them and expressing them, as is clear from what has already been said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[4]</a>). For when we say that God exists, no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say that God wills. Therefore, although He is not anything apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart from
  Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29194"><span class=
"ref">[29194] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, licet divinum velle sit eius esse secundum rem,
tamen differt ratione, secundum diversum modum intelligendi et
significandi, ut ex superioribus patet. In hoc enim quod dico Deum
esse, non importatur habitudo ad aliquid, sicut in hoc quod dico
Deum velle. Et ideo, licet non sit aliquid aliud a se, vult tamen
aliquid aliud a se.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things willed for the sake of the end, the whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves the will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing so wills nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant, which anyone may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its
  own sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only
for the sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it does not follow
that anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He
understands things apart from Himself by understanding His own
essence, so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own
goodness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29195"><span class=
"ref">[29195] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod in his quae volumus propter finem, tota ratio movendi
est finis, et hoc est quod movet voluntatem. Et hoc maxime apparet
in his quae volumus tantum propter finem. Qui enim vult sumere
potionem amaram, nihil in ea vult nisi sanitatem, et hoc solum est
quod movet eius voluntatem. Secus autem est in eo qui sumit
potionem dulcem, quam non solum propter sanitatem, sed etiam
propter se aliquis velle potest. Unde, cum Deus alia a se non velit
nisi propter finem qui est sua bonitas, ut dictum est, non sequitur
quod aliquid aliud moveat voluntatem eius nisi bonitas sua. Et sic,
sicut alia a se intelligit intelligendo essentiam suam, ita alia a
se vult, volendo bonitatem suam.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
to Objection 3:</b> From the fact that His own goodness suffices the
divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from
itself, but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its
goodness. Thus, too, the divine intellect, though its perfection
consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that
essence knows other things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29196"><span class=
"ref">[29196] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod ex hoc quod voluntati divinae sufficit sua bonitas,
non sequitur quod nihil aliud velit, sed quod nihil aliud vult nisi
ratione suae bonitatis. Sicut etiam intellectus divinus, licet sit
perfectus ex hoc ipso quod essentiam divinam cognoscit, tamen in ea
cognoscit alia.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
4:</b> As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the many only in the
one, in the same way the divine will is one and simple, as willing the
many only through the one, that is, through its own
goodness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="29197"><span class=
"ref">[29197] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod, sicut intelligere divinum est unum, quia multa non
videt nisi in uno; ita velle divinum est unum et simplex, quia
multa non vult nisi per unum, quod est bonitas
sua.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3"
next="FP_Q19_A4" prev="FP_Q19_A2" progress="3.47%" n="iii"
title="Article. 3 - Whether whatever God wills He wills
necessarily?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p0.1">Whether whatever God wills He wills
necessarily?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For everything
eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills from eternity,
for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever He wills,
He wills necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29198"><span class=
"ref">[29198] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod quidquid Deus vult, ex necessitate velit.
Omne enim aeternum est necessarium. Sed quidquid Deus vult, ab
aeterno vult, alias, voluntas eius esset mutabilis. Ergo quidquid
vult, ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p3"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God wills things apart
from Himself, inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His
own goodness necessarily. Therefore He wills things apart from Himself
necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29199"><span class=
"ref">[29199] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
vult alia a se, inquantum vult bonitatem suam. Sed Deus bonitatem
suam ex necessitate vult. Ergo alia a se ex necessitate
vult.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary, for God
is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of all necessity, as
above shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p4.1"
href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[2],
A[3]</a>). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills;
since in God there can be nothing over and above His nature as stated
in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills
necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29200"><span class=
"ref">[29200] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
quidquid est Deo naturale, est necessarium, quia Deus est per se
necesse esse, et principium omnis necessitatis, ut supra ostensum
est. Sed naturale est ei velle quidquid vult, quia in Deo nihil
potest esse praeter naturam, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Ergo
quidquid vult, ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p5"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, being that is not
necessary, and being that is possible not to be, are one and the same
thing. If, therefore, God does not necessarily will a thing that He
wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore possible
for Him to will what He does not will. And so the divine will is
contingent upon one or the other of two things, and imperfect, since
everything contingent is imperfect and mutable.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="29201"><span class=
"ref">[29201] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, non
necesse esse, et possibile non esse, aequipollent. Si igitur non
necesse est Deum velle aliquid eorum quae vult, possibile est eum
non velle illud; et possibile est eum velle illud quod non vult.
Ergo voluntas divina est contingens ad utrumlibet. Et sic
imperfecta, quia omne contingens est imperfectum et
mutabile.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 5:</b>
Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one or the other
of two things, no action results unless it is inclined to one or the
other by some other power, as the Commentator [*Averroes] says in
Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent with regard to
anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from another;
and thus He has some cause prior to Himself.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 5"><a name="29202"><span class=
"ref">[29202] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 3 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, ab eo
quod est ad utrumlibet, non sequitur aliqua actio, nisi ab aliquo
alio inclinetur ad unum, ut dicit Commentator, in II Physic. Si
ergo voluntas Dei in aliquibus se habet ad utrumlibet, sequitur
quod ab aliquo alio determinetur ad effectum. Et sic habet aliquam
causam priorem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 6:</b>
Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as the divine
knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore whatever
God wills, He wills necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 6"><a name="29203"><span class=
"ref">[29203] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 3 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea,
quidquid Deus scit, ex necessitate scit. Sed sicut scientia divina
est eius essentia, ita voluntas divina. Ergo quidquid Deus vult, ex
necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b>
The Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eph.1.11"
parsed="vul|Eph|1|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p8.1"
passage="Eph. 1:11">Eph. 1:11</scripRef>): "Who worketh all things
according to the counsel of His will." Now, what we work according to
the counsel of the will, we do not will necessarily. Therefore God
does not will necessarily whatever He wills.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29204"><span class=
"ref">[29204] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit apostolus, Ephes. I, <i>qui operatur omnia secundum
consilium voluntatis suae</i>. Quod autem operamur ex consilio
voluntatis, non ex necessitate volumus. Non ergo quidquid Deus
vult, ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> There are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it is not
  necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we
  will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for instance the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take ship
  in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for
  supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it,
as His will cannot change.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 co."><a name="29205"><span class=
"ref">[29205] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod necessarium dicitur aliquid dupliciter, scilicet absolute, et
ex suppositione. Necessarium absolute iudicatur aliquid ex
habitudine terminorum, utpote quia praedicatum est in definitione
subiecti, sicut necessarium est hominem esse animal; vel quia
subiectum est de ratione praedicati, sicut hoc est necessarium,
numerum esse parem vel imparem. Sic autem non est necessarium
Socratem sedere. Unde non est necessarium absolute, sed potest dici
necessarium ex suppositione, supposito enim quod sedeat, necesse
est eum sedere dum sedet. Circa divina igitur volita hoc
considerandum est, quod aliquid Deum velle est necessarium
absolute, non tamen hoc est verum de omnibus quae vult. Voluntas
enim divina necessariam habitudinem habet ad bonitatem suam, quae
est proprium eius obiectum. Unde bonitatem suam esse Deus ex
necessitate vult; sicut et voluntas nostra ex necessitate vult
beatitudinem. Sicut et quaelibet alia potentia necessariam
habitudinem habet ad proprium et principale obiectum, ut visus ad
colorem; quia de sui ratione est, ut in illud tendat. Alia autem a
se Deus vult, inquantum ordinantur ad suam bonitatem ut in finem.
Ea autem quae sunt ad finem, non ex necessitate volumus volentes
finem, nisi sint talia, sine quibus finis esse non potest, sicut
volumus cibum, volentes conservationem vitae; et navem, volentes
transfretare. Non sic autem ex necessitate volumus ea sine quibus
finis esse potest, sicut equum ad ambulandum, quia sine hoc
possumus ire; et eadem ratio est in aliis. Unde, cum bonitas Dei
sit perfecta, et esse possit sine aliis, cum nihil ei perfectionis
ex aliis accrescat; sequitur quod alia a se eum velle, non sit
necessarium absolute. Et tamen necessarium est ex suppositione,
supposito enim quod velit, non potest non velle, quia non potest
voluntas eius mutari.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
to Objection 1:</b> From the fact that God wills from eternity
whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily;
except by supposition.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29206"><span class=
"ref">[29206] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod ex hoc quod Deus ab aeterno vult aliquid, non
sequitur quod necesse est eum illud velle, nisi ex
suppositione.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
2:</b> Although God necessarily wills His own goodness, He does not
necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness; for it can
exist without other things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29207"><span class=
"ref">[29207] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, licet Deus ex necessitate velit bonitatem suam, non
tamen ex necessitate vult ea quae vult propter bonitatem suam, quia
bonitas eius potest esse sine aliis.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p12" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
to Objection 3:</b> It is not natural to God to will any of those
other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not
unnatural or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29208"><span class=
"ref">[29208] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod non est naturale Deo velle aliquid aliorum, quae non
ex necessitate vult. Neque tamen innaturale, aut contra naturam,
sed est voluntarium.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p13" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in the cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the
  divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing
willed, namely, that the perfect goodness of God can be without it;
and such defect accompanies all created good.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="29209"><span class=
"ref">[29209] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod aliquando aliqua causa necessaria habet non
necessariam habitudinem ad aliquem effectum, quod est propter
defectum effectus, et non propter defectum causae. Sicut virtus
solis habet non necessariam habitudinem ad aliquid eorum quae
contingenter hic eveniunt, non propter defectum virtutis solaris,
sed propter defectum effectus non necessario ex causa provenientis.
Et similiter, quod Deus non ex necessitate velit aliquid eorum quae
vult, non accidit ex defectu voluntatis divinae, sed ex defectu qui
competit volito secundum suam rationem, quia scilicet est tale, ut
sine eo esse possit perfecta bonitas Dei. Qui quidem defectus
consequitur omne bonum creatum.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p14" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
to Objection 5:</b> A naturally contingent cause must be determined to
act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is
necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no
necessary relation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 5"><a name="29210"><span class=
"ref">[29210] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 3 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum ergo
dicendum quod causa quae est ex se contingens, oportet quod
determinetur ab aliquo exteriori ad effectum. Sed voluntas divina,
quae ex se necessitatem habet, determinat seipsam ad volitum, ad
quod habet habitudinem non necessariam.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p15" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves. Since then all other things have necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute
  necessity so as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they
exist in themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily whatever He
wills, but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 6"><a name="29211"><span class=
"ref">[29211] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 3 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum
quod, sicut divinum esse in se est necessarium, ita et divinum
velle et divinum scire, sed divinum scire habet necessariam
habitudinem ad scita, non autem divinum velle ad volita. Quod ideo
est, quia scientia habetur de rebus, secundum quod sunt in sciente,
voluntas autem comparatur ad res, secundum quod sunt in seipsis.
Quia igitur omnia alia habent necessarium esse secundum quod sunt
in Deo; non autem secundum quod sunt in seipsis, habent
necessitatem absolutam ita quod sint per seipsa necessaria; propter
hoc Deus quaecumque scit, ex necessitate scit, non autem quaecumque
vult, ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4" next="FP_Q19_A5" prev="FP_Q19_A3" progress="3.51%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether the will of God is the cause of things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p0.1">Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p2"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is
not the cause of things. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "As our
sun, not by reason nor by pre-election, but by its very being,
enlightens all things that can participate in its light, so the divine
good by its very essence pours the rays of goodness upon everything
that exists." But every voluntary agent acts by reason and
pre-election. Therefore God does not act by will; and so His will is
not the cause of things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29212"><span class=
"ref">[29212] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei non sit causa rerum. Dicit
enim Dionysius, cap. IV de Div. Nom., <i>sicut noster sol, non
ratiocinans aut praeeligens, sed per ipsum esse illuminat omnia
participare lumen ipsius valentia; ita et bonum divinum per ipsam
essentiam omnibus existentibus immittit bonitatis suae radios</i>.
Sed omne quod agit per voluntatem, agit ut ratiocinans et
praeeligens. Ergo Deus non agit per voluntatem. Ergo voluntas Dei
non est causa rerum.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p3"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, The first in any order is
that which is essentially so, thus in the order of burning things,
that comes first which is fire by its essence. But God is the first
agent. Therefore He acts by His essence; and that is His nature. He
acts then by nature, and not by will. Therefore the divine will is not
the cause of things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29213"><span class=
"ref">[29213] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id
quod est per essentiam, est primum in quolibet ordine sicut in
ordine ignitorum est primum, quod est ignis per essentiam sed Deus
est primum agens. Ergo est agens per essentiam suam, quae est
natura eius. Agit igitur per naturam, et non per voluntatem.
Voluntas igitur divina non est causa rerum.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p4"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Whatever is the cause of
anything, through being "such" a thing, is the cause by nature, and
not by will. For fire is the cause of heat, as being itself hot;
whereas an architect is the cause of a house, because he wills to
build it. Now Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because God
is good, we exist." Therefore God is the cause of things by His
nature, and not by His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29214"><span class=
"ref">[29214] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
quidquid est causa alicuius per hoc quod est tale, est causa per
naturam, et non per voluntatem, ignis enim causa est calefactionis,
quia est calidus; sed artifex est causa domus, quia vult eam
facere. Sed Augustinus dicit, in I de Doct. Christ., quod <i>quia
Deus bonus est, sumus</i>. Ergo Deus per suam naturam est causa
rerum, et non per voluntatem.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p5"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Of one thing there is one
cause. But the created things is the knowledge of God, as said before
(<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8"
shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[8]</a>). Therefore the will of
God cannot be considered the cause of things.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="29215"><span class=
"ref">[29215] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, unius
rei una est causa. Sed rerum creatarum est causa scientia Dei, ut
supra dictum est. Ergo voluntas Dei non debet poni causa rerum.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p6"
shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef
osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.26" parsed="vul|Wis|11|26|0|0"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p6.1"
passage="Wis. 11:26">Wis. 11:26</scripRef>), "How could anything
endure, if Thou wouldst not?"</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29216"><span class=
"ref">[29216] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Sap. XI, <i>quomodo posset aliquid permanere, nisi tu
voluisses?</i></p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We must hold that the will of God is the cause of things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed, by a necessity of His nature.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p8" shownumber="no"> This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as proved in Phys. ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary means predetermined for it by some higher intellect; as the end and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the agent that acts by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of agents, He
  must act by intellect and will.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p9" shownumber="no"> This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of which the property is to produce one and the same effect; for nature operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent; and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance with that nature; for every natural agent has a determinate being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself
  the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[7], A[2]</a>). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and intellect.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p10" shownumber="no"> Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause. Wherefore since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed from Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will,
  for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived appertains to the will. Therefore the will of God is the cause of things.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 co."><a name="29217"><span class=
"ref">[29217] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod necesse est dicere voluntatem Dei esse causam rerum, et Deum
agere per voluntatem, non per necessitatem naturae, ut quidam
existimaverunt. Quod quidem apparere potest tripliciter. Primo
quidem, ex ipso ordine causarum agentium. Cum enim propter finem
agat et intellectus et natura, ut probatur in II Physic., necesse
est ut agenti per naturam praedeterminetur finis, et media
necessaria ad finem, ab aliquo superiori intellectu; sicut sagittae
praedeterminatur finis et certus modus a sagittante. Unde necesse
est quod agens per intellectum et voluntatem, sit prius agente per
naturam. Unde, cum primum in ordine agentium sit Deus, necesse est
quod per intellectum et voluntatem agat. Secundo, ex ratione
naturalis agentis, ad quod pertinet ut unum effectum producat, quia
natura uno et eodem modo operatur, nisi impediatur. Et hoc ideo,
quia secundum quod est tale, agit, unde, quandiu est tale, non
facit nisi tale. Omne enim agens per naturam, habet esse
determinatum. Cum igitur esse divinum non sit determinatum, sed
contineat in se totam perfectionem essendi, non potest esse quod
agat per necessitatem naturae, nisi forte causaret aliquid
indeterminatum et infinitum in essendo; quod est impossibile, ut ex
superioribus patet. Non igitur agit per necessitatem naturae sed
effectus determinati ab infinita ipsius perfectione procedunt
secundum determinationem voluntatis et intellectus ipsius. Tertio,
ex habitudine effectuum ad causam. Secundum hoc enim effectus
procedunt a causa agente, secundum quod praeexistunt in ea, quia
omne agens agit sibi simile. Praeexistunt autem effectus in causa
secundum modum causae. Unde, cum esse divinum sit ipsum eius
intelligere, praeexistunt in eo effectus eius secundum modum
intelligibilem. Unde et per modum intelligibilem procedunt ab eo.
Et sic, per consequens, per modum voluntatis, nam inclinatio eius
ad agendum quod intellectu conceptum est, pertinet ad voluntatem.
Voluntas igitur Dei est causa rerum.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p11"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius in these words
does not intend to exclude election from God absolutely; but only in a
certain sense, in so far, that is, as He communicates His goodness not
merely to certain things, but to all; and as election implies a
certain distinction.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29218"><span class=
"ref">[29218] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Dionysius per verba illa non intendit excludere
electionem a Deo simpliciter, sed secundum quid, inquantum
scilicet, non quibusdam solum bonitatem suam communicat, sed
omnibus, prout scilicet electio discretionem quandam importat.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p12"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because the essence of
God is His intellect and will, from the fact of His acting by His
essence, it follows that He acts after the mode of intellect and
will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29219"><span class=
"ref">[29219] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, quia essentia Dei est eius intelligere et velle, ex
hoc ipso quod per essentiam suam agit, sequitur quod agat per modum
intellectus et voluntatis.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p13"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Good is the object of the
will. The words, therefore, "Because God is good, we exist," are true
inasmuch as His goodness is the reason of His willing all other
things, as said before (A[2], ad 2).</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29220"><span class=
"ref">[29220] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod bonum est obiectum voluntatis. Pro tanto ergo
dicitur, quia Deus bonus est, sumus, inquantum sua bonitas est ei
ratio volendi omnia alia, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p14" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even in us the cause of one and the same effect is knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is conceived, and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the effect, except by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to operation. But the power is cause, as executing the effect, since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in God
  all these things are one.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="29221"><span class=
"ref">[29221] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod unius et eiusdem effectus, etiam in nobis, est causa
scientia ut dirigens, qua concipitur forma operis, et voluntas ut
imperans, quia forma, ut est in intellectu tantum, non determinatur
ad hoc quod sit vel non sit in effectu, nisi per voluntatem. Unde
intellectus speculativus nihil dicit de operando. Sed potentia est
causa ut exequens, quia nominat immediatum principium operationis.
Sed haec omnia in Deo unum sunt.</p></div></div>
</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5" next="FP_Q19_A6" prev="FP_Q19_A4" progress="3.55%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p0.1">Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p2"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that some cause can be
assigned to the divine will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46):
"Who would venture to say that God made all things irrationally?" But
to a voluntary agent, what is the reason of operating, is the cause of
willing. Therefore the will of God has some cause.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="29222"><span class=
"ref">[29222] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod voluntatis divinae sit assignare aliquam
causam. Dicit enim Augustinus, libro octoginta trium quaest.,
<i>quis audeat dicere Deum irrationabiliter omnia condidisse?</i>
Sed agenti voluntario, quod est ratio operandi, est etiam causa
volendi. Ergo voluntas Dei habet aliquam causam.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause of all things, as has been already shown <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[4])</a>. If, then, there is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause, except the divine will alone. Thus all science would be in vain, since science seeks to assign causes
  to effects. This seems inadmissible, and therefore we must assign
some cause to the divine will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="29223"><span class=
"ref">[29223] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in
his quae fiunt a volente qui propter nullam causam aliquid vult,
non oportet aliam causam assignare nisi voluntatem volentis. Sed
voluntas Dei est causa omnium rerum, ut ostensum est. Si igitur
voluntatis eius non sit aliqua causa, non oportebit in omnibus
rebus naturalibus aliam causam quaerere, nisi solam voluntatem
divinam. Et sic omnes scientiae essent supervacuae, quae causas
aliquorum effectuum assignare nituntur, quod videtur inconveniens.
Est igitur assignare aliquam causam voluntatis divinae.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p4"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is done by the
willer, on account of no cause, depends simply on his will. If,
therefore, the will of God has no cause, it follows that all things
made depend simply on His will, and have no other cause. But this also
is not admissible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="29224"><span class=
"ref">[29224] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod
fit a volente non propter aliquam causam, dependet ex simplici
voluntate eius. Si igitur voluntas Dei non habeat aliquam causam,
sequitur quod omnia quae fiunt, dependeant ex simplici eius
voluntate, et non habeant aliquam aliam causam. Quod est
inconveniens.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p5"
shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii,
28): "Every efficient cause is greater than the thing effected." But
nothing is greater than the will of God. We must not then seek for a
cause of it.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 s. c."><a name="29225"><span class=
"ref">[29225] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>omnis
causa efficiens maior est eo quod efficitur; nihil tamen maius est
voluntate Dei; non ergo causa eius quaerenda est</i>.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> In no wise has the will of God a cause. In proof of which we must consider that, since the will follows from the intellect, there is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the same way as there is a cause of the understanding, in the person that understands. The case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its conclusion are understood separately from each other, the understanding the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is known.
  If the understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself, apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance, in this case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding the premisses, since a thing cannot be its own cause; and yet, it would be true that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the cause of the conclusion. It is the same with the will, with respect to which the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end, as do the
  premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p7" shownumber="no"> Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means to that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and means; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by one act understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the
  cause is not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause of His willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end. Therefore, He wills this to be as means to that; but does not will this on account of that.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 co."><a name="29226"><span class=
"ref">[29226] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod nullo modo voluntas Dei causam habet. Ad cuius evidentiam,
considerandum est quod, cum voluntas sequatur intellectum, eodem
modo contingit esse causam alicuius volentis ut velit, et alicuius
intelligentis ut intelligat. In intellectu autem sic est quod, si
seorsum intelligat principium, et seorsum conclusionem,
intelligentia principii est causa scientiae conclusionis. Sed si
intellectus in ipso principio inspiceret conclusionem, uno intuitu
apprehendens utrumque, in eo scientia conclusionis non causaretur
ab intellectu principiorum, quia idem non est causa sui ipsius. Sed
tamen intelligeret principia esse causas conclusionis. Similiter
est ex parte voluntatis, circa quam sic se habet finis ad ea quae
sunt ad finem, sicut in intellectu principia ad conclusiones. Unde,
si aliquis uno actu velit finem, et alio actu ea quae sunt ad
finem, velle finem erit ei causa volendi ea quae sunt ad finem. Sed
si uno actu velit finem et ea quae sunt ad finem, hoc esse non
poterit, quia idem non est causa sui ipsius. Et tamen erit verum
dicere quod velit ordinare ea quae sunt ad finem, in finem. Deus
autem, sicut uno actu omnia in essentia sua intelligit, ita uno
actu vult omnia in sua bonitate. Unde, sicut in Deo intelligere
causam non est causa intelligendi effectus, sed ipse intelligit
effectus in causa; ita velle finem non est ei causa volendi ea quae
sunt ad finem, sed tamen vult ea quae sunt ad finem, ordinari in
finem. Vult ergo hoc esse propter hoc, sed non propter hoc vult
hoc.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p8"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will of God is
reasonable, not because anything is to God a cause of willing, but in
so far as He wills one thing to be on account of
another.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="29227"><span class=
"ref">[29227] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod voluntas Dei rationabilis est, non quod aliquid sit
Deo causa volendi, sed inquantum vult unum esse propter aliud.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since God wills effects to proceed from definite causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not unreasonable to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It would, however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary, and not as dependent on the will of God. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 2): "Philosophers in their vanity have thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes, being utterly
  unable to perceive the cause that is shown above all others, the
will of God."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="29228"><span class=
"ref">[29228] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, cum velit Deus effectus sic esse, ut ex causis
certis proveniant, ad hoc quod servetur ordo in rebus; non est
supervacuum, etiam cum voluntate Dei, alias causas quaerere. Esset
tamen supervacuum, si aliae causae quaererentur ut primae, et non
dependentes a divina voluntate. Et sic loquitur Augustinus in III
de Trin., <i>placuit vanitati philosophorum etiam aliis causis
effectus contingentes tribuere, cum omnino videre non possent
superiorem ceteris omnibus causam, idest voluntatem Dei</i>.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since God wills effects to come from causes, all effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the will of God, but on something else besides: but the first effect depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say that God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work, and intellect, that he might be man; and willed him to be man that he might enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this
  cannot be reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things
depend on the simple will of God; but the others on the order of other
causes.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="29229"><span class=
"ref">[29229] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, cum Deus velit effectus esse propter causas,
quicumque effectus praesupponunt aliquem alium effectum, non
dependent ex sola Dei voluntate, sed ex aliquo alio. Sed primi
effectus ex sola divina voluntate dependent. Utpote si dicamus quod
Deus voluit hominem habere manus, ut deservirent intellectui,
operando diversa opera, et voluit eum habere intellectum, ad hoc
quod esset homo, et voluit eum esse hominem, ut frueretur ipso, vel
ad complementum universi. Quae quidem non est reducere ad alios
fines creatos ulteriores. Unde huiusmodi dependent ex simplici
voluntate Dei, alia vero ex ordine etiam aliarum causarum.</p></div></div>
</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6" next="FP_Q19_A7" prev="FP_Q19_A5" progress="3.58%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p0.1">Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p2"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is
not always fulfilled. For the Apostle says (<scripRef
osisRef="Bible.vul:1Tim.2.4" parsed="vul|1Tim|2|4|0|0"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p2.1" passage="1 Tim. 2:4">1
Tim. 2:4</scripRef>): "God will have all men to be saved, and to come
to the knowledge of the truth." But this does not happen. Therefore
the will of God is not always fulfilled.</p></div><div style="width:
45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="29230"><span class=
"ref">[29230] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei non semper impleatur. Dicit
enim apostolus, I ad Tim. II, quod <i>Deus vult omnes homines
salvos fieri, et ad agnitionem veritatis venire</i>. Sed hoc non
ita evenit. Ergo voluntas Dei non semper impletur.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p3"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as is the relation of
knowledge to truth, so is that of the will to good. Now God knows all
truth. Therefore He wills all good. But not all good actually exists;
for much more good might exist. Therefore the will of God is not
always fulfilled.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="29231"><span class=
"ref">[29231] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
se habet scientia ad verum, ita voluntas ad bonum. Sed Deus scit
omne verum. Ergo vult omne bonum. Sed non omne bonum fit, multa
enim bona possunt fieri, quae non fiunt. Non ergo voluntas Dei
semper impletur.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p4"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since the will of God is
the first cause, it does not exclude intermediate causes. But the
effect of a first cause may be hindered by a defect of a secondary
cause; as the effect of the motive power may be hindered by the
weakness of the limb. Therefore the effect of the divine will may be
hindered by a defect of the secondary causes. The will of God,
therefore, is not always fulfilled.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="29232"><span class=
"ref">[29232] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
voluntas Dei, cum sit causa prima, non excludit causas medias, ut
dictum est. Sed effectus causae primae potest impediri per defectum
causae secundae, sicut effectus virtutis motivae impeditur propter
debilitatem tibiae. Ergo et effectus divinae voluntatis potest
impediri propter defectum secundarum causarum. Non ergo voluntas
Dei semper impletur.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p5"
shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef
osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.113.11" parsed="vul|Ps|113|11|0|0"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p5.1"
passage="Ps. 113:11">Ps. 113:11</scripRef>): "God hath done all
things, whatsoever He would."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 s. c."><a name="29233"><span class=
"ref">[29233] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur in Psalmo CXIII, <i>omnia quaecumque voluit Deus,
fecit</i>.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In proof of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active causes as with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that although a thing may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the universal form. For though a thing may fail to be, for example, a man or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence
  the same must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the order of any particular active cause, but not outside the order of the universal cause; under which all particular causes are included: and if any particular cause fails of its effect, this is because of the hindrance of some other particular cause, which is included in the order of the universal cause. Therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen.
  For it may happen that a star is hindered from producing its effects; yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things, from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred through intermediate causes to the universal influence of the first heaven. Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will should not produce its effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in another order; as
  does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the divine will as much
as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that will, when by
its justice he is punished.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 co."><a name="29234"><span class=
"ref">[29234] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod necesse est voluntatem Dei semper impleri. Ad cuius
evidentiam, considerandum est quod, cum effectus conformetur agenti
secundum suam formam, eadem ratio est in causis agentibus, quae est
in causis formalibus. In formis autem sic est quod, licet aliquid
possit deficere ab aliqua forma particulari, tamen a forma
universali nihil deficere potest, potest enim esse aliquid quod non
est homo vel vivum, non autem potest esse aliquid quod non sit ens.
Unde et hoc idem in causis agentibus contingere oportet. Potest
enim aliquid fieri extra ordinem alicuius causae particularis
agentis, non autem extra ordinem alicuius causae universalis, sub
qua omnes causae particulares comprehenduntur. Quia, si aliqua
causa particularis deficiat a suo effectu, hoc est propter aliquam
aliam causam particularem impedientem, quae continetur sub ordine
causae universalis, unde effectus ordinem causae universalis nullo
modo potest exire. Et hoc etiam patet in corporalibus. Potest enim
impediri quod aliqua stella non inducat suum effectum, sed tamen
quicumque effectus ex causa corporea impediente in rebus
corporalibus consequatur, oportet quod reducatur per aliquas causas
medias in universalem virtutem primi caeli. Cum igitur voluntas Dei
sit universalis causa omnium rerum, impossibile est quod divina
voluntas suum effectum non consequatur. Unde quod recedere videtur
a divina voluntate secundum unum ordinem, relabitur in ipsam
secundum alium, sicut peccator, qui, quantum est in se, recedit a
divina voluntate peccando, incidit in ordinem divinae voluntatis,
dum per eius iustitiam punitur.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a restricted application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not will." Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every
  class of individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case they mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition. Thirdly, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent,
  but to the things willed.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p8" shownumber="no"> To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or
  dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in
  themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills
  takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="29235"><span class=
"ref">[29235] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod illud verbum apostoli, quod Deus vult omnes homines
salvos fieri etc., potest tripliciter intelligi. Uno modo, ut sit
accommoda distributio, secundum hunc sensum, Deus vult salvos fieri
omnes homines qui salvantur, non quia nullus homo sit quem salvum
fieri non velit, sed quia nullus salvus fit, quem non velit salvum
fieri, ut dicit Augustinus secundo potest intelligi, ut fiat
distributio pro generibus singulorum, et non pro singulis generum,
secundum hunc sensum, Deus vult de quolibet statu hominum salvos
fieri, mares et feminas, Iudaeos et gentiles, parvos et magnos; non
tamen omnes de singulis statibus. Tertio, secundum Damascenum,
intelligitur de voluntate antecedente, non de voluntate
consequente. Quae quidem distinctio non accipitur ex parte ipsius
voluntatis divinae, in qua nihil est prius vel posterius; sed ex
parte volitorum. Ad cuius intellectum, considerandum est quod
unumquodque, secundum quod bonum est, sic est volitum a Deo.
Aliquid autem potest esse in prima sui consideratione, secundum
quod absolute consideratur, bonum vel malum, quod tamen, prout cum
aliquo adiuncto consideratur, quae est consequens consideratio
eius, e contrario se habet. Sicut hominem vivere est bonum, et
hominem occidi est malum, secundum absolutam considerationem, sed
si addatur circa aliquem hominem, quod sit homicida, vel vivens in
periculum multitudinis, sic bonum est eum occidi, et malum est eum
vivere. Unde potest dici quod iudex iustus antecedenter vult omnem
hominem vivere; sed consequenter vult homicidam suspendi. Similiter
Deus antecedenter vult omnem hominem salvari; sed consequenter vult
quosdam damnari, secundum exigentiam suae iustitiae. Neque tamen id
quod antecedenter volumus, simpliciter volumus, sed secundum quid.
Quia voluntas comparatur ad res, secundum quod in seipsis sunt, in
seipsis autem sunt in particulari, unde simpliciter volumus
aliquid, secundum quod volumus illud consideratis omnibus
circumstantiis particularibus, quod est consequenter velle. Unde
potest dici quod iudex iustus simpliciter vult homicidam suspendi,
sed secundum quid vellet eum vivere, scilicet inquantum est homo.
Unde magis potest dici velleitas, quam absoluta voluntas. Et sic
patet quod quidquid Deus simpliciter vult, fit; licet illud quod
antecedenter vult, non fiat.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p9"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An act of the cognitive
faculty is according as the thing known is in the knower; while an act
of the appetite faculty is directed to things as they exist in
themselves. But all that can have the nature of being and truth
virtually exists in God, though it does not all exist in created
things. Therefore God knows all truth; but does not will all good,
except in so far as He wills Himself, in Whom all good virtually
exists.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="29236"><span class=
"ref">[29236] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod actus cognoscitivae virtutis est secundum quod
cognitum est in cognoscente, actus autem virtutis appetitivae est
ordinatus ad res, secundum quod in seipsis sunt. Quidquid autem
potest habere rationem entis et veri, totum est virtualiter in Deo;
sed non totum existit in rebus creatis. Et ideo Deus cognoscit omne
verum, non tamen vult omne bonum, nisi inquantum vult se, in quo
virtualiter omne bonum existit.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p10"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A first cause can be
hindered in its effect by deficiency in the secondary cause, when it
is not the universal first cause, including within itself all causes;
for then the effect could in no way escape its order. And thus it is
with the will of God, as said above.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="29237"><span class=
"ref">[29237] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod causa prima tunc potest impediri a suo effectu per
defectum causae secundae, quando non est universaliter prima, sub
se omnes causas comprehendens, quia sic effectus nullo modo posset
suum ordinem evadere. Et sic est de voluntate Dei, ut dictum
est.</p></div></div>
</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7" next="FP_Q19_A8"
prev="FP_Q19_A6" progress="3.62%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether
the will of God is changeable?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p0.1">Whether the will of God is
changeable?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord says (<scripRef
osisRef="Bible.vul:Gen.6.7" parsed="vul|Gen|6|7|0|0"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p2.1"
passage="Gn. 6:7">Gn. 6:7</scripRef>): "It repenteth Me that I have
made man." But whoever repents of what he has done, has a changeable
will. Therefore God has a changeable will.</p></div><div style="width:
45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="29238"><span class=
"ref">[29238] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei sit mutabilis. Dicit enim
dominus Genes. VI, <i>poenitet me fecisse hominem</i>. Sed
quemcumque poenitet de eo quod fecit, habet mutabilem voluntatem.
Ergo Deus habet mutabilem voluntatem.</p></div></div><div
style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p3"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said in the person
of the Lord: "I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to
root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it; but if that nation
shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have
thought to do to them" (<scripRef
osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.18.7-Jer.18.8" parsed="vul|Jer|18|7|18|8"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p3.1"
passage="Jer. 18:7,8">Jer. 18:7,8</scripRef>) Therefore God has a
changeable will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="29239"><span class=
"ref">[29239] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Ierem. XVIII, ex persona domini dicitur, <i>loquar adversus gentem
et adversus regnum, ut eradicem et destruam et disperdam illud; sed
si poenitentiam egerit gens illa a malo suo, agam et ego
poenitentiam super malo quod cogitavi ut facerem ei</i>. Ergo Deus
habet mutabilem voluntatem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p4"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever God does, He
does voluntarily. But God does not always do the same thing, for at
one time He ordered the law to be observed, and at another time
forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable will.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="29240"><span class=
"ref">[29240] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
quidquid Deus facit, voluntarie facit. Sed Deus non semper eadem
facit, nam quandoque praecepit legalia observari, quandoque
prohibuit. Ergo habet mutabilem voluntatem.</p></div></div><div
style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p5"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, God does not will of
necessity what He wills, as said before <a
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3"
shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>. Therefore He can both will
and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two
opposites, is changeable substantially; and that which can exist in a
place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is
changeable as regards His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="29241"><span class=
"ref">[29241] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
non ex necessitate vult quod vult, ut supra dictum est. Ergo potest
velle et non velle idem. Sed omne quod habet potentiam ad opposita,
est mutabile, sicut quod potest esse et non esse, est mutabile
secundum substantiam; et quod potest esse hic et non esse hic, est
mutabile secundum locum. Ergo Deus est mutabilis secundum
voluntatem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b>
It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son
of man, that He should be changed" (<scripRef
osisRef="Bible.vul:Num.23.19" parsed="vul|Num|23|19|0|0"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p6.1"
passage="Num. 23:19">Num. 23:19</scripRef>).</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 s. c."><a name="29242"><span class=
"ref">[29242] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Num. XXIII, <i>non est Deus, quasi homo, ut mentiatur;
neque ut filius hominis, ut mutetur</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if one should begin to will what before he had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless
  we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will regards good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not so before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before;
  hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it
has already been shown that both the substance of God and His
knowledge are entirely unchangeable (<a
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1"
shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[9], A[1]</a>; <a
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15"
shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Therefore His will
must be entirely unchangeable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 co."><a name="29243"><span class=
"ref">[29243] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod voluntas Dei est omnino immutabilis. Sed circa hoc
considerandum est, quod aliud est mutare voluntatem; et aliud est
velle aliquarum rerum mutationem. Potest enim aliquis, eadem
voluntate immobiliter permanente, velle quod nunc fiat hoc, et
postea fiat contrarium. Sed tunc voluntas mutaretur, si aliquis
inciperet velle quod prius non voluit, vel desineret velle quod
voluit. Quod quidem accidere non potest, nisi praesupposita
mutatione vel ex parte cognitionis, vel circa dispositionem
substantiae ipsius volentis. Cum enim voluntas sit boni, aliquis de
novo dupliciter potest incipere aliquid velle. Uno modo sic, quod
de novo incipiat sibi illud esse bonum. Quod non est absque
mutatione eius, sicut adveniente frigore, incipit esse bonum sedere
ad ignem, quod prius non erat. Alio modo sic, quod de novo
cognoscat illud esse sibi bonum, cum prius hoc ignorasset, ad hoc
enim consiliamur, ut sciamus quid nobis sit bonum. Ostensum est
autem supra quod tam substantia Dei quam eius scientia est omnino
immutabilis. Unde oportet voluntatem eius omnino esse
immutabilem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when we repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so far as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom
  He had made.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="29244"><span class=
"ref">[29244] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod illud verbum domini metaphorice intelligendum est,
secundum similitudinem nostram, cum enim nos poenitet, destruimus
quod fecimus. Quamvis hoc esse possit absque mutatione voluntatis,
cum etiam aliquis homo, absque mutatione voluntatis, interdum velit
aliquid facere, simul intendens postea illud destruere. Sic igitur
Deus poenituisse dicitur, secundum similitudinem operationis,
inquantum hominem quem fecerat, per diluvium a facie terrae
delevit.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will of God, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in the divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one who looked only on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not
  rise again," but looking at the divine first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise again." And God wills both: that is, that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen; or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine
  and higher cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.38.1" parsed="vul|Isa|38|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p9.1" passage="Is. 38:1">Is. 38:1</scripRef>). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, which is unchangeable. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5): "The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel"---that is to say, the counsel of His will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent," His words must be understood metaphorically. For
  men seem to repent, when they do not fulfill what they have
threatened.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="29245"><span class=
"ref">[29245] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod voluntas Dei, cum sit causa prima et universalis, non
excludit causas medias, in quarum virtute est ut aliqui effectus
producantur. Sed quia omnes causae mediae non adaequant virtutem
causae primae, multa sunt in virtute et scientia et voluntate
divina, quae non continentur sub ordine causarum inferiorum; sicut
resuscitatio Lazari. Unde aliquis respiciens ad causas inferiores,
dicere poterat, Lazarus non resurget, respiciens vero ad causam
primam divinam, poterat dicere, Lazarus resurget. Et utrumque horum
Deus vult, scilicet quod aliquid quandoque sit futurum secundum
causam inferiorem, quod tamen futurum non sit secundum causam
superiorem; vel e converso. Sic ergo dicendum est quod Deus
aliquando pronuntiat aliquid futurum, secundum quod continetur in
ordine causarum inferiorum, ut puta secundum dispositionem naturae
vel meritorum; quod tamen non fit, quia aliter est in causa
superiori divina. Sicut cum praedixit Ezechiae, <i>dispone domui
tuae, quia morieris et non vives</i>, ut habetur Isaiae XXXVIII;
neque tamen ita evenit, quia ab aeterno aliter fuit in scientia et
voluntate divina, quae immutabilis est. Propter quod dicit
Gregorius, quod <i>Deus immutat sententiam, non tamen mutat
consilium</i>, scilicet voluntatis suae. Quod ergo dicit,
poenitentiam agam ego, intelligitur metaphorice dictum, nam homines
quando non implent quod comminati sunt, poenitere
videntur.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
3:</b> It does not follow from this argument that God has a will that
changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should
change.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="29246"><span class=
"ref">[29246] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod ex ratione illa non potest concludi quod Deus habeat
mutabilem voluntatem; sed quod mutationem velit.</p></div></div><div
style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p11"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although God's willing a
thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by
supposition, on account of the unchangeableness of the divine will, as
has been said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p11.1"
href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect"
xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="29247"><span class=
"ref">[29247] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod, licet Deum velle aliquid non sit necessarium
absolute, tamen necessarium est ex suppositione, propter
immutabilitatem divinae voluntatis, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8" next="FP_Q19_A9" prev="FP_Q19_A7" progress="3.65%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p0.1">Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p2"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God
imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says
(Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved, except whom God has willed to be
saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it
must necessarily be."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="29248"><span class=
"ref">[29248] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei rebus volitis necessitatem
imponat. Dicit enim Augustinus, in Enchirid., <i>nullus fit salvus,
nisi quem Deus voluerit salvari. Et ideo rogandus est ut velit,
quia necesse est fieri, si voluerit</i>.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p3"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every cause that cannot
be hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the
Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84) "Nature always works in the same way,
if there is nothing to hinder it." But the will of God cannot be
hindered. For the Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.9.19"
parsed="vul|Rom|9|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p3.1"
passage="Rom. 9:19">Rom. 9:19</scripRef>): "Who resisteth His will?"
Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the things
willed.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="29249"><span class=
"ref">[29249] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis
causa quae non potest impediri, ex necessitate suum effectum
producit, quia et natura semper idem operatur, nisi aliquid
impediat, ut dicitur in II Physic. Sed voluntas Dei non potest
impediri, dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. IX, <i>voluntati enim eius
quis resistit?</i> Ergo voluntas Dei imponit rebus volitis
necessitatem.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die, being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every true conditional statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is
  necessary absolutely.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="29250"><span class=
"ref">[29250] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, illud
quod habet necessitatem ex priori, est necessarium absolute, sicut
animal mori est necessarium, quia est ex contrariis compositum. Sed
res creatae a Deo, comparantur ad voluntatem divinam sicut ad
aliquid prius, a quo habent necessitatem, cum haec conditionalis
sit vera, si aliquid Deus vult, illud est; omnis autem
conditionalis vera est necessaria. Sequitur ergo quod omne quod
Deus vult, sit necessarium absolute.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p5"
shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> All good things that exist God
wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed,
it follows that all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an
end of free will, counsel, and all other such things.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 s. c."><a name="29251"><span class=
"ref">[29251] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omnia
bona quae fiunt, Deus vult fieri. Si igitur eius voluntas imponat
rebus volitis necessitatem, sequitur quod omnia bona ex necessitate
eveniunt. Et sic perit liberum arbitrium et consilium, et omnia
huiusmodi.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p7" shownumber="no"> This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be
  referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that
  belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise
  contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 co."><a name="29252"><span class=
"ref">[29252] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod divina voluntas quibusdam volitis necessitatem imponit, non
autem omnibus. Cuius quidem rationem aliqui assignare voluerunt ex
causis mediis quia ea quae producit per causas necessarias, sunt
necessaria; ea vero quae producit per causas contingentes, sunt
contingentia. Sed hoc non videtur sufficienter dictum, propter duo.
Primo quidem, quia effectus alicuius primae causae est contingens
propter causam secundam, ex eo quod impeditur effectus causae
primae per defectum causae secundae; sicut virtus solis per
defectum plantae impeditur. Nullus autem defectus causae secundae
impedire potest quin voluntas Dei effectum suum producat. Secundo,
quia, si distinctio contingentium a necessariis referatur solum in
causas secundas, sequitur hoc esse praeter intentionem et
voluntatem divinam, quod est inconveniens. Et ideo melius dicendum
est, quod hoc contingit propter efficaciam divinae voluntatis. Cum
enim aliqua causa efficax fuerit ad agendum, effectus consequitur
causam non tantum secundum id quod fit, sed etiam secundum modum
fiendi vel essendi, ex debilitate enim virtutis activae in semine,
contingit quod filius nascitur dissimilis patri in accidentibus,
quae pertinent ad modum essendi. Cum igitur voluntas divina sit
efficacissima, non solum sequitur quod fiant ea quae Deus vult
fieri; sed quod eo modo fiant, quo Deus ea fieri vult. Vult autem
quaedam fieri Deus necessario, et quaedam contingenter, ut sit ordo
in rebus, ad complementum universi. Et ideo quibusdam effectibus
aptavit causas necessarias, quae deficere non possunt, ex quibus
effectus de necessitate proveniunt, quibusdam autem aptavit causas
contingentes defectibiles, ex quibus effectus contingenter
eveniunt. Non igitur propterea effectus voliti a Deo, eveniunt
contingenter, quia causae proximae sunt contingentes, sed propterea
quia Deus voluit eos contingenter evenire, contingentes causas ad
eos praeparavit.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p8"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the words of Augustine
we must understand a necessity in things willed by God that is not
absolute, but conditional. For the conditional statement that if God
wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily
true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="29253"><span class=
"ref">[29253] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod per illud verbum Augustini intelligenda est
necessitas in rebus volitis a Deo, non absoluta, sed conditionalis,
necesse est enim hanc conditionalem veram esse, si Deus hoc vult,
necesse est hoc esse.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p9"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that
nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things
happen that God wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or
contingently according to His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="29254"><span class=
"ref">[29254] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, ex hoc ipso quod nihil voluntati divinae resistit,
sequitur quod non solum fiant ea quae Deus vult fieri; sed quod
fiant contingenter vel necessario, quae sic fieri vult.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p10"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Consequents have
necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the
antecedents. Hence things effected by the divine will have that kind
of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or
conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute
necessities.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="29255"><span class=
"ref">[29255] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod posteriora habent necessitatem a prioribus, secundum
modum priorum. Unde et ea quae fiunt a voluntate divina, talem
necessitatem habent, qualem Deus vult ea habere, scilicet, vel
absolutam, vel conditionalem tantum. Et sic, non omnia sunt
necessaria absolute.</p></div></div>
</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9" next="FP_Q19_A10"
prev="FP_Q19_A8" progress="3.68%" n="ix" title="Article. 9 - Whether
God wills evils?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p0.1">Whether God wills evils?</h4><div
style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p2"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God wills evils. For
every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should
exist. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far
as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things
should exist, but also evil things." Therefore God wills evil
things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="29256"><span class=
"ref">[29256] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei sit malorum. Omne enim bonum
quod fit, Deus vult. Sed mala fieri bonum est, dicit enim
Augustinus, in Enchirid., <i>quamvis ea quae mala sunt, inquantum
mala sunt, non sint bona; tamen, ut non solum bona, sed etiam ut
sint mala, bonum est</i>. Ergo Deus vult mala.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. And Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil." But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and
  beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all
things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="29257"><span class=
"ref">[29257] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, dicit
Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., erit malum ad omnis (idest
universi) perfectionem conferens. Et Augustinus dicit, in
Enchirid., <i>ex omnibus consistit universitatis admirabilis
pulchritudo; in qua etiam illud quod malum dicitur, bene ordinatum,
et loco suo positum, eminentius commendat bona; ut magis placeant,
et laudabiliora sint, dum comparantur malis</i>. Sed Deus vult omne
illud quod pertinet ad perfectionem et decorem universi, quia hoc
est quod Deus maxime vult in creaturis. Ergo Deus vult
mala.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are
contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not
exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not
always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should
exist.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la"
title="I q. 19 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="29258"><span class=
"ref">[29258] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, mala
fieri, et non fieri, sunt contradictorie opposita. Sed Deus non
vult mala non fieri, quia, cum mala quaedam fiant, non semper
voluntas Dei impleretur. Ergo Deus vult mala
fieri.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b>
Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the cause of another man
becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom. Much less
therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is said
to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it." Therefore it is
not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every
evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not evil
things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 s. c."><a name="29259"><span class=
"ref">[29259] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>nullo
sapiente homine auctore, fit homo deterior; est autem Deus omni
sapiente homine praestantior; multo igitur minus, Deo auctore, fit
aliquis deterior. Illo autem auctore cum dicitur, illo volente
dicitur</i>. Non ergo volente Deo, fit homo deterior. Constat autem
quod quolibet malo fit aliquid deterius. Ergo Deus non vult
mala.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[5], A[1]</a>), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or
  corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not
  even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in
  willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things
to be naturally corrupted.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 co."><a name="29260"><span class=
"ref">[29260] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, cum ratio boni sit ratio appetibilis, ut supra dictum est,
malum autem opponatur bono; impossibile est quod aliquod malum,
inquantum huiusmodi, appetatur, neque appetitu naturali, neque
animali, neque intellectuali, qui est voluntas. Sed aliquod malum
appetitur per accidens, inquantum consequitur ad aliquod bonum. Et
hoc apparet in quolibet appetitu. Non enim agens naturale intendit
privationem vel corruptionem; sed formam, cui coniungitur privatio
alterius formae; et generationem unius, quae est corruptio
alterius. Leo etiam, occidens cervum, intendit cibum, cui
coniungitur occisio animalis. Similiter fornicator intendit
delectationem, cui coniungitur deformitas culpae. Malum autem quod
coniungitur alicui bono, est privatio alterius boni. Nunquam igitur
appeteretur malum, nec per accidens, nisi bonum cui coniungitur
malum, magis appeteretur quam bonum quod privatur per malum. Nullum
autem bonum Deus magis vult quam suam bonitatem, vult tamen aliquod
bonum magis quam aliud quoddam bonum. Unde malum culpae, quod
privat ordinem ad bonum divinum, Deus nullo modo vult. Sed malum
naturalis defectus, vel malum poenae vult, volendo aliquod bonum,
cui coniungitur tale malum, sicut, volendo iustitiam, vult poenam;
et volendo ordinem naturae servari, vult quaedam naturaliter
corrumpi.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that evil should be or be done." This, however, is not correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is
  beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from
his sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience
of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It
cannot therefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in
the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done,
since nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it
accidentally, but by that which belongs to it
essentially.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="29261"><span class=
"ref">[29261] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod, licet Deus non velit mala, vult
tamen mala esse vel fieri, quia, licet mala non sint bona, bonum
tamen est mala esse vel fieri. Quod ideo dicebant, quia ea quae in
se mala sunt, ordinantur ad aliquod bonum, quem quidem ordinem
importari credebant in hoc quod dicitur, mala esse vel fieri. Sed
hoc non recte dicitur. Quia malum non ordinatur ad bonum per se,
sed per accidens. Praeter intentionem enim peccantis est, quod ex
hoc sequatur aliquod bonum; sicut praeter intentionem tyrannorum
fuit, quod ex eorum persecutionibus claresceret patientia martyrum.
Et ideo non potest dici quod talis ordo ab bonum importetur per hoc
quod dicitur, quod malum esse vel fieri sit bonum, quia nihil
iudicatur secundum illud quod competit ei per accidens, sed
secundum illud quod competit ei per se.</p></div></div><div
style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p8"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Evil does not operate
towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except
accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore Dionysius in saying that
"evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe," draws a
conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.</p></div><div style="width:
45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="29262"><span class=
"ref">[29262] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod malum non operatur ad perfectionem et decorem
universi nisi per accidens, ut dictum est. Unde et hoc quod dicit
Dionysius, quod malum est ad universi perfectionem conferens,
concludit inducendo quasi ad inconveniens.</p></div></div><div
style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p9"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The statements that evil
exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet
the statements that anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it
not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affirmative. God
therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done,
but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="29263"><span class=
"ref">[29263] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, licet mala fieri, et mala non fieri, contradictorie
opponantur; tamen velle mala fieri, et velle mala non fieri, non
opponuntur contradictorie, cum utrumque sit affirmativum. Deus
igitur neque vult mala fieri, neque vult mala non fieri, sed vult
permittere mala fieri. Et hoc est bonum.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10" next="FP_Q19_A11" prev="FP_Q19_A9"
progress="3.71%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether God has
free-will?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p0.1">Whether God has free-will?</h4><div
style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p2"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not
free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146,
ad Damas.]; "God alone is He who is not liable to sin, nor can be
liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either
side."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la"
title="I q. 19 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="29264"><span class=
"ref">[29264] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non habeat liberum arbitrium. Dicit
enim Hieronymus, in homilia de filio prodigo, <i>solus Deus est, in
quem peccatum non cadit, nec cadere potest; cetera, cum sint liberi
arbitrii, in utramque partem flecti possunt</i>.</p></div></div><div
style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is the faculty
of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God
does not will evil, as has been said <a
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9"
shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>. Therefore there is not
free-will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="29265"><span class=
"ref">[29265] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
liberum arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis, qua bonum et
malum eligitur. Sed Deus non vult malum, ut dictum est. Ergo
liberum arbitrium non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On
the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit
divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free
choice of the will, not in obedience to necessity."</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 10 s. c."><a name="29266"><span class=
"ref">[29266] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Ambrosius, in libro de fide, <i>spiritus sanctus dividit
singulis prout vult, idest pro liberae voluntatis arbitrio, non
necessitatis obsequio</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>, He has free will with respect to what He does not
  necessarily will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 10 co."><a name="29267"><span class=
"ref">[29267] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod liberum arbitrium habemus respectu eorum quae non necessario
volumus, vel naturali instinctu. Non enim ad liberum arbitrium
pertinet quod volumus esse felices, sed ad naturalem instinctum.
Unde et alia animalia, quae naturali instinctu moventur ad aliquid,
non dicuntur libero arbitrio moveri. Cum igitur Deus ex necessitate
suam bonitatem velit, alia vero non ex necessitate, ut supra
ostensum est; respectu illorum quae non ex necessitate vult,
liberum arbitrium habet.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
to Objection 1:</b> Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply,
but only as regards the inclination to sin.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="29268"><span class=
"ref">[29268] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Hieronymus videtur excludere a Deo liberum arbitrium,
non simpliciter, sed solum quantum ad hoc quod est deflecti in
peccatum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
2:</b> Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine
goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown (De Fide ii,
3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet
He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a
thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin,
can will to sit down, and not will to sit down.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="29269"><span class=
"ref">[29269] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, cum malum culpae dicatur per aversionem a bonitate
divina, per quam Deus omnia vult, ut supra ostensum est, manifestum
est quod impossibile est eum malum culpae velle. Et tamen ad
opposita se habet, inquantum velle potest hoc esse vel non esse.
Sicut et nos, non peccando, possumus velle sedere, et non velle
sedere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11"
next="FP_Q19_A12" prev="FP_Q19_A10" progress="3.73%" n="xi"
title="Article. 11 - Whether the will of expression is to be
distinguished in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p0.1">Whether the will of expression is to
be distinguished in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in
God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so is His
wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine
wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine
will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="29270"><span class=
"ref">[29270] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit distinguenda in Deo voluntas
signi. Sicut enim voluntas Dei est causa rerum, ita et scientia.
Sed non assignantur aliqua signa ex parte divinae scientiae. Ergo
neque debent assignari aliqua signa ex parte divinae
voluntatis.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of
him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the expressions
assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they
are false. But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No expressions
therefore must be assigned to the divine will.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="29271"><span class=
"ref">[29271] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
signum quod non concordat ei cuius est signum, est falsum. Si
igitur signa quae assignantur circa voluntatem divinam, non
concordant divinae voluntati, sunt falsa, si autem concordant,
superflue assignantur. Non igitur sunt aliqua signa circa
voluntatem divinam assignanda.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On
the contrary,</b> The will of God is one, since it is the very essence
of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words
of<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.110.2" parsed="vul|Ps|110|2|0|0"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4.1" passage=" Ps. 110:2">
Ps. 110:2</scripRef>: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out
according to all His wills." Therefore sometimes the sign must be
taken for the will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 11 s. c."><a name="29272"><span class=
"ref">[29272] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod voluntas Dei est una, cum ipsa sit Dei essentia. Quandoque
autem pluraliter significatur, ut cum dicitur, <i>magna opera
domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius</i>. Ergo oportet quod
aliquando signum voluntatis pro voluntate accipiatur.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[3]</a>). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that
  punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.6.10" parsed="vul|Matt|6|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.2" passage="Mat. 6:10">Mat.
  6:10</scripRef>). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called
  will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 11 co."><a name="29273"><span class=
"ref">[29273] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod in Deo quaedam dicuntur proprie, et quaedam secundum
metaphoram, ut ex supradictis patet. Cum autem aliquae passiones
humanae in divinam praedicationem metaphorice assumuntur, hoc fit
secundum similitudinem effectus, unde illud quod est signum talis
passionis in nobis, in Deo nomine illius passionis metaphorice
significatur. Sicut, apud nos, irati punire consueverunt, unde ipsa
punitio est signum irae, et propter hoc, ipsa punitio nomine irae
significatur, cum Deo attribuitur. Similiter id quod solet esse in
nobis signum voluntatis, quandoque metaphorice in Deo voluntas
dicitur. Sicut, cum aliquis praecipit aliquid, signum est quod
velit illud fieri, unde praeceptum divinum quandoque metaphorice
voluntas Dei dicitur, secundum illud Matth. VI, <i>fiat voluntas
tua, sicut in caelo et in terra</i>. Sed hoc distat inter
voluntatem et iram, quia ira de Deo nunquam proprie dicitur, cum in
suo principali intellectu includat passionem, voluntas autem
proprie de Deo dicitur. Et ideo in Deo distinguitur voluntas
proprie, et metaphorice dicta. Voluntas enim proprie dicta, vocatur
voluntas beneplaciti, voluntas autem metaphorice dicta, est
voluntas signi, eo quod ipsum signum voluntatis voluntas
dicitur.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
1:</b> Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless
through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless we
will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge,
but to will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="29274"><span class=
"ref">[29274] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod scientia non est causa eorum quae fiunt, nisi per
voluntatem, non enim quae scimus facimus, nisi velimus. Et ideo
signum non attribuitur scientiae, sicut attribuitur
voluntati.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
2:</b> Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being signs
that God wills anything; but because what in us is the usual
expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus
punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called
anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in
ourselves.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="29275"><span class=
"ref">[29275] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod signa voluntatis dicuntur voluntates divinae, non
quia sint signa quod Deus velit, sed quia ea quae in nobis solent
esse signa volendi, in Deo divinae voluntates dicuntur. Sicut
punitio non est signum quod in Deo sit ira, sed punitio, ex eo ipso
quod in nobis est signum irae, in Deo dicitur ira.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12" next="FP_Q20" prev="FP_Q19_A11" progress="3.75%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p0.1">Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p2"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that five expressions of
will---namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and
permission---are not rightly assigned to the divine will. For the same
things that God bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He
sometimes operates in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these
He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as
distinct.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="29276"><span class=
"ref">[29276] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter circa divinam
voluntatem ponantur quinque signa, scilicet, prohibitio,
praeceptum, consilium, operatio et permissio. Nam eadem quae nobis
praecipit Deus vel consulit, in nobis quandoque operatur, et eadem
quae prohibet, quandoque permittit. Ergo non debent ex opposito
dividi.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p3"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God works nothing unless
He wills it, as the Scripture says (<scripRef
osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.26" parsed="vul|Wis|11|26|0|0"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p3.1"
passage="Wis. 11:26">Wis. 11:26</scripRef>). But the will of
expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure. Therefore
operation ought not to be comprehended in the will of
expression.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 arg. 2"><a name="29277"><span class=
"ref">[29277] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
nihil Deus operatur, nisi volens, ut dicitur Sap. XI. Sed voluntas
signi distinguitur a voluntate beneplaciti. Ergo operatio sub
voluntate signi comprehendi non debet.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p4"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, operation and permission
appertain to all creatures in common, since God works in them all, and
permits some action in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition
belong to rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly
under one division, not being of one order.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="29278"><span class=
"ref">[29278] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
operatio et permissio communiter ad omnes creaturas pertinent, quia
in omnibus Deus operatur, et in omnibus aliquid fieri permittit.
Sed praeceptum, consilium et prohibitio pertinent ad solam
rationalem creaturam. Ergo non veniunt convenienter in unam
divisionem, cum non sint unius ordinis.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p5"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, evil happens in more ways
than good, since "good happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of
ways," as declared by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius
(Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not right therefore to assign one expression
only in the case of evil---namely, prohibition---and two---namely,
counsel and precept---in the case of good.</p></div><div style="width:
45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 arg. 4"><a name="29279"><span class=
"ref">[29279] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 12 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
malum pluribus modis contingit quam bonum, quia bonum contingit uno
modo, sed malum omnifariam, ut patet per philosophum in II Ethic.,
et per Dionysium in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Inconvenienter igitur
respectu mali assignatur unum signum tantum, scilicet prohibitio;
respectu vero boni, duo signa, scilicet consilium et
praeceptum.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> By these signs we name the expression of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may show that he wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may show it by himself, by doing something either directly, or indirectly and accidentally. He shows it directly when he works in his own person; in that way the expression of his will is his own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering the doing of a thing; for
  what removes an impediment is called an accidental mover. In this respect the expression is called permission. He declares his will by means of another when he orders another to perform a work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept, and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of man makes itself known, the same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will, as the expression of that will. That precept,
  counsel, and prohibition are called the will of God is clear from the words of <scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.6.10" parsed="vul|Matt|6|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p6.1" passage="Mat. 6:10">Mat. 6:10</scripRef>: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." That permission and operation are called the will of God is clear from Augustine (Enchiridion 95), who says: "Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually doing it."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p7" shownumber="no"> Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, operation with regard to good. Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is necessary and counsel to good that is of supererogation.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 co."><a name="29280"><span class=
"ref">[29280] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod huiusmodi signa voluntatis dicuntur ea, quibus consuevimus
demonstrare nos aliquid velle. Potest autem aliquis declarare se
velle aliquid, vel per seipsum, vel per alium. Per seipsum quidem,
inquantum facit aliquid, vel directe, vel indirecte et per
accidens. Directe quidem, cum per se aliquid operatur, et quantum
ad hoc, dicitur esse signum operatio. Indirecte autem, inquantum
non impedit operationem, nam removens prohibens dicitur movens per
accidens, ut dicitur in VIII Physic. Et quantum ad hoc, dicitur
signum permissio. Per alium autem declarat se aliquid velle,
inquantum ordinat alium ad aliquid faciendum; vel necessaria
inductione, quod fit praecipiendo quod quis vult, et prohibendo
contrarium; vel aliqua persuasoria inductione, quod pertinet ad
consilium. Quia igitur his modis declaratur aliquem velle aliquid,
propter hoc ista quinque nominantur interdum nomine voluntatis
divinae, tanquam signa voluntatis. Quod enim praeceptum, consilium
et prohibitio dicantur Dei voluntas, patet per id quod dicitur
Matth. VI <i>fiat voluntas tua, sicut in caelo et in terra</i>.
Quod autem permissio vel operatio dicantur Dei voluntas patet per
Augustinum, qui dicit in Enchirid., <i>nihil fit, nisi omnipotens
fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel faciendo</i>. Vel potest dici
quod permissio et operatio referuntur ad praesens permissio quidem
ad malum, operatio vero ad bonum. Ad futurum vero, prohibitio,
respectu mali; respectu vero boni necessarii, praeceptum; respectu
vero superabundantis boni, consilium.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p8"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is nothing to
prevent anyone declaring his will about the same matter in different
ways; thus we find many words that mean the same thing. Hence there is
not reason why the same thing should not be the subject of precept,
operation, and counsel; or of prohibition or permission.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="29281"><span class=
"ref">[29281] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod nihil prohibet, circa eandem rem, aliquem diversimode
declarare se aliquid velle, sicut inveniuntur multa nomina idem
significantia. Unde nihil prohibet idem subiacere praecepto et
consilio et operationi, et prohibitioni vel permissioni.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God may by metaphor be said to will what by His will, properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be said to will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing to prevent the same thing being the object of the will of good pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is always the same as the will of good pleasure; while precept and counsel are not; both because the former regards the present, and the two latter
  the future; and because the former is of itself the effect of the
will; the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of
another.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 ad 2"><a name="29282"><span class=
"ref">[29282] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, sicut Deus potest significari metaphorice velle id
quod non vult voluntate proprie accepta, ita potest metaphorice
significari velle id quod proprie vult. Unde nihil prohibet de
eodem esse voluntatem beneplaciti, et voluntatem signi. Sed
operatio semper est eadem cum voluntate beneplaciti, non autem
praeceptum vel consilium, tum quia haec est de praesenti, illud de
futuro; tum quia haec per se est effectus voluntatis, illud autem
per alium, ut dictum est.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p10"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Rational creatures are
masters of their own acts; and for this reason certain special
expressions of the divine will are assigned to their acts, inasmuch as
God ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily and of
themselves. Other creatures act only as moved by the divine operation;
therefore only operation and permission are concerned with
these.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la"
title="I q. 19 a. 12 ad 3"><a name="29283"><span class=
"ref">[29283] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod creatura rationalis est domina sui actus, et ideo
circa ipsam specialia quaedam signa divinae voluntatis assignantur,
inquantum rationalem creaturam Deus ordinat ad agendum voluntarie
et per se. Sed aliae creaturae non agunt nisi motae ex operatione
divina, et ideo circa alias non habent locum nisi operatio et
permissio.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All evil of sin, though happening in many ways, agrees in being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard to evil, only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. On the other hand, good stands in various relations to the divine goodness, since there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject of precept; and there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and
  these are the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is
not only concerned with the obtaining of greater good; but also with
the avoiding of lesser evils.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 ad 4"><a name="29284"><span class=
"ref">[29284] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 12 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod omne malum culpae, licet multipliciter contingat,
tamen in hoc convenit, quod discordat a voluntate divina et ideo
unum signum respectu malorum assignatur, scilicet prohibitio. Sed
diversimode bona se habent ad bonitatem divinam. Quia quaedam sunt,
sine quibus fruitionem divinae bonitatis consequi non possumus, et
respectu horum est praeceptum. Quaedam vero sunt, quibus perfectius
consequimur, et respectu horum est consilium. Vel dicendum quod
consilium est non solum de melioribus bonis assequendis, sed etiam
de minoribus malis vitandis.</p></div></div>
</div></div>
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20" next="FP_Q20_A1" prev="FP_Q19_A12" progress="3.78%" n="xix" title="Question. 20 - GOD'S LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)">
<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p0.1">Question 20. GOD'S LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p2" shownumber="no"> We next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of God. In the appetitive part of the soul there are found in ourselves both the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the habits of the moral virtues, as justice, fortitude and the like. Hence we shall first consider the love of God, and secondly His justice and mercy. About the first there are four points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether love exists in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether He loves all things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether He loves one thing more than another?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether He loves more the better things?</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/><p title="I q. 20 pr."><a name="29285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29285]
Iª q. 20 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de his quae
absolute ad voluntatem Dei pertinent. In parte autem appetitiva
inveniuntur in nobis et passiones animae, ut gaudium, amor, et
huiusmodi; et habitus moralium virtutum, ut iustitia, fortitudo, et
huiusmodi. Unde primo considerabimus de amore Dei; secundo, de
iustitia Dei, et misericordia eius. Circa primum quaeruntur
quatuor. Primo, utrum in Deo sit amor. Secundo, utrum amet omnia.
Tertio, utrum magis amet unum quam aliud. Quarto, utrum meliora
magis amet.</p></div>
<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1" next="FP_Q20_A2" prev="FP_Q20" progress="3.78%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether love exists in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p0.1">Whether love exists in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that love does not exist in God. For in God there are no passions. Now love is a passion. Therefore love is not in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29286] Iª q. 20 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit in Deo. Nulla enim passio est
in Deo. Amor est passio. Ergo amor non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love, anger, sorrow and the like, are mutually divided against one another. But sorrow and anger are not attributed to God, unless by metaphor. Therefore neither is love attributed to Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29287] Iª q. 20 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, amor,
ira, tristitia, et huiusmodi, contra se dividuntur. Sed tristitia
et ira non dicuntur de Deo nisi metaphorice. Ergo nec amor.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a uniting and binding force." But this cannot take place in God, since He is simple. Therefore love does not exist in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29288] Iª q. 20 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., <i>amor est vis unitiva et
concretiva</i>. Hoc autem in Deo locum habere non potest, cum sit
simplex. Ergo in Deo non est amor.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "God is love" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.4.16" parsed="vul|John|4|16|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p5.1" passage="Jn. 4:16">Jn. 4:16</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29289" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29289] Iª q. 20 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur I Ioan. IV, <i>Deus caritas est</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We must needs assert that in God there is love: because love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty. For since the acts of the will and of every appetitive faculty tend towards good and evil, as to their proper objects: and since good is essentially and especially the object of the will and the appetite, whereas evil is only the object secondarily and indirectly, as opposed to good; it follows that the acts of the will and appetite
  that regard good must naturally be prior to those that regard evil; thus, for instance, joy is prior to sorrow, love to hate: because what exists of itself is always prior to that which exists through another. Again, the more universal is naturally prior to what is less so. Hence the intellect is first directed to universal truth; and in the second place to particular and special truths. Now there are certain acts of the will and appetite that regard good under some special condition, as joy
  and delight regard good present and possessed; whereas desire and hope regard good not as yet possessed. Love, however, regards good universally, whether possessed or not. Hence love is naturally the first act of the will and appetite; for which reason all the other appetite movements presuppose love, as their root and origin. For nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything, except as a good that is loved: nor is anything an object of hate except as opposed to the object of love.
  Similarly, it is clear that sorrow, and other things like to it, must be referred to love as to their first principle. Hence, in whomsoever there is will and appetite, there must also be love: since if the first is wanting, all that follows is also wanting. Now it has been shown that will is in God (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[1]</a>), and hence we must attribute love to Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 1 co."><a name="29290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29290] Iª q. 20 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod necesse est ponere amorem in Deo. Primus enim motus
voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitivae virtutis, est amor. Cum enim
actus voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitivae virtutis tendat in
bonum et malum, sicut in propria obiecta; bonum autem principalius
et per se est obiectum voluntatis et appetitus, malum autem
secundario et per aliud, inquantum scilicet opponitur bono, oportet
naturaliter esse priores actus voluntatis et appetitus qui
respiciunt bonum, his qui respiciunt malum; ut gaudium quam
tristitia, et amor quam odium. Semper enim quod est per se, prius
est eo quod est per aliud. Rursus, quod est communius, naturaliter
est prius, unde et intellectus per prius habet ordinem ad verum
commune, quam ad particularia quaedam vera. Sunt autem quidam actus
voluntatis et appetitus, respicientes bonum sub aliqua speciali
conditione, sicut gaudium et delectatio est de bono praesenti et
habito; desiderium autem et spes, de bono nondum adepto. Amor autem
respicit bonum in communi, sive sit habitum, sive non habitum. Unde
amor naturaliter est primus actus voluntatis et appetitus. Et
propter hoc, omnes alii motus appetitivi praesupponunt amorem,
quasi primam radicem. Nullus enim desiderat aliquid, nisi bonum
amatum, neque aliquis gaudet, nisi de bono amato. Odium etiam non
est nisi de eo quod contrariatur rei amatae. Et similiter
tristitiam, et cetera huiusmodi, manifestum est in amorem referri,
sicut in primum principium. Unde in quocumque est voluntas vel
appetitus, oportet esse amorem, remoto enim primo, removentur alia.
Ostensum est autem in Deo esse voluntatem. Unde necesse est in eo
ponere amorem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The cognitive faculty does not move except through the medium of the appetitive: and just as in ourselves the universal reason moves through the medium of the particular reason, as stated in De Anima iii, 58,75, so in ourselves the intellectual appetite, or the will as it is called, moves through the medium of the sensitive appetite. Hence, in us the sensitive appetite is the proximate motive-force of our bodies. Some bodily change therefore always
  accompanies an act of the sensitive appetite, and this change affects especially the heart, which, as the Philosopher says (De part. animal. iii, 4), is the first principle of movement in animals. Therefore acts of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as they have annexed to them some bodily change, are called passions; whereas acts of the will are not so called. Love, therefore, and joy and delight are passions; in so far as they denote acts of the intellective appetite, they are not passions. It
  is in this latter sense that they are in God. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii): "God rejoices by an operation that is one and simple," and for the same reason He loves without passion.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29291" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29291] Iª q. 20 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod vis cognitiva non movet, nisi mediante appetitiva. Et
sicut in nobis ratio universalis movet mediante ratione
particulari, ut dicitur in III de anima; ita appetitus
intellectivus, qui dicitur voluntas, movet in nobis mediante
appetitu sensitivo. Unde proximum motivum corporis in nobis est
appetitus sensitivus. Unde semper actum appetitus sensitivi
concomitatur aliqua transmutatio corporis; et maxime circa cor,
quod est primum principium motus in animali. Sic igitur actus
appetitus sensitivi, inquantum habent transmutationem corporalem
annexam, passiones dicuntur, non autem actus voluntatis. Amor
igitur et gaudium et delectatio, secundum quod significant actus
appetitus sensitivi, passiones sunt, non autem secundum quod
significant actus appetitus intellectivi. Et sic ponuntur in Deo.
Unde dicit philosophus, in VII Ethic., quod <i>Deus una et simplici
operatione gaudet</i>. Et eadem ratione, sine passione amat.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the passions of the sensitive appetite there may be distinguished a certain material element---namely, the bodily change---and a certain formal element, which is on the part of the appetite. Thus in anger, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 15,63,64), the material element is the kindling of the blood about the heart; but the formal, the appetite for revenge. Again, as regards the formal element of certain passions a certain imperfection is
  implied, as in desire, which is of the good we have not, and in sorrow, which is about the evil we have. This applies also to anger, which supposes sorrow. Certain other passions, however, as love and joy, imply no imperfection. Since therefore none of these can be attributed to God on their material side, as has been said (ad 1); neither can those that even on their formal side imply imperfection be attributed to Him; except metaphorically, and from likeness of effects, as already show (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[3], A[2]</a> , ad 2; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p8.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[11]</a>). Whereas, those that do not imply imperfection, such as love and joy, can be properly predicated of God, though without attributing passion to Him, as said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p8.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[11]</a>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29292] Iª q. 20 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod in passionibus sensitivi appetitus, est considerare
aliquid quasi materiale, scilicet corporalem transmutationem; et
aliquid quasi formale, quod est ex parte appetitus. Sicut in ira,
ut dicitur in I de anima, materiale est accensio sanguinis circa
cor, vel aliquid huiusmodi; formale vero, appetitus vindictae. Sed
rursus, ex parte eius quod est formale, in quibusdam horum
designatur aliqua imperfectio; sicut in desiderio, quod est boni
non habiti; et in tristitia, quae est mali habiti. Et eadem ratio
est de ira, quae tristitiam supponit. Quaedam vero nullam
imperfectionem designant, ut amor et gaudium. Cum igitur nihil
horum Deo conveniat secundum illud quod est materiale in eis, ut
dictum est; illa quae imperfectionem important etiam formaliter,
Deo convenire non possunt nisi metaphorice, propter similitudinem
effectus, ut supra dictum est. Quae autem imperfectionem non
important, de Deo proprie dicuntur, ut amor et gaudium, tamen sine
passione, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An act of love always tends towards two things; to the good that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it: since to love a person is to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as we love ourselves, we wish ourselves good; and, so far as possible, union with that good. So love is called the unitive force, even in God, yet without implying composition; for the good that He wills for Himself, is no other than Himself, Who is good by His essence,
  as above shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,3). And by the fact that anyone loves another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, in the place of himself; and regards the good done to him as done to himself. So far love is a binding force, since it aggregates another to ourselves, and refers his good to our own. And then again the divine love is a binding force, inasmuch as God wills good to others; yet it implies no composition in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29293] Iª q. 20 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod actus amoris semper tendit in duo, scilicet in bonum
quod quis vult alicui; et in eum cui vult bonum. Hoc enim est
proprie amare aliquem, velle ei bonum. Unde in eo quod aliquis amat
se, vult bonum sibi. Et sic illud bonum quaerit sibi unire,
inquantum potest. Et pro tanto dicitur amor vis unitiva, etiam in
Deo, sed absque compositione, quia illud bonum quod vult sibi, non
est aliud quam ipse, qui est per suam essentiam bonus, ut supra
ostensum est. In hoc vero quod aliquis amat alium, vult bonum illi.
Et sic utitur eo tanquam seipso, referens bonum ad illum, sicut ad
seipsum. Et pro tanto dicitur amor vis concretiva, quia alium
aggregat sibi habens se ad eum sicut ad seipsum. Et sic etiam amor
divinus est vis concretiva, absque compositione quae sit in Deo,
inquantum aliis bona vult.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2" next="FP_Q20_A3" prev="FP_Q20_A1" progress="3.82%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether God loves all things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p0.1">Whether God loves all things?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not love all things. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1), love places the lover outside himself, and causes him to pass, as it were, into the object of his love. But it is not admissible to say that God is placed outside of Himself, and passes into other things. Therefore it is inadmissible to say that God loves things other than Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29294" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29294] Iª q. 20 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non omnia amet. Quia, secundum
Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom., amor amantem extra se ponit, et
eum quodammodo in amatum transfert. Inconveniens autem est dicere
quod Deus, extra se positus, in alia transferatur. Ergo
inconveniens est dicere quod Deus alia a se amet.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the love of God is eternal. But things apart from God are not from eternity; except in God. Therefore God does not love anything, except as it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it is no other than Himself. Therefore God does not love things other than Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29295] Iª q. 20 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, amor
Dei aeternus est. Sed ea quae sunt alia a Deo, non sunt ab aeterno
nisi in Deo. Ergo Deus non amat ea nisi in seipso. Sed secundum
quod sunt in eo, non sunt aliud ab eo. Ergo Deus non amat alia a
seipso.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love is twofold---the love, namely, of desire, and the love of friendship. Now God does not love irrational creatures with the love of desire, since He needs no creature outside Himself. Nor with the love of friendship; since there can be no friendship with irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. viii, 2). Therefore God does not love all things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29296] Iª q. 20 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
duplex est amor, scilicet concupiscentiae, et amicitiae. Sed Deus
creaturas irrationales non amat amore concupiscentiae, quia nullius
extra se eget, nec etiam amore amicitiae, quia non potest ad res
irrationales haberi, ut patet per philosophum, in VIII Ethic. Ergo
Deus non omnia amat.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.5.7" parsed="vul|Ps|5|7|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p5.1" passage="Ps. 5:7">Ps. 5:7</scripRef>): "Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity." Now nothing is at the same time hated and loved. Therefore God does not love all things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="29297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29297] Iª q. 20 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in
Psalmo dicitur, <i>odisti omnes qui operantur iniquitatem</i>.
Nihil autem simul odio habetur et amatur. Ergo Deus non omnia
amat.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.25" parsed="vul|Wis|11|25|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p6.1" passage="Wis. 11:25">Wis. 11:25</scripRef>): "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29298] Iª q. 20 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Sap. XI, <i>diligis omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti
eorum quae fecisti</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> God loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a thing is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses. Now it has been shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that God's will is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some
  good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as by its object, our love, whereby we will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides
  the good it has not, and to this end we direct our actions: whereas the love of God infuses and creates goodness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 2 co."><a name="29299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29299] Iª q. 20 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod Deus omnia existentia amat. Nam omnia existentia, inquantum
sunt, bona sunt, ipsum enim esse cuiuslibet rei quoddam bonum est,
et similiter quaelibet perfectio ipsius. Ostensum est autem supra
quod voluntas Dei est causa omnium rerum et sic oportet quod
intantum habeat aliquid esse, aut quodcumque bonum, inquantum est
volitum a Deo. Cuilibet igitur existenti Deus vult aliquod bonum.
Unde, cum amare nil aliud sit quam velle bonum alicui, manifestum
est quod Deus omnia quae sunt, amat. Non tamen eo modo sicut nos.
Quia enim voluntas nostra non est causa bonitatis rerum, sed ab ea
movetur sicut ab obiecto, amor noster, quo bonum alicui volumus,
non est causa bonitatis ipsius, sed e converso bonitas eius, vel
vera vel aestimata, provocat amorem, quo ei volumus et bonum
conservari quod habet, et addi quod non habet, et ad hoc operamur.
Sed amor Dei est infundens et creans bonitatem in rebus.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A lover is placed outside himself, and made to pass into the object of his love, inasmuch as he wills good to the beloved; and works for that good by his providence even as he works for his own. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "On behalf of the truth we must make bold to say even this, that He Himself, the cause of all things, by His abounding love and goodness, is placed outside Himself by His providence for all existing things."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29300] Iª q. 20 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod amans sic fit extra se in amatum translatus,
inquantum vult amato bonum, et operatur per suam providentiam,
sicut et sibi. Unde et Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom.,
<i>audendum est autem et hoc pro veritate dicere, quod et ipse
omnium causa, per abundantiam amativae bonitatis, extra seipsum fit
ad omnia existentia providentiis</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although creatures have not existed from eternity, except in God, yet because they have been in Him from eternity, God has known them eternally in their proper natures; and for that reason has loved them, even as we, by the images of things within us, know things existing in themselves.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29301] Iª q. 20 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, licet creaturae ab aeterno non fuerint nisi in Deo,
tamen per hoc quod ab aeterno in Deo fuerunt, ab aeterno Deus
cognovit res in propriis naturis, et eadem ratione amavit. Sicut et
nos per similitudines rerum, quae in nobis sunt, cognoscimus res in
seipsis existentes.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Friendship cannot exist except towards rational creatures, who are capable of returning love, and communicating one with another in the various works of life, and who may fare well or ill, according to the changes of fortune and happiness; even as to them is benevolence properly speaking exercised. But irrational creatures cannot attain to loving God, nor to any share in the intellectual and beatific life that He lives. Strictly speaking, therefore,
  God does not love irrational creatures with the love of friendship; but as it were with the love of desire, in so far as He orders them to rational creatures, and even to Himself. Yet this is not because He stands in need of them; but only on account of His goodness, and of the services they render to us. For we can desire a thing for others as well as for ourselves.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29302] Iª q. 20 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod amicitia non potest haberi nisi ad rationales
creaturas, in quibus contingit esse redamationem, et
communicationem in operibus vitae, et quibus contingit bene evenire
vel male, secundum fortunam et felicitatem, sicut et ad eas proprie
benevolentia est. Creaturae autem irrationales non possunt
pertingere ad amandum Deum, neque ad communicationem intellectualis
et beatae vitae, qua Deus vivit. Sic igitur Deus, proprie loquendo,
non amat creaturas irrationales amore amicitiae, sed amore quasi
concupiscentiae; inquantum ordinat eas ad rationales creaturas, et
etiam ad seipsum; non quasi eis indigeat, sed propter suam
bonitatem et nostram utilitatem. Concupiscimus enim aliquid et
nobis et aliis.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Nothing prevents one and the same thing being loved under one aspect, while it is hated under another. God loves sinners in so far as they are existing natures; for they have existence and have it from Him. In so far as they are sinners, they have not existence at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from God. Hence under this aspect, they are hated by Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="29303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29303] Iª q. 20 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod nihil prohibet unum et idem secundum aliquid amari,
et secundum aliquid odio haberi. Deus autem peccatores, inquantum
sunt naturae quaedam, amat, sic enim et sunt, et ab ipso sunt.
Inquantum vero peccatores sunt, non sunt, sed ab esse deficiunt, et
hoc in eis a Deo non est. Unde secundum hoc ab ipso odio
habentur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3" next="FP_Q20_A4" prev="FP_Q20_A2" progress="3.86%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God loves all things equally?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p0.1">Whether God loves all things equally?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God loves all things equally. For it is said: "He hath equally care of all" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.6.8" parsed="vul|Wis|6|8|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p2.1" passage="Wis. 6:8">Wis. 6:8</scripRef>). But God's providence over things comes from the love wherewith He loves them. Therefore He loves all things equally.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29304] Iª q. 20 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus aequaliter diligat omnia. Dicitur
enim Sap. VI, <i>aequaliter est ei cura de omnibus</i>. Sed
providentia Dei, quam habet de rebus, est ex amore quo amat res.
Ergo aequaliter amat omnia.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the love of God is His essence. But God's essence does not admit of degree; neither therefore does His love. He does not therefore love some things more than others.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29305] Iª q. 20 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, amor
Dei est eius essentia. Sed essentia Dei magis et minus non recipit.
Ergo nec amor eius. Non igitur quaedam aliis magis amat.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as God's love extends to created things, so do His knowledge and will extend. But God is not said to know some things more than others; nor will one thing more than another. Neither therefore does He love some things more than others.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29306] Iª q. 20 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
amor Dei se extendit ad res creatas, ita et scientia et voluntas.
Sed Deus non dicitur scire quaedam magis quam alia, neque magis
velle. Ergo nec magis quaedam aliis diligit.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. cx): "God loves all things that He has made, and amongst them rational creatures more, and of these especially those who are members of His only-begotten Son Himself."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29307] Iª q. 20 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Augustinus, super Ioann., <i>omnia diligit Deus quae
fecit; et inter ea magis diligit creaturas rationales; et de illis
eas amplius, quae sunt membra unigeniti sui; et multo magis ipsum
unigenitum suum</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since to love a thing is to will it good, in a twofold way anything may be loved more, or less. In one way on the part of the act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. In this way God does not love some things more than others, because He loves all things by an act of the will that is one, simple, and always the same. In another way on the part of the good itself that a person wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that one more
  than another, for whom we will a greater good, though our will is not more intense. In this way we must needs say that God loves some things more than others. For since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, as has been said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[2])</a>, no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 3 co."><a name="29308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29308] Iª q. 20 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, cum amare sit velle bonum alicui, duplici ratione potest
aliquid magis vel minus amari. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius actus
voluntatis, qui est magis vel minus intensus. Et sic Deus non magis
quaedam aliis amat, quia omnia amat uno et simplici actu
voluntatis, et semper eodem modo se habente. Alio modo, ex parte
ipsius boni quod aliquis vult amato. Et sic dicimur aliquem magis
alio amare, cui volumus maius bonum; quamvis non magis intensa
voluntate. Et hoc modo necesse est dicere quod Deus quaedam aliis
magis amat. Cum enim amor Dei sit causa bonitatis rerum, ut dictum
est, non esset aliquid alio melius, si Deus non vellet uni maius
bonum quam alteri.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to have equally care of all, not because by His care He deals out equal good to all, but because He administers all things with a like wisdom and goodness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29309] Iª q. 20 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod dicitur Deo aequaliter esse cura de omnibus, non quia
aequalia bona sua cura omnibus dispenset; sed quia ex aequali
sapientia et bonitate omnia administrat.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument is based on the intensity of love on the part of the act of the will, which is the divine essence. But the good that God wills for His creatures, is not the divine essence. Therefore there is no reason why it may not vary in degree.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29310] Iª q. 20 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de intensione amoris ex parte
actus voluntatis, qui est divina essentia. Bonum autem quod Deus
creaturae vult, non est divina essentia. Unde nihil prohibet illud
intendi vel remitti.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To understand and to will denote the act alone, and do not include in their meaning objects from the diversity of which God may be said to know or will more or less, as has been said with respect to God's love.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29311] Iª q. 20 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod intelligere et velle significant solum actus, non
autem in sua significatione includunt aliqua obiecta, ex quorum
diversitate possit dici Deus magis vel minus scire aut velle; sicut
circa amorem dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4" next="FP_Q21" prev="FP_Q20_A3" progress="3.87%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether God always loves more the better things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p0.1">Whether God always loves more the better things?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not always love more the better things. For it is manifest that Christ is better than the whole human race, being God and man. But God loved the human race more than He loved Christ; for it is said: "He spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.32" parsed="vul|Rom|8|32|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p2.1" passage="Rom. 8:32">Rom. 8:32</scripRef>). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29312] Iª q. 20 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non semper magis diligat meliora.
Manifestum est enim quod Christus est melior toto genere humano,
cum sit Deus et homo. Sed Deus magis dilexit genus humanum quam
Christum, quia dicitur Rom. VIII, <i>proprio filio suo non
pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum</i>. Ergo Deus non
semper magis diligit meliora.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an angel is better than a man. Hence it is said of man: "Thou hast made him a little less than the angels" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.8.6" parsed="vul|Ps|8|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p3.1" passage="Ps. 8:6">Ps. 8:6</scripRef>). But God loved men more than He loved the angels, for it is said: "Nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Heb.2.16" parsed="vul|Heb|2|16|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p3.2" passage="Heb. 2:16">Heb. 2:16</scripRef>). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29313] Iª q. 20 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Angelus est melior homine, unde in Psalmo VIII dicitur de homine,
<i>minuisti eum paulo minus ab Angelis</i>. Sed Deus plus dilexit
hominem quam Angelum, dicitur enim Hebr. II, <i>nusquam Angelos
apprehendit, sed semen Abrahae apprehendit</i>. Ergo Deus non
semper magis diligit meliora.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Peter was better than John, since he loved Christ more. Hence the Lord, knowing this to be true, asked Peter, saying: "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me more than these?" Yet Christ loved John more than He loved Peter. For as Augustine says, commenting on the words, "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me?": "By this very mark is John distinguished from the other disciples, not that He loved him only, but that He loved him more than the rest." Therefore
  God does not always love more the better things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29314] Iª q. 20 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
Petrus fuit melior Ioanne, quia plus Christum diligebat. Unde
dominus, sciens hoc esse verum, interrogavit Petrum, dicens,
<i>Simon Ioannis, diligis me plus his?</i> Sed tamen Christus plus
dilexit Ioannem quam Petrum, ut enim dicit Augustinus, super illud
Ioan. XXI, <i>Simon Ioannis diligis me? Hoc ipso signo Ioannes a
ceteris discipulis discernitur; non quod solum eum, sed quod plus
eum ceteris diligebat</i>. Non ergo semper magis diligit
meliora.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the innocent man is better than the repentant, since repentance is, as Jerome says (Cap. 3 in Isa.), "a second plank after shipwreck." But God loves the penitent more than the innocent; since He rejoices over him the more. For it is said: "I say to you that there shall be joy in heaven upon the one sinner that doth penance, more than upon ninety-nine just who need not penance" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Luke.15.7" parsed="vul|Luke|15|7|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p5.1" passage="Lk. 15:7">Lk. 15:7</scripRef>). Therefore God does not always love more
  the better things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="29315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29315] Iª q. 20 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
melior est innocens poenitente; <i>cum poenitentia sit secunda
tabula post naufragium</i>, ut dicit Hieronymus. Sed Deus plus
diligit poenitentem quam innocentem, quia plus de eo gaudet,
dicitur enim Luc. XV, <i>dico vobis quod maius gaudium erit in
caelo super uno peccatore poenitentiam agente, quam super nonaginta
novem iustis, qui non indigent poenitentia</i>. Ergo Deus non
semper magis diligit meliora.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the just man who is foreknown is better than the predestined sinner. Now God loves more the predestined sinner, since He wills for him a greater good, life eternal. Therefore God does not always love more the better things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="29316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29316] Iª q. 20 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
melior est iustus praescitus, quam peccator praedestinatus. Sed
Deus plus diligit peccatorem praedestinatum, quia vult ei maius
bonum, scilicet vitam aeternam. Ergo Deus non semper magis diligit
meliora.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Everything loves what is like it, as appears from (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Sir.13.19" parsed="vul|Sir|13|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p7.1" passage="Ecclus. 13:19">Ecclus. 13:19</scripRef>): "Every beast loveth its like." Now the better a thing is, the more like is it to God. Therefore the better things are more loved by God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29317] Iª q. 20 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
unumquodque diligit sibi simile; ut patet per illud quod habetur
Eccli. XIII, <i>omne animal diligit sibi simile</i>. Sed intantum
aliquid est melius, inquantum est Deo similius. Ergo meliora magis
diliguntur a Deo.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> It must needs be, according to what has been said before, that God loves more the better things . For it has been shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">AA[2]</a>,3), that God's loving one thing more than another is nothing else than His willing for that thing a greater good: because God's will is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some things are better than others, is that God wills for them a greater good. Hence it follows that He loves more the
  better things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 4 co."><a name="29318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29318] Iª q. 20 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod necesse est dicere, secundum praedicta, quod Deus magis
diligat meliora. Dictum est enim quod Deum diligere magis aliquid,
nihil aliud est quam ei maius bonum velle, voluntas enim Dei est
causa bonitatis in rebus. Et sic, ex hoc sunt aliqua meliora, quod
Deus eis maius bonum vult. Unde sequitur quod meliora plus
amet.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God loves Christ not only more than He loves the whole human race, but more than He loves the entire created universe: because He willed for Him the greater good in giving Him "a name that is above all names," in so far as He was true God. Nor did anything of His excellence diminish when God delivered Him up to death for the salvation of the human race; rather did He become thereby a glorious conqueror: "The government was placed upon His shoulder,"
  according to<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.9.6" parsed="vul|Isa|9|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p9.1" passage=" Is. 9:6."> Is. 9:6.</scripRef></p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29319] Iª q. 20 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Deus Christum diligit, non solum plus quam totum
humanum genus, sed etiam magis quam totam universitatem
creaturarum, quia scilicet ei maius bonum voluit, quia dedit ei
nomen, quod est super omne nomen, ut verus Deus esset. Nec eius
excellentiae deperiit ex hoc quod Deus dedit eum in mortem pro
salute humani generis, quinimo ex hoc factus est victor gloriosus;
<i>factus enim est principatus super humerum eius</i>, ut dicitur
Isaiae IX.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God loves the human nature assumed by the Word of God in the person of Christ more than He loves all the angels; for that nature is better, especially on the ground of the union with the Godhead. But speaking of human nature in general, and comparing it with the angelic, the two are found equal, in the order of grace and of glory: since according to<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rev.21.17" parsed="vul|Rev|21|17|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p10.1" passage=" Rev 21:17, "> Rev 21:17, </scripRef> the measure of a man and of an angel is the same. Yet so that, in this
  respect, some angels are found nobler than some men, and some men nobler than some angels. But as to natural condition an angel is better than a man. God therefore did not assume human nature because He loved man, absolutely speaking, more; but because the needs of man were greater; just as the master of a house may give some costly delicacy to a sick servant, that he does not give to his own son in sound health.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29320] Iª q. 20 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod naturam humanam assumptam a Dei verbo in persona
Christi, secundum praedicta, Deus plus amat quam omnes Angelos, et
melior est, maxime ratione unionis. Sed loquendo de humana natura
communiter, eam angelicae comparando, secundum ordinem ad gratiam
et gloriam, aequalitas invenitur; cum eadem sit mensura hominis et
Angeli, ut dicitur Apoc. XXI; ita tamen quod quidam Angeli
quibusdam hominibus, et quidam homines quibusdam Angelis, quantum
ad hoc, potiores inveniuntur. Sed quantum ad conditionem naturae,
Angelus est melior homine. Nec ideo naturam humanam assumpsit Deus,
quia hominem absolute plus diligeret, sed quia plus indigebat.
Sicut bonus paterfamilias aliquid pretiosius dat servo aegrotanti,
quod non dat filio sano.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This doubt concerning Peter and John has been solved in various ways. Augustine interprets it mystically, and says that the active life, signified by Peter, loves God more than the contemplative signified by John, because the former is more conscious of the miseries of this present life, and therefore the more ardently desires to be freed from them, and depart to God. God, he says, loves more the contemplative life, since He preserves it longer. For
  it does not end, as the active life does, with the life of the body.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p12" shownumber="no"> Some say that Peter loved Christ more in His members, and therefore was loved more by Christ also, for which reason He gave him the care of the Church; but that John loved Christ more in Himself, and so was loved more by Him; on which account Christ commended His mother to his care. Others say that it is uncertain which of them loved Christ more with the love of charity, and uncertain also which of them God loved more and ordained to a greater degree of glory in eternal life.
  Peter is said to have loved more, in regard to a certain promptness and fervor; but John to have been more loved, with respect to certain marks of familiarity which Christ showed to him rather than to others, on account of his youth and purity. While others say that Christ loved Peter more, from his more excellent gift of charity; but John more, from his gifts of intellect. Hence, absolutely speaking, Peter was the better and more beloved; but, in a certain sense, John was the better, and was
  loved the more. However, it may seem presumptuous to pass judgment on these matters; since "the Lord" and no other "is the weigher of spirits" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Prov.16.2" parsed="vul|Prov|16|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p12.1" passage="Prov. 16:2">Prov. 16:2</scripRef>).</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29321] Iª q. 20 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod haec dubitatio de Petro et Ioanne multipliciter
solvitur. Augustinus namque refert hoc ad mysterium, dicens quod
vita activa, quae significatur per Petrum, plus diligit Deum quam
vita contemplativa, quae significatur per Ioannem, quia magis
sentit praesentis vitae angustias, et aestuantius ab eis liberari
desiderat, et ad Deum ire. Contemplativam vero vitam Deus plus
diligit, quia magis eam conservat; non enim finitur simul cum vita
corporis, sicut vita activa. Quidam vero dicunt quod Petrus plus
dilexit Christum in membris; et sic etiam a Christo plus fuit
dilectus; unde ei Ecclesiam commendavit. Ioannes vero plus dilexit
Christum in seipso; et sic etiam plus ab eo fuit dilectus; unde ei
commendavit matrem. Alii vero dicunt quod incertum est quis horum
plus Christum dilexerit amore caritatis, et similiter quem Deus
plus dilexerit in ordine ad maiorem gloriam vitae aeternae. Sed
Petrus dicitur plus dilexisse, quantum ad quandam promptitudinem
vel fervorem, Ioannes vero plus dilectus, quantum ad quaedam
familiaritatis indicia, quae Christus ei magis demonstrabat,
propter eius iuventutem et puritatem. Alii vero dicunt quod
Christus plus dilexit Petrum, quantum ad excellentius donum
caritatis, Ioannem vero plus, quantum ad donum intellectus. Unde
simpliciter Petrus fuit melior, et magis dilectus, sed Ioannes
secundum quid. Praesumptuosum tamen videtur hoc diiudicare, quia,
ut dicitur Prov. XVI, <i>spirituum ponderator est dominus</i>, et
non alius.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p13" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The penitent and the innocent are related as exceeding and exceeded. For whether innocent or penitent, those are the better and better loved who have most grace. Other things being equal, innocence is the nobler thing and the more beloved. God is said to rejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent, because often penitents rise from sin more cautious, humble, and fervent. Hence Gregory commenting on these words (Hom. 34 in Ev.) says that, "In
  battle the general loves the soldier who after flight returns and bravely pursues the enemy, more than him who has never fled, but has never done a brave deed."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p14" shownumber="no"> Or it may be answered that gifts of grace, equal in themselves, are more as conferred on the penitent, who deserved punishment, than as conferred on the innocent, to whom no punishment was due; just as a hundred pounds [marcoe] are a greater gift to a poor man than to a king.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="29322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29322] Iª q. 20 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod poenitentes et innocentes se habent sicut excedentia
et excessa. Nam sive sint innocentes, sive poenitentes, illi sunt
meliores et magis dilecti, qui plus habent de gratia. Ceteris tamen
paribus, innocentia dignior est et magis dilecta. Dicitur tamen
Deus plus gaudere de poenitente quam de innocente, quia plerumque
poenitentes cautiores, humiliores et ferventiores resurgunt. Unde
Gregorius dicit ibidem, quod <i>dux in praelio eum militem plus
diligit, qui post fugam conversus, fortiter hostem premit, quam qui
nunquam fugit, nec unquam fortiter fecit</i>. Vel, alia ratione,
quia aequale donum gratiae plus est, comparatum poenitenti, qui
meruit poenam, quam innocenti, qui non meruit. Sicut centum marcae
maius donum est, si dentur pauperi, quam si dentur regi.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p15" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since God's will is the cause of goodness in things, the goodness of one who is loved by God is to be reckoned according to the time when some good is to be given to him by divine goodness. According therefore to the time, when there is to be given by the divine will to the predestined sinner a greater good, the sinner is better; although according to some other time he is the worse; because even according to some time he is neither good nor bad.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="29323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29323] Iª q. 20 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
dicendum quod, cum voluntas Dei sit causa bonitatis in rebus,
secundum illud tempus pensanda est bonitas eius qui amatur a Deo,
secundum quod dandum est ei ex bonitate divina aliquod bonum.
Secundum ergo illud tempus quo praedestinato peccatori dandum est
ex divina voluntate maius bonum, melior est; licet secundum aliquod
aliud tempus, sit peior; quia et secundum aliquod tempus, non est
nec bonus neque malus.</p></div></div></div></div></div></body></html>
author	ht
date	Fri, 18 Jul 2014 11:39:12 +0000
parents	1684b7ec0b10
children