Mercurial > hg > Aquinas

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<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head><title>Bilingual AquinasQuestion 2. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</title><style>
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    </style></head><body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="bi.xsl"?><div id="FP.ii" next="FP_Q2" prev="FP_Q1_A10" progress="0.25%" n="ii" title="Treatise on The One God (QQ[2-26])"><h2 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ[2]-26)</h2>
<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q13" next="FP_Q13_A1" prev="FP_Q12_A13" progress="1.92%" n="xii" title="Question. 13 - THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)">
<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13-p0.1">Question 13. THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9" next="FP_Q13_A10" prev="FP_Q13_A8" progress="2.21%" n="ix" title="Article. 9 - Whether this name “God” is communicable?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p0.1">Whether this name "God" is communicable?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name "God" is communicable. For whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name itself. But this name "God" signifies the divine nature, which is communicable to others, according to the words, "He hath given us great [Vulg.: 'most great'] and precious promises, that by these we [Vulg.: 'ye'] may be made partakers of the divine nature" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:2Pet.1.4" parsed="vul|2Pet|1|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p2.1" passage="2 Pet. 1:4">2 Pet. 1:4</scripRef>). Therefore this name "God" can be communicated to
  others.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 arg. 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28859" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28859] Iª q. 13 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen Deus sit communicabile.
Cuicumque enim communicatur res significata per nomen, communicatur
et nomen ipsum. Sed hoc nomen Deus, ut dictum est, significat
divinam naturam, quae est communicabilis aliis, secundum illud II
Pet. I, <i>magna et pretiosa promissa nobis donavit, ut per hoc
efficiamur divinae consortes naturae</i>. Ergo hoc nomen Deus est
communicabile.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this name "God"
is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which appears from the fact
that it has a plural, according to the text, "I have said, You are
gods" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.81.6" parsed="vul|Ps|81|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p3.1" passage="Ps. 81:6">Ps. 81:6</scripRef>). Therefore this name "God" is
communicable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 arg. 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28860" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28860] Iª q. 13 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sola
nomina propria non sunt communicabilia. Sed hoc nomen Deus non est
nomen proprium, sed appellativum, quod patet ex hoc quod habet
plurale, secundum illud Psalmi LXXXI, <i>ego dixi, dii estis</i>.
Ergo hoc nomen Deus est communicabile.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
Further, this name "God" comes from operation, as explained. But other
names given to God from His operations or effects are communicable; as
"good," "wise," and the like. Therefore this name "God" is
communicable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 arg. 3" shownumber="no"><a name="28861" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28861] Iª q. 13 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, hoc
nomen Deus imponitur ab operatione, ut dictum est. Sed alia nomina
quae imponuntur Deo ab operationibus, sive ab effectibus, sunt
communicabilia, ut bonus, sapiens et huiusmodi. Ergo et hoc nomen
Deus est communicabile.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the
contrary,</b> It is written: "They gave the incommunicable name to
wood and stones" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.14.21" parsed="vul|Wis|14|21|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p5.1" passage="Wis. 14:21">Wis. 14:21</scripRef>), in reference to the
divine name. Therefore this name "God" is incommunicable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 s. c." shownumber="no"><a name="28862" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28862] Iª q. 13 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Sap. XIV, <i>incommunicabile nomen lignis et lapidibus
imposuerunt</i>; et loquitur de nomine deitatis. Ergo hoc nomen
Deus est nomen incommunicabile.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> A name is communicable in two ways: properly, and by similitude. It is properly communicable in the sense that its whole signification can be given to many; by similitude it is communicable according to some part of the signification of the name. For instance this name "lion" is properly communicable to all things of the same nature as "lion"; by similitude it is communicable to those who participate in the nature of a lion, as for instance by courage, or
  strength, and those who thus participate are called lions metaphorically. To know, however, what names are properly communicable, we must consider that every form existing in the singular subject, by which it is individualized, is common to many either in reality, or in idea; as human nature is common to many in reality, and in idea; whereas the nature of the sun is not common to many in reality, but only in idea; for the nature of the sun can be understood as existing in many subjects; and the
  reason is because the mind understands the nature of every species by abstraction from the singular. Hence to be in one singular subject or in many is outside the idea of the nature of the species. So, given the idea of a species, it can be understood as existing in many. But the singular, from the fact that it is singular, is divided off from all others. Hence every name imposed to signify any singular thing is incommunicable both in reality and idea; for the plurality of this individual thing
  cannot be; nor can it be conceived in idea. Hence no name signifying any individual thing is properly communicable to many, but only by way of similitude; as for instance a person can be called "Achilles" metaphorically, forasmuch as he may possess something of the properties of Achilles, such as strength. On the other hand, forms which are individualized not by any "suppositum," but by and of themselves, as being subsisting forms, if understood as they are in themselves, could not be
  communicable either in reality or in idea; but only perhaps by way of similitude, as was said of individuals. Forasmuch as we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms as they really are, we understand them as compound things having forms in matter; therefore, as was said in the first article, we give them concrete names signifying a nature existing in some "suppositum." Hence, so far as concerns images, the same rules apply to names we impose to signify the nature of compound
  things as to names given to us to signify simple subsisting natures.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7" shownumber="no"> Since, then, this name "God" is given to signify the divine nature as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A8" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[8])</a>, and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q11.FP_Q11_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[11], A[3]</a>), it follows that this name "God" is incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the same way as this name "sun" would be communicable according to the opinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is written: "You served them who
  by nature are not gods," (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gal.4.8" parsed="vul|Gal|4|8|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7.3" passage="Gal. 4:8">Gal. 4:8</scripRef>), and a gloss adds, "Gods not in nature, but in human opinion." Nevertheless this name "God" is communicable, not in its whole signification, but in some part of it by way of similitude; so that those are called gods who share in divinity by likeness, according to the text, "I have said, You are gods" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.81.6" parsed="vul|Ps|81|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p7.4" passage="Ps. 81:6">Ps. 81:6</scripRef>).</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p8" shownumber="no"> But if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as to His "suppositum," accordingly as He is considered as "this something," that name would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for instance, perhaps the Tetragrammaton among the Hebrew; and this is like giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 co." shownumber="no"><a name="28863" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28863] Iª q. 13 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod aliquod nomen potest esse communicabile dupliciter, uno modo,
proprie; alio modo, per similitudinem. Proprie quidem communicabile
est, quod secundum totam significationem nominis, est communicabile
multis. Per similitudinem autem communicabile est, quod est
communicabile secundum aliquid eorum quae includuntur in nominis
significatione. Hoc enim nomen leo proprie communicatur omnibus
illis in quibus invenitur natura quam significat hoc nomen leo, per
similitudinem vero communicabile est illis qui participant aliquid
leoninum, ut puta audaciam vel fortitudinem, qui metaphorice leones
dicuntur. Ad sciendum autem quae nomina proprie sunt
communicabilia, considerandum est quod omnis forma in supposito
singulari existens, per quod individuatur, communis est multis, vel
secundum rem vel secundum rationem saltem, sicut natura humana
communis est multis secundum rem et rationem, natura autem solis
non est communis multis secundum rem, sed secundum rationem tantum;
potest enim natura solis intelligi ut in pluribus suppositis
existens. Et hoc ideo, quia intellectus intelligit naturam
cuiuslibet speciei per abstractionem a singulari, unde esse in uno
supposito singulari vel in pluribus, est praeter intellectum
naturae speciei, unde, servato intellectu naturae speciei, potest
intelligi ut in pluribus existens. Sed singulare, ex hoc ipso quod
est singulare, est divisum ab omnibus aliis. Unde omne nomen
impositum ad significandum aliquod singulare, est incommunicabile
et re et ratione, non enim potest nec in apprehensione cadere
pluralitas huius individui. Unde nullum nomen significans aliquod
individuum, est communicabile multis proprie, sed solum secundum
similitudinem; sicut aliquis metaphorice potest dici Achilles,
inquantum habet aliquid de proprietatibus Achillis, scilicet
fortitudinem. Formae vero quae non individuantur per aliquod
suppositum, sed per seipsas (quia scilicet sunt formae
subsistentes), si intelligerentur secundum quod sunt in seipsis,
non possent communicari nec re neque ratione; sed forte per
similitudinem, sicut dictum est de individuis. Sed quia formas
simplices per se subsistentes non possumus intelligere secundum
quod sunt, sed intelligimus eas ad modum rerum compositarum
habentium formas in materia; ideo, ut dictum est, imponimus eis
nomina concreta significantia naturam in aliquo supposito. Unde,
quantum pertinet ad rationem nominum, eadem ratio est de nominibus
quae a nobis imponuntur ad significandum naturas rerum
compositarum, et de nominibus quae a nobis imponuntur ad
significandum naturas simplices subsistentes. Unde, cum hoc nomen
Deus impositum sit ad significandum naturam divinam, ut dictum est;
natura autem divina multiplicabilis non est, ut supra ostensum est,
sequitur quod hoc nomen Deus incommunicabile quidem sit secundum
rem, sed communicabile sit secundum opinionem, quemadmodum hoc
nomen sol esset communicabile secundum opinionem ponentium multos
soles. Et secundum hoc dicitur Gal. IV, <i>his qui natura non sunt
dii, serviebatis</i>; Glossa, <i>non sunt dii natura, sed opinione
hominum</i>. Est nihilominus communicabile hoc nomen Deus, non
secundum suam totam significationem, sed secundum aliquid eius, per
quandam similitudinem, ut dii dicantur, qui participant aliquid
divinum per similitudinem, secundum illud, <i>ego dixi, dii
estis</i>. Si vero esset aliquod nomen impositum ad significandum
Deum non ex parte naturae, sed ex parte suppositi, secundum quod
consideratur ut hoc aliquid, illud nomen esset omnibus modis
incommunicabile, sicut forte est nomen tetragrammaton apud
Hebraeos. Et est simile si quis imponeret nomen soli designans hoc
individuum.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
1:</b> The divine nature is only communicable according to the
participation of some similitude.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 ad 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28864" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28864] Iª q. 13 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod natura divina non est communicabilis nisi secundum
similitudinis participationem.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
2:</b> This name "God" is an appellative name, and not a proper name,
for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor; although God
Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular. For names do
not follow upon the mode of being in things, but upon the mode of
being as it is in our mind. And yet it is incommunicable according to
the truth of the thing, as was said above concerning the name
"sun."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 ad 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28865" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28865] Iª q. 13 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod hoc nomen Deus est nomen appellativum, et non
proprium, quia significat naturam divinam ut in habente; licet ipse
Deus, secundum rem, non sit nec universalis nec particularis.
Nomina enim non sequuntur modum essendi qui est in rebus, sed modum
essendi secundum quod in cognitione nostra est. Et tamen, secundum
rei veritatem, est incommunicabile, secundum quod dictum est de hoc
nomine sol.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A9-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
3:</b> These names "good," "wise," and the like, are imposed from the
perfections proceeding from God to creatures; but they do not signify
the divine nature, but rather signify the perfections themselves
absolutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable to many. But
this name "God" is given to God from His own proper operation, which
we experience continually, to signify the divine nature.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 9 ad 3" shownumber="no"><a name="28866" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28866] Iª q. 13 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod haec nomina bonus, sapiens, et similia, imposita
quidem sunt a perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas, non
tamen sunt imposita ad significandum divinam naturam, sed ad
significandum ipsas perfectiones absolute. Et ideo etiam secundum
rei veritatem sunt communicabilia multis. Sed hoc nomen Deus
impositum est ab operatione propria Deo, quam experimur continue,
ad significandum divinam naturam.</p></div></div>
</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10" next="FP_Q13_A11" prev="FP_Q13_A9" progress="2.25%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether this name “God” is applied to God univocally by nature, by  participation, and according to opinion?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p0.1">Whether this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b>
It seems that this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature,
by participation, and according to opinion. For where a diverse
signification exists, there is no contradiction of affirmation and
negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction. But a Catholic who
says: "An idol is not God," contradicts a pagan who says: "An idol is
God." Therefore GOD in both senses is spoken of univocally.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 arg. 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28867" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28867] Iª q. 13 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen Deus univoce dicatur de Deo per
naturam, et per participationem, et secundum opinionem. Ubi enim
est diversa significatio, non est contradictio affirmantis et
negantis, aequivocatio enim impedit contradictionem sed Catholicus
dicens idolum non est Deus, contradicit Pagano dicenti idolum est
Deus. Ergo Deus utrobique sumptum univoce dicitur.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in truth, so the
enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion, and not
in truth. But this name "beatitude" is applied univocally to this
supposed happiness, and also to true happiness. Therefore also this
name "God" is applied univocally to the true God, and to God also in
opinion.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 arg. 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28868" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28868] Iª q. 13 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
sicut idolum est Deus secundum opinionem et non secundum veritatem,
ita fruitio carnalium delectationum dicitur felicitas secundum
opinionem, et non secundum veritatem. Sed hoc nomen beatitudo
univoce dicitur de hac beatitudine opinata, et de hac beatitudine
vera. Ergo et hoc nomen Deus univoce dicitur de Deo secundum
veritatem, et de Deo secundum opinionem.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
Further, names are called univocal because they contain one idea. Now
when a Catholic says: "There is one God," he understands by the name
God an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while the
heathen understands the same when he says: "An idol is God." Therefore
this name "God" is applied univocally to both.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 arg. 3" shownumber="no"><a name="28869" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28869] Iª q. 13 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
univoca dicuntur quorum est ratio una. Sed Catholicus, cum dicit
unum esse Deum, intelligit nomine Dei rem omnipotentem, et super
omnia venerandam, et hoc idem intelligit gentilis, cum dicit idolum
esse Deum. Ergo hoc nomen Deus univoce dicitur utrobique.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is in the thing as is said in Peri Herm. i. But the word "animal" applied to a true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore this name "God" applied to the true God and to God in opinion is applied equivocally.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p6" shownumber="no"> Further, No one can signify what he does not know. But the heathen does not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol is God, he does not signify the true Deity. On the other hand, A Catholic signifies the true Deity when he says that there is one God. Therefore this name "God" is not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true God, and to God according to opinion.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><div xml:lang="la">
<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28870" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28870] Iª q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra,
illud quod est in intellectu, est similitudo eius quod est in re,
ut dicitur in I Periherm. Sed animal, dictum de animali vero et de
animali picto, aequivoce dicitur. Ergo hoc nomen Deus, dictum de
Deo vero et de Deo secundum opinionem, aequivoce dicitur.</p>
<p title="I q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28871" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28871] Iª q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
nullus potest significare id quod non cognoscit, sed gentilis non
cognoscit naturam divinam, ergo, cum dicit idolum est Deus, non
significat veram deitatem. Hanc autem significat Catholicus dicens
unum esse Deum. Ergo hoc nomen Deus non dicitur univoce, sed
aequivoce, de Deo vero, et de Deo secundum opinionem.</p>
</div></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> This name "God" in the three aforesaid significations is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. This is apparent from this reason: Univocal terms mean absolutely the same thing, but equivocal terms absolutely different; whereas in analogical terms a word taken in one signification must be placed in the definition of the same word taken in other senses; as, for instance, "being" which is applied to "substance" is placed in the definition
  of being as applied to "accident"; and "healthy" applied to animal is placed in the definition of healthy as applied to urine and medicine. For urine is the sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the cause of health.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p8" shownumber="no"> The same applies to the question at issue. For this name "God," as signifying the true God, includes the idea of God when it is used to denote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone god by participation, we understand by the name of god some likeness of the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god we understand and signify something which men think is God; thus it is manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is
  comprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said analogically.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 co." shownumber="no"><a name="28872" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28872] Iª q. 13 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod hoc nomen Deus, in praemissis tribus significationibus, non
accipitur neque univoce neque aequivoce, sed analogice. Quod ex hoc
patet. Quia univocorum est omnino eadem ratio, aequivocorum est
omnino ratio diversa, in analogicis vero, oportet quod nomen
secundum unam significationem acceptum, ponatur in definitione
eiusdem nominis secundum alias significationes accepti. Sicut ens
de substantia dictum, ponitur in definitione entis secundum quod de
accidente dicitur; et sanum dictum de animali, ponitur in
definitione sani secundum quod dicitur de urina et de medicina;
huius enim sani quod est in animali, urina est significativa, et
medicina factiva. Sic accidit in proposito. Nam hoc nomen Deus,
secundum quod pro Deo vero sumitur, in ratione Dei sumitur secundum
quod dicitur Deus secundum opinionem vel participationem. Cum enim
aliquem nominamus Deum secundum participationem, intelligimus
nomine Dei aliquid habens similitudinem veri Dei. Similiter cum
idolum nominamus Deum, hoc nomine Deus intelligimus significari
aliquid, de quo homines opinantur quod sit Deus. Et sic manifestum
est quod alia et alia est significatio nominis, sed una illarum
significationum clauditur in significationibus aliis. Unde
manifestum est quod analogice dicitur.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The multiplication of names does not depend on the predication of the name, but on the signification: for this name "man," of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is predicated in one sense. But it would be multiplied if by the name "man" we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one meant to signify by this name "man" what man really is, and another meant to signify by the same name a stone, or something else. Hence it
  is evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not God contradicts the pagan asserting that it is God; because each of them uses this name GOD to signify the true God. For when the pagan says an idol is God, he does not use this name as meaning God in opinion, for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics sometimes use the name in the sense, as in the Psalm, "All the gods of the Gentiles are demons" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.95.5" parsed="vul|Ps|95|5|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p9.1" passage="Ps. 95:5">Ps. 95:5</scripRef>).</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p10" shownumber="no"> The same remark applies to the Second and Third Objections. For these reasons proceed from the different predication of the name, and not from its various significations.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><div xml:lang="la">
<p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28873" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28873] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod nominum multiplicitas non attenditur secundum nominis
praedicationem, sed secundum significationem, hoc enim nomen homo,
de quocumque praedicetur, sive vere sive false, dicitur uno modo.
Sed tunc multipliciter diceretur, si per hoc nomen homo
intenderemus significare diversa, puta, si unus intenderet
significare per hoc nomen homo id quod vere est homo, et alius
intenderet significare eodem nomine lapidem, vel aliquid aliud.
Unde patet quod Catholicus dicens idolum non esse Deum, contradicit
Pagano hoc asserenti, quia uterque utitur hoc nomine Deus ad
significandum verum Deum. Cum enim Paganus dicit idolum esse Deum,
non utitur hoc nomine secundum quod significat Deum opinabilem, sic
enim verum diceret, cum etiam Catholici interdum in tali
significatione hoc nomine utantur, ut cum dicitur, <i>omnes dii
gentium Daemonia</i>.</p>
<p title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28874" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28874] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Et similiter
dicendum ad secundum et tertium. Nam illae rationes procedunt
secundum diversitatem praedicationis nominis, et non secundum
diversam significationem.</p>
</div></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to
Objection 4:</b> The term "animal" applied to a true and a pictured
animal is not purely equivocal; for the Philosopher takes equivocal
names in a large sense, including analogous names; because also being,
which is predicated analogically, is sometimes said to be predicated
equivocally of different predicaments.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 4" shownumber="no"><a name="28875" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28875] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod animal dictum de animali vero et de picto, non
dicitur pure aequivoce; sed philosophus largo modo accipit
aequivoca, secundum quod includunt in se analoga. Quia et ens, quod
analogice dicitur, aliquando dicitur aequivoce praedicari de
diversis praedicamentis.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p12" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one knows it according to some idea of causality, or excellence, or remotion (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A10-p12.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q12.FP_Q12_A12" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[12], A[12]</a>). So a pagan can take this name "God" in the same way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying an idol is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use
  names the meaning of which we know not.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 5" shownumber="no"><a name="28876" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28876] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
dicendum quod ipsam naturam Dei prout in se est, neque Catholicus
neque Paganus cognoscit, sed uterque cognoscit eam secundum aliquam
rationem causalitatis vel excellentiae vel remotionis, ut supra
dictum est. Et secundum hoc, in eadem significatione accipere
potest gentilis hoc nomen Deus, cum dicit idolum est Deus, in qua
accipit ipsum Catholicus dicens idolum non est Deus. Si vero
aliquis esset qui secundum nullam rationem Deum cognosceret, nec
ipsum nominaret, nisi forte sicut proferimus nomina quorum
significationem ignoramus.</p></div></div>
</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11" next="FP_Q13_A12" prev="FP_Q13_A10" progress="2.29%" n="xi" title="Article. 11 - Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p0.1">Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b>
It seems that this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of
God. For this name "God" is an incommunicable name. But this name HE
WHO IS, is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name HE WHO IS
is not the most proper name of God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 arg. 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28877" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28877] Iª q. 13 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen qui est non sit maxime
proprium nomen Dei. Hoc enim nomen Deus est nomen incommunicabile,
ut dictum est. Sed hoc nomen qui est non est nomen incommunicabile.
Ergo hoc nomen qui est non est maxime proprium nomen Dei.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "the name of good
excellently manifests all the processions of God." But it especially
belongs to God to be the universal principle of all things. Therefore
this name "good" is supremely proper to God, and not this name HE WHO
IS.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 arg. 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28878" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28878] Iª q. 13 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Dionysius dicit, III cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>boni nominatio est
manifestativa omnium Dei processionum</i>. Sed hoc maxime Deo
convenit, quod sit universale rerum principium. Ergo hoc nomen
bonum est maxime proprium Dei, et non hoc nomen qui est.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
Further, every divine name seems to imply relation to creatures, for
God is known to us only through creatures. But this name HE WHO IS
imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not
the most applicable to God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 arg. 3" shownumber="no"><a name="28879" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28879] Iª q. 13 a. 11 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
nomen divinum videtur importare relationem ad creaturas, cum Deus
non cognoscatur a nobis nisi per creaturas. Sed hoc nomen qui est
nullam importat habitudinem ad creaturas. Ergo hoc nomen qui est
non est maxime proprium nomen Dei.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the
contrary,</b> It is written that when Moses asked, "If they should say
to me, What is His name? what shall I say to them?" The Lord answered
him, "Thus shalt thou say to them, HE WHO IS hath sent me to you"
(<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Exod.3.13-Exod.3.14" parsed="vul|Exod|3|13|3|14" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p5.1" passage="Ex. 3:13,14">Ex. 3:13,14</scripRef>). Therefor this name HE
WHO IS most properly belongs to God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 s. c." shownumber="no"><a name="28880" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28880] Iª q. 13 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Exod. III, quod Moysi quaerenti, <i>si dixerint mihi,
quod est nomen eius? Quid dicam eis?</i> Et respondit ei dominus,
<i>sic dices eis, qui est misit me ad vos</i>. Ergo hoc nomen qui
est est maxime proprium nomen Dei.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God, for three reasons:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p7" shownumber="no"> First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the existence of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for everything is denominated by its form.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p8" shownumber="no"> Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add something above it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine it. Now our intellect cannot know the essence of God itself in this life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining what it understands about God, it falls short of the mode of what God is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the
  more universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are applied to God. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i) that, "HE WHO IS, is the principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending all in itself, it contains existence itself as an infinite and indeterminate sea of substance." Now by any other name some mode of substance is determined, whereas this name HE WHO IS, determines no mode of being, but is indeterminate to all; and therefore it denominates the "infinite ocean of
  substance."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p9" shownumber="no"> Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present existence; and this above all properly applies to God, whose existence knows not past or future, as Augustine says (De Trin. v).</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 co." shownumber="no"><a name="28881" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28881] Iª q. 13 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod hoc nomen qui est triplici ratione est maxime proprium nomen
Dei. Primo quidem, propter sui significationem. Non enim significat
formam aliquam, sed ipsum esse. Unde, cum esse Dei sit ipsa eius
essentia, et hoc nulli alii conveniat, ut supra ostensum est,
manifestum est quod inter alia nomina hoc maxime proprie nominat
Deum, unumquodque enim denominatur a sua forma. Secundo, propter
eius universalitatem. Omnia enim alia nomina vel sunt minus
communia; vel, si convertantur cum ipso, tamen addunt aliqua supra
ipsum secundum rationem; unde quodammodo informant et determinant
ipsum. Intellectus autem noster non potest ipsam Dei essentiam
cognoscere in statu viae, secundum quod in se est, sed quemcumque
modum determinet circa id quod de Deo intelligit, deficit a modo
quo Deus in se est. Et ideo, quanto aliqua nomina sunt minus
determinata, et magis communia et absoluta, tanto magis proprie
dicuntur de Deo a nobis. Unde et Damascenus dicit quod
<i>principalius omnibus quae de Deo dicuntur nominibus, est qui
est, totum enim in seipso comprehendens, habet ipsum esse velut
quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum et indeterminatum</i>.
Quolibet enim alio nomine determinatur aliquis modus substantiae
rei, sed hoc nomen qui est nullum modum essendi determinat, sed se
habet indeterminate ad omnes; et ideo nominat ipsum <i>pelagus
substantiae infinitum</i>. Tertio vero, ex eius consignificatione.
Significat enim esse in praesenti, et hoc maxime proprie de Deo
dicitur, cuius esse non novit praeteritum vel futurum, ut dicit
Augustinus in V de Trin.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This name HE WHO IS is the name of God more properly than this name "God," as regards its source, namely, existence; and as regards the mode of signification and consignification, as said above. But as regards the object intended by the name, this name "God" is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the divine nature; and still more proper is the Tetragrammaton, imposed to signify the substance of God itself, incommunicable and, if one may so speak,
  singular.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 ad 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28882" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28882] Iª q. 13 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod hoc nomen qui est est magis proprium nomen Dei quam
hoc nomen Deus, quantum ad id a quo imponitur, scilicet ab esse, et
quantum ad modum significandi et consignificandi, ut dictum est.
Sed quantum ad id ad quod imponitur nomen ad significandum, est
magis proprium hoc nomen Deus, quod imponitur ad significandum
naturam divinam. Et adhuc magis proprium nomen est tetragrammaton,
quod est impositum ad significandam ipsam Dei substantiam
incommunicabilem, et, ut sic liceat loqui, singularem.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to
Objection 2:</b> This name "good" is the principal name of God in so
far as He is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered
absolutely comes before the idea of cause.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 ad 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28883" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28883] Iª q. 13 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod hoc nomen bonum est principale nomen Dei inquantum
est causa, non tamen simpliciter, nam esse absolute
praeintelligitur causae.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A11-p12" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to
Objection 3:</b> It is not necessary that all the divine names should
import relation to creatures, but it suffices that they be imposed
from some perfections flowing from God to creatures. Among these the
first is existence, from which comes this name, HE WHO IS.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 11 ad 3" shownumber="no"><a name="28884" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28884] Iª q. 13 a. 11 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod non est necessarium quod omnia nomina divina
importent habitudinem ad creaturas; sed sufficit quod imponantur ab
aliquibus perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas. Inter
quas prima est ipsum esse, a qua sumitur hoc nomen qui est.</p></div></div>
</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12" next="FP_Q14" prev="FP_Q13_A11" progress="2.31%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p0.1">Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b>
It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed about God. For
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that "negations about God are true;
but affirmations are vague."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 arg. 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28885" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28885] Iª q. 13 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod propositiones affirmativae non possunt
formari de Deo. Dicit enim Dionysius, II cap. Cael. Hier., quod
<i>negationes de Deo sunt verae, affirmationes autem
incompactae</i>.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that "a simple form cannot be a
subject." But God is the most absolutely simple form, as shown (Q[3]
): therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about which an
affirmative proposition is made is taken as a subject. Therefore an
affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 arg. 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28886" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28886] Iª q. 13 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Boetius dicit, in libro de Trin., quod <i>forma simplex subiectum
esse non potest</i>. Sed Deus maxime est forma simplex, ut supra
ostensum est. Ergo non potest esse subiectum. Sed omne illud de quo
propositio affirmativa formatur, accipitur ut subiectum. Ergo de
Deo propositio affirmativa formari non potest.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
Further, every intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise
than as it is. But God has existence without any composition as shown
above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A7" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore since every
affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows
that a true affirmative proposition about God cannot be made.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 arg. 3" shownumber="no"><a name="28887" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28887] Iª q. 13 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
omnis intellectus intelligens rem aliter quam sit, est falsus. Sed
Deus habet esse absque omni compositione, ut supra probatum est.
Cum igitur omnis intellectus affirmativus intelligat aliquid cum
compositione, videtur quod propositio affirmativa vere de Deo
formari non possit.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the
contrary,</b> What is of faith cannot be false. But some affirmative
propositions are of faith; as that God is Three and One; and that He
is omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can be formed
about God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 s. c." shownumber="no"><a name="28888" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28888] Iª q. 13 a. 12 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod fidei non subest falsum. Sed propositiones quaedam
affirmativae subduntur fidei, utpote quod Deus est trinus et unus,
et quod est omnipotens. Ergo propositiones affirmativae possunt
vere formari de Deo.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> True affirmative propositions can be formed about God. To prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in reality, and different things in idea. And this appears to be the case both in propositions which have an accidental predicate, and in those which have an essential predicate. For it is manifest that "man" and "white" are the same in subject, and different in idea; for
  the idea of man is one thing, and that of whiteness is another. The same applies when I say, "man is an animal"; since the same thing which is man is truly animal; for in the same "suppositum" there is sensible nature by reason of which he is called animal, and the rational nature by reason of which he is called man; hence here again predicate and subject are the same as to "suppositum," but different as to idea. But in propositions where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same rule in
  some way applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to the "suppositum" what it places in the subject; and what it places in the predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the "suppositum"; according to the saying that "predicates are to be taken formally, and subjects materially." To this diversity in idea corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject, while the intellect signifies the identity of the thing by the composition itself.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p7" shownumber="no"> God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple, yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions because it cannot see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him under different conceptions, it knows that one and the same simple object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of predicate and subject represents the plurality of idea; and the intellect represents the unity by composition.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 co." shownumber="no"><a name="28889" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28889] Iª q. 13 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod propositiones affirmativae possunt vere formari de Deo. Ad
cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod in qualibet propositione
affirmativa vera, oportet quod praedicatum et subiectum significent
idem secundum rem aliquo modo, et diversum secundum rationem. Et
hoc patet tam in propositionibus quae sunt de praedicato
accidentali, quam in illis quae sunt de praedicato substantiali.
Manifestum est enim quod homo et albus sunt idem subiecto, et
differunt ratione, alia enim est ratio hominis, et alia ratio albi.
Et similiter cum dico homo est animal, illud enim ipsum quod est
homo, vere animal est; in eodem enim supposito est et natura
sensibilis, a qua dicitur animal, et rationalis, a qua dicitur
homo. Unde hic etiam praedicatum et subiectum sunt idem supposito,
sed diversa ratione. Sed et in propositionibus in quibus idem
praedicatur de seipso, hoc aliquo modo invenitur; inquantum
intellectus id quod ponit ex parte subiecti, trahit ad partem
suppositi, quod vero ponit ex parte praedicati, trahit ad naturam
formae in supposito existentis, secundum quod dicitur quod
praedicata tenentur formaliter, et subiecta materialiter. Huic vero
diversitati quae est secundum rationem, respondet pluralitas
praedicati et subiecti, identitatem vero rei significat intellectus
per ipsam compositionem. Deus autem, in se consideratus, est omnino
unus et simplex, sed tamen intellectus noster secundum diversas
conceptiones ipsum cognoscit, eo quod non potest ipsum ut in seipso
est, videre. Sed tamen, quamvis intelligat ipsum sub diversis
conceptionibus, cognoscit tamen quod omnibus suis conceptionibus
respondet una et eadem res simpliciter. Hanc ergo pluralitatem quae
est secundum rationem, repraesentat per pluralitatem praedicati et
subiecti, unitatem vero repraesentat intellectus per
compositionem.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
1:</b> Dionysius says that the affirmations about God are vague or,
according to another translation, "incongruous," inasmuch as no name
can be applied to God according to its mode of signification.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 ad 1" shownumber="no"><a name="28890" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28890] Iª q. 13 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Dionysius dicit affirmationes de Deo esse
incompactas, vel inconvenientes secundum aliam translationem,
inquantum nullum nomen Deo competit secundum modum significandi, ut
supra dictum est.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
2:</b> Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting forms, as
they really are in themselves; but it apprehends them as compound
things in which there is something taken as subject and something that
is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form as a subject, and
attributes something else to it.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 ad 2" shownumber="no"><a name="28891" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28891] Iª q. 13 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod intellectus noster non potest formas simplices
subsistentes secundum quod in seipsis sunt, apprehendere, sed
apprehendit eas secundum modum compositorum, in quibus est aliquid
quod subiicitur, et est aliquid quod inest. Et ideo apprehendit
formam simplicem in ratione subiecti, et attribuit ei aliquid.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A12-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This proposition, "The intellect understanding anything otherwise than it is, is false," can be taken in two senses, accordingly as this adverb "otherwise" determines the word "understanding" on the part of the thing understood, or on the part of the one who understands. Taken as referring to the thing understood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any intellect which understands that the thing is otherwise than it is, is false. But this
  does not hold in the present case; because our intellect, when forming a proposition about God, does not affirm that He is composite, but that He is simple. But taken as referring to the one who understands, the proposition is false. For the mode of the intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing in its essence. Since it is clear that our intellect understands material things below itself in an immaterial manner; not that it understands them to be immaterial things; but
  its manner of understanding is immaterial. Likewise, when it
understands simple things above itself, it understands them according
to its own mode, which is in a composite manner; yet not so as to
understand them to be composite things. And thus our intellect is not
false in forming composition in its ideas concerning God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 13 a. 12 ad 3" shownumber="no"><a name="28892" shape="rect" xml:link="simple"><span class="ref">[28892] Iª q. 13 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod haec propositio, intellectus intelligens rem aliter
quam sit, est falsus, est duplex, ex eo quod hoc adverbium aliter
potest determinare hoc verbum intelligit ex parte intellecti, vel
ex parte intelligentis. Si ex parte intellecti, sic propositio vera
est, et est sensus, quicumque intellectus intelligit rem esse
aliter quam sit, falsus est. Sed hoc non habet locum in proposito,
quia intellectus noster, formans propositionem de Deo, non dicit
eum esse compositum, sed simplicem. Si vero ex parte intelligentis,
sic propositio falsa est. Alius est enim modus intellectus in
intelligendo, quam rei in essendo. Manifestum est enim quod
intellectus noster res materiales infra se existentes intelligit
immaterialiter; non quod intelligat eas esse immateriales, sed
habet modum immaterialem in intelligendo. Et similiter, cum
intelligit simplicia quae sunt supra se, intelligit ea secundum
modum suum, scilicet composite, non tamen ita quod intelligat ea
esse composita. Et sic intellectus noster non est falsus, formans
compositionem de Deo.</p></div></div>
</div></div>

<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14" next="FP_Q14_A1" prev="FP_Q13_A12" progress="2.35%" n="xiii" title="Question. 14 - OF GOD’S KNOWLEDGE (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)">
<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14-p0.1">Question 14. OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)</h3>
<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5" next="FP_Q14_A6" prev="FP_Q14_A4" progress="2.46%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether God knows things other than Himself?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p0.1">Whether God knows things other than Himself?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p2"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know
things besides Himself. For all other things but God are outside of
God. But Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi) that "God does
not behold anything out of Himself." Therefore He does not know things
other than Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28924"><span class=
"ref">[28924] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat alia a se. Quaecumque
enim sunt alia a Deo, sunt extra ipsum. Sed Augustinus dicit, in
libro octoginta trium qu., quod <i>neque quidquam Deus extra
seipsum intuetur</i>. Ergo non cognoscit alia a se.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p3"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object understood is
the perfection of the one who understands. If therefore God
understands other things besides Himself, something else will be the
perfection of God, and will be nobler than He; which is
impossible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28925"><span class=
"ref">[28925] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
intellectum est perfectio intelligentis. Si ergo Deus intelligat
alia a se, aliquid aliud erit perfectio Dei, et nobilius ipso. Quod
est impossibile.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p4"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the act of understanding
is specified by the intelligible object, as is every other act from
its own object. Hence the intellectual act is so much the nobler, the
nobler the object understood. But God is His own intellectual act. If
therefore God understands anything other than Himself, then God
Himself is specified by something else than Himself; which cannot
be. Therefore He does not understand things other than
Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="28926"><span class=
"ref">[28926] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ipsum
intelligere speciem habet ab intelligibili, sicut et omnis alius
actus a suo obiecto, unde et ipsum intelligere tanto est nobilius,
quanto etiam nobilius est ipsum quod intelligitur. Sed Deus est
ipsum suum intelligere, ut ex dictis patet. Si igitur Deus
intelligit aliquid aliud a se, ipse Deus specificatur per aliquid
aliud a se, quod est impossibile. Non igitur intelligit alia a
se.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p5"
shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "All things are
naked and open to His eyes" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Heb.4.13"
parsed="vul|Heb|4|13|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p5.1"
passage="Heb. 4:13">Heb. 4:13</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width:
45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28927"><span class=
"ref">[28927] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Hebr. IV, <i>omnia nuda et aperta sunt oculis
eius</i>.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For it is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His existence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows of necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its power extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by the very fact
  that it is the first effective cause of all things, as is clear from the aforesaid (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[2], A[3]</a>), God must necessarily know things other than Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we add that the every existence of the first effective cause---viz. God---is His own act of understanding. Hence whatever effects pre-exist in God, as in the first cause, must be in His act of understanding, and all things must be in Him according to an intelligible mode: for
  everything which is in another, is in it according to the mode of that in which it is.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 co."><a name="28928"><span class=
"ref">[28928] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod necesse est Deum cognoscere alia a se. Manifestum est enim
quod seipsum perfecte intelligit, alioquin suum esse non esset
perfectum, cum suum esse sit suum intelligere. Si autem perfecte
aliquid cognoscitur, necesse est quod virtus eius perfecte
cognoscatur. Virtus autem alicuius rei perfecte cognosci non
potest, nisi cognoscantur ea ad quae virtus se extendit. Unde, cum
virtus divina se extendat ad alia, eo quod ipsa est prima causa
effectiva omnium entium, ut ex supradictis patet; necesse est quod
Deus alia a se cognoscat. Et hoc etiam evidentius fit, si
adiungatur quod ipsum esse causae agentis primae, scilicet Dei, est
eius intelligere. Unde quicumque effectus praeexistunt in Deo sicut
in causa prima, necesse est quod sint in ipso eius intelligere; et
quod omnia in eo sint secundum modum intelligibilem, nam omne quod
est in altero, est in eo secundum modum eius in quo est.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p7" shownumber="no"> Now in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must consider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself, and in another. A thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species adequate to the knowable object; as when the eye sees a man through the image of a man. A thing is seen in another through the image of that which contains it; as when a part is seen in the whole by the image of the whole; or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in the
  mirror, or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in another.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p8" shownumber="no"> So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself through His essence; and He sees other things not in themselves, but in Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of things other than Himself.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p>Ad
sciendum autem qualiter alia a se cognoscat, considerandum est quod
dupliciter aliquid cognoscitur, uno modo, in seipso; alio modo, in
altero. In seipso quidem cognoscitur aliquid, quando cognoscitur
per speciem propriam adaequatam ipsi cognoscibili, sicut cum oculus
videt hominem per speciem hominis. In alio autem videtur id quod
videtur per speciem continentis, sicut cum pars videtur in toto per
speciem totius, vel cum homo videtur in speculo per speciem
speculi, vel quocumque alio modo contingat aliquid in alio videri.</p>
<p>Sic igitur dicendum est quod Deus seipsum videt in seipso, quia
seipsum videt per essentiam suam. Alia autem a se videt non in
ipsis, sed in seipso, inquantum essentia sua continet similitudinem
aliorum ab ipso.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p9"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage of Augustine
in which it is said that God "sees nothing outside Himself" is not to
be taken in such a way, as if God saw nothing outside Himself, but in
the sense that what is outside Himself He does not see except in
Himself, as above explained.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28929"><span class=
"ref">[28929] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod verbum Augustini dicentis quod Deus nihil extra se
intuetur, non est sic intelligendum, quasi nihil quod sit extra se
intueatur, sed quia id quod est extra seipsum, non intuetur nisi in
seipso, ut dictum est.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object understood is a perfection of the one understanding not by its substance, but by its image, according to which it is in the intellect, as its form and perfection, as is said in De Anima iii. For "a stone is not in the soul, but its image." Now those things which are other than God are understood by God, inasmuch as the essence of God contains their images as above explained; hence it does not follow that there is any perfection in the
  divine intellect other than the divine essence.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28930"><span class=
"ref">[28930] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod intellectum est perfectio intelligentis non quidem
secundum suam substantiam, sed secundum suam speciem, secundum quam
est in intellectu, ut forma et perfectio eius, <i>lapis enim non
est in anima, sed species eius</i>, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ea
vero quae sunt alia a Deo, intelliguntur a Deo inquantum essentia
Dei continet species eorum, ut dictum est. Unde non sequitur quod
aliquid aliud sit perfectio divini intellectus, quam ipsa essentia
Dei.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellectual act is not specified by what is understood in another, but by the principal object understood in which other things are understood. For the intellectual act is specified by its object, inasmuch as the intelligible form is the principle of the intellectual operation: since every operation is specified by the form which is its principle of operation; as heating by heat. Hence the intellectual operation is specified by that intelligible
  form which makes the intellect in act. And this is the image of the
principal thing understood, which in God is nothing but His own
essence in which all images of things are comprehended. Hence it does
not follow that the divine intellectual act, or rather God Himself, is
specified by anything else than the divine essence
itself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="28931"><span class=
"ref">[28931] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod ipsum intelligere non specificatur per id quod in
alio intelligitur, sed per principale intellectum, in quo alia
intelliguntur. Intantum enim ipsum intelligere specificatur per
obiectum suum, inquantum forma intelligibilis est principium
intellectualis operationis, nam omnis operatio specificatur per
formam quae est principium operationis, sicut calefactio per
calorem. Unde per illam formam intelligibilem specificatur
intellectualis operatio, quae facit intellectum in actu. Et haec
est species principalis intellecti, quae in Deo nihil est aliud
quam essentia sua, in qua omnes species rerum comprehenduntur. Unde
non oportet quod ipsum intelligere divinum, vel potius ipse Deus,
specificetur per aliud quam per essentiam divinam.</p></div></div>
</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6" next="FP_Q14_A7" prev="FP_Q14_A5" progress="2.50%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p0.1">Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know things other than Himself by proper knowledge. For, as was shown <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[5])</a>, God knows things other than Himself, according as they are in Himself. But other things are in Him as in their common and universal cause, and are known by God as in their first and universal cause. This is to know them by general, and not by proper knowledge. Therefore God knows things besides Himself by general, and not by proper
  knowledge.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28932"><span class=
"ref">[28932] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat alia a se propria
cognitione. Sic enim cognoscit alia a se, ut dictum est, secundum
quod alia ab ipso in eo sunt. Sed alia ab eo sunt in ipso sicut in
prima causa communi et universali. Ergo et alia cognoscuntur a Deo,
sicut in causa prima et universali. Hoc autem est cognoscere in
universali, et non secundum propriam cognitionem. Ergo Deus
cognoscit alia a se in universali, et non secundum propriam
cognitionem.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the created essence is as distant from the divine essence, as the divine essence is distant from the created essence. But the divine essence cannot be known by the created essence, as said above (Q[12]/A[2]). Therefore neither can the created essence be known by the divine essence. Thus as God knows only by His essence, it follows that He does not know what the creature is in its essence, so as to know "what it is," which is to have proper knowledge
  of it.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28933"><span class=
"ref">[28933] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
quantum distat essentia creaturae ab essentia divina, tantum distat
essentia divina ab essentia creaturae. Sed per essentiam creaturae
non potest cognosci essentia divina, ut supra dictum est. Ergo nec
per essentiam divinam potest cognosci essentia creaturae. Et sic,
cum Deus nihil cognoscat nisi per essentiam suam, sequitur quod non
cognoscat creaturam secundum eius essentiam, ut cognoscat de ea
quid est, quod est propriam cognitionem de re habere.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p4"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, proper knowledge of a
thing can come only through its proper ratio. But as God knows all
things by His essence, it seems that He does not know each thing by
its proper ratio; for one thing cannot be the proper ratio of many and
diverse things. Therefore God has not a proper knowledge of things,
but a general knowledge; for to know things otherwise than by their
proper ratio is to have only a common and general knowledge of
them.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="28934"><span class=
"ref">[28934] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
propria cognitio non habetur de re, nisi per propriam eius
rationem. Sed cum Deus cognoscat omnia per essentiam suam, non
videtur quod unumquodque per propriam rationem cognoscat, idem enim
non potest esse propria ratio multorum et diversorum. Non ergo
habet propriam cognitionem Deus de rebus, sed communem, nam
cognoscere res non secundum propriam rationem, est cognoscere res
solum in communi.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p5"
shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> To have a proper knowledge of
things is to know them not only in general, but as they are distinct
from each other. Now God knows things in that manner. Hence it is
written that He reaches "even to the division of the soul and the
spirit, of the joints also and the marrow, and is a discerner of
thoughts and intents of the heart; neither is there any creature
invisible in His sight" (<scripRef
osisRef="Bible.vul:Heb.4.12-Heb.4.13" parsed="vul|Heb|4|12|4|13"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p5.1"
passage="Heb. 4:12,13">Heb. 4:12,13</scripRef>).</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28935"><span class=
"ref">[28935] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
habere propriam cognitionem de rebus, est cognoscere res non solum
in communi, sed secundum quod sunt ab invicem distinctae. Sic autem
Deus cognoscit res. Unde dicitur Heb. IV, quod <i>pertingit usque
ad divisionem spiritus et animae, compagum quoque et medullarum; et
discretor cogitationum et intentionum cordis; et non est ulla
creatura invisibilis in conspectu eius</i>.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Some have erred on this point, saying that God knows things other than Himself only in general, that is, only as beings. For as fire, if it knew the nature of heat, and all things else in so far as they are hot; so God, through knowing Himself as the principle of being, knows the nature of being, and all other things in so far as they are beings.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p7" shownumber="no"> But this cannot be. For to know a thing in general and not in particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge. Hence our intellect, when it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a universal and confused knowledge of things, before it knows them in particular; as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is clear from Phys. i. If therefore the knowledge of God regarding things other than Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow that His
  understanding would not be absolutely perfect; therefore neither would His being be perfect; and this is against what was said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[4], A[1]</a>). We must therefore hold that God knows things other than Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far as being is common to them, but in so far as one is distinguished from the other. In proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to show that God knows many things by one, bring forward some examples, as, for
  instance, that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines that proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it would know all colors.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p8" shownumber="no"> Now these examples although they are similar in part, namely, as regards universal causality, nevertheless they fail in this respect, that multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal principle, not as regards that which is the principle of distinction, but only as regards that in which they communicate. For the diversity of colors is not caused by the light only, but by the different disposition of the diaphanous medium which receives it; and likewise, the diversity
  of the lines is caused by their different position. Hence it is that this kind of diversity and multitude cannot be known in its principle by proper knowledge, but only in a general way. In God, however, it is otherwise. For it was shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that whatever perfection exists in any creature, wholly pre-exists and is contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not only what is common to creatures--viz. being---belongs to their perfection, but also what makes
  them distinguished from each other; as living and understanding, and the like, whereby living beings are distinguished from the non-living, and the intelligent from the non-intelligent. Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its own species, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God, not only as regards what is common to all, but also as regards what distinguishes one thing from another. And therefore as God contains all perfections in Himself, the essence of God
  is compared to all other essences of things, not as the common to the proper, as unity is to numbers, or as the centre (of a circle) to the (radiating) lines; but as perfect acts to imperfect; as if I were to compare man to animal; or six, a perfect number, to the imperfect numbers contained under it. Now it is manifest that by a perfect act imperfect acts can be known not only in general, but also by proper knowledge; thus, for example, whoever knows a man, knows an animal by proper knowledge;
  and whoever knows the number six, knows the number three also by proper knowledge.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p9" shownumber="no"> As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the perfection contained in the essence of any other being, and far more, God can know in Himself all of them with proper knowledge. For the nature proper to each thing consists in some degree of participation in the divine perfection. Now God could not be said to know Himself perfectly unless He knew all the ways in which His own perfection can be shared by others. Neither could He know the very nature of being perfectly,
  unless He knew all modes of being. Hence it is manifest that God knows all things with proper knowledge, in their distinction from each other.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 co."><a name="28936"><span class=
"ref">[28936] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod circa hoc quidam erraverunt, dicentes quod Deus alia a se non
cognoscit nisi in communi, scilicet inquantum sunt entia. Sicut
enim ignis, si cognosceret seipsum ut est principium caloris,
cognosceret naturam caloris, et omnia alia inquantum sunt calida;
ita Deus, inquantum cognoscit se ut principium essendi, cognoscit
naturam entis, et omnia alia inquantum sunt entia. Sed hoc non
potest esse. Nam intelligere aliquid in communi, et non in
speciali, est imperfecte aliquid cognoscere. Unde intellectus
noster, dum de potentia in actum reducitur, pertingit prius ad
cognitionem universalem et confusam de rebus, quam ad propriam
rerum cognitionem, sicut de imperfecto ad perfectum procedens, ut
patet in I Physic. Si igitur cognitio Dei de rebus aliis a se,
esset in universali tantum, et non in speciali, sequeretur quod
eius intelligere non esset omnibus modis perfectum, et per
consequens nec eius esse, quod est contra ea quae superius ostensa
sunt. Oportet igitur dicere quod alia a se cognoscat propria
cognitione; non solum secundum quod communicant in ratione entis,
sed secundum quod unum ab alio distinguitur. Et ad huius
evidentiam, considerandum est quod quidam, volentes ostendere quod
Deus per unum cognoscit multa, utuntur quibusdam exemplis, ut puta
quod, si centrum cognosceret seipsum, cognosceret omnes lineas
progredientes a centro; vel lux, si cognosceret seipsam,
cognosceret omnes colores. Sed haec exempla, licet quantum ad
aliquid similia sint, scilicet quantum ad universalem causalitatem;
tamen deficiunt quantum ad hoc, quod multitudo et diversitas non
causantur ab illo uno principio universali, quantum ad id quod
principium distinctionis est, sed solum quantum ad id in quo
communicant. Non enim diversitas colorum causatur ex luce solum,
sed ex diversa dispositione diaphani recipientis, et similiter
diversitas linearum ex diverso situ. Et inde est quod huiusmodi
diversitas et multitudo non potest cognosci in suo principio
secundum propriam cognitionem, sed solum in communi. Sed in Deo non
sic est. Supra enim ostensum est quod quidquid perfectionis est in
quacumque creatura, totum praeexistit et continetur in Deo secundum
modum excellentem. Non solum autem id in quo creaturae communicant,
scilicet ipsum esse, ad perfectionem pertinet; sed etiam ea per
quae creaturae ad invicem distinguuntur, sicut vivere, et
intelligere, et huiusmodi, quibus viventia a non viventibus, et
intelligentia a non intelligentibus distinguuntur. Et omnis forma,
per quam quaelibet res in propria specie constituitur, perfectio
quaedam est. Et sic omnia in Deo praeexistunt, non solum quantum ad
id quod commune est omnibus, sed etiam quantum ad ea secundum quae
res distinguuntur. Et sic, cum Deus in se omnes perfectiones
contineat, comparatur Dei essentia ad omnes rerum essentias, non
sicut commune ad propria, ut unitas ad numeros, vel centrum ad
lineas; sed sicut perfectus actus ad imperfectos, ut si dicerem,
homo ad animal, vel senarius, qui est numerus perfectus, ad numeros
imperfectos sub ipso contentos. Manifestum est autem quod per actum
perfectum cognosci possunt actus imperfecti, non solum in communi,
sed etiam propria cognitione. Sicut qui cognoscit hominem,
cognoscit animal propria cognitione, et qui cognoscit senarium,
cognoscit trinarium propria cognitione. Sic igitur, cum essentia
Dei habeat in se quidquid perfectionis habet essentia cuiuscumque
rei alterius, et adhuc amplius, Deus in seipso potest omnia propria
cognitione cognoscere. Propria enim natura uniuscuiusque consistit,
secundum quod per aliquem modum divinam perfectionem participat.
Non autem Deus perfecte seipsum cognosceret, nisi cognosceret
quomodocumque participabilis est ab aliis sua perfectio, nec etiam
ipsam naturam essendi perfecte sciret, nisi cognosceret omnes modos
essendi. Unde manifestum est quod Deus cognoscit omnes res propria
cognitione, secundum quod ab aliis distinguuntur.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> So to know a thing as it is in the knower, may be understood in two ways. In one way this adverb "so" imports the mode of knowledge on the part of the thing known; and in that sense it is false. For the knower does not always know the object known according to the existence it has in the knower; since the eye does not know a stone according to the existence it has in the eye; but by the image of the stone which is in the eye, the eye knows the stone
  according to its existence outside the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge of the object known according to the (mode of) existence it has in the knower, the knower nevertheless knows it according to its (mode of) existence outside the knower; thus the intellect knows a stone according to the intelligible existence it has in the intellect, inasmuch as it knows that it understands; while nevertheless it knows what a stone is in its own nature. If however the adverb 'so' be understood to
  import the mode (of knowledge) on the part of the knower, in that sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge of the object known as it is in the knower; for the more perfectly the thing known is in the knower, the more perfect is the mode of knowledge.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p11" shownumber="no"> We must say therefore that God not only knows that all things are in Himself; but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows them in their own nature and all the more perfectly, the more perfectly each one is in Him.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28937"><span class=
"ref">[28937] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod sic cognoscere aliquid sicut in cognoscente est,
potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo, secundum quod hoc adverbium
sic importat modum cognitionis ex parte rei cognitae. Et sic falsum
est. Non enim semper cognoscens cognoscit cognitum secundum illud
esse quod habet in cognoscente, oculus enim non cognoscit lapidem
secundum esse quod habet in oculo; sed per speciem lapidis quam
habet in se, cognoscit lapidem secundum esse quod habet extra
oculum. Et si aliquis cognoscens cognoscat cognitum secundum esse
quod habet in cognoscente, nihilominus cognoscit ipsum secundum
esse quod habet extra cognoscentem, sicut intellectus cognoscit
lapidem secundum esse intelligibile quod habet in intellectu,
inquantum cognoscit se intelligere; sed nihilominus cognoscit esse
lapidis in propria natura. Si vero intelligatur secundum quod hoc
adverbium sic importat modum ex parte cognoscentis, verum est quod
sic solum cognoscens cognoscit cognitum, secundum quod est in
cognoscente, quia quanto perfectius est cognitum in cognoscente,
tanto perfectior est modus cognitionis. Sic igitur dicendum est
quod Deus non solum cognoscit res esse in seipso; sed per id quod
in seipso continet res, cognoscit eas in propria natura; et tanto
perfectius, quanto perfectius est unumquodque in ipso.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p12"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The created essence is
compared to the essence of God as the imperfect to the perfect
act. Therefore the created essence cannot sufficiently lead us to the
knowledge of the divine essence, but rather the
converse.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28938"><span class=
"ref">[28938] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod essentia creaturae comparatur ad essentiam Dei, ut
actus imperfectus ad perfectum. Et ideo essentia creaturae non
sufficienter ducit in cognitionem essentiae divinae, sed e
converso.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A6-p13"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same thing cannot be
taken in an equal manner as the ratio of different things. But the
divine essence excels all creatures. Hence it can be taken as the
proper ration of each thing according to the diverse ways in which
diverse creatures participate in, and imitate it.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="28939"><span class=
"ref">[28939] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod idem non potest accipi ut ratio diversorum per modum
adaequationis. Sed divina essentia est aliquid excedens omnes
creaturas. Unde potest accipi ut propria ratio uniuscuiusque,
secundum quod diversimode est participabilis vel imitabilis a
diversis creaturis.</p></div></div>
</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7" next="FP_Q14_A8"
prev="FP_Q14_A6" progress="2.55%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether
the knowledge of God is discursive?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is
discursive?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
seems that the knowledge of God is discursive. For the knowledge of
God is not habitual knowledge, but actual knowledge. Now the
Philosopher says (Topic. ii): "The habit of knowledge may regard many
things at once; but actual understanding regards only one thing at a
time." Therefore as God knows many things, Himself and others, as
shown above (AA 2,5), it seems that He does not understand all at
once, but discourses from one to another.</p></div><div style="width:
45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="28940"><span class=
"ref">[28940] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei sit discursiva. Scientia enim
Dei non est secundum scire in habitu, sed secundum intelligere in
actu. Sed secundum philosophum, in II Topic., scire in habitu
contingit multa simul, sed intelligere actu unum tantum. Cum ergo
Deus multa cognoscat, quia et se et alia, ut ostensum est, videtur
quod non simul omnia intelligat, sed de uno in aliud
discurrat.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
Further, discursive knowledge is to know the effect through its
cause. But God knows things through Himself; as an effect (is known)
through its cause. Therefore His knowledge is
discursive.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="28941"><span class=
"ref">[28941] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
cognoscere effectum per causam est scire discurrentis. Sed Deus
cognoscit alia per seipsum, sicut effectum per causam. Ergo
cognitio sua est discursiva.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p4"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knows each creature
more perfectly than we know it. But we know the effects in their
created causes; and thus we go discursively from causes to things
caused. Therefore it seems that the same applies to God.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="28942"><span class=
"ref">[28942] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
perfectius Deus scit unamquamque creaturam quam nos sciamus. Sed
nos in causis creatis cognoscimus earum effectus, et sic de causis
ad causata discurrimus. Ergo videtur similiter esse in
Deo.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b>
Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "God does not see all things in their
particularity or separately, as if He saw alternately here and there;
but He sees all things together at once."</p></div><div style="width:
45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 s. c."><a name="28943"><span class=
"ref">[28943] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod Augustinus dicit, in XV de Trin., quod <i>Deus non
particulatim vel singillatim omnia videt, velut alternante
conspectu hinc illuc, et inde huc; sed omnia videt simul</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> In the divine knowledge there is no discursion; the proof of which is as follows. In our knowledge there is a twofold discursion: one is according to succession only, as when we have actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand something else; while the other mode of discursion is according to causality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge of conclusions. The first kind of discursion cannot belong to God. For many things,
  which we understand in succession if each is considered in itself, we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one thing; if, for instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see different things in a mirror. Now God sees all things in one (thing), which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and not successively. Likewise the second mode of discursion cannot be applied to God. First, because this second mode of discursion presupposes the first mode; for whosoever
  proceeds from principles to conclusions does not consider both at once; secondly, because to discourse thus is to proceed from the known to the unknown. Hence it is manifest that when the first is known, the second is still unknown; and thus the second is known not in the first, but from the first. Now the term discursive reasoning is attained when the second is seen in the first, by resolving the effects into their causes; and then the discursion ceases. Hence as God sees His effects in
  Himself as their cause, His knowledge is not
discursive.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 co."><a name="28944"><span class=
"ref">[28944] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod in scientia divina nullus est discursus. Quod sic patet. In
scientia enim nostra duplex est discursus. Unus secundum
successionem tantum, sicut cum, postquam intelligimus aliquid in
actu, convertimus nos ad intelligendum aliud. Alius discursus est
secundum causalitatem, sicut cum per principia pervenimus in
cognitionem conclusionum. Primus autem discursus Deo convenire non
potest. Multa enim, quae successive intelligimus si unumquodque
eorum in seipso consideretur, omnia simul intelligimus si in aliquo
uno ea intelligamus, puta si partes intelligamus in toto, vel si
diversas res videamus in speculo. Deus autem omnia videt in uno,
quod est ipse, ut habitum est. Unde simul, et non successive omnia
videt. Similiter etiam et secundus discursus Deo competere non
potest. Primo quidem, quia secundus discursus praesupponit primum,
procedentes enim a principiis ad conclusiones, non simul utrumque
considerant. Deinde, quia discursus talis est procedentis de noto
ad ignotum. Unde manifestum est quod, quando cognoscitur primum,
adhuc ignoratur secundum. Et sic secundum non cognoscitur in primo,
sed ex primo. Terminus vero discursus est, quando secundum videtur
in primo, resolutis effectibus in causas, et tunc cessat discursus.
Unde, cum Deus effectus suos in seipso videat sicut in causa, eius
cognitio non est discursiva.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
to Objection 1:</b> Altogether there is only one act of understanding
in itself, nevertheless many things may be understood in one (medium),
as shown above.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="28945"><span class=
"ref">[28945] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, licet sit unum tantum intelligere in seipso, tamen
contingit multa intelligere in aliquo uno, ut dictum
est.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
2:</b> God does not know by their cause, known, as it were previously,
effects unknown; but He knows the effects in the cause; and hence His
knowledge is not discursive, as was shown above.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="28946"><span class=
"ref">[28946] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod Deus non cognoscit per causam quasi prius cognitam,
effectus incognitos, sed eos cognoscit in causa. Unde eius cognitio
est sine discursu, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
to Objection 3:</b> God sees the effects of created causes in the
causes themselves, much better than we can; but still not in such a
manner that the knowledge of the effects is caused in Him by the
knowledge of the created causes, as is the case with us; and hence His
knowledge is not discursive.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="28947"><span class=
"ref">[28947] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod effectus causarum creatarum videt quidem Deus in
ipsis causis, multo melius quam nos, non tamen ita quod cognitio
effectuum causetur in ipso ex cognitione causarum creatarum, sicut
in nobis. Unde eius scientia non est discursiva.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8" next="FP_Q14_A9" prev="FP_Q14_A7" progress="2.57%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p2"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God
is not the cause of things. For Origen says, on<scripRef
osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.30" parsed="vul|Rom|8|30|0|0"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p2.1" passage=" Rom. 8:30, "> Rom. 8:30,
</scripRef> "Whom He called, them He also justified," etc.: "A thing
will happen not because God knows it as future; but because it is
future, it is on that account known by God, before it
exists."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="28948"><span class=
"ref">[28948] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei non sit causa rerum. Dicit
enim Origenes, super epistolam ad Rom., <i>non propterea aliquid
erit, quia id scit Deus futurum; sed quia futurum est, ideo scitur
a Deo antequam fiat</i>.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p3"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, given the cause, the
effect follows. But the knowledge of God is eternal. Therefore if the
knowledge of God is the cause of things created, it seems that
creatures are eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="28949"><span class=
"ref">[28949] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
posita causa ponitur effectus. Sed scientia Dei est aeterna. Si
ergo scientia Dei est causa rerum creatarum, videtur quod creaturae
sint ab aeterno.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p4"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "The thing known is prior
to knowledge, and is its measure," as the Philosopher says
(Metaph. x). But what is posterior and measured cannot be a
cause. Therefore the knowledge of God is not the cause of
things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="28950"><span class=
"ref">[28950] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
scibile est prius scientia, et mensura eius, ut dicitur in X
Metaphys. Sed id quod est posterius et mensuratum, non potest esse
causa. Ergo scientia Dei non est causa rerum.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p5"
shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xv),
"Not because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual and
temporal, but because He knows them, therefore they
are."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 8 s. c."><a name="28951"><span class=
"ref">[28951] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Augustinus, XV de Trin., <i>universas creaturas, et
spirituales et corporales, non quia sunt, ideo novit Deus; sed ideo
sunt, quia novit</i>.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer is to things made by his art. Now the knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact that the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the intellect must be the principle of action; as heat is the principle of heating. Nevertheless, we must observe that a natural form, being a form that
  remains in that to which it gives existence, denotes a principle of action according only as it has an inclination to an effect; and likewise, the intelligible form does not denote a principle of action in so far as it resides in the one who understands unless there is added to it the inclination to an effect, which inclination is through the will. For since the intelligible form has a relation to opposite things (inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to opposites), it would not produce a
  determinate effect unless it were determined to one thing by the
appetite, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. ix). Now it is manifest
that God causes things by His intellect, since His being is His act of
understanding; and hence His knowledge must be the cause of things, in
so far as His will is joined to it. Hence the knowledge of God as the
cause of things is usually called the "knowledge of
approbation."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 8 co."><a name="28952"><span class=
"ref">[28952] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod scientia Dei est causa rerum. Sic enim scientia Dei se habet
ad omnes res creatas, sicut scientia artificis se habet ad
artificiata. Scientia autem artificis est causa artificiatorum, eo
quod artifex operatur per suum intellectum, unde oportet quod forma
intellectus sit principium operationis, sicut calor est principium
calefactionis. Sed considerandum est quod forma naturalis,
inquantum est forma manens in eo cui dat esse, non nominat
principium actionis; sed secundum quod habet inclinationem ad
effectum. Et similiter forma intelligibilis non nominat principium
actionis secundum quod est tantum in intelligente, nisi adiungatur
ei inclinatio ad effectum, quae est per voluntatem. Cum enim forma
intelligibilis ad opposita se habeat (cum sit eadem scientia
oppositorum), non produceret determinatum effectum, nisi
determinaretur ad unum per appetitum, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys.
Manifestum est autem quod Deus per intellectum suum causat res, cum
suum esse sit suum intelligere. Unde necesse est quod sua scientia
sit causa rerum, secundum quod habet voluntatem coniunctam. Unde
scientia Dei, secundum quod est causa rerum, consuevit nominari
scientia approbationis.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Origen spoke in reference to that aspect of knowledge to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is joined to it, as is said above.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p8" shownumber="no"> But when he says the reason why God foreknows some things is because they are future, this must be understood according to the cause of consequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things are in the future, it follows that God knows them; but not that the futurity of things is the cause why God knows them.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="28953"><span class=
"ref">[28953] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Origenes locutus est attendens rationem scientiae,
cui non competit ratio causalitatis, nisi adiuncta voluntate, ut
dictum est. Sed quod dicit ideo praescire Deum aliqua, quia sunt
futura, intelligendum est secundum causam consequentiae, non
secundum causam essendi. Sequitur enim, si aliqua sunt futura, quod
Deus ea praescierit, non tamen res futurae sunt causa quod Deus
sciat.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p9"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The knowledge of God is
the cause of things according as things are in His knowledge. Now that
things should be eternal was not in the knowledge of God; hence
although the knowledge of God is eternal, it does not follow that
creatures are eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="28954"><span class=
"ref">[28954] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod scientia Dei est causa rerum, secundum quod res sunt
in scientia. Non fuit autem in scientia Dei, quod res essent ab
aeterno. Unde, quamvis scientia Dei sit aeterna, non sequitur tamen
quod creaturae sint ab aeterno.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God and our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things, of which God is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its measure, so, the knowledge of God is prior to natural things, and is the measure of them; as, for instance, a house is midway between the knowledge of the builder who made it, and the knowledge of the one who
  gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already
built.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la"
title="I q. 14 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="28955"><span class=
"ref">[28955] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod res naturales sunt mediae inter scientiam Dei et
scientiam nostram, nos enim scientiam accipimus a rebus
naturalibus, quarum Deus per suam scientiam causa est. Unde, sicut
scibilia naturalia sunt priora quam scientia nostra, et mensura
eius, ita scientia Dei est prior quam res naturales, et mensura
ipsarum. Sicut aliqua domus est media inter scientiam artificis qui
eam fecit, et scientiam illius qui eius cognitionem ex ipsa iam
facta capit.</p></div></div>
</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9" next="FP_Q14_A10" prev="FP_Q14_A8" progress="2.60%" n="ix" title="Article. 9 - Whether God has knowledge of things that are not?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p0.1">Whether God has knowledge of things that are not?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p2"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not
knowledge of things that are not. For the knowledge of God is of true
things. But "truth" and "being" are convertible terms. Therefore the
knowledge of God is not of things that are not.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="28956"><span class=
"ref">[28956] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non habeat scientiam non entium.
Scientia enim Dei non est nisi verorum. Sed verum et ens
convertuntur. Ergo scientia Dei non est non entium.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p3"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, knowledge requires
likeness between the knower and the thing known. But those things that
are not cannot have any likeness to God, Who is very being. Therefore
what is not, cannot be known by God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="28957"><span class=
"ref">[28957] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
scientia requirit similitudinem inter scientem et scitum. Sed ea
quae non sunt, non possunt habere aliquam similitudinem ad Deum,
qui est ipsum esse. Ergo ea quae non sunt, non possunt sciri a
Deo.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p4"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of God is
the cause of what is known by Him. But it is not the cause of things
that are not, because a thing that is not, has no cause. Therefore God
has no knowledge of things that are not.</p></div><div style="width:
45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="28958"><span class=
"ref">[28958] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
scientia Dei est causa scitorum ab ipso. Sed non est causa non
entium, quia non ens non habet causam. Ergo Deus non habet
scientiam de non entibus.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p5"
shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says: "Who
. . . calleth those things that are not as those that are" (<scripRef
osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.4.17" parsed="vul|Rom|4|17|0|0"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p5.1"
passage="Rom. 4:17">Rom. 4:17</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width:
45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 s. c."><a name="28959"><span class=
"ref">[28959] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit apostolus ad Rom. IV, <i>qui vocat ea quae non sunt,
tanquam ea quae sunt</i>.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> God knows all things whatsoever that in any way are. Now it is possible that things that are not absolutely, should be in a certain sense. For things absolutely are which are actual; whereas things which are not actual, are in the power either of God Himself or of a creature, whether in active power, or passive; whether in power of thought or of imagination, or of any other manner of meaning whatsoever. Whatever therefore can be made, or thought, or said by
  the creature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to God, although they are not actual. And in so far it can be said that He has knowledge even of things that are not.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p7" shownumber="no"> Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those things that are not actual. For though some of them may not be in act now, still they were, or they will be; and God is said to know all these with the knowledge of vision: for since God's act of understanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and since eternity is without succession, comprehending all time, the present glance of God extends over all time, and to all things which exist in any time,
  as to objects present to Him. But there are other things in God's power, or the creature's, which nevertheless are not, nor will be, nor were; and as regards these He is said to have knowledge, not of vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so called because the things we see around us have distinct being outside the seer.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 co."><a name="28960"><span class=
"ref">[28960] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod Deus scit omnia quaecumque sunt quocumque modo. Nihil autem
prohibet ea quae non sunt simpliciter, aliquo modo esse.
Simpliciter enim sunt, quae actu sunt. Ea vero quae non sunt actu,
sunt in potentia vel ipsius Dei, vel creaturae; sive in potentia
activa, sive in passiva, sive in potentia opinandi, vel imaginandi,
vel quocumque modo significandi. Quaecumque igitur possunt per
creaturam fieri vel cogitari vel dici, et etiam quaecumque ipse
facere potest, omnia cognoscit Deus, etiam si actu non sint. Et pro
tanto dici potest quod habet etiam non entium scientiam. Sed horum
quae actu non sunt, est attendenda quaedam diversitas. Quaedam
enim, licet non sint nunc in actu, tamen vel fuerunt vel erunt, et
omnia ista dicitur Deus scire scientia visionis. Quia, cum
intelligere Dei, quod est eius esse, aeternitate mensuretur, quae
sine successione existens totum tempus comprehendit, praesens
intuitus Dei fertur in totum tempus, et in omnia quae sunt in
quocumque tempore, sicut in subiecta sibi praesentialiter. Quaedam
vero sunt, quae sunt in potentia Dei vel creaturae, quae tamen nec
sunt nec erunt neque fuerunt. Et respectu horum non dicitur habere
scientiam visionis, sed simplicis intelligentiae. Quod ideo
dicitur, quia ea quae videntur apud nos, habent esse distinctum
extra videntem.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p8"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those things that are not
actual are true in so far as they are in potentiality; for it is true
that they are in potentiality; and as such they are known by
God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="28961"><span class=
"ref">[28961] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, secundum quod sunt in potentia, sic habent veritatem
ea quae non sunt actu, verum est enim ea esse in potentia. Et sic
sciuntur a Deo.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p9"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since God is very being
everything is, in so far as it participates in the likeness of God; as
everything is hot in so far as it participates in heat. So, things in
potentiality are known by God, although they are not in
act.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="28962"><span class=
"ref">[28962] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, cum Deus sit ipsum esse, intantum unumquodque est,
inquantum participat de Dei similitudine, sicut unumquodque
intantum est calidum, inquantum participat calorem. Sic et ea quae
sunt in potentia, etiam si non sunt in actu, cognoscuntur a
Deo.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9-p10"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge of God,
joined to His will is the cause of things. Hence it is not necessary
that what ever God knows, is, or was, or will be; but only is this
necessary as regards what He wills to be, or permits to be. Further,
it is in the knowledge of God not that they be, but that they be
possible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="28963"><span class=
"ref">[28963] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod Dei scientia est causa rerum, voluntate adiuncta.
Unde non oportet quod quaecumque scit Deus, sint vel fuerint vel
futura sint, sed solum ea quae vult esse, vel permittit esse. Et
iterum, non est in scientia Dei ut illa sint, sed quod esse
possint.</p></div></div>
</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10" next="FP_Q14_A11"
prev="FP_Q14_A9" progress="2.62%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether
God knows evil things?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p0.1">Whether God knows evil
things?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
seems that God does not know evil things. For the Philosopher (De
Anima iii) says that the intellect which is not in potentiality does
not know privation. But "evil is the privation of good," as Augustine
says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as the intellect of God is never in
potentiality, but is always in act, as is clear from the foregoing
(A[2] ), it seems that God does not know evil things.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="28964"><span class=
"ref">[28964] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat mala. Dicit enim
philosophus, in III de anima, quod intellectus qui non est in
potentia, non cognoscit privationem. Sed malum est privatio boni,
ut dicit Augustinus. Igitur, cum intellectus Dei nunquam sit in
potentia, sed semper actu, ut ex dictis patet, videtur quod Deus
non cognoscat mala.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p3"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all knowledge is either
the cause of the thing known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge of
God is not the cause of evil, nor is it caused by evil. Therefore God
does not know evil things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="28965"><span class=
"ref">[28965] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
omnis scientia vel est causa sciti, vel causatur ab eo. Sed
scientia Dei non est causa mali, nec causatur a malo. Ergo scientia
Dei non est malorum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p4"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything known is known
either by its likeness, or by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He
knows through His essence, as is clear from the foregoing <a
id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5"
shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[5])</a>. Now the divine essence
neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it; for to
the divine essence there is no contrary, as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xii). Therefore God does not know evil things.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="28966"><span class=
"ref">[28966] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
quod cognoscitur, cognoscitur per suam similitudinem, vel per suum
oppositum. Quidquid autem cognoscit Deus, cognoscit per suam
essentiam, ut ex dictis patet. Divina autem essentia neque est
similitudo mali, neque ei malum opponitur, divinae enim essentiae
nihil est contrarium, ut dicit Augustinus, XII de Civ. Dei. Ergo
Deus non cognoscit mala.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p5"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what is known through
another and not through itself, is imperfectly known. But evil is not
known by God; for the thing known must be in the knower. Therefore if
evil is known through another, namely, through good, it would be known
by Him imperfectly; which cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not
imperfect. Therefore God does not know evil things.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 4"><a name="28967"><span class=
"ref">[28967] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, quod
cognoscitur non per seipsum, sed per aliud, imperfecte cognoscitur.
Sed malum non cognoscitur a Deo per seipsum, quia sic oporteret
quod malum esset in Deo; oportet enim cognitum esse in cognoscente.
Si ergo cognoscitur per aliud, scilicet per bonum, imperfecte
cognoscetur ab ipso, quod est impossibile, quia nulla cognitio Dei
est imperfecta. Ergo scientia Dei non est malorum.</p></div></div><div
style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p6"
shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef
osisRef="Bible.vul:Prov.15.11" parsed="vul|Prov|15|11|0|0"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p6.1"
passage="Prov. 15:11">Prov. 15:11</scripRef>), "Hell and destruction
are before God [Vulg: 'the Lord']."</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 s. c."><a name="28968"><span class=
"ref">[28968] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Proverb. XV, <i>Infernus et perditio coram
Deo</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must know all that can be accidental to it. Now there are some good things to which corruption by evil may be accidental. Hence God would not know good things perfectly, unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is knowable in the degree in which it is; hence since this is the essence of evil that it is the privation of good, by the fact that God knows good things, He knows evil things also; as by light is known darkness.
  Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "God through Himself receives
the vision of darkness, not otherwise seeing darkness except through
light."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 co."><a name="28969"><span class=
"ref">[28969] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod quicumque perfecte cognoscit aliquid, oportet quod cognoscat
omnia quae possunt illi accidere. Sunt autem quaedam bona, quibus
accidere potest ut per mala corrumpantur. Unde Deus non perfecte
cognosceret bona, nisi etiam cognosceret mala. Sic autem est
cognoscibile unumquodque, secundum quod est. Unde, cum hoc sit esse
mali, quod est privatio boni, per hoc ipsum quod Deus cognoscit
bona, cognoscit etiam mala; sicut per lucem cognoscuntur tenebrae.
Unde dicit Dionysius, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>Deus per
semetipsum tenebrarum accipit visionem, non aliunde videns tenebras
quam a lumine</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as meaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality, does not know privation by privation existing in it; and this agrees with what he said previously, that a point and every indivisible thing are known by privation of division. This is because simple and indivisible forms are in our intellect not actually, but only potentially; for were they actually in our intellect, they would not be known by
  privation. It is thus that simple things are known by separate
substances. God therefore knows evil, not by privation existing in
Himself, but by the opposite good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="28970"><span class=
"ref">[28970] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod verbum philosophi est sic intelligendum, quod
intellectus qui non est in potentia, non cognoscit privationem per
privationem in ipso existentem. Et hoc congruit cum eo quod supra
dixerat, quod punctum et omne indivisibile per privationem
divisionis cognoscitur. Quod contingit ex hoc, quia formae
simplices et indivisibiles non sunt actu in intellectu nostro, sed
in potentia tantum, nam si essent actu in intellectu nostro, non
per privationem cognoscerentur. Et sic cognoscuntur simplicia a
substantiis separatis. Deus igitur non cognoscit malum per
privationem in se existentem, sed per bonum
oppositum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
2:</b> The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil; but is the cause
of the good whereby evil is known.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="28971"><span class=
"ref">[28971] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod scientia Dei non est causa mali, sed est causa boni,
per quod cognoscitur malum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p10"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although evil is not
opposed to the divine essence, which is not corruptible by evil; it is
opposed to the effects of God, which He knows by His essence; and
knowing them, He knows the opposite evils.</p></div><div style="width:
45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 ad 3"><a name="28972"><span class=
"ref">[28972] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, licet malum non opponatur essentiae divinae, quae
non est corruptibilis per malum, opponitur tamen effectibus Dei;
quos per essentiam suam cognoscit, et eos cognoscens, mala opposita
cognoscit.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A10-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
4:</b> To know a thing by something else only, belongs to imperfect
knowledge, if that thing is of itself knowable; but evil is not of
itself knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of evil means the
privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined nor known
except by good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 10 ad 4"><a name="28973"><span class=
"ref">[28973] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 10 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod cognoscere aliquid per aliud tantum, est imperfectae
cognitionis, si illud sit cognoscibile per se. Sed malum non est
per se cognoscibile, quia de ratione mali est, quod sit privatio
boni. Et sic neque definiri, neque cognosci potest, nisi per
bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11" next="FP_Q14_A12" prev="FP_Q14_A10" progress="2.64%" n="xi" title="Article. 11 - Whether God knows singular things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p0.1">Whether God knows singular things?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p2"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know
singular things. For the divine intellect is more immaterial than the
human intellect. Now the human intellect by reason of its
immateriality does not know singular things; but as the Philosopher
says (De Anima ii), "reason has to do with universals, sense with
singular things." Therefore God does not know singular
things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="28974"><span class=
"ref">[28974] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat singularia.
Intellectus enim divinus immaterialior est quam intellectus
humanus. Sed intellectus humanus, propter suam immaterialitatem,
non cognoscit singularia, sed, sicut dicitur in II de anima,
<i>ratio est universalium, sensus vero singularium</i>. Ergo Deus
non cognoscit singularia.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p3"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in us those faculties
alone know the singular, which receive the species not abstracted from
material conditions. But in God things are in the highest degree
abstracted from all materiality. Therefore God does not know singular
things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="28975"><span class=
"ref">[28975] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
illae solae virtutes in nobis sunt singularium cognoscitivae, quae
recipiunt species non abstractas a materialibus conditionibus. Sed
res in Deo sunt maxime abstractae ab omni materialitate. Ergo Deus
non cognoscit singularia.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p4"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all knowledge comes about
through the medium of some likeness. But the likeness of singular
things in so far as they are singular, does not seem to be in God; for
the principle of singularity is matter, which, since it is in
potentiality only, is altogether unlike God, Who is pure
act. Therefore God cannot know singular things.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 arg. 3"><a name="28976"><span class=
"ref">[28976] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 11 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
omnis cognitio est per aliquam similitudinem. Sed similitudo
singularium, inquantum sunt singularia, non videtur esse in Deo,
quia principium singularitatis est materia, quae, cum sit ens in
potentia tantum, omnino est dissimilis Deo, qui est actus purus.
Non ergo Deus potest cognoscere singularia.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p5"
shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef
osisRef="Bible.vul:Prov.16.2" parsed="vul|Prov|16|2|0|0"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p5.1"
passage="Prov. 16:2">Prov. 16:2</scripRef>), "All the ways of a man
are open to His eyes."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 s. c."><a name="28977"><span class=
"ref">[28977] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur, Proverb. XVI, <i>omnes viae hominum patent oculis
eius</i>.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> God knows singular things. For all perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the foregoing (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q4.FP_Q4_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[4], A[2]</a>). Now to know singular things is part of our perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher considers it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and Metaph. iii) that God would be most ignorant if
  He did not know discord. Now the perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and unitedly in God; hence, although by one faculty we know the universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material things, nevertheless God knows both by His simple intellect.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p7" shownumber="no"> Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows singular things by universal causes. For nothing exists in any singular thing, that does not arise from some universal cause. They give the example of an astrologer who knows all the universal movements of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that are to come. This, however, is not enough; for singular things from universal causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however they may be joined
  together, are not individualized except by individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates because he is white, or because he is the son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that kind, would not know him in so far as he is this particular man. Hence according to the aforesaid mode, God would not know</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p8" shownumber="no"> singular things in their singularity.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p9" shownumber="no"> On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by the application of universal causes to particular effects. But this will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that thing; hence the said application cannot be the reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of singular things.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p10" shownumber="no"> Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of things by His knowledge, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p10.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[8])</a>, His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of God extends not only to forms, which are the source of universality, but also to matter, as we shall prove further on (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p10.2" href="#FP.iv.FP_Q44.FP_Q44_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[44], A[2]</a>), the knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are individualized by matter. For since
  He knows things other than Himself by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their active principle, His essence must be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. The same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer, if it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 co."><a name="28978"><span class=
"ref">[28978] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod Deus cognoscit singularia. Omnes enim perfectiones in
creaturis inventae, in Deo praeexistunt secundum altiorem modum, ut
ex dictis patet. Cognoscere autem singularia pertinet ad
perfectionem nostram. Unde necesse est quod Deus singularia
cognoscat. Nam et philosophus pro inconvenienti habet, quod aliquid
cognoscatur a nobis, quod non cognoscatur a Deo. Unde contra
Empedoclem arguit, in I de anima et in III Metaphys., quod
accideret Deum esse insipientissimum, si discordiam ignoraret. Sed
perfectiones quae in inferioribus dividuntur, in Deo simpliciter et
unite existunt. Unde, licet nos per aliam potentiam cognoscamus
universalia et immaterialia, et per aliam singularia et materialia;
Deus tamen per suum simplicem intellectum utraque cognoscit. Sed
qualiter hoc esse possit, quidam manifestare volentes, dixerunt
quod Deus cognoscit singularia per causas universales, nam nihil
est in aliquo singularium, quod non ex aliqua causa oriatur
universali. Et ponunt exemplum, sicut si aliquis astrologus
cognosceret omnes motus universales caeli, posset praenuntiare
omnes eclipses futuras. Sed istud non sufficit. Quia singularia ex
causis universalibus sortiuntur quasdam formas et virtutes, quae,
quantumcumque ad invicem coniungantur, non individuantur nisi per
materiam individualem. Unde qui cognosceret Socratem per hoc quod
est albus vel Sophronisci filius, vel quidquid aliud sic dicatur,
non cognosceret ipsum inquantum est hic homo. Unde secundum modum
praedictum, Deus non cognosceret singularia in sua singularitate.
Alii vero dixerunt quod Deus cognoscit singularia, applicando
causas universales ad particulares effectus. Sed hoc nihil est.
Quia nullus potest applicare aliquid ad alterum, nisi illud
praecognoscat, unde dicta applicatio non potest esse ratio
cognoscendi particularia, sed cognitionem singularium praesupponit.
Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod, cum Deus sit causa rerum per
suam scientiam, ut dictum est, intantum se extendit scientia Dei,
inquantum se extendit eius causalitas. Unde, cum virtus activa Dei
se extendat non solum ad formas, a quibus accipitur ratio
universalis, sed etiam usque ad materiam, ut infra ostendetur;
necesse est quod scientia Dei usque ad singularia se extendat, quae
per materiam individuantur. Cum enim sciat alia a se per essentiam
suam, inquantum est similitudo rerum velut principium activum
earum, necesse est quod essentia sua sit principium sufficiens
cognoscendi omnia quae per ipsum fiunt, non solum in universali,
sed etiam in singulari. Et esset simile de scientia artificis, si
esset productiva totius rei, et non formae tantum.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the individualizing principles; hence the intelligible species in our intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and on that account our intellect does not know the singular. But the intelligible species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of itself, being the principle of all the principles which enter into the composition
  of things, whether principles of the species or principles of the
individual; hence by it God knows not only universal, but also
singular things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="28979"><span class=
"ref">[28979] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod intellectus noster speciem intelligibilem abstrahit a
principiis individuantibus, unde species intelligibilis nostri
intellectus non potest esse similitudo principiorum individualium.
Et propter hoc, intellectus noster singularia non cognoscit. Sed
species intelligibilis divini intellectus, quae est Dei essentia,
non est immaterialis per abstractionem, sed per seipsam, principium
existens omnium principiorum quae intrant rei compositionem, sive
sint principia speciei, sive principia individui. Unde per eam Deus
cognoscit non solum universalia, sed etiam singularia.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p12"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although as regards the
species in the divine intellect its being has no material conditions
like the images received in the imagination and sense, yet its power
extends to both immaterial and material things.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="28980"><span class=
"ref">[28980] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, quamvis species intellectus divini secundum esse
suum non habeat conditiones materiales, sicut species receptae in
imaginatione et sensu; tamen virtute se extendit ad immaterialia et
materialia, ut dictum est.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A11-p13"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although matter as
regards its potentiality recedes from likeness to God, yet, even in so
far as it has being in this wise, it retains a certain likeness to the
divine being.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 11 ad 3"><a name="28981"><span class=
"ref">[28981] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 11 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod materia, licet recedat a Dei similitudine secundum
suam potentialitatem, tamen inquantum vel sic esse habet,
similitudinem quandam retinet divini esse.</p></div></div>
</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12" next="FP_Q14_A13" prev="FP_Q14_A11" progress="2.68%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether God can know infinite things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p0.1">Whether God can know infinite things?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot know infinite things. For the infinite, as such, is unknown; since the infinite is that which, "to those who measure it, leaves always something more to be measured," as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii). Moreover, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii) that "whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is bounded by the comprehension of the knower." Now infinite things have no boundary. Therefore they cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of
  God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la"
title="I q. 14 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="28982"><span class=
"ref">[28982] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit cognoscere infinita.
Infinitum enim, secundum quod est infinitum, est ignotum, quia
infinitum est cuius quantitatem accipientibus semper est aliquid
extra assumere, ut dicitur in III Physic. Augustinus etiam dicit,
XII de Civ. Dei, quod <i>quidquid scientia comprehenditur, scientis
comprehensione finitur</i>. Sed infinita non possunt finiri. Ergo
non possunt scientia Dei comprehendi.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if we say that things infinite in themselves are finite in God's knowledge, against this it may be urged that the essence of the infinite is that it is untraversable, and the finite that it is traversable, as said in Phys. iii. But the infinite is not traversable either by the finite or by the infinite, as is proved in Phys. vi. Therefore the infinite cannot be bounded by the finite, nor even by the infinite; and so the infinite cannot be finite in
  God's knowledge, which is infinite.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 12 arg. 2"><a name="28983"><span class=
"ref">[28983] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Si dicatur quod
ea quae in se sunt infinita, scientiae Dei finita sunt, contra,
ratio infiniti est quod sit impertransibile; et finiti quod sit
pertransibile, ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed infinitum non potest
transiri nec a finito, nec ab infinito, ut probatur in VI Physic.
Ergo infinitum non potest esse finitum finito, neque etiam
infinito. Et ita infinita non sunt finita scientiae Dei, quae est
infinita.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p4"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of God is
the measure of what is known. But it is contrary to the essence of the
infinite that it be measured. Therefore infinite things cannot be
known by God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="28984"><span class=
"ref">[28984] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
scientia Dei est mensura scitorum. Sed contra rationem infiniti
est, quod sit mensuratum. Ergo infinita non possunt sciri a
Deo.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p5"
shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
xii), "Although we cannot number the infinite, nevertheless it can be
comprehended by Him whose knowledge has no bounds."</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 12 s. c."><a name="28985"><span class=
"ref">[28985] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 12 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Augustinus, XII de Civ. Dei, <i>quamvis infinitorum
numerorum nullus sit numerus, non est tamen incomprehensibilis ei,
cuius scientiae non est numerus</i>.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since God knows not only things actual but also things possible to Himself or to created things, as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>, and as these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows infinite things. Although the knowledge of vision which has relation only to things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite things, as some say, for we do not say that the world is eternal, nor that generation and movement will go on for ever, so
  that individuals be infinitely multiplied; yet, if we consider more attentively, we must hold that God knows infinite things even by the knowledge of vision. For God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts, which will be multiplied to infinity as rational creatures go on for ever.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p7" shownumber="no"> The reason of this is to be found in the fact that the knowledge of every knower is measured by the mode of the form which is the principle of knowledge. For the sensible image in sense is the likeness of only one individual thing, and can give the knowledge of only one individual. But the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of the thing as regards its specific nature, which is participable by infinite particulars; hence our intellect by the intelligible
  species of man in a certain way knows infinite men; not however as distinguished from each other, but as communicating in the nature of the species; and the reason is because the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of man not as to the individual principles, but as to the principles of the species. On the other hand, the divine essence, whereby the divine intellect understands, is a sufficing likeness of all things that are, or can be, not only as regards the universal
  principles, but also as regards the principles proper to each one, as shown above. Hence it follows that the knowledge of God extends to infinite things, even as distinct from each other.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 12 co."><a name="28986"><span class=
"ref">[28986] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, cum Deus sciat non solum ea quae sunt actu, sed etiam ea quae
sunt in potentia vel sua vel creaturae, ut ostensum est; haec autem
constat esse infinita; necesse est dicere quod Deus sciat infinita.
Et licet scientia visionis, quae est tantum eorum quae sunt vel
erunt vel fuerunt, non sit infinitorum, ut quidam dicunt, cum non
ponamus mundum ab aeterno fuisse, nec generationem et motum in
aeternum mansura, ut individua in infinitum multiplicentur, tamen,
si diligentius consideretur, necesse est dicere quod Deus etiam
scientia visionis sciat infinita. Quia Deus scit etiam cogitationes
et affectiones cordium, quae in infinitum multiplicabuntur,
creaturis rationalibus permanentibus absque fine. Hoc autem ideo
est, quia cognitio cuiuslibet cognoscentis se extendit secundum
modum formae quae est principium cognitionis. Species enim
sensibilis, quae est in sensu, est similitudo solum unius
individui, unde per eam solum unum individuum cognosci potest.
Species autem intelligibilis intellectus nostri est similitudo rei
quantum ad naturam speciei, quae est participabilis a
particularibus infinitis, unde intellectus noster per speciem
intelligibilem hominis, cognoscit quodammodo homines infinitos. Sed
tamen non inquantum distinguuntur ab invicem, sed secundum quod
communicant in natura speciei; propter hoc quod species
intelligibilis intellectus nostri non est similitudo hominum
quantum ad principia individualia, sed solum quantum ad principia
speciei. Essentia autem divina, per quam intellectus divinus
intelligit, est similitudo sufficiens omnium quae sunt vel esse
possunt, non solum quantum ad principia communia, sed etiam quantum
ad principia propria uniuscuiusque, ut ostensum est. Unde sequitur
quod scientia Dei se extendat ad infinita, etiam secundum quod sunt
ab invicem distincta.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The idea of the infinite pertains to quantity, as the Philosopher says (Phys. i). But the idea of quantity implies the order of parts. Therefore to know the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to know part after part; and in this way the infinite cannot be known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken, there will always remain something else outside. But God does not know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after
  part; since He knows all things simultaneously, and not
successively, as said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p8.1"
href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A7" shape="rect"
xml:link="simple">(A[7])</a>. Hence there is nothing to prevent Him
from knowing infinite things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="28987"><span class=
"ref">[28987] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod <i>infiniti ratio congruit quantitati</i>, secundum
philosophum in I Physic. De ratione autem quantitatis est ordo
partium. Cognoscere ergo infinitum secundum modum infiniti, est
cognoscere partem post partem. Et sic nullo modo contingit cognosci
infinitum, quia quantacumque quantitas partium accipiatur, semper
remanet aliquid extra accipientem. Deus autem non sic cognoscit
infinitum vel infinita, quasi enumerando partem post partem; cum
cognoscat omnia simul, non successive, ut supra dictum est. Unde
nihil prohibet ipsum cognoscere infinita.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Transition imports a certain succession of parts; and hence it is that the infinite cannot be traversed by the finite, nor by the infinite. But equality suffices for comprehension, because that is said to be comprehended which has nothing outside the comprehender. Hence it is not against the idea of the infinite to be comprehended by the infinite. And so, what is infinite in itself can be called finite to the knowledge of God as comprehended; but not
  as if it were traversable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 12 ad 2"><a name="28988"><span class=
"ref">[28988] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod transitio importat quandam successionem in partibus,
et inde est quod infinitum transiri non potest, neque a finito
neque ab infinito. Sed ad rationem comprehensionis sufficit
adaequatio, quia id comprehendi dicitur, cuius nihil est extra
comprehendentem. Unde non est contra rationem infiniti, quod
comprehendatur ab infinito. Et sic, quod in se est infinitum,
potest dici finitum scientiae Dei, tanquam comprehensum, non tamen
tanquam pertransibile.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A12-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge of God is the measure of things, not quantitatively, for the infinite is not subject to this kind of measure; but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things. For everything has truth of nature according to the degree in which it imitates the knowledge of God, as the thing made by art agrees with the art. Granted, however, an actually infinite number of things, for instance, an infinitude of men, or an infinitude in continuous
  quantity, as an infinitude of air, as some of the ancients held; yet
it is manifest that these would have a determinate and finite being,
because their being would be limited to some determinate nature. Hence
they would be measurable as regards the knowledge of
God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 12 ad 3"><a name="28989"><span class=
"ref">[28989] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod scientia Dei est mensura rerum, non quantitativa, qua
quidem mensura carent infinita; sed quia mensurat essentiam et
veritatem rei. Unumquodque enim intantum habet de veritate suae
naturae, inquantum imitatur Dei scientiam; sicut artificiatum
inquantum concordat arti. Dato autem quod essent aliqua infinita
actu secundum numerum, puta infiniti homines; vel secundum
quantitatem continuam, ut si esset aer infinitus, ut quidam antiqui
dixerunt, tamen manifestum est quod haberent esse determinatum et
finitum, quia esse eorum esset limitatum ad aliquas determinatas
naturas. Unde mensurabilia essent secundum scientiam Dei.</p></div></div>
</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13" next="FP_Q14_A14" prev="FP_Q14_A12" progress="2.71%" n="xiii" title="Article. 13 - Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p2"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God
is not of future contingent things. For from a necessary cause
proceeds a necessary effect. But the knowledge of God is the cause of
things known, as said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p2.1"
href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8" shape="rect"
xml:link="simple">(A[8])</a>. Since therefore that knowledge is
necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the
knowledge of God is not of contingent things.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 arg. 1"><a name="28990"><span class=
"ref">[28990] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 13 arg. 1</span></a> Ad
decimumtertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei non sit
futurorum contingentium. A causa enim necessaria procedit effectus
necessarius. Sed scientia Dei est causa scitorum, ut supra dictum
est. Cum ergo ipsa sit necessaria, sequitur scita eius esse
necessaria. Non ergo scientia Dei est contingentium.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every conditional proposition of which the antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only a necessary conclusion can follow, as is proved in Poster. i. But this is a true conditional proposition, "If God knew that this thing will be, it will be," for the knowledge of God is only of true things. Now the
  antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it
is eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore the
consequent is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God knows,
is necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not of contingent
things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 arg. 2"><a name="28991"><span class=
"ref">[28991] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 13 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
omnis conditionalis cuius antecedens est necessarium absolute,
consequens est necessarium absolute. Sic enim se habet antecedens
ad consequens, sicut principia ad conclusionem, ex principiis autem
necessariis non sequitur conclusio nisi necessaria, ut in I Poster.
probatur. Sed haec est quaedam conditionalis vera, si Deus scivit
hoc futurum esse, hoc erit, quia scientia Dei non est nisi verorum.
Huius autem conditionalis antecedens est necessarium absolute, tum
quia est aeternum; tum quia significatur ut praeteritum. Ergo et
consequens est necessarium absolute. Igitur quidquid scitur a Deo,
est necessarium. Et sic scientia Dei non est contingentium.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p4"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything known by God
must necessarily be, because even what we ourselves know, must
necessarily be; and, of course, the knowledge of God is much more
certain than ours. But no future contingent things must necessarily
be. Therefore no contingent future thing is known by
God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 arg. 3"><a name="28992"><span class=
"ref">[28992] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 13 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
scitum a Deo necesse est esse, quia etiam omne scitum a nobis
necesse est esse, cum tamen scientia Dei certior sit quam scientia
nostra. Sed nullum contingens futurum necesse est esse. Ergo nullum
contingens futurum est scitum a Deo.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p5"
shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef
osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.32.15" parsed="vul|Ps|32|15|0|0"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p5.1"
passage="Ps. 32:15">Ps. 32:15</scripRef>), "He Who hath made the
hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works,"
i.e. of men. Now the works of men are contingent, being subject to
free will. Therefore God knows future contingent things.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 s. c."><a name="28993"><span class=
"ref">[28993] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 13 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur in Psalmo XXXII, <i>qui finxit singillatim corda
eorum, qui intelligit omnia opera eorum</i>, scilicet hominum. Sed
opera hominum sunt contingentia, utpote libero arbitrio subiecta.
Ergo Deus scit futura contingentia.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since as was shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>, God knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and creature; and since some of these are future contingent to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p7" shownumber="no"> In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present; neither is it considered as contingent (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this it can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge, for instance to the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In
  another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as a contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation to opposite things: and in this sense a contingent thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a contingent effect in its cause only, has merely a conjectural knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as
  each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[10], A[2]</a> ). Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only
  because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their own causes.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 co."><a name="28994"><span class=
"ref">[28994] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 13 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, cum supra ostensum sit quod Deus sciat omnia non solum quae
actu sunt, sed etiam quae sunt in potentia sua vel creaturae; horum
autem quaedam sunt contingentia nobis futura; sequitur quod Deus
contingentia futura cognoscat. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum
est quod contingens aliquod dupliciter potest considerari. Uno
modo, in seipso, secundum quod iam actu est. Et sic non
consideratur ut futurum, sed ut praesens, neque ut ad utrumlibet
contingens, sed ut determinatum ad unum. Et propter hoc, sic
infallibiliter subdi potest certae cognitioni, utpote sensui visus,
sicut cum video Socratem sedere. Alio modo potest considerari
contingens, ut est in sua causa. Et sic consideratur ut futurum, et
ut contingens nondum determinatum ad unum, quia causa contingens se
habet ad opposita. Et sic contingens non subditur per certitudinem
alicui cognitioni. Unde quicumque cognoscit effectum contingentem
in causa sua tantum, non habet de eo nisi coniecturalem
cognitionem. Deus autem cognoscit omnia contingentia, non solum
prout sunt in suis causis, sed etiam prout unumquodque eorum est
actu in seipso. Et licet contingentia fiant in actu successive, non
tamen Deus successive cognoscit contingentia, prout sunt in suo
esse, sicut nos, sed simul. Quia sua cognitio mensuratur
aeternitate, sicut etiam suum esse, aeternitas autem, tota simul
existens, ambit totum tempus, ut supra dictum est. Unde omnia quae
sunt in tempore, sunt Deo ab aeterno praesentia, non solum ea
ratione qua habet rationes rerum apud se praesentes, ut quidam
dicunt, sed quia eius intuitus fertur ab aeterno super omnia, prout
sunt in sua praesentialitate. Unde manifestum est quod contingentia
et infallibiliter a Deo cognoscuntur, inquantum subduntur divino
conspectui secundum suam praesentialitatem, et tamen sunt futura
contingentia, suis causis comparata.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p8"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the supreme
cause is necessary, the effect may be contingent by reason of the
proximate contingent cause; just as the germination of a plant is
contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause, although the
movement of the sun which is the first cause, is necessary. So
likewise things known by God are contingent on account of their
proximate causes, while the knowledge of God, which is the first
cause, is necessary.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 ad 1"><a name="28995"><span class=
"ref">[28995] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 13 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, licet causa suprema sit necessaria, tamen effectus
potest esse contingens, propter causam proximam contingentem, sicut
germinatio plantae est contingens propter causam proximam
contingentem, licet motus solis, qui est causa prima, sit
necessarius. Et similiter scita a Deo sunt contingentia propter
causas proximas, licet scientia Dei, quae est causa prima, sit
necessaria.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some say that this antecedent, "God knew this contingent to be future," is not necessary, but contingent; because, although it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This however does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had relation to the future, must have had it, although the future sometimes does not follow. On the other hand some say that this antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and contingent; as
  this saying is contingent, "Socrates is a white man." But this also is to no purpose; for when we say, "God knew this contingent to be future," contingent is used here only as the matter of the word, and not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence its contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or false. For it may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I said Socrates runs, or God is: and the same applies
  to necessary and contingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely necessary. Nor does it follow, as some say, that the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of the consequent, which is contingent by reason of the proximate cause. But this is to no purpose. For the conditional would be false were its antecedent the remote necessary cause, and the consequent a contingent effect; as, for example, if I said, "if the sun moves, the grass
  will grow."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p10" shownumber="no"> Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent must be taken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the existence of a thing in itself is different from the existence of a thing in the soul. For example, when I say, "What the soul understands is immaterial," this is to be understood that it is immaterial as it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself. Likewise if I say, "If God knew
  anything, it will be," the consequent must be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, i.e. as it is in its presentiality. And thus it is necessary, as also is the antecedent: "For everything that is, while it is, must be necessarily be," as the Philosopher says in Peri Herm. i.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 ad 2"><a name="28996"><span class=
"ref">[28996] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 13 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod hoc antecedens, Deus scivit hoc
contingens futurum, non est necessarium, sed contingens, quia,
licet sit praeteritum, tamen importat respectum ad futurum. Sed hoc
non tollit ei necessitatem, quia id quod habuit respectum ad
futurum, necesse est habuisse, licet etiam futurum non sequatur
quandoque. Alii vero dicunt hoc antecedens esse contingens, quia
est compositum ex necessario et contingenti; sicut istud dictum est
contingens, Socratem esse hominem album. Sed hoc etiam nihil est.
Quia cum dicitur, Deus scivit esse futurum hoc contingens,
contingens non ponitur ibi nisi ut materia verbi, et non sicut
principalis pars propositionis, unde contingentia eius vel
necessitas nihil refert ad hoc quod propositio sit necessaria vel
contingens, vera vel falsa. Ita enim potest esse verum me dixisse
hominem esse asinum, sicut me dixisse Socratem currere, vel Deum
esse, et eadem ratio est de necessario et contingenti. Unde
dicendum est quod hoc antecedens est necessarium absolute. Nec
tamen sequitur, ut quidam dicunt, quod consequens sit necessarium
absolute, quia antecedens est causa remota consequentis, quod
propter causam proximam contingens est. Sed hoc nihil est. Esset
enim conditionalis falsa, cuius antecedens esset causa remota
necessaria, et consequens effectus contingens, ut puta si dicerem,
si sol movetur, herba germinabit. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod
quando in antecedente ponitur aliquid pertinens ad actum animae,
consequens est accipiendum non secundum quod in se est, sed
secundum quod est in anima, aliud enim est esse rei in seipsa, et
esse rei in anima. Ut puta, si dicam, si anima intelligit aliquid,
illud est immateriale, intelligendum est quod illud est immateriale
secundum quod est in intellectu, non secundum quod est in seipso.
Et similiter si dicam, si Deus scivit aliquid, illud erit,
consequens intelligendum est prout subest divinae scientiae,
scilicet prout est in sua praesentialitate. Et sic necessarium est,
sicut et antecedens, <i>quia omne quod est, dum est, necesse est
esse</i>, ut dicitur in I Periherm.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things reduced to act in time, as known by us successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is above time. Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who goes along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling
  by the way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes. Hence also this proposition, "Everything known by God must necessarily be," is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or to the saying. If it
  refers to the thing, it is divided and false; for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary." If understood of the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense is, "This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A13-p12" shownumber="no"> Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good with regard to forms that are separable from the subject; thus if I said, "It is possible for a white thing to be black," it is false as applied to the saying, and true as applied to the thing: for a thing which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, " a white thing is black" can never be true. But in forms that are inseparable from the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said,
  "A black crow can be white"; for in both senses it is false. Now to be known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what is known by God cannot be known. This objection, however, would hold if these words "that which is known" implied any disposition inherent to the subject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be attributed to the thing known, in itself (even if it always be known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under actual knowledge; thus
  material existence is attributed to a stone in itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 13 ad 3"><a name="28997"><span class=
"ref">[28997] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 13 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod ea quae temporaliter in actum reducuntur, a nobis
successive cognoscuntur in tempore, sed a Deo in aeternitate, quae
est supra tempus. Unde nobis, quia cognoscimus futura contingentia
inquantum talia sunt, certa esse non possunt, sed soli Deo, cuius
intelligere est in aeternitate supra tempus. Sicut ille qui vadit
per viam, non videt illos qui post eum veniunt, sed ille qui ab
aliqua altitudine totam viam intuetur, simul videt omnes
transeuntes per viam. Et ideo illud quod scitur a nobis, oportet
esse necessarium etiam secundum quod in se est, quia ea quae in se
sunt contingentia futura, a nobis sciri non possunt. Sed ea quae
sunt scita a Deo, oportet esse necessaria secundum modum quo
subsunt divinae scientiae, ut dictum est, non autem absolute,
secundum quod in propriis causis considerantur. Unde et haec
propositio, omne scitum a Deo necessarium est esse, consuevit
distingui. Quia potest esse de re, vel de dicto. Si intelligatur de
re, est divisa et falsa, et est sensus, omnis res quam Deus scit,
est necessaria. Vel potest intelligi de dicto, et sic est composita
et vera; et est sensus, hoc dictum, scitum a Deo esse, est
necessarium. Sed obstant quidam, dicentes quod ista distinctio
habet locum in formis separabilibus a subiecto; ut si dicam, album
possibile est esse nigrum. Quae quidem de dicto est falsa, et de re
est vera, res enim quae est alba, potest esse nigra; sed hoc
dictum, album esse nigrum, nunquam potest esse verum. In formis
autem inseparabilibus a subiecto, non habet locum praedicta
distinctio; ut si dicam, corvum nigrum possibile est esse album,
quia in utroque sensu est falsa. Esse autem scitum a Deo, est
inseparabile a re, quia quod est scitum a Deo, non potest esse non
scitum. Haec autem instantia locum haberet, si hoc quod dico
scitum, importaret aliquam dispositionem subiecto inhaerentem. Sed
cum importet actum scientis, ipsi rei scitae, licet semper sciatur,
potest aliquid attribui secundum se, quod non attribuitur ei
inquantum stat sub actu sciendi, sicut esse materiale attribuitur
lapidi secundum se, quod non attribuitur ei secundum quod est
intelligibile.</p></div></div>
</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14" next="FP_Q14_A15" prev="FP_Q14_A13" progress="2.77%" n="xiv" title="Article. 14 - Whether God knows enunciable things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p0.1">Whether God knows enunciable things?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p2"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know
enunciable things. For to know enunciable things belongs to our
intellect as it composes and divides. But in the divine intellect,
there is no composition. Therefore God does not know enunciable
things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 14 arg. 1"><a name="28998"><span class=
"ref">[28998] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 14 arg. 1</span></a> Ad
decimumquartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat
enuntiabilia. Cognoscere enim enuntiabilia convenit intellectui
nostro, secundum quod componit et dividit. Sed in intellectu divino
nulla est compositio. Ergo Deus non cognoscit enuntiabilia.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p3"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every kind of knowledge
is made through some likeness. But in God there is no likeness of
enunciable things, since He is altogether simple. Therefore God does
not know enunciable things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 14 arg. 2"><a name="28999"><span class=
"ref">[28999] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 14 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
omnis cognitio fit per aliquam similitudinem. Sed in Deo nulla est
similitudo enuntiabilium, cum sit omnino simplex. Ergo Deus non
cognoscit enuntiabilia.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p4"
shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The Lord
knoweth the thoughts of men" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.93.11"
parsed="vul|Ps|93|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p4.1"
passage="Ps. 93:11">Ps. 93:11</scripRef>). But enunciable things are
contained in the thoughts of men. Therefore God knows enunciable
things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 14 s. c."><a name="29000"><span class=
"ref">[29000] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 14 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur in Psalmo XCIII, <i>dominus scit cogitationes
hominum</i>. Sed enuntiabilia continentur in cogitationibus
hominum. Ergo Deus cognoscit enuntiabilia.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since it is in the power of our intellect to form enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in that of creatures, as said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A9" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>, it follows of necessity that God knows all enunciations that can be formed.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p6" shownumber="no"> Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite things simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not after the manner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were composition or division of enunciations; for He knows each thing by simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if we by the very fact that we understand what man is, were to understand all that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in our
  intellect, which discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch as the intelligible species represents one thing in such a way as not to represent another. Hence when we understand what man is, we do not forthwith understand other things which belong to him, but we understand them one by one, according to a certain succession. On this account the things we understand as separated, we must reduce to one by way of composition or division, by forming an enunciation. Now the species of the divine
  intellect, which is God's essence, suffices to represent all things. Hence by understanding His essence, God knows the essences of all things, and also whatever can be accidental to them.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 14 co."><a name="29001"><span class=
"ref">[29001] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 14 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, cum formare enuntiabilia sit in potestate intellectus nostri;
Deus autem scit quidquid est in potentia sua vel creaturae, ut
supra dictum est; necesse est quod Deus sciat omnia enuntiabilia
quae formari possunt. Sed, sicut scit materialia immaterialiter, et
composita simpliciter, ita scit enuntiabilia non per modum
enuntiabilium, quasi scilicet in intellectu eius sit compositio vel
divisio enuntiabilium; sed unumquodque cognoscit per simplicem
intelligentiam, intelligendo essentiam uniuscuiusque. Sicut si nos
in hoc ipso quod intelligimus quid est homo, intelligeremus omnia
quae de homine praedicari possunt. Quod quidem in intellectu nostro
non contingit, qui de uno in aliud discurrit, propter hoc quod
species intelligibilis sic repraesentat unum, quod non repraesentat
aliud. Unde, intelligendo quid est homo, non ex hoc ipso alia quae
ei insunt, intelligimus; sed divisim, secundum quandam
successionem. Et propter hoc, ea quae seorsum intelligimus, oportet
nos in unum redigere per modum compositionis vel divisionis,
enuntiationem formando. Sed species intellectus divini, scilicet
eius essentia, sufficit ad demonstrandum omnia. Unde, intelligendo
essentiam suam, cognoscit essentias omnium, et quaecumque eis
accidere possunt.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p7"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection would
avail if God knew enunciable things after the manner of enunciable
things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 14 ad 1"><a name="29002"><span class=
"ref">[29002] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 14 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si Deus cognosceret
enuntiabilia per modum enuntiabilium.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A14-p8"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Enunciatory composition
signifies some existence of a thing; and thus God by His existence,
which is His essence, is the similitude of all those things which are
signified by enunciation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 14 ad 2"><a name="29003"><span class=
"ref">[29003] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 14 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod compositio enuntiabilis significat aliquod esse rei,
et sic Deus per suum esse, quod est eius essentia, est similitudo
omnium eorum quae per enuntiabilia significantur.</p></div></div>
</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15" next="FP_Q14_A16"
prev="FP_Q14_A14" progress="2.79%" n="xv" title="Article. 15 - Whether
the knowledge of God is variable?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p0.1">Whether the knowledge of God is
variable?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
seems that the knowledge of God is variable. For knowledge is related
to what is knowable. But whatever imports relation to the creature is
applied to God from time, and varies according to the variation of
creatures. Therefore the knowledge of God is variable according to the
variation of creatures.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 arg. 1"><a name="29004"><span class=
"ref">[29004] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 15 arg. 1</span></a> Ad
decimumquintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei sit
variabilis. Scientia enim relative dicitur ad scibile. Sed ea quae
important relationem ad creaturam, dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, et
variantur secundum variationem creaturarum. Ergo scientia Dei est
variabilis, secundum variationem creaturarum.</p></div></div><div
style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p3"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever God can make, He
can know. But God can make more than He does. Therefore He can know
more than He knows. Thus His knowledge can vary according to increase
and diminution.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 arg. 2"><a name="29005"><span class=
"ref">[29005] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 15 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
quidquid potest Deus facere, potest scire. Sed Deus potest plura
facere quam faciat. Ergo potest plura scire quam sciat. Et sic
scientia sua potest variari secundum augmentum et
diminutionem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
Further, God knew that Christ would be born. But He does not know now
that Christ will be born; because Christ is not to be born in the
future. Therefore God does not know everything He once knew; and thus
the knowledge of God is variable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 arg. 3"><a name="29006"><span class=
"ref">[29006] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 15 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
scivit Christum nasciturum. Nunc autem nescit Christum nasciturum,
quia Christus nasciturus non est. Ergo non quidquid Deus scivit,
scit. Et ita scientia Dei videtur esse variabilis.</p></div></div><div
style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p5"
shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said, that in God "there
is no change nor shadow of alteration" (<scripRef
osisRef="Bible.vul:Jas.1.17" parsed="vul|Jas|1|17|0|0"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p5.1" passage="James 1:17">James
1:17</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 s. c."><a name="29007"><span class=
"ref">[29007] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 15 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Iac. I, quod <i>apud Deum non est transmutatio, neque
vicissitudinis obumbratio</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I
answer that,</b> Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is
clear from the foregoing <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p6.1"
href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A4" shape="rect"
xml:link="simple">(A[4])</a>, just as His substance is altogether
immutable, as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p6.2"
href="#FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[9],
A[1]</a>), so His knowledge likewise must be altogether
invariable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 co."><a name="29008"><span class=
"ref">[29008] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 15 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, cum scientia Dei sit eius substantia, ut ex dictis patet;
sicut substantia eius est omnino immutabilis, ut supra ostensum
est, ita oportet scientiam eius omnino invariabilem esse.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import relations to creatures in so far as they are in themselves. But the knowledge of God imports relation to creatures in so far as they are in God; because everything is actually understood according as it is in the one who understands. Now created things are in God in an invariable manner; while they exist variably in themselves. We may also say that "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import the relations consequent
  upon the acts which are understood as terminating in the creatures
themselves, as they are in themselves; and thus these relations are
attributed to God variously, according to the variation of
creatures. But "knowledge" and "love," and the like, import relations
consequent upon the acts which are understood to be in God; and
therefore these are predicated of God in an invariable
manner.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 ad 1"><a name="29009"><span class=
"ref">[29009] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 15 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod dominus et creator, et huiusmodi, important
relationes ad creaturas secundum quod in seipsis sunt. Sed scientia
Dei importat relationem ad creaturas secundum quod sunt in Deo,
quia secundum hoc est unumquodque intellectum in actu quod est in
intelligente. Res autem creatae sunt in Deo invariabiliter, in
seipsis autem variabiliter. Vel aliter dicendum est, quod dominus
et creator, et huiusmodi, important relationes quae consequuntur
actus qui intelliguntur terminari ad ipsas creaturas secundum quod
in seipsis sunt, et ideo huiusmodi relationes varie de Deo
dicuntur, secundum variationem creaturarum. Sed scientia et amor,
et huiusmodi, important relationes quae consequuntur actus qui
intelliguntur in Deo esse, et ideo invariabiliter praedicantur de
Deo.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God knows also what He can make, and does not make. Hence from the fact that He can make more than He makes, it does not follow that He can know more than He knows, unless this be referred to the knowledge of vision, according to which He is said to know those things which are in act in some period of time. But from the fact that He knows some things might be which are not, or that some things might not be which are, it does not follow that His
  knowledge is variable, but rather that He knows the variability of things. If, however, anything existed which God did not previously know, and afterwards knew, then His knowledge would be variable. But this could not be; for whatever is, or can be in any period of time, is known by God in His eternity. Therefore from the fact that a thing exists in some period of time, it follows that it is known by God from eternity. Therefore it cannot be granted that God can know more than He knows; because
  such a proposition implies that first of all He did not know, and
then afterwards knew.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 ad 2"><a name="29010"><span class=
"ref">[29010] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 15 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod Deus scit etiam ea quae potest facere et non facit.
Unde ex hoc quod potest plura facere quam facit, non sequitur quod
possit plura scire quam sciat, nisi hoc referatur ad scientiam
visionis, secundum quam dicitur scire ea quae sunt in actu secundum
aliquod tempus. Ex hoc tamen quod scit quod aliqua possunt esse
quae non sunt, vel non esse quae sunt, non sequitur quod scientia
sua sit variabilis, sed quod cognoscat rerum variabilitatem. Si
tamen aliquid esset quod prius Deus nescivisset et postea sciret,
esset eius scientia variabilis. Sed hoc esse non potest, quia
quidquid est vel potest esse secundum aliquod tempus, Deus in
aeterno suo scit. Et ideo ex hoc ipso quod ponitur aliquid esse
secundum quodcumque tempus, oportet poni quod ab aeterno sit scitum
a Deo. Et ideo non debet concedi quod Deus possit plura scire quam
sciat, quia haec propositio implicat quod ante nesciverit et postea
sciat.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The ancient Nominalists said that it was the same thing to say "Christ is born" and "will be born" and "was born"; because the same thing is signified by these three---viz. the nativity of Christ. Therefore it follows, they said, that whatever God knew, He knows; because now He knows that Christ is born, which means the same thing as that Christ will be born. This opinion, however, is false; both because the diversity in the parts of a sentence causes
  a diversity of enunciations; and because it would follow that a proposition which is true once would be always true; which is contrary to what the Philosopher lays down (Categor. iii) when he says that this sentence, "Socrates sits," is true when he is sitting, and false when he rises up. Therefore, it must be conceded that this proposition is not true, "Whatever God knew He knows," if referred to enunciable propositions. But because of this, it does not follow that the knowledge of God is
  variable. For as it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows one and the same thing sometime to be, and sometime not to be, so it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows an enunciable proposition is sometime true, and sometime false. The knowledge of God, however, would be variable if He knew enunciable things by way of enunciation, by composition and division, as occurs in our intellect. Hence our knowledge varies either as regards truth and falsity, for
  example, if when either as regards truth and falsity, for example,
if when a thing suffers change we retained the same opinion about it;
or as regards diverse opinions, as if we first thought that anyone was
sitting, and afterwards thought that he was not sitting; neither of
which can be in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 15 ad 3"><a name="29011"><span class=
"ref">[29011] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 15 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod antiqui nominales dixerunt idem esse enuntiabile,
Christum nasci, et esse nasciturum, et esse natum, quia eadem res
significatur per haec tria, scilicet nativitas Christi. Et secundum
hoc sequitur quod Deus quidquid scivit, sciat, quia modo scit
Christum natum, quod significat idem ei quod est Christum esse
nasciturum. Sed haec opinio falsa est. Tum quia diversitas partium
orationis diversitatem enuntiabilium causat. Tum etiam quia
sequeretur quod propositio quae semel est vera, esset semper vera,
quod est contra philosophum, qui dicit quod haec oratio, Socrates
sedet, vera est eo sedente, et eadem falsa est, eo surgente. Et
ideo concedendum est quod haec non est vera, quidquid Deus scivit,
scit, si ad enuntiabilia referatur. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod
scientia Dei sit variabilis. Sicut enim absque variatione divinae
scientiae est, quod sciat unam et eandem rem quandoque esse et
quandoque non esse; ita absque variatione divinae scientiae est,
quod scit aliquod enuntiabile quandoque esse verum, et quandoque
esse falsum. Esset autem ex hoc scientia Dei variabilis, si
enuntiabilia cognosceret per modum enuntiabilium, componendo et
dividendo, sicut accidit in intellectu nostro. Unde cognitio nostra
variatur, vel secundum veritatem et falsitatem, puta si, mutata re,
eandem opinionem de re illa retineamus, vel secundum diversas
opiniones, ut si primo opinemur aliquem sedere, et postea opinemur
eum non sedere. Quorum neutrum potest esse in Deo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16" next="FP_Q15" prev="FP_Q14_A15" progress="2.82%" n="xvi" title="Article. 16 - Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p0.1">Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p2"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not a
speculative knowledge of things. For the knowledge of God is the cause
of things, as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p2.1"
href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8" shape="rect"
xml:link="simple">(A[8])</a>. But speculative knowledge is not the
cause of the things known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not
speculative.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 16 arg. 1"><a name="29012"><span class=
"ref">[29012] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 16 arg. 1</span></a> Ad
decimumsextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus de rebus non habeat
scientiam speculativam. Scientia enim Dei est causa rerum, ut supra
ostensum est. Sed scientia speculativa non est causa rerum
scitarum. Ergo scientia Dei non est speculativa.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p3"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, speculative knowledge
comes by abstraction from things; which does not belong to the divine
knowledge. Therefore the knowledge of God is not
speculative.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 16 arg. 2"><a name="29013"><span class=
"ref">[29013] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 16 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea.
Scientia speculativa est per abstractionem a rebus, quod divinae
scientiae non competit. Ergo scientia Dei non est speculativa.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p4"
shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is the more excellent
must be attributed to God. But speculative knowledge is more excellent
than practical knowledge, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of
Metaphysics. Therefore God has a speculative knowledge of
things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 16 s. c."><a name="29014"><span class=
"ref">[29014] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 16 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne
quod est nobilius, Deo est attribuendum. Sed scientia speculativa
est nobilior quam practica, ut patet per philosophum, in principio
Metaphys. Ergo Deus habet de rebus scientiam speculativam.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Some knowledge is speculative only; some is practical only; and some is partly speculative and partly practical. In proof whereof it must be observed that knowledge can be called speculative in three ways: first, on the part of the things known, which are not operable by the knower; such is the knowledge of man about natural or divine thing. Secondly, as regards the manner of knowing---as, for instance, if a builder consider a house by defining and dividing,
  and considering what belongs to it in general: for this is to consider operable things in a speculative manner, and not as practically operable; for operable means the application of form to matter, and not the resolution of the composite into its universal formal principles. Thirdly, as regards the end; "for the practical intellect differs in its end from the speculative," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii). For the practical intellect is ordered to the end of the operation; whereas the
  end of the speculative intellect is the consideration of truth. Hence if a builder should consider how a house can be made, not ordering this to the end of operation, but only to know (how to do it), this would be only a speculative considerations as regards the end, although it concerns an operable thing. Therefore knowledge which is speculative by reason of the thing itself known, is merely speculative. But that which is speculative either in its mode or as to its end is partly speculative
  and partly practical: and when it is ordained to an operative end it is simply practical.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p6" shownumber="no"> In accordance with this, therefore, it must be said that God has of Himself a speculative knowledge only; for He Himself is not operable. But of all other things He has both speculative and practical knowledge. He has speculative knowledge as regards the mode; for whatever we know speculatively in things by defining and dividing, God knows all this much more perfectly.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p7" shownumber="no"> Now of things which He can make, but does not make at any time, He has not a practical knowledge, according as knowledge is called practical from the end. But He has a practical knowledge of what He makes in some period of time. And, as regards evil things, although they are not operable by Him, yet they fall under His practical knowledge, like good things, inasmuch as He permits, or impedes, or directs them; as also sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of the
  physician, inasmuch as he cures them by his art.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 16 co."><a name="29015"><span class=
"ref">[29015] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 16 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod aliqua scientia est speculativa tantum, aliqua practica
tantum, aliqua vero secundum aliquid speculativa et secundum
aliquid practica. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod aliqua
scientia potest dici speculativa tripliciter. Primo, ex parte rerum
scitarum, quae non sunt operabiles a sciente, sicut est scientia
hominis de rebus naturalibus vel divinis. Secundo, quantum ad modum
sciendi, ut puta si aedificator consideret domum definiendo et
dividendo et considerando universalia praedicata ipsius. Hoc
siquidem est operabilia modo speculativo considerare, et non
secundum quod operabilia sunt, operabile enim est aliquid per
applicationem formae ad materiam, non per resolutionem compositi in
principia universalia formalia. Tertio, quantum ad finem, <i>nam
intellectus practicus differt fine a speculativo</i>, sicut dicitur
in III de anima. Intellectus enim practicus ordinatur ad finem
operationis, finis autem intellectus speculativi est consideratio
veritatis. Unde, si quis aedificator consideret qualiter posset
fieri aliqua domus, non ordinans ad finem operationis, sed ad
cognoscendum tantum, erit, quantum ad finem, speculativa
consideratio, tamen de re operabili. Scientia igitur quae est
speculativa ratione ipsius rei scitae, est speculativa tantum. Quae
vero speculativa est vel secundum modum vel secundum finem, est
secundum quid speculativa et secundum quid practica. Cum vero
ordinatur ad finem operationis, est simpliciter practica. Secundum
hoc ergo, dicendum est quod Deus de seipso habet scientiam
speculativam tantum, ipse enim operabilis non est. De omnibus vero
aliis habet scientiam et speculativam et practicam. Speculativam
quidem, quantum ad modum, quidquid enim in rebus nos speculative
cognoscimus definiendo et dividendo, hoc totum Deus multo
perfectius novit. Sed de his quae potest quidem facere, sed
secundum nullum tempus facit, non habet practicam scientiam,
secundum quod practica scientia dicitur a fine. Sic autem habet
practicam scientiam de his quae secundum aliquod tempus facit. Mala
vero, licet ab eo non sint operabilia, tamen sub cognitione
practica ipsius cadunt, sicut et bona, inquantum permittit vel
impedit vel ordinat ea, sicut et aegritudines cadunt sub practica
scientia medici, inquantum per artem suam curat eas.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p8"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The knowledge of God is
the cause, not indeed of Himself, but of other things. He is actually
the cause of some, that is, of things that come to be in some period
of time; and He is virtually the cause of others, that is, of things
which He can make, and which nevertheless are never
made.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 16 ad 1"><a name="29016"><span class=
"ref">[29016] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 16 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod scientia Dei est causa, non quidem sui ipsius, sed
aliorum, quorundam quidem actu, scilicet eorum quae secundum
aliquod tempus fiunt; quorundam vero virtute, scilicet eorum quae
potest facere, et tamen nunquam fiunt.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that knowledge is derived from things known does not essentially belong to speculative knowledge, but only accidentally in so far as it is human.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A16-p10" shownumber="no"> In answer to what is objected on the contrary, we must say that perfect knowledge of operable things is obtainable only if they are known in so far as they are operable. Therefore, since the knowledge of God is in every way perfect, He must know what is operable by Him, formally as such, and not only in so far as they are speculative. Nevertheless this does not impair the nobility of His speculative knowledge, forasmuch as He sees all things other than Himself in Himself, and He
  knows Himself speculatively; and so in the speculative knowledge of Himself, he possesses both speculative and practical knowledge of all other things.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 14 a. 16 ad 2"><a name="29017"><span class=
"ref">[29017] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 16 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod scientiam esse acceptam a rebus scitis, non per se
convenit scientiae speculativae, sed per accidens, inquantum est
humana.</p><p title="I q. 14 a. 16 ad 3"><a name="29018"><span class=
"ref">[29018] I&ordf; q. 14 a. 16 ad 3</span></a> Ad id vero quod
in contrarium obiicitur, dicendum quod de operabilibus perfecta
scientia non habetur, nisi sciantur inquantum operabilia sunt. Et
ideo, cum scientia Dei sit omnibus modis perfecta, oportet quod
sciat ea quae sunt a se operabilia, inquantum huiusmodi, et non
solum secundum quod sunt speculabilia. Sed tamen non receditur a
nobilitate speculativae scientiae, quia omnia alia a se videt in
seipso, seipsum autem speculative cognoscit; et sic in speculativa
sui ipsius scientia, habet cognitionem et speculativam et practicam
omnium aliorum.</p></div></div>
</div></div>
<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q15" next="FP_Q15_A1" prev="FP_Q14_A16" progress="2.85%" n="xiv" title="Question. 15 - OF IDEAS (THREE ARTICLES)">
<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p0.1">Question 15. OF IDEAS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p2" shownumber="no"> After considering the knowledge of God, it remains to consider ideas. And about this there are three points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether there are ideas?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether they are many, or one only?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether there are ideas of all things known by God?</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1" next="FP_Q15_A2" prev="FP_Q15" progress="2.86%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether there are ideas?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p0.1">Whether there are ideas?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), that God does not know things by ideas. But ideas are for nothing else except that things may be known through them. Therefore there are no ideas.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been already said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A5" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[5]</a>). But He does not know Himself through an idea; neither therefore other things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an idea is considered to be the principle of knowledge and action. But the divine essence is a sufficient principle of knowing and effecting all things. It is not therefore necessary to suppose ideas.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi),"Such is the power inherent in ideas, that no one can be wise unless they are understood."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind. For the Greek word {Idea} is in Latin "forma." Hence by ideas are understood the forms of things, existing apart from the things themselves. Now the form of anything existing apart from the thing itself can be for one of two ends: either to be the type of that of which it is called the form, or to be the principle of the knowledge of that thing, inasmuch as the forms of things knowable are said to be in
  him who knows them. In either case we must suppose ideas, as is clear for the following reason:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p7" shownumber="no"> In all things not generated by chance, the form must be the end of any generation whatsoever. But an agent does not act on account of the form, except in so far as the likeness of the form is in the agent, as may happen in two ways. For in some agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists according to its natural being, as in those that act by their nature; as a man generates a man, or fire generates fire. Whereas in other agents (the form of the thing to be made
  pre-exists) according to intelligible being, as in those that act by the intellect; and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists in the mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends to build his house like to the form conceived in his mind. As then the world was not made by chance, but by God acting by His intellect, as will appear later (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.iv.FP_Q46.FP_Q46_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[46], A[1]</a>), there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which the
  world was made. And in this the notion of an idea consists.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God does not understand things according to an idea existing outside Himself. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. ix) rejects the opinion of Plato, who held that ideas existed of themselves, and not in the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although God knows Himself and all else by His own essence, yet His essence is the operative principle of all things, except of Himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with respect to other things; though not with respect to Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A1-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is the similitude of all things according to His essence; therefore an idea in God is identical with His essence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2" next="FP_Q15_A3" prev="FP_Q15_A1" progress="2.88%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether ideas are many?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p0.1">Whether ideas are many?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in God is His essence. But God's essence is one only. Therefore there is only one idea.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and operating, so are art and wisdom. But in God there are not several arts or wisdoms. Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be said that ideas are multiplied according to their relations to different creatures, it may be argued on the contrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal. If, then, ideas are many, but creatures temporal, then the temporal must be the cause of the eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, these relations are either real in creatures only, or in God also. If in creatures only, since creatures are not from eternity, the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity, if ideas are multiplied only according to these relations. But if they are real in God, it follows that there is a real plurality in God other than the plurality of Persons: and this is against the teaching of Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 10), who says, in God all things are one,
  except "ingenerability, generation, and procession." Ideas therefore are not many.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "Ideas are certain principal forms, or permanent and immutable types of things, they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal, and existing always in the same manner, as being contained in the divine intelligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come into being nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with them everything is formed that can rise or decay, and all that actually does so."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> It must necessarily be held that ideas are many. In proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the ultimate end is the proper intention of the principal agent, as the order of an army (is the proper intention) of the general. Now the highest good existing in things is the good of the order of the universe, as the Philosopher clearly teaches in Metaph. xii. Therefore the order of the universe is properly intended by God, and is not the
  accidental result of a succession of agents, as has been supposed by those who have taught that God created only the first creature, and that this creature created the second creature, and so on, until this great multitude of beings was produced. According to this opinion God would have the idea of the first created thing alone; whereas, if the order itself of the universe was created by Him immediately, and intended by Him, He must have the idea of the order of the universe. Now there cannot
  be an idea of any whole, unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which the whole is made; just as a builder cannot conceive the idea of a house unless he has the idea of each of its parts. So, then, it must needs be that in the divine mind there are the proper ideas of all things. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "that each thing was created by God according to the idea proper to it," from which it follows that in the divine mind ideas are many. Now it can easily
  be seen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of God, if we consider that the idea of a work is in the mind of the operator as that which is understood, and not as the image whereby he understands, which is a form that makes the intellect in act. For the form of the house in the mind of the builder, is something understood by him, to the likeness of which he forms the house in matter. Now, it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it understand many things; though it
  would be repugnant to its simplicity were His understanding to be formed by a plurality of images. Hence many ideas exist in the divine mind, as things understood by it; as can be proved thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own essence perfectly, He knows it according to every mode in which it can be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in itself, but as it can be participated in by creatures according to some degree of likeness. But every creature has its own proper species, according to
  which it participates in some degree in likeness to the divine essence. So far, therefore, as God knows His essence as capable of such imitation by any creature, He knows it as the particular type and idea of that creature; and in like manner as regards other creatures. So it is clear that God understands many particular types of things and these are many ideas.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine essence is not called an idea in so far as it is that essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or type of this or that thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch as many types are understood through the self-same essence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By wisdom and art we signify that by which God understands; but an idea, that which God understands. For God by one understands many things, and that not only according to what they are in themselves, but also according as they are understood, and this is to understand the several types of things. In the same way, an architect is said to understand a house, when he understands the form of the house in matter. But if he understands the form of a house,
  as devised by himself, from the fact that he understands that he understands it, he thereby understands the type or idea of the house. Now not only does God understand many things by His essence, but He also understands that He understands many things by His essence. And this means that He understands the several types of things; or that many ideas are in His intellect as understood by Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Such relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are caused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect comparing its own essence with these things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A2-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in created things, but in God. Yet they are not real relations, such as those whereby the Persons are distinguished, but relations understood by God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3" next="FP_Q16" prev="FP_Q15_A2" progress="2.92%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p0.1">Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would follow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God. Therefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be, nor have been, as has been said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p3.1" href="#FP_Q15_A9" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>. But of such things there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): "Acts of the divine will are the determining and effective types of things." Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knows primary matter, of which there can be no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is certain that God knows not only species, but also genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are not ideas of these, according to Plato's teaching, who first taught ideas, as Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore there are not ideas in God of all things known by Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But God has the proper types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas of all things known by Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold office, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the principle of the making of things, it may be called an "exemplar," and belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of knowledge, it is properly called a "type," and may belong to speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect to
  everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a principle of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God, even though they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows according to their proper type, in so far as they are known by Him in a speculative manner.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil is known by God not through its own type, but through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God, neither in so far as an idea is an "exemplar" nor as a "type."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God has no practical knowledge, except virtually, of things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with respect to these there is no idea in God in so far as idea signifies an "exemplar" but only in so far as it denotes a "type."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a concause with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God; but not apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in itself can neither exist, nor be known.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species, in so far as idea denotes an "exemplar"; for genus cannot exist except in some species. The same is the case with those accidents that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the subject, have their special idea. For an architect produces through the form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it;
  whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such as painting, or any other such thing, are produced through some other form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea than that of species; both because particular things are individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated and the concause with the idea; and because the intention of nature regards the species, and produces individuals only that in them the species may be preserved.
  However, divine providence extends not merely to species; but to
individuals as will be shown later (<a
id="FP.ii.FP_Q15.FP_Q15_A3-p11.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q22.FP_Q22_A3"
shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[22], A[3]</a> ).</p></div></div></div></div>
<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16" next="FP_Q16_A1" prev="FP_Q15_A3" progress="2.95%" n="xv" title="Question. 16 - OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)">
<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p0.1">Question 16. OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p2" shownumber="no"> Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration of the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth. About this there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) On the comparison of the true to being.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) On the comparison of the true to the good.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p7" shownumber="no"> (5) Whether God is truth?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p8" shownumber="no"> (6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p9" shownumber="no"> (7) On the eternity of truth.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16-p10" shownumber="no"> (8) On the unchangeableness of truth.</p>
</div></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 pr."><a name="29048"><span class="ref">[29048]
I&ordf; q. 16 pr.</span></a> Quoniam autem scientia verorum est,
post considerationem scientiae Dei, de veritate inquirendum est.
Circa quam quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum veritas sit in re, vel
tantum in intellectu. Secundo, utrum sit tantum in intellectu
componente et dividente. Tertio, de comparatione veri ad ens.
Quarto, de comparatione veri ad bonum. Quinto, utrum Deus sit
veritas. Sexto, utrum omnia sint vera veritate una, vel pluribus.
Septimo, de aeternitate veritatis. Octavo, de incommutabilitate
ipsius.</p></div></div>
<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" next="FP_Q16_A2" prev="FP_Q16" progress="2.95%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether truth resides only in the intellect?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p0.1">Whether truth resides only in the intellect?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns this definition of truth, "That is true which is seen"; since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, "That is true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing and able to know," for hence it would follow that nothing would be true,
  unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: "That
is true which is." It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and
not in the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29049"><span class=
"ref">[29049] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod veritas non sit tantum in intellectu, sed
magis in rebus. Augustinus enim, in libro Soliloq., reprobat hanc
notificationem veri, verum est id quod videtur, quia secundum hoc,
lapides qui sunt in abditissimo terrae sinu, non essent veri
lapides, quia non videntur. Reprobat etiam istam, verum est quod
ita se habet ut videtur cognitori, si velit et possit cognoscere,
quia secundum hoc sequeretur quod nihil esset verum, si nullus
posset cognoscere. Et definit sic verum, verum est id quod est. Et
sic videtur quod veritas sit in rebus, et non in intellectu.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p3"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is true, is true
by reason of truth. If, then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing
will be true except in so far as it is understood. But this is the
error of the ancient philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be
true is so. Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as
seen by different persons at the same time.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29050"><span class=
"ref">[29050] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
quidquid est verum, veritate verum est. Si igitur veritas est in
intellectu solo, nihil erit verum nisi secundum quod intelligitur,
quod est error antiquorum philosophorum, qui dicebant omne quod
videtur, esse verum. Ad quod sequitur contradictoria simul esse
vera, cum contradictoria simul a diversis vera esse videantur.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p4"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "that, on account of
which a thing is so, is itself more so," as is evident from the
Philosopher (Poster. i). But it is from the fact that a thing is or is
not, that our thought or word is true or false, as the Philosopher
teaches (Praedicam. iii). Therefore truth resides rather in things
than in the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29051"><span class=
"ref">[29051] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> <i>Praeterea,
propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis</i>, ut patet I Poster.
<i>Sed ex eo quod res est vel non est, est opinio vel oratio vera
vel falsa</i>, secundum philosophum in praedicamentis. Ergo veritas
magis est in rebus quam in intellectu.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p5"
shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says
(Metaph. vi), " The true and the false reside not in things, but in
the intellect."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29052"><span class=
"ref">[29052] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod philosophus dicit, VI Metaphys., quod <i>verum et falsum non
sunt in rebus, sed in intellectu</i>.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As the good denotes that towards which the appetite tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends towards the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely good, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect,
  namely true, is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is related to the appetite---and hence the aspect of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far as the appetite is called good if its object is good; so, since the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood is said to be
  true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect. Now a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect on which it depends as regards its essence; but accidentally to an intellect by which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is related essentially to the intellect of the architect, but accidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p7" shownumber="no"> Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said to be true absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it depends; and thus it is that artificial things are said to be true a being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the form in the architect's mind; and words are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the
  intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so far as they express the likeness of the species that are in the divine mind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to a stone, according to the preconception in the divine intellect. Thus, then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things according as they are related to the intellect as their principle. Consequently there are various definitions of truth. Augustine says (De Vera
  Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is;" and Hilary says (De Trin. v) that "Truth makes being clear and evident" and this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as they are related to the intellect, we have Augustine's definition (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is a supreme likeness without any unlikeness to a principle": also Anselm's definition (De Verit. xii), "Truth is rightness, perceptible by the mind alone";
  for that is right which is in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna's definition (Metaph. viii, 6), "The truth of each thing is a property of the essence which is immutably attached to it." The definition that "Truth is the equation of thought and thing" is applicable to it under either aspect.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 1 co."><a name="29053"><span class=
"ref">[29053] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut bonum nominat id in quod tendit appetitus, ita verum
nominat id in quod tendit intellectus. Hoc autem distat inter
appetitum et intellectum, sive quamcumque cognitionem, quia
cognitio est secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente, appetitus
autem est secundum quod appetens inclinatur in ipsam rem appetitam.
Et sic terminus appetitus, quod est bonum, est in re appetibili,
sed terminus cognitionis, quod est verum, est in ipso intellectu.
Sicut autem bonum est in re, inquantum habet ordinem ad appetitum;
et propter hoc ratio bonitatis derivatur a re appetibili in
appetitum, secundum quod appetitus dicitur bonus, prout est boni,
ita, cum verum sit in intellectu secundum quod conformatur rei
intellectae, necesse est quod ratio veri ab intellectu ad rem
intellectam derivetur, ut res etiam intellecta vera dicatur,
secundum quod habet aliquem ordinem ad intellectum. Res autem
intellecta ad intellectum aliquem potest habere ordinem vel per se,
vel per accidens. Per se quidem habet ordinem ad intellectum a quo
dependet secundum suum esse, per accidens autem ad intellectum a
quo cognoscibilis est. Sicut si dicamus quod domus comparatur ad
intellectum artificis per se, per accidens autem comparatur ad
intellectum a quo non dependet. Iudicium autem de re non sumitur
secundum id quod inest ei per accidens, sed secundum id quod inest
ei per se. Unde unaquaeque res dicitur vera absolute, secundum
ordinem ad intellectum a quo dependet. Et inde est quod res
artificiales dicuntur verae per ordinem ad intellectum nostrum,
dicitur enim domus vera, quae assequitur similitudinem formae quae
est in mente artificis; et dicitur oratio vera, inquantum est
signum intellectus veri. Et similiter res naturales dicuntur esse
verae, secundum quod assequuntur similitudinem specierum quae sunt
in mente divina, dicitur enim verus lapis, qui assequitur propriam
lapidis naturam, secundum praeconceptionem intellectus divini. Sic
ergo veritas principaliter est in intellectu; secundario vero in
rebus, secundum quod comparantur ad intellectum ut ad principium.
Et secundum hoc, veritas diversimode notificatur. Nam Augustinus,
in libro de vera Relig., dicit quod <i>veritas est, qua ostenditur
id quod est</i>. Et Hilarius dicit quod <i>verum est declarativum
aut manifestativum esse</i>. Et hoc pertinet ad veritatem secundum
quod est in intellectu. Ad veritatem autem rei secundum ordinem ad
intellectum, pertinet definitio Augustini in libro de vera Relig.,
<i>veritas est summa similitudo principii, quae sine ulla
dissimilitudine est</i>. Et quaedam definitio Anselmi, <i>veritas
est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis</i>; nam rectum est, quod
principio concordat. Et quaedam definitio Avicennae, <i>veritas
uniuscuiusque rei est proprietas sui esse quod stabilitum est
ei</i>. Quod autem dicitur quod veritas est adaequatio rei et
intellectus potest ad utrumque pertinere.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p8"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking
about the truth of things, and excludes from the notion of this truth,
relation to our intellect; for what is accidental is excluded from
every definition.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29054"><span class=
"ref">[29054] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de veritate rei; et excludit a
ratione huius veritatis, comparationem ad intellectum nostrum. Nam
id quod est per accidens, ab unaquaque definitione excluditur.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The ancient philosophers held that the species of natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they were compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to our intellect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph. iv). Such, however, do not follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their
  relation to the divine intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29055"><span class=
"ref">[29055] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod antiqui philosophi species rerum naturalium non
dicebant procedere ab aliquo intellectu, sed eas provenire a casu,
et quia considerabant quod verum importat comparationem ad
intellectum, cogebantur veritatem rerum constituere in ordine ad
intellectum nostrum. Ex quo inconvenientia sequebantur quae
philosophus prosequitur in IV Metaphys. Quae quidem inconvenientia
non accidunt, si ponamus veritatem rerum consistere in comparatione
ad intellectum divinum.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing, yet it is not necessary that truth should be there primarily, any more than that health should be primarily in medicine, rather than in the animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not its health, is the cause of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the same way, the being of the thing, not its truth, is the cause of truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a thought
  or a word is true "from the fact that a thing is, not because a
thing is true."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29056"><span class=
"ref">[29056] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, licet veritas intellectus nostri a re causetur, non
tamen oportet quod in re per prius inveniatur ratio veritatis,
sicut neque in medicina per prius invenitur ratio sanitatis quam in
animali; virtus enim medicinae, non sanitas eius, causat sanitatem,
cum non sit agens univocum. Et similiter esse rei, non veritas
eius, causat veritatem intellectus. Unde philosophus dicit quod
opinio et oratio vera est <i>ex eo quod res est, non ex eo quod res
vera est</i>.</p></div></div>
</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2" next="FP_Q16_A3" prev="FP_Q16_A1" progress="2.99%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p0.1">Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p2"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth does not
reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. For the
Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that as the senses are always true as
regards their proper sensible objects, so is the intellect as regards
"what a thing is." Now composition and division are neither in the
senses nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is." Therefore truth
does not reside only in the intellect composing and
dividing.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29057"><span class=
"ref">[29057] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod veritas non sit solum in intellectu
componente et dividente. Dicit enim philosophus, in III de anima,
quod sicut sensus propriorum sensibilium semper veri sunt, ita et
intellectus eius quod quid est. Sed compositio et divisio non est
neque in sensu, neque in intellectu cognoscente quod quid est. Ergo
veritas non solum est in compositione et divisione intellectus.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p3"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isaac says in his book On
Definitions that truth is the equation of thought and thing. Now just
as the intellect with regard to complex things can be equated to
things, so also with regard to simple things; and this is true also of
sense apprehending a thing as it is. Therefore truth does not reside
only in the intellect composing and dividing.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29058"><span class=
"ref">[29058] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Isaac
dicit, in libro de definitionibus, quod veritas est adaequatio rei
et intellectus. Sed sicut intellectus complexorum potest adaequari
rebus, ita intellectus incomplexorum, et etiam sensus sentiens rem
ut est. Ergo veritas non est solum in compositione et divisione
intellectus.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p4"
shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says
(Metaph. vi) that with regard to simple things and "what a thing is,"
truth is "found neither in the intellect nor in things."</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29059"><span class=
"ref">[29059] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit philosophus, in VI Metaphys., quod circa simplicia et
quod quid est non est veritas, nec in intellectu neque in
rebus.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect, in the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has the form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing, must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the thing known, this being its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the conformity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity is to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For
  although sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the comparison which exists between the thing seen and that which itself apprehends concerning it. But the intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of a thing "what a thing is." When, however, it judges that a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing, then first it knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and dividing:
  for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes from the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by the predicate: and this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing, as is also the intellect, when it knows "what a thing is"; but it does not thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like manner the case with complex or non-complex words. Truth therefore may be in the senses, or in the intellect knowing "what a thing is," as in anything that is true; yet not as the
  thing known in the knower, which is implied by the word "truth"; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as known. Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect composing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2-p6" shownumber="no"> And thus the Objections given are solved.</p>
</div></div>
<div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 2 co."><a name="29060"><span class=
"ref">[29060] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod verum, sicut dictum est, secundum sui primam rationem est in
intellectu. Cum autem omnis res sit vera secundum quod habet
propriam formam naturae suae, necesse est quod intellectus,
inquantum est cognoscens, sit verus inquantum habet similitudinem
rei cognitae, quae est forma eius inquantum est cognoscens. Et
propter hoc per conformitatem intellectus et rei veritas definitur.
Unde conformitatem istam cognoscere, est cognoscere veritatem. Hanc
autem nullo modo sensus cognoscit, licet enim visus habeat
similitudinem visibilis, non tamen cognoscit comparationem quae est
inter rem visam et id quod ipse apprehendit de ea. Intellectus
autem conformitatem sui ad rem intelligibilem cognoscere potest,
sed tamen non apprehendit eam secundum quod cognoscit de aliquo
quod quid est; sed quando iudicat rem ita se habere sicut est forma
quam de re apprehendit, tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum. Et hoc
facit componendo et dividendo, nam in omni propositione aliquam
formam significatam per praedicatum, vel applicat alicui rei
significatae per subiectum, vel removet ab ea. Et ideo bene
invenitur quod sensus est verus de aliqua re, vel intellectus
cognoscendo quod quid est, sed non quod cognoscat aut dicat verum.
Et similiter est de vocibus complexis aut incomplexis. Veritas
quidem igitur potest esse in sensu, vel in intellectu cognoscente
quod quid est, ut in quadam re vera, non autem ut cognitum in
cognoscente, quod importat nomen veri; perfectio enim intellectus
est verum ut cognitum. Et ideo, proprie loquendo, veritas est in
intellectu componente et dividente, non autem in sensu, neque in
intellectu cognoscente quod quid est.</p><p title="I q. 16 a. 2 ad arg."><a name="29061"><span class=
"ref">[29061] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 2 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc
patet solutio ad obiecta.</p></div></div>
</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3" next="FP_Q16_A4"
prev="FP_Q16_A2" progress="3.01%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether
the true and being are convertible terms?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p0.1">Whether the true and being are
convertible terms?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For the true
resides properly in the intellect, as stated <a
id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p2.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1"
shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>; but being is properly in
things. Therefore they are not convertible.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29062"><span class=
"ref">[29062] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod verum et ens non convertantur. Verum enim
est proprie in intellectu, ut dictum est. Ens autem proprie est in
rebus. Ergo non convertuntur.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p3"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which extends to
being and not-being is not convertible with being. But the true
extends to being and not-being; for it is true that what is, is; and
that what is not, is not. Therefore the true and being are not
convertible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29063"><span class=
"ref">[29063] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id
quod se extendit ad ens et non ens, non convertitur cum ente. Sed
verum se extendit ad ens et non ens, nam verum est quod est esse,
et quod non est non esse. Ergo verum et ens non
convertuntur.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority and
posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true appears to be
prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of
the true. Therefore it seems they are not convertible.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29064"><span class=
"ref">[29064] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quae
se habent secundum prius et posterius, non videntur converti. Sed
verum videtur prius esse quam ens, nam ens non intelligitur nisi
sub ratione veri. Ergo videtur quod non sint
convertibilia.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b>
the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the same disposition
of things in being and in truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29065"><span class=
"ref">[29065] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit philosophus, II Metaphys., quod eadem est dispositio
rerum in esse et veritate.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I
answer that,</b> As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth
is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, so
far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in De Anima iii that "the
soul is in some manner all things," through the senses and the
intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the
true. But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true
adds relation to the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 3 co."><a name="29066"><span class=
"ref">[29066] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut bonum habet rationem appetibilis, ita verum habet
ordinem ad cognitionem. Unumquodque autem inquantum habet de esse,
intantum est cognoscibile. Et propter hoc dicitur in III de anima,
quod anima est quodammodo omnia secundum sensum et intellectum. Et
ideo, sicut bonum convertitur cum ente, ita et verum. Sed tamen,
sicut bonum addit rationem appetibilis supra ens, ita et verum
comparationem ad intellectum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said before <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. But the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. It may, however, be said that being also is in the things and in the
  intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in things;
and this is so because truth and being differ in idea.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29067"><span class=
"ref">[29067] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod verum est in rebus et in intellectu, ut dictum est.
Verum autem quod est in rebus, convertitur cum ente secundum
substantiam. Sed verum quod est in intellectu, convertitur cum
ente, ut manifestativum cum manifestato. Hoc enim est de ratione
veri, ut dictum est. Quamvis posset dici quod etiam ens est in
rebus et in intellectu, sicut et verum; licet verum principaliter
in intellectu, ens vero principaliter in rebus. Et hoc accidit
propter hoc, quod verum et ens differunt ratione.</p></div></div><div
style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p8"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not-being has nothing in
itself whereby it can be known; yet it is known in so far as the
intellect renders it knowable. Hence the true is based on being,
inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being, apprehended, that
is, by reason.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29068"><span class=
"ref">[29068] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod non ens non habet in se unde cognoscatur, sed
cognoscitur inquantum intellectus facit illud cognoscibile. Unde
verum fundatur in ente, inquantum non ens est quoddam ens rationis,
apprehensum scilicet a ratione.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be
  apprehended also; since being is included in the idea of the
true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object with
being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is
intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility is
not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true
is not understood by understanding being.</p></div><div style="width:
45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29069"><span class=
"ref">[29069] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, cum dicitur quod ens non potest apprehendi sine
ratione veri, hoc potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo, ita quod
non apprehendatur ens, nisi ratio veri assequatur apprehensionem
entis. Et sic locutio habet veritatem. Alio modo posset sic
intelligi, quod ens non posset apprehendi, nisi apprehenderetur
ratio veri. Et hoc falsum est. Sed verum non potest apprehendi,
nisi apprehendatur ratio entis, quia ens cadit in ratione veri. Et
est simile sicut si comparemus intelligibile ad ens. Non enim
potest intelligi ens, quin ens sit intelligibile, sed tamen potest
intelligi ens, ita quod non intelligatur eius intelligibilitas. Et
similiter ens intellectum est verum, non tamen intelligendo ens,
intelligitur verum.</p></div></div></div><div
id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4" next="FP_Q16_A5" prev="FP_Q16_A3"
progress="3.03%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether good is logically
prior to the true?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p0.1">Whether good is logically prior to
the true?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
seems that good is logically prior to the true. For what is more
universal is logically prior, as is evident from Phys. i. But the good
is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind of good,
namely, of the intellect. Therefore the good is logically prior to the
true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29070"><span class=
"ref">[29070] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam
verum. Quod enim est universalius, secundum rationem prius est, ut
patet ex I Physic. Sed bonum est universalius quam verum, nam verum
est quoddam bonum, scilicet intellectus. Ergo bonum prius est
secundum rationem quam verum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p3"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is in things, but
the true in the intellect composing and dividing as said above <a
id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2"
shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[2])</a>. But that which is in things
is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is
logically prior to the true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29071"><span class=
"ref">[29071] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, bonum
est in rebus, verum autem in compositione et divisione intellectus,
ut dictum est. Sed ea quae sunt in re, sunt priora his quae sunt in
intellectu. Ergo prius est secundum rationem bonum quam
verum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from Ethic. iv. But
virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine says (De
Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind. Therefore the
good is prior to the true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29072"><span class=
"ref">[29072] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
veritas est quaedam species virtutis, ut patet in IV Ethic. Sed
virtus continetur sub bono, est enim bona qualitas mentis, ut dicit
Augustinus. Ergo bonum est prius quam verum.</p></div></div><div
style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p5"
shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> What is in more things is
prior logically. But the true is in some things wherein good is not,
as, for instance, in mathematics. Therefore the true is prior to
good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29073"><span class=
"ref">[29073] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, quod
est in pluribus, est prius secundum rationem. Sed verum est in
quibusdam in quibus non est bonum, scilicet in mathematicis. Ergo
verum est prius quam bonum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Although the good and the true are convertible with being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two reasons. First, because the true is more closely related to being than is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately; while the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident
  from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence,
since the true regards knowledge, but the good regards the appetite,
the true must be prior in idea to the good.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 4 co."><a name="29074"><span class=
"ref">[29074] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, licet bonum et verum supposito convertantur cum ente, tamen
ratione differunt. Et secundum hoc verum, absolute loquendo, prius
est quam bonum. Quod ex duobus apparet. Primo quidem ex hoc, quod
verum propinquius se habet ad ens, quod est prius, quam bonum. Nam
verum respicit ipsum esse simpliciter et immediate, ratio autem
boni consequitur esse, secundum quod est aliquo modo perfectum; sic
enim appetibile est. Secundo apparet ex hoc, quod cognitio
naturaliter praecedit appetitum. Unde, cum verum respiciat
cognitionem, bonum autem appetitum, prius erit verum quam bonum
secundum rationem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will and the intellect mutually include one another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the intellect to understand. So then, among things directed to the object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the intellect; and conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas in the order of intelligible things the converse of the case. From the
  fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the
good is prior in the order of things desirable; but not that it is
prior absolutely.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29075"><span class=
"ref">[29075] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod voluntas et intellectus mutuo se includunt, nam
intellectus intelligit voluntatem, et voluntas vult intellectum
intelligere. Sic ergo inter illa quae ordinantur ad obiectum
voluntatis, continentur etiam ea quae sunt intellectus; et e
converso. Unde in ordine appetibilium, bonum se habet ut
universale, et verum ut particulare, in ordine autem
intelligibilium est e converso. Ex hoc ergo quod verum est quoddam
bonum, sequitur quod bonum sit prius in ordine appetibilium, non
autem quod sit prius simpliciter.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
to Objection 2:</b> A thing is prior logically in so far as it is
prior to the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being
itself; secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and
thirdly, it apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being
is first, that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though
good is in things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29076"><span class=
"ref">[29076] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod secundum hoc est aliquid prius ratione, quod prius
cadit in intellectu. Intellectus autem per prius apprehendit ipsum
ens; et secundario apprehendit se intelligere ens; et tertio
apprehendit se appetere ens. Unde primo est ratio entis, secundo
ratio veri, tertio ratio boni, licet bonum sit in rebus.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to "life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has been said that truth exists in other things <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A4-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. Whereas the truth of "justice" is found in man as he
  fulfills his duty to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we
cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in
general.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29077"><span class=
"ref">[29077] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod virtus quae dicitur veritas, non est veritas
communis, sed quaedam veritas secundum quam homo in dictis et
factis ostendit se ut est. Veritas autem vitae dicitur
particulariter, secundum quod homo in vita sua implet illud ad quod
ordinatur per intellectum divinum, sicut etiam dictum est veritatem
esse in ceteris rebus. Veritas autem iustitiae est secundum quod
homo servat id quod debet alteri secundum ordinem legum. Unde ex
his particularibus veritatibus non est procedendum ad veritatem
communem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5" next="FP_Q16_A6" prev="FP_Q16_A4" progress="3.05%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether God is truth?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p0.1">Whether God is truth?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the intellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition and division. Therefore in Him there is not truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxvi) is a "likeness to the principle." But in God there is no likeness to a principle. Therefore in God there is not truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the first cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause of all being; and His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is truth in God, all truth will be from Him. But it is true that someone sins. Therefore this will be from God; which is evidently false.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord says, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.14.6" parsed="vul|John|14|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p5.1" passage="Jn. 14:6">Jn. 14:6</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>, truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things according as they have being conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of every other intellect, and He Himself is His
  own existence and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but that He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although in the divine intellect there is neither composition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He judges of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is truth in His intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The truth of our intellect is according to its conformity with its principle, that is to say, to the things from which it receives knowledge. The truth also of things is according to their conformity with their principle, namely, the divine intellect. Now this cannot be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless perhaps in so far as truth is appropriated to the Son, Who has a principle. But if we speak of divine truth in its essence, we cannot
  understand this unless the affirmative must be resolved into the
negative, as when one says: "the Father is of Himself, because He is
not from another." Similarly, the divine truth can be called a
"likeness to the principle," inasmuch as His existence is not
dissimilar to His intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
3:</b> Not-being and privation have no truth of themselves, but only
in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all apprehension of the
intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that exists in the
statement---"that a person commits fornication is true"---is entirely
from God. But to argue, "Therefore that this person fornicates is from
God", is a fallacy of Accident.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
float: right"/></div></div>
<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6" next="FP_Q16_A7" prev="FP_Q16_A5"
progress="3.07%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether there is only one
truth, according to which all things are true?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p0.1">Whether there is only one truth,
according to which all things are true?</h4><div style="clear: both;
margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p2"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is only one
truth, according to which all things are true. For according to
Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1), "nothing is greater than the mind of man,
except God." Now truth is greater than the mind of man; otherwise the
mind would be the judge of truth: whereas in fact it judges all things
according to truth, and not according to its own measure. Therefore
God alone is truth. Therefore there is no other truth but
God.</p></div>
<div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="29086"><span class=
"ref">[29086] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod una sola sit veritas, secundum quam omnia
sunt vera. Quia, secundum Augustinum, nihil est maius mente humana,
nisi Deus. Sed veritas est maior mente humana, alioquin mens
iudicaret de veritate; nunc autem omnia iudicat secundum veritatem,
et non secundum seipsam. Ergo solus Deus est veritas. Ergo non est
alia veritas quam Deus.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p3"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Anselm says (De
Verit. xiv), that, "as is the relation of time to temporal things, so
is that of truth to true things." But there is only one time for all
temporal things. Therefore there is only one truth, by which all
things are true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="29087"><span class=
"ref">[29087] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Anselmus dicit, in libro de veritate, quod sicut tempus se habet ad
temporalia, ita veritas ad res veras. Sed unum est tempus omnium
temporalium. Ergo una est veritas, qua omnia vera
sunt.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b>
it is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.11.2"
parsed="vul|Ps|11|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p4.1"
passage="Ps. 11:2">Ps. 11:2</scripRef>), "Truths are decayed from
among the children of men."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 6 s. c."><a name="29088"><span class=
"ref">[29088] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod in Psalmo XI dicitur, <i>diminutae sunt veritates a filiis
hominum</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is one, and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must consider that when anything is predicated of many things univocally, it is found in each of them according to its proper nature; as animal is found in each species of animal. But when anything is predicated of many things analogically, it is found in only one of them according to its proper nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So
  healthiness is predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is only in the animal; but from the health of the animal, medicine is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and urine is called healthy, in so far as it indicates health. And although health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something whereby the one causes, and the other indicates health. Now we have said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a> that truth resides primarily in the
  intellect; and secondarily in things, according as they are related to the divine intellect. If therefore we speak of truth, as it exists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many truths in many created intellects; and even in one and the same intellect, according to the number of things known. Whence a gloss on<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.11.2" parsed="vul|Ps|11|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p5.2" passage=" Ps. 11:2, "> Ps. 11:2, </scripRef> "Truths are decayed from among the children of men," says: "As from one man's face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror,
  so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth." But if we
speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are true by one
primary truth; to which each one is assimilated according to its own
entity. And thus, although the essences or forms of things are many,
yet the truth of the divine intellect is one, in conformity to which
all things are said to be true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 6 co."><a name="29089"><span class=
"ref">[29089] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod quodammodo una est veritas, qua omnia sunt vera, et quodammodo
non. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod, quando aliquid
praedicatur univoce de multis, illud in quolibet eorum secundum
propriam rationem invenitur, sicut animal in qualibet specie
animalis. Sed quando aliquid dicitur analogice de multis, illud
invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum, a quo
alia denominantur. Sicut sanum dicitur de animali et urina et
medicina, non quod sanitas sit nisi in animali tantum, sed a
sanitate animalis denominatur medicina sana, inquantum est illius
sanitatis effectiva, et urina, inquantum est illius sanitatis
significativa. Et quamvis sanitas non sit in medicina neque in
urina, tamen in utroque est aliquid per quod hoc quidem facit,
illud autem significat sanitatem. Dictum est autem quod veritas per
prius est in intellectu, et per posterius in rebus, secundum quod
ordinantur ad intellectum divinum. Si ergo loquamur de veritate
prout existit in intellectu, secundum propriam rationem, sic in
multis intellectibus creatis sunt multae veritates; etiam in uno et
eodem intellectu, secundum plura cognita. Unde dicit Glossa super
illud Psalmi XI, <i>diminutae sunt veritates a filiis hominum</i>
etc., quod sicut ab una facie hominis resultant plures
similitudines in speculo, sic ab una veritate divina resultant
plures veritates. Si vero loquamur de veritate secundum quod est in
rebus, sic omnes sunt verae una prima veritate, cui unumquodque
assimilatur secundum suam entitatem. Et sic, licet plures sint
essentiae vel formae rerum, tamen una est veritas divini
intellectus, secundum quam omnes res denominantur verae.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The soul does not judge of things according to any kind of truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it is reflected in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first principles of the understanding. It follows, therefore, that the primary truth is greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth, which resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not simply, but in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even as
  science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it is true that
nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul, except
God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="29090"><span class=
"ref">[29090] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod anima non secundum quamcumque veritatem iudicat de
rebus omnibus; sed secundum veritatem primam, inquantum resultat in
ea sicut in speculo, secundum prima intelligibilia. Unde sequitur
quod veritas prima sit maior anima. Et tamen etiam veritas creata,
quae est in intellectu nostro, est maior anima, non simpliciter,
sed secundum quid, inquantum est perfectio eius; sicut etiam
scientia posset dici maior anima. Sed verum est quod nihil
subsistens est maius mente rationali, nisi Deus.</p></div></div><div
style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A6-p7"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The saying of Anselm is
correct in so far as things are said to be true by their relation to
the divine intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="29091"><span class=
"ref">[29091] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod dictum Anselmi veritatem habet, secundum quod res
dicuntur verae per comparationem ad intellectum
divinum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7"
next="FP_Q16_A8" prev="FP_Q16_A6" progress="3.10%" n="vii"
title="Article. 7 - Whether created truth is eternal?"><h4
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p0.1">Whether created truth
is eternal?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says (De
Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) "Nothing is more eternal than the nature of a
circle, and that two added to three make five." But the truth of these
is a created truth. Therefore created truth is eternal.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="29092"><span class=
"ref">[29092] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod veritas creata sit aeterna. Dicit enim
Augustinus, in libro de libero arbitrio, quod nihil est magis
aeternum quam ratio circuli, et duo et tria esse quinque. Sed horum
veritas est veritas creata. Ergo veritas creata est
aeterna.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals are always
and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore is truth,
which is the most universal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="29093"><span class=
"ref">[29093] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
quod est semper, est aeternum. Sed universalia sunt ubique et
semper. Ergo sunt aeterna. Ergo et verum, quod est maxime
universale.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
Further, it was always true that what is true in the present was to be
in the future. But as the truth of a proposition regarding the present
is a created truth, so is that of a proposition regarding the
future. Therefore some created truth is eternal.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="29094"><span class=
"ref">[29094] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, id
quod est verum in praesenti, semper fuit verum esse futurum. Sed
sicut veritas propositionis de praesenti est veritas creata, ita
veritas propositionis de futuro. Ergo aliqua veritas creata est
aeterna.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal. But the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end; for if their truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true that truth was not, and true, of course, by reason of truth; so that truth was before it began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that truth has an end, it follows that it is after it has ceased to be, for it will still be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is
  eternal.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="29095"><span class=
"ref">[29095] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, omne
quod caret principio et fine, est aeternum. Sed veritas
enuntiabilium caret principio et fine. Quia, si veritas incoepit
cum ante non esset, verum erat veritatem non esse, et utique aliqua
veritate verum erat, et sic veritas erat antequam inciperet. Et
similiter si ponatur veritatem habere finem, sequitur quod sit
postquam desierit, verum enim erit veritatem non esse. Ergo veritas
est aeterna.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b>
God alone is eternal, as laid down before (<a
id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q10.FP_Q10_A3"
shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[10], A[3]</a>).</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 7 s. c."><a name="29096"><span class=
"ref">[29096] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod solus Deus est aeternus, ut supra habitum est.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself: but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable truth, according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on account of any truth residing in the enunciation, as though in a subject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health within it but
  from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it
has been already said that things are called true from the truth of
the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be
eternal. Now because only the divine intellect is eternal, in it alone
truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else
but God is eternal; since the truth of the divine intellect is God
Himself, as shown already <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p7.1"
href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A5" shape="rect"
xml:link="simple">(A[5])</a>.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 7 co."><a name="29097"><span class=
"ref">[29097] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod veritas enuntiabilium non est aliud quam veritas intellectus.
Enuntiabile enim et est in intellectu, et est in voce. Secundum
autem quod est in intellectu, habet per se veritatem. Sed secundum
quod est in voce, dicitur verum enuntiabile, secundum quod
significat aliquam veritatem intellectus; non propter aliquam
veritatem in enuntiabili existentem sicut in subiecto. Sicut urina
dicitur sana, non a sanitate quae in ipsa sit, sed a sanitate
animalis, quam significat. Similiter etiam supra dictum est quod
res denominantur verae a veritate intellectus. Unde si nullus
intellectus esset aeternus, nulla veritas esset aeterna. Sed quia
solus intellectus divinus est aeternus, in ipso solo veritas
aeternitatem habet. Nec propter hoc sequitur quod aliquid aliud sit
aeternum quam Deus, quia veritas intellectus divini est ipse Deus,
ut supra ostensum est.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
to Objection 1:</b> The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and
three make five, have eternity in the mind of God.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="29098"><span class=
"ref">[29098] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod ratio circuli, et duo et tria esse quinque, habent
aeternitatem in mente divina.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That something is always and everywhere, can be understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of extension to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of all distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be everywhere
  and always, in so far as universals are independent of place and
time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are eternal,
except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="29099"><span class=
"ref">[29099] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod aliquid esse semper et ubique, potest intelligi
dupliciter. Uno modo, quia habet in se unde se extendat ad omne
tempus et ad omnem locum, sicut Deo competit esse ubique et semper.
Alio modo, quia non habet in se quo determinetur ad aliquem locum
vel tempus, sicut materia prima dicitur esse una, non quia habet
unam formam, sicut homo est unus ab unitate unius formae, sed per
remotionem omnium formarum distinguentium. Et per hunc modum,
quodlibet universale dicitur esse ubique et semper, inquantum
universalia abstrahunt ab hic et nunc. Sed ex hoc non sequitur ea
esse aeterna, nisi in intellectu, si quis sit
aeternus.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
3:</b> That which now is, was future, before it (actually) was;
because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the cause were
removed, that thing's coming to be was not future. But the first cause
is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was always true
that what now is would be, except in so far as its future being was in
the sempiternal cause; and God alone is such a cause.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="29100"><span class=
"ref">[29100] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod illud quod nunc est, ex eo futurum fuit antequam
esset, quia in causa sua erat ut fieret. Unde, sublata causa, non
esset futurum illud fieri. Sola autem causa prima est aeterna. Unde
ex hoc non sequitur quod ea quae sunt, semper fuerit verum ea esse
futura, nisi quatenus in causa sempiterna fuit ut essent futura.
Quae quidem causa solus Deus est.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A7-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal, but it had a beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was not true to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason of the divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now to say that that truth did not then exist: and this is true only by reason of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not by
  reason of any truth in the things. For this is truth concerning
not-being; and not-being has not truth of itself, but only so far as
our intellect apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did
not exist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being as preceding its
being.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la"
title="I q. 16 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="29101"><span class=
"ref">[29101] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod, quia intellectus noster non est aeternus, nec
veritas enuntiabilium quae a nobis formantur, est aeterna, sed
quandoque incoepit. Et antequam huiusmodi veritas esset, non erat
verum dicere veritatem talem non esse, nisi ab intellectu divino,
in quo solum veritas est aeterna. Sed nunc verum est dicere
veritatem tunc non fuisse. Quod quidem non est verum nisi veritate
quae nunc est in intellectu nostro, non autem per aliquam veritatem
ex parte rei. Quia ista est veritas de non ente; non ens autem non
habet ex se ut sit verum, sed solummodo ex intellectu apprehendente
ipsum. Unde intantum est verum dicere veritatem non fuisse,
inquantum apprehendimus non esse ipsius ut praecedens esse
eius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8"
next="FP_Q17" prev="FP_Q16_A7" progress="3.13%" n="viii"
title="Article. 8 - Whether truth is immutable?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p0.1">Whether truth is immutable?</h4><div
style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p2"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth is
immutable. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that "Truth and
mind do not rank as equals, otherwise truth would be mutable, as the
mind is."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="29102"><span class=
"ref">[29102] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod veritas sit immutabilis. Dicit enim
Augustinus, in libro II de libero arbitrio, quod veritas non est
aequalis menti, quia esset mutabilis, sicut et
mens.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as primary
matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains after all
generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change; for
after every change it is true to say that a thing is, or is
not. Therefore truth is immutable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="29103"><span class=
"ref">[29103] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id
quod remanet post omnem mutationem, est immutabile, sicut prima
materia est ingenita et incorruptibilis, quia remanet post omnem
generationem et corruptionem. Sed veritas remanet post omnem
mutationem, quia post omnem mutationem verum est dicere esse vel
non esse. Ergo veritas est immutabilis.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the truth of an enunciation changes, it changes mostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus change. For truth, according to Anselm (De Verit. viii), "is a certain rightness" in so far as a thing answers to that which is in the divine mind concerning it. But this proposition that "Socrates sits", receives from the divine mind the signification that Socrates does sit; and it has the same signification even though he does not sit.
  Therefore the truth of the proposition in no way
changes.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="29104"><span class=
"ref">[29104] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
veritas enuntiationis mutatur, maxime mutatur ad mutationem rei.
Sed sic non mutatur. Veritas enim, secundum Anselmum, est rectitudo
quaedam, inquantum aliquid implet id quod est de ipso in mente
divina. Haec autem propositio, Socrates sedet, accipit a mente
divina ut significet Socratem sedere, quod significat etiam eo non
sedente. Ergo veritas propositionis nullo modo
mutatur.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b>
Further, where there is the same cause, there is the same effect. But
the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three propositions,
"Socrates sits, will sit, sat." Therefore the truth of each is the
same. But one or other of these must be the true one. Therefore the
truth of these propositions remains immutable; and for the same reason
that of any other.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="29105"><span class=
"ref">[29105] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, ubi
est eadem causa, et idem effectus. Sed eadem res est causa
veritatis harum trium propositionum Socrates sedet, sedebit, et
sedit. Ergo eadem est harum veritas. Sed oportet quod alterum horum
sit verum. Ergo veritas harum propositionum immutabiliter manet. Et
eadem ratione cuiuslibet alterius propositionis.</p></div></div><div
style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p6"
shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (<scripRef
osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.11.2" parsed="vul|Ps|11|2|0|0"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p6.1"
passage="Ps. 11:2">Ps. 11:2</scripRef>),"Truths are decayed from among
the children of men."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 s. c."><a name="29106"><span class=
"ref">[29106] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur in Psalmo XI, <i>diminutae sunt veritates a filiis
hominum</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect, as said before <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>; but things are called true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be regarded from the point of view of the intellect, the truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness, through change in one of the two extremes. Hence in
  one way truth varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing which in itself has not changed, and in another way, when the thing is changed, but not the opinion; and in either way there can be a change from true to false. If, then, there is an intellect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and the knowledge of which nothing can escape, in this is immutable truth. Now such is the divine intellect, as is clear from what has been said
  before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p7.2"
href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14],
A[15]</a>). Hence the truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But
the truth of our intellect is mutable; not because it is itself the
subject of change, but in so far as our intellect changes from truth
to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable. Whereas the truth of
the divine intellect is that according to which natural things are
said to be true, and this is altogether immutable.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 co."><a name="29107"><span class=
"ref">[29107] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut supra dictum est, veritas proprie est in solo
intellectu, res autem dicuntur verae a veritate quae est in aliquo
intellectu. Unde mutabilitas veritatis consideranda est circa
intellectum. Cuius quidem veritas in hoc consistit, quod habeat
conformitatem ad res intellectas. Quae quidem conformitas variari
potest dupliciter, sicut et quaelibet alia similitudo, ex mutatione
alterius extremi. Unde uno modo variatur veritas ex parte
intellectus, ex eo quod de re eodem modo se habente aliquis aliam
opinionem accipit, alio modo si, opinione eadem manente, res
mutetur. Et utroque modo fit mutatio de vero in falsum. Si ergo sit
aliquis intellectus in quo non possit esse alternatio opinionum,
vel cuius acceptionem non potest subterfugere res aliqua, in eo est
immutabilis veritas. Talis autem est intellectus divinus, ut ex
superioribus patet. Unde veritas divini intellectus est
immutabilis. Veritas autem intellectus nostri mutabilis est. Non
quod ipsa sit subiectum mutationis, sed inquantum intellectus
noster mutatur de veritate in falsitatem; sic enim formae mutabiles
dici possunt. Veritas autem intellectus divini est secundum quam
res naturales dicuntur verae, quae est omnino
immutabilis.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
1:</b> Augustine is speaking of divine truth.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="29108"><span class=
"ref">[29108] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de veritate
divina.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
2:</b> The true and being are convertible terms. Hence just as being
is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but accidentally, in so far
as this being or that is corrupted or generated, as is said in
Phys. i, so does truth change, not so as that no truth remains, but
because that truth does not remain which was before.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="29109"><span class=
"ref">[29109] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod verum et ens sunt convertibilia. Unde, sicut ens non
generatur neque corrumpitur per se, sed per accidens, inquantum hoc
vel illud ens corrumpitur vel generatur, ut dicitur in I Physic.;
ita veritas mutatur, non quod nulla veritas remaneat, sed quia non
remanet illa veritas quae prius erat.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but it said to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates the truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore
  this proposition, "Socrates sits," is true, as long as he is
sitting, both with the truth of the thing, in so far as the expression
is significative, and with the truth of signification, in so far as it
signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the first truth
remains, but the second is changed.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="29110"><span class=
"ref">[29110] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod propositio non solum habet veritatem sicut res aliae
veritatem habere dicuntur, inquantum implent id quod de eis est
ordinatum ab intellectu divino; sed dicitur habere veritatem quodam
speciali modo, inquantum significat veritatem intellectus. Quae
quidem consistit in conformitate intellectus et rei. Qua quidem
subtracta, mutatur veritas opinionis, et per consequens veritas
propositionis. Sic igitur haec propositio, Socrates sedet, eo
sedente vera est et veritate rei, inquantum est quaedam vox
significativa; et veritate significationis, inquantum significat
opinionem veram. Socrate vero surgente, remanet prima veritas, sed
mutatur secunda.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A8-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
4:</b> The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of the truth of the
proposition, "Socrates sits," has not the same meaning when Socrates
sits, after he sits, and before he sits. Hence the truth which
results, varies, and is variously signified by these propositions
concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not follow, though
one of the three propositions is true, that the same truth remains
invariable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 16 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="29111"><span class=
"ref">[29111] I&ordf; q. 16 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod sessio Socratis, quae est causa veritatis huius
propositionis, Socrates sedet, non eodem modo se habet dum Socrates
sedet, et postquam sederit, et antequam sederet. Unde et veritas ab
hoc causata, diversimode se habet; et diversimode significatur
propositionibus de praesenti, praeterito et futuro. Unde non
sequitur quod, licet altera trium propositionum sit vera, quod
eadem veritas invariabilis maneat.</p></div></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q17" next="FP_Q17_A1" prev="FP_Q16_A8" progress="3.16%" n="xvi" title="Question. 17 - CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)">
<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p0.1">Question 17. CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p2" shownumber="no"> We next consider falsity. About this four points of inquiry arise:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether falsity exists in things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether it exists in the sense?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether it exists in the intellect?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Concerning the opposition of the true and the false.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 pr."><a name="29112"><span class="ref">[29112]
I&ordf; q. 17 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de falsitate. Et
circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum falsitas sit in rebus.
Secundo, utrum sit in sensu. Tertio, utrum sit in intellectu.
Quarto, de oppositione veri et falsi.</p></div></div>
<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1" next="FP_Q17_A2" prev="FP_Q17" progress="3.16%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether falsity exists in things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p0.1">Whether falsity exists in things?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
										      float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), "If the true is that which is, it will be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may appear to the contrary."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29113"><span class=
"ref">[29113] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod falsitas non sit in rebus. Dicit enim
Augustinus, in libro Soliloq., <i>si verum est id quod est, falsum
non esse uspiam concludetur, quovis repugnante</i>.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p3"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, false is derived from
"fallere" [to deceive]. But things do not deceive; for, as Augustine
says (De Vera Relig. 33), they show nothing but their own
species. Therefore the false is not found in things.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29114"><span class=
"ref">[29114] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
falsum dicitur a fallendo. Sed res non fallunt, ut dicit Augustinus
in libro de vera Relig., <i>quia non ostendunt aliud quam suam
speciem</i>. Ergo falsum in rebus non invenitur.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p4"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the true is said to exist
in things by conformity to the divine intellect, as stated above <a
id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16" shape="rect"
xml:link="simple">(Q[16])</a>. But everything, in so far as it exists,
imitates God. Therefore everything is true without admixture of
falsity; and thus nothing is false.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29115"><span class=
"ref">[29115] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, verum
dicitur in rebus per comparationem ad intellectum divinum, ut supra
dictum est. Sed quaelibet res, inquantum est, imitatur Deum. Ergo
quaelibet res vera est, absque falsitate. Et sic nulla res est
falsa.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p5"
shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vera
Relig. 34): "Every body is a true body and a false unity: for it
imitates unity without being unity." But everything imitates the
divine unity yet falls short of it. Therefore in all things falsity
exists.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29116"><span class=
"ref">[29116] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., quod <i>omne corpus
est verum corpus et falsa unitas</i>; quia imitatur unitatem, et
non est unitas. Sed quaelibet res imitatur divinam bonitatem, et ab
ea deficit. Ergo in omnibus rebus est falsitas.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since true and false are opposed, and since opposites stand in relation to the same thing, we must needs seek falsity, where primarily we find truth; that is to say, in the intellect. Now, in things, neither truth nor falsity exists, except in relation to the intellect. And since every thing is denominated simply by what belongs to it "per se," but is denominated relatively by what belongs to it accidentally; a thing indeed may be called false simply when
  compared with the intellect on which it depends, and to which it is compared "per se" but may be called false relatively as directed to another intellect, to which it is compared accidentally. Now natural things depend on the divine intellect, as artificial things on the human. Wherefore artificial things are said to be false simply and in themselves, in so far as they fall short of the form of the art; whence a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if it falls short of the proper
  operation of his art.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p7" shownumber="no"> In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be found, in so far as they are compared with the divine intellect; since whatever takes place in things proceeds from the ordinance of that intellect, unless perhaps in the case of voluntary agents only, who have it in their power to withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; wherein consists the evil of sin. Thus sins themselves are called untruths and lies in the Scriptures, according to the words of the text, "Why do you love
  vanity, and seek after lying?" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.4.3" parsed="vul|Ps|4|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p7.1" passage="Ps. 4:3">Ps. 4:3</scripRef>): as on the other hand virtuous deeds are called the "truth of life" as being obedient to the order of the divine intellect. Thus it is said, "He that doth truth, cometh to the light" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.3.21" parsed="vul|John|3|21|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p7.2" passage="Jn. 3:21">Jn. 3:21</scripRef>).</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p8" shownumber="no"> But in relation to our intellect, natural things which are compared thereto accidentally, can be called false; not simply, but relatively; and that in two ways. In one way according to the thing signified, and thus a thing is said to be false as being signified or represented by word or thought that is false. In this respect anything can be said to be false as regards any quality not possessed by it; as if we should say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing, as the
  Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34). So, too, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 10): "The true tragedian is a false Hector": even as, on the contrary, anything can be called true, in regard to that which is becoming to it. In another way a thing can be called false, by way of cause---and thus a thing is said to be false that naturally begets a false opinion. And whereas it is innate in us to judge things by external appearances, since our knowledge takes its rise from sense, which principally and
  naturally deals with external accidents, therefore those external accidents, which resemble things other than themselves, are said to be false with respect to those things; thus gall is falsely honey; and tin, false gold. Regarding this, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6): "We call those things false that appear to our apprehension like the true:" and the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34): "Things are called false that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not, or what they are not." In this
  way a man is called false as delighting in false opinions or words, and not because he can invent them; for in this way many wise and learned persons might be called false, as stated in Metaph. v, 34.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 1 co."><a name="29117"><span class=
"ref">[29117] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, cum verum et falsum opponantur; opposita autem sunt circa
idem; necesse est ut ibi prius quaeratur falsitas, ubi primo
veritas invenitur, hoc est in intellectu. In rebus autem neque
veritas neque falsitas est, nisi per ordinem ad intellectum. Et
quia unumquodque secundum id quod convenit ei per se, simpliciter
nominatur; secundum autem id quod convenit ei per accidens, non
nominatur nisi secundum quid; res quidem simpliciter falsa dici
posset per comparationem ad intellectum a quo dependet, cui
comparatur per se; in ordine autem ad alium intellectum, cui
comparatur per accidens, non posset dici falsa nisi secundum quid.
Dependent autem ab intellectu divino res naturales, sicut ab
intellectu humano res artificiales. Dicuntur igitur res
artificiales falsae simpliciter et secundum se, inquantum deficiunt
a forma artis, unde dicitur aliquis artifex opus falsum facere,
quando deficit ab operatione artis. Sic autem in rebus
dependentibus a Deo, falsitas inveniri non potest per comparationem
ad intellectum divinum, cum quidquid in rebus accidit, ex
ordinatione divini intellectus procedat, nisi forte in voluntariis
agentibus tantum, in quorum potestate est subducere se ab
ordinatione divini intellectus; in quo malum culpae consistit,
secundum quod ipsa peccata falsitates et mendacia dicuntur in
Scripturis, secundum illud Psalmi IV, <i>ut quid diligitis
vanitatem et quaeritis mendacium?</i> Sicut per oppositum operatio
virtuosa veritas vitae nominatur, inquantum subditur ordini divini
intellectus; sicut dicitur Ioan. III, <i>qui facit veritatem, venit
ad lucem</i>. Sed per ordinem ad intellectum nostrum, ad quem
comparantur res naturales per accidens, possunt dici falsae, non
simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo,
secundum rationem significati, ut dicatur illud esse falsum in
rebus, quod significatur vel repraesentatur oratione vel intellectu
falso. Secundum quem modum quaelibet res potest dici esse falsa,
quantum ad id quod ei non inest, sicut si dicamus diametrum esse
falsum commensurabile, ut dicit philosophus in V Metaphys.; et
sicut dicit Augustinus, in libro Soliloq., quod <i>tragoedus est
falsus Hector</i>. Sicut e contrario potest unumquodque dici verum,
secundum id quod competit ei. Alio modo, per modum causae. Et sic
dicitur res esse falsa, quae nata est facere de se opinionem
falsam. Et quia innatum est nobis per ea quae exterius apparent de
rebus iudicare, eo quod nostra cognitio a sensu ortum habet, qui
primo et per se est exteriorum accidentium; ideo ea quae in
exterioribus accidentibus habent similitudinem aliarum rerum,
dicuntur esse falsa secundum illas res; sicut fel est falsum mel,
et stannum est falsum argentum. Et secundum hoc dicit Augustinus,
in libro Soliloq., quod <i>eas res falsas nominamus, quae
verisimilia apprehendimus</i>. Et philosophus dicit, in V
Metaphys., quod <i>falsa dicuntur quaecumque apta nata sunt
apparere aut qualia non sunt, aut quae non sunt</i>. Et per hunc
modum etiam dicitur homo falsus, inquantum est amativus falsarum
opinionum vel locutionum. Non autem ex hoc quod potest eas
confingere, quia sic etiam sapientes et scientes falsi dicerentur,
ut dicitur in V Metaphys.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p9"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing compared with the
intellect is said to be true in respect to what it is; and false in
respect to what it is not. Hence, "The true tragedian is a false
Hector," as stated in Soliloq. ii, 6. As, therefore, in things that
are is found a certain non-being, so in things that are is found a
degree of falseness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29118"><span class=
"ref">[29118] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod res comparata ad intellectum, secundum id quod est,
dicitur vera, secundum id quod non est, dicitur falsa. <i>Unde
verus tragoedus est falsus Hector</i>, ut dicitur in II Soliloq.
Sicut igitur in his quae sunt, invenitur quoddam non esse; ita in
his quae sunt, invenitur quaedam ratio falsitatis.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p10"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things do not deceive by
their own nature, but by accident. For they give occasion to falsity,
by the likeness they bear to things which they actually are
not.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29119"><span class=
"ref">[29119] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod res per se non fallunt, sed per accidens. Dant enim
occasionem falsitatis, eo quod similitudinem eorum gerunt, quorum
non habent existentiam.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things are said to be false, not as compared with the divine intellect, in which case they would be false simply, but as compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only relatively.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A1-p12" shownumber="no"> To the argument which is urged on the contrary, likeness or defective representation does not involve the idea of falsity except in so far as it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always said to be false, because it resembles another thing; but only when the resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not in any one case, but in the majority of instances.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29120"><span class=
"ref">[29120] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod per comparationem ad intellectum divinum non dicuntur
res falsae, quod esset eas esse falsas simpliciter, sed per
comparationem ad intellectum nostrum, quod est eas esse falsas
secundum quid.</p><p title="I q. 17 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="29121"><span class=
"ref">[29121] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum, quod
in oppositum obiicitur, dicendum quod similitudo vel repraesentatio
deficiens non inducit rationem falsitatis, nisi inquantum praestat
occasionem falsae opinionis. Unde non ubicumque est similitudo,
dicitur res falsa, sed ubicumque est talis similitudo, quae nata
est facere opinionem falsam, non cuicumque, sed ut in pluribus.</p></div></div>
</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2" next="FP_Q17_A3" prev="FP_Q17_A1" progress="3.20%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether there is falsity in the senses?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p0.1">Whether there is falsity in the senses?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p2"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that falsity is not in
the senses. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33): "If all the bodily
senses report as they are affected, I do not know what more we can
require from them." Thus it seems that we are not deceived by the
senses; and therefore that falsity is not in them.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29122"><span class=
"ref">[29122] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod in sensu non sit falsitas. Dicit enim
Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., <i>si omnes corporis sensus
ita nuntiant ut afficiuntur, quid ab eis amplius exigere debemus,
ignoro</i>. Et sic videtur quod ex sensibus non fallamur. Et sic
falsitas in sensu non est.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p3"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says
(Metaph. iv, 24) that falsity is not proper to the senses, but to the
imagination.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29123"><span class=
"ref">[29123] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
philosophus dicit, in IV Metaphys., quod <i>falsitas non est
propria sensui, sed phantasiae</i>.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p4"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in non-complex things
there is neither true nor false, but in complex things only. But
affirmation and negation do not belong to the senses. Therefore in the
senses there is no falsity.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29124"><span class=
"ref">[29124] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in
incomplexis non est verum nec falsum, sed solum in complexis. Sed
componere et dividere non pertinet ad sensum. Ergo in sensu non est
falsitas.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p5"
shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Soliloq. ii,
6), "It appears that the senses entrap us into error by their
deceptive similitudes."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29125"><span class=
"ref">[29125] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Augustinus, in libro Soliloq., <i>apparet nos in omnibus
sensibus similitudine lenocinante falli</i>.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as truth is in them. Now truth is not in them in such a way as that the senses know truth, but in so far as they apprehend sensible things truly, as said above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[16], A[2]</a>), and this takes place through the senses apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that falsity exists in the senses through their apprehending or judging things to be otherwise than they really
  are.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p7" shownumber="no"> The knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the existence of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness of a thing can exist in the senses in three ways. In the first way, primarily and of its own nature, as in sight there is the likeness of colors, and of other sensible objects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature, though not primarily; as in sight there is the likeness of shape, size, and of other sensible objects common to more than one sense. Thirdly,
  neither primarily nor of its own nature, but accidentally, as in sight, there is the likeness of a man, not as man, but in so far as it is accidental to the colored object to be a man.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p8" shownumber="no"> Sense, then, has no false knowledge about its proper objects, except accidentally and rarely, and then, because of the unsound organ it does not receive the sensible form rightly; just as other passive subjects because of their indisposition receive defectively the impressions of the agent. Hence, for instance, it happens that on account of an unhealthy tongue sweet seems bitter to a sick person. But as to common objects of sense, and accidental objects, even a rightly disposed
  sense may have a false judgment, because it is referred to them not directly, but accidentally, or as a consequence of being directed to other things.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 2 co."><a name="29126"><span class=
"ref">[29126] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod falsitas non est quaerenda in sensu, nisi sicut ibi est
veritas. Veritas autem non sic est in sensu, ut sensus cognoscat
veritatem; sed inquantum veram apprehensionem habet de
sensibilibus, ut supra dictum est. Quod quidem contingit eo quod
apprehendit res ut sunt. Unde contingit falsitatem esse in sensu,
ex hoc quod apprehendit vel iudicat res aliter quam sint. Sic autem
se habet ad cognoscendum res, inquantum similitudo rerum est in
sensu. Similitudo autem alicuius rei est in sensu tripliciter. Uno
modo, primo et per se; sicut in visu est similitudo colorum et
aliorum propriorum sensibilium. Alio modo, per se, sed non primo;
sicut in visu est similitudo figurae vel magnitudinis, et aliorum
communium sensibilium. Tertio modo, nec primo nec per se, sed per
accidens; sicut in visu est similitudo hominis, non inquantum est
homo, sed inquantum huic colorato accidit esse hominem. Et circa
propria sensibilia sensus non habet falsam cognitionem, nisi per
accidens, et ut in paucioribus, ex eo scilicet quod, propter
indispositionem organi, non convenienter recipit formam sensibilem,
sicut et alia passiva, propter suam indispositionem, deficienter
recipiunt impressionem agentium. Et inde est quod, propter
corruptionem linguae, infirmis dulcia amara esse videntur. De
sensibilibus vero communibus et per accidens, potest esse falsum
iudicium etiam in sensu recte disposito, quia sensus non directe
refertur ad illa, sed per accidens, vel ex consequenti, inquantum
refertur ad alia.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p9"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The affection of sense is
its sensation itself. Hence, from the fact that sense reports as it is
affected, it follows that we are not deceived in the judgment by which
we judge that we experience sensation. Since, however, sense is
sometimes affected erroneously of that object, it follows that it
sometimes reports erroneously of that object; and thus we are deceived
by sense about the object, but not about the fact of
sensation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29127"><span class=
"ref">[29127] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod sensum affici, est ipsum eius sentire. Unde per hoc
quod sensus ita nuntiant sicut afficiuntur, sequitur quod non
decipiamur in iudicio quo iudicamus nos sentire aliquid. Sed ex eo
quod sensus aliter afficitur interdum quam res sit, sequitur quod
nuntiet nobis aliquando rem aliter quam sit. Et ex hoc fallimur per
sensum circa rem, non circa ipsum sentire.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Falsity is said not to be proper to sense, since sense is not deceived as to its proper object. Hence in another translation it is said more plainly, "Sense, about its proper object, is never false." Falsity is attributed to the imagination, as it represents the likeness of something even in its absence. Hence, when anyone perceives the likeness of a thing as if it were the thing itself, falsity results from such an apprehension; and for this reason
  the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34) that shadows, pictures, and
dreams are said to be false inasmuch as they convey the likeness of
things that are not present in substance.</p></div><div style="width:
45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29128"><span class=
"ref">[29128] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod falsitas dicitur non esse propria sensui, quia non
decipitur circa proprium obiectum. Unde in alia translatione
planius dicitur, quod <i>sensus proprii sensibilis falsus non
est</i>. Phantasiae autem attribuitur falsitas, quia repraesentat
similitudinem rei etiam absentis; unde quando aliquis convertitur
ad similitudinem rei tanquam ad rem ipsam, provenit ex tali
apprehensione falsitas. Unde etiam philosophus, in V Metaphys.,
dicit quod umbrae et picturae et somnia dicuntur falsa, inquantum
non subsunt res quarum habent similitudinem.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2-p11"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument proves that
the false is not in the sense, as in that which knows the true and the
false.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la"
title="I q. 17 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29129"><span class=
"ref">[29129] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod ratio illa procedit, quod falsitas non sit in sensu
sicut in cognoscente verum et falsum.</p></div></div>
</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3" next="FP_Q17_A4" prev="FP_Q17_A2" progress="3.22%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether falsity is in the intellect?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p0.1">Whether falsity is in the intellect?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p2"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that falsity is not in
the intellect. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 32), "Everyone who is
deceived, understands not that in which he is deceived." But falsity
is said to exist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived
therein. Therefore falsity does not exist in the
intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29130"><span class=
"ref">[29130] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod falsitas non sit in intellectu. Dicit enim
Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>omnis qui
fallitur, id in quo fallitur, non intelligit</i>. Sed falsum
dicitur esse in aliqua cognitione, secundum quod per eam fallimur.
Ergo in intellectu non est falsitas.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p3"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De
Anima iii, 51) that the intellect is always right. Therefore there is
no falsity in the intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29131"><span class=
"ref">[29131] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod intellectus semper est
rectus. Non ergo in intellectu est falsitas.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p4"
shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in De Anima iii,
21,[22] that "where there is composition of objects understood, there
is truth and falsehood." But such composition is in the
intellect. Therefore truth and falsehood exist in the
intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29132"><span class=
"ref">[29132] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur in III de anima, quod <i>ubi compositio intellectuum
est, ibi verum et falsum est</i>. Sed compositio intellectuum est
in intellectu. Ergo verum et falsum est in intellectu.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Just as a thing has being by its proper form, so the knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known. Hence, as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs to them by their form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent qualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail to be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in knowledge of the thing with the likeness of which it is informed; but may fail
  with regard to something consequent upon that form, or accidental thereto. For it has been said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[2])</a> that sight is not deceived in its proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent to that object; or about accidental objects of sense. Now as the sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so is the intellect by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither the
  sense about its proper object. But in affirming and denying, the intellect may be deceived, by attributing to the thing of which it understands the essence, something which is not consequent upon it, or is opposed to it. For the intellect is in the same position as regards judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common, or accidental, sensible objects. There is, however, this difference, as before mentioned regarding truth (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p5.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q16.FP_Q16_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[16], A[2]</a>), that falsity can
  exist in the intellect not only because the intellect is conscious of that knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas in sense falsity does not exist as known, as stated above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p5.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[2])</a>.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p6" shownumber="no"> But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs also accidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of a thing, in so far as composition of the intellect is mixed up in it. This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying to one thing the definition proper to another; as that of a circle to a man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is false of another.
  In another way, by composing a definition of parts which are mutually exclusive. For thus the definition is not only false of the thing, but false in itself. A definition such as " a reasonable four-footed animal" would be of this kind, and the intellect false in making it; for such a statement as "some reasonable animals are four-footed" is false in itself. For this reason the intellect cannot be false in its knowledge of simple essences; but it is either true, or it understands nothing at
  all.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 3 co."><a name="29133"><span class=
"ref">[29133] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut res habet esse per propriam formam, ita virtus
cognoscitiva habet cognoscere per similitudinem rei cognitae. Unde,
sicut res naturalis non deficit ab esse quod sibi competit secundum
suam formam, potest autem deficere ab aliquibus accidentalibus vel
consequentibus; sicut homo ab hoc quod est habere duos pedes, non
autem ab hoc quod est esse hominem, ita virtus cognoscitiva non
deficit in cognoscendo respectu illius rei cuius similitudine
informatur; potest autem deficere circa aliquid consequens ad
ipsam, vel accidens ei. Sicut est dictum quod visus non decipitur
circa sensibile proprium, sed circa sensibilia communia, quae
consequenter se habent ad illud, et circa sensibilia per accidens.
Sicut autem sensus informatur directe similitudine propriorum
sensibilium, ita intellectus informatur similitudine quidditatis
rei. Unde circa quod quid est intellectus non decipitur, sicut
neque sensus circa sensibilia propria. In componendo vero vel
dividendo potest decipi, dum attribuit rei cuius quidditatem
intelligit, aliquid quod eam non consequitur, vel quod ei
opponitur. Sic enim se habet intellectus ad iudicandum de
huiusmodi, sicut sensus ad iudicandum de sensibilibus communibus
vel per accidens. Hac tamen differentia servata, quae supra circa
veritatem dicta est, quod falsitas in intellectu esse potest, non
solum quia cognitio intellectus falsa est, sed quia intellectus eam
cognoscit, sicut et veritatem, in sensu autem falsitas non est ut
cognita, ut dictum est. Quia vero falsitas intellectus per se solum
circa compositionem intellectus est, per accidens etiam in
operatione intellectus qua cognoscit quod quid est, potest esse
falsitas, inquantum ibi compositio intellectus admiscetur. Quod
potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod intellectus
definitionem unius attribuit alteri; ut si definitionem circuli
attribuat homini. Unde definitio unius rei est falsa de altera.
Alio modo, secundum quod partes definitionis componit ad invicem,
quae simul sociari non possunt, sic enim definitio non est solum
falsa respectu alicuius rei, sed est falsa in se. Ut si formet
talem definitionem, animal rationale quadrupes, falsus est
intellectus sic definiendo, propterea quod falsus est in formando
hanc compositionem, aliquod animal rationale est quadrupes. Et
propter hoc, in cognoscendo quidditates simplices non potest esse
intellectus falsus, sed vel est verus, vel totaliter nihil
intelligit.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p7"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because the essence of a
thing is the proper object of the intellect, we are properly said to
understand a thing when we reduce it to its essence, and judge of it
thereby; as takes place in demonstrations, in which there is no
falsity. In this sense Augustine's words must be understood, "that he
who is deceived, understands not that wherein he is deceived;" and not
in the sense that no one is ever deceived in any operation of the
intellect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29134"><span class=
"ref">[29134] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, quia quidditas rei est proprium obiectum
intellectus, propter hoc tunc proprie dicimur aliquid intelligere,
quando, reducentes illud in quod quid est, sic de eo iudicamus,
sicut accidit in demonstrationibus, in quibus non est falsitas. Et
hoc modo intelligitur verbum Augustini, quod omnis qui fallitur,
non intelligit id in quo fallitur, non autem ita, quod in nulla
operatione intellectus aliquis fallatur.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3-p8"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellect is always
right as regards first principles; since it is not deceived about them
for the same reason that it is not deceived about what a thing is. For
self-known principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are
understood, from the fact that the predicate is contained in the
definition of the subject.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29135"><span class=
"ref">[29135] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod intellectus semper est rectus, secundum quod
intellectus est principiorum, circa quae non decipitur, ex eadem
causa qua non decipitur circa quod quid est. Nam principia per se
nota sunt illa quae statim, intellectis terminis, cognoscuntur, ex
eo quod praedicatum ponitur in definitione subiecti.</p></div></div>
</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4" next="FP_Q18" prev="FP_Q17_A3"
progress="3.25%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether true and false are
contraries?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p0.1">Whether true and false are
contraries?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
seems that true and false are not contraries. For true and false are
opposed, as that which is to that which is not; for "truth," as
Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 5), "is that which is." But that which is
and that which is not are not opposed as contraries. Therefore true
and false are not contrary things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29136"><span class=
"ref">[29136] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod verum et falsum non sint contraria. Verum
enim et falsum opponuntur sicut quod est et quod non est, <i>nam
verum est id quod est</i>, ut dicit Augustinus. Sed quod est et
quod non est, non opponuntur ut contraria. Ergo verum et falsum non
sunt contraria.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
Further, one of two contraries is not in the other. But falsity is in
truth, because, as Augustine says, (Soliloq. ii, 10), "A tragedian
would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true tragedian."
Therefore true and false are not contraries.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29137"><span class=
"ref">[29137] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, unum
contrariorum non est in alio. Sed falsum est in vero, quia, sicut
dicit Augustinus in libro Soliloq., <i>tragoedus non esset falsus
Hector, si non esset verus tragoedus</i>. Ergo verum et falsum non
sunt contraria.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
Further, in God there is no contrariety, for "nothing is contrary to
the Divine Substance," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 2). But
falsity is opposed to God, for an idol is called in Scripture a lie,
"They have laid hold on lying" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.8.5"
parsed="vul|Jer|8|5|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p4.1"
passage="Jer. 8:5">Jer. 8:5</scripRef>), that is to say, "an idol," as
a gloss says. Therefore false and true are not
contraries.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29138"><span class=
"ref">[29138] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in
Deo non est contrarietas aliqua, nihil enim divinae substantiae est
contrarium, ut dicit Augustinus, XII de Civit. Dei. Sed Deo
opponitur falsitas, nam idolum in Scriptura mendacium nominatur,
Ierem. VIII, <i>apprehenderunt mendacium</i>; Glossa, <i>idest
idola</i>. Ergo verum et falsum non sunt
contraria.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b>
The Philosopher says (Peri Herm. ii), that a false opinion is contrary
to a true one.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29139"><span class=
"ref">[29139] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit philosophus, in II Periherm., ponit enim falsam
opinionem verae contrariam.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as some have said, as affirmation and negation. In proof of which it must be considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines any subject, and can therefore be said of being as of not-being, for instance not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation asserts nothing, whereas it determines its subject, for it is "negation in a subject," as stated in Metaph. iv, 4: v. 27; for blindness is not said
  except of one whose nature it is to see. Contraries, however, both
assert something and determine the subject, for blackness is a species
of color. Falsity asserts something, for a thing is false, as the
Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 27), inasmuch as something is said or
seems to be something that it is not, or not to be what it really
is. For as truth implies an adequate apprehension of a thing, so
falsity implies the contrary. Hence it is clear that true and false
are contraries.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 4 co."><a name="29140"><span class=
"ref">[29140] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod verum et falsum opponuntur ut contraria, et non sicut
affirmatio et negatio, ut quidam dixerunt. Ad cuius evidentiam,
sciendum est quod negatio neque ponit aliquid, neque determinat
sibi aliquod subiectum. Et propter hoc, potest dici tam de ente
quam de non ente; sicut non videns, et non sedens. Privatio autem
non ponit aliquid, sed determinat sibi subiectum. Est enim negatio
in subiecto, ut dicitur IV Metaphys., caecum enim non dicitur nisi
de eo quod est natum videre. Contrarium vero et aliquid ponit, et
subiectum determinat, nigrum enim est aliqua species coloris.
Falsum autem aliquid ponit. Est enim falsum, ut dicit philosophus,
IV Metaphys., ex eo quod dicitur vel videtur aliquid esse quod non
est, vel non esse quod est. Sicut enim verum ponit acceptionem
adaequatam rei, ita falsum acceptionem rei non adaequatam. Unde
manifestum est quod verum et falsum sunt
contraria.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
1:</b> What is in things is the truth of the thing; but what is
apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth primarily
resides. Hence the false is that which is not as apprehended. To
apprehend being, and not-being, implies contrariety; for, as the
Philosopher proves (Peri Herm. ii), the contrary of this statement
"God is good," is, "God is not good."</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29141"><span class=
"ref">[29141] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod id quod est in rebus, est veritas rei sed id quod est
ut apprehensum, est verum intellectus, in quo primo est veritas.
Unde et falsum est id quod non est ut apprehensum. Apprehendere
autem esse et non esse, contrarietatem habet, sicut probat
philosophus, in II Periherm., quod huic opinioni, bonum est bonum,
contraria est, bonum non est bonum.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
to Objection 2:</b> Falsity is not founded in the truth which is
contrary to it, just as evil is not founded in the good which is
contrary to it, but in that which is its proper subject. This happens
in either, because true and good are universals, and convertible with
being. Hence, as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a
being, so every evil is founded in some good, and every falsity in
some truth.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29142"><span class=
"ref">[29142] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod falsum non fundatur in vero sibi contrario, sicut nec
malum in bono sibi contrario; sed in eo quod sibi subiicitur. Et
hoc ideo in utroque accidit, quia verum et bonum communia sunt, et
convertuntur cum ente, unde, sicut omnis privatio fundatur in
subiecto quod est ens, ita omne malum fundatur in aliquo bono, et
omne falsum in aliquo vero.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A4-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Because contraries, and opposites by way of privation, are by nature about one and the same thing, therefore there is nothing contrary to God, considered in Himself, either with respect to His goodness or His truth, for in His intellect there can be nothing false. But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for the false opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true. So idols are called lies, opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch as the false
  opinion concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the
divine unity.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 17 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29143"><span class=
"ref">[29143] I&ordf; q. 17 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, quia contraria et opposita privative nata sunt fieri
circa idem, ideo Deo, prout in se consideratur, non est aliquid
contrarium, neque ratione suae bonitatis, neque ratione suae
veritatis, quia in intellectu eius non potest esse falsitas aliqua.
Sed in apprehensione nostra habet aliquid contrarium, nam verae
opinioni de ipso contrariatur falsa opinio. Et sic idola mendacia
dicuntur opposita veritati divinae, inquantum falsa opinio de
idolis contrariatur verae opinioni de unitate
Dei.</p></div></div></div></div>
<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18" next="FP_Q18_A1" prev="FP_Q17_A4" progress="3.28%" n="xvii" title="Question. 18 - THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)">
<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p0.1">Question 18. THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p2" shownumber="no"> Since to understand belongs to living beings, after considering the divine knowledge and intellect, we must consider the divine life. About this, four points of inquiry arise:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) To whom does it belong to live?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) What is life?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether life is properly attributed to God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether all things in God are life?</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 18 pr."><a name="29144"><span class="ref">[29144]
I&ordf; q. 18 pr.</span></a> Quoniam autem intelligere viventium
est, post considerationem de scientia et intellectu divino,
considerandum est de vita ipsius. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.
Primo, quorum sit vivere. Secundo, quid sit vita. Tertio, utrum
vita Deo conveniat. Quarto, utrum omnia in Deo sint vita.</p></div></div>
<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1" next="FP_Q18_A2" prev="FP_Q18"
progress="3.28%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether to live belongs to
all natural things?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p0.1">Whether to live belongs to all
natural things?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p2"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to live belongs to
all natural things. For the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 1) that
"Movement is like a kind of life possessed by all things existing in
nature." But all natural things participate in movement. Therefore all
natural things partake of life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29145"><span class=
"ref">[29145] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod omnium rerum naturalium sit vivere. Dicit
enim philosophus, in VIII Physic., quod motus est ut vita quaedam
natura existentibus omnibus. Sed omnes res naturales participant
motum. Ergo omnes res naturales participant vitam.</p></div></div><div
style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p3"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, plants are said to live,
inasmuch as they in themselves a principle of movement of growth and
decay. But local movement is naturally more perfect than, and prior
to, movement of growth and decay, as the Philosopher shows
(Phys. viii, 56,57). Since then, all natural bodies have in themselves
some principle of local movement, it seems that all natural bodies
live.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29146"><span class=
"ref">[29146] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
plantae dicuntur vivere, inquantum habent in seipsis principium
motus augmenti et decrementi. Sed motus localis est perfectior et
prior secundum naturam quam motus augmenti et decrementi, ut
probatur in VIII Physic. Cum igitur omnia corpora naturalia habeant
aliquod principium motus localis, videtur quod omnia corpora
naturalia vivant.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
.5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
Further, amongst natural bodies the elements are the less perfect. Yet
life is attributed to them, for we speak of "living waters." Much
more, therefore, have other natural bodies life.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29147"><span class=
"ref">[29147] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, inter
corpora naturalia imperfectiora sunt elementa. Sed eis attribuitur
vita, dicuntur enim aquae vivae. Ergo multo magis alia corpora
naturalia vitam habent.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the
contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vi, 1) that "The last echo of
life is heard in the plants," whereby it is inferred that their life
is life in its lowest degree. But inanimate bodies are inferior to
plants. Therefore they have not life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29148"><span class=
"ref">[29148] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit Dionysius, VI cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>plantae
secundum ultimam resonantiam vitae habent vivere</i>, ex quo potest
accipi quod ultimum gradum vitae obtinent plantae. Sed corpora
inanimata sunt infra plantas. Ergo eorum non est vivere.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We can gather to what things life belongs, and to what it does not, from such things as manifestly possess life. Now life manifestly belongs to animals, for it said in De Vegetab. i [*De Plantis i, 1] that in animals life is manifest. We must, therefore, distinguish living from lifeless things, by comparing them to that by reason of which animals are said to live: and this it is in which life is manifested first and remains last. We say then that an animal
  begins to live when it begins to move of itself: and as long as such movement appears in it, so long as it is considered to be alive. When it no longer has any movement of itself, but is only moved by another power, then its life is said to fail, and the animal to be dead. Whereby it is clear that those things are properly called living that move themselves by some kind of movement, whether it be movement properly so called, as the act of an imperfect being, i.e. of a thing in potentiality, is
  called movement; or movement in a more general sense, as when said
of the act of a perfect thing, as understanding and feeling are called
movement. Accordingly all things are said to be alive that determine
themselves to movement or operation of any kind: whereas those things
that cannot by their nature do so, cannot be called living, unless by
a similitude.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 1 co."><a name="29149"><span class=
"ref">[29149] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod ex his quae manifeste vivunt, accipere possumus quorum sit
vivere, et quorum non sit vivere. Vivere autem manifeste animalibus
convenit, dicitur enim in libro de vegetabilibus, quod <i>vita in
animalibus manifesta est</i>. Unde secundum illud oportet
distinguere viventia a non viventibus secundum quod animalia
dicuntur vivere. Hoc autem est in quo primo manifestatur vita, et
in quo ultimo remanet. Primo autem dicimus animal vivere, quando
incipit ex se motum habere; et tandiu iudicatur animal vivere,
quandiu talis motus in eo apparet; quando vero iam ex se non habet
aliquem motum, sed movetur tantum ab alio tunc dicitur animal
mortuum, per defectum vitae. Ex quo patet quod illa proprie sunt
viventia, quae seipsa secundum aliquam speciem motus movent; sive
accipiatur motus proprie, sicut motus dicitur actus imperfecti,
idest existentis in potentia; sive motus accipiatur communiter,
prout motus dicitur actus perfecti, prout intelligere et sentire
dicitur moveri, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ut sic viventia
dicantur quaecumque se agunt ad motum vel operationem aliquam, ea
vero in quorum natura non est ut se agant ad aliquem motum vel
operationem, viventia dici non possunt, nisi per aliquam
similitudinem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Philosopher may be understood either of the first movement, namely, that of the celestial bodies, or of the movement in its general sense. In either way is movement called the life, as it were, of natural bodies, speaking by a similitude, and not attributing it to them as their property. The movement of the heavens is in the universe of corporeal natures as the movement of the heart, whereby life is preserved, is in animals.
  Similarly also every natural movement in respect to natural things
has a certain similitude to the operations of life. Hence, if the
whole corporeal universe were one animal, so that its movement came
from an "intrinsic moving force," as some in fact have held, in that
case movement would really be the life of all natural
bodies.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29150"><span class=
"ref">[29150] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod verbum illud philosophi potest intelligi vel de motu
primo, scilicet corporum caelestium; vel de motu communiter. Et
utroque modo motus dicitur quasi vita corporum naturalium, per
similitudinem; et non per proprietatem. Nam motus caeli est in
universo corporalium naturarum, sicut motus cordis in animali, quo
conservatur vita. Similiter etiam quicumque motus naturalis hoc
modo se habet ad res naturales, ut quaedam similitudo vitalis
operationis. Unde, si totum universum corporale esset unum animal,
ita quod iste motus esset a movente intrinseco, ut quidam
posuerunt, sequeretur quod motus esset vita omnium naturalium
corporum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To bodies, whether heavy or light, movement does not belong, except in so far as they are displaced from their natural conditions, and are out of their proper place; for when they are in the place that is proper and natural to them, then they are at rest. Plants and other living things move with vital movement, in accordance with the disposition of their nature, but not by approaching thereto, or by receding from it, for in so far as they recede from
  such movement, so far do they recede from their natural
disposition. Heavy and light bodies are moved by an extrinsic force,
either generating them and giving them form, or removing obstacles
from their way. They do not therefore move themselves, as do living
bodies.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29151"><span class=
"ref">[29151] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod corporibus gravibus et levibus non competit moveri,
nisi secundum quod sunt extra dispositionem suae naturae, utpote
cum sunt extra locum proprium, cum enim sunt in loco proprio et
naturali, quiescunt. Sed plantae et aliae res viventes moventur
motu vitali, secundum hoc quod sunt in sua dispositione naturali,
non autem in accedendo ad eam vel in recedendo ab ea, imo secundum
quod recedunt a tali motu, recedunt a naturali dispositione. Et
praeterea, corpora gravia et levia moventur a motore extrinseco,
vel generante, qui dat formam, vel removente prohibens, ut dicitur
in VIII Physic., et ita non movent seipsa, sicut corpora
viventia.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Waters are called living that have a continuous current: for standing waters, that are not connected with a continually flowing source, are called dead, as in cisterns and ponds. This is merely a similitude, inasmuch as the movement they are seen to possess makes them look as if they were alive. Yet this is not life in them in its real sense, since this movement of theirs is not from themselves but from the cause that generates them. The same is the
  case with the movement of other heavy and light
bodies.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 18 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29152"><span class=
"ref">[29152] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod aquae vivae dicuntur, quae habent continuum fluxum,
aquae enim stantes, quae non continuantur ad principium continue
fluens, dicuntur mortuae, ut aquae cisternarum et lacunarum. Et hoc
dicitur per similitudinem, inquantum enim videntur se movere,
habent similitudinem vitae. Sed tamen non est in eis vera ratio
vitae, quia hunc motum non habent a seipsis, sed a causa generante
eas; sicut accidit circa motum aliorum gravium et levium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2" next="FP_Q18_A3" prev="FP_Q18_A1" progress="3.31%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether life is an operation?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p0.1">Whether life is an operation?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p2"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is an
operation. For nothing is divided except into parts of the same
genus. But life is divided by certain operations, as is clear from the
Philosopher (De Anima ii, 13), who distinguishes four kinds of life,
namely, nourishment, sensation, local movement and
understanding. Therefore life is an operation.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29153"><span class=
"ref">[29153] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod vita sit quaedam operatio. Nihil enim
dividitur nisi per ea quae sunt sui generis. Sed vivere dividitur
per operationes quasdam, ut patet per philosophum in II libro de
anima, qui distinguit vivere per quatuor, scilicet alimento uti,
sentire, moveri secundum locum, et intelligere. Ergo vita est
operatio quaedam.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p3"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the active life is said
to be different from the contemplative. But the contemplative is only
distinguished from the active by certain operations. Therefore life is
an operation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29154"><span class=
"ref">[29154] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, vita
activa dicitur alia esse a contemplativa. Sed contemplativi ab
activis non diversificantur nisi secundum operationes quasdam. Ergo
vita est quaedam operatio.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p4"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to know God is an
operation. But this is life, as is clear from the words of<scripRef
osisRef="Bible.vul:John.18.3" parsed="vul|John|18|3|0|0"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p4.1" passage=" Jn. 18:3, "> Jn. 18:3,
</scripRef> "Now this is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the
only true God." Therefore life is an operation.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29155"><span class=
"ref">[29155] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
cognoscere Deum est operatio quaedam. Haec autem est vita, ut patet
per illud Ioan. XVII, <i>haec est autem vita aeterna, ut cognoscant
te solum verum Deum</i>. Ergo vita est operatio.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p5"
shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima
ii, 37), "In living things, to live is to be."</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29156"><span class=
"ref">[29156] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicit philosophus, in II de anima, <i>vivere viventibus est
esse</i>.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q17.FP_Q17_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[17], A[3]</a>), our intellect, which takes cognizance of the essence of a thing as its proper object, gains knowledge from sense, of which the proper objects are external accidents. Hence from external appearances we come to the knowledge of the essence of things. And because we name a thing in accordance with our knowledge of it, as is clear from what has already been said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p6.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[1]</a>), so from external properties names are often imposed to signify essences. Hence such names are sometimes taken strictly to denote the essence itself, the signification of which is their principal object; but sometimes, and less strictly, to denote the properties by reason of which they are imposed. And so we see that the word "body" is used to denote a genus of substances from the fact of their possessing three dimensions: and is sometimes taken to denote the
  dimensions themselves; in which sense body is said to be a species of quantity. The same must be said of life. The name is given from a certain external appearance, namely, self-movement, yet not precisely to signify this, but rather a substance to which self-movement and the application of itself to any kind of operation, belong naturally. To live, accordingly, is nothing else than to exist in this or that nature; and life signifies this, though in the abstract, just as the word "running"
  denotes "to run" in the abstract.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p7" shownumber="no"> Hence "living" is not an accidental but an essential predicate. Sometimes, however, life is used less properly for the operations from which its name is taken, and thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is principally to sense or to understand.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 2 co."><a name="29157"><span class=
"ref">[29157] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut ex dictis patet, intellectus noster, qui proprie est
cognoscitivus quidditatis rei ut proprii obiecti, accipit a sensu,
cuius propria obiecta sunt accidentia exteriora. Et inde est quod
ex his quae exterius apparent de re, devenimus ad cognoscendam
essentiam rei. Et quia sic nominamus aliquid sicut cognoscimus
illud, ut ex supradictis patet, inde est quod plerumque a
proprietatibus exterioribus imponuntur nomina ad significandas
essentias rerum. Unde huiusmodi nomina quandoque accipiuntur
proprie pro ipsis essentiis rerum, ad quas significandas
principaliter sunt imposita, aliquando autem sumuntur pro
proprietatibus a quibus imponuntur, et hoc minus proprie. Sicut
patet quod hoc nomen corpus impositum est ad significandum quoddam
genus substantiarum, ex eo quod in eis inveniuntur tres
dimensiones, et ideo aliquando ponitur hoc nomen corpus ad
significandas tres dimensiones, secundum quod corpus ponitur
species quantitatis. Sic ergo dicendum est et de vita. Nam vitae
nomen sumitur ex quodam exterius apparenti circa rem, quod est
movere seipsum, non tamen est impositum hoc nomen ad hoc
significandum, sed ad significandam substantiam cui convenit
secundum suam naturam movere seipsam, vel agere se quocumque modo
ad operationem. Et secundum hoc, vivere nihil aliud est quam esse
in tali natura, et vita significat hoc ipsum, sed in abstracto;
sicut hoc nomen cursus significat ipsum currere in abstracto. Unde
vivum non est praedicatum accidentale, sed substantiale. Quandoque
tamen vita sumitur minus proprie pro operationibus vitae, a quibus
nomen vitae assumitur; sicut dicit philosophus, IX Ethic., quod
<i>vivere principaliter est sentire vel intelligere</i>.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher here takes "to live" to mean an operation of life. Or it would be better to say that sensation and intelligence and the like, are sometimes taken for the operations, sometimes for the existence itself of the operator. For he says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is to sense or to understand---in other words, to have a nature capable of sensation or understanding. Thus, then, he distinguishes life by the four operations mentioned. For in
  this lower world there are four kinds of living things. It is the
nature of some to be capable of nothing more than taking nourishment,
and, as a consequence, of growing and generating. Others are able, in
addition, to sense, as we see in the case of shellfish and other
animals without movement. Others have the further power of moving from
place to place, as perfect animals, such as quadrupeds, and birds, and
so on. Others, as man, have the still higher faculty of
understanding.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29158"><span class=
"ref">[29158] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod philosophus ibi accipit vivere pro operatione vitae.
Vel dicendum est melius, quod sentire et intelligere, et huiusmodi,
quandoque sumuntur pro quibusdam operationibus; quandoque autem pro
ipso esse sic operantium. Dicitur enim IX Ethic., quod <i>esse est
sentire vel intelligere</i>, idest habere naturam ad sentiendum vel
intelligendum. Et hoc modo distinguit philosophus vivere per illa
quatuor. Nam in istis inferioribus quatuor sunt genera viventium.
Quorum quaedam habent naturam solum ad utendum alimento, et ad
consequentia, quae sunt augmentum et generatio; quaedam ulterius ad
sentiendum, ut patet in animalibus immobilibus, sicut sunt ostrea;
quaedam vero, cum his, ulterius ad movendum se secundum locum,
sicut animalia perfecta, ut quadrupedia et volatilia et huiusmodi;
quaedam vero ulterius ad intelligendum, sicut homines.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By vital operations are meant those whose principles are within the operator, and in virtue of which the operator produces such operations of itself. It happens that there exist in men not merely such natural principles of certain operations as are their natural powers, but something over and above these, such as habits inclining them like a second nature to particular kinds of operations, so that the operations become sources of pleasure. Thus, as by
  a similitude, any kind of work in which a man takes delight, so that his bent is towards it, his time spent in it, and his whole life ordered with a view to it, is said to be the life of that man. Hence some are said to lead to life of self-indulgence, others a life of virtue. In this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the active, and thus to know God is said to be life eternal.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2-p10" shownumber="no"> Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29159"><span class=
"ref">[29159] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod opera vitae dicuntur, quorum principia sunt in
operantibus, ut seipsos inducant in tales operationes. Contingit
autem aliquorum operum inesse hominibus non solum principia
naturalia, ut sunt potentiae naturales; sed etiam quaedam
superaddita, ut sunt habitus inclinantes ad quaedam operationum
genera quasi per modum naturae, et facientes illas operationes esse
delectabiles. Et ex hoc dicitur, quasi per quandam similitudinem,
quod illa operatio quae est homini delectabilis, et ad quam
inclinatur, et in qua conversatur, et ordinat vitam suam ad ipsam,
dicitur vita hominis, unde quidam dicuntur agere vitam luxuriosam,
quidam vitam honestam. Et per hunc modum vita contemplativa ab
activa distinguitur. Et per hunc etiam modum cognoscere Deum
dicitur vita aeterna.</p><p title="I q. 18 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29160"><span class=
"ref">[29160] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Unde patet solutio
ad tertium.</p></div></div>
</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3" next="FP_Q18_A4" prev="FP_Q18_A2" progress="3.34%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether life is properly attributed to God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p0.1">Whether life is properly attributed to God?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p2"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is not properly
attributed to God. For things are said to live inasmuch as they move
themselves, as previously stated <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p2.1"
href="#FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A2" shape="rect"
xml:link="simple">(A[2])</a>. But movement does not belong to
God. Neither therefore does life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29161"><span class=
"ref">[29161] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
proceditur. Videtur quod Deo non conveniat vita. Vivere enim
dicuntur aliqua secundum quod movent seipsa, ut dictum est. Sed Deo
non competit moveri. Ergo neque vivere.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p3"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in all living things we
must needs suppose some principle of life. Hence it is said by the
Philosopher (De Anima ii, 4) that "the soul is the cause and principle
of the living body." But God has no principle. Therefore life cannot
be attributed to Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29162"><span class=
"ref">[29162] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in
omnibus quae vivunt, est accipere aliquod vivendi principium, unde
dicitur in II de anima, quod <i>anima est viventis corporis causa
et principium</i>. Sed Deus non habet aliquod principium. Ergo sibi
non competit vivere.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p4"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the principle of life in
the living things that exist among us is the vegetative soul. But this
exists only in corporeal things. Therefore life cannot be attributed
to incorporeal things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29163"><span class=
"ref">[29163] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
principium vitae in rebus viventibus quae apud nos sunt, est anima
vegetabilis, quae non est nisi in rebus corporalibus. Ergo rebus
incorporalibus non competit vivere.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p5"
shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef
osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.83.3" parsed="vul|Ps|83|3|0|0"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p5.1"
passage="Ps. 83:3">Ps. 83:3</scripRef>): "My heart and my flesh have
rejoiced in the living God."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29164"><span class=
"ref">[29164] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur in Psalmo LXXXIII, <i>cor meum et caro mea
exultaverunt in Deum vivum</i>.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Life is in the highest degree properly in God. In proof of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to live in so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another, the more perfectly this power is found in anything, the more perfect is the life of that thing. In things that move and are moved, a threefold order is found. In the first place, the end moves the agent: and the principal agent is that which acts through its form, and
  sometimes it does so through some instrument that acts by virtue not of its own form, but of the principal agent, and does no more than execute the action. Accordingly there are things that move themselves, not in respect of any form or end naturally inherent in them, but only in respect of the executing of the movement; the form by which they act, and the end of the action being alike determined for them by their nature. Of this kind are plants, which move themselves according to their
  inherent nature, with regard only to executing the movements of growth and decay.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p7" shownumber="no"> Other things have self-movement in a higher degree, that is, not only with regard to executing the movement, but even as regards to the form, the principle of movement, which form they acquire of themselves. Of this kind are animals, in which the principle of movement is not a naturally implanted form; but one received through sense. Hence the more perfect is their sense, the more perfect is their power of self-movement. Such as have only the sense of touch, as shellfish, move
  only with the motion of expansion and contraction; and thus their movement hardly exceeds that of plants. Whereas such as have the sensitive power in perfection, so as to recognize not only connection and touch, but also objects apart from themselves, can move themselves to a distance by progressive movement. Yet although animals of the latter kind receive through sense the form that is the principle of their movement, nevertheless they cannot of themselves propose to themselves the end of
  their operation, or movement; for this has been implanted in them by nature; and by natural instinct they are moved to any action through the form apprehended by sense. Hence such animals as move themselves in respect to an end they themselves propose are superior to these. This can only be done by reason and intellect; whose province it is to know the proportion between the end and the means to that end, and duly coordinate them. Hence a more perfect degree of life is that of intelligible
  beings; for their power of self-movement is more perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one and the same man the intellectual faculty moves the sensitive powers; and these by their command move the organs of movement. Thus in the arts we see that the art of using a ship, i.e. the art of navigation, rules the art of ship-designing; and this in its turn rules the art that is only concerned with preparing the material for the ship.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p8" shownumber="no"> But although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are supplied by nature, as are first principles, which it cannot doubt; and the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with respect to some things it moves itself, yet with regard to other things it must be moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is its very nature, and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most perfect
  degree. Such is God; and hence in Him principally is life. From this the Philosopher concludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after showing God to be intelligent, that God has life most perfect and eternal, since His intellect is most perfect and always in act.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 3 co."><a name="29165"><span class=
"ref">[29165] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod vita maxime proprie in Deo est. Ad cuius evidentiam,
considerandum est quod, cum vivere dicantur aliqua secundum quod
operantur ex seipsis, et non quasi ab aliis mota; quanto perfectius
competit hoc alicui, tanto perfectius in eo invenitur vita. In
moventibus autem et motis tria per ordinem inveniuntur. Nam primo,
finis movet agentem; agens vero principale est quod per suam formam
agit; et hoc interdum agit per aliquod instrumentum, quod non agit
ex virtute suae formae, sed ex virtute principalis agentis; cui
instrumento competit sola executio actionis. Inveniuntur igitur
quaedam, quae movent seipsa, non habito respectu ad formam vel
finem, quae inest eis a natura, sed solum quantum ad executionem
motus, sed forma per quam agunt, et finis propter quem agunt,
determinantur eis a natura. Et huiusmodi sunt plantae, quae
secundum formam inditam eis a natura, movent seipsas secundum
augmentum et decrementum. Quaedam vero ulterius movent seipsa, non
solum habito respectu ad executionem motus, sed etiam quantum ad
formam quae est principium motus, quam per se acquirunt. Et
huiusmodi sunt animalia, quorum motus principium est forma non a
natura indita, sed per sensum accepta. Unde quanto perfectiorem
sensum habent, tanto perfectius movent seipsa. Nam ea quae non
habent nisi sensum tactus, movent solum seipsa motu dilatationis et
constrictionis, ut ostrea, parum excedentia motum plantae. Quae
vero habent virtutem sensitivam perfectam, non solum ad
cognoscendum coniuncta et tangentia, sed etiam ad cognoscendum
distantia, movent seipsa in remotum motu processivo. Sed quamvis
huiusmodi animalia formam quae est principium motus, per sensum
accipiant, non tamen per seipsa praestituunt sibi finem suae
operationis, vel sui motus; sed est eis inditus a natura, cuius
instinctu ad aliquid agendum moventur per formam sensu apprehensam.
Unde supra talia animalia sunt illa quae movent seipsa, etiam
habito respectu ad finem, quem sibi praestituunt. Quod quidem non
fit nisi per rationem et intellectum, cuius est cognoscere
proportionem finis et eius quod est ad finem, et unum ordinare in
alterum. Unde perfectior modus vivendi est eorum quae habent
intellectum, haec enim perfectius movent seipsa. Et huius est
signum, quod in uno et eodem homine virtus intellectiva movet
potentias sensitivas; et potentiae sensitivae per suum imperium
movent organa, quae exequuntur motum. Sicut etiam in artibus,
videmus quod ars ad quam pertinet usus navis, scilicet ars
gubernatoria, praecipit ei quae inducit formam navis, et haec
praecipit illi quae habet executionem tantum, in disponendo
materiam. Sed quamvis intellectus noster ad aliqua se agat, tamen
aliqua sunt ei praestituta a natura; sicut sunt prima principia,
circa quae non potest aliter se habere, et ultimus finis, quem non
potest non velle. Unde, licet quantum ad aliquid moveat se, tamen
oportet quod quantum ad aliqua ab alio moveatur. Illud igitur cuius
sua natura est ipsum eius intelligere, et cui id quod naturaliter
habet, non determinatur ab alio, hoc est quod obtinet summum gradum
vitae. Tale autem est Deus. Unde in Deo maxime est vita. Unde
philosophus, in XII Metaphys., ostenso quod Deus sit intelligens,
concludit quod habeat vitam perfectissimam et sempiternam, quia
intellectus eius est perfectissimus, et semper in actu.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in Metaph. ix, 16, action is twofold. Actions of one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat or to cut; whilst actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand, to sense and to will. The difference between them is this, that the former action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of the thing moved; whereas the latter action is the perfection of the agent. Hence, because movement is an act of the thing in
  movement, the latter action, in so far as it is the act of the operator, is called its movement, by this similitude, that as movement is an act of the thing moved, so an act of this kind is the act of the agent, although movement is an act of the imperfect, that is, of what is in potentiality; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that is to say, of what is in act as stated in De Anima iii, 28. In the sense, therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which understands itself
  is said to move itself. It is in this sense that Plato also taught
that God moves Himself; not in the sense in which movement is an act
of the imperfect.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29166"><span class=
"ref">[29166] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in IX Metaphys., duplex est actio,
una, quae transit in exteriorem materiam, ut calefacere et secare;
alia, quae manet in agente, ut intelligere, sentire et velle.
Quarum haec est differentia, quia prima actio non est perfectio
agentis quod movet, sed ipsius moti; secunda autem actio est
perfectio agentis. Unde, quia motus est actus mobilis, secunda
actio, inquantum est actus operantis, dicitur motus eius; ex hac
similitudine, quod, sicut motus est actus mobilis, ita huiusmodi
actio est actus agentis; licet motus sit actus imperfecti, scilicet
existentis in potentia, huiusmodi autem actio est actus perfecti,
idest existentis in actu, ut dicitur in III de anima. Hoc igitur
modo quo intelligere est motus, id quod se intelligit, dicitur se
movere. Et per hunc modum etiam Plato posuit quod Deus movet
seipsum, non eo modo quo motus est actus imperfecti.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p10"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God is His own very
existence and understanding, so is He His own life; and therefore He
so lives that He has not principle of life.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29167"><span class=
"ref">[29167] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, sicut Deus est ipsum suum esse et suum intelligere,
ita est suum vivere. Et propter hoc, sic vivit, quod non habet
vivendi principium.</p></div></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3-p11"
shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Life in this lower world
is bestowed on a corruptible nature, that needs generation to preserve
the species, and nourishment to preserve the individual. For this
reason life is not found here below apart from a vegetative soul: but
this does not hold good with incorruptible natures.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29168"><span class=
"ref">[29168] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod vita in istis inferioribus recipitur in natura
corruptibili, quae indiget et generatione ad conservationem
speciei, et alimento ad conservationem individui. Et propter hoc,
in istis inferioribus non invenitur vita sine anima vegetabili. Sed
hoc non habet locum in rebus incorruptibilibus.</p></div></div>
</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4" next="FP_Q19" prev="FP_Q18_A3"
progress="3.38%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether all things are
life in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p0.1">Whether all things are life in
God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width:
45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p2"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not all things are
life in God. For it is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Acts.17.28"
parsed="vul|Acts|17|28|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p2.1"
passage="Acts 17:28">Acts 17:28</scripRef>), "In Him we live, and
move, and be." But not all things in God are movement. Therefore not
all things are life in Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29169"><span class=
"ref">[29169] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia sint vita in Deo. Dicitur enim
Act. XVII, <i>in ipso vivimus, movemur et sumus</i>. Sed non omnia
in Deo sunt motus. Ergo non omnia in ipso sunt
vita.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
Further, all things are in God as their first model. But things
modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not all things
have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life in
God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29170"><span class=
"ref">[29170] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnia
sunt in Deo sicut in primo exemplari. Sed exemplata debent
conformari exemplari. Cum igitur non omnia vivant in seipsis,
videtur quod non omnia in Deo sint vita.</p></div></div><div
style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p4"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De
Vera Relig. 29), a living substance is better than a substance that
does not live. If, therefore, things which in themselves have not
life, are life in God, it seems that things exist more truly in God
than themselves. But this appears to be false; since in themselves
they exist actually, but in God potentially.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29171"><span class=
"ref">[29171] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
Augustinus dicit in libro de vera Relig., substantia vivens est
melior qualibet substantia non vivente. Si igitur ea quae in
seipsis non vivunt, in Deo sunt vita, videtur quod verius sint res
in Deo quam in seipsis. Quod tamen videtur esse falsum, cum in
seipsis sint in actu, in Deo vero in potentia.</p></div></div><div
style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p5"
shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as good things and
things made in time are known by God, so are bad things, and things
that God can make, but never will be made. If, therefore, all things
are life in God, inasmuch as known by Him, it seems that even bad
things and things that will never be made are life in God, as known by
Him, and this appears inadmissible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="29172"><span class=
"ref">[29172] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
sciuntur a Deo bona, et ea quae fiunt secundum aliquod tempus; ita
mala, et ea quae Deus potest facere, sed nunquam fiunt. Si ergo
omnia sunt vita in Deo, inquantum sunt scita ab ipso, videtur quod
etiam mala, et quae nunquam fiunt, sunt vita in Deo, inquantum sunt
scita ab eo. Quod videtur inconveniens.</p></div></div><div
style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p6"
shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> (<scripRef
osisRef="Bible.vul:John.1.3-John.1.4" parsed="vul|John|1|3|1|4"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p6.1"
passage="Jn. 1:3,4">Jn. 1:3,4</scripRef>), it is said, "What was made,
in Him was life." But all things were made, except God. Therefore all
things are life in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29173"><span class=
"ref">[29173] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
quod dicitur Ioan. I, <i>quod factum est, in ipso vita erat</i>.
Sed omnia praeter Deum facta sunt. Ergo omnia in Deo sunt
vita.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b>
In God to live is to understand, as before stated <a
id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A3"
shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>. In God intellect, the thing
understood, and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence
whatever is in God as understood is the very living or life of
God. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been made by God are
in Him as things understood, it follows that all things in Him are the
divine life itself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 co."><a name="29174"><span class=
"ref">[29174] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
quod, sicut dictum est, vivere Dei est eius intelligere. In Deo
autem est idem intellectus et quod intelligitur, et ipsum
intelligere eius. Unde quidquid est in Deo ut intellectum, est
ipsum vivere vel vita eius. Unde, cum omnia quae facta sunt a Deo,
sint in ipso ut intellecta, sequitur quod omnia in ipso sunt ipsa
vita divina.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold sense. In one way, so far are they are held together and preserved by the divine power; even as we say that things that are in our power are in us. And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they exist in their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the Apostle when he says, "In Him we live, move, and be"; since our being, living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In
  another sense things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows
them, in which sense they are in God through their proper ideas, which
in God are not distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they
are in God are the divine essence. And since the divine essence is
life and not movement, it follows that things existing in God in this
manner are not movement, but life.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29175"><span class=
"ref">[29175] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod creaturae in Deo esse dicuntur dupliciter. Uno modo,
inquantum continentur et conservantur virtute divina, sicut dicimus
ea esse in nobis, quae sunt in nostra potestate. Et sic creaturae
dicuntur esse in Deo, etiam prout sunt in propriis naturis. Et hoc
modo intelligendum est verbum apostoli dicentis, <i>in ipso
vivimus, movemur et sumus</i>, quia et nostrum vivere, et nostrum
esse, et nostrum moveri causantur a Deo. Alio modo dicuntur res
esse in Deo sicut in cognoscente. Et sic sunt in Deo per proprias
rationes, quae non sunt aliud in Deo ab essentia divina. Unde res,
prout sic in Deo sunt, sunt essentia divina. Et quia essentia
divina est vita, non autem motus, inde est quod res, hoc modo
loquendi, in Deo non sunt motus, sed vita.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The thing modelled must be like the model according to the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form has being of another kind in the model from that which it has in the thing modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the architect immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that exists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence the ideas of things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine mind,
  as having a divine existence in that mind.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29176"><span class=
"ref">[29176] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod exemplata oportet conformari exemplari secundum
rationem formae, non autem secundum modum essendi. Nam alterius
modi esse habet quandoque forma in exemplari et in exemplato, sicut
forma domus in mente artificis habet esse immateriale et
intelligibile, in domo autem quae est extra animam, habet esse
materiale et sensibile. Unde et rationes rerum quae in seipsis non
vivunt, in mente divina sunt vita, quia in mente divina habent esse
divinum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in the divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which reason, in fact, Plato held that the "separate" man was the true man; and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by participation. But since matter enters into the being of natural things, we must say that those things have simply being in the divine mind more
  truly than in themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated being, but in themselves a created being: whereas this particular being, a man, or horse, for example, has this being more truly in its own nature than in the divine mind, because it belongs to human nature to be material, which, as existing in the divine mind, it is not. Even so a house has nobler being in the architect's mind than in matter; yet a material house is called a house more truly than the one which exists in the
  mind; since the former is actual, the latter only
potential.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29177"><span class=
"ref">[29177] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, si de ratione rerum naturalium non esset materia,
sed tantum forma, omnibus modis veriori modo essent res naturales
in mente divina per suas ideas, quam in seipsis. Propter quod et
Plato posuit quod homo separatus erat verus homo, homo autem
materialis est homo per participationem. Sed quia de ratione rerum
naturalium est materia, dicendum quod res naturales verius esse
habent simpliciter in mente divina, quam in seipsis, quia in mente
divina habent esse increatum, in seipsis autem esse creatum. Sed
esse hoc, utpote homo vel equus, verius habent in propria natura
quam in mente divina, quia ad veritatem hominis pertinet esse
materiale, quod non habent in mente divina. Sicut domus nobilius
esse habet in mente artificis, quam in materia, sed tamen verius
dicitur domus quae est in materia, quam quae est in mente; quia
haec est domus in actu, illa autem domus in potentia.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q18.FP_Q18_A4-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although bad things are in God's knowledge, as being comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as created by Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him. They are known by God through the types of good things. Hence it cannot be said that bad things are life in God. Those things that are not in time may be called life in God in so far as life means understanding only, and inasmuch as they are understood by God; but not in so
  far as life implies a principle of operation.</p></div><div
style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 18 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="29178"><span class=
"ref">[29178] I&ordf; q. 18 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod, licet mala sint in Dei scientia, inquantum sub Dei
scientia comprehenduntur, non tamen sunt in Deo sicut creata a Deo
vel conservata ab ipso, neque sicut habentia rationem in Deo,
cognoscuntur enim a Deo per rationes bonorum. Unde non potest dici
quod mala sint vita in Deo. Ea vero quae secundum nullum tempus
sunt, possunt dici esse vita in Deo, secundum quod vivere nominat
intelligere tantum, inquantum intelliguntur a Deo, non autem
secundum quod vivere importat principium
operationis.</p></div></div></div></div>
<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19" next="FP_Q19_A1" prev="FP_Q18_A4" progress="3.41%" n="xviii" title="Question. 19 - THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)">
<h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p0.1">Question 19. THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p2" shownumber="no"> After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether there is will in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p7" shownumber="no"> (5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p8" shownumber="no"> (6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p9" shownumber="no"> (7) Whether the will of God is mutable?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p10" shownumber="no"> (8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p11" shownumber="no"> (9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p12" shownumber="no"> (10) Whether God has free will?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p13" shownumber="no"> (11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p14" shownumber="no"> (12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</p>
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<div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1" next="FP_Q19_A2" prev="FP_Q19" progress="3.42%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether there is will in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p0.1">Whether there is will in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is not will in God. For the object of will is the end and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end. Therefore there is not will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, will is a kind of appetite. But appetite, as it is directed to things not possessed, implies imperfection, which cannot be imputed to God. Therefore there is not will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 54), the will moves, and is moved. But God is the first cause of movement, and Himself is unmoved, as proved in Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there is not will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.12.2" parsed="vul|Rom|12|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p5.1" passage="Rom. 12:2">Rom. 12:2</scripRef>): "That you may prove what is the will of God."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> There is will in God, as there is intellect: since will follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual existence by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards its natural form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when it has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same with every natural perfection, which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things
  without knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also intellectual natures have a like aptitude as apprehended through its intelligible form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain to the will. Hence in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there is animal appetite. And so there must be will in God, since there is intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own existence, so is His
  will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this by His essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[6], A[3]</a>): for the end has the aspect of good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which, although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking what it does not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in what it does possess. In this respect will is said to be in God, as having always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is not distinct from His essence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A will of which the principal object is a good outside itself, must be moved by another; but the object of the divine will is His goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since the will of God is His essence, it is not moved by another than itself, but by itself alone, in the same sense as understanding and willing are said to be movement. This is what Plato meant when he said that the first mover moves itself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2" next="FP_Q19_A3" prev="FP_Q19_A1" progress="3.44%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether God wills things apart from Himself?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p0.1">Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not will things apart from Himself. For the divine will is the divine existence. But God is not other than Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, 54. If, therefore, God wills anything apart from Himself, His will must be moved by another; which is impossible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks nothing beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely satisfies His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, acts of will are multiplied in proportion to the number of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and things apart from Himself, it follows that the act of His will is manifold, and consequently His existence, which is His will. But this is impossible. Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Thess.4.3" parsed="vul|1Thess|4|3|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p6.1" passage="1 Thess. 4:3">1 Thess. 4:3</scripRef>): "This is the will of God, your sanctification."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. For natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces
  its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed; and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other
  things to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other things should be partakers therein.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine will is God's own existence essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of understanding them and expressing them, as is clear from what has already been said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[4]</a>). For when we say that God exists, no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say that God wills. Therefore, although He is not anything apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart from
  Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things willed for the sake of the end, the whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves the will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing so wills nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant, which anyone may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its
  own sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only for the sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it does not follow that anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He understands things apart from Himself by understanding His own essence, so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own goodness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From the fact that His own goodness suffices the divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from itself, but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its goodness. Thus, too, the divine intellect, though its perfection consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that essence knows other things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the many only in the one, in the same way the divine will is one and simple, as willing the many only through the one, that is, through its own goodness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" next="FP_Q19_A4" prev="FP_Q19_A2" progress="3.47%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p0.1">Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills from eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His own goodness necessarily. Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of all necessity, as above shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p4.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[2], A[3]</a>). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing over and above His nature as stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God does not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore possible for Him to will what He does not will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two things, and imperfect, since everything contingent is imperfect and mutable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one or the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined to one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator [*Averroes] says in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent with regard to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from another; and thus He has some cause prior to Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 6:</b> Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as the divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore whatever God wills, He wills necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eph.1.11" parsed="vul|Eph|1|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p8.1" passage="Eph. 1:11">Eph. 1:11</scripRef>): "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will." Now, what we work according to the counsel of the will, we do not will necessarily. Therefore God does not will necessarily whatever He wills.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> There are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it is not
  necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we
  will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for instance the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take ship
  in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for
  supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From the fact that God wills from eternity whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily; except by supposition.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although God necessarily wills His own goodness, He does not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness; for it can exist without other things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p12" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not natural to God to will any of those other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not unnatural or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p13" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in the cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the
  divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely, that the perfect goodness of God can be without it; and such defect accompanies all created good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p14" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A naturally contingent cause must be determined to act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p15" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves. Since then all other things have necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute
  necessity so as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily whatever He wills, but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4" next="FP_Q19_A5" prev="FP_Q19_A3" progress="3.51%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether the will of God is the cause of things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p0.1">Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "As our sun, not by reason nor by pre-election, but by its very being, enlightens all things that can participate in its light, so the divine good by its very essence pours the rays of goodness upon everything that exists." But every voluntary agent acts by reason and pre-election. Therefore God does not act by will; and so His will is not the cause of things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, The first in any order is that which is essentially so, thus in the order of burning things, that comes first which is fire by its essence. But God is the first agent. Therefore He acts by His essence; and that is His nature. He acts then by nature, and not by will. Therefore the divine will is not the cause of things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Whatever is the cause of anything, through being "such" a thing, is the cause by nature, and not by will. For fire is the cause of heat, as being itself hot; whereas an architect is the cause of a house, because he wills to build it. Now Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because God is good, we exist." Therefore God is the cause of things by His nature, and not by His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the created things is the knowledge of God, as said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[8]</a>). Therefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.26" parsed="vul|Wis|11|26|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p6.1" passage="Wis. 11:26">Wis. 11:26</scripRef>), "How could anything endure, if Thou wouldst not?"</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We must hold that the will of God is the cause of things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed, by a necessity of His nature.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p8" shownumber="no"> This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as proved in Phys. ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary means predetermined for it by some higher intellect; as the end and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the agent that acts by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of agents, He
  must act by intellect and will.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p9" shownumber="no"> This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of which the property is to produce one and the same effect; for nature operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent; and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance with that nature; for every natural agent has a determinate being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself
  the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[7], A[2]</a>). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and intellect.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p10" shownumber="no"> Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause. Wherefore since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed from Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will,
  for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived appertains to the will. Therefore the will of God is the cause of things.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius in these words does not intend to exclude election from God absolutely; but only in a certain sense, in so far, that is, as He communicates His goodness not merely to certain things, but to all; and as election implies a certain distinction.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p12" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because the essence of God is His intellect and will, from the fact of His acting by His essence, it follows that He acts after the mode of intellect and will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p13" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Good is the object of the will. The words, therefore, "Because God is good, we exist," are true inasmuch as His goodness is the reason of His willing all other things, as said before (A[2], ad 2).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p14" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even in us the cause of one and the same effect is knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is conceived, and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the effect, except by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to operation. But the power is cause, as executing the effect, since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in God
  all these things are one.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5" next="FP_Q19_A6" prev="FP_Q19_A4" progress="3.55%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p0.1">Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that some cause can be assigned to the divine will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46): "Who would venture to say that God made all things irrationally?" But to a voluntary agent, what is the reason of operating, is the cause of willing. Therefore the will of God has some cause.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause of all things, as has been already shown <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[4])</a>. If, then, there is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause, except the divine will alone. Thus all science would be in vain, since science seeks to assign causes
  to effects. This seems inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no cause, depends simply on his will. If, therefore, the will of God has no cause, it follows that all things made depend simply on His will, and have no other cause. But this also is not admissible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 28): "Every efficient cause is greater than the thing effected." But nothing is greater than the will of God. We must not then seek for a cause of it.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> In no wise has the will of God a cause. In proof of which we must consider that, since the will follows from the intellect, there is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the same way as there is a cause of the understanding, in the person that understands. The case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its conclusion are understood separately from each other, the understanding the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is known.
  If the understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself, apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance, in this case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding the premisses, since a thing cannot be its own cause; and yet, it would be true that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the cause of the conclusion. It is the same with the will, with respect to which the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end, as do the
  premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p7" shownumber="no"> Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means to that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and means; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by one act understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the
  cause is not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause of His willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end. Therefore, He wills this to be as means to that; but does not will this on account of that.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will of God is reasonable, not because anything is to God a cause of willing, but in so far as He wills one thing to be on account of another.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since God wills effects to proceed from definite causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not unreasonable to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It would, however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary, and not as dependent on the will of God. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 2): "Philosophers in their vanity have thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes, being utterly
  unable to perceive the cause that is shown above all others, the will of God."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since God wills effects to come from causes, all effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the will of God, but on something else besides: but the first effect depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say that God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work, and intellect, that he might be man; and willed him to be man that he might enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this
  cannot be reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things depend on the simple will of God; but the others on the order of other causes.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6" next="FP_Q19_A7" prev="FP_Q19_A5" progress="3.58%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p0.1">Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled. For the Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:1Tim.2.4" parsed="vul|1Tim|2|4|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p2.1" passage="1 Tim. 2:4">1 Tim. 2:4</scripRef>): "God will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." But this does not happen. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is that of the will to good. Now God knows all truth. Therefore He wills all good. But not all good actually exists; for much more good might exist. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since the will of God is the first cause, it does not exclude intermediate causes. But the effect of a first cause may be hindered by a defect of a secondary cause; as the effect of the motive power may be hindered by the weakness of the limb. Therefore the effect of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the secondary causes. The will of God, therefore, is not always fulfilled.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.113.11" parsed="vul|Ps|113|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p5.1" passage="Ps. 113:11">Ps. 113:11</scripRef>): "God hath done all things, whatsoever He would."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In proof of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active causes as with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that although a thing may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the universal form. For though a thing may fail to be, for example, a man or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence
  the same must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the order of any particular active cause, but not outside the order of the universal cause; under which all particular causes are included: and if any particular cause fails of its effect, this is because of the hindrance of some other particular cause, which is included in the order of the universal cause. Therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen.
  For it may happen that a star is hindered from producing its effects; yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things, from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred through intermediate causes to the universal influence of the first heaven. Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will should not produce its effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in another order; as
  does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the divine will as much as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that will, when by its justice he is punished.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a restricted application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not will." Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every
  class of individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case they mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition. Thirdly, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent,
  but to the things willed.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p8" shownumber="no"> To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or
  dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in
  themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills
  takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An act of the cognitive faculty is according as the thing known is in the knower; while an act of the appetite faculty is directed to things as they exist in themselves. But all that can have the nature of being and truth virtually exists in God, though it does not all exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth; but does not will all good, except in so far as He wills Himself, in Whom all good virtually exists.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A first cause can be hindered in its effect by deficiency in the secondary cause, when it is not the universal first cause, including within itself all causes; for then the effect could in no way escape its order. And thus it is with the will of God, as said above.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7" next="FP_Q19_A8" prev="FP_Q19_A6" progress="3.62%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether the will of God is changeable?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p0.1">Whether the will of God is changeable?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gen.6.7" parsed="vul|Gen|6|7|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p2.1" passage="Gn. 6:7">Gn. 6:7</scripRef>): "It repenteth Me that I have made man." But whoever repents of what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has a changeable will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: "I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.18.7-Jer.18.8" parsed="vul|Jer|18|7|18|8" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p3.1" passage="Jer. 18:7,8">Jer. 18:7,8</scripRef>) Therefore God has a changeable will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God does not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the law to be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as said before <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>. Therefore He can both will and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is changeable substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable as regards His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son of man, that He should be changed" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Num.23.19" parsed="vul|Num|23|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p6.1" passage="Num. 23:19">Num. 23:19</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if one should begin to will what before he had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless
  we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will regards good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not so before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before;
  hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both the substance of God and His knowledge are entirely unchangeable (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[9], A[1]</a>; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when we repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so far as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom
  He had made.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will of God, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in the divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one who looked only on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not
  rise again," but looking at the divine first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise again." And God wills both: that is, that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen; or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine
  and higher cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.38.1" parsed="vul|Isa|38|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p9.1" passage="Is. 38:1">Is. 38:1</scripRef>). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, which is unchangeable. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5): "The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel"---that is to say, the counsel of His will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent," His words must be understood metaphorically. For
  men seem to repent, when they do not fulfill what they have threatened.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It does not follow from this argument that God has a will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should change.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the unchangeableness of the divine will, as has been said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p11.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8" next="FP_Q19_A9" prev="FP_Q19_A7" progress="3.65%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p0.1">Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved, except whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84) "Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder it." But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.9.19" parsed="vul|Rom|9|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p3.1" passage="Rom. 9:19">Rom. 9:19</scripRef>): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die, being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every true conditional statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is
  necessary absolutely.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> All good things that exist God wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will, counsel, and all other such things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p7" shownumber="no"> This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be
  referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that
  belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise
  contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.</p>
</div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the words of Augustine we must understand a necessity in things willed by God that is not absolute, but conditional. For the conditional statement that if God wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Consequents have necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the divine will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute necessities.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
</div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9" next="FP_Q19_A10" prev="FP_Q19_A8" progress="3.68%" n="ix" title="Article. 9 - Whether God wills evils?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p0.1">Whether God wills evils?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God wills evils. For every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should exist, but also evil things." Therefore God wills evil things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. And Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil." But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and
  beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should exist.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom. Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it." Therefore it is not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not evil things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[5], A[1]</a>), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or
  corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not
  even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in
  willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that evil should be or be done." This, however, is not correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is
  beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from his sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot therefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done, since nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it accidentally, but by that which belongs to it essentially.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore Dionysius in saying that "evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe," draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The statements that evil exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affirmative. God therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10" next="FP_Q19_A11" prev="FP_Q19_A9" progress="3.71%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether God has free-will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p0.1">Whether God has free-will?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; "God alone is He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either side."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, as has been said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>. Therefore there is not free-will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of the will, not in obedience to necessity."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>, He has free will with respect to what He does not
  necessarily will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply, but only as regards the inclination to sin.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown (De Fide ii, 3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can will to sit down, and not will to sit down.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11" next="FP_Q19_A12" prev="FP_Q19_A10" progress="3.73%" n="xi" title="Article. 11 - Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p0.1">Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The will of God is one, since it is the very essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.110.2" parsed="vul|Ps|110|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4.1" passage=" Ps. 110:2"> Ps. 110:2</scripRef>: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills." Therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for the will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[3]</a>). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that
  punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.6.10" parsed="vul|Matt|6|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.2" passage="Mat. 6:10">Mat.
  6:10</scripRef>). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called
  will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge, but to will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the usual expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12" next="FP_Q20" prev="FP_Q19_A11" progress="3.75%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p0.1">Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</h4>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that five expressions of will---namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission---are not rightly assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God works nothing unless He wills it, as the Scripture says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.26" parsed="vul|Wis|11|26|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p3.1" passage="Wis. 11:26">Wis. 11:26</scripRef>). But the will of expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be comprehended in the will of expression.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, operation and permission appertain to all creatures in common, since God works in them all, and permits some action in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly under one division, not being of one order.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, evil happens in more ways than good, since "good happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of ways," as declared by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not right therefore to assign one expression only in the case of evil---namely, prohibition---and two---namely, counsel and precept---in the case of good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
<p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> By these signs we name the expression of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may show that he wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may show it by himself, by doing something either directly, or indirectly and accidentally. He shows it directly when he works in his own person; in that way the expression of his will is his own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering the doing of a thing; for
  what removes an impediment is called an accidental mover. In this respect the expression is called permission. He declares his will by means of another when he orders another to perform a work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept, and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of man makes itself known, the same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will, as the expression of that will. That precept,
  counsel, and prohibition are called the will of God is clear from the words of <scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.6.10" parsed="vul|Matt|6|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p6.1" passage="Mat. 6:10">Mat. 6:10</scripRef>: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." That permission and operation are called the will of God is clear from Augustine (Enchiridion 95), who says: "Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually doing it."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p7" shownumber="no"> Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, operation with regard to good. Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is necessary and counsel to good that is of supererogation.</p>
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<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will about the same matter in different ways; thus we find many words that mean the same thing. Hence there is not reason why the same thing should not be the subject of precept, operation, and counsel; or of prohibition or permission.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God may by metaphor be said to will what by His will, properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be said to will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing to prevent the same thing being the object of the will of good pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is always the same as the will of good pleasure; while precept and counsel are not; both because the former regards the present, and the two latter
  the future; and because the former is of itself the effect of the will; the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of another.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Rational creatures are masters of their own acts; and for this reason certain special expressions of the divine will are assigned to their acts, inasmuch as God ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily and of themselves. Other creatures act only as moved by the divine operation; therefore only operation and permission are concerned with these.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
<div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All evil of sin, though happening in many ways, agrees in being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard to evil, only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. On the other hand, good stands in various relations to the divine goodness, since there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject of precept; and there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and
  these are the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is not only concerned with the obtaining of greater good; but also with the avoiding of lesser evils.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>
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author	ht
date	Fri, 18 Jul 2014 11:39:12 +0000
parents	6d097403ddb9
children