Mercurial > hg > Aquinas
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catch up through FS_vi A108
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--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/summa/bilingual/FS_vi.html Sat Sep 10 10:03:58 2022 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,16296 @@ + + <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:x="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + <head> + <title>Bilingual Aquinas</title> + <style> + h2, h3, h4 {margin-bottom: 0px; clear: both} + .bilingual {clear: both; margin-top: .5em} + div.eng {width: 45%; float: left} + div.lat {width: 45%; float: right} + @page { size: A4 portrait; margin: 1cm; + orphans: 2; widows: 2; + } + @media print {div.div3 {page-break-before: always}} + </style> + </head> + <body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><div id="FS.vi" class="div2"> + + + <h2 id="FS.vi-p0.1">TREATISE ON LAW (QQ 90-108)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FS_Q90">Q. 90. OF THE ESSENCE OF LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q91">Q. 91. OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q92">Q. 92. OF THE EFFECTS OF LAW (TWO ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q93">Q. 93. OF THE ETERNAL LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q94">Q. 94. OF THE NATURAL LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q95">Q. 95. OF HUMAN LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q96">Q. 96. OF THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q97">Q. 97. OF CHANGE IN LAWS (FOUR ARTICLES) </a><br/><a href="#FS_Q98">Q. 98. OF THE OLD LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q99">Q. 99. OF THE PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q100">Q. 100. OF THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW (TWELVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q101">Q. 101. OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS IN THEMSELVES (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q102">Q. 102. OF THE CAUSES OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q103">Q. 103. OF THE DURATION OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q104">Q. 104. OF THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q105">Q. 105. OF THE REASON FOR THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q106">Q. 106. OF THE LAW OF THE GOSPEL, CALLED THE NEW LAW, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q107">Q. 107. OF THE NEW LAW AS COMPARED WITH THE OLD (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q108">Q. 108. OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE CONTAINED IN THE NEW LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/></div> + <div id="FS_Q90" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q90-p0.1">Q. 90. OF THE ESSENCE OF LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q90-p2"> We have now to consider the extrinsic principles of acts. Now the extrinsic principle inclining to evil is the devil, of + whose temptations we have spoken in the + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q114" id="FS_Q90-p2.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[114].</a> But the extrinsic principle moving to good is God, Who both instructs us by means of His Law, and assists us by His Grace: + wherefore in the first place we must speak of law; in the second place, of grace. + </p><p id="FS_Q90-p3"> Concerning law, we must consider: (1) Law itself in general; (2) its parts. Concerning law in general three points offer + themselves for our consideration: (1) Its essence; (2) The different kinds of law; (3) The effects of law. + </p><p id="FS_Q90-p4"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q90-p5"><a href="#FS_Q90_A1"> (1) Whether law is something pertaining to reason?</a></p><p id="FS_Q90-p6"><a href="#FS_Q90_A2"> (2) Concerning the end of law;</a></p><p id="FS_Q90-p7"><a href="#FS_Q90_A3"> (3) Its cause;</a></p><p id="FS_Q90-p8"><a href="#FS_Q90_A4"> (4) The promulgation of law.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 pr."><a name="37425" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37425] +Iª-IIae q. 90 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de +principiis exterioribus actuum. Principium autem exterius ad malum +inclinans est Diabolus, de cuius tentatione in primo dictum est. +Principium autem exterius movens ad bonum est Deus, qui et nos +instruit per legem, et iuvat per gratiam. Unde primo, de lege; +secundo, de gratia dicendum est. Circa legem autem, primo oportet +considerare de ipsa lege in communi; secundo, de partibus eius. +Circa legem autem in communi tria occurrunt consideranda, primo +quidem, de essentia ipsius; secundo, de differentia legum; tertio, +de effectibus legis. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum +lex sit aliquid rationis. Secundo, de fine legis. Tertio, de causa +eius. Quarto, de promulgatione ipsius.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q90_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q90_A1-p0.1">Q. 90. A. 1. Whether law is something pertaining to reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that law is not something pertaining to reason. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q90_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.23" target="asv">Rom. 7:23</a>): "I see another law in my members," etc. But nothing pertaining to reason is in the members; since the reason does not make + use of a bodily organ. Therefore law is not something pertaining to reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37426] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex non sit aliquid rationis. Dicit +enim apostolus, ad Rom. VII, <i>video aliam legem in membris +meis,</i> et cetera. Sed nihil quod est rationis, est in membris, +quia ratio non utitur organo corporali. Ergo lex non est aliquid +rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the reason there is nothing else but power, habit, and act. But law is not the power itself of reason. In like + manner, neither is it a habit of reason: because the habits of reason are the intellectual virtues of which we have spoken + above ( + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q57" id="FS_Q90_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[57])</a>. Nor again is it an act of reason: because then law would cease, when the act of reason ceases, for instance, while we are + asleep. Therefore law is nothing pertaining to reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37427" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37427] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +in ratione non est nisi potentia, habitus et actus. Sed lex non est +ipsa potentia rationis. Similiter etiam non est aliquis habitus +rationis, quia habitus rationis sunt virtutes intellectuales, de +quibus supra dictum est. Nec etiam est actus rationis, quia +cessante rationis actu, lex cessaret, puta in dormientibus. Ergo +lex non est aliquid rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the law moves those who are subject to it to act aright. But it belongs properly to the will to move to act, as + is evident from what has been said above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q90_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Therefore law pertains, not to the reason, but to the will; according to the words of the Jurist (Lib. i, ff., De Const. + Prin. leg. i): "Whatsoever pleaseth the sovereign, has force of law." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37428] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex movet eos qui subiiciuntur legi, ad recte agendum. Sed movere +ad agendum proprie pertinet ad voluntatem, ut patet ex praemissis. +Ergo lex non pertinet ad rationem, sed magis ad voluntatem, +secundum quod etiam iurisperitus dicit, <i>quod placuit principi, +legis habet vigorem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It belongs to the law to command and to forbid. But it belongs to reason to command, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q17_A1" id="FS_Q90_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[17], A[1]</a>). Therefore law is something pertaining to reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37429] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod ad legem pertinet praecipere et prohibere. Sed imperare +est rationis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo lex est aliquid +rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting: for "lex" [law] is derived + from "ligare" [to bind], because it binds one to act. Now the rule and measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first + principle of human acts, as is evident from what has been stated above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A1" id="FS_Q90_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[1]</a>, ad 3); since it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the first principle in all matters + of action, according to the Philosopher (Phys. ii). Now that which is the principle in any genus, is the rule and measure + of that genus: for instance, unity in the genus of numbers, and the first movement in the genus of movements. Consequently + it follows that law is something pertaining to reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 1 co."><a name="37430" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37430] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod lex quaedam regula est et mensura actuum, secundum +quam inducitur aliquis ad agendum, vel ab agendo retrahitur, +dicitur enim lex a ligando, quia obligat ad agendum. Regula autem +et mensura humanorum actuum est ratio, quae est primum principium +actuum humanorum, ut ex praedictis patet, rationis enim est +ordinare ad finem, qui est primum principium in agendis, secundum +philosophum. In unoquoque autem genere id quod est principium, est +mensura et regula illius generis, sicut unitas in genere numeri, et +motus primus in genere motuum. Unde relinquitur quod lex sit +aliquid pertinens ad rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since law is a kind of rule and measure, it may be in something in two ways. First, as in that which measures and rules: + and since this is proper to reason, it follows that, in this way, law is in the reason alone. Secondly, as in that which is + measured and ruled. In this way, law is in all those things that are inclined to something by reason of some law: so that + any inclination arising from a law, may be called a law, not essentially but by + participation as it were. And thus the inclination of the members to concupiscence is called "the law of the members." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37431] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, cum lex sit regula quaedam et mensura, dicitur +dupliciter esse in aliquo. Uno modo, sicut in mensurante et +regulante. Et quia hoc est proprium rationis, ideo per hunc modum +lex est in ratione sola. Alio modo, sicut in regulato et mensurato. +Et sic lex est in omnibus quae inclinantur in aliquid ex aliqua +lege, ita quod quaelibet inclinatio proveniens ex aliqua lege, +potest dici lex, non essentialiter, sed quasi participative. Et hoc +modo inclinatio ipsa membrorum ad concupiscendum lex membrorum +vocatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as, in external action, we may consider the work and the work done, for instance the work of building and the house + built; so in the acts of reason, we may consider the act itself of reason, i.e. to understand and to reason, and something + produced by this act. With regard to the speculative reason, this is first of all the definition; secondly, the proposition; + thirdly, the syllogism or argument. And since also the practical reason makes use of a + syllogism in respect of the work to be done, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q13_A3" id="FS_Q90_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[3]</a>; + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q76_A1" id="FS_Q90_A1-p8.2" shape="rect"> Q[76], A[1]</a>) and since as the Philosopher teaches (Ethic. vii, 3); hence we find in the practical reason something that holds the same + position in regard to operations, as, in the speculative intellect, the proposition holds in regard to conclusions. Such like + universal propositions of the practical intellect that are directed to actions have the nature of law. And these + propositions are sometimes under our actual consideration, while sometimes they are retained in the reason by means of a habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37432" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37432] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut in actibus exterioribus est considerare +operationem et operatum, puta aedificationem et aedificatum; ita in +operibus rationis est considerare ipsum actum rationis, qui est +intelligere et ratiocinari, et aliquid per huiusmodi actum +constitutum. Quod quidem in speculativa ratione primo quidem est +definitio; secundo, enunciatio; tertio vero, syllogismus vel +argumentatio. Et quia ratio etiam practica utitur quodam syllogismo +in operabilibus, ut supra habitum est, secundum quod philosophus +docet in VII Ethic.; ideo est invenire aliquid in ratione practica +quod ita se habeat ad operationes, sicut se habet propositio in +ratione speculativa ad conclusiones. Et huiusmodi propositiones +universales rationis practicae ordinatae ad actiones, habent +rationem legis. Quae quidem propositiones aliquando actualiter +considerantur, aliquando vero habitualiter a ratione tenentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reason has its power of moving from the will, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q17_A1" id="FS_Q90_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[17], A[1]</a>): for it is due to the fact that one wills the end, that the reason issues its commands as regards things ordained to the + end. But in order that the volition of what is commanded may have the nature of law, it needs to be in accord with some rule + of reason. And in this sense is to be understood the saying that the will of the sovereign has the force of + law; otherwise the sovereign's will would savor of lawlessness rather than of law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37433" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37433] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio habet vim movendi a voluntate, ut supra dictum +est, ex hoc enim quod aliquis vult finem, ratio imperat de his quae +sunt ad finem. Sed voluntas de his quae imperantur, ad hoc quod +legis rationem habeat, oportet quod sit aliqua ratione regulata. Et +hoc modo intelligitur quod voluntas principis habet vigorem legis, +alioquin voluntas principis magis esset iniquitas quam lex.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q90_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q90_A2-p0.1">Q. 90. A. 2. Whether the law is always something directed to the common good? </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the law is not always directed to the common good as to its end. For it belongs to law to command and + to forbid. But commands are directed to certain individual goods. Therefore the end of the law is not always the common good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37434" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37434] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex non ordinetur semper ad bonum +commune sicut ad finem. Ad legem enim pertinet praecipere et +prohibere. Sed praecepta ordinantur ad quaedam singularia bona. Non +ergo semper finis legis est bonum commune.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the law directs man in his actions. But human actions are concerned with particular matters. Therefore the law is + directed to some particular good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37435" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37435] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +lex dirigit hominem ad agendum. Sed actus humani sunt in +particularibus. Ergo et lex ad aliquod particulare bonum +ordinatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Isidore says (Etym. v, 3): "If the law is based on reason, whatever is based on reason will be a law." But reason + is the foundation not only of what is ordained to the common good, but also of that which is directed private good. Therefore + the law is not only directed to the good of all, but also to the private good of an individual. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37436" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37436] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., <i>si ratione lex constat, lex +erit omne quod ratione constiterit</i>. Sed ratione consistit non +solum quod ordinatur ad bonum commune, sed etiam quod ordinatur ad +bonum privatum. Ergo lex non ordinatur solum ad bonum commune, sed +etiam ad bonum privatum unius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (Etym. v, 21) that "laws are enacted for no private profit, but for the common benefit of the citizens." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37437" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37437] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Isidorus dicit, in V Etymol., quod <i>lex est nullo +privato commodo, sed pro communi utilitate civium +conscripta</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q90_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q90_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the law belongs to that which is a principle of human acts, because it is their rule and measure. Now as reason is a principle + of human acts, so in reason itself there is something which is the principle in respect of all the rest: wherefore to this + principle chiefly and mainly law must needs be referred. Now the first principle in practical matters, which are the object + of the practical reason, is the last + end: and the last end of human life is bliss or happiness, as stated above (Q[2], A[7]; Q[3], A[1]). Consequently the law + must needs regard principally the relationship to happiness. Moreover, since every part is ordained to the whole, as imperfect + to perfect; and since one man is a part of the perfect community, the law must needs regard properly the relationship to universal + happiness. Wherefore the Philosopher, in the above definition of legal matters mentions both happiness and the body + politic: for he says (Ethic. v, 1) that we call those legal matters "just, which are adapted to produce and preserve happiness + and its parts for the body politic": since the state is a perfect community, as he says in Polit. i, 1. + </p><p id="FS_Q90_A2-p7"> Now in every genus, that which belongs to it chiefly is the principle of the others, and the others belong to that genus + in subordination to that thing: thus fire, which is chief among hot things, is the cause of heat in mixed bodies, and these + are said to be hot in so far as they have a share of fire. Consequently, since the law is chiefly ordained to the common good, + any other precept in regard to some individual work, must needs be devoid of the nature of a law, save in so + far as it regards the common good. Therefore every law is ordained to the common good. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 2 co."><a name="37438" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37438] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, lex pertinet ad id quod est +principium humanorum actuum, ex eo quod est regula et mensura. +Sicut autem ratio est principium humanorum actuum, ita etiam in +ipsa ratione est aliquid quod est principium respectu omnium +aliorum. Unde ad hoc oportet quod principaliter et maxime pertineat +lex. Primum autem principium in operativis, quorum est ratio +practica, est finis ultimus. Est autem ultimus finis humanae vitae +felicitas vel beatitudo, ut supra habitum est. Unde oportet quod +lex maxime respiciat ordinem qui est in beatitudinem. Rursus, cum +omnis pars ordinetur ad totum sicut imperfectum ad perfectum; unus +autem homo est pars communitatis perfectae, necesse est quod lex +proprie respiciat ordinem ad felicitatem communem. Unde et +philosophus, in praemissa definitione legalium, mentionem facit et +de felicitate et communione politica. Dicit enim, in V Ethic., quod +<i>legalia iusta dicimus factiva et conservativa felicitatis et +particularum ipsius, politica communicatione</i>, perfecta enim +communitas civitas est, ut dicitur in I Polit. In quolibet autem +genere id quod maxime dicitur, est principium aliorum, et alia +dicuntur secundum ordinem ad ipsum, sicut ignis, qui est maxime +calidus, est causa caliditatis in corporibus mixtis, quae intantum +dicuntur calida, inquantum participant de igne. Unde oportet quod, +cum lex maxime dicatur secundum ordinem ad bonum commune, +quodcumque aliud praeceptum de particulari opere non habeat +rationem legis nisi secundum ordinem ad bonum commune. Et ideo +omnis lex ad bonum commune ordinatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A command denotes an application of a law to matters regulated by the law. Now the order to the common good, at which the + law aims, is applicable to particular ends. And in this way commands are given even concerning particular matters. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37439" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37439] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod praeceptum importat applicationem legis ad ea +quae ex lege regulantur. Ordo autem ad bonum commune, qui pertinet +ad legem, est applicabilis ad singulares fines. Et secundum hoc, +etiam de particularibus quibusdam praecepta dantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Actions are indeed concerned with particular matters: but those particular matters are referable to the common good, not + as to a common genus or species, but as to a common final cause, according as the common good is said to be the common end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37440" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37440] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod operationes quidem sunt in particularibus, sed illa +particularia referri possunt ad bonum commune, non quidem +communitate generis vel speciei, sed communitate causae finalis, +secundum quod bonum commune dicitur finis communis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as nothing stands firm with regard to the speculative reason except that which is traced back to the first indemonstrable + principles, so nothing stands firm with regard to the practical reason, unless it be directed to the last end which is the + common good: and whatever stands to reason in this sense, has the nature of a law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37441" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37441] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut nihil constat firmiter secundum rationem +speculativam nisi per resolutionem ad prima principia +indemonstrabilia, ita firmiter nihil constat per rationem practicam +nisi per ordinationem ad ultimum finem, qui est bonum commune. Quod +autem hoc modo ratione constat, legis rationem habet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q90_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q90_A3-p0.1">Q. 90. A. 3. Whether the reason of any man is competent to make laws?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the reason of any man is competent to make laws. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q90_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.14" target="asv">Rom. 2:14</a>) that "when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law . . . they are a law to themselves." + Now he says this of all in general. Therefore anyone can make a law for himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37442" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37442] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod cuiuslibet ratio sit factiva legis. +Dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. II, quod <i>cum gentes, quae legem +non habent, naturaliter ea quae legis sunt faciunt, ipsi sibi sunt +lex</i>. Hoc autem communiter de omnibus dicit. Ergo quilibet +potest facere sibi legem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1), "the intention of the lawgiver is to lead men to virtue." But every man + can lead another to virtue. Therefore the reason of any man is competent to make laws. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37443" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37443] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut philosophus dicit, in libro II Ethic., <i>intentio +legislatoris est ut inducat hominem ad virtutem</i>. Sed quilibet +homo potest alium inducere ad virtutem. Ergo cuiuslibet hominis +ratio est factiva legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as the sovereign of a state governs the state, so every father of a family governs his household. But the sovereign + of a state can make laws for the state. Therefore every father of a family can make laws for his household. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37444" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37444] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut princeps civitatis est civitatis gubernator, ita quilibet +paterfamilias est gubernator domus. Sed princeps civitatis potest +legem in civitate facere. Ergo quilibet paterfamilias potest in sua +domo facere legem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (Etym. v, 10): "A law is an ordinance of the people, whereby something is sanctioned by the Elders together + with the Commonalty." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37445" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37445] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., et habetur in decretis, +dist. II, <i>lex est constitutio populi, secundum quam maiores natu +simul cum plebibus aliquid sanxerunt</i>. Non est ergo cuiuslibet +facere legem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A law, properly speaking, regards first and foremost the order to the common good. Now to order anything to the common good, + belongs either to the whole people, or to someone who is the viceregent of the whole people. And therefore the making of a + law belongs either to the whole people or to a public personage who has care of the whole people: since in all other matters + the directing of anything to the end concerns him to whom the end belongs. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 3 co."><a name="37446" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37446] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod lex proprie, primo et principaliter respicit ordinem +ad bonum commune. Ordinare autem aliquid in bonum commune est vel +totius multitudinis, vel alicuius gerentis vicem totius +multitudinis. Et ideo condere legem vel pertinet ad totam +multitudinem, vel pertinet ad personam publicam quae totius +multitudinis curam habet. Quia et in omnibus aliis ordinare in +finem est eius cuius est proprius ille finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (A[1], ad 1), a law is in a person not only as in one that rules, but also by participation as in one that + is ruled. In the latter way each one is a law to himself, in so far as he shares the direction that he receives from one who + rules him. Hence the same text goes on: "Who show the work of the law written in their hearts." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37447" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37447] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex est in aliquo non +solum sicut in regulante, sed etiam participative sicut in +regulato. Et hoc modo unusquisque sibi est lex, inquantum +participat ordinem alicuius regulantis. Unde et ibidem subditur, +<i>qui ostendunt opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A private person cannot lead another to virtue efficaciously: for he can only advise, and if his advice be not taken, it + has no coercive power, such as the law should have, in order to prove an efficacious inducement to virtue, as the Philosopher + says (Ethic. x, 9). But this coercive power is vested in the whole people or in some public personage, to whom it belongs + to inflict penalties, as we shall state further on (Q[92], A[2], ad 3; + + <a href="SS_ii.html#SS_Q64_A3" id="FS_Q90_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[64], A[3]</a>). Wherefore the framing of laws belongs to him alone. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37448" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37448] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod persona privata non potest inducere efficaciter ad +virtutem. Potest enim solum monere, sed si sua monitio non +recipiatur, non habet vim coactivam; quam debet habere lex, ad hoc +quod efficaciter inducat ad virtutem, ut philosophus dicit, in X +Ethic. Hanc autem virtutem coactivam habet multitudo vel persona +publica, ad quam pertinet poenas infligere, ut infra dicetur. Et +ideo solius eius est leges facere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As one man is a part of the household, so a household is a part of the state: and the state is a perfect community, according + to Polit. i, 1. And therefore, as the good of one man is not the last end, but is ordained to the common good; so too the + good of one household is ordained to the good of a single state, which is a perfect community. Consequently he that governs + a family, can indeed make certain commands or ordinances, but not such as to have + properly the force of law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37449" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37449] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut homo est pars domus, ita domus est pars +civitatis, civitas autem est communitas perfecta, ut dicitur in I +Politic. Et ideo sicut bonum unius hominis non est ultimus finis, +sed ordinatur ad commune bonum; ita etiam et bonum unius domus +ordinatur ad bonum unius civitatis, quae est communitas perfecta. +Unde ille qui gubernat aliquam familiam, potest quidem facere +aliqua praecepta vel statuta; non tamen quae proprie habeant +rationem legis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q90_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q90_A4-p0.1">Q. 90. A. 4. Whether promulgation is essential to a law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that promulgation is not essential to a law. For the natural law above all has the character of law. But the + natural law needs no promulgation. Therefore it is not essential to a law that it be promulgated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37450" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37450] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod promulgatio non sit de ratione legis. +Lex enim naturalis maxime habet rationem legis. Sed lex naturalis +non indiget promulgatione. Ergo non est de ratione legis quod +promulgetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs properly to a law to bind one to do or not to do something. But the obligation of fulfilling a law touches + not only those in whose presence it is promulgated, but also others. Therefore promulgation is not essential to a law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37451" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37451] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ad legem pertinet proprie obligare ad aliquid faciendum vel non +faciendum. Sed non solum obligantur ad implendam legem illi coram +quibus promulgatur lex, sed etiam alii. Ergo promulgatio non est de +ratione legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the binding force of a law extends even to the future, since "laws are binding in matters of the future," as the + jurists say (Cod. 1, tit. De lege et constit. leg. vii). But promulgation concerns those who are present. Therefore it is + not essential to a law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37452" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37452] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +obligatio legis extenditur etiam in futurum, quia leges futuris +negotiis necessitatem imponunt, ut iura dicunt. Sed promulgatio fit +ad praesentes. Ergo promulgatio non est de necessitate legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is laid down in the Decretals, dist. 4, that "laws are established when they are promulgated." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37453" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37453] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur in decretis, IV dist., quod <i>leges instituuntur +cum promulgantur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q90_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q90_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, a law is imposed on others by way of a rule and measure. Now a rule or measure is imposed by being applied to those who + are to be ruled and measured by it. Wherefore, in order that a law obtain the binding force which is proper to a law, it must + needs be applied to the men who have to be ruled by it. Such application is made by its being notified to them by promulgation. + Wherefore promulgation is necessary for + the law to obtain its force. + </p><p id="FS_Q90_A4-p7"> Thus from the four preceding articles, the definition of law may be gathered; and it is nothing else than an ordinance of + reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 4 co."><a name="37454" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37454] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, lex imponitur aliis per modum +regulae et mensurae. Regula autem et mensura imponitur per hoc quod +applicatur his quae regulantur et mensurantur. Unde ad hoc quod lex +virtutem obligandi obtineat, quod est proprium legis, oportet quod +applicetur hominibus qui secundum eam regulari debent. Talis autem +applicatio fit per hoc quod in notitiam eorum deducitur ex ipsa +promulgatione. Unde promulgatio necessaria est ad hoc quod lex +habeat suam virtutem. Et sic ex quatuor praedictis potest colligi +definitio legis, quae nihil est aliud quam quaedam rationis +ordinatio ad bonum commune, ab eo qui curam communitatis habet, +promulgata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The natural law is promulgated by the very fact that God instilled it into man's mind so as to be known by him naturally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37455" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37455] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod promulgatio legis naturae est ex hoc ipso quod +Deus eam mentibus hominum inseruit naturaliter cognoscendam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who are not present when a law is promulgated, are bound to observe the law, in so far as it is notified or can be + notified to them by others, after it has been promulgated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37456" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37456] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illi coram quibus lex non promulgatur, obligantur ad +legem servandam, inquantum in eorum notitiam devenit per alios, vel +devenire potest, promulgatione facta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q90_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The promulgation that takes place now, extends to future time by reason of the durability of written characters, by which + means it is continually promulgated. Hence Isidore says (Etym. v, 3; ii, 10) that "lex [law] is derived from legere [to read] + because it is written." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 90 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37457" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37457] Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod promulgatio praesens in futurum extenditur per +firmitatem Scripturae, quae quodammodo semper eam promulgat. Unde +Isidorus dicit, in II Etymol., quod <i>lex a legendo vocata est, +quia scripta est</i>.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q91" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q91-p0.1">Q. 91. OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q91-p2"> We must now consider the various kinds of law: under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q91-p3"><a href="#FS_Q91_A1"> (1) Whether there is an eternal law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q91-p4"><a href="#FS_Q91_A2"> (2) Whether there is a natural law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q91-p5"><a href="#FS_Q91_A3"> (3) Whether there is a human law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q91-p6"><a href="#FS_Q91_A4"> (4) Whether there is a Divine law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q91-p7"><a href="#FS_Q91_A5"> (5) Whether there is one Divine law, or several?</a></p><p id="FS_Q91-p8"><a href="#FS_Q91_A6"> (6) Whether there is a law of sin?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 pr."><a name="37458" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37458] +Iª-IIae q. 91 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +diversitate legum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum sit +aliqua lex aeterna. Secundo, utrum sit aliqua lex naturalis. +Tertio, utrum sit aliqua lex humana. Quarto, utrum sit aliqua lex +divina. Quinto, utrum sit una tantum, vel plures. Sexto, utrum sit +aliqua lex peccati.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q91_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q91_A1-p0.1">Q. 91. A. 1. Whether there is an eternal law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no eternal law. Because every law is imposed on someone. But there was not someone from eternity + on whom a law could be imposed: since God alone was from eternity. Therefore no law is eternal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37459" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37459] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit aliqua lex aeterna. Omnis enim +lex aliquibus imponitur. Sed non fuit ab aeterno aliquis cui lex +posset imponi, solus enim Deus fuit ab aeterno. Ergo nulla lex est +aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, promulgation is essential to law. But promulgation could not be from eternity: because there was no one to whom + it could be promulgated from eternity. Therefore no law can be eternal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37460" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37460] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +promulgatio est de ratione legis. Sed promulgatio non potuit esse +ab aeterno, quia non erat ab aeterno cui promulgaretur. Ergo nulla +lex potest esse aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a law implies order to an end. But nothing ordained to an end is eternal: for the last end alone is eternal. Therefore + no law is eternal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37461" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37461] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex importat ordinem ad finem. Sed nihil est aeternum quod +ordinetur ad finem, solus enim ultimus finis est aeternus. Ergo +nulla lex est aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): "That Law which is the Supreme Reason cannot be understood to be otherwise than unchangeable + and eternal." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37462] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb., <i>lex quae summa +ratio nominatur, non potest cuipiam intelligenti non incommutabilis +aeternaque videri</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 2; + <a href="#FS_Q91_A3" id="FS_Q91_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[3]</a>,4), a law is nothing else but a dictate of practical reason emanating from the ruler who governs a perfect community. Now + it is evident, granted that the world is ruled by Divine Providence, as was stated in the + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q22_A1" id="FS_Q91_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2, that the whole community of the universe is governed by Divine Reason. Wherefore the very Idea of the government of things + in God the + Ruler of the universe, has the nature of a law. And since the Divine Reason's conception of things is not subject to time + but is eternal, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.23" target="asv"> Prov. 8:23, </a> therefore it is that this kind of law must be called eternal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 1 co."><a name="37463" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37463] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, nihil est aliud lex quam +quoddam dictamen practicae rationis in principe qui gubernat +aliquam communitatem perfectam. Manifestum est autem, supposito +quod mundus divina providentia regatur, ut in primo habitum est, +quod tota communitas universi gubernatur ratione divina. Et ideo +ipsa ratio gubernationis rerum in Deo sicut in principe +universitatis existens, legis habet rationem. Et quia divina ratio +nihil concipit ex tempore, sed habet aeternum conceptum, ut dicitur +Prov. VIII; inde est quod huiusmodi legem oportet dicere +aeternam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those things that are not in themselves, exist with God, inasmuch as they are foreknown and preordained by Him, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.17" target="asv">Rom. 4:17</a>: "Who calls those things that are not, as those that are." Accordingly the eternal concept of the Divine law bears the character + of an eternal law, in so far as it is ordained by God to the government of things foreknown by Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37464" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37464] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ea quae in seipsis non sunt, apud Deum existunt, +inquantum sunt ab ipso praecognita et praeordinata; secundum illud +Rom. IV, <i>qui vocat ea quae non sunt, tanquam ea quae sunt</i>. +Sic igitur aeternus divinae legis conceptus habet rationem legis +aeternae, secundum quod a Deo ordinatur ad gubernationem rerum ab +ipso praecognitarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Promulgation is made by word of mouth or in writing; and in both ways the eternal law is promulgated: because both the Divine + Word and the writing of the Book of Life are eternal. But the promulgation cannot be from eternity on the part of the creature + that hears or reads. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37465" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37465] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod promulgatio fit et verbo et scripto; et utroque modo +lex aeterna habet promulgationem ex parte Dei promulgantis, quia et +verbum divinum est aeternum, et Scriptura libri vitae est aeterna. +Sed ex parte creaturae audientis aut inspicientis, non potest esse +promulgatio aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The law implies order to the end actively, in so far as it directs certain things to the end; but not passively---that is + to say, the law itself is not ordained to the end---except accidentally, in a governor whose end is extrinsic to him, and + to which end his law must needs be ordained. But the end of the Divine government is God Himself, and His law is not distinct + from Himself. Wherefore the eternal law is not ordained to another end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37466" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37466] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod lex importat ordinem ad finem active, inquantum +scilicet per eam ordinantur aliqua in finem, non autem passive, +idest quod ipsa lex ordinetur ad finem, nisi per accidens in +gubernante cuius finis est extra ipsum, ad quem etiam necesse est +ut lex eius ordinetur. Sed finis divinae gubernationis est ipse +Deus, nec eius lex est aliud ab ipso. Unde lex aeterna non +ordinatur in alium finem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q91_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q91_A2-p0.1">Q. 91. A. 2. Whether there is in us a natural law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no natural law in us. Because man is governed sufficiently by the eternal law: for Augustine + says (De Lib. Arb. i) that "the eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should be most orderly." But nature + does not abound in superfluities as neither does she fail in necessaries. Therefore no law is natural to man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37467" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37467] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit in nobis aliqua lex naturalis. +Sufficienter enim homo gubernatur per legem aeternam, dicit enim +Augustinus, in I de Lib. Arb., quod <i>lex aeterna est qua iustum +est ut omnia sint ordinatissima</i>. Sed natura non abundat in +superfluis, sicut nec deficit in necessariis. Ergo non est aliqua +lex homini naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by the law man is directed, in his acts, to the end, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q91_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[2]</a>). But the directing of human acts to their end is not a function of nature, as is the case in irrational creatures, which + act for an end solely by their natural appetite; whereas man acts for an end by his reason and will. Therefore no law is natural + to man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37468" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37468] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +per legem ordinatur homo in suis actibus ad finem, ut supra habitum +est. Sed ordinatio humanorum actuum ad finem non est per naturam, +sicut accidit in creaturis irrationabilibus, quae solo appetitu +naturali agunt propter finem, sed agit homo propter finem per +rationem et voluntatem. Ergo non est aliqua lex homini +naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more a man is free, the less is he under the law. But man is freer than all the animals, on account of his free-will, + with which he is endowed above all other animals. Since therefore other animals are not subject to a natural law, neither + is man subject to a natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37469] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quanto aliquis est liberior, tanto minus est sub lege. Sed homo est +liberior omnibus animalibus, propter liberum arbitrium, quod prae +aliis animalibus habet. Cum igitur alia animalia non subdantur legi +naturali, nec homo alicui legi naturali subditur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.14" target="asv"> Rom. 2:14</a>: "When the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law," comments as follows: "Although + they have no written law, yet they have the natural law, whereby each one knows, and is conscious of, what is good and what + is evil." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37470" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37470] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod, Rom. II, super illud, <i>cum gentes, quae legem non +habent, naturaliter ea quae legis sunt faciunt</i>, dicit Glossa, +<i>etsi non habent legem scriptam, habent tamen legem naturalem, +qua quilibet intelligit et sibi conscius est quid sit bonum et quid +malum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 1), law, being a rule and measure, can be in a person in two ways: in one way, as in him + that rules and measures; in another way, as in that which is ruled and measured, since a thing is ruled and measured, in so + far as it partakes of the rule or measure. Wherefore, since all things subject to Divine providence are ruled and measured + by the eternal law, as was stated above + <a href="#FS_Q91_A1" id="FS_Q91_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>; it is evident that + all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, they derive their + respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends. Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence + in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for others. + Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and + this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law. Hence the Psalmist after saying + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.6" target="asv">Ps. 4:6</a>): "Offer up the sacrifice of justice," as though someone asked what the works of justice are, adds: "Many say, Who showeth + us good things?" in answer to which question he says: "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us": thus implying + that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the + natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing + else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 2 co."><a name="37471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37471] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex, cum sit regula et +mensura, dupliciter potest esse in aliquo, uno modo, sicut in +regulante et mensurante; alio modo, sicut in regulato et mensurato, +quia inquantum participat aliquid de regula vel mensura, sic +regulatur vel mensuratur. Unde cum omnia quae divinae providentiae +subduntur, a lege aeterna regulentur et mensurentur, ut ex dictis +patet; manifestum est quod omnia participant aliqualiter legem +aeternam, inquantum scilicet ex impressione eius habent +inclinationes in proprios actus et fines. Inter cetera autem +rationalis creatura excellentiori quodam modo divinae providentiae +subiacet, inquantum et ipsa fit providentiae particeps, sibi ipsi +et aliis providens. Unde et in ipsa participatur ratio aeterna, per +quam habet naturalem inclinationem ad debitum actum et finem. Et +talis participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura lex +naturalis dicitur. Unde cum Psalmista dixisset, sacrificate +sacrificium iustitiae, quasi quibusdam quaerentibus quae sunt +iustitiae opera, subiungit, multi dicunt, quis ostendit nobis bona? +Cui quaestioni respondens, dicit, signatum est super nos lumen +vultus tui, domine, quasi lumen rationis naturalis, quo discernimus +quid sit bonum et malum, quod pertinet ad naturalem legem, nihil +aliud sit quam impressio divini luminis in nobis. Unde patet quod +lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam participatio legis aeternae in +rationali creatura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument would hold, if the natural law were something different from the eternal law: whereas it is nothing but a participation + thereof, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37472] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si lex naturalis esset +aliquid diversum a lege aeterna. Non autem est nisi quaedam +participatio eius, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every act of reason and will in us is based on that which is according to nature, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q10_A1" id="FS_Q91_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[10], A[1]</a>): for every act of reasoning is based on principles that are known naturally, and every act of appetite in respect of the + means is derived from the natural appetite in respect of the last end. Accordingly the first direction of our acts to their + end must needs be in virtue of the natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37473" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37473] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod omnis operatio, rationis et voluntatis derivatur in +nobis ab eo quod est secundum naturam, ut supra habitum est, nam +omnis ratiocinatio derivatur a principiis naturaliter notis, et +omnis appetitus eorum quae sunt ad finem, derivatur a naturali +appetitu ultimi finis. Et sic etiam oportet quod prima directio +actuum nostrorum ad finem, fiat per legem naturalem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even irrational animals partake in their own way of the Eternal Reason, just as the rational creature does. But because the + rational creature partakes thereof in an intellectual and rational manner, therefore the participation of the eternal law + in the rational creature is properly called a law, since a law is something pertaining to reason, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q91_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[1]</a>). Irrational creatures, however, do not partake thereof + in a rational manner, wherefore there is no participation of the eternal law in them, except by way of similitude. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37474] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam animalia irrationalia participant rationem +aeternam suo modo, sicut et rationalis creatura. Sed quia +rationalis creatura participat eam intellectualiter et +rationaliter, ideo participatio legis aeternae in creatura +rationali proprie lex vocatur, nam lex est aliquid rationis, ut +supra dictum est. In creatura autem irrationali non participatur +rationaliter, unde non potest dici lex nisi per similitudinem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q91_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q91_A3-p0.1">Q. 91. A. 3. Whether there is a human law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is not a human law. For the natural law is a participation of the eternal law, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q91_A2" id="FS_Q91_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Now through the eternal law "all things are most orderly," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 6). Therefore the natural + law suffices for the ordering of all human affairs. Consequently there is no need for a human law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37475" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37475] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit aliqua lex humana. Lex enim +naturalis est participatio legis aeternae, ut dictum est. Sed per +legem aeternam omnia sunt ordinatissima, ut Augustinus dicit, in I +de Lib. Arb. Ergo lex naturalis sufficit ad omnia humana ordinanda. +Non est ergo necessarium quod sit aliqua lex humana.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a law bears the character of a measure, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q91_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[1]</a>). But human reason is not a measure of things, but vice versa, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 5. Therefore no law can emanate + from human reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37476] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +lex habet rationem mensurae, ut dictum est. Sed ratio humana non +est mensura rerum, sed potius e converso, ut in X Metaphys. +dicitur. Ergo ex ratione humana nulla lex procedere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a measure should be most certain, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 3. But the dictates of human reason in matters of + conduct are uncertain, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.14" target="asv"> Wis. 9:14</a>: "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Therefore no law can emanate from human reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37477] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +mensura debet esse certissima, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed +dictamen humanae rationis de rebus gerendis est incertum; secundum +illud Sap. IX, <i>cogitationes mortalium timidae, et incertae +providentiae nostrae</i>. Ergo ex ratione humana nulla lex +procedere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) distinguishes two kinds of law, the one eternal, the other temporal, which he calls human. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37478" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37478] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus, in I de Lib. Arb., ponit duas leges, unam +aeternam et aliam temporalem, quam dicit esse humanam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q91_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[1]</a>, ad 2), a law is a dictate of the practical reason. Now it is to be observed that the same procedure takes place in the practical + and in the speculative reason: for each proceeds from principles to conclusions, as stated above (De Lib. Arb. i, 6). Accordingly + we conclude that just as, in the speculative reason, from naturally known indemonstrable principles, we draw the conclusions + of the various + sciences, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by nature, but acquired by the efforts of reason, so too it is from + the precepts of the natural law, as from general and indemonstrable principles, that the human reason needs to proceed to + the more particular determination of certain matters. These particular determinations, devised by human reason, are called + human laws, provided the other essential conditions of law be observed, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q91_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[90], + AA[2] + </a>,3,4). Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "justice has its source in nature; thence certain things + came into custom by reason of their utility; afterwards these things which emanated from nature and were approved by custom, + were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the law." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 3 co."><a name="37479" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37479] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex est quoddam dictamen +practicae rationis. Similis autem processus esse invenitur rationis +practicae et speculativae, utraque enim ex quibusdam principiis ad +quasdam conclusiones procedit, ut superius habitum est. Secundum +hoc ergo dicendum est quod, sicut in ratione speculativa ex +principiis indemonstrabilibus naturaliter cognitis producuntur +conclusiones diversarum scientiarum, quarum cognitio non est nobis +naturaliter indita, sed per industriam rationis inventa; ita etiam +ex praeceptis legis naturalis, quasi ex quibusdam principiis +communibus et indemonstrabilibus, necesse est quod ratio humana +procedat ad aliqua magis particulariter disponenda. Et istae +particulares dispositiones adinventae secundum rationem humanam, +dicuntur leges humanae, servatis aliis conditionibus quae pertinent +ad rationem legis, ut supra dictum est. Unde et Tullius dicit, in +sua Rhetor., quod <i>initium iuris est a natura profectum; deinde +quaedam in consuetudinem ex utilitate rationis venerunt; postea res +et a natura profectas et a consuetudine probatas legum metus et +religio sanxit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The human reason cannot have a full participation of the dictate of the Divine Reason, but according to its own mode, and + imperfectly. Consequently, as on the part of the speculative reason, by a natural participation of Divine Wisdom, there is + in us the knowledge of certain general principles, but not proper knowledge of each single truth, such as that contained in + the Divine Wisdom; so too, on the part of the practical reason, man has a natural + participation of the eternal law, according to certain general principles, but not as regards the particular determinations + of individual cases, which are, however, contained in the eternal law. Hence the need for human reason to proceed further + to sanction them by law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37480] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio humana non potest participare ad plenum +dictamen rationis divinae, sed suo modo et imperfecte. Et ideo +sicut ex parte rationis speculativae, per naturalem participationem +divinae sapientiae, inest nobis cognitio quorundam communium +principiorum, non autem cuiuslibet veritatis propria cognitio, +sicut in divina sapientia continetur; ita etiam ex parte rationis +practicae naturaliter homo participat legem aeternam secundum +quaedam communia principia, non autem secundum particulares +directiones singulorum, quae tamen in aeterna lege continentur. Et +ideo necesse est ulterius quod ratio humana procedat ad +particulares quasdam legum sanctiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Human reason is not, of itself, the rule of things: but the principles impressed on it by nature, are general rules and measures + of all things relating to human conduct, whereof the natural reason is the rule and measure, although it is not the measure + of things that are from nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37481" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37481] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio humana secundum se non est regula rerum, sed +principia ei naturaliter indita, sunt quaedam regulae generales et +mensurae omnium eorum quae sunt per hominem agenda, quorum ratio +naturalis est regula et mensura, licet non sit mensura eorum quae +sunt a natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The practical reason is concerned with practical matters, which are singular and contingent: but not with necessary things, + with which the speculative reason is concerned. Wherefore human laws cannot have that inerrancy that belongs to the demonstrated + conclusions of sciences. Nor is it necessary for every measure to be altogether unerring and certain, but according as it + is possible in its own particular genus. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37482" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37482] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio practica est circa operabilia, quae sunt +singularia et contingentia, non autem circa necessaria, sicut ratio +speculativa. Et ideo leges humanae non possunt illam +infallibilitatem habere quam habent conclusiones demonstrativae +scientiarum. Nec oportet quod omnis mensura sit omni modo +infallibilis et certa, sed secundum quod est possibile in genere +suo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q91_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q91_A4-p0.1">Q. 91. A. 4. Whether there was any need for a Divine law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there was no need for a Divine law. Because, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q91_A2" id="FS_Q91_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, the natural law is a participation in us of the eternal law. But the eternal law is a Divine law, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q91_A1" id="FS_Q91_A4-p2.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore there was no need for a Divine law in addition to the natural law, and human laws derived therefrom. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37483" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37483] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit necessarium esse aliquam +legem divinam. Quia, ut dictum est, lex naturalis est quaedam +participatio legis aeternae in nobis. Sed lex aeterna est lex +divina, ut dictum est. Ergo non oportet quod praeter legem +naturalem, et leges humanas ab ea derivatas, sit aliqua alia lex +divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 15:14</a>) that "God left man in the hand of his own counsel." Now counsel is an act of reason, as stated above (Q[14], A[1]). Therefore + man was left to the direction of his reason. But a dictate of human reason is a human law as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q91_A3" id="FS_Q91_A4-p3.2" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Therefore there is no need for man to be governed also by a Divine law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37484] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Eccli. XV dicitur quod <i>Deus dimisit hominem in manu consilii +sui</i>. Consilium autem est actus rationis, ut supra habitum est. +Ergo homo dimissus est gubernationi suae rationis. Sed dictamen +rationis humanae est lex humana, ut dictum est. Ergo non oportet +quod homo alia lege divina gubernetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, human nature is more self-sufficing than irrational creatures. But irrational creatures have no Divine law besides + the natural inclination impressed on them. Much less, therefore, should the rational creature have a Divine law in addition + to the natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37485" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37485] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +natura humana est sufficientior irrationalibus creaturis. Sed +irrationales creaturae non habent aliquam legem divinam praeter +inclinationem naturalem eis inditam. Ergo multo minus creatura +rationalis debet habere aliquam legem divinam praeter naturalem +legem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> David prayed God to set His law before him, saying ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.33" target="asv">Ps. 118:33</a>): "Set before me for a law the way of Thy justifications, O Lord." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37486" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37486] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod David expetit legem a Deo sibi poni, dicens, <i>legem pone +mihi, domine, in via iustificationum tuarum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q91_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Besides the natural and the human law it was necessary for the directing of human conduct to have a Divine law. And this + for four reasons. First, because it is by law that man is directed how to perform his proper acts in view of his last end. + And indeed if man were ordained to no other end than that which is proportionate to his natural faculty, there would be no + need for man to have any further direction of the part of his reason, besides the natural law + and human law which is derived from it. But since man is ordained to an end of eternal happiness which is inproportionate + to man's natural faculty, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q5_A5" id="FS_Q91_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[5], A[5]</a>), therefore it was necessary that, besides the natural and the human law, man should be directed to his end by a law given + by God. + </p><p id="FS_Q91_A4-p7"> Secondly, because, on account of the uncertainty of human judgment, especially on contingent and particular matters, different + people form different judgments on human acts; whence also different and contrary laws result. In order, therefore, that man + may know without any doubt what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid, it was necessary for man to be directed in his + proper acts by a law given by God, for it is certain that such a law cannot err. + </p><p id="FS_Q91_A4-p8"> Thirdly, because man can make laws in those matters of which he is competent to judge. But man is not competent to judge + of interior movements, that are hidden, but only of exterior acts which appear: and yet for the perfection of virtue it is + necessary for man to conduct himself aright in both kinds of acts. Consequently human law could not sufficiently curb and + direct interior acts; and it was necessary for this purpose that a Divine law should supervene. + </p><p id="FS_Q91_A4-p9"> Fourthly, because, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5,6), human law cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds: since while + aiming at doing away with all evils, it would do away with many good things, and would hinder the advance of the common good, + which is necessary for human intercourse. In order, therefore, that no evil might remain unforbidden and unpunished, it was + necessary for the Divine law to supervene, whereby all sins are forbidden. + </p><p id="FS_Q91_A4-p10"> And these four causes are touched upon in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.8" target="asv"> Ps. 118:8, </a> where it is said: "The law of the Lord is unspotted," i.e. allowing no foulness of sin; "converting souls," because it directs + not only exterior, but also interior acts; "the testimony of the Lord is faithful," because of the certainty of what is true + and right; "giving wisdom to little ones," by directing man to an end supernatural and Divine. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 4 co."><a name="37487" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37487] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod praeter legem naturalem et legem humanam, necessarium +fuit ad directionem humanae vitae habere legem divinam. Et hoc +propter quatuor rationes. Primo quidem, quia per legem dirigitur +homo ad actus proprios in ordine ad ultimum finem. Et si quidem +homo ordinaretur tantum ad finem qui non excederet proportionem +naturalis facultatis hominis, non oporteret quod homo haberet +aliquid directivum ex parte rationis, supra legem naturalem et +legem humanitus positam, quae ab ea derivatur. Sed quia homo +ordinatur ad finem beatitudinis aeternae, quae excedit proportionem +naturalis facultatis humanae, ut supra habitum est; ideo +necessarium fuit ut supra legem naturalem et humanam, dirigeretur +etiam ad suum finem lege divinitus data. Secundo, quia propter +incertitudinem humani iudicii, praecipue de rebus contingentibus et +particularibus, contingit de actibus humanis diversorum esse +diversa iudicia, ex quibus etiam diversae et contrariae leges +procedunt. Ut ergo homo absque omni dubitatione scire possit quid +ei sit agendum et quid vitandum, necessarium fuit ut in actibus +propriis dirigeretur per legem divinitus datam, de qua constat quod +non potest errare. Tertio, quia de his potest homo legem ferre, de +quibus potest iudicare. Iudicium autem hominis esse non potest de +interioribus motibus, qui latent, sed solum de exterioribus +actibus, qui apparent. Et tamen ad perfectionem virtutis requiritur +quod in utrisque actibus homo rectus existat. Et ideo lex humana +non potuit cohibere et ordinare sufficienter interiores actus, sed +necessarium fuit quod ad hoc superveniret lex divina. Quarto quia, +sicut Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb., lex humana non potest +omnia quae male fiunt, punire vel prohibere, quia dum auferre +vellet omnia mala, sequeretur quod etiam multa bona tollerentur, et +impediretur utilitas boni communis, quod est necessarium ad +conversationem humanam. Ut ergo nullum malum improhibitum et +impunitum remaneat, necessarium fuit supervenire legem divinam, per +quam omnia peccata prohibentur. Et istae quatuor causae tanguntur +in Psalmo XVIII, ubi dicitur, lex domini immaculata, idest nullam +peccati turpitudinem permittens; convertens animas, quia non solum +exteriores actus, sed etiam interiores dirigit; testimonium domini +fidele, propter certitudinem veritatis et rectitudinis; sapientiam +praestans parvulis, inquantum ordinat hominem ad supernaturalem +finem et divinum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the natural law the eternal law is participated proportionately to the capacity of human nature. But to his supernatural + end man needs to be directed in a yet higher way. Hence the additional law given by God, whereby man shares more perfectly + in the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37488" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37488] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod per naturalem legem participatur lex aeterna +secundum proportionem capacitatis humanae naturae. Sed oportet ut +altiori modo dirigatur homo in ultimum finem supernaturalem. Et +ideo superadditur lex divinitus data, per quam lex aeterna +participatur altiori modo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Counsel is a kind of inquiry: hence it must proceed from some principles. Nor is it enough for it to proceed from principles + imparted by nature, which are the precepts of the natural law, for the reasons given above: but there is need for certain + additional principles, namely, the precepts of the Divine law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37489" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37489] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod consilium est inquisitio quaedam, unde oportet quod +procedat ex aliquibus principiis. Nec sufficit quod procedat ex +principiis naturaliter inditis, quae sunt praecepta legis naturae, +propter praedicta, sed oportet quod superaddantur quaedam alia +principia, scilicet praecepta legis divinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Irrational creatures are not ordained to an end higher than that which is proportionate to their natural powers: consequently + the comparison fails. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37490" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37490] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod creaturae irrationales non ordinantur ad altiorem +finem quam sit finis qui est proportionatus naturali virtuti +ipsarum. Et ideo non est similis ratio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q91_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q91_A5-p0.1">Q. 91. A. 5. Whether there is but one Divine law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is but one Divine law. Because, where there is one king in one kingdom there is but one law. Now + the whole of mankind is compared to God as to one king, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.46.8" target="asv"> Ps. 46:8</a>: "God is the King of all the earth." Therefore there is but one Divine law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37491] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex divina sit una tantum. Unius enim +regis in uno regno est una lex. Sed totum humanum genus comparatur +ad Deum sicut ad unum regem; secundum illud Psalmi XLVI, <i>rex +omnis terrae Deus</i>. Ergo est una tantum lex divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every law is directed to the end which the lawgiver intends for those for whom he makes the law. But God intends + one and the same thing for all men; since according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:4</a>: "He will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." Therefore there is but one Divine law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37492" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37492] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis lex ordinatur ad finem quem legislator intendit in eis quibus +legem fert. Sed unum et idem est quod Deus intendit in omnibus +hominibus; secundum illud I ad Tim. II, <i>vult omnes homines +salvos fieri, et ad agnitionem veritatis venire</i>. Ergo una +tantum est lex divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Divine law seems to be more akin to the eternal law, which is one, than the natural law, according as the revelation + of grace is of a higher order than natural knowledge. Therefore much more is the Divine law but one. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37493] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex divina propinquior esse videtur legi aeternae, quae est una, +quam lex naturalis, quanto altior est revelatio gratiae quam +cognitio naturae. Sed lex naturalis est una omnium hominum. Ergo +multo magis lex divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.12" target="asv">Heb. 7:12</a>): "The priesthood being translated, it is necessary that a translation also be made of the law." But the priesthood is twofold, + as stated in the same passage, viz. the levitical priesthood, and the priesthood of Christ. Therefore the Divine law is twofold, + namely the Old Law and the New Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37494" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37494] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VII, <i>translato sacerdotio, +necesse est ut legis translatio fiat</i>. Sed sacerdotium est +duplex, ut ibidem dicitur, scilicet sacerdotium leviticum, et +sacerdotium Christi. Ergo etiam duplex est lex divina, scilicet lex +vetus, et lex nova.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q91_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in the + <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q30_A3" id="FS_Q91_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[30], A[3]</a>, distinction is the cause of number. Now things may be distinguished in two ways. First, as those things that are altogether + specifically different, e.g. a horse and an ox. Secondly, as perfect and imperfect in the same species, e.g. a boy and a man: + and in this way the Divine law is divided into Old and New. Hence the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.24" target="asv">Gal. 3:24,25</a>) compares the state of man under the Old + Law to that of a child "under a pedagogue"; but the state under the New Law, to that of a full grown man, who is "no longer + under a pedagogue." + </p><p id="FS_Q91_A5-p7"> Now the perfection and imperfection of these two laws is to be taken in connection with the three conditions pertaining to + law, as stated above. For, in the first place, it belongs to law to be directed to the common good as to its end, as stated + above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q91_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[2]</a>). This good may be twofold. It may be a sensible and earthly good; and to this, man was directly ordained by the Old Law: + wherefore, at the very outset of the law, the people were invited to + the earthly kingdom of the Chananaeans ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A5-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.3.8" target="asv">Ex. 3:8</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A5-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.3.17" target="asv">17</a>). Again it may be an intelligible and heavenly good: and to this, man is ordained by the New Law. Wherefore, at the very + beginning of His preaching, Christ invited men to the kingdom of heaven, saying ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A5-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.17" target="asv">Mat. 4:17</a>): "Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. iv) that "promises of temporal + goods are contained in the Old Testament, for which reason it is called old; but the promise of + eternal life belongs to the New Testament." + </p><p id="FS_Q91_A5-p8"> Secondly, it belongs to the law to direct human acts according to the order of righteousness + <a href="#FS_Q91_A4" id="FS_Q91_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>: wherein also the New Law surpasses the Old Law, since it directs our internal acts, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A5-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.20" target="asv"> Mat. 5:20</a>: "Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." + Hence the saying that "the Old Law restrains the hand, but the New Law controls the mind" ( Sentent. iii, + D, xl). + </p><p id="FS_Q91_A5-p9"> Thirdly, it belongs to the law to induce men to observe its commandments. This the Old Law did by the fear of punishment: + but the New Law, by love, which is poured into our hearts by the grace of Christ, bestowed in the New Law, but foreshadowed + in the Old. Hence Augustine says (Contra Adimant. Manich. discip. xvii) that "there is little difference [*The 'little difference' + refers to the Latin words 'timor' and 'amor'---'fear' and 'love.'] between the Law and the Gospel---fear + and love." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 5 co."><a name="37495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37495] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, distinctio est causa +numeri. Dupliciter autem inveniuntur aliqua distingui. Uno modo, +sicut ea quae sunt omnino specie diversa, ut equus et bos. Alio +modo, sicut perfectum et imperfectum in eadem specie, sicut puer et +vir. Et hoc modo lex divina distinguitur in legem veterem et legem +novam. Unde apostolus, ad Gal. III, comparat statum veteris legis +statui puerili existenti sub paedagogo, statum autem novae legis +comparat statui viri perfecti, qui iam non est sub paedagogo. +Attenditur autem perfectio et imperfectio utriusque legis secundum +tria quae ad legem pertinent, ut supra dictum est. Primo enim ad +legem pertinet ut ordinetur ad bonum commune sicut ad finem, ut +supra dictum est. Quod quidem potest esse duplex. Scilicet bonum +sensibile et terrenum, et ad tale bonum ordinabat directe lex +vetus; unde statim, Exodi III, in principio legis, invitatur +populus ad regnum terrenum Chananaeorum. Et iterum bonum +intelligibile et caeleste, et ad hoc ordinat lex nova. Unde statim +Christus ad regnum caelorum in suae praedicationis principio +invitavit, dicens, <i>poenitentiam agite, appropinquavit enim +regnum caelorum</i>, Matth. IV. Et ideo Augustinus dicit, in IV +contra Faustum, quod <i>temporalium rerum promissiones testamento +veteri continentur, et ideo vetus appellatur, sed aeternae vitae +promissio ad novum pertinet testamentum</i>. Secundo ad legem +pertinet dirigere humanos actus secundum ordinem iustitiae. In quo +etiam superabundat lex nova legi veteri, interiores actus animi +ordinando; secundum illud Matth. V, <i>nisi abundaverit iustitia +vestra plus quam Scribarum et Pharisaeorum, non intrabitis in +regnum caelorum</i>. Et ideo dicitur quod <i>lex vetus cohibet +manum, lex nova animum</i>. Tertio ad legem pertinet inducere +homines ad observantias mandatorum. Et hoc quidem lex vetus +faciebat timore poenarum, lex autem nova facit hoc per amorem, qui +in cordibus nostris infunditur per gratiam Christi, quae in lege +nova confertur, sed in lege veteri figurabatur. Et ideo dicit +Augustinus, contra Adimantum Manichaei discipulum, <i>quod brevis +differentia est legis et Evangelii, timor et amor</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the father of a family issues different commands to the children and to the adults, so also the one King, God, in His + one kingdom, gave one law to men, while they were yet imperfect, and another more perfect law, when, by the preceding law, + they had been led to a greater capacity for Divine things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37496" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37496] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut paterfamilias in domo alia mandata +proponit pueris et adultis, ita etiam unus rex Deus, in uno suo +regno, aliam legem dedit hominibus adhuc imperfectis existentibus; +et aliam perfectiorem iam manuductis per priorem legem ad maiorem +capacitatem divinorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The salvation of man could not be achieved otherwise than through Christ, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A5-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.4.12" target="asv"> Acts 4:12</a>: "There is no other name . . . given to men, whereby we must be saved." Consequently the law that brings all to salvation + could not be given until after the coming of Christ. But before His coming it was necessary to give to the people, of whom + Christ was to be born, a law containing certain rudiments of righteousness unto salvation, + in order to prepare them to receive Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37497" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37497] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod salus hominum non poterat esse nisi per Christum; +secundum illud Act. IV, <i>non est aliud nomen datum hominibus, in +quo oporteat nos salvos fieri</i>. Et ideo lex perfecte ad salutem +omnes inducens, dari non potuit nisi post Christi adventum. Antea +vero dari oportuit populo ex quo Christus erat nasciturus, legem +praeparatoriam ad Christi susceptionem, in qua quaedam rudimenta +salutaris iustitiae continerentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The natural law directs man by way of certain general precepts, common to both the perfect and the imperfect: wherefore it + is one and the same for all. But the Divine law directs man also in certain particular matters, to which the perfect and imperfect + do not stand in the same relation. Hence the necessity for the Divine law to be twofold, as already explained. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37498] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod lex naturalis dirigit hominem secundum quaedam +praecepta communia, in quibus conveniunt tam perfecti quam +imperfecti, et ideo est una omnium. Sed lex divina dirigit hominem +etiam in quibusdam particularibus, ad quae non similiter se habent +perfecti et imperfecti. Et ideo oportuit legem divinam esse +duplicem, sicut iam dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q91_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q91_A6-p0.1">Q. 91. A. 6. Whether there is a law in the fomes of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no law of the "fomes" of sin. For Isidore says (Etym. v) that the "law is based on reason." But + the "fomes" of sin is not based on reason, but deviates from it. Therefore the "fomes" has not the nature of a law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37499" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37499] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit aliqua lex fomitis. Dicit enim +Isidorus, in V Etymol., quod <i>lex ratione consistit</i>. Fomes +autem non consistit ratione, sed magis a ratione deviat. Ergo fomes +non habet rationem legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every law is binding, so that those who do not obey it are called transgressors. But man is not called a transgressor, + from not following the instigations of the "fomes"; but rather from his following them. Therefore the "fomes" has not the + nature of a law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37500" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37500] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis lex obligatoria est, ita quod qui ipsam non servant, +transgressores dicuntur. Sed fomes non constituit aliquem +transgressorem ex hoc quod ipsum non sequitur, sed magis +transgressor redditur si quis ipsum sequatur. Ergo fomes non habet +rationem legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the law is ordained to the common good, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q91_A6-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[2]</a>). But the "fomes" inclines us, not to the common, but to our own private good. Therefore the "fomes" has not the nature of + sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37501" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37501] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex ordinatur ad bonum commune, ut supra habitum est. Sed fomes non +inclinat ad bonum commune, sed magis ad bonum privatum. Ergo fomes +non habet rationem legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.23" target="asv">Rom. 7:23</a>): "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 6 s. c."><a name="37502" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37502] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. VII, <i>video aliam legem in membris +meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q91_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q91_A2" id="FS_Q91_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2];</a> Q[90], A[1], ad 1), the law, as to its essence, resides in him that rules and measures; but, by way of participation, in + that which is ruled and measured; so that every inclination or ordination which may be found in things subject to the law, + is called a law by participation, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q91_A2" id="FS_Q91_A6-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[2];</a> Q[90], A[1] , ad 1). Now those who are subject to a law may receive a twofold + inclination from the lawgiver. First, in so far as he directly inclines his subjects to something; sometimes indeed different + subjects to different acts; in this way we may say that there is a military law and a mercantile law. Secondly, indirectly; + thus by the very fact that a lawgiver deprives a subject of some dignity, the latter passes into another order, so as to be + under another law, as it were: thus if a soldier be turned out of the army, he becomes a subject of rural or of mercantile + legislation. + </p><p id="FS_Q91_A6-p7"> Accordingly under the Divine Lawgiver various creatures have various natural inclinations, so that what is, as it were, a + law for one, is against the law for another: thus I might say that fierceness is, in a way, the law of a dog, but against + the law of a sheep or another meek animal. And so the law of man, which, by the Divine ordinance, is allotted to him, according + to his proper natural condition, is that he should act in accordance with reason: and this law was so effective + in the primitive state, that nothing either beside or against reason could take man unawares. But when man turned his back + on God, he fell under the influence of his sensual impulses: in fact this happens to each one individually, the more he deviates + from the path of reason, so that, after a fashion, he is likened to the beasts that are led by the impulse of sensuality, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.48.21" target="asv"> Ps. 48:21</a>: "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand: he hath been compared to + senseless beasts, and made like to them." + </p><p id="FS_Q91_A6-p8"> So, then, this very inclination of sensuality which is called the "fomes," in other animals has simply the nature of a law + (yet only in so far as a law may be said to be in such things), by reason of a direct inclination. But in man, it has not + the nature of law in this way, rather is it a deviation from the law of reason. But since, by the just sentence of God, man + is destitute of original justice, and his reason bereft of its vigor, this impulse of sensuality, whereby he is + led, in so far as it is a penalty following from the Divine law depriving man of his proper dignity, has the nature of a law. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 6 co."><a name="37503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37503] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex essentialiter invenitur +in regulante et mensurante, participative autem in eo quod +mensuratur et regulatur; ita quod omnis inclinatio vel ordinatio +quae invenitur in his quae subiecta sunt legi, participative +dicitur lex, ut ex supradictis patet. Potest autem in his quae +subduntur legi, aliqua inclinatio inveniri dupliciter a +legislatore. Uno modo, inquantum directe inclinat suos subditos ad +aliquid; et diversos interdum ad diversos actus; secundum quem +modum potest dici quod alia est lex militum, et alia est lex +mercatorum. Alio modo, indirecte, inquantum scilicet per hoc quod +legislator destituit aliquem sibi subditum aliqua dignitate, +sequitur quod transeat in alium ordinem et quasi in aliam legem, +puta si miles ex militia destituatur, transibit in legem rusticorum +vel mercatorum. Sic igitur sub Deo legislatore diversae creaturae +diversas habent naturales inclinationes, ita ut quod uni est +quodammodo lex, alteri sit contra legem, ut si dicam quod +furibundum esse est quodammodo lex canis, est autem contra legem +ovis vel alterius mansueti animalis. Est ergo hominis lex, quam +sortitur ex ordinatione divina secundum propriam conditionem, ut +secundum rationem operetur. Quae quidem lex fuit tam valida in +primo statu, ut nihil vel praeter rationem vel contra rationem +posset subrepere homini. Sed dum homo a Deo recessit, incurrit in +hoc quod feratur secundum impetum sensualitatis, et unicuique etiam +particulariter hoc contingit, quanto magis a ratione recesserit, ut +sic quodammodo bestiis assimiletur, quae sensualitatis impetu +feruntur; secundum illud Psalmi XLVIII, <i>homo, cum in honore +esset, non intellexit, comparatus est iumentis insipientibus, et +similis factus est illis</i>. Sic igitur ipsa sensualitatis +inclinatio, quae fomes dicitur, in aliis quidem animalibus +simpliciter habet rationem legis, illo tamen modo quo in talibus +lex dici potest, secundum directam inclinationem. In hominibus +autem secundum hoc non habet rationem legis, sed magis est deviatio +a lege rationis. Sed inquantum per divinam iustitiam homo +destituitur originali iustitia et vigore rationis, ipse impetus +sensualitatis qui eum ducit, habet rationem legis, inquantum est +poenalis et ex lege divina consequens, hominem destituente propria +dignitate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the "fomes" in itself, as an incentive to evil. It is not thus that it has the nature of a law, as + stated above, but according as it results from the justice of the Divine law: it is as though we were to say that the law + allows a nobleman to be condemned to hard labor for some misdeed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="37504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37504] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de fomite secundum se +considerato, prout inclinat ad malum. Sic enim non habet rationem +legis, ut dictum est, sed secundum quod sequitur ex divinae legis +iustitia, tanquam si diceretur lex esse quod aliquis nobilis, +propter suam culpam, ad servilia opera induci permitteretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers law in the light of a rule or measure: for it is in this sense that those who deviate from the law + become transgressors. But the "fomes" is not a law in this respect, but by a kind of participation, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="37505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37505] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de eo quod est lex quasi +regula et mensura, sic enim deviantes a lege transgressores +constituuntur. Sic autem fomes non est lex, sed per quandam +participationem, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q91_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the "fomes" as to its proper inclination, and not as to its origin. And yet if the inclination of + sensuality be considered as it is in other animals, thus it is ordained to the common good, namely, to the preservation of + nature in the species or in the individual. And this is in man also, in so far as sensuality is subject to reason. But it + is called "fomes" in so far as it strays from the order of reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 91 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="37506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37506] Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de fomite quantum ad +inclinationem propriam, non autem quantum ad suam originem. Et +tamen si consideretur inclinatio sensualitatis prout est in aliis +animalibus, sic ordinatur ad bonum commune, idest ad conservationem +naturae in specie vel in individuo. Et hoc est etiam in homine, +prout sensualitas subditur rationi. Sed fomes dicitur secundum quod +exit rationis ordinem.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q92" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q92-p0.1">Q. 92. OF THE EFFECTS OF LAW (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q92-p2"> We must now consider the effects of law; under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q92-p3"><a href="#FS_Q92_A1"> (1) Whether an effect of law is to make men good?</a></p><p id="FS_Q92-p4"><a href="#FS_Q92_A2"> (2) Whether the effects of law are to command, to forbid, to permit, and to punish, as the Jurist states?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 pr."><a name="37507" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37507] +Iª-IIae q. 92 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +effectibus legis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum +effectus legis sit homines facere bonos. Secundo, utrum effectus +legis sint imperare, vetare, permittere et punire, sicut +legisperitus dicit.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q92_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q92_A1-p0.1">Q. 92. A. 1. Whether an effect of law is to make men good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that it is not an effect of law to make men good. For men are good through virtue, since virtue, as stated in Ethic. + ii, 6 is "that which makes its subject good." But virtue is in man from God alone, because He it is Who "works it in us without + us," as we stated above ( + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q55_A4" id="FS_Q92_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[4]</a>) in giving the definition of virtue. Therefore the law does not make men good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37508] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod legis non sit facere homines bonos. +Homines enim sunt boni per virtutem, virtus enim est quae bonum +facit habentem, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed virtus est homini a +solo Deo, ipse enim eam facit in nobis sine nobis, ut supra dictum +est in definitione virtutis. Ergo legis non est facere homines +bonos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Law does not profit a man unless he obeys it. But the very fact that a man obeys a law is due to his being good. + Therefore in man goodness is presupposed to the law. Therefore the law does not make men good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37509" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37509] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +lex non prodest homini nisi legi obediat. Sed hoc ipsum quod homo +obedit legi, est ex bonitate. Ergo bonitas praeexigitur in homine +ad legem. Non igitur lex facit homines bonos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Law is ordained to the common good, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q92_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[2]</a>). But some behave well in things regarding the community, who behave ill in things regarding themselves. Therefore it is + not the business of the law to make men good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37510" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37510] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex ordinatur ad bonum commune, ut supra dictum est. Sed quidam +bene se habent in his quae ad commune pertinent, qui tamen in +propriis non bene se habent. Non ergo ad legem pertinet quod faciat +homines bonos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, some laws are tyrannical, as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 6). But a tyrant does not intend the good of his + subjects, but considers only his own profit. Therefore law does not make men good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="37511" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37511] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +quaedam leges sunt tyrannicae, ut philosophus dicit, in sua +politica. Sed tyrannus non intendit ad bonitatem subditorum, sed +solum ad propriam utilitatem. Non ergo legis est facere homines +bonos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that the "intention of every lawgiver is to make good citizens." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37512" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37512] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>voluntas +cuiuslibet legislatoris haec est, ut faciat cives bonos</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> as stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 2; + <a href="#FS_Q92_A3" id="FS_Q92_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">AA[3]</a>,4), a law is nothing else than a dictate of reason in the ruler by whom his subjects are governed. Now the virtue of any + subordinate thing consists in its being well subordinated to that by which it is regulated: thus we see that the virtue of + the irascible and concupiscible faculties consists in their being obedient to reason; and accordingly "the virtue of every + subject consists in his + being well subjected to his ruler," as the Philosopher says (Polit. i). But every law aims at being obeyed by those who are + subject to it. Consequently it is evident that the proper effect of law is to lead its subjects to their proper virtue: and + since virtue is "that which makes its subject good," it follows that the proper effect of law is to make those to whom it + is given, good, either simply or in some particular respect. For if the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on true good, which + is + the common good regulated according to Divine justice, it follows that the effect of the law is to make men good simply. If, + however, the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on that which is not simply good, but useful or pleasurable to himself, or + in opposition to Divine justice; then the law does not make men good simply, but in respect to that particular government. + In this way good is found even in things that are bad of themselves: thus a man is called a good robber, because he works + in a + way that is adapted to his end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 1 co."><a name="37513" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37513] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex nihil aliud est quam +dictamen rationis in praesidente, quo subditi gubernantur. +Cuiuslibet autem subditi virtus est ut bene subdatur ei a quo +gubernatur, sicut videmus quod virtus irascibilis et +concupiscibilis in hoc consistit quod sint bene obedientes rationi. +Et per hunc modum <i>virtus cuiuslibet subiecti est ut bene +subiiciatur principanti</i>, ut philosophus dicit, in I Polit. Ad +hoc autem ordinatur unaquaeque lex, ut obediatur ei a subditis. +Unde manifestum est quod hoc sit proprium legis, inducere subiectos +ad propriam ipsorum virtutem. Cum igitur virtus sit quae bonum +facit habentem, sequitur quod proprius effectus legis sit bonos +facere eos quibus datur, vel simpliciter vel secundum quid. Si enim +intentio ferentis legem tendat in verum bonum, quod est bonum +commune secundum iustitiam divinam regulatum, sequitur quod per +legem homines fiant boni simpliciter. Si vero intentio legislatoris +feratur ad id quod non est bonum simpliciter, sed utile vel +delectabile sibi, vel repugnans iustitiae divinae; tunc lex non +facit homines bonos simpliciter, sed secundum quid, scilicet in +ordine ad tale regimen. Sic autem bonum invenitur etiam in per se +malis, sicut aliquis dicitur bonus latro, quia operatur accommode +ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue is twofold, as explained above ( + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q63_A2" id="FS_Q92_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[63], A[2]</a>), viz. acquired and infused. Now the fact of being accustomed to an action contributes to both, but in different ways; for + it causes the acquired virtue; while it disposes to infused virtue, and preserves and fosters it when it already exists. And + since law is given for the purpose of directing human acts; as far as human acts conduce to virtue, so far does law make men + good. + Wherefore the Philosopher says in the second book of the Politics (Ethic. ii) that "lawgivers make men good by habituating + them to good works." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37514] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod duplex est virtus, ut ex supradictis patet, +scilicet acquisita, et infusa. Ad utramque autem aliquid operatur +operum assuetudo, sed diversimode, nam virtutem quidem acquisitam +causat; ad virtutem autem infusam disponit, et eam iam habitam +conservat et promovet. Et quia lex ad hoc datur ut dirigat actus +humanos, inquantum actus humani operantur ad virtutem, intantum lex +facit homines bonos. Unde et philosophus dicit, II Polit., quod +<i>legislatores assuefacientes faciunt bonos</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not always through perfect goodness of virtue that one obeys the law, but sometimes it is through fear of punishment, + and sometimes from the mere dictates of reason, which is a beginning of virtue, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q63_A1" id="FS_Q92_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[63], A[1]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37515" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37515] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod non semper aliquis obedit legi ex bonitate perfecta +virtutis, sed quandoque quidem ex timore poenae; quandoque autem ex +solo dictamine rationis, quod est quoddam principium virtutis, ut +supra habitum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The goodness of any part is considered in comparison with the whole; hence Augustine says (Confess. iii) that "unseemly is + the part that harmonizes not with the whole." Since then every man is a part of the state, it is impossible that a man be + good, unless he be well proportionate to the common good: nor can the whole be well consistent unless its parts be proportionate + to it. Consequently the common good of the state cannot flourish, unless the + citizens be virtuous, at least those whose business it is to govern. But it is enough for the good of the community, that + the other citizens be so far virtuous that they obey the commands of their rulers. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, + 2) that "the virtue of a sovereign is the same as that of a good man, but the virtue of any common citizen is not the same + as that of a good man." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37516] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod bonitas cuiuslibet partis consideratur in proportione +ad suum totum, unde et Augustinus dicit, in III Confess., quod +<i>turpis omnis pars est quae suo toti non congruit</i>. Cum igitur +quilibet homo sit pars civitatis, impossibile est quod aliquis homo +sit bonus, nisi sit bene proportionatus bono communi, nec totum +potest bene consistere nisi ex partibus sibi proportionatis. Unde +impossibile est quod bonum commune civitatis bene se habeat, nisi +cives sint virtuosi, ad minus illi quibus convenit principari. +Sufficit autem, quantum ad bonum communitatis, quod alii intantum +sint virtuosi quod principum mandatis obediant. Et ideo philosophus +dicit, in III Polit., quod <i>eadem est virtus principis et boni +viri; non autem eadem est virtus cuiuscumque civis et boni +viri</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A tyrannical law, through not being according to reason, is not a law, absolutely speaking, but rather a perversion of law; + and yet in so far as it is something in the nature of a law, it aims at the citizens' being good. For all it has in the nature + of a law consists in its being an ordinance made by a superior to his subjects, and aims at being obeyed by them, which is + to make them good, not simply, but with respect to that particular + government. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="37517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37517] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod lex tyrannica, cum non sit secundum rationem, non est +simpliciter lex, sed magis est quaedam perversitas legis. Et tamen +inquantum habet aliquid de ratione legis, intendit ad hoc quod +cives sint boni. Non enim habet de ratione legis nisi secundum hoc +quod est dictamen alicuius praesidentis in subditis, et ad hoc +tendit ut subditi legi sint bene obedientes; quod est eos esse +bonos, non simpliciter, sed in ordine ad tale regimen.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q92_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q92_A2-p0.1">Q. 92. A. 2. Whether the acts of law are suitably assigned?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the acts of law are not suitably assigned as consisting in "command," "prohibition," "permission" and + "punishment." For "every law is a general precept," as the jurist states. But command and precept are the same. Therefore + the other three are superfluous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37518" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37518] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod legis actus non sint convenienter +assignati in hoc quod dicitur quod legis actus est imperare, +vetare, permittere et punire. Lex enim omnis praeceptum commune +est, ut legisconsultus dicit. Sed idem est imperare quod +praecipere. Ergo alia tria superfluunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the effect of a law is to induce its subjects to be good, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q92_A1" id="FS_Q92_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But counsel aims at a higher good than a command does. Therefore it belongs to law to counsel rather than to command. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37519" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37519] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +effectus legis est ut inducat subditos ad bonum, sicut supra dictum +est. Sed consilium est de meliori bono quam praeceptum. Ergo magis +pertinet ad legem consulere quam praecipere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as punishment stirs a man to good deeds, so does reward. Therefore if to punish is reckoned an effect of law, + so also is to reward. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37520" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37520] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut homo aliquis incitatur ad bonum per poenas, ita etiam et per +praemia. Ergo sicut punire ponitur effectus legis, ita etiam et +praemiare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the intention of a lawgiver is to make men good, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q92_A1" id="FS_Q92_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But he that obeys the law, merely through fear of being punished, is not good: because "although a good deed may be done + through servile fear, i.e. fear of punishment, it is not done well," as Augustine says (Contra duas Epist. Pelag. ii). Therefore + punishment is not a proper effect of law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="37521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37521] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +intentio legislatoris est ut homines faciat bonos, sicut supra +dictum est. Sed ille qui solo metu poenarum obedit legi, non est +bonus, nam <i>timore servili, qui est timor poenarum, etsi bonum +aliquis faciat, non tamen bene aliquid fit</i>, ut Augustinus +dicit. Non ergo videtur esse proprium legis quod puniat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (Etym. v, 19): "Every law either permits something, as: 'A brave man may demand his reward'": or forbids something, + as: "No man may ask a consecrated virgin in marriage": or punishes, as: "Let him that commits a murder be put to death." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37522" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37522] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Isidorus dicit, in V Etymol., <i>omnis lex aut permittit +aliquid, ut, vir fortis praemium petat. Aut vetat, ut, sacrarum +virginum nuptias nulli liceat petere. Aut punit, ut, qui caedem +fecerit, capite plectatur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q92_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Just as an assertion is a dictate of reason asserting something, so is a law a dictate of reason, commanding something. Now + it is proper to reason to lead from one thing to another. Wherefore just as, in demonstrative sciences, the reason leads us + from certain principles to assent to the conclusion, so it induces us by some means to assent to the precept of the law. + </p><p id="FS_Q92_A2-p8"> Now the precepts of law are concerned with human acts, in which the law directs, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q92_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[90], AA[1]</a>,2; + <a href="#FS_Q91_A4" id="FS_Q92_A2-p8.2" shape="rect"> Q[91], A[4]</a>). Again there are three kinds of human acts: for, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A8" id="FS_Q92_A2-p8.3" shape="rect">Q[18], A[8]</a>), some acts are good generically, viz. acts of virtue; and in respect of these the act of the law is a precept or command, + for "the law commands all acts of virtue" (Ethic. v, 1). Some acts are evil + generically, viz. acts of vice, and in respect of these the law forbids. Some acts are generically indifferent, and in respect + of these the law permits; and all acts that are either not distinctly good or not distinctly bad may be called indifferent. + And it is the fear of punishment that law makes use of in order to ensure obedience: in which respect punishment is an effect + of law. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 2 co."><a name="37523" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37523] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut enuntiatio est rationis dictamen per modum +enuntiandi, ita etiam lex per modum praecipiendi. Rationis autem +proprium est ut ex aliquo ad aliquid inducat. Unde sicut in +demonstrativis scientiis ratio inducit ut assentiatur conclusioni +per quaedam principia, ita etiam inducit ut assentiatur legis +praecepto per aliquid. Praecepta autem legis sunt de actibus +humanis, in quibus lex dirigit, ut supra dictum est. Sunt autem +tres differentiae humanorum actuum. Nam sicut supra dictum est, +quidam actus sunt boni ex genere, qui sunt actus virtutum, et +respectu horum, ponitur legis actus praecipere vel imperare; +praecipit enim lex omnes actus virtutum, ut dicitur in V Ethic. +Quidam vero sunt actus mali ex genere, sicut actus vitiosi, et +respectu horum, lex habet prohibere. Quidam vero ex genere suo sunt +actus indifferentes, et respectu horum, lex habet permittere. Et +possunt etiam indifferentes dici omnes illi actus qui sunt vel +parum boni vel parum mali. Id autem per quod inducit lex ad hoc +quod sibi obediatur, est timor poenae, et quantum ad hoc, ponitur +legis effectus punire.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as to cease from evil is a kind of good, so a prohibition is a kind of precept: and accordingly, taking precept in a + wide sense, every law is a kind of precept. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37524" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37524] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut cessare a malo habet quandam rationem +boni, ita etiam prohibitio habet quandam rationem praecepti. Et +secundum hoc, large accipiendo praeceptum, universaliter lex +praeceptum dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To advise is not a proper act of law, but may be within the competency even of a private person, who cannot make a law. Wherefore + too the Apostle, after giving a certain counsel ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q92_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:12</a>) says: "I speak, not the Lord." Consequently it is not reckoned as an effect of law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37525" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37525] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod consulere non est proprius actus legis, sed potest +pertinere etiam ad personam privatam, cuius non est condere legem. +Unde etiam apostolus, I ad Cor. VII, cum consilium quoddam daret, +dixit, ego dico, non dominus. Et ideo non ponitur inter effectus +legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To reward may also pertain to anyone: but to punish pertains to none but the framer of the law, by whose authority the pain + is inflicted. Wherefore to reward is not reckoned an effect of law, but only to punish. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37526" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37526] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam praemiare potest ad quemlibet pertinere, sed +punire non pertinet nisi ad ministrum legis, cuius auctoritate +poena infertur. Et ideo praemiare non ponitur actus legis, sed +solum punire.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q92_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> From becoming accustomed to avoid evil and fulfill what is good, through fear of punishment, one is sometimes led on to do + so likewise, with delight and of one's own accord. Accordingly, law, even by punishing, leads men on to being good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 92 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="37527" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37527] Iª-IIae q. 92 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod per hoc quod aliquis incipit assuefieri ad vitandum +mala et ad implendum bona propter metum poenae, perducitur +quandoque ad hoc quod delectabiliter et ex propria voluntate hoc +faciat. Et secundum hoc, lex etiam puniendo perducit ad hoc quod +homines sint boni.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q93" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q93-p0.1">Q. 93. OF THE ETERNAL LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q93-p2"> We must now consider each law by itself; and (1) The eternal law; (2) The natural law; (3) The human law; (4) The old law; + (5) The new law, which is the law of the Gospel. Of the sixth law which is the law of the "fomes," suffice what we have said + when treating of original sin. + </p><p id="FS_Q93-p3"> Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q93-p4"><a href="#FS_Q93_A1"> (1) What is the eternal law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q93-p5"><a href="#FS_Q93_A2"> (2) Whether it is known to all?</a></p><p id="FS_Q93-p6"><a href="#FS_Q93_A3"> (3) Whether every law is derived from it?</a></p><p id="FS_Q93-p7"><a href="#FS_Q93_A4"> (4) Whether necessary things are subject to the eternal law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q93-p8"><a href="#FS_Q93_A5"> (5) Whether natural contingencies are subject to the eternal law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q93-p9"><a href="#FS_Q93_A6"> (6) Whether all human things are subject to it?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 pr."><a name="37528" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37528] +Iª-IIae q. 93 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +singulis legibus. Et primo, de lege aeterna; secundo, de lege +naturali; tertio, de lege humana; quarto, de lege veteri; quinto, +de lege nova, quae est lex Evangelii. De sexta autem lege, quae est +lex fomitis, sufficiat quod dictum est cum de peccato originali +ageretur. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, quid sit lex aeterna. +Secundo, utrum sit omnibus nota. Tertio, utrum omnis lex ab ea +derivetur. Quarto, utrum necessaria subiiciantur legi aeternae. +Quinto, utrum contingentia naturalia subiiciantur legi aeternae. +Sexto, utrum omnes res humanae ei subiiciantur.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q93_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q93_A1-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 1. Whether the eternal law is a sovereign type [*Ratio] existing in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the eternal law is not a sovereign type existing in God. For there is only one eternal law. But there + are many types of things in the Divine mind; for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 46) that God "made each thing according + to its type." Therefore the eternal law does not seem to be a type existing in the Divine mind. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37529" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37529] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex aeterna non sit ratio summa in Deo +existens. Lex enim aeterna est una tantum. Sed rationes rerum in +mente divina sunt plures, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta +trium quaest., quod <i>Deus singula fecit propriis rationibus</i>. +Ergo lex aeterna non videtur esse idem quod ratio in mente divina +existens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is essential to a law that it be promulgated by word, as stated above (Q[90], A[4]). But Word is a Personal name + in God, as stated in the + <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q34_A1" id="FS_Q93_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[34], A[1]</a>: whereas type refers to the Essence. Therefore the eternal law is not the same as a Divine type. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37530" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37530] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +de ratione legis est quod verbo promulgetur, ut supra dictum est. +Sed verbum in divinis dicitur personaliter, ut in primo habitum +est, ratio autem dicitur essentialiter. Non igitur idem est lex +aeterna quod ratio divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxx): "We see a law above our minds, which is called truth." But the law which is + above our minds is the eternal law. Therefore truth is the eternal law. But the idea of truth is not the same as the idea + of a type. Therefore the eternal law is not the same as the sovereign type. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37531" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37531] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera Relig., <i>apparet supra mentem +nostram legem esse, quae veritas dicitur</i>. Lex autem supra +mentem nostram existens est lex aeterna. Ergo veritas est lex +aeterna. Sed non est eadem ratio veritatis et rationis. Ergo lex +aeterna non est idem quod ratio summa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the eternal law is the sovereign type, to which we must always conform." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37532" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37532] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb., quod <i>lex aeterna +est summa ratio, cui semper obtemperandum est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Just as in every artificer there pre-exists a type of the things that are made by his art, so too in every governor there + must pre-exist the type of the order of those things that are to be done by those who are subject to his government. And just + as the type of the things yet to be made by an art is called the art or exemplar of the products of that art, so too the type + in him who governs the acts of his subjects, bears the character of a law, provided the + other conditions be present which we have mentioned above (Q[90]). Now God, by His wisdom, is the Creator of all things in + relation to which He stands as the artificer to the products of his art, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q14_A8" id="FS_Q93_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[14], A[8]</a>. Moreover He governs all the acts and movements that are to be found in each single creature, as was also stated in the + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q103_A5" id="FS_Q93_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[103], A[5]</a>. Wherefore as the type of the Divine Wisdom, inasmuch as by It all things are + created, has the character of art, exemplar or idea; so the type of Divine Wisdom, as moving all things to their due end, + bears the character of law. Accordingly the eternal law is nothing else than the type of Divine Wisdom, as directing all actions + and movements. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 1 co."><a name="37533" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37533] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut in quolibet artifice praeexistit ratio eorum +quae constituuntur per artem, ita etiam in quolibet gubernante +oportet quod praeexistat ratio ordinis eorum quae agenda sunt per +eos qui gubernationi subduntur. Et sicut ratio rerum fiendarum per +artem vocatur ars vel exemplar rerum artificiatarum, ita etiam +ratio gubernantis actus subditorum, rationem legis obtinet, +servatis aliis quae supra esse diximus de legis ratione. Deus autem +per suam sapientiam conditor est universarum rerum, ad quas +comparatur sicut artifex ad artificiata, ut in primo habitum est. +Est etiam gubernator omnium actuum et motionum quae inveniuntur in +singulis creaturis, ut etiam in primo habitum est. Unde sicut ratio +divinae sapientiae inquantum per eam cuncta sunt creata, rationem +habet artis vel exemplaris vel ideae; ita ratio divinae sapientiae +moventis omnia ad debitum finem, obtinet rationem legis. Et +secundum hoc, lex aeterna nihil aliud est quam ratio divinae +sapientiae, secundum quod est directiva omnium actuum et +motionum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking in that passage of the ideal types which regard the proper nature of each single thing; and consequently + in them there is a certain distinction and plurality, according to their different relations to things, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q15_A2" id="FS_Q93_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[15], A[2]</a>. But law is said to direct human acts by ordaining them to the common good, as stated above (Q[90], A[2]). And things, which + are in themselves different, may be + considered as one, according as they are ordained to one common thing. Wherefore the eternal law is one since it is the type + of this order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37534] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur ibi de rationibus idealibus, +quae respiciunt proprias naturas singularum rerum, et ideo in eis +invenitur quaedam distinctio et pluralitas, secundum diversos +respectus ad res, ut in primo habitum est. Sed lex dicitur +directiva actuum in ordine ad bonum commune, ut supra dictum est. +Ea autem quae sunt in seipsis diversa, considerantur ut unum, +secundum quod ordinantur ad aliquod commune. Et ideo lex aeterna +est una, quae est ratio huius ordinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> With regard to any sort of word, two points may be considered: viz. the word itself, and that which is expressed by the word. + For the spoken word is something uttered by the mouth of man, and expresses that which is signified by the human word. The + same applies to the human mental word, which is nothing else that something conceived by the mind, by which man expresses + his thoughts mentally. So then in God the Word conceived by the intellect of the + Father is the name of a Person: but all things that are in the Father's knowledge, whether they refer to the Essence or to + the Persons, or to the works of God, are expressed by this Word, as Augustine declares (De Trin. xv, 14). And among other + things expressed by this Word, the eternal law itself is expressed thereby. Nor does it follow that the eternal law is a Personal + name in God: yet it is appropriated to the Son, on account of the kinship between type and word. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37535" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37535] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod circa verbum quodcumque duo possunt considerari, +scilicet ipsum verbum, et ea quae verbo exprimuntur. Verbum enim +vocale est quiddam ab ore hominis prolatum; sed hoc verbo +exprimuntur quae verbis humanis significantur. Et eadem ratio est +de verbo hominis mentali, quod nihil est aliud quam quiddam mente +conceptum, quo homo exprimit mentaliter ea de quibus cogitat. Sic +igitur in divinis ipsum verbum, quod est conceptio paterni +intellectus, personaliter dicitur, sed omnia quaecumque sunt in +scientia patris, sive essentialia sive personalia, sive etiam Dei +opera exprimuntur hoc verbo, ut patet per Augustinum, in XV de +Trin. Et inter cetera quae hoc verbo exprimuntur, etiam ipsa lex +aeterna verbo ipso exprimitur. Nec tamen propter hoc sequitur quod +lex aeterna personaliter in divinis dicatur. Appropriatur tamen +filio, propter convenientiam quam habet ratio ad verbum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The types of the Divine intellect do not stand in the same relation to things, as the types of the human intellect. For the + human intellect is measured by things, so that a human concept is not true by reason of itself, but by reason of its being + consonant with things, since "an opinion is true or false according as it answers to the reality." But the Divine intellect + is the measure of things: since each thing has so far truth in it, as it represents + the Divine intellect, as was stated in the + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q16_A1" id="FS_Q93_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[16], A[1]</a>. Consequently the Divine intellect is true in itself; and its type is truth itself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37536" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37536] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio intellectus divini aliter se habet ad res quam +ratio intellectus humani. Intellectus enim humanus est mensuratus a +rebus, ut scilicet conceptus hominis non sit verus propter seipsum, +sed dicitur verus ex hoc quod consonat rebus, ex hoc enim quod res +est vel non est, opinio vera vel falsa est. Intellectus vero +divinus est mensura rerum, quia unaquaeque res intantum habet de +veritate, inquantum imitatur intellectum divinum, ut in primo +dictum est. Et ideo intellectus divinus est verus secundum se. Unde +ratio eius est ipsa veritas.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q93_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q93_A2-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 2. Whether the eternal law is known to all?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the eternal law is not known to all. Because, as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:11</a>), "the things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God." But the eternal law is a type existing in the Divine + mind. Therefore it is unknown to all save God alone. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37537" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37537] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex aeterna non sit omnibus nota. Quia +ut dicit apostolus, I ad Cor., <i>quae sunt Dei, nemo novit nisi +spiritus Dei</i>. Sed lex aeterna est quaedam ratio in mente divina +existens. Ergo omnibus est ignota nisi soli Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) "the eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should be most + orderly." But all do not know how all things are most orderly. Therefore all do not know the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37538" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37538] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arb., <i>lex aeterna est +qua iustum est ut omnia sint ordinatissima</i>. Sed non omnes +cognoscunt qualiter omnia sint ordinatissima. Non ergo omnes +cognoscunt legem aeternam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi) that "the eternal law is not subject to the judgment of man." But according + to Ethic. i, "any man can judge well of what he knows." Therefore the eternal law is not known to us. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37539" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37539] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera Relig., quod <i>lex aeterna est +de qua homines iudicare non possunt</i>. Sed sicut in I Ethic. +dicitur, <i>unusquisque bene iudicat quae cognoscit</i>. Ergo lex +aeterna non est nobis nota.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "knowledge of the eternal law is imprinted on us." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37540" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37540] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arb., quod <i>aeternae +legis notio nobis impressa est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be known in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in its effect, wherein some likeness of that thing is found: + thus someone not seeing the sun in its substance, may know it by its rays. So then no one can know the eternal law, as it + is in itself, except the blessed who see God in His Essence. But every rational creature knows it in its reflection, greater + or less. For every knowledge of truth is a kind of reflection and participation of the + eternal law, which is the unchangeable truth, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi). Now all men know the truth to a certain + extent, at least as to the common principles of the natural law: and as to the others, they partake of the knowledge of truth, + some more, some less; and in this respect are more or less cognizant of the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 2 co."><a name="37541" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37541] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod dupliciter aliquid cognosci potest, uno modo, in +seipso; alio modo, in suo effectu, in quo aliqua similitudo eius +invenitur; sicut aliquis non videns solem in sua substantia, +cognoscit ipsum in sua irradiatione. Sic igitur dicendum est quod +legem aeternam nullus potest cognoscere secundum quod in seipsa +est, nisi solum beati, qui Deum per essentiam vident. Sed omnis +creatura rationalis ipsam cognoscit secundum aliquam eius +irradiationem, vel maiorem vel minorem. Omnis enim cognitio +veritatis est quaedam irradiatio et participatio legis aeternae, +quae est veritas incommutabilis, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de +vera Relig. Veritatem autem omnes aliqualiter cognoscunt, ad minus +quantum ad principia communia legis naturalis. In aliis vero quidam +plus et quidam minus participant de cognitione veritatis; et +secundum hoc etiam plus vel minus cognoscunt legem aeternam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We cannot know the things that are of God, as they are in themselves; but they are made known to us in their effects, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv"> Rom. 1:20</a>: "The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37542" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37542] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ea quae sunt Dei, in seipsis quidem cognosci a +nobis non possunt, sed tamen in effectibus suis nobis +manifestantur, secundum illud Rom. I, <i>invisibilia Dei per ea +quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although each one knows the eternal law according to his own capacity, in the way explained above, yet none can comprehend + it: for it cannot be made perfectly known by its effects. Therefore it does not follow that anyone who knows the eternal law + in the way aforesaid, knows also the whole order of things, whereby they are most orderly. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37543" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37543] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod legem aeternam etsi unusquisque cognoscat pro sua +capacitate, secundum modum praedictum, nullus tamen eam +comprehendere potest, non enim totaliter manifestari potest per +suos effectus. Et ideo non oportet quod quicumque cognoscit legem +aeternam secundum modum praedictum, cognoscat totum ordinem rerum, +quo omnia sunt ordinatissima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To judge a thing may be understood in two ways. First, as when a cognitive power judges of its proper object, according to + + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Job.12.11" target="asv">Job 12:11</a>: "Doth not the ear discern words, and the palate of him that eateth, the taste?" It is to this kind of judgment that the + Philosopher alludes when he says that "anyone can judge well of what he knows," by judging, namely, whether what is put forward + is true. In another way we speak of a superior judging of a subordinate + by a kind of practical judgment, as to whether he should be such and such or not. And thus none can judge of the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37544" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37544] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod iudicare de aliquo potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno +modo, sicut vis cognitiva diiudicat de proprio obiecto; secundum +illud Iob XII, <i>nonne auris verba diiudicat, et fauces comedentis +saporem?</i> Et secundum istum modum iudicii, philosophus dicit +quod unusquisque bene iudicat quae cognoscit, iudicando scilicet an +sit verum quod proponitur. Alio modo, secundum quod superior +iudicat de inferiori quodam practico iudicio, an scilicet ita +debeat esse vel non ita. Et sic nullus potest iudicare de lege +aeterna.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q93_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q93_A3-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 3. Whether every law is derived from the eternal law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not every law is derived from the eternal law. For there is a law of the "fomes," as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q91_A6" id="FS_Q93_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[91], A[6]</a>), which is not derived from that Divine law which is the eternal law, since thereunto pertains the "prudence of the flesh," + of which the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.7" target="asv">Rom. 8:7</a>), that "it cannot be subject to the law of God." Therefore not every law is derived from the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37545" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37545] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnis lex a lege aeterna +derivetur. Est enim quaedam lex fomitis, ut supra dictum est. Ipsa +autem non derivatur a lege divina, quae est lex aeterna, ad ipsam +enim pertinet prudentia carnis, de qua apostolus dicit, ad Rom. +VIII, quod <i>legi Dei non potest esse subiecta</i>. Ergo non omnis +lex procedit a lege aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing unjust can be derived from the eternal law, because, as stated above (A[2], OBJ[2]), "the eternal law is + that, according to which it is right that all things should be most orderly." But some laws are unjust, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.10.1" target="asv"> Is. 10:1</a>: "Woe to them that make wicked laws." Therefore not every law is derived from the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37546" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37546] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +a lege aeterna nihil iniquum procedere potest, quia sicut dictum +est, lex aeterna est secundum quam iustum est ut omnia sint +ordinatissima. Sed quaedam leges sunt iniquae; secundum illud +Isaiae X, <i>vae qui condunt leges iniquas</i>. Ergo non omnis lex +procedit a lege aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) that "the law which is framed for ruling the people, rightly permits many things + which are punished by Divine providence." But the type of Divine providence is the eternal law, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q93_A1" id="FS_Q93_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore not even every good law is derived from the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37547" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37547] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arbit., quod <i>lex quae populo +regendo scribitur, recte multa permittit quae per divinam +providentiam vindicantur</i>. Sed ratio divinae providentiae est +lex aeterna, ut dictum est. Ergo nec etiam omnis lex recta procedit +a lege aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Divine Wisdom says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.15" target="asv">Prov. 8:15</a>): "By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things." But the type of Divine Wisdom is the eternal law, as stated above + + <a href="#FS_Q93_A1" id="FS_Q93_A3-p5.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore all laws proceed from the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37548" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37548] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod, Prov. VIII, divina sapientia dicit, <i>per me reges +regnant, et legum conditores iusta decernunt</i>. Ratio autem +divinae sapientiae est lex aeterna, ut supra dictum est. Ergo omnes +leges a lege aeterna procedunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q93_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[90], AA[1]</a>,2), the law denotes a kind of plan directing acts towards an end. Now wherever there are movers ordained to one another, + the power of the second mover must needs be derived from the power of the first mover; since the second mover does not move + except in so far as it is moved by the first. Wherefore we observe the same in all those who govern, so that the plan of government + is derived by secondary + governors from the governor in chief; thus the plan of what is to be done in a state flows from the king's command to his + inferior administrators: and again in things of art the plan of whatever is to be done by art flows from the chief craftsman + to the under-crafts-men, who work with their hands. Since then the eternal law is the plan of government in the Chief Governor, + all the plans of government in the inferior governors must be derived from the eternal law. But these plans of inferior + governors are all other laws besides the eternal law. Therefore all laws, in so far as they partake of right reason, are derived + from the eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "in temporal law there is nothing just and lawful, but + what man has drawn from the eternal law." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 3 co."><a name="37549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37549] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex importat rationem +quandam directivam actuum ad finem. In omnibus autem moventibus +ordinatis oportet quod virtus secundi moventis derivetur a virtute +moventis primi, quia movens secundum non movet nisi inquantum +movetur a primo. Unde et in omnibus gubernantibus idem videmus, +quod ratio gubernationis a primo gubernante ad secundos derivatur, +sicut ratio eorum quae sunt agenda in civitate, derivatur a rege +per praeceptum in inferiores administratores. Et in artificialibus +etiam ratio artificialium actuum derivatur ab architectore ad +inferiores artifices, qui manu operantur. Cum ergo lex aeterna sit +ratio gubernationis in supremo gubernante, necesse est quod omnes +rationes gubernationis quae sunt in inferioribus gubernantibus, a +lege aeterna deriventur. Huiusmodi autem rationes inferiorum +gubernantium sunt quaecumque aliae leges praeter legem aeternam. +Unde omnes leges, inquantum participant de ratione recta, intantum +derivantur a lege aeterna. Et propter hoc Augustinus dicit, in I de +Lib. Arb., quod <i>in temporali lege nihil est iustum ac legitimum, +quod non ex lege aeterna homines sibi derivaverunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The "fomes" has the nature of law in man, in so far as it is a punishment resulting from Divine justice; and in this respect + it is evident that it is derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it denotes a proneness to sin, it is contrary to the + Divine law, and has not the nature of law, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q91_A6" id="FS_Q93_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[91], A[6]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37550" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37550] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod fomes habet rationem legis in homine, inquantum +est poena consequens divinam iustitiam, et secundum hoc manifestum +est quod derivatur a lege aeterna. Inquantum vero inclinat ad +peccatum, sic contrariatur legi Dei, et non habet rationem legis, +ut ex supradictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Human law has the nature of law in so far as it partakes of right reason; and it is clear that, in this respect, it is derived + from the eternal law. But in so far as it deviates from reason, it is called an unjust law, and has the nature, not of law + but of violence. Nevertheless even an unjust law, in so far as it retains some appearance of law, though being framed by one + who is in power, is derived from the eternal law; since all power is from the + Lord God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv"> Rom. 13:1.</a> + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37551" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37551] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod lex humana intantum habet rationem legis, inquantum +est secundum rationem rectam, et secundum hoc manifestum est quod a +lege aeterna derivatur. Inquantum vero a ratione recedit, sic +dicitur lex iniqua, et sic non habet rationem legis, sed magis +violentiae cuiusdam. Et tamen in ipsa lege iniqua inquantum +servatur aliquid de similitudine legis propter ordinem potestatis +eius qui legem fert, secundum hoc etiam derivatur a lege aeterna, +omnis enim potestas a domino Deo est, ut dicitur Rom. XIII.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Human law is said to permit certain things, not as approving them, but as being unable to direct them. And many things are + directed by the Divine law, which human law is unable to direct, because more things are subject to a higher than to a lower + cause. Hence the very fact that human law does not meddle with matters it cannot direct, comes under the ordination of the + eternal law. It would be different, were human law to sanction what the eternal law + condemns. Consequently it does not follow that human law is not derived from the eternal law, but that it is not on a perfect + equality with it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37552] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod lex humana dicitur aliqua permittere, non quasi ea +approbans, sed quasi ea dirigere non potens. Multa autem diriguntur +lege divina quae dirigi non possunt lege humana, plura enim +subduntur causae superiori quam inferiori. Unde hoc ipsum quod lex +humana non se intromittat de his quae dirigere non potest, ex +ordine legis aeternae provenit. Secus autem esset si approbaret ea +quae lex aeterna reprobat. Unde ex hoc non habetur quod lex humana +non derivetur a lege aeterna, sed quod non perfecte eam assequi +possit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q93_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q93_A4-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 4. Whether necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law. For whatever is reasonable is subject to + reason. But the Divine will is reasonable, for it is just. Therefore it is subject to (the Divine) reason. But the eternal + law is the Divine reason. Therefore God's will is subject to the eternal law. But God's will is eternal. Therefore eternal + and necessary things are subject to the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37553" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37553] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod necessaria et aeterna subiiciantur +legi aeternae. Omne enim quod rationabile est, rationi subditur. +Sed voluntas divina est rationabilis, cum sit iusta. Ergo rationi +subditur. Sed lex aeterna est ratio divina. Ergo voluntas Dei +subditur legi aeternae. Voluntas autem Dei est aliquod aeternum. +Ergo etiam aeterna et necessaria legi aeternae subduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is subject to the King, is subject to the King's law. Now the Son, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.28" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:28,24, </a> "shall be subject . . . to God and the Father . . . when He shall have delivered up the Kingdom to Him." Therefore the Son, + Who is eternal, is subject to the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37554" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37554] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quidquid subiicitur regi, subiicitur legi regis. <i>Filius +autem</i>, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XV, <i>subiectus erit Deo et patri, +cum tradiderit ei regnum</i>. Ergo filius, qui est aeternus, +subiicitur legi aeternae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the eternal law is Divine providence as a type. But many necessary things are subject to Divine providence: for + instance, the stability of incorporeal substances and of the heavenly bodies. Therefore even necessary things are subject + to the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37555" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37555] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex aeterna est ratio divinae providentiae. Sed multa necessaria +subduntur divinae providentiae, sicut permanentia substantiarum +incorporalium et corporum caelestium. Ergo legi aeternae subduntur +etiam necessaria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Things that are necessary cannot be otherwise, and consequently need no restraining. But laws are imposed on men, in order + to restrain them from evil, as explained above ( + <a href="#FS_Q92_A2" id="FS_Q93_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[92], A[2]</a>). Therefore necessary things are not subject to the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37556" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37556] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +ea quae sunt necessaria, impossibile est aliter se habere, unde +cohibitione non indigent. Sed imponitur hominibus lex ut +cohibeantur a malis, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo ea quae sunt +necessaria, legi non subduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q93_A1" id="FS_Q93_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the eternal law is the type of the Divine government. Consequently whatever is subject to the Divine government, is subject + to the eternal law: while if anything is not subject to the Divine government, neither is it subject to the eternal law. The + application of this distinction may be gathered by looking around us. For those things are subject to human government, which + can be done by man; but what pertains + to the nature of man is not subject to human government; for instance, that he should have a soul, hands, or feet. Accordingly + all that is in things created by God, whether it be contingent or necessary, is subject to the eternal law: while things pertaining + to the Divine Nature or Essence are not subject to the eternal law, but are the eternal law itself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 4 co."><a name="37557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37557] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex aeterna est ratio +divinae gubernationis. Quaecumque ergo divinae gubernationi +subduntur, subiiciuntur etiam legi aeternae, quae vero gubernationi +aeternae non subduntur, neque legi aeternae subduntur. Horum autem +distinctio attendi potest ex his quae circa nos sunt. Humanae enim +gubernationi subduntur ea quae per homines fieri possunt, quae vero +ad naturam hominis pertinent, non subduntur gubernationi humanae, +scilicet quod homo habeat animam, vel manus aut pedes. Sic igitur +legi aeternae subduntur omnia quae sunt in rebus a Deo creatis, +sive sint contingentia sive sint necessaria, ea vero quae pertinent +ad naturam vel essentiam divinam, legi aeternae non subduntur, sed +sunt realiter ipsa lex aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We may speak of God's will in two ways. First, as to the will itself: and thus, since God's will is His very Essence, it + is subject neither to the Divine government, nor to the eternal law, but is the same thing as the eternal law. Secondly, we + may speak of God's will, as to the things themselves that God wills about creatures; which things are subject to the eternal + law, in so far as they are planned by Divine Wisdom. In reference to these things + God's will is said to be reasonable [rationalis]: though regarded in itself it should rather be called their type [ratio]. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37558" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37558] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod de voluntate Dei dupliciter possumus loqui. Uno +modo, quantum ad ipsam voluntatem, et sic, cum voluntas Dei sit +ipsa eius essentia, non subditur gubernationi divinae neque legi +aeternae, sed est idem quod lex aeterna. Alio modo possumus loqui +de voluntate divina quantum ad ipsa quae Deus vult circa creaturas, +quae quidem subiecta sunt legi aeternae, inquantum horum ratio est +in divina sapientia. Et ratione horum, voluntas Dei dicitur +rationabilis. Alioquin, ratione sui ipsius, magis est dicenda ipsa +ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God the Son was not made by God, but was naturally born of God. Consequently He is not subject to Divine providence or to + the eternal law: but rather is Himself the eternal law by a kind of appropriation, as Augustine explains (De Vera Relig. xxxi). + But He is said to be subject to the Father by reason of His human nature, in respect of which also the Father is said to be + greater than He. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37559" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37559] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod filius Dei non est a Deo factus, sed naturaliter ab +ipso genitus. Et ideo non subditur divinae providentiae aut legi +aeternae, sed magis ipse est lex aeterna per quandam +appropriationem, ut patet per Augustinum, in libro de vera Relig. +Dicitur autem esse subiectus patri ratione humanae naturae, +secundum quam etiam pater dicitur esse maior eo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A4-p9"> The third objection we grant, because it deals with those necessary things that are created.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37560" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37560] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Tertium +concedimus, quia procedit de necessariis creatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 6), some necessary things have a cause of their necessity: and thus they derive + from something else the fact that they cannot be otherwise. And this is in itself a most effective restraint; for whatever + is restrained, is said to be restrained in so far as it cannot do otherwise than it is allowed to. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="37561" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37561] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., quaedam +necessaria habent causam suae necessitatis, et sic hoc ipsum quod +impossibile est ea aliter esse, habent ab alio. Et hoc ipsum est +cohibitio quaedam efficacissima, nam quaecumque cohibentur, +intantum cohiberi dicuntur, inquantum non possunt aliter facere +quam de eis disponatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q93_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q93_A5-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 5. Whether natural contingents are subject to the eternal law? </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that natural contingents are not subject to the eternal law. Because promulgation is essential to law, as stated + above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A4" id="FS_Q93_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[4]</a>). But a law cannot be promulgated except to rational creatures, to whom it is possible to make an announcement. Therefore + none but rational creatures are subject to the eternal law; and consequently natural contingents are not. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37562" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37562] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod naturalia contingentia non subsint +legi aeternae. Promulgatio enim est de ratione legis, ut supra +dictum est. Sed promulgatio non potest fieri nisi ad creaturas +rationales, quibus potest aliquid denuntiari. Ergo solae creaturae +rationales subsunt legi aeternae. Non ergo naturalia +contingentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Whatever obeys reason partakes somewhat of reason," as stated in Ethic. i. But the eternal law, is the supreme + type, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q93_A1" id="FS_Q93_A5-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Since then natural contingents do not partake of reason in any way, but are altogether void of reason, it seems that they + are not subject to the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37563" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37563] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae obediunt rationi, participant aliqualiter ratione, ut +dicitur in I Ethic. Lex autem aeterna est ratio summa, ut supra +dictum est. Cum igitur naturalia contingentia non participent +aliqualiter ratione, sed penitus sint irrationabilia, videtur quod +non subsint legi aeternae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the eternal law is most efficient. But in natural contingents defects occur. Therefore they are not subject to the + eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37564" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37564] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex aeterna est efficacissima. Sed in naturalibus contingentibus +accidit defectus. Non ergo subsunt legi aeternae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.29" target="asv">Prov. 8:29</a>): "When He compassed the sea with its bounds, and set a law to the waters, that they should not pass their limits." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37565] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Prov. VIII, <i>quando circumdabat mari terminum +suum, et legem ponebat aquis ne transirent fines suos</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q93_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We must speak otherwise of the law of man, than of the eternal law which is the law of God. For the law of man extends only + to rational creatures subject to man. The reason of this is because law directs the actions of those that are subject to the + government of someone: wherefore, properly speaking, none imposes a law on his own actions. Now whatever is done regarding + the use of irrational things subject to man, is done by the act of man himself moving + those things, for these irrational creatures do not move themselves, but are moved by others, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A2" id="FS_Q93_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[2]</a>). Consequently man cannot impose laws on irrational beings, however much they may be subject to him. But he can impose laws + on rational beings subject to him, in so far as by his command or pronouncement of any kind, he imprints on their minds a + rule which is a principle of action. + </p><p id="FS_Q93_A5-p7"> Now just as man, by such pronouncement, impresses a kind of inward principle of action on the man that is subject to him, + so God imprints on the whole of nature the principles of its proper actions. And so, in this way, God is said to command the + whole of nature, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.148.6" target="asv"> Ps. 148:6</a>: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away." And thus all actions and movements of the whole of nature are subject + to the eternal law. Consequently irrational + creatures are subject to the eternal law, through being moved by Divine providence; but not, as rational creatures are, through + understanding the Divine commandment. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 5 co."><a name="37566" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37566] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliter dicendum est de lege hominis, et aliter de +lege aeterna, quae est lex Dei. Lex enim hominis non se extendit +nisi ad creaturas rationales quae homini subiiciuntur. Cuius ratio +est quia lex est directiva actuum qui conveniunt subiectis +gubernationi alicuius, unde nullus, proprie loquendo, suis actibus +legem imponit. Quaecumque autem aguntur circa usum rerum +irrationalium homini subditarum, aguntur per actum ipsius hominis +moventis huiusmodi res, nam huiusmodi irrationales creaturae non +agunt seipsas, sed ab aliis aguntur, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo +rebus irrationalibus homo legem imponere non potest, quantumcumque +ei subiiciantur. Rebus autem rationalibus sibi subiectis potest +imponere legem, inquantum suo praecepto, vel denuntiatione +quacumque, imprimit menti earum quandam regulam quae est principium +agendi. Sicut autem homo imprimit, denuntiando, quoddam interius +principium actuum homini sibi subiecto, ita etiam Deus imprimit +toti naturae principia propriorum actuum. Et ideo per hunc modum +dicitur Deus praecipere toti naturae; secundum illud Psalmi +CXLVIII, <i>praeceptum posuit, et non praeteribit</i>. Et per hanc +etiam rationem omnes motus et actiones totius naturae legi aeternae +subduntur. Unde alio modo creaturae irrationales subduntur legi +aeternae, inquantum moventur a divina providentia, non autem per +intellectum divini praecepti, sicut creaturae rationales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The impression of an inward active principle is to natural things, what the promulgation of law is to men: because law, by + being promulgated, imprints on man a directive principle of human actions, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37567" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37567] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod hoc modo se habet impressio activi principii +intrinseci, quantum ad res naturales, sicut se habet promulgatio +legis quantum ad homines, quia per legis promulgationem imprimitur +hominibus quoddam directivum principium humanorum actuum, ut dictum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Irrational creatures neither partake of nor are obedient to human reason: whereas they do partake of the Divine Reason by + obeying it; because the power of Divine Reason extends over more things than human reason does. And as the members of the + human body are moved at the command of reason, and yet do not partake of reason, since they have no apprehension subordinate + to reason; so too irrational creatures are moved by God, without, on that account, + being rational. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37568] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod creaturae irrationales non participant ratione +humana, nec ei obediunt, participant tamen, per modum obedientiae, +ratione divina. Ad plura enim se extendit virtus rationis divinae +quam virtus rationis humanae. Et sicut membra corporis humani +moventur ad imperium rationis, non tamen participant ratione, quia +non habent aliquam apprehensionem ordinatam ad rationem; ita etiam +creaturae irrationales moventur a Deo, nec tamen propter hoc sunt +rationales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the defects which occur in natural things are outside the order of particular causes, they are not outside the order + of universal causes, especially of the First Cause, i.e. God, from Whose providence nothing can escape, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q22_A2" id="FS_Q93_A5-p10.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[22], A[2]</a>. And since the eternal law is the type of Divine providence, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q93_A1" id="FS_Q93_A5-p10.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, hence the defects of natural things are subject to the + eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37569" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37569] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod defectus qui accidunt in rebus naturalibus, quamvis +sint praeter ordinem causarum particularium, non tamen sunt praeter +ordinem causarum universalium; et praecipue causae primae, quae +Deus est, cuius providentiam nihil subterfugere potest, ut in primo +dictum est. Et quia lex aeterna est ratio divinae providentiae, ut +dictum est, ideo defectus rerum naturalium legi aeternae +subduntur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q93_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q93_A6-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 6. Whether all human affairs are subject to the eternal law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all human affairs are subject to the eternal law. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.18" target="asv">Gal. 5:18</a>): "If you are led by the spirit you are not under the law." But the righteous who are the sons of God by adoption, are led + by the spirit of God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A6-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.14" target="asv"> Rom. 8:14</a>: "Whosoever are led by the spirit of God, they are the sons of God." Therefore not all men are under the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37570" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37570] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes res humanae subiiciantur +legi aeternae. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Gal. V, <i>si spiritu +ducimini, non estis sub lege</i>. Sed viri iusti, qui sunt filii +Dei per adoptionem, spiritu Dei aguntur; secundum illud Rom. VIII, +<i>qui spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt</i>. Ergo non omnes +homines sunt sub lege aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.7" target="asv">Rom. 8:7</a>): "The prudence [Vulg.: 'wisdom'] of the flesh is an enemy to God: for it is not subject to the law of God." But many are + those in whom the prudence of the flesh dominates. Therefore all men are not subject to the eternal law which is the law of + God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37571" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37571] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +apostolus dicit, ad Rom. VIII, <i>prudentia carnis inimica est Deo, +legi enim Dei subiecta non est</i>. Sed multi homines sunt in +quibus prudentia carnis dominatur. Ergo legi aeternae, quae est lex +Dei, non subiiciuntur omnes homines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the eternal law is that by which the wicked deserve misery, the good, a + life of blessedness." But those who are already blessed, and those who are already lost, are not in the state of merit. Therefore + they are not under the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37572" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37572] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb., quod <i>lex aeterna est qua +mali miseriam, boni vitam beatam merentur</i>. Sed homines iam +beati, vel iam damnati, non sunt in statu merendi. Ergo non subsunt +legi aeternae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12): "Nothing evades the laws of the most high Creator and Governor, for by Him the peace + of the universe is administered." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 6 s. c."><a name="37573" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37573] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, <i>nullo modo aliquid +legibus summi creatoris ordinatorisque subtrahitur, a quo pax +universitatis administratur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q93_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There are two ways in which a thing is subject to the eternal law, as explained above + <a href="#FS_Q93_A5" id="FS_Q93_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>: first, by partaking of the eternal law by way of knowledge; secondly, by way of action and passion, i.e. by partaking of + the eternal law by way of an inward motive principle: and in this second way, irrational creatures are subject to the eternal + law, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q93_A5" id="FS_Q93_A6-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. But since the rational nature, together + with that which it has in common with all creatures, has something proper to itself inasmuch as it is rational, consequently + it is subject to the eternal law in both ways; because while each rational creature has some knowledge of the eternal law, + as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q93_A2" id="FS_Q93_A6-p6.3" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, it also has a natural inclination to that which is in harmony with the eternal law; for "we are naturally adapted to the + recipients of virtue" (Ethic. ii, 1). + </p><p id="FS_Q93_A6-p7"> Both ways, however, are imperfect, and to a certain extent destroyed, in the wicked; because in them the natural inclination + to virtue is corrupted by vicious habits, and, moreover, the natural knowledge of good is darkened by passions and habits + of sin. But in the good both ways are found more perfect: because in them, besides the natural knowledge of good, there is + the added knowledge of faith and wisdom; and again, besides the natural inclination to good, there is the added + motive of grace and virtue. + </p><p id="FS_Q93_A6-p8"> Accordingly, the good are perfectly subject to the eternal law, as always acting according to it: whereas the wicked are + subject to the eternal law, imperfectly as to their actions, indeed, since both their knowledge of good, and their inclination + thereto, are imperfect; but this imperfection on the part of action is supplied on the part of passion, in so far as they + suffer what the eternal law decrees concerning them, according as they fail to act in harmony with that law. + Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 15): "I esteem that the righteous act according to the eternal law; and (De Catech. + Rud. xviii): Out of the just misery of the souls which deserted Him, God knew how to furnish the inferior parts of His creation + with most suitable laws." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 6 co."><a name="37574" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37574] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod duplex est modus quo aliquid subditur legi aeternae, +ut ex supradictis patet, uno modo, inquantum participatur lex +aeterna per modum cognitionis; alio modo, per modum actionis et +passionis, inquantum participatur per modum principii motivi. Et +hoc secundo modo subduntur legi aeternae irrationales creaturae, ut +dictum est. Sed quia rationalis natura, cum eo quod est commune +omnibus creaturis, habet aliquid sibi proprium inquantum est +rationalis, ideo secundum utrumque modum legi aeternae subditur, +quia et notionem legis aeternae aliquo modo habet, ut supra dictum +est; et iterum unicuique rationali creaturae inest naturalis +inclinatio ad id quod est consonum legi aeternae; sumus enim innati +ad habendum virtutes, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Uterque tamen modus +imperfectus quidem est, et quodammodo corruptus, in malis; in +quibus et inclinatio naturalis ad virtutem depravatur per habitum +vitiosum; et iterum ipsa naturalis cognitio boni in eis +obtenebratur per passiones et habitus peccatorum. In bonis autem +uterque modus invenitur perfectior, quia et supra cognitionem +naturalem boni, superadditur eis cognitio fidei et sapientiae; et +supra naturalem inclinationem ad bonum, superadditur eis interius +motivum gratiae et virtutis. Sic igitur boni perfecte subsunt legi +aeternae, tanquam semper secundum eam agentes. Mali autem subsunt +quidem legi aeternae, imperfecte quidem quantum ad actiones +ipsorum, prout imperfecte cognoscunt et imperfecte inclinantur ad +bonum, sed quantum deficit ex parte actionis, suppletur ex parte +passionis, prout scilicet intantum patiuntur quod lex aeterna +dictat de eis, inquantum deficiunt facere quod legi aeternae +convenit. Unde Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb., <i>iustos sub +aeterna lege agere existimo</i>. Et in libro de catechizandis +rudibus, dicit quod <i>Deus ex iusta miseria animarum se +deserentium, convenientissimis legibus inferiores partes creaturae +suae novit ornare</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This saying of the Apostle may be understood in two ways. First, so that a man is said to be under the law, through being + pinned down thereby, against his will, as by a load. Hence, on the same passage a gloss says that "he is under the law, who + refrains from evil deeds, through fear of punishment threatened by the law, and not from love of virtue." In this way the + spiritual man is not under the law, because he fulfils the law willingly, through + charity which is poured into his heart by the Holy Ghost. Secondly, it can be understood as meaning that the works of a man, + who is led by the Holy Ghost, are the works of the Holy Ghost rather than his own. Therefore, since the Holy Ghost is not + under the law, as neither is the Son, as stated above (A[4], ad 2); it follows that such works, in so far as they are of the + Holy Ghost, are not under the law. The Apostle witnesses to this when he says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.17" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:17</a>): "Where the + Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="37575" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37575] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illud verbum apostoli potest intelligi +dupliciter. Uno modo, ut esse sub lege intelligatur ille qui nolens +obligationi legis subditur, quasi cuidam ponderi. Unde Glossa +ibidem dicit quod <i>sub lege est qui timore supplicii quod lex +minatur, non amore iustitiae, a malo opere abstinet</i>. Et hoc +modo spirituales viri non sunt sub lege, quia per caritatem, quam +spiritus sanctus cordibus eorum infundit, voluntarie id quod legis +est, implent. Alio modo potest etiam intelligi inquantum hominis +opera qui spiritu sancto agitur, magis dicuntur esse opera spiritus +sancti quam ipsius hominis. Unde cum spiritus sanctus non sit sub +lege, sicut nec filius, ut supra dictum est; sequitur quod +huiusmodi opera, inquantum sunt spiritus sancti, non sint sub lege. +Et huic attestatur quod apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. III, <i>ubi +spiritus domini, ibi libertas</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The prudence of the flesh cannot be subject to the law of God as regards action; since it inclines to actions contrary to + the Divine law: yet it is subject to the law of God, as regards passion; since it deserves to suffer punishment according + to the law of Divine justice. Nevertheless in no man does the prudence of the flesh dominate so far as to destroy the whole + good of his nature: and consequently there remains in man the inclination to act in + accordance with the eternal law. For we have seen above ( + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q85_A2" id="FS_Q93_A6-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[85], A[2]</a>) that sin does not destroy entirely the good of nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="37576" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37576] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod prudentia carnis non potest subiici legi Dei ex parte +actionis, quia inclinat ad actiones contrarias legi Dei. Subiicitur +tamen legi Dei ex parte passionis, quia meretur pati poenam +secundum legem divinae iustitiae. Nihilominus tamen in nullo homine +ita prudentia carnis dominatur, quod totum bonum naturae +corrumpatur. Et ideo remanet in homine inclinatio ad agendum ea +quae sunt legis aeternae. Habitum est enim supra quod peccatum non +tollit totum bonum naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q93_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A thing is maintained in the end and moved towards the end by one and the same cause: thus gravity which makes a heavy body + rest in the lower place is also the cause of its being moved thither. We therefore reply that as it is according to the eternal + law that some deserve happiness, others unhappiness, so is it by the eternal law that some are maintained in a happy state, + others in an unhappy state. Accordingly both the blessed and the damned are + under the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 93 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="37577" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37577] Iª-IIae q. 93 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod idem est per quod aliquid conservatur in fine, et per +quod movetur ad finem, sicut corpus grave gravitate quiescit in +loco inferiori, per quam etiam ad locum ipsum movetur. Et sic +dicendum est quod, sicut secundum legem aeternam aliqui merentur +beatitudinem vel miseriam, ita per eandem legem in beatitudine vel +miseria conservantur. Et secundum hoc, et beati et damnati subsunt +legi aeternae.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q94" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q94-p0.1">Q. 94. OF THE NATURAL LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q94-p2"> We must now consider the natural law; concerning which there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q94-p3"><a href="#FS_Q94_A1"> (1) What is the natural law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q94-p4"><a href="#FS_Q94_A2"> (2) What are the precepts of the natural law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q94-p5"><a href="#FS_Q94_A3"> (3) Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q94-p6"><a href="#FS_Q94_A4"> (4) Whether the natural law is the same in all?</a></p><p id="FS_Q94-p7"><a href="#FS_Q94_A5"> (5) Whether it is changeable?</a></p><p id="FS_Q94-p8"><a href="#FS_Q94_A6"> (6) Whether it can be abolished from the heart of man?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 pr."><a name="37578" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37578] +Iª-IIae q. 94 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de lege +naturali. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, quid sit lex +naturalis. Secundo, quae sint praecepta legis naturalis. Tertio, +utrum omnes actus virtutum sint de lege naturali. Quarto, utrum lex +naturalis sit una apud omnes. Quinto, utrum sit mutabilis. Sexto, +utrum possit a mente hominis deleri.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q94_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q94_A1-p0.1">Q. 94. A. 1. Whether the natural law is a habit?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the natural law is a habit. Because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5), "there are three things in + the soul: power, habit, and passion." But the natural law is not one of the soul's powers: nor is it one of the passions; + as we may see by going through them one by one. Therefore the natural law is a habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37579" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37579] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex naturalis sit habitus. Quia ut +philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., <i>tria sunt in anima, potentia, +habitus et passio</i>. Sed naturalis lex non est aliqua potentiarum +animae, nec aliqua passionum, ut patet enumerando per singula. Ergo +lex naturalis est habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Basil [*Damascene, De Fide Orth. iv, 22] says that the conscience or "synderesis is the law of our mind"; which + can only apply to the natural law. But the "synderesis" is a habit, as was shown in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q79_A12" id="FS_Q94_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[79], A[12]</a>. Therefore the natural law is a habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37580" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37580] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Basilius dicit quod conscientia, sive synderesis, est lex +intellectus nostri, quod non potest intelligi nisi de lege +naturali. Sed synderesis est habitus quidam, ut in primo habitum +est. Ergo lex naturalis est habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the natural law abides in man always, as will be shown further on + <a href="#FS_Q94_A6" id="FS_Q94_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>. But man's reason, which the law regards, does not always think about the natural law. Therefore the natural law is not an + act, but a habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37581" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37581] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex naturalis semper in homine manet, ut infra patebit. Sed non +semper ratio hominis, ad quam lex pertinet, cogitat de lege +naturali. Ergo lex naturalis non est actus, sed habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "a habit is that whereby something is done when necessary." But such is not the + natural law: since it is in infants and in the damned who cannot act by it. Therefore the natural law is not a habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37582" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37582] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de bono coniugali, quod +<i>habitus est quo aliquid agitur cum opus est</i>. Sed naturalis +lex non est huiusmodi, est enim in parvulis et damnatis, qui per +eam agere non possunt. Ergo lex naturalis non est habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q94_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be called a habit in two ways. First, properly and essentially: and thus the natural law is not a habit. For + it has been stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q94_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[1]</a>, ad 2) that the natural law is something appointed by reason, just as a proposition is a work of reason. Now that which a + man does is not the same as that whereby he does it: for he makes a becoming speech by the habit of grammar. Since then a + habit is that by which we act, a + law cannot be a habit properly and essentially. + </p><p id="FS_Q94_A1-p7"> Secondly, the term habit may be applied to that which we hold by a habit: thus faith may mean that which we hold by faith. + And accordingly, since the precepts of the natural law are sometimes considered by reason actually, while sometimes they are + in the reason only habitually, in this way the natural law may be called a habit. Thus, in speculative matters, the indemonstrable + principles are not the habit itself whereby we hold those principles, but are the principles the habit + of which we possess. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 1 co."><a name="37583" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37583] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquid potest dici esse habitus dupliciter. Uno +modo, proprie et essentialiter, et sic lex naturalis non est +habitus. Dictum est enim supra quod lex naturalis est aliquid per +rationem constitutum, sicut etiam propositio est quoddam opus +rationis. Non est autem idem quod quis agit, et quo quis agit, +aliquis enim per habitum grammaticae agit orationem congruam. Cum +igitur habitus sit quo quis agit, non potest esse quod lex aliqua +sit habitus proprie et essentialiter. Alio modo potest dici habitus +id quod habitu tenetur, sicut dicitur fides id quod fide tenetur. +Et hoc modo, quia praecepta legis naturalis quandoque considerantur +in actu a ratione, quandoque autem sunt in ea habitualiter tantum, +secundum hunc modum potest dici quod lex naturalis sit habitus. +Sicut etiam principia indemonstrabilia in speculativis non sunt +ipse habitus principiorum, sed sunt principia quorum est +habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher proposes there to discover the genus of virtue; and since it is evident that virtue is a principle of action, + he mentions only those things which are principles of human acts, viz. powers, habits and passions. But there are other things + in the soul besides these three: there are acts; thus "to will" is in the one that wills; again, things known are in the knower; + moreover its own natural properties are in the soul, such as immortality + and the like. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37584" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37584] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod philosophus intendit ibi investigare genus +virtutis, et cum manifestum sit quod virtus sit quoddam principium +actus, illa tantum ponit quae sunt principia humanorum actuum, +scilicet potentias, habitus et passiones. Praeter haec autem tria +sunt quaedam alia in anima, sicut quidam actus, ut velle est in +volente; et etiam cognita sunt in cognoscente; et proprietates +naturales animae insunt ei, ut immortalitas et alia huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Synderesis" is said to be the law of our mind, because it is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law, which are + the first principles of human actions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37585" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37585] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod synderesis dicitur lex intellectus nostri, inquantum +est habitus continens praecepta legis naturalis, quae sunt prima +principia operum humanorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument proves that the natural law is held habitually; and this is granted. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37586" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37586] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa concludit quod lex naturalis habitualiter +tenetur. Et hoc concedimus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> To the argument advanced in the contrary sense we reply that sometimes a man is unable to make use of that which is in him + habitually, on account of some impediment: thus, on account of sleep, a man is unable to use the habit of science. In like + manner, through the deficiency of his age, a child cannot use the habit of understanding of principles, or the natural law, + which is in him habitually. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="37587" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37587] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad id vero +quod in contrarium obiicitur, dicendum quod eo quod habitualiter +inest, quandoque aliquis uti non potest propter aliquod +impedimentum, sicut homo non potest uti habitu scientiae propter +somnum. Et similiter puer non potest uti habitu intellectus +principiorum, vel etiam lege naturali, quae ei habitualiter inest, +propter defectum aetatis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q94_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q94_A2-p0.1">Q. 94. A. 2. Whether the natural law contains several precepts, or only one?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the natural law contains, not several precepts, but one only. For law is a kind of precept, as stated + above ( + <a href="#FS_Q92_A2" id="FS_Q94_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[92], A[2]</a>). If therefore there were many precepts of the natural law, it would follow that there are also many natural laws. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37588" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37588] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex naturalis non contineat plura +praecepta, sed unum tantum. Lex enim continetur in genere +praecepti, ut supra habitum est. Si igitur essent multa praecepta +legis naturalis, sequeretur quod etiam essent multae leges +naturales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the natural law is consequent to human nature. But human nature, as a whole, is one; though, as to its parts, it + is manifold. Therefore, either there is but one precept of the law of nature, on account of the unity of nature as a whole; + or there are many, by reason of the number of parts of human nature. The result would be that even things relating to the + inclination of the concupiscible faculty belong to the natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37589" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37589] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +lex naturalis consequitur hominis naturam. Sed humana natura est +una secundum totum, licet sit multiplex secundum partes. Aut ergo +est unum praeceptum tantum legis naturae, propter unitatem totius, +aut sunt multa, secundum multitudinem partium humanae naturae. Et +sic oportebit quod etiam ea quae sunt de inclinatione +concupiscibilis, pertineant ad legem naturalem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, law is something pertaining to reason, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q94_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[1]</a>). Now reason is but one in man. Therefore there is only one precept of the natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37590" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37590] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex est aliquid ad rationem pertinens, ut supra dictum est. Sed +ratio in homine est una tantum. Ergo solum unum praeceptum est +legis naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The precepts of the natural law in man stand in relation to practical matters, as the first principles to matters of demonstration. + But there are several first indemonstrable principles. Therefore there are also several precepts of the natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37591" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37591] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quia sic se habent praecepta legis naturalis in homine quantum +ad operabilia, sicut se habent prima principia in demonstrativis. +Sed prima principia indemonstrabilia sunt plura. Ergo etiam +praecepta legis naturae sunt plura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q94_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q91_A3" id="FS_Q94_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[91], A[3]</a>), the precepts of the natural law are to the practical reason, what the first principles of demonstrations are to the speculative + reason; because both are self-evident principles. Now a thing is said to be self-evident in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, + in relation to us. Any proposition is said to be self-evident in itself, if its predicate is contained in the notion of the + subject: although, to + one who knows not the definition of the subject, it happens that such a proposition is not self-evident. For instance, this + proposition, "Man is a rational being," is, in its very nature, self-evident, since who says "man," says "a rational being": + and yet to one who knows not what a man is, this proposition is not self-evident. Hence it is that, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), + certain axioms or propositions are universally self-evident to all; and such are those propositions whose terms are + known to all, as, "Every whole is greater than its part," and, "Things equal to one and the same are equal to one another." + But some propositions are self-evident only to the wise, who understand the meaning of the terms of such propositions: thus + to one who understands that an angel is not a body, it is self-evident that an angel is not circumscriptively in a place: + but this is not evident to the unlearned, for they cannot grasp it. + </p><p id="FS_Q94_A2-p7"> Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended universally. For that which, before aught else, falls + under apprehension, is "being," the notion of which is included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends. Wherefore the first + indemonstrable principle is that "the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," which is based on the notion + of "being" and "not-being": and on this principle all others are based, as is stated in Metaph. iv, + text. 9. Now as "being" is the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so "good" is the first thing that falls + under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under the aspect + of good. Consequently the first principle of practical reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz. that "good is that + which all things seek after." Hence this is the first precept of law, that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to + be avoided." All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends + as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided. + </p><p id="FS_Q94_A2-p8"> Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which + man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, + and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order + of the precepts of the natural law. Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in + accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation + of its own being, according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, + and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain + to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, + those things are said to belong to the natural law, "which nature has taught to all animals" [*Pandect. Just. I, tit. i], + such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according + to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, + and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, + to + shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 2 co."><a name="37592" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37592] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, praecepta legis naturae hoc +modo se habent ad rationem practicam, sicut principia prima +demonstrationum se habent ad rationem speculativam, utraque enim +sunt quaedam principia per se nota. Dicitur autem aliquid per se +notum dupliciter, uno modo, secundum se; alio modo, quoad nos. +Secundum se quidem quaelibet propositio dicitur per se nota, cuius +praedicatum est de ratione subiecti, contingit tamen quod ignoranti +definitionem subiecti, talis propositio non erit per se nota. Sicut +ista propositio, homo est rationale, est per se nota secundum sui +naturam, quia qui dicit hominem, dicit rationale, et tamen +ignoranti quid sit homo, haec propositio non est per se nota. Et +inde est quod, sicut dicit Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., quaedam +sunt dignitates vel propositiones per se notae communiter omnibus, +et huiusmodi sunt illae propositiones quarum termini sunt omnibus +noti, ut, omne totum est maius sua parte, et, quae uni et eidem +sunt aequalia, sibi invicem sunt aequalia. Quaedam vero +propositiones sunt per se notae solis sapientibus, qui terminos +propositionum intelligunt quid significent, sicut intelligenti quod +Angelus non est corpus, per se notum est quod non est +circumscriptive in loco, quod non est manifestum rudibus, qui hoc +non capiunt. In his autem quae in apprehensione omnium cadunt, +quidam ordo invenitur. Nam illud quod primo cadit in apprehensione, +est ens, cuius intellectus includitur in omnibus quaecumque quis +apprehendit. Et ideo primum principium indemonstrabile est quod non +est simul affirmare et negare, quod fundatur supra rationem entis +et non entis, et super hoc principio omnia alia fundantur, ut +dicitur in IV Metaphys. Sicut autem ens est primum quod cadit in +apprehensione simpliciter, ita bonum est primum quod cadit in +apprehensione practicae rationis, quae ordinatur ad opus, omne enim +agens agit propter finem, qui habet rationem boni. Et ideo primum +principium in ratione practica est quod fundatur supra rationem +boni, quae est, bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Hoc est ergo primum +praeceptum legis, quod bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et +malum vitandum. Et super hoc fundantur omnia alia praecepta legis +naturae, ut scilicet omnia illa facienda vel vitanda pertineant ad +praecepta legis naturae, quae ratio practica naturaliter +apprehendit esse bona humana. Quia vero bonum habet rationem finis, +malum autem rationem contrarii, inde est quod omnia illa ad quae +homo habet naturalem inclinationem, ratio naturaliter apprehendit +ut bona, et per consequens ut opere prosequenda, et contraria eorum +ut mala et vitanda. Secundum igitur ordinem inclinationum +naturalium, est ordo praeceptorum legis naturae. Inest enim primo +inclinatio homini ad bonum secundum naturam in qua communicat cum +omnibus substantiis, prout scilicet quaelibet substantia appetit +conservationem sui esse secundum suam naturam. Et secundum hanc +inclinationem, pertinent ad legem naturalem ea per quae vita +hominis conservatur, et contrarium impeditur. Secundo inest homini +inclinatio ad aliqua magis specialia, secundum naturam in qua +communicat cum ceteris animalibus. Et secundum hoc, dicuntur ea +esse de lege naturali quae natura omnia animalia docuit, ut est +coniunctio maris et feminae, et educatio liberorum, et similia. +Tertio modo inest homini inclinatio ad bonum secundum naturam +rationis, quae est sibi propria, sicut homo habet naturalem +inclinationem ad hoc quod veritatem cognoscat de Deo, et ad hoc +quod in societate vivat. Et secundum hoc, ad legem naturalem +pertinent ea quae ad huiusmodi inclinationem spectant, utpote quod +homo ignorantiam vitet, quod alios non offendat cum quibus debet +conversari, et cetera huiusmodi quae ad hoc spectant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All these precepts of the law of nature have the character of one natural law, inasmuch as they flow from one first precept. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37593" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37593] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omnia ista praecepta legis naturae, inquantum +referuntur ad unum primum praeceptum, habent rationem unius legis +naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All the inclinations of any parts whatsoever of human nature, e.g. of the concupiscible and irascible parts, in so far as + they are ruled by reason, belong to the natural law, and are reduced to one first precept, as stated above: so that the precepts + of the natural law are many in themselves, but are based on one common foundation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37594" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37594] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod omnes inclinationes quarumcumque partium humanae +naturae, puta concupiscibilis et irascibilis, secundum quod +regulantur ratione, pertinent ad legem naturalem, et reducuntur ad +unum primum praeceptum, ut dictum est. Et secundum hoc, sunt multa +praecepta legis naturae in seipsis, quae tamen communicant in una +radice.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although reason is one in itself, yet it directs all things regarding man; so that whatever can be ruled by reason, is contained + under the law of reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37595" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37595] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio, etsi in se una sit, tamen est ordinativa +omnium quae ad homines spectant. Et secundum hoc, sub lege rationis +continentur omnia ea quae ratione regulari possunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q94_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q94_A3-p0.1">Q. 94. A. 3. Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law. Because, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q94_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[2]</a>) it is essential to a law that it be ordained to the common good. But some acts of virtue are ordained to the private good + of the individual, as is evident especially in regards to acts of temperance. Therefore not all acts of virtue are the subject + of natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37596" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37596] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes actus virtutum sint de lege +naturae. Quia, ut supra dictum est, de ratione legis est ut +ordinetur ad bonum commune. Sed quidam virtutum actus ordinantur ad +bonum privatum alicuius, ut patet praecipue in actibus +temperantiae. Non ergo omnes actus virtutum legi subduntur +naturali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every sin is opposed to some virtuous act. If therefore all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law, it + seems to follow that all sins are against nature: whereas this applies to certain special sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37597" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37597] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omnia peccata aliquibus virtuosis actibus opponuntur. Si igitur +omnes actus virtutum sint de lege naturae, videtur ex consequenti +quod omnia peccata sint contra naturam. Quod tamen specialiter de +quibusdam peccatis dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those things which are according to nature are common to all. But acts of virtue are not common to all: since a + thing is virtuous in one, and vicious in another. Therefore not all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37598" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37598] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +in his quae sunt secundum naturam, omnes conveniunt. Sed in actibus +virtutum non omnes conveniunt, aliquid enim est virtuosum uni, quod +est alteri vitiosum. Ergo non omnes actus virtutum sunt de lege +naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "virtues are natural." Therefore virtuous acts also are a subject of the natural + law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37599" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37599] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod virtutes sunt +naturales. Ergo et actus virtuosi subiacent legi naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of virtuous acts in two ways: first, under the aspect of virtuous; secondly, as such and such acts considered + in their proper species. If then we speak of acts of virtue, considered as virtuous, thus all virtuous acts belong to the + natural law. For it has been stated + <a href="#FS_Q94_A2" id="FS_Q94_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a> that to the natural law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now each thing is inclined + naturally to an operation + that is suitable to it according to its form: thus fire is inclined to give heat. Wherefore, since the rational soul is the + proper form of man, there is in every man a natural inclination to act according to reason: and this is to act according to + virtue. Consequently, considered thus, all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law: since each one's reason naturally + dictates to him to act virtuously. But if we speak of virtuous acts, considered in themselves, i.e. in their proper species, + thus not all virtuous acts are prescribed by the natural law: for many things are done virtuously, to which nature does not + incline at first; but which, through the inquiry of reason, have been found by men to be conducive to well-living. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 3 co."><a name="37600" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37600] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod de actibus virtuosis dupliciter loqui possumus, uno +modo, inquantum sunt virtuosi; alio modo, inquantum sunt tales +actus in propriis speciebus considerati. Si igitur loquamur de +actibus virtutum inquantum sunt virtuosi, sic omnes actus virtuosi +pertinent ad legem naturae. Dictum est enim quod ad legem naturae +pertinet omne illud ad quod homo inclinatur secundum suam naturam. +Inclinatur autem unumquodque naturaliter ad operationem sibi +convenientem secundum suam formam, sicut ignis ad calefaciendum. +Unde cum anima rationalis sit propria forma hominis, naturalis +inclinatio inest cuilibet homini ad hoc quod agat secundum +rationem. Et hoc est agere secundum virtutem. Unde secundum hoc, +omnes actus virtutum sunt de lege naturali, dictat enim hoc +naturaliter unicuique propria ratio, ut virtuose agat. Sed si +loquamur de actibus virtuosis secundum seipsos, prout scilicet in +propriis speciebus considerantur, sic non omnes actus virtuosi sunt +de lege naturae. Multa enim secundum virtutem fiunt, ad quae natura +non primo inclinat; sed per rationis inquisitionem ea homines +adinvenerunt, quasi utilia ad bene vivendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Temperance is about the natural concupiscences of food, drink and sexual matters, which are indeed ordained to the natural + common good, just as other matters of law are ordained to the moral common good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37601" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37601] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod temperantia est circa concupiscentias naturales +cibi et potus et venereorum, quae quidem ordinantur ad bonum +commune naturae, sicut et alia legalia ordinantur ad bonum commune +morale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By human nature we may mean either that which is proper to man---and in this sense all sins, as being against reason, are + also against nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): or we may mean that nature which is common to man and other + animals; and in this sense, certain special sins are said to be against nature; thus contrary to sexual intercourse, which + is natural to all animals, is unisexual lust, which has received the special name of + the unnatural crime. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37602" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37602] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod natura hominis potest dici vel illa quae est propria +homini, et secundum hoc, omnia peccata, inquantum sunt contra +rationem, sunt etiam contra naturam, ut patet per Damascenum, in II +libro. Vel illa quae est communis homini et aliis animalibus, et +secundum hoc, quaedam specialia peccata dicuntur esse contra +naturam; sicut contra commixtionem maris et feminae, quae est +naturalis omnibus animalibus, est concubitus masculorum, quod +specialiter dicitur vitium contra naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers acts in themselves. For it is owing to the various conditions of men, that certain acts are virtuous + for some, as being proportionate and becoming to them, while they are vicious for others, as being out of proportion to them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37603" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37603] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de actibus secundum seipsos +consideratis. Sic enim, propter diversas hominum conditiones, +contingit quod aliqui actus sunt aliquibus virtuosi, tanquam eis +proportionati et convenientes, qui tamen sunt aliis vitiosi, +tanquam eis non proportionati.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q94_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q94_A4-p0.1">Q. 94. A. 4. Whether the natural law is the same in all men?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the natural law is not the same in all. For it is stated in the Decretals (Dist. i) that "the natural + law is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel." But this is not common to all men; because, as it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q94_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.10.16" target="asv">Rom. 10:16</a>), "all do not obey the gospel." Therefore the natural law is not the same in all men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37604" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37604] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex naturae non sit una apud omnes. +Dicitur enim in decretis, dist. I, quod <i>ius naturale est quod in +lege et in Evangelio continetur</i>. Sed hoc non est commune +omnibus, quia, ut dicitur Rom. X, <i>non omnes obediunt +Evangelio</i>. Ergo lex naturalis non est una apud omnes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Things which are according to the law are said to be just," as stated in Ethic. v. But it is stated in the same + book that nothing is so universally just as not to be subject to change in regard to some men. Therefore even the natural + law is not the same in all men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37605" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37605] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae sunt secundum legem, iusta esse dicuntur, ut dicitur in V +Ethic. Sed in eodem libro dicitur quod nihil est ita iustum apud +omnes, quin apud aliquos diversificetur. Ergo lex etiam naturalis +non est apud omnes eadem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q94_A2" id="FS_Q94_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3), to the natural law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now different men are naturally + inclined to different things; some to the desire of pleasures, others to the desire of honors, and other men to other things. + Therefore there is not one natural law for all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37606" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37606] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ad legem naturae pertinet id ad quod homo secundum naturam suam +inclinatur, ut supra dictum est. Sed diversi homines naturaliter ad +diversa inclinantur, alii quidem ad concupiscentiam voluptatum, +alii ad desideria honorum, alii ad alia. Ergo non est una lex +naturalis apud omnes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (Etym. v, 4): "The natural law is common to all nations." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37607" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37607] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., <i>ius naturale est +commune omnium nationum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q94_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q94_A2" id="FS_Q94_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3), to the natural law belongs those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and among these it is proper to man to + be inclined to act according to reason. Now the process of reason is from the common to the proper, as stated in Phys. i. + The speculative reason, however, is differently situated in this matter, from the practical reason. For, since the speculative + reason is busied chiefly with the necessary + things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth + without fail. The practical reason, on the other hand, is busied with contingent matters, about which human actions are concerned: + and consequently, although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the more + frequently we encounter defects. Accordingly then in speculative matters truth is the same in all men, both as to + principles and as to conclusions: although the truth is not known to all as regards the conclusions, but only as regards the + principles which are called common notions. But in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, + as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles: and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, + it is not equally known to all. + </p><p id="FS_Q94_A4-p7"> It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude + is the same for all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper conclusions of the speculative reason, the truth is the + same for all, but is not equally known to all: thus it is true for all that the three angles of a triangle are together equal + to two right angles, although it is not known to all. But as to the proper conclusions of the practical + reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all. Thus it + is right and true for all to act according to reason: and from this principle it follows as a proper conclusion, that goods + entrusted to another should be restored to their owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases: but it may happen in a + particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance, if they + are + claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's country. And this principle will be found to fail the more, according as + we descend further into detail, e.g. if one were to say that goods held in trust should be restored with such and such a guarantee, + or in such and such a way; because the greater the number of conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the + principle may fail, so that it be not right to restore or not to restore. + </p><p id="FS_Q94_A4-p8"> Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to general principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as + to knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail, which are conclusions, as it were, of those general principles, it is the + same for all in the majority of cases, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in some few cases it may fail, both + as to rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles (just as natures subject to generation and corruption fail in + some few cases on account of some obstacle), and as to knowledge, since in some the reason is perverted by passion, or evil + habit, or an evil disposition of nature; thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural law, was not + considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates (De Bello Gall. vi). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 4 co."><a name="37608" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37608] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad legem naturae pertinent +ea ad quae homo naturaliter inclinatur; inter quae homini proprium +est ut inclinetur ad agendum secundum rationem. Ad rationem autem +pertinet ex communibus ad propria procedere, ut patet ex I Physic. +Aliter tamen circa hoc se habet ratio speculativa, et aliter ratio +practica. Quia enim ratio speculativa praecipue negotiatur circa +necessaria, quae impossibile est aliter se habere, absque aliquo +defectu invenitur veritas in conclusionibus propriis, sicut et in +principiis communibus. Sed ratio practica negotiatur circa +contingentia, in quibus sunt operationes humanae, et ideo, etsi in +communibus sit aliqua necessitas, quanto magis ad propria +descenditur, tanto magis invenitur defectus. Sic igitur in +speculativis est eadem veritas apud omnes tam in principiis quam in +conclusionibus, licet veritas non apud omnes cognoscatur in +conclusionibus, sed solum in principiis, quae dicuntur communes +conceptiones. In operativis autem non est eadem veritas vel +rectitudo practica apud omnes quantum ad propria, sed solum quantum +ad communia, et apud illos apud quos est eadem rectitudo in +propriis, non est aequaliter omnibus nota. Sic igitur patet quod, +quantum ad communia principia rationis sive speculativae sive +practicae, est eadem veritas seu rectitudo apud omnes, et +aequaliter nota. Quantum vero ad proprias conclusiones rationis +speculativae, est eadem veritas apud omnes, non tamen aequaliter +omnibus nota, apud omnes enim verum est quod triangulus habet tres +angulos aequales duobus rectis, quamvis hoc non sit omnibus notum. +Sed quantum ad proprias conclusiones rationis practicae, nec est +eadem veritas seu rectitudo apud omnes; nec etiam apud quos est +eadem, est aequaliter nota. Apud omnes enim hoc rectum est et +verum, ut secundum rationem agatur. Ex hoc autem principio sequitur +quasi conclusio propria, quod deposita sint reddenda. Et hoc quidem +ut in pluribus verum est, sed potest in aliquo casu contingere quod +sit damnosum, et per consequens irrationabile, si deposita +reddantur; puta si aliquis petat ad impugnandam patriam. Et hoc +tanto magis invenitur deficere, quanto magis ad particularia +descenditur, puta si dicatur quod deposita sunt reddenda cum tali +cautione, vel tali modo, quanto enim plures conditiones +particulares apponuntur, tanto pluribus modis poterit deficere, ut +non sit rectum vel in reddendo vel in non reddendo. Sic igitur +dicendum est quod lex naturae, quantum ad prima principia communia, +est eadem apud omnes et secundum rectitudinem, et secundum +notitiam. Sed quantum ad quaedam propria, quae sunt quasi +conclusiones principiorum communium, est eadem apud omnes ut in +pluribus et secundum rectitudinem et secundum notitiam, sed ut in +paucioribus potest deficere et quantum ad rectitudinem, propter +aliqua particularia impedimenta (sicut etiam naturae generabiles et +corruptibiles deficiunt ut in paucioribus, propter impedimenta), et +etiam quantum ad notitiam; et hoc propter hoc quod aliqui habent +depravatam rationem ex passione, seu ex mala consuetudine, seu ex +mala habitudine naturae; sicut apud germanos olim latrocinium non +reputabatur iniquum, cum tamen sit expresse contra legem naturae, +ut refert Iulius Caesar, in libro de bello Gallico.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The meaning of the sentence quoted is not that whatever is contained in the Law and the Gospel belongs to the natural law, + since they contain many things that are above nature; but that whatever belongs to the natural law is fully contained in them. + Wherefore Gratian, after saying that "the natural law is what is contained in the Law and the Gospel," adds at once, by way + of example, "by which everyone is commanded to do to others as he would be done + by." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37609" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37609] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod verbum illud non est sic intelligendum quasi +omnia quae in lege et in Evangelio continentur, sint de lege +naturae, cum multa tradantur ibi supra naturam, sed quia ea quae +sunt de lege naturae, plenarie ibi traduntur. Unde cum dixisset +Gratianus quod <i>ius naturale est quod in lege et in Evangelio +continetur</i>, statim, exemplificando, subiunxit, <i>quo quisque +iubetur alii facere quod sibi vult fieri</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of things that are naturally just, not as general principles, but as conclusions + drawn from them, having rectitude in the majority of cases, but failing in a few. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37610" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37610] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod verbum philosophi est intelligendum de his quae sunt +naturaliter iusta non sicut principia communia, sed sicut quaedam +conclusiones ex his derivatae; quae ut in pluribus rectitudinem +habent, et ut in paucioribus deficiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As, in man, reason rules and commands the other powers, so all the natural inclinations belonging to the other powers must + needs be directed according to reason. Wherefore it is universally right for all men, that all their inclinations should be + directed according to reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37611" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37611] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut ratio in homine dominatur et imperat aliis +potentiis, ita oportet quod omnes inclinationes naturales ad alias +potentias pertinentes ordinentur secundum rationem. Unde hoc est +apud omnes communiter rectum, ut secundum rationem dirigantur omnes +hominum inclinationes.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q94_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q94_A5-p0.1">Q. 94. A. 5. Whether the natural law can be changed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the natural law can be changed. Because on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q94_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.17.9" target="asv"> Ecclus. 17:9, </a> "He gave them instructions, and the law of life," the gloss says: "He wished the law of the letter to be written, in order + to correct the law of nature." But that which is corrected is changed. Therefore the natural law can be changed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37612" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37612] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex naturae mutari possit. Quia super +illud Eccli. XVII, <i>addidit eis disciplinam et legem vitae</i>, +dicit Glossa, <i>legem litterae, quantum ad correctionem legis +naturalis, scribi voluit</i>. Sed illud quod corrigitur, mutatur. +Ergo lex naturalis potest mutari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the slaying of the innocent, adultery, and theft are against the natural law. But we find these things changed by + God: as when God commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q94_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.22.2" target="asv">Gn. 22:2</a>); and when he ordered the Jews to borrow and purloin the vessels of the Egyptians ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q94_A5-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.12.35" target="asv">Ex. 12:35</a>); and when He commanded Osee to take to himself "a wife of fornications" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q94_A5-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Hos.1.2" target="asv">Osee 1:2</a>). Therefore the natural law can be changed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37613" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37613] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +contra legem naturalem est occisio innocentis, et etiam adulterium +et furtum. Sed ista inveniuntur esse mutata a Deo, puta cum Deus +praecepit Abrahae quod occideret filium innocentem, ut habetur Gen. +XXII; et cum praecepit Iudaeis ut mutuata Aegyptiorum vasa +subriperent, ut habetur Exod. XII; et cum praecepit Osee ut uxorem +fornicariam acciperet, ut habetur Osee I. Ergo lex naturalis potest +mutari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Isidore says (Etym. 5:4) that "the + possession of all things in common, and universal freedom, are matters of natural law." But these things are seen to be changed + by human laws. Therefore it seems that the natural law is subject to change. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37614" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37614] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., quod <i>communis omnium +possessio, et una libertas, est de iure naturali</i>. Sed haec +videmus esse commutata per leges humanas. Ergo videtur quod lex +naturalis sit mutabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in the Decretals (Dist. v): "The natural law dates from the creation of the rational creature. It does not vary + according to time, but remains unchangeable." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37615" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37615] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur in decretis, dist. V, <i>naturale ius ab exordio +rationalis creaturae. Nec variatur tempore, sed immutabile +permanet</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q94_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A change in the natural law may be understood in two ways. First, by way of addition. In this sense nothing hinders the natural + law from being changed: since many things for the benefit of human life have been added over and above the natural law, both + by the Divine law and by human laws. + </p><p id="FS_Q94_A5-p7"> Secondly, a change in the natural law may be understood by way of subtraction, so that what previously was according to the + natural law, ceases to be so. In this sense, the natural law is altogether unchangeable in its first principles: but in its + secondary principles, which, as we have said + <a href="#FS_Q94_A4" id="FS_Q94_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, are certain detailed proximate conclusions drawn from the first principles, the natural law is not changed so that what + it prescribes be not right in most + cases. But it may be changed in some particular cases of rare occurrence, through some special causes hindering the observance + of such precepts, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q94_A4" id="FS_Q94_A5-p7.2" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 5 co."><a name="37616" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37616] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod lex naturalis potest intelligi mutari dupliciter. Uno +modo, per hoc quod aliquid ei addatur. Et sic nihil prohibet legem +naturalem mutari, multa enim supra legem naturalem superaddita +sunt, ad humanam vitam utilia, tam per legem divinam, quam etiam +per leges humanas. Alio modo intelligitur mutatio legis naturalis +per modum subtractionis, ut scilicet aliquid desinat esse de lege +naturali, quod prius fuit secundum legem naturalem. Et sic quantum +ad prima principia legis naturae, lex naturae est omnino +immutabilis. Quantum autem ad secunda praecepta, quae diximus esse +quasi quasdam proprias conclusiones propinquas primis principiis, +sic lex naturalis non immutatur quin ut in pluribus rectum sit +semper quod lex naturalis habet. Potest tamen immutari in aliquo +particulari, et in paucioribus, propter aliquas speciales causas +impedientes observantiam talium praeceptorum, ut supra dictum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The written law is said to be given for the correction of the natural law, either because it supplies what was wanting to + the natural law; or because the natural law was perverted in the hearts of some men, as to certain matters, so that they esteemed + those things good which are naturally evil; which perversion stood in need of correction. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37617" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37617] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod lex scripta dicitur esse data ad correctionem +legis naturae, vel quia per legem scriptam suppletum est quod legi +naturae deerat, vel quia lex naturae in aliquorum cordibus, quantum +ad aliqua, corrupta erat intantum ut existimarent esse bona quae +naturaliter sunt mala; et talis corruptio correctione +indigebat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All men alike, both guilty and innocent, die the death of nature: which death of nature is inflicted by the power of God + on account of original sin, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q94_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.2.6" target="asv">1 Kings 2:6</a>: "The Lord killeth and maketh alive." Consequently, by the command of God, death can be inflicted on any man, guilty or innocent, + without any injustice whatever. In like manner adultery is intercourse with another's wife; who is allotted to him by the + law + emanating from God. Consequently intercourse with any woman, by the command of God, is neither adultery nor fornication. The + same applies to theft, which is the taking of another's property. For whatever is taken by the command of God, to Whom all + things belong, is not taken against the will of its owner, whereas it is in this that theft consists. Nor is it only in human + things, that whatever is commanded by God is right; but also in natural things, whatever is done by God, is, in some way, + natural, as stated in the + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A6" id="FS_Q94_A5-p9.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[105], A[6]</a>, ad 1. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37618" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37618] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod naturali morte moriuntur omnes communiter, tam +nocentes quam innocentes. Quae quidem naturalis mors divina +potestate inducitur propter peccatum originale; secundum illud I +Reg. II, <i>dominus mortificat et vivificat</i>. Et ideo absque +aliqua iniustitia, secundum mandatum Dei, potest infligi mors +cuicumque homini, vel nocenti vel innocenti. Similiter etiam +adulterium est concubitus cum uxore aliena, quae quidem est ei +deputata secundum legem divinitus traditam. Unde ad quamcumque +mulierem aliquis accedat ex mandato divino, non est adulterium nec +fornicatio. Et eadem ratio est de furto, quod est acceptio rei +alienae. Quidquid enim accipit aliquis ex mandato Dei, qui est +dominus universorum, non accipit absque voluntate domini, quod est +furari. Nec solum in rebus humanis quidquid a Deo mandatur, hoc +ipso est debitum, sed etiam in rebus naturalibus quidquid a Deo +fit, est quodammodo naturale, ut in primo dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A thing is said to belong to the natural law in two ways. First, because nature inclines thereto: e.g. that one should not + do harm to another. Secondly, because nature did not bring in the contrary: thus we might say that for man to be naked is + of the natural law, because nature did not give him clothes, but art invented them. In this sense, "the possession of all + things in common and universal freedom" are said to be of the natural law, because, to + wit, the distinction of possessions and slavery were not brought in by nature, but devised by human reason for the benefit + of human life. Accordingly the law of nature was not changed in this respect, except by addition. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37619" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37619] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod aliquid dicitur esse de iure naturali dupliciter. Uno +modo, quia ad hoc natura inclinat, sicut non esse iniuriam alteri +faciendam. Alio modo, quia natura non induxit contrarium, sicut +possemus dicere quod hominem esse nudum est de iure naturali, quia +natura non dedit ei vestitum, sed ars adinvenit. Et hoc modo +communis omnium possessio, et omnium una libertas, dicitur esse de +iure naturali, quia scilicet distinctio possessionum et servitus +non sunt inductae a natura, sed per hominum rationem, ad utilitatem +humanae vitae. Et sic in hoc lex naturae non est mutata nisi per +additionem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q94_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q94_A6-p0.1">Q. 94. A. 6. Whether the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the natural law can be abolished from the heart of man. Because on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q94_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.14" target="asv"> Rom. 2:14, </a> "When the Gentiles who have not the law," etc. a gloss says that "the law of righteousness, which sin had blotted out, is + graven on the heart of man when he is restored by grace." But the law of righteousness is the law of nature. Therefore the + law of nature can be blotted out. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37620" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37620] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex naturae possit a corde hominis +aboleri. Quia Rom. II, super illud, <i>cum gentes, quae legem non +habent,</i> etc., dicit Glossa quod <i>in interiori homine per +gratiam innovato, lex iustitiae inscribitur, quam deleverat +culpa</i>. Sed lex iustitiae est lex naturae. Ergo lex naturae +potest deleri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the law of grace is more efficacious than the law of nature. But the law of grace is blotted out by sin. Much more + therefore can the law of nature be blotted out. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37621" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37621] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +lex gratiae est efficacior quam lex naturae. Sed lex gratiae +deletur per culpam. Ergo multo magis lex naturae potest deleri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is established by law is made just. But many things are enacted by men, which are contrary to the law + of nature. Therefore the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37622" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37622] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +illud quod lege statuitur, inducitur quasi iustum. Sed multa sunt +ab hominibus statuta contra legem naturae. Ergo lex naturae potest +a cordibus hominum aboleri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. ii): "Thy law is written in the hearts of men, which iniquity itself effaces not." But the law which + is written in men's hearts is the natural law. Therefore the natural law cannot be blotted out. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 6 s. c."><a name="37623" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37623] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in II Confess., <i>lex tua scripta est +in cordibus hominum, quam nec ulla quidem delet iniquitas</i>. Sed +lex scripta in cordibus hominum est lex naturalis. Ergo lex +naturalis deleri non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q94_A4" id="FS_Q94_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[4]</a>,5), there belong to the natural law, first, certain most general precepts, that are known to all; and secondly, certain secondary + and more detailed precepts, which are, as it were, conclusions following closely from first principles. As to those general + principles, the natural law, in the abstract, can nowise be blotted out from men's hearts. But it is blotted out in the case + of a particular action, in so far + as reason is hindered from applying the general principle to a particular point of practice, on account of concupiscence or + some other passion, as stated above (Q[77], A[2]). But as to the other, i.e. the secondary precepts, the natural law can be + blotted out from the human heart, either by evil persuasions, just as in speculative matters errors occur in respect of necessary + conclusions; or by vicious customs and corrupt habits, as among some men, theft, and even unnatural vices, as the Apostle + states (Rom. i), were not esteemed sinful. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 6 co."><a name="37624" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37624] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad legem naturalem pertinent +primo quidem quaedam praecepta communissima, quae sunt omnibus +nota, quaedam autem secundaria praecepta magis propria, quae sunt +quasi conclusiones propinquae principiis. Quantum ergo ad illa +principia communia, lex naturalis nullo modo potest a cordibus +hominum deleri in universali. Deletur tamen in particulari +operabili, secundum quod ratio impeditur applicare commune +principium ad particulare operabile, propter concupiscentiam vel +aliquam aliam passionem, ut supra dictum est. Quantum vero ad alia +praecepta secundaria, potest lex naturalis deleri de cordibus +hominum, vel propter malas persuasiones, eo modo quo etiam in +speculativis errores contingunt circa conclusiones necessarias; vel +etiam propter pravas consuetudines et habitus corruptos; sicut apud +quosdam non reputabantur latrocinia peccata, vel etiam vitia contra +naturam, ut etiam apostolus dicit, ad Rom. I.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sin blots out the law of nature in particular cases, not universally, except perchance in regard to the secondary precepts + of the natural law, in the way stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="37625" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37625] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod culpa delet legem naturae in particulari, non +autem in universali, nisi forte quantum ad secunda praecepta legis +naturae, eo modo quo dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although grace is more efficacious than nature, yet nature is more essential to man, and therefore more enduring. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="37626" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37626] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod gratia etsi sit efficacior quam natura, tamen natura +essentialior est homini, et ideo magis permanens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q94_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument is true of the secondary precepts of the natural law, against which some legislators have framed certain enactments + which are unjust. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 94 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="37627" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37627] Iª-IIae q. 94 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de secundis praeceptis legis +naturae, contra quae aliqui legislatores statuta aliqua fecerunt, +quae sunt iniqua.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q95" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q95-p0.1">Q. 95. OF HUMAN LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q95-p2"> We must now consider human law; and (1) this law considered in itself; (2) its power; (3) its mutability. Under the first + head there are four points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q95-p3"><a href="#FS_Q95_A1"> (1) Its utility.</a></p><p id="FS_Q95-p4"><a href="#FS_Q95_A2"> (2) Its origin.</a></p><p id="FS_Q95-p5"><a href="#FS_Q95_A3"> (3) Its quality.</a></p><p id="FS_Q95-p6"><a href="#FS_Q95_A4"> (4) Its division.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 pr."><a name="37628" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37628] +Iª-IIae q. 95 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de lege +humana. Et primo quidem, de ipsa lege secundum se; secundo, de +potestate eius; tertio, de eius mutabilitate. Circa primum +quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, de utilitate ipsius. Secundo, de origine +eius. Tertio, de qualitate ipsius. Quarto, de divisione +eiusdem.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q95_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q95_A1-p0.1">Q. 95. A. 1. Whether it was useful for laws to be framed by men?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it was not useful for laws to be framed by men. Because the purpose of every law is that man be made good + thereby, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q92_A1" id="FS_Q95_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[92], A[1]</a>). But men are more to be induced to be good willingly by means of admonitions, than against their will, by means of laws. + Therefore there was no need to frame laws. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37629" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37629] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit utile aliquas leges poni ab +hominibus. Intentio enim cuiuslibet legis est ut per eam homines +fiant boni, sicut supra dictum est. Sed homines magis inducuntur ad +bonum voluntarii per monitiones, quam coacti per leges. Ergo non +fuit necessarium leges ponere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have recourse to a judge as to animate justice." But animate justice + is better than inanimate justice, which contained in laws. Therefore it would have been better for the execution of justice + to be entrusted to the decision of judges, than to frame laws in addition. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37630" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37630] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut dicit philosophus, in V Ethic., <i>ad iudicem confugiunt +homines sicut ad iustum animatum</i>. Sed iustitia animata est +melior quam inanimata, quae legibus continetur. Ergo melius fuisset +ut executio iustitiae committeretur arbitrio iudicum, quam quod +super hoc lex aliqua ederetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every law is framed for the direction of human actions, as is evident from what has been stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q95_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[90], AA[1]</a>,2). But since human actions are about singulars, which are infinite in number, matter pertaining to the direction of human + actions cannot be taken into sufficient consideration except by a wise man, who looks into each one of them. Therefore it + would have been better for human acts to be directed by the judgment + of wise men, than by the framing of laws. Therefore there was no need of human laws. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37631" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37631] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex omnis directiva est actuum humanorum, ut ex supradictis patet. +Sed cum humani actus consistant in singularibus, quae sunt +infinita, non possunt ea quae ad directionem humanorum actuum +pertinent, sufficienter considerari, nisi ab aliquo sapiente, qui +inspiciat singula. Ergo melius fuisset arbitrio sapientum dirigi +actus humanos, quam aliqua lege posita. Ergo non fuit necessarium +leges humanas ponere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (Etym. v, 20): "Laws were made that in fear thereof human audacity might be held in check, that innocence might + be safeguarded in the midst of wickedness, and that the dread of punishment might prevent the wicked from doing harm." But + these things are most necessary to mankind. Therefore it was necessary that human laws should be made. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37632" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37632] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., <i>factae sunt leges ut +earum metu humana coerceretur audacia, tutaque sit inter improbos +innocentia, et in ipsis improbis formidato supplicio refrenetur +nocendi facultas</i>. Sed haec sunt maxime necessaria humano +generi. Ergo necessarium fuit ponere leges humanas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q63_A1" id="FS_Q95_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[63], A[1]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q94_A3" id="FS_Q95_A1-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[94], A[3]</a>), man has a natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of virtue must be acquired by man by means of some kind of training. + Thus we observe that man is helped by industry in his necessities, for instance, in food and clothing. Certain beginnings + of these he has from nature, viz. his reason and his hands; but he has not the full complement, as other animals have, + to whom nature has given sufficiency of clothing and food. Now it is difficult to see how man could suffice for himself in + the matter of this training: since the perfection of virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing man from undue pleasures, to which + above all man is inclined, and especially the young, who are more capable of being trained. Consequently a man needs to receive + this training from another, whereby to arrive at the perfection of virtue. And as to those young people who are inclined + to acts of virtue, by their good natural disposition, or by custom, or rather by the gift of God, paternal training suffices, + which is by admonitions. But since some are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not easily amenable to words, it + was necessary for such to be restrained from evil by force and fear, in order that, at least, they might desist from evil-doing, + and leave others in peace, and that they themselves, by being habituated in this way, might be brought to do willingly + what hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous. Now this kind of training, which compels through fear of punishment, + is the discipline of laws. Therefore in order that man might have peace and virtue, it was necessary for laws to be framed: + for, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), "as man is the most noble of animals if he be perfect in virtue, so is he the + lowest of all, if he be severed from law and righteousness"; because man can use his reason to devise means of satisfying + his lusts and evil passions, which other animals are unable to do. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 1 co."><a name="37633" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37633] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, homini naturaliter inest +quaedam aptitudo ad virtutem; sed ipsa virtutis perfectio necesse +est quod homini adveniat per aliquam disciplinam. Sicut etiam +videmus quod per aliquam industriam subvenitur homini in suis +necessitatibus, puta in cibo et vestitu, quorum initia quaedam +habet a natura, scilicet rationem et manus, non autem ipsum +complementum, sicut cetera animalia, quibus natura dedit +sufficienter tegumentum et cibum. Ad hanc autem disciplinam non de +facili invenitur homo sibi sufficiens. Quia perfectio virtutis +praecipue consistit in retrahendo hominem ab indebitis +delectationibus, ad quas praecipue homines sunt proni, et maxime +iuvenes, circa quos efficacior est disciplina. Et ideo oportet quod +huiusmodi disciplinam, per quam ad virtutem perveniatur, homines ab +alio sortiantur. Et quidem quantum ad illos iuvenes qui sunt proni +ad actus virtutum, ex bona dispositione naturae, vel consuetudine, +vel magis divino munere, sufficit disciplina paterna, quae est per +monitiones. Sed quia inveniuntur quidam protervi et ad vitia proni, +qui verbis de facili moveri non possunt; necessarium fuit ut per +vim et metum cohiberentur a malo, ut saltem sic male facere +desistentes, et aliis quietam vitam redderent, et ipsi tandem per +huiusmodi assuetudinem ad hoc perducerentur quod voluntarie +facerent quae prius metu implebant, et sic fierent virtuosi. +Huiusmodi autem disciplina cogens metu poenae, est disciplina +legum. Unde necessarium fuit ad pacem hominum et virtutem, ut leges +ponerentur, quia sicut philosophus dicit, in I Polit., <i>sicut +homo, si sit perfectus virtute, est optimum animalium; sic, si sit +separatus a lege et iustitia, est pessimum omnium</i>; quia homo +habet arma rationis ad explendas concupiscentias et saevitias, quae +non habent alia animalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Men who are well disposed are led willingly to virtue by being admonished better than by coercion: but men who are evilly + disposed are not led to virtue unless they are compelled. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37634" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37634] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod homines bene dispositi melius inducuntur ad +virtutem monitionibus voluntariis quam coactione, sed quidam male +dispositi non ducuntur ad virtutem nisi cogantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q95_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 1), "it is better that all things be regulated by law, than left to be decided by judges": + and this for three reasons. First, because it is easier to find a few wise men competent to frame right laws, than to find + the many who would be necessary to judge aright of each single case. Secondly, because those who make laws consider long beforehand + what laws to make; whereas judgment on each single case has to be + pronounced as soon as it arises: and it is easier for man to see what is right, by taking many instances into consideration, + than by considering one solitary fact. Thirdly, because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of future events; whereas those + who sit in judgment of things present, towards which they are affected by love, hatred, or some kind of cupidity; wherefore + their judgment is perverted. + </p><p id="FS_Q95_A1-p9"> Since then the animated justice of the judge is not found in every man, and since it can be deflected, therefore it was necessary, + whenever possible, for the law to determine how to judge, and for very few matters to be left to the decision of men. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37635" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37635] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, I Rhetor., <i>melius est +omnia ordinari lege, quam dimittere iudicum arbitrio</i>. Et hoc +propter tria. Primo quidem, quia facilius est invenire paucos +sapientes, qui sufficiant ad rectas leges ponendas, quam multos, +qui requirerentur ad recte iudicandum de singulis. Secundo, quia +illi qui leges ponunt, ex multo tempore considerant quid lege +ferendum sit, sed iudicia de singularibus factis fiunt ex casibus +subito exortis. Facilius autem ex multis consideratis potest homo +videre quid rectum sit, quam solum ex aliquo uno facto. Tertio, +quia legislatores iudicant in universali, et de futuris, sed +homines iudiciis praesidentes iudicant de praesentibus, ad quae +afficiuntur amore vel odio, aut aliqua cupiditate; et sic eorum +depravatur iudicium. Quia ergo iustitia animata iudicis non +invenitur in multis; et quia flexibilis est; ideo necessarium fuit, +in quibuscumque est possibile, legem determinare quid iudicandum +sit, et paucissima arbitrio hominum committere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certain individual facts which cannot be covered by the law "have necessarily to be committed to judges," as the Philosopher + says in the same passage: for instance, "concerning something that has happened or not happened," and the like. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37636" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37636] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod quaedam singularia, quae non possunt lege +comprehendi, necesse est committere iudicibus, ut ibidem +philosophus dicit, puta de eo quod est factum esse vel non esse, et +de aliis huiusmodi.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q95_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q95_A2-p0.1">Q. 95. A. 2. Whether every human law is derived from the natural law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not every human law is derived from the natural law. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the + legal just is that which originally was a matter of indifference." But those things which arise from the natural law are not + matters of indifference. Therefore the enactments of human laws are not derived from the natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37637" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37637] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnis lex humanitus posita a lege +naturali derivetur. Dicit enim philosophus, in V Ethic., quod +<i>iustum legale est quod ex principio quidem nihil differt utrum +sic vel aliter fiat</i>. Sed in his quae oriuntur ex lege naturali, +differt utrum sic vel aliter fiat. Ergo ea quae sunt legibus +humanis statuta, non omnia derivantur a lege naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, positive law is contrasted with natural law, as stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4) and the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7). + But those things which flow as conclusions from the general principles of the natural law belong to the natural law, as stated + above ( + <a href="#FS_Q94_A4" id="FS_Q95_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[94], A[4]</a>). Therefore that which is established by human law does not belong to the natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37638" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37638] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ius positivum dividitur contra ius naturale, ut patet per Isidorum, +in libro Etymol., et per philosophum, in V Ethic. Sed ea quae +derivantur a principiis communibus legis naturae sicut +conclusiones, pertinent ad legem naturae, ut supra dictum est. Ergo +ea quae sunt de lege humana, non derivantur a lege naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the law of nature is the same for all; since the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the natural just is that which + is equally valid everywhere." If therefore human laws were derived from the natural law, it would follow that they too are + the same for all: which is clearly false. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37639" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37639] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex naturae est eadem apud omnes, dicit enim philosophus, in V +Ethic., quod <i>naturale iustum est quod ubique habet eandem +potentiam</i>. Si igitur leges humanae a naturali lege +derivarentur, sequeretur quod etiam ipsae essent eaedem apud omnes. +Quod patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is possible to give a reason for things which are derived from the natural law. But "it is not possible to give + the reason for all the legal enactments of the lawgivers," as the jurist says [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff, tit. iii, v; + De Leg. et Senat.]. Therefore not all human laws are derived from the natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="37640" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37640] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +eorum quae a lege naturali derivantur, potest aliqua ratio +assignari. Sed non omnium quae a maioribus lege statuta sunt, ratio +reddi potest, ut iurisperitus dicit. Ergo non omnes leges humanae +derivantur a lege naturali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully says (Rhet. ii): "Things which emanated from nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence + for the laws." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37641" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37641] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Tullius dicit, in sua Rhetor., <i>res a natura profectas, +et a consuetudine probatas, legum metus et religio sanxit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q95_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) "that which is not just seems to be no law at all": wherefore the force of a law depends + on the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is said to be just, from being right, according to the rule of + reason. But the first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has been stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q91_A2" id="FS_Q95_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[91], A[2]</a>, ad 2). Consequently every human law has just so much of the nature of + law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law + but a perversion of law. + </p><p id="FS_Q95_A2-p8"> But it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural law in two ways: first, as a conclusion from premises, + secondly, by way of determination of certain generalities. The first way is like to that by which, in sciences, demonstrated + conclusions are drawn from the principles: while the second mode is likened to that whereby, in the arts, general forms are + particularized as to details: thus the craftsman needs to determine the general form of a house to some + particular shape. Some things are therefore derived from the general principles of the natural law, by way of conclusions; + e.g. that "one must not kill" may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that "one should do harm to no man": while + some are derived therefrom by way of determination; e.g. the law of nature has it that the evil-doer should be punished; but + that he be punished in this or that way, is a determination of the law of nature. + </p><p id="FS_Q95_A2-p9"> Accordingly both modes of derivation are found in the human law. But those things which are derived in the first way, are + contained in human law not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but have some force from the natural law also. But those things + which are derived in the second way, have no other force than that of human law. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 2 co."><a name="37642" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37642] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb., <i>non +videtur esse lex, quae iusta non fuerit</i>. Unde inquantum habet +de iustitia, intantum habet de virtute legis. In rebus autem +humanis dicitur esse aliquid iustum ex eo quod est rectum secundum +regulam rationis. Rationis autem prima regula est lex naturae, ut +ex supradictis patet. Unde omnis lex humanitus posita intantum +habet de ratione legis, inquantum a lege naturae derivatur. Si vero +in aliquo, a lege naturali discordet, iam non erit lex sed legis +corruptio. Sed sciendum est quod a lege naturali dupliciter potest +aliquid derivari, uno modo, sicut conclusiones ex principiis; alio +modo, sicut determinationes quaedam aliquorum communium. Primus +quidem modus est similis ei quo in scientiis ex principiis +conclusiones demonstrativae producuntur. Secundo vero modo simile +est quod in artibus formae communes determinantur ad aliquid +speciale, sicut artifex formam communem domus necesse est quod +determinet ad hanc vel illam domus figuram. Derivantur ergo quaedam +a principiis communibus legis naturae per modum conclusionum, sicut +hoc quod est non esse occidendum, ut conclusio quaedam derivari +potest ab eo quod est nulli esse malum faciendum. Quaedam vero per +modum determinationis, sicut lex naturae habet quod ille qui +peccat, puniatur; sed quod tali poena puniatur, hoc est quaedam +determinatio legis naturae. Utraque igitur inveniuntur in lege +humana posita. Sed ea quae sunt primi modi, continentur lege humana +non tanquam sint solum lege posita, sed habent etiam aliquid +vigoris ex lege naturali. Sed ea quae sunt secundi modi, ex sola +lege humana vigorem habent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking of those enactments which are by way of determination or specification of the precepts of the + natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37643" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37643] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de illis quae sunt lege +posita per determinationem vel specificationem quandam praeceptorum +legis naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument avails for those things that are derived from the natural law, by way of conclusions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37644" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37644] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de his quae derivantur a lege +naturae tanquam conclusiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The general principles of the natural law cannot be applied to all men in the same way on account of the great variety of + human affairs: and hence arises the diversity of positive laws among various people. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37645" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37645] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod principia communia legis naturae non possunt eodem +modo applicari omnibus, propter multam varietatem rerum humanarum. +Et exinde provenit diversitas legis positivae apud diversos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q95_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> These words of the Jurist are to be understood as referring to decisions of rulers in determining particular points of the + natural law: on which determinations the judgment of expert and prudent men is based as on its principles; in so far, to wit, + as they see at once what is the best thing to decide. + </p><p id="FS_Q95_A2-p14"> Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11) that in such matters, "we ought to pay as much attention to the undemonstrated + sayings and opinions of persons who surpass us in experience, age and prudence, as to their demonstrations." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="37646" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37646] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod verbum illud iurisperiti intelligendum est in his +quae sunt introducta a maioribus circa particulares determinationes +legis naturalis; ad quas quidem determinationes se habet expertorum +et prudentum iudicium sicut ad quaedam principia; inquantum +scilicet statim vident quid congruentius sit particulariter +determinari. Unde philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod <i>in +talibus oportet attendere expertorum et seniorum vel prudentum +indemonstrabilibus enuntiationibus et opinionibus, non minus quam +demonstrationibus</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q95_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q95_A3-p0.1">Q. 95. A. 3. Whether Isidore's description of the quality of positive law is appropriate?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Isidore's description of the quality of positive law is not appropriate, when he says (Etym. v, 21): "Law + shall be virtuous, just, possible to nature, according to the custom of the country, suitable to place and time, necessary, + useful; clearly expressed, lest by its obscurity it lead to misunderstanding; framed for no private benefit, but for the common + good." Because he had previously expressed the quality of law in three conditions, + saying that "law is anything founded on reason, provided that it foster religion, be helpful to discipline, and further the + common weal." Therefore it was needless to add any further conditions to these. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37647" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37647] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod Isidorus inconvenienter qualitatem +legis positivae describat, dicens, <i>erit lex honesta, iusta, +possibilis secundum naturam, secundum consuetudinem patriae, loco +temporique conveniens, necessaria, utilis; manifesta quoque, ne +aliquid per obscuritatem in captionem contineat; nullo privato +commodo, sed pro communi utilitate civium scripta</i>. Supra enim +in tribus conditionibus qualitatem legis explicaverat, dicens, +<i>lex erit omne quod ratione constiterit, dumtaxat quod religioni +congruat, quod disciplinae conveniat, quod saluti proficiat</i>. +Ergo superflue postmodum conditiones legis multiplicat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Justice is included in honesty, as Tully says (De Offic. vii). Therefore after saying "honest" it was superfluous + to add "just." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37648" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37648] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +iustitia pars est honestatis; ut Tullius dicit, in I de Offic. Ergo +postquam dixerat honesta, superflue additur iusta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, written law is condivided with custom, according to Isidore (Etym. ii, 10). Therefore it should not be stated in + the definition of law that it is "according to the custom of the country." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37649" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37649] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex scripta, secundum Isidorum, contra consuetudinem dividitur. Non +ergo debuit in definitione legis poni quod esset secundum +consuetudinem patriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a thing may be necessary in two ways. It may be necessary simply, because it cannot be otherwise: and that which + is necessary in this way, is not subject to human judgment, wherefore human law is not concerned with necessity of this kind. + Again a thing may be necessary for an end: and this necessity is the same as usefulness. Therefore it is superfluous to say + both "necessary" and "useful." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="37650" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37650] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +necessarium dupliciter dicitur. Scilicet id quod est necessarium +simpliciter, quod impossibile est aliter se habere, et huiusmodi +necessarium non subiacet humano iudicio, unde talis necessitas ad +legem humanam non pertinet. Est etiam aliquid necessarium propter +finem, et talis necessitas idem est quod utilitas. Ergo superflue +utrumque ponitur, necessaria et utilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Isidore. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37651" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37651] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est auctoritas ipsius Isidori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q95_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Whenever a thing is for an end, its form must be determined proportionately to that end; as the form of a saw is such as + to be suitable for cutting (Phys. ii, text. 88). Again, everything that is ruled and measured must have a form proportionate + to its rule and measure. Now both these conditions are verified of human law: since it is both something ordained to an end; + and is a rule or measure ruled or measured by a higher measure. And this higher measure is + twofold, viz. the Divine law and the natural law, as explained above + <a href="#FS_Q95_A2" id="FS_Q95_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2];</a> Q[93], A[3] ). Now the end of human law is to be useful to man, as the jurist states [*Pandect. Justin. lib. xxv, ff., tit. + iii; De Leg. et Senat.]. Wherefore Isidore in determining the nature of law, lays down, at first, three conditions; viz. that + it "foster religion," inasmuch as it is proportionate to the Divine law; that it be "helpful to discipline," inasmuch as it + is proportionate to the + nature law; and that it "further the common weal," inasmuch as it is proportionate to the utility of mankind. + </p><p id="FS_Q95_A3-p8"> All the other conditions mentioned by him are reduced to these three. For it is called virtuous because it fosters religion. + And when he goes on to say that it should be "just, possible to nature, according to the customs of the country, adapted to + place and time," he implies that it should be helpful to discipline. For human discipline depends on first on the order of + reason, to which he refers by saying "just": secondly, it depends on the ability of the agent; because + discipline should be adapted to each one according to his ability, taking also into account the ability of nature (for the + same burdens should be not laid on children as adults); and should be according to human customs; since man cannot live alone + in society, paying no heed to others: thirdly, it depends on certain circumstances, in respect of which he says, "adapted + to place and time." The remaining words, "necessary, useful," etc. mean that law should further the common weal: so that + "necessity" refers to the removal of evils; "usefulness" to the attainment of good; "clearness of expression," to the need + of preventing any harm ensuing from the law itself. And since, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q95_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[2]</a>), law is ordained to the common good, this is expressed in the last part of the description. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 3 co."><a name="37652" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37652] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod uniuscuiusque rei quae est propter finem, necesse est +quod forma determinetur secundum proportionem ad finem; sicut forma +serrae talis est qualis convenit sectioni; ut patet in II Physic. +Quaelibet etiam res recta et mensurata oportet quod habeat formam +proportionalem suae regulae et mensurae. Lex autem humana utrumque +habet, quia et est aliquid ordinatum ad finem; et est quaedam +regula vel mensura regulata vel mensurata quadam superiori mensura; +quae quidem est duplex, scilicet lex divina et lex naturae, ut ex +supradictis patet. Finis autem humanae legis est utilitas hominum; +sicut etiam iurisperitus dicit. Et ideo Isidorus in conditione +legis, primo quidem tria posuit, scilicet quod religioni congruat, +inquantum scilicet est proportionata legi divinae; quod disciplinae +conveniat, inquantum est proportionata legi naturae; quod saluti +proficiat, inquantum est proportionata utilitati humanae. Et ad +haec tria omnes aliae conditiones quas postea ponit, reducuntur. +Nam quod dicitur honesta, refertur ad hoc quod religioni congruat. +Quod autem subditur, <i>iusta, possibilis secundum naturam, +secundum consuetudinem patriae, loco temporique conveniens</i>, +additur ad hoc quod conveniat disciplinae. Attenditur enim humana +disciplina primum quidem quantum ad ordinem rationis, qui +importatur in hoc quod dicitur iusta. Secundo, quantum ad +facultatem agentium. Debet enim esse disciplina conveniens +unicuique secundum suam possibilitatem, observata etiam +possibilitate naturae (non enim eadem sunt imponenda pueris, quae +imponuntur viris perfectis); et secundum humanam consuetudinem; non +enim potest homo solus in societate vivere, aliis morem non gerens. +Tertio, quantum ad debitas circumstantias, dicit, loco temporique +conveniens. Quod vero subditur, necessaria, utilis, etc., refertur +ad hoc quod expediat saluti, ut necessitas referatur ad remotionem +malorum; utilitas, ad consecutionem bonorum; manifestatio vero, ad +cavendum nocumentum quod ex ipsa lege posset provenire. Et quia, +sicut supra dictum est, lex ordinatur ad bonum commune, hoc ipsum +in ultima parte determinationis ostenditur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objections:</b> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 3 ad arg."><a name="37653" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37653] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 3 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q95_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q95_A4-p0.1">Q. 95. A. 4. Whether Isidore's division of human laws is appropriate?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Isidore wrongly divided human statutes or human law (Etym. v, 4, seqq.). For under this law he includes + the "law of nations," so called, because, as he says, "nearly all nations use it." But as he says, "natural law is that which + is common to all nations." Therefore the law of nations is not contained under positive human law, but rather under natural + law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37654" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37654] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter Isidorus divisionem +legum humanarum ponat, sive iuris humani. Sub hoc enim iure +comprehendit ius gentium, quod ideo sic nominatur, ut ipse dicit, +quia eo omnes fere gentes utuntur. Sed sicut ipse dicit, <i>ius +naturale est quod est commune omnium nationum</i>. Ergo ius gentium +non continetur sub iure positivo humano, sed magis sub iure +naturali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those laws which have the same force, seem to differ not formally but only materially. But "statutes, decrees of + the commonalty, senatorial decrees," and the like which he mentions (Etym. v, 9), all have the same force. Therefore they + do not differ, except materially. But art takes no notice of such a distinction: since it may go on to infinity. Therefore + this division of human laws is not appropriate. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37655" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37655] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae habent eandem vim, non videntur formaliter differre, sed +solum materialiter. Sed leges, plebiscita, senatusconsulta, et alia +huiusmodi quae ponit, omnia habent eandem vim. Ergo videtur quod +non differant nisi materialiter. Sed talis distinctio in arte non +est curanda, cum possit esse in infinitum. Ergo inconvenienter +huiusmodi divisio humanarum legum introducitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as, in the state, there are princes, priests and soldiers, so are there other human offices. Therefore it seems + that, as this division includes "military law," and "public law," referring to priests and magistrates; so also it should + include other laws pertaining to other offices of the state. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37656" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37656] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut in civitate sunt principes et sacerdotes et milites, ita +etiam sunt et alia hominum officia. Ergo videtur quod, sicut +ponitur quoddam ius militare, et ius publicum, quod consistit in +sacerdotibus et magistratibus; ita etiam debeant poni alia iura, ad +alia officia civitatis pertinentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, those things that are accidental should be passed over. But it is accidental to law that it be framed by this or + that man. Therefore it is unreasonable to divide laws according to the names of lawgivers, so that one be called the "Cornelian" + law, another the "Falcidian" law, etc. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="37657" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37657] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae sunt per accidens, sunt praetermittenda. Sed accidit legi +ut ab hoc vel illo homine feratur. Ergo inconvenienter ponitur +divisio legum humanarum ex nominibus legislatorum, ut scilicet +quaedam dicatur Cornelia, quaedam Falcidia, et cetera.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The authority of Isidore (OBJ[1]) suffices. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37658" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37658] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> In +contrarium auctoritas Isidori sufficiat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q95_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing can of itself be divided in respect of something contained in the notion of that thing. Thus a soul either rational + or irrational is contained in the notion of animal: and therefore animal is divided properly and of itself in respect of its + being rational or irrational; but not in the point of its being white or black, which are entirely beside the notion of animal. + Now, in the notion of human law, many things are contained, in respect of any of + which human law can be divided properly and of itself. For in the first place it belongs to the notion of human law, to be + derived from the law of nature, as explained above + <a href="#FS_Q95_A2" id="FS_Q95_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. In this respect positive law is divided into the "law of nations" and "civil law," according to the two ways in which something + may be derived from the law of nature, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q95_A2" id="FS_Q95_A4-p7.2" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Because, to the law of nations belong those things which are derived from + the law of nature, as conclusions from premises, e.g. just buyings and sellings, and the like, without which men cannot live + together, which is a point of the law of nature, since man is by nature a social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2. But + those things which are derived from the law of nature by way of particular determination, belong to the civil law, according + as each state decides on what is best for itself. + </p><p id="FS_Q95_A4-p8"> Secondly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be ordained to the common good of the state. In this respect human law + may be divided according to the different kinds of men who work in a special way for the common good: e.g. priests, by praying + to God for the people; princes, by governing the people; soldiers, by fighting for the safety of the people. Wherefore certain + special kinds of law are adapted to these men. + </p><p id="FS_Q95_A4-p9"> Thirdly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be framed by that one who governs the community of the state, as shown + above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A3" id="FS_Q95_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[3]</a>). In this respect, there are various human laws according to the various forms of government. Of these, according to the + Philosopher (Polit. iii, 10) one is "monarchy," i.e. when the state is governed by one; and then we have "Royal Ordinances." + Another form is "aristocracy," i.e. government by the best men or men + of highest rank; and then we have the "Authoritative legal opinions" [Responsa Prudentum] and "Decrees of the Senate" [Senatus + consulta]. Another form is "oligarchy," i.e. government by a few rich and powerful men; and then we have "Praetorian," also + called "Honorary," law. Another form of government is that of the people, which is called "democracy," and there we have "Decrees + of the commonalty" [Plebiscita]. There is also tyrannical government, which is altogether corrupt, which, therefore, + has no corresponding law. Finally, there is a form of government made up of all these, and which is the best: and in this + respect we have law sanctioned by the "Lords and Commons," as stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4, seqq.). + </p><p id="FS_Q95_A4-p10"> Fourthly, it belongs to the notion of human law to direct human actions. In this respect, according to the various matters + of which the law treats, there are various kinds of laws, which are sometimes named after their authors: thus we have the + "Lex Julia" about adultery, the "Lex Cornelia" concerning assassins, and so on, differentiated in this way, not on account + of the authors, but on account of the matters to which they refer. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 4 co."><a name="37659" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37659] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod unumquodque potest per se dividi secundum id quod in +eius ratione continetur. Sicut in ratione animalis continetur +anima, quae est rationalis vel irrationalis, et ideo animal proprie +et per se dividitur secundum rationale et irrationale; non autem +secundum album et nigrum, quae sunt omnino praeter rationem eius. +Sunt autem multa de ratione legis humanae, secundum quorum +quodlibet lex humana proprie et per se dividi potest. Est enim +primo de ratione legis humanae quod sit derivata a lege naturae, ut +ex dictis patet. Et secundum hoc dividitur ius positivum in ius +gentium et ius civile, secundum duos modos quibus aliquid derivatur +a lege naturae, ut supra dictum est. Nam ad ius gentium pertinent +ea quae derivantur ex lege naturae sicut conclusiones ex +principiis, ut iustae emptiones, venditiones, et alia huiusmodi, +sine quibus homines ad invicem convivere non possent; quod est de +lege naturae, quia homo est naturaliter animal sociale, ut probatur +in I Polit. Quae vero derivantur a lege naturae per modum +particularis determinationis, pertinent ad ius civile, secundum +quod quaelibet civitas aliquid sibi accommodum determinat. Secundo +est de ratione legis humanae quod ordinetur ad bonum commune +civitatis. Et secundum hoc lex humana dividi potest secundum +diversitatem eorum qui specialiter dant operam ad bonum commune, +sicut sacerdotes, pro populo Deum orantes; principes, populum +gubernantes; et milites, pro salute populi pugnantes. Et ideo istis +hominibus specialia quaedam iura aptantur. Tertio est de ratione +legis humanae ut instituatur a gubernante communitatem civitatis, +sicut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc distinguuntur leges humanae +secundum diversa regimina civitatum. Quorum unum, secundum +philosophum, in III Polit., est regnum, quando scilicet civitas +gubernatur ab uno, et secundum hoc accipiuntur constitutiones +principum. Aliud vero regimen est aristocratia, idest principatus +optimorum, vel optimatum, et secundum hoc sumuntur responsa +prudentum, et etiam senatusconsulta. Aliud regimen est oligarchia, +idest principatus paucorum divitum et potentum, et secundum hoc +sumitur ius praetorium, quod etiam honorarium dicitur. Aliud autem +regimen est populi, quod nominatur democratia, et secundum hoc +sumuntur plebiscita. Aliud autem est tyrannicum, quod est omnino +corruptum, unde ex hoc non sumitur aliqua lex. Est etiam aliquod +regimen ex istis commixtum, quod est optimum, et secundum hoc +sumitur lex, <i>quam maiores natu simul cum plebibus sanxerunt</i>, +ut Isidorus dicit. Quarto vero de ratione legis humanae est quod +sit directiva humanorum actuum. Et secundum hoc, secundum diversa +de quibus leges feruntur, distinguuntur leges, quae interdum ab +auctoribus nominantur, sicut distinguitur lex Iulia de adulteriis, +lex Cornelia de sicariis, et sic de aliis, non propter auctores, +sed propter res de quibus sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The law of nations is indeed, in some way, natural to man, in so far as he is a reasonable being, because it is derived from + the natural law by way of a conclusion that is not very remote from its premises. Wherefore men easily agreed thereto. Nevertheless + it is distinct from the natural law, especially it is distinct from the natural law which is common to all animals. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37660" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37660] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ius gentium est quidem aliquo modo naturale +homini, secundum quod est rationalis, inquantum derivatur a lege +naturali per modum conclusionis quae non est multum remota a +principiis. Unde de facili in huiusmodi homines consenserunt. +Distinguitur tamen a lege naturali, maxime ab eo quod est omnibus +animalibus communis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q95_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objections 2--4:</b> The Replies to the other Objections are evident from what has been said.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 95 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37661" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37661] Iª-IIae q. 95 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad alia patet +responsio ex his quae dicta sunt.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q96" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q96-p0.1">Q. 96. OF THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q96-p2"> We must now consider the power of human law. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q96-p3"><a href="#FS_Q96_A1"> (1) Whether human law should be framed for the community?</a></p><p id="FS_Q96-p4"><a href="#FS_Q96_A2"> (2) Whether human law should repress all vices?</a></p><p id="FS_Q96-p5"><a href="#FS_Q96_A3"> (3) Whether human law is competent to direct all acts of virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q96-p6"><a href="#FS_Q96_A4"> (4) Whether it binds man in conscience?</a></p><p id="FS_Q96-p7"><a href="#FS_Q96_A5"> (5) Whether all men are subject to human law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q96-p8"><a href="#FS_Q96_A6"> (6) Whether those who are under the law may act beside the letter of the law?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 pr."><a name="37662" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37662] +Iª-IIae q. 96 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +potestate legis humanae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum +lex humana debeat poni in communi. Secundo, utrum lex humana debeat +omnia vitia cohibere. Tertio, utrum omnium virtutum actus habeat +ordinare. Quarto, utrum imponat homini necessitatem quantum ad +forum conscientiae. Quinto, utrum omnes homines legi humanae +subdantur. Sexto, utrum his qui sunt sub lege, liceat agere praeter +verba legis.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q96_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q96_A1-p0.1">Q. 96. A. 1. Whether human law should be framed for the community rather than for the individual?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human law should be framed not for the community, but rather for the individual. For the Philosopher says + (Ethic. v, 7) that "the legal just . . . includes all particular acts of legislation . . . and all those matters which are + the subject of decrees," which are also individual matters, since decrees are framed about individual actions. Therefore law + is framed not only for the community, but also for the individual. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37663" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37663] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex humana non debeat poni in communi, +sed magis in particulari. Dicit enim philosophus, in V Ethic., quod +<i>legalia sunt quaecumque in singularibus lege ponunt; et etiam +sententialia</i>, quae sunt etiam singularia, quia de singularibus +actibus sententiae feruntur. Ergo lex non solum ponitur in communi, +sed etiam in singulari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, law is the director of human acts, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q96_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[90], AA[1]</a>,2). But human acts are about individual matters. Therefore human laws should be framed, not for the community, but rather + for the individual. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37664" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37664] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +lex est directiva humanorum actuum, ut supra dictum est. Sed humani +actus in singularibus consistunt. Ergo leges humanae non debent in +universali ferri, sed magis in singulari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, law is a rule and measure of human acts, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q96_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[90], AA[1]</a>,2). But a measure should be most certain, as stated in Metaph. x. Since therefore in human acts no general proposition can + be so certain as not to fail in some individual cases, it seems that laws should be framed not in general but for individual + cases. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37665" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37665] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex est regula et mensura humanorum actuum, ut supra dictum est. +Sed mensura debet esse certissima, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Cum +ergo in actibus humanis non possit esse aliquod universale certum, +quin in particularibus deficiat; videtur quod necesse sit leges non +in universali, sed in singulari poni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The jurist says (Pandect. Justin. lib. i, tit. iii, art. ii; De legibus, etc.) that "laws should be made to suit the majority + of instances; and they are not framed according to what may possibly happen in an individual case." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37666" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37666] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod iurisperitus dicit, quod <i>iura constitui oportet in his +quae saepius accidunt, ex his autem quae forte uno casu accidere +possunt, iura non constituuntur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Whatever is for an end should be proportionate to that end. Now the end of law is the common good; because, as Isidore says + (Etym. v, 21) that "law should be framed, not for any private benefit, but for the common good of all the citizens." Hence + human laws should be proportionate to the common good. Now the common good comprises many things. Wherefore law should take + account of many things, as to persons, as to matters, and as to times. Because the + community of the state is composed of many persons; and its good is procured by many actions; nor is it established to endure + for only a short time, but to last for all time by the citizens succeeding one another, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, + 21; xxii, 6). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 1 co."><a name="37667" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37667] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod unumquodque quod est propter finem, necesse est quod +sit fini proportionatum. Finis autem legis est bonum commune, quia, +ut Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., <i>nullo privato commodo, sed +pro communi utilitate civium lex debet esse conscripta</i>. Unde +oportet leges humanas esse proportionatas ad bonum commune. Bonum +autem commune constat ex multis. Et ideo oportet quod lex ad multa +respiciat, et secundum personas, et secundum negotia, et secundum +tempora. Constituitur enim communitas civitatis ex multis personis; +et eius bonum per multiplices actiones procuratur; nec ad hoc solum +instituitur quod aliquo modico tempore duret, sed quod omni tempore +perseveret per civium successionem, ut Augustinus dicit, in XXII de +Civ. Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7) divides the legal just, i.e. positive law, into three parts. For some things are laid down + simply in a general way: and these are the general laws. Of these he says that "the legal is that which originally was a matter + of indifference, but which, when enacted, is so no longer": as the fixing of the ransom of a captive. Some things affect the + community in one respect, and individuals in another. These are called + "privileges," i.e. "private laws," as it were, because they regard private persons, although their power extends to many matters; + and in regard to these, he adds, "and further, all particular acts of legislation." Other matters are legal, not through being + laws, but through being applications of general laws to particular cases: such are decrees which have the force of law; and + in regard to these, he adds "all matters subject to decrees." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37668" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37668] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod philosophus in V Ethic. ponit tres partes iusti +legalis, quod est ius positivum. Sunt enim quaedam quae simpliciter +in communi ponuntur. Et haec sunt leges communes. Et quantum ad +huiusmodi, dicit quod <i>legale est quod ex principio quidem nihil +differt sic vel aliter, quando autem ponitur, differt</i>, puta +quod captivi statuto pretio redimantur. Quaedam vero sunt quae sunt +communia quantum ad aliquid, et singularia quantum ad aliquid. Et +huiusmodi dicuntur privilegia, quasi leges privatae, quia +respiciunt singulares personas, et tamen potestas eorum extenditur +ad multa negotia. Et quantum ad hoc, subdit, <i>adhuc quaecumque in +singularibus lege ponunt</i>. Dicuntur etiam quaedam legalia, non +quia sint leges, sed propter applicationem legum communium ad +aliqua particularia facta; sicut sunt sententiae, quae pro iure +habentur. Et quantum ad hoc, subdit, et sententialia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A principle of direction should be applicable to many; wherefore (Metaph. x, text. 4) the Philosopher says that all things + belonging to one genus, are measured by one, which is the principle in that genus. For if there were as many rules or measures + as there are things measured or ruled, they would cease to be of use, since their use consists in being applicable to many + things. Hence law would be of no use, if it did not extend further than to one + single act. Because the decrees than to one single act. Because the decrees of prudent men are made for the purpose of directing + individual actions; whereas law is a general precept, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q92_A2" id="FS_Q96_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[92], A[2]</a>, OBJ[2]). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37669" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37669] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illud quod est directivum, oportet esse plurium +directivum, unde in X Metaphys., philosophus dicit quod omnia quae +sunt unius generis, mensurantur aliquo uno, quod est primum in +genere illo. Si enim essent tot regulae vel mensurae quot sunt +mensurata vel regulata, cessaret utilitas regulae vel mensurae, +quae est ut ex uno multa possint cognosci. Et ita nulla esset +utilitas legis, si non se extenderet nisi ad unum singularem actum. +Ad singulares enim actus dirigendos dantur singularia praecepta +prudentium, sed lex est praeceptum commune, ut supra dictum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "We must not seek the same degree of certainty in all things" (Ethic. i, 3). Consequently in contingent matters, such as + natural and human things, it is enough for a thing to be certain, as being true in the greater number of instances, though + at times and less frequently it fail. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37670] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod non est eadem certitudo quaerenda in omnibus, ut in I +Ethic. dicitur. Unde in rebus contingentibus, sicut sunt naturalia +et res humanae, sufficit talis certitudo ut aliquid sit verum ut in +pluribus, licet interdum deficiat in paucioribus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q96_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q96_A2-p0.1">Q. 96. A. 2. Whether it belongs to the human law to repress all vices?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it belongs to human law to repress all vices. For Isidore says (Etym. v, 20) that "laws were made in order + that, in fear thereof, man's audacity might be held in check." But it would not be held in check sufficiently, unless all + evils were repressed by law. Therefore human laws should repress all evils. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37671" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37671] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad legem humanam pertineat omnia vitia +cohibere. Dicit enim Isidorus, in libro Etymol., quod <i>leges sunt +factae ut earum metu coerceatur audacia</i>. Non autem sufficienter +coerceretur, nisi quaelibet mala cohiberentur per legem. Ergo lex +humana debet quaelibet mala cohibere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the intention of the lawgiver is to make the citizens virtuous. But a man cannot be virtuous unless he forbear from + all kinds of vice. Therefore it belongs to human law to repress all vices. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37672" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37672] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +intentio legislatoris est cives facere virtuosos. Sed non potest +esse aliquis virtuosus, nisi ab omnibus vitiis compescatur. Ergo ad +legem humanam pertinet omnia vitia compescere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, human law is derived from the natural law, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q95_A2" id="FS_Q96_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[95], A[2]</a>). But all vices are contrary to the law of nature. Therefore human law should repress all vices. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37673" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37673] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex humana a lege naturali derivatur, ut supra dictum est. Sed +omnia vitia repugnant legi naturae. Ergo lex humana omnia vitia +debet cohibere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> We read in De Lib. Arb. i, 5: "It seems to me that the law which is written for the governing of the people rightly permits + these things, and that Divine providence punishes them." But Divine providence punishes nothing but vices. Therefore human + law rightly allows some vices, by not repressing them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37674" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37674] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur in I de Lib. Arb., <i>videtur mihi legem istam +quae populo regendo scribitur, recte ista permittere, et divinam +providentiam vindicare</i>. Sed divina providentia non vindicat +nisi vitia. Ergo recte lex humana permittit aliqua vitia, non +cohibendo ipsa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q96_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q96_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[90], AA[1]</a>,2), law is framed as a rule or measure of human acts. Now a measure should be homogeneous with that which it measures, as + stated in Metaph. x, text. 3,4, since different things are measured by different measures. Wherefore laws imposed on men should + also be in keeping with their condition, for, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21), law should be "possible both according to nature, + and according to the customs + of the country." Now possibility or faculty of action is due to an interior habit or disposition: since the same thing is + not possible to one who has not a virtuous habit, as is possible to one who has. Thus the same is not possible to a child + as to a full-grown man: for which reason the law for children is not the same as for adults, since many things are permitted + to children, which in an adult are punished by law or at any rate are open to blame. In like manner many things are permissible + to + men not perfect in virtue, which would be intolerable in a virtuous man. + </p><p id="FS_Q96_A2-p7"> Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws + do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for + the majority to abstain; and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which human society + could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits murder, theft and such like. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 2 co."><a name="37675" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37675] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, lex ponitur ut quaedam regula +vel mensura humanorum actuum. Mensura autem debet esse homogenea +mensurato, ut dicitur in X Metaphys., diversa enim diversis +mensuris mensurantur. Unde oportet quod etiam leges imponantur +hominibus secundum eorum conditionem, quia, ut Isidorus dicit. +<i>Lex debet esse possibilis et secundum naturam, et secundum +consuetudinem patriae</i>. Potestas autem sive facultas operandi ex +interiori habitu seu dispositione procedit, non enim idem est +possibile ei qui non habet habitum virtutis, et virtuoso; sicut +etiam non est idem possibile puero et viro perfecto. Et propter hoc +non ponitur eadem lex pueris quae ponitur adultis, multa enim +pueris permittuntur quae in adultis lege puniuntur, vel etiam +vituperantur. Et similiter multa sunt permittenda hominibus non +perfectis virtute, quae non essent toleranda in hominibus +virtuosis. Lex autem humana ponitur multitudini hominum, in qua +maior pars est hominum non perfectorum virtute. Et ideo lege humana +non prohibentur omnia vitia, a quibus virtuosi abstinent; sed solum +graviora, a quibus possibile est maiorem partem multitudinis +abstinere; et praecipue quae sunt in nocumentum aliorum, sine +quorum prohibitione societas humana conservari non posset, sicut +prohibentur lege humana homicidia et furta et huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Audacity seems to refer to the assailing of others. Consequently it belongs to those sins chiefly whereby one's neighbor + is injured: and these sins are forbidden by human law, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37676" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37676] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod audacia pertinere videtur ad invasionem aliorum. +Unde praecipue pertinet ad illa peccata quibus iniuria proximis +irrogatur; quae lege humana prohibentur, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The purpose of human law is to lead men to virtue, not suddenly, but gradually. Wherefore it does not lay upon the multitude + of imperfect men the burdens of those who are already virtuous, viz. that they should abstain from all evil. Otherwise these + imperfect ones, being unable to bear such precepts, would break out into yet greater evils: thus it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.30.33" target="asv">Ps. 30:33</a>): "He that violently bloweth his nose, bringeth out blood"; + and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A2-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.9.17" target="asv">Mat. 9:17</a>) that if "new wine," i.e. precepts of a perfect life, "is put into old bottles," i.e. into imperfect men, "the bottles break, + and the wine runneth out," i.e. the precepts are despised, and those men, from contempt, break into evils worse still. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37677" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37677] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod lex humana intendit homines inducere ad virtutem, non +subito, sed gradatim. Et ideo non statim multitudini imperfectorum +imponit ea quae sunt iam virtuosorum, ut scilicet ab omnibus malis +abstineant. Alioquin imperfecti, huiusmodi praecepta ferre non +valentes, in deteriora mala prorumperent, sicut dicitur Prov. XXX, +<i>qui nimis emungit, elicit sanguinem</i>; et Matth. IX dicitur +quod, si vinum novum, idest praecepta perfectae vitae, mittatur in +utres veteres, idest in homines imperfectos, utres rumpuntur, et +vinum effunditur, idest, praecepta contemnuntur, et homines ex +contemptu ad peiora mala prorumpunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The natural law is a participation in us of the eternal law: while human law falls short of the eternal law. Now Augustine + says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): "The law which is framed for the government of states, allows and leaves unpunished many things + that are punished by Divine providence. Nor, if this law does not attempt to do everything, is this a reason why it should + be blamed for what it does." Wherefore, too, human law does not prohibit everything + that is forbidden by the natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37678" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37678] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod lex naturalis est quaedam participatio legis aeternae +in nobis, lex autem humana deficit a lege aeterna. Dicit enim +Augustinus, in I de Lib. Arb., <i>lex ista quae regendis +civitatibus fertur, multa concedit atque impunita relinquit, quae +per divinam providentiam vindicantur. Neque enim quia non omnia +facit, ideo quae facit, improbanda sunt</i>. Unde etiam lex humana +non omnia potest prohibere quae prohibet lex naturae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q96_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q96_A3-p0.1">Q. 96. A. 3. Whether human law prescribes acts of all the virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human law does not prescribe acts of all the virtues. For vicious acts are contrary to acts of virtue. + But human law does not prohibit all vices, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q96_A2" id="FS_Q96_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore neither does it prescribe all acts of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37679" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37679] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex humana non praecipiat actus omnium +virtutum. Actibus enim virtutum opponuntur actus vitiosi. Sed lex +humana non prohibet omnia vitia, ut dictum est. Ergo etiam non +praecipit actus omnium virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a virtuous act proceeds from a virtue. But virtue is the end of law; so that whatever is from a virtue, cannot come + under a precept of law. Therefore human law does not prescribe all acts of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37680" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37680] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +actus virtutis a virtute procedit. Sed virtus est finis legis, et +ita quod est ex virtute, sub praecepto legis cadere non potest. +Ergo lex humana non praecipit actus omnium virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, law is ordained to the common good, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q96_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[2]</a>). But some acts of virtue are ordained, not to the common good, but to private good. Therefore the law does not prescribe + all acts of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37681" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37681] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex ordinatur ad bonum commune, ut dictum est. Sed quidam actus +virtutum non ordinantur ad bonum commune, sed ad bonum privatum. +Ergo lex non praecipit actus omnium virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that the law "prescribes the performance of the acts of a brave man . . . and the acts + of the temperate man . . . and the acts of the meek man: and in like manner as regards the other virtues and vices, prescribing + the former, forbidding the latter." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37682" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37682] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., quod <i>praecipit lex +fortis opera facere, et quae temperati, et quae mansueti; similiter +autem secundum alias virtutes et malitias, haec quidem iubens, haec +autem prohibens</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The species of virtues are distinguished by their objects, as explained above ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q54_A2" id="FS_Q96_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[54], A[2]</a>; + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q60_A1" id="FS_Q96_A3-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[60], A[1]</a>; + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q62_A2" id="FS_Q96_A3-p6.3" shape="rect"> Q[62], A[2]</a>). Now all the objects of virtues can be referred either to the private good of an individual, or to the common good of the + multitude: thus matters of fortitude may be achieved either for the safety of the state, or for upholding the rights of a + friend, and in like + manner with the other virtues. But law, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q96_A3-p6.4" shape="rect">Q[90], A[2]</a>) is ordained to the common good. Wherefore there is no virtue whose acts cannot be prescribed by the law. Nevertheless human + law does not prescribe concerning all the acts of every virtue: but only in regard to those that are ordainable to the common + good---either immediately, as when certain things are done directly for the common good---or mediately, as when a lawgiver + prescribes certain things + pertaining to good order, whereby the citizens are directed in the upholding of the common good of justice and peace. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 3 co."><a name="37683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37683] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod species virtutum distinguuntur secundum obiecta, ut +ex supradictis patet. Omnia autem obiecta virtutum referri possunt +vel ad bonum privatum alicuius personae, vel ad bonum commune +multitudinis, sicut ea quae sunt fortitudinis potest aliquis exequi +vel propter conservationem civitatis, vel ad conservandum ius amici +sui; et simile est in aliis. Lex autem, ut dictum est, ordinatur ad +bonum commune. Et ideo nulla virtus est de cuius actibus lex +praecipere non possit. Non tamen de omnibus actibus omnium virtutum +lex humana praecipit, sed solum de illis qui sunt ordinabiles ad +bonum commune, vel immediate, sicut cum aliqua directe propter +bonum commune fiunt; vel mediate, sicut cum aliqua ordinantur a +legislatore pertinentia ad bonam disciplinam, per quam cives +informantur ut commune bonum iustitiae et pacis conservent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Human law does not forbid all vicious acts, by the obligation of a precept, as neither does it prescribe all acts of virtue. + But it forbids certain acts of each vice, just as it prescribes some acts of each virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37684" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37684] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod lex humana non prohibet omnes actus vitiosos, +secundum obligationem praecepti, sicut nec praecipit omnes actus +virtuosos. Prohibet tamen aliquos actus singulorum vitiorum, sicut +etiam praecipit quosdam actus singularum virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An act is said to be an act of virtue in two ways. First, from the fact that a man does something virtuous; thus the act + of justice is to do what is right, and an act of fortitude is to do brave things: and in this way law prescribes certain acts + of virtue. Secondly an act of virtue is when a man does a virtuous thing in a way in which a virtuous man does it. Such an + act always proceeds from virtue: and it does not come under a precept of law, but is + the end at which every lawgiver aims. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37685" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37685] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod aliquis actus dicitur esse virtutis dupliciter. Uno +modo, ex eo quod homo operatur virtuosa, sicut actus iustitiae est +facere recta, et actus fortitudinis facere fortia. Et sic lex +praecipit aliquos actus virtutum. Alio modo dicitur actus virtutis, +quia aliquis operatur virtuosa eo modo quo virtuosus operatur. Et +talis actus semper procedit a virtute, nec cadit sub praecepto +legis, sed est finis ad quem legislator ducere intendit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is no virtue whose act is not ordainable to the common good, as stated above, either mediately or immediately. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37686" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37686] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod non est aliqua virtus cuius actus non sint +ordinabiles ad bonum commune, ut dictum est, vel mediate vel +immediate.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q96_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q96_A4-p0.1">Q. 96. A. 4. Whether human law binds a man in conscience?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human law does not bind man in conscience. For an inferior power has no jurisdiction in a court of higher + power. But the power of man, which frames human law, is beneath the Divine power. Therefore human law cannot impose its precept + in a Divine court, such as is the court of conscience. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37687" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37687] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex humana non imponat homini +necessitatem in foro conscientiae. Inferior enim potestas non +potest imponere legem in iudicio superioris potestatis. Sed +potestas hominis, quae fert legem humanam, est infra potestatem +divinam. Ergo lex humana non potest imponere legem quantum ad +iudicium divinum, quod est iudicium conscientiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the judgment of conscience depends chiefly on the commandments of God. But sometimes God's commandments are made + void by human laws, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.6" target="asv"> Mat. 15:6</a>: "You have made void the commandment of God for your tradition." Therefore human law does not bind a man in conscience. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37688" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37688] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +iudicium conscientiae maxime dependet ex divinis mandatis. Sed +quandoque divina mandata evacuantur per leges humanas; secundum +illud Matth. XV, <i>irritum fecistis mandatum Dei propter +traditiones vestras</i>. Ergo lex humana non imponit necessitatem +homini quantum ad conscientiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, human laws often bring loss of character and injury on man, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.10.1" target="asv"> Is. 10:1 </a>et seqq.: "Woe to them that make wicked laws, and when they write, write injustice; to oppress the poor in judgment, and do + violence to the cause of the humble of My people." But it is lawful for anyone to avoid oppression and violence. Therefore + human laws do not bind man in conscience. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37689] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +leges humanae frequenter ingerunt calumniam et iniuriam hominibus; +secundum illud Isaiae X, <i>vae qui condunt leges iniquas, et +scribentes iniustitias scripserunt, ut opprimerent in iudicio +pauperes, et vim facerent causae humilium populi mei</i>. Sed +licitum est unicuique oppressionem et violentiam evitare. Ergo +leges humanae non imponunt necessitatem homini quantum ad +conscientiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.2.19" target="asv">1 Pet. + 2:19 + </a>): "This is thankworthy, if for conscience . . . a man endure sorrows, suffering wrongfully." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37690" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37690] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur I Petr. II, <i>haec est gratia, si propter +conscientiam sustineat quis tristitias, patiens iniuste</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q96_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Laws framed by man are either just or unjust. If they be just, they have the power of binding in conscience, from the eternal + law whence they are derived, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.15" target="asv"> Prov. 8:15</a>: "By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things." Now laws are said to be just, both from the end, when, to wit, they + are ordained to the common good---and from their author, that is to say, when the law that is made does not exceed the power + of the + lawgiver---and from their form, when, to wit, burdens are laid on the subjects, according to an equality of proportion and + with a view to the common good. For, since one man is a part of the community, each man in all that he is and has, belongs + to the community; just as a part, in all that it is, belongs to the whole; wherefore nature inflicts a loss on the part, in + order to save the whole: so that on this account, such laws as these, which impose proportionate burdens, are just and binding + in + conscience, and are legal laws. + </p><p id="FS_Q96_A4-p7"> On the other hand laws may be unjust in two ways: first, by being contrary to human good, through being opposed to the things + mentioned above---either in respect of the end, as when an authority imposes on his subjects burdensome laws, conducive, not + to the common good, but rather to his own cupidity or vainglory---or in respect of the author, as when a man makes a law that + goes beyond the power committed to him---or in respect of the form, as when burdens are imposed unequally + on the community, although with a view to the common good. The like are acts of violence rather than laws; because, as Augustine + says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5), "a law that is not just, seems to be no law at all." Wherefore such laws do not bind in conscience, + except perhaps in order to avoid scandal or disturbance, for which cause a man should even yield his right, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.40" target="asv"> Mat. 5:40,41</a>: "If a man . . . take away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him; and whosoever will + force thee one mile, go with him other two." + </p><p id="FS_Q96_A4-p8"> Secondly, laws may be unjust through being opposed to the Divine good: such are the laws of tyrants inducing to idolatry, + or to anything else contrary to the Divine law: and laws of this kind must nowise be observed, because, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.29" target="asv"> Acts 5:29, </a> "we ought to obey God rather than man." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 4 co."><a name="37691" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37691] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod leges positae humanitus vel sunt iustae, vel +iniustae. Si quidem iustae sint, habent vim obligandi in foro +conscientiae a lege aeterna, a qua derivantur; secundum illud Prov. +VIII, <i>per me reges regnant, et legum conditores iusta +decernunt</i>. Dicuntur autem leges iustae et ex fine, quando +scilicet ordinantur ad bonum commune; et ex auctore, quando +scilicet lex lata non excedit potestatem ferentis; et ex forma, +quando scilicet secundum aequalitatem proportionis imponuntur +subditis onera in ordine ad bonum commune. Cum enim unus homo sit +pars multitudinis, quilibet homo hoc ipsum quod est et quod habet, +est multitudinis, sicut et quaelibet pars id quod est, est totius. +Unde et natura aliquod detrimentum infert parti, ut salvet totum. +Et secundum hoc, leges huiusmodi, onera proportionabiliter +inferentes, iustae sunt, et obligant in foro conscientiae, et sunt +leges legales. Iniustae autem sunt leges dupliciter. Uno modo, per +contrarietatem ad bonum humanum, e contrario praedictis, vel ex +fine, sicut cum aliquis praesidens leges imponit onerosas subditis +non pertinentes ad utilitatem communem, sed magis ad propriam +cupiditatem vel gloriam; vel etiam ex auctore, sicut cum aliquis +legem fert ultra sibi commissam potestatem; vel etiam ex forma, +puta cum inaequaliter onera multitudini dispensantur, etiam si +ordinentur ad bonum commune. Et huiusmodi magis sunt violentiae +quam leges, quia, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arb., +<i>lex esse non videtur, quae iusta non fuerit</i>. Unde tales +leges non obligant in foro conscientiae, nisi forte propter +vitandum scandalum vel turbationem, propter quod etiam homo iuri +suo debet cedere, secundum illud Matth. V, <i>qui angariaverit te +mille passus, vade cum eo alia duo; et qui abstulerit tibi tunicam, +da ei et pallium</i>. Alio modo leges possunt esse iniustae per +contrarietatem ad bonum divinum, sicut leges tyrannorum inducentes +ad idololatriam, vel ad quodcumque aliud quod sit contra legem +divinam. Et tales leges nullo modo licet observare, quia sicut +dicitur Act. V, <i>obedire oportet Deo magis quam +hominibus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1,2</a>), all human power is from God . . . "therefore he that resisteth the power," in matters that are within its scope, "resisteth + the ordinance of God"; so that he becomes guilty according to his conscience. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37692" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37692] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, ad Rom. XIII, <i>omnis +potestas humana a Deo est, et ideo qui potestati resistit</i>, in +his quae ad ordinem potestatis pertinent, Dei ordinationi resistit. +Et secundum hoc efficitur reus quantum ad conscientiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument is true of laws that are contrary to the commandments of God, which is beyond the scope of (human) power. Wherefore + in such matters human law should not be obeyed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37693" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37693] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de legibus humanis quae +ordinantur contra Dei mandatum. Et ad hoc ordo potestatis non se +extendit. Unde in talibus legi humanae non est parendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument is true of a law that inflicts unjust hurt on its subjects. The power that man holds from God does not extend + to this: wherefore neither in such matters is man bound to obey the law, provided he avoid giving scandal or inflicting a + more grievous hurt. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37694" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37694] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de lege quae infert gravamen +iniustum subditis, ad quod etiam ordo potestatis divinitus +concessus non se extendit. Unde nec in talibus homo obligatur ut +obediat legi, si sine scandalo vel maiori detrimento resistere +possit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q96_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q96_A5-p0.1">Q. 96. A. 5. Whether all are subject to the law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all are subject to the law. For those alone are subject to a law for whom a law is made. But the Apostle + says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.9" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:9</a>): "The law is not made for the just man." Therefore the just are not subject to the law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37695" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37695] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes legi subiiciantur. Illi enim +soli subiiciuntur legi, quibus lex ponitur. Sed apostolus dicit, I +ad Tim. I, quod <i>iusto non est lex posita</i>. Ergo iusti non +subiiciuntur legi humanae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Pope Urban says [*Decretals. caus. xix, qu. 2]: "He that is guided by a private law need not for any reason be bound + by the public law." Now all spiritual men are led by the private law of the Holy Ghost, for they are the sons of God, of whom + it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.14" target="asv">Rom. 8:14</a>): "Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God." Therefore not all men are subject to human law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37696" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37696] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Urbanus Papa dicit, et habetur in decretis, XIX qu. II, <i>qui lege +privata ducitur, nulla ratio exigit ut publica constringatur</i>. +Lege autem privata spiritus sancti ducuntur omnes viri spirituales, +qui sunt filii Dei; secundum illud Rom. VIII, <i>qui spiritu Dei +aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt</i>. Ergo non omnes homines legi humanae +subiiciuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the jurist says [*Pandect. Justin. i, ff., tit. 3, De Leg. et Senat.] that "the sovereign is exempt from the laws." + But he that is exempt from the law is not bound thereby. Therefore not all are subject to the law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37697" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37697] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +iurisperitus dicit quod princeps legibus solutus est. Qui autem est +solutus a lege, non subditur legi. Ergo non omnes subiecti sunt +legi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1</a>): "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers." But subjection to a power seems to imply subjection to the laws framed + by that power. Therefore all men should be subject to human law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37698" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37698] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. XIII, <i>omnis anima potestatibus +sublimioribus subdita sit</i>. Sed non videtur esse subditus +potestati, qui non subiicitur legi quam fert potestas. Ergo omnes +homines debent esse legi humanae subiecti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q96_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q96_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[90], AA[1]</a>,2; A[3], ad 2), the notion of law contains two things: first, that it is a rule of human acts; secondly, that it has coercive + power. Wherefore a man may be subject to law in two ways. First, as the regulated is subject to the regulator: and, in this + way, whoever is subject to a power, is subject to the law framed by that power. But it may happen in two ways that one is + not subject to a power. In one way, + by being altogether free from its authority: hence the subjects of one city or kingdom are not bound by the laws of the sovereign + of another city or kingdom, since they are not subject to his authority. In another way, by being under a yet higher law; + thus the subject of a proconsul should be ruled by his command, but not in those matters in which the subject receives his + orders from the emperor: for in these matters, he is not bound by the mandate of the lower authority, since he is directed + by that of a higher. In this way, one who is simply subject to a law, may not be a subject thereto in certain matters, in + respect of which he is ruled by a higher law. + </p><p id="FS_Q96_A5-p7"> Secondly, a man is said to be subject to a law as the coerced is subject to the coercer. In this way the virtuous and righteous + are not subject to the law, but only the wicked. Because coercion and violence are contrary to the will: but the will of the + good is in harmony with the law, whereas the will of the wicked is discordant from it. Wherefore in this sense the good are + not subject to the law, but only the wicked. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 5 co."><a name="37699" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37699] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, lex de sui ratione duo +habet, primo quidem, quod est regula humanorum actuum; secundo, +quod habet vim coactivam. Dupliciter ergo aliquis homo potest esse +legi subiectus. Uno modo, sicut regulatum regulae. Et hoc modo +omnes illi qui subduntur potestati, subduntur legi quam fert +potestas. Quod autem aliquis potestati non subdatur, potest +contingere dupliciter. Uno modo, quia est simpliciter absolutus ab +eius subiectione. Unde illi qui sunt de una civitate vel regno, non +subduntur legibus principis alterius civitatis vel regni, sicut nec +eius dominio. Alio modo, secundum quod regitur superiori lege. Puta +si aliquis subiectus sit proconsuli, regulari debet eius mandato, +non tamen in his quae dispensantur ei ab imperatore, quantum enim +ad illa, non adstringitur mandato inferioris, cum superiori mandato +dirigatur. Et secundum hoc contingit quod aliquis simpliciter +subiectus legi, secundum aliqua legi non adstringitur, secundum +quae regitur superiori lege. Alio vero modo dicitur aliquis subdi +legi sicut coactum cogenti. Et hoc modo homines virtuosi et iusti +non subduntur legi, sed soli mali. Quod enim est coactum et +violentum, est contrarium voluntati. Voluntas autem bonorum +consonat legi, a qua malorum voluntas discordat. Et ideo secundum +hoc boni non sunt sub lege, sed solum mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is true of subjection by way of coercion: for, in this way, "the law is not made for the just men": because + "they are a law to themselves," since they "show the work of the law written in their hearts," as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.14" target="asv">Rom. 2:14,15</a>). Consequently the law does not enforce itself upon them as it does on the wicked. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37700" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37700] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de subiectione quae est per +modum coactionis. Sic enim iusto non est lex posita, quia ipsi sibi +sunt lex, dum ostendunt opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis, sicut +apostolus, ad Rom. II, dicit. Unde in eos non habet lex vim +coactivam, sicut habet in iniustos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The law of the Holy Ghost is above all law framed by man: and therefore spiritual men, in so far as they are led by the law + of the Holy Ghost, are not subject to the law in those matters that are inconsistent with the guidance of the Holy Ghost. + Nevertheless the very fact that spiritual men are subject to law, is due to the leading of the Holy Ghost, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.2.13" target="asv">1 Pet. 2:13</a>: "Be ye subject . . . to every human creature for God's + sake." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37701" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37701] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod lex spiritus sancti est superior omni lege humanitus +posita. Et ideo viri spirituales, secundum hoc quod lege spiritus +sancti ducuntur, non subduntur legi, quantum ad ea quae repugnant +ductioni spiritus sancti. Sed tamen hoc ipsum est de ductu spiritus +sancti, quod homines spirituales legibus humanis subdantur; +secundum illud I Petr. II, <i>subiecti estote omni humanae +creaturae, propter Deum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sovereign is said to be "exempt from the law," as to its coercive power; since, properly speaking, no man is coerced + by himself, and law has no coercive power save from the authority of the sovereign. Thus then is the sovereign said to be + exempt from the law, because none is competent to pass sentence on him, if he acts against the law. Wherefore on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A5-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.50.6" target="asv"> Ps. 50:6</a>: "To Thee only have I sinned," a gloss says that "there is no man who + can judge the deeds of a king." But as to the directive force of law, the sovereign is subject to the law by his own will, + according to the statement (Extra, De Constit. cap. Cum omnes) that "whatever law a man makes for another, he should keep + himself. And a wise authority [*Dionysius Cato, Dist. de Moribus] says: 'Obey the law that thou makest thyself.'" Moreover + the Lord reproaches those who "say and do not"; and who "bind heavy burdens and lay them on men's shoulders, but with a finger + of + their own they will not move them" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A5-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.23.3" target="asv">Mat. 23:3,4</a>). Hence, in the judgment of God, the sovereign is not exempt from the law, as to its directive force; but he should fulfil + it to his own free-will and not of constraint. Again the sovereign is above the law, in so far as, when it is expedient, he + can change the law, and dispense in it according to time and place. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37702" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37702] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod princeps dicitur esse solutus a lege, quantum ad vim +coactivam legis, nullus enim proprie cogitur a seipso; lex autem +non habet vim coactivam nisi ex principis potestate. Sic igitur +princeps dicitur esse solutus a lege, quia nullus in ipsum potest +iudicium condemnationis ferre, si contra legem agat. Unde super +illud Psalmi l, <i>tibi soli peccavi</i> etc., dicit Glossa quod +<i>lex non habet hominem qui sua facta diiudicet</i>. Sed quantum +ad vim directivam legis, princeps subditur legi propria voluntate; +secundum quod dicitur extra, de constitutionibus, cap. cum omnes, +<i>quod quisque iuris in alterum statuit, ipse eodem iure uti +debet. Et sapientis dicit auctoritas, patere legem quam ipse +tuleris</i>. Improperatur etiam his a domino qui dicunt et non +faciunt; et qui aliis onera gravia imponunt, et ipsi nec digito +volunt ea movere; ut habetur Matth. XXIII. Unde quantum ad Dei +iudicium, princeps non est solutus a lege, quantum ad vim +directivam eius; sed debet voluntarius, non coactus, legem implere. +Est etiam princeps supra legem, inquantum, si expediens fuerit, +potest legem mutare, et in ea dispensare, pro loco et tempore.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q96_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q96_A6-p0.1">Q. 96. A. 6. Whether he who is under a law may act beside the letter of the law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that he who is subject to a law may not act beside the letter of the law. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 31): + "Although men judge about temporal laws when they make them, yet when once they are made they must pass judgment not on them, + but according to them." But if anyone disregard the letter of the law, saying that he observes the intention of the lawgiver, + he seems to pass judgment on the law. Therefore it is not right for one who is under the + law to disregard the letter of the law, in order to observe the intention of the lawgiver. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37703" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37703] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non liceat ei qui subditur legi, +praeter verba legis agere. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de vera +Relig., <i>in temporalibus legibus, quamvis homines iudicent de his +cum eas instituunt, tamen quando fuerint institutae et firmatae, +non licebit de ipsis iudicare, sed secundum ipsas</i>. Sed si +aliquis praetermittat verba legis, dicens se intentionem +legislatoris servare, videtur iudicare de lege. Ergo non licet ei +qui subditur legi, ut praetermittat verba legis, ut intentionem +legislatoris servet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he alone is competent to interpret the law who can make the law. But those who are subject to the law cannot make + the law. Therefore they have no right to interpret the intention of the lawgiver, but should always act according to the letter + of the law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37704] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ad eum solum pertinet leges interpretari, cuius est condere leges. +Sed hominum subditorum legi non est leges condere. Ergo eorum non +est interpretari legislatoris intentionem, sed semper secundum +verba legis agere debent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every wise man knows how to explain his intention by words. But those who framed the laws should be reckoned wise: + for Wisdom says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.15" target="asv">Prov. 8:15</a>): "By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things." Therefore we should not judge of the intention of the lawgiver otherwise + than by the words of the law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37705" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37705] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis sapiens intentionem suam verbis novit explicare. Sed illi qui +leges condiderunt, reputari debent sapientes, dicit enim sapientia, +Prov. VIII, <i>per me reges regnant, et legum conditores iusta +decernunt</i>. Ergo de intentione legislatoris non est iudicandum +nisi per verba legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The meaning of what is said is according to the motive for saying it: because things are not + subject to speech, but speech to things." Therefore we should take account of the motive of the lawgiver, rather than of his + very words. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 6 s. c."><a name="37706" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37706] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Hilarius dicit, in IV de Trin., <i>intelligentia dictorum +ex causis est assumenda dicendi, quia non sermoni res, sed rei +debet esse sermo subiectus</i>. Ergo magis est attendendum ad +causam quae movit legislatorem, quam ad ipsa verba legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q96_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q96_A4" id="FS_Q96_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, every law is directed to the common weal of men, and derives the force and nature of law accordingly. Hence the jurist says + [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff., tit. 3, De Leg. et Senat.]: "By no reason of law, or favor of equity, is it allowable for + us to interpret harshly, and render burdensome, those useful measures which have been enacted for the welfare of man." Now + it happens often that the observance of some + point of law conduces to the common weal in the majority of instances, and yet, in some cases, is very hurtful. Since then + the lawgiver cannot have in view every single case, he shapes the law according to what happens most frequently, by directing + his attention to the common good. Wherefore if a case arise wherein the observance of that law would be hurtful to the general + welfare, it should not be observed. For instance, suppose that in a besieged city it be an established law that the gates + of the city are to be kept closed, this is good for public welfare as a general rule: but, it were to happen that the enemy + are in pursuit of certain citizens, who are defenders of the city, it would be a great loss to the city, if the gates were + not opened to them: and so in that case the gates ought to be opened, contrary to the letter of the law, in order to maintain + the common weal, which the lawgiver had in view. + </p><p id="FS_Q96_A6-p7"> Nevertheless it must be noted, that if the observance of the law according to the letter does not involve any sudden risk + needing instant remedy, it is not competent for everyone to expound what is useful and what is not useful to the state: those + alone can do this who are in authority, and who, on account of such like cases, have the power to dispense from the laws. + If, however, the peril be so sudden as not to allow of the delay involved by referring the matter to authority, + the mere necessity brings with it a dispensation, since necessity knows no law. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 6 co."><a name="37707" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37707] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, omnis lex ordinatur ad +communem hominum salutem, et intantum obtinet vim et rationem +legis; secundum vero quod ab hoc deficit, virtutem obligandi non +habet. Unde iurisperitus dicit quod <i>nulla iuris ratio aut +aequitatis benignitas patitur ut quae salubriter pro utilitate +hominum introducuntur, ea nos duriori interpretatione, contra +ipsorum commodum, perducamus ad severitatem</i>. Contingit autem +multoties quod aliquid observari communi saluti est utile ut in +pluribus, quod tamen in aliquibus casibus est maxime nocivum. Quia +igitur legislator non potest omnes singulares casus intueri, +proponit legem secundum ea quae in pluribus accidunt, ferens +intentionem suam ad communem utilitatem. Unde si emergat casus in +quo observatio talis legis sit damnosa communi saluti, non est +observanda. Sicut si in civitate obsessa statuatur lex quod portae +civitatis maneant clausae, hoc est utile communi saluti ut in +pluribus, si tamen contingat casus quod hostes insequantur aliquos +cives, per quos civitas conservatur, damnosissimum esset civitati +nisi eis portae aperirentur, et ideo in tali casu essent portae +aperiendae, contra verba legis, ut servaretur utilitas communis, +quam legislator intendit. Sed tamen hoc est considerandum, quod si +observatio legis secundum verba non habeat subitum periculum, cui +oportet statim occurri, non pertinet ad quemlibet ut interpretetur +quid sit utile civitati et quid inutile, sed hoc solum pertinet ad +principes, qui propter huiusmodi casus habent auctoritatem in +legibus dispensandi. Si vero sit subitum periculum, non patiens +tantam moram ut ad superiorem recurri possit, ipsa necessitas +dispensationem habet annexam, quia necessitas non subditur +legi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> He who in a case of necessity acts beside the letter of the law, does not judge the law; but of a particular case in which + he sees that the letter of the law is not to be observed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="37708" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37708] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ille qui in casu necessitatis agit praeter verba +legis, non iudicat de ipsa lege, sed iudicat de casu singulari, in +quo videt verba legis observanda non esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He who follows the intention of the lawgiver, does not interpret the law simply; but in a case in which it is evident, by + reason of the manifest harm, that the lawgiver intended otherwise. For if it be a matter of doubt, he must either act according + to the letter of the law, or consult those in power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="37709" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37709] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ille qui sequitur intentionem legislatoris, non +interpretatur legem simpliciter; sed in casu in quo manifestum est +per evidentiam nocumenti, legislatorem aliud intendisse. Si enim +dubium sit, debet vel secundum verba legis agere, vel superiores +consulere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q96_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No man is so wise as to be able to take account of every single case; wherefore he is not able sufficiently to express in + words all those things that are suitable for the end he has in view. And even if a lawgiver were able to take all the cases + into consideration, he ought not to mention them all, in order to avoid confusion: but should frame the law according to that + which is of most common occurrence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 96 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="37710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37710] Iª-IIae q. 96 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod nullius hominis sapientia tanta est ut possit omnes +singulares casus excogitare, et ideo non potest sufficienter per +verba sua exprimere ea quae conveniunt ad finem intentum. Et si +posset legislator omnes casus considerare, non oporteret ut omnes +exprimeret, propter confusionem vitandam, sed legem ferre deberet +secundum ea quae in pluribus accidunt.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q97" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q97-p0.1">Q. 97. OF CHANGE IN LAWS (FOUR ARTICLES) </h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q97-p2"> We must now consider change in laws: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q97-p3"><a href="#FS_Q97_A1"> (1) Whether human law is changeable?</a></p><p id="FS_Q97-p4"><a href="#FS_Q97_A2"> (2) Whether it should be always changed, whenever anything better occurs?</a></p><p id="FS_Q97-p5"><a href="#FS_Q97_A3"> (3) Whether it is abolished by custom, and whether custom obtains the force of law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q97-p6"><a href="#FS_Q97_A4"> (4) Whether the application of human law should be changed by dispensation of those in authority?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 pr."><a name="37711" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37711] +Iª-IIae q. 97 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +mutatione legum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum lex +humana sit mutabilis. Secundo, utrum semper debeat mutari, quando +aliquid melius occurrerit. Tertio, utrum per consuetudinem +aboleatur; et utrum consuetudo obtineat vim legis. Quarto, utrum +usus legis humanae per dispensationem rectorum immutari debeat.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q97_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q97_A1-p0.1">Q. 97. A. 1. Whether human law should be changed in any way?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human law should not be changed in any way at all. Because human law is derived from the natural law, + as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q95_A2" id="FS_Q97_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[95], A[2]</a>). But the natural law endures unchangeably. Therefore human law should also remain without any change. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37712" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37712] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex humana nullo modo debeat mutari. +Lex enim humana derivatur a lege naturali, ut supra dictum est. Sed +lex naturalis immobilis perseverat. Ergo et lex humana debet +immobilis permanere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), a measure should be absolutely stable. But human law is the measure of human + acts, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A1" id="FS_Q97_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[90], AA[1]</a>,2). Therefore it should remain without change. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37713] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., mensura maxime debet esse +permanens. Sed lex humana est mensura humanorum actuum, ut supra +dictum est. Ergo debet immobiliter permanere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is of the essence of law to be just and right, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q95_A2" id="FS_Q97_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[95], A[2]</a>). But that which is right once is right always. Therefore that which is law once, should be always law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37714" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37714] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +de ratione legis est quod sit iusta et recta, ut supra dictum est. +Sed illud quod semel est rectum, semper est rectum. Ergo illud quod +semel est lex, semper debet esse lex.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): "A temporal law, however just, may be justly changed in course of time." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37715" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37715] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb., <i>lex temporalis +quamvis iusta sit, commutari tamen per tempora iuste +potest</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q97_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q91_A3" id="FS_Q97_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[91], A[3]</a>), human law is a dictate of reason, whereby human acts are directed. Thus there may be two causes for the just change of + human law: one on the part of reason; the other on the part of man whose acts are regulated by law. The cause on the part + of reason is that it seems natural to human reason to advance gradually from the imperfect to the perfect. Hence, in speculative + sciences, we see that the teaching + of the early philosophers was imperfect, and that it was afterwards perfected by those who succeeded them. So also in practical + matters: for those who first endeavored to discover something useful for the human community, not being able by themselves + to take everything into consideration, set up certain institutions which were deficient in many ways; and these were changed + by subsequent lawgivers who made institutions that might prove less frequently deficient in respect of the common weal. + </p><p id="FS_Q97_A1-p7"> On the part of man, whose acts are regulated by law, the law can be rightly changed on account of the changed condition of + man, to whom different things are expedient according to the difference of his condition. An example is proposed by Augustine + (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): "If the people have a sense of moderation and responsibility, and are most careful guardians of the common + weal, it is right to enact a law allowing such a people to choose their own magistrates for the government + of the commonwealth. But if, as time goes on, the same people become so corrupt as to sell their votes, and entrust the government + to scoundrels and criminals; then the right of appointing their public officials is rightly forfeit to such a people, and + the choice devolves to a few good men." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 1 co."><a name="37716" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37716] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod sicut supra dictum est, lex humana est quoddam +dictamen rationis, quo diriguntur humani actus. Et secundum hoc +duplex causa potest esse quod lex humana iuste mutetur, una quidem +ex parte rationis; alia vero ex parte hominum, quorum actus lege +regulantur. Ex parte quidem rationis, quia humanae rationi naturale +esse videtur ut gradatim ab imperfecto ad perfectum perveniat. Unde +videmus in scientiis speculativis quod qui primo philosophati sunt, +quaedam imperfecta tradiderunt, quae postmodum per posteriores sunt +magis perfecta. Ita etiam est in operabilibus. Nam primi qui +intenderunt invenire aliquid utile communitati hominum, non +valentes omnia ex seipsis considerare, instituerunt quaedam +imperfecta in multis deficientia quae posteriores mutaverunt, +instituentes aliqua quae in paucioribus deficere possent a communi +utilitate. Ex parte vero hominum, quorum actus lege regulantur, lex +recte mutari potest propter mutationem conditionum hominum, quibus +secundum diversas eorum conditiones diversa expediunt. Sicut +Augustinus ponit exemplum, in I de Lib. Arb., quod <i>si populus +sit bene moderatus et gravis, communisque utilitatis +diligentissimus custos, recte lex fertur qua tali populo liceat +creare sibi magistratus, per quos respublica administretur. Porro +si paulatim idem populus depravatus habeat venale suffragium, et +regimen flagitiosis sceleratisque committat; recte adimitur tali +populo potestas dandi honores, et ad paucorum bonorum redit +arbitrium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The natural law is a participation of the eternal law, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q91_A2" id="FS_Q97_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[91], A[2]</a>), and therefore endures without change, owing to the unchangeableness and perfection of the Divine Reason, the Author of + nature. But the reason of man is changeable and imperfect: wherefore his law is subject to change. Moreover the natural law + contains certain universal precepts, which are everlasting: whereas human law contains certain + particular precepts, according to various emergencies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37717" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37717] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod naturalis lex est participatio quaedam legis +aeternae, ut supra dictum est, et ideo immobilis perseverat, quod +habet ex immobilitate et perfectione divinae rationis instituentis +naturam. Sed ratio humana mutabilis est et imperfecta. Et ideo eius +lex mutabilis est. Et praeterea lex naturalis continet quaedam +universalia praecepta, quae semper manent, lex vero posita ab +homine continet praecepta quaedam particularia, secundum diversos +casus qui emergunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A measure should be as enduring as possible. But nothing can be absolutely unchangeable in things that are subject to change. + And therefore human law cannot be altogether unchangeable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37718" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37718] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod mensura debet esse permanens quantum est possibile. +Sed in rebus mutabilibus non potest esse aliquid omnino +immutabiliter permanens. Et ideo lex humana non potest esse omnino +immutabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In corporal things, right is predicated absolutely: and therefore, as far as itself is concerned, always remains right. But + right is predicated of law with reference to the common weal, to which one and the same thing is not always adapted, as stated + above: wherefore rectitude of this kind is subject to change. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37719" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37719] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod rectum in rebus corporalibus dicitur absolute, et +ideo semper, quantum est de se, manet rectum. Sed rectitudo legis +dicitur in ordine ad utilitatem communem, cui non semper +proportionatur una eademque res, sicut supra dictum est. Et ideo +talis rectitudo mutatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q97_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q97_A2-p0.1">Q. 97. A. 2. Whether human law should always be changed, whenever something better occurs?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human law should be changed, whenever something better occurs. Because human laws are devised by human + reason, like other arts. But in the other arts, the tenets of former times give place to others, if something better occurs. + Therefore the same should apply to human laws. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37720" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37720] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod semper lex humana, quando aliquid +melius occurrit, sit mutanda. Leges enim humanae sunt adinventae +per rationem humanam, sicut etiam aliae artes. Sed in aliis artibus +mutatur id quod prius tenebatur, si aliquid melius occurrat. Ergo +idem est etiam faciendum in legibus humanis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by taking note of the past we can provide for the future. Now unless human laws had been changed when it was found + possible to improve them, considerable inconvenience would have ensued; because the laws of old were crude in many points. + Therefore it seems that laws should be changed, whenever anything better occurs to be enacted. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37721" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37721] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ex his quae praeterita sunt, providere possumus de futuris. Sed +nisi leges humanae mutatae fuissent supervenientibus melioribus +adinventionibus, multa inconvenientia sequerentur, eo quod leges +antiquae inveniuntur multas ruditates continere. Ergo videtur quod +leges sint mutandae, quotiescumque aliquid melius occurrit +statuendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, human laws are enacted about single acts of man. But we cannot acquire perfect knowledge in singular matters, except + by experience, which "requires time," as stated in Ethic. ii. Therefore it seems that as time goes on it is possible for something + better to occur for legislation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37722" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37722] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +leges humanae circa singulares actus hominum statuuntur. In +singularibus autem perfectam cognitionem adipisci non possumus nisi +per experientiam, quae tempore indiget, ut dicitur in II Ethic. +Ergo videtur quod per successionem temporis possit aliquid melius +occurrere statuendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in the Decretals (Dist. xii, 5): "It is absurd, and a detestable shame, that we should suffer those traditions + to be changed which we have received from the fathers of old." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37723" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37723] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur in decretis, dist. XII, <i>ridiculum est et satis +abominabile dedecus, ut traditiones quas antiquitus a patribus +suscepimus, infringi patiamur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q97_A1" id="FS_Q97_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, human law is rightly changed, in so far as such change is conducive to the common weal. But, to a certain extent, the mere + change of law is of itself prejudicial to the common good: because custom avails much for the observance of laws, seeing that + what is done contrary to general custom, even in slight matters, is looked upon as grave. Consequently, when a law is changed, + the binding power of the law is + diminished, in so far as custom is abolished. Wherefore human law should never be changed, unless, in some way or other, the + common weal be compensated according to the extent of the harm done in this respect. Such compensation may arise either from + some very great and every evident benefit conferred by the new enactment; or from the extreme urgency of the case, due to + the fact that either the existing law is clearly unjust, or its observance extremely harmful. Wherefore the jurist says + [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff., tit. 4, De Constit. Princip.] that "in establishing new laws, there should be evidence of + the benefit to be derived, before departing from a law which has long been considered just." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 2 co."><a name="37724" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37724] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, lex humana intantum recte mutatur, +inquantum per eius mutationem communi utilitati providetur. Habet +autem ipsa legis mutatio, quantum in se est, detrimentum quoddam +communis salutis. Quia ad observantiam legum plurimum valet +consuetudo, intantum quod ea quae contra communem consuetudinem +fiunt, etiam si sint leviora de se, graviora videantur. Unde quando +mutatur lex, diminuitur vis constrictiva legis, inquantum tollitur +consuetudo. Et ideo nunquam debet mutari lex humana, nisi ex aliqua +parte tantum recompensetur communi saluti, quantum ex ista parte +derogatur. Quod quidem contingit vel ex hoc quod aliqua maxima et +evidentissima utilitas ex novo statuto provenit, vel ex eo quod est +maxima necessitas, ex eo quod lex consueta aut manifestam +iniquitatem continet, aut eius observatio est plurimum nociva. Unde +dicitur a iurisperito quod <i>in rebus novis constituendis, evidens +debet esse utilitas, ut recedatur ab eo iure quod diu aequum visum +est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Rules of art derive their force from reason alone: and therefore whenever something better occurs, the rule followed hitherto + should be changed. But "laws derive very great force from custom," as the Philosopher states (Polit. ii, 5): consequently + they should not be quickly changed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37725" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37725] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ea quae sunt artis, habent efficaciam ex sola +ratione, et ideo ubicumque melior ratio occurrat, est mutandum quod +prius tenebatur. <i>Sed leges habent maximam virtutem ex +consuetudine</i>, ut philosophus dicit, in II Polit. Et inde non +sunt de facili mutandae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument proves that laws ought to be changed: not in view of any improvement, but for the sake of a great benefit or + in a case of great urgency, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37726" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37726] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa concludit quod leges sunt mutandae, non +tamen pro quacumque melioratione, sed pro magna utilitate vel +necessitate, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This answer applies also to the Third Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37727" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37727] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Et similiter +dicendum est ad tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q97_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q97_A3-p0.1">Q. 97. A. 3. Whether custom can obtain force of law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that custom cannot obtain force of law, nor abolish a law. Because human law is derived from the natural law + and from the Divine law, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q93_A3" id="FS_Q97_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[93], A[3]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q95_A2" id="FS_Q97_A3-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[95], A[2]</a>). But human custom cannot change either the law of nature or the Divine law. Therefore neither can it change human law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37728" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37728] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod consuetudo non possit obtinere vim +legis, nec legem amovere. Lex enim humana derivatur a lege naturae +et a lege divina, ut ex supradictis patet. Sed consuetudo hominum +non potest immutare legem naturae, nec legem divinam. Ergo etiam +nec legem humanam immutare potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, many evils cannot make one good. But he who first acted against the law, did evil. Therefore by multiplying such + acts, nothing good is the result. Now a law is something good; since it is a rule of human acts. Therefore law is not abolished + by custom, so that the mere custom should obtain force of law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37729" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37729] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ex multis malis non potest fieri unum bonum. Sed ille qui incipit +primo contra legem agere, male facit. Ergo, multiplicatis similibus +actibus, non efficietur aliquod bonum. Lex autem est quoddam bonum, +cum sit regula humanorum actuum. Ergo per consuetudinem non potest +removeri lex, ut ipsa consuetudo vim legis obtineat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the framing of laws belongs to those public men whose business it is to govern the community; wherefore private + individuals cannot make laws. But custom grows by the acts of private individuals. Therefore custom cannot obtain force of + law, so as to abolish the law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37730" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37730] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ferre legem pertinet ad publicas personas, ad quas pertinet regere +communitatem, unde privatae personae legem facere non possunt. Sed +consuetudo invalescit per actus privatarum personarum. Ergo +consuetudo non potest obtinere vim legis, per quam lex +removeatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Ep. ad Casulan. xxxvi): "The customs of God's people and the institutions of our ancestors are to be considered + as laws. And those who throw contempt on the customs of the Church ought to be punished as those who disobey the law of God." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37731" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37731] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in Epist. ad Casulan., <i>mos populi Dei +et instituta maiorum pro lege sunt tenenda. Et sicut +praevaricatores legum divinarum, ita et contemptores consuetudinum +ecclesiasticarum coercendi sunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> All law proceeds from the reason and will of the lawgiver; the Divine and natural laws from the reasonable will of God; the + human law from the will of man, regulated by reason. Now just as human reason and will, in practical matters, may be made + manifest by speech, so may they be made known by deeds: since seemingly a man chooses as good that which he carries into execution. + But it is evident that by human speech, law can be both changed and expounded, in so + far as it manifests the interior movement and thought of human reason. Wherefore by actions also, especially if they be repeated, + so as to make a custom, law can be changed and expounded; and also something can be established which obtains force of law, + in so far as by repeated external actions, the inward movement of the will, and concepts of reason are most effectually declared; + for when a thing is done again and again, it seems to proceed from a deliberate judgment of reason. Accordingly, + custom has the force of a law, abolishes law, and is the interpreter of law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 3 co."><a name="37732" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37732] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod omnis lex proficiscitur a ratione et voluntate +legislatoris, lex quidem divina et naturalis a rationabili Dei +voluntate; lex autem humana a voluntate hominis ratione regulata. +Sicut autem ratio et voluntas hominis manifestantur verbo in rebus +agendis, ita etiam manifestantur facto, hoc enim unusquisque +eligere videtur ut bonum, quod opere implet. Manifestum est autem +quod verbo humano potest et mutari lex, et etiam exponi, inquantum +manifestat interiorem motum et conceptum rationis humanae. Unde +etiam et per actus, maxime multiplicatos, qui consuetudinem +efficiunt, mutari potest lex, et exponi, et etiam aliquid causari +quod legis virtutem obtineat, inquantum scilicet per exteriores +actus multiplicatos interior voluntatis motus, et rationis +conceptus, efficacissime declaratur; cum enim aliquid multoties +fit, videtur ex deliberato rationis iudicio provenire. Et secundum +hoc, consuetudo et habet vim legis, et legem abolet, et est legum +interpretatrix.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The natural and Divine laws proceed from the Divine will, as stated above. Wherefore they cannot be changed by a custom proceeding + from the will of man, but only by Divine authority. Hence it is that no custom can prevail over the Divine or natural laws: + for Isidore says (Synon. ii, 16): "Let custom yield to authority: evil customs should be eradicated by law and reason." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37733" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37733] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod lex naturalis et divina procedit a voluntate +divina, ut dictum est. Unde non potest mutari per consuetudinem +procedentem a voluntate hominis, sed solum per auctoritatem divinam +mutari posset. Et inde est quod nulla consuetudo vim obtinere +potest contra legem divinam vel legem naturalem, dicit enim +Isidorus, in Synonym., <i>usus auctoritati cedat, pravum usum lex +et ratio vincat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q96_A6" id="FS_Q97_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[96], A[6]</a>), human laws fail in some cases: wherefore it is possible sometimes to act beside the law; namely, in a case where the law + fails; yet the act will not be evil. And when such cases are multiplied, by reason of some change in man, then custom shows + that the law is no longer useful: just as it might be declared by the verbal promulgation of a law to the contrary. If, however, + the same reason remains, + for which the law was useful hitherto, then it is not the custom that prevails against the law, but the law that overcomes + the custom: unless perhaps the sole reason for the law seeming useless, be that it is not "possible according to the custom + of the country" [* + <a href="#FS_Q95_A3" id="FS_Q97_A3-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[95], A[3]</a>], which has been stated to be one of the conditions of law. For it is not easy to set aside the custom of a whole people. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37734" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37734] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, leges humanae in aliquibus +casibus deficiunt, unde possibile est quandoque praeter legem +agere, in casu scilicet in quo deficit lex, et tamen actus non erit +malus. Et cum tales casus multiplicantur, propter aliquam +mutationem hominum, tunc manifestatur per consuetudinem quod lex +ulterius utilis non est, sicut etiam manifestaretur si lex +contraria verbo promulgaretur. Si autem adhuc maneat ratio eadem +propter quam prima lex utilis erat, non consuetudo legem, sed lex +consuetudinem vincit, nisi forte propter hoc solum inutilis lex +videatur, quia non est possibilis secundum consuetudinem patriae, +quae erat una de conditionibus legis. Difficile enim est +consuetudinem multitudinis removere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The people among whom a custom is introduced may be of two conditions. For if they are free, and able to make their own laws, + the consent of the whole people expressed by a custom counts far more in favor of a particular observance, that does the authority + of the sovereign, who has not the power to frame laws, except as representing the people. Wherefore although each individual + cannot make laws, yet the whole people can. If however the people have + not the free power to make their own laws, or to abolish a law made by a higher authority; nevertheless with such a people + a prevailing custom obtains force of law, in so far as it is tolerated by those to whom it belongs to make laws for that people: + because by the very fact that they tolerate it they seem to approve of that which is introduced by custom. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37735" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37735] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod multitudo in qua consuetudo introducitur duplicis +conditionis esse potest. Si enim sit libera multitudo, quae possit +sibi legem facere, plus est consensus totius multitudinis ad +aliquid observandum, quem consuetudo manifestat, quam auctoritas +principis, qui non habet potestatem condendi legem, nisi inquantum +gerit personam multitudinis. Unde licet singulae personae non +possint condere legem, tamen totus populus legem condere potest. Si +vero multitudo non habeat liberam potestatem condendi sibi legem, +vel legem a superiori potestate positam removendi; tamen ipsa +consuetudo in tali multitudine praevalens obtinet vim legis, +inquantum per eos toleratur ad quos pertinet multitudini legem +imponere, ex hoc enim ipso videntur approbare quod consuetudo +induxit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q97_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q97_A4-p0.1">Q. 97. A. 4. Whether the rulers of the people can dispense from human laws?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the rulers of the people cannot dispense from human laws. For the law is established for the "common weal," + as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21). But the common good should not be set aside for the private convenience of an individual: because, + as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 2), "the good of the nation is more godlike than the good of one man." Therefore it seems + that a man should not be dispensed from acting in compliance with the general + law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37736" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37736] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod rectores multitudinis non possint in +legibus humanis dispensare. Lex enim statuta est pro communi +utilitate, ut Isidorus dicit. Sed bonum commune non debet +intermitti pro privato commodo alicuius personae, quia, ut dicit +philosophus, in I Ethic., <i>bonum gentis divinius est quam bonum +unius hominis</i>. Ergo videtur quod non debeat dispensari cum +aliquo ut contra legem communem agat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those who are placed over others are commanded as follows ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q97_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.1.17" target="asv">Dt. 1:17</a>): "You shall hear the little as well as the great; neither shall you respect any man's person, because it is the judgment + of God." But to allow one man to do that which is equally forbidden to all, seems to be respect of persons. Therefore the + rulers of a community cannot grant such dispensations, since this is against a precept of the Divine law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37737" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37737] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illis qui super alios constituuntur, praecipitur Deut. I, <i>ita +parvum audietis ut magnum, nec accipietis cuiusquam personam, quia +Dei iudicium est</i>. Sed concedere alicui quod communiter +denegatur omnibus, videtur esse acceptio personarum. Ergo huiusmodi +dispensationes facere rectores multitudinis non possunt, cum hoc +sit contra praeceptum legis divinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, human law, in order to be just, should accord with the natural and Divine laws: else it would not "foster religion," + nor be "helpful to discipline," which is requisite to the nature of law, as laid down by Isidore (Etym. v, 3). But no man + can dispense from the Divine and natural laws. Neither, therefore, can he dispense from the human law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37738" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37738] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex humana, si sit recta, oportet quod consonet legi naturali et +legi divinae, aliter enim non congrueret religioni, nec conveniret +disciplinae, quod requiritur ad legem, ut Isidorus dicit. Sed in +lege divina et naturali nullus homo potest dispensare. Ergo nec +etiam in lege humana.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q97_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.17" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:17</a>): "A dispensation is committed to me." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37739" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37739] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicit apostolus, I ad Cor. IX, <i>dispensatio mihi credita +est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Dispensation, properly speaking, denotes a measuring out to individuals of some common goods: thus the head of a household + is called a dispenser, because to each member of the household he distributes work and necessaries of life in due weight and + measure. Accordingly in every community a man is said to dispense, from the very fact that he directs how some general precept + is to be fulfilled by each individual. Now it happens at times that a precept, which is + conducive to the common weal as a general rule, is not good for a particular individual, or in some particular case, either + because it would hinder some greater good, or because it would be the occasion of some evil, as explained above ( + <a href="#FS_Q96_A6" id="FS_Q97_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[96], A[6]</a>). But it would be dangerous to leave this to the discretion of each individual, except perhaps by reason of an evident and + sudden emergency, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q96_A6" id="FS_Q97_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[96], A[6]</a>). Consequently he who is + placed over a community is empowered to dispense in a human law that rests upon his authority, so that, when the law fails + in its application to persons or circumstances, he may allow the precept of the law not to be observed. If however he grant + this permission without any such reason, and of his mere will, he will be an unfaithful or an imprudent dispenser: unfaithful, + if he has not the common good in view; imprudent, if he ignores the reasons for granting dispensations. Hence Our Lord says + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q97_A4-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.42" target="asv">Lk. 12:42</a>): "Who, thinkest thou, is the faithful and wise dispenser [Douay: steward], whom his lord setteth over his family?" + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 4 co."><a name="37740" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37740] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod dispensatio proprie importat commensurationem +alicuius communis ad singula, unde etiam gubernator familiae +dicitur dispensator, inquantum unicuique de familia cum pondere et +mensura distribuit et operationes et necessaria vitae. Sic igitur +et in quacumque multitudine ex eo dicitur aliquis dispensare, quod +ordinat qualiter aliquod commune praeceptum sit a singulis +adimplendum. Contingit autem quandoque quod aliquod praeceptum quod +est ad commodum multitudinis ut in pluribus, non est conveniens +huic personae, vel in hoc casu, quia vel per hoc impediretur +aliquid melius, vel etiam induceretur aliquod malum, sicut ex +supradictis patet. Periculosum autem esset ut hoc iudicio +cuiuslibet committeretur, nisi forte propter evidens et subitum +periculum, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo ille qui habet regere +multitudinem, habet potestatem dispensandi in lege humana quae suae +auctoritati innititur, ut scilicet in personis vel casibus in +quibus lex deficit, licentiam tribuat ut praeceptum legis non +servetur. Si autem absque hac ratione, pro sola voluntate, +licentiam tribuat, non erit fidelis in dispensatione, aut erit +imprudens, infidelis quidem, si non habeat intentionem ad bonum +commune; imprudens autem, si rationem dispensandi ignoret. Propter +quod dominus dicit, Lucae XII, <i>quis, putas, est fidelis +dispensator et prudens, quem constituit dominus super familiam +suam?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When a person is dispensed from observing the general law, this should not be done to the prejudice of, but with the intention + of benefiting, the common good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37741" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37741] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quando cum aliquo dispensatur ut legem communem +non servet, non debet fieri in praeiudicium boni communis; sed ea +intentione ut ad bonum commune proficiat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not respect of persons if unequal measures are served out to those who are themselves unequal. Wherefore when the condition + of any person requires that he should reasonably receive special treatment, it is not respect of persons if he be the object + of special favor. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37742" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37742] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod non est acceptio personarum si non serventur aequalia +in personis inaequalibus. Unde quando conditio alicuius personae +requirit ut rationabiliter in ea aliquid specialiter observetur, +non est personarum acceptio si sibi aliqua specialis gratia +fiat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q97_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Natural law, so far as it contains general precepts, which never fail, does not allow of dispensations. In other precepts, + however, which are as conclusions of the general precepts, man sometimes grants a dispensation: for instance, that a loan + should not be paid back to the betrayer of his country, or something similar. But to the Divine law each man stands as a private + person to the public law to which he is subject. Wherefore just as none can + dispense from public human law, except the man from whom the law derives its authority, or his delegate; so, in the precepts + of the Divine law, which are from God, none can dispense but God, or the man to whom He may give special power for that purpose. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 97 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37743" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37743] Iª-IIae q. 97 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod lex naturalis inquantum continet praecepta communia, +quae nunquam fallunt, dispensationem recipere non potest. In aliis +vero praeceptis, quae sunt quasi conclusiones praeceptorum +communium, quandoque per hominem dispensatur, puta quod mutuum non +reddatur proditori patriae, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Ad legem autem +divinam ita se habet quilibet homo, sicut persona privata ad legem +publicam cui subiicitur. Unde sicut in lege humana publica non +potest dispensare nisi ille a quo lex auctoritatem habet, vel is +cui ipse commiserit; ita in praeceptis iuris divini, quae sunt a +Deo, nullus potest dispensare nisi Deus, vel si cui ipse +specialiter committeret.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q98" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q98-p0.1">Q. 98. OF THE OLD LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q98-p2"> In due sequence we must now consider the Old Law; and (1) The Law itself; (2) Its precepts. Under the first head there are + six points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q98-p3"><a href="#FS_Q98_A1"> (1) Whether the Old Law was good?</a></p><p id="FS_Q98-p4"><a href="#FS_Q98_A2"> (2) Whether it was from God?</a></p><p id="FS_Q98-p5"><a href="#FS_Q98_A3"> (3) Whether it came from Him through the angels?</a></p><p id="FS_Q98-p6"><a href="#FS_Q98_A4"> (4) Whether it was given to all?</a></p><p id="FS_Q98-p7"><a href="#FS_Q98_A5"> (5) Whether it was binding on all?</a></p><p id="FS_Q98-p8"><a href="#FS_Q98_A6"> (6) Whether it was given at a suitable time?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 pr."><a name="37744" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37744] +Iª-IIae q. 98 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de +lege veteri. Et primo, de ipsa lege; secundo, de praeceptis eius. +Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum lex vetus sit bona. +Secundo, utrum sit a Deo. Tertio, utrum sit ab eo mediantibus +Angelis. Quarto, utrum data sit omnibus. Quinto, utrum omnes +obliget. Sexto, utrum congruo tempore fuerit data.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q98_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q98_A1-p0.1">Q. 98. A. 1. Whether the Old Law was good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law was not good. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.20.25" target="asv">Ezech. 20:25</a>): "I gave them statutes that were not good, and judgments in which they shall not live." But a law is not said to be good + except on account of the goodness of the precepts that it contains. Therefore the Old Law was not good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37745" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37745] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non fuerit bona. Dicitur +enim Ezech. XX <i>dedi eis praecepta non bona, et iudicia in quibus +non vivent</i>. Sed lex non dicitur bona nisi propter bonitatem +praeceptorum quae continet. Ergo lex vetus non fuit bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to the goodness of a law that it conduce to the common welfare, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 3). But the + Old Law was not salutary; rather was it deadly and hurtful. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.8" target="asv">Rom. 7:8</a>, seqq.): "Without the law sin was dead. And I lived some time without the law. But when the commandment came sin revived; + and I died." Again he says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.20" target="asv">Rom. 5:20</a>): "Law entered in that sin might abound." Therefore the Old Law was not + good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37746" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37746] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ad bonitatem legis pertinet ut communi saluti proficiat sicut +Isidorus dicit. Sed lex vetus non fuit salutifera, sed magis +mortifera et nociva. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. VII, <i>sine lege +peccatum mortuum erat. Ego autem vivebam sine lege aliquando, sed +cum venisset mandatum, peccatum revixit, ego autem mortuus sum</i>; +et Rom. V, <i>lex subintravit ut abundaret delictum</i>. Ergo lex +vetus non fuit bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it belongs to the goodness of the law that it should be possible to obey it, both according to nature, and according + to human custom. But such the Old Law was not: since Peter said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.15.10" target="asv">Acts 15:10</a>): "Why tempt you (God) to put a yoke on the necks of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?" + Therefore it seems that the Old Law was not good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37747" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37747] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ad bonitatem legis pertinet quod sit possibilis ad observandum et +secundum naturam, et secundum humanam consuetudinem. Sed hoc non +habuit lex vetus, dicit enim Petrus, Act. XV, <i>quid tentatis +imponere iugum super cervicem discipulorum, quod neque nos, neque +patres nostri, portare potuimus?</i> Ergo videtur quod lex vetus +non fuerit bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.12" target="asv">Rom. 7:12</a>): "Wherefore the law indeed is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37748" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37748] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. VII, itaque <i>lex quidem sancta +est, et mandatum sanctum et iustum et bonum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q98_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Without any doubt, the Old Law was good. For just as a doctrine is shown to be good by the fact that it accords with right + reason, so is a law proved to be good if it accords with reason. Now the Old Law was in accordance with reason. Because it + repressed concupiscence which is in conflict with reason, as evidenced by the commandment, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's + goods" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.17" target="asv">Ex. 20:17</a>). Moreover the same law forbade all kinds of sin; + and these too are contrary to reason. Consequently it is evident that it was a good law. The Apostle argues in the same way + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.7" target="asv">Rom. 7</a>): "I am delighted," says he (verse 22), "with the law of God, according to the inward man": and again (verse 16): "I consent + to the law, that is good." + </p><p id="FS_Q98_A1-p7"> But it must be noted that the good has various degrees, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv): for there is a perfect good, + and an imperfect good. In things ordained to an end, there is perfect goodness when a thing is such that it is sufficient + in itself to conduce to the end: while there is imperfect goodness when a thing is of some assistance in attaining the end, + but is not sufficient for the realization thereof. Thus a medicine is perfectly good, if it gives health to a man; + but it is imperfect, if it helps to cure him, without being able to bring him back to health. Again it must be observed that + the end of human law is different from the end of Divine law. For the end of human law is the temporal tranquillity of the + state, which end law effects by directing external actions, as regards those evils which might disturb the peaceful condition + of the state. On the other hand, the end of the Divine law is to bring man to that end which is everlasting happiness; which + end is hindered by any sin, not only of external, but also of internal action. Consequently that which suffices for the perfection + of human law, viz. the prohibition and punishment of sin, does not suffice for the perfection of the Divine law: but it is + requisite that it should make man altogether fit to partake of everlasting happiness. Now this cannot be done save by the + grace of the Holy Ghost, whereby "charity" which fulfilleth the law . . . "is spread abroad in our hearts" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv">Rom. + 5:5 + </a>): since "the grace of God is life everlasting" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.23" target="asv">Rom. 6:23</a>). But the Old Law could not confer this grace, for this was reserved to Christ; because, as it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p7.3" href="./asv.html#John.1.17" target="asv">Jn. 1:17</a>), the law was given "by Moses, grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." Consequently the Old Law was good indeed, but imperfect, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.19" target="asv"> Heb. 7:19</a>: "The law brought nothing to perfection." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 1 co."><a name="37749" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37749] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod absque omni dubio lex vetus bona fuit. Sicut enim +doctrina ostenditur esse vera ex hoc quod consonat rationi rectae, +ita etiam lex aliqua ostenditur esse bona ex eo quod consonat +rationi. Lex autem vetus rationi consonabat. Quia concupiscentiam +reprimebat, quae rationi adversatur; ut patet in illo mandato, non +concupisces rem proximi tui, quod ponitur Exod. XX. Ipsa etiam +omnia peccata prohibebat, quae sunt contra rationem. Unde +manifestum est quod bona erat. Et haec est ratio apostoli, Rom. +VII, condelector, inquit, legi Dei secundum interiorem hominem; et +iterum, consentio legi, quoniam bona est. Sed notandum est quod +bonum diversos gradus habet, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. +Nom., est enim aliquod bonum perfectum, et aliquod bonum +imperfectum. Perfecta quidem bonitas est, in his quae ad finem +ordinantur, quando aliquid est tale quod per se sufficiens est +inducere ad finem, imperfectum autem bonum est quod operatur +aliquid ad hoc quod perveniatur ad finem, non tamen sufficit ad hoc +quod ad finem perducat. Sicut medicina perfecte bona est quae +hominem sanat, imperfecta autem est quae hominem adiuvat, sed tamen +sanare non potest. Est autem sciendum quod est alius finis legis +humanae, et alius legis divinae. Legis enim humanae finis est +temporalis tranquillitas civitatis, ad quem finem pervenit lex +cohibendo exteriores actus, quantum ad illa mala quae possunt +perturbare pacificum statum civitatis. Finis autem legis divinae +est perducere hominem ad finem felicitatis aeternae; qui quidem +finis impeditur per quodcumque peccatum, et non solum per actus +exteriores, sed etiam per interiores. Et ideo illud quod sufficit +ad perfectionem legis humanae, ut scilicet peccata prohibeat et +poenam apponat, non sufficit ad perfectionem legis divinae, sed +oportet quod hominem totaliter faciat idoneum ad participationem +felicitatis aeternae. Quod quidem fieri non potest nisi per gratiam +spiritus sancti, per quam diffunditur caritas in cordibus nostris, +quae legem adimplet, gratia enim Dei vita aeterna, ut dicitur Rom. +VI. Hanc autem gratiam lex vetus conferre non potuit, reservabatur +enim hoc Christo, quia, ut dicitur Ioan. I, <i>lex per Moysen data +est; gratia et veritas per Iesum Christum facta est</i>. Et inde +est quod lex vetus bona quidem est, sed imperfecta; secundum illud +Heb. VII, <i>nihil ad perfectum adduxit lex</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Lord refers there to the ceremonial precepts; which are said not to be good, because they did not confer grace unto the + remission of sins, although by fulfilling these precepts man confessed himself a sinner. Hence it is said pointedly, "and + judgments in which they shall not live"; i.e. whereby they are unable to obtain life; and so the text goes on: "And I polluted + them," i.e. showed them to be polluted, "in their own gifts, when they offered all + that opened the womb, for their offenses." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37750" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37750] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod dominus loquitur ibi de praeceptis +caeremonialibus; quae quidem dicuntur non bona, quia gratiam non +conferebant, per quam homines a peccato mundarentur, cum tamen per +huiusmodi se peccatores ostenderent. Unde signanter dicitur, et +iudicia in quibus non vivent, idest per quae vitam gratiae obtinere +non possunt; et postea subditur, et pollui eos in muneribus suis, +idest pollutos ostendi, <i>cum offerrent omne quod aperit vulvam, +propter delicta sua</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The law is said to have been deadly, as being not the cause, but the occasion of death, on account of its imperfection: in + so far as it did not confer grace enabling man to fulfil what is prescribed, and to avoid what it forbade. Hence this occasion + was not given to men, but taken by them. Wherefore the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.11" target="asv">Rom. 5:11</a>): "Sin, taking occasion by the commandment, seduced me, and by it killed me." In the same sense when it is + said that "the law entered in that sin might abound," the conjunction "that" must be taken as consecutive and not final: in + so far as men, taking occasion from the law, sinned all the more, both because a sin became more grievous after law had forbidden + it, and because concupiscence increased, since we desire a thing the more from its being forbidden. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37751" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37751] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod lex dicitur occidisse, non quidem effective, sed +occasionaliter, ex sua imperfectione, inquantum scilicet gratiam +non conferebat, per quam homines implere possent quod mandabat, vel +vitare quod vetabat. Et sic occasio ista non erat data, sed sumpta +ab hominibus. Unde et apostolus ibidem dicit, <i>occasione accepta +peccatum per mandatum seduxit me, et per illud occidit</i>. Et ex +hac etiam ratione dicitur quod lex subintravit ut abundaret +delictum, ut ly ut teneatur consecutive, non causaliter, inquantum +scilicet homines, accipientes occasionem a lege, abundantius +peccaverunt; tum quia gravius fuit peccatum post legis +prohibitionem; tum etiam quia concupiscentia crevit, magis enim +concupiscimus quod nobis prohibetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The yoke of the law could not be borne without the help of grace, which the law did not confer: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.16" target="asv">Rom. 9:16</a>): "It is not him that willeth, nor of him that runneth," viz. that he wills and runs in the commandments of God, "but of + God that showeth mercy." Wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.32" target="asv">Ps. 118:32</a>): "I have run the way of Thy commandments, when Thou didst enlarge my heart," i.e. by giving me grace and + charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37752" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37752] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod iugum legis servari non poterat sine gratia +adiuvante, quam lex non dabat, dicitur enim Rom. IX, <i>non est +volentis neque currentis</i>, scilicet velle et currere in +praeceptis Dei, sed miserentis Dei. Unde et in Psalmo CXVIII +dicitur, <i>viam mandatorum tuorum cucurri, cum dilatasti cor +meum</i>, scilicet per donum gratiae et caritatis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q98_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q98_A2-p0.1">Q. 98. A. 2. Whether the Old Law was from God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law was not from God. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.32.4" target="asv">Dt. 32:4</a>): "The works of God are perfect." But the Law was imperfect, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q98_A1" id="FS_Q98_A2-p2.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore the Old Law was not from God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37753" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37753] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non fuerit a Deo. Dicitur +enim Deut. XXXII, <i>Dei perfecta sunt opera</i>. Sed lex fuit +imperfecta, ut supra dictum est. Ergo lex vetus non fuit a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.3.14" target="asv">Eccles. 3:14</a>): "I have learned that all the works which God hath made continue for ever." But the Old Law does not continue for ever: + since the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.18" target="asv">Heb. 7:18</a>): "There is indeed a setting aside of the former commandment, because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof." Therefore + the Old Law was not from God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37754" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37754] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Eccle. III dicitur, <i>didici quod omnia opera quae fecit Deus, +perseverent in aeternum</i>. Sed lex vetus non perseverat in +aeternum, dicit enim apostolus, ad Heb. VII, <i>reprobatio fit +quidem praecedentis mandati, propter infirmitatem eius et +inutilitatem</i>. Ergo lex vetus non fuit a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a wise lawgiver should remove, not only evil, but also the occasions of evil. But the Old Law was an occasion of + sin, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Therefore the giving of such a law does not pertain to God, to Whom "none is like among + the lawgivers" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.36.22" target="asv">Job 36:22</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37755" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37755] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ad sapientem legislatorem pertinet non solum mala auferre, sed +etiam occasiones malorum. Sed vetus lex fuit occasio peccati, ut +supra dictum est. Ergo ad Deum, cui nullus est similis in +legislatoribus, ut dicitur Iob XXXVI, non pertinebat legem talem +dare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:4</a>) that God "will have all men to be saved." But the Old Law did not suffice to save man, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q98_A1" id="FS_Q98_A2-p5.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore the giving of such a law did not appertain to God. Therefore the Old Law was not from God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="37756" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37756] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +I ad Tim. II, dicitur quod <i>Deus vult omnes homines salvos +fieri</i>. Sed lex vetus non sufficiebat ad salutem hominum, ut +supra dictum est. Ergo ad Deum non pertinebat talem legem dare. Lex +ergo vetus non est a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.6" target="asv">Mat. 15:6</a>) while speaking to the Jews, to whom the Law was given: "You have made void the commandment of God for your tradition." And + shortly before (verse 4) He had said: "Honor thy father and mother," which is contained expressly in the Old Law ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.12" target="asv">Ex. 20:12</a>; + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.5.16" target="asv"> Dt. 5:16</a>). Therefore the Old Law was from God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37757" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37757] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dominus dicit, Matth. XV, loquens Iudaeis, quibus erat lex +vetus data, <i>irritum fecistis mandatum Dei propter traditiones +vestras</i>. Et paulo ante praemittitur, <i>honora patrem tuum et +matrem tuam</i>, quod manifeste in lege veteri continetur. Ergo lex +vetus est a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The Old Law was given by the good God, Who is the Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ. For the Old Law ordained men to Christ + in two ways. First by bearing witness to Christ; wherefore He Himself says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.24.44" target="asv">Lk. 24:44</a>): "All things must needs be fulfilled, which are written in the law . . . and in the prophets, and in the psalms, concerning + Me": and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#John.5.46" target="asv">Jn. 5:46</a>): "If you did believe Moses, you would perhaps believe Me also; for he wrote of Me." Secondly, as a kind of + disposition, since by withdrawing men from idolatrous worship, it enclosed [concludebat] them in the worship of one God, by + Whom the human race was to be saved through Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.23" target="asv">Gal. 3:23</a>): "Before the faith came, we were kept under the law shut up [conclusi], unto that faith which was to be revealed." Now it + is evident that the same thing it is, which gives a disposition to the end, and which brings to the end; and when I say "the + same," I mean + that it does so either by itself or through its subjects. For the devil would not make a law whereby men would be led to Christ, + Who was to cast him out, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.26" target="asv"> Mat. 12:26</a>: "If Satan cast out Satan, his kingdom is divided" [Vulg.: 'he is divided against himself']. Therefore the Old Law was given + by the same God, from Whom came salvation to man, through the grace of Christ. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 2 co."><a name="37758" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37758] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod lex vetus a bono Deo data est, qui est pater domini +nostri Iesu Christi. Lex enim vetus homines ordinabat ad Christum +dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, testimonium Christo perhibendo, unde +ipse dicit, Lucae ult., <i>oportet impleri omnia quae scripta sunt +in lege et Psalmis et prophetis de me</i>; et Ioan. V, <i>si +crederetis Moysi, crederetis forsitan et mihi, de me enim ille +scripsit</i>. Alio modo, per modum cuiusdam dispositionis, dum, +retrahens homines a cultu idololatriae, concludebat eos sub cultu +unius Dei, a quo salvandum erat humanum genus per Christum, unde +apostolus dicit, ad Gal. III, <i>priusquam veniret fides, sub lege +custodiebamur conclusi in eam fidem quae revelanda erat</i>. +Manifestum est autem quod eiusdem est disponere ad finem et ad +finem perducere, et dico eiusdem per se vel per suos subiectos. Non +enim Diabolus legem tulisset per quam homines adducerentur ad +Christum, per quem erat eiiciendus; secundum illud Matth. XII, +<i>si Satanas Satanam eiicit, divisum est regnum eius</i>. Et ideo +ab eodem Deo a quo facta est salus hominum per gratiam Christi, lex +vetus data est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing prevents a thing being not perfect simply, and yet perfect in respect of time: thus a boy is said to be perfect, + not simply, but with regard to the condition of time. So, too, precepts that are given to children are perfect in comparison + with the condition of those to whom they are given, although they are not perfect simply. Hence the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.24" target="asv">Gal. 3:24</a>): "The law was our pedagogue in Christ." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37759" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37759] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid non esse perfectum +simpliciter, quod tamen est perfectum secundum tempus, sicut +dicitur aliquis puer perfectus non simpliciter, sed secundum +temporis conditionem. Ita etiam praecepta quae pueris dantur, sunt +quidem perfecta secundum conditionem eorum quibus dantur, etsi non +sint perfecta simpliciter. Et talia fuerunt praecepta legis. Unde +apostolus dicit, ad Gal. III, <i>lex paedagogus noster fuit in +Christo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those works of God endure for ever which God so made that they would endure for ever; and these are His perfect works. But + the Old Law was set aside when there came the perfection of grace; not as though it were evil, but as being weak and useless + for this time; because, as the Apostle goes on to say, "the law brought nothing to perfection": hence he says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.25" target="asv">Gal. 3:25</a>): "After the faith is come, we are no longer under a + pedagogue." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37760" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37760] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod opera Dei perseverant in aeternum, quae sic Deus +fecit ut in aeternum perseverent, et haec sunt ea quae sunt +perfecta. Lex autem vetus reprobatur tempore perfectionis gratiae, +non tanquam mala, sed tanquam infirma et inutilis pro isto tempore, +quia, ut subditur, nihil ad perfectum adduxit lex. Unde ad Gal. +III, dicit apostolus, <i>ubi venit fides, iam non sumus sub +paedagogo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q79_A4" id="FS_Q98_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[4]</a>), God sometimes permits certain ones to fall into sin, that they may thereby be humbled. So also did He wish to give such + a law as men by their own forces could not fulfill, so that, while presuming on their own powers, they might find themselves + to be sinners, and being humbled might have recourse to the help of grace. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37761" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37761] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Deus aliquando permittit +aliquos cadere in peccatum, ut exinde humilientur. Ita etiam voluit +talem legem dare quam suis viribus homines implere non possent, ut +sic dum homines de se praesumentes peccatores se invenirent, +humiliati recurrerent ad auxilium gratiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the Old Law did not suffice to save man, yet another help from God besides the Law was available for man, viz. faith + in the Mediator, by which the fathers of old were justified even as we were. Accordingly God did not fail man by giving him + insufficient aids to salvation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="37762" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37762] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, quamvis lex vetus non sufficeret ad salvandum +hominem, tamen aderat aliud auxilium a Deo hominibus simul cum +lege, per quod salvari poterant, scilicet fides mediatoris, per +quam iustificati sunt antiqui patres, sicut etiam nos iustificamur. +Et sic Deus non deficiebat hominibus quin daret eis salutis +auxilia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q98_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q98_A3-p0.1">Q. 98. A. 3. Whether the Old Law was given through the angels?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the Old Law was not given through the angels, but immediately by God. For an angel means a "messenger"; so + that the word "angel" denotes ministry, not lordship, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.102.20" target="asv"> Ps. 102:20,21</a>: "Bless the Lord, all ye His Angels . . . you ministers of His." But the Old Law is related to have been given by the Lord: + for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.1" target="asv">Ex. 20:1</a>): "And the Lord spoke . . . these words," and further on: "I am the Lord Thy God." + Moreover the same expression is often repeated in Exodus, and the later books of the Law. Therefore the Law was given by God + immediately. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37763" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37763] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non fuerit data per Angelos, +sed immediate a Deo. Angelus enim nuntius dicitur, et sic nomen +Angeli ministerium importat, non dominium; secundum illud Psalmi +CII, <i>benedicite domino, omnes Angeli eius, ministri eius</i>. +Sed vetus lex a domino tradita esse perhibetur, dicitur enim Exod. +XX, <i>locutusque est dominus sermones hos</i>, et postea subditur, +<i>ego enim sum dominus Deus tuus</i>. Et idem modus loquendi +frequenter repetitur in Exodo, et in libris consequentibus legis. +Ergo lex est immediate data a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.17" target="asv"> Jn. 1:17, </a> "the Law was given by Moses." But Moses received it from God immediately: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A3-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.33.11" target="asv">Ex. 33:11</a>): "The Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend." Therefore the Old Law was given by God + immediately. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37764" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37764] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut dicitur Ioan. I, lex per Moysen data est. Sed Moyses +immediate accepit a Deo, dicitur enim Exod. XXXIII, <i>loquebatur +dominus ad Moysen facie ad faciem, sicut loqui solet homo ad amicum +suum</i>. Ergo lex vetus immediate data est a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it belongs to the sovereign alone to make a law, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A3" id="FS_Q98_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[3]</a>). But God alone is Sovereign as regards the salvation of souls: while the angels are the "ministering spirits," as stated + in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv"> Heb. 1:14.</a> Therefore it was not meet for the Law to be given through the angels, since it is ordained to the salvation of souls. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37765" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37765] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ad solum principem pertinet legem ferre, ut supra dictum est. Sed +solus Deus est princeps salutis animarum, <i>Angeli vero sunt +administratorii spiritus</i>, ut dicitur ad Heb. I. Ergo lex vetus +per Angelos dari non debuit, cum ordinaretur ad animarum +salutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.19" target="asv">Gal. 3:19</a>) that the Law was "given [Vulg.: 'ordained'] by angels in the hand of a Mediator." And Stephen said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Acts.7.53" target="asv">Acts 7:53</a>): "(Who) have received the Law by the disposition of angels." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37766" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37766] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicit apostolus, ad Gal. III, <i>lex data est per Angelos +in manu mediatoris</i>. Et Act. VII, dicit Stephanus, <i>accepistis +legem in dispositione Angelorum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The Law was given by God through the angels. And besides the general reason given by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv), viz. that + "the gifts of God should be brought to men by means of the angels," there is a special reason why the Old Law should have + been given through them. For it has been stated ( + <a href="#FS_Q98_A1" id="FS_Q98_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2) that the Old Law was imperfect, and yet disposed man to that perfect salvation of the human race, which was to come through + Christ. + Now it is to be observed that wherever there is an order of powers or arts, he that holds the highest place, himself exercises + the principal and perfect acts; while those things which dispose to the ultimate perfection are effected by him through his + subordinates: thus the ship-builder himself rivets the planks together, but prepares the material by means of the workmen + who assist him under his direction. Consequently it was fitting that the perfect law of the New Testament should be given + by + the incarnate God immediately; but that the Old Law should be given to men by the ministers of God, i.e. by the angels. It + is thus that the Apostle at the beginning of his epistle to the Hebrews (1:2) proves the excellence of the New Law over the + Old; because in the New Testament "God . . . hath spoken to us by His Son," whereas in the Old Testament "the word was spoken + by angels" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.2.2" target="asv">Heb. 2:2</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 3 co."><a name="37767" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37767] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod lex data est a Deo per Angelos. Et praeter generalem +rationem, quam Dionysius assignat, in IV cap. Cael. Hier., quod +<i>divina debent deferri ad homines mediantibus Angelis</i>, +specialis ratio est quare legem veterem per Angelos dari oportuit. +Dictum est enim quod lex vetus imperfecta erat, sed disponebat ad +salutem perfectam generis humani, quae futura erat per Christum. +Sic autem videtur in omnibus potestatibus et artibus ordinatis, +quod ille qui est superior, principalem et perfectum actum operatur +per seipsum; ea vero quae disponunt ad perfectionem ultimam, +operatur per suos ministros; sicut navifactor compaginat navem per +seipsum, sed praeparat materiam per artifices subministrantes. Et +ideo conveniens fuit ut lex perfecta novi testamenti daretur +immediate per ipsum Deum hominem factum; lex autem vetus per +ministros Dei, scilicet per Angelos, daretur hominibus. Et per hunc +modum apostolus, in principio ad Heb., probat eminentiam novae +legis ad veterem, quia in novo testamento locutus est nobis Deus in +filio suo, in veteri autem testamento est sermo factus per +Angelos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Gregory says at the beginning of his Morals (Praef. chap. i), "the angel who is described to have appeared to Moses, is + sometimes mentioned as an angel, sometimes as the Lord: an angel, in truth, in respect of that which was subservient to the + external delivery; and the Lord, because He was the Director within, Who supported the effectual power of speaking." Hence + also it is that the angel spoke as personating the Lord. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37768" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37768] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut Gregorius dicit, in principio Moral., +<i>Angelus qui Moysi apparuisse describitur, modo Angelus, modo +dominus memoratur. Angelus videlicet, propter hoc quod exterius +loquendo serviebat; dominus autem dicitur, quia interius praesidens +loquendi efficaciam ministrabat</i>. Et inde est etiam quod quasi +ex persona domini Angelus loquebatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27), it is stated in Exodus that "the Lord spoke to Moses face to face"; and shortly + afterwards we read, "Show me Thy glory. Therefore He perceived what he saw and he desired what he saw not." Hence he did not + see the very Essence of God; and consequently he was not taught by Him immediately. Accordingly when Scripture states that + "He spoke to him face to face," this is to be understood as expressing the opinion of + the people, who thought that Moses was speaking with God mouth to mouth, when God spoke and appeared to him, by means of a + subordinate creature, i.e. an angel and a cloud. Again we may say that this vision "face to face" means some kind of sublime + and familiar contemplation, inferior to the vision of the Divine Essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37769" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37769] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., in +Exodo dicitur, <i>locutus est dominus Moysi facie ad faciem</i>; et +paulo post subditur, <i>ostende mihi gloriam tuam. Sentiebat ergo +quid videbat; et quod non videbat, desiderabat</i>. Non ergo +videbat ipsam Dei essentiam, et ita non immediate ab eo +instruebatur. Quod ergo dicitur quod loquebatur ei facie ad faciem, +secundum opinionem populi loquitur Scriptura, qui putabat Moysen +ore ad os loqui cum Deo, cum per subiectam creaturam, idest per +Angelum et nubem, ei loqueretur et appareret. Vel per visionem +faciei intelligitur quaedam eminens contemplatio et familiaris, +infra essentiae divinae visionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is for the sovereign alone to make a law by his own authority; but sometimes after making a law, he promulgates it through + others. Thus God made the Law by His own authority, but He promulgated it through the angels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37770" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37770] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod solius principis est sua auctoritate legem +instituere, sed quandoque legem institutam per alios promulgat. Et +ita Deus sua auctoritate instituit legem, sed per Angelos +promulgavit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q98_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q98_A4-p0.1">Q. 98. A. 4. Whether the Old Law should have been given to the Jews alone?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law should not have been given to the Jews alone. For the Old Law disposed men for the salvation + which was to come through Christ, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q98_A2" id="FS_Q98_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3). But that salvation was to come not to the Jews alone but to all nations, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.49.6" target="asv"> Is. 49:6</a>: "It is a small thing that thou shouldst be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to convert the dregs of Israel. + Behold I have + given thee to be the light of the Gentiles, that thou mayest be My salvation, even to the farthest part of the earth." Therefore + the Old Law should have been given to all nations, and not to one people only. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37771" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37771] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non debuerit dari soli +populo Iudaeorum. Lex enim vetus disponebat ad salutem quae futura +erat per Christum, ut dictum est. Sed salus illa non erat futura +solum in Iudaeis, sed in omnibus gentibus; secundum illud Isaiae +XLIX, <i>parum est ut sis mihi servus ad suscitandas tribus Iacob +et faeces Israel convertendas, dedi te in lucem gentium, ut sis +salus mea usque ad extremum terrae</i>. Ergo lex vetus dari debuit +omnibus gentibus, et non uni populo tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.10.34" target="asv"> Acts 10:34,35, </a> "God is not a respecter of persons: but in every nation, he that feareth Him, and worketh justice, is acceptable to Him." + Therefore the way of salvation should not have been opened to one people more than to another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37772" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37772] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut dicitur Act. X, <i>non est personarum acceptor Deus, sed in +omni gente qui timet Deum et facit iustitiam, acceptus est +illi</i>. Non ergo magis uni populo quam aliis viam salutis debuit +aperire.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the law was given through the angels, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q98_A3" id="FS_Q98_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. But God always vouchsafed the ministrations of the angels not to the Jews alone, but to all nations: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.17.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 17:14</a>): "Over every nation He set a ruler." Also on all nations He bestows temporal goods, which are of less account with God than + spiritual goods. Therefore He should have given the Law also to all peoples. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37773" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37773] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex data est per Angelos, sicut iam dictum est. Sed ministeria +Angelorum Deus non solum Iudaeis, sed omnibus gentibus semper +exhibuit, dicitur enim Eccli. XVII, <i>in unamquamque gentem +praeposuit rectorem</i>. Omnibus etiam gentibus temporalia bona +largitur, quae minus sunt curae Deo quam spiritualia bona. Ergo +etiam legem omnibus populis dare debuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.1" target="asv">Rom. 3:1,2</a>): "What advantage then hath the Jew? . . . Much every way. First indeed, because the words of God were committed to them": + and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.147.9" target="asv">Ps. 147:9</a>): "He hath not done in like manner to every nation: and His judgments He hath not made manifest unto them." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37774" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37774] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Rom. III, <i>quid ergo amplius est Iudaeo? Multum +quidem per omnem modum. Primum quidem, quia credita sunt illis +eloquia Dei</i>. Et in Psalmo CXLVII dicitur, <i>non fecit taliter +omni nationi, et iudicia sua non manifestavit eis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q98_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It might be assigned as a reason for the Law being given to the Jews rather than to other peoples, that the Jewish people + alone remained faithful to the worship of one God, while the others turned away to idolatry; wherefore the latter were unworthy + to receive the Law, lest a holy thing should be given to dogs. + </p><p id="FS_Q98_A4-p7"> But this reason does not seem fitting: because that people turned to idolatry, even after the Law had been made, which was + more grievous, as is clear from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.32" target="asv">Ex. 32</a> and from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Amos.5.25" target="asv"> Amos 5:25,26</a>: "Did you offer victims and sacrifices to Me in the desert for forty years, O house of Israel? But you carried a tabernacle + for your Moloch, and the image of your idols, the star of your god, which you made to yourselves." Moreover it is stated expressly + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.9.6" target="asv">Dt. + 9:6 + </a>): "Know therefore that the Lord thy God giveth thee not this excellent land in possession for thy justices, for thou art + a very stiff-necked people": but the real reason is given in the preceding verse: "That the Lord might accomplish His word, + which He promised by oath to thy fathers Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob." + </p><p id="FS_Q98_A4-p8"> What this promise was is shown by the Apostle, who says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.16" target="asv">Gal. 3:16</a>) that "to Abraham were the promises made and to his seed. He saith not, 'And to his seeds,' as of many: but as of one, 'And + to thy seed,' which is Christ." And so God vouchsafed both the Law and other special boons to that people, on account of the + promised made to their fathers that Christ should be born of them. For it was fitting that the people, of whom Christ was + to be born, should be + signalized by a special sanctification, according to the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.2" target="asv"> Lev. 19:2</a>: "Be ye holy, because I . . . am holy." Nor again was it on account of the merit of Abraham himself that this promise was + made to him, viz. that Christ should be born of his seed: but of gratuitous election and vocation. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Isa.41.2" target="asv">Is. 41:2</a>): "Who hath raised up the just one form the east, hath called him to follow him?" + </p><p id="FS_Q98_A4-p9"> It is therefore evident that it was merely from gratuitous election that the patriarchs received the promise, and that the + people sprung from them received the law; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.4.36" target="asv"> Dt. 4:36, 37</a>: "Ye did [Vulg.: 'Thou didst'] hear His words out of the midst of the fire, because He loved thy fathers, and chose their + seed after them." And if again it asked why He chose this people, and not another, that Christ might be born thereof; a fitting + answer is given by + Augustine (Tract. super Joan. xxvi): "Why He draweth one and draweth not another, seek not thou to judge, if thou wish not + to err." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 4 co."><a name="37775" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37775] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod posset una ratio assignari quare potius populo +Iudaeorum data sit lex quam aliis populis, quia, aliis ad +idololatriam declinantibus, solus populus Iudaeorum in cultu unius +Dei remansit; et ideo alii populi indigni erant legem recipere, ne +sanctum canibus daretur. Sed ista ratio conveniens non videtur, +quia populus ille etiam post legem latam, ad idololatriam +declinavit, quod gravius fuit, ut patet Exod. XXXII; et Amos V, +<i>numquid hostias et sacrificium obtulistis mihi in deserto +quadraginta annis, domus Israel? Et portastis tabernaculum Moloch +vestro, et imaginem idolorum vestrorum, sidus Dei vestri, quae +fecistis vobis</i>. Expresse etiam dicitur Deut. IX, <i>scito quod +non propter iustitias tuas dominus Deus tuus dedit tibi terram hanc +in possessionem, cum durissimae cervici sis populus</i>. Sed ratio +ibi praemittitur, <i>ut compleret verbum suum dominus, quod sub +iuramento pollicitus est patribus tuis, Abraham, Isaac et +Iacob</i>. Quae autem promissio eis sit facta, ostendit apostolus, +ad Galat. III, dicens, <i>Abrahae dictae sunt promissiones, et +semini eius. Non dicit, seminibus, quasi in multis, sed quasi in +uno, et semini tuo, qui est Christus</i>. Deus igitur et legem et +alia beneficia specialia illi populo exhibuit propter promissionem +eorum patribus factam ut ex eis Christus nasceretur. Decebat enim +ut ille populus ex quo Christus nasciturus erat, quadam speciali +sanctificatione polleret; secundum illud quod dicitur Levit. XIX, +<i>sancti eritis, quia ego sanctus sum</i>. Nec etiam fuit propter +meritum ipsius Abrahae ut talis promissio ei fieret, ut scilicet +Christus ex eius semine nasceretur, sed ex gratuita electione et +vocatione. Unde dicitur Isaiae XLI, <i>quis suscitavit ab oriente +iustum, vocavit eum ut sequeretur se?</i> Sic ergo patet quod ex +sola gratuita electione patres promissionem acceperunt, et populus +ex eis progenitus legem accepit; secundum illud Deut. IV, +<i>audistis verba illius de medio ignis, quia dilexit patres, et +elegit semen eorum post illos</i>. Si autem rursus quaeratur quare +hunc populum elegit ut ex eo Christus nasceretur, et non alium, +conveniet responsio Augustini, quam dicit super Ioan., <i>quare +hunc trahat et illum non trahat, noli velle diiudicare, si non vis +errare</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the salvation, which was to come through Christ, was prepared for all nations, yet it was necessary that Christ + should be born of one people, which, for this reason, was privileged above other peoples; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.4" target="asv"> Rom. 9:4</a>: "To whom," namely the Jews, "belongeth the adoption as of children (of God) . . . and the testament, and the giving of the + Law . . . whose are the fathers, and of whom is Christ according to the + flesh." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37776" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37776] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quamvis salus futura per Christum, esset +omnibus gentibus praeparata; tamen oportebat ex uno populo Christum +nasci, qui propter hoc prae aliis praerogativas habuit; secundum +illud Rom. IX, quorum, scilicet Iudaeorum, <i>est adoptio filiorum +Dei, et testamentum et legislatio; quorum patres; ex quibus +Christus est secundum carnem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Respect of persons takes place in those things which are given according to due; but it has no place in those things which + are bestowed gratuitously. Because he who, out of generosity, gives of his own to one and not to another, is not a respecter + of persons: but if he were a dispenser of goods held in common, and were not to distribute them according to personal merits, + he would be a respecter of persons. Now God bestows the benefits of salvation on + the human race gratuitously: wherefore He is not a respecter of persons, if He gives them to some rather than to others. Hence + Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. viii): "All whom God teaches, he teaches out of pity; but whom He teaches not, out of + justice He teaches not": for this is due to the condemnation of the human race for the sin of the first parent. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37777" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37777] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod acceptio personarum locum habet in his quae ex debito +dantur, in his vero quae ex gratuita voluntate conferuntur, +acceptio personarum locum non habet. Non enim est personarum +acceptor qui ex liberalitate de suo dat uni et non alteri, sed si +esset dispensator bonorum communium, et non distribueret aequaliter +secundum merita personarum, esset personarum acceptor. Salutaria +autem beneficia Deus humano generi confert ex sua gratia. Unde non +est personarum acceptor si quibusdam prae aliis conferat. Unde +Augustinus dicit, in libro de Praedest. Sanct., <i>omnes quos Deus +docet, misericordia docet, quos autem non docet, iudicio non +docet</i>. Hoc enim venit ex damnatione humani generis pro peccato +primi parentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The benefits of grace are forfeited by man on account of sin: but not the benefits of nature. Among the latter are the ministries + of the angels, which the very order of various natures demands, viz. that the lowest beings be governed through the intermediate + beings: and also bodily aids, which God vouchsafes not only to men, but also to beasts, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.7" target="asv"> Ps. 35:7</a>: "Men and beasts Thou wilt preserve, O Lord." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37778" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37778] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod beneficia gratiae subtrahuntur homini propter culpam, +sed beneficia naturalia non subtrahuntur. Inter quae sunt +ministeria Angelorum, quae ipse naturarum ordo requirit, ut +scilicet per media gubernentur infima; et etiam corporalia +subsidia, quae non solum hominibus, sed etiam iumentis Deus +administrat, secundum illud Psalmi XXXV, <i>homines et iumenta +salvabis, domine</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q98_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q98_A5-p0.1">Q. 98. A. 5. Whether all men were bound to observe the Old Law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all men were bound to observe the Old Law. Because whoever is subject to the king, must needs be subject + to his law. But the Old Law was given by God, Who is "King of all the earth" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.46.8" target="asv">Ps. 46:8</a>). Therefore all the inhabitants of the earth were bound to observe the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37779" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37779] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnes homines obligarentur ad +observandam veterem legem. Quicumque enim subditur regi, oportet +quod subdatur legi ipsius. Sed vetus lex est data a Deo, qui est +rex omnis terrae, ut in Psalmo XLVI dicitur. Ergo omnes habitantes +terram tenebantur ad observantiam legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Jews could not be saved without observing the Old Law: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.27.26" target="asv">Dt. 27:26</a>): "Cursed be he that abideth not in the words of this law, and fulfilleth them not in work." If therefore other men could + be saved without the observance of the Old Law, the Jews would be in a worse plight than other men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37780" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37780] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Iudaei salvari non poterant nisi legem veterem observarent, dicitur +enim Deut. XXVII, <i>maledictus qui non permanet in sermonibus +legis huius, nec eos opere perficit</i>. Si igitur alii homines +sine observantia legis veteris potuissent salvari, peior fuisset +conditio Iudaeorum quam aliorum hominum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Gentiles were admitted to the Jewish ritual and to the observances of the Law: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.12.48" target="asv">Ex. 12:48</a>): "If any stranger be willing to dwell among you, and to keep the Phase of the Lord, all his males shall first be circumcised, + and then shall he celebrate it according to the manner; and he shall be as he that is born in the land." But it would have + been useless to admit strangers to the legal observances according to + Divine ordinance, if they could have been saved without the observance of the Law. Therefore none could be saved without observing + the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37781" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37781] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +gentiles ad ritum Iudaicum et ad observantias legis admittebantur, +dicitur enim Exod. XII, <i>si quis peregrinorum in vestram voluerit +transire coloniam, et facere phase domini, circumcidetur prius omne +masculinum eius, et tunc rite celebrabit, eritque simul sicut +indigena terrae</i>. Frustra autem ad observantias legales fuissent +extranei admissi ex ordinatione divina, si absque legalibus +observantiis salvari potuissent. Ergo nullus salvari poterat nisi +legem observaret.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix) that many of the Gentiles were brought back to God by the angels. But it is clear that the + Gentiles did not observe the Law. Therefore some could be saved without observing the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37782" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37782] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Dionysius dicit, IX cap. Cael. Hier., quod multi gentilium +per Angelos sunt reducti in Deum. Sed constat quod gentiles legem +non observabant. Ergo absque observantia legis poterant aliqui +salvari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q98_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The Old Law showed forth the precepts of the natural law, and added certain precepts of its own. Accordingly, as to those + precepts of the natural law contained in the Old Law, all were bound to observe the Old Law; not because they belonged to + the Old Law, but because they belonged to the natural law. But as to those precepts which were added by the Old Law, they + were not binding on save the Jewish people alone. + </p><p id="FS_Q98_A5-p7"> The reason of this is because the Old Law, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q98_A4" id="FS_Q98_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, was given to the Jewish people, that it might receive a prerogative of holiness, in reverence for Christ Who was to be born + of that people. Now whatever laws are enacted for the special sanctification of certain ones, are binding on them alone: thus + clerics who are set aside for the service of God are bound to certain obligations to which the laity are not bound; likewise + religious are + bound by their profession to certain works of perfection, to which people living in the world are not bound. In like manner + this people was bound to certain special observances, to which other peoples were not bound. Wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A5-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.18.13" target="asv">Dt. 18:13</a>): "Thou shalt be perfect and without spot before the Lord thy God": and for this reason they used a kind of form of profession, + as appears from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A5-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.26.3" target="asv"> Dt. 26:3</a>: "I profess this day before the Lord thy God," + etc. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 5 co."><a name="37783" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37783] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod lex vetus manifestabat praecepta legis naturae, et +superaddebat quaedam propria praecepta. Quantum igitur ad illa quae +lex vetus continebat de lege naturae, omnes tenebantur ad +observantiam veteris legis, non quia erant de veteri lege, sed quia +erant de lege naturae. Sed quantum ad illa quae lex vetus +superaddebat, non tenebantur aliqui ad observantiam veteris legis +nisi solus populus Iudaeorum. Cuius ratio est quia lex vetus, sicut +dictum est, data est populo Iudaeorum ut quandam praerogativam +sanctitatis obtineret, propter reverentiam Christi, qui ex illo +populo nasciturus erat. Quaecumque autem statuuntur ad specialem +aliquorum sanctificationem, non obligant nisi illos, sicut ad +quaedam obligantur clerici, qui mancipantur divino ministerio, ad +quae laici non obligantur; similiter et religiosi ad quaedam +perfectionis opera obligantur ex sua professione, ad quae +saeculares non obligantur. Et similiter ad quaedam specialia +obligabatur populus ille, ad quae alii populi non obligabantur. +Unde dicitur Deut. XVIII, <i>perfectus eris, et absque macula, cum +domino Deo tuo</i>. Et propter hoc etiam quadam professione +utebantur; ut patet Deut. XXVI, <i>profiteor hodie coram domino Deo +tuo</i> et cetera.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Whoever are subject to a king, are bound to observe his law which he makes for all in general. But if he orders certain things + to be observed by the servants of his household, others are not bound thereto. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37784" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37784] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod quicumque subduntur regi, obligantur ad legem +eius observandam quam omnibus communiter proponit. Sed si instituat +aliqua observanda a suis familiaribus ministris, ad haec ceteri non +obligantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The more a man is united to God, the better his state becomes: wherefore the more the Jewish people were bound to the worship + of God, the greater their excellence over other peoples. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.4.8" target="asv">Dt. 4:8</a>): "What other nation is there so renowned that hath ceremonies and just judgments, and all the law?" In like manner, from + this point of view, the state of clerics is better than that of the laity, and the state of + religious than that of folk living in the world. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37785" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37785] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod homo quanto Deo magis coniungitur, tanto efficitur +melioris conditionis. Et ideo quanto populus Iudaeorum erat +adstrictus magis ad divinum cultum, dignior aliis populis erat. +Unde dicitur Deut. IV, <i>quae est alia gens sic inclyta, ut habeat +caeremonias, iustaque iudicia, et universam legem?</i> Et similiter +etiam quantum ad hoc sunt melioris conditionis clerici quam laici, +et religiosi quam saeculares.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Gentiles obtained salvation more perfectly and more securely under the observances of the Law than under the mere natural + law: and for this reason they were admitted to them. So too the laity are now admitted to the ranks of the clergy, and secular + persons to those of the religious, although they can be saved without this. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37786" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37786] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod gentiles perfectius et securius salutem +consequebantur sub observantiis legis quam sub sola lege naturali, +et ideo ad eas admittebantur. Sicut etiam nunc laici transeunt ad +clericatum, et saeculares ad religionem, quamvis absque hoc possint +salvari.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q98_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q98_A6-p0.1">Q. 98. A. 6. Whether the Old Law was suitably given at the time of Moses?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law was not suitably given at the time of Moses. Because the Old Law disposed man for the salvation + which was to come through Christ, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q98_A2" id="FS_Q98_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3). But man needed this salutary remedy immediately after he had sinned. Therefore the Law should have been given immediately + after sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37787" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37787] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non convenienter fuerit data +tempore Moysi. Lex enim vetus disponebat ad salutem quae erat +futura per Christum, sicut dictum est. Sed statim homo post +peccatum indiguit huiusmodi salutis remedio. Ergo statim post +peccatum lex vetus debuit dari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Old Law was given for the sanctification of those from whom Christ was to be born. Now the promise concerning + the "seed, which is Christ" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.16" target="asv">Gal. 3:16</a>) was first made to Abraham, as related in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A6-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.12.7" target="asv">Gn. 12:7</a>. Therefore the Law should have been given at once at the time of Abraham. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37788" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37788] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +lex vetus data est propter sanctificationem eorum ex quibus +Christus nasciturus erat. Sed Abrahae incoepit fieri promissio de +semine, quod est Christus, ut habetur Gen. XII. Ergo statim tempore +Abrahae debuit lex dari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as Christ was born of those alone who descended from Noe through Abraham, to whom the promise was made; so was He + born of no other of the descendants of Abraham but David, to whom the promise was renewed, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiKgdms.23.1" target="asv">2 Kings 23:1</a>: "The man to whom it was appointed concerning the Christ of the God of Jacob . . . said." Therefore the Old Law should have + been given after David, just as it was given after Abraham. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37789" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37789] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut Christus non est natus ex aliis descendentibus ex Noe nisi ex +Abraham, cui facta est promissio; ita etiam non est natus ex aliis +filiis Abrahae nisi ex David, cui est promissio renovata, secundum +illud II Reg. XXIII, <i>dixit vir cui constitutum est de Christo +Dei Iacob</i>. Ergo lex vetus debuit dari post David, sicut data +est post Abraham.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.19" target="asv">Gal. 3:19</a>) that the Law "was set because of transgressions, until the seed should come, to whom He made the promise, being ordained + by angels in the hand of a Mediator": ordained, i.e. "given in orderly fashion," as the gloss explains. Therefore it was fitting + that the Old Law should be given in this order of time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 6 s. c."><a name="37790" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37790] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Gal. III, quod <i>lex propter +transgressionem posita est, donec veniret semen cui promiserat, +ordinata per Angelos in manu mediatoris</i>, idest ordinabiliter +data, ut Glossa dicit. Ergo congruum fuit ut lex vetus illo +temporis ordine traderetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q98_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It was most fitting for the Law to be given at the time of Moses. The reason for this may be taken from two things in respect + of which every law is imposed on two kinds of men. Because it is imposed on some men who are hard-hearted and proud, whom + the law restrains and tames: and it is imposed on good men, who, through being instructed by the law, are helped to fulfil + what they desire to do. Hence it was fitting that the Law should be given at such a time as + would be appropriate for the overcoming of man's pride. For man was proud of two things, viz. of knowledge and of power. He + was proud of his knowledge, as though his natural reason could suffice him for salvation: and accordingly, in order that his + pride might be overcome in this matter, man was left to the guidance of his reason without the help of a written law: and + man was able to learn from experience that his reason was deficient, since about the time of Abraham man had fallen headlong + into idolatry and the most shameful vices. Wherefore, after those times, it was necessary for a written law to be given as + a remedy for human ignorance: because "by the Law is the knowledge of sin" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.20" target="asv">Rom. 3:20</a>). But, after man had been instructed by the Law, his pride was convinced of his weakness, through his being unable to fulfil + what he knew. Hence, as the Apostle concludes ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A6-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.3" target="asv">Rom. 8:3,4</a>), "what the Law could not do in that it was weak through the flesh, + God sent [Vulg.: 'sending'] His own Son . . . that the justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us." + </p><p id="FS_Q98_A6-p7"> With regard to good men, the Law was given to them as a help; which was most needed by the people, at the time when the natural + law began to be obscured on account of the exuberance of sin: for it was fitting that this help should be bestowed on men + in an orderly manner, so that they might be led from imperfection to perfection; wherefore it was becoming that the Old Law + should be given between the law of nature and the law of grace. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 6 co."><a name="37791" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37791] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod convenientissime lex vetus data fuit tempore Moysi. +Cuius ratio potest accipi ex duobus, secundum quod quaelibet lex +duobus generibus hominum imponitur. Imponitur enim quibusdam duris +et superbis, qui per legem compescuntur et domantur, imponitur +etiam bonis, qui, per legem instructi, adiuvantur ad implendum quod +intendunt. Conveniens igitur fuit tali tempore legem veterem dari, +ad superbiam hominum convincendam. De duobus enim homo superbiebat, +scilicet de scientia, et de potentia. De scientia quidem, quasi +ratio naturalis ei posset sufficere ad salutem. Et ideo ut de hoc +eius superbia convinceretur permissus est homo regimini suae +rationis absque adminiculo legis scriptae, et experimento homo +discere potuit quod patiebatur rationis defectum, per hoc quod +homines usque ad idololatriam et turpissima vitia circa tempora +Abrahae sunt prolapsi. Et ideo post haec tempora fuit necessarium +legem scriptam dari in remedium humanae ignorantiae, quia per legem +est cognitio peccati, ut dicitur Rom. III. Sed postquam homo est +instructus per legem, convicta est eius superbia de infirmitate, +dum implere non poterat quod cognoscebat. Et ideo, sicut apostolus +concludit, ad Rom. VIII, <i>quod impossibile erat legi, in qua +infirmabatur per carnem, misit Deus filium suum, ut iustificatio +legis impleretur in nobis</i>. Ex parte vero bonorum, lex data est +in auxilium. Quod quidem tunc maxime populo necessarium fuit, +quando lex naturalis obscurari incipiebat propter exuberantiam +peccatorum. Oportebat autem huiusmodi auxilium quodam ordine dari, +ut per imperfecta ad perfectionem manuducerentur. Et ideo inter +legem naturae et legem gratiae, oportuit legem veterem dari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It was not fitting for the Old Law to be given at once after the sin of the first man: both because man was so confident + in his own reason, that he did not acknowledge his need of the Old Law; because as yet the dictate of the natural law was + not darkened by habitual sinning. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="37792" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37792] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod statim post peccatum primi hominis non +competebat legem veterem dari, tum quia nondum homo recognoscebat +se ea indigere, de sua ratione confisus. Tum quia adhuc dictamen +legis naturae nondum erat obtenebratum per consuetudinem +peccandi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A law should not be given save to the people, since it is a general precept, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q98_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[90], AA[2]</a>,3); wherefore at the time of Abraham God gave men certain familiar, and, as it were, household precepts: but when Abraham's + descendants had multiplied, so as to form a people, and when they had been freed from slavery, it was fitting that they should + be given a law; for "slaves are not that part of the people or state to + which it is fitting for the law to be directed," as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2,4,5). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="37793" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37793] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod lex non debet dari nisi populo, est enim praeceptum +commune, ut dictum est. Et ideo tempore Abrahae data sunt quaedam +familiaria praecepta, et quasi domestica, Dei ad homines. Sed +postmodum, multiplicatis eius posteris intantum quod populus esset, +et liberatis eis a servitute, lex convenienter potuit dari, nam +servi non sunt pars populi vel civitatis, cui legem dari competit, +ut philosophus dicit, in III Polit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q98_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since the Law had to be given to the people, not only those, of whom Christ was born, received the Law, but the whole people, + who were marked with the seal of circumcision, which was the sign of the promise made to Abraham, and in which he believed, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A6-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.11" target="asv"> Rom. 4:11</a>: hence even before David, the Law had to be given to that people as soon as they were collected together. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 98 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="37794" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37794] Iª-IIae q. 98 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, quia legem oportebat alicui populo dari, non solum +illi ex quibus Christus natus est, legem acceperunt; sed totus +populus consignatus signaculo circumcisionis, quae fuit signum +promissionis Abrahae factae et ab eo creditae, ut dicit apostolus, +Rom. IV. Et ideo etiam ante David oportuit legem dari tali populo +iam collecto.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q99" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q99-p0.1">Q. 99. OF THE PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q99-p2"> We must now consider the precepts of the Old Law; and (1) how they are distinguished from one another; (2) each kind of precept. + Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q99-p3"><a href="#FS_Q99_A1"> (1) Whether the Old Law contains several precepts or only one?</a></p><p id="FS_Q99-p4"><a href="#FS_Q99_A2"> (2) Whether the Old Law contains any moral precepts?</a></p><p id="FS_Q99-p5"><a href="#FS_Q99_A3"> (3) Whether it contains ceremonial precepts in addition to the moral precepts?</a></p><p id="FS_Q99-p6"><a href="#FS_Q99_A4"> (4) Whether besides these it contains judicial precepts?</a></p><p id="FS_Q99-p7"><a href="#FS_Q99_A5"> (5) Whether it contains any others besides these?</a></p><p id="FS_Q99-p8"><a href="#FS_Q99_A6"> (6) How the Old Law induced men to keep its precepts.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 pr."><a name="37795" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37795] +Iª-IIae q. 99 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +praeceptis veteris legis. Et primo, de distinctione ipsorum; +secundo, de singulis generibus distinctis. Circa primum quaeruntur +sex. Primo, utrum legis veteris sint plura praecepta, vel unum +tantum. Secundo, utrum lex vetus contineat aliqua praecepta +moralia. Tertio, utrum praeter moralia contineat caeremonialia. +Quarto, utrum contineat, praeter haec, iudicialia. Quinto, utrum +praeter ista tria contineat aliqua alia. Sexto, de modo quo lex +inducebat ad observantiam praedictorum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q99_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q99_A1-p0.1">Q. 99. A. 1. Whether the Old Law contains only one precept?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law contains but one precept. Because a law is nothing else than a precept, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q99_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[90], AA[2]</a>,3). Now there is but one Old Law. Therefore it contains but one precept. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37796" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37796] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in lege veteri non contineatur nisi +unum praeceptum. Lex enim est nihil aliud quam praeceptum, ut supra +habitum est. Sed lex vetus est una. Ergo non continet nisi unum +praeceptum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.9" target="asv">Rom. 13:9</a>): "If there be any other commandment, it is comprised in this word: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." But this is + only one commandment. Therefore the Old Law contained but one commandment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37797" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37797] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +apostolus dicit, Rom. XIII, <i>si quod est aliud mandatum, in hoc +verbo instauratur, diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum</i>. Sed +istud mandatum est unum. Ergo lex vetus non continet nisi unum +mandatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.12" target="asv">Mat. 7:12</a>): "All things . . . whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them. For this is the Law and the prophets." + But the whole of the Old Law is comprised in the Law and the prophets. Therefore the whole of the Old Law contains but one + commandment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37798" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37798] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Matth. VII, dicitur, <i>omnia quaecumque vultis ut faciant vobis +homines, et vos facite illis, haec est enim lex et prophetae</i>. +Sed tota lex vetus continetur in lege et prophetis. Ergo tota lex +vetus non habet nisi unum praeceptum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.15" target="asv">Eph. 2:15</a>): "Making void the Law of commandments contained in decrees": where he is referring to the Old Law, as the gloss comments, + on the passage. Therefore the Old Law comprises many commandments. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37799" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37799] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. II, <i>legem mandatorum +decretis evacuans</i>. Et loquitur de lege veteri, ut patet per +Glossam ibidem. Ergo lex vetus continet in se multa mandata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since a precept of law is binding, it is about something which must be done: and, that a thing must be done, arises from + the necessity of some end. Hence it is evident that a precept implies, in its very idea, relation to an end, in so far as + a thing is commanded as being necessary or expedient to an end. Now many things may happen to be necessary or expedient to + an end; and, accordingly, precepts may be given about various things as being ordained to one + end. Consequently we must say that all the precepts of the Old Law are one in respect of their relation to one end: and yet + they are many in respect of the diversity of those things that are ordained to that end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 1 co."><a name="37800" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37800] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod praeceptum legis, cum sit obligatorium, est de aliquo +quod fieri debet. Quod autem aliquid debeat fieri, hoc provenit ex +necessitate alicuius finis. Unde manifestum est quod de ratione +praecepti est quod importet ordinem ad finem, inquantum scilicet +illud praecipitur quod est necessarium vel expediens ad finem. +Contingit autem ad unum finem multa esse necessaria vel +expedientia. Et secundum hoc possunt de diversis rebus dari +praecepta inquantum ordinantur ad unum finem. Unde dicendum est +quod omnia praecepta legis veteris sunt unum secundum ordinem ad +unum finem, sunt tamen multa secundum diversitatem eorum quae +ordinantur ad finem illum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Old Law is said to be one as being ordained to one end: yet it comprises various precepts, according to the diversity + of the things which it directs to the end. Thus also the art of building is one according to the unity of its end, because + it aims at the building of a house: and yet it contains various rules, according to the variety of acts ordained thereto. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37801" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37801] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod lex vetus dicitur esse una secundum ordinem ad +finem unum, et tamen continet diversa praecepta, secundum +distinctionem eorum quae ordinat ad finem. Sicut etiam ars +aedificativa est una secundum unitatem finis, quia tendit ad +aedificationem domus, tamen continet diversa praecepta, secundum +diversos actus ad hoc ordinatos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.5" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:5</a>), "the end of the commandment is charity"; since every law aims at establishing friendship, either between man and man, or + between man and God. Wherefore the whole Law is comprised in this one commandment, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," + as expressing the end of all commandments: because love of one's neighbor includes love of God, when we love our neighbor + for God's sake. Hence the + Apostle put this commandment in place of the two which are about the love of God and of one's neighbor, and of which Our Lord + said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.40" target="asv">Mat. 22:40</a>): "On these two commandments dependeth the whole Law and the prophets." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37802" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37802] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. I, <i>finis +praecepti caritas est</i>, ad hoc enim omnis lex tendit, ut +amicitiam constituat vel hominum ad invicem, vel hominis ad Deum. +Et ideo tota lex impletur in hoc uno mandato, <i>diliges proximum +tuum sicut teipsum</i>, sicut in quodam fine mandatorum omnium, in +dilectione enim proximi includitur etiam Dei dilectio, quando +proximus diligitur propter Deum. Unde apostolus hoc unum praeceptum +posuit pro duobus quae sunt de dilectione Dei et proximi, de quibus +dicit dominus, Matth. XXII, <i>in his duobus mandatis pendet omnis +lex et prophetae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in Ethic. ix, 8, "friendship towards another arises from friendship towards oneself," in so far as man looks on + another as on himself. Hence when it is said, "All things whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them," + this is an explanation of the rule of neighborly love contained implicitly in the words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as + thyself": so that it is an explanation of this commandment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37803" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37803] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in IX Ethic., <i>amicabilia quae sunt +ad alterum, venerunt ex amicabilibus quae sunt homini ad +seipsum</i>, dum scilicet homo ita se habet ad alterum sicut ad se. +Et ideo in hoc quod dicitur, <i>omnia quaecumque vultis ut faciant +vobis homines, et vos facite illis</i>, explicatur quaedam regula +dilectionis proximi, quae etiam implicite continetur in hoc quod +dicitur, <i>diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum</i>. Unde est +quaedam explicatio istius mandati.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q99_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q99_A2-p0.1">Q. 99. A. 2. Whether the Old Law contains moral precepts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law contains no moral precepts. For the Old Law is distinct from the law of nature, as stated + above ( + <a href="#FS_Q91_A4" id="FS_Q99_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[91], AA[4]</a>,5; + <a href="#FS_Q98_A5" id="FS_Q99_A2-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[98], A[5]</a>). But the moral precepts belong to the law of nature. Therefore they do not belong to the Old Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37804" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37804] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non contineat praecepta +moralia. Lex enim vetus distinguitur a lege naturae, ut supra +habitum est. Sed praecepta moralia pertinent ad legem naturae. Ergo +non pertinent ad legem veterem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Divine Law should have come to man's assistance where human reason fails him: as is evident in regard to things + that are of faith, which are above reason. But man's reason seems to suffice for the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts + do not belong to the Old Law, which is a Divine law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37805" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37805] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ibi subvenire debuit homini lex divina, ubi deficit ratio humana, +sicut patet in his quae ad fidem pertinent, quae sunt supra +rationem. Sed ad praecepta moralia ratio hominis sufficere videtur. +Ergo praecepta moralia non sunt de lege veteri, quae est lex +divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Old Law is said to be "the letter that killeth" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:6</a>). But the moral precepts do not kill, but quicken, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.93" target="asv"> Ps. 118:93</a>: "Thy justifications I will never forget, for by them Thou hast given me life." Therefore the moral precepts do not belong + to the Old Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37806" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37806] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex vetus dicitur littera occidens, ut patet II ad Cor. III. Sed +praecepta moralia non occidunt, sed vivificant; secundum illud +Psalmi CXVIII, <i>in aeternum non obliviscar iustificationes tuas, +quia in ipsis vivificasti me</i>. Ergo praecepta moralia non +pertinent ad veterem legem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.17.9" target="asv">Ecclus. 17:9</a>): "Moreover, He gave them discipline [Douay: 'instructions'] and the law of life for an inheritance." Now discipline belongs + to morals; for this gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.12.11" target="asv">Heb. 12:11</a>: "Now all chastisement [disciplina]," etc., says: "Discipline is an exercise in morals by means of difficulties." Therefore + the Law which was given by God comprised moral precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37807" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37807] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Eccli. XVII, <i>addidit illis disciplinam, et +legem vitae haereditavit eos</i>. Disciplina autem pertinet ad +mores, dicit enim Glossa ad Heb. XII, super illud, omnis disciplina +etc., <i>disciplina est eruditio morum per difficilia</i>. Ergo lex +a Deo data, praecepta moralia continebat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The Old Law contained some moral precepts; as is evident from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.13" target="asv">Ex. 20:13</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.15" target="asv">15</a>: "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal." This was reasonable: because, just as the principal intention of human law + is to created friendship between man and man; so the chief intention of the Divine law is to establish man in friendship with + God. Now since likeness is the reason of love, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Sir.13.19" target="asv"> Ecclus. 13:19</a>: "Every beast loveth its + like"; there cannot possibly be any friendship of man to God, Who is supremely good, unless man become good: wherefore it + is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A2-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.2" target="asv">Lev. 19:2</a>; 11:45): "You shall be holy, for I am holy." But the goodness of man is virtue, which "makes its possessor good" (Ethic. + ii, 6). Therefore it was necessary for the Old Law to include precepts about acts of virtue: and these are the moral precepts + of the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 2 co."><a name="37808" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37808] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod lex vetus continebat praecepta quaedam moralia, ut +patet Exod. XX, <i>non occides, non furtum facies</i>. Et hoc +rationabiliter. Nam sicut intentio principalis legis humanae est ut +faciat amicitiam hominum ad invicem; ita intentio legis divinae est +ut constituat principaliter amicitiam hominis ad Deum. Cum autem +similitudo sit ratio amoris, secundum illud Eccli. XIII, <i>omne +animal diligit simile sibi</i>; impossibile est esse amicitiam +hominis ad Deum, qui est optimus, nisi homines boni efficiantur, +unde dicitur Levit. XIX, <i>sancti eritis, quoniam ego sanctus +sum</i>. Bonitas autem hominis est virtus, quae facit bonum +habentem. Et ideo oportuit praecepta legis veteris etiam de actibus +virtutum dari. Et haec sunt moralia legis praecepta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Old Law is distinct from the natural law, not as being altogether different from it, but as something added thereto. + For just as grace presupposes nature, so must the Divine law presuppose the natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37809" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37809] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod lex vetus distinguitur a lege naturae non +tanquam ab ea omnino aliena, sed tanquam aliquid ei superaddens. +Sicut enim gratia praesupponit naturam, ita oportet quod lex divina +praesupponat legem naturalem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It was fitting that the Divine law should come to man's assistance not only in those things for which reason is insufficient, + but also in those things in which human reason may happen to be impeded. Now human reason could not go astray in the abstract, + as to the universal principles of the natural law; but through being habituated to sin, it became obscured in the point of + things to be done in detail. But with regard to the other moral precepts, which + are like conclusions drawn from the universal principles of the natural law, the reason of many men went astray, to the extend + of judging to be lawful, things that are evil in themselves. Hence there was need for the authority of the Divine law to rescue + man from both these defects. Thus among the articles of faith not only are those things set forth to which reason cannot reach, + such as the Trinity of the Godhead; but also those to which right reason can attain, such as the Unity of the + Godhead; in order to remove the manifold errors to which reason is liable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37810" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37810] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod legi divinae conveniens erat ut non solum provideret +homini in his ad quae ratio non potest, sed etiam in his circa quae +contingit rationem hominis impediri. Ratio autem hominis circa +praecepta moralia, quantum ad ipsa communissima praecepta legis +naturae, non poterat errare in universali, sed tamen, propter +consuetudinem peccandi, obscurabatur in particularibus agendis. +Circa alia vero praecepta moralia, quae sunt quasi conclusiones +deductae ex communibus principiis legis naturae, multorum ratio +oberrabat, ita ut quaedam quae secundum se sunt mala, ratio +multorum licita iudicaret. Unde oportuit contra utrumque defectum +homini subveniri per auctoritatem legis divinae. Sicut etiam inter +credenda nobis proponuntur non solum ea ad quae ratio attingere non +potest, ut Deum esse trinum; sed etiam ea ad quae ratio recta +pertingere potest, ut Deum esse unum; ad excludendum rationis +humanae errorem, qui accidebat in multis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine proves (De Spiritu et Litera xiv), even the letter of the law is said to be the occasion of death, as to the + moral precepts; in so far as, to wit, it prescribes what is good, without furnishing the aid of grace for its fulfilment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37811" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37811] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus probat in libro de spiritu et +littera, etiam littera legis quantum ad praecepta moralia, occidere +dicitur occasionaliter, inquantum scilicet praecipit quod bonum +est, non praebens auxilium gratiae ad implendum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q99_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q99_A3-p0.1">Q. 99. A. 3. Whether the Old Law comprises ceremonial, besides moral, precepts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law does not comprise ceremonial, besides moral, precepts. For every law that is given to man + is for the purpose of directing human actions. Now human actions are called moral, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q99_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[3]</a>). Therefore it seems that the Old Law given to men should not comprise other than moral precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37812" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37812] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non contineat praecepta +caeremonialia, praeter moralia. Omnis enim lex quae hominibus +datur, est directiva humanorum actuum. Actus autem humani morales +dicuntur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo videtur quod in lege veteri +hominibus data, non debeant contineri nisi praecepta moralia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those precepts that are styled ceremonial seem to refer to the Divine worship. But Divine worship is the act of + a virtue, viz. religion, which, as Tully says (De Invent. ii) "offers worship and ceremony to the Godhead." Since, then, the + moral precepts are about acts of virtue, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q99_A2" id="FS_Q99_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, it seems that the ceremonial precepts should not be distinct from the moral. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37813" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37813] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +praecepta quae dicuntur caeremonialia, videntur ad divinum cultum +pertinere. Sed divinus cultus est actus virtutis, scilicet +religionis, quae, ut Tullius dicit in sua Rhetoric., <i>divinae +naturae cultum caeremoniamque affert</i>. Cum igitur praecepta +moralia sint de actibus virtutum, ut dictum est, videtur quod +praecepta caeremonialia non sint distinguenda a moralibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the ceremonial precepts seem to be those which signify something figuratively. But, as Augustine observes (De Doctr. + Christ. ii, 3,4), "of all signs employed by men words hold the first place." Therefore there is no need for the Law to contain + ceremonial precepts about certain figurative actions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37814" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37814] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +praecepta caeremonialia esse videntur quae figurative aliquid +significant. Sed sicut Augustinus dicit, in II de Doctr. Christ., +<i>verba inter homines obtinuerunt principatum significandi</i>. +Ergo nulla necessitas fuit ut in lege continerentur praecepta +caeremonialia de aliquibus actibus figurativis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.4.13" target="asv">Dt. 4:13,14</a>): "Ten words . . . He wrote in two tables of stone; and He commanded me at that time that I should teach you the ceremonies + and judgments which you shall do." But the ten commandments of the Law are moral precepts. Therefore besides the moral precepts + there are others which are ceremonial. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37815" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37815] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Deut. IV, <i>decem verba scripsit in duabus +tabulis lapideis, mihique mandavit in illo tempore ut docerem vos +caeremonias et iudicia quae facere deberetis</i>. Sed decem +praecepta legis sunt moralia. Ergo praeter praecepta moralia sunt +etiam alia praecepta caeremonialia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q99_A2" id="FS_Q99_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, the Divine law is instituted chiefly in order to direct men to God; while human law is instituted chiefly in order to direct + men in relation to one another. Hence human laws have not concerned themselves with the institution of anything relating to + Divine worship except as affecting the common good of mankind: and for this reason they have devised many institutions relating + to Divine matters, according as it + seemed expedient for the formation of human morals; as may be seen in the rites of the Gentiles. On the other hand the Divine + law directed men to one another according to the demands of that order whereby man is directed to God, which order was the + chief aim of that law. Now man is directed to God not only by the interior acts of the mind, which are faith, hope, and love, + but also by certain external works, whereby man makes profession of his subjection to God: and it is these works that are + said to belong to the Divine worship. This worship is called "ceremony" [the munia, i.e. gifts] of Ceres (who was the goddess + of fruits), as some say: because, at first, offerings were made to God from the fruits: or because, as Valerius Maximus states + [*Fact. et Dict. Memor. i, 1], the word "ceremony" was introduced among the Latins, to signify the Divine worship, being derived + from a town near Rome called "Caere": since, when Rome was taken by the Gauls, the sacred chattels of the Romans were + taken thither and most carefully preserved. Accordingly those precepts of the Law which refer to the Divine worship are specially + called ceremonial. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 3 co."><a name="37816" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37816] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, lex divina principaliter +instituitur ad ordinandum homines ad Deum; lex autem humana +principaliter ad ordinandum homines ad invicem. Et ideo leges +humanae non curaverunt aliquid instituere de cultu divino nisi in +ordine ad bonum commune hominum, et propter hoc etiam multa +confinxerunt circa res divinas, secundum quod videbatur eis +expediens ad informandos mores hominum; sicut patet in ritu +gentilium. Sed lex divina e converso homines ad invicem ordinavit +secundum quod conveniebat ordini qui est in Deum, quem +principaliter intendebat. Ordinatur autem homo in Deum non solum +per interiores actus mentis, qui sunt credere, sperare et amare; +sed etiam per quaedam exteriora opera, quibus homo divinam +servitutem profitetur. Et ista opera dicuntur ad cultum Dei +pertinere. Qui quidem cultus caeremonia vocatur, quasi munia, idest +dona, Caereris, quae dicebatur dea frugum, ut quidam dicunt, eo +quod primo ex frugibus oblationes Deo offerebantur. Sive, ut +maximus Valerius refert, nomen caeremoniae introductum est ad +significandum cultum divinum apud Latinos, a quodam oppido iuxta +Romam, quod Caere vocabatur, eo quod, Roma capta a gallis, illuc +sacra Romanorum ablata sunt, et reverentissime habita. Sic igitur +illa praecepta quae in lege pertinent ad cultum Dei, specialiter +caeremonialia dicuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Human acts extend also to the Divine worship: and therefore the Old Law given to man contains precepts about these matters + also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37817" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37817] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod humani actus se extendunt etiam ad cultum +divinum. Et ideo etiam de his continet praecepta lex vetus +hominibus data.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q91_A3" id="FS_Q99_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[91], A[3]</a>), the precepts of the natural law are general, and require to be determined: and they are determined both by human law and + by Divine law. And just as these very determinations which are made by human law are said to be, not of natural, but of positive + law; so the determinations of the precepts of the natural law, effected by the Divine law, are distinct from the moral precepts + which belong to the + natural law. Wherefore to worship God, since it is an act of virtue, belongs to a moral precept; but the determination of + this precept, namely that He is to be worshipped by such and such sacrifices, and such and such offerings, belongs to the + ceremonial precepts. Consequently the ceremonial precepts are distinct from the moral precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37818" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37818] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, praecepta legis naturae +communia sunt, et indigent determinatione. Determinantur autem et +per legem humanam, et per legem divinam. Et sicut ipsae +determinationes quae fiunt per legem humanam, non dicuntur esse de +lege naturae, sed de iure positivo; ita ipsae determinationes +praeceptorum legis naturae quae fiunt per legem divinam, +distinguuntur a praeceptis moralibus, quae pertinent ad legem +naturae. Colere ergo Deum, cum sit actus virtutis, pertinet ad +praeceptum morale, sed determinatio huius praecepti, ut scilicet +colatur talibus hostiis et talibus muneribus, hoc pertinet ad +praecepta caeremonialia. Et ideo praecepta caeremonialia +distinguuntur a praeceptis moralibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i), the things of God cannot be manifested to men except by means of sensible similitudes. + Now these similitudes move the soul more when they are not only expressed in words, but also offered to the senses. Wherefore + the things of God are set forth in the Scriptures not only by similitudes expressed in words, as in the case of metaphorical + expressions; but also by similitudes of things set before the eyes, which pertains + to the ceremonial precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37819" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37819] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut Dionysius dicit, I cap. Cael. Hier., divina +hominibus manifestari non possunt nisi sub aliquibus +similitudinibus sensibilibus. Ipsae autem similitudines magis +movent animum quando non solum verbo exprimuntur, sed etiam sensui +offeruntur. Et ideo divina traduntur in Scripturis non solum per +similitudines verbo expressas, sicut patet in metaphoricis +locutionibus; sed etiam per similitudines rerum quae visui +proponuntur, quod pertinet ad praecepta caeremonialia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q99_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q99_A4-p0.1">Q. 99. A. 4. Whether, besides the moral and ceremonial precepts, there are also judicial precepts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no judicial precepts in addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts in the Old Law. For Augustine + says (Contra Faust. vi, 2) that in the Old Law there are "precepts concerning the life we have to lead, and precepts regarding + the life that is foreshadowed." Now the precepts of the life we have to lead are moral precepts; and the precepts of the life + that is foreshadowed are ceremonial. Therefore besides these two kinds of precepts + we should not put any judicial precepts in the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37820" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37820] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod praeter praecepta moralia et +caeremonialia, non sint aliqua praecepta iudicialia in veteri lege. +Dicit enim Augustinus, contra Faustum, quod in lege veteri sunt +praecepta vitae agendae, et praecepta vitae significandae. Sed +praecepta vitae agendae sunt moralia; praecepta autem vitae +significandae sunt caeremonialia. Ergo praeter haec duo genera +praeceptorum, non sunt ponenda in lege alia praecepta +iudicialia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.102" target="asv"> Ps. 118:102, </a> "I have not declined from Thy judgments," says, i.e. "from the rule of life Thou hast set for me." But a rule of life belongs + to the moral precepts. Therefore the judicial precepts should not be considered as distinct from the moral precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37821" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37821] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +super illud Psalmi CXVIII, <i>a iudiciis tuis non declinavi</i>, +dicit Glossa, <i>idest ab his quae constituisti regulam +vivendi</i>. Sed regula vivendi pertinet ad praecepta moralia. Ergo +praecepta iudicialia non sunt distinguenda a moralibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, judgment seems to be an act of justice, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.93.15" target="asv">Ps. 93:15</a>: "Until justice be turned into judgment." But acts of justice, like the acts of other virtues, belong to the moral precepts. + Therefore the moral precepts include the judicial precepts, and consequently should not be held as distinct from them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37822" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37822] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +iudicium videtur esse actus iustitiae; secundum illud Psalmi XCIII, +<i>quoadusque iustitia convertatur in iudicium</i>. Sed actus +iustitiae, sicut et actus ceterarum virtutum, pertinet ad praecepta +moralia. Ergo praecepta moralia includunt in se iudicialia, et sic +non debent ab eis distingui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.1" target="asv">Dt. 6:1</a>): "These are the precepts and ceremonies, and judgments": where "precepts" stands for "moral precepts" antonomastically. + Therefore there are judicial precepts besides moral and ceremonial precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37823" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37823] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Deut. VI, <i>haec sunt praecepta et caeremoniae +atque iudicia</i>. Praecepta autem antonomastice dicuntur moralia. +Ergo praeter praecepta moralia et caeremonialia, sunt etiam +iudicialia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q99_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q99_A2" id="FS_Q99_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3), it belongs to the Divine law to direct men to one another and to God. Now each of these belongs in the abstract to the + dictates of the natural law, to which dictates the moral precepts are to be referred: yet each of them has to be determined + by Divine or human law, because naturally known principles are universal, both in speculative and in practical matters. Accordingly + just as the determination of the + universal principle about Divine worship is effected by the ceremonial precepts, so the determination of the general precepts + of that justice which is to be observed among men is effected by the judicial precepts. + </p><p id="FS_Q99_A4-p7"> We must therefore distinguish three kinds of precept in the Old Law; viz. "moral" precepts, which are dictated by the natural + law; "ceremonial" precepts, which are determinations of the Divine worship; and "judicial" precepts, which are determinations + of the justice to be maintained among men. Wherefore the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.12" target="asv">Rom. 7:12</a>) after saying that the "Law is holy," adds that "the commandment is just, and holy, and good": "just," in respect of the + judicial + precepts; "holy," with regard to the ceremonial precepts (since the word "sanctus"---"holy"---is applied to that which is + consecrated to God); and "good," i.e. conducive to virtue, as to the moral precepts. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 4 co."><a name="37824" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37824] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad legem divinam pertinet ut +ordinet homines ad invicem et ad Deum. Utrumque autem horum in +communi quidem pertinet ad dictamen legis naturae, ad quod +referuntur moralia praecepta, sed oportet quod determinetur +utrumque per legem divinam vel humanam, quia principia naturaliter +nota sunt communia tam in speculativis quam in activis. Sicut +igitur determinatio communis praecepti de cultu divino fit per +praecepta caeremonialia, sic et determinatio communis praecepti de +iustitia observanda inter homines, determinatur per praecepta +iudicialia. Et secundum hoc, oportet tria praecepta legis veteris +ponere; scilicet moralia, quae sunt de dictamine legis naturae; +caeremonialia, quae sunt determinationes cultus divini; et +iudicialia, quae sunt determinationes iustitiae inter homines +observandae. Unde cum apostolus, Rom. VII, dixisset quod lex est +sancta, subiungit quod mandatum est iustum et sanctum et bonum, +iustum quidem, quantum ad iudicialia; sanctum, quantum ad +caeremonialia (nam sanctum dicitur quod est Deo dicatum); bonum, +idest honestum, quantum ad moralia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Both the moral and the judicial precepts aim at the ordering of human life: and consequently they are both comprised under + one of the heads mentioned by Augustine, viz. under the precepts of the life we have to lead. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37825" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37825] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod tam praecepta moralia, quam etiam iudicialia, +pertinent ad directionem vitae humanae. Et ideo utraque continentur +sub uno membro illorum quae ponit Augustinus, scilicet sub +praeceptis vitae agendae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Judgment denotes execution of justice, by an application of the reason to individual cases in a determinate way. Hence the + judicial precepts have something in common with the moral precepts, in that they are derived from reason; and something in + common with the ceremonial precepts, in that they are determinations of general precepts. This explains why sometimes "judgments" + comprise both judicial and moral precepts, as in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.5.1" target="asv"> Dt. 5:1</a>: + "Hear, O Israel, the ceremonies and judgments"; and sometimes judicial and ceremonial precepts, as in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A4-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.18.4" target="asv"> Lev. 18:4</a>: "You shall do My judgments, and shall observe My precepts," where "precepts" denotes moral precepts, while "judgments" refers + to judicial and ceremonial precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37826" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37826] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod iudicium significat executionem iustitiae, quae +quidem est secundum applicationem rationis ad aliqua particularia +determinate. Unde praecepta iudicialia communicant in aliquo cum +moralibus, inquantum scilicet a ratione derivantur; et in aliquo +cum caeremonialibus, inquantum scilicet sunt quaedam +determinationes communium praeceptorum. Et ideo quandoque sub +iudiciis comprehenduntur praecepta iudicialia et moralia, sicut +Deut. V, audi, Israel, caeremonias atque iudicia; quandoque vero +iudicialia et caeremonialia, sicut Levit. XVIII, facietis iudicia +mea, et praecepta mea servabitis, ubi praecepta ad moralia +referuntur, iudicia vero ad iudicialia et caeremonialia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The act of justice, in general, belongs to the moral precepts; but its determination to some special kind of act belongs + to the judicial precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37827" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37827] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod actus iustitiae in generali pertinet ad praecepta +moralia, sed determinatio eius in speciali pertinet ad praecepta +iudicialia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q99_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q99_A5-p0.1">Q. 99. A. 5. Whether the Old Law contains any others besides the moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law contains others besides the moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts. Because the judicial + precepts belong to the act of justice, which is between man and man; while the ceremonial precepts belong to the act of religion, + whereby God is worshipped. Now besides these there are many other virtues, viz. temperance, fortitude, liberality, and several + others, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q60_A5" id="FS_Q99_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[60], A[5]</a>). Therefore besides the + aforesaid precepts, the Old Law should comprise others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37828" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37828] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliqua alia praecepta contineantur in +lege veteri praeter moralia, iudicialia et caeremonialia. +Iudicialia enim praecepta pertinent ad actum iustitiae, quae est +hominis ad hominem; caeremonialia vero pertinent ad actum +religionis, qua Deus colitur. Sed praeter has sunt multae aliae +virtutes, scilicet temperantia, fortitudo, liberalitas, et aliae +plures, ut supra dictum est. Ergo praeter praedicta oportet plura +alia in lege veteri contineri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.11.1" target="asv">Dt. 11:1</a>): "Love the Lord thy God, and observe His precepts and ceremonies, His judgments and commandments." Now precepts concern + moral matters, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q99_A4" id="FS_Q99_A5-p3.2" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. Therefore besides the moral, judicial and ceremonial precepts, the Law contains others which are called "commandments." + [*The "commandments" (mandata) spoken of here and in the body of this article are not to be confused with + the Commandments (praecepta) in the ordinary acceptance of the word.] + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37829" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37829] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Deut. XI dicitur, <i>ama dominum Deum tuum, et observa eius +praecepta et caeremonias et iudicia atque mandata</i>. Sed +praecepta pertinent ad moralia, ut dictum est. Ergo praeter +moralia, iudicialia et caeremonialia, adhuc alia continentur in +lege, quae dicuntur mandata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.17" target="asv">Dt. 6:17</a>): "Keep the precepts of the Lord thy God, and the testimonies and ceremonies which I have [Vulg.: 'He hath'] commanded thee." + Therefore in addition to the above, the Law comprises "testimonies." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37830" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37830] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Deut. VI dicitur, <i>custodi praecepta domini Dei tui, ac +testimonia et caeremonias quas tibi praecepi</i>. Ergo praeter +omnia praedicta adhuc in lege testimonia continentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.93" target="asv">Ps. 118:93</a>): "Thy justifications (i.e. "Thy Law," according to a gloss) I will never forget." Therefore in the Old Law there are not + only moral, ceremonial and judicial precepts, but also others, called "justifications." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="37831" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37831] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +in Psalmo CXVIII dicitur, <i>in aeternum non obliviscar +iustificationes tuas</i>, Glossa, <i>idest legem</i>. Ergo +praecepta legis veteris non solum sunt moralia, caeremonialia et +iudicialia, sed etiam iustificationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.1" target="asv">Dt. 6:1</a>): "These are the precepts and ceremonies and judgments which the Lord your God commanded . . . you." And these words are + placed at the beginning of the Law. Therefore all the precepts of the Law are included under them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37832" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37832] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Deut. VI, <i>haec sunt praecepta et caeremoniae +atque iudicia quae mandavit dominus Deus vobis</i>. Et haec +ponuntur in principio legis. Ergo omnia praecepta legis sub his +comprehenduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q99_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some things are included in the Law by way of precept; other things, as being ordained to the fulfilment of the precepts. + Now the precepts refer to things which have to be done: and to their fulfilment man is induced by two considerations, viz. + the authority of the lawgiver, and the benefit derived from the fulfilment, which benefit consists in the attainment of some + good, useful, pleasurable or virtuous, or in the avoidance of some contrary evil. Hence it + was necessary that in the Old Law certain things should be set forth to indicate the authority of God the lawgiver: e.g. + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.4" target="asv"> Dt. 6:4</a>: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord"; and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A5-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv"> Gn. 1:1</a>: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth": and these are called "testimonies." Again it was necessary that in the + Law certain rewards should be appointed for those who observe the Law, and punishments for those who transgress; as it may + be seen in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A5-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.28" target="asv">Dt. 28</a>: "If + thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord thy God . . . He will make thee higher than all the nations," etc.: and these are called + "justifications," according as God punishes or rewards certain ones justly. + </p><p id="FS_Q99_A5-p8"> The things that have to be done do not come under the precept except in so far as they have the character of a duty. Now + a duty is twofold: one according to the rule of reason; the other according to the rule of a law which prescribes that duty: + thus the Philosopher distinguishes a twofold just---moral and legal (Ethic. v, 7). + </p><p id="FS_Q99_A5-p9"> Moral duty is twofold: because reason dictates that something must be done, either as being so necessary that without it + the order of virtue would be destroyed; or as being useful for the better maintaining of the order of virtue. And in this + sense some of the moral precepts are expressed by way of absolute command or prohibition, as "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt + not steal": and these are properly called "precepts." Other things are prescribed or forbidden, not as an absolute + duty, but as something better to be done. These may be called "commandments"; because they are expressed by way of inducement + and persuasion: an example whereof is seen in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.26" target="asv"> Ex. 22:26</a>: "If thou take of thy neighbor a garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him again before sunset"; and in other like cases. + Wherefore Jerome (Praefat. in Comment. super Marc.) says that "justice is in the precepts, charity in the commandments." Duty + as fixed by the Law, belongs to the judicial + precepts, as regards human affairs; to the "ceremonial" precepts, as regards Divine matters. + </p><p id="FS_Q99_A5-p10"> Nevertheless those ordinances also which refer to punishments and rewards may be called "testimonies," in so far as they + testify to the Divine justice. Again all the precepts of the Law may be styled "justifications," as being executions of legal + justice. Furthermore the commandments may be distinguished from the precepts, so that those things be called "precepts" which + God Himself prescribed; and those things "commandments" which He enjoined [mandavit] through others, as the + very word seems to denote. + </p><p id="FS_Q99_A5-p11"> From this it is clear that all the precepts of the Law are either moral, ceremonial, or judicial; and that other ordinances + have not the character of a precept, but are directed to the observance of the precepts, as stated above. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 5 co."><a name="37833" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37833] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod in lege ponuntur aliqua tanquam praecepta; aliqua +vero tanquam ad praeceptorum adimpletionem ordinata. Praecepta +quidem sunt de his quae sunt agenda. Ad quorum impletionem ex +duobus homo inducitur, scilicet ex auctoritate praecipientis; et ex +utilitate impletionis, quae quidem est consecutio alicuius boni +utilis, delectabilis vel honesti, aut fuga alicuius mali contrarii. +Oportuit igitur in veteri lege proponi quaedam quae auctoritatem +Dei praecipientis indicarent, sicut illud Deut. VI, <i>audi, +Israel, dominus Deus tuus Deus unus est</i>; et illud Gen. I, <i>in +principio creavit Deus caelum et terram</i>. Et huiusmodi dicuntur +testimonia. Oportuit etiam quod in lege proponerentur quaedam +praemia observantium legem, et poenae transgredientium, ut patet +Deut. XXVIII, <i>si audieris vocem domini Dei tui, faciet te +excelsiorem cunctis gentibus,</i> et cetera. Et huiusmodi dicuntur +iustificationes, secundum quod Deus aliquos iuste punit vel +praemiat. Ipsa autem agenda sub praecepto non cadunt nisi inquantum +habent aliquam debiti rationem. Est autem duplex debitum, unum +quidem secundum regulam rationis, aliud autem secundum regulam +legis determinantis; sicut philosophus, in V Ethic., distinguit +duplex iustum, scilicet morale et legale. Debitum autem morale est +duplex, dictat enim ratio aliquid faciendum vel tanquam +necessarium, sine quo non potest esse ordo virtutis; vel tanquam +utile ad hoc quod ordo virtutis melius conservetur. Et secundum +hoc, quaedam moralium praecise praecipiuntur vel prohibentur in +lege, sicut, non occides, non furtum facies. Et haec proprie +dicuntur praecepta. Quaedam vero praecipiuntur vel prohibentur, non +quasi praecise debita, sed propter melius. Et ista possunt dici +mandata, quia quandam inductionem habent et persuasionem. Sicut +illud Exod. XXII, <i>si pignus acceperis vestimentum a proximo tuo, +ante solis occasum reddas ei</i>; et aliqua similia. Unde +Hieronymus dicit quod <i>in praeceptis est iustitia, in mandatis +vero caritas</i>. Debitum autem ex determinatione legis, in rebus +quidem humanis pertinet ad iudicialia; in rebus autem divinis, ad +caeremonialia. Quamvis etiam ea quae pertinent ad poenam vel +praemia, dici possint testimonia, inquantum sunt protestationes +quaedam divinae iustitiae. Omnia vero praecepta legis possunt dici +iustificationes, inquantum sunt quaedam executiones legalis +iustitiae. Possunt etiam aliter mandata a praeceptis distingui, ut +praecepta dicantur quae Deus per seipsum iussit; mandata autem, +quae per alios mandavit, ut ipsum nomen sonare videtur. Ex quibus +omnibus apparet quod omnia legis praecepta continentur sub +moralibus, caeremonialibus et iudicialibus, alia vero non habent +rationem praeceptorum, sed ordinantur ad praeceptorum +observationem, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Justice alone, of all the virtues, implies the notion of duty. Consequently moral matters are determinable by law in so far + as they belong to justice: of which virtue religion is a part, as Tully says (De Invent. ii). Wherefore the legal just cannot + be anything foreign to the ceremonial and judicial precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37834" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37834] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod sola iustitia, inter alias virtutes, importat +rationem debiti. Et ideo moralia intantum sunt lege determinabilia, +inquantum pertinent ad iustitiam, cuius etiam quaedam pars est +religio, ut Tullius dicit. Unde iustum legale non potest esse +aliquod praeter caeremonialia et iudicialia praecepta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A5-p13"> <b>Reply to Objections 2--4:</b> The Replies to the other Objections are clear from what has been said.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37835" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37835] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad alia patet +responsio per ea quae dicta sunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q99_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q99_A6-p0.1">Q. 99. A. 6. Whether the Old Law should have induced men to the observance of its precepts, by means of temporal promises and threats?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law should not have induced men to the observance of its precepts, by means of temporal promises + and threats. For the purpose of the Divine law is to subject man to God by fear and love: hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.10.12" target="asv">Dt. 10:12</a>): "And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways, + and love Him?" But the desire for temporal goods leads man away from God: + for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36), that "covetousness is the bane of charity." Therefore temporal promises and threats + seem to be contrary to the intention of a lawgiver: and this makes a law worthy of rejection, as the Philosopher declares + (Polit. ii, 6). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37836" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37836] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non debuerit inducere ad +observantiam praeceptorum per temporales promissiones et +comminationes. Intentio enim legis divinae est ut homines Deo +subdat per timorem et amorem, unde dicitur Deut. X, <i>et nunc, +Israel, quid dominus Deus tuus petit a te, nisi ut timeas dominum +Deum tuum, et ambules in viis eius, et diligas eum?</i> Sed +cupiditas rerum temporalium abducit a Deo, dicit enim Augustinus, +in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod <i>venenum caritatis est +cupiditas</i>. Ergo promissiones et comminationes temporales +videntur contrariari intentioni legislatoris, quod facit legem +reprobabilem, ut patet per philosophum, in II Polit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Divine law is more excellent than human law. Now, in sciences, we notice that the loftier the science, the higher + the means of persuasion that it employs. Therefore, since human law employs temporal threats and promises, as means of persuading + man, the Divine law should have used, not these, but more lofty means. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37837" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37837] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +lex divina est excellentior quam lex humana. Videmus autem in +scientiis quod quanto aliqua est altior, tanto per altiora media +procedit. Ergo cum lex humana procedat ad inducendum homines per +temporales comminationes et promissiones, lex divina non debuit ex +his procedere, sed per aliqua maiora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the reward of righteousness and the punishment of guilt cannot be that which befalls equally the good and the wicked. + But as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.9.2" target="asv"> Eccles. 9:2, </a> "all" temporal "things equally happen to the just and to the wicked, to the good and the evil, to the clean and to the unclean, + to him that offereth victims, and to him that despiseth sacrifices." Therefore temporal goods or evils are not suitably set + forth as punishments or rewards of + the commandments of the Divine law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37838" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37838] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +illud non potest esse praemium iustitiae vel poena culpae, quod +aequaliter evenit et bonis et malis. Sed sicut dicitur Eccle. IX, +<i>universa, temporalia, aeque eveniunt iusto et impio, bono et +malo, mundo et immundo, immolanti victimas et sacrificia +contemnenti</i>. Ergo temporalia bona vel mala non convenienter +ponuntur ut poenae vel praemia mandatorum legis divinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.1.19" target="asv">Is. 1:19,20</a>): "If you be willing, and will hearken to Me, you shall eat the good things of the land. But if you will not, and will provoke + Me to wrath: the sword shall devour you." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 6 s. c."><a name="37839" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37839] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Isaiae I, <i>si volueritis, et audieritis me, bona +terrae comedetis. Quod si nolueritis, et me ad iracundiam +provocaveritis, gladius devorabit vos</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As in speculative sciences men are persuaded to assent to the conclusions by means of syllogistic arguments, so too in every + law, men are persuaded to observe its precepts by means of punishments and rewards. Now it is to be observed that, in speculative + sciences, the means of persuasion are adapted to the conditions of the pupil: wherefore the process of argument in sciences + should be ordered becomingly, so that the instruction is based on principles more + generally known. And thus also he who would persuade a man to the observance of any precepts, needs to move him at first by + things for which he has an affection; just as children are induced to do something, by means of little childish gifts. Now + it has been said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q98_A1" id="FS_Q99_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[98], AA[1]</a>,2,3) that the Old Law disposed men to (the coming of) Christ, as the imperfect in comparison disposes to the perfect, wherefore + it was given to a people as yet imperfect in comparison to the + perfection which was to result from Christ's coming: and for this reason, that people is compared to a child that is still + under a pedagogue ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A6-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.24" target="asv">Gal. 3:24</a>). But the perfection of man consists in his despising temporal things and cleaving to things spiritual, as is clear from + the words of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A6-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.13" target="asv">Phil. 3:13</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A6-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.15" target="asv">15</a>): "Forgetting the things that are behind, I stretch [Vulg.: 'and stretching'] forth myself to those that are before . . . + Let us therefore, as + many as are perfect, be thus minded." Those who are yet imperfect desire temporal goods, albeit in subordination to God: whereas + the perverse place their end in temporalities. It was therefore fitting that the Old Law should conduct men to God by means + of temporal goods for which the imperfect have an affection. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 6 co."><a name="37840" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37840] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut in scientiis speculativis inducuntur homines +ad assentiendum conclusionibus per media syllogistica, ita etiam in +quibuslibet legibus homines inducuntur ad observantias praeceptorum +per poenas et praemia. Videmus autem in scientiis speculativis quod +media proponuntur auditori secundum eius conditionem, unde oportet +ordinate in scientiis procedere, ut ex notioribus disciplina +incipiat. Ita etiam oportet eum qui vult inducere hominem ad +observantiam praeceptorum, ut ex illis eum movere incipiat quae +sunt in eius affectu, sicut pueri provocantur ad aliquid faciendum +aliquibus puerilibus munusculis. Dictum est autem supra quod lex +vetus disponebat ad Christum sicut imperfectum ad perfectum, unde +dabatur populo adhuc imperfecto in comparatione ad perfectionem +quae erat futura per Christum, et ideo populus ille comparatur +puero sub paedagogo existenti, ut patet Galat. III. Perfectio autem +hominis est ut, contemptis temporalibus, spiritualibus inhaereat, +ut patet per illud quod apostolus dicit, Philipp. III, <i>quae +quidem retro sunt obliviscens, ad ea quae priora sunt me extendo. +Quicumque ergo perfecti sumus, hoc sentiamus</i>. Imperfectorum +autem est quod temporalia bona desiderent, in ordine tamen ad Deum. +Perversorum autem est quod in temporalibus bonis finem constituant. +Unde legi veteri conveniebat ut per temporalia, quae erant in +affectu hominum imperfectorum, manuduceret homines ad Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Covetousness whereby man places his end in temporalities, is the bane of charity. But the attainment of temporal goods which + man desires in subordination to God is a road leading the imperfect to the love of God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.48.19" target="asv"> Ps. 48:19</a>: "He will praise Thee, when Thou shalt do well to him." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="37841" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37841] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod cupiditas, qua homo constituit finem in +temporalibus bonis, est caritatis venenum. Sed consecutio +temporalium bonorum quae homo desiderat in ordine ad Deum, est +quaedam via inducens imperfectos ad Dei amorem; secundum illud +Psalmi XLVIII, <i>confitebitur tibi cum benefeceris illi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Human law persuades men by means of temporal rewards or punishments to be inflicted by men: whereas the Divine law persuades + men by meas of rewards or punishments to be received from God. In this respect it employs higher means. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="37842" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37842] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod lex humana inducit homines ex temporalibus praemiis +vel poenis per homines inducendis, lex vero divina ex praemiis vel +poenis exhibendis per Deum. Et in hoc procedit per media +altiora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q99_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As any one can see, who reads carefully the story of the Old Testament, the common weal of the people prospered under the + Law as long as they obeyed it; and as soon as they departed from the precepts of the Law they were overtaken by many calamities. + But certain individuals, although they observed the justice of the Law, met with misfortunes---either because they had already + become spiritual (so that misfortune might withdraw them all the more from + attachment to temporal things, and that their virtue might be tried)---or because, while outwardly fulfilling the works of + the Law, their heart was altogether fixed on temporal goods, and far removed from God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.29.13" target="asv">Is. 29:13</a> ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A6-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.8" target="asv">Mat. 15:8</a>): "This people honoreth Me with their lips; but their hearts is far from Me." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 99 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="37843" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37843] Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut patet historias veteris testamenti revolventi, +communis status populi semper sub lege in prosperitate fuit, +quandiu legem observabant; et statim declinantes a praeceptis +legis, in multas adversitates incidebant. Sed aliquae personae +particulares etiam iustitiam legis observantes, in aliquas +adversitates incidebant, vel quia iam erant spirituales effecti, ut +per hoc magis ab affectu temporalium abstraherentur, et eorum +virtus probata redderetur; aut quia, opera legis exterius +implentes, cor totum habebant in temporalibus defixum et a Deo +elongatum, secundum quod dicitur Isaiae XXIX, <i>populus hic labiis +me honorat, cor autem eorum longe est a me</i>.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q100" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q100-p0.1">Q. 100. OF THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q100-p2"> We must now consider each kind of precept of the Old Law: and (1) the moral precepts, (2) the ceremonial precepts, (3) the + judicial precepts. Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q100-p3"><a href="#FS_Q100_A1"> (1) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature?</a></p><p id="FS_Q100-p4"><a href="#FS_Q100_A2"> (2) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law are about the acts of all the virtues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q100-p5"><a href="#FS_Q100_A3"> (3) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q100-p6"><a href="#FS_Q100_A4"> (4) How the precepts of the decalogue are distinguished from one another?</a></p><p id="FS_Q100-p7"><a href="#FS_Q100_A5"> (5) Their number;</a></p><p id="FS_Q100-p8"><a href="#FS_Q100_A6"> (6) Their order;</a></p><p id="FS_Q100-p9"><a href="#FS_Q100_A7"> (7) The manner in which they were given;</a></p><p id="FS_Q100-p10"><a href="#FS_Q100_A8"> (8) Whether they are dispensable?</a></p><p id="FS_Q100-p11"><a href="#FS_Q100_A9"> (9) Whether the mode of observing a virtue comes under the precept of the Law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q100-p12"><a href="#FS_Q100_A10"> (10) Whether the mode of charity comes under the precept?</a></p><p id="FS_Q100-p13"><a href="#FS_Q100_A11"> (11) The distinction of other moral precepts;</a></p><p id="FS_Q100-p14"><a href="#FS_Q100_A12"> (12) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 pr."><a name="37844" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37844] Iª-IIae q. 100 pr.</span></a> Deinde +considerandum est de singulis generibus praeceptorum veteris legis. +Et primo, de praeceptis moralibus; secundo, de caeremonialibus; +tertio, de iudicialibus. Circa primum quaeruntur duodecim. Primo, +utrum omnia praecepta moralia veteris legis sint de lege naturae. +Secundo, utrum praecepta moralia veteris legis sint de actibus +omnium virtutum. Tertio, utrum omnia praecepta moralia veteris +legis reducantur ad decem praecepta Decalogi. Quarto, de +distinctione praeceptorum Decalogi. Quinto, de numero eorum. Sexto, +de ordine. Septimo, de modo tradendi ipsa. Octavo, utrum sint +dispensabilia. Nono, utrum modus observandi virtutem cadat sub +praecepto. Decimo, utrum modus caritatis cadat sub praecepto. +Undecimo, de distinctione aliorum praeceptorum moralium. Duodecimo, +utrum praecepta moralia veteris legis iustificent.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q100_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q100_A1-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 1. Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all the moral precepts belong to the law of nature. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.17.9" target="asv">Ecclus. 17:9</a>): "Moreover He gave them instructions, and the law of life for an inheritance." But instruction is in contradistinction to + the law of nature; since the law of nature is not learnt, but instilled by natural instinct. Therefore not all the moral precepts + belong to the natural law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37845" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37845] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia praecepta moralia pertineant +ad legem naturae. Dicitur enim Eccli. XVII, <i>addidit illis +disciplinam, et legem vitae haereditavit illos</i>. Sed disciplina +dividitur contra legem naturae, eo quod lex naturalis non +addiscitur, sed ex naturali instinctu habetur. Ergo non omnia +praecepta moralia sunt de lege naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Divine law is more perfect than human law. But human law adds certain things concerning good morals, to those + that belong to the law of nature: as is evidenced by the fact that the natural law is the same in all men, while these moral + institutions are various for various people. Much more reason therefore was there why the Divine law should add to the law + of nature, ordinances pertaining to good morals. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37846" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37846] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +lex divina perfectior est quam lex humana. Sed lex humana +superaddit aliqua ad bonos mores pertinentia his quae sunt de lege +naturae, quod patet ex hoc quod lex naturae est eadem apud omnes, +huiusmodi autem morum instituta sunt diversa apud diversos. Ergo +multo fortius divina lex aliqua ad bonos mores pertinentia debuit +addere supra legem naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as natural reason leads to good morals in certain matters, so does faith: hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.6" target="asv">Gal. 5:6</a>) that faith "worketh by charity." But faith is not included in the law of nature; since that which is of faith is above nature. + Therefore not all the moral precepts of the Divine law belong to the law of nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37847" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37847] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut ratio naturalis inducit ad aliquos bonos mores, ita et fides, +unde etiam dicitur ad Galat. V, quod fides per dilectionem +operatur. Sed fides non continetur sub lege naturae, quia ea quae +sunt fidei, sunt supra rationem naturalem. Ergo non omnia praecepta +moralia legis divinae pertinent ad legem naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.14" target="asv">Rom. 2:14</a>) that "the Gentiles, who have not the Law, do by nature those things that are of the Law": which must be understood of things + pertaining to good morals. Therefore all the moral precepts of the Law belong to the law of nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37848" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37848] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicit apostolus, Rom. II, quod <i>gentes, quae legem non +habent, naturaliter ea quae legis sunt, faciunt</i>, quod oportet +intelligi de his quae pertinent ad bonos mores. Ergo omnia moralia +praecepta legis sunt de lege naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q100_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The moral precepts, distinct from the ceremonial and judicial precepts, are about things pertaining of their very nature + to good morals. Now since human morals depend on their relation to reason, which is the proper principle of human acts, those + morals are called good which accord with reason, and those are called bad which are discordant from reason. And as every judgment + of speculative reason proceeds from the natural knowledge of first principles, so + every judgment of practical reason proceeds from principles known naturally, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q94_A2" id="FS_Q100_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[94], AA[2]</a>,4): from which principles one may proceed in various ways to judge of various matters. For some matters connected with human + actions are so evident, that after very little consideration one is able at once to approve or disapprove of them by means + of these general first principles: while some matters cannot be the subject of judgment without much consideration of + the various circumstances, which all are not competent to do carefully, but only those who are wise: just as it is not possible + for all to consider the particular conclusions of sciences, but only for those who are versed in philosophy: and lastly there + are some matters of which man cannot judge unless he be helped by Divine instruction; such as the articles of faith. + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A1-p7"> It is therefore evident that since the moral precepts are about matters which concern good morals; and since good morals + are those which are in accord with reason; and since also every judgment of human reason must needs by derived in some way + from natural reason; it follows, of necessity, that all the moral precepts belong to the law of nature; but not all in the + same way. For there are certain things which the natural reason of every man, of its own accord and at once, judges + to be done or not to be done: e.g. "Honor thy father and thy mother," and "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal": and + these belong to the law of nature absolutely. And there are certain things which, after a more careful consideration, wise + men deem obligatory. Such belong to the law of nature, yet so that they need to be inculcated, the wiser teaching the less + wise: e.g. "Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged man," and the like. And there are some things, + to + judge of which, human reason needs Divine instruction, whereby we are taught about the things of God: e.g. "Thou shalt not + make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything; Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 1 co."><a name="37849" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37849] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod praecepta moralia, a caeremonialibus et iudicialibus +distincta, sunt de illis quae secundum se ad bonos mores pertinent. +Cum autem humani mores dicantur in ordine ad rationem, quae est +proprium principium humanorum actuum, illi mores dicuntur boni qui +rationi congruunt, mali autem qui a ratione discordant. Sicut autem +omne iudicium rationis speculativae procedit a naturali cognitione +primorum principiorum, ita etiam omne iudicium rationis practicae +procedit ex quibusdam principiis naturaliter cognitis, ut supra +dictum est. Ex quibus diversimode procedi potest ad iudicandum de +diversis. Quaedam enim sunt in humanis actibus adeo explicita quod +statim, cum modica consideratione, possunt approbari vel reprobari +per illa communia et prima principia. Quaedam vero sunt ad quorum +iudicium requiritur multa consideratio diversarum circumstantiarum, +quas considerare diligenter non est cuiuslibet, sed sapientum, +sicut considerare particulares conclusiones scientiarum non +pertinet ad omnes, sed ad solos philosophos. Quaedam vero sunt ad +quae diiudicanda indiget homo adiuvari per instructionem divinam, +sicut est circa credenda. Sic igitur patet quod, cum moralia +praecepta sint de his quae pertinent ad bonos mores; haec autem +sunt quae rationi congruunt; omne autem rationis humanae iudicium +aliqualiter a naturali ratione derivatur, necesse est quod omnia +praecepta moralia pertineant ad legem naturae, sed diversimode. +Quaedam enim sunt quae statim per se ratio naturalis cuiuslibet +hominis diiudicat esse facienda vel non facienda, sicut <i>honora +patrem tuum et matrem tuam, et, non occides, non furtum facies</i>. +Et huiusmodi sunt absolute de lege naturae. Quaedam vero sunt quae +subtiliori consideratione rationis a sapientibus iudicantur esse +observanda. Et ista sic sunt de lege naturae, ut tamen indigeant +disciplina, qua minores a sapientioribus instruantur, sicut illud, +<i>coram cano capite consurge, et honora personam senis</i>, et +alia huiusmodi. Quaedam vero sunt ad quae iudicanda ratio humana +indiget instructione divina, per quam erudimur de divinis, sicut +est illud, <i>non facies tibi sculptile neque omnem similitudinem; +non assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A1-p8"><b>Reply to Objections</b> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 1 ad arg."><a name="37850" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37850] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 1 ad arg.</span></a> Et per +hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q100_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q100_A2-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 2. Whether the moral precepts of the Law are about all the acts of virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral precepts of the Law are not about all the acts of virtue. For observance of the precepts of + the Old Law is called justification, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.8" target="asv"> Ps. 118:8</a>: "I will keep Thy justifications." But justification is the execution of justice. Therefore the moral precepts are only about + acts of justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37851" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37851] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta moralia legis non +sint de omnibus actibus virtutum. Observatio enim praeceptorum +veteris legis iustificatio nominatur, secundum illud Psalmi CXVIII, +<i>iustificationes tuas custodiam</i>. Sed iustificatio est +executio iustitiae. Ergo praecepta moralia non sunt nisi de actibus +iustitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which comes under a precept has the character of a duty. But the character of duty belongs to justice alone + and to none of the other virtues, for the proper act of justice consists in rendering to each one his due. Therefore the precepts + of the moral law are not about the acts of the other virtues, but only about the acts of justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37852" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37852] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +id quod cadit sub praecepto, habet rationem debiti. Sed ratio +debiti non pertinet ad alias virtutes nisi ad solam iustitiam, +cuius proprius actus est reddere unicuique debitum. Ergo praecepta +legis moralia non sunt de actibus aliarum virtutum, sed solum de +actibus iustitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every law is made for the common good, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21). But of all the virtues justice alone regards + the common good, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore the moral precepts are only about the acts of justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37853" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37853] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis lex ponitur propter bonum commune, ut dicit Isidorus. Sed +inter virtutes sola iustitia respicit bonum commune, ut philosophus +dicit, in V Ethic. Ergo praecepta moralia sunt solum de actibus +iustitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Paradiso viii) that "a sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and a disobedience to the commandments + of heaven." But there are sins contrary to all the acts of virtue. Therefore it belongs to Divine law to direct all the acts + of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37854" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37854] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Ambrosius dicit, quod <i>peccatum est transgressio legis +divinae, et caelestium inobedientia mandatorum</i>. Sed peccata +contrariantur omnibus actibus virtutum. Ergo lex divina habet +ordinare de actibus omnium virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q100_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since the precepts of the Law are ordained to the common good, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q100_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[2]</a>), the precepts of the Law must needs be diversified according to the various kinds of community: hence the Philosopher (Polit. + iv, 1) teaches that the laws which are made in a state which is ruled by a king must be different from the laws of a state + which is ruled by the people, or by a few powerful men in the state. Now human law is ordained + for one kind of community, and the Divine law for another kind. Because human law is ordained for the civil community, implying + mutual duties of man and his fellows: and men are ordained to one another by outward acts, whereby men live in communion with + one another. This life in common of man with man pertains to justice, whose proper function consists in directing the human + community. Wherefore human law makes precepts only about acts of justice; and if it commands acts of other virtues, this + is only in so far as they assume the nature of justice, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. v, 1). + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A2-p7"> But the community for which the Divine law is ordained, is that of men in relation to God, either in this life or in the + life to come. And therefore the Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters whereby men are well ordered in their + relations to God. Now man is united to God by his reason or mind, in which is God's image. Wherefore the Divine law proposes + precepts about all those matters whereby human reason is well ordered. But this is effected by the acts of all the + virtues: since the intellectual virtues set in good order the acts of the reason in themselves: while the moral virtues set + in good order the acts of the reason in reference to the interior passions and exterior actions. It is therefore evident that + the Divine law fittingly proposes precepts about the acts of all the virtues: yet so that certain matters, without which the + order of virtue, which is the order of reason, cannot even exist, come under an obligation of precept; while other matters, + which pertain to the well-being of perfect virtue, come under an admonition of counsel. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 2 co."><a name="37855" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37855] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum praecepta legis ordinentur ad bonum commune, +sicut supra habitum est, necesse est quod praecepta legis +diversificentur secundum diversos modos communitatum, unde et +philosophus, in sua politica, docet quod alias leges oportet +statuere in civitate quae regitur rege, et alias in ea quae regitur +per populum, vel per aliquos potentes de civitate. Est autem alius +modus communitatis ad quam ordinatur lex humana, et ad quam +ordinatur lex divina. Lex enim humana ordinatur ad communitatem +civilem, quae est hominum ad invicem. Homines autem ordinantur ad +invicem per exteriores actus, quibus homines sibi invicem +communicant. Huiusmodi autem communicatio pertinet ad rationem +iustitiae, quae est proprie directiva communitatis humanae. Et ideo +lex humana non proponit praecepta nisi de actibus iustitiae; et si +praecipiat actus aliarum virtutum, hoc non est nisi inquantum +assumunt rationem iustitiae; ut patet per philosophum, in V Ethic. +Sed communitas ad quam ordinat lex divina, est hominum ad Deum, vel +in praesenti vel in futura vita. Et ideo lex divina praecepta +proponit de omnibus illis per quae homines bene ordinentur ad +communicationem cum Deo. Homo autem Deo coniungitur ratione, sive +mente, in qua est Dei imago. Et ideo lex divina praecepta proponit +de omnibus illis per quae ratio hominis est bene ordinata. Hoc +autem contingit per actus omnium virtutum, nam virtutes +intellectuales ordinant bene actus rationis in seipsis; virtutes +autem morales ordinant bene actus rationis circa interiores +passiones et exteriores operationes. Et ideo manifestum est quod +lex divina convenienter proponit praecepta de actibus omnium +virtutum, ita tamen quod quaedam, sine quibus ordo virtutis, qui +est ordo rationis, observari non potest, cadunt sub obligatione +praecepti; quaedam vero, quae pertinent ad bene esse virtutis +perfectae, cadunt sub admonitione consilii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The fulfilment of the commandments of the Law, even of those which are about the acts of the other virtues, has the character + of justification, inasmuch as it is just that man should obey God: or again, inasmuch as it is just that all that belongs + to man should be subject to reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37856" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37856] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod adimpletio mandatorum legis etiam quae sunt de +actibus aliarum virtutum, habet rationem iustificationis, inquantum +iustum est ut homo obediat Deo. Vel etiam inquantum iustum est quod +omnia quae sunt hominis, rationi subdantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Justice properly so called regards the duty of one man to another: but all the other virtues regard the duty of the lower + powers to reason. It is in relation to this latter duty that the Philosopher speaks (Ethic. v, 11) of a kind of metaphorical + justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37857" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37857] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod iustitia proprie dicta attendit debitum unius hominis +ad alium, sed in omnibus aliis virtutibus attenditur debitum +inferiorum virium ad rationem. Et secundum rationem huius debiti, +philosophus assignat, in V Ethic., quandam iustitiam +metaphoricam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3</b>The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said about the different kinds of community.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37858" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37858] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt de diversitate +communitatis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q100_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q100_A3-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 3. Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue. For the + first and principal precepts of the Law are, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God," and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor," as stated + in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.37" target="asv"> Mat. 22:37,39.</a> But these two are not contained in the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore not all the moral precepts are contained in the + precepts of the decalogue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37859" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37859] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia praecepta moralia veteris +legis reducantur ad decem praecepta Decalogi. Prima enim et +principalia legis praecepta sunt, diliges dominum Deum tuum, et, +diliges proximum tuum, ut habetur Matth. XXII. Sed ista duo non +continentur in praeceptis Decalogi. Ergo non omnia praecepta +moralia continentur in praeceptis Decalogi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the moral precepts are not reducible to the ceremonial precepts, but rather vice versa. But among the precepts of + the decalogue, one is ceremonial, viz. "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day." Therefore the moral precepts are not + reducible to all the precepts of the decalogue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37860" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37860] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +praecepta moralia non reducuntur ad praecepta caeremonialia, sed +potius e converso. Sed inter praecepta Decalogi est unum +caeremoniale, scilicet, <i>memento ut diem sabbati sanctifices</i>. +Ergo praecepta moralia non reducuntur ad omnia praecepta +Decalogi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the moral precepts are about all the acts of virtue. But among the precepts of the decalogue are only such as regard + acts of justice; as may be seen by going through them all. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue do not include all the + moral precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37861" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37861] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +praecepta moralia sunt de omnibus actibus virtutum. Sed inter +praecepta Decalogi ponuntur sola praecepta pertinentia ad actus +iustitiae; ut patet discurrenti per singula. Ergo praecepta +Decalogi non continent omnia praecepta moralia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.11" target="asv"> Mat. 5:11</a>: "Blessed are ye when they shall revile you," etc. says that "Moses, after propounding the ten precepts, set them out in + detail." Therefore all the precepts of the Law are so many parts of the precepts of the decalogue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37862" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37862] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod, Matth. V, super illud, <i>beati estis cum +maledixerint</i> etc., dicit Glossa quod <i>Moyses, decem praecepta +proponens, postea per partes explicat</i>. Ergo omnia praecepta +legis sunt quaedam partes praeceptorum Decalogi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The precepts of the decalogue differ from the other precepts of the Law, in the fact that God Himself is said to have given + the precepts of the decalogue; whereas He gave the other precepts to the people through Moses. Wherefore the decalogue includes + those precepts the knowledge of which man has immediately from God. Such are those which with but slight reflection can be + gathered at once from the first general principles: and those also which become known + to man immediately through divinely infused faith. Consequently two kinds of precepts are not reckoned among the precepts + of the decalogue: viz. first general principles, for they need no further promulgation after being once imprinted on the natural + reason to which they are self-evident; as, for instance, that one should do evil to no man, and other similar principles: + and again those which the careful reflection of wise men shows to be in accord with reason; since the people receive these + principles from God, through being taught by wise men. Nevertheless both kinds of precepts are contained in the precepts of + the decalogue; yet in different ways. For the first general principles are contained in them, as principles in their proximate + conclusions; while those which are known through wise men are contained, conversely, as conclusions in their principles. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 3 co."><a name="37863" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37863] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod praecepta Decalogi ab aliis praeceptis legis +differunt in hoc, quod praecepta Decalogi per seipsum Deus dicitur +populo proposuisse; alia vero praecepta proposuit populo per +Moysen. Illa ergo praecepta ad Decalogum pertinent, quorum notitiam +homo habet per seipsum a Deo. Huiusmodi vero sunt illa quae statim +ex principiis communibus primis cognosci possunt modica +consideratione, et iterum illa quae statim ex fide divinitus infusa +innotescunt. Inter praecepta ergo Decalogi non computantur duo +genera praeceptorum, illa scilicet quae sunt prima et communia, +quorum non oportet aliam editionem esse nisi quod sunt scripta in +ratione naturali quasi per se nota, sicut quod nulli debet homo +malefacere, et alia huiusmodi; et iterum illa quae per diligentem +inquisitionem sapientum inveniuntur rationi convenire, haec enim +proveniunt a Deo ad populum mediante disciplina sapientum. Utraque +tamen horum praeceptorum continentur in praeceptis Decalogi, sed +diversimode. Nam illa quae sunt prima et communia, continentur in +eis sicut principia in conclusionibus proximis, illa vero quae per +sapientes cognoscuntur, continentur in eis, e converso, sicut +conclusiones in principiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those two principles are the first general principles of the natural law, and are self-evident to human reason, either through + nature or through faith. Wherefore all the precepts of the decalogue are referred to these, as conclusions to general principles. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37864" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37864] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illa duo praecepta sunt prima et communia +praecepta legis naturae, quae sunt per se nota rationi humanae, vel +per naturam vel per fidem. Et ideo omnia praecepta Decalogi ad illa +duo referuntur sicut conclusiones ad principia communia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The precept of the Sabbath observance is moral in one respect, in so far as it commands man to give some time to the things + of God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.45.11" target="asv"> Ps. 45:11</a>: "Be still and see that I am God." In this respect it is placed among the precepts of the decalogue: but not as to the fixing + of the time, in which respect it is a ceremonial precept. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37865" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37865] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod praeceptum de observatione sabbati est secundum +aliquid morale, inquantum scilicet per hoc praecipitur quod homo +aliquo tempore vacet rebus divinis; secundum illud Psalmi XLV, +<i>vacate, et videte quoniam ego sum Deus</i>. Et secundum hoc, +inter praecepta Decalogi computatur. Non autem quantum ad +taxationem temporis, quia secundum hoc est caeremoniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The notion of duty is not so patent in the other virtues as it is in justice. Hence the precepts about the acts of the other + virtues are not so well known to the people as are the precepts about acts of justice. Wherefore the acts of justice especially + come under the precepts of the decalogue, which are the primary elements of the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37866" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37866] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio debiti in aliis virtutibus est magis latens +quam in iustitia. Et ideo praecepta de actibus aliarum virtutum non +sunt ita nota populo sicut praecepta de actibus iustitiae. Et +propter hoc actus iustitiae specialiter cadunt sub praeceptis +Decalogi, quae sunt prima legis elementa.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q100_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q100_A4-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 4. Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably distinguished from one another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably distinguished from one another. For worship is a virtue distinct + from faith. Now the precepts are about acts of virtue. But that which is said at the beginning of the decalogue, "Thou shalt + not have strange gods before Me," belongs to faith: and that which is added, "Thou shalt not make . . . any graven thing," + etc. belongs to worship. Therefore these are not one precept, as Augustine asserts (Qq. + in Exod. qu. lxxi), but two. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37867" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37867] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter praecepta Decalogi +distinguantur. Latria enim est alia virtus a fide. Sed praecepta +dantur de actibus virtutum. Sed hoc quod dicitur in principio +Decalogi, non habebis deos alienos coram me, pertinet ad fidem, +quod autem subditur, non facies sculptile etc., pertinet ad +latriam. Ergo sunt duo praecepta, et non unum, sicut Augustinus +dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the affirmative precepts in the Law are distinct from the negative precepts; e.g. "Honor thy father and thy mother," + and, "Thou shalt not kill." But this, "I am the Lord thy God," is affirmative: and that which follows, "Thou shalt not have + strange gods before Me," is negative. Therefore these are two precepts, and do not, as Augustine says (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi), + make one. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37868" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37868] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +praecepta affirmativa in lege distinguuntur a negativis, sicut, +honora patrem et matrem, et, non occides. Sed hoc quod dicitur, ego +sum dominus Deus tuus, est affirmativum, quod autem subditur, non +habebis deos alienos coram me, est negativum. Ergo sunt duo +praecepta, et non continentur sub uno, ut Augustinus ponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.7" target="asv">Rom. 7:7</a>): "I had not known concupiscence, if the Law did not say: 'Thou shalt not covet.'" Hence it seems that this precept, "Thou + shalt not covet," is one precept; and, therefore, should not be divided into two. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37869" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37869] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +apostolus, ad Rom. VII, dicit, <i>concupiscentiam nesciebam, nisi +lex diceret, non concupisces</i>. Et sic videtur quod hoc +praeceptum, non concupisces, sit unum praeceptum. Non ergo debet +distingui in duo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Augustine who, in commenting on Exodus (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi) distinguishes three precepts as referring + to God, and seven as referring to our neighbor. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37870" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37870] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est auctoritas Augustini, in Glossa super Exod., ubi ponit tria +praecepta pertinentia ad Deum, et septem ad proximum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q100_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The precepts of the decalogue are differently divided by different authorities. For Hesychius commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.26.26" target="asv"> Lev. 26:26, </a> "Ten women shall bake your bread in one oven," says that the precept of the Sabbath-day observance is not one of the ten + precepts, because its observance, in the letter, is not binding for all time. But he distinguishes four precepts pertaining + to God, the first being, "I am the Lord thy God"; the second, "Thou shalt + not have strange gods before Me," (thus also Jerome distinguishes these two precepts, in his commentary on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Hos.10.10" target="asv"> Osee 10:10, </a> "On thy" [Vulg.: "their"] "two iniquities"); the third precept according to him is, "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven + thing"; and the fourth, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain." He states that there are six precepts + pertaining to our neighbor; the first, "Honor thy father and thy mother"; the second, "Thou shalt not kill"; + the third, "Thou shalt not commit adultery"; the fourth, "Thou shalt not steal"; the fifth, "Thou shalt not bear false witness"; + the sixth, "Thou shalt not covet." + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A4-p7"> But, in the first place, it seems unbecoming for the precept of the Sabbath-day observance to be put among the precepts of + the decalogue, if it nowise belonged to the decalogue. Secondly, because, since it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.24" target="asv">Mat. 6:24</a>), "No man can serve two masters," the two statements, "I am the Lord thy God," and, "Thou shalt not have strange gods before + Me" seem to be of the same nature and to form one precept. Hence Origen (Hom. viii in Exod.) who also + distinguishes four precepts as referring to God, unites these two under one precept; and reckons in the second place, "Thou + shalt not make . . . any graven thing"; as third, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain"; and as fourth, + "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day." The other six he reckons in the same way as Hesychius. + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A4-p8"> Since, however, the making of graven things or the likeness of anything is not forbidden except as to the point of their + being worshipped as gods---for God commanded an image of the Seraphim [Vulg.: Cherubim] to be made and placed in the tabernacle, + as related in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.25.18" target="asv"> Ex. 25:18</a>---Augustine more fittingly unites these two, "Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me," and, "Thou shalt not make . . + . any graven thing," into one precept. Likewise to covet another's + wife, for the purpose of carnal knowledge, belongs to the concupiscence of the flesh; whereas, to covet other things, which + are desired for the purpose of possession, belongs to the concupiscence of the eyes; wherefore Augustine reckons as distinct + precepts, that which forbids the coveting of another's goods, and that which prohibits the coveting of another's wife. Thus + he distinguishes three precepts as referring to God, and seven as referring to our neighbor. And this is better. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 4 co."><a name="37871" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37871] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod praecepta Decalogi diversimode a diversis +distinguuntur. Hesychius enim, Levit. XXVI, super illud, <i>decem +mulieres in uno clibano coquunt panes</i>, dicit praeceptum de +observatione sabbati non esse de decem praeceptis, quia non est +observandum, secundum litteram, secundum omne tempus. Distinguit +tamen quatuor praecepta pertinentia ad Deum, ut primum sit, ego sum +dominus Deus tuus; secundum sit, non habebis deos alienos coram me +(et sic etiam distinguit haec duo Hieronymus, Osee X, super illud, +propter duas iniquitates tuas); tertium vero praeceptum esse dicit, +non facies tibi sculptile; quartum vero, non assumes nomen Dei tui +in vanum. Pertinentia vero ad proximum dicit esse sex, ut primum +sit, honora patrem tuum et matrem tuam; secundum, non occides; +tertium, non moechaberis; quartum, non furtum facies; quintum, non +falsum testimonium dices; sextum, non concupisces. Sed primo hoc +videtur inconveniens, quod praeceptum de observatione sabbati +praeceptis Decalogi interponatur, si nullo modo ad Decalogum +pertineat. Secundo quia, cum scriptum sit Matth. VI, nemo potest +duobus dominis servire, eiusdem rationis esse videtur, et sub eodem +praecepto cadere, ego sum dominus Deus tuus, et, non habebis deos +alienos. Unde Origenes, distinguens etiam quatuor praecepta +ordinantia ad Deum, ponit ista duo pro uno praecepto; secundum vero +ponit, non facies sculptile; tertium, non assumes nomen Dei tui in +vanum; quartum, memento ut diem sabbati sanctifices. Alia vero sex +ponit sicut Hesychius. Sed quia facere sculptile vel similitudinem +non est prohibitum nisi secundum hoc, ut non colantur pro diis (nam +et in tabernaculo Deus praecepit fieri imaginem Seraphim, ut +habetur Exod. XXV); convenientius Augustinus ponit sub uno +praecepto, non habebis deos alienos, et, non facies sculptile. +Similiter etiam concupiscentia uxoris alienae ad commixtionem, +pertinet ad concupiscentiam carnis; concupiscentiae autem aliarum +rerum, quae desiderantur ad possidendum, pertinent ad +concupiscentiam oculorum; unde etiam Augustinus ponit duo praecepta +de non concupiscendo rem alienam, et uxorem alienam. Et sic ponit +tria praecepta in ordine ad Deum, et septem in ordine ad proximum. +Et hoc melius est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Worship is merely a declaration of faith: wherefore the precepts about worship should not be reckoned as distinct from those + about faith. Nevertheless precepts should be given about worship rather than about faith, because the precept about faith + is presupposed to the precepts of the decalogue, as is also the precept of charity. For just as the first general principles + of the natural law are self-evident to a subject having natural reason, and need no + promulgation; so also to believe in God is a first and self-evident principle to a subject possessed of faith: "for he that + cometh to God, must believe that He is" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.6" target="asv">Heb. 11:6</a>). Hence it needs no other promulgation that the infusion of faith. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37872" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37872] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod latria non est nisi quaedam protestatio fidei, +unde non sunt alia praecepta danda de latria, et alia de fide. +Potius tamen sunt danda de latria quam de fide, quia praeceptum +fidei praesupponitur ad praecepta Decalogi, sicut praeceptum +dilectionis. Sicut enim prima praecepta communia legis naturae sunt +per se nota habenti rationem naturalem, et promulgatione non +indigent; ita etiam et hoc quod est credere in Deum, est primum et +per se notum ei qui habet fidem, accedentem enim ad Deum oportet +credere quia est, ut dicitur ad Heb. XI. Et ideo non indiget alia +promulgatione nisi infusione fidei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The affirmative precepts are distinct from the negative, when one is not comprised in the other: thus that man should honor + his parents does not include that he should not kill another man; nor does the latter include the former. But when an affirmative + precept is included in a negative, or vice versa, we do not find that two distinct precepts are given: thus there is not one + precept saying that "Thou shalt not steal," and another binding one to keep + another's property intact, or to give it back to its owner. In the same way there are not different precepts about believing + in God, and about not believing in strange gods. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37873" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37873] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod praecepta affirmativa distinguuntur a negativis, +quando unum non comprehenditur in alio, sicut in honoratione +parentum non includitur quod nullus homo occidatur, nec e converso. +Sed quando affirmativum comprehenditur in negativo vel e converso, +non dantur super hoc diversa praecepta, sicut non datur aliud +praeceptum de hoc quod est, non furtum facies, et de hoc quod est +conservare rem alienam, vel restituere eam. Et eadem ratione non +sunt diversa praecepta de credendo in Deum, et de hoc quod non +credatur in alienos deos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All covetousness has one common ratio: and therefore the Apostle speaks of the commandment about covetousness as though it + were one. But because there are various special kinds of covetousness, therefore Augustine distinguishes different prohibitions + against coveting: for covetousness differs specifically in respect of the diversity of actions or things coveted, as the Philosopher + says (Ethic. x, 5). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37874" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37874] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnis concupiscentia convenit in una communi ratione, +et ideo apostolus singulariter de mandato concupiscendi loquitur. +Quia tamen in speciali diversae sunt rationes concupiscendi, ideo +Augustinus distinguit diversa praecepta de non concupiscendo, +differunt enim specie concupiscentiae secundum diversitatem +actionum vel concupiscibilium, ut philosophus dicit, in X +Ethic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q100_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q100_A5-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 5. Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably set forth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably set forth. Because sin, as stated by Ambrose (De Paradiso + viii), is "a transgression of the Divine law and a disobedience to the commandments of heaven." But sins are distinguished + according as man sins against God, or his neighbor, or himself. Since, then, the decalogue does not include any precepts directing + man in his relations to himself, but only such as direct him in his relations to God and + himself, it seems that the precepts of the decalogue are insufficiently enumerated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37875" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37875] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter praecepta Decalogi +enumerentur. Peccatum enim, ut Ambrosius dicit, est <i>transgressio +legis divinae, et caelestium inobedientia mandatorum</i>. Sed +peccata distinguuntur per hoc quod homo peccat vel in Deum, vel in +proximum, vel in seipsum. Cum igitur in praeceptis Decalogi non +ponantur aliqua praecepta ordinantia hominem ad seipsum, sed solum +ordinantia ipsum ad Deum et proximum; videtur quod insufficiens sit +enumeratio praeceptorum Decalogi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as the Sabbath-day observance pertained to the worship of God, so also did the observance of other solemnities, + and the offering of sacrifices. But the decalogue contains a precept about the Sabbath-day observance. Therefore it should + contain others also, pertaining to the other solemnities, and to the sacrificial rite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37876" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37876] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut ad cultum Dei pertinebat observatio sabbati, ita etiam +observatio aliarum solemnitatum, et immolatio sacrificiorum. Sed +inter praecepta Decalogi est unum pertinens ad observantiam +sabbati. Ergo etiam debent esse aliqua pertinentia ad alias +solemnitates, et ad ritum sacrificiorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as sins against God include the sin of perjury, so also do they include blasphemy, or other ways of lying against + the teaching of God. But there is a precept forbidding perjury, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain." + Therefore there should be also a precept of the decalogue forbidding blasphemy and false doctrine. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37877" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37877] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut contra Deum peccare contingit periurando, ita etiam +blasphemando, vel alias contra doctrinam divinam mentiendo. Sed +ponitur unum praeceptum prohibens periurium, cum dicitur, <i>non +assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum</i>. Ergo peccatum blasphemiae, et +falsae doctrinae, debent aliquo praecepto Decalogi prohiberi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as man has a natural affection for his parents, so has he also for his children. Moreover the commandment of + charity extends to all our neighbors. Now the precepts of the decalogue are ordained unto charity, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.5" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:5</a>: "The end of the commandment is charity." Therefore as there is a precept referring to parents, so should there have been + some precepts referring to children and other neighbors. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="37878" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37878] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut homo naturalem dilectionem habet ad parentes, ita etiam ad +filios. Mandatum etiam caritatis ad omnes proximos extenditur. Sed +praecepta Decalogi ordinantur ad caritatem; secundum illud I Tim. +I, <i>finis praecepti caritas est</i>. Ergo sicut ponitur quoddam +praeceptum pertinens ad parentes, ita etiam debuerunt poni aliqua +praecepta pertinentia ad filios et ad alios proximos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A5-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, in every kind of sin, it is possible to sin in thought or in deed. But in some kinds of sin, namely in theft and + adultery, the prohibition of sins of deed, when it is said, "Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not steal," is distinct + from the prohibition of the sin of thought, when it is said, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods," and, "Thou shalt + not covet thy neighbor's wife." Therefore the same should have been done in regard to the + sins of homicide and false witness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 5 arg. 5"><a name="37879" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37879] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +in quolibet genere peccati contingit peccare corde et opere. Sed in +quibusdam generibus peccatorum, scilicet in furto et adulterio, +seorsum prohibetur peccatum operis, cum dicitur, non moechaberis, +non furtum facies; et seorsum peccatum cordis, cum dicitur, non +concupisces rem proximi tui, et, non concupisces uxorem proximi +tui. Ergo etiam idem debuit poni in peccato homicidii et falsi +testimonii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A5-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, just as sin happens through disorder of the concupiscible faculty, so does it arise through disorder of the irascible + part. But some precepts forbid inordinate concupiscence, when it is said, "Thou shalt not covet." Therefore the decalogue + should have included some precepts forbidding the disorders of the irascible faculty. Therefore it seems that the ten precepts + of the decalogue are unfittingly enumerated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 5 arg. 6"><a name="37880" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37880] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut contingit peccatum provenire ex inordinatione +concupiscibilis, ita etiam ex inordinatione irascibilis. Sed +quibusdam praeceptis prohibetur inordinata concupiscentia, cum +dicitur, non concupisces. Ergo etiam aliqua praecepta in Decalogo +debuerunt poni per quae prohiberetur inordinatio irascibilis. Non +ergo videtur quod convenienter decem praecepta Decalogi +enumerentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A5-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.4.13" target="asv">Dt. 4:13</a>): "He shewed you His covenant, which He commanded you to do, and the ten words that He wrote in two tablets of stone." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37881" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37881] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Deut. IV, <i>ostendit vobis pactum suum, quod +praecepit ut faceretis; et decem verba quae scripsit in duabus +tabulis lapideis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q100_A5-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q100_A2" id="FS_Q100_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, just as the precepts of human law direct man in his relations to the human community, so the precepts of the Divine law + direct man in his relations to a community or commonwealth of men under God. Now in order that any man may dwell aright in + a community, two things are required: the first is that he behave well to the head of the community; the other is that he + behave well to those who are his fellows and + partners in the community. It is therefore necessary that the Divine law should contain in the first place precepts ordering + man in his relations to God; and in the second place, other precepts ordering man in his relations to other men who are his + neighbors and live with him under God. + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A5-p10"> Now man owes three things to the head of the community: first, fidelity; secondly, reverence; thirdly, service. Fidelity + to his master consists in his not giving sovereign honor to another: and this is the sense of the first commandment, in the + words "Thou shalt not have strange gods." Reverence to his master requires that he should do nothing injurious to him: and + this is conveyed by the second commandment, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain." Service is + due to the master in return for the benefits which his subjects receive from him: and to this belongs the third commandment + of the sanctification of the Sabbath in memory of the creation of all things. + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A5-p11"> To his neighbors a man behaves himself well both in particular and in general. In particular, as to those to whom he is indebted, + by paying his debts: and in this sense is to be taken the commandment about honoring one's parents. In general, as to all + men, by doing harm to none, either by deed, or by word, or by thought. By deed, harm is done to one's neighbor---sometimes + in his person, i.e. as to his personal existence; and this is forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not kill": + sometimes in a person united to him, as to the propagation of offspring; and this is prohibited by the words, "Thou shalt + not commit adultery": sometimes in his possessions, which are directed to both the aforesaid; and with this regard to this + it is said, "Thou shalt not steal." Harm done by word is forbidden when it is said, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against + thy neighbor": harm done by thought is forbidden in the words, "Thou shalt not covet." + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A5-p12"> The three precepts that direct man in his behavior towards God may also be differentiated in this same way. For the first + refers to deeds; wherefore it is said, "Thou shalt not make . . . a graven thing": the second, to words; wherefore it is said, + "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain": the third, to thoughts; because the sanctification of the Sabbath, + as the subject of a moral precept, requires repose of the heart in God. Or, according to Augustine (In + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A5-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.32" target="asv">Ps. + 32 + </a>: Conc. 1), by the first commandment we reverence the unity of the First Principle; by the second, the Divine truth; by the + third, His goodness whereby we are sanctified, and wherein we rest as in our last end. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 5 co."><a name="37882" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37882] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, sicut praecepta legis +humanae ordinant hominem ad communitatem humanam, ita praecepta +legis divinae ordinant hominem ad quandam communitatem seu +rempublicam hominum sub Deo. Ad hoc autem quod aliquis in aliqua +communitate bene commoretur, duo requiruntur, quorum primum est ut +bene se habeat ad eum qui praeest communitati; aliud autem est ut +homo bene se habeat ad alios communitatis consocios et +comparticipes. Oportet igitur quod in lege divina primo ferantur +quaedam praecepta ordinantia hominem ad Deum; et deinde alia +praecepta ordinantia hominem ad alios proximos simul conviventes +sub Deo. Principi autem communitatis tria debet homo, primo quidem, +fidelitatem; secundo, reverentiam; tertio, famulatum. Fidelitas +quidem ad dominum in hoc consistit, ut honorem principatus ad alium +non deferat. Et quantum ad hoc accipitur primum praeceptum, cum +dicitur, non habebis deos alienos. Reverentia autem ad dominum +requiritur ut nihil iniuriosum in eum committatur. Et quantum ad +hoc accipitur secundum praeceptum, quod est, non assumes nomen +domini Dei tui in vanum. Famulatus autem debetur domino in +recompensationem beneficiorum quae ab ipso percipiunt subditi. Et +ad hoc pertinet tertium praeceptum, de sanctificatione sabbati in +memoriam creationis rerum. Ad proximos autem aliquis bene se habet +et specialiter, et generaliter. Specialiter quidem, quantum ad +illos quorum est debitor, ut eis debitum reddat. Et quantum ad hoc +accipitur praeceptum de honoratione parentum. Generaliter autem, +quantum ad omnes, ut nulli nocumentum inferatur, neque opere neque +ore neque corde. Opere quidem infertur nocumentum proximo, +quandoque quidem in personam propriam, quantum ad consistentiam +scilicet personae. Et hoc prohibetur per hoc quod dicitur, non +occides. Quandoque autem in personam coniunctam quantum ad +propagationem prolis. Et hoc prohibetur cum dicitur, non +moechaberis. Quandoque autem in rem possessam, quae ordinatur ad +utrumque. Et quantum ad hoc dicitur, non furtum facies. Nocumentum +autem oris prohibetur cum dicitur, <i>non loqueris contra proximum +tuum falsum testimonium</i>. Nocumentum autem cordis prohibetur cum +dicitur, non concupisces. Et secundum hanc etiam differentiam +possent distingui tria praecepta ordinantia in Deum. Quorum primum +pertinet ad opus, unde ibi dicitur, non facies sculptile. Secundum +ad os, unde dicitur, non assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum. Tertium +pertinet ad cor, quia in sanctificatione sabbati, secundum quod est +morale praeceptum, praecipitur quies cordis in Deum. Vel, secundum +Augustinum, per primum praeceptum reveremur unitatem primi +principii; per secundum, veritatem divinam; per tertium, eius +bonitatem, qua sanctificamur, et in qua quiescimus sicut in +fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q100_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection may be answered in two ways. First, because the precepts of the decalogue can be reduced to the precepts of + charity. Now there was need for man to receive a precept about loving God and his neighbor, because in this respect the natural + law had become obscured on account of sin: but not about the duty of loving oneself, because in this respect the natural law + retained its vigor: or again, because love of oneself is contained in the love + of God and of one's neighbor: since true self-love consists in directing oneself to God. And for this reason the decalogue + includes those precepts only which refer to our neighbor and to God. + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A5-p14"> Secondly, it may be answered that the precepts of the decalogue are those which the people received from God immediately; + wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A5-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.10.4" target="asv">Dt. 10:4</a>): "He wrote in the tables, according as He had written before, the ten words, which the Lord spoke to you." Hence the precepts + of the decalogue need to be such as the people can understand at once. Now a precept implies the notion of duty. But it is + easy for a man, especially for a believer, to understand + that, of necessity, he owes certain duties to God and to his neighbor. But that, in matters which regard himself and not another, + man has, of necessity, certain duties to himself, is not so evident: for, at the first glance, it seems that everyone is free + in matters that concern himself. And therefore the precepts which prohibit disorders of a man with regard to himself, reach + the people through the instruction of men who are versed through the instruction of men who are versed in such matters; + and, consequently, they are not contained in the decalogue. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37883" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37883] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo potest responderi dupliciter. Primo quidem, quia praecepta +Decalogi referuntur ad praecepta dilectionis. Fuit autem dandum +praeceptum homini de dilectione Dei et proximi, quia quantum ad hoc +lex naturalis obscurata erat propter peccatum, non autem quantum ad +dilectionem sui ipsius, quia quantum ad hoc lex naturalis vigebat. +Vel quia etiam dilectio sui ipsius includitur in dilectione Dei et +proximi, in hoc enim homo vere se diligit, quod se ordinat in Deum. +Et ideo etiam in praeceptis Decalogi ponuntur solum praecepta +pertinentia ad proximum et ad Deum. Aliter potest dici quod +praecepta Decalogi sunt illa quae immediate populus recepit a Deo, +unde dicitur Deut. X, <i>scripsit in tabulis, iuxta id quod prius +scripserat, verba decem, quae locutus est ad vos dominus</i>. Unde +oportet praecepta Decalogi talia esse quae statim in mente populi +cadere possunt. Praeceptum autem habet rationem debiti. Quod autem +homo ex necessitate debeat aliquid Deo vel proximo, hoc de facili +cadit in conceptione hominis, et praecipue fidelis. Sed quod +aliquid ex necessitate sit debitum homini de his quae pertinent ad +seipsum et non ad alium, hoc non ita in promptu apparet, videtur +enim primo aspectu quod quilibet sit liber in his quae ad ipsum +pertinent. Et ideo praecepta quibus prohibentur inordinationes +hominis ad seipsum, perveniunt ad populum mediante instructione +sapientum. Unde non pertinent ad Decalogum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A5-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All the solemnities of the Old Law were instituted in celebration of some Divine favor, either in memory of past favors, + or in sign of some favor to come: in like manner all the sacrifices were offered up with the same purpose. Now of all the + Divine favors to be commemorated the chief was that of the Creation, which was called to mind by the sanctification of the + Sabbath; wherefore the reason for this precept is given in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A5-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.11" target="asv"> Ex. + 20:11 + </a>: "In six days the Lord made heaven and earth," etc. And of all future blessings, the chief and final was the repose of the + mind in God, either, in the present life, by grace, or, in the future life, by glory; which repose was also foreshadowed in + the Sabbath-day observance: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A5-p15.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.58.13" target="asv">Is. 58:13</a>): "If thou turn away thy foot from the Sabbath, from doing thy own will in My holy day, and call the Sabbath delightful, + and the holy of the Lord + glorious." Because these favors first and chiefly are borne in mind by men, especially by the faithful. But other solemnities + were celebrated on account of certain particular favors temporal and transitory, such as the celebration of the Passover in + memory of the past favor of the delivery from Egypt, and as a sign of the future Passion of Christ, which though temporal + and transitory, brought us to the repose of the spiritual Sabbath. Consequently, the Sabbath alone, and none of the other + solemnities and sacrifices, is mentioned in the precepts of the decalogue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37884" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37884] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod omnes solemnitates legis veteris sunt institutae in +commemorationem alicuius divini beneficii vel praeteriti +commemorati, vel futuri praefigurati. Et similiter propter hoc +omnia sacrificia offerebantur. Inter omnia autem beneficia Dei +commemoranda, primum et praecipuum erat beneficium creationis, quod +commemoratur in sanctificatione sabbati, unde Exod. XX pro ratione +huius praecepti ponitur, <i>sex enim diebus fecit Deus caelum et +terram</i> et cetera. Inter omnia autem futura beneficia, quae +erant praefiguranda, praecipuum et finale erat quies mentis in Deo, +vel in praesenti per gratiam, vel in futuro per gloriam, quae etiam +figurabatur per observantiam sabbati; unde dicitur Isaiae LVIII, +<i>si averteris a sabbato pedem tuum, facere voluntatem tuam in die +sancto meo, et vocaveris sabbatum delicatum, et sanctum domini +gloriosum</i>. Haec enim beneficia primo et principaliter sunt in +mente hominum, maxime fidelium. Aliae vero solemnitates celebrantur +propter aliqua particularia beneficia temporaliter transeuntia, +sicut celebratio phase propter beneficium praeteritae liberationis +ex Aegypto, et propter futuram passionem Christi, quae temporaliter +transivit, inducens nos in quietem sabbati spiritualis. Et ideo, +praetermissis omnibus aliis solemnitatibus et sacrificiis, de solo +sabbato fiebat mentio inter praecepta Decalogi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A5-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A5-p16.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.6.16" target="asv">Heb. 6:16</a>), "men swear by one greater than themselves; and an oath for confirmation is the end of all their controversy." Hence, since + oaths are common to all, inordinate swearing is the matter of a special prohibition by a precept of the decalogue. According + to one interpretation, however, the words, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain," are a prohibition of + false doctrine, for one gloss + expounds them thus: "Thou shalt not say that Christ is a creature." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37885" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37885] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VI, <i>homines per +maiorem sui iurant, et omnis controversiae eorum finis ad +confirmationem est iuramentum</i>. Et ideo, quia iuramentum est +omnibus commune, propter hoc prohibitio inordinationis circa +iuramentum, specialiter praecepto Decalogi prohibetur. Peccatum +vero falsae doctrinae non pertinet nisi ad paucos, unde non +oportebat ut de hoc fieret mentio inter praecepta Decalogi. Quamvis +etiam, quantum ad aliquem intellectum, in hoc quod dicitur, non +assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum, prohibeatur falsitas doctrinae, una +enim Glossa exponit, non dices Christum esse creaturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A5-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> That a man should not do harm to anyone is an immediate dictate of his natural reason: and therefore the precepts that forbid + the doing of harm are binding on all men. But it is not an immediate dictate of natural reason that a man should do one thing + in return for another, unless he happen to be indebted to someone. Now a son's debt to his father is so evident that one cannot + get away from it by denying it: since the father is the principle of + generation and being, and also of upbringing and teaching. Wherefore the decalogue does not prescribe deeds of kindness or + service to be done to anyone except to one's parents. On the other hand parents do not seem to be indebted to their children + for any favors received, but rather the reverse is the case. Again, a child is a part of his father; and "parents love their + children as being a part of themselves," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 12). Hence, just as the decalogue contains + no + ordinance as to man's behavior towards himself, so, for the same reason, it includes no precept about loving one's children. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="37886" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37886] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod statim ratio naturalis homini dictat quod nulli +iniuriam faciat, et ideo praecepta prohibentia nocumentum, +extendunt se ad omnes. Sed ratio naturalis non statim dictat quod +aliquid sit pro alio faciendum, nisi cui homo aliquid debet. +Debitum autem filii ad patrem adeo est manifestum quod nulla +tergiversatione potest negari, eo quod pater est principium +generationis et esse, et insuper educationis et doctrinae. Et ideo +non ponitur sub praecepto Decalogi ut aliquod beneficium vel +obsequium alicui impendatur nisi parentibus. Parentes autem non +videntur esse debitores filiis propter aliqua beneficia suscepta, +sed potius e converso. Filius etiam est aliquid patris; et patres +amant filios ut aliquid ipsorum, sicut dicit philosophus, in VIII +Ethic. Unde eisdem rationibus non ponuntur aliqua praecepta +Decalogi pertinentia ad amorem filiorum, sicut neque etiam aliqua +ordinantia hominem ad seipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A5-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The pleasure of adultery and the usefulness of wealth, in so far as they have the character of pleasurable or useful good, + are of themselves, objects of appetite: and for this reason they needed to be forbidden not only in the deed but also in the + desire. But murder and falsehood are, of themselves, objects of repulsion (since it is natural for man to love his neighbor + and the truth): and are desired only for the sake of something else. Consequently + with regard to sins of murder and false witness, it was necessary to proscribe, not sins of thought, but only sins of deed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 5 ad 5"><a name="37887" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37887] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod delectatio adulterii, et utilitas divitiarum, sunt +propter seipsa appetibilia, inquantum habent rationem boni +delectabilis vel utilis. Et propter hoc oportuit in eis prohiberi +non solum opus, sed etiam concupiscentiam. Sed homicidium et +falsitas sunt secundum seipsa horribilia, quia proximus et veritas +naturaliter amantur, et non desiderantur nisi propter aliud. Et +ideo non oportuit circa peccatum homicidii et falsi testimonii +prohibere peccatum cordis, sed solum operis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A5-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q25_A1" id="FS_Q100_A5-p19.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[1]</a>), all the passions of the irascible faculty arise from the passions of the concupiscible part. Hence, as the precepts of + the decalogue are, as it were, the first elements of the Law, there was no need for mention of the irascible passions, but + only of the concupiscible passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 5 ad 6"><a name="37888" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37888] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 5 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, omnes passiones irascibilis +derivantur a passionibus concupiscibilis. Et ideo in praeceptis +Decalogi, quae sunt quasi prima elementa legis, non erat mentio +facienda de passionibus irascibilis, sed solum de passionibus +concupiscibilis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q100_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q100_A6-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 6. Whether the ten precepts of the decalogue are set in proper order?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the ten precepts of the decalogue are not set in proper order. Because love of one's neighbor is seemingly + previous to love of God, since our neighbor is better known to us than God is; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.20" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:20</a>: "He that loveth not his brother, whom he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?" But the first three precepts belong + to the love of God, while the other seven pertain to the love of our neighbor. Therefore + the precepts of the decalogue are not set in proper order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37889" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37889] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter ordinentur decem +praecepta Decalogi. Dilectio enim proximi videtur esse praevia ad +dilectionem Dei, quia proximus est nobis magis notus quam Deus; +secundum illud I Ioan. IV, <i>qui fratrem suum, quem videt, non +diligit, Deum, quem non videt, quomodo potest diligere?</i> Sed +tria prima praecepta pertinent ad dilectionem Dei, septem vero alia +ad dilectionem proximi. Ergo inconvenienter praecepta Decalogi +ordinantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the acts of virtue are prescribed by the affirmative precepts, and acts of vice are forbidden by the negative precepts. + But according to Boethius in his commentary on the Categories [*Lib. iv, cap. De Oppos.], vices should be uprooted before + virtues are sown. Therefore among the precepts concerning our neighbor, the negative precepts should have preceded the affirmative. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37890" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37890] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +per praecepta affirmativa imperantur actus virtutum, per praecepta +vero negativa prohibentur actus vitiorum. Sed secundum Boetium, in +commento praedicamentorum, prius sunt extirpanda vitia quam +inserantur virtutes. Ergo inter praecepta pertinentia ad proximum, +primo ponenda fuerunt praecepta negativa quam affirmativa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the precepts of the Law are about men's actions. But actions of thought precede actions of word or outward deed. + Therefore the precepts about not coveting, which regard our thoughts, are unsuitably placed last in order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37891" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37891] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +praecepta legis dantur de actibus hominum. Sed prior est actus +cordis quam oris vel exterioris operis. Ergo inconvenienti ordine +praecepta de non concupiscendo, quae pertinent ad cor, ultimo +ponuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1</a>): "The things that are of God, are well ordered" [Vulg.: 'Those that are, are ordained of God']. But the precepts of the + decalogue were given immediately by God, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q100_A3" id="FS_Q100_A6-p5.2" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Therefore they are arranged in becoming order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 6 s. c."><a name="37892" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37892] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. XIII, <i>quae a Deo sunt, ordinata +sunt</i>. Sed praecepta Decalogi sunt immediate data a Deo, ut +dictum est. Ergo convenientem ordinem habent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q100_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q100_A3" id="FS_Q100_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[3]</a>,5, ad 1), the precepts of the decalogue are such as the mind of man is ready to grasp at once. Now it is evident that a thing + is so much the more easily grasped by the reason, as its contrary is more grievous and repugnant to reason. Moreover, it is + clear, since the order of reason begins with the end, that, for a man to be inordinately disposed towards his end, is supremely + contrary to reason. Now the end of + human life and society is God. Consequently it was necessary for the precepts of the decalogue, first of all, to direct man + to God; since the contrary to this is most grievous. Thus also, in an army, which is ordained to the commander as to its end, + it is requisite first that the soldier should be subject to the commander, and the opposite of this is most grievous; and + secondly it is requisite that he should be in coordination with the other soldiers. + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A6-p7"> Now among those things whereby we are ordained to God, the first is that man should be subjected to Him faithfully, by having + nothing in common with His enemies. The second is that he should show Him reverence: the third that he should offer Him service. + Thus, in an army, it is a greater sin for a soldier to act treacherously and make a compact with the foe, than to be insolent + to his commander: and this last is more grievous than if he be found wanting in some point of service + to him. + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A6-p8"> As to the precepts that direct man in his behavior towards his neighbor, it is evident that it is more repugnant to reason, + and a more grievous sin, if man does not observe the due order as to those persons to whom he is most indebted. Consequently, + among those precepts that direct man in his relations to his neighbor, the first place is given to that one which regards + his parents. Among the other precepts we again find the order to be according to the gravity of sin. For it is + more grave and more repugnant to reason, to sin by deed than by word; and by word than by thought. And among sins of deed, + murder which destroys life in one already living is more grievous than adultery, which imperils the life of the unborn child; + and adultery is more grave than theft, which regards external goods. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 6 co."><a name="37893" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37893] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, praecepta Decalogi dantur de his +quae statim in promptu mens hominis suscipit. Manifestum est autem +quod tanto aliquid magis a ratione suscipitur, quanto contrarium +est gravius et magis rationi repugnans. Manifestum est autem quod, +cum rationis ordo a fine incipiat, maxime est contra rationem ut +homo inordinate se habeat circa finem. Finis autem humanae vitae et +societatis est Deus. Et ideo primo oportuit per praecepta Decalogi +hominem ordinare ad Deum, cum eius contrarium sit gravissimum. +Sicut etiam in exercitu, qui ordinatur ad ducem sicut ad finem, +primum est quod miles subdatur duci, et huius contrarium est +gravissimum; secundum vero est ut aliis coordinetur. Inter ipsa +autem per quae ordinamur in Deum, primum occurrit quod homo +fideliter ei subdatur, nullam participationem cum inimicis habens. +Secundum autem est quod ei reverentiam exhibeat. Tertium autem est +quod etiam famulatum impendat. Maiusque peccatum est in exercitu si +miles, infideliter agens, cum hoste pactum habeat, quam si aliquam +irreverentiam faciat duci, et hoc est etiam gravius quam si in +aliquo obsequio ducis deficiens inveniatur. In praeceptis autem +ordinantibus ad proximum, manifestum est quod magis repugnat +rationi, et gravius peccatum est, si homo non servet ordinem +debitum ad personas quibus magis est debitor. Et ideo inter +praecepta ordinantia ad proximum, primo ponitur praeceptum +pertinens ad parentes. Inter alia vero praecepta etiam apparet ordo +secundum ordinem gravitatis peccatorum. Gravius est enim, et magis +rationi repugnans, peccare opere quam ore, et ore quam corde. Et +inter peccata operis, gravius est homicidium, per quod tollitur +vita hominis iam existentis, quam adulterium, per quod impeditur +certitudo prolis nasciturae; et adulterium gravius quam furtum, +quod pertinet ad bona exteriora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although our neighbor is better known than God by the way of the senses, nevertheless the love of God is the reason for the + love of our neighbor, as shall be declared later on ( + <a href="SS_i.html#SS_Q25_A1" id="FS_Q100_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[25], A[1]</a>; + <a href="SS_i.html#SS_Q26_A2" id="FS_Q100_A6-p9.2" shape="rect">SS, Q[26], A[2]</a>). Hence the precepts ordaining man to God demanded precedence of the others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="37894" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37894] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quamvis secundum viam sensus proximus sit magis +notus quam Deus, tamen dilectio Dei est ratio dilectionis proximi, +ut infra patebit. Et ideo praecepta ordinantia ad Deum, fuerunt +praeordinanda.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as God is the universal principle of being in respect of all things, so is a father a principle of being in respect + of his son. Therefore the precept regarding parents was fittingly placed after the precepts regarding God. This argument holds + in respect of affirmative and negative precepts about the same kind of deed: although even then it is not altogether cogent. + For although in the order of execution, vices should be uprooted before virtues + are sown, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A6-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.15" target="asv"> Ps. 33:15</a>: "Turn away from evil, and do good," and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A6-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.1.16" target="asv"> Is. 1:16,17</a>: "Cease to do perversely; learn to do well"; yet, in the order of knowledge, virtue precedes vice, because "the crooked line + is known by the straight" (De Anima i): and "by the law is the knowledge of sin" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A6-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.20" target="asv">Rom. 3:20</a>). Wherefore the affirmation precept demanded the first place. However, this is not the reason for the order, but that which + is given + above. Because in the precepts regarding God, which belongs to the first table, an affirmative precept is placed last, since + its transgression implies a less grievous sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="37895" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37895] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut Deus est universale principium essendi +omnibus, ita etiam pater est principium quoddam essendi filio. Et +ideo convenienter post praecepta pertinentia ad Deum, ponitur +praeceptum pertinens ad parentes. Ratio autem procedit quando +affirmativa et negativa pertinent ad idem genus operis. Quamvis +etiam et in hoc non habeat omnimodam efficaciam. Etsi enim in +executione operis, prius extirpanda sint vitia quam inserendae +virtutes, secundum illud Psalmi XXXIII, <i>declina a malo, et fac +bonum</i>, et Isaiae I, <i>quiescite agere perverse, discite +benefacere</i>; tamen in cognitione prior est virtus quam peccatum, +quia per rectum cognoscitur obliquum, ut dicitur in I de anima. Per +legem autem cognitio peccati, ut Rom. III dicitur. Et secundum hoc, +praeceptum affirmativum debuisset primo poni. Sed non est ista +ratio ordinis, sed quae supra posita est. Quia in praeceptis +pertinentibus ad Deum, quae sunt primae tabulae, ultimo ponitur +praeceptum affirmativum, quia eius transgressio minorem reatum +inducit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although sin of thought stands first in the order of execution, yet its prohibition holds a later position in the order of + reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="37896" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37896] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod peccatum cordis etsi sit prius in executione, tamen +eius prohibitio posterius cadit in ratione.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q100_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q100_A7-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 7. Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably formulated?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably formulated. Because the affirmative precepts direct man to + acts of virtue, while the negative precepts withdraw him from acts of vice. But in every matter there are virtues and vices + opposed to one another. Therefore in whatever matter there is an ordinance of a precept of the decalogue, there should have + been an affirmative and a negative precept. Therefore it was unfitting that affirmative + precepts should be framed in some matters, and negative precepts in others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="37897" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37897] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta Decalogi +inconvenienter tradantur. Praecepta enim affirmativa ordinant ad +actus virtutum, praecepta autem negativa abstrahunt ab actibus +vitiorum. Sed circa quamlibet materiam opponuntur sibi virtutes et +vitia. Ergo in qualibet materia de qua ordinat praeceptum Decalogi, +debuit poni praeceptum affirmativum et negativum. Inconvenienter +igitur ponuntur quaedam affirmativa et quaedam negativa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isidore says (Etym. ii, 10) that every law is based on reason. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the + Divine law. Therefore the reason should have been pointed out in each precept, and not only in the first and third. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="37898" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37898] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Isidorus dicit quod omnis lex ratione constat. Sed omnia praecepta +Decalogi pertinent ad legem divinam. Ergo in omnibus debuit ratio +assignari, et non solum in primo et tertio praecepto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by observing the precepts man deserves to be rewarded by God. But the Divine promises concern the rewards of the + precepts. Therefore the promise should have been included in each precept, and not only in the second and fourth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="37899" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37899] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +per observantiam praeceptorum meretur aliquis praemia a Deo. Sed +divinae promissiones sunt de praemiis praeceptorum. Ergo promissio +debuit poni in omnibus praeceptis, et non solum in primo et +quarto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A7-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Old Law is called "the law of fear," in so far as it induced men to observe the precepts, by means of the threat + of punishments. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the Old Law. Therefore a threat of punishment should have + been included in each, and not only in the first and second. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="37900" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37900] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +lex vetus dicitur lex timoris, inquantum per comminationes poenarum +inducebat ad observationes praeceptorum. Sed omnia praecepta +Decalogi pertinent ad legem veterem. Ergo in omnibus debuit poni +comminatio poenae, et non solum in primo et secundo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A7-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, all the commandments of God should be retained in the memory: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.3" target="asv">Prov. 3:3</a>): "Write them in the tables of thy heart." Therefore it was not fitting that mention of the memory should be made in the + third commandment only. Consequently it seems that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably formulated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 7 arg. 5"><a name="37901" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37901] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +omnia praecepta Dei sunt in memoria retinenda, dicitur enim Prov. +III, <i>describe ea in tabulis cordis tui</i>. Inconvenienter ergo +in solo tertio praecepto fit mentio de memoria. Et ita videntur +praecepta Decalogi inconvenienter tradita esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A7-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A7-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>) that "God made all things, in measure, number and weight." Much more therefore did He observe a suitable manner in formulating + His Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 7 s. c."><a name="37902" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37902] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Sap. XI, quod <i>Deus omnia fecit in numero, +pondere et mensura</i>. Multo magis ergo in praeceptis suae legis +congruum modum tradendi servavit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A7-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The highest wisdom is contained in the precepts of the Divine law: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.4.6" target="asv">Dt. 4:6</a>): "This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations." Now it belongs to wisdom to arrange all things in due + manner and order. Therefore it must be evident that the precepts of the Law are suitably set forth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 7 co."><a name="37903" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37903] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod in praeceptis divinae legis maxima sapientia +continetur, unde dicitur Deut. IV, <i>haec est vestra sapientia et +intellectus coram populis</i>. Sapientis autem est omnia debito +modo et ordine disponere. Et ideo manifestum esse debet quod +praecepta legis convenienti modo sunt tradita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Affirmation of one thing always leads to the denial of its opposite: but the denial of one opposite does not always lead + to the affirmation of the other. For it follows that if a thing is white, it is not black: but it does not follow that if + it is not black, it is white: because negation extends further than affirmation. And hence too, that one ought not to do harm + to another, which pertains to the negative precepts, extends to more persons, as a + primary dictate of reason, than that one ought to do someone a service or kindness. Nevertheless it is a primary dictate of + reason that man is a debtor in the point of rendering a service or kindness to those from whom he has received kindness, if + he has not yet repaid the debt. Now there are two whose favors no man can sufficiently repay, viz. God and man's father, as + stated in Ethic. viii, 14. Therefore it is that there are only two affirmative precepts; one about the honor due to parents, + the other about the celebration of the Sabbath in memory of the Divine favor. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="37904" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37904] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod semper ad affirmationem sequitur negatio +oppositi, non autem semper ad negationem unius oppositi sequitur +affirmatio alterius. Sequitur enim, si est album, non est nigrum, +non tamen sequitur, si non est nigrum, ergo est album, quia ad +plura sese extendit negatio quam affirmatio. Et inde est etiam quod +non esse faciendum iniuriam, quod pertinet ad praecepta negativa, +ad plures personas se extendit, secundum primum dictamen rationis, +quam esse debitum ut alicui obsequium vel beneficium impendatur. +Inest autem primo dictamen rationis quod homo debitor est beneficii +vel obsequii exhibendi illis a quibus beneficia accepit, si nondum +recompensavit. Duo autem sunt quorum beneficiis sufficienter nullus +recompensare potest, scilicet Deus et pater, ut dicitur in VIII +Ethic. Et ideo sola duo praecepta affirmativa ponuntur, unum de +honoratione parentum; aliud de celebratione sabbati in +commemorationem divini beneficii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reasons for the purely moral precepts are manifest; hence there was no need to add the reason. But some of the precepts + include ceremonial matter, or a determination of a general moral precept; thus the first precept includes the determination, + "Thou shalt not make a graven thing"; and in the third precept the Sabbath-day is fixed. Consequently there was need to state + the reason in each case. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="37905" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37905] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illa praecepta quae sunt pure moralia, habent +manifestam rationem, unde non oportuit quod in eis aliqua ratio +adderetur. Sed quibusdam praeceptis additur caeremoniale, vel +determinativum praecepti moralis communis, sicut in primo +praecepto, non facies sculptile; et in tertio praecepto +determinatur dies sabbati. Et ideo utrobique oportuit rationem +assignari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A7-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Generally speaking, men direct their actions to some point of utility. Consequently in those precepts in which it seemed + that there would be no useful result, or that some utility might be hindered, it was necessary to add a promise of reward. + And since parents are already on the way to depart from us, no benefit is expected from them: wherefore a promise of reward + is added to the precept about honoring one's parents. The same applies to the precept + forbidding idolatry: since thereby it seemed that men were hindered from receiving the apparent benefit which they think they + can get by entering into a compact with the demons. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="37906" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37906] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod homines ut plurimum actus suos ad aliquam utilitatem +ordinant. Et ideo in illis praeceptis necesse fuit promissionem +praemii apponere, ex quibus videbatur nulla utilitas sequi, vel +aliqua utilitas impediri. Quia vero parentes sunt iam in recedendo, +ab eis non expectatur utilitas. Et ideo praecepto de honore +parentum additur promissio. Similiter etiam praecepto de +prohibitione idololatriae, quia per hoc videbatur impediri apparens +utilitas quam homines credunt se posse consequi per pactum cum +Daemonibus initum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A7-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Punishments are necessary against those who are prone to evil, as stated in Ethic. x, 9. Wherefore a threat of punishment + is only affixed to those precepts of the law which forbade evils to which men were prone. Now men were prone to idolatry by + reason of the general custom of the nations. Likewise men are prone to perjury on account of the frequent use of oaths. Hence + it is that a threat is affixed to the first two precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="37907" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37907] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod poenae praecipue necessariae sunt contra illos qui +sunt proni ad malum, ut dicitur in X Ethic. Et ideo illis solis +praeceptis legis additur comminatio poenarum, in quibus erat +pronitas ad malum. Erant autem homines proni ad idololatriam, +propter generalem consuetudinem gentium. Et similiter sunt etiam +homines proni ad periurium, propter frequentiam iuramenti. Et ideo +primis duobus praeceptis adiungitur comminatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A7-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The commandment about the Sabbath was made in memory of a past blessing. Wherefore special mention of the memory is made + therein. Or again, the commandment about the Sabbath has a determination affixed to it that does not belong to the natural + law, wherefore this precept needed a special admonition. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 7 ad 5"><a name="37908" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37908] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 7 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod praeceptum de sabbato ponitur ut commemorativum +beneficii praeteriti. Et ideo specialiter in eo fit mentio de +memoria. Vel quia praeceptum de sabbato habet determinationem +adiunctam quae non est de lege naturae; et ideo hoc praeceptum +speciali admonitione indiguit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q100_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q100_A8-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 8. Whether the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable. For the precepts of the decalogue belong to the natural + law. But the natural law fails in some cases and is changeable, like human nature, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7). + Now the failure of law to apply in certain particular cases is a reason for dispensation, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q96_A6" id="FS_Q100_A8-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[96], A[6]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q97_A4" id="FS_Q100_A8-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[97], A[4]</a>). Therefore a dispensation can be + granted in the precepts of the decalogue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="37909" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37909] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta Decalogi sint dispensabilia. +Praecepta enim Decalogi sunt de iure naturali. Sed iustum naturale +in aliquibus deficit, et mutabile est, sicut et natura humana, ut +philosophus dicit, in V Ethic. Defectus autem legis in aliquibus +particularibus casibus est ratio dispensandi, ut supra dictum est. +Ergo in praeceptis Decalogi potest fieri dispensatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man stands in the same relation to human law as God does to Divine law. But man can dispense with the precepts of + a law made by man. Therefore, since the precepts of the decalogue are ordained by God, it seems that God can dispense with + them. Now our superiors are God's viceregents on earth; for the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.2.10" target="asv">2 Cor. 2:10</a>): "For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person of + Christ." Therefore superiors can dispense with the precepts of the decalogue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="37910" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37910] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut se habet homo ad legem humanam, ita se habet Deus ad legem +datam divinitus. Sed homo potest dispensare in praeceptis legis +quae homo statuit. Ergo, cum praecepta Decalogi sint instituta a +Deo, videtur quod Deus in eis possit dispensare. Sed praelati vice +Dei funguntur in terris, dicit enim apostolus, II ad Cor. II, +<i>nam et ego, si quid donavi, propter vos donavi in persona +Christi</i>. Ergo etiam praelati possunt in praeceptis Decalogi +dispensare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among the precepts of the decalogue is one forbidding murder. But it seems that a dispensation is given by men in + this precept: for instance, when according to the prescription of human law, such as evil-doers or enemies are lawfully slain. + Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="37911" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37911] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +inter praecepta Decalogi continetur prohibitio homicidii. Sed in +isto praecepto videtur dispensari per homines, puta cum, secundum +praeceptum legis humanae, homines licite occiduntur, puta +malefactores vel hostes. Ergo praecepta Decalogi sunt +dispensabilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A8-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the observance of the Sabbath is ordained by a precept of the decalogue. But a dispensation was granted in this + precept; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iMacc.2.4" target="asv">1 Macc. 2:4</a>): "And they determined in that day, saying: Whosoever shall come up to fight against us on the Sabbath-day, we will fight + against him." Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="37912" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37912] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +observatio sabbati continetur inter praecepta Decalogi. Sed in hoc +praecepto fuit dispensatum, dicitur enim I Machab. II, <i>et +cogitaverunt in die illa dicentes, omnis homo quicumque venerit ad +nos in bello die sabbatorum, pugnemus adversus eum</i>. Ergo +praecepta Decalogi sunt dispensabilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A8-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> are the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.24.5" target="asv"> Is. 24:5, </a> where some are reproved for that "they have changed the ordinance, they have broken the everlasting covenant"; which, seemingly, + apply principally to the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue cannot be changed by dispensation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 8 s. c."><a name="37913" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37913] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Isaiae XXIV, quidam reprehenduntur de hoc quod +mutaverunt ius, dissipaverunt foedus sempiternum, quod maxime +videtur intelligendum de praeceptis Decalogi. Ergo praecepta +Decalogi mutari per dispensationem non possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q100_A8-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q96_A6" id="FS_Q100_A8-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[96], A[6]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q97_A4" id="FS_Q100_A8-p7.2" shape="rect"> Q[97], A[4]</a>), precepts admit of dispensation, when there occurs a particular case in which, if the letter of the law be observed, the + intention of the lawgiver is frustrated. Now the intention of every lawgiver is directed first and chiefly to the common good; + secondly, to the order of justice and virtue, whereby the common good is preserved and attained. If therefore there by + any precepts which contain the very preservation of the common good, or the very order of justice and virtue, such precepts + contain the intention of the lawgiver, and therefore are indispensable. For instance, if in some community a law were enacted, + such as this---that no man should work for the destruction of the commonwealth, or betray the state to its enemies, or that + no man should do anything unjust or evil, such precepts would not admit of dispensation. But if other precepts were enacted, + subordinate to the above, and determining certain special modes of procedure, these latter precepts would admit of dispensation, + in so far as the omission of these precepts in certain cases would not be prejudicial to the former precepts which contain + the intention of the lawgiver. For instance if, for the safeguarding of the commonwealth, it were enacted in some city that + from each ward some men should keep watch as sentries in case of siege, some might be dispensed from this on account of + some greater utility. + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A8-p8"> Now the precepts of the decalogue contain the very intention of the lawgiver, who is God. For the precepts of the first table, + which direct us to God, contain the very order to the common and final good, which is God; while the precepts of the second + table contain the order of justice to be observed among men, that nothing undue be done to anyone, and that each one be given + his due; for it is in this sense that we are to take the precepts of the decalogue. Consequently the + precepts of the decalogue admit of no dispensation whatever. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 8 co."><a name="37914" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37914] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, tunc in praeceptis debet +fieri dispensatio, quando occurrit aliquis particularis casus in +quo, si verbum legis observetur, contrariatur intentioni +legislatoris. Intentio autem legislatoris cuiuslibet ordinatur +primo quidem et principaliter ad bonum commune; secundo autem, ad +ordinem iustitiae et virtutis, secundum quem bonum commune +conservatur, et ad ipsum pervenitur. Si qua ergo praecepta dentur +quae contineant ipsam conservationem boni communis, vel ipsum +ordinem iustitiae et virtutis; huiusmodi praecepta continent +intentionem legislatoris, et ideo indispensabilia sunt. Puta si +poneretur hoc praeceptum in aliqua communitate, quod nullus +destrueret rempublicam, neque proderet civitatem hostibus, sive +quod nullus faceret aliquid iniuste vel male; huiusmodi praecepta +essent indispensabilia. Sed si aliqua alia praecepta traderentur +ordinata ad ista praecepta, quibus determinantur aliqui speciales +modi, in talibus praeceptis dispensatio posset fieri; inquantum per +omissionem huiusmodi praeceptorum in aliquibus casibus, non fieret +praeiudicium primis praeceptis, quae continent intentionem +legislatoris. Puta si, ad conservationem reipublicae, statueretur +in aliqua civitate quod de singulis vicis aliqui vigilarent ad +custodiam civitatis obsessae; posset cum aliquibus dispensari +propter aliquam maiorem utilitatem. Praecepta autem Decalogi +continent ipsam intentionem legislatoris, scilicet Dei. Nam +praecepta primae tabulae, quae ordinant ad Deum, continent ipsum +ordinem ad bonum commune et finale, quod Deus est; praecepta autem +secundae tabulae continent ipsum ordinem iustitiae inter homines +observandae, ut scilicet nulli fiat indebitum, et cuilibet reddatur +debitum; secundum hanc enim rationem sunt intelligenda praecepta +Decalogi. Et ideo praecepta Decalogi sunt omnino +indispensabilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is not speaking of the natural law which contains the very order of justice: for it is a never-failing principle + that "justice should be preserved." But he is speaking in reference to certain fixed modes of observing justice, which fail + to apply in certain cases. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="37915" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37915] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod philosophus non loquitur de iusto naturali quod +continet ipsum ordinem iustitiae, hoc enim nunquam deficit, +iustitiam esse servandam. Sed loquitur quantum ad determinatos +modos observationis iustitiae, qui in aliquibus fallunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A8-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.13" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:13</a>), "God continueth faithful, He cannot deny Himself." But He would deny Himself if He were to do away with the very order + of His own justice, since He is justice itself. Wherefore God cannot dispense a man so that it be lawful for him not to direct + himself to God, or not to be subject to His justice, even in those matters in which men are directed to one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="37916" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37916] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, II ad Tim. II, <i>Deus +fidelis permanet, negare seipsum non potest</i>. Negaret autem +seipsum, si ipsum ordinem suae iustitiae auferret, cum ipse sit +ipsa iustitia. Et ideo in hoc Deus dispensare non potest, ut homini +liceat non ordinate se habere ad Deum, vel non subdi ordini +iustitiae eius, etiam in his secundum quae homines ad invicem +ordinantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q100_A8-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The slaying of a man is forbidden in the decalogue, in so far as it bears the character of something undue: for in this sense + the precept contains the very essence of justice. Human law cannot make it lawful for a man to be slain unduly. But it is + not undue for evil-doers or foes of the common weal to be slain: hence this is not contrary to the precept of the decalogue; + and such a killing is no murder as forbidden by that precept, as Augustine + observes (De Lib. Arb. i, 4). In like manner when a man's property is taken from him, if it be due that he should lose it, + this is not theft or robbery as forbidden by the decalogue. + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A8-p12"> Consequently when the children of Israel, by God's command, took away the spoils of the Egyptians, this was not theft; since + it was due to them by the sentence of God. Likewise when Abraham consented to slay his son, he did not consent to murder, + because his son was due to be slain by the command of God, Who is Lord of life and death: for He it is Who inflicts the punishment + of death on all men, both godly and ungodly, on account of the sin of our first parent, and if a man be + the executor of that sentence by Divine authority, he will be no murderer any more than God would be. Again Osee, by taking + unto himself a wife of fornications, or an adulterous woman, was not guilty either of adultery or of fornication: because + he took unto himself one who was his by command of God, Who is the Author of the institution of marriage. + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A8-p13"> Accordingly, therefore, the precepts of the decalogue, as to the essence of justice which they contain, are unchangeable: + but as to any determination by application to individual actions---for instance, that this or that be murder, theft or adultery, + or not---in this point they admit of change; sometimes by Divine authority alone, namely, in such matters as are exclusively + of Divine institution, as marriage and the like; sometimes also by human authority, namely in such matters + as are subject to human jurisdiction: for in this respect men stand in the place of God: and yet not in all respects. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="37917" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37917] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod occisio hominis prohibetur in Decalogo secundum quod +habet rationem indebiti, sic enim praeceptum continet ipsam +rationem iustitiae. Lex autem humana hoc concedere non potest, quod +licite homo indebite occidatur. Sed malefactores occidi, vel hostes +reipublicae, hoc non est indebitum. Unde hoc non contrariatur +praecepto Decalogi, nec talis occisio est homicidium, quod +praecepto Decalogi prohibetur, ut Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. +Arb. Et similiter si alicui auferatur quod suum erat, si debitum +est quod ipsum amittat, hoc non est furtum vel rapina, quae +praecepto Decalogi prohibentur. Et ideo quando filii Israel +praecepto Dei tulerunt Aegyptiorum spolia, non fuit furtum, quia +hoc eis debebatur ex sententia Dei. Similiter etiam Abraham, cum +consensit occidere filium, non consensit in homicidium, quia +debitum erat eum occidi per mandatum Dei, qui est dominus vitae et +mortis. Ipse enim est qui poenam mortis infligit omnibus hominibus, +iustis et iniustis, pro peccato primi parentis, cuius sententiae si +homo sit executor auctoritate divina, non erit homicida, sicut nec +Deus. Et similiter etiam Osee, accedens ad uxorem fornicariam, vel +ad mulierem adulteram, non est moechatus nec fornicatus, quia +accessit ad eam quae sua erat secundum mandatum divinum, qui est +auctor institutionis matrimonii. Sic igitur praecepta ipsa +Decalogi, quantum ad rationem iustitiae quam continent, immutabilia +sunt. Sed quantum ad aliquam determinationem per applicationem ad +singulares actus, ut scilicet hoc vel illud sit homicidium, furtum +vel adulterium, aut non, hoc quidem est mutabile, quandoque sola +auctoritate divina, in his scilicet quae a solo Deo sunt instituta, +sicut in matrimonio, et in aliis huiusmodi; quandoque etiam +auctoritate humana, sicut in his quae sunt commissa hominum +iurisdictioni. Quantum enim ad hoc, homines gerunt vicem Dei, non +autem quantum ad omnia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A8-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This determination was an interpretation rather than a dispensation. For a man is not taken to break the Sabbath, if he does + something necessary for human welfare; as Our Lord proves ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A8-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.3" target="asv">Mat. 12:3, </a> seqq.). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="37918" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37918] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod illa excogitatio magis fuit interpretatio praecepti +quam dispensatio. Non enim intelligitur violare sabbatum qui facit +opus quod est necessarium ad salutem humanam; sicut dominus probat, +Matth. XII.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q100_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q100_A9-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 9. Whether the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law. For the mode of virtue is that deeds of justice + should be done justly, that deeds of fortitude should be done bravely, and in like manner as to the other virtues. But it + is commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A9-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.26.20" target="asv">Dt. 26:20</a>) that "thou shalt follow justly after that which is just." Therefore the mode of virtue falls under the precept. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="37919" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37919] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod modus virtutis cadat sub praecepto +legis. Est enim modus virtutis ut aliquis iuste operetur iusta, et +fortiter fortia, et similiter de aliis virtutibus. Sed Deut. XVI +praecipitur, <i>iuste quod iustum est exequeris</i>. Ergo modus +virtutis cadit sub praecepto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which belongs to the intention of the lawgiver comes chiefly under the precept. But the intention of the lawgiver + is directed chiefly to make men virtuous, as stated in Ethic. ii: and it belongs to a virtuous man to act virtuously. Therefore + the mode of virtue falls under the precept. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="37920" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37920] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illud maxime cadit sub praecepto quod est de intentione +legislatoris. Sed intentio legislatoris ad hoc principaliter fertur +ut homines faciat virtuosos, sicut dicitur in II Ethic. Virtuosi +autem est virtuose agere. Ergo modus virtutis cadit sub +praecepto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the mode of virtue seems to consist properly in working willingly and with pleasure. But this falls under a precept + of the Divine law, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A9-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.99.2" target="asv">Ps. 99:2</a>): "Serve ye the Lord with gladness"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A9-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.9.7" target="asv">2 Cor. 9:7</a>): "Not with sadness or necessity: for God loveth a cheerful giver"; whereupon the gloss says: "Whatever ye do, do gladly; + and then you will do it well; whereas if you do it sorrowfully, it is done + in thee, not by thee." Therefore the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="37921" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37921] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +modus virtutis proprie esse videtur ut aliquis voluntarie et +delectabiliter operetur. Sed hoc cadit sub praecepto legis divinae, +dicitur enim in Psalmo XCIX, <i>servite domino in laetitia</i>; et +II ad Cor. IX, <i>non ex tristitia aut ex necessitate, hilarem enim +datorem diligit Deus</i>; ubi Glossa dicit, <i>quidquid boni facis, +cum hilaritate fac, et tunc bene facis, si autem cum tristitia +facis, fit de te, non tu facis</i>. Ergo modus virtutis cadit sub +praecepto legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A9-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> No man can act as a virtuous man acts unless he has the habit of virtue, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. ii, 4; v, 8). + Now whoever transgresses a precept of the law, deserves to be punished. Hence it would follow that a man who has not the habit + of virtue, would deserve to be punished, whatever he does. But this is contrary to the intention of the law, which aims at + leading man to virtue, by habituating him to good works. Therefore the mode of virtue + does not fall under the precept. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 9 s. c."><a name="37922" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37922] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +nullus potest operari eo modo quo operatur virtuosus, nisi habeat +habitum virtutis; ut patet per philosophum, in II et V Ethic. +Quicumque autem transgreditur praeceptum legis, meretur poenam. +Sequeretur ergo quod ille qui non habet habitum virtutis, quidquid +faceret, mereretur poenam. Hoc autem est contra intentionem legis, +quae intendit hominem, assuefaciendo ad bona opera, inducere ad +virtutem. Non ergo modus virtutis cadit sub praecepto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q100_A9-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A3" id="FS_Q100_A9-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[3]</a>, ad 2), a precept of law has compulsory power. Hence that on which the compulsion of the law is brought to bear, falls directly + under the precept of the law. Now the law compels through fear of punishment, as stated in Ethic. x, 9, because that properly + falls under the precept of the law, for which the penalty of the law is inflicted. But Divine law and human law are differently + situated as to the + appointment of penalties; since the penalty of the law is inflicted only for those things which come under the judgment of + the lawgiver; for the law punishes in accordance with the verdict given. Now man, the framer of human law, is competent to + judge only of outward acts; because "man seeth those things that appear," according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A9-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iKgs.16.7" target="asv">1 Kings 16:7</a>: while God alone, the framer of the Divine law, is competent to judge of the inward movements of wills, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A9-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.7.10" target="asv"> Ps. + 7:10 + </a>: "The searcher of hearts and reins is God." + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A9-p7"> Accordingly, therefore, we must say that the mode of virtue is in some sort regarded both by human and by Divine law; in + some respect it is regarded by the Divine, but not by the human law; and in another way, it is regarded neither by the human + nor by the Divine law. Now the mode of virtue consists in three things, as the Philosopher states in Ethic. ii. The first + is that man should act "knowingly": and this is subject to the judgment of both Divine and human law; because what + a man does in ignorance, he does accidentally. Hence according to both human and Divine law, certain things are judged in + respect of ignorance to be punishable or pardonable. + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A9-p8"> The second point is that a man should act "deliberately," i.e. "from choice, choosing that particular action for its own + sake"; wherein a twofold internal movement is implied, of volition and of intention, about which we have spoken above (QQ[8], + 12): and concerning these two, Divine law alone, and not human law, is competent to judge. For human law does not punish the + man who wishes to slay, and slays not: whereas the Divine law does, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A9-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.22" target="asv"> Mat. 5:22</a>: + "Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment." + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A9-p9"> The third point is that he should "act from a firm and immovable principle": which firmness belongs properly to a habit, + and implies that the action proceeds from a rooted habit. In this respect, the mode of virtue does not fall under the precept + either of Divine or of human law, since neither by man nor by God is he punished as breaking the law, who gives due honor + to his parents and yet has not the habit of filial piety. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 9 co."><a name="37923" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37923] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, praeceptum legis habet vim +coactivam. Illud ergo directe cadit sub praecepto legis, ad quod +lex cogit. Coactio autem legis est per metum poenae, ut dicitur X +Ethic., nam illud proprie cadit sub praecepto legis, pro quo poena +legis infligitur. Ad instituendam autem poenam aliter se habet lex +divina, et lex humana. Non enim poena legis infligitur nisi pro +illis de quibus legislator habet iudicare, quia ex iudicio lex +punit. Homo autem, qui est legis lator humanae, non habet iudicare +nisi de exterioribus actibus, quia <i>homines vident ea quae +parent</i>, ut dicitur I Reg. XVI. Sed solius Dei, qui est lator +legis divinae est iudicare de interioribus motibus voluntatum; +secundum illud Psalmi VII, <i>scrutans corda et renes Deus</i>. +Secundum hoc igitur dicendum est quod modus virtutis quantum ad +aliquid respicitur a lege humana et divina; quantum ad aliquid +autem, a lege divina sed non a lege humana; quantum ad aliquid +vero, nec a lege humana nec a lege divina. Modus autem virtutis in +tribus consistit, secundum philosophum, in II Ethic. Quorum primum +est, si aliquis operetur sciens. Hoc autem diiudicatur et a lege +divina et a lege humana. Quod enim aliquis facit ignorans, per +accidens facit. Unde secundum ignorantiam aliqua diiudicantur ad +poenam vel ad veniam, tam secundum legem humanam quam secundum +legem divinam. Secundum autem est ut aliquis operetur volens, vel +eligens et propter hoc eligens; in quo importatur duplex motus +interior, scilicet voluntatis et intentionis, de quibus supra +dictum est. Et ista duo non diiudicat lex humana, sed solum lex +divina. Lex enim humana non punit eum qui vult occidere et non +occidit, punit autem eum lex divina, secundum illud Matth. V, +<i>qui irascitur fratri suo, reus erit iudicio</i>. Tertium autem +est ut firme et immobiliter habeat et operetur. Et ista firmitas +proprie pertinet ad habitum, ut scilicet aliquis ex habitu radicato +operetur. Et quantum ad hoc, modus virtutis non cadit sub praecepto +neque legis divinae neque legis humanae, neque enim ab homine neque +a Deo punitur tanquam praecepti transgressor, qui debitum honorem +impendit parentibus, quamvis non habeat habitum pietatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A9-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The mode of doing acts of justice, which falls under the precept, is that they be done in accordance with right; but not + that they be done from the habit of justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="37924" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37924] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod modus faciendi actum iustitiae qui cadit sub +praecepto, est ut fiat aliquid secundum ordinem iuris, non autem +quod fiat ex habitu iustitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A9-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intention of the lawgiver is twofold. His aim, in the first place, is to lead men to something by the precepts of the + law: and this is virtue. Secondly, his intention is brought to bear on the matter itself of the precept: and this is something + leading or disposing to virtue, viz. an act of virtue. For the end of the precept and the matter of the precept are not the + same: just as neither in other things is the end the same as that which conduces + to the end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="37925" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37925] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod intentio legislatoris est de duobus. De uno quidem, +ad quod intendit per praecepta legis inducere, et hoc est virtus. +Aliud autem est de quo intendit praeceptum ferre, et hoc est id +quod ducit vel disponit ad virtutem, scilicet actus virtutis. Non +enim idem est finis praecepti et id de quo praeceptum datur, sicut +neque in aliis rebus idem est finis et quod est ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A9-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That works of virtue should be done without sadness, falls under the precept of the Divine law; for whoever works with sadness + works unwillingly. But to work with pleasure, i.e. joyfully or cheerfully, in one respect falls under the precept, viz. in + so far as pleasure ensues from the love of God and one's neighbor (which love falls under the precept), and love causes pleasure: + and in another respect does not fall under the precept, in so far as + pleasure ensues from a habit; for "pleasure taken in a work proves the existence of a habit," as stated in Ethic. ii, 3. For + an act may give pleasure either on account of its end, or through its proceeding from a becoming habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="37926" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37926] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod operari sine tristitia opus virtutis, cadit sub +praecepto legis divinae, quia quicumque cum tristitia operatur, non +volens operatur. Sed delectabiliter operari, sive cum laetitia vel +hilaritate, quodammodo cadit sub praecepto, scilicet secundum quod +sequitur delectatio ex dilectione Dei et proximi, quae cadit sub +praecepto, cum amor sit causa delectationis, et quodammodo non, +secundum quod delectatio consequitur habitum; delectatio enim +operis est signum habitus generati, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Potest +enim aliquis actus esse delectabilis vel propter finem, vel propter +convenientiam habitus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q100_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q100_A10-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 10. Whether the mode of charity falls under the precept of the Divine law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A10-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the mode of charity falls under the precept of the Divine law. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A10-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.17" target="asv">Mat. 19:17</a>): "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments": whence it seems to follow that the observance of the commandments + suffices for entrance into life. But good works do not suffice for entrance into life, except they be done from charity: for + it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A10-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:3</a>): "If I should distribute all my + goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." Therefore + the mode of charity is included in the commandment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="37927" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37927] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod modus caritatis cadat sub +praecepto divinae legis. Dicitur enim Matth. XIX, <i>si vis ad +vitam ingredi, serva mandata</i>, ex quo videtur quod observatio +mandatorum sufficiat ad introducendum in vitam. Sed opera bona non +sufficiunt ad introducendum in vitam, nisi ex caritate fiant, +dicitur enim I ad Cor. XIII, <i>si distribuero in cibos pauperum +omnes facultates meas, et si tradidero corpus meum ita ut ardeam, +caritatem autem non habuero, nihil mihi prodest</i>. Ergo modus +caritatis est in praecepto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A10-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the mode of charity consists properly speaking in doing all things for God. But this falls under the precept; for + the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A10-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:31</a>): "Do all to the glory of God." Therefore the mode of charity falls under the precept. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="37928" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37928] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> +Praeterea, ad modum caritatis proprie pertinet ut omnia fiant +propter Deum. Sed istud cadit sub praecepto, dicit enim apostolus, +I ad Cor. X, <i>omnia in gloriam Dei facite</i>. Ergo modus +caritatis cadit sub praecepto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A10-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the mode of charity does not fall under the precept, it follows that one can fulfil the precepts of the law without + having charity. Now what can be done without charity can be done without grace, which is always united to charity. Therefore + one can fulfil the precepts of the law without grace. But this is the error of Pelagius, as Augustine declares (De Haeres. + lxxxviii). Therefore the mode of charity is included in the commandment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="37929" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37929] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> +Praeterea, si modus caritatis non cadit sub praecepto, ergo aliquis +potest implere praecepta legis non habens caritatem. Sed quod +potest fieri sine caritate, potest fieri sine gratia, quae semper +adiuncta est caritati. Ergo aliquis potest implere praecepta legis +sine gratia. Hoc autem est Pelagiani erroris; ut patet per +Augustinum, in libro de haeresibus. Ergo modus caritatis est in +praecepto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A10-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Whoever breaks a commandment sins mortally. If therefore the mode of charity falls under the precept, it follows that whoever + acts otherwise than from charity sins mortally. But whoever has not charity, acts otherwise than from charity. Therefore it + follows that whoever has not charity, sins mortally in whatever he does, however good this may be in itself: which is absurd. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 10 s. c."><a name="37930" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37930] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quia quicumque non servat praeceptum, peccat mortaliter. Si +igitur modus caritatis cadat sub praecepto, sequitur quod quicumque +operatur aliquid et non ex caritate, peccet mortaliter. Sed +quicumque non habet caritatem, operatur non ex caritate. Ergo +sequitur quod quicumque non habet caritatem, peccet mortaliter in +omni opere quod facit, quantumcumque sit de genere bonorum. Quod +est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q100_A10-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Opinions have been contrary on this question. For some have said absolutely that the mode of charity comes under the precept; + and yet that it is possible for one not having charity to fulfil this precept: because he can dispose himself to receive charity + from God. Nor (say they) does it follow that a man not having charity sins mortally whenever he does something good of its + kind: because it is an affirmative precept that binds one to act from charity, and + is binding not for all time, but only for such time as one is in a state of charity. On the other hand, some have said that + the mode of charity is altogether outside the precept. + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A10-p7"> Both these opinions are true up to a certain point. Because the act of charity can be considered in two ways. First, as an + act by itself: and thus it falls under the precept of the law which specially prescribes it, viz. "Thou shalt love the Lord + thy God," and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor." In this sense, the first opinion is true. Because it is not impossible to observe + this precept which regards the act of charity; since man can dispose himself to possess charity, and when he + possesses it, he can use it. Secondly, the act of charity can be considered as being the mode of the acts of the other virtues, + i.e. inasmuch as the acts of the other virtues are ordained to charity, which is "the end of the commandment," as stated in + 1 Tim. i, 5: for it has been said above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q12_A4" id="FS_Q100_A10-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[12], A[4]</a>) that the intention of the end is a formal mode of the act ordained to that end. In this sense the second opinion is true + in saying that the mode of charity does not + fall under the precept, that is to say that this commandment, "Honor thy father," does not mean that a man must honor his + father from charity, but merely that he must honor him. Wherefore he that honors his father, yet has not charity, does not + break this precept: although he does break the precept concerning the act of charity, for which reason he deserves to be punished. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 10 co."><a name="37931" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37931] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod circa hoc fuerunt contrariae opiniones. Quidam enim +dixerunt absolute modum caritatis esse sub praecepto. Nec est +impossibile observare hoc praeceptum caritatem non habenti, quia +potest se disponere ad hoc quod caritas ei infundatur a Deo. Nec +quandocumque aliquis non habens caritatem facit aliquid de genere +bonorum, peccat mortaliter, quia hoc est praeceptum affirmativum, +ut ex caritate operetur, et non obligat ad semper, sed pro tempore +illo quo aliquis habet caritatem. Alii vero dixerunt quod omnino +modus caritatis non cadit sub praecepto. Utrique autem quantum ad +aliquid, verum dixerunt. Actus enim caritatis dupliciter +considerari potest. Uno modo, secundum quod est quidam actus per +se. Et hoc modo cadit sub praecepto legis quod de hoc specialiter +datur, scilicet, <i>diliges dominum Deum tuum, et, diliges proximum +tuum</i>. Et quantum ad hoc, primi verum dixerunt. Non enim est +impossibile hoc praeceptum observare, quod est de actu caritatis, +quia homo potest se disponere ad caritatem habendam, et quando +habuerit eam, potest ea uti. Alio modo potest considerari actus +caritatis secundum quod est modus actuum aliarum virtutum, hoc est +secundum quod actus aliarum virtutum ordinantur ad caritatem, quae +est finis praecepti, ut dicitur I ad Tim. I, dictum est enim supra +quod intentio finis est quidam modus formalis actus ordinati in +finem. Et hoc modo verum est quod secundi dixerunt, quod modus +caritatis non cadit sub praecepto, hoc est dictu, quod in hoc +praecepto, honora patrem, non includitur quod honoretur pater ex +caritate, sed solum quod honoretur pater. Unde qui honorat patrem, +licet non habens caritatem, non efficitur transgressor huius +praecepti, etsi sit transgressor praecepti quod est de actu +caritatis, propter quam transgressionem meretur poenam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A10-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our Lord did not say, "If thou wilt enter into life, keep one commandment"; but "keep" all "the commandments": among which + is included the commandment concerning the love of God and our neighbor. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="37932" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37932] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod dominus non dixit, si vis ad vitam ingredi, +serva unum mandatum, sed, serva omnia mandata. Inter quae etiam +continetur mandatum de dilectione Dei et proximi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A10-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The precept of charity contains the injunction that God should be loved from our whole heart, which means that all things + would be referred to God. Consequently man cannot fulfil the precept of charity, unless he also refer all things to God. Wherefore + he that honors his father and mother, is bound to honor them from charity, not in virtue of the precept, "Honor thy father + and mother," but in virtue of the precept, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God + with thy whole heart." And since these are two affirmative precepts, not binding for all times, they can be binding, each + one at a different time: so that it may happen that a man fulfils the precept of honoring his father and mother, without at + the same time breaking the precept concerning the omission of the mode of charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="37933" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37933] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod sub mandato caritatis continetur ut diligatur Deus ex +toto corde, ad quod pertinet ut omnia referantur in Deum. Et ideo +praeceptum caritatis implere homo non potest, nisi etiam omnia +referantur in Deum. Sic ergo qui honorat parentes, tenetur ex +caritate honorare, non ex vi huius praecepti quod est, honora +parentes, sed ex vi huius praecepti, diliges dominum Deum tuum ex +toto corde tuo. Et cum ista sint duo praecepta affirmativa non +obligantia ad semper, possunt pro diversis temporibus obligare. Et +ita potest contingere quod aliquis implens praeceptum de +honoratione parentum, non tunc transgrediatur praeceptum de +omissione modi caritatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A10-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man cannot fulfil all the precepts of the law, unless he fulfil the precept of charity, which is impossible without charity. + Consequently it is not possible, as Pelagius maintained, for man to fulfil the law without grace. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 10 ad 3"><a name="37934" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37934] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 10 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod observare omnia praecepta legis homo non potest, nisi +impleat praeceptum caritatis, quod non fit sine gratia. Et ideo +impossibile est quod Pelagius dixit, hominem implere legem sine +gratia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q100_A11" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q100_A11-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 11. Whether it is right to distinguish other moral precepts of the law besides the decalogue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A11-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is wrong to distinguish other moral precepts of the law besides the decalogue. Because, as Our Lord + declared ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.40" target="asv">Mat. 22:40</a>), "on these two commandments" of charity "dependeth the whole law and the prophets." But these two commandments are explained + by the ten commandments of the decalogue. Therefore there is no need for other moral precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="37935" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37935] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter distinguantur +alia moralia praecepta legis praeter Decalogum. Quia ut dominus +dicit, Matth. XXII, <i>in duobus praeceptis caritatis pendet omnis +lex et prophetae</i>. Sed haec duo praecepta explicantur per decem +praecepta Decalogi. Ergo non oportet alia praecepta moralia +esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A11-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the moral precepts are distinct from the judicial and ceremonial precepts, as stated above (Q[99], AA[3],4). But + the determinations of the general moral precepts belong to the judicial and ceremonial precepts: and the general moral precepts + are contained in the decalogue, or are even presupposed to the decalogue, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q100_A3" id="FS_Q100_A11-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Therefore it was unsuitable to lay down other moral precepts besides the decalogue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="37936" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37936] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> +Praeterea, praecepta moralia a iudicialibus et caeremonialibus +distinguuntur, ut dictum est. Sed determinationes communium +praeceptorum moralium pertinent ad iudicialia et caeremonialia +praecepta, communia autem praecepta moralia sub Decalogo +continentur, vel etiam Decalogo praesupponuntur, ut dictum est. +Ergo inconvenienter traduntur alia praecepta moralia praeter +Decalogum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A11-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the moral precepts are about the acts of all the virtues, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q100_A2" id="FS_Q100_A11-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore, as the Law contains, besides the decalogue, moral precepts pertaining to religion, liberality, mercy, and chastity; + so there should have been added some precepts pertaining to the other virtues, for instance, fortitude, sobriety, and so forth. + And yet such is not the case. It is therefore unbecoming to distinguish other moral precepts + in the Law besides those of the decalogue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 11 arg. 3"><a name="37937" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37937] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 11 arg. 3</span></a> +Praeterea, praecepta moralia sunt de actibus omnium virtutum, ut +supra dictum est. Sicut igitur in lege ponuntur praecepta moralia +praeter Decalogum pertinentia ad latriam, liberalitatem et +misericordiam, et castitatem; ita etiam deberent poni aliqua +praecepta pertinentia ad alias virtutes, puta ad fortitudinem, +sobrietatem, et alia huiusmodi. Quod tamen non invenitur. Non ergo +convenienter distinguuntur in lege alia praecepta moralia quae sunt +praeter Decalogum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A11-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.18.8" target="asv">Ps. 18:8</a>): "The law of the Lord is unspotted, converting souls." But man is preserved from the stain of sin, and his soul is converted + to God by other moral precepts besides those of the decalogue. Therefore it was right for the Law to include other moral precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 11 s. c."><a name="37938" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37938] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod in Psalmo XVIII dicitur, <i>lex domini immaculata, +convertens animas</i>. Sed per alia etiam moralia quae Decalogo +superadduntur, homo conservatur absque macula peccati, et anima +eius ad Deum convertitur. Ergo ad legem pertinebat etiam alia +praecepta moralia tradere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q100_A11-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As is evident from what has been stated (Q[99], AA[3],4), the judicial and ceremonial precepts derive their force from their + institution alone: since before they were instituted, it seemed of no consequence whether things were done in this or that + way. But the moral precepts derive their efficacy from the very dictate of natural reason, even if they were never included + in the Law. Now of these there are three grades: for some are most certain, and so evident + as to need no promulgation; such as the commandments of the love of God and our neighbor, and others like these, as stated + above + <a href="#FS_Q100_A3" id="FS_Q100_A11-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, which are, as it were, the ends of the commandments; wherefore no man can have an erroneous judgment about them. Some precepts + are more detailed, the reason of which even an uneducated man can easily grasp; and yet they need to be promulgated, because + human judgment, in a few instances, happens to be led astray concerning them: these + are the precepts of the decalogue. Again, there are some precepts the reason of which is not so evident to everyone, but only + the wise; these are moral precepts added to the decalogue, and given to the people by God through Moses and Aaron. + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A11-p7"> But since the things that are evident are the principles whereby we know those that are not evident, these other moral precepts + added to the decalogue are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue, as so many corollaries. Thus the first commandment + of the decalogue forbids the worship of strange gods: and to this are added other precepts forbidding things relating to worship + of idols: thus it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.18.10" target="asv">Dt. 18:10,11</a>): "Neither let there be found among you + anyone that shall expiate his son or daughter, making them to pass through the fire: . . . neither let there by any wizard + nor charmer, nor anyone that consulteth pythonic spirits, or fortune-tellers, or that seeketh the truth from the dead." The + second commandment forbids perjury. To this is added the prohibition of blasphemy ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.24.15" target="asv">Lev. 24:15, </a> seqq) and the prohibition of false doctrine ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.13" target="asv">Dt. 13</a>). To the third commandment are added all the ceremonial precepts. To the fourth + commandment prescribing the honor due to parents, is added the precept about honoring the aged, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.32" target="asv"> Lev. 19:32</a>: "Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged man"; and likewise all the precepts prescribing the reverence + to be observed towards our betters, or kindliness towards our equals or inferiors. To the fifth commandment, which forbids + murder, is added the prohibition of hatred and of any kind of violence inflicted on our neighbor, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.5" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.16" target="asv"> Lev. 19:16</a>: "Thou shalt not stand against the blood of thy neighbor": likewise the prohibition against hating one's brother ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.6" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.17" target="asv">Lev. 19:17</a>): "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart." To the sixth commandment which forbids adultery, is added the prohibition + about whoredom, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.7" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.17" target="asv"> Dt. 23:17</a>: "There shall be no whore among the daughters of Israel, nor whoremonger among the sons of Israel"; and the prohibition against + unnatural sins, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.8" href="./asv.html#Lev.28.22" target="asv"> Lev. 28:22,23</a>: "Thou shalt not lie with mankind . . . thou shalt not copulate with any beast." To the seventh commandment which prohibits + theft, is added the precept forbidding usury, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.9" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.19" target="asv"> Dt. 23:19</a>: "Thou shalt not lend to thy brother money to usury"; and the prohibition against fraud, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.10" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.13" target="asv"> Dt. 25:13</a>: "Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag"; and universally all prohibitions + relating to peculations and larceny. To the eighth commandment, forbidding false testimony, is added the prohibition against + false judgment, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.11" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.2" target="asv"> Ex. 23:2</a>: "Neither shalt thou yield in judgment, to the opinion of the most part, to stray from the truth"; and the prohibition against + lying ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.12" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.7" target="asv">Ex. 23:7</a>): "Thou shalt fly lying," and the prohibition against detraction, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.13" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.16" target="asv"> Lev. 19:16</a>: "Thou shalt not be a detractor, nor a + whisperer among the people." To the other two commandments no further precepts are added, because thereby are forbidden all + kinds of evil desires. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 11 co."><a name="37939" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37939] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, praecepta iudicialia et +caeremonialia ex sola institutione vim habent, quia antequam +instituerentur, non videbatur differre utrum sic vel aliter fieret. +Sed praecepta moralia ex ipso dictamine naturalis rationis +efficaciam habent, etiam si nunquam in lege statuantur. Horum autem +triplex est gradus. Nam quaedam sunt certissima, et adeo manifesta +quod editione non indigent; sicut mandata de dilectione Dei et +proximi, et alia huiusmodi, ut supra dictum est, quae sunt quasi +fines praeceptorum, unde in eis nullus potest errare secundum +iudicium rationis. Quaedam vero sunt magis determinata, quorum +rationem statim quilibet, etiam popularis, potest de facili videre; +et tamen quia in paucioribus circa huiusmodi contingit iudicium +humanum perverti, huiusmodi editione indigent, et haec sunt +praecepta Decalogi. Quaedam vero sunt quorum ratio non est adeo +cuilibet manifesta, sed solum sapientibus, et ista sunt praecepta +moralia superaddita Decalogo, tradita a Deo populo per Moysen et +Aaron. Sed quia ea quae sunt manifesta, sunt principia cognoscendi +eorum quae non sunt manifesta; alia praecepta moralia superaddita +Decalogo reducuntur ad praecepta Decalogi, per modum cuiusdam +additionis ad ipsa. Nam in primo praecepto Decalogi prohibetur +cultus alienorum deorum, cui superadduntur alia praecepta +prohibitiva eorum quae ordinantur in cultum idolorum; sicut habetur +Deut. XVIII, <i>non inveniatur in te qui lustret filium suum aut +filiam, ducens per ignem, nec sit maleficus atque incantator, nec +Pythones consulat neque divinos, et quaerat a mortuis +veritatem</i>. Secundum autem praeceptum prohibet periurium. +Superadditur autem ei prohibitio blasphemiae, Levit. XXIV; et +prohibitio falsae doctrinae, Deut. XIII. Tertio vero praecepto +superadduntur omnia caeremonialia. Quarto autem praecepto, de +honore parentum, superadditur praeceptum de honoratione senum, +secundum illud Levit. XIX, <i>coram cano capite consurge, et honora +personam senis</i>; et universaliter omnia praecepta inducentia ad +reverentiam exhibendam maioribus, vel ad beneficia exhibenda vel +aequalibus vel minoribus. Quinto autem praecepto, quod est de +prohibitione homicidii, additur prohibitio odii et cuiuslibet +violationis contra proximum, sicut illud Levit. XIX, <i>non stabis +contra sanguinem proximi tui</i>; et etiam prohibitio odii fratris, +secundum illud, <i>ne oderis fratrem tuum in corde tuo</i>. +Praecepto autem sexto, quod est de prohibitione adulterii, +superadditur praeceptum de prohibitione meretricii, secundum illud +Deut. XXIII, <i>non erit meretrix de filiabus Israel, neque +fornicator de filiis Israel</i>; et iterum prohibitio vitii contra +naturam, secundum illud Levit. XVIII, <i>cum masculo non +commisceberis, cum omni pecore non coibis</i>. Septimo autem +praecepto, de prohibitione furti adiungitur praeceptum de +prohibitione usurae, secundum illud Deut. XXIII, <i>non foenerabis +fratri tuo ad usuram</i>; et prohibitio fraudis, secundum illud +Deut. XXV, <i>non habebis in sacculo diversa pondera</i>; et +universaliter omnia quae ad prohibitionem calumniae et rapinae +pertinent. Octavo vero praecepto, quod est de prohibitione falsi +testimonii, additur prohibitio falsi iudicii, secundum illud Exod. +XXIII, <i>nec in iudicio plurimorum acquiesces sententiae, ut a +veritate devies</i>; et prohibitio mendacii, sicut ibi subditur, +<i>mendacium fugies</i>; et prohibitio detractionis, secundum illud +Levit. XIX, <i>non eris criminator et susurro in populis</i>. Aliis +autem duobus praeceptis nulla alia adiunguntur, quia per ea +universaliter omnis mala concupiscentia prohibetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A11-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The precepts of the decalogue are ordained to the love of God and our neighbor as pertaining evidently to our duty towards + them; but the other precepts are so ordained as pertaining thereto less evidently. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="37940" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37940] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ad dilectionem Dei et proximi ordinantur quidem +praecepta Decalogi secundum manifestam rationem debiti, alia vero +secundum rationem magis occultam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A11-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is in virtue of their institution that the ceremonial and judicial precepts "are determinations of the precepts of the + decalogue," not by reason of a natural instinct, as in the case of the superadded moral precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="37941" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37941] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod praecepta caeremonialia et iudicialia sunt +determinativa praeceptorum Decalogi ex vi institutionis, non autem +ex vi naturalis instinctus, sicut praecepta moralia +superaddita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A11-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The precepts of a law are ordained for the common good, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q100_A11-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[2]</a>). And since those virtues which direct our conduct towards others pertain directly to the common good, as also does the virtue + of chastity, in so far as the generative act conduces to the common good of the species; hence precepts bearing directly on + these virtues are given, both in the decalogue and in addition thereto. As to the act of + fortitude there are the order to be given by the commanders in the war, which is undertaken for the common good: as is clear + from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.20.3" target="asv">Dt. 20:3</a>, where the priest is commanded (to speak thus): "Be not afraid, do not give back." In like manner the prohibition of acts + of gluttony is left to paternal admonition, since it is contrary to the good of the household; hence it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.20" target="asv">Dt. 21:20</a>) in the person of parents: "He slighteth hearing our admonitions, he giveth himself to + revelling, and to debauchery and banquetings." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 11 ad 3"><a name="37942" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37942] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 11 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod praecepta legis ordinantur ad bonum commune, ut supra +dictum est. Et quia virtutes ordinantes ad alium directe pertinent +ad bonum commune; et similiter virtus castitatis, inquantum actus +generationis deservit bono communi speciei; ideo de istis +virtutibus directe dantur praecepta et Decalogi et superaddita. De +actu autem fortitudinis datur praeceptum proponendum per duces +exhortantes in bello, quod pro bono communi suscipitur, ut patet +Deut. XX, ubi mandatur sacerdoti, <i>nolite metuere, nolite +cedere</i>. Similiter etiam actus gulae prohibendus committitur +monitioni paternae, quia contrariatur bono domestico, unde dicitur +Deut. XXI, ex persona parentum, <i>monita nostra audire contemnit, +comessationibus vacat et luxuriae atque conviviis</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q100_A12" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q100_A12-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 12. Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A12-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man. Because the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A12-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.13" target="asv">Rom. 2:13</a>): "For not the hearers of the Law are justified before God, but the doers of the Law shall be justified." But the doers of + the Law are those who fulfil the precepts of the Law. Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of the Law was a cause of justification. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="37943" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37943] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta moralia veteris +legis iustificarent. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. II, <i>non enim +auditores legis iusti sunt apud Deum, sed factores legis +iustificabuntur</i>. Sed factores legis dicuntur qui implent +praecepta legis. Ergo praecepta legis adimpleta iustificabant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A12-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A12-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.18.5" target="asv">Lev. 18:5</a>): "Keep My laws and My judgments, which if a man do, he shall live in them." But the spiritual life of man is through justice. + Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of the Law was a cause of justification. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 12 arg. 2"><a name="37944" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37944] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> +Praeterea, Levit. XVIII dicitur, <i>custodite leges meas atque +iudicia, quae faciens homo vivet in eis</i>. Sed vita spiritualis +hominis est per iustitiam. Ergo praecepta legis adimpleta +iustificabant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A12-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Divine law is more efficacious than human law. But human law justifies man; since there is a kind of justice + consisting in fulfilling the precepts of law. Therefore the precepts of the Law justified man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="37945" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37945] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> +Praeterea, lex divina efficacior est quam lex humana. Sed lex +humana iustificat, est enim quaedam iustitia in hoc quod praecepta +legis adimplentur. Ergo praecepta legis iustificabant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A12-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A12-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:6</a>): "The letter killeth": which, according to Augustine (De Spir. et Lit. xiv), refers even to the moral precepts. Therefore + the moral precepts did not cause justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 12 s. c."><a name="37946" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37946] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 12 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. III, littera occidit. Quod +secundum Augustinum, in libro de spiritu et littera, intelligitur +etiam de praeceptis moralibus. Ergo praecepta moralia non +iustificabant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q100_A12-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Just as "healthy" is said properly and first of that which is possessed of health, and secondarily of that which is a sign + or a safeguard of health; so justification means first and properly the causing of justice; while secondarily and improperly, + as it were, it may denote a sign of justice or a disposition thereto. If justice be taken in the last two ways, it is evident + that it was conferred by the precepts of the Law; in so far, to wit, as they disposed + men to the justifying grace of Christ, which they also signified, because as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 24), "even + the life of that people foretold and foreshadowed Christ." + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A12-p7"> But if we speak of justification properly so called, then we must notice that it can be considered as in the habit or as + in the act: so that accordingly justification may be taken in two ways. First, according as man is made just, by becoming + possessed of the habit of justice: secondly, according as he does works of justice, so that in this sense justification is + nothing else than the execution of justice. Now justice, like the other virtues, may denote either the acquired or + the infused virtue, as is clear from what has been stated ( + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q63_A4" id="FS_Q100_A12-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[63], A[4]</a>). The acquired virtue is caused by works; but the infused virtue is caused by God Himself through His grace. The latter is + true justice, of which we are speaking now, and in this respect of which a man is said to be just before God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A12-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.2" target="asv"> Rom. 4:2</a>: "If Abraham were justified by works, he hath whereof to glory, but not before God." Hence this justice could not be caused + by + moral precepts, which are about human actions: wherefore the moral precepts could not justify man by causing justice. + </p><p id="FS_Q100_A12-p8"> If, on the other hand, by justification we understand the execution of justice, thus all the precepts of the Law justified + man, but in various ways. Because the ceremonial precepts taken as a whole contained something just in itself, in so far as + they aimed at offering worship to God; whereas taken individually they contained that which is just, not in itself, but by + being a determination of the Divine law. Hence it is said of these precepts that they did not justify man save + through the devotion and obedience of those who complied with them. On the other hand the moral and judicial precepts, either + in general or also in particular, contained that which is just in itself: but the moral precepts contained that which is just + in itself according to that "general justice" which is "every virtue" according to Ethic. v, 1: whereas the judicial precepts + belonged to "special justice," which is about contracts connected with the human mode of life, between one man and + another. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 12 co."><a name="37947" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37947] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut sanum proprie et primo dicitur quod habet +sanitatem, per posterius autem quod significat sanitatem, vel quod +conservat sanitatem; ita iustificatio primo et proprie dicitur ipsa +factio iustitiae; secundario vero, et quasi improprie, potest dici +iustificatio significatio iustitiae, vel dispositio ad iustitiam. +Quibus duobus modis manifestum est quod praecepta legis +iustificabant, inquantum scilicet disponebant homines ad gratiam +Christi iustificantem, quam etiam significabant; quia sicut dicit +Augustinus, contra Faustum, <i>etiam vita illius populi prophetica +erat, et Christi figurativa</i>. Sed si loquamur de iustificatione +proprie dicta, sic considerandum est quod iustitia potest accipi +prout est in habitu, vel prout est in actu, et secundum hoc, +iustificatio dupliciter dicitur. Uno quidem modo, secundum quod +homo fit iustus adipiscens habitum iustitiae. Alio vero modo, +secundum quod opera iustitiae operatur, ut secundum hoc +iustificatio nihil aliud sit quam iustitiae executio. Iustitia +autem, sicut et aliae virtutes potest accipi et acquisita et +infusa, ut ex supradictis patet. Acquisita quidem causatur ex +operibus, sed infusa causatur ab ipso Deo per eius gratiam. Et haec +est vera iustitia, de qua nunc loquimur, secundum quam aliquis +dicitur iustus apud Deum; secundum illud Rom. IV, <i>si Abraham ex +operibus legis iustificatus est, habet gloriam, sed non apud +Deum</i>. Haec igitur iustitia causari non poterat per praecepta +moralia, quae sunt de actibus humanis. Et secundum hoc, praecepta +moralia iustificare non poterant iustitiam causando. Si vero +accipiatur iustificatio pro executione iustitiae, sic omnia +praecepta legis iustificabant, aliter tamen et aliter. Nam +praecepta caeremonialia continebant quidem iustitiam secundum se in +generali, prout scilicet exhibebantur in cultum Dei, in speciali +vero non continebant secundum se iustitiam, nisi ex sola +determinatione legis divinae. Et ideo de huiusmodi praeceptis +dicitur quod non iustificabant nisi ex devotione et obedientia +facientium. Praecepta vero moralia et iudicialia continebant id +quod erat secundum se iustum vel in generali, vel etiam in +speciali. Sed moralia praecepta continebant id quod est secundum se +iustum secundum iustitiam generalem quae est omnis virtus, ut +dicitur in V Ethic. Praecepta vero iudicialia pertinebant ad +iustitiam specialem, quae consistit circa contractus humanae vitae, +qui sunt inter homines ad invicem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A12-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle takes justification for the execution of justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="37948" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37948] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod apostolus accipit ibi iustificationem pro +executione iustitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A12-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The man who fulfilled the precepts of the Law is said to live in them, because he did not incur the penalty of death, which + the Law inflicted on its transgressors: in this sense the Apostle quotes this passage ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A12-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.12" target="asv">Gal. 3:12</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 12 ad 2"><a name="37949" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37949] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod homo faciens praecepta legis dicitur vivere in eis, +quia non incurrebat poenam mortis, quam lex transgressoribus +infligebat. In quo sensu inducit hoc apostolus, Gal. III.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q100_A12-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The precepts of human law justify man by acquired justice: it is not about this that we are inquiring now, but only about + that justice which is before God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 100 a. 12 ad 3"><a name="37950" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37950] Iª-IIae q. 100 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod praecepta legis humanae iustificant iustitia +acquisita, de qua non quaeritur ad praesens, sed solum de iustitia +quae est apud Deum.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q101" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q101-p0.1">Q. 101. OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS IN THEMSELVES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q101-p2"> We must now consider the ceremonial precepts: and first we must consider them in themselves; secondly, their cause; thirdly, + their duration. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q101-p3"><a href="#FS_Q101_A1"> (1) The nature of the ceremonial precepts;</a></p><p id="FS_Q101-p4"><a href="#FS_Q101_A2"> (2) Whether they are figurative?</a></p><p id="FS_Q101-p5"><a href="#FS_Q101_A3"> (3) Whether there should have been many of them?</a></p><p id="FS_Q101-p6"><a href="#FS_Q101_A4"> (4) Of their various kinds.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 pr."><a name="37951" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37951] Iª-IIae q. 101 pr.</span></a> Consequenter +considerandum est de praeceptis caeremonialibus. Et primo, de ipsis +secundum se; secundo, de causa eorum; tertio, de duratione ipsorum. +Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, quae sit ratio praeceptorum +caeremonialium. Secundo, utrum sint figuralia. Tertio, utrum +debuerint esse multa. Quarto, de distinctione ipsorum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q101_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q101_A1-p0.1">Q. 101. A. 1. Whether the nature of the ceremonial precepts consists in their pertaining to the worship of God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the nature of the ceremonial precepts does not consist in their pertaining to the worship of God. Because, + in the Old Law, the Jews were given certain precepts about abstinence from food ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.11" target="asv">Lev. 11</a>); and about refraining from certain kinds of clothes, e.g. ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.19" target="asv">Lev. 19:19</a>): "Thou shalt not wear a garment that is woven of two sorts"; and again ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A1-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Num.15.38" target="asv">Num. 15:38</a>): "To make to themselves fringes in the corners of their garments." But + these are not moral precepts; since they do not remain in the New Law. Nor are they judicial precepts; since they do not pertain + to the pronouncing of judgment between man and man. Therefore they are ceremonial precepts. Yet they seem in no way to pertain + to the worship of God. Therefore the nature of the ceremonial precepts does not consist in their pertaining to Divine worship. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37952" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37952] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ratio praeceptorum caeremonialium non +in hoc consistat quod pertinent ad cultum Dei. In lege enim veteri +dantur Iudaeis quaedam praecepta de abstinentia ciborum, ut patet +Levit. XI; et etiam de abstinendo ab aliquibus vestimentis, sicut +illud Levit. XIX, <i>vestem quae ex duobus texta est, non +indueris</i>; et iterum quod praecipitur Num. XV, <i>ut faciant +sibi fimbrias per angulos palliorum</i>. Sed huiusmodi non sunt +praecepta moralia, quia non manent in nova lege. Nec etiam +iudicialia, quia non pertinent ad iudicium faciendum inter homines. +Ergo sunt caeremonialia. Sed in nullo pertinere videntur ad cultum +Dei. Ergo non est ratio caeremonialium praeceptorum quod pertineant +ad cultum Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some state that the ceremonial precepts are those which pertain to solemnities; as though they were so called from + the "cerei" [candles] which are lit up on those occasions. But many other things besides solemnities pertain to the worship + of God. Therefore it does not seem that the ceremonial precepts are so called from their pertaining to the Divine worship. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37953" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37953] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +dicunt quidam quod praecepta caeremonialia dicuntur illa quae +pertinent ad solemnitates, quasi dicerentur a cereis, qui in +solemnitatibus accenduntur. Sed multa alia sunt pertinentia ad +cultum Dei praeter solemnitates. Ergo non videtur quod praecepta +caeremonialia ea ratione dicantur, quia pertinent ad cultum +Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some say that the ceremonial precepts are patterns, i.e. rules, of salvation: because the Greek {chaire} is the + same as the Latin "salve." But all the precepts of the Law are rules of salvation, and not only those that pertain to the + worship of God. Therefore not only those precepts which pertain to Divine worship are called ceremonial. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37954" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37954] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum quosdam praecepta caeremonialia dicuntur quasi normae, +idest regulae, salutis, nam chaire in Graeco idem est quod salve. +Sed omnia praecepta legis sunt regulae salutis, et non solum illa +quae pertinent ad Dei cultum. Ergo non solum illa praecepta +dicuntur caeremonialia quae pertinent ad cultum Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Rabbi Moses says (Doct. Perplex. iii) that the ceremonial precepts are those for which there is no evident reason. + But there is evident reason for many things pertaining to the worship of God; such as the observance of the Sabbath, the feasts + of the Passover and of the Tabernacles, and many other things, the reason for which is set down in the Law. Therefore the + ceremonial precepts are not those which pertain to the worship of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="37955" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37955] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +Rabbi Moyses dicit quod praecepta caeremonialia dicuntur quorum +ratio non est manifesta. Sed multa pertinentia ad cultum Dei habent +rationem manifestam, sicut observatio sabbati, et celebratio phase +et Scenopegiae, et multorum aliorum, quorum ratio assignatur in +lege. Ergo caeremonialia non sunt quae pertinent ad cultum Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.18.19" target="asv">Ex. 18:19,20</a>): "Be thou to the people in those things that pertain to God . . . and . . . shew the people the ceremonies and the manner + of worshipping." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37956" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37956] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Exod. XVIII, <i>esto populo in his quae ad Deum +pertinent, ostendasque populo caeremonias et ritum colendi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q99_A4" id="FS_Q101_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[99], A[4]</a>), the ceremonial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts whereby man is directed to God, just as the judicial precepts + are determinations of the moral precepts whereby he is directed to his neighbor. Now man is directed to God by the worship + due to Him. Wherefore those precepts are properly called ceremonial, which pertain to the Divine worship. The reason for their + being so called was given + above ( + <a href="#FS_Q99_A3" id="FS_Q101_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[99], A[3]</a>), when we established the distinction between the ceremonial and the other precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 1 co."><a name="37957" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37957] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, caeremonialia praecepta +determinant praecepta moralia in ordine ad Deum, sicut iudicialia +determinant praecepta moralia in ordine ad proximum. Homo autem +ordinatur ad Deum per debitum cultum. Et ideo caeremonialia proprie +dicuntur quae ad cultum Dei pertinent. Ratio autem huius nominis +posita est supra, ubi praecepta caeremonialia ab aliis sunt +distincta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Divine worship includes not only sacrifices and the like, which seem to be directed to God immediately, but also those + things whereby His worshippers are duly prepared to worship Him: thus too in other matters, whatever is preparatory to the + end comes under the science whose object is the end. Accordingly those precepts of the Law which regard the clothing and food + of God's worshippers, and other such matters, pertain to a certain preparation of + the ministers, with the view of fitting them for the Divine worship: just as those who administer to a king make use of certain + special observances. Consequently such are contained under the ceremonial precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37958" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37958] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ad cultum Dei pertinent non solum sacrificia et +alia huiusmodi, quae immediate ad Deum ordinari videntur, sed etiam +debita praeparatio colentium Deum ad cultum ipsius, sicut etiam in +aliis quaecumque sunt praeparatoria ad finem, cadunt sub scientia +quae est de fine. Huiusmodi autem praecepta quae dantur in lege de +vestibus et cibis colentium Deum, et aliis huiusmodi, pertinent ad +quandam praeparationem ipsorum ministrantium, ut sint idonei ad +cultum Dei, sicut etiam specialibus observantiis aliqui utuntur qui +sunt in ministerio regis. Unde etiam sub praeceptis caeremonialibus +continentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The alleged explanation of the name does not seem very probable: especially as the Law does not contain many instances of + the lighting of candles in solemnities; since, even the lamps of the Candlestick were furnished with "oil of olives," as stated + in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.24.2" target="asv"> Lev. 24:2.</a> Nevertheless we may say that all things pertaining to the Divine worship were more carefully observed on solemn festivals: + so that all ceremonial precepts may be included + under the observance of solemnities. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37959" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37959] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illa expositio nominis non videtur esse multum +conveniens, praesertim cum non multum inveniatur in lege quod in +solemnitatibus cerei accenderentur, sed in ipso etiam candelabro +lucernae cum oleo olivarum praeparabantur, ut patet Lev. XXIV. +Nihilominus tamen potest dici quod in solemnitatibus omnia illa +quae pertinebant ad cultum Dei, diligentius observabantur, et +secundum hoc, in observatione solemnitatum omnia caeremonialia +includuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Neither does this explanation of the name appear to be very much to the point, since the word "ceremony" is not Greek but + Latin. We may say, however, that, since man's salvation is from God, those precepts above all seem to be rules of salvation, + which direct man to God: and accordingly those which refer to Divine worship are called ceremonial precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37960" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37960] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod nec illa expositio nominis videtur esse multum +conveniens, nomen enim caeremoniae non est Graecum, sed Latinum. +Potest tamen dici quod, cum salus hominis sit a Deo, praecipue illa +praecepta videntur esse salutis regulae, quae hominem ordinant ad +Deum. Et sic caeremonialia dicuntur quae ad cultum Dei +pertinent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This explanation of the ceremonial precepts has a certain amount of probability: not that they are called ceremonial precisely + because there is no evident reason for them; this is a kind of consequence. For, since the precepts referring to the Divine + worship must needs be figurative, as we shall state further on + <a href="#FS_Q101_A2" id="FS_Q101_A1-p11.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, the consequence is that the reason for them is not so very evident. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="37961" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37961] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod illa ratio caeremonialium est quodammodo probabilis, +non quod ex eo dicuntur caeremonialia quia eorum ratio non est +manifesta; sed hoc est quoddam consequens. Quia enim praecepta ad +cultum Dei pertinentia oportet esse figuralia, ut infra dicetur, +inde est quod eorum ratio non est adeo manifesta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q101_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q101_A2-p0.1">Q. 101. A. 2. Whether the ceremonial precepts are figurative?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the ceremonial precepts are not figurative. For it is the duty of every teacher to express himself in + such a way as to be easily understood, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. iv, 4,10) and this seems very necessary in the + framing of a law: because precepts of law are proposed to the populace; for which reason a law should be manifest, as Isidore + declares (Etym. v, 21). If therefore the precepts of the Law were given as figures of + something, it seems unbecoming that Moses should have delivered these precepts without explaining what they signified. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37962" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37962] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta caeremonialia non +sint figuralia. Pertinet enim ad officium cuiuslibet doctoris ut +sic pronunciet ut de facili intelligi possit, sicut Augustinus +dicit, in IV de Doctr. Christ. Et hoc maxime videtur esse +necessarium in legis latione, quia praecepta legis populo +proponuntur. Unde lex debet esse manifesta, ut Isidorus dicit. Si +igitur praecepta caeremonialia data sunt in alicuius rei figuram, +videtur inconvenienter tradidisse huiusmodi praecepta Moyses, non +exponens quid figurarent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is done for the worship of God, should be entirely free from unfittingness. But the performance of actions + in representation of others, seems to savor of the theatre or of the drama: because formerly the actions performed in theatres + were done to represent the actions of others. Therefore it seems that such things should not be done for the worship of God. + But the ceremonial precepts are ordained to the Divine worship, as stated above + + <a href="#FS_Q101_A1" id="FS_Q101_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore they should not be figurative. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37963" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37963] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae in cultum Dei aguntur, maxime debent honestatem habere. Sed +facere aliqua facta ad alia repraesentanda, videtur esse +theatricum, sive poeticum, in theatris enim repraesentabantur olim +per aliqua quae ibi gerebantur, quaedam aliorum facta. Ergo videtur +quod huiusmodi non debeant fieri ad cultum Dei. Sed caeremonialia +ordinantur ad cultum Dei, ut dictum est. Ergo caeremonialia non +debent esse figuralia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion iii, iv) that "God is worshipped chiefly by faith, hope, and charity." But the precepts + of faith, hope, and charity are not figurative. Therefore the ceremonial precepts should not be figurative. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37964" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37964] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod <i>Deus maxime colitur fide, +spe et caritate</i>. Sed praecepta quae dantur de fide, spe et +caritate, non sunt figuralia. Ergo praecepta caeremonialia non +debent esse figuralia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.24" target="asv">Jn. 4:24</a>): "God is a spirit, and they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth." But a figure is not the very truth: + in fact one is condivided with the other. Therefore the ceremonial precepts, which refer to the Divine worship, should not + be figurative. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="37965" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37965] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +dominus dicit, Ioan. IV, <i>spiritus est Deus, et eos qui adorant +eum, in spiritu et veritate adorare oportet</i>. Sed figura non est +ipsa veritas, immo contra se invicem dividuntur. Ergo +caeremonialia, quae pertinent ad cultum Dei, non debent esse +figuralia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Col.2.16" target="asv">Col. 2:16,17</a>): "Let no man . . . judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a festival day, or of the new moon, or of the sabbaths, + which are a shadow of things to come." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37966" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37966] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Colos. II, <i>nemo vos iudicet in cibo +aut in potu, aut in parte diei festi aut Neomeniae aut sabbatorum, +quae sunt umbra futurorum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q101_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q101_A1" id="FS_Q101_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[99], AA[3],4), the ceremonial precepts are those which refer to the worship of God. Now the Divine worship is twofold: + internal, and external. For since man is composed of soul and body, each of these should be applied to the worship of God; + the soul by an interior worship; the body by an outward worship: hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.3" target="asv">Ps. 83:3</a>): "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living + God." And as the body is ordained to God through the soul, so the outward worship is ordained to the internal worship. Now + interior worship consists in the soul being united to God by the intellect and affections. Wherefore according to the various + ways in which the intellect and affections of the man who worships God are rightly united to God, his external actions are + applied in various ways to the Divine worship. + </p><p id="FS_Q101_A2-p8"> For in the state of future bliss, the human intellect will gaze on the Divine Truth in Itself. Wherefore the external worship + will not consist in anything figurative, but solely in the praise of God, proceeding from the inward knowledge and affection, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.51.3" target="asv"> Is. 51:3</a>: "Joy and gladness shall be found therein, thanksgiving and the voice of praise." + </p><p id="FS_Q101_A2-p9"> But in the present state of life, we are unable to gaze on the Divine Truth in Itself, and we need the ray of Divine light + to shine upon us under the form of certain sensible figures, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. i); in various ways, however, + according to the various states of human knowledge. For under the Old Law, neither was the Divine Truth manifest in Itself, + nor was the way leading to that manifestation as yet opened out, as the Apostle declares ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.8" target="asv">Heb. + 9:8 + </a>). Hence the external worship of the Old Law needed to be figurative not only of the future truth to be manifested in our + heavenly country, but also of Christ, Who is the way leading to that heavenly manifestation. But under the New Law this way + is already revealed: and therefore it needs no longer to be foreshadowed as something future, but to be brought to our minds + as something past or present: and the truth of the glory to come, which is not yet revealed, alone needs to be + foreshadowed. This is what the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A2-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>): "The Law has [Vulg.: 'having'] a shadow of the good things to come, not the very image of the things": for a shadow is + less than an image; so that the image belongs to the New Law, but the shadow to the Old. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 2 co."><a name="37967" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37967] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, praecepta caeremonialia +dicuntur quae ordinantur ad cultum Dei. Est autem duplex cultus +Dei, interior, et exterior. Cum enim homo sit compositus ex anima +et corpore, utrumque debet applicari ad colendum Deum, ut scilicet +anima colat interiori cultu, et corpus exteriori, unde dicitur in +Psalmo LXXXIII, <i>cor meum et caro mea exultaverunt in Deum +vivum</i>. Et sicut corpus ordinatur in Deum per animam, ita cultus +exterior ordinatur ad interiorem cultum. Consistit autem interior +cultus in hoc quod anima coniungatur Deo per intellectum et +affectum. Et ideo secundum quod diversimode intellectus et affectus +colentis Deum Deo recte coniungitur, secundum hoc diversimode +exteriores actus hominis ad cultum Dei applicantur. In statu enim +futurae beatitudinis, intellectus humanus ipsam divinam veritatem +in seipsa intuebitur. Et ideo exterior cultus non consistet in +aliqua figura, sed solum in laude Dei, quae procedit ex interiori +cognitione et affectione; secundum illud Isaiae li, <i>gaudium et +laetitia invenietur in ea, gratiarum actio et vox laudis</i>. In +statu autem praesentis vitae, non possumus divinam veritatem in +seipsa intueri, sed oportet quod radius divinae veritatis nobis +illucescat sub aliquibus sensibilibus figuris, sicut Dionysius +dicit, I cap. Cael. Hier., diversimode tamen, secundum diversum +statum cognitionis humanae. In veteri enim lege neque ipsa divina +veritas in seipsa manifesta erat, neque etiam adhuc propalata erat +via ad hoc perveniendi, sicut apostolus dicit, ad Heb. IX. Et ideo +oportebat exteriorem cultum veteris legis non solum esse +figurativum futurae veritatis manifestandae in patria; sed etiam +esse figurativum Christi, qui est via ducens ad illam patriae +veritatem. Sed in statu novae legis, haec via iam est revelata. +Unde hanc praefigurari non oportet sicut futuram, sed commemorari +oportet per modum praeteriti vel praesentis, sed solum oportet +praefigurari futuram veritatem gloriae nondum revelatam. Et hoc est +quod apostolus dicit, ad Heb. X, <i>umbram habet lex futurorum +bonorum, non ipsam imaginem rerum</i>, umbra enim minus est quam +imago; tanquam imago pertineat ad novam legem, umbra vero ad +veterem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The things of God are not to be revealed to man except in proportion to his capacity: else he would be in danger of downfall, + were he to despise what he cannot grasp. Hence it was more beneficial that the Divine mysteries should be revealed to uncultured + people under a veil of figures, that thus they might know them at least implicitly by using those figures to the honor of + God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37968" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37968] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod divina non sunt revelanda hominibus nisi +secundum eorum capacitatem, alioquin daretur eis praecipitii +materia, dum contemnerent quae capere non possent. Et ideo utilius +fuit ut sub quodam figurarum velamine divina mysteria rudi populo +traderentur, ut sic saltem ea implicite cognoscerent, dum illis +figuris deservirent ad honorem Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as human reason fails to grasp poetical expressions on account of their being lacking in truth, so does it fail to grasp + Divine things perfectly, on account of the sublimity of the truth they contain: and therefore in both cases there is need + of signs by means of sensible figures. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37969" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37969] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut poetica non capiuntur a ratione humana propter +defectum veritatis qui est in eis, ita etiam ratio humana perfecte +capere non potest divina propter excedentem ipsorum veritatem. Et +ideo utrobique opus est repraesentatione per sensibiles +figuras.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Augustine is speaking there of internal worship; to which, however, external worship should be ordained, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37970" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37970] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de cultu interiore; ad quem +tamen ordinari oportet exteriorem cultum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A2-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 4</b> The same answer applies to the Fourth Objection: because men were taught by Him to practice more perfectly the spiritual + worship of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="37971" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37971] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Et similiter +dicendum est ad quartum, quia per Christum homines plenius ad +spiritualem Dei cultum sunt introducti.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q101_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q101_A3-p0.1">Q. 101. A. 3. Whether there should have been man ceremonial precepts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there should not have been many ceremonial precepts. For those things which conduce to an end should be + proportionate to that end. But the ceremonial precepts, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q101_A1" id="FS_Q101_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2), are ordained to the worship of God, and to the foreshadowing of Christ. Now "there is but one God, of Whom are all things + . . . and one Lord Jesus Christ, by Whom are all things" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.8.6" target="asv">1 Cor. 8:6</a>). Therefore there + should not have been many ceremonial precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37972" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37972] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non debuerint esse multa caeremonialia +praecepta. Ea enim quae sunt ad finem, debent esse fini +proportionata. Sed caeremonialia praecepta, sicut dictum est, +ordinantur ad cultum Dei et in figuram Christi. Est autem <i>unus +Deus, a quo omnia; et unus dominus Iesus Christus, per quem +omnia</i>, ut dicitur I ad Cor. VIII. Ergo caeremonialia non +debuerunt multiplicari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the great number of the ceremonial precepts was an occasion of transgression, according to the words of Peter ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.15.10" target="asv">Acts 15:10</a>): "Why tempt you God, to put a yoke upon the necks of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?" + Now the transgression of the Divine precepts is an obstacle to man's salvation. Since, therefore, every law should conduce + to man's salvation, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 3), it seems + that the ceremonial precepts should not have been given in great number. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37973" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37973] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +multitudo caeremonialium praeceptorum transgressionis erat occasio; +secundum illud quod dicit Petrus, Act. XV, <i>quid tentatis Deum, +imponere iugum super cervicem discipulorum, quod neque nos, neque +patres nostri, portare potuimus?</i> Sed transgressio divinorum +praeceptorum contrariatur humanae saluti. Cum igitur lex omnis +debeat saluti congruere hominum, ut Isidorus dicit, videtur quod +non debuerint multa praecepta caeremonialia dari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the ceremonial precepts referred to the outward and bodily worship of God, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q101_A2" id="FS_Q101_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. But the Law should have lessened this bodily worship: since it directed men to Christ, Who taught them to worship God "in + spirit and in truth," as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#John.4.23" target="asv"> Jn. 4:23.</a> Therefore there should not have been many ceremonial precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37974" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37974] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +praecepta caeremonialia pertinebant ad cultum Dei exteriorem et +corporalem, ut dictum est. Sed huiusmodi cultum corporalem lex +debebat diminuere, quia ordinabat ad Christum, qui docuit homines +Deum colere in spiritu et veritate, ut habetur Ioan. IV. Non ergo +debuerunt multa praecepta caeremonialia dari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.8.12" target="asv">Osee 8:12</a>): "I shall write to them [Vulg.: 'him'] My manifold laws"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Job.11.6" target="asv">Job 11:6</a>): "That He might show thee the secrets of His wisdom, and that His Law is manifold." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37975" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37975] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Osee VIII, <i>scribam eis multiplices leges +intus</i>; et Iob XI, ut <i>ostenderet tibi secreta sapientiae, +quod multiplex sit lex eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q96_A1" id="FS_Q101_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[96], A[1]</a>), every law is given to a people. Now a people contains two kinds of men: some, prone to evil, who have to be coerced by + the precepts of the law, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q95_A1" id="FS_Q101_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[95], A[1]</a>); some, inclined to good, either from nature or from custom, or rather from grace; and the like have to be taught and improved + by means of the precepts of the law. Accordingly, with regard to both kinds of + the law. Accordingly, with regard to both kinds of men it was expedient that the Old Law should contain many ceremonial precepts. + For in that people there were many prone to idolatry; wherefore it was necessary to recall them by means of ceremonial precepts + from the worship of idols to the worship of God. And since men served idols in many ways, it was necessary on the other hand + to devise many means of repressing every single one: and again, to lay many obligations on such like men, in order + that being burdened, as it were, by their duties to the Divine worship, they might have no time for the service of idols. + As to those who were inclined to good, it was again necessary that there should be many ceremonial precepts; both because + thus their mind turned to God in many ways, and more continually; and because the mystery of Christ, which was foreshadowed + by these ceremonial precepts, brought many boons to the world, and afforded men many considerations, which needed to be signified + by various ceremonies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 3 co."><a name="37976" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37976] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, omnis lex alicui populo +datur. In populo autem duo genera hominum continentur, quidam proni +ad malum, qui sunt per praecepta legis coercendi, ut supra dictum +est; quidam habentes inclinationem ad bonum, vel ex natura vel ex +consuetudine, vel magis ex gratia; et tales sunt per legis +praeceptum instruendi et in melius promovendi. Quantum igitur ad +utrumque genus hominum, expediebat praecepta caeremonialia in +veteri lege multiplicari. Erant enim in illo populo aliqui ad +idololatriam proni, et ideo necesse erat ut ab idololatriae cultu +per praecepta caeremonialia revocarentur ad cultum Dei. Et quia +multipliciter homines idololatriae deserviebant, oportebat e +contrario multa institui ad singula reprimenda, et iterum multa +talibus imponi, ut, quasi oneratis ex his quae ad cultum Dei +impenderent, non vacaret idololatriae deservire. Ex parte vero +eorum qui erant prompti ad bonum, etiam necessaria fuit +multiplicatio caeremonialium praeceptorum. Tum quia per hoc +diversimode mens eorum referebatur in Deum, et magis assidue. Tum +etiam quia mysterium Christi, quod per huiusmodi caeremonialia +figurabatur, multiplices utilitates attulit mundo, et multa circa +ipsum consideranda erant, quae oportuit per diversa caeremonialia +figurari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When that which conduces to an end is sufficient to conduce thereto, then one such thing suffices for one end: thus one remedy, + if it be efficacious, suffices sometimes to restore men to health, and then the remedy needs not to be repeated. But when + that which conduces to an end is weak and imperfect, it needs to be multiplied: thus many remedies are given to a sick man, + when one is not enough to heal him. Now the ceremonies of the Old Law were weak + and imperfect, both for representing the mystery of Christ, on account of its surpassing excellence; and for subjugating men's + minds to God. Hence the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.18" target="asv">Heb. 7:18,19</a>): "There is a setting aside of the former commandment because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof, for the law brought + nothing to perfection." Consequently these ceremonies needed to be in great number. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37977" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37977] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quando id quod ordinatur ad finem, est +sufficiens ad ducendum in finem, tunc sufficit unum ad unum finem, +sicut una medicina, si sit efficax, sufficit quandoque ad sanitatem +inducendam, et tunc non oportet multiplicari medicinam. Sed propter +debilitatem et imperfectionem eius quod est ad finem, oportet eam +multiplicari, sicut multa remedia adhibentur infirmo, quando unum +non sufficit ad sanandum. Caeremoniae autem veteris legis invalidae +et imperfectae erant et ad repraesentandum Christi mysterium, quod +est superexcellens; et ad subiugandum mentes hominum Deo. Unde +apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VII, <i>reprobatio fit praecedentis +mandati, propter infirmitatem et inutilitatem, nihil enim ad +perfectum adduxit lex</i>. Et ideo oportuit huiusmodi caeremonias +multiplicari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A wise lawgiver should suffer lesser transgressions, that the greater may be avoided. And therefore, in order to avoid the + sin of idolatry, and the pride which would arise in the hearts of the Jews, were they to fulfil all the precepts of the Law, + the fact that they would in consequence find many occasions of disobedience did not prevent God from giving them many ceremonial + precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37978" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37978] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod sapientis legislatoris est minores transgressiones +permittere, ut maiores caveantur. Et ideo, ut caveretur +transgressio idololatriae, et superbiae quae in Iudaeorum cordibus +nasceretur si omnia praecepta legis implerent, non propter hoc +praetermisit Deus multa caeremonialia praecepta tradere, quia de +facili sumebant ex hoc transgrediendi occasionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Old Law lessened bodily worship in many ways. Thus it forbade sacrifices to be offered in every place and by any person. + Many such like things did it enact for the lessening of bodily worship; as Rabbi Moses, the Egyptian testifies (Doct. Perplex. + iii). Nevertheless it behooved not to attenuate the bodily worship of God so much as to allow men to fall away into the worship + of idols. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37979" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37979] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod vetus lex in multis diminuit corporalem cultum. +Propter quod statuit quod non in omni loco sacrificia offerrentur, +neque a quibuslibet. Et multa huiusmodi statuit ad diminutionem +exterioris cultus; sicut etiam Rabbi Moyses Aegyptius dicit. +Oportebat tamen non ita attenuare corporalem cultum Dei, ut homines +ad cultum Daemonum declinarent.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q101_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q101_A4-p0.1">Q. 101. A. 4. Whether the ceremonies of the Old Law are suitably divided into sacrifices, sacred things, sacraments, and observances?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law are unsuitably divided into "sacrifices, sacred things, sacraments, and + observances." For the ceremonies of the Old Law foreshadowed Christ. But this was done only by the sacrifices, which foreshadowed + the sacrifice in which Christ "delivered Himself an oblation and a sacrifice to God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.2" target="asv">Eph. 5:2</a>). Therefore none but the sacrifices were ceremonies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37980" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37980] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod caeremoniae veteris legis +inconvenienter dividantur in sacrificia, sacra, sacramenta et +observantias. Caeremoniae enim veteris legis figurabant Christum. +Sed hoc solum fiebat per sacrificia, per quae figurabatur +sacrificium quo Christus se obtulit oblationem et hostiam Deo, ut +dicitur ad Ephes. V. Ergo sola sacrificia erant caeremonialia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Old Law was ordained to the New. But in the New Law the sacrifice is the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore in + the Old Law there should be no distinction between "sacrifices" and "sacraments." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37981" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37981] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +vetus lex ordinabatur ad novam. Sed in nova lege ipsum sacrificium +est sacramentum altaris. Ergo in veteri lege non debuerunt +distingui sacramenta contra sacrificia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a "sacred thing" is something dedicated to God: in which sense the tabernacle and its vessels were said to be consecrated. + But all the ceremonial precepts were ordained to the worship of God, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q101_A1" id="FS_Q101_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore all ceremonies were sacred things. Therefore "sacred things" should not be taken as a part of the ceremonies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37982" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37982] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sacrum dicitur quod est Deo dicatum, secundum quem modum +tabernaculum et vasa eius sacrificari dicebantur. Sed omnia +caeremonialia erant ordinata ad cultum Dei, ut dictum est. Ergo +caeremonialia omnia sacra erant. Non ergo una pars caeremonialium +debet sacra nominari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, "observances" are so called from having to be observed. But all the precepts of the Law had to be observed: for + it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.8.11" target="asv">Dt. 8:11</a>): "Observe [Douay: 'Take heed'] and beware lest at any time thou forget the Lord thy God, and neglect His commandments and + judgments and ceremonies." Therefore the "observances" should not be considered as a part of the ceremonies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="37983" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37983] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +observantiae ab observando dicuntur. Sed omnia praecepta legis +observari debebant, dicitur enim Deut. VIII, <i>observa et cave ne +quando obliviscaris domini Dei tui, et negligas mandata eius atque +iudicia et caeremonias</i>. Non ergo observantiae debent poni una +pars caeremonialium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the solemn festivals are reckoned as part of the ceremonial: since they were a shadow of things to come ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Col.2.16" target="asv">Col. 2:16,17</a>): and the same may be said of the oblations and gifts, as appears from the words of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.9" target="asv">Heb. 9:9</a>): and yet these do not seem to be inclined in any of those mentioned above. Therefore the above division of ceremonies is + unsuitable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="37984" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37984] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +solemnitates inter caeremonialia computantur, cum sint in umbram +futuri, ut patet ad Colos. II. Similiter etiam oblationes et +munera; ut patet per apostolum, ad Heb. IX. Quae tamen sub nullo +horum contineri videntur. Ergo inconveniens est praedicta +distinctio caeremonialium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A4-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> In the Old Law each of the above is called a ceremony. For the sacrifices are called ceremonies ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Num.15.24" target="asv">Num. 15:24</a>): "They shall offer a calf . . . and the sacrifices and libations thereof, as the ceremonies require." Of the sacrament of + Order it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.7.35" target="asv">Lev. 7:35</a>): "This is the anointing of Aaron and his sons in the ceremonies." Of sacred things also it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.38.21" target="asv">Ex. 38:21</a>): "These are the + instruments of the tabernacle of the testimony . . . in the ceremonies of the Levites." And again of the observances it is + written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p7.4" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 9:6</a>): "If you . . . shall turn away from following Me, and will not observe [Douay: 'keep'] My . . . ceremonies which I have + set before you." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37985" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37985] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod in veteri lege singula praedicta caeremoniae vocantur. +Sacrificia enim dicuntur caeremoniae Num. XV, <i>offerat vitulum et +sacrificia eius ac libamenta, ut caeremoniae eius postulant</i>. De +sacramento etiam ordinis dicitur Levit. VII, <i>haec est unctio +Aaron et filiorum eius in caeremoniis</i>. De sacris etiam dicitur +Exod. XXXVIII, haec sunt <i>instrumenta tabernaculi testimonii in +caeremoniis Levitarum</i>. De observantiis etiam dicitur III Reg. +IX, <i>si aversi fueritis, non sequentes me, nec observantes +caeremonias quas proposui vobis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A4-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q101_A1" id="FS_Q101_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2), the ceremonial precepts are ordained to the Divine worship. Now in this worship we may consider the worship itself, the + worshippers, and the instruments of worship. The worship consists specially in "sacrifices," which are offered up in honor + of God. The instruments of worship refer to the "sacred things," such as the tabernacle, the vessels and so forth. With regard + to the worshippers two points may be + considered. The first point is their preparation for Divine worship, which is effected by a sort of consecration either of + the people or of the ministers; and to this the "sacraments" refer. The second point is their particular mode of life, whereby + they are distinguished from those who do not worship God: and to this pertain the "observances," for instance, in matters + of food, clothing, and so forth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 4 co."><a name="37986" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37986] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, caeremonialia praecepta +ordinantur ad cultum Dei. In quo quidem cultu considerari possunt +et ipse cultus, et colentes, et instrumenta colendi. Ipse autem +cultus specialiter consistit in sacrificiis, quae in Dei +reverentiam offeruntur. Instrumenta autem colendi pertinent ad +sacra, sicut est tabernaculum, et vasa, et alia huiusmodi. Ex parte +autem colentium duo possunt considerari. Scilicet et eorum +institutio ad cultum divinum, quod fit per quandam consecrationem +vel populi, vel ministrorum, et ad hoc pertinent sacramenta. Et +iterum eorum singularis conversatio, per quam distinguuntur ab his +qui Deum non colunt, et ad hoc pertinent observantiae, puta in +cibis et vestimentis et aliis huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It was necessary for the sacrifices to be offered both in some certain place and by some certain men: and all this pertained + to the worship of God. Wherefore just as their sacrifices signified Christ the victim, so too their sacraments and sacred + things of the New Law; while their observances foreshadowed the mode of life of the people under the New Law: all of which + things pertain to Christ. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37987" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37987] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod sacrificia oportebat offerri et in aliquibus +locis, et per aliquos homines, et totum hoc ad cultum Dei pertinet. +Unde sicut per sacrificia significatur Christus immolatus, ita +etiam per sacramenta et sacra illorum figurabantur sacramenta et +sacra novae legis; et per eorum observantias figurabatur +conversatio populi novae legis. Quae omnia ad Christum +pertinent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The sacrifice of the New Law, viz. the Eucharist, contains Christ Himself, the Author of our Sanctification: for He sanctified + "the people by His own blood" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.13.12" target="asv">Heb. 13:12</a>). Hence this Sacrifice is also a sacrament. But the sacrifices of the Old Law did not contain Christ, but foreshadowed Him; + hence they are not called sacraments. In order to signify this there were certain sacraments apart from the sacrifices of + the Old Law, which + sacraments were figures of the sanctification to come. Nevertheless to certain consecrations certain sacrifices were united. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37988" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37988] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod sacrificium novae legis, idest Eucharistia, continet +ipsum Christum, qui est sanctificationis auctor, sanctificavit enim +per suum sanguinem populum, ut dicitur ad Heb. ult. Et ideo hoc +sacrificium etiam est sacramentum. Sed sacrificia veteris legis non +continebant Christum, sed ipsum figurabant, et ideo non dicuntur +sacramenta. Sed ad hoc designandum seorsum erant quaedam sacramenta +in veteri lege, quae erant figurae futurae consecrationis. Quamvis +etiam quibusdam consecrationibus quaedam sacrificia +adiungerentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sacrifices and sacraments were of course sacred things. But certain things were sacred, through being dedicated to the + Divine worship, and yet were not sacrifices or sacraments: wherefore they retained the common designation of sacred things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37989" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37989] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam sacrificia et sacramenta erant sacra. Sed +quaedam erant quae erant sacra, utpote ad cultum Dei dicata, nec +tamen erant sacrificia nec sacramenta, et ideo retinebant sibi +commune nomen sacrorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those things which pertained to the mode of life of the people who worshipped God, retained the common designation of observances, + in so far as they fell short of the above. For they were not called sacred things, because they had no immediate connection + with the worship of God, such as the tabernacle and its vessels had. But by a sort of consequence they were matters of ceremony, + in so far as they affected the fitness of the people who worshipped + God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="37990" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37990] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod ea quae pertinebant ad conversationem populi colentis +Deum, retinebant sibi commune nomen observantiarum, inquantum a +praemissis deficiebant. Non enim dicebantur sacra, quia non +habebant immediatum respectum ad cultum Dei, sicut tabernaculum et +vasa eius. Sed per quandam consequentiam erant caeremonialia, +inquantum pertinebant ad quandam idoneitatem populi colentis +Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q101_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Just as the sacrifices were offered in a fixed place, so were they offered at fixed times: for which reason the solemn festivals + seem to be reckoned among the sacred things. The oblations and gifts are counted together with the sacrifices; hence the Apostle + says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.5.1" target="asv">Heb. 5:1</a>): "Every high-priest taken from among men, is ordained for men in things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts + and sacrifices." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 101 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="37991" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37991] Iª-IIae q. 101 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod, sicut sacrificia offerebantur in determinato loco +ita etiam offerebantur in determinatis temporibus, unde etiam +solemnitates inter sacra computari videntur. Oblationes autem et +munera computantur cum sacrificiis, quia Deo offerebantur, unde +apostolus dicit, ad Heb. V, <i>omnis pontifex ex hominibus +assumptus, pro hominibus constituitur in his quae sunt ad Deum, ut +offerat dona et sacrificia</i>.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q102" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q102-p0.1">Q. 102. OF THE CAUSES OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q102-p2"> We must now consider the causes of the ceremonial precepts: under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q102-p3"><a href="#FS_Q102_A1"> (1) Whether there was any cause for the ceremonial precepts?</a></p><p id="FS_Q102-p4"><a href="#FS_Q102_A2"> (2) Whether the cause of the ceremonial precepts was literal or figurative?</a></p><p id="FS_Q102-p5"><a href="#FS_Q102_A3"> (3) The causes of the sacrifices;</a></p><p id="FS_Q102-p6"><a href="#FS_Q102_A4"> (4) The causes of the sacrifices;</a></p><p id="FS_Q102-p7"><a href="#FS_Q102_A5"> (5) The causes of the sacred things;</a></p><p id="FS_Q102-p8"><a href="#FS_Q102_A6"> (6) The causes of the observances.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 pr."><a name="37992" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37992] Iª-IIae q. 102 pr.</span></a> Deinde +considerandum est de causis caeremonialium praeceptorum. Et circa +hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum praecepta caeremonialia habeant +causam. Secundo, utrum habeant causam litteralem, vel solum +figuralem. Tertio, de causis sacrificiorum. Quarto, de causis +sacramentorum. Quinto, de causis sacrorum. Sexto, de causis +observantiarum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q102_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q102_A1-p0.1">Q. 102. A. 1. Whether there was any cause for the ceremonial precepts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there was no cause for the ceremonial precepts. Because on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.15" target="asv"> Eph. 2:15, </a> "Making void the law of the commandments," the gloss says, (i.e.) "making void the Old Law as to the carnal observances, + by substituting decrees, i.e. evangelical precepts, which are based on reason." But if the observances of the Old Law were + based on reason, it would have been useless to void them by the reasonable decrees of the New Law. Therefore + there was no reason for the ceremonial observances of the Old Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37993" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37993] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod caeremonialia praecepta non habeant +causam. Quia super illud Ephes. II, legem mandatorum decretis +evacuans, dicit Glossa, <i>idest, evacuans legem veterem quantum ad +carnales observantias, decretis, idest praeceptis evangelicis, quae +ex ratione sunt</i>. Sed si observantiae veteris legis ex ratione +erant, frustra evacuarentur per rationabilia decreta novae legis. +Non ergo caeremoniales observantiae veteris legis habebant aliquam +rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Old Law succeeded the law of nature. But in the law of nature there was a precept for which there was no reason + save that man's obedience might be tested; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 6,13), concerning the prohibition about the + tree of life. Therefore in the Old Law there should have been some precepts for the purpose of testing man's obedience, having + no reason in themselves. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37994" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37994] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +vetus lex successit legi naturae. Sed in lege naturae fuit aliquod +praeceptum quod nullam rationem habebat nisi ut hominis obedientia +probaretur; sicut Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., de +prohibitione ligni vitae. Ergo etiam in veteri lege aliqua +praecepta danda erant in quibus hominis obedientia probaretur, quae +de se nullam rationem haberent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man's works are called moral according as they proceed from reason. If therefore there is any reason for the ceremonial + precepts, they would not differ from the moral precepts. It seems therefore that there was no cause for the ceremonial precepts: + for the reason of a precept is taken from some cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37995" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37995] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +opera hominis dicuntur moralia secundum quod sunt a ratione. Si +igitur caeremonialium praeceptorum sit aliqua ratio, non different +a moralibus praeceptis. Videtur ergo quod caeremonialia praecepta +non habeant aliquam causam, ratio enim praecepti ex aliqua causa +sumitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.18.9" target="asv">Ps. 18:9</a>): "The commandment of the Lord is lightsome, enlightening the eyes." But the ceremonial precepts are commandments of God. + Therefore they are lightsome: and yet they would not be so, if they had no reasonable cause. Therefore the ceremonial precepts + have a reasonable cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37996" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37996] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur in Psalmo XVIII, <i>praeceptum domini lucidum, +illuminans oculos</i>. Sed caeremonialia sunt praecepta Dei. Ergo +sunt lucida. Quod non esset nisi haberent rationabilem causam. Ergo +praecepta caeremonialia habent rationabilem causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 2), it is the function of a "wise man to do everything in order," those things + which proceed from the Divine wisdom must needs be well ordered, as the Apostle states ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1</a>). Now there are two conditions required for things to be well ordered. First, that they be ordained to their due end, which + is the principle of the whole order in matters of action: since those things that happen by + chance outside the intention of the end, or which are not done seriously but for fun, are said to be inordinate. Secondly, + that which is done in view of the end should be proportionate to the end. From this it follows that the reason for whatever + conduces to the end is taken from the end: thus the reason for the disposition of a saw is taken from cutting, which is its + end, as stated in Phys. ii, 9. Now it is evident that the ceremonial precepts, like all the other precepts of the Law, were + institutions of Divine wisdom: hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.4.6" target="asv">Dt. 4:6</a>): "This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations." Consequently we must needs say that the ceremonial precepts + were ordained to a certain end, wherefrom their reasonable causes can be gathered. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 1 co."><a name="37997" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37997] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum sapientis sit ordinare, secundum philosophum, in +I Metaphys., ea quae ex divina sapientia procedunt, oportet esse +ordinata, ut apostolus dicit, ad Rom. XIII. Ad hoc autem quod +aliqua sint ordinata, duo requiruntur. Primo quidem, quod aliqua +ordinentur ad debitum finem, qui est principium totius ordinis in +rebus agendis, ea enim quae casu eveniunt praeter intentionem +finis, vel quae non serio fiunt sed ludo, dicimus esse inordinata. +Secundo oportet quod id quod est ad finem, sit proportionatum fini. +Et ex hoc sequitur quod ratio eorum quae sunt ad finem, sumitur ex +fine, sicut ratio dispositionis serrae sumitur ex sectione, quae +est finis eius, ut dicitur in II Physic. Manifestum est autem quod +praecepta caeremonialia, sicut et omnia alia praecepta legis, sunt +ex divina sapientia instituta, unde dicitur Deut. IV, <i>haec est +sapientia vestra et intellectus coram populis</i>. Unde necesse est +dicere quod praecepta caeremonialia sint ordinata ad aliquem finem, +ex quo eorum rationabiles causae assignari possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It may be said there was no reason for the observances of the Old Law, in the sense that there was no reason in the very + nature of the thing done: for instance that a garment should not be made of wool and linen. But there could be a reason for + them in relation to something else: namely, in so far as something was signified or excluded thereby. On the other hand, the + decrees of the New Law, which refer chiefly to faith and the love of God, are + reasonable from the very nature of the act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37998" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37998] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod observantiae veteris legis possunt dici sine +ratione quantum ad hoc, quod ipsa facta in sui natura rationem non +habebant, puta quod vestis non conficeretur ex lana et lino. +Poterant tamen habere rationem ex ordine ad aliud, inquantum +scilicet vel aliquid per hoc figurabatur, vel aliquid excludebatur. +Sed decreta novae legis, quae praecipue consistunt in fide et +dilectione Dei, ex ipsa natura actus rationabilia sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason for the prohibition concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil was not that this tree was naturally evil: + and yet this prohibition was reasonable in its relation to something else, in as much as it signified something. And so also + the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law were reasonable on account of their relation to something else. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37999" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37999] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod prohibitio ligni scientiae boni et mali non fuit +propter hoc quod illud lignum esset naturaliter malum, sed tamen +ipsa prohibitio habuit aliquam rationem ex ordine ad aliud, +inquantum scilicet per hoc aliquid figurabatur. Et sic etiam +caeremonialia praecepta veteris legis habent rationem in ordine ad +aliud.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The moral precepts in their very nature have reasonable causes: as for instance, "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal." + But the ceremonial precepts have a reasonable cause in their relation to something else, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="38000" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38000] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod praecepta moralia secundum suam naturam habent +rationabiles causas, sicut, non occides, non furtum facies. Sed +praecepta caeremonialia habent rationabiles causas ex ordine ad +aliud, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q102_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q102_A2-p0.1">Q. 102. A. 2. Whether the ceremonial precepts have a literal cause or merely a figurative cause?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the ceremonial precepts have not a literal, but merely a figurative cause. For among the ceremonial precepts, + the chief was circumcision and the sacrifice of the paschal lamb. But neither of these had any but a figurative cause: because + each was given as a sign. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.17.11" target="asv">Gn. 17:11</a>): "You shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin, that it may be a sign of the covenant between Me and you": and of the + celebration of the Passover it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.13.9" target="asv">Ex. 13:9</a>): "It shall be as a sign in thy hand, and as a memorial before thy eyes." Therefore much more did the other ceremonial precepts + have none but a figurative reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="38001" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38001] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta caeremonialia non +habeant causam litteralem, sed figuralem tantum. Inter praecepta +enim caeremonialia praecipua erant circumcisio, et immolatio agni +paschalis. Sed utrumque istorum non habebat nisi causam figuralem, +quia utrumque istorum datum est in signum. Dicitur enim Gen. XVII, +<i>circumcidetis carnem praeputii vestri, ut sit in signum foederis +inter me et vos</i>. Et de celebratione phase dicitur Exod. XIII, +<i>erit quasi signum in manu tua, et quasi monumentum ante oculos +tuos</i>. Ergo multo magis alia caeremonialia non habent nisi +causam figuralem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an effect is proportionate to its cause. But all the ceremonial precepts are figurative, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q101_A2" id="FS_Q102_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[101], A[2]</a>). Therefore they have no other than a figurative cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="38002" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38002] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +effectus proportionatur suae causae. Sed omnia caeremonialia sunt +figuralia, ut supra dictum est. Ergo non habent nisi causam +figuralem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be a matter of indifference whether a certain thing, considered in itself, be done in a particular way or + not, it seems that it has not a literal cause. Now there are certain points in the ceremonial precepts, which appear to be + a matter of indifference, as to whether they be done in one way or in another: for instance, the number of animals to be offered, + and other such particular circumstances. Therefore there is no literal cause for the + precepts of the Old Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="38003" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38003] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +illud quod de se est indifferens utrum sic vel non sic fiat, non +videtur habere aliquam litteralem causam. Sed quaedam sunt in +praeceptis caeremonialibus quae non videntur differre utrum sic vel +sic fiant, sicut est de numero animalium offerendorum, et aliis +huiusmodi particularibus circumstantiis. Ergo praecepta veteris +legis non habent rationem litteralem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Just as the ceremonial precepts foreshadowed Christ, so did the stories of the Old Testament: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:11</a>) that "all (these things) happened to them in figure." Now in the stories of the Old Testament, besides the mystical or figurative, + there is the literal sense. Therefore the ceremonial precepts had also literal, besides their figurative causes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 2 s. c."><a name="38004" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38004] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +sicut praecepta caeremonialia figurabant Christum, ita etiam +historiae veteris testamenti, dicitur enim I ad Cor. X, quod omnia +in figuram contingebant illis. Sed in historiis veteris testamenti, +praeter intellectum mysticum seu figuralem, est etiam intellectus +litteralis. Ergo etiam praecepta caeremonialia, praeter causas +figurales, habebant etiam causas litterales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q102_A1" id="FS_Q102_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the reason for whatever conduces to an end must be taken from that end. Now the end of the ceremonial precepts was twofold: + for they were ordained to the Divine worship, for that particular time, and to the foreshadowing of Christ; just as the words + of the prophets regarded the time being in such a way as to be utterances figurative of the time to come, as Jerome says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Hos.1.3" target="asv"> Osee 1:3.</a> + Accordingly the reasons for the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law can be taken in two ways. First, in respect of the Divine + worship which was to be observed for that particular time: and these reasons are literal: whether they refer to the shunning + of idolatry; or recall certain Divine benefits; or remind men of the Divine excellence; or point out the disposition of mind + which was then required in those who worshipped God. Secondly, their reasons can be gathered from the point of view of their + being ordained to foreshadow Christ: and thus their reasons are figurative and mystical: whether they be taken from Christ + Himself and the Church, which pertains to the allegorical sense; or to the morals of the Christian people, which pertains + to the moral sense; or to the state of future glory, in as much as we are brought thereto by Christ, which refers to the anagogical + sense. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 2 co."><a name="38005" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38005] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ratio eorum quae sunt ad +finem, oportet quod a fine sumatur. Finis autem praeceptorum +caeremonialium est duplex, ordinabatur enim ad cultum Dei pro +tempore illo, et ad figurandum Christum; sicut etiam verba +prophetarum sic respiciebant praesens tempus, quod etiam in figuram +futuri dicebantur, ut Hieronymus dicit, super Osee. Sic igitur +rationes praeceptorum caeremonialium veteris legis dupliciter +accipi possunt. Uno modo, ex ratione cultus divini qui erat pro +tempore illo observandus. Et rationes istae sunt litterales, sive +pertineant ad vitandum idololatriae cultum; sive ad rememoranda +aliqua Dei beneficia; sive ad insinuandam excellentiam divinam; vel +etiam ad designandam dispositionem mentis quae tunc requirebatur in +colentibus Deum. Alio modo possunt eorum rationes assignari +secundum quod ordinantur ad figurandum Christum. Et sic habent +rationes figurales et mysticas, sive accipiantur ex ipso Christo et +Ecclesia, quod pertinet ad allegoriam; sive ad mores populi +Christiani, quod pertinet ad moralitatem; sive ad statum futurae +gloriae, prout in eam introducimur per Christum, quod pertinet ad +anagogiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as the use of metaphorical expressions in Scripture belongs to the literal sense, because the words are employed in + order to convey that particular meaning; so also the meaning of those legal ceremonies which commemorated certain Divine benefits, + on account of which they were instituted, and of others similar which belonged to that time, does not go beyond the order + of literal causes. Consequently when we assert that the cause of the celebration + of the Passover was its signification of the delivery from Egypt, or that circumcision was a sign of God's covenant with Abraham, + we assign the literal cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="38006" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38006] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut intellectus metaphoricae locutionis in +Scripturis est litteralis, quia verba ad hoc proferuntur ut hoc +significent; ita etiam significationes caeremoniarum legis quae +sunt commemorativae beneficiorum Dei propter quae instituta sunt, +vel aliorum huiusmodi quae ad illum statum pertinebant, non +transcendunt ordinem litteralium causarum. Unde quod assignetur +causa celebrationis phase quia est signum liberationis ex Aegypto, +et quod circumcisio est signum pacti quod Deus habuit cum Abraham, +pertinet ad causam litteralem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument would avail if the ceremonial precepts had been given merely as figures of things to come, and not for the + purpose of worshipping God then and there. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="38007" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38007] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si caeremonialia praecepta +essent data solum ad figurandum futurum, non autem ad +praesentialiter Deum colendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As we have stated when speaking of human laws ( + <a href="#FS_Q96_A1" id="FS_Q102_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[96], AA[1]</a> ,6), there is a reason for them in the abstract, but not in regard to particular conditions, which depend on the judgment + of those who frame them; so also many particular determinations in the ceremonies of the Old Law have no literal cause, but + only a figurative cause; whereas in the abstract they have a literal cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="38008" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38008] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut in legibus humanis dictum est quod in +universali habent rationem, non autem quantum ad particulares +conditiones, sed haec sunt ex arbitrio instituentium; ita etiam +multae particulares determinationes in caeremoniis veteris legis +non habent aliquam causam litteralem, sed solam figuralem; in +communi vero habent etiam causam litteralem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q102_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q102_A3-p0.1">Q. 102. A. 3. Whether a suitable cause can be assigned for the ceremonies which pertained to sacrifices?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no suitable cause can be assigned for the ceremonies pertaining to sacrifices. For those things which + were offered in sacrifice, are those which are necessary for sustaining human life: such as certain animals and certain loaves. + But God needs no such sustenance; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.49.13" target="asv"> Ps. 49:13</a>: "Shall I eat the flesh of bullocks? Or shall I drink the blood of goats?" Therefore such sacrifices were unfittingly offered + to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="38009" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38009] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non possit conveniens ratio assignari +caeremoniarum quae ad sacrificia pertinent. Ea enim quae in +sacrificium offerebantur, sunt illa quae sunt necessaria ad +sustentandam humanam vitam, sicut animalia quaedam, et panes +quidam. Sed tali sustentamento Deus non indiget; secundum illud +Psalmi XLIX, <i>numquid manducabo carnes taurorum, aut sanguinem +hircorum potabo?</i> Ergo inconvenienter huiusmodi sacrificia Deo +offerebantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, only three kinds of quadrupeds were offered in sacrifice to God, viz. oxen, sheep and goats; of birds, generally + the turtledove and the dove; but specially, in the cleansing of a leper, an offering was made of sparrows. Now many other + animals are more noble than these. Since therefore whatever is best should be offered to God, it seems that not only of these + three should sacrifices have been offered to Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="38010" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38010] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +in sacrificium divinum non offerebantur nisi de tribus generibus +animalium quadrupedum, scilicet de genere bovum, ovium et caprarum; +et de avibus, communiter quidem turtur et columba; specialiter +autem in emundatione leprosi fiebat sacrificium de passeribus. +Multa autem alia animalia sunt eis nobiliora. Cum igitur omne quod +est optimum Deo sit exhibendum, videtur quod non solum de istis +rebus fuerint Deo sacrificia offerenda.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as man has received from God the dominion over birds and beasts, so also has he received dominion over fishes. + Consequently it was unfitting for fishes to be excluded from the divine sacrifices. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="38011" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38011] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut homo a Deo habet dominium volatilium et bestiarum, ita etiam +piscium. Inconvenienter igitur pisces a divino sacrificio +excludebantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, turtledoves and doves indifferently are commanded to be offered up. Since then the young of the dove are commanded + to be offered, so also should the young of the turtledove. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="38012" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38012] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +indifferenter offerri mandantur turtures et columbae. Sicut igitur +mandantur offerri pulli columbarum, ita etiam pulli turturum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, God is the Author of life, not only of men, but also of animals, as is clear from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.20" target="asv"> Gn. 1:20, </a> seqq. Now death is opposed to life. Therefore it was fitting that living animals rather than slain animals should be offered + to God, especially as the Apostle admonishes us ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.1" target="asv">Rom. 12:1</a>), to present our bodies "a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing unto God." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 arg. 5"><a name="38013" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38013] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +Deus est auctor vitae non solum hominum, sed etiam animalium; ut +patet per id quod dicitur Gen. I. Mors autem opponitur vitae. Non +ergo debuerunt Deo offerri animalia occisa, sed magis animalia +viventia. Praecipue quia etiam apostolus monet, Rom. XII, <i>ut +exhibeamus nostra corpora hostiam viventem, sanctam, Deo +placentem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, if none but slain animals were offered in sacrifice to God, it seems that it mattered not how they were slain. Therefore + it was unfitting that the manner of immolation should be determined, especially as regards birds ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.1.15" target="asv">Lev. 1:15, </a> seqq.). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 arg. 6"><a name="38014" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38014] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +si animalia Deo in sacrificium non offerebantur nisi occisa, nulla +videtur esse differentia qualiter occidantur. Inconvenienter igitur +determinatur modus immolationis, praecipue in avibus, ut patet +Levit. I.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p8"> + <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, every defect in an animal is a step towards corruption and death. If therefore slain animals were offered to God, + it was unreasonable to forbid the offering of an imperfect animal, e.g. a lame, or a blind, or otherwise defective animal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 arg. 7"><a name="38015" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38015] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 7</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis defectus animalis via est ad corruptionem et mortem. Si +igitur animalia occisa Deo offerebantur, inconveniens fuit +prohibere oblationem animalis imperfecti, puta claudi aut caeci, +aut aliter maculosi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p9"> + <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, those who offer victims to God should partake thereof, according to the words of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.18" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:18</a>): "Are not they that eat of the sacrifices partakers of the altar?" It was therefore unbecoming for the offerers to be denied + certain parts of the victims, namely, the blood, the fat, the breastbone and the right shoulder. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 arg. 8"><a name="38016" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38016] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 8</span></a> Praeterea, +illi qui offerunt hostias Deo, debent de his participare; secundum +illud apostoli, I Cor. X, <i>nonne qui edunt hostias, participes +sunt altaris?</i> Inconvenienter igitur quaedam partes hostiarum +offerentibus subtrahebantur, scilicet sanguis et adeps, et +pectusculum et armus dexter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p10"> + <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, just as holocausts were offered up in honor of God, so also were the peace-offerings and sin-offerings. But no female + animals was offered up to God as a holocaust, although holocausts were offered of both quadrupeds and birds. Therefore it + was inconsistent that female animals should be offered up in peace-offerings and sin-offerings, and that nevertheless birds + should not be offered up in peace-offerings. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 arg. 9"><a name="38017" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38017] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 9</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut holocausta offerebantur in honorem Dei, ita etiam hostiae +pacificae et hostiae pro peccato. Sed nullum animal feminini sexus +offerebatur Deo in holocaustum, fiebant tamen holocausta tam de +quadrupedibus quam de avibus. Ergo inconvenienter in hostiis +pacificis et pro peccato offerebantur animalia feminini sexus; et +tamen in hostiis pacificis non offerebantur aves.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p11"> + <b>Objection 10:</b> Further, all the peace-offerings seem to be of one kind. Therefore it was unfitting to make a distinction among them, so + that it was forbidden to eat the flesh of certain peace-offerings on the following day, while it was allowed to eat the flesh + of other peace-offerings, as laid down in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.7.15" target="asv"> Lev. 7:15, </a> seqq. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 arg. 10"><a name="38018" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38018] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 10</span></a> +Praeterea, omnes hostiae pacificae unius generis esse videntur. Non +ergo debuit poni ista differentia, quod quorundam pacificorum +carnes non possent vesci in crastino, quorundam autem possent, ut +mandatur Levit. VII.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p12"> + <b>Objection 11:</b> Further, all sins agree in turning us from God. Therefore, in order to reconcile us to God, one kind of sacrifice should + have been offered up for all sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 arg. 11"><a name="38019" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38019] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 11</span></a> +Praeterea, omnia peccata in hoc conveniunt quod a Deo avertunt. +Ergo pro omnibus peccatis, in Dei reconciliationem, unum genus +sacrificii debuit offerri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p13"> + <b>Objection 12:</b> Further, all animals that were offered up in sacrifice, were offered up in one way, viz. slain. Therefore it does not seem + to be suitable that products of the soil should be offered up in various ways; for sometimes an offering was made of ears + of corn, sometimes of flour, sometimes of bread, this being baked sometimes in an oven, sometimes in a pan, sometimes on a + gridiron. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 arg. 12"><a name="38020" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38020] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 12</span></a> +Praeterea, omnia animalia quae offerebantur in sacrificium, uno +modo offerebantur, scilicet occisa. Non videtur ergo conveniens +quod de terrae nascentibus diversimode fiebat oblatio, nunc enim +offerebantur spicae, nunc simila, nunc panis, quandoque quidem +coctus in clibano, quandoque in sartagine, quandoque in +craticula.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p14"> + <b>Objection 13:</b> Further, whatever things are serviceable to us should be recognized as coming from God. It was therefore unbecoming that + besides animals, nothing but bread, wine, oil, incense, and salt should be offered to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 arg. 13"><a name="38021" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38021] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 13</span></a> +Praeterea, omnia quae in usum nostrum veniunt, a Deo recognoscere +debemus. Inconvenienter ergo praeter animalia, solum haec Deo +offerebantur, panis, vinum, oleum, thus et sal.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p15"> + <b>Objection 14:</b> Further, bodily sacrifices denote the inward sacrifice of the heart, whereby man offers his soul to God. But in the inward + sacrifice, the sweetness, which is denoted by honey, surpasses the pungency which salt represents; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.27" target="asv">Ecclus. 24:27</a>): "My spirit is sweet above honey." Therefore it was unbecoming that the use of honey, and of leaven which makes bread savory, + should be forbidden in a sacrifice; while the use was + prescribed, of salt which is pungent, and of incense which has a bitter taste. Consequently it seems that things pertaining + to the ceremonies of the sacrifices have no reasonable cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 arg. 14"><a name="38022" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38022] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 arg. 14</span></a> +Praeterea, sacrificia corporalia exprimunt interius sacrificium +cordis, quo homo spiritum suum offert Deo. Sed in interiori +sacrificio plus est de dulcedine, quam repraesentat mel, quam de +mordacitate, quam repraesentat sal, dicitur enim Eccli. XXIV, +<i>spiritus meus super mel dulcis</i>. Ergo inconvenienter +prohibebatur in sacrificio apponi mel et fermentum, quod etiam +facit panem sapidum; et praecipiebatur ibi apponi sal, quod est +mordicativum, et thus, quod habet saporem amarum. Videtur ergo quod +ea quae pertinent ad caeremonias sacrificiorum, non habeant +rationabilem causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p16"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p16.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.1.13" target="asv">Lev. 1:13</a>): "The priest shall offer it all and burn it all upon the altar, for a holocaust, and most sweet savor to the Lord." Now + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p16.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.28" target="asv"> Wis. 7:28, </a> "God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom": whence it seems to follow that whatever is acceptable to God is wisely + done. Therefore these ceremonies of the sacrifices were wisely done, as having reasonable causes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 s. c."><a name="38023" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38023] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Levit. I, <i>oblata omnia adolebit sacerdos super +altare in holocaustum et odorem suavissimum domino</i>. Sed sicut +dicitur Sap. VII, <i>neminem diligit Deus nisi qui cum sapientia +inhabitat</i>, ex quo potest accipi quod quidquid est Deo acceptum, +est cum sapientia. Ergo illae caeremoniae sacrificiorum cum +sapientia erant, velut habentes rationabiles causas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p17"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q102_A2" id="FS_Q102_A3-p17.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, the ceremonies of the Old Law had a twofold cause, viz. a literal cause, according as they were intended for Divine worship; + and a figurative or mystical cause, according as they were intended to foreshadow Christ: and on either hand the ceremonies + pertaining to the sacrifices can be assigned to a fitting cause. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p18"> For, according as the ceremonies of the sacrifices were intended for the divine worship, the causes of the sacrifices can + be taken in two ways. First, in so far as the sacrifice represented the directing of the mind to God, to which the offerer + of the sacrifice was stimulated. Now in order to direct his mind to God aright, man must recognize that whatever he has is + from God as from its first principle, and direct it to God as its last end. This was denoted in the offerings and + sacrifices, by the fact that man offered some of his own belongings in honor of God, as though in recognition of his having + received them from God, according to the saying of David (1 Paral. xxix, 14): "All things are Thine: and we have given Thee + what we received of Thy hand." Wherefore in offering up sacrifices man made protestation that God is the first principle of + the creation of all things, and their last end, to which all things must be directed. And since, for the human mind to be + directed to God aright, it must recognize no first author of things other than God, nor place its end in any other; for this + reason it was forbidden in the Law to offer sacrifice to any other but God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p18.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.20" target="asv"> Ex. 22:20</a>: "He that sacrificeth to gods, shall be put to death, save only to the Lord." Wherefore another reasonable cause may be assigned + to the ceremonies of the sacrifices, from the fact that thereby men were withdrawn from offering sacrifices to idols. Hence + too it is that the precepts about the sacrifices were not given to the Jewish people until after they had fallen into idolatry, + by worshipping the molten calf: as though those sacrifices were instituted, that the people, being ready to offer sacrifices, + might offer those sacrifices to God rather than to idols. Thus it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p18.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.7.22" target="asv">Jer. 7:22</a>): "I spake not to your fathers and I commanded them not, in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt, concerning + the matter + of burnt-offerings and sacrifices." + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p19"> Now of all the gifts which God vouchsafed to mankind after they had fallen away by sin, the chief is that He gave His Son; + wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p19.1" href="./asv.html#John.3.16" target="asv">Jn. 3:16</a>): "God so loved the world, as to give His only-begotten Son; that whosoever believeth in Him, may not perish, but may have + life everlasting." Consequently the chief sacrifice is that whereby Christ Himself "delivered Himself . . . to God for an + odor of sweetness" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p19.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.2" target="asv">Eph. 5:2</a>). And for this reason all the + other sacrifices of the Old Law were offered up in order to foreshadow this one individual and paramount sacrifice---the imperfect + forecasting the perfect. Hence the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p19.3" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.11" target="asv">Heb. 10:11</a>) that the priest of the Old Law "often" offered "the same sacrifices, which can never take away sins: but" Christ offered + "one sacrifice for sins, for ever." And since the reason of the figure is taken from that which the figure represents, therefore + the reasons of the figurative + sacrifices of the Old Law should be taken from the true sacrifice of Christ. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 co."><a name="38024" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38024] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, caeremoniae veteris legis +duplicem causam habebant, unam scilicet litteralem, secundum quod +ordinabantur ad cultum Dei; aliam vero figuralem, sive mysticam, +secundum quod ordinabantur ad figurandum Christum. Et ex utraque +parte potest convenienter assignari causa caeremoniarum quae ad +sacrificia pertinebant. Secundum enim quod sacrificia ordinabantur +ad cultum Dei, causa sacrificiorum dupliciter accipi potest. Uno +modo, secundum quod per sacrificia repraesentabatur ordinatio +mentis in Deum, ad quam excitabatur sacrificium offerens. Ad rectam +autem ordinationem mentis in Deum pertinet quod omnia quae homo +habet, recognoscat a Deo tanquam a primo principio, et ordinet in +Deum tanquam in ultimum finem. Et hoc repraesentabatur in +oblationibus et sacrificiis, secundum quod homo ex rebus suis, +quasi in recognitionem quod haberet ea a Deo, in honorem Dei ea +offerebat; secundum quod dixit David, I Paral. XXIX, <i>tua sunt +omnia; et quae de manu tua accepimus, dedimus tibi</i>. Et ideo in +oblatione sacrificiorum protestabatur homo quod Deus esset primum +principium creationis rerum et ultimus finis, ad quem essent omnia +referenda. Et quia pertinet ad rectam ordinationem mentis in Deum +ut mens humana non recognoscat alium primum auctorem rerum nisi +solum Deum, neque in aliquo alio finem suum constituat; propter hoc +prohibebatur in lege offerre sacrificium alicui alteri nisi Deo, +secundum illud Exod. XXII, <i>qui immolat diis, occidetur, praeter +domino soli</i>. Et ideo de causa caeremoniarum circa sacrificia +potest assignari ratio alio modo, ex hoc quod per huiusmodi homines +retrahebantur a sacrificiis idolorum. Unde etiam praecepta de +sacrificiis non fuerunt data populo Iudaeorum nisi postquam +declinavit ad idololatriam, adorando vitulum conflatilem, quasi +huiusmodi sacrificia sint instituta ut populus ad sacrificandum +promptus, huiusmodi sacrificia magis Deo quam idolis offerret. Unde +dicitur Ierem. VII, <i>non sum locutus cum patribus vestris, et non +praecepi eis, in die qua eduxi eos de terra Aegypti, de verbo +holocautomatum et victimarum</i>. Inter omnia autem dona quae Deus +humano generi iam per peccatum lapso dedit, praecipuum est quod +dedit filium suum, unde dicitur Ioan. III, <i>sic Deus dilexit +mundum ut filium suum unigenitum daret, ut omnis qui credit in +ipsum non pereat, sed habeat vitam aeternam</i>. Et ideo potissimum +sacrificium est quo ipse Christus seipsum obtulit Deo in odorem +suavitatis, ut dicitur ad Ephes. V. Et propter hoc omnia alia +sacrificia offerebantur in veteri lege ut hoc unum singulare et +praecipuum sacrificium figuraretur, tanquam perfectum per +imperfecta. Unde apostolus dicit, ad Heb. X, quod <i>sacerdos +veteris legis easdem saepe offerebat hostias, quae nunquam possunt +auferre peccata, Christus autem pro peccatis obtulit unam in +sempiternum</i>. Et quia ex figurato sumitur ratio figurae, ideo +rationes sacrificiorum figuralium veteris legis sunt sumendae ex +vero sacrificio Christi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p20"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God did not wish these sacrifices to be offered to Him on account of the things themselves that were offered, as though He + stood in need of them: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p20.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.1.11" target="asv">Is. 1:11</a>): "I desire not holocausts of rams, and fat of fatlings, and blood of calves and lambs and buckgoats." But, as stated above, + He wished them to be offered to Him, in order to prevent idolatry; in order to signify the right ordering of man's mind to + God; + and in order to represent the mystery of the Redemption of man by Christ. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="38025" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38025] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Deus non volebat huiusmodi sacrificia sibi +offerri propter ipsas res quae offerebantur, quasi eis indigeret, +unde dicitur Isaiae I, <i>holocausta arietum, et adipem pinguium, +et sanguinem vitulorum et hircorum et agnorum, nolui</i>. Sed +volebat ea sibi offerri, ut supra dictum est, tum ad excludendam +idololatriam; tum ad significandum debitum ordinem mentis humanae +in Deum; tum etiam ad figurandum mysterium redemptionis humanae +factae per Christum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p21"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In all the respects mentioned above (ad 1), there was a suitable reason for these animals, rather than others, being offered + in sacrifice to God. First, in order to prevent idolatry. Because idolaters offered all other animals to their gods, or made + use of them in their sorceries: while the Egyptians (among whom the people had been dwelling) considered it abominable to + slay these animals, wherefore they used not to offer them in sacrifice to their + gods. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p21.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.8.26" target="asv">Ex. 8:26</a>): "We shall sacrifice the abominations of the Egyptians to the Lord our God." For they worshipped the sheep; they reverenced + the ram (because demons appeared under the form thereof); while they employed oxen for agriculture, which was reckoned by + them as something sacred. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p22"> Secondly, this was suitable for the aforesaid right ordering of man's mind to God: and in two ways. First, because it is + chiefly by means of these animals that human life is sustained: and moreover they are most clean, and partake of a most clean + food: whereas other animals are either wild, and not deputed to ordinary use among men: or, if they be tame, they have unclean + food, as pigs and geese: and nothing but what is clean should be offered to God. These birds especially were + offered in sacrifice because there were plenty of them in the land of promise. Secondly, because the sacrificing of these + animals represented purity of heart. Because as the gloss says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p22.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.1" target="asv">Lev. 1</a>, "We offer a calf, when we overcome the pride of the flesh; a lamb, when we restrain our unreasonable motions; a goat, when + we conquer wantonness; a turtledove, when we keep chaste; unleavened bread, when we feast on the unleavened bread of sincerity." + And it is evident that the dove denotes charity and + simplicity of heart. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p23"> Thirdly, it was fitting that these animals should be offered, that they might foreshadow Christ. Because, as the gloss observes, + "Christ is offered in the calf, to denote the strength of the cross; in the lamb, to signify His innocence; in the ram, to + foreshadow His headship; and in the goat, to signify the likeness of 'sinful flesh' [*An allusion to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p23.1" href="./asv.html#Col.2.11" target="asv">Col. 2:11</a> (Textus Receptus)]. The turtledove and dove denoted the union of the two natures"; or else the turtledove signified + chastity; while the dove was a figure of charity. "The wheat-flour foreshadowed the sprinkling of believers with the water + of Baptism." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="38026" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38026] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod quantum ad omnia praedicta, conveniens ratio fuit +quare ista animalia offerebantur Deo in sacrificium, et non alia. +Primo quidem, ad excludendum idololatriam. Quia omnia alia animalia +offerebant idololatrae diis suis, vel eis ad maleficia utebantur, +ista autem animalia apud Aegyptios, cum quibus conversati erant, +abominabilia erant ad occidendum, unde ea non offerebant in +sacrificium diis suis; unde dicitur Exod. VIII, <i>abominationes +Aegyptiorum immolabimus domino Deo nostro</i>. Oves enim colebant; +hircos venerabantur, quia in eorum figura Daemones apparebant; +bobus autem utebantur ad agriculturam, quam inter res sacras +habebant. Secundo, hoc conveniens erat ad praedictam ordinationem +mentis in Deum. Et hoc dupliciter. Primo quidem, quia huiusmodi +animalia maxime sunt per quae sustentatur humana vita, et cum hoc +mundissima sunt, et mundissimum habent nutrimentum. Alia vero +animalia vel sunt silvestria, et non sunt communiter hominum usui +deputata, vel, si sunt domestica, immundum habent nutrimentum, ut +porcus et gallina; solum autem id quod est purum, Deo est +attribuendum. Huiusmodi autem aves specialiter offerebantur, quia +habentur in copia in terra promissionis. Secundo, quia per +immolationem huiusmodi animalium puritas mentis designatur. Quia, +ut dicitur in Glossa Levit. I, <i>vitulum offerimus, cum carnis +superbiam vincimus; agnum, cum irrationales motus corrigimus; +haedum, cum lasciviam superamus; turturem, dum castitatem servamus; +panes azymos, cum in azymis sinceritatis epulamur</i>. In columba +vero manifestum est quod significatur caritas et simplicitas +mentis. Tertio vero, conveniens fuit haec animalia offerri in +figuram Christi. Quia, ut in eadem Glossa dicitur, <i>Christus in +vitulo offertur, propter virtutem crucis; in agno, propter +innocentiam; in ariete, propter principatum; in hirco, propter +similitudinem carnis peccati. In turture et columba duarum +naturarum coniunctio monstrabatur</i>, vel in turture castitas, in +columba caritas significatur. <i>In similagine aspersio credentium +per aquam Baptismi figurabatur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p24"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Fish through living in water are further removed from man than other animals, which, like man, live in the air. Again, fish + die as soon as they are taken out of water; hence they could not be offered in the temple like other animals. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="38027" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38027] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod pisces, quia in aquis vivunt, magis sunt alieni ab +homine quam alia animalia, quae vivunt in aere, sicut et homo. Et +iterum pisces, ex aqua extracti, statim moriuntur, unde non +poterant in templo offerri, sicut alia animalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p25"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Among turtledoves the older ones are better than the young; while with doves the case is the reverse. Wherefore, as Rabbi + Moses observes (Doct. Perplex. iii), turtledoves and young doves are commanded to be offered, because nothing should be offered + to God but what is best. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="38028" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38028] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod in turturibus meliores sunt maiores quam pulli; in +columbis autem e converso. Et ideo, ut Rabbi Moyses dicit, +mandantur offerri turtures et pulli columbarum, quia omne quod est +optimum, Deo est attribuendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p26"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The animals which were offered in sacrifice were slain, because it is by being killed that they become useful to man, forasmuch + as God gave them to man for food. Wherefore also they were burnt with fire: because it is by being cooked that they are made + fit for human consumption. Moreover the slaying of the animals signified the destruction of sins: and also that man deserved + death on account of his sins; as though those animals were slain in man's + stead, in order to betoken the expiation of sins. Again the slaying of these animals signified the slaying of Christ. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 ad 5"><a name="38029" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38029] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod animalia in sacrificium oblata occidebantur, quia +veniunt in usum hominis occisa, secundum quod a Deo dantur homini +ad esum. Et ideo etiam igni cremabantur, quia per ignem decocta +fiunt apta humano usui. Similiter etiam per occisionem animalium +significatur destructio peccatorum. Et quod homines erant digni +occisione pro peccatis suis, ac si illa animalia loco eorum +occiderentur, ad significandum expiationem peccatorum. Per +occisionem etiam huiusmodi animalium significabatur occisio +Christi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p27"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The Law fixed the special manner of slaying the sacrificial animals in order to exclude other ways of killing, whereby idolaters + sacrificed animals to idols. Or again, as Rabbi Moses says (Doct. Perplex. iii), "the Law chose that manner of slaying which + was least painful to the slain animal." This excluded cruelty on the part of the offerers, and any mangling of the animals + slain. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 ad 6"><a name="38030" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38030] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum +dicendum quod specialis modus occidendi animalia immolata +determinabatur in lege ad excludendum alios modos, quibus +idololatrae animalia idolis immolabant. Vel etiam, ut Rabbi Moyses +dicit, <i>lex elegit genus occisionis quo animalia minus +affligebantur occisa</i>. Per quod excludebatur etiam +immisericordia offerentium, et deterioratio animalium +occisorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p28"> + <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> It is because unclean animals are wont to be held in contempt among men, that it was forbidden to offer them in sacrifice + to God: and for this reason too they were forbidden ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p28.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.18" target="asv">Dt. 23:18</a>) to offer "the hire of a strumpet or the price of a dog in the house of . . . God." For the same reason they did not offer + animals before the seventh day, because such were abortive as it were, the flesh being not yet firm on account of its + exceeding softness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 ad 7"><a name="38031" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38031] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 7</span></a> Ad septimum +dicendum quod, quia animalia maculosa solent haberi contemptui +etiam apud homines, ideo prohibitum est ne Deo in sacrificium +offerrentur, propter quod etiam prohibitum erat <i>ne mercedem +prostibuli, aut pretium canis, in domum Dei offerrent</i>. Et eadem +etiam ratione non offerebant animalia ante septimum diem, quia +talia animalia erant quasi abortiva, nondum plene consistentia, +propter teneritudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p29"> + <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> There were three kinds of sacrifices. There was one in which the victim was entirely consumed by fire: this was called "a + holocaust, i.e. all burnt." For this kind of sacrifice was offered to God specially to show reverence to His majesty, and + love of His goodness: and typified the state of perfection as regards the fulfilment of the counsels. Wherefore the whole + was burnt up: so that as the whole animal by being dissolved into vapor soared aloft, so + it might denote that the whole man, and whatever belongs to him, are subject to the authority of God, and should be offered + to Him. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p30"> Another sacrifice was the "sin-offering," which was offered to God on account of man's need for the forgiveness of sin: and + this typifies the state of penitents in satisfying for sins. It was divided into two parts: for one part was burnt; while + the other was granted to the use of the priests to signify that remission of sins is granted by God through the ministry of + His priests. When, however, this sacrifice was offered for the sins of the whole people, or specially for the sin + of the priest, the whole victim was burnt up. For it was not fitting that the priests should have the use of that which was + offered for their own sins, to signify that nothing sinful should remain in them. Moreover, this would not be satisfaction + for sin: for if the offering were granted to the use of those for whose sins it was offered, it would seem to be the same + as if it had not been offered. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p31"> The third kind of sacrifice was called the "peace-offering," which was offered to God, either in thanksgiving, or for the + welfare and prosperity of the offerers, in acknowledgment of benefits already received or yet to be received: and this typifies + the state of those who are proficient in the observance of the commandments. These sacrifices were divided into three parts: + for one part was burnt in honor of God; another part was allotted to the use of the priests; and the third + part to the use of the offerers; in order to signify that man's salvation is from God, by the direction of God's ministers, + and through the cooperation of those who are saved. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p32"> But it was the universal rule that the blood and fat were not allotted to the use either of the priests or of the offerers: + the blood being poured out at the foot of the altar, in honor of God, while the fat was burnt upon the altar ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p32.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.9.9" target="asv">Lev. 9:9,10</a>). The reason for this was, first, in order to prevent idolatry: because idolaters used to drink the blood and eat the fat + of the victims, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p32.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.32.38" target="asv"> Dt. 32:38</a>: "Of whose victims they eat the + fat, and drank the wine of their drink-offerings." Secondly, in order to form them to a right way of living. For they were + forbidden the use of the blood that they might abhor the shedding of human blood; wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p32.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.9.4" target="asv">Gn. 9:4,5</a>): "Flesh with blood you shall not eat: for I will require the blood of your lives": and they were forbidden to eat the fat, + in order to withdraw them from lasciviousness; hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p32.4" href="./asv.html#Ezek.34.3" target="asv">Ezech. 34:3</a>): "You have + killed that which was fat." Thirdly, on account of the reverence due to God: because blood is most necessary for life, for + which reason "life" is said to be "in the blood" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p32.5" href="./asv.html#Lev.17.11" target="asv">Lev. 17:11</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p32.6" href="./asv.html#Lev.17.14" target="asv">14</a>): while fat is a sign of abundant nourishment. Wherefore, in order to show that to God we owe both life and a sufficiency + of all good things, the blood was poured out, and the fat burnt up in His honor. Fourthly, in order to foreshadow the shedding + of Christ's blood, and the abundance of His charity, whereby He + offered Himself to God for us. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p33"> In the peace-offerings, the breast-bone and the right shoulder were allotted to the use of the priest, in order to prevent + a certain kind of divination which is known as "spatulamantia," so called because it was customary in divining to use the + shoulder-blade [spatula], and the breast-bone of the animals offered in sacrifice; wherefore these things were taken away + from the offerers. This is also denoted the priest's need of wisdom in the heart, to instruct the people---this was + signified by the breast-bone, which covers the heart; and his need of fortitude, in order to bear with human frailty---and + this was signified by the right shoulder. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 ad 8"><a name="38032" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38032] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 8</span></a> Ad octavum +dicendum quod triplex erat sacrificiorum genus. Quoddam erat quod +totum comburebatur, et hoc dicebatur holocaustum, quasi totum +incensum. Huiusmodi enim sacrificium offerebatur Deo specialiter ad +reverentiam maiestatis ipsius, et amorem bonitatis eius, et +conveniebat perfectionis statui in impletione consiliorum. Et ideo +totum comburebatur, ut sicut totum animal, resolutum in vaporem, +sursum ascendebat, ita etiam significaretur totum hominem, et omnia +quae ipsius sunt, Dei dominio esse subiecta, et ei esse offerenda. +Aliud autem erat sacrificium pro peccato, quod offerebatur Deo ex +necessitate remissionis peccati, et conveniebat statui poenitentium +in satisfactione peccatorum. Quod dividebatur in duas partes, nam +una pars eius comburebatur, alia vero cedebat in usum sacerdotum; +ad significandum quod expiatio peccatorum fit a Deo per ministerium +sacerdotum. Nisi quando offerebatur sacrificium pro peccato totius +populi, vel specialiter pro peccato sacerdotis, tunc enim totum +comburebatur. Non enim debebant in usum sacerdotum venire ea quae +pro peccato eorum offerebantur, ut nihil peccati in eis remaneret. +Et quia hoc non esset satisfactio pro peccato, si enim cederet in +usum eorum pro quorum peccatis offerebatur, idem esse videretur ac +si non offerrent. Tertium vero sacrificium vocabatur hostia +pacifica, quae offerebatur Deo vel pro gratiarum actione, vel pro +salute et prosperitate offerentium, ex debito beneficii vel accepti +vel accipiendi, et convenit statui proficientium in impletione +mandatorum. Et ista dividebantur in tres partes, nam una pars +incendebatur ad honorem Dei, alia pars cedebat in usum sacerdotum, +tertia vero pars in usum offerentium; ad significandum quod salus +hominis procedit a Deo, dirigentibus ministris Dei, et +cooperantibus ipsis hominibus qui salvantur. Hoc autem generaliter +observabatur, quod sanguis et adeps non veniebant neque in usum +sacerdotum, neque in usum offerentium, sed sanguis effundebatur ad +crepidinem altaris, in honorem Dei; adeps vero adurebatur in igne. +Cuius ratio una quidem fuit ad excludendam idololatriam. +Idololatrae enim bibebant de sanguine victimarum, et comedebant +adipes; secundum illud Deut. XXXII, <i>de quorum victimis +comedebant adipes, et bibebant vinum libaminum</i>. Secunda ratio +est ad informationem humanae vitae. Prohibebatur enim eis usus +sanguinis, ad hoc quod horrerent humani sanguinis effusionem, unde +dicitur Gen. IX, <i>carnem cum sanguine non comedetis, sanguinem +enim animarum vestrarum requiram</i>. Esus vero adipum prohibebatur +eis ad vitandam lasciviam, unde dicitur Ezech. XXXIV, <i>quod +crassum erat, occidebatis</i>. Tertia ratio est propter reverentiam +divinam. Quia sanguis est maxime necessarius ad vitam, ratione +cuius dicitur anima esse in sanguine, adeps autem abundantiam +nutrimenti demonstrat. Et ideo ut ostenderetur quod a Deo nobis est +et vita et omnis bonorum sufficientia, ad honorem Dei effundebatur +sanguis, et adurebatur adeps. Quarta ratio est quia per hoc +figurabatur effusio sanguinis Christi, et pinguedo caritatis eius, +per quam se obtulit Deo pro nobis. De hostiis autem pacificis in +usum sacerdotis cedebat pectusculum et armus dexter, ad excludendum +quandam divinationis speciem quae vocatur spatulamantia, quia +scilicet in spatulis animalium immolatorum divinabant, et similiter +in osse pectoris. Et ideo ista offerentibus subtrahebantur. Per hoc +etiam significabatur quod sacerdoti erat necessaria sapientia +cordis ad instruendum populum, quod significabatur per pectus, quod +est tegumentum cordis; et etiam fortitudo ad sustentandum defectus, +quae significatur per armum dextrum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p34"> + <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> Because the holocaust was the most perfect kind of sacrifice, therefore none but a male was offered for a holocaust: because + the female is an imperfect animal. The offering of turtledoves and doves was on account of the poverty of the offerers, who + were unable to offer bigger animals. And since peace-victims were offered freely, and no one was bound to offer them against + his will, hence these birds were offered not among the peace-victims, but among + the holocausts and victims for sin, which man was obliged to offer at times. Moreover these birds, on account of their lofty + flight, while befitting the perfection of the holocausts: and were suitable for sin-offerings because their song is doleful. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 ad 9"><a name="38033" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38033] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 9</span></a> Ad nonum +dicendum quod, quia holocaustum erat perfectissimum inter +sacrificia, ideo non offerebatur in holocaustum nisi masculus, nam +femina est animal imperfectum. Oblatio autem turturum et columbarum +erat propter paupertatem offerentium, qui maiora animalia offerre +non poterant. Et quia hostiae pacificae gratis offerebantur, et +nullus eas offerre cogebatur nisi spontaneus; ideo huiusmodi aves +non offerebantur inter hostias pacificas, sed inter holocausta et +hostias pro peccato, quas quandoque oportebat offerre. Aves etiam +huiusmodi, propter altitudinem volatus, congruunt perfectioni +holocaustorum, et etiam hostiis pro peccato, quia habent gemitum +pro cantu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p35"> + <b>Reply to Objection 10:</b> The holocaust was the chief of all the sacrifices: because all were burnt in honor of God, and nothing of it was eaten. The + second place in holiness, belongs to the sacrifice for sins, which was eaten in the court only, and on the very day of the + sacrifice ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p35.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.7.6" target="asv">Lev. 7:6</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p35.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.7.15" target="asv">15</a>). The third place must be given to the peace-offerings of thanksgiving, which were eaten on the same day, but anywhere in + Jerusalem. Fourth in order were the + "ex-voto" peace-offerings, the flesh of which could be eaten even on the morrow. The reason for this order is that man is + bound to God, chiefly on account of His majesty; secondly, on account of the sins he has committed; thirdly, because of the + benefits he has already received from Him; fourthly, by reason of the benefits he hopes to receive from Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 ad 10"><a name="38034" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38034] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 10</span></a> Ad decimum +dicendum quod inter omnia sacrificia holocaustum erat praecipuum, +quia totum comburebatur in honorem Dei, et nihil ex eo comedebatur. +Secundum vero locum in sanctitate tenebat hostia pro peccato, quae +comedebatur solum in atrio a sacerdotibus, et in ipsa die +sacrificii. Tertium vero gradum tenebant hostiae pacificae pro +gratiarum actione, quae comedebantur ipso die, sed ubique in +Ierusalem. Quartum vero locum tenebant hostiae pacificae ex voto, +quarum carnes poterant etiam in crastino comedi. Et est ratio huius +ordinis quia maxime obligatur homo Deo propter eius maiestatem, +secundo, propter offensam commissam; tertio, propter beneficia iam +suscepta; quarto, propter beneficia sperata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A3-p36"> + <b>Reply to Objection 11:</b> Sins are more grievous by reason of the state of the sinner, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q73_A10" id="FS_Q102_A3-p36.1" shape="rect">Q[73], A[10]</a>): wherefore different victims are commanded to be offered for the sin of a priest, or of a prince, or of some other private + individual. "But," as Rabbi Moses says (Doct. Perplex. iii), "we must take note that the more grievous the sin, the lower + the species of animals offered for it. Wherefore the goat, which is a very base animal, was + offered for idolatry; while a calf was offered for a priest's ignorance, and a ram for the negligence of a prince." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 ad 11"><a name="38035" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38035] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 11</span></a> Ad +undecimum dicendum quod peccata aggravantur ex statu peccantis, ut +supra dictum est. Et ideo alia hostia mandatur offerri pro peccato +sacerdotis et principis, vel alterius privatae personae. Est autem +attendendum, ut Rabbi Moyses dicit, quod <i>quanto gravius erat +peccatum, tanto vilior species animalis offerebatur pro eo. Unde +capra, quod est vilissimum animal, offerebatur pro idololatria, +quod est gravissimum peccatum; pro ignorantia vero sacerdotis +offerebatur vitulus; pro negligentia autem principis, +hircus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p37"> + <b>Reply to Objection 12:</b> In the matter of sacrifices the Law had in view the poverty of the offerers; so that those who could not have a four-footed + animal at their disposal, might at least offer a bird; and that he who could not have a bird might at least offer bread; and + that if a man had not even bread he might offer flour or ears of corn. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p38"> The figurative cause is that the bread signifies Christ Who is the "living bread" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p38.1" href="./asv.html#John.6.41" target="asv">Jn. 6:41</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p38.2" href="./asv.html#John.6.51" target="asv">51</a>). He was indeed an ear of corn, as it were, during the state of the law of nature, in the faith of the patriarchs; He was + like flour in the doctrine of the Law of the prophets; and He was like perfect bread after He had taken human nature; baked + in the fire, i.e. formed by the Holy Ghost in the oven of the virginal womb; baked again in a pan by the toils which He + suffered in the world; and consumed by fire on the cross as on a gridiron. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 ad 12"><a name="38036" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38036] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 12</span></a> Ad +duodecimum dicendum quod lex in sacrificiis providere voluit +paupertati offerentium, ut qui non posset habere animal quadrupes, +saltem offerret avem; quam qui habere non posset, saltem offerret +panem; et si hunc habere non posset, saltem offerret farinam vel +spicas. Causa vero figuralis est quia panis significat Christum, +qui est panis vivus, ut dicitur Ioan. VI. Qui quidem erat sicut in +spica, pro statu legis naturae, in fide patrum; erat autem sicut +simila in doctrina legis prophetarum; erat autem sicut panis +formatus post humanitatem assumptam; coctus igne, idest formatus +spiritu sancto in clibano uteri virginalis; qui etiam fuit coctus +in sartagine, per labores quos in mundo sustinebat; in cruce vero +quasi in craticula adustus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p39"> + <b>Reply to Objection 13:</b> The products of the soil are useful to man, either as food, and of these bread was offered; or as drink, and of these wine + was offered; or as seasoning, and of these oil and salt were offered; or as healing, and of these they offered incense, which + both smells sweetly and binds easily together. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p40"> Now the bread foreshadowed the flesh of Christ; and the wine, His blood, whereby we were redeemed; oil betokens the grace + of Christ; salt, His knowledge; incense, His prayer. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 ad 13"><a name="38037" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38037] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 13</span></a> Ad +decimumtertium dicendum quod ea quae in usum hominis veniunt de +terrae nascentibus, vel sunt in cibum, et de eis offerebatur panis. +Vel sunt in potum, et de his offerebatur vinum. Vel sunt in +condimentum, et de his offerebatur oleum et sal. Vel sunt in +medicamentum, et de his offerebatur thus, quod est aromaticum et +consolidativum. Per panem autem figuratur caro Christi; per vinum +autem sanguis eius, per quem redempti sumus; oleum figurat gratiam +Christi; sal scientiam; thus orationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p41"> + <b>Reply to Objection 14:</b> Honey was not offered in the sacrifices to God, both because it was wont to be offered in the sacrifices to idols; and in + order to denote the absence of all carnal sweetness and pleasure from those who intend to sacrifice to God. Leaven was not + offered, to denote the exclusion of corruption. Perhaps too, it was wont to be offered in the sacrifices to idols. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p42"> Salt, however, was offered, because it wards off the corruption of putrefaction: for sacrifices offered to God should be + incorrupt. Moreover, salt signifies the discretion of wisdom, or again, mortification of the flesh. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A3-p43"> Incense was offered to denote devotion of the heart, which is necessary in the offerer; and again, to signify the odor of + a good name: for incense is composed of matter, both rich and fragrant. And since the sacrifice "of jealousy" did not proceed + from devotion, but rather from suspicion, therefore incense was not offered therein ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p43.1" href="./asv.html#Num.5.15" target="asv">Num. 5:15</a>). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 3 ad 14"><a name="38038" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38038] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 3 ad 14</span></a> Ad +decimumquartum dicendum quod mel non offerebatur in sacrificiis +Dei, tum quia consueverat offerri in sacrificiis idolorum. Tum +etiam ad excludendam omnem carnalem dulcedinem et voluptatem ab his +qui Deo sacrificare intendunt. Fermentum vero non offerebatur, ad +excludendam corruptionem. Et forte etiam in sacrificiis idolorum +solitum erat offerri. Sal autem offerebatur, quia impedit +corruptionem putredinis, sacrificia autem Dei debent esse +incorrupta. Et etiam quia in sale significatur discretio +sapientiae; vel etiam mortificatio carnis. Thus autem offerebatur +ad designandam devotionem mentis, quae est necessaria offerentibus; +et etiam ad designandum odorem bonae famae, nam thus et pingue est, +et odoriferum. Et quia sacrificium zelotypiae non procedebat ex +devotione, sed magis ex suspicione, ideo in eo non offerebatur +thus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q102_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q102_A4-p0.1">Q. 102. A. 4. Whether sufficient reason can be assigned for the ceremonies pertaining to holy things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no sufficient reason can be assigned for the ceremonies of the Old Law that pertain to holy things. For + Paul said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.17.24" target="asv">Acts 17:24</a>): "God Who made the world and all things therein; He being Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made by hands." + It was therefore unfitting that in the Old Law a tabernacle or temple should be set up for the worship of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="38039" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38039] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod caeremoniarum veteris legis quae ad +sacra pertinent sufficiens ratio assignari non possit. Dicit enim +Paulus, Act. XVII, <i>Deus, qui fecit mundum et omnia quae in eo +sunt, hic, caeli et terrae cum sit dominus, non in manufactis +templis habitat</i>. Inconvenienter igitur ad cultum Dei +tabernaculum, vel templum, in lege veteri est institutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the state of the Old Law was not changed except by Christ. But the tabernacle denoted the state of the Old Law. + Therefore it should not have been changed by the building of a temple. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="38040" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38040] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +status veteris legis non fuit immutatus nisi per Christum. Sed +tabernaculum designabat statum veteris legis. Non ergo debuit +mutari per aedificationem alicuius templi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Divine Law, more than any other indeed, should lead man to the worship of God. But an increase of divine worship + requires multiplication of altars and temples; as is evident in regard to the New Law. Therefore it seems that also under + the Old Law there should have been not only one tabernacle or temple, but many. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="38041" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38041] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +divina lex praecipue etiam debet homines inducere ad divinum +cultum. Sed ad augmentum divini cultus pertinet quod fiant multa +altaria et multa templa, sicut patet in nova lege. Ergo videtur +quod etiam in veteri lege non debuit esse solum unum templum aut +unum tabernaculum sed multa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the tabernacle or temple was ordained to the worship of God. But in God we should worship above all His unity and + simplicity. Therefore it seems unbecoming for the tabernacle or temple to be divided by means of veils. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="38042" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38042] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +tabernaculum, seu templum, ad cultum Dei ordinabatur. Sed in Deo +praecipue oportet venerari unitatem et simplicitatem. Non videtur +igitur fuisse conveniens ut tabernaculum, seu templum, per quaedam +vela distingueretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the power of the First Mover, i.e. God, appears first of all in the east, for it is in that quarter that the first + movement begins. But the tabernacle was set up for the worship of God. Therefore it should have been built so as to point + to the east rather than the west. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="38043" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38043] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +virtus primi moventis, qui est Deus, primo apparet in parte +orientis, a qua parte incipit primus motus. Sed tabernaculum fuit +institutum ad Dei adorationem. Ergo debebat esse dispositum magis +versus orientem quam versus occidentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A4-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the Lord commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.4" target="asv">Ex. 20:4</a>) that they should "not make . . . a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything." It was therefore unfitting for graven images + of the cherubim to be set up in the tabernacle or temple. In like manner, the ark, the propitiatory, the candlestick, the + table, the two altars, seem to have been placed there without reasonable cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 arg. 6"><a name="38044" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38044] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +Exod. XX, dominus praecepit ut <i>non facerent sculptile, neque +aliquam similitudinem</i>. Inconvenienter igitur in tabernaculo, +vel in templo, fuerunt sculptae imagines Cherubim. Similiter etiam +et arca, et propitiatorium, et candelabrum, et mensa, et duplex +altare, sine rationabili causa ibi fuisse videntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A4-p8"> + <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, the Lord commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.24" target="asv">Ex. 20:24</a>): "You shall make an altar of earth unto Me": and again ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.26" target="asv">Ex. 20:26</a>): "Thou shalt not go up by steps unto My altar." It was therefore unfitting that subsequently they should be commanded to + make an altar of wood laid over with gold or brass; and of such a height that it was impossible to go up to it except by steps. + For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.27.1" target="asv">Ex. 27:1,2</a>): "Thou shalt + make also an altar of setim wood, which shall be five cubits long, and as many broad . . . and three cubits high . . . and + thou shalt cover it with brass": and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p8.4" href="./asv.html#Exod.30.1" target="asv">Ex. 30:1</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p8.5" href="./asv.html#Exod.30.3" target="asv">3</a>): "Thou shalt make . . . an altar to burn incense, of setim wood . . . and thou shalt overlay it with the purest gold." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 arg. 7"><a name="38045" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38045] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 7</span></a> Praeterea, +dominus praecepit, Exod. XX, altare de terra facietis mihi. Et +iterum, non ascendes ad altare meum per gradus. Inconvenienter +igitur mandatur postmodum altare fieri de lignis auro vel aere +contextis; et tantae altitudinis ut ad illud nisi per gradus +ascendi non posset. Dicitur enim Exod. XXVII, <i>facies et altare +de lignis setim, quod habebit quinque cubitos in longitudine, et +totidem in latitudine, et tres cubitos in altitudine; et operies +illud aere</i>. Et Exod. XXX dicitur, <i>facies altare ad adolendum +thymiamata, de lignis setim, vestiesque illud auro +purissimo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A4-p9"> + <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, in God's works nothing should be superfluous; for not even in the works of nature is anything superfluous to be + found. But one cover suffices for one tabernacle or house. Therefore it was unbecoming to furnish the tabernacle with many + coverings, viz. curtains, curtains of goats' hair, rams' skins dyed red, and violet-colored skins ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.26" target="asv">Ex. 26</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 arg. 8"><a name="38046" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38046] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 8</span></a> Praeterea, +in operibus Dei nihil debet esse superfluum, quia nec in operibus +naturae aliquid superfluum invenitur. Sed uni tabernaculo, vel +domui, sufficit unum operimentum. Inconvenienter igitur tabernaculo +fuerunt apposita multa tegumenta, scilicet cortinae, saga cilicina, +pelles arietum rubricatae, et pelles hyacintinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A4-p10"> + <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, exterior consecration signifies interior holiness, the subject of which is the soul. It was therefore unsuitable + for the tabernacle and its vessels to be consecrated, since they were inanimate things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 arg. 9"><a name="38047" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38047] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 9</span></a> Praeterea, +consecratio exterior interiorem sanctitatem significat, cuius +subiectum est anima. Inconvenienter igitur tabernaculum et eius +vasa consecrabantur, cum essent quaedam corpora inanimata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A4-p11"> + <b>Objection 10:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.2" target="asv">Ps. 33:2</a>): "I will bless the Lord at all times, His praise shall always be in my mouth." But the solemn festivals were instituted + for the praise of God. Therefore it was not fitting that certain days should be fixed for keeping solemn festivals; so that + it seems that there was no suitable cause for the ceremonies relating to holy things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 arg. 10"><a name="38048" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38048] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 arg. 10</span></a> +Praeterea, in Psalmo XXXIII dicitur, <i>benedicam dominum in omni +tempore, semper laus eius in ore meo</i>. Sed solemnitates +instituuntur ad laudandum Deum. Non ergo fuit conveniens ut aliqui +certi dies statuerentur ad solemnitates peragendas. Sic igitur +videtur quod caeremoniae sacrorum convenientes causas non +haberent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A4-p12"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.8.4" target="asv">Heb. 8:4</a>) that those who "offer gifts according to the law . . . serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things. As it was answered + to Moses, when he was to finish the tabernacle: See, says He, that thou make all things according to the pattern which was + shown thee on the mount." But that is most reasonable, which presents a likeness to heavenly things. Therefore the ceremonies + relating to holy things had a + reasonable cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 s. c."><a name="38049" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38049] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VIII, quod <i>illi qui offerunt +secundum legem munera, exemplari et umbrae deserviunt caelestium, +sicut responsum est Moysi, cum consummaret tabernaculum, vide, +inquit, omnia facito secundum exemplar quod tibi in monte +monstratum est</i>. Sed valde rationabile est quod imaginem +caelestium repraesentat. Ergo caeremoniae sacrorum rationabilem +causam habebant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p13"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The chief purpose of the whole external worship is that man may give worship to God. Now man's tendency is to reverence less + those things which are common, and indistinct from other things; whereas he admires and reveres those things which are distinct + from others in some point of excellence. Hence too it is customary among men for kings and princes, who ought to be reverenced + by their subjects, to be clothed in more precious garments, and to possess vaster + and more beautiful abodes. And for this reason it behooved special times, a special abode, special vessels, and special ministers + to be appointed for the divine worship, so that thereby the soul of man might be brought to greater reverence for God. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p14"> In like manner the state of the Old Law, as observed above + <a href="#FS_Q102_A2" id="FS_Q102_A4-p14.1" shape="rect">(A[2];</a> Q[100] , A[12]; Q[101], A[2]), was instituted that it might foreshadow the mystery of Christ. Now that which foreshadows + something should be determinate, so that it may present some likeness thereto. Consequently, certain special points had to + be observed in matters pertaining to the worship of God. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 co."><a name="38050" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38050] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod totus exterior cultus Dei ad hoc praecipue ordinatur +ut homines Deum in reverentia habeant. Habet autem hoc humanus +affectus, ut ea quae communia sunt, et non distincta ab aliis, +minus revereatur; ea vero quae habent aliquam excellentiae +discretionem ab aliis, magis admiretur et revereatur. Et inde etiam +hominum consuetudo inolevit ut reges et principes, quos oportet in +reverentia haberi a subditis, et pretiosioribus vestibus ornentur, +et etiam ampliores et pulchriores habitationes possideant. Et +propter hoc oportuit ut aliqua specialia tempora, et speciale +habitaculum, et specialia vasa, et speciales ministri ad cultum Dei +ordinarentur, ut per hoc animi hominum ad maiorem Dei reverentiam +adducerentur. Similiter etiam status veteris legis, sicut dictum +est, institutus erat ad figurandum mysterium Christi. Oportet autem +esse aliquid determinatum id per quod aliud figurari debet, ut +scilicet eius aliquam similitudinem repraesentet. Et ideo etiam +oportuit aliqua specialia observari in his quae pertinent ad cultum +Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine worship regards two things: namely, God Who is worshipped; and men, who worship Him. Accordingly God, Who is worshipped, + is confined to no bodily place: wherefore there was no need, on His part, for a tabernacle or temple to be set up. But men, + who worship Him, are corporeal beings: and for their sake there was need for a special tabernacle or temple to be set up for + the worship of God, for two reasons. First, that through coming together + with the thought that the place was set aside for the worship of God, they might approach thither with greater reverence. + Secondly, that certain things relating to the excellence of Christ's Divine or human nature might be signified by the arrangement + of various details in such temple or tabernacle. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p16"> To this Solomon refers ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p16.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 8:27</a>) when he says: "If heaven and the heavens of heavens cannot contain Thee, how much less this house which I have built" for + Thee? And further on ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p16.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 8:29</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p16.3" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">20</a>) he adds: "That Thy eyes may be open upon this house . . . of which Thou hast said: My name shall be there; . . . that Thou + mayest hearken to the supplication of Thy servant and of Thy people Israel." From this it is evident that the house of + the sanctuary was set up, not in order to contain God, as abiding therein locally, but that God might be made known there + by means of things done and said there; and that those who prayed there might, through reverence for the place, pray more + devoutly, so as to be heard more readily. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="38051" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38051] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod cultus Dei duo respicit, scilicet Deum, qui +colitur; et homines colentes. Ipse igitur Deus, qui colitur, nullo +corporali loco clauditur, unde propter ipsum non oportuit +tabernaculum fieri, aut templum. Sed homines ipsum colentes +corporales sunt, et propter eos oportuit speciale tabernaculum, vel +templum, institui ad cultum Dei, propter duo. Primo quidem, ut ad +huiusmodi locum convenientes cum hac cogitatione quod deputaretur +ad colendum Deum, cum maiori reverentia accederent. Secundo, ut per +dispositionem talis templi, vel tabernaculi, significarentur aliqua +pertinentia ad excellentiam divinitatis vel humanitatis Christi. Et +hoc est quod Salomon dicit, III Reg. VIII, <i>si caelum et caeli +caelorum te capere non possunt, quanto magis domus haec, quam +aedificavi tibi? Et</i> postea subdit, <i>sint oculi tui aperti +super domum hanc, de qua dixisti, erit nomen meum ibi; ut exaudias +deprecationem servi tui et populi tui Israel</i>. Ex quo patet quod +domus sanctuarii non est instituta ad hoc quod Deum capiat, quasi +localiter inhabitantem; sed ad hoc quod nomen Dei habitet ibi, +idest ut notitia Dei ibi manifestetur per aliqua quae ibi fiebant +vel dicebantur; et quod, propter reverentiam loci, orationes +fierent ibi magis exaudibiles ex devotione orantium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Before the coming of Christ, the state of the Old Law was not changed as regards the fulfilment of the Law, which was effected + in Christ alone: but it was changed as regards the condition of the people that were under the Law. Because, at first, the + people were in the desert, having no fixed abode: afterwards they were engaged in various wars with the neighboring nations; + and lastly, at the time of David and Solomon, the state of that people was one + of great peace. And then for the first time the temple was built in the place which Abraham, instructed by God, had chosen + for the purpose of sacrifice. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p17.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.22.2" target="asv">Gn. 22:2</a>) that the Lord commanded Abraham to "offer" his son "for a holocaust upon one of the mountains which I will show thee": and + it is related further on ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p17.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.22.14" target="asv">Gn. 22:14</a>) that "he calleth the name of that place, The Lord seeth," as though, according to the Divine prevision, that place + were chosen for the worship of God. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p17.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.12.5" target="asv">Dt. 12:5,6</a>): "You shall come to the place which the Lord your God shall choose . . . and you shall offer . . . your holocausts and victims." + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p18"> Now it was not meet for that place to be pointed out by the building of the temple before the aforesaid time; for three reasons + assigned by Rabbi Moses. First, lest the Gentiles might seize hold of that place. Secondly, lest the Gentiles might destroy + it. The third reason is lest each tribe might wish that place to fall to their lot, and strifes and quarrels be the result. + Hence the temple was not built until they had a king who would be able to quell such quarrels. Until that + time a portable tabernacle was employed for divine worship, no place being as yet fixed for the worship of God. This is the + literal reason for the distinction between the tabernacle and the temple. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p19"> The figurative reason may be assigned to the fact that they signify a twofold state. For the tabernacle, which was changeable, + signifies the state of the present changeable life: whereas the temple, which was fixed and stable, signifies the state of + future life which is altogether unchangeable. For this reason it is said that in the building of the temple no sound was heard + of hammer or saw, to signify that all movements of disturbance will be far removed from the future state. + Or else the tabernacle signifies the state of the Old Law; while the temple built by Solomon betokens the state of the New + Law. Hence the Jews alone worked at the building of the tabernacle; whereas the temple was built with the cooperation of the + Gentiles, viz. the Tyrians and Sidonians. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="38052" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38052] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod status veteris legis non fuit immutatus ante Christum +quantum ad impletionem legis, quae facta est solum per Christum, +est tamen immutatus quantum ad conditionem populi qui erat sub +lege. Nam primo populus fuit in deserto, non habens certam +mansionem; postmodum autem habuerunt varia bella cum finitimis +gentibus; ultimo autem, tempore David et Salomonis, populus ille +habuit quietissimum statum. Et tunc primo aedificatum fuit templum, +in loco quem designaverat Abraham, ex divina demonstratione, ad +immolandum. Dicitur enim Gen. XXII, quod dominus mandavit Abrahae +ut offerret filium suum <i>in holocaustum super unum montium quem +monstravero tibi</i>. Et postea dicit quod appellavit nomen illius +loci, <i>dominus videt</i>, quasi secundum Dei praevisionem esset +locus ille electus ad cultum divinum. Propter quod dicitur Deut. +XII, <i>ad locum quem elegerit dominus Deus vester, venietis, et +offeretis holocausta et victimas vestras</i>. Locus autem ille +designari non debuit per aedificationem templi ante tempus +praedictum, propter tres rationes, quas Rabbi Moyses assignat. +Prima est ne gentes appropriarent sibi locum illum. Secunda est ne +gentes ipsum destruerent. Tertia vero ratio est ne quaelibet tribus +vellet habere locum illum in sorte sua, et propter hoc orirentur +lites et iurgia. Et ideo non fuit aedificatum templum donec +haberent regem, per quem posset huiusmodi iurgium compesci. Antea +vero ad cultum Dei erat ordinatum tabernaculum portatile per +diversa loca, quasi nondum existente determinato loco divini +cultus. Et haec est ratio litteralis diversitatis tabernaculi et +templi. Ratio autem figuralis esse potest quia per haec duo +significatur duplex status. Per tabernaculum enim, quod est +mutabile, significatur status praesentis vitae mutabilis. Per +templum vero, quod erat fixum et stans, significatur status futurae +vitae, quae omnino invariabilis est. Et propter hoc in +aedificatione templi dicitur quod non est auditus sonitus mallei +vel securis, ad significandum quod omnis perturbationis tumultus +longe erit a statu futuro. Vel per tabernaculum significatur status +veteris legis, per templum autem a Salomone constructum, status +novae legis. Unde ad constructionem tabernaculi soli Iudaei sunt +operati, ad aedificationem vero templi cooperati sunt etiam +gentiles, scilicet Tyrii et Sidonii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p20"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason for the unity of the temple or tabernacle may be either literal or figurative. The literal reason was the exclusion + of idolatry. For the Gentiles put up various times to various gods: and so, to strengthen in the minds of men their belief + in the unity of the Godhead, God wished sacrifices to be offered to Him in one place only. Another reason was in order to + show that bodily worship is not acceptable of itself: and so they restrained from + offering sacrifices anywhere and everywhere. But the worship of the New Law, in the sacrifice whereof spiritual grace is contained, + is of itself acceptable to God; and consequently the multiplication of altars and temples is permitted in the New Law. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p21"> As to those matters that regarded the spiritual worship of God, consisting in the teaching of the Law and the Prophets, there + were, even under the Old Law, various places, called synagogues, appointed for the people to gather together for the praise + of God; just as now there are places called churches in which the Christian people gather together for the divine worship. + Thus our church takes the place of both temple and synagogue: since the very sacrifice of the Church is + spiritual; wherefore with us the place of sacrifice is not distinct from the place of teaching. The figurative reason may + be that hereby is signified the unity of the Church, whether militant or triumphant. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="38053" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38053] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio unitatis templi, vel tabernaculi, potest esse +et litteralis, et figuralis. Litteralis quidem est ratio ad +exclusionem idololatriae. Quia gentiles diversis diis diversa +templa constituebant, et ideo, ut firmaretur in animis hominum +fides unitatis divinae, voluit Deus ut in uno loco tantum sibi +sacrificium offerretur. Et iterum ut per hoc ostenderet quod +corporalis cultus non propter se erat ei acceptus. Et ideo +compescebantur ne passim et ubique sacrificia offerrent. Sed cultus +novae legis, in cuius sacrificio spiritualis gratia continetur, est +secundum se Deo acceptus. Et ideo multiplicatio altarium et +templorum acceptatur in nova lege. Quantum vero ad ea quae +pertinebant ad spiritualem cultum Dei, qui consistit in doctrina +legis et prophetarum, erant etiam in veteri lege diversa loca +deputata in quibus conveniebant ad laudem Dei, quae dicebantur +synagogae, sicut et nunc dicuntur Ecclesiae, in quibus populus +Christianus ad laudem Dei congregatur. Et sic Ecclesia nostra +succedit in locum et templi et synagogae, quia ipsum sacrificium +Ecclesiae spirituale est; unde non distinguitur apud nos locus +sacrificii a loco doctrinae. Ratio autem figuralis esse potest quia +per hoc significatur unitas Ecclesiae, vel militantis vel +triumphantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p22"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Just as the unity of the temple or tabernacle betokened the unity of God, or the unity of the Church, so also the division + of the tabernacle or temple signified the distinction of those things that are subject to God, and from which we arise to + the worship of God. Now the tabernacle was divided into two parts: one was called the "Holy of Holies," and was placed to + the west; the other was called the "Holy Place" [*Or 'Sanctuary'. The Douay version uses + both expressions], which was situated to the east. Moreover there was a court facing the tabernacle. Accordingly there are + two reasons for this distinction. One is in respect of the tabernacle being ordained to the worship of God. Because the different + parts of the world are thus betokened by the division of the tabernacle. For that part which was called the Holy of Holies + signified the higher world, which is that of spiritual substances: while that part which is called the Holy Place signified + the corporeal world. Hence the Holy Place was separated from the Holy of Holies by a veil, which was of four different colors + (denoting the four elements), viz. of linen, signifying earth, because linen, i.e. flax, grows out of the earth; purple, signifying + water, because the purple tint was made from certain shells found in the sea; violet, signifying air, because it has the color + of the air; and scarlet twice dyed, signifying fire: and this because matter composed of the four elements is a + veil between us and incorporeal substances. Hence the high-priest alone, and that once a year, entered into the inner tabernacle, + i.e. the Holy of Holies: whereby we are taught that man's final perfection consists in his entering into that (higher) world: + whereas into the outward tabernacle, i.e. the Holy Place, the priests entered every day: whereas the people were only admitted + to the court; because the people were able to perceived material things, the inner nature of which only wise men by + dint of study are able to discover. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p23"> But regard to the figurative reason, the outward tabernacle, which was called the Holy Place, betokened the state of the + Old Law, as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p23.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.6" target="asv">Heb. 9:6, </a> seqq.): because into that tabernacle "the priests always entered accomplishing the offices of sacrifices." But the inner + tabernacle, which was called the Holy of Holies, signified either the glory of heaven or the spiritual state of the New Law + to come. To the latter state Christ brought us; and this + was signified by the high-priest entering alone, once a year, into the Holy of Holies. The veil betokened the concealing of + the spiritual sacrifices under the sacrifices of old. This veil was adorned with four colors: viz. that of linen, to designate + purity of the flesh; purple, to denote the sufferings which the saints underwent for God; scarlet twice dyed, signifying the + twofold love of God and our neighbor; and violet, in token of heavenly contemplation. With regard to the state of the Old + Law the people and the priests were situated differently from one another. For the people saw the mere corporeal sacrifices + which were offered in the court: whereas the priests were intent on the inner meaning of the sacrifices, because their faith + in the mysteries of Christ was more explicit. Hence they entered into the outer tabernacle. This outer tabernacle was divided + from the court by a veil; because some matters relating to the mystery of Christ were hidden from the people, while they + were known to the priests: though they were not fully revealed to them, as they were subsequently in the New Testament (cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p23.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.5" target="asv"> Eph. 3:5</a>). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="38054" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38054] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut in unitate templi, vel tabernaculi, +repraesentabatur unitas Dei, vel unitas Ecclesiae; ita etiam in +distinctione tabernaculi, vel templi, repraesentabatur distinctio +eorum quae Deo sunt subiecta, ex quibus in Dei venerationem +consurgimus. Distinguebatur autem tabernaculum in duas partes, in +unam quae vocabatur sancta sanctorum, quae erat Occidentalis; et +aliam quae vocabatur sancta, quae erat ad orientem. Et iterum ante +tabernaculum erat atrium. Haec igitur distinctio duplicem habet +rationem. Unam quidem, secundum quod tabernaculum ordinatur ad +cultum Dei. Sic enim diversae partes mundi in distinctione +tabernaculi figurantur. Nam pars illa quae sancta sanctorum +dicitur, figurabat saeculum altius, quod est spiritualium +substantiarum, pars vero illa quae dicitur sancta, exprimebat +mundum corporalem. Et ideo sancta a sanctis sanctorum +distinguebantur quodam velo, quod quatuor coloribus erat +distinctum, per quos quatuor elementa designantur, scilicet bysso, +per quod designatur terra, quia byssus, idest linum, de terra +nascitur; purpura, per quam significatur aqua, fiebat enim +purpureus color ex quibusdam conchis quae inveniuntur in mari; +hyacintho, per quem significatur aer, quia habet aereum colorem; et +cocco bis tincto, per quem designatur ignis. Et hoc ideo quia +materia quatuor elementorum est impedimentum per quod velantur +nobis incorporales substantiae. Et ideo in interius tabernaculum, +idest in sancta sanctorum, solus summus sacerdos, et semel in anno, +introibat, ut designaretur quod haec est finalis perfectio hominis, +ut ad illud saeculum introducatur. In tabernaculum vero exterius, +idest in sancta, introibant sacerdotes quotidie, non autem populus, +qui solum ad atrium accedebat, quia ipsa corpora populus percipere +potest; ad interiores autem eorum rationes soli sapientes per +considerationem attingere possunt. Secundum vero rationem +figuralem, per exterius tabernaculum, quod dicitur sancta, +significatur status veteris legis, ut apostolus dicit, ad Heb. IX, +quia ad illud tabernaculum <i>semper introibant sacerdotes +sacrificiorum officia consummantes</i>. Per interius vero +tabernaculum, quod dicitur sancta sanctorum, significatur vel +caelestis gloria, vel etiam status spiritualis novae legis, qui est +quaedam inchoatio futurae gloriae. In quem statum nos Christus +introduxit, quod figurabatur per hoc quod summus sacerdos, semel in +anno, solus in sancta sanctorum intrabat. Velum autem figurabat +spiritualium occultationem sacrificiorum in veteribus sacrificiis. +Quod velum quatuor coloribus erat ornatum, bysso quidem, ad +designandam carnis puritatem; purpura autem, ad figurandum +passiones quas sancti sustinuerunt pro Deo; cocco bis tincto, ad +significandum caritatem geminam Dei et proximi; hyacintho autem +significabatur caelestis meditatio. Ad statum autem veteris legis +aliter se habebat populus, et aliter sacerdotes. Nam populus ipsa +corporalia sacrificia considerabat, quae in atrio offerebantur. +Sacerdotes vero rationem sacrificiorum considerabant, habentes +fidem magis explicitam de mysteriis Christi. Et ideo intrabant in +exterius tabernaculum. Quod etiam quodam velo distinguebatur ab +atrio, quia quaedam erant velata populo circa mysterium Christi, +quae sacerdotibus erant nota. Non tamen erant eis plene revelata, +sicut postea in novo testamento, ut habetur Ephes. III.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A4-p24"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Worship towards the west was introduced in the Law to the exclusion of idolatry: because all the Gentiles, in reverence to + the sun, worshipped towards the east; hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p24.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.8.16" target="asv">Ezech. 8:16</a>) that certain men "had their backs towards the temple of the Lord, and their faces to the east, and they adored towards the + rising of the sun." Accordingly, in order to prevent this, the tabernacle had the Holy of Holies to westward, that + they might adore toward the west. A figurative reason may also be found in the fact that the whole state of the first tabernacle + was ordained to foreshadow the death of Christ, which is signified by the west, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p24.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.67.5" target="asv"> Ps. 67:5</a>: "Who ascendeth unto the west; the Lord is His name." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="38055" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38055] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod adoratio ad occidentem fuit introducta in lege ad +excludendam idololatriam, nam omnes gentiles, in reverentiam solis, +adorabant ad orientem; unde dicitur Ezech. VIII, quod <i>quidam +habebant dorsa contra templum domini et facies ad orientem, et +adorabant ad ortum solis</i>. Unde ad hoc excludendum, tabernaculum +habebat sancta sanctorum ad occidentem, ut versus occidentem +adorarent. Ratio etiam figuralis esse potest quia totus status +prioris tabernaculi ordinabatur ad figurandum mortem Christi, quae +significatur per occasum; secundum illud Psalmi LXVII, <i>qui +ascendit super occasum, dominus nomen illi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p25"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Both literal and figurative reasons may be assigned for the things contained in the tabernacle. The literal reason is in + connection with the divine worship. And because, as already observed (ad 4), the inner tabernacle, called the Holy of Holies, + signified the higher world of spiritual substances, hence that tabernacle contained three things, viz. "the ark of the testament + in which was a golden pot that had manna, and the rod of Aaron that had + blossomed, and the tables" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p25.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.4" target="asv">Heb. 9:4</a>) on which were written the ten commandments of the Law. Now the ark stood between two "cherubim" that looked one towards + the other: and over the ark was a table, called the "propitiatory," raised above the wings of the cherubim, as though it were + held up by them; and appearing, to the imagination, to be the very seat of God. For this reason it was called the "propitiatory," + as though the people received propitiation thence at the prayers + of the high-priest. And so it was held up, so to speak, by the cherubim, in obedience, as it were, to God: while the ark of + the testament was like the foot-stool to Him that sat on the propitiatory. These three things denote three things in that + higher world: namely, God Who is above all, and incomprehensible to any creature. Hence no likeness of Him was set up; to + denote His invisibility. But there was something to represent his seat; since, to wit, the creature, which is beneath God, + as the + seat under the sitter, is comprehensible. Again in that higher world there are spiritual substances called angels. These are + signified by the two cherubim, looking one towards the other, to show that they are at peace with one another, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p25.2" href="./asv.html#Job.25.2" target="asv"> Job 25:2</a>: "Who maketh peace in . . . high places." For this reason, too, there was more than one cherub, to betoken the multitude + of heavenly spirits, and to prevent their receiving worship from those who had been commanded to + worship but one God. Moreover there are, enclosed as it were in that spiritual world, the intelligible types of whatsoever + takes place in this world, just as in every cause are enclosed the types of its effects, and in the craftsman the types of + the works of his craft. This was betokened by the ark, which represented, by means of the three things it contained, the three + things of greatest import in human affairs. These are wisdom, signified by the tables of the testament; the power of + governing, betokened by the rod of Aaron; and life, betokened by the manna which was the means of sustenance. Or else these + three things signified the three Divine attributes, viz. wisdom, in the tables; power, in the rod; goodness, in the manna---both + by reason of its sweetness, and because it was through the goodness of God that it was granted to man, wherefore it was preserved + as a memorial of the Divine mercy. Again, these three things were represented in Isaias' vision. For he "saw the + Lord sitting upon a throne high and elevated"; and the seraphim standing by; and that the house was filled with the glory + of the Lord; wherefrom the seraphim cried out: "All the earth is full of His glory" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p25.3" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.1" target="asv">Is. 6:1</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p25.4" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.3" target="asv">3</a>). And so the images of the seraphim were set up, not to be worshipped, for this was forbidden by the first commandment; but + as a sign of their function, as stated above. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p26"> The outer tabernacle, which denotes this present world, also contained three things, viz. the "altar of incense," which was + directly opposite the ark; the "table of proposition," with the twelve loaves of proposition on it, which stood on the northern + side; and the "candlestick," which was placed towards the south. These three things seem to correspond to the three which + were enclosed in the ark; and they represented the same things as the latter, but more clearly: because, in + order that wise men, denoted by the priests entering the temple, might grasp the meaning of these types, it was necessary + to express them more manifestly than they are in the Divine or angelic mind. Accordingly the candlestick betokened, as a sensible + sign thereof, the wisdom which was expressed on the tables (of the Law) in intelligible words. The altar of incense signified + the office of the priest, whose duty it was to bring the people to God: and this was signified also by the rod: because + on that altar the sweet-smelling incense was burnt, signifying the holiness of the people acceptable to God: for it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p26.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.8.3" target="asv">Apoc. 8:3</a>) that the smoke of the sweet-smelling spices signifies the "justifications of the saints" (cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p26.2" href="./asv.html#Rev.19.8" target="asv"> Apoc. 19:8</a>). Moreover it was fitting that the dignity of the priesthood should be denoted, in the ark, by the rod, and, in the outer + tabernacle, by the altar of incense: because the priest is the mediator between God and the + people, governing the people by Divine power, denoted by the rod; and offering to God the fruit of His government, i.e. the + holiness of the people, on the altar of incense, so to speak. The table signified the sustenance of life, just as the manna + did: but the former, a more general and a coarser kind of nourishment; the latter, a sweeter and more delicate. Again, the + candlestick was fittingly placed on the southern side, while the table was placed to the north: because the south is the + right-hand side of the world, while the north is the left-hand side, as stated in De Coelo et Mundo ii; and wisdom, like other + spiritual goods, belongs to the right hand, while temporal nourishment belongs on the left, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p26.3" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.16" target="asv"> Prov. 3:16</a>: "In her left hand (are) riches and glory." And the priestly power is midway between temporal goods and spiritual wisdom; + because thereby both spiritual wisdom and temporal goods are dispensed. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p27"> Another literal signification may be assigned. For the ark contained the tables of the Law, in order to prevent forgetfulness + of the Law, wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p27.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.24.12" target="asv">Ex. 24:12</a>): "I will give thee two tables of stone, and the Law, and the commandments which I have written: that thou mayest teach them" + to the children of Israel. The rod of Aaron was placed there to restrain the people from insubordination to the priesthood + of Aaron; wherefore it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p27.2" href="./asv.html#Num.17.10" target="asv">Num. 17:10</a>): "Carry back the rod of Aaron into the tabernacle of the testimony, that it may be kept there for a token of the rebellious + children of Israel." The manna was kept in the ark to remind them of the benefit conferred by God on the children of Israel + in the desert; wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p27.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.16.32" target="asv">Ex. 16:32</a>): "Fill a gomor of it, and let it be kept unto generations to come hereafter, that they may know the bread wherewith I fed + you in the wilderness." + The candlestick was set up to enhance the beauty of the temple, for the magnificence of a house depends on its being well + lighted. Now the candlestick had seven branches, as Josephus observes (Antiquit. iii, 7,8), to signify the seven planets, + wherewith the whole world is illuminated. Hence the candlestick was placed towards the south; because for us the course of + the planets is from that quarter. The altar of incense was instituted that there might always be in the tabernacle a sweet-smelling + smoke; both through respect for the tabernacle, and as a remedy for the stenches arising from the shedding of blood and the + slaying of animals. For men despise evil-smelling things as being vile, whereas sweet-smelling things are much appreciated. + The table was place there to signify that the priests who served the temple should take their food in the temple: wherefore, + as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p27.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.4" target="asv"> Mat. 12:4, </a> it was lawful for none but the priests to eat the twelve loaves which were put on + the table in memory of the twelve tribes. And the table was not placed in the middle directly in front of the propitiatory, + in order to exclude an idolatrous rite: for the Gentiles, on the feasts of the moon, set up a table in front of the idol of + the moon, wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p27.5" href="./asv.html#Jer.7.18" target="asv">Jer. 7:18</a>): "The women knead the dough, to make cakes to the queen of heaven." + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p28"> In the court outside the tabernacle was the altar of holocausts, on which sacrifices of those things which the people possessed + were offered to God: and consequently the people who offered these sacrifices to God by the hands of the priest could be present + in the court. But the priests alone, whose function it was to offer the people to God, could approach the inner altar, whereon + the very devotion and holiness of the people was offered to God. And this altar was put up outside + the tabernacle and in the court, to the exclusion of idolatrous worship: for the Gentiles placed altars inside the temples + to offer up sacrifices thereon to idols. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p29"> The figurative reason for all these things may be taken from the relation of the tabernacle to Christ, who was foreshadowed + therein. Now it must be observed that to show the imperfection of the figures of the Law, various figures were instituted + in the temple to betoken Christ. For He was foreshadowed by the "propitiatory," since He is "a propitiation for our sins" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p29.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:2</a>). This propitiatory was fittingly carried by cherubim, since of Him it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p29.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.6" target="asv">Heb. 1:6</a>): "Let all the angels of God adore Him." He is also signified by the ark: because just as the ark was made of setim-wood, + so was Christ's body composed of most pure members. More over it was gilded: for Christ was full of wisdom and charity, which + are betokened by gold. And in the ark was a golden pot, i.e. His holy soul, having manna, i.e. "all the fulness of the Godhead" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p29.3" href="./asv.html#Col.2.9" target="asv">Col. 2:9</a>). Also there was a rod in the ark, i.e. His priestly power: + for "He was made a . . . priest for ever" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p29.4" href="./asv.html#Heb.6.20" target="asv">Heb. 6:20</a>). And therein were the tables of the Testament, to denote that Christ Himself is a lawgiver. Again, Christ was signified + by the candlestick, for He said Himself ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p29.5" href="./asv.html#John.8.12" target="asv">Jn. 8:12</a>): "I am the Light of the world"; while the seven lamps denoted the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost. He is also betokened in + the table, because He is our spiritual food, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p29.6" href="./asv.html#John.6.41" target="asv">Jn. 6:41</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p29.7" href="./asv.html#John.6.51" target="asv">51</a>: "I am the living bread": and the twelve + loaves signified the twelve apostles, or their teaching. Or again, the candlestick and table may signify the Church's teaching, + and faith, which also enlightens and refreshes. Again, Christ is signified by the two altars of holocausts and incense. Because + all works of virtue must be offered to us to God through Him; both those whereby we afflict the body, which are offered, as + it were, on the altar of holocausts; and those which, with greater perfection of mind, are offered to God in Christ, by + the spiritual desires of the perfect, on the altar of incense, as it were, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p29.8" href="./asv.html#Heb.13.15" target="asv"> Heb. 13:15</a>: "By Him therefore let us offer the sacrifice of praise always to God." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 ad 6"><a name="38056" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38056] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum +dicendum quod eorum quae in tabernaculo continebantur, ratio reddi +potest et litteralis et figuralis. Litteralis quidem, per +relationem ad cultum divinum. Et quia dictum est quod per +tabernaculum interius, quod dicebatur sancta sanctorum, +significabatur saeculum altius spiritualium substantiarum, ideo in +illo tabernaculo tria continebantur. Scilicet arca testamenti, in +qua erat urna aurea habens manna, et virga Aaron quae fronduerat, +et tabulae in quibus erant scripta decem praecepta legis. Haec +autem arca sita erat inter duos Cherubim, qui se mutuis vultibus +respiciebant. Et super arcam erat quaedam tabula, quae dicebatur +propitiatorium, super alas Cherubim, quasi ab ipsis Cherubim +portaretur, ac si imaginaretur quod illa tabula esset sedes Dei. +Unde et propitiatorium dicebatur, quasi exinde populo +propitiaretur, ad preces summi sacerdotis. Et ideo quasi portabatur +a Cherubim, quasi Deo obsequentibus, arca vero testamenti erat +quasi scabellum sedentis supra propitiatorium. Per haec autem tria +designantur tria quae sunt in illo altiori saeculo. Scilicet Deus, +qui super omnia est, et incomprehensibilis omni creaturae. Et +propter hoc nulla similitudo eius ponebatur, ad repraesentandam +eius invisibilitatem. Sed ponebatur quaedam figura sedis eius, quia +scilicet creatura comprehensibilis est, quae est subiecta Deo, +sicut sedes sedenti. Sunt etiam in illo altiori saeculo spirituales +substantiae, quae Angeli dicuntur. Et hi significantur per duos +Cherubim; mutuo se respicientes, ad designandam concordiam eorum ad +invicem, secundum illud Iob XXV, qui facit concordiam in +sublimibus. Et propter hoc etiam non fuit unus tantum Cherubim, ut +designaretur multitudo caelestium spirituum, et excluderetur cultus +eorum ab his quibus praeceptum erat ut solum unum Deum colerent. +Sunt etiam in illo intelligibili saeculo rationes omnium eorum quae +in hoc saeculo perficiuntur quodammodo clausae, sicut rationes +effectuum clauduntur in suis causis, et rationes artificiatorum in +artifice. Et hoc significabatur per arcam, in qua +repraesentabantur, per tria ibi contenta, tria quae sunt potissima +in rebus humanis, scilicet sapientia, quae repraesentabatur per +tabulas testamenti; potestas regiminis, quae repraesentabatur per +virgam Aaron; vita, quae repraesentabatur per manna, quod fuit +sustentamentum vitae. Vel per haec tria significabantur tria Dei +attributa, scilicet sapientia, in tabulis; potentia, in virga; +bonitas, in manna, tum propter dulcedinem, tum quia ex Dei +misericordia est populo datum, et ideo in memoriam divinae +misericordiae conservabatur. Et haec tria etiam figurata sunt in +visione Isaiae. Vidit enim dominum sedentem super solium excelsum +et elevatum; et Seraphim assistentes; et domum impleri a gloria +Dei. Unde et Seraphim dicebant, plena est omnis terra gloria eius. +Et sic similitudines Seraphim non ponebantur ad cultum, quod +prohibebatur primo legis praecepto, sed in signum ministerii, ut +dictum est. In exteriori vero tabernaculo, quod significat praesens +saeculum, continebantur etiam tria, scilicet altare thymiamatis, +quod erat directe contra arcam; mensa propositionis, super quam +duodecim panes apponebantur, erat posita ex parte aquilonari; +candelabrum vero ex parte Australi. Quae tria videntur respondere +tribus quae erant in arca clausa, sed magis manifeste eadem +repraesentabant, oportet enim rationes rerum ad manifestiorem +demonstrationem perduci quam sint in mente divina et Angelorum, ad +hoc quod homines sapientes eas cognoscere possint qui significantur +per sacerdotes ingredientes tabernaculum. In candelabro igitur +designabatur, sicut in signo sensibili, sapientia quae +intelligibilibus verbis exprimebatur in tabulis. Per altare vero +thymiamatis significabatur officium sacerdotum, quorum erat populum +ad Deum reducere, et hoc etiam significabatur per virgam. Nam in +illo altari incedebatur thymiama boni odoris, per quod +significabatur sanctitas populi acceptabilis Deo, dicitur enim +Apoc. VIII, quod per fumum aromatum significantur iustificationes +sanctorum. Convenienter autem sacerdotalis dignitas in arca +significabatur per virgam, in exteriori vero tabernaculo per altare +thymiamatis, quia sacerdos mediator est inter Deum et populum, +regens populum per potestatem divinam, quam virga significat; et +fructum sui regiminis, scilicet sanctitatem populi, Deo offert, +quasi in altari thymiamatis. Per mensam autem significatur +nutrimentum vitae, sicut et per manna. Sed hoc est communius et +grossius nutrimentum, illud autem suavius et subtilius. +Convenienter autem candelabrum ponebatur ex parte Australi, mensa +autem ex parte aquilonari, quia Australis pars est dextera pars +mundi, aquilonaris autem sinistra, ut dicitur in II de caelo et +mundo; sapientia autem pertinet ad dextram, sicut et cetera +spiritualia bona; temporale autem nutrimentum ad sinistram, +secundum illud Prov. III, in sinistra illius divitiae et gloria. +Potestas autem sacerdotalis media est inter temporalia et +spiritualem sapientiam, quia per eam et spiritualis sapientia et +temporalia dispensantur. Potest autem et horum alia ratio assignari +magis litteralis. In arca enim continebantur tabulae legis, ad +tollendam legis oblivionem, unde dicitur Exod. XXIV, <i>dabo tibi +duas tabulas lapideas et legem ac mandata quae scripsi, ut doceas +filios Israel</i>. Virga vero Aaron ponebatur ibi ad comprimendam +dissensionem populi de sacerdotio Aaron, unde dicitur Num. XVII, +<i>refer virgam Aaron in tabernaculum testimonii, ut servetur in +signum rebellium filiorum Israel</i>. Manna autem conservabatur in +arca, ad commemorandum beneficium quod dominus praestitit filiis +Israel in deserto, unde dicitur Exod. XVI, <i>imple gomor ex eo, et +custodiatur in futuras retro generationes, ut noverint panes de +quibus alui vos in solitudine</i>. Candelabrum vero erat institutum +ad honorificentiam tabernaculi, pertinet enim ad magnificentiam +domus quod sit bene luminosa. Habebat autem candelabrum septem +calamos, ut Iosephus dicit, ad significandum septem planetas, +quibus totus mundus illuminatur. Et ideo ponebatur candelabrum ex +parte Australi, quia ex illa parte est nobis planetarum cursus. +Altare vero thymiamatis erat institutum ut iugiter in tabernaculo +esset fumus boni odoris, tum propter venerationem tabernaculi; tum +etiam in remedium fetoris quem oportebat accidere ex effusione +sanguinis et occisione animalium. Ea enim quae sunt fetida, +despiciuntur quasi vilia, quae vero sunt boni odoris, homines magis +appretiant. Mensa autem apponebatur ad significandum quod +sacerdotes templo servientes, in templo victum habere debebant, +unde duodecim panes superpositos mensae, in memoriam duodecim +tribuum, solis sacerdotibus edere licitum erat, ut habetur Matth. +XII. Mensa autem non ponebatur directe in medio ante +propitiatorium, ad excludendum ritum idololatriae, nam gentiles in +sacris lunae proponebant mensam coram idolo lunae; unde dicitur +Ierem. VII, <i>mulieres conspergunt adipem ut faciant placentas +reginae caeli</i>. In atrio vero extra tabernaculum continebatur +altare holocaustorum, in quo offerebantur Deo sacrificia de his +quae erant a populo possessa. Et ideo in atrio poterat esse +populus, qui huiusmodi Deo offerebat per manus sacerdotum. Sed ad +altare interius, in quo ipsa devotio et sanctitas populi Deo +offerebatur, non poterant accedere nisi sacerdotes, quorum erat Deo +offerre populum. Est autem hoc altare extra tabernaculum in atrio +constitutum, ad removendum cultum idololatriae, nam gentiles infra +templa altaria constituebant ad immolandum idolis. Figuralis vero +ratio omnium horum assignari potest ex relatione tabernaculi ad +Christum, qui figurabatur. Est autem considerandum quod ad +designandum imperfectionem legalium figurarum, diversae figurae +fuerunt institutae in templo ad significandum Christum. Ipse enim +significatur per propitiatorium, quia ipse est propitiatio pro +peccatis nostris, ut dicitur I Ioan. II. Et convenienter hoc +propitiatorium a Cherubim portatur, quia de eo scriptum est, +adorent eum omnes Angeli Dei, ut habetur Heb. I. Ipse etiam +significatur per arcam, quia sicut arca erat constructa de lignis +setim, ita corpus Christi de membris purissimis constabat. Erat +autem deaurata, quia Christus fuit plenus sapientia et caritate, +quae per aurum significantur. Intra arcam autem erat urna aurea, +idest sancta anima; habens manna, idest omnem plenitudinem +divinitatis. Erat etiam in arca virga, idest potestas sacerdotalis, +quia ipse est factus sacerdos in aeternum. Erant etiam ibi tabulae +testamenti, ad designandum quod ipse Christus est legis dator. Ipse +etiam Christus significatur per candelabrum, quia ipse dicit, ego +sum lux mundi, per septem lucernas, septem dona spiritus sancti. +Ipse est spiritualis cibus, secundum illud Ioan. VI, ego sum panis +vivus, duodecim autem panes significant duodecim apostolos, vel +doctrinam eorum. Sive per candelabrum et mensam potest significari +doctrina et fides Ecclesiae, quae etiam illuminat et spiritualiter +reficit. Ipse etiam Christus significatur per duplex altare +holocaustorum et thymiamatis. Quia per ipsum oportet nos Deo +offerre omnia virtutum opera, sive illa quibus carnem affligimus, +quae offeruntur quasi in altari holocaustorum; sive illa quae, +maiore mentis perfectione, per spiritualia perfectorum desideria, +Deo offeruntur in Christo, quasi in altari thymiamatis, secundum +illud ad Heb. ult., <i>per ipsum ergo offeramus hostiam laudis +semper Deo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p30"> + <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> The Lord commanded an altar to be made for the offering of sacrifices and gifts, in honor of God, and for the upkeep of the + ministers who served the tabernacle. Now concerning the construction of the altar the Lord issued a twofold precept. One was + at the beginning of the Law ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p30.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.24" target="asv">Ex. 20:24, </a> seqq.) when the Lord commanded them to make "an altar of earth," or at least "not of hewn stones"; and again, not to make + the altar high, so as + to make it necessary to "go up" to it "by steps." This was in detestation of idolatrous worship: for the Gentiles made their + altars ornate and high, thinking that there was something holy and divine in such things. For this reason, too, the Lord commanded + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p30.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.16.21" target="asv">Dt. 16:21</a>): "Thou shalt plant no grove, nor any tree near the altar of the Lord thy God": since idolaters were wont to offer sacrifices + beneath trees, on account of the pleasantness and shade afforded by them. There was + also a figurative reason for these precepts. Because we must confess that in Christ, Who is our altar, there is the true nature + of flesh, as regards His humanity---and this is to make an altar of earth; and again, in regard to His Godhead, we must confess + His equality with the Father---and this is "not to go up" to the altar by steps. Moreover we should not couple the doctrine + of Christ to that of the Gentiles, which provokes men to lewdness. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p31"> But when once the tabernacle had been constructed to the honor of God, there was no longer reason to fear these occasions + of idolatry. Wherefore the Lord commanded the altar of holocausts to be made of brass, and to be conspicuous to all the people; + and the altar of incense, which was visible to none but the priests. Nor was brass so precious as to give the people an occasion + for idolatry. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p32"> Since, however, the reason for the precept, "Thou shalt not go up by steps unto My altar" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p32.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.26" target="asv">Ex. 20:26</a>) is stated to have been "lest thy nakedness be discovered," it should be observed that this too was instituted with the purpose + of preventing idolatry, for in the feasts of Priapus the Gentiles uncovered their nakedness before the people. But later on + the priests were prescribed the use of loin-cloths for the sake of decency: so that without any danger the + altar could be placed so high that the priests when offering sacrifices would go up by steps of wood, not fixed but movable. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 ad 7"><a name="38057" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38057] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 7</span></a> Ad septimum +dicendum quod dominus praecepit altare construi ad sacrificia et +munera offerenda, in honorem Dei et sustentationem ministrorum qui +tabernaculo deserviebant. De constructione autem altaris datur a +domino duplex praeceptum. Unum quidem in principio legis, Exod. XX, +ubi dominus mandavit quod facerent altare de terra, vel saltem de +lapidibus non sectis; et iterum quod non facerent altare excelsum, +ad quod oporteret per gradus ascendere. Et hoc, ad detestandum +idololatriae cultum, gentiles enim idolis construebant altaria +ornata et sublimia, in quibus credebant aliquid sanctitatis et +numinis esse. Propter quod etiam dominus mandavit, Deut. XVI, +<i>non plantabis lucum, et omnem arborem, iuxta altare domini Dei +tui</i>, idololatrae enim consueverunt sub arboribus sacrificare, +propter amoenitatem et umbrositatem. Quorum etiam praeceptorum +ratio figuralis fuit. Quia in Christo, qui est nostrum altare, +debemus confiteri veram carnis naturam, quantum ad humanitatem, +quod est altare de terra facere, et quantum ad divinitatem, debemus +in eo confiteri patris aequalitatem, quod est non ascendere per +gradus ad altare. Nec etiam iuxta Christum debemus admittere +doctrinam gentilium, ad lasciviam provocantem. Sed facto +tabernaculo ad honorem Dei, non erant timendae huiusmodi occasiones +idololatriae. Et ideo dominus mandavit quod fieret altare +holocaustorum de aere, quod esset omni populo conspicuum; et altare +thymiamatis de auro, quod soli sacerdotes videbant. Nec erat tanta +pretiositas aeris ut per hoc populus ad aliquam idololatriam +provocaretur. Sed quia Exod. XX ponitur pro ratione huius +praecepti, <i>non ascendes per gradus ad altare meum</i>, id quod +subditur, ne reveletur turpitudo tua; considerandum est quod hoc +etiam fuit institutum ad excludendam idololatriam, nam in sacris +Priapi sua pudenda gentiles populo denudabant. Postmodum autem +indictus est sacerdotibus feminalium usus ad tegimen pudendorum. Et +ideo sine periculo institui potuit tanta altaris altitudo ut per +aliquos gradus ligneos, non stantes sed portatiles, in hora +sacrificii, sacerdotes ad altare ascenderent sacrificia +offerentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p33"> + <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> The body of the tabernacle consisted of boards placed on end, and covered on the inside with curtains of four different colors, + viz. twisted linen, violet, purple, and scarlet twice dyed. These curtains, however, covered the sides only of the tabernacle; + and the roof of the tabernacle was covered with violet-colored skins; and over this there was another covering of rams' skins + dyed red; and over this there was a third curtain made of goats' hair, + which covered not only the roof of the tabernacle, but also reached to the ground and covered the boards of the tabernacle + on the outside. The literal reason of these coverings taken altogether was the adornment and protection of the tabernacle, + that it might be an object of respect. Taken singly, according to some, the curtains denoted the starry heaven, which is adorned + with various stars; the curtain (of goats' skin) signified the waters which are above the firmament; the skins dyed red + denoted the empyrean heaven, where the angels are; the violet skins, the heaven of the Blessed Trinity. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p34"> The figurative meaning of these things is that the boards of which the tabernacle was constructed signify the faithful of + Christ, who compose the Church. The boards were covered on the inner side by curtains of four colors: because the faithful + are inwardly adorned with the four virtues: for "the twisted linen," as the gloss observes, "signifies the flesh refulgent + with purity; violet signifies the mind desirous of heavenly things; purple denotes the flesh subject to passions; + the twice dyed scarlet betokens the mind in the midst of the passions enlightened by the love of God and our neighbor." The + coverings of the building designate prelates and doctors, who ought to be conspicuous for their heavenly manner of life, signified + by the violet colored skins: and who should also be ready to suffer martyrdom, denoted by the skins dyed red; and austere + of life and patient in adversity, betokened by the curtains of goats' hair, which were exposed to wind and rain, as the + gloss observes. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 ad 8"><a name="38058" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38058] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 8</span></a> Ad octavum +dicendum quod corpus tabernaculi constabat ex quibusdam tabulis in +longitudinem erectis, quae quidem interius tegebantur quibusdam +cortinis ex quatuor coloribus variatis, scilicet de bysso retorta, +et hyacintho, ac purpura, coccoque bis tincto. Sed huiusmodi +cortinae tegebant solum latera tabernaculi, in tecto autem +tabernaculi erat operimentum unum de pellibus hyacinthinis; et +super hoc aliud de pellibus arietum rubricatis; et desuper tertium +de quibusdam sagis cilicinis, quae non tantum operiebant tectum +tabernaculi, sed etiam descendebant usque terram, et tegebant +tabulas tabernaculi exterius. Horum autem operimentorum ratio +litteralis in communi erat ornatus et protectio tabernaculi, ut in +reverentia haberetur. In speciali vero, secundum quosdam, per +cortinas designabatur caelum sydereum, quod est diversis stellis +variatum; per saga, aquae quae sunt supra firmamentum; per pelles +rubricatas, caelum Empyreum, in quo sunt Angeli; per pelles +hyacinthinas, caelum sanctae Trinitatis. Figuralis autem ratio +horum est quia per tabulas ex quibus construebatur tabernaculum, +significantur Christi fideles, ex quibus construitur Ecclesia. +Tegebantur autem interius tabulae cortinis quadricoloribus, quia +fideles interius ornantur quatuor virtutibus; <i>nam in bysso +retorta</i>, ut Glossa dicit, <i>significatur caro castitate +renitens; in hyacintho, mens superna cupiens; in purpura, caro +passionibus subiacens; in cocco bis tincto, mens inter passiones +Dei et proximi dilectione praefulgens</i>. Per operimenta vero +tecti designantur praelati et doctores, in quibus debet renitere +caelestis conversatio, quod significatur per pelles hyacinthinas; +promptitudo ad martyrium, quod significant pelles rubricatae; +austeritas vitae et tolerantia adversorum, quae significantur per +saga cilicina, quae erant exposita ventis et pluviis, ut Glossa +dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A4-p35"> + <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> The literal reason for the sanctification of the tabernacle and vessels was that they might be treated with greater reverence, + being deputed, as it were, to the divine worship by this consecration. The figurative reason is that this sanctification signified + the sanctification of the living tabernacle, i.e. the faithful of whom the Church of Christ is composed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 ad 9"><a name="38059" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38059] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 9</span></a> Ad nonum +dicendum quod sanctificatio tabernaculi et vasorum eius habebat +causam litteralem ut in maiori reverentia haberetur, quasi per +huiusmodi consecrationem divino cultui deputatum. Figuralis autem +ratio est quia per huiusmodi sanctificationem significatur +spiritualis sanctificatio viventis tabernaculi, scilicet fidelium, +ex quibus constituitur Ecclesia Christi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p36"> + <b>Reply to Objection 10:</b> Under the Old Law there were seven temporal solemnities, and one continual solemnity, as may be gathered from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p36.1" href="./asv.html#Num.28" target="asv">Num. 28</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p36.2" href="./asv.html#Num.29" target="asv">29</a>. There was a continual feast, since the lamb was sacrificed every day, morning and evening: and this continual feast of an + abiding sacrifice signified the perpetuity of Divine bliss. Of the temporal feasts the first was that which was repeated every + week. This was the solemnity of the "Sabbath," celebrated in memory of the work of + the creation of the universe. Another solemnity, viz. the "New Moon," was repeated every month, and was observed in memory + of the work of the Divine government. For the things of this lower world owe their variety chiefly to the movement of the + moon; wherefore this feast was kept at the new moon: and not at the full moon, to avoid the worship of idolaters who used + to offer sacrifices to the moon at that particular time. And these two blessings are bestowed in common on the whole human + race; and + hence they were repeated more frequently. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p37"> The other five feasts were celebrated once a year: and they commemorated the benefits which had been conferred especially + on that people. For there was the feast of the "Passover" in the first month to commemorate the blessing of being delivered + out of Egypt. The feast of "Pentecost" was celebrated fifty days later, to recall the blessing of the giving of the Law. The + other three feasts were kept in the seventh month, nearly the whole of which was solemnized by them, just as the + seventh day. For on the first of the seventh month was the feast of "Trumpets," in memory of the delivery of Isaac, when Abraham + found the ram caught by its horns, which they represented by the horns which they blew. The feast of Trumpets was a kind of + invitation whereby they prepared themselves to keep the following feast which was kept on the tenth day. This was the feast + of "Expiation," in memory of the blessing whereby, at the prayer of Moses, God forgave the people's sin of worshipping the + calf. After this was the feast of "Scenopegia" or of "Tents," which was kept for seven days, to commemorate the blessing of + being protected and led by God through the desert, where they lived in tents. Hence during this feast they had to take "the + fruits of the fairest tree," i.e. the citron, "and the trees of dense foliage" [*Douay and A. V. and R. V. read: 'Boughs of + thick trees'], i.e. the myrtle, which is fragrant, "and the branches of palm-trees, and willows of the brook," which retain + their greenness a long time; and these are to be found in the Land of promise; to signify that God had brought them through + the arid land of the wilderness to a land of delights. On the eighth day another feast was observed, of "Assembly and Congregation," + on which the people collected the expenses necessary for the divine worship: and it signified the uniting of the people and + the peace granted to them in the Land of promise. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A4-p38"> The figurative reason for these feasts was that the continual sacrifice of the lamb foreshadowed the perpetuity of Christ, + Who is the "Lamb of God," according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p38.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.13.8" target="asv"> Heb. 13:8</a>: "Jesus Christ yesterday and today, and the same for ever." The Sabbath signified the spiritual rest bestowed by Christ, + as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p38.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.4" target="asv">Heb. 4</a>. The Neomenia, which is the beginning of the new moon, signified the enlightening of the primitive Church by Christ's preaching + and miracles. The + feast of Pentecost signified the Descent of the Holy Ghost on the apostles. The feast of Trumpets signified the preaching + of the apostles. The feast of Expiation signified the cleansing of the Christian people from sins: and the feast of Tabernacles + signified their pilgrimage in this world, wherein they walk by advancing in virtue. The feast of Assembly or Congregation + foreshadowed the assembly of the faithful in the kingdom of heaven: wherefore this feast is described as "most holy" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p38.3" href="./asv.html#Lev.23.36" target="asv">Lev. 23:36</a>). These three feasts followed immediately on one another, because those who expiate their vices should advance in virtue, + until they come to see God, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p38.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.8" target="asv"> Ps. 83:8.</a> + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 4 ad 10"><a name="38060" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38060] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 4 ad 10</span></a> Ad decimum +dicendum quod in veteri lege erant septem solemnitates temporales, +et una continua, ut potest colligi Num. XXVIII et XXIX. Erat enim +quasi continuum festum, quia quotidie mane et vespere immolabatur +agnus. Et per illud continuum festum iugis sacrificii +repraesentabatur perpetuitas divinae beatitudinis. Festorum autem +temporalium primum erat quod iterabatur qualibet septimana. Et haec +erat solemnitas sabbati, quod celebrabatur in memoriam creationis +rerum, ut supra dictum est. Alia autem solemnitas iterabatur +quolibet mense, scilicet festum Neomeniae, quod celebrabatur ad +commemorandum opus divinae gubernationis. Nam haec inferiora +praecipue variantur secundum motum lunae, et ideo celebrabatur hoc +festum in novitate lunae. Non autem in eius plenitudine, ad +evitandum idololatrarum cultum, qui in tali tempore lunae +sacrificabant. Haec autem duo beneficia sunt communia toti humano +generi, et ideo frequentius iterabantur. Alia vero quinque festa +celebrabantur semel in anno, et recolebantur in eis beneficia +specialiter illi populo exhibita. Celebrabatur enim festum phase +primo mense, ad commemorandum beneficium liberationis ex Aegypto. +Celebrabatur autem festum Pentecostes post quinquaginta dies, ad +recolendum beneficium legis datae. Alia vero tria festa +celebrabantur in mense septimo, qui quasi totus apud eos erat +solemnis, sicut et septimus dies. In prima enim die mensis septimi +erat festum tubarum, in memoriam liberationis Isaac, quando Abraham +invenit arietem haerentem cornibus, quem repraesentabant per cornua +quibus buccinabant. Erat autem festum tubarum quasi quaedam +invitatio ut praepararent se ad sequens festum, quod celebrabatur +decimo die. Et hoc erat festum expiationis, in memoriam illius +beneficii quo Deus propitiatus est peccato populi de adoratione +vituli, ad preces Moysi. Post hoc autem celebrabatur festum +Scenopegiae, idest tabernaculorum, septem diebus, ad commemorandum +beneficium divinae protectionis et deductionis per desertum, ubi in +tabernaculis habitaverunt. Unde in hoc festo debebant habere +fructum arboris pulcherrimae, idest citrum, et lignum densarum +frondium, idest myrtum, quae sunt odorifera; et spatulas palmarum, +et salices de torrente, quae diu retinent suum virorem; et haec +inveniuntur in terra promissionis; ad significandum quod per aridam +terram deserti eos duxerat Deus ad terram deliciosam. Octavo autem +die celebrabatur aliud festum, scilicet coetus atque collectae, in +quo colligebantur a populo ea quae erant necessaria ad expensas +cultus divini. Et significabatur adunatio populi et pax praestita +in terra promissionis. Figuralis autem ratio horum festorum est +quia per iuge sacrificium agni figuratur perpetuitas Christi, qui +est agnus Dei; secundum illud Heb. ult., <i>Iesus Christus heri et +hodie, ipse et in saecula</i>. Per sabbatum autem significatur +spiritualis requies nobis data per Christum, ut habetur ad Heb. IV. +Per Neomeniam autem, quae est incoeptio novae lunae, significatur +illuminatio primitivae Ecclesiae per Christum, eo praedicante et +miracula faciente. Per festum autem Pentecostes significatur +descensus spiritus sancti in apostolos. Per festum autem tubarum +significatur praedicatio apostolorum. Per festum autem expiationis +significatur emundatio a peccatis populi Christiani. Per festum +autem tabernaculorum, peregrinatio eorum in hoc mundo, in quo +ambulant in virtutibus proficiendo. Per festum autem coetus atque +collectae significatur congregatio fidelium in regno caelorum, et +ideo istud festum dicebatur sanctissimum esse. Et haec tria festa +erant continua ad invicem, quia oportet expiatos a vitiis proficere +in virtute, quousque perveniant ad Dei visionem, ut dicitur in +Psalmo LXXXIII.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q102_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q102_A5-p0.1">Q. 102. A. 5. Whether there can be any suitable cause for the sacraments of the Old Law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there can be no suitable cause for the sacraments of the Old Law. Because those things that are done for + the purpose of divine worship should not be like the observances of idolaters: since it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.12.31" target="asv">Dt. 12:31</a>): "Thou shalt not do in like manner to the Lord thy God: for they have done to their gods all the abominations which the + Lord abhorreth." Now worshippers of idols used to knive themselves to the shedding of + blood: for it is related ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 18:28</a>) that they "cut themselves after their manner with knives and lancets, till they were all covered with blood." For this reason + the Lord commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.14.1" target="asv">Dt. 14:1</a>): "You shall not cut yourselves nor make any baldness for the dead." Therefore it was unfitting for circumcision to be prescribed + by the Law ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p2.4" href="./asv.html#Lev.12.3" target="asv">Lev. 12:3</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="38061" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38061] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod sacramentorum veteris legis conveniens +causa esse non possit. Ea enim quae ad cultum divinum fiunt, non +debent esse similia his quae idololatrae observabant, dicitur enim +Deut. XII, <i>non facies similiter domino Deo tuo, omnes enim +abominationes quas aversatur dominus, fecerunt diis suis</i>. Sed +cultores idolorum in eorum cultu se incidebant usque ad effusionem +sanguinis, dicitur enim III Reg. XVIII, quod <i>incidebant se, +iuxta ritum suum, cultris et lanceolis, donec perfunderentur +sanguine</i>. Propter quod dominus mandavit, Deut. XIV, <i>non vos +incidetis, nec facietis calvitium super mortuo</i>. Inconvenienter +igitur circumcisio erat instituta in lege.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those things which are done for the worship of God should be marked with decorum and gravity; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.34.18" target="asv"> Ps. 34:18</a>: "I will praise Thee in a grave [Douay: 'strong'] people." But it seems to savor of levity for a man to eat with haste. Therefore + it was unfittingly commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.12.11" target="asv">Ex. 12:11</a>) that they should eat the Paschal lamb "in haste." Other things too relative to the eating of the lamb were prescribed, which + seem altogether unreasonable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="38062" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38062] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae in cultum divinum fiunt, debent honestatem et gravitatem +habere; secundum illud Psalmi XXXIV, <i>in populo gravi laudabo +te</i>. Sed ad levitatem quandam pertinere videtur ut homines +festinanter comedant. Inconvenienter igitur praeceptum est, Exod. +XII, ut comederent festinanter agnum paschalem. Et alia etiam circa +eius comestionem sunt instituta, quae videntur omnino +irrationabilia esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sacraments of the Old Law were figures of the sacraments of the New Law. Now the Paschal lamb signified the + sacrament of the Eucharist, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.5.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 5:7</a>: "Christ our Pasch is sacrificed." Therefore there should also have been some sacraments of the Old Law to foreshadow the + other sacraments of the New Law, such as Confirmation, Extreme Unction, and Matrimony, and so forth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="38063" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38063] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sacramenta veteris legis figurae fuerunt sacramentorum novae legis. +Sed per agnum paschalem significatur sacramentum Eucharistiae; +secundum illud I ad Cor. V, <i>Pascha nostrum immolatus est +Christus</i>. Ergo etiam debuerunt esse aliqua sacramenta in lege +quae praefigurarent alia sacramenta novae legis, sicut +confirmationem et extremam unctionem et matrimonium, et alia +sacramenta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, purification can scarcely be done except by removing something impure. But as far as God is concerned, no bodily + thing is reputed impure, because all bodies are God's creatures; and "every creature of God is good, and nothing to be rejected + that is received with thanksgiving" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:4</a>). It was therefore unfitting for them to be purified after contact with a corpse, or any similar corporeal infection. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="38064" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38064] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +purificatio non potest convenienter fieri nisi ab aliquibus +immunditiis. Sed quantum ad Deum, nullum corporale reputatur +immundum, quia omne corpus creatura Dei est; <i>et omnis creatura +Dei bona, et nihil reiiciendum quod cum gratiarum actione +percipitur</i>, ut dicitur I ad Tim. IV. Inconvenienter igitur +purificabantur propter contactum hominis mortui, vel alicuius +huiusmodi corporalis infectionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A5-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.34.4" target="asv">Ecclus. 34:4</a>): "What can be made clean by the unclean?" But the ashes of the red heifer [*Cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.13" target="asv"> Heb. 9:13</a>] which was burnt, were unclean, since they made a man unclean: for it is stated ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Num.19.7" target="asv">Num. 19:7, </a> seqq.) that the priest who immolated her was rendered unclean "until the evening"; likewise he that burnt her; and he that + gathered up her ashes. Therefore it was unfittingly + prescribed there that the unclean should be purified by being sprinkled with those cinders. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 arg. 5"><a name="38065" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38065] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +Eccli. XXXIV dicitur, <i>ab immundo quid mundabitur?</i> Sed cinis +vitulae rufae quae comburebatur, immundus erat, quia immundum +reddebat, dicitur enim Num. XIX, quod sacerdos qui immolabat eam, +commaculatus erat usque ad vesperum; similiter et ille qui eam +comburebat; et etiam ille qui eius cineres colligebat. Ergo +inconvenienter praeceptum ibi fuit ut per huiusmodi cinerem +aspersum immundi purificarentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A5-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, sins are not something corporeal that can be carried from one place to another: nor can man be cleansed from sin + by means of something unclean. It was therefore unfitting for the purpose of expiating the sins of the people that the priest + should confess the sins of the children of Israel on one of the buck-goats, that it might carry them away into the wilderness: + while they were rendered unclean by the other, which they used for the purpose of + purification, by burning it together with the calf outside the camp; so that they had to wash their clothes and their bodies + with water ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.16" target="asv">Lev. 16</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 arg. 6"><a name="38066" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38066] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +peccata non sunt aliquid corporale, quod possit deferri de loco ad +locum, neque etiam per aliquid immundum potest homo a peccato +mundari. Inconvenienter igitur ad expiationem peccatorum populi, +sacerdos super unum hircorum confitebatur peccata filiorum Israel, +ut portaret ea in desertum, per alium autem, quo utebantur ad +purificationes, simul cum vitulo comburentes extra castra, immundi +reddebantur, ita quod oportebat eos lavare vestimenta et carnem +aqua.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A5-p8"> + <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, what is already cleansed should not be cleansed again. It was therefore unfitting to apply a second purification + to a man cleansed from leprosy, or to a house; as laid down in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.14" target="asv">Lev. 14</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 arg. 7"><a name="38067" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38067] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 7</span></a> Praeterea, +illud quod iam est mundatum, non oportet iterum mundari. +Inconvenienter igitur, mundata lepra hominis, vel etiam domus, alia +purificatio adhibebatur; ut habetur Levit. XIV.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A5-p9"> + <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, spiritual uncleanness cannot be cleansed by material water or by shaving the hair. Therefore it seems unreasonable + that the Lord ordered ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.30.18" target="asv">Ex. 30:18, </a> seqq.) the making of a brazen laver with its foot, that the priests might wash their hands and feet before entering the temple; + and that He commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Num.8.7" target="asv">Num. 8:7</a>) the Levites to be sprinkled with the water of purification, and to shave all the hairs of their + flesh. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 arg. 8"><a name="38068" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38068] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 8</span></a> Praeterea, +spiritualis immunditia non potest per corporalem aquam, vel pilorum +rasuram, emundari. Irrationabile igitur videtur quod dominus +praecepit Exod. XXX, ut fieret labium aeneum cum basi sua ad +lavandum manus et pedes sacerdotum qui ingressuri erant +tabernaculum; et quod praecipitur Num. VIII, quod Levitae +abstergerentur aqua lustrationis, et raderent omnes pilos carnis +suae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A5-p10"> + <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, that which is greater cannot be cleansed by that which is less. Therefore it was unfitting that, in the Law, the + higher and lower priests, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.8" target="asv">Lev. 8</a> [*Cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.29" target="asv">Ex. 29</a>], and the Levites, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Num.8" target="asv">Num. 8</a>, should be consecrated with any bodily anointing, bodily sacrifices, and bodily oblations. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 arg. 9"><a name="38069" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38069] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 9</span></a> Praeterea, +quod maius est, non potest sanctificari per illud quod minus est. +Inconvenienter igitur per quandam unctionem corporalem, et +corporalia sacrificia, et oblationes corporales, fiebat in lege +consecratio maiorum et minorum sacerdotum, ut habetur Levit. VIII; +et Levitarum, ut habetur Num. VIII.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A5-p11"> + <b>Objection 10:</b> Further, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.16.7" target="asv">1 Kings 16:7, </a> "Man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart." But those things that appear outwardly in man are + the dispositions of his body and his clothes. Therefore it was unfitting for certain special garments to be appointed to the + higher and lower priests, as related in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.28" target="asv">Ex. 28</a> [*Cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p11.3" href="./asv.html#Lev.8.7" target="asv"> Lev. 8:7, </a> seqq.]. It seems, moreover, unreasonable that anyone should be debarred from + the priesthood on account of defects in the body, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p11.4" href="./asv.html#Lev.21.17" target="asv">Lev. 21:17</a>, seqq.: "Whosoever of thy seed throughout their families, hath a blemish, he shall not offer bread to his God . . . if he + be blind, if he be lame," etc. It seems, therefore, that the sacraments of the Old Law were unreasonable. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 arg. 10"><a name="38070" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38070] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 arg. 10</span></a> +Praeterea, sicut dicitur I Reg. XVI, <i>homines vident ea quae +parent, Deus autem intuetur cor</i>. Sed ea quae exterius parent in +homine, est corporalis dispositio, et etiam indumenta. +Inconvenienter igitur sacerdotibus maioribus et minoribus quaedam +specialia vestimenta deputabantur, de quibus habetur Exod. XXVIII. +Et sine ratione videtur quod prohiberetur aliquis a sacerdotio +propter corporales defectus, secundum quod dicitur Levit. XXI, +<i>homo de semine tuo per familias qui habuerit maculam, non +offeret panes Deo suo, si caecus fuerit, vel claudus</i>, et +cetera. Sic igitur videtur quod sacramenta veteris legis +irrationabilia fuerint.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A5-p12"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.20.8" target="asv">Lev. 20:8</a>): "I am the Lord that sanctify you." But nothing unreasonable is done by God, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.103.24" target="asv">Ps. 103:24</a>): "Thou hast made all things in wisdom." Therefore there was nothing without a reasonable cause in the sacraments of the + Old Law, which were ordained to the sanctification of man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 s. c."><a name="38071" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38071] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Levit. XX, <i>ego sum dominus, qui sanctifico +vos</i>. Sed a Deo nihil sine ratione fit, dicitur enim in Psalmo +CIII, <i>omnia in sapientia fecisti</i>. Ergo in sacramentis +veteris legis, quae ordinabantur ad hominum sanctificationem, nihil +erat sine rationabili causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p13"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q101_A4" id="FS_Q102_A5-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[101], A[4]</a>), the sacraments are, properly speaking, things applied to the worshippers of God for their consecration so as, in some way, + to depute them to the worship of God. Now the worship of God belonged in a general way to the whole people; but in a special + way, it belonged to the priests and Levites, who were the ministers of divine worship. Consequently, in these sacraments of + the Old Law, certain things + concerned the whole people in general; while others belonged to the ministers. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p14"> In regard to both, three things were necessary. The first was to be established in the state of worshipping God: and this + institution was brought about---for all in general, by circumcision, without which no one was admitted to any of the legal + observances---and for the priests, by their consecration. The second thing required was the use of those things that pertain + to divine worship. And thus, as to the people, there was the partaking of the paschal banquet, to which no + uncircumcised man was admitted, as is clear from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.12.43" target="asv"> Ex. 12:43, </a> seqq.: and, as to the priests, the offering of the victims, and the eating of the loaves of proposition and of other things + that were allotted to the use of the priests. The third thing required was the removal of all impediments to divine worship, + viz. of uncleannesses. And then, as to the people, certain purifications were instituted for the removal of certain external + uncleannesses; and also expiations from + sins; while, as to the priests and Levites, the washing of hands and feet and the shaving of the hair were instituted. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p15"> And all these things had reasonable causes, both literal, in so far as they were ordained to the worship of God for the time + being, and figurative, in so far as they were ordained to foreshadow Christ: as we shall see by taking them one by one. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 co."><a name="38072" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38072] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, sacramenta proprie dicuntur +illa quae adhibebantur Dei cultoribus ad quandam consecrationem, +per quam scilicet deputabantur quodammodo ad cultum Dei. Cultus +autem Dei generali quidem modo pertinebat ad totum populum; sed +speciali modo pertinebat ad sacerdotes et Levitas, qui erant +ministri cultus divini. Et ideo in istis sacramentis veteris legis +quaedam pertinebant communiter ad totum populum; quaedam autem +specialiter ad ministros. Et circa utrosque tria erant necessaria. +Quorum primum est institutio in statu colendi Deum. Et haec quidem +institutio communiter quantum ad omnes, fiebat per circumcisionem, +sine qua nullus admittebatur ad aliquid legalium, quantum vero ad +sacerdotes, per sacerdotum consecrationem. Secundo requirebatur +usus eorum quae pertinent ad divinum cultum. Et sic quantum ad +populum, erat esus paschalis convivii, ad quem nullus incircumcisus +admittebatur, ut patet Exod. XII, et quantum ad sacerdotes, oblatio +victimarum, et esus panum propositionis et aliorum quae erant +sacerdotum usibus deputata. Tertio requirebatur remotio eorum per +quae aliqui impediebantur a cultu divino, scilicet immunditiarum. +Et sic quantum ad populum, erant institutae quaedam purificationes +a quibusdam exterioribus immunditiis, et etiam expiationes a +peccatis, quantum vero ad sacerdotes et Levitas, erat instituta +ablutio manuum et pedum, et rasio pilorum. Et haec omnia habebant +rationabiles causas et litterales, secundum quod ordinabantur ad +cultum Dei pro tempore illo; et figurales, secundum quod +ordinabantur ad figurandum Christum; ut patebit per singula.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The chief literal reason for circumcision was in order that man might profess his belief in one God. And because Abraham + was the first to sever himself from the infidels, by going out from his house and kindred, for this reason he was the first + to receive circumcision. This reason is set forth by the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p16.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.9" target="asv">Rom. 4:9, </a> seqq.) thus: "He received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the justice of the faith which he had, being + uncircumcised"; because, to wit, we are told that "unto Abraham faith was reputed to justice," for the reason that "against + hope he believed in hope," i.e. against the hope that is of nature he believed in the hope that is of grace, "that he might + be made the father of many nations," when he was an old man, and his wife an old and barren woman. And in order that this + declaration, and imitation of Abraham's faith, might be fixed firmly in the hearts of the Jews, they received in their flesh + such + a sign as they could not forget, wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p16.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.17.13" target="asv">Gn. 17:13</a>): "My covenant shall be in your flesh for a perpetual covenant." This was done on the eighth day, because until then a child + is very tender, and so might be seriously injured; and is considered as something not yet consolidated: wherefore neither + are animals offered before the eighth day. And it was not delayed after that time, lest some might refuse the sign of circumcision + on account of the pain: and also lest the parents, + whose love for their children increases as they become used to their presence and as they grow older, should withdraw their + children from circumcision. A second reason may have been the weakening of concupiscence in that member. A third motive may + have been to revile the worship of Venus and Priapus, which gave honor to that part of the body. The Lord's prohibition extended + only to the cutting of oneself in honor of idols: and such was not the circumcision of which we have been speaking. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p17"> The figurative reason for circumcision was that it foreshadowed the removal of corruption, which was to be brought about + by Christ, and will be perfectly fulfilled in the eighth age, which is the age of those who rise from the dead. And since + all corruption of guilt and punishment comes to us through our carnal origin, from the sin of our first parent, therefore + circumcision was applied to the generative member. Hence the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p17.1" href="./asv.html#Col.2.11" target="asv">Col. 2:11</a>): "You are + circumcised" in Christ "with circumcision not made by hand in despoiling of the body of the flesh, but in the circumcision + of" Our Lord Jesus "Christ." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="38073" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38073] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod litteralis ratio circumcisionis principalis +quidem fuit ad protestationem fidei unius Dei. Et quia Abraham fuit +primus qui se ab infidelibus separavit, exiens de domo sua et de +cognatione sua, ideo ipse primus circumcisionem accepit. Et hanc +causam assignat apostolus, ad Rom. IV, <i>signum accepit +circumcisionis, signaculum iustitiae fidei quae est in +praeputio</i>, quia scilicet in hoc legitur Abrahae fides reputata +ad iustitiam, quod contra spem in spem credidit, scilicet contra +spem naturae in spem gratiae, ut fieret pater multarum gentium, cum +ipse esset senex, et uxor sua esset anus et sterilis. Et ut haec +protestatio, et imitatio fidei Abrahae, firmaretur in cordibus +Iudaeorum, acceperunt signum in carne sua, cuius oblivisci non +possent, unde dicitur Gen. XVII, <i>erit pactum meum in carne +vestra in foedus aeternum</i>. Ideo autem fiebat octava die, quia +antea puer est valde tenellus, et posset ex hoc graviter laedi, et +reputatur adhuc quasi quiddam non solidatum, unde etiam nec +animalia offerebantur ante octavum diem. Ideo vero non magis +tardabatur, ne propter dolorem aliqui signum circumcisionis +refugerent, et ne parentes etiam, quorum amor increscit ad filios +post frequentem conversationem et eorum augmentum, eos +circumcisioni subtraherent. Secunda ratio esse potuit ad +debilitationem concupiscentiae in membro illo. Tertia ratio, in +sugillationem sacrorum Veneris et Priapi, in quibus illa pars +corporis honorabatur. Dominus autem non prohibuit nisi incisionem +quae in cultum idolorum fiebat, cui non erat similis praedicta +circumcisio. Figuralis vero ratio circumcisionis erat quia +figurabatur ablatio corruptionis fienda per Christum, quae perfecte +complebitur in octava aetate, quae est aetas resurgentium. Et quia +omnis corruptio culpae et poenae provenit in nos per carnalem +originem ex peccato primi parentis, ideo talis circumcisio fiebat +in membro generationis. Unde apostolus dicit, ad Colos. II, +<i>circumcisi estis in Christo circumcisione non manu facta in +expoliatione corporis carnis, sed in circumcisione domini nostri +Iesu Christi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The literal reason of the paschal banquet was to commemorate the blessing of being led by God out of Egypt. Hence by celebrating + this banquet they declared that they belonged to that people which God had taken to Himself out of Egypt. For when they were + delivered from Egypt, they were commanded to sprinkle the lamb's blood on the transoms of their house doors, as though declaring + that they were averse to the rites of the Egyptians who worshipped the + ram. Wherefore they were delivered by the sprinkling or rubbing of the blood of the lamb on the door-posts, from the danger + of extermination which threatened the Egyptians. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p19"> Now two things are to be observed in their departure from Egypt: namely, their haste in going, for the Egyptians pressed + them to go forth speedily, as related in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p19.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.12.33" target="asv"> Ex. 12:33</a>; and there was danger that anyone who did not hasten to go with the crowd might be slain by the Egyptians. Their haste was + shown in two ways. First by what they ate. For they were commanded to eat unleavened bread, as a sign "that it could not be + leavened, the Egyptians pressing them to + depart"; and to eat roast meat, for this took less time to prepare; and that they should not break a bone thereof, because + in their haste there was no time to break bones. Secondly, as to the manner of eating. For it is written: "You shall gird + your reins, and you shall have shoes on your feet, holding staves in your hands, and you shall eat in haste": which clearly + designates men at the point of starting on a journey. To this also is to be referred the command: "In one house shall it be + eaten, + neither shall you carry forth of the flesh thereof out of the house": because, to wit, on account of their haste, they could + not send any gifts of it. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p20"> The stress they suffered while in Egypt was denoted by the wild lettuces. The figurative reason is evident, because the sacrifice + of the paschal lamb signified the sacrifice of Christ according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p20.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.5.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 5:7</a>: "Christ our pasch is sacrificed." The blood of the lamb, which ensured deliverance from the destroyer, by being sprinkled + on the transoms, signified faith in Christ's Passion, in the hearts and on the lips of the faithful, by which same Passion + we are + delivered from sin and death, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p20.2" href="./asv.html#iPet.1.18" target="asv">1 Pet. 1:18</a>: "You were . . . redeemed . . . with the precious blood . . . of a lamb unspotted." The partaking of its flesh signified + the eating of Christ's body in the Sacrament; and the flesh was roasted at the fire to signify Christ's Passion or charity. + And it was eaten with unleavened bread to signify the blameless life of the faithful who partake of Christ's body, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p20.3" href="./asv.html#iCor.5.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 5:8</a>: "Let us feast . . + . with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth." The wild lettuces were added to denote repentance for sins, which is + required of those who receive the body of Christ. Their loins were girt in sign of chastity: and the shoes of their feet are + the examples of our dead ancestors. The staves they were to hold in their hands denoted pastoral authority: and it was commanded + that the paschal lamb should be eaten in one house, i.e. in a catholic church, and not in the conventicles of heretics. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="38074" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38074] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod litteralis ratio paschalis convivii fuit in +commemorationem beneficii quo Deus eduxit eos de Aegypto. Unde per +huiusmodi convivii celebrationem profitebantur se ad illum populum +pertinere quem Deus sibi assumpserat ex Aegypto. Quando enim sunt +ex Aegypto liberati, praeceptum est eis ut sanguine agni linirent +superliminaria domorum, quasi protestantes se recedere a ritibus +Aegyptiorum, qui arietem colebant. Unde et liberati sunt per +sanguinis agni aspersionem vel linitionem in postibus domorum, a +periculo exterminii quod imminebat Aegyptiis. In illo autem exitu +eorum de Aegypto duo fuerunt, scilicet festinantia ad egrediendum, +impellebant enim eos Aegyptii ut exirent velociter, ut habetur +Exod. XII; imminebatque periculum ei qui non festinaret exire cum +multitudine, ne remanens occideretur ab Aegyptiis. Festinantia +autem designabatur dupliciter. Uno quidem modo per ea quae +comedebant. Praeceptum enim erat eis quod comederent panes azymos, +in huius signum, quod non poterant fermentari, cogentibus exire +Aegyptiis; et quod comederent assum igni, sic enim velocius +praeparabatur; et quod os non comminuerent ex eo, quia in +festinantia non vacat ossa frangere. Alio modo, quantum ad modum +comedendi. Dicitur enim, <i>renes vestros accingetis, calceamenta +habebitis in pedibus, tenentes baculos in manibus, et comedetis +festinanter</i>, quod manifeste designat homines existentes in +promptu itineris. Ad idem etiam pertinet quod eis praecipitur, +<i>in una domo comedetis, neque feretis de carnibus eius foras</i>, +quia scilicet, propter festinantiam, non vacabat invicem mittere +exennia. Amaritudo autem quam passi fuerant in Aegypto, +significabatur per lactucas agrestes. Figuralis autem ratio patet. +Quia per immolationem agni paschalis significabatur immolatio +Christi; secundum illud I ad Cor. V, <i>Pascha nostrum immolatus +est Christus</i>. Sanguis vero agni liberans ab exterminatore, +linitis superliminaribus domorum, significat fidem passionis +Christi in corde et ore fidelium, per quam liberamur a peccato et a +morte; secundum illud I Petr. I, <i>redempti estis pretioso +sanguine agni immaculati</i>. Comedebantur autem carnes illae, ad +significandum esum corporis Christi in sacramento. Erant autem +assae igni, ad significandum passionem, vel caritatem Christi. +Comedebantur autem cum azymis panibus, ad significandam puram +conversationem fidelium sumentium corpus Christi, secundum illud I +ad Cor. V, <i>epulemur in azymis sinceritatis et veritatis</i>. +Lactucae autem agrestes addebantur, in signum poenitentiae +peccatorum, quae necessaria est sumentibus corpus Christi. Renes +autem accingendi sunt cingulo castitatis. Calceamenta autem pedum +sunt exempla mortuorum patrum. Baculi autem habendi in manibus, +significant pastoralem custodiam. Praecipitur autem quod in una +domo agnus paschalis comedatur, idest in Ecclesia Catholicorum, non +in conventiculis haereticorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A5-p21"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some of the sacraments of the New Law had corresponding figurative sacraments in the Old Law. For Baptism, which is the sacrament + of Faith, corresponds to circumcision. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p21.1" href="./asv.html#Col.2.11" target="asv">Col. 2:11,12</a>): "You are circumcised . . . in the circumcision of" Our Lord Jesus "Christ: buried with Him in Baptism." In the New Law + the sacrament of the Eucharist corresponds to the banquet of the paschal lamb. The sacrament of Penance in the New Law corresponds + to all the purifications of the Old Law. The sacrament of Orders corresponds to the consecration of the pontiff and of the + priests. To the sacrament of Confirmation, which is the sacrament of the fulness of grace, there would be no corresponding + sacrament of the Old Law, because the time of fulness had not yet come, since "the Law brought no man [Vulg.: 'nothing'] to + perfection" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p21.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.19" target="asv">Heb. 7:19</a>). The same applies to the sacrament of Extreme Unction, which is an immediate + preparation for entrance into glory, to which the way was not yet opened out in the Old Law, since the price had not yet been + paid. Matrimony did indeed exist under the Old Law, as a function of nature, but not as the sacrament of the union of Christ + with the Church, for that union was not as yet brought about. Hence under the Old Law it was allowable to give a bill of divorce, + which is contrary to the nature of the sacrament. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="38075" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38075] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod quaedam sacramenta novae legis habuerunt in veteri +lege sacramenta figuralia sibi correspondentia. Nam circumcisioni +respondet Baptismus, qui est fidei sacramentum, unde dicitur ad +Col. II, <i>circumcisi estis in circumcisione domini nostri Iesu +Christi, consepulti ei in Baptismo</i>. Convivio vero agni +paschalis respondet in nova lege sacramentum Eucharistiae. Omnibus +autem purificationibus veteris legis respondet in nova lege +sacramentum poenitentiae. Consecrationi autem pontificum et +sacerdotum respondet sacramentum ordinis. Sacramento autem +confirmationis, quod est sacramentum plenitudinis gratiae, non +potest respondere in veteri lege aliquod sacramentum, quia nondum +advenerat tempus plenitudinis, eo quod neminem ad perfectum adduxit +lex. Similiter autem et sacramento extremae unctionis, quod est +quaedam immediata praeparatio ad introitum gloriae, cuius aditus +nondum patebat in veteri lege, pretio nondum soluto. Matrimonium +autem fuit quidem in veteri lege prout erat in officium naturae; +non autem prout est sacramentum coniunctionis Christi et Ecclesiae, +quae nondum erat facta. Unde et in veteri lege dabatur libellus +repudii, quod est contra sacramenti rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p22"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As already stated, the purifications of the Old Law were ordained for the removal of impediments to the divine worship: which + worship is twofold; viz. spiritual, consisting in devotion of the mind to God; and corporal, consisting in sacrifices, oblations, + and so forth. Now men are hindered in the spiritual worship by sins, whereby men were said to be polluted, for instance, by + idolatry, murder, adultery, or incest. From such pollutions men were + purified by certain sacrifices, offered either for the whole community in general, or also for the sins of individuals; not + that those carnal sacrifices had of themselves the power of expiating sin; but that they signified that expiation of sins + which was to be effected by Christ, and of which those of old became partakers by protesting their faith in the Redeemer, + while taking part in the figurative sacrifices. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p23"> The impediments to external worship consisted in certain bodily uncleannesses; which were considered in the first place as + existing in man, and consequently in other animals also, and in man's clothes, dwelling-place, and vessels. In man himself + uncleanness was considered as arising partly from himself and partly from contact with unclean things. Anything proceeding + from man was reputed unclean that was already subject to corruption, or exposed thereto: and consequently since + death is a kind of corruption, the human corpse was considered unclean. In like manner, since leprosy arises from corruption + of the humors, which break out externally and infect other persons, therefore were lepers also considered unclean; and, again, + women suffering from a flow of blood, whether from weakness, or from nature (either at the monthly course or at the time of + conception); and, for the same reason, men were reputed unclean if they suffered from a flow of seed, whether due to + weakness, to nocturnal pollution, or to sexual intercourse. Because every humor issuing from man in the aforesaid ways involves + some unclean infection. Again, man contracted uncleanness by touching any unclean thing whatever. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p24"> Now there was both a literal and a figurative reason for these uncleannesses. The literal reason was taken from the reverence + due to those things that belong to the divine worship: both because men are not wont, when unclean, to touch precious things: + and in order that by rarely approaching sacred things they might have greater respect for them. For since man could seldom + avoid all the aforesaid uncleannesses, the result was that men could seldom approach to touch things + belonging to the worship of God, so that when they did approach, they did so with greater reverence and humility. Moreover, + in some of these the literal reason was that men should not be kept away from worshipping God through fear of coming in contact + with lepers and others similarly afflicted with loathsome and contagious diseases. In others, again, the reason was to avoid + idolatrous worship: because in their sacrificial rites the Gentiles sometimes employed human blood and seed. All these + bodily uncleannesses were purified either by the mere sprinkling of water, or, in the case of those which were more grievous, + by some sacrifice of expiation for the sin which was the occasion of the uncleanness in question. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p25"> The figurative reason for these uncleannesses was that they were figures of various sins. For the uncleanness of any corpse + signifies the uncleanness of sin, which is the death of the soul. The uncleanness of leprosy betokened the uncleanness of + heretical doctrine: both because heretical doctrine is contagious just as leprosy is, and because no doctrine is so false + as not to have some truth mingled with error, just as on the surface of a leprous body one may distinguish the + healthy parts from those that are infected. The uncleanness of a woman suffering from a flow of blood denotes the uncleanness + of idolatry, on account of the blood which is offered up. The uncleanness of the man who has suffered seminal loss signifies + the uncleanness of empty words, for "the seed is the word of God." The uncleanness of sexual intercourse and of the woman + in child-birth signifies the uncleanness of original sin. The uncleanness of the woman in her periods signifies the + uncleanness of a mind that is sensualized by pleasure. Speaking generally, the uncleanness contracted by touching an unclean + thing denotes the uncleanness arising from consent in another's sin, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p25.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.17" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:17</a>: "Go out from among them, and be ye separate . . . and touch not the unclean thing." + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p26"> Moreover, this uncleanness arising from the touch was contracted even by inanimate objects; for whatever was touched in any + way by an unclean man, became itself unclean. Wherein the Law attenuated the superstition of the Gentiles, who held that uncleanness + was contracted not only by touch, but also by speech or looks, as Rabbi Moses states (Doct. Perplex. iii) of a woman in her + periods. The mystical sense of this was that "to God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p26.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.9" target="asv">Wis. 14:9</a>). + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p27"> There was also an uncleanness of inanimate things considered in themselves, such as the uncleanness of leprosy in a house + or in clothes. For just as leprosy occurs in men through a corrupt humor causing putrefaction and corruption in the flesh; + so, too, through some corruption and excess of humidity or dryness, there arises sometimes a kind of corruption in the stones + with which a house is built, or in clothes. Hence the Law called this corruption by the name of leprosy, whereby + a house or a garment was deemed to be unclean: both because all corruption savored of uncleanness, as stated above, and because + the Gentiles worshipped their household gods as a preservative against this corruption. Hence the Law prescribed such houses, + where this kind of corruption was of a lasting nature, to be destroyed; and such garments to be burnt, in order to avoid all + occasion of idolatry. There was also an uncleanness of vessels, of which it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p27.1" href="./asv.html#Num.19.15" target="asv">Num. + 19:15 + </a>): "The vessel that hath no cover, and binding over it, shall be unclean." The cause of this uncleanness was that anything + unclean might easily drop into such vessels, so as to render them unclean. Moreover, this command aimed at the prevention + of idolatry. For idolaters believed that if mice, lizards, or the like, which they used to sacrifice to the idols, fell into + the vessels or into the water, these became more pleasing to the gods. Even now some women let down uncovered + vessels in honor of the nocturnal deities which they call "Janae." + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p28"> The figurative reason of these uncleannesses is that the leprosy of a house signified the uncleanness of the assembly of + heretics; the leprosy of a linen garment signified an evil life arising from bitterness of mind; the leprosy of a woolen garment + denoted the wickedness of flatterers; leprosy in the warp signified the vices of the soul; leprosy on the woof denoted sins + of the flesh, for as the warp is in the woof, so is the soul in the body. The vessel that has neither cover + nor binding, betokens a man who lacks the veil of taciturnity, and who is unrestrained by any severity of discipline. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="38076" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38076] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, purificationes veteris legis +ordinabantur ad removendum impedimenta cultus divini. Qui quidem +est duplex, scilicet spiritualis, qui consistit in devotione mentis +ad Deum; et corporalis, qui consistit in sacrificiis et +oblationibus et aliis huiusmodi. A cultu autem spirituali +impediuntur homines per peccata, quibus homines pollui dicebantur, +sicut per idololatriam et homicidium, per adulteria et incestus. Et +ab istis pollutionibus purificabantur homines per aliqua sacrificia +vel communiter oblata pro tota multitudine, vel etiam pro peccatis +singulorum. Non quod sacrificia illa carnalia haberent ex seipsis +virtutem expiandi peccatum, sed quia significabant expiationem +peccatorum futuram per Christum, cuius participes erant etiam +antiqui, protestantes fidem redemptoris in figuris sacrificiorum. A +cultu vero exteriori impediebantur homines per quasdam immunditias +corporales, quae quidem primo considerabantur in hominibus; +consequenter etiam in aliis animalibus, et in vestimentis et +domibus et vasis. In hominibus quidem immunditia reputabatur partim +quidem ex ipsis hominibus; partim autem ex contactu rerum +immundarum. Ex ipsis autem hominibus immundum reputabatur omne +illud quod corruptionem aliquam iam habebat, vel erat corruptioni +expositum. Et ideo, quia mors est corruptio quaedam, cadaver +hominis reputabatur immundum. Similiter etiam, quia lepra ex +corruptione humorum contingit, qui etiam exterius erumpunt et alios +inficiunt, leprosi etiam reputabantur immundi. Similiter etiam +mulieres patientes sanguinis fluxum, sive per infirmitatem, sive +etiam per naturam vel temporibus menstruis vel etiam tempore +conceptionis. Et eadem ratione viri reputabantur immundi fluxum +seminis patientes, vel per infirmitatem, vel per pollutionem +nocturnam, vel etiam per coitum. Nam omnis humiditas praedictis +modis ab homine egrediens, quandam immundam infectionem habet. +Inerat etiam hominibus immunditia quaedam ex contactu quarumcumque +rerum immundarum. Istarum autem immunditiarum ratio erat et +litteralis, et figuralis. Litteralis quidem, propter reverentiam +eorum quae ad divinum cultum pertinent. Tum quia homines pretiosas +res contingere non solent cum fuerint immundi. Tum etiam ut ex raro +accessu ad sacra, ea magis venerarentur. Cum enim omnes huiusmodi +immunditias raro aliquis cavere possit, contingebat quod raro +poterant homines accedere ad attingendum ea quae pertinebant ad +divinum cultum, et sic quando accedebant, cum maiori reverentia et +humilitate mentis accedebant. Erat autem in quibusdam horum ratio +litteralis ut homines non reformidarent accedere ad divinum cultum, +quasi refugientes consortium leprosorum et similium infirmorum, +quorum morbus abominabilis erat et contagiosus. In quibusdam etiam +ratio erat ad vitandum idololatriae cultum, quia gentiles in ritu +suorum sacrificiorum utebantur quandoque humano sanguine et semine. +Omnes autem huiusmodi immunditiae corporales purificabantur vel per +solam aspersionem aquae, vel quae maiores erant, per aliquod +sacrificium ad expiandum peccatum, ex quo tales infirmitates +contingebant. Ratio autem figuralis harum immunditiarum fuit quia +per huiusmodi exteriores immunditias figurabantur diversa peccata. +Nam immunditia cadaveris cuiuscumque significat immunditiam +peccati, quod est mors animae. Immunditia autem leprae significat +immunditiam haereticae doctrinae, tum quia haeretica doctrina +contagiosa est, sicut et lepra; tum etiam quia nulla falsa doctrina +est quae vera falsis non admisceat, sicut etiam in superficie +corporis leprosi apparet quaedam distinctio quarundam macularum ab +alia carne integra. Per immunditiam vero mulieris sanguinifluae, +designatur immunditia idololatriae, propter immolatitium cruorem. +Per immunditiam vero viri seminiflui, designatur immunditia vanae +locutionis, eo quod semen est verbum Dei. Per immunditiam vero +coitus, et mulieris parientis, designatur immunditia peccati +originalis. Per immunditiam vero mulieris menstruatae, designatur +immunditia mentis per voluptates emollitae. Universaliter vero per +immunditiam contactus rei immundae designatur immunditia consensus +in peccatum alterius; secundum illud II ad Cor. VI, <i>exite de +medio eorum et separamini, et immundum ne tetigeritis</i>. +Huiusmodi autem immunditia contactus derivabatur etiam ad res +inanimatas, quidquid enim quocumque modo tangebat immundus, +immundum erat. In quo lex attenuavit superstitionem gentilium, qui +non solum per contactum immundi dicebant immunditiam contrahi, sed +etiam per collocutionem aut per aspectum, ut Rabbi Moyses dicit de +muliere menstruata. Per hoc autem mystice significabatur id quod +dicitur Sap. XIV, <i>similiter odio sunt Deo impius et impietas +eius</i>. Erat autem et immunditia quaedam ipsarum rerum +inanimatarum secundum se, sicut erat immunditia leprae in domo et +in vestimentis. Sicut enim morbus leprae accidit in hominibus ex +humore corrupto putrefaciente carnem et corrumpente, ita etiam +propter aliquam corruptionem et excessum humiditatis vel +siccitatis, fit quandoque aliqua corrosio in lapidibus domus, vel +etiam in vestimento. Et ideo hanc corruptionem vocabat lex lepram, +ex qua domus vel vestis immunda iudicaretur. Tum quia omnis +corruptio ad immunditiam pertinebat, ut dictum est. Tum etiam quia +contra huiusmodi corruptionem gentiles deos Penates colebant, et +ideo lex praecepit huiusmodi domus, in quibus fuerit talis +corruptio perseverans, destrui, et vestes comburi, ad tollendam +idololatriae occasionem. Erat etiam et quaedam immunditia vasorum, +de qua dicitur Num. XIX, vas quod <i>non habuerit cooperculum et +ligaturam desuper, immundum erit</i>. Cuius immunditiae causa est +quia in talia vasa de facili poterat aliquid immundum cadere, unde +poterant immundari. Erat etiam hoc praeceptum ad declinandam +idololatriam, credebant enim idololatrae quod, si mures aut +lacertae, vel aliquid huiusmodi, quae immolabant idolis, cito +caderent in vasa vel in aquas, quod essent diis gratiosa. Adhuc +etiam aliquae mulierculae vasa dimittunt discooperta in obsequium +nocturnorum numinum, quae ianas vocant. Harum autem immunditiarum +ratio est figuralis quia per lepram domus significatur immunditia +congregationis haereticorum. Per lepram vero in veste linea +significatur perversitas morum ex amaritudine mentis. Per lepram +vero vestis laneae significatur perversitas adulatorum. Per lepram +in stamine significantur vitia animae, per lepram vero in +subtegmine significantur peccata carnalia, sicut enim stamen est in +subtegmine, ita anima in corpore. Per vas autem quod non habet +operculum nec ligaturam, significatur homo qui non habet aliquod +velamen taciturnitatis, et qui non constringitur aliqua censura +disciplinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p29"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> As stated above (ad 4), there was a twofold uncleanness in the Law; one by way of corruption in the mind or in the body; + and this was the graver uncleanness; the other was by mere contact with an unclean thing, and this was less grave, and was + more easily expiated. Because the former uncleanness was expiated by sacrifices for sins, since all corruption is due to sin, + and signifies sin: whereas the latter uncleanness was expiated by the mere sprinkling + of a certain water, of which water we read in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p29.1" href="./asv.html#Num.19" target="asv">Num. 19</a>. For there God commanded them to take a red cow in memory of the sin they had committed in worshipping a calf. And a cow + is mentioned rather than a calf, because it was thus that the Lord was wont to designate the synagogue, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p29.2" href="./asv.html#Hos.4.16" target="asv"> Osee 4:16</a>: "Israel hath gone astray like a wanton heifer": and this was, perhaps, because they worshipped heifers after the custom + of Egypt, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p29.3" href="./asv.html#Hos.10.5" target="asv">Osee 10:5</a>: "(They) have + worshipped the kine of Bethaven." And in detestation of the sin of idolatry it was sacrificed outside the camp; in fact, whenever + sacrifice was offered up in expiation of the multitude of sins, it was all burnt outside the camp. Moreover, in order to show + that this sacrifice cleansed the people from all their sins, "the priest" dipped "his finger in her blood," and sprinkled + "it over against the door of the tabernacle seven times"; for the number seven signified universality. Further, the very + sprinkling of blood pertained to the detestation of idolatry, in which the blood that was offered up was not poured out, but + was collected together, and men gathered round it to eat in honor of the idols. Likewise it was burnt by fire, either because + God appeared to Moses in a fire, and the Law was given from the midst of fire; or to denote that idolatry, together with all + that was connected therewith, was to be extirpated altogether; just as the cow was burnt "with her skin and her flesh, her + blood and dung being delivered to the flames." To this burning were added "cedar-wood, and hyssop, and scarlet twice dyed," + to signify that just as cedar-wood is not liable to putrefaction, and scarlet twice dyed does not easily lose its color, and + hyssop retains its odor after it has been dried; so also was this sacrifice for the preservation of the whole people, and + for their good behavior and devotion. Hence it is said of the ashes of the cow: "That they may be reserved for the multitude + of + the children of Israel." Or, according to Josephus (Antiq. iii, 8,9,10), the four elements are indicated here: for "cedar-wood" + was added to the fire, to signify the earth, on account of its earthiness; "hyssop," to signify the air, on account of its + smell; "scarlet twice dyed," to signify water, for the same reason as purple, on account of the dyes which are taken out of + the water: thus denoting the fact that this sacrifice was offered to the Creator of the four elements. And since this + sacrifice was offered for the sin of idolatry, both "he that burned her," and "he that gathered up the ashes," and "he that + sprinkled the water" in which the ashes were placed, were deemed unclean in detestation of that sin, in order to show that + whatever was in any way connected with idolatry should be cast aside as being unclean. From this uncleanness they were purified + by the mere washing of their clothes; nor did they need to be sprinkled with the water on account of this kind of + uncleanness, because otherwise the process would have been unending, since he that sprinkled the water became unclean, so + that if he were to sprinkle himself he would remain unclean; and if another were to sprinkle him, that one would have become + unclean, and in like manner, whoever might sprinkle him, and so on indefinitely. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p30"> The figurative reason of this sacrifice was that the red cow signified Christ in respect his assumed weakness, denoted by + the female sex; while the color of the cow designated the blood of His Passion. And the "red cow was of full age," because + all Christ's works are perfect, "in which there" was "no blemish"; "and which" had "not carried the yoke," because Christ + was innocent, nor did He carry the yoke of sin. It was commanded to be taken to Moses, because they blamed Him for + transgressing the law of Moses by breaking the Sabbath. And it was commanded to be delivered "to Eleazar the priest," because + Christ was delivered into the hands of the priests to be slain. It was immolated "without the camp," because Christ "suffered + outside the gate" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p30.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.13.12" target="asv">Heb. 13:12</a>). And the priest dipped "his finger in her blood," because the mystery of Christ's Passion should be considered and imitated. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p31"> It was sprinkled "over against . . . the tabernacle," which denotes the synagogue, to signify either the condemnation of + the unbelieving Jews, or the purification of believers; and this "seven times," in token either of the seven gifts of the + Holy Ghost, or of the seven days wherein all time is comprised. Again, all things that pertain to the Incarnation of Christ + should be burnt with fire, i.e. they should be understood spiritually; for the "skin" and "flesh" signified Christ's + outward works; the "blood" denoted the subtle inward force which quickened His external deeds; the "dung" betokened His weariness, + His thirst, and all such like things pertaining to His weakness. Three things were added, viz. "cedar-wood," which denotes + the height of hope or contemplation; "hyssop," in token of humility or faith; "scarlet twice dyed," which denotes twofold + charity; for it is by these three that we should cling to Christ suffering. The ashes of this burning were gathered by "a + man that is clean," because the relics of the Passion came into the possession of the Gentiles, who were not guilty of Christ's + death. The ashes were put into water for the purpose of expiation, because Baptism receives from Christ's Passion the power + of washing away sins. The priest who immolated and burned the cow, and he who burned, and he who gathered together the ashes, + were unclean, as also he that sprinkled the water: either because the Jews became unclean through putting Christ to + death, whereby our sins are expiated; and this, until the evening, i.e. until the end of the world, when the remnants of Israel + will be converted; or else because they who handle sacred things with a view to the cleansing of others contract certain uncleannesses, + as Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 5); and this until the evening, i.e. until the end of this life. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 ad 5"><a name="38077" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38077] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, duplex erat immunditia in lege. +Una quidem per aliquam corruptionem mentis vel corporis, et haec +immunditia maior erat. Alia vero erat immunditia ex solo contactu +rei immundae, et haec minor erat, et faciliori ritu expiabatur. Nam +immunditia prima expiabatur sacrificio pro peccato, quia omnis +corruptio ex peccato procedit et peccatum significat, sed secunda +immunditia expiabatur per solam aspersionem aquae cuiusdam, de qua +quidem aqua expiationis habetur Num. XIX. Mandatur enim ibi a +domino quod accipiant vaccam rufam, in memoriam peccati quod +commiserunt in adoratione vituli. Et dicitur vacca magis quam +vitulus, quia sic dominus synagogam vocare consuevit; secundum +illud Osee IV, sicut vacca lasciviens declinavit Israel. Et hoc +forte ideo quia vaccas in morem Aegyptii, coluerunt; secundum illud +Osee X, vaccas Bethaven coluerunt. Et in detestationem peccati +idololatriae, immolabatur extra castra. Et ubicumque sacrificium +fiebat pro expiatione multitudinis peccatorum, cremabatur extra +castra totum. Et ut significaretur per hoc sacrificium emundari +populus ab universitate peccatorum, intingebat sacerdos digitum in +sanguine eius, et aspergebat contra fores sanctuarii septem +vicibus, quia septenarius universitatem significat. Et ipsa etiam +aspersio sanguinis pertinebat ad detestationem idololatriae, in qua +sanguis immolatitius non effundebatur, sed congregabatur, et circa +ipsum homines comedebant in honorem idolorum. Comburebatur autem in +igne. Vel quia Deus Moysi in igne apparuit, et in igne data est +lex. Vel quia per hoc significabatur quod idololatria totaliter +erat extirpanda, et omne quod ad idololatriam pertinebat, sicut +vacca cremabatur, tam pelle et carnibus, quam sanguine et fimo, +flammae traditis. Adiungebatur etiam in combustione lignum +cedrinum, hyssopus, coccusque bis tinctus, ad significandum quod, +sicut ligna cedrina non de facili putrescunt, et coccus bis tinctus +non amittit colorem, et hyssopus retinet odorem etiam postquam +fuerit desiccatus; ita etiam hoc sacrificium erat in conservationem +ipsius populi, et honestatis et devotionis ipsius. Unde dicitur de +cineribus vaccae, <i>ut sint multitudini filiorum Israel in +custodiam</i>. Vel, secundum Iosephum, quatuor elementa significata +sunt, igni enim apponebatur cedrus, significans terram, propter sui +terrestreitatem; hyssopus, significans aerem, propter odorem; +coccus, significans aquam, eadem ratione qua et purpura, propter +tincturas, quae ex aquis sumuntur, ut per hoc exprimeretur quod +illud sacrificium offerebatur creatori quatuor elementorum. Et quia +huiusmodi sacrificium offerebatur pro peccato idololatriae, in eius +detestationem et comburens, et cineres colligens, et ille qui +aspergit aquas in quibus cinis ponebatur, immundi reputabantur, ut +per hoc ostenderetur quod quidquid quocumque modo ad idololatriam +pertinet, quasi immundum est abiiciendum. Ab hac autem immunditia +purificabantur per solam ablutionem vestimentorum, nec indigebant +aqua aspergi propter huiusmodi immunditiam, quia sic esset +processus in infinitum. Ille enim qui aspergebat aquam, immundus +fiebat, et sic si ipse seipsum aspergeret, immundus remaneret; si +autem alius eum aspergeret, ille immundus esset; et similiter ille +qui illum aspergeret, et sic in infinitum. Figuralis autem ratio +huius sacrificii est quia per vaccam rufam significatur Christus +secundum infirmitatem assumptam, quam femininus sexus designat. +Sanguinem passionis eius designat vaccae color. Erat autem vacca +rufa aetatis integrae, quia omnis operatio Christi est perfecta. In +qua nulla erat macula, nec portavit iugum, quia non portavit iugum +peccati. Praecipitur autem adduci ad Moysen, quia imputabant ei +transgressionem Mosaicae legis in violatione sabbati. Praecipitur +etiam tradi Eleazaro sacerdoti, quia Christus occidendus in manus +sacerdotum traditus est. Immolatur autem extra castra, quia extra +portam Christus passus est. Intingit autem sacerdos digitum in +sanguine eius, quia per discretionem, quam digitus significat, +mysterium passionis Christi est considerandum et imitandum. +Aspergitur autem contra tabernaculum, per quod synagoga designatur, +vel ad condemnationem Iudaeorum non credentium; vel ad +purificationem credentium. Et hoc septem vicibus, vel propter +septem dona spiritus sancti; vel propter septem dies, in quibus +omne tempus intelligitur. Sunt autem omnia quae ad Christi +incarnationem pertinent, igne cremanda, idest spiritualiter +intelligenda, nam per pellem et carnem exterior Christi operatio +significatur; per sanguinem, subtilis et interna virtus exteriora +vivificans; per fimum, lassitudo, sitis, et omnia huiusmodi ad +infirmitatem pertinentia. Adduntur autem tria, cedrus, quod +significat altitudinem spei, vel contemplationis; hyssopus, quod +significat humilitatem, vel fidem; coccus bis tinctus, quod +significat geminam caritatem; per haec enim debemus Christo passo +adhaerere. Iste autem cinis combustionis colligitur a viro mundo, +quia reliquiae passionis pervenerunt ad gentiles, qui non fuerunt +culpabiles in Christi morte. Apponuntur autem cineres in aqua ad +expiandum, quia ex passione Christi Baptismus sortitur virtutem +emundandi peccata. Sacerdos autem qui immolabat et comburebat +vaccam, et ille qui comburebat, et qui colligebat cineres, immundus +erat, et etiam qui aspergebat aquam, vel quia Iudaei facti sunt +immundi ex occisione Christi, per quam nostra peccata expiantur; et +hoc usque ad vesperum, idest usque ad finem mundi, quando reliquiae +Israel convertentur. Vel quia illi qui tractant sancta intendentes +ad emundationem aliorum, ipsi etiam aliquas immunditias contrahunt, +ut Gregorius dicit, in pastorali; et hoc usque ad vesperum, idest +usque ad finem praesentis vitae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p32"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> As stated above (ad 5), an uncleanness which was caused by corruption either of mind or of body was expiated by sin-offerings. + Now special sacrifices were wont to be offered for the sins of individuals: but since some were neglectful about expiating + such sins and uncleannesses; or, through ignorance, failed to offer this expiation; it was laid down that once a year, on + the tenth day of the seventh month, a sacrifice of expiation should be offered for + the whole people. And because, as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p32.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.28" target="asv">Heb. 7:28</a>), "the Law maketh men priests, who have infirmity," it behooved the priest first of all to offer a calf for his own sins, + in memory of Aaron's sin in fashioning the molten calf; and besides, to offer a ram for a holocaust, which signified that + the priestly sovereignty denoted by the ram, who is the head of the flock, was to be ordained to the glory of God. Then he + offered two he-goats for the people: one of which + was offered in expiation of the sins of the multitude. For the he-goat is an evil-smelling animal; and from its skin clothes + are made having a pungent odor; to signify the stench, uncleanness and the sting of sin. After this he-goat had been immolated, + its blood was taken, together with the blood of the calf, into the Holy of Holies, and the entire sanctuary was sprinkled + with it; to signify that the tabernacle was cleansed from the uncleanness of the children of Israel. But the corpses of the + he-goat and calf which had been offered up for sin had to be burnt, to denote the destruction of sins. They were not, however, + burnt on the altar: since none but holocausts were burnt thereon; but it was prescribed that they should be burnt without + the camp, in detestation of sin: for this was done whenever sacrifice was offered for a grievous sin, or for the multitude + of sins. The other goat was let loose into the wilderness: not indeed to offer it to the demons, whom the Gentiles worshipped + in desert places, because it was unlawful to offer aught to them; but in order to point out the effect of the sacrifice which + had been offered up. Hence the priest put his hand on its head, while confessing the sins of the children of Israel: as though + that goat were to carry them away into the wilderness, where it would be devoured by wild beasts, because it bore the punishment + of the people's sins. And it was said to bear the sins of the people, either because the forgiveness of the people's + sins was signified by its being let loose, or because on its head written lists of sins were fastened. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p33"> The figurative reason of these things was that Christ was foreshadowed both by the calf, on account of His power; and by + the ram, because He is the Head of the faithful; and by the he-goat, on account of "the likeness of sinful flesh" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p33.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.3" target="asv">Rom. 8:3</a>). Moreover, Christ was sacrificed for the sins of both priests and people: since both those of high and those of low degree + are cleansed from sin by His Passion. The blood of the calf and of the goat was brought into + the Holies by the priest, because the entrance to the kingdom of heaven was opened to us by the blood of Christ's Passion. + Their bodies were burnt without the camp, because "Christ suffered without the gate," as the Apostle declares ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p33.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.13.12" target="asv">Heb. 13:12</a>). The scape-goat may denote either Christ's Godhead Which went away into solitude when the Man Christ suffered, not by going + to another place, but by restraining His power: or it may signify the base concupiscence which we ought to + cast away from ourselves, while we offer up to Our Lord acts of virtue. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p34"> With regard to the uncleanness contracted by those who burnt these sacrifices, the reason is the same as that which we assigned + (ad 5) to the sacrifice of the red heifer. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 ad 6"><a name="38078" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38078] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, immunditia quae ex corruptione +proveniebat vel mentis vel corporis, expiabatur per sacrificia pro +peccato. Offerebantur autem specialia sacrificia pro peccatis +singulorum, sed quia aliqui negligentes erant circa expiationem +huiusmodi peccatorum et immunditiarum; vel etiam propter +ignorantiam ab expiatione huiusmodi desistebant; institutum fuit ut +semel in anno, decima die septimi mensis, fieret sacrificium +expiationis pro toto populo. Et quia, sicut apostolus dicit, ad +Heb. VII, <i>lex constituit homines sacerdotes infirmitatem +habentes</i>, oportebat quod sacerdos prius offerret pro seipso +vitulum pro peccato, in commemorationem peccati quod Aaron fecerat +in conflatione vituli aurei; et arietem in holocaustum, per quod +significabatur quod sacerdotis praelatio, quam aries designat, qui +est dux gregis, erat ordinanda ad honorem Dei. Deinde autem +offerebat pro populo duos hircos. Quorum unus immolabatur, ad +expiandum peccatum multitudinis. Hircus enim animal fetidum est, et +de pilis eius fiunt vestimenta pungentia, ut per hoc significaretur +fetor et immunditia et aculei peccatorum. Huius autem hirci +immolati sanguis inferebatur, simul etiam cum sanguine vituli, in +sancta sanctorum, et aspergebatur ex eo totum sanctuarium, ad +significandum quod tabernaculum emundabatur ab immunditiis filiorum +Israel. Corpus vero hirci et vituli quae immolata sunt pro peccato, +oportebat comburi, ad ostendendum consumptionem peccatorum. Non +autem in altari, quia ibi non comburebantur totaliter nisi +holocausta. Unde mandatum erat ut comburerentur extra castra, in +detestationem peccati, hoc enim fiebat quandocumque immolabatur +sacrificium pro aliquo gravi peccato, vel pro multitudine +peccatorum. Alter vero hircus emittebatur in desertum, non quidem +ut offerretur Daemonibus, quos colebant gentiles in desertis, quia +eis nihil licebat immolari; sed ad designandum effectum illius +sacrificii immolati. Et ideo sacerdos imponebat manum super caput +eius, confitens peccata filiorum Israel, ac si ille hircus +deportaret ea in desertum, ubi a bestiis comederetur, quasi portans +poenam pro peccatis populi. Dicebatur autem portare peccata populi, +vel quia in eius emissione significabatur remissio peccatorum +populi, vel quia colligabatur super caput eius aliqua schedula ubi +erant scripta peccata. Ratio autem figuralis horum erat quia +Christus significatur et per vitulum, propter virtutem; et per +arietem, quia ipse est dux fidelium; et per hircum, propter +similitudinem carnis peccati. Et ipse Christus est immolatus pro +peccatis et sacerdotum et populi, quia per eius passionem et +maiores et minores a peccato mundantur. Sanguis autem vituli et +hirci infertur in sancta per pontificem, quia per sanguinem +passionis Christi patet nobis introitus in regnum caelorum. +Comburuntur autem eorum corpora extra castra, quia extra portam +Christus passus est, ut apostolus dicit, ad Heb. ult. Per hircum +autem qui emittebatur, potest significari vel ipsa divinitas +Christi, quae in solitudinem abiit, homine Christo patiente, non +quidem locum mutans, sed virtutem cohibens, vel significatur +concupiscentia mala, quam debemus a nobis abiicere, virtuosos autem +motus domino immolare. De immunditia vero eorum qui huiusmodi +sacrificia comburebant, eadem ratio est quae in sacrificio vitulae +rufae dicta est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p35"> + <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> The legal rite did not cleanse the leper of his deformity, but declared him to be cleansed. This is shown by the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p35.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.14.3" target="asv"> Lev. 14:3, </a> seqq., where it was said that the priest, "when he shall find that the leprosy is cleansed," shall command "him that is to + be purified": consequently, the leper was already healed: but he was said to be purified in so far as the verdict of the priest + restored him to the society of men and to the + worship of God. It happened sometimes, however, that bodily leprosy was miraculously cured by the legal rite, when the priest + erred in his judgment. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p36"> Now this purification of a leper was twofold: for, in the first place, he was declared to be clean; and, secondly, he was + restored, as clean, to the society of men and to the worship of God, to wit, after seven days. At the first purification the + leper who sought to be cleansed offered for himself "two living sparrows . . . cedar-wood, and scarlet, and hyssop," in such + wise that a sparrow and the hyssop should be tied to the cedar-wood with a scarlet thread, so that the + cedar-wood was like the handle of an aspersory: while the hyssop and sparrow were that part of the aspersory which was dipped + into the blood of the other sparrow which was "immolated . . . over living waters." These things he offered as an antidote + to the four defects of leprosy: for cedar-wood, which is not subject to putrefaction, was offered against the putrefaction; + hyssop, which is a sweet-smelling herb, was offered up against the stench; a living sparrow was offered up against numbness; + and scarlet, which has a vivid color, was offered up against the repulsive color of leprosy. The living sparrow was let loose + to fly away into the plain, because the leper was restored to his former liberty. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p37"> On the eighth day he was admitted to divine worship, and was restored to the society of men; but only after having shaved + all the hair of his body, and washed his clothes, because leprosy rots the hair, infects the clothes, and gives them an evil + smell. Afterwards a sacrifice was offered for his sin, since leprosy was frequently a result of sin: and some of the blood + of the sacrifice was put on the tip of the ear of the man that was to be cleansed, "and on the thumb of his right + hand, and the great toe of his right foot"; because it is in these parts that leprosy is first diagnosed and felt. In this + rite, moreover, three liquids were employed: viz. blood, against the corruption of the blood; oil, to denote the healing of + the disease; and living waters, to wash away the filth. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p38"> The figurative reason was that the Divine and human natures in Christ were denoted by the two sparrows, one of which, in + likeness of His human nature, was offered up in an earthen vessel over living waters, because the waters of Baptism are sanctified + by Christ's Passion. The other sparrow, in token of His impassible Godhead, remained living, because the Godhead cannot die: + hence it flew away, for the Godhead could not be encompassed by the Passion. Now this living sparrow, + together with the cedar-wood and scarlet or cochineal, and hyssop, i.e. faith, hope and charity, as stated above (ad 5), was + put into the water for the purpose of sprinkling, because we are baptized in the faith of the God-Man. By the waters of Baptism + or of his tears man washes his clothes, i.e. his works, and all his hair, i.e. his thoughts. The tip of the right ear of the + man to be cleansed is moistened with some the blood and oil, in order to strengthen his hearing against harmful words; + and the thumb and toe of his right hand and foot are moistened that his deeds may be holy. Other matters pertaining to this + purification, or to that also of any other uncleannesses, call for no special remark, beyond what applies to other sacrifices, + whether for sins or for trespasses. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 ad 7"><a name="38079" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38079] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 ad 7</span></a> Ad septimum +dicendum quod per ritum legis leprosus non emundabatur a macula +leprae, sed emundatus ostendebatur. Et hoc significatur Lev. XIV, +cum dicitur de sacerdote, <i>cum invenerit lepram esse emundatam, +praecipiet ei qui purificatur</i>. Iam ergo lepra mundata erat, sed +purificari dicebatur, inquantum iudicio sacerdotis restituebatur +consortio hominum et cultui divino. Contingebat tamen quandoque ut +divino miraculo per ritum legis corporalis mundaretur lepra, quando +sacerdos decipiebatur in iudicio. Huiusmodi autem purificatio +leprosi dupliciter fiebat, nam primo, iudicabatur esse mundus; +secundo autem, restituebatur tanquam mundus consortio hominum et +cultui divino, scilicet post septem dies. In prima autem +purificatione offerebat pro se leprosus mundandus duos passeres +vivos, et lignum cedrinum, et vermiculum, et hyssopum; hoc modo ut +filo coccineo ligarentur passer et hyssopus simul cum ligno +cedrino, ita scilicet quod lignum cedrinum esset quasi manubrium +aspersorii. Hyssopus vero et passer erant id quod de aspersorio +tingebatur in sanguine alterius passeris immolati in aquis vivis. +Haec autem quatuor offerebat contra quatuor defectus leprae, nam +contra putredinem, offerebatur cedrus, quae est arbor imputribilis; +contra fetorem, hyssopus, quae est herba odorifera; contra +insensibilitatem, passer vivus; contra turpitudinem coloris, +vermiculus, qui habet vivum colorem. Passer vero vivus avolare +dimittebatur in agrum, quia leprosus restituebatur pristinae +libertati. In octavo vero die admittebatur ad cultum divinum, et +restituebatur consortio hominum. Primo tamen rasis pilis totius +corporis et vestimentis, eo quod lepra pilos corrodit, et +vestimenta inquinat et fetida reddit. Et postmodum sacrificium +offerebatur pro delicto eius, quia lepra plerumque inducitur pro +peccato. De sanguine autem sacrificii tingebatur extremum auriculae +eius qui erat mundandus, et pollices manus dextrae et pedis, quia +in istis partibus primum lepra dignoscitur et sentitur. +Adhibebantur etiam huic ritui tres liquores, scilicet sanguis, +contra sanguinis corruptionem; oleum, ad designandam sanationem +morbi; aqua viva, ad emundandum spurcitiem. Figuralis autem ratio +erat quia per duos passeres significantur divinitas et humanitas +Christi. Quorum unus, scilicet humanitas, immolatur in vase fictili +super aquas viventes, quia per passionem Christi aquae Baptismi +consecrantur. Alius autem, scilicet impassibilis divinitas, vivus +remanebat, quia divinitas mori non potest. Unde et avolabat, quia +passione astringi non poterat. Hic autem passer vivus, simul cum +ligno cedrino et cocco, vel vermiculo, et hyssopo, idest fide, spe +et caritate, ut supra dictum est, mittitur in aquam ad aspergendum, +quia in fide Dei et hominis baptizamur. Lavat autem homo, per aquam +Baptismi vel lacrymarum, vestimenta sua, idest opera, et omnes +pilos, idest cogitationes. Tingitur autem extremum auriculae +dextrae eius qui mundatur, de sanguine et de oleo, ut eius auditum +muniat contra corrumpentia verba, pollices autem manus dextrae et +pedis tinguntur, ut sit eius actio sancta. Alia vero quae ad hanc +purificationem pertinent, vel etiam aliarum immunditiarum, non +habent aliquid speciale praeter alia sacrificia pro peccatis vel +pro delictis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p39"><b>Reply to Objections 8&9</b> Just as the people were initiated by circumcision to the divine worship, so were the ministers by some + special purification or consecration: wherefore they are commanded to be separated from other men, as being specially deputed, + rather than others, to the ministry of the divine worship. And all that was done touching them in their consecration or institution, + was with a view to show that they were in possession of a prerogative of purity, power and dignity. + Hence three things were done in the institution of ministers: for first, they were purified; secondly, they were adorned [*'Ornabantur.' + Some editions have 'ordinabantur'---'were ordained': the former reading is a reference to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p39.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.8.7" target="asv"> Lev. 8:7-9</a>] and consecrated; thirdly, they were employed in the ministry. All in general used to be purified by washing in water, and + by certain sacrifices; but the Levites in particular shaved all the hair of their bodies, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p39.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.8" target="asv">Lev. 8</a> (cf. + + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p39.3" href="./asv.html#Num.8" target="asv">Num. 8</a>). + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p40"> With regard to the high-priests and priests the consecration was performed as follows. First, when they had been washed, + they were clothed with certain special garments in designation of their dignity. In particular, the high-priest was anointed + on the head with the oil of unction: to denote that the power of consecration was poured forth by him on to others, just as + oil flows from the head on to the lower parts of the body; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p40.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.132.2" target="asv"> Ps. 132:2</a>: "Like the + precious ointment on the head that ran down upon the beard, the beard of Aaron." But the Levites received no other consecration + besides being offered to the Lord by the children of Israel through the hands of the high-priest, who prayed for them. The + lesser priests were consecrated on the hands only, which were to be employed in the sacrifices. The tip of their right ear + and the thumb of their right hand, and the great toe of their right foot were tinged with the blood of the sacrificial + animal, to denote that they should be obedient to God's law in offering the sacrifices (this is denoted by touching their + right ear); and that they should be careful and ready in performing the sacrifices (this is signified by the moistening of + the right foot and hand). They themselves and their garments were sprinkled with the blood of the animal that had been sacrificed, + in memory of the blood of the lamb by which they had been delivered in Egypt. At their consecration the following + sacrifices were offered: a calf, for sin, in memory of Aaron's sin in fashioning the molten calf; a ram, for a holocaust, + in memory of the sacrifice of Abraham, whose obedience it behooved the high-priest to imitate; again, a ram of consecration, + which was a peace-offering, in memory of the delivery form Egypt through the blood of the lamb; and a basket of bread, in + memory of the manna vouchsafed to the people. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p41"> In reference to their being destined to the ministry, the fat of the ram, one roll of bread, and the right shoulder were + placed on their hands, to show that they received the power of offering these things to the Lord: while the Levites were initiated + to the ministry by being brought into the tabernacle of the covenant, as being destined to the ministry touching the vessels + of the sanctuary. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p42"> The figurative reason of these things was that those who are to be consecrated to the spiritual ministry of Christ, should + be first of all purified by the waters of Baptism, and by the waters of tears, in their faith in Christ's Passion, which is + a sacrifice both of expiation and of purification. They have also to shave all the hair of their body, i.e. all evil thoughts. + They should, moreover, be decked with virtues, and be consecrated with the oil of the Holy Ghost, and with + the sprinkling of Christ's blood. And thus they should be intent on the fulfilment of their spiritual ministry. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 ad 8"><a name="38080" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38080] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 ad 8</span></a> Ad octavum +et nonum dicendum quod, sicut populus instituebatur ad cultum Dei +per circumcisionem, ita ministri per aliquam specialem +purificationem vel consecrationem, unde et separari ab aliis +praecipiuntur, quasi specialiter ad ministerium cultus divini prae +aliis deputati. Et totum quod circa eos fiebat in eorum +consecratione vel institutione ad hoc pertinebat ut ostenderetur +eos habere quandam praerogativam puritatis et virtutis et +dignitatis. Et ideo in institutione ministrorum tria fiebant, primo +enim, purificabantur; secundo, ornabantur et consecrabantur; +tertio, applicabantur ad usum ministerii. Purificabantur quidem +communiter omnes per ablutionem aquae, et per quaedam sacrificia; +specialiter autem Levitae radebant omnes pilos carnis suae; ut +habetur Lev. VIII. Consecratio vero circa pontifices et sacerdotes +hoc ordine fiebat. Primo enim, postquam abluti erant, induebantur +quibusdam vestimentis specialibus pertinentibus ad designandum +dignitatem ipsorum. Specialiter autem pontifex oleo unctionis in +capite ungebatur, ut designaretur quod ab ipso diffundebatur +potestas consecrandi ad alios, sicut oleum a capite derivatur ad +inferiora; ut habetur in Psalmo CXXXII, <i>sicut unguentum in +capite, quod descendit in barbam, barbam Aaron</i>. Levitae vero +non habebant aliam consecrationem, nisi quod offerebantur domino a +filiis Israel per manus pontificis, qui orabat pro eis. Minorum +vero sacerdotum solae manus consecrabantur, quae erant applicandae +ad sacrificia. Et de sanguine animalis immolatitii tingebatur +extremum auriculae dextrae ipsorum, et pollices pedis ac manus +dextrae, ut scilicet essent obedientes legi Dei in oblatione +sacrificiorum, quod significatur in intinctione auris dextrae; et +quod essent solliciti et prompti in executione sacrificiorum, quod +significatur in intinctione pedis et manus dextrae. Aspergebantur +etiam ipsi, et vestimenta eorum, sanguine animalis immolati, in +memoriam sanguinis agni per quem fuerunt liberati in Aegypto. +Offerebantur autem in eorum consecratione huiusmodi sacrificia, +vitulus pro peccato, in memoriam remissionis peccati Aaron circa +conflationem vituli; aries in holocaustum, in memoriam oblationis +Abrahae, cuius obedientiam pontifex imitari debebat; aries etiam +consecrationis, qui erat quasi hostia pacifica, in memoriam +liberationis de Aegypto per sanguinem agni; canistrum panum, in +memoriam mannae praestiti populo. Pertinebat autem ad applicationem +ministerii quod imponebantur super manus eorum adeps arietis, et +torta panis unius, et armus dexter, ut ostenderetur quod +accipiebant potestatem huiusmodi offerendi domino. Levitae vero +applicabantur ad ministerium per hoc quod intromittebantur in +tabernaculum foederis, quasi ad ministrandum circa vasa sanctuarii. +Figuralis vero horum ratio erat quia illi qui sunt consecrandi ad +spirituale ministerium Christi, debent primo purificari per aquam +Baptismi et lacrymarum in fide passionis Christi, quod est +expiativum et purgativum sacrificium. Et debent radere omnes pilos +carnis, idest omnes pravas cogitationes. Debent etiam ornari +virtutibus; et consecrari oleo spiritus sancti; et aspersione +sanguinis Christi. Et sic debent esse intenti ad exequenda +spiritualia ministeria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p43"> + <b>Reply to Objection 10:</b> As already stated + <a href="#FS_Q102_A4" id="FS_Q102_A5-p43.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, the purpose of the Law was to induce men to have reverence for the divine worship: and this in two ways; first, by excluding + from the worship of God whatever might be an object of contempt; secondly, by introducing into the divine worship all that + seemed to savor of reverence. And, indeed, if this was observed in regard to the tabernacle and its vessels, and in the animals + to be sacrificed, much + more was it to be observed in the very ministers. Wherefore, in order to obviate contempt for the ministers, it was prescribed + that they should have no bodily stain or defect: since men so deformed are wont to be despised by others. For the same reason + it was also commanded that the choice of those who were to be destined to the service of God was not to be made in a broadcast + manner from any family, but according to their descent from one particular stock, thus giving them distinction and + nobility. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p44"> In order that they might be revered, special ornate vestments were appointed for their use, and a special form of consecration. + This indeed is the general reason of ornate garments. But the high-priest in particular had eight vestments. First, he had + a linen tunic. Secondly, he had a purple tunic; round the bottom of which were placed "little bells" and "pomegranates of + violet, and purple, and scarlet twice dyed." Thirdly, he had the ephod, which covered his shoulders and his + breast down to the girdle; and it was made of gold, and violet and purple, and scarlet twice dyed and twisted linen: and on + his shoulders he bore two onyx stones, on which were graven the names of the children of Israel. Fourthly, he had the rational, + made of the same material; it was square in shape, and was worn on the breast, and was fastened to the ephod. On this rational + there were twelve precious stones set in four rows, on which also were graven the names of the children of Israel, in + token that the priest bore the burden of the whole people, since he bore their names on his shoulders; and that it was his + duty ever to think of their welfare, since he wore them on his breast, bearing them in his heart, so to speak. And the Lord + commanded the "Doctrine and Truth" to be put in the rational: for certain matters regarding moral and dogmatic truth were + written on it. The Jews indeed pretend that on the rational was placed a stone which changed color according to the various + things + which were about to happen to the children of Israel: and this they call the "Truth and Doctrine." Fifthly, he wore a belt + or girdle made of the four colors mentioned above. Sixthly, there was the tiara or mitre which was made of linen. Seventhly, + there was the golden plate which hung over his forehead; on it was inscribed the Lord's name. Eighthly, there were "the linen + breeches to cover the flesh of their nakedness," when they went up to the sanctuary or altar. Of these eight vestments the + lesser priests had four, viz. the linen tunic and breeches, the belt and the tiara. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p45"> According to some, the literal reason for these vestments was that they denoted the disposition of the terrestrial globe; + as though the high-priest confessed himself to be the minister of the Creator of the world, wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p45.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.18.24" target="asv">Wis. 18:24</a>): "In the robe" of Aaron "was the whole world" described. For the linen breeches signified the earth out of which the flax + grows. The surrounding belt signified the ocean which surrounds the earth. The violet + tunic denoted the air by its color: its little bells betoken the thunder; the pomegranates, the lightning. The ephod, by its + many colors, signified the starry heaven; the two onyx stones denoted the two hemispheres, or the sun and moon. The twelve + precious stones on the breast are the twelve signs of the zodiac: and they are said to have been placed on the rational because + in heaven, are the types [rationes] of earthly things, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p45.2" href="./asv.html#Job.38.33" target="asv"> Job 38:33</a>: "Dost thou know the + order of heaven, and canst thou set down the reason [rationem] thereof on the earth?" The turban or tiara signified the empyrean: + the golden plate was a token of God, the governor of the universe. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p46"> The figurative reason is evident. Because bodily stains or defects wherefrom the priests had to be immune, signify the various + vices and sins from which they should be free. Thus it is forbidden that he should be blind, i.e. he ought not to be ignorant: + he must not be lame, i.e. vacillating and uncertain of purpose: that he must have "a little, or a great, or a crooked nose," + i.e. that he should not, from lack of discretion, exceed in one direction or in another, or even + exercise some base occupation: for the nose signifies discretion, because it discerns odors. It is forbidden that he should + have "a broken foot" or "hand," i.e. he should not lose the power of doing good works or of advancing in virtue. He is rejected, + too, if he have a swelling either in front or behind [Vulg.: 'if he be crook-backed']: by which is signified too much love + of earthly things: if he be blear-eyed, i.e. if his mind is darkened by carnal affections: for running of the eyes is + caused by a flow of matter. He is also rejected if he had "a pearl in his eye," i.e. if he presumes in his own estimation + that he is clothed in the white robe of righteousness. Again, he is rejected "if he have a continued scab," i.e. lustfulness + of the flesh: also, if he have "a dry scurf," which covers the body without giving pain, and is a blemish on the comeliness + of the members; which denotes avarice. Lastly, he is rejected "if he have a rupture" or hernia; through baseness rending his + heart, though it appear not in his deeds. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A5-p47"> The vestments denote the virtues of God's ministers. Now there are four things that are necessary to all His ministers, viz. + chastity denoted by the breeches; a pure life, signified by the linen tunic; the moderation of discretion, betokened by the + girdle; and rectitude of purpose, denoted by the mitre covering the head. But the high-priests needed four other things in + addition to these. First, a continual recollection of God in their thoughts; and this was signified by the + golden plate worn over the forehead, with the name of God engraved thereon. Secondly, they had to bear with the shortcomings + of the people: this was denoted by the ephod which they bore on their shoulders. Thirdly, they had to carry the people in + their mind and heart by the solicitude of charity, in token of which they wore the rational. Fourthly, they had to lead a + godly life by performing works of perfection; and this was signified by the violet tunic. Hence little golden bells were fixed + to + the bottom of the violet tunic, which bells signified the teaching of divine things united in the high-priest to his godly + mode of life. In addition to these were the pomegranates, signifying unity of faith and concord in good morals: because his + doctrine should hold together in such a way that it should not rend asunder the unity of faith and peace. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 5 ad 10"><a name="38081" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38081] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 5 ad 10</span></a> Ad decimum +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, intentio legis erat inducere +ad reverentiam divini cultus. Et hoc dupliciter, uno modo, +excludendo a cultu divino omne id quod poterat esse contemptibile; +alio modo, apponendo ad cultum divinum omne illud quod videbatur ad +honorificentiam pertinere. Et si hoc quidem observabatur in +tabernaculo et vasis eius, et animalibus immolandis, multo magis +hoc observandum erat in ipsis ministris. Et ideo ad removendum +contemptum ministrorum, praeceptum fuit ut non haberent maculam vel +defectum corporalem, quia huiusmodi homines solent apud alios in +contemptu haberi. Propter quod etiam institutum fuit ut non sparsim +ex quolibet genere ad Dei ministerium applicarentur, sed ex certa +prosapia secundum generis successionem, ut ex hoc clariores et +nobiliores haberentur. Ad hoc autem quod in reverentia haberentur, +adhibebatur eis specialis ornatus vestium, et specialis +consecratio. Et haec est in communi causa ornatus vestium. In +speciali autem sciendum est quod pontifex habebat octo ornamenta. +Primo enim, habebat vestem lineam. Secundo, habebat tunicam +hyacinthinam; in cuius extremitate versus pedes, ponebantur per +circuitum tintinabula quaedam, et mala Punica facta ex hyacintho et +purpura coccoque bis tincto. Tertio, habebat superhumerale, quod +tegebat humeros et anteriorem partem usque ad cingulum; quod erat +ex auro et hyacintho et purpura, coccoque bis tincto, et bysso +retorta. Et super humeros habebat duos onychinos, in quibus erant +sculpta nomina filiorum Israel. Quartum erat rationale, ex eadem +materia factum; quod erat quadratum, et ponebatur in pectore, et +coniungebatur superhumerali. Et in hoc rationali erant duodecim +lapides pretiosi distincti per quatuor ordines, in quibus etiam +sculpta erant nomina filiorum Israel, quasi ad designandum quod +ferret onus totius populi, per hoc quod habebat nomina eorum in +humeris; et quod iugiter debebat de eorum salute cogitare, per hoc +quod portabat eos in pectore, quasi in corde habens. In quo etiam +rationali mandavit dominus poni doctrinam et veritatem, quia +quaedam pertinentia ad veritatem iustitiae et doctrinae, +scribebantur in illo rationali. Iudaei tamen fabulantur quod in +rationali erat lapis qui secundum diversos colores mutabatur, +secundum diversa quae debebant accidere filiis Israel, et hoc +vocant veritatem et doctrinam. Quintum erat balteus, idest cingulus +quidam, factus ex praedictis quatuor coloribus. Sextum erat tiara, +idest mitra quaedam, de bysso. Septimum autem erat lamina aurea, +pendens in fronte eius, in qua erat nomen domini. Octavum autem +erant femoralia linea, ut operirent carnem turpitudinis suae, +quando accederent ad sanctuarium vel ad altare. Ex istis autem octo +ornamentis minores sacerdotes habebant quatuor, scilicet tunicam +lineam, femoralia, balteum et tiaram. Horum autem ornamentorum +quidam rationem litteralem assignant, dicentes quod in istis +ornamentis designatur dispositio orbis terrarum, quasi pontifex +protestaretur se esse ministrum creatoris mundi, unde etiam Sap. +XVIII dicitur quod in veste Aaron erat descriptus orbis terrarum. +Nam femoralia linea figurabant terram, ex qua linum nascitur. +Baltei circumvolutio significabat Oceanum, qui circumcingit terram. +Tunica hyacinthina suo colore significabat aerem, per cuius +tintinabula significabantur tonitrua; per mala granata, +coruscationes. Superhumerale vero significabat sua varietate caelum +sidereum, duo onychini, duo hemisphaeria, vel solem et lunam. +Duodecim gemmae in pectore, duodecim signa in zodiaco, quae +dicebantur posita in rationali, quia in caelestibus sunt rationes +terrenorum, secundum illud Iob XXXVIII, <i>numquid nosti ordinem +caeli, et ponis rationem eius in terra?</i> Cidaris autem, vel +tiara, significabat caelum Empyreum. Lamina aurea, Deum omnibus +praesidentem. Figuralis vero ratio manifesta est. Nam maculae vel +defectus corporales a quibus debebant sacerdotes esse immunes, +significant diversa vitia et peccata quibus debent carere. +Prohibetur enim esse caecus, idest, ne sit ignorans. Ne sit +claudus, idest instabilis, et ad diversa se inclinans. Ne sit +parvo, vel grandi, vel torto naso, idest ne per defectum +discretionis, vel in plus vel in minus excedat, aut etiam aliqua +prava exerceat; per nasum enim discretio designatur, quia est +discretivus odoris. Ne sit fracto pede vel manus, idest ne amittat +virtutem bene operandi, vel procedendi in virtutem. Repudiatur +etiam si habeat gibbum vel ante vel retro, per quem significatur +superfluus amor terrenorum. Si est lippus, idest per carnalem +affectum eius ingenium obscuratur, contingit enim lippitudo ex +fluxu humoris. Repudiatur etiam si habeat albuginem in oculo, idest +praesumptionem candoris iustitiae in sua cogitatione. Repudiatur +etiam si habuerit iugem scabiem, idest petulantiam carnis. Et si +habuerit impetiginem, quae sine dolore corpus occupat, et membrorum +decorem foedat, per quam avaritia designatur. Et etiam si sit +herniosus vel ponderosus, qui scilicet gestat pondus turpitudinis +in corde, licet non exerceat in opere. Per ornamenta vero +designantur virtutes ministrorum Dei. Sunt autem quatuor quae sunt +necessariae omnibus ministris, scilicet castitas, quae significatur +per femoralia; puritas vero vitae, quae significatur per lineam +tunicam; moderatio discretionis quae significatur per cingulum; +rectitudo intentionis, quae significatur per tiaram protegentem +caput. Sed prae his pontifices debent quatuor habere. Primo quidem, +iugem Dei memoriam in contemplatione, et hoc significat lamina +aurea habens nomen Dei, in fronte. Secundo, quod supportent +infirmitates populi, quod significat superhumerale. Tertio, quod +habeant populum in corde et in visceribus per sollicitudinem +caritatis, quod significatur per rationale. Quarto, quod habeant +conversationem caelestem per opera perfectionis, quod significatur +per tunicam hyacinthinam. Unde et tunicae hyacinthinae adiunguntur +in extremitate tintinabula aurea, per quae significatur doctrina +divinorum, quae debet coniungi caelesti conversationi pontificis. +Adiunguntur autem mala Punica, per quae significatur unitas fidei +et concordia in bonis moribus, quia sic coniuncta debet esse eius +doctrina, ut per eam fidei et pacis unitas non rumpatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q102_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q102_A6-p0.1">Q. 102. A. 6. Whether there was any reasonable cause for the ceremonial observances?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there was no reasonable cause for the ceremonial observances. Because, as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:4</a>), "every creature of God is good, and nothing to be rejected that is received with thanksgiving." It was therefore unfitting + that they should be forbidden to eat certain foods, as being unclean according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.11" target="asv">Lev. 11</a> [*Cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.14" target="asv">Dt. 14</a>]. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="38082" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38082] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod observantiarum caeremonialium nulla +fuerit rationabilis causa. Quia ut apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. IV, +<i>omnis creatura Dei est bona, et nihil reiiciendum quod cum +gratiarum actione percipitur</i>. Inconvenienter igitur prohibiti +sunt ab esu quorundam ciborum tanquam immundorum, ut patet Lev. +XI.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as animals are given to man for food, so also are herbs: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.9.3" target="asv">Gn. 9:3</a>): "As the green herbs have I delivered all" flesh "to you." But the Law did not distinguish any herbs from the rest as being + unclean, although some are most harmful, for instance, those that are poisonous. Therefore it seems that neither should any + animals have been prohibited as being unclean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="38083" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38083] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut animalia dantur in cibum hominis, ita etiam et herbae, unde +dicitur Gen. IX, <i>quasi olera virentia dedi vobis omnem +carnem</i>. Sed in herbis lex non distinxit aliquas immundas, cum +tamen aliquae illarum sint maxime nocivae, ut puta venenosae. Ergo +videtur quod nec de animalibus aliqua debuerint prohiberi tanquam +immunda.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the matter from which a thing is generated be unclean, it seems that likewise the thing generated therefrom is + unclean. But flesh is generated from blood. Since therefore all flesh was not prohibited as unclean, it seems that in like + manner neither should blood have been forbidden as unclean; nor the fat which is engendered from blood. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="38084" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38084] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si materia est immunda ex qua aliquid generatur, pari ratione +videtur quod id quod generatur ex ea, sit immundum. Sed ex sanguine +generatur caro. Cum igitur non omnes carnes prohiberentur tanquam +immundae, pari ratione nec sanguis debuit prohiberi quasi immundus; +aut adeps, qui ex sanguine generatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.28" target="asv">Mat. 10:28</a>; cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.4" target="asv"> Lk. 12:4</a>), that those should not be feared "that kill the body," since after death they "have no more that they can do": which would + not be true if after death harm might come to man through anything done with his body. Much less therefore does it matter + to an animal already dead how its flesh be cooked. Consequently there seems to be no reason in what is said, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.19" target="asv">Ex. 23:19</a>: "Thou + shalt not boil a kid in the milk of its dam." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 arg. 4"><a name="38085" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38085] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +dominus dicit, Matth. X, eos non esse timendos qui occidunt corpus, +quia post mortem non habent quid faciant, quod non esset verum, si +in nocumentum homini cederet quid ex eo fieret. Multo igitur minus +pertinet ad animal iam occisum qualiter eius carnes decoquantur. +Irrationabile igitur videtur esse quod dicitur Exod. XXIII, <i>non +coques haedum in lacte matris suae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, all that is first brought forth of man and beast, as being most perfect, is commanded to be offered to the Lord + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.13" target="asv">Ex. 13</a>). Therefore it is an unfitting command that is set forth in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.23" target="asv"> Lev. 19:23</a>: "when you shall be come into the land, and shall have planted in it fruit trees, you shall take away the uncircumcision + [*'Praeputia,' which Douay version renders 'first fruits'] of them," i.e. the first crops, and they "shall be unclean to + you, neither shall you eat of them." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 arg. 5"><a name="38086" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38086] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae sunt primitiva in hominibus et animalibus, tanquam +perfectiora, praecipiuntur domino offerri. Inconvenienter igitur +praecipitur Lev. XIX, <i>quando ingressi fueritis terram, et +plantaveritis in ea ligna pomifera, auferetis praeputia eorum</i>, +idest prima germina, et immunda erunt vobis, nec edetis ex eis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, clothing is something extraneous to man's body. Therefore certain kinds of garments should not have been forbidden + to the Jews: for instance ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.19" target="asv">Lev. 19:19</a>): "Thou shalt not wear a garment that is woven of two sorts": and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.5" target="asv">Dt. 22:5</a>): "A woman shall not be clothed with man's apparel, neither shall a man use woman's apparel": and further on ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.11" target="asv">Dt. 22:11</a>): "Thou shalt not wear a garment that is + woven of woolen and linen together." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 arg. 6"><a name="38087" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38087] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +vestimentum extra corpus hominis est. Non igitur debuerunt quaedam +specialia vestimenta Iudaeis interdici, puta quod dicitur Lev. XIX, +<i>vestem quae ex duobus texta est, non indueris</i>; et Deut. +XXII, <i>non induetur mulier veste virili, et vir non induetur +veste feminea</i>; et infra, <i>non indueris vestimento quod ex +lana linoque contextum est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p8"> + <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, to be mindful of God's commandments concerns not the body but the heart. Therefore it is unsuitably prescribed ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.8" target="asv">Dt. 6:8, </a> seqq.) that they should "bind" the commandments of God "as a sign" on their hands; and that they should "write them in the + entry"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Num.15.38" target="asv">Num. 15:38</a>, seqq.) that they should "make to themselves fringes in the corners of their garments, putting in them ribands of blue . + . . they may remember . . . the commandments + of the Lord." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 arg. 7"><a name="38088" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38088] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 7</span></a> Praeterea, +memoria mandatorum Dei non pertinet ad corpus, sed ad cor. +Inconvenienter igitur praecipitur Deut. VI, quod <i>ligarent +praecepta Dei quasi signum in manu sua, et quod scriberentur in +limine ostiorum; et quod per angulos palliorum facerent fimbrias, +in quibus ponerent vittas hyacinthinas, in memoriam mandatorum +Dei</i>, ut habetur Num. XV.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p9"> + <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:9</a>) that God does not "take care for oxen," and, therefore, neither of other irrational animals. Therefore without reason is + it commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.6" target="asv">Dt. 22:6</a>): "If thou find, as thou walkest by the way, a bird's nest in a tree . . . thou shalt not take the dam with her young"; and + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p9.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.4" target="asv">Dt. 25:4</a>): "Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out thy corn"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p9.4" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.19" target="asv">Lev. + 19:19 + </a>): "Thou shalt not make thy cattle to gender with beasts of any other kind." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 arg. 8"><a name="38089" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38089] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 8</span></a> Praeterea, +apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. IX, quod non est cura Deo de bobus, et +per consequens neque de aliis animalibus irrationalibus. +Inconvenienter igitur praecipitur Deut. XXII, <i>si ambulaveris per +viam, et inveneris nidum avis, non tenebis matrem cum filiis</i>; +et Deut. XXV, <i>non alligabis os bovis triturantis</i>; et Lev. +XIX, <i>iumenta tua non facies coire cum alterius generis +animantibus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p10"> + <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, no distinction was made between clean and unclean plants. Much less therefore should any distinction have been made + about the cultivation of plants. Therefore it was unfittingly prescribed ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.19" target="asv">Lev. 19:19</a>): "Thou shalt not sow thy field with different seeds"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.9" target="asv">Dt. 22:9</a>, seqq.): "Thou shalt sow thy vineyard with divers seeds"; and: "Thou shalt not plough with an ox and an ass together." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 arg. 9"><a name="38090" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38090] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 9</span></a> Praeterea, +inter plantas non fiebat discretio mundorum ab immundis. Ergo multo +minus circa culturam plantarum debuit aliqua discretio adhiberi. +Ergo inconvenienter praecipitur Lev. XIX, <i>agrum non seres +diverso semine</i>; et Deut. XXII, <i>non seres vineam tuam altero +semine; et, non arabis in bove simul et asino</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p11"> + <b>Objection 10:</b> Further, it is apparent that inanimate things are most of all subject to the power of man. Therefore it was unfitting to + debar man from taking silver and gold of which idols were made, or anything they found in the houses of idols, as expressed + in the commandment of the Law ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.7.25" target="asv">Dt. 7:25, </a> seqq.). It also seems an absurd commandment set forth in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.13" target="asv">Dt. 23:13</a>, that they should "dig round about and . . . cover with earth that which they were eased + of." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 arg. 10"><a name="38091" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38091] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 10</span></a> +Praeterea, ea quae sunt inanimata, maxime videmus hominum potestati +esse subiecta. Inconvenienter igitur arcetur homo ab argento et +auro ex quibus fabricata sunt idola, et ab aliis quae in idolorum +domibus inveniuntur, praecepto legis quod habetur Deut. VII. +Ridiculum etiam videtur esse praeceptum quod habetur Deut. XXIII, +ut <i>egestiones humo operirent, fodientes in terra</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p12"> + <b>Objection 11:</b> Further, piety is required especially in priests. But it seems to be an act of piety to assist at the burial of one's friends: + wherefore Tobias is commended for so doing ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Tob.1.20" target="asv">Tob. 1:20, </a> seqq.). In like manner it is sometimes an act of piety to marry a loose woman, because she is thereby delivered from sin + and infamy. Therefore it seems inconsistent for these things to be forbidden to priests ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.21" target="asv">Lev. 21</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 arg. 11"><a name="38092" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38092] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 arg. 11</span></a> +Praeterea, pietas maxime in sacerdotibus requiritur. Sed ad +pietatem pertinere videtur quod aliquis funeribus amicorum +intersit, unde etiam de hac Tobias laudatur, ut habetur Tob. I. +Similiter etiam quandoque ad pietatem pertinet quod aliquis in +uxorem accipiat meretricem, quia per hoc eam a peccato et infamia +liberat. Ergo videtur quod haec inconvenienter prohibeantur +sacerdotibus, Lev. XXI.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p13"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.18.14" target="asv">Dt. 18:14</a>): "But thou art otherwise instructed by the Lord thy God": from which words we may gather that these observances were instituted + by God to be a special prerogative of that people. Therefore they are not without reason or cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 s. c."><a name="38093" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38093] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Deut. XVIII, <i>tu autem a domino Deo tuo aliter +institutus es</i>, ex quo potest accipi quod huiusmodi observantiae +sunt institutae a Deo ad quandam specialem illius populi +praerogativam. Non ergo sunt irrationabiles, aut sine causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p14"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The Jewish people, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q102_A5" id="FS_Q102_A6-p14.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>, were specially chosen for the worship of God, and among them the priests themselves were specially set apart for that purpose. + And just as other things that are applied to the divine worship, need to be marked in some particular way so that they be + worthy of the worship of God; so too in that people's, and especially the priests', mode of life, there needed to be certain + special things + befitting the divine worship, whether spiritual or corporal. Now the worship prescribed by the Law foreshadowed the mystery + of Christ: so that whatever they did was a figure of things pertaining to Christ, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p14.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:11</a>: "All these things happened to them in figures." Consequently the reasons for these observances may be taken in two ways, + first according to their fittingness to the worship of God; secondly, according as they foreshadow something touching the + Christian mode of life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 co."><a name="38094" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38094] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod populus Iudaeorum, ut supra dictum est, specialiter +erat deputatus ad cultum divinum; et inter eos, specialiter +sacerdotes. Et sicut aliae res quae applicantur ad cultum divinum, +aliquam specialitatem debent habere, quod pertinet ad +honorificentiam divini cultus; ita etiam et in conversatione illius +populi, et praecipue sacerdotum, debuerunt esse aliqua specialia +congruentia ad cultum divinum, vel spiritualem vel corporalem. +Cultus autem legis figurabat mysterium Christi, unde omnia eorum +gesta figurabant ea quae ad Christum pertinent; secundum illud I +Cor. X, <i>omnia in figuram contingebant illis</i>. Et ideo +rationes harum observantiarum dupliciter assignari possunt, uno +modo, secundum congruentiam ad divinum cultum; alio modo, secundum +quod figurant aliquid circa Christianorum vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (A[5], ad 4,5), the Law distinguished a twofold pollution or uncleanness; one, that of sin, whereby the soul + was defiled; and another consisting in some kind of corruption, whereby the body was in some way infected. Speaking then of + the first-mentioned uncleanness, no kind of food is unclean, or can defile a man, by reason of its nature; wherefore we read + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.11" target="asv">Mat. 15:11</a>): "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a + man; but what cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man": which words are explained ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p15.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.17" target="asv">Mat. 15:17</a>) as referring to sins. Yet certain foods can defile the soul accidentally; in so far as man partakes of them against obedience + or a vow, or from excessive concupiscence; or through their being an incentive to lust, for which reason some refrain from + wine and flesh-meat. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p16"> If, however, we speak of bodily uncleanness, consisting in some kind of corruption, the flesh of certain animals is unclean, + either because like the pig they feed on unclean things; or because their life is among unclean surroundings: thus certain + animals, like moles and mice and such like, live underground, whence they contract a certain unpleasant smell; or because + their flesh, through being too moist or too dry, engenders corrupt humors in the human body. Hence they were + forbidden to eat the flesh of flat-footed animals, i.e. animals having an uncloven hoof, on account of their earthiness; and + in like manner they were forbidden to eat the flesh of animals that have many clefts in their feet, because such are very + fierce and their flesh is very dry, such as the flesh of lions and the like. For the same reason they were forbidden to eat + certain birds of prey the flesh of which is very dry, and certain water-fowl on account of their exceeding humidity. In like + manner certain fish lacking fins and scales were prohibited on account of their excessive moisture; such as eels and the like. + They were, however, allowed to eat ruminants and animals with a divided hoof, because in such animals the humors are well + absorbed, and their nature well balanced: for neither are they too moist, as is indicated by the hoof; nor are they too earthly, + which is shown by their having not a flat but a cloven hoof. Of fishes they were allowed to partake of the drier kinds, + of which the fins and scales are an indication, because thereby the moist nature of the fish is tempered. Of birds they were + allowed to eat the tamer kinds, such as hens, partridges, and the like. Another reason was detestation of idolatry: because + the Gentiles, and especially the Egyptians, among whom they had grown up, offered up these forbidden animals to their idols, + or employed them for the purpose of sorcery: whereas they did not eat those animals which the Jews were allowed to eat, but + worshipped them as gods, or abstained, for some other motive, from eating them, as stated above (A[3], ad 2). The third reason + was to prevent excessive care about food: wherefore they were allowed to eat those animals which could be procured easily + and promptly. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p17"> With regard to blood and fat, they were forbidden to partake of those of any animals whatever without exception. Blood was + forbidden, both in order to avoid cruelty, that they might abhor the shedding of human blood, as stated above (A[3], ad 8); + and in order to shun idolatrous rite whereby it was customary for men to collect the blood and to gather together around it + for a banquet in honor of the idols, to whom they held the blood to be most acceptable. Hence the Lord commanded + the blood to be poured out and to be covered with earth ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p17.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.17.13" target="asv">Lev. 17:13</a>). For the same reason they were forbidden to eat animals that had been suffocated or strangled: because the blood of these + animals would not be separated from the body: or because this form of death is very painful to the victim; and the Lord wished + to withdraw them from cruelty even in regard to irrational animals, so as to be less inclined to be cruel to other men, through + being used to be kind to beasts. + They were forbidden to eat the fat: both because idolaters ate it in honor of their gods; and because it used to be burnt + in honor of God; and, again, because blood and fat are not nutritious, which is the cause assigned by Rabbi Moses (Doct. Perplex. + iii). The reason why they were forbidden to eat the sinews is given in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p17.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.32.32" target="asv"> Gn. 32:32, </a> where it is stated that "the children of Israel . . . eat not the sinew . . . because he touched the sinew of" Jacob's "thing + and it shrank." + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p18"> The figurative reason for these things is that all these animals signified certain sins, in token of which those animals + were prohibited. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faustum iv, 7): "If the swine and lamb be called in question, both are clean + by nature, because all God's creatures are good: yet the lamb is clean, and the pig is unclean in a certain signification. + Thus if you speak of a foolish, and of a wise man, each of these expressions is clean considered in the nature of + the sound, letters and syllables of which it is composed: but in signification, the one is clean, the other unclean." The + animal that chews the cud and has a divided hoof, is clean in signification. Because division of the hoof is a figure of the + two Testaments: or of the Father and Son: or of the two natures in Christ: of the distinction of good and evil. While chewing + the cud signifies meditation on the Scriptures and a sound understanding thereof; and whoever lacks either of these is + spiritually unclean. In like manner those fish that have scales and fins are clean in signification. Because fins signify + the heavenly or contemplative life; while scales signify a life of trials, each of which is required for spiritual cleanness. + Of birds certain kinds were forbidden. In the eagle which flies at a great height, pride is forbidden: in the griffon which + is hostile to horses and men, cruelty of powerful men is prohibited. The osprey, which feeds on very small birds, signifies + those who oppress the poor. The kite, which is full of cunning, denotes those who are fraudulent in their dealings. The vulture, + which follows an army, expecting to feed on the carcases of the slain, signifies those who like others to die or to fight + among themselves that they may gain thereby. Birds of the raven kind signify those who are blackened by their lusts; or those + who lack kindly feelings, for the raven did not return when once it had been let loose from the ark. The ostrich which, + though a bird, cannot fly, and is always on the ground, signifies those who fight God's cause, and at the same time are taken + up with worldly business. The owl, which sees clearly at night, but cannot see in the daytime, denotes those who are clever + in temporal affairs, but dull in spiritual matters. The gull, which flies both in the air and swims in the water, signifies + those who are partial both to Circumcision and to Baptism: or else it denotes those who would fly by contemplation, yet dwell + in the waters of sensual delights. The hawk, which helps men to seize the prey, is a figure of those who assist the strong + to prey on the poor. The screech-owl, which seeks its food by night but hides by day, signifies the lustful man who seeks + to lie hidden in his deeds of darkness. The cormorant, so constituted that it can stay a long time under water, denotes the + glutton who plunges into the waters of pleasure. The ibis is an African bird with a long beak, and feeds on snakes; and perhaps + it + is the same as the stork: it signifies the envious man, who refreshes himself with the ills of others, as with snakes. The + swan is bright in color, and by the aid of its long neck extracts its food from deep places on land or water: it may denote + those who seek earthly profit though an external brightness of virtue. The bittern is a bird of the East: it has a long beak, + and its jaws are furnished with follicules, wherein it stores its food at first, after a time proceeding to digest it: it + is a + figure of the miser, who is excessively careful in hoarding up the necessaries of life. The coot [*Douay: 'porphyrion.' St. + Thomas' description tallies with the coot or moorhen: though of course he is mistaken about the feet differing from one another.] + has this peculiarity apart from other birds, that it has a webbed foot for swimming, and a cloven foot for walking: for it + swims like a duck in the water, and walks like a partridge on land: it drinks only when it bites, since it dips all its + food in water: it is a figure of a man who will not take advice, and does nothing but what is soaked in the water of his own + will. The heron [*Vulg.: 'herodionem'], commonly called a falcon, signifies those whose "feet are swift to shed blood" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p18.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.13.3" target="asv">Ps. 13:3</a>). The plover [*Here, again, the Douay translators transcribed from the Vulgate: 'charadrion'; 'charadrius' is the generic + name for all plovers.], which is a garrulous bird, signifies the gossip. The hoopoe, which builds its + nest on dung, feeds on foetid ordure, and whose song is like a groan, denotes worldly grief which works death in those who + are unclean. The bat, which flies near the ground, signifies those who being gifted with worldly knowledge, seek none but + earthly things. Of fowls and quadrupeds those alone were permitted which have the hind-legs longer than the forelegs, so that + they can leap: whereas those were forbidden which cling rather to the earth: because those who abuse the doctrine of the four + Evangelists, so that they are not lifted up thereby, are reputed unclean. By the prohibition of blood, fat and nerves, we + are to understand the forbidding of cruelty, lust, and bravery in committing sin. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="38095" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38095] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex pollutio, vel +immunditia, observabatur in lege, una quidem culpae, per quam +polluebatur anima; alia autem corruptionis cuiusdam, per quam +quodammodo inquinatur corpus. Loquendo igitur de prima immunditia, +nulla genera ciborum immunda sunt, vel hominem inquinare possunt, +secundum suam naturam, unde dicitur Matth. XV, <i>non quod intrat +in os, coinquinat hominem; sed quae procedunt de ore, haec +coinquinant hominem</i>; et exponitur hoc de peccatis. Possunt +tamen aliqui cibi per accidens inquinare animam, inquantum scilicet +contra obedientiam vel votum, vel nimia concupiscentia comeduntur; +vel inquantum praebent fomentum luxuriae, propter quod aliqui a +vino et carnibus abstinent. Secundum autem corporalem immunditiam, +quae est corruptionis cuiusdam, aliquae animalium carnes +immunditiam habent, vel quia ex rebus immundis nutriuntur, sicut +porcus; aut immunde conversantur, sicut quaedam animalia sub terra +habitantia, sicut talpae et mures et alia huiusmodi, unde etiam +quendam fetorem contrahunt; vel quia eorum carnes, propter +superfluam umiditatem vel siccitatem, corruptos humores in +corporibus humanis generant. Et ideo prohibitae sunt eis carnes +animalium habentium soleas, idest ungulam unam non fissam, propter +eorum terrestreitatem. Et similiter sunt eis prohibitae carnes +animalium habentium multas fissuras in pedibus, quia sunt nimis +cholerica et adusta, sicut carnes leonis et huiusmodi. Et eadem +ratione prohibitae sunt eis aves quaedam rapaces, quae sunt nimiae +siccitatis; et quaedam aves aquaticae, propter excessum +humiditatis. Similiter etiam quidam pisces non habentes pinnulas et +squamas, ut anguillae et huiusmodi, propter excessum humiditatis. +Sunt autem eis concessa ad esum animalia ruminantia et findentia +ungulam, quia habent humores bene digestos, et sunt medie +complexionata, quia nec sunt nimis humida, quod significant +ungulae; neque sunt nimis terrestria, cum non habeant ungulam +continuam, sed fissam. In piscibus etiam concessi sunt eis pisces +sicciores, quod significatur per hoc quod habent squamas et +pinnulas, per hoc enim efficitur temperata complexio humida +piscium. In avibus etiam sunt eis concessae magis temperatae, sicut +gallinae, perdices, et aliae huiusmodi. Alia ratio fuit in +detestationem idololatriae. Nam gentiles, et praecipue Aegyptii, +inter quos erant nutriti, huiusmodi animalia prohibita idolis +immolabant, vel eis ad maleficia utebantur. Animalia vero quae +Iudaeis sunt concessa ad esum non comedebant, sed ea tanquam deos +colebant; vel propter aliam causam ab eis abstinebant, ut supra +dictum est. Tertia ratio est ad tollendam nimiam diligentiam circa +cibaria. Et ideo conceduntur illa animalia quae de facili et in +promptu haberi possunt. Generaliter tamen prohibitus est eis esus +sanguinis et adipis cuiuslibet animalis. Sanguinis quidem tum ad +vitandam crudelitatem, ut detestarentur humanum sanguinem +effundere, sicut supra dictum est. Tum etiam ad vitandum +idololatriae ritum, quia eorum consuetudo erat ut circa sanguinem +congregatum adunarentur ad comedendum in honorem idolorum, quibus +reputabant sanguinem acceptissimum esse. Et ideo dominus mandavit +quod sanguis effunderetur, et quod pulvere operiretur. Et propter +hoc etiam prohibitum est eis comedere animalia suffocata vel +strangulata, quia sanguis eorum non separaretur a carne. Vel quia +in tali morte animalia multum affliguntur; et dominus voluit eos a +crudelitate prohibere etiam circa animalia bruta, ut per hoc magis +recederent a crudelitate hominis, habentes exercitium pietatis +etiam circa bestias. Adipis etiam esus prohibitus est eis, tum quia +idololatrae comedebant illum in honorem deorum suorum. Tum etiam +quia cremabatur in honorem Dei. Tum etiam quia sanguis et adeps non +generant bonum nutrimentum, quod pro causa inducit Rabbi Moyses. +Causa autem prohibitionis esus nervorum exprimitur Gen. XXXII, ubi +dicitur quod <i>non comedunt filii Israel nervum, eo quod tetigerit +nervum femoris Iacob, et obstupuerit</i>. Figuralis autem ratio +horum est quia per omnia huiusmodi animalia prohibita designantur +aliqua peccata, in quorum figuram illa animalia prohibentur. Unde +dicit Augustinus, in libro contra Faustum, <i>si de porco et agno +requiratur, utrumque natura mundum est, quia omnis creatura Dei +bona est, quadam vero significatione, agnus mundus, porcus immundus +est. Tanquam, si stultum et sapientem diceres, utrumque hoc verbum +natura vocis et litterarum et syllabarum ex quibus constat, mundum +est, significatione autem unum est mundum, et aliud immundum</i>. +Animal enim quod ruminat et ungulam findit, mundum est +significatione. Quia fissio ungulae significat distinctionem duorum +testamentorum; vel patris et filii; vel duarum naturarum in +Christo; vel discretionem boni et mali. Ruminatio autem significat +meditationem Scripturarum, et sanum intellectum earum. Cuicumque +autem horum alterum deest, spiritualiter immundus est. Similiter +etiam in piscibus illi qui habent squamas et pinnulas, +significatione mundi sunt. Quia per pinnulas significatur vita +sublimis, vel contemplatio; per squamas autem significatur aspera +vita; quorum utrumque necessarium est ad munditiam spiritualem. In +avibus autem specialia quaedam genera prohibentur. In aquila enim, +quae alte volat, prohibetur superbia. In gryphe autem, qui equis et +hominibus infestus est, crudelitas potentum prohibetur. In +haliaeeto autem, qui pascitur minutis avibus, significantur illi +qui sunt pauperibus molesti. In milvo autem, qui maxime insidiis +utitur, designantur fraudulenti. In vulture autem, qui sequitur +exercitum expectans comedere cadavera mortuorum, significantur illi +qui mortes et seditiones hominum affectant ut inde lucrentur. Per +animalia corvini generis significantur illi qui sunt voluptatibus +denigrati, vel qui sunt expertes bonae affectionis, quia corvus, +semel emissus ab arca, non est reversus. Per struthionem, qui, cum +sit avis, volare non potest, sed semper est circa terram, +significantur Deo militantes et se negotiis saecularibus +implicantes. Nycticorax, quae in nocte acuti est visus, in die +autem non videt, significat eos qui in temporalibus sunt astuti, in +spiritualibus hebetes. Larus autem, qui et volat in aere et natat +in aqua, significat eos qui et circumcisionem et Baptismum +venerantur, vel significat eos qui per contemplationem volare +volunt, et tamen vivunt in aquis voluptatum. Accipiter vero, qui +deservit hominibus ad praedam, significat eos qui ministrant +potentibus ad depraedandum pauperes. Per bubonem, qui in nocte +pastum quaerit, de die autem latet, significantur luxuriosi, qui +occultari quaerunt in nocturnis operibus quae agunt. Mergulus +autem, cuius natura est ut sub undis diutius immoretur, significat +gulosos, qui aquis deliciarum se immergunt. Ibis vero avis est in +Africa habens longum rostrum, quae serpentibus pascitur, et forte +est idem quod ciconia, et significat invidos, qui de malis aliorum, +quasi de serpentibus, reficiuntur. Cygnus autem est coloris +candidi, et longo collo quod habet, ex profunditate terrae vel +aquae cibum trahit, et potest significare homines qui per +exteriorem iustitiae candorem lucra terrena quaerunt. Onocrotalus +autem avis est in partibus orientis, longo rostro, quae in faucibus +habet quosdam folliculos, in quibus primo cibum reponit, et post +horam in ventrem mittit, et significat avaros, qui immoderata +sollicitudine vitae necessaria congregant. Porphyrio autem, praeter +modum aliarum avium, habet unum pedem latum ad natandum, alium +fissum ad ambulandum, quia et in aqua natat ut anates, et in terra +ambulat ut perdices, solo morsu bibit, omnem cibum aqua tingens, et +significat eos qui nihil ad alterius arbitrium facere volunt, sed +solum quod fuerit tinctum aqua propriae voluntatis. Per Herodionem +qui vulgariter falco dicitur, significantur illi quorum pedes sunt +veloces ad effundendum sanguinem. Charadrius autem, quae est avis +garrula, significat loquaces. Upupa autem, quae nidificat in +stercoribus et fetenti pascitur fimo, et gemitum in cantu simulat, +significat tristitiam saeculi, quae in hominibus immundis mortem +operatur. Per vespertilionem autem, quae circa terram volitat, +significantur illi qui, saeculari scientia praediti, sola terrena +sapiunt. Circa volatilia autem et quadrupedia, illa sola +conceduntur eis quae posteriora crura habent longiora, ut salire +possint. Alia vero, quae terrae magis adhaerent, prohibentur, quia +illi qui abutuntur doctrina quatuor Evangelistarum, ut per eam in +altum non subleventur, immundi reputantur. In sanguine vero et +adipe et nervo, intelligitur prohiberi crudelitas, et voluptas, et +fortitudo ad peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Men were wont to eat plants and other products of the soil even before the deluge: but the eating of flesh seems to have + been introduced after the deluge; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p19.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.9.3" target="asv">Gn. 9:3</a>): "Even as the green herbs have I delivered . . . all" flesh "to you." The reason for this was that the eating of the products + of the soil savors rather of a simple life; whereas the eating of flesh savors of delicate and over-careful living. For the + soil gives birth to the herb of its own accord; and such like products of the earth may be had in great quantities with very + little effort: whereas no small trouble is necessary either to rear or to catch an animal. Consequently God being wishful + to bring His people back to a more simple way of living, forbade them to eat many kinds of animals, but not those things that + are produced by the soil. Another reason may be that animals were offered to idols, while the products of the soil were + not. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p20"> The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said (ad 1).</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="38096" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38096] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod esus plantarum et aliorum terrae nascentium adfuit +apud homines etiam ante diluvium, sed esus carnium videtur esse +post diluvium introductus; dicitur enim Gen. IX, <i>quasi olera +virentia dedi vobis omnem carnem</i>. Et hoc ideo, quia esus terrae +nascentium magis pertinet ad quandam simplicitatem vitae; esus +autem carnium ad quasdam delicias et curiositatem vivendi. Sponte +enim terra herbam germinat, vel cum modico studio huiusmodi terrae +nascentia in magna copia procurantur, oportet autem cum magno +studio animalia vel nutrire, vel etiam capere. Et ideo volens +dominus populum suum reducere ad simpliciorem victum, multa in +genere animalium eis prohibuit, non autem in genere terrae +nascentium. Vel etiam quia animalia immolabantur idolis, non autem +terrae nascentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p21"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the kid that is slain has no perception of the manner in which its flesh is cooked, yet it would seem to savor of + heartlessness if the dam's milk, which was intended for the nourishment of her offspring, were served up on the same dish. + It might also be said that the Gentiles in celebrating the feasts of their idols prepared the flesh of kids in this manner, + for the purpose of sacrifice or banquet: hence ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p21.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.23" target="asv">Ex. 23</a>) after the solemnities to be + celebrated under the Law had been foretold, it is added: "Thou shalt not boil a kid in the milk of its dam." The figurative + reason for this prohibition is this: the kid, signifying Christ, on account of "the likeness of sinful flesh" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p21.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.3" target="asv">Rom. 8:3</a>), was not to be seethed, i.e. slain, by the Jews, "in the milk of its dam," i.e. during His infancy. Or else it signifies + that the kid, i.e. the sinner, should not be boiled in the milk of its dam, i.e. should not be cajoled by flattery. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="38097" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38097] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +patet responsio ex dictis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p22"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The Gentiles offered their gods the first-fruits, which they held to bring them good luck: or they burnt them for the purpose + of secrecy. Consequently (the Israelites) were commanded to look upon the fruits of the first three years as unclean: for + in that country nearly all the trees bear fruit in three years' time; those trees, to wit, that are cultivated either from + seed, or from a graft, or from a cutting: but it seldom happens that the + fruit-stones or seeds encased in a pod are sown: since it would take a longer time for these to bear fruit: and the Law considered + what happened most frequently. The fruits, however, of the fourth year, as being the firstlings of clean fruits, were offered + to God: and from the fifth year onward they were eaten. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p23"> The figurative reason was that this foreshadowed the fact that after the three states of the Law (the first lasting from + Abraham to David, the second, until they were carried away to Babylon, the third until the time of Christ), the Fruit of the + Law, i.e. Christ, was to be offered to God. Or again, that we must mistrust our first efforts, on account of their imperfection. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 ad 4"><a name="38098" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38098] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, etsi haedus occisus non sentiat qualiter carnes eius +coquantur, tamen in animo decoquentis ad quandam crudelitatem +pertinere videtur si lac matris, quod datum est ei pro nutrimento, +adhibeatur ad consumptionem carnium ipsius. Vel potest dici quod +gentiles in solemnitatibus idolorum taliter carnes haedi coquebant, +ad immolandum vel ad comedendum. Et ideo Exod. XXIII, postquam +praedictum fuerat de solemnitatibus celebrandis in lege, subditur, +<i>non coques haedum in lacte matris suae</i>. Figuralis autem +ratio huius prohibitionis est quia praefigurabatur quod Christus, +qui est haedus propter similitudinem carnis peccati, non erat a +Iudaeis coquendus, idest occidendus, in lacte matris, idest tempore +infantiae. Vel significatur quod haedus idest peccator, non est +coquendus in lacte matris, idest non est blanditiis +deliniendus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p24"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> It is said of a man in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p24.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.19.27" target="asv"> Ecclus. 19:27, </a> that "the attire of the body . . . " shows "what he is." Hence the Lord wished His people to be distinguished from other + nations, not only by the sign of the circumcision, which was in the flesh, but also by a certain difference of attire. Wherefore + they were forbidden to wear garments woven of woolen and linen together, and for a woman to be clothed with man's apparel, + or vice versa, for two + reasons. First, to avoid idolatrous worship. Because the Gentiles, in their religious rites, used garments of this sort, made + of various materials. Moreover in the worship of Mars, women put on men's armor; while, conversely, in the worship of Venus + men donned women's attire. The second reason was to preserve them from lust: because the employment of various materials in + the making of garments signified inordinate union of sexes, while the use of male attire by a woman, or vice versa, has an + incentive to evil desires, and offers an occasion of lust. The figurative reason is that the prohibition of wearing a garment + woven of woolen and linen signified that it was forbidden to unite the simplicity of innocence, denoted by wool, with the + duplicity of malice, betokened by linen. It also signifies that woman is forbidden to presume to teach, or perform other duties + of men: or that man should not adopt the effeminate manners of a woman. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 ad 5"><a name="38099" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38099] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod gentiles fructus primitivos, quos fortunatos +aestimabant, diis suis offerebant, vel etiam comburebant eos ad +quaedam magica facienda. Et ideo praeceptum est eis ut fructus +trium primorum annorum immundos reputarent. In tribus enim annis +fere omnes arbores terrae illius fructum producunt, quae scilicet +vel seminando, vel inserendo, vel plantando coluntur. Raro autem +contingit quod ossa fructuum arboris, vel semina latentia, +seminentur, haec enim tardius facerent fructum, sed lex respexit ad +id quod frequentius fit. Poma autem quarti anni, tanquam primitiae +mundorum fructuum, Deo offerebantur, a quinto autem anno, et +deinceps, comedebantur. Figuralis autem ratio est quia per hoc +praefiguratur quod post tres status legis, quorum unus est ab +Abraham usque ad David, secundus usque ad transmigrationem +Babylonis, tertius usque ad Christum, erat Christus Deo offerendus, +qui est fructus legis. Vel quia primordia nostrorum operum debent +esse nobis suspecta, propter imperfectionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p25"> + <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> As Jerome says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p25.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.23.6" target="asv"> Mat. 23:6, </a> "the Lord commanded them to make violet-colored fringes in the four corners of their garments, so that the Israelites might + be distinguished from other nations." Hence, in this way, they professed to be Jews: and consequently the very sight of this + sign reminded them of their law. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p26"> When we read: "Thou shalt bind them on thy hand, and they shall be ever before thy eyes [Vulg.: 'they shall be and shall + move between thy eyes'], the Pharisees gave a false interpretation to these words, and wrote the decalogue of Moses on a parchment, + and tied it on their foreheads like a wreath, so that it moved in front of their eyes": whereas the intention of the Lord + in giving this commandment was that they should be bound in their hands, i.e. in their works; and that they + should be before their eyes, i.e. in their thoughts. The violet-colored fillets which were inserted in their cloaks signify + the godly intention which should accompany our every deed. It may, however, be said that, because they were a carnal-minded + and stiff-necked people, it was necessary for them to be stirred by these sensible things to the observance of the Law. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 ad 6"><a name="38100" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38100] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum +dicendum quod sicut dicitur Eccli. XIX, <i>amictus corporis +enuntiat de homine</i>. Et ideo voluit dominus ut populus eius +distingueretur ab aliis populis non solum signo circumcisionis, +quod erat in carne, sed etiam certa habitus distinctione. Et ideo +prohibitum fuit eis ne induerentur vestimento ex lana et lino +contexto, et ne mulier indueretur veste virili, aut e converso, +propter duo. Primo quidem, ad vitandum idololatriae cultum. +Huiusmodi enim variis vestibus ex diversis confectis gentiles in +cultu suorum deorum utebantur. Et etiam in cultu Martis mulieres +utebantur armis virorum; in cultu autem Veneris e converso viri +utebantur vestibus mulierum. Alia ratio est ad declinandam +luxuriam. Nam per commixtiones varias in vestimentis omnis +inordinata commixtio coitus excluditur. Quod autem mulier induatur +veste virili, aut e converso, incentivum est concupiscentiae, et +occasionem libidini praestat. Figuralis autem ratio est quia in +vestimento contexto ex lana et lino interdicitur coniunctio +simplicitatis innocentiae, quae figuratur per lanam, et +subtilitatis malitiae, quae figuratur per linum. Prohibetur etiam +quod mulier non usurpet sibi doctrinam, vel alia virorum officia; +vel vir declinet ad mollities mulierum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p27"> + <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> Affection in man is twofold: it may be an affection of reason, or it may be an affection of passion. If a man's affection + be one of reason, it matters not how man behaves to animals, because God has subjected all things to man's power, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p27.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.8.8" target="asv"> Ps. 8:8</a>: "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet": and it is in this sense that the Apostle says that "God has no care for + oxen"; because God does not ask of man what he does + with oxen or other animals. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p28"> But if man's affection be one of passion, then it is moved also in regard to other animals: for since the passion of pity + is caused by the afflictions of others; and since it happens that even irrational animals are sensible to pain, it is possible + for the affection of pity to arise in a man with regard to the sufferings of animals. Now it is evident that if a man practice + a pitiful affection for animals, he is all the more disposed to take pity on his fellow-men: wherefore it + is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p28.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.11.10" target="asv">Prov. 11:10</a>): "The just regardeth the lives of his beasts: but the bowels of the wicked are cruel." Consequently the Lord, in order to + inculcate pity to the Jewish people, who were prone to cruelty, wished them to practice pity even with regard to dumb animals, + and forbade them to do certain things savoring of cruelty to animals. Hence He prohibited them to "boil a kid in the milk + of its dam"; and to "muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn"; and to slay "the dam with her young." + It may, nevertheless, be also said that these prohibitions were made in hatred of idolatry. For the Egyptians held it to be + wicked to allow the ox to eat of the grain while threshing the corn. Moreover certain sorcerers were wont to ensnare the mother + bird with her young during incubation, and to employ them for the purpose of securing fruitfulness and good luck in bringing + up children: also because it was held to be a good omen to find the mother sitting on her young. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p29"> As to the mingling of animals of divers species, the literal reason may have been threefold. The first was to show detestation + for the idolatry of the Egyptians, who employed various mixtures in worshipping the planets, which produce various effects, + and on various kinds of things according to their various conjunctions. The second reason was in condemnation of unnatural + sins. The third reason was the entire removal of all occasions of concupiscence. Because animals of different + species do not easily breed, unless this be brought about by man; and movements of lust are aroused by seeing such things. + Wherefore in the Jewish traditions we find it prescribed as stated by Rabbi Moses that men shall turn away their eyes from + such sights. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p30"> The figurative reason for these things is that the necessities of life should not be withdrawn from the ox that treadeth + the corn, i.e. from the preacher bearing the sheaves of doctrine, as the Apostle states ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p30.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:4</a>, seqq.). Again, we should not take the dam with her young: because in certain things we have to keep the spiritual senses, + i.e. the offspring, and set aside the observance of the letter, i.e. the mother, for instance, in all the ceremonies of the + Law. It is also + forbidden that beast of burden, i.e. any of the common people, should be allowed to engender, i.e. to have any connection, + with animals of another kind, i.e. with Gentiles or Jews. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 ad 7"><a name="38101" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38101] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 7</span></a> Ad septimum +dicendum quod, sicut Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., <i>dominus +iussit ut in quatuor angulis palliorum hyacinthinas fimbrias +facerent, ad populum Israel dignoscendum ab aliis populis</i>. Unde +per hoc se esse Iudaeos profitebantur, et ideo per aspectum huius +signi inducebantur in memoriam suae legis. Quod autem dicitur, +<i>ligabis ea in manu tua, et erunt semper ante oculos tuos, +Pharisaei male interpretabantur, scribentes in membranis Decalogum +Moysi, et ligabant in fronte, quasi coronam, ut ante oculos +moverentur</i>, cum tamen intentio domini mandantis fuerit ut +ligarentur in manu, idest in operatione; et essent ante oculos, +idest in meditatione. In hyacinthinis etiam vittis, quae palliis +inserebantur, significatur caelestis intentio, quae omnibus +operibus nostris debet adiungi. Potest tamen dici quod, quia +populus ille carnalis erat et durae cervicis, oportuit etiam per +huiusmodi sensibilia eos ad legis observantiam excitari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p31"> + <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> All these minglings were forbidden in agriculture; literally, in detestation of idolatry. For the Egyptians in worshipping + the stars employed various combinations of seeds, animals and garments, in order to represent the various connections of the + stars. Or else all these minglings were forbidden in detestation of the unnatural vice. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p32"> They have, however, a figurative reason. For the prohibition: "Thou shalt not sow thy field with different seeds," is to + be understood, in the spiritual sense, of the prohibition to sow strange doctrine in the Church, which is a spiritual vineyard. + Likewise "the field," i.e. the Church, must not be sown "with different seeds," i.e. with Catholic and heretical doctrines. + Neither is it allowed to plough "with an ox and an ass together"; thus a fool should not accompany a wise man + in preaching, for one would hinder the other. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 ad 8"><a name="38102" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38102] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 8</span></a> Ad octavum +dicendum quod affectus hominis est duplex, unus quidem secundum +rationem; alius vero secundum passionem. Secundum igitur affectum +rationis, non refert quid homo circa bruta animalia agat, quia +omnia sunt subiecta eius potestati a Deo, secundum illud Psalmi +VIII, <i>omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius</i>. Et secundum hoc +apostolus dicit quod non est cura Deo de bobus, quia Deus non +requirit ab homine quid circa boves agat, vel circa alia animalia. +Quantum vero ad affectum passionis, movetur affectus hominis etiam +circa alia animalia, quia enim passio misericordiae consurgit ex +afflictionibus aliorum, contingit autem etiam bruta animalia poenas +sentire, potest in homine consurgere misericordiae affectus etiam +circa afflictiones animalium. Proximum autem est ut qui exercetur +in affectu misericordiae circa animalia, magis ex hoc disponatur ad +affectum misericordiae circa homines, unde dicitur Prov. XII, +<i>novit iustus animas iumentorum suorum; viscera autem impiorum +crudelia</i>. Et ideo ut dominus populum Iudaicum, ad crudelitatem +pronum, ad misericordiam revocaret, voluit eos exerceri ad +misericordiam etiam circa bruta animalia, prohibens quaedam circa +animalia fieri quae ad crudelitatem quandam pertinere videntur. Et +ideo prohibuit ne coqueretur haedus in lacte matris; et quod non +alligaretur os bovi trituranti; et quod non occideretur mater cum +filiis. Quamvis etiam dici possit quod haec prohibita sunt eis in +detestationem idololatriae. Nam Aegyptii nefarium reputabant ut +boves triturantes de frugibus comederent. Aliqui etiam malefici +utebantur matre avis incubante et pullis eius simul captis, ad +fecunditatem et fortunam circa nutritionem filiorum. Et etiam quia +in auguriis reputabatur hoc esse fortunatum, quod inveniretur mater +incubans filiis. Circa commixtionem vero animalium diversae +speciei, ratio litteralis potuit esse triplex. Una quidem, ad +detestationem idololatriae Aegyptiorum, qui diversis commixtionibus +utebantur in servitium planetarum, qui secundum diversas +coniunctiones habent diversos effectus, et super diversas species +rerum. Alia ratio est ad excludendum concubitus contra naturam. +Tertia ratio est ad tollendam universaliter occasionem +concupiscentiae. Animalia enim diversarum specierum non +commiscentur de facili ad invicem, nisi hoc per homines procuretur; +et in aspectu coitus animalium excitatur homini concupiscentiae +motus. Unde etiam in traditionibus Iudaeorum praeceptum invenitur, +ut Rabbi Moyses dicit, ut homines avertant oculos ab animalibus +coeuntibus. Figuralis autem horum ratio est quia bovi trituranti, +idest praedicatori deferenti segetes doctrinae, non sunt necessaria +victus subtrahenda; ut apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. IX. Matrem etiam +non simul debemus tenere cum filiis, quia in quibusdam retinendi +sunt spirituales sensus, quasi filii, et dimittenda est litteralis +observantia, quasi mater; sicut in omnibus caeremoniis legis. +Prohibetur etiam quod iumenta, idest populares homines, non +faciamus coire, idest coniunctionem habere, cum alterius generis +animantibus, idest cum gentilibus vel Iudaeis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q102_A6-p33"> + <b>Reply to Objection 10:</b> [*The Reply to the Tenth Objection is lacking in the codices. The solution given here is found in some editions, and was + supplied by Nicolai.] Silver and gold were reasonably forbidden ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p33.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.7" target="asv">Dt. 7</a>) not as though they were not subject to the power of man, but because, like the idols themselves, all materials out of which + idols were made, were anathematized as hateful in God's sight. This is clear from the same chapter, where we read further + on + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p33.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.7.26" target="asv">Dt. 7:26</a>): "Neither shalt thou bring anything of the idol into thy house, lest thou become an anathema like it." Another reason was + lest, by taking silver and gold, they should be led by avarice into idolatry to which the Jews were inclined. The other precept + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p33.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.23" target="asv">Dt. 23</a>) about covering up excretions, was just and becoming, both for the sake of bodily cleanliness; and in order to keep the air + wholesome; and by reason of the respect due to the tabernacle of the covenant which + stood in the midst of the camp, wherein the Lord was said to dwell; as is clearly set forth in the same passage, where after + expressing the command, the reason thereof is at once added, to wit: "For the Lord thy God walketh in the midst of thy camp, + to deliver thee, and to give up thy enemies to thee, and let thy camp be holy [i.e. clean], and let no uncleanness appear + therein." The figurative reason for this precept, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi), is that sins which are the fetid + excretions of the mind should be covered over by repentance, that we may become acceptable to God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p33.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.31.1" target="asv"> Ps. 31:1</a>: "Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered." Or else according to a gloss, that we should + recognize the unhappy condition of human nature, and humbly cover and purify the stains of a puffed-up and proud spirit in + the deep furrow of self-examination. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 ad 9"><a name="38103" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38103] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 9</span></a> Ad nonum +dicendum quod omnes illae commixtiones in agricultura sunt +prohibitae, ad litteram, in detestationem idololatriae. Quia +Aegyptii, in venerationem stellarum, diversas commixtiones +faciebant et in seminibus et in animalibus et in vestibus, +repraesentantes diversas coniunctiones stellarum. Vel omnes +huiusmodi commixtiones variae prohibentur ad detestationem coitus +contra naturam. Habent tamen figuralem rationem. Quia quod dicitur, +non seres vineam tuam altero semine, est spiritualiter +intelligendum, quod in Ecclesia, quae est spiritualis vinea, non +est seminanda aliena doctrina. Et similiter ager, idest Ecclesia, +non est seminandus diverso semine, idest Catholica doctrina et +haeretica. Non est etiam simul arandum in bove et asino, quia +fatuus sapienti in praedicatione non est sociandus, quia unus +impedit alium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p34"> + <b>Reply to Objection 11:</b> Sorcerers and idolatrous priests made use, in their rites, of the bones and flesh of dead men. Wherefore, in order to extirpate + the customs of idolatrous worship, the Lord commanded that the priests of inferior degree, who at fixed times served in the + temple, should not "incur an uncleanness at the death" of anyone except of those who were closely related to them, viz. their + father or mother, and others thus near of kin to them. But the high-priest + had always to be ready for the service of the sanctuary; wherefore he was absolutely forbidden to approach the dead, however + nearly related to him. They were also forbidden to marry a "harlot" or "one that has been put away," or any other than a virgin: + both on account of the reverence due to the priesthood, the honor of which would seem to be tarnished by such a marriage: + and for the sake of the children who would be disgraced by the mother's shame: which was most of all to be avoided when the + priestly dignity was passed on from father to son. Again, they were commanded to shave neither head nor beard, and not to + make incisions in their flesh, in order to exclude the rites of idolatry. For the priests of the Gentiles shaved both head + and beard, wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p34.1" href="./asv.html#Bar.6.30" target="asv">Bar 6:30</a>): "Priests sit in their temples having their garments rent, and their heads and beards shaven." Moreover, in worshipping + their idols "they cut themselves with knives and lancets" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p34.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 18:28</a>). For this reason the priests of the Old Law were commanded to do the contrary. + </p><p id="FS_Q102_A6-p35"> The spiritual reason for these things is that priests should be entirely free from dead works, i.e. sins. And they should + not shave their heads, i.e. set wisdom aside; nor should they shave their beards, i.e. set aside the perfection of wisdom; + nor rend their garments or cut their flesh, i.e. they should not incur the sin of schism. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 102 a. 6 ad 11"><a name="38104" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38104] Iª-IIae q. 102 a. 6 ad 11</span></a> Ad +undecimum dicendum quod malefici et sacerdotes idolorum utebantur +in suis ritibus ossibus vel carnibus hominum mortuorum. Et ideo, ad +extirpandum idololatriae cultum, praecepit dominus ut sacerdotes +minores, qui per tempora certa ministrabant in sanctuario, non +inquinarentur in mortibus nisi valde propinquorum, scilicet patris +et matris et huiusmodi coniunctarum personarum. Pontifex autem +semper debebat esse paratus ad ministerium sanctuarii, et ideo +totaliter prohibitus erat ei accessus ad mortuos, quantumcumque +propinquos. Praeceptum etiam est eis ne ducerent uxorem meretricem +ac repudiatam, sed virginem. Tum propter reverentiam sacerdotum, +quorum dignitas quodammodo ex tali coniugio diminui videretur. Tum +etiam propter filios, quibus esset ad ignominiam turpitudo matris, +quod maxime tunc erat vitandum, quando sacerdotii dignitas secundum +successionem generis conferebatur. Praeceptum etiam erat eis ut non +raderent caput nec barbam, nec in carnibus suis facerent incisuram, +ad removendum idololatriae ritum. Nam sacerdotes gentilium radebant +caput et barbam, unde dicitur Baruch VI, <i>sacerdotes sedent +habentes tunicas scissas, et capita et barbam rasam</i>. Et etiam +in cultu idolorum incidebant se cultris et lanceolis, ut dicitur +III regum XVIII. Unde contraria praecepta sunt sacerdotibus veteris +legis. Spiritualis autem ratio horum est quia sacerdotes omnino +debent esse immunes ab operibus mortuis, quae sunt opera peccati. +Et etiam non debent radere caput, idest deponere sapientiam; neque +deponere barbam, idest sapientiae perfectionem; neque etiam +scindere vestimenta aut incidere carnes, ut scilicet vitium +schismatis non incurrant.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q103" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q103-p0.1">Q. 103. OF THE DURATION OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q103-p2"> We must now consider the duration of the ceremonial precepts: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q103-p3"><a href="#FS_Q103_A1"> (1) Whether the ceremonial precepts were in existence before the Law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q103-p4"><a href="#FS_Q103_A2"> (2) Whether at the time of the Law the ceremonies of the Old Law had any power of justification?</a></p><p id="FS_Q103-p5"><a href="#FS_Q103_A3"> (3) Whether they ceased at the coming of Christ?</a></p><p id="FS_Q103-p6"><a href="#FS_Q103_A4"> (4) Whether it is a mortal sin to observe them after the coming of Christ?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 pr."><a name="38105" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38105] Iª-IIae q. 103 pr.</span></a> Deinde +considerandum est de duratione caeremonialium praeceptorum. Et +circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum praecepta caeremonialia +fuerint ante legem. Secundo, utrum in lege aliquam virtutem +habuerint iustificandi. Tertio, utrum cessaverint Christo veniente. +Quarto, utrum sit peccatum mortale observare ea post Christum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q103_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q103_A1-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 1. Whether the ceremonies of the Law were in existence before the Law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the ceremonies of the Law were in existence before the Law. For sacrifices and holocausts were ceremonies + of the Old Law, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q101_A4" id="FS_Q103_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[101], A[4]</a>). But sacrifices and holocausts preceded the Law: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.4.3" target="asv">Gn. 4:3,4</a>) that "Cain offered, of the fruits of the earth, gifts to the Lord," and that "Abel offered of the firstlings of his flock, + and of their fat." Noe also "offered + holocausts" to the Lord ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.18.20" target="asv">Gn. 18:20</a>), and Abraham did in like manner ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p2.4" href="./asv.html#Gen.22.13" target="asv">Gn. 22:13</a>). Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law preceded the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="38106" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38106] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod caeremoniae legis fuerint ante legem. +Sacrificia enim et holocausta pertinent ad caeremonias veteris +legis, ut supra dictum est. Sed sacrificia et holocausta fuerunt +ante legem. Dicitur enim Gen. IV, quod <i>Cain obtulit de fructibus +terrae munera domino; Abel autem obtulit de primogenitis gregis +sui, et de adipibus eorum</i>. Noe etiam obtulit holocausta domino, +ut dicitur Gen. VIII; et Abraham similiter, ut dicitur Gen. XXII. +Ergo caeremoniae veteris legis fuerunt ante legem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the erecting and consecrating of the altar were part of the ceremonies relating to holy things. But these preceded + the Law. For we read ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.13.18" target="asv">Gn. 13:18</a>) that "Abraham . . . built . . . an altar to the Lord"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.28.18" target="asv">Gn. 28:18</a>) that "Jacob . . . took the stone . . . and set it up for a title, pouring oil upon the top of it." Therefore the legal ceremonies + preceded the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="38107" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38107] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ad caeremonias sacrorum pertinet constructio altaris, et eius +inunctio. Sed ista fuerunt ante legem. Legitur enim Gen. XIII, quod +Abraham aedificavit altare domino; et de Iacob dicitur Gen. XXVIII, +quod <i>tulit lapidem et erexit in titulum fundens oleum +desuper</i>. Ergo caeremoniae legales fuerunt ante legem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the first of the legal sacraments seems to have been circumcision. But circumcision preceded the Law, as appears + from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.17" target="asv">Gn. 17</a>. In like manner the priesthood preceded the Law; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.14.18" target="asv">Gn. 14:18</a>) that "Melchisedech . . . was the priest of the most high God." Therefore the sacramental ceremonies preceded the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="38108" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38108] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +inter sacramenta legalia primum videtur fuisse circumcisio. Sed +circumcisio fuit ante legem, ut patet Gen. XVII. Similiter etiam +sacerdotium fuit ante legem, dicitur enim Gen. XIV, quod +Melchisedech erat sacerdos Dei summi. Ergo caeremoniae +sacramentorum fuerunt ante legem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the distinction of clean from unclean animals belongs to the ceremonies of observances, as stated above (Q[100], + 2, A[6], ad 1). But this distinction preceded the Law; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.7.2" target="asv">Gn. 7:2,3</a>): "Of all clean beasts take seven and seven . . . but of the beasts that are unclean, two and two." Therefore the legal ceremonies + preceded the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="38109" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38109] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +discretio mundorum animalium ab immundis pertinet ad caeremonias +observantiarum, ut supra dictum est. Sed talis discretio fuit ante +legem, dicitur enim Gen. VII, <i>ex omnibus mundis animalibus tolle +septena et septena; de animantibus vero immundis, duo et duo</i>. +Ergo caeremoniae legales fuerunt ante legem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.1" target="asv">Dt. 6:1</a>): "These are the precepts and ceremonies . . . which the Lord your God commanded that I should teach you." But they would + not have needed to be taught about these things, if the aforesaid ceremonies had been already in existence. Therefore the + legal ceremonies did not precede the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 1 s. c."><a name="38110" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38110] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Deut. VI, <i>haec sunt praecepta et caeremoniae +quae mandavit dominus Deus vester ut docerem vos</i>. Non autem +indiguissent super his doceri, si prius praedictae caeremoniae +fuissent. Ergo caeremoniae legis non fuerunt ante legem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said ( + <a href="#FS_Q101_A2" id="FS_Q103_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[101], A[2]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q102_A2" id="FS_Q103_A1-p7.2" shape="rect"> Q[102] , A[2]</a>), the legal ceremonies were ordained for a double purpose; the worship of God, and the foreshadowing of Christ. Now whoever + worships God must needs worship Him by means of certain fixed things pertaining to external worship. But the fixing of the + divine worship belongs to the ceremonies; just as the determining of our relations with our + neighbor is a matter determined by the judicial precepts, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q99_A4" id="FS_Q103_A1-p7.3" shape="rect">Q[99], A[4]</a>). Consequently, as among men in general there were certain judicial precepts, not indeed established by Divine authority, + but ordained by human reason; so also there were some ceremonies fixed, not by the authority of any law, but according to + the will and devotion of those that worship God. Since, however, even before the Law some of the leading men were gifted with + the spirit of + prophecy, it is to be believed that a heavenly instinct, like a private law, prompted them to worship God in a certain definite + way, which would be both in keeping with the interior worship, and a suitable token of Christ's mysteries, which were foreshadowed + also by other things that they did, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p7.4" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:11</a>: "All . . . things happened to them in figure." Therefore there were some ceremonies before the Law, but they were not legal + ceremonies, because they were not as yet established + by legislation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 1 co."><a name="38111" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38111] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, caeremoniae legis ad duo +ordinabantur, scilicet ad cultum Dei, et ad figurandum Christum. +Quicumque autem colit Deum, oportet quod per aliqua determinata eum +colat, quae ad exteriorem cultum pertinent. Determinatio autem +divini cultus ad caeremonias pertinet; sicut etiam determinatio +eorum per quae ordinamur ad proximum, pertinet ad praecepta +iudicialia; ut supra dictum est. Et ideo sicut inter homines +communiter erant aliqua iudicialia, non tamen ex auctoritate legis +divinae instituta, sed ratione hominum ordinata; ita etiam erant +quaedam caeremoniae, non quidem ex auctoritate alicuius legis +determinatae, sed solum secundum voluntatem et devotionem hominum +Deum colentium. Sed quia etiam ante legem fuerunt quidam viri +praecipui prophetico spiritu pollentes, credendum est quod ex +instinctu divino, quasi ex quadam privata lege, inducerentur ad +aliquem certum modum colendi Deum, qui et conveniens esset +interiori cultui, et etiam congrueret ad significandum Christi +mysteria, quae figurabantur etiam per alia eorum gesta, secundum +illud I ad Cor. X, <i>omnia in figuram contingebant illis</i>. +Fuerunt igitur ante legem quaedam caeremoniae, non tamen +caeremoniae legis, quia non erant per aliquam legislationem +institutae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The patriarchs offered up these oblations, sacrifices and holocausts previously to the Law, out of a certain devotion of + their own will, according as it seemed proper to them to offer up in honor of God those things which they had received from + Him, and thus to testify that they worshipped God Who is the beginning and end of all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="38112" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38112] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod huiusmodi oblationes et sacrificia et holocausta +offerebant antiqui ante legem ex quadam devotione propriae +voluntatis, secundum quod eis videbatur conveniens ut in rebus quas +a Deo acceperant, quas in reverentiam divinam offerrent, +protestarentur se colere Deum, qui est omnium principium et +finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> They also established certain sacred things, because they thought that the honor due to God demanded that certain places + should be set apart from others for the purpose of divine worship. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="38113" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38113] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod etiam sacra quaedam instituerunt, quia videbatur eis +conveniens ut in reverentiam divinam essent aliqua loca ab aliis +discreta, divino cultui mancipata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sacrament of circumcision was established by command of God before the Law. Hence it cannot be called a sacrament of + the Law as though it were an institution of the Law, but only as an observance included in the Law. Hence Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#John.7.20" target="asv">Jn. 7:20</a>) that circumcision was "not of Moses, but of his fathers." Again, among those who worshipped God, the priesthood was in existence + before the Law by human appointment, for the Law + allotted the priestly dignity to the firstborn. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="38114" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38114] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod sacramentum circumcisionis praecepto divino fuit +statutum ante legem. Unde non potest dici sacramentum legis quasi +in lege institutum, sed solum quasi in lege observatum. Et hoc est +quod dominus dicit, Ioan. VII, <i>circumcisio non ex Moyse est, sed +ex patribus eius</i>. Sacerdotium etiam erat ante legem apud +colentes Deum, secundum humanam determinationem, quia hanc +dignitatem primogenitis attribuebant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The distinction of clean from unclean animals was in vogue before the Law, not with regard to eating them, since it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.9.3" target="asv">Gn. 9:3</a>): "Everything that moveth and liveth shall be meat for you": but only as to the offering of sacrifices because they used + only certain animals for that purpose. If, however, they did make any distinction in regard to eating; it was not that it + was considered illegal to eat such animals, since this was not forbidden by + any law, but from dislike or custom: thus even now we see that certain foods are looked upon with disgust in some countries, + while people partake of them in others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="38115" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38115] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod distinctio mundorum animalium et immundorum non fuit +ante legem quantum ad esum, cum dictum sit Gen. IX, <i>omne quod +movetur et vivit, erit vobis in cibum</i>, sed solum quantum ad +sacrificiorum oblationem, quia de quibusdam determinatis animalibus +sacrificia offerebant. Si tamen quantum ad esum erat aliqua +discretio animalium, hoc non erat quia esus illorum reputaretur +illicitus, cum nulla lege esset prohibitus, sed propter +abominationem vel consuetudinem, sicut et nunc videmus quod aliqua +cibaria sunt in aliquibus terris abominabilia, quae in aliis +comeduntur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q103_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q103_A2-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 2. Whether, at the time of the Law, the ceremonies of the Old Law had any power of justification?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power of justification at the time of the Law. Because expiation + from sin and consecration pertains to justification. But it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.39.21" target="asv">Ex. 39:21</a>) that the priests and their apparel were consecrated by the sprinkling of blood and the anointing of oil; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.16.16" target="asv">Lev. 16:16</a>) that, by sprinkling the blood of the calf, the priest expiated "the sanctuary from the + uncleanness of the children of Israel, and from their transgressions and . . . their sins." Therefore the ceremonies of the + Old Law had the power of justification. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="38116" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38116] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caeremoniae veteris legis +habuerint virtutem iustificandi tempore legis. Expiatio enim a +peccato, et consecratio hominis, ad iustificationem pertinent, sed +Exod. XXIX, dicitur quod per aspersionem sanguinis et inunctionem +olei consecrabantur sacerdotes et vestes eorum; et Levit. XVI, +dicitur quod sacerdos per aspersionem sanguinis vituli <i>expiabat +sanctuarium ab immunditiis filiorum Israel, et a praevaricationibus +eorum atque peccatis</i>. Ergo caeremoniae veteris legis habebant +virtutem iustificandi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that by which man pleases God pertains to justification, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.10.8" target="asv"> Ps. 10:8</a>: "The Lord is just and hath loved justice." But some pleased God by means of ceremonies, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.10.19" target="asv"> Lev. 10:19</a>: "How could I . . . please the Lord in the ceremonies, having a sorrowful heart?" Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law + had the power of justification. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="38117" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38117] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +id per quod homo placet Deo, ad iustitiam pertinet; secundum illud +Psalmi X, <i>iustus dominus, et iustitias dilexit</i>, sed per +caeremonias aliqui Deo placebant, secundum illud Levit. X, +<i>quomodo potui placere domino in caeremoniis mente lugubri?</i> +Ergo caeremoniae veteris legis habebant virtutem iustificandi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things relating to the divine worship regard the soul rather than the body, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.18.8" target="asv"> Ps. 18:8</a>: "The Law of the Lord is unspotted, converting souls." But the leper was cleansed by means of the ceremonies of the Old Law, + as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.14" target="asv">Lev. 14</a>. Much more therefore could the ceremonies of the Old Law cleanse the soul by justifying it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="38118" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38118] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae sunt divini cultus magis pertinent ad animam quam ad +corpus; secundum illud Psalmi XVIII, <i>lex domini immaculata, +convertens animas</i>. Sed per caeremonias veteris legis mundabatur +leprosus, ut dicitur Levit. XIV. Ergo multo magis caeremoniae +veteris legis poterant mundare animam, iustificando.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.2" target="asv">Gal. 2</a>) [*The first words of the quotation are from 3:21: St. Thomas probably quoting from memory, substituted them for 2:21, which + runs thus: 'If justice be by the Law, then Christ died in vain.']: "If there had been a law given which could justify [Vulg.: + 'give life'], Christ died in vain," i.e. without cause. But this is inadmissible. Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law + did not confer justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 2 s. c."><a name="38119" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38119] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Galat. II, <i>si data esset lex quae +posset iustificare, Christus gratis mortuus esset</i>, idest sine +causa. Sed hoc est inconveniens. Ergo caeremoniae veteris legis non +iustificabant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q103_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q102_A5" id="FS_Q103_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[102], A[5]</a>, ad 4), a twofold uncleanness was distinguished in the Old Law. One was spiritual and is the uncleanness of sin. The other + was corporal, which rendered a man unfit for divine worship; thus a leper, or anyone that touched carrion, was said to be + unclean: and thus uncleanness was nothing but a kind of irregularity. From this uncleanness, then, the ceremonies of the Old + Law had the power to cleanse: + because they were ordered by the Law to be employed as remedies for the removal of the aforesaid uncleannesses which were + contracted in consequence of the prescription of the Law. Hence the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.13" target="asv">Heb. 9:13</a>) that "the blood of goats and of oxen, and the ashes of a heifer, being sprinkled, sanctify such as are defiled, to the cleansing + of the flesh." And just as this uncleanness which was washed away by such like ceremonies, affected the flesh rather than + the soul, so + also the ceremonies themselves are called by the Apostle shortly before ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.10" target="asv">Heb. 9:10</a>) justices of the flesh: "justices of the flesh," says he, "being laid on them until the time of correction." + </p><p id="FS_Q103_A2-p7"> On the other hand, they had no power of cleansing from uncleanness of the soul, i.e. from the uncleanness of sin. The reason + of this was that at no time could there be expiation from sin, except through Christ, "Who taketh away the sins [Vulg.: 'sin'] + of the world" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.29" target="asv">Jn. 1:29</a>). And since the mystery of Christ's Incarnation and Passion had not yet really taken place, those ceremonies of the Old Law + could not really contain in themselves a power flowing from + Christ already incarnate and crucified, such as the sacraments of the New Law contain. Consequently they could not cleanse + from sin: thus the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.4" target="asv">Heb. 10:4</a>) that "it is impossible that with the blood of oxen and goats sin should be taken away"; and for this reason he calls them + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.9" target="asv">Gal. 4:9</a>) "weak and needy elements": weak indeed, because they cannot take away sin; but this weakness results from their being needy, + i.e. from the fact that they do + not contain grace within themselves. + </p><p id="FS_Q103_A2-p8"> However, it was possible at the time of the Law, for the minds of the faithful, to be united by faith to Christ incarnate + and crucified; so that they were justified by faith in Christ: of which faith the observance of these ceremonies was a sort + of profession, inasmuch as they foreshadowed Christ. Hence in the Old Law certain sacrifices were offered up for sins, not + as though the sacrifices themselves washed sins away, but because they were professions of faith which cleansed + from sin. In fact, the Law itself implies this in the terms employed: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.4.26" target="asv">Lev. 4:26</a>; 5:16) that in offering the sacrifice for sin "the priest shall pray for him . . . and it shall be forgiven him," as though + the sin were forgiven, not in virtue of the sacrifices, but through the faith and devotion of those who offered them. It must + be observed, however, that the very fact that the ceremonies of the Old Law washed away uncleanness of the body, was a figure + of + that expiation from sins which was effected by Christ. + </p><p id="FS_Q103_A2-p9"> It is therefore evident that under the state of the Old Law the ceremonies had no power of justification.</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 2 co."><a name="38120" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38120] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in veteri lege duplex +immunditia observabatur. Una quidem spiritualis, quae est +immunditia culpae. Alia vero corporalis, quae tollebat idoneitatem +ad cultum divinum, sicut leprosus dicebatur immundus, vel ille qui +tangebat aliquod morticinum, et sic immunditia nihil aliud erat +quam irregularitas quaedam. Ab hac igitur immunditia caeremoniae +veteris legis habebant virtutem emundandi, quia huiusmodi +caeremoniae erant quaedam remedia adhibita ex ordinatione legis ad +tollendas praedictas immunditias ex statuto legis inductas. Et ideo +apostolus dicit, ad Heb. IX, quod <i>sanguis hircorum et taurorum, +et cinis vitulae aspersus, inquinatos sanctificat ad emundationem +carnis</i>. Et sicut ista immunditia quae per huiusmodi caeremonias +emundabatur, erat magis carnis quam mentis; ita etiam ipsae +caeremoniae iustitiae carnis dicuntur ab ipso apostolo, parum +supra, <i>iustitiis, inquit, carnis usque ad tempus correctionis +impositis</i>. Ab immunditia vero mentis, quae est immunditia +culpae, non habebant virtutem expiandi. Et hoc ideo quia expiatio a +peccatis nunquam fieri potuit nisi per Christum, qui tollit peccata +mundi, ut dicitur Ioan. I, et quia mysterium incarnationis et +passionis Christi nondum erat realiter peractum, illae veteris +legis caeremoniae non poterant in se continere realiter virtutem +profluentem a Christo incarnato et passo, sicut continent +sacramenta novae legis. Et ideo non poterant a peccato mundare, +sicut apostolus dicit, ad Heb. X, quod <i>impossibile est sanguine +taurorum aut hircorum auferri peccata</i>. Et hoc est quod, Gal. +IV, apostolus vocat ea egena et infirma elementa, infirma quidem, +quia non possunt a peccato mundare; sed haec infirmitas provenit ex +eo quod sunt egena, idest eo quod non continent in se gratiam. +Poterat autem mens fidelium, tempore legis, per fidem coniungi +Christo incarnato et passo, et ita ex fide Christi iustificabantur. +Cuius fidei quaedam protestatio erat huiusmodi caeremoniarum +observatio, inquantum erant figura Christi. Et ideo pro peccatis +offerebantur sacrificia quaedam in veteri lege, non quia ipsa +sacrificia a peccato emundarent, sed quia erant quaedam +protestationes fidei, quae a peccato mundabat. Et hoc etiam ipsa +lex innuit ex modo loquendi, dicitur enim Levit. IV et V, quod in +oblatione hostiarum pro peccato orabit pro eo sacerdos, et +dimittetur ei; quasi peccatum dimittatur non ex vi sacrificiorum, +sed ex fide et devotione offerentium. Sciendum est tamen quod hoc +ipsum quod veteris legis caeremoniae a corporalibus immunditiis +expiabant, erat in figura expiationis a peccatis quae fit per +Christum. Sic igitur patet quod caeremoniae in statu veteris legis +non habebant virtutem iustificandi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That sanctification of priests and their sons, and of their apparel or of anything else belonging to them, by sprinkling + them with blood, had no other effect but to appoint them to the divine worship, and to remove impediments from them, "to the + cleansing of the flesh," as the Apostle states ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.13" target="asv">Heb. 9:13</a>) in token of that sanctification whereby "Jesus" sanctified "the people by His own blood" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.13.12" target="asv">Heb. 13:12</a>). + Moreover, the expiation must be understood as referring to the removal of these bodily uncleannesses, not to the forgiveness + of sin. Hence even the sanctuary which could not be the subject of sin is stated to be expiated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="38121" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38121] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illa sanctificatio sacerdotum et filiorum eius, +et vestium ipsorum, vel quorumcumque aliorum, per aspersionem +sanguinis, nihil aliud erat quam deputatio ad divinum cultum, et +remotio impedimentorum ad emundationem carnis, ut apostolus dicit; +in praefigurationem illius sanctificationis qua Iesus per suum +sanguinem sanctificavit populum. Expiatio etiam ad remotionem +huiusmodi corporalium immunditiarum referenda est, non ad +remotionem culpae. Unde etiam sanctuarium expiari dicitur, quod +culpae subiectum esse non poterat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The priests pleased God in the ceremonies by their obedience and devotion, and by their faith in the reality foreshadowed; + not by reason of the things considered in themselves. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="38122" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38122] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod sacerdotes placebant Deo in caeremoniis propter +obedientiam et devotionem et fidem rei praefiguratae, non autem +propter ipsas res secundum se consideratas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those ceremonies which were prescribed in the cleansing of a leper, were not ordained for the purpose of taking away the + defilement of leprosy. This is clear from the fact that these ceremonies were not applied to a man until he was already healed: + hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.14.3" target="asv">Lev. 14:3,4</a>) that the priest, "going out of the camp, when he shall find that the leprosy is cleansed, shall command him that is to be + purified to offer," etc.; whence it is evident + that the priest was appointed the judge of leprosy, not before, but after cleansing. But these ceremonies were employed for + the purpose of taking away the uncleanness of irregularity. They do say, however, that if a priest were to err in his judgment, + the leper would be cleansed miraculously by the power of God, but not in virtue of the sacrifice. Thus also it was by miracle + that the thigh of the adulterous woman rotted, when she had drunk the water "on which" the priest had "heaped curses," as + stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Num.5.19" target="asv"> Num. 5:19-27.</a> + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="38123" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38123] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod caeremoniae illae quae erant institutae in +emundatione leprosi, non ordinabantur ad tollendam immunditiam +infirmitatis leprae. Quod patet ex hoc quod non adhibebantur +huiusmodi caeremoniae nisi iam emundato, unde dicitur Levit. XIV, +quod <i>sacerdos, egressus de castris, cum invenerit lepram esse +mundatam, praecipiet ei qui purificatur ut offerat</i>, etc.; ex +quo patet quod sacerdos constituebatur iudex leprae emundatae, non +autem emundandae. Adhibebantur autem huiusmodi caeremoniae ad +tollendam immunditiam irregularitatis. Dicunt tamen quod quandoque, +si contingeret sacerdotem errare in iudicando, miraculose leprosus +mundabatur a Deo virtute divina, non autem virtute sacrificiorum. +Sicut etiam miraculose mulieris adulterae computrescebat femur, +bibitis aquis in quibus sacerdos maledicta congesserat, ut habetur +Num. V.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q103_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q103_A3-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 3. Whether the ceremonies of the Old Law ceased at the coming of Christ?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law did not cease at the coming of Christ. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Bar.4.1" target="asv">Bar 4:1</a>): "This is the book of the commandments of God, and the law that is for ever." But the legal ceremonies were part of the + Law. Therefore the legal ceremonies were to last for ever. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="38124" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38124] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod caeremoniae veteris legis non +cessaverint in Christi adventu. Dicitur enim Baruch IV, <i>hic est +liber mandatorum Dei, et lex quae est in aeternum</i>. Sed ad legem +pertinebant legis caeremoniae. Ergo legis caeremoniae in aeternum +duraturae erant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the offering made by a leper after being cleansed was a ceremony of the Law. But the Gospel commands the leper, + who has been cleansed, to make this offering ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.8.4" target="asv">Mat. 8:4</a>). Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law did not cease at Christ's coming. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="38125" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38125] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +oblatio leprosi mundati ad legis caeremonias pertinebat. Sed etiam +in Evangelio praecipitur leproso emundato ut huiusmodi oblationes +offerat. Ergo caeremoniae veteris legis non cessaverunt Christo +veniente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as long as the cause remains, the effect remains. But the ceremonies of the Old Law had certain reasonable causes, + inasmuch as they were ordained to the worship of God, besides the fact that they were intended to be figures of Christ. Therefore + the ceremonies of the Old Law should not have ceased. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="38126" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38126] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +manente causa, manet effectus. Sed caeremoniae veteris legis +habebant quasdam rationabiles causas, inquantum ordinabantur ad +divinum cultum; etiam praeter hoc quod ordinabantur in figuram +Christi. Ergo caeremoniae veteris legis cessare non debuerunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, circumcision was instituted as a sign of Abraham's faith: the observance of the sabbath, to recall the blessing + of creation: and other solemnities, in memory of other Divine favors, as state above ( + <a href="#FS_Q102_A4" id="FS_Q103_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[102], A[4]</a>, ad 10; A[5], ad 1). But Abraham's faith is ever to be imitated even by us: and the blessing of creation and other Divine + favors should never be forgotten. Therefore at least circumcision and the other legal + solemnities should not have ceased. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="38127" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38127] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +circumcisio erat instituta in signum fidei Abrahae; observatio +autem sabbati ad recolendum beneficium creationis; et aliae +solemnitates legis ad recolendum alia beneficia Dei; ut supra +dictum est. Sed fides Abrahae est semper imitanda etiam a nobis; et +beneficium creationis, et alia Dei beneficia, semper sunt +recolenda. Ergo ad minus circumcisio et solemnitates legis cessare +non debuerunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Col.2.16" target="asv">Col. 2:16,17</a>): "Let no man . . . judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a festival day, or of the new moon, or of the sabbaths, + which are a shadow of things to come": and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.8.13" target="asv">Heb. 8:13</a>): "In saying a new (testament), he hath made the former old: and that which decayeth and groweth old, is near its end." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 3 s. c."><a name="38128" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38128] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Coloss. II, <i>nemo vos iudicet in +cibo aut in potu, aut in parte diei festi aut Neomeniae aut +sabbatorum, quae sunt umbra futurorum</i>. Et ad Heb. VIII dicitur +quod, <i>dicendo novum testamentum, veteravit prius, quod autem +antiquatur et senescit, prope interitum est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q103_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> All the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law were ordained to the worship of God as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q101_A1" id="FS_Q103_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[101], AA[1]</a>,2). Now external worship should be in proportion to the internal worship, which consists in faith, hope and charity. Consequently + exterior worship had to be subject to variations according to the variations in the internal worship, in which a threefold + state may be distinguished. One state was in respect of faith and hope, + both in heavenly goods, and in the means of obtaining them---in both of these considered as things to come. Such was the state + of faith and hope in the Old Law. Another state of interior worship is that in which we have faith and hope in heavenly goods + as things to come; but in the means of obtaining heavenly goods, as in things present or past. Such is the state of the New + Law. The third state is that in which both are possessed as present; wherein nothing is believed in as lacking, nothing + hoped for as being yet to come. Such is the state of the Blessed. + </p><p id="FS_Q103_A3-p8"> In this state of the Blessed, then, nothing in regard to worship of God will be figurative; there will be naught but "thanksgiving + and voice of praise" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.51.3" target="asv">Is. 51:3</a>). Hence it is written concerning the city of the Blessed ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A3-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.22" target="asv">Apoc. 21:22</a>): "I saw no temple therein: for the Lord God Almighty is the temple thereof, and the Lamb." Proportionately, therefore, the + ceremonies of the first-mentioned state which foreshadowed the second and third + states, had need to cease at the advent of the second state; and other ceremonies had to be introduced which would be in keeping + with the state of divine worship for that particular time, wherein heavenly goods are a thing of the future, but the Divine + favors whereby we obtain the heavenly boons are a thing of the present. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 3 co."><a name="38129" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38129] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod omnia praecepta caeremonialia veteris legis ad cultum +Dei sunt ordinata, ut supra dictum est. Exterior autem cultus +proportionari debet interiori cultui, qui consistit in fide, spe et +caritate. Unde secundum diversitatem interioris cultus, debuit +diversificari cultus exterior. Potest autem triplex status +distingui interioris cultus. Unus quidem secundum quem habetur +fides et spes et de bonis caelestibus, et de his per quae in +caelestia introducimur, de utrisque quidem sicut de quibusdam +futuris. Et talis fuit status fidei et spei in veteri lege. Alius +autem est status interioris cultus in quo habetur fides et spes de +caelestibus bonis sicut de quibusdam futuris, sed de his per quae +introducimur in caelestia, sicut de praesentibus vel praeteritis. +Et iste est status novae legis. Tertius autem status est in quo +utraque habentur ut praesentia, et nihil creditur ut absens, neque +speratur ut futurum. Et iste est status beatorum. In illo ergo +statu beatorum nihil erit figurale ad divinum cultum pertinens, sed +solum gratiarum actio et vox laudis. Et ideo dicitur Apoc. XXI, de +civitate beatorum, <i>templum non vidi in ea, dominus enim Deus +omnipotens templum illius est, et agnus</i>. Pari igitur ratione, +caeremoniae primi status, per quas figurabatur et secundus et +tertius, veniente secundo statu, cessare debuerunt; et aliae +caeremoniae induci, quae convenirent statui cultus divini pro +tempore illo, in quo bona caelestia sunt futura, beneficia autem +Dei per quae ad caelestia introducimur, sunt praesentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Old Law is said to be "for ever" simply and absolutely, as regards its moral precepts; but as regards the ceremonial + precepts it lasts for even in respect of the reality which those ceremonies foreshadowed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="38130" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38130] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod lex vetus dicitur esse in aeternum, secundum +moralia quidem, simpliciter et absolute, secundum caeremonialia +vero, quantum ad veritatem per ea figuratam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The mystery of the redemption of the human race was fulfilled in Christ's Passion: hence Our Lord said then: "It is consummated" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#John.19.30" target="asv">Jn. 19:30</a>). Consequently the prescriptions of the Law must have ceased then altogether through their reality being fulfilled. As a + sign of this, we read that at the Passion of Christ "the veil of the temple was rent" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A3-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.27.51" target="asv">Mat. 27:51</a>). Hence, before Christ's Passion, while Christ was + preaching and working miracles, the Law and the Gospel were concurrent, since the mystery of Christ had already begun, but + was not as yet consummated. And for this reason Our Lord, before His Passion, commanded the leper to observe the legal ceremonies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="38131" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38131] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod mysterium redemptionis humani generis completum fuit +in passione Christi, unde tunc dominus <i>dixit, consummatum +est</i>, ut habetur Ioan. XIX. Et ideo tunc totaliter debuerunt +cessare legalia, quasi iam veritate eorum consummata. In cuius +signum, in passione Christi velum templi legitur esse scissum, +Matth. XXVII. Et ideo ante passionem Christi, Christo praedicante +et miracula faciente, currebant simul lex et Evangelium, quia iam +mysterium Christi erat inchoatum, sed nondum consummatum. Et +propter hoc mandavit dominus, ante passionem suam, leproso, ut +legales caeremonias observaret.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The literal reasons already given ( + <a href="#FS_Q102" id="FS_Q103_A3-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[102])</a> for the ceremonies refer to the divine worship, which was founded on faith in that which was to come. Hence, at the advent + of Him Who was to come, both that worship ceased, and all the reasons referring thereto. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="38132" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38132] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod rationes litterales caeremoniarum supra assignatae +referuntur ad divinum cultum, qui quidem cultus erat in fide +venturi. Et ideo, iam veniente eo qui venturus erat, et cultus ille +cessat, et omnes rationes ad hunc cultum ordinatae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q103_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The faith of Abraham was commended in that he believed in God's promise concerning his seed to come, in which all nations + were to blessed. Wherefore, as long as this seed was yet to come, it was necessary to make profession of Abraham's faith by + means of circumcision. But now that it is consummated, the same thing needs to be declared by means of another sign, viz. + Baptism, which, in this respect, took the place of circumcision, according to the + saying of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A3-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Col.2.11" target="asv">Col. 2:11, 12</a>): "You are circumcised with circumcision not made by hand, in despoiling of the body of the flesh, but in the circumcision + of Christ, buried with Him in Baptism." + </p><p id="FS_Q103_A3-p13"> As to the sabbath, which was a sign recalling the first creation, its place is taken by the "Lord's Day," which recalls the + beginning of the new creature in the Resurrection of Christ. In like manner other solemnities of the Old Law are supplanted + by new solemnities: because the blessings vouchsafed to that people, foreshadowed the favors granted us by Christ. Hence the + feast of the Passover gave place to the feast of Christ's Passion and Resurrection: the feast of Pentecost + when the Old Law was given, to the feast of Pentecost on which was given the Law of the living spirit: the feast of the New + Moon, to Lady Day, when appeared the first rays of the sun, i.e. Christ, by the fulness of grace: the feast of Trumpets, to + the feasts of the Apostles: the feast of Expiation, to the feasts of Martyrs and Confessors: the feast of Tabernacles, to + the feast of the Church Dedication: the feast of the Assembly and Collection, to feast of the Angels, or else to the feast + of All + Hallows. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="38133" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38133] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod fides Abrahae fuit commendata in hoc quod credidit +divinae promissioni de futuro semine, in quo benedicerentur omnes +gentes. Et ideo quandiu hoc erat futurum, oportebat protestari +fidem Abrahae in circumcisione. Sed postquam iam hoc est perfectum, +oportet idem alio signo declarari, scilicet Baptismo, qui in hoc +circumcisioni succedit; secundum illud apostoli, ad Coloss. II, +<i>circumcisi estis circumcisione non manu facta in expoliatione +corporis carnis, sed in circumcisione domini nostri Iesu Christi, +consepulti ei in Baptismo</i>. Sabbatum autem, quod significabat +primam creationem, mutatur in diem dominicum, in quo commemoratur +nova creatura inchoata in resurrectione Christi. Et similiter aliis +solemnitatibus veteris legis novae solemnitates succedunt, quia +beneficia illi populo exhibita, significant beneficia nobis +concessa per Christum. Unde festo phase succedit festum passionis +Christi et resurrectionis. Festo Pentecostes, in quo fuit data lex +vetus, succedit festum Pentecostes in quo fuit data lex spiritus +vitae. Festo Neomeniae succedit festum beatae virginis, in qua +primo apparuit illuminatio solis, idest Christi, per copiam +gratiae. Festo tubarum succedunt festa apostolorum. Festo +expiationis succedunt festa martyrum et confessorum. Festo +tabernaculorum succedit festum consecrationis Ecclesiae. Festo +coetus atque collectae succedit festum Angelorum; vel etiam festum +omnium sanctorum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q103_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q103_A4-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 4. Whether since Christ's Passion the legal ceremonies can be observed without committing mortal sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that since Christ's Passion the legal ceremonies can be observed without committing mortal sin. For we must + not believe that the apostles committed mortal sin after receiving the Holy Ghost: since by His fulness they were "endued + with power from on high" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.24.49" target="asv">Lk. 24:49</a>). But the apostles observed the legal ceremonies after the coming of the Holy Ghost: for it is stated ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Acts.16.3" target="asv">Acts 16:3</a>) that Paul circumcised Timothy: and + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A4-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Acts.21.26" target="asv">Acts 21:26</a>) that Paul, at the advice of James, "took the men, and . . . being purified with them, entered into the temple, giving notice + of the accomplishment of the days of purification, until an oblation should be offered for every one of them." Therefore the + legal ceremonies can be observed since the Passion of Christ without mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="38134" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38134] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod post passionem Christi legalia possint +sine peccato mortali observari. Non est enim credendum quod +apostoli, post acceptum spiritum sanctum, mortaliter peccaverint, +eius enim plenitudine sunt induti virtute ex alto, ut dicitur Lucae +ult. Sed apostoli post adventum spiritus sancti legalia +observaverunt, dicitur enim Act. XVI, quod Paulus circumcidit +Timotheum; et Act. XXI, dicitur quod Paulus, secundum consilium +Iacobi, <i>assumptis viris, purificatus cum eis intravit in +templum, annuntians expletionem dierum purificationis, donec +offerretur pro unoquoque eorum oblatio</i>. Ergo sine peccato +mortali possunt post Christi passionem legalia observari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one of the legal ceremonies consisted in shunning the fellowship of Gentiles. But the first Pastor of the Church + complied with this observance; for it is stated ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.2.12" target="asv">Gal. 2:12</a>) that, "when" certain men "had come" to Antioch, Peter "withdrew and separated himself" from the Gentiles. Therefore the + legal ceremonies can be observed since Christ's Passion without committing mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="38135" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38135] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +vitare consortia gentilium ad caeremonias legis pertinebat. Sed hoc +observavit primus pastor Ecclesiae, dicitur enim ad Gal. II, quod, +cum venissent quidam Antiochiam, <i>subtrahebat et segregabat se +Petrus a gentilibus</i>. Ergo absque peccato post passionem Christi +legis caeremoniae observari possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the commands of the apostles did not lead men into sin. But it was commanded by apostolic decree that the Gentiles + should observe certain ceremonies of the Law: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.15.28" target="asv">Acts 15:28,29</a>): "It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us, to lay no further burden upon you than these necessary things: that you + abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication." Therefore + the legal ceremonies can be observed since Christ's Passion without committing mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="38136" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38136] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +praecepta apostolorum non induxerunt homines ad peccatum. Sed ex +decreto apostolorum statutum fuit quod gentiles quaedam de +caeremoniis legis observarent, dicitur enim Act. XV, <i>visum est +spiritui sancto et nobis nihil ultra imponere oneris vobis quam +haec necessaria, ut abstineatis vos ab immolatis simulacrorum, et +sanguine, et suffocato, et fornicatione</i>. Ergo absque peccato +caeremoniae legales possunt post Christi passionem observari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.2" target="asv">Gal. 5:2</a>): "If you be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing." But nothing save mortal sin hinders us from receiving Christ's + fruit. Therefore since Christ's Passion it is a mortal sin to be circumcised, or to observe the other legal ceremonies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 4 s. c."><a name="38137" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38137] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Gal. V, <i>si circumcidimini, Christus +nihil vobis proderit</i>. Sed nihil excludit fructum Christi nisi +peccatum mortale. Ergo circumcidi, et alias caeremonias observare, +post passionem Christi est peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> All ceremonies are professions of faith, in which the interior worship of God consists. Now man can make profession of his + inward faith, by deeds as well as by words: and in either profession, if he make a false declaration, he sins mortally. Now, + though our faith in Christ is the same as that of the fathers of old; yet, since they came before Christ, whereas we come + after Him, the same faith is expressed in different words, by us and by them. For by them + was it said: "Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a son," where the verbs are in the future tense: whereas we express + the same by means of verbs in the past tense, and say that she "conceived and bore." In like manner the ceremonies of the + Old Law betokened Christ as having yet to be born and to suffer: whereas our sacraments signify Him as already born and having + suffered. Consequently, just as it would be a mortal sin now for anyone, in making a profession of faith, to say that Christ + is + yet to be born, which the fathers of old said devoutly and truthfully; so too it would be a mortal sin now to observe those + ceremonies which the fathers of old fulfilled with devotion and fidelity. Such is the teaching Augustine (Contra Faust. xix, + 16), who says: "It is no longer promised that He shall be born, shall suffer and rise again, truths of which their sacraments + were a kind of image: but it is declared that He is already born, has suffered and risen again; of which our sacraments, in + which Christians share, are the actual representation." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 4 co."><a name="38138" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38138] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod omnes caeremoniae sunt quaedam protestationes fidei, +in qua consistit interior Dei cultus. Sic autem fidem interiorem +potest homo protestari factis, sicut et verbis, et in utraque +protestatione, si aliquid homo falsum protestatur, peccat +mortaliter. Quamvis autem sit eadem fides quam habemus de Christo, +et quam antiqui patres habuerunt; tamen quia ipsi praecesserunt +Christum, nos autem sequimur, eadem fides diversis verbis +significatur a nobis et ab eis. Nam ab eis dicebatur, ecce virgo +concipiet et pariet filium, quae sunt verba futuri temporis, nos +autem idem repraesentamus per verba praeteriti temporis, dicentes +quod concepit et peperit. Et similiter caeremoniae veteris legis +significabant Christum ut nasciturum et passurum, nostra autem +sacramenta significant ipsum ut natum et passum. Sicut igitur +peccaret mortaliter qui nunc, suam fidem protestando, diceret +Christum nasciturum, quod antiqui pie et veraciter dicebant; ita +etiam peccaret mortaliter, si quis nunc caeremonias observaret, +quas antiqui pie et fideliter observabant. Et hoc est quod +Augustinus dicit, contra Faustum, <i>iam non promittitur +nasciturus, passurus, resurrecturus, quod illa sacramenta +quodammodo personabant, sed annuntiatur quod natus sit, passus sit, +resurrexerit; quod haec sacramenta quae a Christianis aguntur, iam +personant</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q103_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> On this point there seems to have been a difference of opinion between Jerome and Augustine. For Jerome (Super Galat. ii, + 11, seqq.) distinguished two periods of time. One was the time previous to Christ's Passion, during which the legal ceremonies + were neither dead, since they were obligatory, and did expiate in their own fashion; nor deadly, because it was not sinful + to observe them. But immediately after Christ's Passion they began to be not only + dead, so as no longer to be either effectual or binding; but also deadly, so that whoever observed them was guilty of mortal + sin. Hence he maintained that after the Passion the apostles never observed the legal ceremonies in real earnest; but only + by a kind of pious pretense, lest, to wit, they should scandalize the Jews and hinder their conversion. This pretense, however, + is to be understood, not as though they did not in reality perform those actions, but in the sense that they performed them + without the mind to observe the ceremonies of the Law: thus a man might cut away his foreskin for health's sake, not with + the intention of observing legal circumcision. + </p><p id="FS_Q103_A4-p8"> But since it seems unbecoming that the apostles, in order to avoid scandal, should have hidden things pertaining to the truth + of life and doctrine, and that they should have made use of pretense, in things pertaining to the salvation of the faithful; + therefore Augustine (Epist. lxxxii) more fittingly distinguished three periods of time. One was the time that preceded the + Passion of Christ, during which the legal ceremonies were neither deadly nor dead: another period was after + the publication of the Gospel, during which the legal ceremonies are both dead and deadly. The third is a middle period, viz. + from the Passion of Christ until the publication of the Gospel, during which the legal ceremonies were dead indeed, because + they had neither effect nor binding force; but were not deadly, because it was lawful for the Jewish converts to Christianity + to observe them, provided they did not put their trust in them so as to hold them to be necessary unto salvation, as though + faith in Christ could not justify without the legal observances. On the other hand, there was no reason why those who were + converted from heathendom to Christianity should observe them. Hence Paul circumcised Timothy, who was born of a Jewish mother; + but was unwilling to circumcise Titus, who was of heathen nationality. + </p><p id="FS_Q103_A4-p9"> The reason why the Holy Ghost did not wish the converted Jews to be debarred at once from observing the legal ceremonies, + while converted heathens were forbidden to observe the rites of heathendom, was in order to show that there is a difference + between these rites. For heathenish ceremonial was rejected as absolutely unlawful, and as prohibited by God for all time; + whereas the legal ceremonial ceased as being fulfilled through Christ's Passion, being instituted by God as a + figure of Christ. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="38139" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38139] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod circa hoc diversimode sensisse videntur +Hieronymus et Augustinus. Hieronymus enim distinxit duo tempora. +Unum tempus ante passionem Christi, in quo legalia nec erant +mortua, quasi non habentia vim obligatoriam, aut expiativam pro suo +modo; nec etiam mortifera, quia non peccabant ea observantes. +Statim autem post passionem Christi incoeperunt esse non solum +mortua, idest non habentia virtutem et obligationem; sed etiam +mortifera, ita scilicet quod peccabant mortaliter quicumque ea +observabant. Unde dicebat quod apostoli nunquam legalia +observaverunt post passionem secundum veritatem; sed solum quadam +pia simulatione, ne scilicet scandalizarent Iudaeos et eorum +conversionem impedirent. Quae quidem simulatio sic intelligenda +est, non quidem ita quod illos actus secundum rei veritatem non +facerent, sed quia non faciebant tanquam legis caeremonias +observantes; sicut si quis pelliculam virilis membri abscinderet +propter sanitatem, non causa legalis circumcisionis observandae. +Sed quia indecens videtur quod apostoli ea occultarent propter +scandalum quae pertinent ad veritatem vitae et doctrinae, et quod +simulatione uterentur in his quae pertinent ad salutem fidelium; +ideo convenientius Augustinus distinxit tria tempora. Unum quidem +ante Christi passionem, in quo legalia non erant neque mortifera +neque mortua. Aliud autem post tempus Evangelii divulgati, in quo +legalia sunt et mortua et mortifera. Tertium autem est tempus +medium, scilicet a passione Christi usque ad divulgationem +Evangelii, in quo legalia fuerunt quidem mortua, quia neque vim +aliquam habebant, neque aliquis ea observare tenebatur; non tamen +fuerunt mortifera, quia illi qui conversi erant ad Christum ex +Iudaeis, poterant illa legalia licite observare, dummodo non sic +ponerent spem in eis quod ea reputarent sibi necessaria ad salutem, +quasi sine legalibus fides Christi iustificare non posset. His +autem qui convertebantur ex gentilitate ad Christum, non inerat +causa ut ea observarent. Et ideo Paulus circumcidit Timotheum, qui +ex matre Iudaea genitus erat; Titum autem, qui ex gentilibus natus +erat, circumcidere noluit. Ideo autem noluit spiritus sanctus ut +statim inhiberetur his qui ex Iudaeis convertebantur observatio +legalium, sicut inhibebatur his qui ex gentilibus convertebantur +gentilitatis ritus, ut quaedam differentia inter hos ritus +ostenderetur. Nam gentilitatis ritus repudiabatur tanquam omnino +illicitus, et a Deo semper prohibitus, ritus autem legis cessabat +tanquam impletus per Christi passionem, utpote a Deo in figuram +Christi institutus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q103_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to Jerome, Peter withdrew himself from the Gentiles by pretense, in order to avoid giving scandal to the Jews, + of whom he was the Apostle. Hence he did not sin at all in acting thus. On the other hand, Paul in like manner made a pretense + of blaming him, in order to avoid scandalizing the Gentiles, whose Apostle he was. But Augustine disapproves of this solution: + because in the canonical Scripture (viz. + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.2.11" target="asv"> Gal. 2:11</a>), + wherein we must not hold anything to be false, Paul says that Peter "was to be blamed." Consequently it is true that Peter + was at fault: and Paul blamed him in very truth and not with pretense. Peter, however, did not sin, by observing the legal + ceremonial for the time being; because this was lawful for him who was a converted Jew. But he did sin by excessive minuteness + in the observance of the legal rites lest he should scandalize the Jews, the result being that he gave scandal to the + Gentiles. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="38140" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38140] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, secundum Hieronymum, Petrus simulatorie se a +gentilibus subtrahebat, ut vitaret Iudaeorum scandalum, quorum erat +apostolus. Unde in hoc nullo modo peccavit, sed Paulus eum +similiter simulatorie reprehendit, ut vitaret scandalum gentilium, +quorum erat apostolus. Sed Augustinus hoc improbat, quia Paulus in +canonica Scriptura, scilicet Gal. II, in qua nefas est credere +aliquid esse falsum, dicit quod Petrus reprehensibilis erat. Unde +verum est quod Petrus peccavit, et Paulus vere eum, non +simulatorie, reprehendit. Non autem peccavit Petrus in hoc quod ad +tempus legalia observabat, quia hoc sibi licebat, tanquam ex +Iudaeis converso. Sed peccabat in hoc quod circa legalium +observantiam nimiam diligentiam adhibebat ne scandalizaret Iudaeos, +ita quod ex hoc sequebatur gentilium scandalum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q103_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some have held that this prohibition of the apostles is not to be taken literally, but spiritually: namely, that the prohibition + of blood signifies the prohibition of murder; the prohibition of things strangled, that of violence and rapine; the prohibition + of things offered to idols, that of idolatry; while fornication is forbidden as being evil in itself: which opinion they gathered + from certain glosses, which expound these prohibitions in a mystical + sense. Since, however, murder and rapine were held to be unlawful even by the Gentiles, there would have been no need to give + this special commandment to those who were converted to Christ from heathendom. Hence others maintain that those foods were + forbidden literally, not to prevent the observance of legal ceremonies, but in order to prevent gluttony. Thus Jerome says + on Ezech. 44:31 ("The priest shall not eat of anything that is dead"): "He condemns those priests who from gluttony did not + keep these precepts." + </p><p id="FS_Q103_A4-p12"> But since certain foods are more delicate than these and more conducive to gluttony, there seems no reason why these should + have been forbidden more than the others. + </p><p id="FS_Q103_A4-p13"> We must therefore follow the third opinion, and hold that these foods were forbidden literally, not with the purpose of enforcing + compliance with the legal ceremonies, but in order to further the union of Gentiles and Jews living side by side. Because + blood and things strangled were loathsome to the Jews by ancient custom; while the Jews might have suspected the Gentiles + of relapse into idolatry if the latter had partaken of things offered to idols. Hence these things were + prohibited for the time being, during which the Gentiles and Jews were to become united together. But as time went on, with + the lapse of the cause, the effect lapsed also, when the truth of the Gospel teaching was divulged, wherein Our Lord taught + that "not that which entereth into the mouth defileth a man" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A4-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.11" target="asv">Mat. 15:11</a>); and that "nothing is to be rejected that is received with thanksgiving" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A4-p13.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:4</a>). With regard to fornication a special prohibition + was made, because the Gentiles did not hold it to be sinful. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 103 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="38141" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38141] Iª-IIae q. 103 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod illa prohibitio apostolorum non +est intelligenda ad litteram, sed secundum spiritualem intellectum, +ut scilicet in prohibitione sanguinis, intelligatur prohibitio +homicidii; in prohibitione suffocati, intelligatur prohibitio +violentiae et rapinae; in prohibitione immolatorum, intelligatur +prohibitio idololatriae; fornicatio autem prohibetur tanquam per se +malum. Et hanc opinionem accipiunt ex quibusdam Glossis, quae +huiusmodi praecepta mystice exponunt. Sed quia homicidium et rapina +etiam apud gentiles reputabantur illicita, non oportuisset super +hoc speciale mandatum dari his qui erant ex gentilitate conversi ad +Christum. Unde alii dicunt quod ad litteram illa comestibilia +fuerunt prohibita, non propter observantiam legalium, sed propter +gulam comprimendam. Unde dicit Hieronymus, super illud Ezech. XLIV, +<i>omne morticinum etc., condemnat sacerdotes qui in turdis et +ceteris huiusmodi, haec, cupiditate gulae, non custodiunt</i>. Sed +quia sunt quaedam cibaria magis delicata et gulam provocantia, non +videtur ratio quare fuerunt haec magis quam alia prohibita. Et ideo +dicendum, secundum tertiam opinionem, quod ad litteram ista sunt +prohibita, non ad observandum caeremonias legis, sed ad hoc quod +posset coalescere unio gentilium et Iudaeorum insimul habitantium. +Iudaeis enim, propter antiquam consuetudinem, sanguis et suffocatum +erant abominabilia, comestio autem immolatorum simulacris, poterat +in Iudaeis aggenerare circa gentiles suspicionem reditus ad +idololatriam. Et ideo ista fuerunt prohibita pro tempore illo, in +quo de novo oportebat convenire in unum gentiles et Iudaeos. +Procedente autem tempore, cessante causa, cessat effectus; +manifestata evangelicae doctrinae veritate, in qua dominus docet +quod nihil quod per os intrat, coinquinat hominem, ut dicitur +Matth. XV; <i>et quod nihil est reiiciendum quod cum gratiarum +actione percipitur</i>, ut I ad Tim. IV dicitur. Fornicatio autem +prohibetur specialiter, quia gentiles eam non reputabant esse +peccatum.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q104" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q104-p0.1">Q. 104. OF THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q104-p2"> We must now consider the judicial precepts: and first of all we shall consider them in general; in the second place we shall + consider their reasons. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q104-p3"><a href="#FS_Q104_A1"> (1) What is meant by the judicial precepts?</a></p><p id="FS_Q104-p4"><a href="#FS_Q104_A2"> (2) Whether they are figurative?</a></p><p id="FS_Q104-p5"><a href="#FS_Q104_A3"> (3) Their duration;</a></p><p id="FS_Q104-p6"><a href="#FS_Q104_A4"> (4) Their division.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 pr."><a name="38142" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38142] Iª-IIae q. 104 pr.</span></a> Consequenter +considerandum est de praeceptis iudicialibus. Et primo, +considerandum est de ipsis in communi; secundo, de rationibus +eorum. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, quae sint iudicialia +praecepta. Secundo, utrum sint figuralia. Tertio, de duratione +eorum. Quarto, de distinctione eorum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q104_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q104_A1-p0.1">Q. 104. A. 1. Whether the judicial precepts were those which directed man in relation to his neighbor?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the judicial precepts were not those which directed man in his relations to his neighbor. For judicial + precepts take their name from "judgment." But there are many things that direct man as to his neighbor, which are not subordinate + to judgment. Therefore the judicial precepts were not those which directed man in his relations to his neighbor. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="38143" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38143] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ratio praeceptorum iudicialium non +consistat in hoc quod sunt ordinantia ad proximum. Iudicialia enim +praecepta a iudicio dicuntur. Sed multa sunt alia quibus homo ad +proximum ordinatur, quae non pertinent ad ordinem iudiciorum. Non +ergo praecepta iudicialia dicuntur quibus homo ordinatur ad +proximum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the judicial precepts are distinct from the moral precepts, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q99_A4" id="FS_Q104_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[99], A[4]</a>). But there are many moral precepts which direct man as to his neighbor: as is evidently the case with the seven precepts + of the second table. Therefore the judicial precepts are not so called from directing man as to his neighbor. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="38144" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38144] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +praecepta iudicialia a moralibus distinguuntur, ut supra dictum +est. Sed multa praecepta moralia sunt quibus homo ordinatur ad +proximum, sicut patet in septem praeceptis secundae tabulae. Non +ergo praecepta iudicialia dicuntur ex hoc quod ad proximum +ordinant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the ceremonial precepts relate to God, so do the judicial precepts relate to one's neighbor, as stated above + ( + <a href="#FS_Q99_A4" id="FS_Q104_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[99], A[4]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q101_A1" id="FS_Q104_A1-p4.2" shape="rect"> Q[101], A[1]</a>). But among the ceremonial precepts there are some which concern man himself, such as observances in matter of food and apparel, + of which we have already spoken ( + <a href="#FS_Q102_A6" id="FS_Q104_A1-p4.3" shape="rect">Q[102], A[6]</a>, ad 1,6). Therefore the judicial precepts are not so called from + directing man as to his neighbor. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="38145" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38145] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut se habent praecepta caeremonialia ad Deum, ita se habent +iudicialia praecepta ad proximum, ut supra dictum est. Sed inter +praecepta caeremonialia sunt quaedam quae pertinent ad seipsum, +sicut observantiae ciborum et vestimentorum, de quibus supra dictum +est. Ergo praecepta iudicialia non ex hoc dicuntur quod ordinent +hominem ad proximum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is reckoned ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q104_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.8" target="asv">Ezech. 18:8</a>) among other works of a good and just man, that "he hath executed true judgment between man and man." But judicial precepts + are so called from "judgment." Therefore it seems that the judicial precepts were those which directed the relations between + man and man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 1 s. c."><a name="38146" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38146] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Ezech. XVIII, inter cetera bona opera viri iusti, +<i>si iudicium verum fecerit inter virum et virum</i>. Sed +iudicialia praecepta a iudicio dicuntur. Ergo praecepta iudicialia +videntur dici illa quae pertinent ad ordinationem hominum ad +invicem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As is evident from what we have stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q95_A2" id="FS_Q104_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[95], A[2]</a> ; + <a href="#FS_Q99_A4" id="FS_Q104_A1-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[99], A[4]</a>), in every law, some precepts derive their binding force from the dictate of reason itself, because natural reason dictates + that something ought to be done or to be avoided. These are called "moral" precepts: since human morals are based on reason. + At the same time there are other precepts which derive their binding force, not from the + very dictate of reason (because, considered in themselves, they do not imply an obligation of something due or undue); but + from some institution, Divine or human: and such are certain determinations of the moral precepts. When therefore the moral + precepts are fixed by Divine institution in matters relating to man's subordination to God, they are called "ceremonial" precepts: + but when they refer to man's relations to other men, they are called "judicial" precepts. Hence there are two conditions + attached to the judicial precepts: viz. first, that they refer to man's relations to other men; secondly, that they derive + their binding force not from reason alone, but in virtue of their institution. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 1 co."><a name="38147" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38147] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, praeceptorum cuiuscumque +legis quaedam habent vim obligandi ex ipso dictamine rationis, quia +naturalis ratio dictat hoc esse debitum fieri vel vitari. Et +huiusmodi praecepta dicuntur moralia, eo quod a ratione dicuntur +mores humani. Alia vero praecepta sunt quae non habent vim +obligandi ex ipso dictamine rationis, quia scilicet in se +considerata non habent absolute rationem debiti vel indebiti; sed +habent vim obligandi ex aliqua institutione divina vel humana. Et +huiusmodi sunt determinationes quaedam moralium praeceptorum. Si +igitur determinentur moralia praecepta per institutionem divinam in +his per quae ordinatur homo ad Deum, talia dicentur praecepta +caeremonialia. Si autem in his quae pertinent ad ordinationem +hominum ad invicem, talia dicentur praecepta iudicialia. In duobus +ergo consistit ratio iudicialium praeceptorum, scilicet ut +pertineant ad ordinationem hominum ad invicem; et ut non habeant +vim obligandi ex sola ratione, sed ex institutione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Judgments emanate through the official pronouncement of certain men who are at the head of affairs, and in whom the judicial + power is vested. Now it belongs to those who are at the head of affairs to regulate not only litigious matters, but also voluntary + contracts which are concluded between man and man, and whatever matters concern the community at large and the government + thereof. Consequently the judicial precepts are not only those which concern + actions at law; but also all those that are directed to the ordering of one man in relation to another, which ordering is + subject to the direction of the sovereign as supreme judge. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="38148" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38148] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod iudicia exercentur officio aliquorum principum, +qui habent potestatem iudicandi. Ad principem autem pertinet non +solum ordinare de his quae veniunt in litigium, sed etiam de +voluntariis contractibus qui inter homines fiunt, et de omnibus +pertinentibus ad populi communitatem et regimen. Unde praecepta +iudicialia non solum sunt illa quae pertinent ad lites iudiciorum; +sed etiam quaecumque pertinent ad ordinationem hominum ad invicem, +quae subest ordinationi principis tanquam supremi iudicis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument holds in respect of those precepts which direct man in his relations to his neighbor, and derive their binding + force from the mere dictate of reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="38149" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38149] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de illis praeceptis ordinantibus +ad proximum, quae habent vim obligandi ex solo dictamine +rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even in those precepts which direct us to God, some are moral precepts, which the reason itself dictates when it is quickened + by faith; such as that God is to be loved and worshipped. There are also ceremonial precepts, which have no binding force + except in virtue of their Divine institution. Now God is concerned not only with the sacrifices that are offered to Him, but + also with whatever relates to the fitness of those who offer sacrifices to Him and + worship Him. Because men are ordained to God as to their end; wherefore it concerns God and, consequently, is a matter of + ceremonial precept, that man should show some fitness for the divine worship. On the other hand, man is not ordained to his + neighbor as to his end, so as to need to be disposed in himself with regard to his neighbor, for such is the relationship + of a slave to his master, since a slave "is his master's in all that he is," as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2). Hence + there are + no judicial precepts ordaining man in himself; all such precepts are moral: because the reason, which is the principal in + moral matters, holds the same position, in man, with regard to things that concern him, as a prince or judge holds in the + state. Nevertheless we must take note that, since the relations of man to his neighbor are more subject to reason than the + relations of man to God, there are more precepts whereby man is directed in his relations to his neighbor, than whereby he + is + directed to God. For the same reason there had to be more ceremonial than judicial precepts in the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="38150" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38150] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam in his quae ordinant ad Deum, quaedam sunt +moralia, quae ipsa ratio fide informata dictat, sicut Deum esse +amandum et colendum. Quaedam vero sunt caeremonialia, quae non +habent vim obligationis nisi ex institutione divina. Ad Deum autem +pertinent non solum sacrificia oblata Deo, sed etiam quaecumque +pertinent ad idoneitatem offerentium et Deum colentium. Homines +enim ordinantur in Deum sicut in finem, et ideo ad cultum Dei +pertinet, et per consequens ad caeremonialia praecepta, quod homo +habeat quandam idoneitatem respectu cultus divini. Sed homo non +ordinatur ad proximum sicut in finem, ut oporteat eum disponi in +seipso in ordine ad proximum, haec enim est comparatio servorum ad +dominos, <i>qui id quod sunt, dominorum sunt</i>, secundum +philosophum, in I Polit. Et ideo non sunt aliqua praecepta +iudicialia ordinantia hominem in seipso, sed omnia talia sunt +moralia, quia ratio, quae est principium moralium, se habet in +homine respectu eorum quae ad ipsum pertinent, sicut princeps vel +iudex in civitate. Sciendum tamen quod, quia ordo hominis ad +proximum magis subiacet rationi quam ordo hominis ad Deum, plura +praecepta moralia inveniuntur per quae ordinatur homo ad proximum, +quam per quae ordinatur ad Deum. Et propter hoc etiam oportuit +plura esse caeremonialia in lege quam iudicialia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q104_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q104_A2-p0.1">Q. 104. A. 2. Whether the judicial precepts were figurative?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the judicial precepts were not figurative. Because it seems proper to the ceremonial precepts to be instituted + as figures of something else. Therefore, if the judicial precepts are figurative, there will be no difference between the + judicial and ceremonial precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="38151" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38151] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta iudicialia non +figurent aliquid. Hoc enim videtur esse proprium caeremonialium +praeceptorum, quod sint in figuram alicuius rei instituta. Si +igitur etiam praecepta iudicialia aliquid figurent, non erit +differentia inter iudicialia et caeremonialia praecepta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as certain judicial precepts were given to the Jewish people, so also were some given to other heathen peoples. + But the judicial precepts given to other peoples were not figurative, but stated what had to be done. Therefore it seems that + neither were the judicial precepts of the Old Law figures of anything. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="38152" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38152] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicuti illi populo Iudaeorum data sunt quaedam iudicialia +praecepta, ita etiam aliis populis gentilium. Sed iudicialia +praecepta aliorum populorum non figurant aliquid, sed ordinant quid +fieri debeat. Ergo videtur quod neque praecepta iudicialia veteris +legis aliquid figurarent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those things which relate to the divine worship had to be taught under certain figures, because the things of God + are above our reason, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q101_A2" id="FS_Q104_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[101], A[2]</a>, ad 2). But things concerning our neighbor are not above our reason. Therefore the judicial precepts which direct us in relation + to our neighbor should not have been figurative. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="38153" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38153] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae ad cultum divinum pertinent, figuris quibusdam tradi +oportuit, quia ea quae Dei sunt, supra nostram rationem sunt, ut +supra dictum est. Sed ea quae sunt proximorum, non excedunt nostram +rationem. Ergo per iudicialia, quae ad proximum nos ordinant, non +oportuit aliquid figurari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The judicial precepts are expounded both in the allegorical and in the moral sense ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q104_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.21" target="asv">Ex. 21</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 2 s. c."><a name="38154" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38154] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Exod. XXI iudicialia praecepta allegorice et moraliter +exponuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A precept may be figurative in two ways. First, primarily and in itself: because, to wit, it is instituted principally that + it may be the figure of something. In this way the ceremonial precepts are figurative; since they were instituted for the + very purpose that they might foreshadow something relating to the worship of God and the mystery of Christ. But some precepts + are figurative, not primarily and in themselves, but consequently. In this way the + judicial precepts of the Old Law are figurative. For they were not instituted for the purpose of being figurative, but in + order that they might regulate the state of that people according to justice and equity. Nevertheless they did foreshadow + something consequently: since, to wit, the entire state of that people, who were directed by these precepts, was figurative, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q104_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:11</a>: "All . . . things happened to them in figure." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 2 co."><a name="38155" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38155] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod dupliciter contingit aliquod praeceptum esse +figurale. Uno modo, primo et per se, quia scilicet principaliter +est institutum ad aliquid figurandum. Et hoc modo praecepta +caeremonialia sunt figuralia, ad hoc enim sunt instituta, ut +aliquid figurent pertinens ad cultum Dei et ad mysterium Christi. +Quaedam vero praecepta sunt figuralia non primo et per se, sed ex +consequenti. Et hoc modo praecepta iudicialia veteris legis sunt +figuralia. Non enim sunt instituta ad aliquid figurandum; sed ad +ordinandum statum illius populi secundum iustitiam et aequitatem. +Sed ex consequenti aliquid figurabant, inquantum scilicet totus +status illius populi, qui per huiusmodi praecepta disponebatur, +figuralis erat; secundum illud I ad Cor. X, <i>omnia in figuram +contingebant illis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The ceremonial precepts are not figurative in the same way as the judicial precepts, as explained above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="38156" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38156] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod praecepta caeremonialia alio modo sunt figuralia +quam iudicialia, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Jewish people were chosen by God that Christ might be born of them. Consequently the entire state of that people had + to be prophetic and figurative, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. xxii, 24). For this reason even the judicial precepts that + were given to this people were more figurative that those which were given to other nations. Thus, too, the wars and deeds + of this people are expounded in the mystical sense: but not the wars and deeds of the + Assyrians or Romans, although the latter are more famous in the eyes of men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="38157" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38157] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod populus Iudaeorum ad hoc electus erat a Deo, quod ex +eo Christus nasceretur. Et ideo oportuit totum illius populi statum +esse propheticum et figuralem, ut Augustinus dicit, contra Faustum. +Et propter hoc etiam iudicialia illi populo tradita, magis sunt +figuralia quam iudicialia aliis populis tradita. Sicut etiam bella +et gesta illius populi exponuntur mystice; non autem bella vel +gesta Assyriorum vel Romanorum, quamvis longe clariora secundum +homines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In this people the direction of man in regard to his neighbor, considered in itself, was subject to reason. But in so far + as it was referred to the worship of God, it was above reason: and in this respect it was figurative. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="38158" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38158] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ordo ad proximum in populo illo, secundum se +consideratus, pervius erat rationi. Sed secundum quod referebatur +ad cultum Dei, superabat rationem. Et ex hac parte erat +figuralis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q104_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q104_A3-p0.1">Q. 104. A. 3. Whether the judicial precepts of the Old Law bind for ever?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the judicial precepts of the Old Law bind for ever. Because the judicial precepts relate to the virtue + of justice: since a judgment is an execution of the virtue of justice. Now "justice is perpetual and immortal" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q104_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.15" target="asv">Wis. 1:15</a>). Therefore the judicial precepts bind for ever. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="38159" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38159] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta iudicialia veteris legis +perpetuam obligationem habeant. Praecepta enim iudicialia pertinent +ad virtutem iustitiae, nam iudicium dicitur iustitiae executio. +Iustitia autem est perpetua et immortalis, ut dicitur Sap. I. Ergo +obligatio praeceptorum iudicialium est perpetua.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Divine institutions are more enduring than human institutions. But the judicial precepts of human laws bind for + ever. Therefore much more do the judicial precepts of the Divine Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="38160" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38160] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +institutio divina est stabilior quam institutio humana. Sed +praecepta iudicialia humanarum legum habent perpetuam obligationem. +Ergo multo magis praecepta iudicialia legis divinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q104_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.18" target="asv">Heb. 7:18</a>) that "there is a setting aside of the former commandment, because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof." Now this + is true of the ceremonial precept, which "could [Vulg.: 'can'] not, as to the conscience, make him perfect that serveth only + in meats and in drinks, and divers washings and justices of the flesh," as the Apostle declares ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q104_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.9" target="asv">Heb. 9:9,10</a>). On the other hand, the + judicial precepts were useful and efficacious in respect of the purpose for which they were instituted, viz. to establish + justice and equity among men. Therefore the judicial precepts of the Old Law are not set aside, but still retain their efficacy. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="38161" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38161] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VII, quod <i>reprobatio fit praecedentis +mandati propter infirmitatem ipsius et inutilitatem</i>. Quod +quidem verum est de mandato caeremoniali quod <i>non poterat facere +perfectum iuxta conscientiam servientem solummodo in cibis et in +potibus et variis Baptismatibus et iustitiis carnis</i>, ut +apostolus dicit, ad Heb. IX. Sed praecepta iudicialia utilia erant +et efficacia ad id ad quod ordinabantur, scilicet ad iustitiam et +aequitatem inter homines constituendam. Ergo praecepta iudicialia +veteris legis non reprobantur, sed adhuc efficaciam habent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q104_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.12" target="asv">Heb. 7:12</a>) that "the priesthood being translated it is necessary that a translation also be made of the Law." But the priesthood was + transferred from Aaron to Christ. Therefore the entire Law was also transferred. Therefore the judicial precepts are no longer + in force. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 3 s. c."><a name="38162" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38162] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VII, quod <i>translato +sacerdotio, necesse est ut legis translatio fiat</i>. Sed +sacerdotium est translatum ab Aaron ad Christum. Ergo etiam et tota +lex est translata. Non ergo iudicialia praecepta adhuc obligationem +habent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q104_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The judicial precepts did not bind for ever, but were annulled by the coming of Christ: yet not in the same way as the ceremonial + precepts. For the ceremonial precepts were annulled so far as to be not only "dead," but also deadly to those who observe + them since the coming of Christ, especially since the promulgation of the Gospel. On the other hand, the judicial precepts + are dead indeed, because they have no binding force: but they are not deadly. For if a + sovereign were to order these judicial precepts to be observed in his kingdom, he would not sin: unless perchance they were + observed, or ordered to be observed, as though they derived their binding force through being institutions of the Old Law: + for it would be a deadly sin to intend to observe them thus. + </p><p id="FS_Q104_A3-p7"> The reason for this difference may be gathered from what has been said above + <a href="#FS_Q104_A2" id="FS_Q104_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. For it has been stated that the ceremonial precepts are figurative primarily and in themselves, as being instituted chiefly + for the purpose of foreshadowing the mysteries of Christ to come. On the other hand, the judicial precepts were not instituted + that they might be figures, but that they might shape the state of that people who were directed to Christ. Consequently, + when the state of that people changed with the coming of Christ, the judicial precepts lost their binding force: for the Law + was a pedagogue, leading men to Christ, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q104_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.24" target="asv"> Gal. 3:24.</a> Since, however, these judicial precepts are instituted, not for the purpose of being figures, but for the performance of + certain deeds, the observance thereof is not prejudicial to the truth of faith. But the intention of observing them, as though + one were bound by the Law, is + prejudicial to the truth of faith: because it would follow that the former state of the people still lasts, and that Christ + has not yet come. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 3 co."><a name="38163" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38163] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod iudicialia praecepta non habuerunt perpetuam +obligationem, sed sunt evacuata per adventum Christi, aliter tamen +quam caeremonialia. Nam caeremonialia adeo sunt evacuata ut non +solum sint mortua, sed etiam mortifera observantibus post Christum, +maxime post Evangelium divulgatum. Praecepta autem iudicialia sunt +quidem mortua, quia non habent vim obligandi, non tamen sunt +mortifera. Quia si quis princeps ordinaret in regno suo illa +iudicialia observari, non peccaret, nisi forte hoc modo +observarentur, vel observari mandarentur, tanquam habentia vim +obligandi ex veteris legis institutione. Talis enim intentio +observandi esset mortifera. Et huius differentiae ratio potest +accipi ex praemissis. Dictum est enim quod praecepta caeremonialia +sunt figuralia primo et per se, tanquam instituta principaliter ad +figurandum Christi mysteria ut futura. Et ideo ipsa observatio +eorum praeiudicat fidei veritati, secundum quam confitemur illa +mysteria iam esse completa. Praecepta autem iudicialia non sunt +instituta ad figurandum, sed ad disponendum statum illius populi, +qui ordinabatur ad Christum. Et ideo, mutato statu illius populi, +Christo iam veniente, iudicialia praecepta obligationem amiserunt, +lex enim fuit paedagogus ducens ad Christum, ut dicitur ad Gal. +III. Quia tamen huiusmodi iudicialia praecepta non ordinantur ad +figurandum, sed ad aliquid fiendum, ipsa eorum observatio absolute +non praeiudicat fidei veritati. Sed intentio observandi tanquam ex +obligatione legis, praeiudicat veritati fidei, quia per hoc +haberetur quod status prioris populi adhuc duraret, et quod +Christus nondum venisset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The obligation of observing justice is indeed perpetual. But the determination of those things that are just, according to + human or Divine institution, must needs be different, according to the different states of mankind. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="38164" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38164] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod iustitia quidem perpetuo est observanda. Sed +determinatio eorum quae sunt iusta secundum institutionem humanam +vel divinam, oportet quod varietur secundum diversum hominum +statum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The judicial precepts established by men retain their binding force for ever, so long as the state of government remains + the same. But if the state or nation pass to another form of government, the laws must needs be changed. For democracy, which + is government by the people, demands different laws from those of oligarchy, which is government by the rich, as the Philosopher + shows (Polit. iv, 1). Consequently when the state of that people changed, the + judicial precepts had to be changed also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="38165" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38165] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod praecepta iudicialia ab hominibus instituta habent +perpetuam obligationem, manente illo statu regiminis. Sed si +civitas vel gens ad aliud regimen deveniat, oportet leges mutari. +Non enim eaedem leges conveniunt in democratia, quae est potestas +populi, et in oligarchia, quae est potestas divitum; ut patet per +philosophum, in sua politica. Et ideo etiam, mutato statu illius +populi, oportuit praecepta iudicialia mutari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those judicial precepts directed the people to justice and equity, in keeping with the demands of that state. But after the + coming of Christ, there had to be a change in the state of that people, so that in Christ there was no distinction between + Gentile and Jew, as there had been before. For this reason the judicial precepts needed to be changed also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="38166" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38166] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illa praecepta iudicialia disponebant populum ad +iustitiam et aequitatem secundum quod conveniebat illi statui. Sed +post Christum, statum illius populi oportuit mutari, ut iam in +Christo non esset discretio gentilis et Iudaei, sicut antea erat. +Et propter hoc oportuit etiam praecepta iudicialia mutari.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q104_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q104_A4-p0.1">Q. 104. A. 4. Whether it is possible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is impossible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts. Because the judicial precepts + direct men in their relations to one another. But those things which need to be directed, as pertaining to the relationship + between man and man, and which are made use of by men, are not subject to division, since they are infinite in number. Therefore + it is not possible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="38167" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38167] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta iudicialia non possint +habere aliquam certam divisionem. Praecepta enim iudicialia +ordinant homines ad invicem. Sed ea quae inter homines ordinari +oportet, in usum eorum venientia, non cadunt sub certa +distinctione, cum sint infinita. Ergo praecepta iudicialia non +possunt habere certam distinctionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the judicial precepts are decisions on moral matters. But moral precepts do not seem to be capable of division, + except in so far as they are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore there is no distinct division of the judicial + precepts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="38168" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38168] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +praecepta iudicialia sunt determinationes moralium. Sed moralia +praecepta non videntur habere aliquam distinctionem, nisi secundum +quod reducuntur ad praecepta Decalogi. Ergo praecepta iudicialia +non habent aliquam certam distinctionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, because there is a distinct division of the ceremonial precepts, the Law alludes to this division, by describing + some as "sacrifices," others as "observances." But the Law contains no allusion to a division of the judicial precepts. Therefore + it seems that they have no distinct division. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="38169" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38169] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +praecepta caeremonialia quia certam distinctionem habent, eorum +distinctio in lege innuitur, dum quaedam vocantur sacrificia, +quaedam observantiae. Sed nulla distinctio innuitur in lege +praeceptorum iudicialium. Ergo videtur quod non habeant certam +distinctionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Wherever there is order there must needs be division. But the notion of order is chiefly applicable to the judicial precepts, + since thereby that people was ordained. Therefore it is most necessary that they should have a distinct division. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 4 s. c."><a name="38170" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38170] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +ubi est ordo, oportet quod sit distinctio. Sed ratio ordinis maxime +pertinet ad praecepta iudicialia, per quae populus ille +ordinabatur. Ergo maxime debent habere distinctionem certam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q104_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since law is the art, as it were, of directing or ordering the life of man, as in every art there is a distinct division + in the rules of art, so, in every law, there must be a distinct division of precepts: else the law would be rendered useless + by confusion. We must therefore say that the judicial precepts of the Old Law, whereby men were directed in their relations + to one another, are subject to division according to the divers ways in which man is + directed. + </p><p id="FS_Q104_A4-p7"> Now in every people a fourfold order is to be found: one, of the people's sovereign to his subjects; a second of the subjects + among themselves; a third, of the citizens to foreigners; a fourth, of members of the same household, such as the order of + the father to his son; of the wife to her husband; of the master to his servant: and according to these four orders we may + distinguish different kinds of judicial precepts in the Old Law. For certain precepts are laid down concerning + the institution of the sovereign and relating to his office, and about the respect due to him: this is one part of the judicial + precepts. Again, certain precepts are given in respect of a man to his fellow citizens: for instance, about buying and selling, + judgments and penalties: this is the second part of the judicial precepts. Again, certain precepts are enjoined with regard + to foreigners: for instance, about wars waged against their foes, and about the way to receive travelers and strangers: + this is the third part of the judicial precepts. Lastly, certain precepts are given relating to home life: for instance, about + servants, wives and children: this is the fourth part of the judicial precepts. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 4 co."><a name="38171" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38171] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum lex sit quasi quaedam ars humanae vitae +instituendae vel ordinandae, sicut in unaquaque arte est certa +distinctio regularum artis, ita oportet in qualibet lege esse +certam distinctionem praeceptorum, aliter enim ipsa confusio +utilitatem legis auferret. Et ideo dicendum est quod praecepta +iudicialia veteris legis, per quae homines ad invicem ordinabantur, +distinctionem habent secundum distinctionem ordinationis humanae. +Quadruplex autem ordo in aliquo populo inveniri potest, unus +quidem, principum populi ad subditos; alius autem, subditorum ad +invicem; tertius autem, eorum qui sunt de populo ad extraneos; +quartus autem, ad domesticos, sicut patris ad filium, uxoris ad +virum, et domini ad servum. Et secundum istos quatuor ordines +distingui possunt praecepta iudicialia veteris legis. Dantur enim +quaedam praecepta de institutione principum et officio eorum, et de +reverentia eis exhibenda, et haec est una pars iudicialium +praeceptorum. Dantur etiam quaedam praecepta pertinentia ad +concives ad invicem, puta circa emptiones et venditiones, et +iudicia et poenas. Et haec est secunda pars iudicialium +praeceptorum. Dantur etiam quaedam praecepta pertinentia ad +extraneos, puta de bellis contra hostes, et de susceptione +peregrinorum et advenarum. Et haec est tertia pars iudicialium +praeceptorum. Dantur etiam in lege quaedam praecepta pertinentia ad +domesticam conversationem, sicut de servis, et uxoribus, et filiis. +Et haec est quarta pars iudicialium praeceptorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Things pertaining to the ordering of relations between one man and another are indeed infinite in number: yet they are reducible + to certain distinct heads, according to the different relations in which one man stands to another, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="38172" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38172] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ea quae pertinent ad ordinationem hominum ad +invicem, sunt quidem numero infinita; sed tamen reduci possunt ad +aliqua certa, secundum differentiam ordinationis humanae, ut dictum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The precepts of the decalogue held the first place in the moral order, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q100_A3" id="FS_Q104_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[100], A[3]</a>): and consequently it is fitting that other moral precepts should be distinguished in relation to them. But the judicial + and ceremonial precepts have a different binding force, derived, not from natural reason, but from their institution alone. + Hence there is a distinct reason for distinguishing them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="38173" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38173] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod praecepta Decalogi sunt prima in genere moralium, ut +supra dictum est, et ideo convenienter alia praecepta moralia +secundum ea distinguuntur. Sed praecepta iudicialia et +caeremonialia habent aliam rationem obligationis non quidem ex +ratione naturali sed ex sola institutione. Et ideo distinctionis +eorum est alia ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q104_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Law alludes to the division of the judicial precepts in the very things themselves which are prescribed by the judicial + precepts of the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 104 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="38174" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38174] Iª-IIae q. 104 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ex ipsis rebus quae per praecepta iudicialia +ordinantur in lege, innuit lex distinctionem iudicialium +praeceptorum.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q105" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q105-p0.1">Q. 105. OF THE REASON FOR THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q105-p2"> We must now consider the reason for the judicial precepts: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q105-p3"><a href="#FS_Q105_A1"> (1) Concerning the reason for the judicial precepts relating to the rulers;</a></p><p id="FS_Q105-p4"><a href="#FS_Q105_A2"> (2) Concerning the fellowship of one man with another;</a></p><p id="FS_Q105-p5"><a href="#FS_Q105_A3"> (3) Concerning matters relating to foreigners;</a></p><p id="FS_Q105-p6"><a href="#FS_Q105_A4"> (4) Concerning things relating to domestic matters.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 pr."><a name="38175" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38175] Iª-IIae q. 105 pr.</span></a> Deinde +considerandum est de ratione iudicialium praeceptorum. Et circa hoc +quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, de ratione praeceptorum iudicialium quae +pertinent ad principes. Secundo, de his quae pertinent ad convictum +hominum ad invicem. Tertio, de his quae pertinent ad extraneos. +Quarto, de his quae pertinent ad domesticam conversationem.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q105_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q105_A1-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 1. Whether the Old Law enjoined fitting precepts concerning rulers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law made unfitting precepts concerning rulers. Because, as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 4), + "the ordering of the people depends mostly on the chief ruler." But the Law contains no precept relating to the institution + of the chief ruler; and yet we find therein prescriptions concerning the inferior rulers: firstly ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.18.21" target="asv">Ex. 18:21</a>): "Provide out of all the people wise [Vulg.: 'able'] men," etc.; again ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Num.11.16" target="asv">Num. 11:16</a>): + "Gather unto Me seventy men of the ancients of Israel"; and again ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.1.13" target="asv">Dt. 1:13</a>): "Let Me have from among you wise and understanding men," etc. Therefore the Law provided insufficiently in regard to the + rulers of the people. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="38176" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38176] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter lex vetus de +principibus ordinaverit. Quia, ut philosophus dicit, in III Polit., +<i>ordinatio populi praecipue dependet ex maximo principatu</i>. +Sed in lege non invenitur qualiter debeat institui supremus +princeps. Invenitur autem de inferioribus principibus, primo +quidem, Exod. XVIII, provide de omni plebe viros sapientes, etc.; +et Num. XI, congrega mihi septuaginta viros de senioribus Israel; +et Deut. I, date ex vobis viros sapientes et gnaros, et cetera. +Ergo insufficienter lex vetus principes populi ordinavit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "The best gives of the best," as Plato states (Tim. ii). Now the best ordering of a state or of any nation is to + be ruled by a king: because this kind of government approaches nearest in resemblance to the Divine government, whereby God + rules the world from the beginning. Therefore the Law should have set a king over the people, and they should not have been + allowed a choice in the matter, as indeed they were allowed ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.17.14" target="asv">Dt. + 17:14,15 + </a>): "When thou . . . shalt say: I will set a king over me . . . thou shalt set him," etc. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="38177" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38177] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +optimi est optima adducere, ut Plato dicit. Sed optima ordinatio +civitatis vel populi cuiuscumque est ut gubernetur per regem, quia +huiusmodi regimen maxime repraesentat divinum regimen, quo unus +Deus mundum gubernat. A principio igitur lex debuit regem populo +instituere; et non permittere hoc eorum arbitrio, sicut permittitur +Deut. XVII, <i>cum dixeris, constituam super me regem, eum +constitues,</i> et cetera.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.25" target="asv"> Mat. 12:25</a>: "Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made desolate": a saying which was verified in the Jewish people, whose destruction + was brought about by the division of the kingdom. But the Law should aim chiefly at things pertaining to the general well-being + of the people. Therefore it should have forbidden the kingdom to be divided under two kings: nor should this have been introduced + even by Divine + authority; as we read of its being introduced by the authority of the prophet Ahias the Silonite ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 11:29, </a> seqq.). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="38178" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38178] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut dicitur Matth. XII, omne regnum in se divisum desolabitur, +quod etiam experimento patuit in populo Iudaeorum, in quo divisio +regni fuit destructionis causa. Sed lex praecipue debet intendere +ea quae pertinent ad communem salutem populi. Ergo debuit in lege +prohiberi divisio regni in duos reges. Nec etiam debuit hoc +auctoritate divina introduci; sicut legitur introductum auctoritate +domini per Ahiam Silonitem prophetam, III Reg. XI.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as priests are instituted for the benefit of the people in things concerning God, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.5.1" target="asv"> Heb. 5:1</a>; so are rulers set up for the benefit of the people in human affairs. But certain things were allotted as a means of livelihood + for the priests and Levites of the Law: such as the tithes and first-fruits, and many like things. Therefore in like manner + certain things should have been determined for the livelihood of the + rulers of the people: the more that they were forbidden to accept presents, as is clearly stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.8" target="asv"> Ex. 23:8</a>: "You shall not [Vulg.: 'Neither shalt thou'] take bribes, which even blind the wise, and pervert the words of the just." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="38179" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38179] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut sacerdotes instituuntur ad utilitatem populi in his quae ad +Deum pertinent, ut patet Heb. V; ita etiam principes instituuntur +ad utilitatem populi in rebus humanis. Sed sacerdotibus et Levitis +qui sunt in lege, deputantur aliqua ex quibus vivere debeant, sicut +decimae et primitiae, et multa alia huiusmodi. Ergo similiter +principibus populi debuerunt aliqua ordinari unde sustentarentur, +et praecipue cum inhibita sit eis munerum acceptio, ut patet Exod. +XXIII, <i>non accipietis munera, quae excaecant etiam prudentes, et +subvertunt verba iustorum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, as a kingdom is the best form of government, so is tyranny the most corrupt. But when the Lord appointed the king, + He established a tyrannical law; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.8.11" target="asv">1 Kings 8:11</a>): "This will be the right of the king, that shall reign over you: He will take your sons," etc. Therefore the Law made unfitting + provision with regard to the institution of rulers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="38180" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38180] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut regnum est optimum regimen, ita tyrannis est pessima +corruptio regiminis. Sed dominus regi instituendo instituit ius +tyrannicum, dicitur enim I Reg. VIII, <i>hoc erit ius regis qui +imperaturus est vobis, filios vestros tollet</i>, et cetera. Ergo +inconvenienter fuit provisum per legem circa principum +ordinationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The people of Israel is commended for the beauty of its order ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Num.24.5" target="asv">Num. 24:5</a>): "How beautiful are thy tabernacles, O Jacob, and thy tents." But the beautiful ordering of a people depends on the right + establishment of its rulers. Therefore the Law made right provision for the people with regard to its rulers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 1 s. c."><a name="38181" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38181] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod populus Israel de pulchritudine ordinationis commendatur, +Num. XXIV, <i>quam pulchra tabernacula tua, Iacob; et tentoria tua, +Israel</i>. Sed pulchritudo ordinationis populi dependet ex +principibus bene institutis. Ergo per legem populus fuit circa +principes bene institutus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q105_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Two points are to be observed concerning the right ordering of rulers in a state or nation. One is that all should take some + share in the government: for this form of constitution ensures peace among the people, commends itself to all, and is most + enduring, as stated in Polit. ii, 6. The other point is to be observed in respect of the kinds of government, or the different + ways in which the constitutions are established. For whereas these differ in kind, as + the Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5), nevertheless the first place is held by the "kingdom," where the power of government + is vested in one; and "aristocracy," which signifies government by the best, where the power of government is vested in a + few. Accordingly, the best form of government is in a state or kingdom, where one is given the power to preside over all; + while under him are others having governing powers: and yet a government of this kind is shared by all, both because all are + eligible to govern, and because the rules are chosen by all. For this is the best form of polity, being partly kingdom, since + there is one at the head of all; partly aristocracy, in so far as a number of persons are set in authority; partly democracy, + i.e. government by the people, in so far as the rulers can be chosen from the people, and the people have the right to choose + their rulers. + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A1-p9"> Such was the form of government established by the Divine Law. For Moses and his successors governed the people in such a + way that each of them was ruler over all; so that there was a kind of kingdom. Moreover, seventy-two men were chosen, who + were elders in virtue: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.1.15" target="asv">Dt. 1:15</a>): "I took out of your tribes wise and honorable, and appointed them rulers": so that there was an element of aristocracy. + But it was a democratical government in so + far as the rulers were chosen from all the people; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.18.21" target="asv">Ex. 18:21</a>): "Provide out of all the people wise [Vulg.: 'able'] men," etc.; and, again, in so far as they were chosen by the people; + wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p9.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.1.13" target="asv">Dt. 1:13</a>): "Let me have from among you wise [Vulg.: 'able'] men," etc. Consequently it is evident that the ordering of the rulers + was well provided for by the Law. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 1 co."><a name="38182" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38182] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod circa bonam ordinationem principum in aliqua civitate +vel gente, duo sunt attendenda. Quorum unum est ut omnes aliquam +partem habeant in principatu, per hoc enim conservatur pax populi, +et omnes talem ordinationem amant et custodiunt, ut dicitur in II +Polit. Aliud est quod attenditur secundum speciem regiminis, vel +ordinationis principatuum. Cuius cum sint diversae species, ut +philosophus tradit, in III Polit., praecipuae tamen sunt regnum, in +quo unus principatur secundum virtutem; et aristocratia, idest +potestas optimorum, in qua aliqui pauci principantur secundum +virtutem. Unde optima ordinatio principum est in aliqua civitate +vel regno, in qua unus praeficitur secundum virtutem qui omnibus +praesit; et sub ipso sunt aliqui principantes secundum virtutem; et +tamen talis principatus ad omnes pertinet, tum quia ex omnibus +eligi possunt, tum quia etiam ab omnibus eliguntur. Talis enim est +optima politia, bene commixta ex regno, inquantum unus praeest; et +aristocratia, inquantum multi principantur secundum virtutem; et ex +democratia, idest potestate populi, inquantum ex popularibus +possunt eligi principes, et ad populum pertinet electio principum. +Et hoc fuit institutum secundum legem divinam. Nam Moyses et eius +successores gubernabant populum quasi singulariter omnibus +principantes, quod est quaedam species regni. Eligebantur autem +septuaginta duo seniores secundum virtutem, dicitur enim Deut. I, +<i>tuli de vestris tribubus viros sapientes et nobiles, et +constitui eos principes</i>, et hoc erat aristocraticum. Sed +democraticum erat quod isti de omni populo eligebantur; dicitur +enim Exod. XVIII, <i>provide de omni plebe viros sapientes,</i> +etc., et etiam quod populus eos eligebat; unde dicitur Deut. I, +date ex vobis viros sapientes, et cetera. Unde patet quod optima +fuit ordinatio principum quam lex instituit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This people was governed under the special care of God: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.7.6" target="asv">Dt. 7:6</a>): "The Lord thy God hath chosen thee to be His peculiar people": and this is why the Lord reserved to Himself the institution + of the chief ruler. For this too did Moses pray ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Num.27.16" target="asv">Num. 27:16</a>): "May the Lord the God of the spirits of all the flesh provide a man, that may be over this multitude." Thus by God's orders + Josue was + set at the head in place of Moses; and we read about each of the judges who succeeded Josue that God "raised . . . up a saviour" + for the people, and that "the spirit of the Lord was" in them ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Judg.3.9" target="asv">Judges 3:9</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p10.4" href="./asv.html#Judg.3.10" target="asv">10</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p10.5" href="./asv.html#Judg.3.15" target="asv">15</a>). Hence the Lord did not leave the choice of a king to the people; but reserved this to Himself, as appears from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p10.6" href="./asv.html#Deut.17.15" target="asv"> Dt. 17:15</a>: "Thou shalt set him whom the Lord thy God shall choose." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="38183" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38183] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod populus ille sub speciali cura Dei regebatur, +unde dicitur Deut. VII, <i>te elegit dominus Deus tuus ut sis ei +populus peculiaris</i>. Et ideo institutionem summi principis +dominus sibi reservavit. Et hoc est quod Moyses petivit, Num. +XXVII, <i>provideat dominus Deus spirituum omnis carnis, hominem +qui sit super multitudinem hanc</i>. Et sic ex Dei ordinatione +institutus est Iosue in principatu post Moysen, et de singulis +iudicibus qui post Iosue fuerunt, legitur quod Deus suscitavit +populo salvatorem, et quod spiritus domini fuit in eis, ut patet +Iudic. III. Et ideo etiam electionem regis non commisit dominus +populo, sed sibi reservavit; ut patet Deut. XVII, <i>eum constitues +regem, quem dominus Deus tuus elegerit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q105_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A kingdom is the best form of government of the people, so long as it is not corrupt. But since the power granted to a king + is so great, it easily degenerates into tyranny, unless he to whom this power is given be a very virtuous man: for it is only + the virtuous man that conducts himself well in the midst of prosperity, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 3). Now perfect + virtue is to be found in few: and especially were the Jews inclined to + cruelty and avarice, which vices above all turn men into tyrants. Hence from the very first the Lord did not set up the kingly + authority with full power, but gave them judges and governors to rule them. But afterwards when the people asked Him to do + so, being indignant with them, so to speak, He granted them a king, as is clear from His words to Samuel ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.8.7" target="asv">1 Kings 8:7</a>): "They have not rejected thee, but Me, that I should not reign over them." + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A1-p12"> Nevertheless, as regards the appointment of a king, He did establish the manner of election from the very beginning ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.17.14" target="asv">Dt. 17:14, </a> seqq.): and then He determined two points: first, that in choosing a king they should wait for the Lord's decision; and that + they should not make a man of another nation king, because such kings are wont to take little interest in the people they + are set over, and consequently to have no care for their welfare: secondly, He + prescribed how the king after his appointment should behave, in regard to himself; namely, that he should not accumulate chariots + and horses, nor wives, nor immense wealth: because through craving for such things princes become tyrants and forsake justice. + He also appointed the manner in which they were to conduct themselves towards God: namely, that they should continually read + and ponder on God's Law, and should ever fear and obey God. Moreover, He decided how they should behave towards their + subjects: namely, that they should not proudly despise them, or ill-treat them, and that they should not depart from the paths + of justice. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="38184" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38184] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod regnum est optimum regimen populi, si non +corrumpatur. Sed propter magnam potestatem quae regi conceditur, de +facili regnum degenerat in tyrannidem, nisi sit perfecta virtus +eius cui talis potestas conceditur, quia non est nisi virtuosi bene +ferre bonas fortunas, ut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic. Perfecta +autem virtus in paucis invenitur, et praecipue Iudaei crudeles +erant et ad avaritiam proni, per quae vitia maxime homines in +tyrannidem decidunt. Et ideo dominus a principio eis regem non +instituit cum plena potestate, sed iudicem et gubernatorem in eorum +custodiam. Sed postea regem ad petitionem populi, quasi indignatus, +concessit, ut patet per hoc quod dixit ad Samuelem, I Reg. VIII, +<i>non te abiecerunt, sed me, ne regnem super eos</i>. Instituit +tamen a principio circa regem instituendum, primo quidem, modum +eligendi. In quo duo determinavit, ut scilicet in eius electione +expectarent iudicium domini; et ut non facerent regem alterius +gentis, quia tales reges solent parum affici ad gentem cui +praeficiuntur, et per consequens non curare de eis. Secundo, +ordinavit circa reges institutos qualiter deberent se habere +quantum ad seipsos, ut scilicet non multiplicarent currus et equos, +neque uxores, neque etiam immensas divitias; quia ex cupiditate +horum principes ad tyrannidem declinant, et iustitiam derelinquunt. +Instituit etiam qualiter se deberent habere ad Deum, ut scilicet +semper legerent et cogitarent de lege Dei, et semper essent in Dei +timore et obedientia. Instituit etiam qualiter se haberent ad +subditos suos, ut scilicet non superbe eos contemnerent, aut +opprimerent, neque etiam a iustitia declinarent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The division of the kingdom, and a number of kings, was rather a punishment inflicted on that people for their many dissensions, + specially against the just rule of David, than a benefit conferred on them for their profit. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.13.11" target="asv">Osee 13:11</a>): "I will give thee a king in My wrath"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p13.2" href="./asv.html#Hos.8.4" target="asv">Osee 8:4</a>): "They have reigned, but not by Me: they have been princes, and I knew not." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="38185" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38185] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod divisio regni, et multitudo regum, magis est populo +illi data in poenam pro multis dissensionibus eorum, quas maxime +contra regnum David iustum moverant, quam ad eorum profectum. Unde +dicitur Osee XIII, <i>dabo tibi regem in furore meo</i>; et Osee +VIII, <i>ipsi regnaverunt, et non ex me, principes extiterunt, et +non cognovi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The priestly office was bequeathed by succession from father to son: and this, in order that it might be held in greater + respect, if not any man from the people could become a priest: since honor was given to them out of reverence for the divine + worship. Hence it was necessary to put aside certain things for them both as to tithes and as to first-fruits, and, again, + as to oblations and sacrifices, that they might be afforded a means of livelihood. On + the other hand, the rulers, as stated above, were chosen from the whole people; wherefore they had their own possessions, + from which to derive a living: and so much the more, since the Lord forbade even a king to have superabundant wealth to make + too much show of magnificence: both because he could scarcely avoid the excesses of pride and tyranny, arising from such things, + and because, if the rulers were not very rich, and if their office involved much work and anxiety, it would not tempt the + ambition of the common people; and would not become an occasion of sedition. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="38186" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38186] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod sacerdotes per successionem originis sacris +deputabantur. Et hoc ideo ut in maiori reverentia haberentur, si +non quilibet ex populo posset sacerdos fieri, quorum honor cedebat +in reverentiam divini cultus. Et ideo oportuit ut eis specialia +quaedam deputarentur, tam in decimis quam in primitiis, quam etiam +in oblationibus et sacrificiis, ex quibus viverent. Sed principes, +sicut dictum est, assumebantur ex toto populo, et ideo habebant +certas possessiones proprias, ex quibus vivere poterant. Et +praecipue cum dominus prohiberet etiam in rege ne superabundaret +divitiis aut magnifico apparatu, tum quia non erat facile quin ex +his in superbiam et tyrannidem erigeretur; tum etiam quia, si +principes non erant multum divites, et erat laboriosus principatus +et sollicitudine plenus, non multum affectabatur a popularibus, et +sic tollebatur seditionis materia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> That right was not given to the king by Divine institution: rather was it foretold that kings would usurp that right, by + framing unjust laws, and by degenerating into tyrants who preyed on their subjects. This is clear from the context that follows: + "And you shall be his slaves [Douay: 'servants']": which is significative of tyranny, since a tyrant rules is subjects as + though they were his slaves. Hence Samuel spoke these words to deter them from + asking for a king; since the narrative continues: "But the people would not hear the voice of Samuel." It may happen, however, + that even a good king, without being a tyrant, may take away the sons, and make them tribunes and centurions; and may take + many things from his subjects in order to secure the common weal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="38187" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38187] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod illud ius non dabatur regi ex institutione divina; +sed magis praenuntiatur usurpatio regum, qui sibi ius iniquum +constituunt in tyrannidem degenerantes, et subditos depraedantes. +Et hoc patet per hoc quod in fine subdit, <i>vosque eritis ei +servi</i>, quod proprie pertinet ad tyrannidem, quia tyranni suis +subditis principantur ut servis. Unde hoc dicebat Samuel ad +deterrendum eos ne regem peterent, sequitur enim, <i>noluit autem +audire populus vocem Samuelis</i>. Potest tamen contingere quod +etiam bonus rex, absque tyrannide, filios tollat, et constituat +tribunos et centuriones, et multa accipiat a subditis, propter +commune bonum procurandum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q105_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q105_A2-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 2. Whether the judicial precepts were suitably framed as to the relations of one man with another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the judicial precepts were not suitably framed as regards the relations of one man with another. Because + men cannot live together in peace, if one man takes what belongs to another. But this seems to have been approved by the Law: + since it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.24" target="asv">Dt. 23:24</a>): "Going into thy neighbor's vineyard, thou mayest eat as many grapes as thou pleasest." Therefore the Old Law did not make + suitable provisions for man's + peace. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="38188" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38188] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter fuerint +tradita praecepta iudicialia quantum ad popularium convictum. Non +enim possunt homines pacifice vivere ad invicem, si unus accipiat +ea quae sunt alterius. Sed hoc videtur esse inductum in lege, +dicitur enim Deut. XXIII, <i>ingressus vineam proximi tui, comede +uvas quantum tibi placuerit</i>. Ergo lex vetus non convenienter +providebat hominum paci.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one of the chief causes of the downfall of states has been the holding of property by women, as the Philosopher + says (Polit. ii, 6). But this was introduced by the Old Law; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Num.27.8" target="asv">Num. 27:8</a>): "When a man dieth without a son, his inheritance shall pass to his daughter." Therefore the Law made unsuitable provision + for the welfare of the people. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="38189" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38189] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ex hoc maxime multae civitates et regna destruuntur, quod +possessiones ad mulieres perveniunt, ut philosophus dicit, in II +Polit. Sed hoc fuit introductum in veteri lege, dicitur enim Num. +XXVII, <i>homo cum mortuus fuerit absque filio, ad filiam eius +transibit hereditas</i>. Ergo non convenienter providit lex saluti +populi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is most conducive to the preservation of human society that men may provide themselves with necessaries by buying + and selling, as stated in Polit. i. But the Old Law took away the force of sales; since it prescribes that in the 50th year + of the jubilee all that is sold shall return to the vendor ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.25.28" target="asv">Lev. 25:28</a>). Therefore in this matter the Law gave the people an unfitting command. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="38190" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38190] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +societas hominum maxime per hoc conservatur, quod homines emendo et +vendendo sibi invicem res suas commutant quibus indigent, ut +dicitur in I Polit. Sed lex vetus abstulit virtutem venditionis, +mandavit enim quod possessio vendita reverteretur ad venditorem in +quinquagesimo anno iubilaei, ut patet Levit. XXV. Inconvenienter +igitur lex populum illum circa hoc instituit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, man's needs require that men should be ready to lend: which readiness ceases if the creditors do not return the + pledges: hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.29.10" target="asv">Ecclus. 29:10</a>): "Many have refused to lend, not out of wickedness, but they were afraid to be defrauded without cause." And yet this was + encouraged by the Law. First, because it prescribed ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.15.2" target="asv">Dt. 15:2</a>): "He to whom any thing is owing from his friend or neighbor or brother, + cannot demand it again, because it is the year of remission of the Lord"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.15" target="asv">Ex. 22:15</a>) it is stated that if a borrowed animal should die while the owner is present, the borrower is not bound to make restitution. + Secondly, because the security acquired through the pledge is lost: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p5.4" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.10" target="asv">Dt. 24:10</a>): "When thou shalt demand of thy neighbor any thing that he oweth thee, thou shalt not go into his house to take away a pledge"; + and again + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p5.5" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.12" target="asv">Dt. 24:12,13</a>): "The pledge shall not lodge with thee that night, but thou shalt restore it to him presently." Therefore the Law made insufficient + provision in the matter of loans. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="38191" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38191] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +necessitatibus hominum maxime expedit ut homines sint prompti ad +mutuum concedendum. Quae quidem promptitudo tollitur per hoc quod +creditores accepta non reddunt, unde dicitur Eccli. XXIX, <i>multi +non causa nequitiae non faenerati sunt, sed fraudari gratis +timuerunt</i>. Hoc autem induxit lex. Primo quidem, quia mandavit +Deut. XV, <i>cui debetur aliquid ab amico vel proximo ac fratre +suo, repetere non poterit, quia annus remissionis est domini</i>; +et Exod. XXII dicitur quod si praesente domino animal mutuatum +mortuum fuerit, reddere non tenetur. Secundo, quia aufertur ei +securitas quae habetur per pignus, dicitur enim Deut. XXIV, <i>cum +repetes a proximo tuo rem aliquam quam debet tibi, non ingredieris +domum eius ut pignus auferas</i>; et iterum, <i>non pernoctabit +apud te pignus, sed statim reddes ei</i>. Ergo insufficienter fuit +ordinatum in lege de mutuis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, considerable risk attaches to goods deposited with a fraudulent depositary: wherefore great caution should be observed + in such matters: hence it is stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.3.15" target="asv">2 Mac. 3:15 </a>that "the priests . . . called upon Him from heaven, Who made the law concerning things given to be kept, that He would preserve + them safe, for them that had deposited them." But the precepts of the Old Law observed little caution in regard to deposits: + since it + is prescribed ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.10" target="asv">Ex. 22:10,11</a>) that when goods deposited are lost, the owner is to stand by the oath of the depositary. Therefore the Law made unsuitable + provision in this matter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 arg. 5"><a name="38192" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38192] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +ex defraudatione depositi maximum periculum imminet, et ideo est +maxima cautela adhibenda, unde etiam dicitur II Mach. III, quod +<i>sacerdotes invocabant de caelo eum qui de depositis legem +posuit, ut his qui deposuerant ea, salva custodiret</i>. Sed in +praeceptis veteris legis parva cautela circa deposita adhibetur, +dicitur enim Exod. XXII quod in amissione depositi statur iuramento +eius apud quem fuit depositum. Ergo non fuit circa hoc legis +ordinatio conveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, just as a workman offers his work for hire, so do men let houses and so forth. But there is no need for the tenant + to pay his rent as soon as he takes a house. Therefore it seems an unnecessarily hard prescription ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.13" target="asv">Lev. 19:13</a>) that "the wages of him that hath been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until morning." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 arg. 6"><a name="38193" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38193] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut aliquis mercenarius locat operas suas, ita etiam aliqui +locant domum, vel quaecumque alia huiusmodi. Sed non est +necessarium ut statim pretium locatae domus conductor exhibeat. +Ergo etiam nimis durum fuit quod praecipitur Levit. XIX, <i>non +morabitur opus mercenarii tui apud te usque mane</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p8"> + <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, since there is often pressing need for a judge, it should be easy to gain access to one. It was therefore unfitting + that the Law ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.17.8" target="asv">Dt. 17:8,9</a>) should command them to go to a fixed place to ask for judgment on doubtful matters. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 arg. 7"><a name="38194" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38194] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 7</span></a> Praeterea, +cum frequenter immineat iudiciorum necessitas, facilis debet esse +accessus ad iudicem. Inconvenienter igitur statuit lex, Deut. XVII, +ut irent ad unum locum expetituri iudicium de suis dubiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p9"> + <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, it is possible that not only two, but three or more, should agree to tell a lie. Therefore it is unreasonably stated + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.19.15" target="asv">Dt. 19:15</a>) that "in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word shall stand." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 arg. 8"><a name="38195" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38195] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 8</span></a> Praeterea, +possibile est non solum duos, sed etiam tres vel plures concordare +ad mentiendum. Inconvenienter igitur dicitur Deut. XIX, <i>in ore +duorum vel trium testium stabit omne verbum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p10"> + <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, punishment should be fixed according to the gravity of the fault: for which reason also it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv">Dt. 25:2</a>): "According to the measure of the sin, shall the measure also of the stripes be." Yet the Law fixed unequal punishments + for certain faults: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.1" target="asv">Ex. 22:1</a>) that the thief "shall restore five oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep." Moreover, certain slight offenses are + severely + punished: thus ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Num.15.32" target="asv">Num. 15:32, </a> seqq.) a man is stoned for gathering sticks on the sabbath day: and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p10.4" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.18" target="asv">Dt. 21:18, </a> seqq.) the unruly son is commanded to be stoned on account of certain small transgressions, viz. because "he gave himself + to revelling . . . and banquetings." Therefore the Law prescribed punishments in an unreasonable manner. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 arg. 9"><a name="38196" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38196] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 9</span></a> Praeterea, +poena debet taxari secundum quantitatem culpae, unde dicitur etiam +Deut. XXV, <i>pro mensura peccati erit et plagarum modus</i>. Sed +quibusdam aequalibus culpis lex statuit inaequales poenas, dicitur +enim Exod. XXII, quod restituet fur quinque boves pro uno bove, et +quatuor oves pro una ove. Quaedam etiam non multum gravia peccata +gravi poena puniuntur, sicut Num. XV, lapidatus est qui collegerat +ligna in sabbato. Filius etiam protervus propter parva delicta, +quia scilicet comessationibus vacabat et conviviis, mandatur +lapidari, Deut. XXI. Igitur inconvenienter in lege sunt institutae +poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p11"> + <b>Objection 10:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11), "Tully writes that the laws recognize eight forms of punishment, indemnity, + prison, stripes, retaliation, public disgrace, exile, death, slavery." Now some of these were prescribed by the Law. "Indemnity," + as when a thief was condemned to make restitution fivefold or fourfold. "Prison," as when ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Num.15.34" target="asv">Num. 15:34</a>) a certain man is ordered to be imprisoned. "Stripes"; thus ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv">Dt. + 25:2 + </a>), "if they see that the offender be worthy of stripes; they shall lay him down, and shall cause him to be beaten before them." + "Public disgrace" was brought on to him who refused to take to himself the wife of his deceased brother, for she took "off + his shoe from his foot, and" did "spit in his face" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p11.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.9" target="asv">Dt. 25:9</a>). It prescribed the "death" penalty, as is clear from ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p11.4" href="./asv.html#Lev.20.9" target="asv">Lev. 20:9</a>): "He that curseth his father, or mother, dying let him die." + The Law also recognized the "lex talionis," by prescribing ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p11.5" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.24" target="asv">Ex. 21:24</a>): "Eye for eye, tooth for tooth." Therefore it seems unreasonable that the Law should not have inflicted the two other punishments, + viz. "exile" and "slavery." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 arg. 10"><a name="38197" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38197] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 10</span></a> +Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, XXI de Civ. Dei, <i>octo genera +poenarum in legibus esse scribit Tullius, damnum, vincula, verbera, +talionem, ignominiam, exilium, mortem, servitutem</i>. Ex quibus +aliqua sunt in lege statuta. Damnum quidem, sicut cum fur +condemnabatur ad quintuplum vel quadruplum. Vincula vero, sicut +Num. XV, mandatur de quodam quod in carcerem includatur. Verbera +vero, sicut Deut. XXV, <i>si eum qui peccavit dignum viderint +plagis, prosternent, et coram se facient verberari</i>. Ignominiam +etiam inferebat illi qui nolebat accipere uxorem fratris sui +defuncti, quae tollebat calceamentum illius, et spuebat in faciem +illius. Mortem etiam inferebat, ut patet Levit. XX, <i>qui +maledixerit patri suo aut matri, morte moriatur</i>. Poenam etiam +talionis lex induxit, dicens Exod. XXI, <i>oculum pro oculo, dentem +pro dente</i>. Inconveniens igitur videtur quod alias duas poenas, +scilicet exilium et servitutem, lex vetus non inflixit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p12"> + <b>Objection 11:</b> Further, no punishment is due except for a fault. But dumb animals cannot commit a fault. Therefore the Law is unreasonable + in punishing them ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.29" target="asv">Ex. 21:29</a>): "If the ox . . . shall kill a man or a woman," it "shall be stoned": and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.20.16" target="asv">Lev. 20:16</a>): "The woman that shall lie under any beast, shall be killed together with the same." Therefore it seems that matters pertaining + to the relations of one man with another were + unsuitably regulated by the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 arg. 11"><a name="38198" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38198] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 11</span></a> +Praeterea, poena non debetur nisi culpae. Sed bruta animalia non +possunt habere culpam. Ergo inconvenienter eis infligitur poena, +Exod. XXI, <i>bos lapidibus obruetur qui occiderit virum aut +mulierem</i>. Et Levit. XX dicitur, <i>mulier quae succubuerit +cuilibet iumento, simul interficiatur cum eo</i>. Sic igitur +videtur quod inconvenienter ea quae pertinent ad convictum hominum +ad invicem, fuerint in lege veteri ordinata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p13"> + <b>Objection 12:</b> Further, the Lord commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.12" target="asv">Ex. 21:12</a>) a murderer to be punished with death. But the death of a dumb animal is reckoned of much less account than the slaying of + a man. Hence murder cannot be sufficiently punished by the slaying of a dumb animal. Therefore it is unfittingly prescribed + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p13.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.1" target="asv">Dt. 21:1</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p13.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.4" target="asv">4</a>) that "when there shall be found . . . the corpse of a man slain, and it is not known who is guilty of the murder . . . the + ancients" of the nearest city "shall take a heifer of the herd, that hath not drawn in the yoke, nor ploughed the ground, + and they shall bring her into a rough and stony valley, that never was ploughed, nor sown; and there they shall strike off + the head of the heifer." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 arg. 12"><a name="38199" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38199] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 arg. 12</span></a> +Praeterea, dominus mandavit Exod. XXI, quod homicidium morte +hominis puniretur. Sed mors bruti animalis multo minus reputatur +quam occisio hominis. Ergo non potest sufficienter recompensari +poena homicidii per occisionem bruti animalis. Inconvenienter +igitur mandatur Deut. XXI quod <i>quando inventum fuerit cadaver +occisi hominis, et ignorabitur caedis reus, seniores propinquioris +civitatis tollant vitulam de armento quae non traxit iugum nec +terram scidit vomere, et ducent eam ad vallem asperam atque saxosam +quae numquam arata est nec sementa recepit, et caedent in ea +cervices vitulae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p14"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is recalled as a special blessing ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.147.20" target="asv">Ps. 147:20</a>) that "He hath not done in like manner to every nation; and His judgments He hath not made manifest to them." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 s. c."><a name="38200" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38200] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod pro speciali beneficio commemoratur in Psalmo CXLVII, +<i>non fecit taliter omni nationi, et iudicia sua non manifestavit +eis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p15"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21), quoting Tully, "a nation is a body of men united together by consent to the law and + by community of welfare." Consequently it is of the essence of a nation that the mutual relations of the citizens be ordered + by just laws. Now the relations of one man with another are twofold: some are effected under the guidance of those in authority: + others are effected by the will of private individuals. And since whatever is + subject to the power of an individual can be disposed of according to his will, hence it is that the decision of matters between + one man and another, and the punishment of evildoers, depend on the direction of those in authority, to whom men are subject. + On the other hand, the power of private persons is exercised over the things they possess: and consequently their dealings + with one another, as regards such things, depend on their own will, for instance in buying, selling, giving, and so + forth. Now the Law provided sufficiently in respect of each of these relations between one man and another. For it established + judges, as is clearly indicated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.16.18" target="asv"> Dt. 16:18</a>: "Thou shalt appoint judges and magistrates in all its [Vulg.: 'thy'] gates . . . that they may judge the people with just + judgment." It is also directed the manner of pronouncing just judgments, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p15.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.1.16" target="asv">Dt. 1:16,17</a>: "Judge that which is just, whether he be one of your own country or a stranger: + there shall be no difference of persons." It also removed an occasion of pronouncing unjust judgment, by forbidding judges + to accept bribes ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p15.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.8" target="asv">Ex. 23:8</a>; + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p15.4" href="./asv.html#Deut.16.19" target="asv"> Dt. 16:19</a>). It prescribed the number of witnesses, viz. two or three: and it appointed certain punishments to certain crimes, as we + shall state farther on (ad 10). + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p16"> But with regard to possessions, it is a very good thing, says the Philosopher (Polit. ii, 2) that the things possessed should + be distinct, and the use thereof should be partly common, and partly granted to others by the will of the possessors. These + three points were provided for by the Law. Because, in the first place, the possessions themselves were divided among individuals: + for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p16.1" href="./asv.html#Num.33.53" target="asv">Num. 33:53,54</a>): "I have given you" the land "for a possession: + and you shall divide it among you by lot." And since many states have been ruined through want of regulations in the matter + of possessions, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 6); therefore the Law provided a threefold remedy against the regularity + of possessions. The first was that they should be divided equally, wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p16.2" href="./asv.html#Num.33.54" target="asv">Num. 33:54</a>): "To the more you shall give a larger part, and to the fewer, a lesser." A second remedy was that possessions could not + be alienated for ever, but after a certain lapse of time should return to their former owner, so as to avoid confusion of + possessions (cf. ad 3). The third remedy aimed at the removal of this confusion, and provided that the dead should be succeeded + by their next of kin: in the first place, the son; secondly, the daughter; thirdly, the brother; fourthly, the father's brother; + fifthly, any other next of kin. Furthermore, in order to preserve the distinction of property, the Law enacted that + heiresses should marry within their own tribe, as recorded in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p16.3" href="./asv.html#Num.36.6" target="asv"> Num. 36:6.</a> + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p17"> Secondly, the Law commanded that, in some respects, the use of things should belong to all in common. Firstly, as regards + the care of them; for it was prescribed ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p17.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.1" target="asv">Dt. 22:1-4</a>): "Thou shalt not pass by, if thou seest thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray; but thou shalt bring them back to thy brother," + and in like manner as to other things. Secondly, as regards fruits. For all alike were allowed on entering a friend's vineyard + to eat of the fruit, but not to + take any away. And, specially, with respect to the poor, it was prescribed that the forgotten sheaves, and the bunches of + grapes and fruit, should be left behind for them ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p17.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.9" target="asv">Lev. 19:9</a>; + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p17.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.19" target="asv"> Dt. 24:19</a>). Moreover, whatever grew in the seventh year was common property, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p17.4" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.11" target="asv"> Ex. 23:11 </a>and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p17.5" href="./asv.html#Lev.25.4" target="asv"> Lev. 25:4.</a> + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p18"> Thirdly, the law recognized the transference of goods by the owner. There was a purely gratuitous transfer: thus it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p18.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.14.28" target="asv">Dt. 14:28,29</a>): "The third day thou shalt separate another tithe . . . and the Levite . . . and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the + widow . . . shall come and shall eat and be filled." And there was a transfer for a consideration, for instance, by selling + and buying, by letting out and hiring, by loan and also by deposit, concerning all of which we + find that the Law made ample provision. Consequently it is clear that the Old Law provided sufficiently concerning the mutual + relations of one man with another. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 co."><a name="38201" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38201] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus in II de Civ. Dei introducit a +Tullio dictum, <i>populus est coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et +utilitatis communione sociatus</i>. Unde ad rationem populi +pertinet ut communicatio hominum ad invicem iustis praeceptis legis +ordinetur. Est autem duplex communicatio hominum ad invicem, una +quidem quae fit auctoritate principum; alia autem fit propria +voluntate privatarum personarum. Et quia voluntate uniuscuiusque +disponi potest quod eius subditur potestati, ideo auctoritate +principum, quibus subiecti sunt homines, oportet quod iudicia inter +homines exerceantur, et poenae malefactoribus inferantur. Potestati +vero privatarum personarum subduntur res possessae, et ideo propria +voluntate in his possunt sibi invicem communicare, puta emendo, +vendendo, donando, et aliis huiusmodi modis. Circa utramque autem +communicationem lex sufficienter ordinavit. Statuit enim iudices, +ut patet Deut. XVI, <i>iudices et magistros constitues in omnibus +portis eius, ut iudicent populum iusto iudicio</i>. Instituit etiam +iustum iudicii ordinem, ut dicitur Deut. I, <i>quod iustum est +iudicate, sive civis ille sit sive peregrinus, nulla erit +personarum distantia</i>. Sustulit etiam occasionem iniusti +iudicii, acceptionem munerum iudicibus prohibendo; ut patet Exod. +XXIII, et Deut. XVI. Instituit etiam numerum testium duorum vel +trium; ut patet Deut. XVII, et XIX. Instituit etiam certas poenas +pro diversis delictis, ut post dicetur. Sed circa res possessas +optimum est, sicut dicit philosophus, in II Polit., quod +possessiones sint distinctae, et usus sit partim communis, partim +autem per voluntatem possessorum communicetur. Et haec tria fuerunt +in lege statuta. Primo enim, ipsae possessiones divisae erant in +singulos, dicitur enim Num. XXXIII, <i>ego dedi vobis terram in +possessionem, quam sorte dividetis vobis</i>. Et quia per +possessionum irregularitatem plures civitates destruuntur, ut +philosophus dicit, in II Polit.; ideo circa possessiones regulandas +triplex remedium lex adhibuit. Unum quidem, ut secundum numerum +hominum aequaliter dividerentur, unde dicitur Num. XXXIII, +<i>pluribus dabitis latiorem, et paucioribus angustiorem</i>. Aliud +remedium est ut possessiones non in perpetuum alienentur, sed certo +tempore ad suos possessores revertantur, ut non confundantur sortes +possessionum. Tertium remedium est ad huiusmodi confusionem +tollendam, ut proximi succedant morientibus, primo quidem gradu, +filius; secundo autem, filia; tertio, fratres; quarto, patrui; +quinto, quicumque propinqui. Et ad distinctionem sortium +conservandam, ulterius lex statuit ut mulieres quae sunt haeredes, +nuberent suae tribus hominibus, ut habetur Num. XXXVI. Secundo +vero, instituit lex ut quantum ad aliqua usus rerum esset communis. +Et primo, quantum ad curam, praeceptum est enim Deut. XXII, <i>non +videbis bovem et ovem fratris tui errantem, et praeteribis, sed +reduces fratri tuo</i>; et similiter de aliis. Secundo, quantum ad +fructum. Concedebatur enim communiter quantum ad omnes, ut +ingressus in vineam amici posset licite comedere, dum tamen extra +non auferret. Quantum ad pauperes vero specialiter, ut eis +relinquerentur manipuli obliti, et fructus et racemi remanentes, ut +habetur Lev. XIX, et Deut. XXIV. Et etiam communicabantur ea quae +nascebantur in septimo anno; ut habetur Exod. XXIII, et Lev. XXV. +Tertio vero, statuit lex communicationem factam per eos qui sunt +domini rerum. Unam pure gratuitam, unde dicitur Deut. XIV, <i>anno +tertio separabis aliam decimam, venientque Levites et peregrinus et +pupillus et vidua, et comedent et saturabuntur</i>. Aliam vero cum +recompensatione utilitatis, sicut per venditionem et emptionem, et +locationem et conductionem, et per mutuum, et iterum per depositum, +de quibus omnibus inveniuntur ordinationes certae in lege. Unde +patet quod lex vetus sufficienter ordinavit convictum illius +populi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p19.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.8" target="asv">Rom. 13:8</a>), "he that loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the Law": because, to wit, all the precepts of the Law, chiefly those concerning + our neighbor, seem to aim at the end that men should love one another. Now it is an effect of love that men give their own + goods to others: because, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p19.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.17" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:17</a>: "He that . . . shall see his brother in need, and shall shut up his bowels from + him: how doth the charity of God abide in him?" Hence the purpose of the Law was to accustom men to give of their own to others + readily: thus the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p19.3" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.18" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:18</a>) commands the rich "to give easily and to communicate to others." Now a man does not give easily to others if he will not + suffer another man to take some little thing from him without any great injury to him. And so the Law laid down that it should + be lawful for a man, on entering his neighbor's vineyard, to + eat of the fruit there: but not to carry any away, lest this should lead to the infliction of a grievous harm, and cause a + disturbance of the peace: for among well-behaved people, the taking of a little does not disturb the peace; in fact, it rather + strengthens friendship and accustoms men to give things to one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="38202" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38202] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, Rom. XIII, <i>qui +diligit proximum, legem implevit</i>, quia scilicet omnia praecepta +legis, praecipue ordinata ad proximum, ad hunc finem ordinari +videntur, ut homines se invicem diligant. Ex dilectione autem +procedit quod homines sibi invicem bona sua communicent, quia ut +dicitur I Ioan. III, <i>qui viderit fratrem suum necessitatem +patientem, et clauserit viscera sua ab eo, quomodo caritas Dei +manet in illo?</i> Et ideo intendebat lex homines assuefacere ut +facile sibi invicem sua communicarent, sicut et apostolus, I ad +Tim. VI, divitibus mandat facile tribuere et communicare. Non autem +facile communicativus est qui non sustinet quod proximus aliquid +modicum de suo accipiat, absque magno sui detrimento. Et ideo lex +ordinavit ut liceret intrantem in vineam proximi, racemos ibi +comedere, non autem extra deferre, ne ex hoc daretur occasio gravis +damni inferendi, ex quo pax perturbaretur. Quae inter disciplinatos +non perturbatur ex modicorum acceptione, sed magis amicitia +confirmatur, et assuefiunt homines ad facile communicandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p20"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Law did not prescribe that women should succeed to their father's estate except in default of male issue: failing which + it was necessary that succession should be granted to the female line in order to comfort the father, who would have been + sad to think that his estate would pass to strangers. Nevertheless the Law observed due caution in the matter, by providing + that those women who succeeded to their father's estate, should marry within their + own tribe, in order to avoid confusion of tribal possessions, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p20.1" href="./asv.html#Num.36.7" target="asv"> Num. 36:7,8.</a> + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="38203" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38203] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod lex non statuit quod mulieres succederent in bonis +paternis, nisi in defectu filiorum masculorum. Tunc autem +necessarium erat ut successio mulieribus concederetur in +consolationem patris, cui grave fuisset si eius hereditas omnino ad +extraneos transiret. Adhibuit tamen circa hoc lex cautelam debitam, +praecipiens ut mulieres succedentes in haereditate paterna, +nuberent suae tribus hominibus, ad hoc quod sortes tribuum non +confunderentur, ut habetur Num. ult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p21"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 4), the regulation of possessions conduces much to the preservation of a state or nation. + Consequently, as he himself observes, it was forbidden by the law in some of the heathen states, "that anyone should sell + his possessions, except to avoid a manifest loss." For if possessions were to be sold indiscriminately, they might happen + to come into the hands of a few: so that it might become necessary for a state or + country to become void of inhabitants. Hence the Old Law, in order to remove this danger, ordered things in such a way that + while provision was made for men's needs, by allowing the sale of possessions to avail for a certain period, at the same time + the said danger was removed, by prescribing the return of those possessions after that period had elapsed. The reason for + this law was to prevent confusion of possessions, and to ensure the continuance of a definite distinction among the tribes. + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p22"> But as the town houses were not allotted to distinct estates, therefore the Law allowed them to be sold in perpetuity, like + movable goods. Because the number of houses in a town was not fixed, whereas there was a fixed limit to the amount of estates, + which could not be exceeded, while the number of houses in a town could be increased. On the other hand, houses situated not + in a town, but "in a village that hath no walls," could not be sold in perpetuity: because such houses are + built merely with a view to the cultivation and care of possessions; wherefore the Law rightly made the same prescription + in regard to both ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p22.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.25" target="asv">Lev. 25</a>). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="38204" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38204] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in II Polit., regulatio +possessionum multum confert ad conservationem civitatis vel gentis. +Unde, sicut ipse dicit, apud quasdam gentilium civitates statutum +fuit <i>ut nullus possessionem vendere posset, nisi pro manifesto +detrimento</i>. Si enim passim possessiones vendantur, potest +contingere quod omnes possessiones ad paucos deveniant, et ita +necesse erit civitatem vel regionem habitatoribus evacuari. Et ideo +lex vetus, ad huiusmodi periculum amovendum, sic ordinavit quod et +necessitatibus hominum subveniretur, concedens possessionum +venditionem usque ad certum tempus; et tamen periculum removit, +praecipiens ut certo tempore possessio vendita ad vendentem +rediret. Et hoc instituit ut sortes non confunderentur, sed semper +remaneret eadem distinctio determinata in tribubus. Quia vero domus +urbanae non erant sorte distinctae, ideo concessit quod in +perpetuum vendi possent, sicut et mobilia bona. Non enim erat +statutus numerus domorum civitatis, sicut erat certa mensura +possessionis, ad quam non addebatur, poterat autem aliquid addi ad +numerum domorum civitatis. Domus vero quae non erant in urbe, sed +in villa muros non habente, in perpetuum vendi non poterant, quia +huiusmodi domus non construuntur nisi ad cultum et ad custodiam +possessionum; et ideo lex congrue statuit idem ius circa +utrumque.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p23"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As stated above (ad 1), the purpose of the Law was to accustom men to its precepts, so as to be ready to come to one another's + assistance: because this is a very great incentive to friendship. The Law granted these facilities for helping others in the + matter not only of gratuitous and absolute donations, but also of mutual transfers: because the latter kind of succor is more + frequent and benefits the greater number: and it granted facilities for this + purpose in many ways. First of all by prescribing that men should be ready to lend, and that they should not be less inclined + to do so as the year of remission drew nigh, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p23.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.15.7" target="asv"> Dt. 15:7, </a> seqq. Secondly, by forbidding them to burden a man to whom they might grant a loan, either by exacting usury, or by accepting + necessities of life in security; and by prescribing that when this had been done they should be restored at once. For it is + written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p23.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.19" target="asv">Dt. + 23:19 + </a>): "Thou shalt not lend to thy brother money to usury": and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p23.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.6" target="asv">Dt. 24:6</a>): "Thou shalt not take the nether nor the upper millstone to pledge; for he hath pledged his life to thee": and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p23.4" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.26" target="asv">Ex. 22:26</a>): "If thou take of thy neighbor a garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him again before sunset." Thirdly, by forbidding + them to be importunate in exacting payment. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p23.5" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.25" target="asv">Ex. 22:25</a>): "If thou lend money to any of + my people that is poor that dwelleth with thee, thou shalt not be hard upon them as an extortioner." For this reason, too, + it is enacted ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p23.6" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.10" target="asv">Dt. 24:10,11</a>): "When thou shalt demand of thy neighbor anything that he oweth thee, thou shalt not go into his house to take away a pledge, + but thou shalt stand without, and he shall bring out to thee what he hath": both because a man's house is his surest refuge, + wherefore it is offensive to a man to be set upon in his own house; and because the Law does not + allow the creditor to take away whatever he likes in security, but rather permits the debtor to give what he needs least. + Fourthly, the Law prescribed that debts should cease together after the lapse of seven years. For it was probable that those + who could conveniently pay their debts, would do so before the seventh year, and would not defraud the lender without cause. + But if they were altogether insolvent, there was the same reason for remitting the debt from love for them, as there was for + renewing the loan on account of their need. + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p24"> As regards animals granted in loan, the Law enacted that if, through the neglect of the person to whom they were lent, they + perished or deteriorated in his absence, he was bound to make restitution. But if they perished or deteriorated while he was + present and taking proper care of them, he was not bound to make restitution, especially if they were hired for a consideration: + because they might have died or deteriorated in the same way if they had remained in possession of the + lender, so that if the animal had been saved through being lent, the lender would have gained something by the loan which + would no longer have been gratuitous. And especially was this to be observed when animals were hired for a consideration: + because then the owner received a certain price for the use of the animals; wherefore he had no right to any profit, by receiving + indemnity for the animal, unless the person who had charge of it were negligent. In the case, however, of animals not hired + for a consideration, equity demanded that he should receive something by way of restitution at least to the value of the hire + of the animal that had perished or deteriorated. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="38205" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38205] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, intentio legis erat assuefacere +homines suis praeceptis ad hoc quod sibi invicem de facili in +necessitatibus subvenirent, quia hoc maxime est amicitiae fomentum. +Et hanc quidem facilitatem subveniendi non solum statuit in his +quae gratis et absolute donantur, sed etiam in his quae mutuo +conceduntur, quia huiusmodi subventio frequentior est, et pluribus +necessaria. Huiusmodi autem subventionis facilitatem multipliciter +instituit. Primo quidem, ut faciles se praeberent ad mutuum +exhibendum, nec ab hoc retraherentur anno remissionis +appropinquante, ut habetur Deut. XV. Secundo, ne eum cui mutuum +concederent, gravarent vel usuris, vel etiam aliqua pignora omnino +vitae necessaria accipiendo, et si accepta fuerint, quod statim +restituerentur. Dicitur enim Deut. XXIII, <i>non faeneraberis +fratri tuo ad usuram</i>; et XXIV, <i>non accipies loco pignoris +inferiorem et superiorem molam, quia animam suam apposuit tibi</i>; +et Exod. XXII dicitur, <i>si pignus a proximo tuo acceperis +vestimentum, ante solis occasum reddes ei</i>. Tertio, ut non +importune exigerent. Unde dicitur Exod. XXII, <i>si pecuniam mutuam +dederis populo meo pauperi qui habitat tecum, non urgebis eum quasi +exactor</i>. Et propter hoc etiam mandatur Deut. XXIV, <i>cum +repetes a proximo tuo rem aliquam quam debet tibi, non ingredieris +in domum eius ut pignus auferas; sed stabis foris, et ille tibi +proferet quod habuerit</i>, tum quia domus est tutissimum +uniuscuiusque receptaculum, unde molestum homini est ut in domo sua +invadatur; tum etiam quia non concedit creditori ut accipiat pignus +quod voluerit, sed magis debitori ut det quo minus indiguerit. +Quarto, instituit quod in septimo anno debita penitus +remitterentur. Probabile enim erat ut illi qui commode reddere +possent, ante septimum annum redderent, et gratis mutuantem non +defraudarent. Si autem omnino impotentes essent, eadem ratione eis +erat debitum remittendum ex dilectione, qua etiam erat eis de novo +dandum propter indigentiam. Circa animalia vero mutuata haec lex +statuit, ut propter negligentiam eius cui mutuata sunt, si in +ipsius absentia moriantur vel debilitentur, reddere ea compellatur. +Si vero eo praesente et diligenter custodiente, mortua fuerint vel +debilitata, non cogebatur restituere, et maxime si erant mercede +conducta, quia ita etiam potuissent mori et debilitari apud +mutuantem; et ita, si conservationem animalis consequeretur, iam +aliquod lucrum reportaret ex mutuo, et non esset gratuitum mutuum. +Et maxime hoc observandum erat quando animalia erant mercede +conducta, quia tunc habebat certum pretium pro usu animalium; unde +nihil accrescere debebat per restitutionem animalium, nisi propter +negligentiam custodientis. Si autem non essent mercede conducta, +potuisset habere aliquam aequitatem ut saltem tantum restitueret +quantum usus animalis mortui vel debilitati conduci potuisset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p25"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The difference between a loan and a deposit is that a loan is in respect of goods transferred for the use of the person to + whom they are transferred, whereas a deposit is for the benefit of the depositor. Hence in certain cases there was a stricter + obligation of returning a loan than of restoring goods held in deposit. Because the latter might be lost in two ways. First, + unavoidably: i.e. either through a natural cause, for instance if an animal held + in deposit were to die or depreciate in value; or through an extrinsic cause, for instance, if it were taken by an enemy, + or devoured by a beast (in which case, however, a man was bound to restore to the owner what was left of the animal thus slain): + whereas in the other cases mentioned above, he was not bound to make restitution; but only to take an oath in order to clear + himself of suspicion. Secondly, the goods deposited might be lost through an avoidable cause, for instance by theft: and + then the depositary was bound to restitution on account of his neglect. But, as stated above (ad 4), he who held an animal + on loan, was bound to restitution, even if he were absent when it depreciated or died: because he was held responsible for + less negligence than a depositary, who was only held responsible in case of theft. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="38206" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38206] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod haec differentia est inter mutuum et depositum, quia +mutuum traditur in utilitatem eius cui traditur; sed depositum +traditur in utilitatem deponentis. Et ideo magis arctabatur aliquis +in aliquibus casibus ad restituendum mutuum, quam ad restituendum +depositum. Depositum enim perdi poterat dupliciter. Uno modo, ex +causa inevitabili, vel naturali, puta si esset mortuum vel +debilitatum animal depositum; vel extrinseca, puta si esset captum +ab hostibus, vel si esset comestum a bestia; in quo tamen casu +tenebatur deferre ad dominum animalis id quod de animali occiso +supererat. In aliis autem praedictis casibus nihil reddere +tenebatur, sed solum, ad expurgandam suspicionem fraudis, tenebatur +iuramentum praestare. Alio modo poterat perdi ex causa evitabili, +puta per furtum. Et tunc, propter negligentiam custodis, reddere +tenebatur. Sed, sicut dictum est, ille qui mutuo accipiebat animal, +tenebatur reddere, etiam si debilitatum aut mortuum fuisset in eius +absentia. De minori enim negligentia tenebatur quam depositarius, +qui non tenebatur nisi de furto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p26"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Workmen who offer their labor for hire, are poor men who toil for their daily bread: and therefore the Law commanded wisely + that they should be paid at once, lest they should lack food. But they who offer other commodities for hire, are wont to be + rich: nor are they in such need of their price in order to gain a livelihood: and consequently the comparison does not hold. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 ad 6"><a name="38207" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38207] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum +dicendum quod mercenarii qui locant operas suas, pauperes sunt, de +laboribus suis victum quaerentes quotidianum, et ideo lex provide +ordinavit ut statim eis merces solveretur, ne victus eis deficeret. +Sed illi qui locant alias res, divites esse consueverunt, nec ita +indigent locationis pretio ad suum victum quotidianum. Et ideo non +est eadem ratio in utroque.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p27"> + <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> The purpose for which judges are appointed among men, is that they may decide doubtful points in matters of justice. Now + a matter may be doubtful in two ways. First, among simple-minded people: and in order to remove doubts of this kind, it was + prescribed ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p27.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.16.18" target="asv">Dt. 16:18</a>) that "judges and magistrates" should be appointed in each tribe, "to judge the people with just judgment." Secondly, a matter + may be doubtful even among experts: and + therefore, in order to remove doubts of this kind, the Law prescribed that all should foregather in some chief place chosen + by God, where there would be both the high-priest, who would decide doubtful matters relating to the ceremonies of divine + worship; and the chief judge of the people, who would decide matters relating to the judgments of men: just as even now cases + are taken from a lower to a higher court either by appeal or by consultation. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p27.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.17.8" target="asv">Dt. + 17:8,9 + </a>): "If thou perceive that there be among you a hard and doubtful matter in judgment . . . and thou see that the words of the + judges within thy gates do vary; arise and go up to the place, which the Lord thy God shall choose; and thou shalt come to + the priests of the Levitical race, and to the judge that shall be at that time." But such like doubtful matters did not often + occur for judgment: wherefore the people were not burdened on this account. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 ad 7"><a name="38208" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38208] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 7</span></a> Ad septimum +dicendum quod iudices ad hoc inter homines constituuntur, quod +determinent quod ambiguum inter homines circa iustitiam esse +potest. Dupliciter autem aliquid potest esse ambiguum. Uno modo, +apud simplices. Et ad hoc dubium tollendum, mandatur Deut. XVI, ut +<i>iudices et magistri constituerentur per singulas tribus, ut +iudicarent populum iusto iudicio</i>. Alio modo contingit aliquid +esse dubium etiam apud peritos. Et ideo ad hoc dubium tollendum, +constituit lex ut omnes recurrerent ad locum principalem a Deo +electum, in quo et summus sacerdos esset, qui determinaret dubia +circa caeremonias divini cultus; et summus iudex populi, qui +determinaret quae pertinent ad iudicia hominum, sicut etiam nunc +per appellationem, vel per consultationem, causae ab inferioribus +iudicibus ad superiores deferuntur. Unde dicitur Deut. XVII, <i>si +difficile et ambiguum apud te iudicium perspexeris, et iudicum +intra portas tuas videris verba variari; ascende ad locum quem +elegerit dominus, veniesque ad sacerdotes levitici generis, et ad +iudicem qui fuerit illo tempore</i>. Huiusmodi autem ambigua +iudicia non frequenter emergebant. Unde ex hoc populus non +gravabatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p28"> + <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> In the business affairs of men, there is no such thing as demonstrative and infallible proof, and we must be content with + a certain conjectural probability, such as that which an orator employs to persuade. Consequently, although it is quite possible + for two or three witnesses to agree to a falsehood, yet it is neither easy nor probable that they succeed in so doing: wherefore + their testimony is taken as being true, especially if they do not waver in + giving it, or are not otherwise suspect. Moreover, in order that witnesses might not easily depart from the truth, the Law + commanded that they should be most carefully examined, and that those who were found untruthful should be severely punished, + as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p28.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.19.16" target="asv"> Dt. 19:16, </a> seqq. + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p29"> There was, however, a reason for fixing on this particular number, in token of the unerring truth of the Divine Persons, + Who are sometimes mentioned as two, because the Holy Ghost is the bond of the other two Persons; and sometimes as three: as + Augustine observes on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p29.1" href="./asv.html#John.8.17" target="asv"> Jn. 8:17</a>: "In your law it is written that the testimony of two men is true." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 ad 8"><a name="38209" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38209] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 8</span></a> Ad octavum +dicendum quod in negotiis humanis non potest haberi probatio +demonstrativa et infallibilis, sed sufficit aliqua coniecturalis +probabilitas, secundum quam rhetor persuadet. Et ideo, licet sit +possibile duos aut tres testes in mendacium convenire, non tamen +est facile nec probabile quod conveniant; et ideo accipitur eorum +testimonium tanquam verum; et praecipue si in suo testimonio non +vacillent, vel alias suspecti non fuerint. Et ad hoc etiam quod non +de facili a veritate testes declinarent, instituit lex ut testes +diligentissime examinarentur, et graviter punirentur qui +invenirentur mendaces, ut habetur Deut. XIX. Fuit tamen aliqua +ratio huiusmodi numeri determinandi, ad significandam infallibilem +veritatem personarum divinarum, quae quandoque numerantur duae, +quia spiritus sanctus est nexus duorum, quandoque exprimuntur tres; +ut Augustinus dicit, super illud Ioan. VIII, <i>in lege vestra +scriptum est quia duorum hominum testimonium verum est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p30"> + <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> A severe punishment is inflicted not only on account of the gravity of a fault, but also for other reasons. First, on account + of the greatness of the sin, because a greater sin, other things being equal, deserves a greater punishment. Secondly, on + account of a habitual sin, since men are not easily cured of habitual sin except by severe punishments. Thirdly, on account + of a great desire for or a great pleasure in the sin: for men are not easily + deterred from such sins unless they be severely punished. Fourthly, on account of the facility of committing a sin and of + concealing it: for such like sins, when discovered, should be more severely punished in order to deter others from committing + them. + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p31"> Again, with regard to the greatness of a sin, four degrees may be observed, even in respect of one single deed. The first + is when a sin is committed unwillingly; because then, if the sin be altogether involuntary, man is altogether excused from + punishment; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p31.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.25" target="asv">Dt. 22:25, </a> seqq.) that a damsel who suffers violence in a field is not guilty of death, because "she cried, and there was no man to + help her." But if a man sinned in any way voluntarily, + and yet through weakness, as for instance when a man sins from passion, the sin is diminished: and the punishment, according + to true judgment, should be diminished also; unless perchance the common weal requires that the sin be severely punished in + order to deter others from committing such sins, as stated above. The second degree is when a man sins through ignorance: + and then he was held to be guilty to a certain extent, on account of his negligence in acquiring knowledge: yet he was not + punished by the judges but expiated his sin by sacrifices. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p31.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.4.2" target="asv">Lev. 4:2</a>): "The soul that sinneth through ignorance," etc. This is, however, to be taken as applying to ignorance of fact; and not + to ignorance of the Divine precept, which all were bound to know. The third degree was when a man sinned from pride, i.e. + through deliberate choice or malice: and then he was punished according to the greatness of the sin [*Cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p31.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv"> Dt. 25:2</a>]. The + fourth degree was when a man sinned from stubbornness or obstinacy: and then he was to be utterly cut off as a rebel and a + destroyer of the commandment of the Law [*Cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p31.4" href="./asv.html#Num.15.30" target="asv"> Num. 15:30,31</a>]. + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p32"> Accordingly we must say that, in appointing the punishment for theft, the Law considered what would be likely to happen most + frequently ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p32.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.1" target="asv">Ex. 22:1-9</a>): wherefore, as regards theft of other things which can easily be safeguarded from a thief, the thief restored only twice + their value. But sheep cannot be easily safeguarded from a thief, because they graze in the fields: wherefore it happened + more frequently that sheep were stolen in the fields. Consequently the Law inflicted a + heavier penalty, by ordering four sheep to be restored for the theft of one. As to cattle, they were yet more difficult to + safeguard, because they are kept in the fields, and do not graze in flocks as sheep do; wherefore a yet more heavy penalty + was inflicted in their regard, so that five oxen were to be restored for one ox. And this I say, unless perchance the animal + itself were discovered in the thief's possession: because in that case he had to restore only twice the number, as in the + case + of other thefts: for there was reason to presume that he intended to restore the animal, since he kept it alive. Again, we + might say, according to a gloss, that "a cow is useful in five ways: it may be used for sacrifice, for ploughing, for food, + for milk, and its hide is employed for various purposes": and therefore for one cow five had to be restored. But the sheep + was useful in four ways: "for sacrifice, for meat, for milk, and for its wool." The unruly son was slain, not because he ate + and + drank: but on account of his stubbornness and rebellion, which was always punished by death, as stated above. As to the man + who gathered sticks on the sabbath, he was stoned as a breaker of the Law, which commanded the sabbath to be observed, to + testify the belief in the newness of the world, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q100_A5" id="FS_Q105_A2-p32.2" shape="rect">Q[100], A[5]</a>): wherefore he was slain as an unbeliever. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 ad 9"><a name="38210" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38210] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 9</span></a> Ad nonum +dicendum quod non solum propter gravitatem culpae, sed etiam +propter alias causas gravis poena infligitur. Primo quidem, propter +quantitatem peccati, quia maiori peccato, ceteris paribus, gravior +poena debetur. Secundo, propter peccati consuetudinem, quia a +peccatis consuetis non faciliter homines abstrahuntur nisi per +graves poenas. Tertio, propter multam concupiscentiam vel +delectationem in peccato, ab his enim non de facili homines +abstrahuntur nisi per graves poenas. Quarto, propter facilitatem +committendi peccatum, et latendi in ipso, huiusmodi enim peccata, +quando manifestantur, sunt magis punienda, ad terrorem aliorum. +Circa ipsam etiam quantitatem peccati quadruplex gradus est +attendendus, etiam circa unum et idem factum. Quorum primus est +quando involuntarius peccatum committit. Tunc enim, si omnino est +involuntarius, totaliter excusatur a poena, dicitur enim Deut. +XXII, quod puella quae opprimitur in agro, <i>non est rea mortis, +quia clamavit, et nullus affuit qui liberaret eam</i>. Si vero +aliquo modo fuerit voluntarius, sed tamen ex infirmitate peccat, +puta cum quis peccat ex passione, minuitur peccatum, et poena, +secundum veritatem iudicii, diminui debet; nisi forte, propter +communem utilitatem, poena aggravetur, ad abstrahendum homines ab +huiusmodi peccatis, sicut dictum est. Secundus gradus est quando +quis per ignorantiam peccavit. Et tunc aliquo modo reus +reputabatur, propter negligentiam addiscendi; sed tamen non +puniebatur per iudices, sed expiabat peccatum suum per sacrificia. +Unde dicitur Levit. IV, <i>anima quae peccaverit per +ignorantiam,</i> et cetera. Sed hoc intelligendum est de ignorantia +facti, non autem de ignorantia praecepti divini, quod omnes scire +tenebantur. Tertius gradus est quando aliquis ex superbia peccabat, +idest ex certa electione vel ex certa malitia. Et tunc puniebatur +secundum quantitatem delicti. Quartus autem gradus est quando +peccabat per proterviam et pertinaciam. Et tunc, quasi rebellis et +destructor ordinationis legis, omnino occidendus erat. Secundum +hoc, dicendum est quod in poena furti considerabatur secundum legem +id quod frequenter accidere poterat. Et ideo pro furto aliarum +rerum, quae de facili custodiri possunt a furibus, non reddebat fur +nisi duplum. Oves autem non de facili possunt custodiri a furto, +quia pascuntur in agris, et ideo frequentius contingebat quod oves +furto subtraherentur. Unde lex maiorem poenam apposuit, ut scilicet +quatuor oves pro una ove redderentur. Adhuc autem boves difficilius +custodiuntur, quia habentur in agris, et non ita pascuntur gregatim +sicut oves. Et ideo adhuc hic maiorem poenam apposuit, ut scilicet +quinque boves pro uno bove redderentur. Et hoc dico, nisi forte +idem animal inventum fuerit vivens apud eum, quia tunc solum duplum +restituebat, sicut et in ceteris furtis; poterat enim haberi +praesumptio quod cogitaret restituere, ex quo vivum servasset. Vel +potest dici, secundum Glossam, quod <i>bos habet quinque +utilitates, quia immolatur, arat, pascit carnibus, lactat, et +corium etiam diversis usibus ministrat</i>, et ideo pro uno bove +quinque boves reddebantur. Ovis autem habet quatuor utilitates, +quia immolatur, pascit, lac dat, et lanam ministrat. Filius autem +contumax, non quia comedebat et bibebat, occidebatur, sed propter +contumaciam et rebellionem, quae semper morte puniebatur, ut dictum +est. Ille vero qui colligebat ligna in sabbato, lapidatus fuit +tanquam legis violator, quae sabbatum observari praecipiebat in +commemorationem fidei novitatis mundi, sicut supra dictum est. Unde +occisus fuit tanquam infidelis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p33"> + <b>Reply to Objection 10:</b> The Old Law inflicted the death penalty for the more grievous crimes, viz. for those which are committed against God, and + for murder, for stealing a man, irreverence towards one's parents, adultery and incest. In the case of thief of other things + it inflicted punishment by indemnification: while in the case of blows and mutilation it authorized punishment by retaliation; + and likewise for the sin of bearing false witness. In other faults of less + degree it prescribed the punishment of stripes or of public disgrace. + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p34"> The punishment of slavery was prescribed by the Law in two cases. First, in the case of a slave who was unwilling to avail + himself of the privilege granted by the Law, whereby he was free to depart in the seventh year of remission: wherefore he + was punished by remaining a slave for ever. Secondly, in the case of a thief, who had not wherewith to make restitution, as + stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p34.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.3" target="asv"> Ex. 22:3.</a> + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p35"> The punishment of absolute exile was not prescribed by the Law: because God was worshipped by that people alone, whereas + all other nations were given to idolatry: wherefore if any man were exiled from that people absolutely, he would be in danger + of falling into idolatry. For this reason it is related ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p35.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.26.19" target="asv">1 Kings 26:19</a>) that David said to Saul: "They are cursed in the sight of the Lord, who have case me out this day, that I should not dwell + in the inheritance of + the Lord, saying: Go, serve strange gods." There was, however, a restricted sort of exile: for it is written in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p35.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.19.4" target="asv"> Dt. 19:4</a> [*Cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p35.3" href="./asv.html#Num.35.25" target="asv"> Num. 35:25</a>] that "he that striketh [Vulg.: 'killeth'] his neighbor ignorantly, and is proved to have had no hatred against him, shall + flee to one of the cities" of refuge and "abide there until the death of the high-priest." For then it became lawful for him + to return home, because when the whole people thus suffered a loss they + forgot their private quarrels, so that the next of kin of the slain were not so eager to kill the slayer. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 ad 10"><a name="38211" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38211] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 10</span></a> Ad decimum +dicendum quod lex vetus poenam mortis inflixit in gravioribus +criminibus, scilicet in his quae contra Deum peccantur, et in +homicidio, et in furto hominum, et in irreverentia ad parentes, et +in adulterio, et in incestibus. In furto autem aliarum rerum +adhibuit poenam damni. In percussuris autem et mutilationibus +induxit poenam talionis; et similiter in peccato falsi testimonii. +In aliis autem minoribus culpis induxit poenam flagellationis vel +ignominiae. Poenam autem servitutis induxit in duobus casibus. In +uno quidem, quando, septimo anno remissionis, ille qui erat servus, +nolebat beneficio legis uti ut liber exiret. Unde pro poena ei +infligebatur ut in perpetuum servus remaneret. Secundo, +infligebatur furi, quando non habebat quod posset restituere, sicut +habetur Exod. XXII. Poenam autem exilii universaliter lex non +statuit. Quia in solo populo illo Deus colebatur, omnibus aliis +populis per idololatriam corruptis, unde si quis a populo illo +universaliter exclusus esset, daretur ei occasio idololatriae. Et +ideo I Reg. XXVI dicitur quod David dixit ad Saul, <i>maledicti +sunt qui eiecerunt me hodie, ut non habitem in hereditate domini, +dicentes, vade, servi diis alienis</i>. Erat tamen aliquod +particulare exilium. Dicitur enim Deut. XIX quod <i>qui percusserit +proximum suum nesciens, et qui nullum contra ipsum habuisse odium +comprobatur</i>, ad unam urbium refugii confugiebat, et ibi manebat +usque ad mortem summi sacerdotis. Tunc enim licebat ei redire ad +domum suam, quia in universali damno populi consueverunt +particulares irae sedari, et ita proximi defuncti non sic proni +erant ad eius occisionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A2-p36"> + <b>Reply to Objection 11:</b> Dumb animals were ordered to be slain, not on account of any fault of theirs; but as a punishment to their owners, who had + not safeguarded their beasts from these offenses. Hence the owner was more severely punished if his ox had butted anyone "yesterday + or the day before" (in which case steps might have been taken to butting suddenly). Or again, the animal was slain in detestation + of the sin; and lest men should be horrified at the sight + thereof. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 ad 11"><a name="38212" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38212] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 11</span></a> Ad +undecimum dicendum quod animalia bruta mandabantur occidi, non +propter aliquam ipsorum culpam; sed in poenam dominorum, qui talia +animalia non custodierant ab huiusmodi peccatis. Et ideo magis +puniebatur dominus si bos cornupeta fuerat ab heri et +nudiustertius, in quo casu poterat occurri periculo; quam si subito +cornupeta efficeretur. Vel occidebantur animalia in detestationem +peccati; et ne ex eorum aspectu aliquis horror hominibus +incuteretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p37"> + <b>Reply to Objection 12:</b> The literal reason for this commandment, as Rabbi Moses declares (Doct. Perplex. iii), was because the slayer was frequently + from the nearest city: wherefore the slaying of the calf was a means of investigating the hidden murder. This was brought + about in three ways. In the first place the elders of the city swore that they had taken every measure for safeguarding the + roads. Secondly, the owner of the heifer was indemnified for the slaying of his + beast, and if the murder was previously discovered, the beast was not slain. Thirdly, the place, where the heifer was slain, + remained uncultivated. Wherefore, in order to avoid this twofold loss, the men of the city would readily make known the murderer, + if they knew who he was: and it would seldom happen but that some word or sign would escape about the matter. Or again, this + was done in order to frighten people, in detestation of murder. Because the slaying of a heifer, which is a useful + animal and full of strength, especially before it has been put under the yoke, signified that whoever committed murder, however + useful and strong he might be, was to forfeit his life; and that, by a cruel death, which was implied by the striking off + of its head; and that the murderer, as vile and abject, was to be cut off from the fellowship of men, which was betokened + by the fact that the heifer after being slain was left to rot in a rough and uncultivated place. + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A2-p38"> Mystically, the heifer taken from the herd signifies the flesh of Christ; which had not drawn a yoke, since it had done no + sin; nor did it plough the ground, i.e. it never knew the stain of revolt. The fact of the heifer being killed in an uncultivated + valley signified the despised death of Christ, whereby all sins are washed away, and the devil is shown to be the arch-murderer. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 2 ad 12"><a name="38213" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38213] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 2 ad 12</span></a> Ad +duodecimum dicendum quod ratio litteralis illius mandati fuit, ut +Rabbi Moyses dicit, quia frequenter interfector est de civitate +propinquiori. Unde occisio vitulae fiebat ad explorandum homicidium +occultum. Quod quidem fiebat per tria. Quorum unum est quod +seniores civitatis iurabant nihil se praetermisisse in custodia +viarum. Aliud est quia ille cuius erat vitula damnificabatur in +occisione animalis, et si prius manifestaretur homicidium, animal +non occideretur. Tertium est quia locus in quo occidebatur vitula, +remanebat incultus. Et ideo, ad evitandum utrumque damnum, homines +civitatis de facili manifestarent homicidam, si scirent, et raro +poterat esse quin aliqua verba vel iudicia super hoc facta essent. +Vel hoc fiebat ad terrorem, in detestationem homicidii. Per +occisionem enim vitulae, quae est animal utile et fortitudine +plenum, praecipue antequam laboret sub iugo, significabatur quod +quicumque homicidium fecisset, quamvis esset utilis et fortis, +occidendus erat; et morte crudeli, quod cervicis concisio +significabat; et quod tanquam vilis et abiectus a consortio hominum +excludendus erat, quod significabatur per hoc quod vitula occisa in +loco aspero et inculto relinquebatur, in putredinem convertenda. +Mystice autem per vitulam de armento significatur caro Christi; +quae non traxit iugum, quia non fecit peccatum; nec terram scidit +vomere, idest seditionis maculam non admisit. Per hoc autem quod in +valle inculta occidebatur, significabatur despecta mors Christi; +per quam purgantur omnia peccata, et Diabolus esse homicidii auctor +ostenditur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q105_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q105_A3-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 3. Whether the judicial precepts regarding foreigners were framed in a suitable manner?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the judicial precepts regarding foreigners were not suitably framed. For Peter said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.10.34" target="asv">Acts 10:34,35</a>): "In very deed I perceive that God is not a respecter of persons, but in every nation, he that feareth Him and worketh justice + is acceptable to Him." But those who are acceptable to God should not be excluded from the Church of God. Therefore it is + unsuitably commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.3" target="asv">Dt. 23:3</a>) that "the Ammonite and + the Moabite, even after the tenth generation, shall not enter into the church of the Lord for ever": whereas, on the other + hand, it is prescribed ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.7" target="asv">Dt. 23:7</a>) to be observed with regard to certain other nations: "Thou shalt not abhor the Edomite, because he is thy brother; nor the + Egyptian because thou wast a stranger in his land." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="38214" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38214] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod iudicialia praecepta non sint +convenienter tradita quantum ad extraneos. Dicit enim Petrus, Act. +X, <i>in veritate comperi quoniam non est acceptor personarum Deus; +sed in omni gente qui timet Deum et operatur iustitiam, acceptus +est illi</i>. Sed illi qui sunt Deo accepti, non sunt ab Ecclesia +Dei excludendi. Inconvenienter igitur mandatur Deut. XXIII, quod +<i>Ammonites et Moabites, etiam post decimam generationem, non +intrabunt Ecclesiam domini in aeternum</i>; e contrario autem +ibidem praecipitur de quibusdam gentibus, <i>non abominaberis +Idumaeum, quia frater tuus est; nec Aegyptium, quia advena fuisti +in terra eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we do not deserve to be punished for those things which are not in our power. But it is not in man's power to be + an eunuch, or born of a prostitute. Therefore it is unsuitably commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.1" target="asv">Dt. 23:1,2</a>) that "an eunuch and one born of a prostitute shalt not enter into the church of the Lord." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="38215" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38215] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae non sunt in potestate nostra, non merentur aliquam poenam. +Sed quod homo sit eunuchus, vel ex scorto natus, non est in +potestate eius. Ergo inconvenienter mandatur Deut. XXIII, quod +<i>eunuchus, et ex scorto natus, non ingrediatur Ecclesiam +domini</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Old Law mercifully forbade strangers to be molested: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.21" target="asv">Ex. 22:21</a>): "Thou shalt not molest a stranger, nor afflict him; for yourselves also were strangers in the land of Egypt": and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.9" target="asv">Ex. 23:9</a>): "Thou shalt not molest a stranger, for you know the hearts of strangers, for you also were strangers in the land of Egypt." + But it is an affliction to be burdened with usury. Therefore the Law + unsuitably permitted them ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.19" target="asv">Dt. 23:19,20</a>) to lend money to the stranger for usury. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="38216" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38216] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex vetus misericorditer mandavit ut advenae non affligantur, +dicitur enim Exod. XXII, <i>advenam non contristabis, neque +affliges eum, advenae enim et ipsi fuistis in terra Aegypti</i>; et +XXIII, <i>peregrino molestus non eris, scitis enim advenarum +animas, quia et ipsi peregrini fuistis in terra Aegypti</i>. Sed ad +afflictionem alicuius pertinet quod usuris opprimatur. +Inconvenienter igitur lex permisit, Deut. XXIII, ut alienis ad +usuram pecuniam mutuarent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, men are much more akin to us than trees. But we should show greater care and love for these things that are nearest + to us, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.13.19" target="asv"> Ecclus. 13:19</a>: "Every beast loveth its like: so also every man him that is nearest to himself." Therefore the Lord unsuitably commanded + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.20.13" target="asv">Dt. 20:13-19</a>) that all the inhabitants of a captured hostile city were to be slain, but that the fruit-trees should not be cut down. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="38217" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38217] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +multo magis appropinquant nobis homines quam arbores. Sed his quae +sunt nobis magis propinqua, magis debemus affectum et effectum +dilectionis impendere; secundum illud Eccli. XIII, <i>omne animal +diligit simile sibi, sic et omnis homo proximum sibi</i>. +Inconvenienter igitur dominus, Deut. XX, mandavit quod de +civitatibus hostium captis omnes interficerent, et tamen arbores +fructiferas non succiderent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, every one should prefer the common good of virtue to the good of the individual. But the common good is sought in + a war which men fight against their enemies. Therefore it is unsuitably commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.20.5" target="asv">Dt. 20:5-7</a>) that certain men should be sent home, for instance a man that had built a new house, or who had planted a vineyard, or who + had married a wife. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 3 arg. 5"><a name="38218" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38218] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +bonum commune secundum virtutem est bono privato praeferendum ab +unoquoque. Sed in bello quod committitur contra hostes, quaeritur +bonum commune. Inconvenienter igitur mandatur Deut. XX, quod, +imminente proelio, aliqui domum remittantur, puta qui aedificavit +domum novam, qui plantavit vineam, vel qui despondit uxorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A3-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, no man should profit by his own fault. But it is a man's fault if he be timid or faint-hearted: since this is contrary + to the virtue of fortitude. Therefore the timid and faint-hearted are unfittingly excused from the toil of battle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.20.8" target="asv">Dt. 20:8</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 3 arg. 6"><a name="38219" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38219] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +ex culpa non debet quis commodum reportare. Sed quod homo sit +formidolosus et corde pavido, culpabile est, contrariatur enim +virtuti fortitudinis. Inconvenienter igitur a labore proelii +excusabantur formidolosi et pavidum cor habentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A3-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Divine Wisdom declares ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.8" target="asv">Prov. 8:8</a>): "All my words are just, there is nothing wicked nor perverse in them." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 3 s. c."><a name="38220" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38220] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod sapientia divina dicit, Prov. VIII, <i>recti sunt omnes +sermones mei, non est in eis pravum quid neque perversum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q105_A3-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man's relations with foreigners are twofold: peaceful, and hostile: and in directing both kinds of relation the Law contained + suitable precepts. For the Jews were offered three opportunities of peaceful relations with foreigners. First, when foreigners + passed through their land as travelers. Secondly, when they came to dwell in their land as newcomers. And in both these respects + the Law made kind provision in its precepts: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.21" target="asv">Ex. + 22:21 + </a>): "Thou shalt not molest a stranger [advenam]"; and again ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.9" target="asv">Ex. 22:9</a>): "Thou shalt not molest a stranger [peregrino]." Thirdly, when any foreigners wished to be admitted entirely to their fellowship + and mode of worship. With regard to these a certain order was observed. For they were not at once admitted to citizenship: + just as it was law with some nations that no one was deemed a citizen except after two or three generations, as the Philosopher + says (Polit. + iii, 1). The reason for this was that if foreigners were allowed to meddle with the affairs of a nation as soon as they settled + down in its midst, many dangers might occur, since the foreigners not yet having the common good firmly at heart might attempt + something hurtful to the people. Hence it was that the Law prescribed in respect of certain nations that had close relations + with the Jews (viz., the Egyptians among whom they were born and educated, and the Idumeans, the children of Esau, + Jacob's brother), that they should be admitted to the fellowship of the people after the third generation; whereas others + (with whom their relations had been hostile, such as the Ammonites and Moabites) were never to be admitted to citizenship; + while the Amalekites, who were yet more hostile to them, and had no fellowship of kindred with them, were to be held as foes + in perpetuity: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p9.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.17.16" target="asv">Ex. 17:16</a>): "The war of the Lord shall be against Amalec from generation + to generation." + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A3-p10"> In like manner with regard to hostile relations with foreigners, the Law contained suitable precepts. For, in the first place, + it commanded that war should be declared for a just cause: thus it is commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.20.10" target="asv">Dt. 20:10</a>) that when they advanced to besiege a city, they should at first make an offer of peace. Secondly, it enjoined that when + once they had entered on a war they should undauntedly persevere in it, putting their trust in God. And in order that they + might be the more heedful of this command, it ordered that on the approach of battle the priest should hearten them by promising + them God's aid. Thirdly, it prescribed the removal of whatever might prove an obstacle to the fight, and that certain men, + who might be in the way, should be sent home. Fourthly, it enjoined that they should use moderation in pursuing the advantage + of victory, by sparing women and children, and by not cutting down fruit-trees of that country. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 3 co."><a name="38221" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38221] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod cum extraneis potest esse hominum conversatio +dupliciter, uno modo, pacifice; alio modo, hostiliter. Et quantum +ad utrumque modum ordinandum, lex convenientia praecepta +continebat. Tripliciter enim offerebatur Iudaeis occasio ut cum +extraneis pacifice communicarent. Primo quidem, quando extranei per +terram eorum transitum faciebant quasi peregrini. Alio modo, quando +in terram eorum adveniebant ad inhabitandum sicut advenae. Et +quantum ad utrumque, lex misericordiae praecepta proposuit, nam +Exod. XXII dicitur, <i>advenam non contristabis</i>; et XXIII +dicitur, <i>peregrino molestus non eris</i>. Tertio vero, quando +aliqui extranei totaliter in eorum consortium et ritum admitti +volebant. Et in his quidam ordo attendebatur. Non enim statim +recipiebantur quasi cives, sicut etiam apud quosdam gentilium +statutum erat ut non reputarentur cives nisi qui ex avo, vel abavo, +cives existerent, ut philosophus dicit, in III Polit. Et hoc ideo +quia, si statim extranei advenientes reciperentur ad tractandum ea +quae sunt populi, possent multa pericula contingere; dum extranei, +non habentes adhuc amorem firmatum ad bonum publicum, aliqua contra +populum attentarent. Et ideo lex statuit ut de quibusdam gentibus +habentibus aliquam affinitatem ad Iudaeos, scilicet de Aegyptiis, +apud quos nati fuerant et nutriti, et de Idumaeis, filiis Esau +fratris Iacob, in tertia generatione reciperentur in consortium +populi; quidam vero, quia hostiliter se ad eos habuerant, sicut +Ammonitae et Moabitae, nunquam in consortium populi admitterentur; +Amalecitae autem, qui magis eis fuerant adversati, et cum eis +nullum cognationis habebant consortium, quasi hostes perpetui +haberentur; dicitur enim Exod. XVII, <i>bellum Dei erit contra +Amalec a generatione in generationem</i>. Similiter etiam quantum +ad hostilem communicationem cum extraneis, lex convenientia +praecepta tradidit. Nam primo quidem, instituit ut bellum iuste +iniretur, mandatur enim Deut. XX, quod quando accederent ad +expugnandum civitatem, offerrent ei primum pacem. Secundo, +instituit ut fortiter bellum susceptum exequerentur, habentes de +Deo fiduciam. Et ad hoc melius observandum, instituit quod, +imminente proelio, sacerdos eos confortaret, promittendo auxilium +Dei. Tertio, mandavit ut impedimenta proelii removerentur, +remittendo quosdam ad domum, qui possent impedimenta praestare. +Quarto, instituit ut victoria moderate uterentur, parcendo +mulieribus et parvulis, et etiam ligna fructifera regionis non +incidendo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q105_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Law excluded the men of no nation from the worship of God and from things pertaining to the welfare of the soul: for + it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.12.48" target="asv">Ex. 12:48</a>): "If any stranger be willing to dwell among you, and to keep the Phase of the Lord; all his males shall first be circumcised, + and then shall he celebrate it according to the manner, and he shall be as that which is born in the land." But in temporal + matters concerning the public life of + the people, admission was not granted to everyone at once, for the reason given above: but to some, i.e. the Egyptians and + Idumeans, in the third generation; while others were excluded in perpetuity, in detestation of their past offense, i.e. the + peoples of Moab, Ammon, and Amalec. For just as one man is punished for a sin committed by him, in order that others seeing + this may be deterred and refrain from sinning; so too may one nation or city be punished for a crime, that others may refrain + from similar crimes. + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A3-p12"> Nevertheless it was possible by dispensation for a man to be admitted to citizenship on account of some act of virtue: thus + it is related ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Jdt.14.6" target="asv">Judith 14:6</a>) that Achior, the captain of the children of Ammon, "was joined to the people of Israel, with all the succession of his kindred." + The same applies to Ruth the Moabite who was "a virtuous woman" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Ruth.3.11" target="asv">Ruth 3:11</a>): although it may be said that this prohibition regarded men and not women, who are not competent to be + citizens absolutely speaking. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="38222" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38222] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod homines nullius gentis exclusit lex a cultu Dei +et ab his quae pertinent ad animae salutem, dicitur enim Exod. XII, +<i>si quis peregrinorum in vestram voluerit transire coloniam, et +facere phase domini; circumcidetur prius omne masculinum eius, et +tunc rite celebrabit, eritque simul sicut indigena terrae</i>. Sed +in temporalibus, quantum ad ea quae pertinebant ad communitatem +populi, non statim quilibet admittebatur, ratione supra dicta, sed +quidam in tertia generatione, scilicet Aegyptii et Idumaei; alii +vero perpetuo excludebantur, in detestationem culpae praeteritae, +sicut Moabitae et Ammonitae et Amalecitae. Sicut enim punitur unus +homo propter peccatum quod commisit, ut alii videntes timeant et +peccare desistant; ita etiam propter aliquod peccatum gens vel +civitas potest puniri, ut alii a simili peccato abstineant. Poterat +tamen dispensative aliquis in collegium populi admitti propter +aliquem virtutis actum, sicut Iudith XIV dicitur quod Achior, dux +filiorum Ammon, <i>appositus est ad populum Israel, et omnis +successio generis eius</i>. Et similiter Ruth Moabitis, quae mulier +virtutis erat. Licet possit dici quod illa prohibitio extendebatur +ad viros, non ad mulieres, quibus non competit simpliciter esse +cives.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3), a man is said to be a citizen in two ways: first, simply; secondly, in a restricted + sense. A man is a citizen simply if he has all the rights of citizenship, for instance, the right of debating or voting in + the popular assembly. On the other hand, any man may be called citizen, only in a restricted sense, if he dwells within the + state, even common people or children or old men, who are not fit to enjoy power in + matters pertaining to the common weal. For this reason bastards, by reason of their base origin, were excluded from the "ecclesia," + i.e. from the popular assembly, down to the tenth generation. The same applies to eunuchs, who were not competent to receive + the honor due to a father, especially among the Jews, where the divine worship was continued through carnal generation: for + even among the heathens, those who had many children were marked with special honor, as the Philosopher remarks + (Polit. ii, 6). Nevertheless, in matters pertaining to the grace of God, eunuchs were not discriminated from others, as neither + were strangers, as already stated: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.56.3" target="asv">Isa. 56:3</a>): "Let not the son of the stranger that adhereth to the Lord speak, saying: The Lord will divide and separate me from His + people. And let not the eunuch say: Behold I am a dry tree." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="38223" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38223] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in III Polit., dupliciter +aliquis dicitur esse civis, uno modo, simpliciter; et alio modo, +secundum quid. Simpliciter quidem civis est qui potest agere ea +quae sunt civium, puta dare consilium vel iudicium in populo. +Secundum quid autem civis dici potest quicumque civitatem +inhabitat, etiam viles personae et pueri et senes, qui non sunt +idonei ad hoc quod habeant potestatem in his quae pertinent ad +commune. Ideo ergo spurii, propter vilitatem originis, +excludebantur ab Ecclesia, idest a collegio populi, usque ad +decimam generationem. Et similiter eunuchi, quibus non poterat +competere honor qui patribus debebatur, et praecipue in populo +Iudaeorum, in quo Dei cultus conservabatur per carnis generationem, +nam etiam apud gentiles, qui multos filios genuerant, aliquo +insigni honore donabantur, sicut philosophus dicit, in II Polit. +Tamen quantum ad ea quae ad gratiam Dei pertinent, eunuchi ab aliis +non separabantur, sicut nec advenae, ut dictum est, dicitur enim +Isaiae LVI, <i>non dicat filius advenae qui adhaeret domino, +dicens, separatione dividet me dominus a populo suo. Et non dicat +eunuchus, ecce ego lignum aridum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It was not the intention of the Law to sanction the acceptance of usury from strangers, but only to tolerate it on account + of the proneness of the Jews to avarice; and in order to promote an amicable feeling towards those out of whom they made a + profit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="38224" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38224] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod accipere usuras ab alienis non erat secundum +intentionem legis, sed ex quadam permissione, propter pronitatem +Iudaeorum ad avaritiam; et ut magis pacifice se haberent ad +extraneos, a quibus lucrabantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A3-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A distinction was observed with regard to hostile cities. For some of them were far distant, and were not among those which + had been promised to them. When they had taken these cities, they killed all the men who had fought against God's people; + whereas the women and children were spared. But in the neighboring cities which had been promised to them, all were ordered + to be slain, on account of their former crimes, to punish which God sent the + Israelites as executor of Divine justice: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.9.5" target="asv">Dt. 9:5</a>) "because they have done wickedly, they are destroyed at thy coming in." The fruit-trees were commanded to be left untouched, + for the use of the people themselves, to whom the city with its territory was destined to be subjected. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="38225" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38225] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod circa civitates hostium quaedam distinctio +adhibebatur. Quaedam enim erant remotae, non de numero illarum +urbium quae eis erant repromissae, et in talibus urbibus expugnatis +occidebantur masculi, qui pugnaverant contra populum Dei; +mulieribus autem et infantibus parcebatur. Sed in civitatibus +vicinis, quae erant eis repromissae omnes mandabantur interfici, +propter iniquitates eorum priores, ad quas puniendas dominus +populum Israel quasi divinae iustitiae executorem mittebat, dicitur +enim Deut. IX, <i>quia illae egerunt impie, introeunte te deletae +sunt</i>. Ligna autem fructifera mandabantur reservari propter +utilitatem ipsius populi, cuius ditioni civitas et eius territorium +erat subiiciendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A3-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The builder of a new house, the planter of a vineyard, the newly married husband, were excluded from fighting, for two reasons. + First, because man is wont to give all his affection to those things which he has lately acquired, or is on the point of having, + and consequently he is apt to dread the loss of these above other things. Wherefore it was likely enough that on account of + this affection they would fear death all the more, and be so much the less + brave in battle. Secondly, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 5), "it is a misfortune for a man if he is prevented + from obtaining something good when it is within his grasp." And so lest the surviving relations should be the more grieved + at the death of these men who had not entered into the possession of the good things prepared for them; and also lest the + people should be horror-stricken at the sight of their misfortune: these men were taken away from the danger of death by being + removed from the battle. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 3 ad 5"><a name="38226" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38226] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod novus aedificator domus, aut plantator vineae, vel +desponsator uxoris, excludebatur a proelio propter duo. Primo +quidem, quia ea quae homo de novo habet, vel statim paratus est ad +habendum, magis solet amare, et per consequens eorum amissionem +timere. Unde probabile erat quod ex tali amore magis mortem +timerent, et sic minus fortes essent ad pugnandum. Secundo quia, +sicut philosophus dicit, in II Physic., <i>infortunium videtur +quando aliquis appropinquat ad aliquod bonum habendum, si postea +impediatur ab illo</i>. Et ideo ne propinqui remanentes magis +contristarentur de morte talium, qui bonis sibi paratis potiti non +fuerunt; et etiam populus, considerans hoc, horreret; huiusmodi +homines a mortis periculo sunt sequestrati per subtractionem a +proelio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A3-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The timid were sent back home, not that they might be the gainers thereby; but lest the people might be the losers by their + presence, since their timidity and flight might cause others to be afraid and run away. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 3 ad 6"><a name="38227" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38227] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 3 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum +dicendum quod timidi remittebantur ad domum, non ut ipsi ex hoc +commodum consequerentur; sed ne populus ex eorum praesentia +incommodum consequeretur, dum per eorum timorem et fugam etiam alii +ad timendum et fugiendum provocarentur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q105_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q105_A4-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 4. Whether the Old Law set forth suitable precepts about the members of the household?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law set forth unsuitable precepts about the members of the household. For a slave "is in every + respect his master's property," as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 2). But that which is a man's property should be his + always. Therefore it was unfitting for the Law to command ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.2" target="asv">Ex. 21:2</a>) that slaves should "go out free" in the seventh year. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="38228" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38228] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter lex vetus praecepta +ediderit circa personas domesticas. Servus enim id quod est, domini +est, ut philosophus dicit, in I Polit. Sed id quod est alicuius, +perpetuo eius esse debet. Ergo inconvenienter lex mandavit Exod. +XXI, quod servi septimo anno liberi abscederent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a slave is his master's property, just as an animal, e.g. an ass or an ox. But it is commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.1" target="asv">Dt. 22:1-3</a>) with regard to animals, that they should be brought back to the owner if they be found going astray. Therefore it was unsuitably + commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.15" target="asv">Dt. 23:15</a>): "Thou shalt not deliver to his master the servant that is fled to thee." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="38229" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38229] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut animal aliquod, ut asinus aut bos, est possessio domini, ita +etiam servus. Sed de animalibus praecipitur Deut. XXII, quod +restituantur dominis suis, si errare inveniantur. Inconvenienter +ergo mandatur Deut. XXIII, <i>non tradas servum domino suo, qui ad +te confugerit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Divine Law should encourage mercy more even than the human law. But according to human laws those who ill-treat + their servants and maidservants are severely punished: and the worse treatment of all seems to be that which results in death. + Therefore it is unfittingly commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.20" target="asv">Ex. 21:20,21</a>) that "he that striketh his bondman or bondwoman with a rod, and they die under his hands . . . if the party remain alive + a day . . . he + shall not be subject to the punishment, because it is his money." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="38230" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38230] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex divina debet magis ad misericordiam provocare quam etiam lex +humana. Sed secundum leges humanas graviter puniuntur qui nimis +aspere affligunt servos aut ancillas. Asperrima autem videtur esse +afflictio ex qua sequitur mors. Inconvenienter igitur statuitur +Exod. XXI, quod <i>qui percusserit servum suum vel ancillam virga, +si uno die supervixerit, non subiacebit poenae, quia pecunia illius +est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the dominion of a master over his slave differs from that of the father over his son (Polit. i, 3). But the dominion + of master over slave gives the former the right to sell his servant or maidservant. Therefore it was unfitting for the Law + to allow a man to sell his daughter to be a servant or handmaid ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.7" target="asv">Ex. 21:7</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="38231" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38231] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +alius est principatus domini ad servum, et patris ad filium, ut +dicitur in I et III Polit. Sed hoc ad principatum domini ad servum +pertinet, ut aliquis servum vel ancillam vendere possit. +Inconvenienter igitur lex permisit quod aliquis venderet filiam +suam in famulam vel ancillam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, a father has power over his son. But he who has power over the sinner has the right to punish him for his offenses. + Therefore it is unfittingly commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.18" target="asv">Dt. 21:18, </a> seqq.) that a father should bring his son to the ancients of the city for punishment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="38232" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38232] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +pater habet sui filii potestatem. Sed eius est punire excessus, qui +habet potestatem super peccantem. Inconvenienter igitur mandatur +Deut. XXI, quod pater ducat filium ad seniores civitatis +puniendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the Lord forbade them ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.7.3" target="asv">Dt. 7:3, </a> seqq.) to make marriages with strange nations; and commanded the dissolution of such as had been contracted ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iEsd.10" target="asv">1 Esdras 10</a>). Therefore it was unfitting to allow them to marry captive women from strange nations ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.10" target="asv">Dt. 21:10, </a> seqq.). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 arg. 6"><a name="38233" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38233] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +dominus prohibuit, Deut. VII, ut cum alienigenis non sociarent +coniugia; et coniuncta etiam separarentur, ut patet I Esdrae X. +Inconvenienter igitur Deut. XXI conceditur eis ut captivas +alienigenarum ducere possint uxores.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p8"> + <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, the Lord forbade them to marry within certain degrees of consanguinity and affinity, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.18" target="asv">Lev. 18</a>. Therefore it was unsuitably commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.5" target="asv">Dt. 25:5</a>) that if any man died without issue, his brother should marry his wife. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 arg. 7"><a name="38234" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38234] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 arg. 7</span></a> Praeterea, +dominus in uxoribus ducendis quosdam consanguinitatis et +affinitatis gradus praecepit esse vitandos, ut patet Lev. XVIII. +Inconvenienter igitur mandatur Deut. XXV, quod si aliquis esset +mortuus absque liberis, uxorem ipsius frater eius acciperet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p9"> + <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, as there is the greatest familiarity between man and wife, so should there be the staunchest fidelity. But this + is impossible if the marriage bond can be sundered. Therefore it was unfitting for the Lord to allow ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.1" target="asv">Dt. 24:1-4</a>) a man to put his wife away, by writing a bill of divorce; and besides, that he could not take her again to wife. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 arg. 8"><a name="38235" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38235] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 arg. 8</span></a> Praeterea, +inter virum et uxorem, sicut est maxima familiaritas, ita debet +esse firmissima fides. Sed hoc non potest esse, si matrimonium +dissolubile fuerit. Inconvenienter igitur dominus permisit, Deut. +XXIV, quod aliquis posset uxorem dimittere, scripto libello +repudii; et quod etiam ulterius eam recuperare non posset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p10"> + <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, just as a wife can be faithless to her husband, so can a slave be to his master, and a son to his father. But the + Law did not command any sacrifice to be offered in order to investigate the injury done by a servant to his master, or by + a son to his father. Therefore it seems to have been superfluous for the Law to prescribe the "sacrifice of jealousy" in order + to investigate a wife's adultery ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Num.5.12" target="asv">Num. 5:12, </a> seqq.). Consequently it + seems that the Law put forth unsuitable judicial precepts about the members of the household. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 arg. 9"><a name="38236" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38236] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 arg. 9</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut uxor potest frangere fidem marito, ita etiam servus domino, +et filius patri. Sed ad investigandam iniuriam servi in dominum, +vel filii in patrem, non est institutum in lege aliquod +sacrificium. Superflue igitur videtur institui sacrificium +zelotypiae ad investigandum uxoris adulterium, Num. V. Sic igitur +inconvenienter videntur esse tradita in lege praecepta iudicialia +circa personas domesticas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p11"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.18.10" target="asv">Ps. 18:10</a>): "The judgments of the Lord are true, justified in themselves." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 s. c."><a name="38237" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38237] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur in Psalmo XVIII, <i>iudicia domini vera, +iustificata in semetipsa</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q105_A4-p12"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The mutual relations of the members of a household regard everyday actions directed to the necessities of life, as the Philosopher + states (Polit. i, 1). Now the preservation of man's life may be considered from two points of view. First, from the point + of view of the individual, i.e. in so far as man preserves his individuality: and for the purpose of the preservation of life, + considered from this standpoint, man has at his service external goods, by means + of which he provides himself with food and clothing and other such necessaries of life: in the handling of which he has need + of servants. Secondly man's life is preserved from the point of view of the species, by means of generation, for which purpose + man needs a wife, that she may bear him children. Accordingly the mutual relations of the members of a household admit of + a threefold combination: viz. those of master and servant, those of husband and wife, and those of father and son: and in + respect of all these relationships the Old Law contained fitting precepts. Thus, with regard to servants, it commanded them + to be treated with moderation---both as to their work, lest, to wit, they should be burdened with excessive labor, wherefore + the Lord commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.5.14" target="asv">Dt. 5:14</a>) that on the Sabbath day "thy manservant and thy maidservant" should "rest even as thyself"---and also as to the infliction + of punishment, for it ordered those who maimed their servants, to set them + free ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.26" target="asv">Ex. 21:26,27</a>). Similar provision was made in favor of a maidservant when married to anyone ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p12.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.7" target="asv">Ex. 21:7, </a> seqq.). Moreover, with regard to those servants in particular who were taken from among the people, the Law prescribed that + they should go out free in the seventh year taking whatever they brought with them, even their clothes ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p12.4" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.2" target="asv">Ex. 21:2, </a> seqq.): and furthermore it was commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p12.5" href="./asv.html#Deut.15.13" target="asv">Dt. 15:13</a>) that they should + be given provision for the journey. + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A4-p13"> With regard to wives the Law made certain prescriptions as to those who were to be taken in marriage: for instance, that + they should marry a wife from their own tribe ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Num.36.6" target="asv">Num. 36:6</a>): and this lest confusion should ensue in the property of various tribes. Also that a man should marry the wife of his deceased + brother when the latter died without issue, as prescribed in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p13.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.5" target="asv"> Dt. 25:5,6</a>: and this in order that he who could not have successors + according to carnal origin, might at least have them by a kind of adoption, and that thus the deceased might not be entirely + forgotten. It also forbade them to marry certain women; to wit, women of strange nations, through fear of their losing their + faith; and those of their near kindred, on account of the natural respect due to them. Furthermore it prescribed in what way + wives were to be treated after marriage. To wit, that they should not be slandered without grave reason: wherefore it + ordered punishment to be inflicted on the man who falsely accused his wife of a crime ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p13.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.13" target="asv">Dt. 22:13, </a> seqq.). Also that a man's hatred of his wife should not be detrimental to his son ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p13.4" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.15" target="asv">Dt. 21:15, </a> seqq.). Again, that a man should not ill-use his wife through hatred of her, but rather that he should write a bill of divorce + and send her away ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p13.5" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.1" target="asv">Dt. 24:1</a>). Furthermore, in order to foster conjugal love from the very outset, it was prescribed + that no public duties should be laid on a recently married man, so that he might be free to rejoice with his wife. + </p><p id="FS_Q105_A4-p14"> With regard to children, the Law commanded parents to educate them by instructing them in the faith: hence it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.12.26" target="asv">Ex. 12:26, </a> seqq.): "When your children shall say to you: What is the meaning of this service? You shall say to them: It is the victim + of the passage of the Lord." Moreover, they are commanded to teach them the rules of right conduct: wherefore it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p14.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.20" target="asv">Dt. 21:20</a>) that the parents had to say: "He slighteth + hearing our admonitions, he giveth himself to revelling and to debauchery." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 co."><a name="38238" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38238] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod communio domesticarum personarum ad invicem, ut +philosophus dicit, in I Polit., est secundum quotidianos actus qui +ordinantur ad necessitatem vitae. Vita autem hominis conservatur +dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad individuum, prout scilicet homo +idem numero vivit, et ad talem vitae conservationem opitulantur +homini exteriora bona, ex quibus homo habet victum et vestitum et +alia huiusmodi necessaria vitae; in quibus administrandis indiget +homo servis. Alio modo conservatur vita hominis secundum speciem +per generationem, ad quam indiget homo uxore, ut ex ea generet +filium. Sic igitur in domestica communione sunt tres combinationes, +scilicet domini ad servum, viri ad uxorem, patris ad filium. Et +quantum ad omnia ista lex vetus convenientia praecepta tradidit. +Nam quantum ad servos, instituit ut modeste tractarentur et quantum +ad labores, ne scilicet immoderatis laboribus affligerentur, unde +Deut. V, dominus mandavit ut in die sabbati requiesceret servus et +ancilla tua sicut et tu, et iterum quantum ad poenas infligendas, +imposuit enim poenam mutilatoribus servorum ut dimitterent eos +liberos, sicut habetur Exod. XXI. Et simile etiam statuit in +ancilla quam in uxorem aliquis duxerit. Statuit etiam specialiter +circa servos qui erant ex populo, ut septimo anno liberi +egrederentur cum omnibus quae apportaverant, etiam vestimentis, ut +habetur Exod. XXI. Mandatur etiam insuper Deut. XV, ut ei detur +viaticum. Circa uxores vero, statuitur in lege quantum ad uxores +ducendas. Ut scilicet ducant uxores suae tribus, sicut habetur Num. +ult., et hoc ideo, ne sortes tribuum confundantur. Et quod aliquis +in uxorem ducat uxorem fratris defuncti sine liberis, ut habetur +Deut. XXV, et hoc ideo, ut ille qui non potuit habere successores +secundum carnis originem, saltem habeat per quandam adoptionem, et +sic non totaliter memoria defuncti deleretur. Prohibuit etiam +quasdam personas ne in coniugium ducerentur, scilicet alienigenas, +propter periculum seductionis; et propinquas, propter reverentiam +naturalem quae eis debetur. Statuit etiam qualiter uxores iam +ductae tractari deberent. Ut scilicet non leviter infamarentur, +unde mandatur puniri ille qui falso crimen imponit uxori, ut +habetur Deut. XXII. Et quod etiam propter uxoris odium filius +detrimentum non pateretur, ut habetur Deut. XXI. Et etiam quod, +propter odium uxorem non affligeret, sed potius, scripto libello, +eam dimitteret, ut patet Deut. XXIV. Et ut etiam maior dilectio +inter coniuges a principio contrahatur, praecipitur quod, cum +aliquis nuper uxorem acceperit, nihil ei publicae necessitatis +iniungatur, ut libere possit laetari cum uxore sua. Circa filios +autem, instituit ut patres eis disciplinam adhiberent, instruendo +eos in fide, unde habetur Exod. XII, <i>cum dixerint vobis filii +vestri, quae est ista religio? Dicetis eis, victima transitus +domini est</i>. Et quod etiam instruerent eos in moribus, unde +dicitur Deut. XXI, quod patres dicere debent, <i>monita nostra +audire contemnit, commessationibus vacat et luxuriae atque +conviviis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the children of Israel had been delivered by the Lord from slavery, and for this reason were bound to the service of God, + He did not wish them to be slaves in perpetuity. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.25.39" target="asv">Lev. 25:39</a>, seqq.): "If thy brother, constrained by poverty, sell himself to thee, thou shalt not oppress him with the service of bondservants: + but he shall be as a hireling and a sojourner . . . for they are My servants, and I brought them out of the land of + Egypt: let them not be sold as bondmen": and consequently, since they were slaves, not absolutely but in a restricted sense, + after a lapse of time they were set free. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="38239" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38239] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quia filii Israel erant a domino de servitute +liberati, et per hoc divinae servituti addicti, noluit dominus ut +in perpetuum servi essent. Unde dicitur Lev. XXV, <i>si paupertate +compulsus vendiderit se tibi frater tuus, non eum opprimes +servitute famulorum, sed quasi mercenarius et colonus erit. Mei +enim sunt servi, et ego eduxi eos de terra Aegypti, non veneant +conditione servorum</i>. Et ideo, quia simpliciter servi non erant, +sed secundum quid, finito tempore, dimittebantur liberi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This commandment is to be understood as referring to a servant whom his master seeks to kill, or to help him in committing + some sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="38240" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38240] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod mandatum illud intelligitur de servo qui a domino +quaeritur ad occidendum, vel ad aliquod peccati ministerium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> With regard to the ill-treatment of servants, the Law seems to have taken into consideration whether it was certain or not: + since if it were certain, the Law fixed a penalty: for maiming, the penalty was forfeiture of the servant, who was ordered + to be given his liberty: while for slaying, the punishment was that of a murderer, when the slave died under the blow of his + master. If, however, the hurt was not certain, but only probable, the Law did not + impose any penalty as regards a man's own servant: for instance if the servant did not die at once after being struck, but + after some days: for it would be uncertain whether he died as a result of the blows he received. For when a man struck a free + man, yet so that he did not die at once, but "walked abroad again upon his staff," he that struck him was quit of murder, + even though afterwards he died. Nevertheless he was bound to pay the doctor's fees incurred by the victim of his assault. + But + this was not the case if a man killed his own servant: because whatever the servant had, even his very person, was the property + of his master. Hence the reason for his not being subject to a pecuniary penalty is set down as being "because it is his money." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="38241" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38241] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod circa laesiones servis illatas, lex considerasse +videtur utrum sit certa vel incerta. Si enim laesio certa esset, +lex poenam adhibuit, pro mutilatione quidem, amissionem servi qui +mandabatur libertati donandus; pro morte autem, homicidii poenam, +cum servus in manu domini verberantis moreretur. Si vero laesio non +esset certa, sed aliquam apparentiam haberet, lex nullam poenam +infligebat in proprio servo, puta cum percussus servus non statim +moriebatur, sed post aliquos dies. Incertum enim erat utrum ex +percussione mortuus esset. Quia si percussisset liberum hominem, +ita tamen quod statim non moreretur, sed super baculum suum +ambularet, non erat homicidii reus qui percusserat, etiam si postea +moreretur. Tenebatur tamen ad impensas solvendas quas percussus in +medicos fecerat. Sed hoc in servo proprio locum non habebat, quia +quidquid servus habebat, et etiam ipsa persona servi, erat quaedam +possessio domini. Et ideo pro causa assignatur quare non subiaceat +poenae pecuniariae, quia pecunia illius est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As stated above (ad 1), no Jew could own a Jew as a slave absolutely: but only in a restricted sense, as a hireling for a + fixed time. And in this way the Law permitted that through stress of poverty a man might sell his son or daughter. This is + shown by the very words of the Law, where we read: "If any man sell his daughter to be a servant, she shall not go out as + bondwomen are wont to go out." Moreover, in this way a man might sell not only his son, + but even himself, rather as a hireling than as a slave, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p18.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.25.39" target="asv"> Lev. 25:39,40</a>: "If thy brother, constrained by poverty, sell himself to thee, thou shalt not oppress him with the service of bondservants: + but he shall be as a hireling and a sojourner." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="38242" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38242] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, nullus Iudaeus poterat possidere +Iudaeum quasi simpliciter servum; sed erat servus secundum quid, +quasi mercenarius, usque ad tempus. Et per hunc modum permittebat +lex quod, paupertate cogente, aliquis filium aut filiam venderet. +Et hoc etiam verba ipsius legis ostendunt, dicit enim, <i>si quis +vendiderit filiam suam in famulam, non egredietur sicut ancillae +exire consueverunt</i>. Per hunc etiam modum non solum filium, sed +etiam seipsum aliquis vendere poterat, magis quasi mercenarium quam +quasi servum; secundum illud Levit. XXV, <i>si paupertate compulsus +vendiderit se tibi frater tuus, non eum opprimes servitute +famulorum, sed quasi mercenarius et colonus erit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9), the paternal authority has the power only of admonition; but not that of coercion, + whereby rebellious and headstrong persons can be compelled. Hence in this case the Lord commanded the stubborn son to be punished + by the rulers of the city. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="38243" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38243] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., principatus +paternus habet solam admonendi potestatem; non autem habet vim +coactivam, per quam rebelles et contumaces comprimi possunt. Et +ideo in hoc casu lex mandabat ut filius contumax a principibus +civitatis puniretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p20"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The Lord forbade them to marry strange women on account of the danger of seduction, lest they should be led astray into idolatry. + And specially did this prohibition apply with respect to those nations who dwelt near them, because it was more probable that + they would adopt their religious practices. When, however, the woman was willing to renounce idolatry, and become an adherent + of the Law, it was lawful to take her in marriage: as was the case with + Ruth whom Booz married. Wherefore she said to her mother-in-law ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p20.1" href="./asv.html#Ruth.1.16" target="asv">Ruth 1:16</a>): "Thy people shall be my people, and thy God my God." Accordingly it was not permitted to marry a captive woman unless she + first shaved her hair, and pared her nails, and put off the raiment wherein she was taken, and mourned for her father and + mother, in token that she renounced idolatry for ever. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 ad 6"><a name="38244" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38244] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum +dicendum quod dominus alienigenas prohibuit in matrimonium duci +propter periculum seductionis, ne inducerentur in idololatriam. Et +specialiter hoc prohibuit de illis gentibus quae in vicino +habitabant, de quibus erat magis probabile quod suos ritus +retinerent. Si qua vero idololatriae cultum dimittere vellet, et ad +legis cultum se transferre, poterat in matrimonium duci, sicut +patet de Ruth, quam duxit Booz in uxorem. Unde ipsa dixerat socrui +suae, <i>populus tuus populus meus, Deus tuus Deus meus</i>, ut +habetur Ruth I. Et ideo captiva non aliter permittebatur in uxorem +duci nisi prius rasa caesarie, et circumcisis unguibus, et deposita +veste in qua capta est, et fleret patrem et matrem, per quae +significatur idololatriae perpetua abiectio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p21"> + <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> As Chrysostom says (Hom. xlviii super Matth.), "because death was an unmitigated evil for the Jews, who did everything with + a view to the present life, it was ordained that children should be born to the dead man through his brother: thus affording + a certain mitigation to his death. It was not, however, ordained that any other than his brother or one next of kin should + marry the wife of the deceased, because" the offspring of this union "would not be + looked upon as that of the deceased: and moreover, a stranger would not be under the obligation to support the household of + the deceased, as his brother would be bound to do from motives of justice on account of his relationship." Hence it is evident + that in marrying the wife of his dead brother, he took his dead brother's place. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 ad 7"><a name="38245" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38245] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 ad 7</span></a> Ad septimum +dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., <i>quia +immitigabile malum mors erat apud Iudaeos, qui omnia pro praesenti +vita faciebant, statutum fuit ut defuncto filius nasceretur ex +fratre, quod erat quaedam mortis mitigatio. Non autem alius quam +frater vel propinquus iubebatur accipere uxorem defuncti, quia non +ita crederetur</i> (qui ex tali coniunctione erat nasciturus) +<i>esse filius eius qui obiit; et iterum extraneus non ita haberet +necessitatem statuere domum eius qui obierat, sicut frater, cui +etiam ex cognatione hoc facere iustum erat</i>. Ex quo patet quod +frater in accipiendo uxorem fratris sui, persona fratris defuncti +fungebatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p22"> + <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> The Law permitted a wife to be divorced, not as though it were just absolutely speaking, but on account of the Jews' hardness + of heart, as Our Lord declared ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p22.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.8" target="asv">Mat. 19:8</a>). Of this, however, we must speak more fully in the treatise on Matrimony ( + <a href="unknown.html#SP_Q67" id="FS_Q105_A4-p22.2" shape="rect">SP, Q[67])</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 ad 8"><a name="38246" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38246] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 ad 8</span></a> Ad octavum +dicendum quod lex permisit repudium uxoris, non quia simpliciter +iustum esset, sed propter duritiam Iudaeorum; ut dominus dicit, +Matth. XIX. Sed de hoc oportet plenius tractari cum de matrimonio +agetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q105_A4-p23"> + <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> Wives break their conjugal faith by adultery, both easily, for motives of pleasure, and hiddenly, since "the eye of the adulterer + observeth darkness" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p23.1" href="./asv.html#Job.24.15" target="asv">Job 24:15</a>). But this does not apply to a son in respect of his father, or to a servant in respect of his master: because the latter + infidelity is not the result of the lust of pleasure, but rather of malice: nor can it remain hidden like the infidelity of + an adulterous woman. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 105 a. 4 ad 9"><a name="38247" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38247] Iª-IIae q. 105 a. 4 ad 9</span></a> Ad nonum +dicendum quod uxores fidem matrimonii frangunt per adulterium et de +facili, propter delectationem; et latenter, <i>quia oculus adulteri +observat caliginem</i>, ut dicitur Iob XXIV. Non autem est similis +ratio de filio ad patrem, vel de servo ad dominum, quia talis +infidelitas non procedit ex concupiscentia delectationis, sed magis +ex malitia; nec potest ita latere sicut infidelitas mulieris +adulterae.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q106" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q106-p0.1">Q. 106. OF THE LAW OF THE GOSPEL, CALLED THE NEW LAW, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q106-p2"> In proper sequence we have to consider now the Law of the Gospel which is called the New Law: and in the first place we must + consider it in itself; secondly, in comparison with the Old Law; thirdly, we shall treat of those things that are contained + in the New Law. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q106-p3"><a href="#FS_Q106_A1"> (1) What kind of law is it? i.e. Is it a written law or is it instilled in the heart?</a></p><p id="FS_Q106-p4"><a href="#FS_Q106_A2"> (2) Of its efficacy, i.e. does it justify?</a></p><p id="FS_Q106-p5"><a href="#FS_Q106_A3"> (3) Of its beginning: should it have been given at the beginning of the world?</a></p><p id="FS_Q106-p6"><a href="#FS_Q106_A4"> (4) Of its end: i.e. whether it will last until the end, or will another law take its place?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 pr."><a name="38248" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38248] Iª-IIae q. 106 pr.</span></a> Consequenter +considerandum est de lege Evangelii, quod dicitur lex nova. Et +primo, de ipsa secundum se; secundo, de ipsa per comparationem ad +legem veterem; tertio, de his quae in lege nova continentur. Circa +primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, qualis sit, utrum scilicet +scripta vel indita. Secundo, de virtute eius, utrum iustificet. +Tertio, de principio eius, utrum debuerit dari a principio mundi. +Quarto, de termino eius utrum scilicet sit duratura usque ad finem, +an debeat ei alia lex succedere.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q106_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q106_A1-p0.1">Q. 106. A. 1. Whether the New Law is a written law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law is a written law. For the New Law is just the same as the Gospel. But the Gospel is set forth + in writing, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.20.31" target="asv"> Jn. 20:31</a>: "But these are written that you may believe." Therefore the New Law is a written law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="38249" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38249] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova sit lex scripta. Lex enim +nova est ipsum Evangelium. Sed Evangelium est descriptum, Ioan. XX, +<i>haec autem scripta sunt ut credatis</i>. Ergo lex nova est lex +scripta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the law that is instilled in the heart is the natural law, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.14" target="asv"> Rom. 2:14,15</a>: "(The Gentiles) do by nature those things that are of the law . . . who have [Vulg.: 'show'] the work of the law written + in their hearts." If therefore the law of the Gospel were instilled in our hearts, it would not be distinct from the law of + nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="38250" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38250] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +lex indita est lex naturae; secundum illud Rom. II, <i>naturaliter +ea quae legis sunt faciunt, qui habent opus legis scriptum in +cordibus suis</i>. Si igitur lex Evangelii esset lex indita, non +differret a lege naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the law of the Gospel is proper to those who are in the state of the New Testament. But the law that is instilled + in the heart is common to those who are in the New Testament and to those who are in the Old Testament: for it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.27" target="asv">Wis. 7:27</a>) that Divine Wisdom "through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls, she maketh the friends of God and prophets." Therefore + the New Law is not instilled in our hearts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="38251" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38251] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +lex Evangelii propria est eorum qui sunt in statu novi testamenti. +Sed lex indita communis est et eis qui sunt in novo testamento, et +eis qui sunt in veteri testamento, dicitur enim Sap. VII, quod +<i>divina sapientia per nationes in animas sanctas se transfert, +amicos Dei et prophetas constituit</i>. Ergo lex nova non est lex +indita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The New Law is the law of the New Testament. But the law of the New Testament is instilled in our hearts. For the Apostle, + quoting the authority of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.31" target="asv">Jeremiah 31:31</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.33" target="asv">33</a>: "Behold the days shall come, saith the Lord; and I will perfect unto the house of Israel, and unto the house of Judah, a + new testament," says, explaining what this statement is ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Heb.8.8" target="asv">Heb. 8:8</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p5.4" href="./asv.html#Heb.8.10" target="asv">10</a>): "For this is the testament which I will make to the house + of Israel . . . by giving [Vulg.: 'I will give'] My laws into their mind, and in their heart will I write them." Therefore + the New Law is instilled in our hearts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 1 s. c."><a name="38252" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38252] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod lex nova est lex novi testamenti. Sed lex novi testamenti +est indita in corde. Apostolus enim, ad Heb. VIII, dicit, inducens +auctoritatem quae habetur Ierem. XXXI, <i>ecce dies venient, dicit +dominus, et consummabo super domum Israel et super domum Iuda +testamentum novum</i>, et exponens quid sit hoc testamentum, dicit, +<i>quia hoc est testamentum quod disponam domui Israel, dando leges +meas in mentem eorum, et in corde eorum superscribam eas</i>. Ergo +lex nova est lex indita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q106_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> "Each thing appears to be that which preponderates in it," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 8). Now that which is preponderant + in the law of the New Testament, and whereon all its efficacy is based, is the grace of the Holy Ghost, which is given through + faith in Christ. Consequently the New Law is chiefly the grace itself of the Holy Ghost, which is given to those who believe + in Christ. This is manifestly stated by the Apostle who says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.27" target="asv">Rom. + 3:27 + </a>): "Where is . . . thy boasting? It is excluded. By what law? Of works? No, but by the law of faith": for he calls the grace + itself of faith "a law." And still more clearly it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.2" target="asv">Rom. 8:2</a>): "The law of the spirit of life, in Christ Jesus, hath delivered me from the law of sin and of death." Hence Augustine says + (De Spir. et Lit. xxiv) that "as the law of deeds was written on tables of stone, so is the law of faith inscribed on the + hearts of the + faithful": and elsewhere, in the same book (xxi): "What else are the Divine laws written by God Himself on our hearts, but + the very presence of His Holy Spirit?" + </p><p id="FS_Q106_A1-p7"> Nevertheless the New Law contains certain things that dispose us to receive the grace of the Holy Ghost, and pertaining to + the use of that grace: such things are of secondary importance, so to speak, in the New Law; and the faithful need to be instructed + concerning them, both by word and writing, both as to what they should believe and as to what they should do. Consequently + we must say that the New Law is in the first place a law that is inscribed on our hearts, but that + secondarily it is a written law. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 1 co."><a name="38253" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38253] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod <i>unaquaeque res illud videtur esse quod in ea est +potissimum</i>, ut philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic. Id autem quod +est potissimum in lege novi testamenti, et in quo tota virtus eius +consistit, est gratia spiritus sancti, quae datur per fidem +Christi. Et ideo principaliter lex nova est ipsa gratia spiritus +sancti, quae datur Christi fidelibus. Et hoc manifeste apparet per +apostolum, qui, ad Rom. III, dicit, <i>ubi est ergo gloriatio tua? +Exclusa est. Per quam legem? Factorum? Non, sed per legem +fidei</i>, ipsam enim fidei gratiam legem appellat. Et expressius +ad Rom. VIII dicitur, <i>lex spiritus vitae in Christo Iesu +liberavit me a lege peccati et mortis</i>. Unde et Augustinus +dicit, in libro de spiritu et littera, quod <i>sicut lex factorum +scripta fuit in tabulis lapideis, ita lex fidei scripta est in +cordibus fidelium</i>. Et alibi dicit in eodem libro, <i>quae sunt +leges Dei ab ipso Deo scriptae in cordibus, nisi ipsa praesentia +spiritus sancti?</i> Habet tamen lex nova quaedam sicut dispositiva +ad gratiam spiritus sancti, et ad usum huius gratiae pertinentia, +quae sunt quasi secundaria in lege nova, de quibus oportuit instrui +fideles Christi et verbis et scriptis, tam circa credenda quam +circa agenda. Et ideo dicendum est quod principaliter nova lex est +lex indita, secundario autem est lex scripta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Gospel writings contain only such things as pertain to the grace of the Holy Ghost, either by disposing us thereto, or + by directing us to the use thereof. Thus with regard to the intellect, the Gospel contains certain matters pertaining to the + manifestation of Christ's Godhead or humanity, which dispose us by means of faith through which we receive the grace of the + Holy Ghost: and with regard to the affections, it contains matters touching the + contempt of the world, whereby man is rendered fit to receive the grace of the Holy Ghost: for "the world," i.e. worldly men, + "cannot receive" the Holy Ghost ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.17" target="asv">Jn. 14:17</a>). As to the use of spiritual grace, this consists in works of virtue to which the writings of the New Testament exhort men + in divers ways. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="38254" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38254] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod in Scriptura Evangelii non continentur nisi ea +quae pertinent ad gratiam spiritus sancti vel sicut dispositiva, +vel sicut ordinativa ad usum huius gratiae. Sicut dispositiva +quidem quantum ad intellectum per fidem, per quam datur spiritus +sancti gratia, continentur in Evangelio ea quae pertinent ad +manifestandam divinitatem vel humanitatem Christi. Secundum +affectum vero, continentur in Evangelio ea quae pertinent ad +contemptum mundi, per quem homo fit capax gratiae spiritus sancti, +mundus enim, idest amatores mundi, non potest capere spiritum +sanctum, ut habetur Ioan. XIV. Usus vero spiritualis gratiae est in +operibus virtutum, ad quae multipliciter Scriptura novi testamenti +homines exhortatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There are two ways in which a thing may be instilled into man. First, through being part of his nature, and thus the natural + law is instilled into man. Secondly, a thing is instilled into man by being, as it were, added on to his nature by a gift + of grace. In this way the New Law is instilled into man, not only by indicating to him what he should do, but also by helping + him to accomplish it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="38255" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38255] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod dupliciter est aliquid inditum homini. Uno modo, +pertinens ad naturam humanam, et sic lex naturalis est lex indita +homini. Alio modo est aliquid inditum homini quasi naturae +superadditum per gratiae donum. Et hoc modo lex nova est indita +homini, non solum indicans quid sit faciendum, sed etiam adiuvans +ad implendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No man ever had the grace of the Holy Ghost except through faith in Christ either explicit or implicit: and by faith in Christ + man belongs to the New Testament. Consequently whoever had the law of grace instilled into them belonged to the New Testament. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="38256" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38256] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod nullus unquam habuit gratiam spiritus sancti nisi per +fidem Christi explicitam vel implicitam. Per fidem autem Christi +pertinet homo ad novum testamentum. Unde quibuscumque fuit lex +gratiae indita, secundum hoc ad novum testamentum pertinebant.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q106_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q106_A2-p0.1">Q. 106. A. 2. Whether the New Law justifies?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law does not justify. For no man is justified unless he obeys God's law, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.5.9" target="asv"> Heb. 5:9</a>: "He," i.e. Christ, "became to all that obey Him the cause of eternal salvation." But the Gospel does not always cause men + to believe in it: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.10.16" target="asv">Rom. 10:16</a>): "All do not obey the Gospel." Therefore the New Law does not justify. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="38257" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38257] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova non iustificet. +Nullus enim iustificatur nisi legi Dei obediat; secundum illud ad +Heb. V, <i>factus est</i>, scilicet Christus, <i>omnibus +obtemperantibus sibi causa salutis aeternae</i>. Sed Evangelium non +semper hoc operatur quod homines ei obediant, dicitur enim Rom. X, +non omnes obediunt Evangelio. Ergo lex nova non iustificat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle proves in his epistle to the Romans that the Old Law did not justify, because transgression increased + at its advent: for it is stated ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.15" target="asv">Rom. 4:15</a>): "The Law worketh wrath: for where there is no law, neither is there transgression." But much more did the New Law increase + transgression: since he who sins after the giving of the New Law deserves greater punishment, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.28" target="asv"> Heb. 10:28,29</a>: "A man + making void the Law of Moses dieth without any mercy under two or three witnesses. How much more, do you think, he deserveth + worse punishments, who hath trodden underfoot the Son of God," etc.? Therefore the New Law, like the Old Law, does not justify. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="38258" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38258] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +apostolus probat, ad Rom., quod lex vetus non iustificabat, quia ea +adveniente praevaricatio crevit, habetur enim ad Rom. IV, <i>lex +iram operatur, ubi enim non est lex, nec praevaricatio</i>. Sed +multo magis lex nova praevaricationem addidit, maiori enim poena +est dignus qui post legem novam datam adhuc peccat; secundum illud +Heb. X, <i>irritam quis faciens legem Moysi, sine ulla miseratione, +duobus vel tribus testibus, moritur. Quanto magis putatis deteriora +mereri supplicia, qui filium Dei conculcaverit, et cetera?</i> Ergo +lex nova non iustificat, sicut nec vetus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, justification is an effect proper to God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.33" target="asv"> Rom. 8:33</a>: "God that justifieth." But the Old Law was from God just as the New Law. Therefore the New Law does not justify any more + than the Old Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="38259" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38259] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +iustificare est proprius effectus Dei; secundum illud ad Rom. VIII, +Deus qui iustificat. Sed lex vetus fuit a Deo, sicut et lex nova. +Ergo lex nova non magis iustificat quam lex vetus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.16" target="asv">Rom. 1:16</a>): "I am not ashamed of the Gospel: for it is in the power of God unto salvation to everyone that believeth." But there is + no salvation but to those who are justified. Therefore the Law of the Gospel justifies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 2 s. c."><a name="38260" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38260] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Rom. I, <i>non erubesco Evangelium, +virtus enim Dei est in salutem omni credenti</i>. Non autem est +salus nisi iustificatis. Ergo lex Evangelii iustificat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q106_A1" id="FS_Q106_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, there is a twofold element in the Law of the Gospel. There is the chief element, viz. the grace of the Holy Ghost bestowed + inwardly. And as to this, the New Law justifies. Hence Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xvii): "There," i.e. in the Old Testament, + "the Law was set forth in an outward fashion, that the ungodly might be afraid"; "here," i.e. in the New Testament, "it is + given in an inward manner, that + they may be justified." The other element of the Evangelical Law is secondary: namely, the teachings of faith, and those commandments + which direct human affections and human actions. And as to this, the New Law does not justify. Hence the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:6</a>) "The letter killeth, but the spirit quickeneth": and Augustine explains this (De Spir. et Lit. xiv, xvii) by saying that + the letter denotes any writing external to man, even that of the moral precepts such as are + contained in the Gospel. Wherefore the letter, even of the Gospel would kill, unless there were the inward presence of the + healing grace of faith. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 2 co."><a name="38261" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38261] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad legem Evangelii duo pertinent. +Unum quidem principaliter, scilicet ipsa gratia spiritus sancti +interius data. Et quantum ad hoc, nova lex iustificat. Unde +Augustinus dicit, in libro de spiritu et littera, ibi, scilicet in +veteri testamento, lex extrinsecus posita est, qua iniusti +terrerentur, hic, scilicet in novo testamento, intrinsecus data +est, qua iustificarentur. Aliud pertinet ad legem Evangelii +secundario, scilicet documenta fidei, et praecepta ordinantia +affectum humanum et humanos actus. Et quantum ad hoc, lex nova non +iustificat. Unde apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. III, <i>littera +occidit, spiritus autem vivificat</i>. Et Augustinus exponit, in +libro de spiritu et littera, quod per litteram intelligitur +quaelibet Scriptura extra homines existens, etiam moralium +praeceptorum qualia continentur in Evangelio. Unde etiam littera +Evangelii occideret, nisi adesset interius gratia fidei sanans.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument holds true of the New Law, not as to its principal, but as to its secondary element: i.e. as to the dogmas + and precepts outwardly put before man either in words or in writing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="38262" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38262] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illa obiectio procedit de lege nova non quantum +ad id quod est principale in ipsa, sed quantum ad id quod est +secundarium in ipsa, scilicet quantum ad documenta et praecepta +exterius homini proposita vel verbo vel scripto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the grace of the New Testament helps man to avoid sin, yet it does not so confirm man in good that he cannot sin: + for this belongs to the state of glory. Hence if a man sin after receiving the grace of the New Testament, he deserves greater + punishment, as being ungrateful for greater benefits, and as not using the help given to him. And this is why the New Law + is not said to "work wrath": because as far as it is concerned it gives man + sufficient help to avoid sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="38263" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38263] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod gratia novi testamenti, etsi adiuvet hominem ad non +peccandum, non tamen ita confirmat in bono ut homo peccare non +possit, hoc enim pertinet ad statum gloriae. Et ideo si quis post +acceptam gratiam novi testamenti peccaverit, maiori poena est +dignus, tanquam maioribus beneficiis ingratus, et auxilio sibi dato +non utens. Nec tamen propter hoc dicitur quod lex nova iram +operatur, quia quantum est de se, sufficiens auxilium dat ad non +peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same God gave both the New and the Old Law, but in different ways. For He gave the Old Law written on tables of stone: + whereas He gave the New Law written "in the fleshly tables of the heart," as the Apostle expresses it ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.3" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:3</a>). Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xviii), "the Apostle calls this letter which is written outside man, a ministration + of death and a ministration of condemnation: whereas he calls + the other letter, i.e. the Law of the New Testament, the ministration of the spirit and the ministration of justice: because + through the gift of the Spirit we work justice, and are delivered from the condemnation due to transgression." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="38264" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38264] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod legem novam et veterem unus Deus dedit, sed aliter et +aliter. Nam legem veterem dedit scriptam in tabulis lapideis, legem +autem novam dedit scriptam in tabulis cordis carnalibus, ut +apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. III. Proinde sicut Augustinus dicit, in +libro de spiritu et littera, <i>litteram istam extra hominem +scriptam, et ministrationem mortis et ministrationem damnationis +apostolus appellat. Hanc autem, scilicet novi testamenti legem, +ministrationem spiritus et ministrationem iustitiae dicit, quia per +donum spiritus operamur iustitiam, et a praevaricationis damnatione +liberamur</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q106_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q106_A3-p0.1">Q. 106. A. 3. Whether the New Law should have been given from the beginning of the world?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law should have been given from the beginning of the world. "For there is no respect of persons + with God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.11" target="asv">Rom. 2:11</a>). But "all" men "have sinned and do need the glory of God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.23" target="asv">Rom. 3:23</a>). Therefore the Law of the Gospel should have been given from the beginning of the world, in order that it might bring succor + to all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="38265" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38265] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova debuerit dari a principio +mundi. Non enim est personarum acceptio apud Deum, ut dicitur ad +Rom. II. Sed omnes homines peccaverunt, et egent gloria Dei, ut +dicitur ad Rom. III. Ergo a principio mundi lex Evangelii dari +debuit, ut omnibus per eam subveniretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as men dwell in various places, so do they live in various times. But God, "Who will have all men to be saved" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:4</a>), commanded the Gospel to be preached in all places, as may be seen in the last chapters of Matthew and Mark. Therefore the + Law of the Gospel should have been at hand for all times, so as to be given from the beginning of the world. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="38266" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38266] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut in diversis locis sunt diversi homines, ita etiam in diversis +temporibus. Sed Deus, <i>qui vult omnes homines salvos fieri</i>, +ut dicitur I ad Tim. II, mandavit Evangelium praedicari in omnibus +locis; ut patet Matth. ult., et Marc. ult. Ergo omnibus temporibus +debuit adesse lex Evangelii, ita quod a principio mundi +daretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man needs to save his soul, which is for all eternity, more than to save his body, which is a temporal matter. But + God provided man from the beginning of the world with things that are necessary for the health of his body, by subjecting + to his power whatever was created for the sake of man ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26-29</a>). Therefore the New Law also, which is very necessary for the health of the soul, should have been given to man from the + beginning + of the world. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="38267" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38267] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +magis est necessaria homini salus spiritualis, quae est aeterna, +quam salus corporalis, quae est temporalis. Sed Deus ab initio +mundi providit homini ea quae sunt necessaria ad salutem +corporalem, tradens eius potestati omnia quae erant propter hominem +creata, ut patet Gen. I. Ergo etiam lex nova, quae maxime est +necessaria ad salutem spiritualem, debuit hominibus a principio +mundi dari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.46" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:46</a>): "That was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural." But the New Law is highly spiritual. Therefore it was + not fitting for it to be given from the beginning of the world. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 3 s. c."><a name="38268" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38268] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XV, <i>non prius quod +spirituale est, sed quod animale</i>. Sed lex nova est maxime +spiritualis. Ergo lex nova non debuit dari a principio mundi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q106_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Three reasons may be assigned why it was not fitting for the New Law to be given from the beginning of the world. The first + is because the New Law, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q106_A1" id="FS_Q106_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, consists chiefly in the grace of the Holy Ghost: which it behoved not to be given abundantly until sin, which is an obstacle + to grace, had been cast out of man through the accomplishment of his redemption by Christ: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#John.7.39" target="asv">Jn. + 7:39 + </a>): "As yet the Spirit was not given, because Jesus was not yet glorified." This reason the Apostle states clearly ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A3-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.2" target="asv">Rom. 8:2, </a> seqq.) where, after speaking of "the Law of the Spirit of life," he adds: "God sending His own Son, in the likeness of sinful + flesh, of sin* hath condemned sin in the flesh, that the justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us." [*St. Thomas, + quoting perhaps from memory, omits the "et" (and), after "sinful flesh." The text quoted + should read thus: "in the likeness of sinful flesh, and a sin offering ({peri hamartias}), hath," etc.] + </p><p id="FS_Q106_A3-p7"> A second reason may be taken from the perfection of the New Law. Because a thing is not brought to perfection at once from + the outset, but through an orderly succession of time; thus one is at first a boy, and then a man. And this reason is stated + by the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.24" target="asv">Gal. 3:24,25</a>): "The Law was our pedagogue in Christ that we might be justified by faith. But after the faith is come, we are no longer + under a pedagogue." + </p><p id="FS_Q106_A3-p8"> The third reason is found in the fact that the New Law is the law of grace: wherefore it behoved man first of all to be left + to himself under the state of the Old Law, so that through falling into sin, he might realize his weakness, and acknowledge + his need of grace. This reason is set down by the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.20" target="asv">Rom. 5:20</a>): "The Law entered in, that sin might abound: and when sin abounded grace did more abound." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 3 co."><a name="38269" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38269] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod triplex ratio potest assignari quare lex nova non +debuit dari a principio mundi. Quarum prima est quia lex nova, +sicut dictum est, principaliter est gratia spiritus sancti; quae +abundanter dari non debuit antequam impedimentum peccati ab humano +genere tolleretur, consummata redemptione per Christum; unde +dicitur Ioan. VII, <i>nondum erat spiritus datus, quia Iesus nondum +erat glorificatus</i>. Et hanc rationem manifeste assignat +apostolus ad Rom. VIII, ubi, postquam praemiserat de lege spiritus +vitae, subiungit, <i>Deus, filium suum mittens in similitudinem +carnis peccati, de peccato damnavit peccatum in carne, ut +iustificatio legis impleretur in nobis</i>. Secunda ratio potest +assignari ex perfectione legis novae. Non enim aliquid ad perfectum +adducitur statim a principio, sed quodam temporali successionis +ordine, sicut aliquis prius fit puer, et postmodum vir. Et hanc +rationem assignat apostolus ad Gal. III, <i>lex paedagogus noster +fuit in Christo, ut ex fide iustificemur. At ubi venit fides, iam +non sumus sub paedagogo</i>. Tertia ratio sumitur ex hoc quod lex +nova est lex gratiae, et ideo primo oportuit quod homo +relinqueretur sibi in statu veteris legis, ut, in peccatum cadendo, +suam infirmitatem cognoscens, recognosceret se gratia indigere. Et +hanc rationem assignat apostolus ad Rom. V, dicens, <i>lex +subintravit ut abundaret delictum, ubi autem abundavit delictum, +superabundavit et gratia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Mankind on account of the sin of our first parents deserved to be deprived of the aid of grace: and so "from whom it is withheld + it is justly withheld, and to whom it is given, it is mercifully given," as Augustine states (De Perfect. Justit. iv) [*Cf. + Ep. ccvii; De Pecc. Mer. et Rem. ii, 19]. Consequently it does not follow that there is respect of persons with God, from + the fact that He did not offer the Law of grace to all from the beginning of the + world, which Law was to be published in due course of time, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="38270" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38270] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod humanum genus propter peccatum primi parentis +meruit privari auxilio gratiae. <i>Et ideo quibuscumque non datur, +hoc est ex iustitia, quibuscumque autem datur, hoc est ex +gratia</i>, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Perfect. Iustit. Unde +non est acceptio personarum apud Deum ex hoc quod non omnibus a +principio mundi legem gratiae proposuit, quae erat debito ordine +proponenda, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The state of mankind does not vary according to diversity of place, but according to succession of time. Hence the New Law + avails for all places, but not for all times: although at all times there have been some persons belonging to the New Testament, + as stated above (A[1], ad 3). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="38271" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38271] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod diversitas locorum non variat diversum statum humani +generis, qui variatur per temporis successionem. Et ideo omnibus +locis proponitur lex nova, non autem omnibus temporibus, licet omni +tempore fuerint aliqui ad novum testamentum pertinentes, ut supra +dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things pertaining to the health of the body are of service to man as regards his nature, which sin does not destroy: whereas + things pertaining to the health of the soul are ordained to grace, which is forfeit through sin. Consequently the comparison + will not hold. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="38272" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38272] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ea quae pertinent ad salutem corporalem, deserviunt +homini quantum ad naturam, quae non tollitur per peccatum. Sed ea +quae pertinent ad spiritualem salutem, ordinantur ad gratiam, quae +amittitur per peccatum. Et ideo non est similis ratio de +utrisque.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q106_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q106_A4-p0.1">Q. 106. A. 4. Whether the New Law will last till the end of the world?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law will not last until the end of the world. Because, as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:10</a>), "when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away." But the New Law is "in part," since the + Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:9</a>): "We know in part and we prophesy in part." Therefore the New Law is to be done away, and will be succeeded by a more perfect + state. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="38273" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38273] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova non sit duratura usque ad +finem mundi. Quia ut apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIII, <i>cum +venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est</i>. Sed +lex nova ex parte est, dicit enim apostolus ibidem, <i>ex parte +cognoscimus, et ex parte prophetamus</i>. Ergo lex nova evacuanda +est, alio perfectiori statu succedente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Our Lord ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.16.13" target="asv">Jn. 16:13</a>) promised His disciples the knowledge of all truth when the Holy Ghost, the Comforter, should come. But the Church knows + not yet all truth in the state of the New Testament. Therefore we must look forward to another state, wherein all truth will + be revealed by the Holy Ghost. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="38274" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38274] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +dominus, Ioan. XVI, promisit discipulis suis in adventu spiritus +sancti Paracleti cognitionem omnis veritatis. Sed nondum Ecclesia +omnem veritatem cognoscit, in statu novi testamenti. Ergo +expectandus est alius status, in quo per spiritum sanctum omnis +veritas manifestetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as the Father is distinct from the Son and the Son from the Father, so is the Holy Ghost distinct from the + Father and the Son. But there was a state corresponding with the Person of the Father, viz. the state of the Old Law, wherein + men were intent on begetting children: and likewise there is a state corresponding to the Person of the Son: viz. the state + of the New Law, wherein the clergy who are intent on wisdom (which is appropriated to the + Son) hold a prominent place. Therefore there will be a third state corresponding to the Holy Ghost, wherein spiritual men + will hold the first place. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="38275" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38275] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut pater est alius a filio et filius a patre, ita spiritus +sanctus a patre et filio. Sed fuit quidam status conveniens +personae patris, scilicet status veteris legis, in quo homines +generationi intendebant. Similiter etiam est alius status +conveniens personae filii, scilicet status novae legis, in quo +clerici, intendentes sapientiae, quae appropriatur filio, +principantur. Ergo erit status tertius spiritus sancti, in quo +spirituales viri principabuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.14" target="asv">Mat. 24:14</a>): "This Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in the whole world . . . and then shall the consummation come." But the Gospel + of Christ is already preached throughout the whole world: and yet the consummation has not yet come. Therefore the Gospel + of Christ is not the Gospel of the kingdom, but another Gospel, that of the Holy Ghost, is to come yet, like unto another + Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="38276" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38276] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +dominus dicit, Matth. XXIV, praedicabitur hoc <i>Evangelium regni +in universo orbe, et tunc veniet consummatio</i>. Sed Evangelium +Christi iamdiu est praedicatum in universo orbe; nec tamen adhuc +venit consummatio. Ergo Evangelium Christi non est Evangelium +regni, sed futurum est aliud Evangelium spiritus sancti, quasi alia +lex.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.34" target="asv">Mat. 24:34</a>): "I say to you that this generation shall not pass till all (these) things be done": which passage Chrysostom (Hom. lxxvii) + explains as referring to "the generation of those that believe in Christ." Therefore the state of those who believe in Christ + will last until the consummation of the world. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 4 s. c."><a name="38277" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38277] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dominus dicit, Matth. XXIV, <i>dico vobis quia non +praeteribit generatio haec donec omnia fiant</i>, quod Chrysostomus +exponit de generatione fidelium Christi. Ergo status fidelium +Christi manebit usque ad consummationem saeculi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q106_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The state of the world may change in two ways. In one way, according to a change of law: and thus no other state will succeed + this state of the New Law. Because the state of the New Law succeeded the state of the Old Law, as a more perfect law a less + perfect one. Now no state of the present life can be more perfect that the state of the New Law: since nothing can approach + nearer to the last end than that which is the immediate cause of our being brought to + the last end. But the New Law does this: wherefore the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.19" target="asv">Heb. 10:19-22</a>): "Having therefore, brethren, a confidence in the entering into the Holies by the blood of Christ, a new . . . way which + He hath dedicated for us . . . let us draw near." Therefore no state of the present life can be more perfect than that of + the New Law, since the nearer a thing is to the last end the more perfect it is. + </p><p id="FS_Q106_A4-p8"> In another way the state of mankind may change according as man stands in relation to one and the same law more or less perfectly. + And thus the state of the Old Law underwent frequent changes, since at times the laws were very well kept, and at other times + were altogether unheeded. Thus, too, the state of the New Law is subject to change with regard to various places, times, and + persons, according as the grace of the Holy Ghost dwells in man more or less perfectly. Nevertheless + we are not to look forward to a state wherein man is to possess the grace of the Holy Ghost more perfectly than he has possessed + it hitherto, especially the apostles who "received the firstfruits of the Spirit, i.e. sooner and more abundantly than others," + as a gloss expounds on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.23" target="asv"> Rom. 8:23.</a> + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 4 co."><a name="38278" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38278] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod status mundi variari potest dupliciter. Uno modo, +secundum diversitatem legis. Et sic huic statui novae legis nullus +alius status succedet. Successit enim status novae legis statui +veteris legis tanquam perfectior imperfectiori. Nullus autem status +praesentis vitae potest esse perfectior quam status novae legis. +Nihil enim potest esse propinquius fini ultimo quam quod immediate +in finem ultimum introducit. Hoc autem facit nova lex, unde +apostolus dicit, ad Heb. X, <i>habentes itaque, fratres, fiduciam +in introitu sanctorum in sanguine Christi, quam initiavit nobis +viam novam, accedamus ad eum</i>. Unde non potest esse aliquis +perfectior status praesentis vitae quam status novae legis, quia +tanto est unumquodque perfectius, quanto ultimo fini propinquius. +Alio modo status hominum variari potest secundum quod homines +diversimode se habent ad eandem legem, vel perfectius vel minus +perfecte. Et sic status veteris legis frequenter fuit mutatus, cum +quandoque leges optime custodirentur, quandoque omnino +praetermitterentur. Sic etiam status novae legis diversificatur, +secundum diversa loca et tempora et personas, inquantum gratia +spiritus sancti perfectius vel minus perfecte ab aliquibus habetur. +Non est tamen expectandum quod sit aliquis status futurus in quo +perfectius gratia spiritus sancti habeatur quam hactenus habita +fuerit, maxime ab apostolis, qui primitias spiritus acceperunt, +<i>idest et tempore prius et ceteris abundantius</i>, ut Glossa +dicit Rom. VIII.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v), there is a threefold state of mankind; the first was under the Old Law; the second is + that of the New Law; the third will take place not in this life, but in heaven. But as the first state is figurative and imperfect + in comparison with the state of the Gospel; so is the present state figurative and imperfect in comparison with the heavenly + state, with the advent of which the present state will be done away as + expressed in that very passage ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:12</a>): "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="38279" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38279] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut Dionysius dicit, in Eccl. Hier., triplex +est hominum status, primus quidem veteris legis; secundus novae +legis; tertius status succedit non in hac vita, sed in patria. Sed +sicut primus status est figuralis et imperfectus respectu status +evangelici, ita hic status est figuralis et imperfectus respectu +status patriae; quo veniente, iste status evacuatur, sicut ibi +dicitur, <i>videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem +facie ad faciem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q106_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix, 31), Montanus and Priscilla pretended that Our Lord's promise to give the Holy Ghost + was fulfilled, not in the apostles, but in themselves. In like manner the Manicheans maintained that it was fulfilled in Manes + whom they held to be the Paraclete. Hence none of the above received the Acts of the Apostles, where it is clearly shown that + the aforesaid promise was fulfilled in the apostles: just as Our Lord promised + them a second time ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.1.5" target="asv">Acts 1:5</a>): "You shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost, not many days hence": which we read as having been fulfilled in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Acts.2" target="asv">Acts 2</a>. However, these foolish notions are refuted by the statement ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p10.3" href="./asv.html#John.7.39" target="asv">Jn. 7:39</a>) that "as yet the Spirit was not given, because Jesus was not yet glorified"; from which we gather that the Holy Ghost was + given as soon as Christ was glorified in His Resurrection and Ascension. Moreover, this puts out of court the + senseless idea that the Holy Ghost is to be expected to come at some other time. + </p><p id="FS_Q106_A4-p11"> Now the Holy Ghost taught the apostles all truth in respect of matters necessary for salvation; those things, to wit, that + we are bound to believe and to do. But He did not teach them about all future events: for this did not regard them according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.1.7" target="asv"> Acts 1:7</a>: "It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father hath put in His own power." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="38280" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38280] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro contra Faustum, +Montanus et Priscilla posuerunt quod promissio domini de spiritu +sancto dando non fuit completa in apostolis, sed in eis. Et +similiter Manichaei posuerunt quod fuit completa in Manichaeo, quem +dicebant esse spiritum Paracletum. Et ideo utrique non recipiebant +actus apostolorum, in quibus manifeste ostenditur quod illa +promissio fuit in apostolis completa, sicut dominus iterato eis +promisit, Act. I, <i>baptizamini in spiritu sancto non post multos +hos dies</i>; quod impletum legitur Act. II. Sed istae vanitates +excluduntur per hoc quod dicitur Ioan. VII, <i>nondum erat spiritus +datus, quia Iesus nondum erat glorificatus</i>, ex quo datur +intelligi quod statim glorificato Christo in resurrectione et +ascensione, fuit spiritus sanctus datus. Et per hoc etiam +excluditur quorumcumque vanitas qui dicerent esse expectandum aliud +tempus spiritus sancti. Docuit autem spiritus sanctus apostolos +omnem veritatem de his quae pertinent ad necessitatem salutis, +scilicet de credendis et agendis. Non tamen docuit eos de omnibus +futuris eventibus, hoc enim ad eos non pertinebat, secundum illud +Act. I, <i>non est vestrum nosse tempora vel momenta, quae pater +posuit in sua potestate</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Old Law corresponded not only to the Father, but also to the Son: because Christ was foreshadowed in the Old Law. Hence + Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p12.1" href="./asv.html#John.5.46" target="asv">Jn. 5:46</a>): "If you did believe Moses, you would perhaps believe me also; for he wrote of Me." In like manner the New Law corresponds + not only to Christ, but also to the Holy Ghost; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.2" target="asv"> Rom. 8:2</a>: "The Law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus," etc. Hence we are not + to look forward to another law corresponding to the Holy Ghost. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="38281" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38281] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod lex vetus non solum fuit patris, sed etiam filii, +quia Christus in veteri lege figurabatur. Unde dominus dicit, Ioan. +V, <i>si crederetis Moysi, crederetis forsitan et mihi, de me enim +ille scripsit</i>. Similiter etiam lex nova non solum est Christi, +sed etiam spiritus sancti; secundum illud Rom. VIII, <i>lex +spiritus vitae in Christo Iesu,</i> et cetera. Unde non est +expectanda alia lex, quae sit spiritus sancti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q106_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since Christ said at the very outset of the preaching of the Gospel: "The kingdom of heaven is at hand" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.17" target="asv">Mat. 4:17</a>), it is most absurd to say that the Gospel of Christ is not the Gospel of the kingdom. But the preaching of the Gospel of + Christ may be understood in two ways. First, as denoting the spreading abroad of the knowledge of Christ: and thus the Gospel + was preached throughout the world even at the time of the apostles, as + Chrysostom states (Hom. lxxv in Matth.). And in this sense the words that follow---"and then shall the consummation come," + refer to the destruction of Jerusalem, of which He was speaking literally. Secondly, the preaching of the Gospel may be understood + as extending throughout the world and producing its full effect, so that, to wit, the Church would be founded in every nation. + And in these sense, as Augustine writes to Hesychius (Epist. cxcix), the Gospel is not preached to the whole world + yet, but, when it is, the consummation of the world will come. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 106 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="38282" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38282] Iª-IIae q. 106 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, cum Christus statim in principio evangelicae +praedicationis dixerit, appropinquavit regnum caelorum, +stultissimum est dicere quod Evangelium Christi non sit Evangelium +regni. Sed praedicatio Evangelii Christi potest intelligi +dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad divulgationem notitiae Christi, et +sic praedicatum fuit Evangelium in universo orbe etiam tempore +apostolorum, ut Chrysostomus dicit. Et secundum hoc, quod additur, +et tunc erit consummatio, intelligitur de destructione Ierusalem, +de qua tunc ad litteram loquebatur. Alio modo potest intelligi +praedicatio Evangelii in universo orbe cum pleno effectu, ita +scilicet quod in qualibet gente fundetur Ecclesia. Et ita, sicut +dicit Augustinus, in epistola ad Hesych., nondum est praedicatum +Evangelium in universo orbe, sed, hoc facto, veniet consummatio +mundi.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q107" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q107-p0.1">Q. 107. OF THE NEW LAW AS COMPARED WITH THE OLD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q107-p2"> We must now consider the New Law as compared with the Old: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q107-p3"><a href="#FS_Q107_A1"> (1) Whether the New Law is distinct from the Old Law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q107-p4"><a href="#FS_Q107_A2"> (2) Whether the New Law fulfils the Old?</a></p><p id="FS_Q107-p5"><a href="#FS_Q107_A3"> (3) Whether the New Law is contained in the Old?</a></p><p id="FS_Q107-p6"><a href="#FS_Q107_A4"> (4) Which is the more burdensome, the New or the Old Law?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 pr."><a name="38283" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38283] Iª-IIae q. 107 pr.</span></a> Deinde +considerandum est de comparatione legis novae ad legem veterem. Et +circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum lex nova sit alia lex a +lege veteri. Secundo, utrum lex nova impleat veterem. Tertio, utrum +lex nova contineatur in veteri. Quarto, quae sit gravior, utrum lex +nova vel vetus.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q107_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q107_A1-p0.1">Q. 107. A. 1. Whether the New Law is distinct from the Old Law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law is not distinct from the Old. Because both these laws were given to those who believe in God: + since "without faith it is impossible to please God," according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.6" target="asv"> Heb. 11:6.</a> But the faith of olden times and of nowadays is the same, as the gloss says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.21.9" target="asv"> Mat. 21:9.</a> Therefore the law is the same also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="38284" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38284] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova non sit alia a lege veteri. +Utraque enim lex datur fidem Dei habentibus, quia <i>sine fide +impossibile est placere Deo</i>, ut dicitur Heb. XI. Sed eadem +fides est antiquorum et modernorum, ut dicitur in Glossa Matth. +XXI. Ergo etiam est eadem lex.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Contra Adamant. Manich. discip. xvii) that "there is little difference between the Law and Gospel" + [*The 'little difference' refers to the Latin words 'timor' and 'amor']---"fear and love." But the New and Old Laws cannot + be differentiated in respect of these two things: since even the Old Law comprised precepts of charity: "Thou shalt love thy + neighbor" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.18" target="asv">Lev. 19:18</a>), and: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.5" target="asv">Dt. 6:5</a>). In like manner neither can they differ according to the other difference which Augustine assigns (Contra Faust. iv, 2), + viz. that "the Old Testament contained temporal promises, whereas the New Testament contains spiritual and eternal promises": + since even the New Testament contains temporal promises, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Mark.10.30" target="asv"> Mk. 10:30</a>: He shall receive "a hundred times as much . . . in this time, houses and brethren," etc.: while in the Old Testament + they hoped in promises spiritual and eternal, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p3.4" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.16" target="asv"> Heb. 11:16</a>: "But now they desire a better, that is to say, a heavenly country," which is said of the patriarchs. Therefore it seems + that the New Law is not distinct from the Old. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="38285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38285] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro contra Adamantum Manich. Discip., quod +<i>brevis differentia legis et Evangelii est timor et amor</i>. Sed +secundum haec duo nova lex et vetus diversificari non possunt, quia +etiam in veteri lege proponuntur praecepta caritatis; Lev. XIX, +<i>diliges proximum tuum</i>; et Deut. VI, <i>diliges dominum Deum +tuum</i>. Similiter etiam diversificari non possunt per aliam +differentiam quam Augustinus assignat, contra Faustum, quod +<i>vetus testamentum habuit promissa temporalia, novum testamentum +habet promissa spiritualia et aeterna</i>. Quia etiam in novo +testamento promittuntur aliqua promissa temporalia; secundum illud +Marc. X, <i>accipiet centies tantum in tempore hoc, domos et +fratres,</i> et cetera. Et in veteri testamento sperabantur +promissa spiritualia et aeterna; secundum illud ad Heb. XI, <i>nunc +autem meliorem patriam appetunt, idest caelestem</i>, quod dicitur +de antiquis patribus. Ergo videtur quod nova lex non sit alia a +veteri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle seems to distinguish both laws by calling the Old Law "a law of works," and the New Law "a law of faith" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.27" target="asv">Rom. 3:27</a>). But the Old Law was also a law of faith, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.39" target="asv"> Heb. 11:39</a>: "All were [Vulg.: 'All these being'] approved by the testimony of faith," which he says of the fathers of the Old Testament. + In like manner the New Law is a law of works: since it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.44" target="asv">Mat. 5:44</a>): "Do good to + them that hate you"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p4.4" href="./asv.html#Luke.22.19" target="asv">Lk. 22:19</a>): "Do this for a commemoration of Me." Therefore the New Law is not distinct from the Old. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="38286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38286] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +apostolus videtur distinguere utramque legem, ad Rom. III, veterem +legem appellans legem factorum, legem vero novam appellans legem +fidei. Sed lex vetus fuit etiam fidei; secundum illud Heb. XI, +<i>omnes testimonio fidei probati sunt</i>, quod dicit de patribus +veteris testamenti. Similiter etiam lex nova est lex factorum, +dicitur enim Matth. V, <i>benefacite his qui oderunt vos</i>; et +Luc. XXII, <i>hoc facite in meam commemorationem</i>. Ergo lex nova +non est alia a lege veteri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.12" target="asv">Heb. 7:12</a>): "The priesthood being translated it is necessary that a translation also be made of the Law." But the priesthood of the + New Testament is distinct from that of the Old, as the Apostle shows in the same place. Therefore the Law is also distinct. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 1 s. c."><a name="38287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38287] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VII, <i>translato sacerdotio, +necesse est ut legis translatio fiat</i>. Sed aliud est sacerdotium +novi et veteris testamenti, ut ibidem apostolus probat. Ergo est +etiam alia lex.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q107_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q107_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[90], A[2]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q91_A4" id="FS_Q107_A1-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[91], A[4]</a>), every law ordains human conduct to some end. Now things ordained to an end may be divided in two ways, considered from + the point of view of the end. First, through being ordained to different ends: and this difference will be specific, especially + if such ends are proximate. Secondly, by reason of being closely or remotely connected with the end. Thus it is clear + that movements differ in species through being directed to different terms: while according as one part of a movement is nearer + to the term than another part, the difference of perfect and imperfect movement is assessed. + </p><p id="FS_Q107_A1-p7"> Accordingly then two laws may be distinguished from one another in two ways. First, through being altogether diverse, from + the fact that they are ordained to diverse ends: thus a state-law ordained to democratic government, would differ specifically + from a law ordained to government by the aristocracy. Secondly, two laws may be distinguished from one another, through one + of them being more closely connected with the end, and the other more remotely: thus in one and the same + state there is one law enjoined on men of mature age, who can forthwith accomplish that which pertains to the common good; + and another law regulating the education of children who need to be taught how they are to achieve manly deeds later on. + </p><p id="FS_Q107_A1-p8"> We must therefore say that, according to the first way, the New Law is not distinct from the Old Law: because they both have + the same end, namely, man's subjection to God; and there is but one God of the New and of the Old Testament, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.30" target="asv"> Rom. 3:30</a>: "It is one God that justifieth circumcision by faith, and uncircumcision through faith." According to the second way, the + New Law is distinct from the Old Law: because the Old Law is like a pedagogue of + children, as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.24" target="asv">Gal. 3:24</a>), whereas the New Law is the law of perfection, since it is the law of charity, of which the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Col.3.14" target="asv">Col. 3:14</a>) that it is "the bond of perfection." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 1 co."><a name="38288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38288] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, omnis lex ordinat +conversationem humanam in ordine ad aliquem finem. Ea autem quae +ordinantur ad finem, secundum rationem finis dupliciter +diversificari possunt. Uno modo, quia ordinantur ad diversos fines, +et haec est diversitas speciei, maxime si sit finis proximus. Alio +modo, secundum propinquitatem ad finem vel distantiam ab ipso. +Sicut patet quod motus differunt specie secundum quod ordinantur ad +diversos terminos, secundum vero quod una pars motus est +propinquior termino quam alia, attenditur differentia in motu +secundum perfectum et imperfectum. Sic ergo duae leges distingui +possunt dupliciter. Uno modo, quasi omnino diversae, utpote +ordinatae ad diversos fines, sicut lex civitatis quae esset +ordinata ad hoc quod populus dominaretur, esset specie differens ab +illa lege quae esset ad hoc ordinata quod optimates civitatis +dominarentur. Alio modo duae leges distingui possunt secundum quod +una propinquius ordinat ad finem, alia vero remotius. Puta in una +et eadem civitate dicitur alia lex quae imponitur viris perfectis, +qui statim possunt exequi ea quae pertinent ad bonum commune; et +alia lex de disciplina puerorum, qui sunt instruendi qualiter +postmodum opera virorum exequantur. Dicendum est ergo quod secundum +primum modum, lex nova non est alia a lege veteri, quia utriusque +est unus finis, scilicet ut homines subdantur Deo; est autem unus +Deus et novi et veteris testamenti, secundum illud Rom. III, +<i>unus Deus est qui iustificat circumcisionem ex fide, et +praeputium per fidem</i>. Alio modo, lex nova est alia a veteri. +Quia lex vetus est quasi paedagogus puerorum, ut apostolus dicit, +ad Gal. III, lex autem nova est lex perfectionis, quia est lex +caritatis, de qua apostolus dicit, ad Colos. III, quod est vinculum +perfectionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The unity of faith under both Testaments witnesses to the unity of end: for it has been stated above ( + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q62_A2" id="FS_Q107_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[2]</a>) that the object of the theological virtues, among which is faith, is the last end. Yet faith had a different state in the + Old and in the New Law: since what they believed as future, we believe as fact. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="38289" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38289] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod unitas fidei utriusque testamenti attestatur +unitati finis, dictum est enim supra quod obiectum theologicarum +virtutum, inter quas est fides, est finis ultimus. Sed tamen fides +habuit alium statum in veteri et in nova lege, nam quod illi +credebant futurum, nos credimus factum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q107_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All the differences assigned between the Old and New Laws are gathered from their relative perfection and imperfection. For + the precepts of every law prescribe acts of virtue. Now the imperfect, who as yet are not possessed of a virtuous habit, are + directed in one way to perform virtuous acts, while those who are perfected by the possession of virtuous habits are directed + in another way. For those who as yet are not endowed with virtuous habits, are + directed to the performance of virtuous acts by reason of some outward cause: for instance, by the threat of punishment, or + the promise of some extrinsic rewards, such as honor, riches, or the like. Hence the Old Law, which was given to men who were + imperfect, that is, who had not yet received spiritual grace, was called the "law of fear," inasmuch as it induced men to + observe its commandments by threatening them with penalties; and is spoken of as containing temporal promises. On the other + hand, those who are possessed of virtue, are inclined to do virtuous deeds through love of virtue, not on account of some + extrinsic punishment or reward. Hence the New Law which derives its pre-eminence from the spiritual grace instilled into our + hearts, is called the "Law of love": and it is described as containing spiritual and eternal promises, which are objects of + the virtues, chiefly of charity. Accordingly such persons are inclined of themselves to those objects, not as to something + foreign but as to something of their own. For this reason, too, the Old Law is described as "restraining the hand, not the + will" [*Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 40]; since when a man refrains from some sins through fear of being punished, his will + does not shrink simply from sin, as does the will of a man who refrains from sin through love of righteousness: and hence + the New Law, which is the Law of love, is said to restrain the will. + </p><p id="FS_Q107_A1-p11"> Nevertheless there were some in the state of the Old Testament who, having charity and the grace of the Holy Ghost, looked + chiefly to spiritual and eternal promises: and in this respect they belonged to the New Law. In like manner in the New Testament + there are some carnal men who have not yet attained to the perfection of the New Law; and these it was necessary, even under + the New Testament, to lead to virtuous action by the fear of punishment and by temporal promises. + </p><p id="FS_Q107_A1-p12"> But although the Old Law contained precepts of charity, nevertheless it did not confer the Holy Ghost by Whom "charity . + . . is spread abroad in our hearts" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv">Rom. 5:5</a>). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="38290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38290] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod omnes differentiae quae assignantur inter novam legem +et veterem, accipiuntur secundum perfectum et imperfectum. +Praecepta enim legis cuiuslibet dantur de actibus virtutum. Ad +operanda autem virtutum opera aliter inclinantur imperfecti, qui +nondum habent virtutis habitum; et aliter illi qui sunt per habitum +virtutis perfecti. Illi enim qui nondum habent habitum virtutis, +inclinantur ad agendum virtutis opera ex aliqua causa extrinseca, +puta ex comminatione poenarum, vel ex promissione aliquarum +extrinsecarum remunerationum, puta honoris vel divitiarum vel +alicuius huiusmodi. Et ideo lex vetus, quae dabatur imperfectis, +idest nondum consecutis gratiam spiritualem, dicebatur lex timoris, +inquantum inducebat ad observantiam praeceptorum per comminationem +quarundam poenarum. Et dicitur habere temporalia quaedam promissa. +Illi autem qui habent virtutem, inclinantur ad virtutis opera +agenda propter amorem virtutis, non propter aliquam poenam aut +remunerationem extrinsecam. Et ideo lex nova, cuius principalitas +consistit in ipsa spirituali gratia indita cordibus, dicitur lex +amoris. Et dicitur habere promissa spiritualia et aeterna, quae +sunt obiecta virtutis, praecipue caritatis. Et ita per se in ea +inclinantur, non quasi in extranea, sed quasi in propria. Et +propter hoc etiam lex vetus dicitur cohibere manum, non animum, +quia qui timore poenae ab aliquo peccato abstinet, non simpliciter +eius voluntas a peccato recedit, sicut recedit voluntas eius qui +amore iustitiae abstinet a peccato. Et propter hoc lex nova, quae +est lex amoris, dicitur animum cohibere. Fuerunt tamen aliqui in +statu veteris testamenti habentes caritatem et gratiam spiritus +sancti, qui principaliter expectabant promissiones spirituales et +aeternas. Et secundum hoc pertinebant ad legem novam. Similiter +etiam in novo testamento sunt aliqui carnales nondum pertingentes +ad perfectionem novae legis, quos oportuit etiam in novo testamento +induci ad virtutis opera per timorem poenarum, et per aliqua +temporalia promissa. Lex autem vetus etsi praecepta caritatis +daret, non tamen per eam dabatur spiritus sanctus, per quem +diffunditur caritas in cordibus nostris, ut dicitur Rom. V.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q106_A1" id="FS_Q107_A1-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[106], AA[1]</a>,2), the New Law is called the law of faith, in so far as its pre-eminence is derived from that very grace which is given + inwardly to believers, and for this reason is called the grace of faith. Nevertheless it consists secondarily in certain deeds, + moral and sacramental: but the New Law does not consist chiefly in these latter things, as did the Old Law. As to those under + the Old Testament who + through faith were acceptable to God, in this respect they belonged to the New Testament: for they were not justified except + through faith in Christ, Who is the Author of the New Testament. Hence of Moses the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p13.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.26" target="asv">Heb. 11:26</a>) that he esteemed "the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasure of the Egyptians." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="38291" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38291] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex nova dicitur lex fidei, +inquantum eius principalitas consistit in ipsa gratia quae interius +datur credentibus, unde dicitur gratia fidei. Habet autem +secundario aliqua facta et moralia et sacramentalia, sed in his non +consistit principalitas legis novae, sicut principalitas veteris +legis in eis consistebat. Illi autem qui in veteri testamento Deo +fuerunt accepti per fidem, secundum hoc ad novum testamentum +pertinebant, non enim iustificabantur nisi per fidem Christi, qui +est auctor novi testamenti. Unde et de Moyse dicit apostolus, ad +Heb. XI, quod <i>maiores divitias aestimabat thesauro Aegyptiorum, +improperium Christi</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q107_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q107_A2-p0.1">Q. 107. A. 2. Whether the New Law fulfils the Old?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law does not fulfil the Old. Because to fulfil and to void are contrary. But the New Law voids + or excludes the observances of the Old Law: for the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.2" target="asv">Gal. 5:2</a>): "If you be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing." Therefore the New Law is not a fulfilment of the Old. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="38292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38292] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova legem veterem non +impleat. Impletio enim contrariatur evacuationi. Sed lex nova +evacuat, vel excludit observantias legis veteris, dicit enim +apostolus, ad Gal. V, <i>si circumcidimini, Christus nihil vobis +proderit</i>. Ergo lex nova non est impletiva veteris legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one contrary is not the fulfilment of another. But Our Lord propounded in the New Law precepts that were contrary + to precepts of the Old Law. For we read ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.27" target="asv">Mat. 5:27-32</a>): You have heard that it was said to them of old: . . . "Whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a bill of divorce. + But I say to you that whosoever shall put away his wife . . . maketh her to commit adultery." Furthermore, the same evidently + applies to + the prohibition against swearing, against retaliation, and against hating one's enemies. In like manner Our Lord seems to + have done away with the precepts of the Old Law relating to the different kinds of foods ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.11" target="asv">Mat. 15:11</a>): "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth the man: but what cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man." Therefore + the New Law is not a fulfilment of the Old. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="38293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38293] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +contrarium non est impletivum sui contrarii. Sed dominus in lege +nova proposuit quaedam praecepta contraria praeceptis veteris +legis. Dicitur enim Matth. V, <i>audistis quia dictum est antiquis, +quicumque dimiserit uxorem suam, det ei libellum repudii. Ego autem +dico vobis, quicumque dimiserit uxorem suam, facit eam +moechari</i>. Et idem consequenter patet in prohibitione iuramenti, +et etiam in prohibitione talionis, et in odio inimicorum. Similiter +etiam videtur dominus exclusisse praecepta veteris legis de +discretione ciborum, Matth. XV, <i>non quod intrat in os, +coinquinat hominem</i>. Ergo lex nova non est impletiva +veteris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever acts against a law does not fulfil the law. But Christ in certain cases acted against the Law. For He touched + the leper ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.8.3" target="asv">Mat. 8:3</a>), which was contrary to the Law. Likewise He seems to have frequently broken the sabbath; since the Jews used to say of Him + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#John.9.16" target="asv">Jn. 9:16</a>): "This man is not of God, who keepeth not the sabbath." Therefore Christ did not fulfil the Law: and so the New Law given + by Christ is not a fulfilment of the + Old. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="38294" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38294] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quicumque contra legem agit, non implet legem. Sed Christus in +aliquibus contra legem fecit. Tetigit enim leprosum, ut dicitur +Matth. VIII, quod erat contra legem. Similiter etiam videtur +sabbatum pluries violasse, unde de eo dicebant Iudaei, Ioan. IX, +<i>non est hic homo a Deo, qui sabbatum non custodit</i>. Ergo +Christus non implevit legem. Et ita lex nova data a Christo, non +est veteris impletiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Old Law contained precepts, moral, ceremonial, and judicial, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q99_A4" id="FS_Q107_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[99], A[4]</a>). But Our Lord ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.5" target="asv">Mat. 5</a>) fulfilled the Law in some respects, but without mentioning the judicial and ceremonial precepts. Therefore it seems that + the New Law is not a complete fulfilment of the Old. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="38295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38295] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +in veteri lege continebantur praecepta moralia, caeremonialia et +iudicialia, ut supra dictum est. Sed dominus, Matth. V, ubi quantum +ad aliqua legem implevit, nullam mentionem videtur facere de +iudicialibus et caeremonialibus. Ergo videtur quod lex nova non sit +totaliter veteris impletiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.17" target="asv">Mat. 5:17</a>): "I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil": and went on to say ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.18" target="asv">Mat. 5:18</a>): "One jot or one tittle shall not pass of the Law till all be fulfilled." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 2 s. c."><a name="38296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38296] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dominus dicit, Matth. V, <i>non veni solvere legem, sed +adimplere</i>. Et postea, subdit, <i>iota unum, aut unus apex, non +praeteribit a lege, donec omnia fiant</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q107_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q107_A1" id="FS_Q107_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the New Law is compared to the Old as the perfect to the imperfect. Now everything perfect fulfils that which is lacking + in the imperfect. And accordingly the New Law fulfils the Old by supplying that which was lacking in the Old Law. + </p><p id="FS_Q107_A2-p8"> Now two things of every law is to make men righteous and virtuous, as was stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q92_A1" id="FS_Q107_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[92], A[1]</a>): and consequently the end of the Old Law was the justification of men. The Law, however, could not accomplish this: but + foreshadowed it by certain ceremonial actions, and promised it in words. And in this respect, the New Law fulfils the Old + by justifying men through the power of Christ's Passion. This is what the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.3" target="asv">Rom. + 8:3,4 + </a>): "What the Law could not do . . . God sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh . . . hath condemned sin in the + flesh, that the justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us." And in this respect, the New Law gives what the Old Law + promised, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p8.3" href="./asv.html#iiCor.1.20" target="asv">2 Cor. 1:20</a>: "Whatever are the promises of God, in Him," i.e. in Christ, "they are 'Yea'." [*The Douay version reads thus: "All the promises + of God are in Him, 'It is'."] Again, in this respect, it also fulfils + what the Old Law foreshadowed. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p8.4" href="./asv.html#Col.2.17" target="asv">Col. 2:17</a>) concerning the ceremonial precepts that they were "a shadow of things to come, but the body is of Christ"; in other words, + the reality is found in Christ. Wherefore the New Law is called the law of reality; whereas the Old Law is called the law + of shadow or of figure. + </p><p id="FS_Q107_A2-p9"> Now Christ fulfilled the precepts of the Old Law both in His works and in His doctrine. In His works, because He was willing + to be circumcised and to fulfil the other legal observances, which were binding for the time being; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.4" target="asv"> Gal. 4:4</a>: "Made under the Law." In His doctrine He fulfilled the precepts of the Law in three ways. First, by explaining the true + sense of the Law. This is clear in the case of murder and adultery, the prohibition of which + the Scribes and Pharisees thought to refer only to the exterior act: wherefore Our Lord fulfilled the Law by showing that + the prohibition extended also to the interior acts of sins. Secondly, Our Lord fulfilled the precepts of the Law by prescribing + the safest way of complying with the statutes of the Old Law. Thus the Old Law forbade perjury: and this is more safely avoided, + by abstaining altogether from swearing, save in cases of urgency. Thirdly, Our Lord fulfilled the precepts of the Law, + by adding some counsels of perfection: this is clearly seen in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.21" target="asv"> Mat. 19:21, </a> where Our Lord said to the man who affirmed that he had kept all the precepts of the Old Law: "One thing is wanting to thee: + If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell whatsoever thou hast," etc. [*St. Thomas combines + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p9.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.21" target="asv"> Mat. 19:21 </a>with + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p9.4" href="./asv.html#Mark.10.21" target="asv"> Mk. 10:21</a>]. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 2 co."><a name="38297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38297] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, lex nova comparatur ad veterem +sicut perfectum ad imperfectum. Omne autem perfectum adimplet id +quod imperfecto deest. Et secundum hoc lex nova adimplet veterem +legem, inquantum supplet illud quod veteri legi deerat. In veteri +autem lege duo possunt considerari, scilicet finis; et praecepta +contenta in lege. Finis vero cuiuslibet legis est ut homines +efficiantur iusti et virtuosi, ut supra dictum est. Unde et finis +veteris legis erat iustificatio hominum. Quam quidem lex efficere +non poterat, sed figurabat quibusdam caeremonialibus factis, et +promittebat verbis. Et quantum ad hoc, lex nova implet veterem +legem iustificando virtute passionis Christi. Et hoc est quod +apostolus dicit, ad Rom. VIII, <i>quod impossibile erat legi, Deus, +filium suum mittens in similitudinem carnis peccati, damnavit +peccatum in carne, ut iustificatio legis impleretur in nobis</i>. +Et quantum ad hoc, lex nova exhibet quod lex vetus promittebat; +secundum illud II ad Cor. I, quotquot promissiones Dei sunt, in +illo est, idest in Christo. Et iterum quantum ad hoc etiam complet +quod vetus lex figurabat. Unde ad Colos. II dicitur de +caeremonialibus quod erant umbra futurorum, corpus autem Christi, +idest, veritas pertinet ad Christum. Unde lex nova dicitur lex +veritatis, lex autem vetus umbrae vel figurae. Praecepta vero +veteris legis adimplevit Christus et opere, et doctrina. Opere +quidem, quia circumcidi voluit, et alia legalia observare, quae +erant illo tempore observanda; secundum illud Gal. IV, <i>factum +sub lege</i>. Sua autem doctrina adimplevit praecepta legis +tripliciter. Primo quidem, verum intellectum legis exprimendo. +Sicut patet in homicidio et adulterio, in quorum prohibitione +Scribae et Pharisaei non intelligebant nisi exteriorem actum +prohibitum, unde dominus legem adimplevit, ostendendo etiam +interiores actus peccatorum cadere sub prohibitione. Secundo, +adimplevit dominus praecepta legis, ordinando quomodo tutius +observaretur quod lex vetus statuerat. Sicut lex vetus statuerat ut +homo non peiuraret, et hoc tutius observatur si omnino a iuramento +abstineat, nisi in casu necessitatis. Tertio, adimplevit dominus +praecepta legis, superaddendo quaedam perfectionis consilia, ut +patet Matth. XIX, ubi dominus dicenti se observasse praecepta +veteris legis, dicit, unum tibi deest. <i>Si vis perfectus esse, +vade et vende omnia quae habes,</i> et cetera.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The New Law does not void observance of the Old Law except in the point of ceremonial precepts, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q103_A3" id="FS_Q107_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[103], AA[3]</a>,4). Now the latter were figurative of something to come. Wherefore from the very fact that the ceremonial precepts were fulfilled + when those things were accomplished which they foreshadowed, it follows that they are no longer to be observed: for it they + were to be observed, this would mean that + something is still to be accomplished and is not yet fulfilled. Thus the promise of a future gift holds no longer when it + has been fulfilled by the presentation of the gift. In this way the legal ceremonies are abolished by being fulfilled. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="38298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38298] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod lex nova non evacuat observantiam veteris legis +nisi quantum ad caeremonialia, ut supra habitum est. Haec autem +erant in figuram futuri. Unde ex hoc ipso quod caeremonialia +praecepta sunt impleta, perfectis his quae figurabantur, non sunt +ulterius observanda, quia si observarentur, adhuc significaretur +aliquid ut futurum et non impletum. Sicut etiam promissio futuri +doni locum iam non habet, promissione iam impleta per doni +exhibitionem et per hunc modum, caeremoniae legis tolluntur cum +implentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix, 26), those precepts of Our Lord are not contrary to the precepts of the Old Law. For + what Our Lord commanded about a man not putting away his wife, is not contrary to what the Law prescribed. "For the Law did + not say: 'Let him that wills, put his wife away': the contrary of which would be not to put her away. On the contrary, the + Law was unwilling that a man should put away his wife, since it prescribed a delay, + so that excessive eagerness for divorce might cease through being weakened during the writing of the bill. Hence Our Lord, + in order to impress the fact that a wife ought not easily to be put away, allowed no exception save in the case of fornication." + The same applies to the prohibition about swearing, as stated above. The same is also clear with respect to the prohibition + of retaliation. For the Law fixed a limit to revenge, by forbidding men to seek vengeance unreasonably: whereas Our Lord + deprived them of vengeance more completely by commanding them to abstain from it altogether. With regard to the hatred of + one's enemies, He dispelled the false interpretation of the Pharisees, by admonishing us to hate, not the person, but his + sin. As to discriminating between various foods, which was a ceremonial matter, Our Lord did not forbid this to be observed: + but He showed that no foods are naturally unclean, but only in token of something else, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q102_A6" id="FS_Q107_A2-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[102], A[6]</a>, ad 1). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="38299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38299] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, contra Faustum, praecepta +illa domini non sunt contraria praeceptis veteris legis <i>quod +enim dominus praecepit de uxore non dimittenda, non est contrarium +ei quod lex praecepit. Neque enim ait lex, qui voluerit, dimittat +uxorem; cui esset contrarium non dimittere. Sed utique nolebat +dimitti uxorem a viro, qui hanc interposuit moram, ut in dissidium +animus praeceps libelli conscriptione refractus absisteret. Unde +dominus, ad hoc confirmandum ut non facile uxor dimittatur, solam +causam fornicationis excepit</i>. Et idem etiam dicendum est in +prohibitione iuramenti, sicut dictum est. Et idem etiam patet in +prohibitione talionis. Taxavit enim modum vindictae lex, ut non +procederetur ad immoderatam vindictam, a qua dominus perfectius +removit eum quem monuit omnino a vindicta abstinere. Circa odium +vero inimicorum, removit falsum Pharisaeorum intellectum, nos +monens ut persona odio non haberetur, sed culpa. Circa discretionem +vero ciborum, quae caeremonialis erat, dominus non mandavit ut tunc +non observaretur, sed ostendit quod nulli cibi secundum suam +naturam erant immundi, sed solum secundum figuram, ut supra dictum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It was forbidden by the Law to touch a leper; because by doing so, man incurred a certain uncleanness of irregularity, as + also by touching the dead, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q102_A5" id="FS_Q107_A2-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[102], A[5]</a>, ad 4). But Our Lord, Who healed the leper, could not contract an uncleanness. By those things which He did on the sabbath, + He did not break the sabbath in reality, as the Master Himself shows in the Gospel: both because He worked miracles by His + Divine power, which is ever active among things; and because He worked miracles by His Divine power, which is ever active + among things; and because His works were concerned with the salvation of man, while the Pharisees were concerned for the well-being + of animals even on the sabbath; and again because on account of urgency He excused His disciples for gathering the ears of + corn on the sabbath. But He did seem to break the sabbath according to the superstitious interpretation of the Pharisees, + who thought that man ought to abstain from doing even works of kindness on the sabbath; which was contrary to the intention + of the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="38300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38300] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod tactus leprosi erat prohibitus in lege, quia ex hoc +incurrebat homo quandam irregularitatis immunditiam, sicut et ex +tactu mortui, ut supra dictum est. Sed dominus, qui erat mundator +leprosi, immunditiam incurrere non poterat. Per ea autem quae fecit +in sabbato, sabbatum non solvit secundum rei veritatem, sicut ipse +magister in Evangelio ostendit, tum quia operabatur miracula +virtute divina, quae semper operatur in rebus; tum quia salutis +humanae opera faciebat, cum Pharisaei etiam saluti animalium in die +sabbati providerent; tum quia etiam ratione necessitatis discipulos +excusavit in sabbato spicas colligentes. Sed videbatur solvere +secundum superstitiosum intellectum Pharisaeorum, qui credebant +etiam a salubribus operibus esse in die sabbati abstinendum, quod +erat contra intentionem legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The reason why the ceremonial precepts of the Law are not mentioned in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5" target="asv">Mat. 5</a> is because, as stated above (ad 1), their observance was abolished by their fulfilment. But of the judicial precepts He mentioned + that of retaliation: so that what He said about it should refer to all the others. With regard to this precept, He taught + that the intention of the Law was that retaliation should be sought out of love of justice, and not as a punishment out of + revengeful spite, which He forbade, admonishing man to be ready to suffer yet greater insults; and this remains still in the + New Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="38301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38301] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod caeremonialia praecepta legis non commemorantur +Matth. V, quia eorum observantia totaliter excluditur per +impletionem, ut dictum est. De iudicialibus vero praeceptis +commemoravit praeceptum talionis, ut quod de hoc diceretur, de +omnibus aliis esset intelligendum. In quo quidem praecepto docuit +legis intentionem non esse ad hoc quod poena talionis quaereretur +propter livorem vindictae, quem ipse excludit, monens quod homo +debet esse paratus etiam maiores iniurias sufferre, sed solum +propter amorem iustitiae. Quod adhuc in nova lege remanet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q107_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q107_A3-p0.1">Q. 107. A. 3. Whether the New Law is contained in the Old?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law is not contained in the Old. Because the New Law consists chiefly in faith: wherefore it is + called the "law of faith" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.27" target="asv">Rom. 3:27</a>). But many points of faith are set forth in the New Law, which are not contained in the Old. Therefore the New Law is not + contained in the Old. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="38302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38302] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova in lege veteri non +contineatur. Lex enim nova praecipue in fide consistit, unde +dicitur lex fidei, ut patet Rom. III. Sed multa credenda traduntur +in nova lege quae in veteri non continentur. Ergo lex nova non +continetur in veteri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a gloss says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.19" target="asv"> Mat. 5:19, </a> "He that shall break one of these least commandments," that the lesser commandments are those of the Law, and the greater + commandments, those contained in the Gospel. Now the greater cannot be contained in the lesser. Therefore the New Law is not + contained in the Old. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="38303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38303] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quaedam Glossa dicit, Matth. V, super illud, qui solverit unum de +mandatis istis minimis, quod mandata legis sunt minora, in +Evangelio vero sunt mandata maiora. Maius autem non potest +contineri in minori. Ergo lex nova non continetur in veteri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, who holds the container holds the contents. If, therefore, the New Law is contained in the Old, it follows that + whoever had the Old Law had the New: so that it was superfluous to give men a New Law when once they had the Old. Therefore + the New Law is not contained in the Old. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="38304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38304] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quod continetur in altero, simul habetur habito illo. Si igitur lex +nova contineretur in veteri, sequeretur quod, habita veteri lege, +habeatur et nova. Superfluum igitur fuit, habita veteri lege, +iterum dari novam. Non ergo nova lex continetur in veteri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> As expressed in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.1.16" target="asv"> Ezech. 1:16, </a> there was "a wheel in the midst of a wheel," i.e. "the New Testament within the Old," according to Gregory's exposition. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 3 s. c."><a name="38305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38305] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod, sicut dicitur Ezech. I, <i>rota erat in rota</i>, idest +novum testamentum in veteri, ut Gregorius exponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> One thing may be contained in another in two ways. First, actually; as a located thing is in a place. Secondly, virtually; + as an effect in its cause, or as the complement in that which is incomplete; thus a genus contains its species, and a seed + contains the whole tree, virtually. It is in this way that the New Law is contained in the Old: for it has been stated + <a href="#FS_Q107_A1" id="FS_Q107_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that the New Law is compared to the Old as perfect to imperfect. + Hence Chrysostom, expounding + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.4.28" target="asv"> Mk. 4:28, </a> "The earth of itself bringeth forth fruit, first the blade, then the ear, afterwards the full corn in the ear," expresses + himself as follows: "He brought forth first the blade, i.e. the Law of Nature; then the ear, i.e. the Law of Moses; lastly, + the full corn, i.e. the Law of the Gospel." Hence then the New Law is in the Old as the corn in the ear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 3 co."><a name="38306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38306] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquid continetur in alio dupliciter. Uno modo, in +actu, sicut locatum in loco. Alio modo, virtute, sicut effectus in +causa, vel complementum in incompleto, sicut genus continet species +potestate, et sicut tota arbor continetur in semine. Et per hunc +modum nova lex continetur in veteri, dictum est enim quod nova lex +comparatur ad veterem sicut perfectum ad imperfectum. Unde +Chrysostomus exponens illud quod habetur Marc. IV, <i>ultro terra +fructificat primum herbam, deinde spicam, deinde plenum frumentum +in spica</i>, sic dicit, <i>primo herbam fructificat in lege +naturae; postmodum spicas in lege Moysi; postea plenum frumentum, +in Evangelio</i>. Sic igitur est lex nova in veteri sicut fructus +in spica.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Whatsoever is set down in the New Testament explicitly and openly as a point of faith, is contained in the Old Testament + as a matter of belief, but implicitly, under a figure. And accordingly, even as to those things which we are bound to believe, + the New Law is contained in the Old. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="38307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38307] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omnia quae credenda traduntur in novo testamento +explicite et aperte, traduntur credenda in veteri testamento, sed +implicite sub figura. Et secundum hoc etiam quantum ad credenda lex +nova continetur in veteri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The precepts of the New Law are said to be greater than those of the Old Law, in the point of their being set forth explicitly. + But as to the substance itself of the precepts of the New Testament, they are all contained in the Old. Hence Augustine says + (Contra Faust. xix, 23,28) that "nearly all Our Lord's admonitions or precepts, where He expressed Himself by saying: 'But + I say unto you,' are to be found also in those ancient books. Yet, since they + thought that murder was only the slaying of the human body, Our Lord declared to them that every wicked impulse to hurt our + brother is to be looked on as a kind of murder." And it is in the point of declarations of this kind that the precepts of + the New Law are said to be greater than those of the Old. Nothing, however, prevents the greater from being contained in the + lesser virtually; just as a tree is contained in the seed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="38308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38308] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod praecepta novae legis dicuntur esse maiora quam +praecepta veteris legis, quantum ad explicitam manifestationem. Sed +quantum ad ipsam substantiam praeceptorum novi testamenti, omnia +continentur in veteri testamento. Unde Augustinus dicit, contra +Faustum, quod <i>pene omnia quae monuit vel praecepit dominus, ubi +adiungebat, ego autem dico vobis, inveniuntur etiam in illis +veteribus libris. Sed quia non intelligebant homicidium nisi +peremptionem corporis humani, aperuit dominus omnem iniquum motum +ad nocendum fratri, in homicidii genere deputari</i>. Et quantum ad +huiusmodi manifestationes, praecepta novae legis dicuntur maiora +praeceptis veteris legis. Nihil tamen prohibet maius in minori +virtute contineri, sicut arbor continetur in semine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> What is set forth implicitly needs to be declared explicitly. Hence after the publishing of the Old Law, a New Law also had + to be given. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="38309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38309] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illud quod implicite datum est, oportet explicari. Et +ideo post veterem legem latam, oportuit etiam novam legem dari.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q107_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q107_A4-p0.1">Q. 107. A. 4. Whether the New Law is more burdensome than the Old?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law is more burdensome than the Old. For Chrysostom (Opus Imp. in Matth., Hom. x [*The work of + an unknown author]) say: "The commandments given to Moses are easy to obey: Thou shalt not kill; Thou shalt not commit adultery: + but the commandments of Christ are difficult to accomplish, for instance: Thou shalt not give way to anger, or to lust." Therefore + the New Law is more burdensome than the Old. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="38310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38310] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova sit gravior quam lex vetus. +Matth. enim V, super illud, qui solverit unum de mandatis his +minimis, dicit Chrysostomus, <i>mandata Moysi in actu facilia sunt, +non occides, non adulterabis. Mandata autem Christi, idest, non +irascaris, non concupiscas, in actu difficilia sunt</i>. Ergo lex +nova est gravior quam vetus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is easier to make use of earthly prosperity than to suffer tribulations. But in the Old Testament observance + of the Law was followed by temporal prosperity, as may be gathered from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.28.1" target="asv"> Dt. 28:1-14</a>; whereas many kinds of trouble ensue to those who observe the New Law, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.4" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:4-10</a>: "Let us exhibit ourselves as the ministers of God, in much patience, in tribulation, in necessities, in distresses," + etc. Therefore the New Law is more burdensome than the Old. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="38311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38311] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +facilius est terrena prosperitate uti quam tribulationes perpeti. +Sed in veteri testamento observationem veteris legis consequebatur +prosperitas temporalis, ut patet Deut. XXVIII. Observatores autem +novae legis consequitur multiplex adversitas, prout dicitur II ad +Cor. VI, <i>exhibeamus nosmetipsos sicut Dei ministros in multa +patientia, in tribulationibus, in necessitatibus, in angustiis,</i> +et cetera. Ergo lex nova est gravior quam lex vetus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> The more one has to do, the more difficult it is. But the New Law is something added to the Old. For the Old Law forbade + perjury, while the New Law proscribed even swearing: the Old Law forbade a man to cast off his wife without a bill of divorce, + while the New Law forbade divorce altogether; as is clearly stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.31" target="asv"> Mat. 5:31, </a> seqq., according to Augustine's expounding. Therefore the New Law is more burdensome than the Old. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="38312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38312] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quod se habet ex additione ad alterum, videtur esse difficilius. +Sed lex nova se habet ex additione ad veterem. Nam lex vetus +prohibuit periurium, lex nova etiam iuramentum, lex vetus prohibuit +discidium uxoris sine libello repudii, lex autem nova omnino +discidium prohibuit, ut patet Matth. V, secundum expositionem +Augustini. Ergo lex nova est gravior quam vetus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.28" target="asv">Mat. 11:28</a>): "Come to Me, all you that labor and are burdened": which words are expounded by Hilary thus: "He calls to Himself all those + that labor under the difficulty of observing the Law, and are burdened with the sins of this world." And further on He says + of the yoke of the Gospel: "For My yoke is sweet and My burden light." Therefore the New Law is a lighter burden than the + Old. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 4 s. c."><a name="38313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38313] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Matth. XI, <i>venite ad me omnes qui laboratis et +onerati estis</i>. Quod exponens Hilarius dicit, <i>legis +difficultatibus laborantes, et peccatis saeculi oneratos, ad se +advocat</i>. Et postmodum de iugo Evangelii subdit, <i>iugum enim +meum suave est, et onus meum leve</i>. Ergo lex nova est levior +quam vetus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q107_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A twofold difficult may attach to works of virtue with which the precepts of the Law are concerned. One is on the part of + the outward works, which of themselves are, in a way, difficult and burdensome. And in this respect the Old Law is a much + heavier burden than the New: since the Old Law by its numerous ceremonies prescribed many more outward acts than the New Law, + which, in the teaching of Christ and the apostles, added very few precepts to those of the + natural law; although afterwards some were added, through being instituted by the holy Fathers. Even in these Augustine says + that moderation should be observed, lest good conduct should become a burden to the faithful. For he says in reply to the + queries of Januarius (Ep. lv) that, "whereas God in His mercy wished religion to be a free service rendered by the public + solemnization of a small number of most manifest sacraments, certain persons make it a slave's burden; so much so that the + state + of the Jews who were subject to the sacraments of the Law, and not to the presumptuous devices of man, was more tolerable." + </p><p id="FS_Q107_A4-p7"> The other difficulty attaches to works of virtue as to interior acts: for instance, that a virtuous deed be done with promptitude + and pleasure. It is this difficulty that virtue solves: because to act thus is difficult for a man without virtue: but through + virtue it becomes easy for him. In this respect the precepts of the New Law are more burdensome than those of the Old; because + the New Law prohibits certain interior movements of the soul, which were not expressly forbidden in + the Old Law in all cases, although they were forbidden in some, without, however, any punishment being attached to the prohibition. + Now this is very difficult to a man without virtue: thus even the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 9) that it is easy to do what + a righteous man does; but that to do it in the same way, viz. with pleasure and promptitude, is difficult to a man who is + not righteous. Accordingly we read also ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.5.3" target="asv">1 Jn. 5:3</a>) that "His commandments are not heavy": which + words Augustine expounds by saying that "they are not heavy to the man that loveth; whereas they are a burden to him that + loveth not." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 4 co."><a name="38314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38314] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod circa opera virtutis, de quibus praecepta legis +dantur, duplex difficultas attendi potest. Una quidem ex parte +exteriorum operum, quae ex seipsis quandam difficultatem habent et +gravitatem. Et quantum ad hoc, lex vetus est multo gravior quam +nova, quia ad plures actus exteriores obligabat lex vetus in +multiplicibus caeremoniis, quam lex nova, quae praeter praecepta +legis naturae, paucissima superaddidit in doctrina Christi et +apostolorum; licet aliqua sint postmodum superaddita ex +institutione sanctorum patrum. In quibus etiam Augustinus dicit +esse moderationem attendendam, ne conversatio fidelium onerosa +reddatur. Dicit enim, ad inquisitiones Ianuarii, de quibusdam, quod +<i>ipsam religionem nostram, quam in manifestissimis et paucissimis +celebrationum sacramentis Dei misericordia voluit esse liberam, +servilibus premunt oneribus, adeo ut tolerabilior sit conditio +Iudaeorum, qui legalibus sacramentis, non humanis praesumptionibus +subiiciuntur</i>. Alia autem difficultas est circa opera virtutum +in interioribus actibus, puta quod aliquis opus virtutis exerceat +prompte et delectabiliter. Et circa hoc difficile est virtus, hoc +enim non habenti virtutem est valde difficile; sed per virtutem +redditur facile. Et quantum ad hoc, praecepta novae legis sunt +graviora praeceptis veteris legis, quia in nova lege prohibentur +interiores motus animi, qui expresse in veteri lege non +prohibebantur in omnibus, etsi in aliquibus prohiberentur; in +quibus tamen prohibendis poena non apponebatur. Hoc autem est +difficillimum non habenti virtutem, sicut etiam philosophus dicit, +in V Ethic., quod operari ea quae iustus operatur, facile est; sed +operari ea eo modo quo iustus operatur, scilicet delectabiliter et +prompte, est difficile non habenti iustitiam. Et sic etiam dicitur +I Ioan. V, quod mandata eius gravia non sunt, quod exponens +Augustinus dicit quod <i>non sunt gravia amanti, sed non amanti +sunt gravia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage quoted speaks expressly of the difficulty of the New Law as to the deliberate curbing of interior movements. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="38315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38315] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa expresse loquitur de +difficultate novae legis quantum ad expressam cohibitionem +interiorum motuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The tribulations suffered by those who observe the New Law are not imposed by the Law itself. Moreover they are easily borne, + on account of the love in which the same Law consists: since, as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxx), "love makes light + and nothing of things that seem arduous and beyond our power." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="38316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38316] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod adversitates quas patiuntur observatores novae legis, +non sunt ab ipsa lege impositae. Sed tamen propter amorem, in quo +ipsa lex consistit, faciliter tollerantur, quia sicut Augustinus +dicit, in libro de verbis domini, <i>omnia saeva et immania facilia +et prope nulla efficit amor</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q107_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The object of these additions to the precepts of the Old Law was to render it easier to do what it prescribed, as Augustine + states [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 17,21; xix, 23,26]. Accordingly this does not prove that the New Law is more burdensome, + but rather that it is a lighter burden. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 107 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="38317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38317] Iª-IIae q. 107 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illae additiones ad praecepta veteris legis, ad hoc +ordinantur ut facilius impleatur quod vetus lex mandabat, sicut +Augustinus dicit. Et ideo per hoc non ostenditur quod lex nova sit +gravior, sed magis quod sit facilior.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q108" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q108-p0.1">Q. 108. OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE CONTAINED IN THE NEW LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q108-p2"> We must now consider those things that are contained in the New Law: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q108-p3"><a href="#FS_Q108_A1"> (1) Whether the New Law ought to prescribe or to forbid any outward works?</a></p><p id="FS_Q108-p4"><a href="#FS_Q108_A2"> (2) Whether the New Law makes sufficient provision in prescribing and forbidding external acts?</a></p><p id="FS_Q108-p5"><a href="#FS_Q108_A3"> (3) Whether in the matter of internal acts it directs man sufficiently?</a></p><p id="FS_Q108-p6"><a href="#FS_Q108_A4"> (4) Whether it fittingly adds counsels to precepts?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 pr."><a name="38318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38318] Iª-IIae q. 108 pr.</span></a> Deinde +considerandum est de his quae continentur in lege nova. Et circa +hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum lex nova debeat aliqua opera +exteriora praecipere vel prohibere. Secundo, utrum sufficienter se +habeat in exterioribus actibus praecipiendis vel prohibendis. +Tertio, utrum convenienter instituat homines quantum ad actus +interiores. Quarto, utrum convenienter superaddat consilia +praeceptis.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q108_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q108_A1-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 1. Whether the New Law ought to prescribe or prohibit any external acts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law should not prescribe or prohibit any external acts. For the New Law is the Gospel of the kingdom, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.14" target="asv"> Mat. 24:14</a>: "This Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in the whole world." But the kingdom of God consists not in exterior, but + only in interior acts, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.17.21" target="asv"> Lk. 17:21</a>: "The kingdom of God is within you"; and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.17" target="asv"> Rom. 14:17</a>: "The kingdom of God is not + meat and drink; but justice and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost." Therefore the New Law should not prescribe or forbid any + external acts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="38319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38319] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova nullos exteriores actus +debeat praecipere vel prohibere. Lex enim nova est Evangelium +regni; secundum illud Matth. XXIV, <i>praedicabitur hoc Evangelium +regni in universo orbe</i>. Sed regnum Dei non consistit in +exterioribus actibus, sed solum in interioribus; secundum illud +Luc. XVII, <i>regnum Dei intra vos est</i>; et Rom. XIV, <i>non est +regnum Dei esca et potus, sed iustitia et pax et gaudium in spiritu +sancto</i>. Ergo lex nova non debet praecipere vel prohibere +aliquos exteriores actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the New Law is "the law of the Spirit" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.2" target="asv">Rom. 8:2</a>). But "where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.17" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:17</a>). Now there is no liberty when man is bound to do or avoid certain external acts. Therefore the New Law does not prescribe + or forbid any external acts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="38320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38320] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +lex nova est lex spiritus, ut dicitur Rom. VIII. Sed ubi spiritus +domini, ibi libertas, ut dicitur II ad Cor. III. Non est autem +libertas ubi homo obligatur ad aliqua exteriora opera facienda vel +vitanda. Ergo lex nova non continet aliqua praecepta vel +prohibitiones exteriorum actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all external acts are understood as referable to the hand, just as interior acts belong to the mind. But this is + assigned as the difference between the New and Old Laws that the "Old Law restrains the hand, whereas the New Law curbs the + will" [*Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 40]. Therefore the New Law should not contain prohibitions and commands about exterior + deeds, but only about interior acts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="38321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38321] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +omnes exteriores actus pertinere intelliguntur ad manum, sicut +interiores actus pertinent ad animum. Sed haec ponitur differentia +inter novam legem et veterem, quod <i>vetus lex cohibet manum, sed +lex nova cohibet animum</i>. Ergo in lege nova non debent poni +prohibitiones et praecepta exteriorum actuum, sed solum +interiorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Through the New Law, men are made "children of light": wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.12.36" target="asv">Jn. 12:36</a>): "Believe in the light that you may be the children of light." Now it is becoming that children of the light should do deeds + of light and cast aside deeds of darkness, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.8" target="asv"> Eph. 5:8</a>: "You were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord. Walk . . . as children of the light." Therefore the New Law had + to forbid + certain external acts and prescribe others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 1 s. c."><a name="38322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38322] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod per legem novam efficiuntur homines filii lucis, unde +dicitur Ioan. XII, <i>credite in lucem, ut filii lucis sitis</i>. +Sed filios lucis decet opera lucis facere, et opera tenebrarum +abiicere; secundum illud Ephes. V, <i>eratis aliquando tenebrae, +nunc autem lux in domino. Ut filii lucis ambulate</i>. Ergo lex +nova quaedam exteriora opera debuit prohibere, et quaedam +praecipere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q108_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q106_A1" id="FS_Q108_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[106], AA[1]</a>,2), the New Law consists chiefly in the grace of the Holy Ghost, which is shown forth by faith that worketh through love. + Now men become receivers of this grace through God's Son made man, Whose humanity grace filled first, and thence flowed forth + to us. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#John.1.14" target="asv">Jn. 1:14</a>): "The Word was made flesh," and afterwards: "full of grace and truth"; and further on: "Of His + fulness we all have received, and grace for grace." Hence it is added that "grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." Consequently + it was becoming that the grace flows from the incarnate Word should be given to us by means of certain external sensible objects; + and that from this inward grace, whereby the flesh is subjected to the Spirit, certain external works should ensue. + </p><p id="FS_Q108_A1-p7"> Accordingly external acts may have a twofold connection with grace. In the first place, as leading in some way to grace. + Such are the sacramental acts which are instituted in the New Law, e.g. Baptism, the Eucharist, and the like. + </p><p id="FS_Q108_A1-p8"> In the second place there are those external acts which ensue from the promptings of grace: and herein we must observe a + difference. For there are some which are necessarily in keeping with, or in opposition to inward grace consisting in faith + that worketh through love. Such external works are prescribed or forbidden in the New Law; thus confession of faith is prescribed, + and denial of faith is forbidden; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.32" target="asv">Mat. 10:32,33</a>) "(Every one) that + shall confess Me before men, I will also confess him before My Father . . . But he that shall deny Me before men, I will also + deny him before My Father." On the other hand, there are works which are not necessarily opposed to, or in keeping with faith + that worketh through love. Such works are not prescribed or forbidden in the New Law, by virtue of its primitive institution; + but have been left by the Lawgiver, i.e. Christ, to the discretion of each individual. And so to each one it is free to + decide what he should do or avoid; and to each superior, to direct his subjects in such matters as regards what they must + do or avoid. Wherefore also in this respect the Gospel is called the "law of liberty" [*Cf. Reply OBJ[2]]: since the Old Law + decided many points and left few to man to decide as he chose. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 1 co."><a name="38323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38323] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, principalitas legis novae est +gratia spiritus sancti, quae manifestatur in fide per dilectionem +operante. Hanc autem gratiam consequuntur homines per Dei filium +hominem factum, cuius humanitatem primo replevit gratia, et exinde +est ad nos derivata. Unde dicitur Ioan. I, <i>verbum caro factum +est</i>; et postea subditur, <i>plenum gratiae et veritatis</i>; et +infra, <i>de plenitudine eius nos omnes accepimus, et gratiam pro +gratia</i>. Unde subditur quod gratia et veritas per Iesum Christum +facta est. Et ideo convenit ut per aliqua exteriora sensibilia +gratia a verbo incarnato profluens in nos deducatur; et ex hac +interiori gratia, per quam caro spiritui subditur, exteriora +quaedam opera sensibilia producantur. Sic igitur exteriora opera +dupliciter ad gratiam pertinere possunt. Uno modo, sicut inducentia +aliqualiter ad gratiam. Et talia sunt opera sacramentorum quae in +lege nova sunt instituta, sicut Baptismus, Eucharistia, et alia +huiusmodi. Alia vero sunt opera exteriora quae ex instinctu gratiae +producuntur. Et in his est quaedam differentia attendenda. Quaedam +enim habent necessariam convenientiam vel contrarietatem ad +interiorem gratiam, quae in fide per dilectionem operante +consistit. Et huiusmodi exteriora opera sunt praecepta vel +prohibita in lege nova, sicut praecepta est confessio fidei, et +prohibita negatio; dicitur enim Matth. X, <i>qui confitebitur me +coram hominibus, confitebor et ego eum coram patre meo. Qui autem +negaverit me coram hominibus, negabo et ego eum coram patre +meo</i>. Alia vero sunt opera quae non habent necessariam +contrarietatem vel convenientiam ad fidem per dilectionem +operantem. Et talia opera non sunt in nova lege praecepta vel +prohibita ex ipsa prima legis institutione; sed relicta sunt a +legislatore, scilicet Christo, unicuique, secundum quod aliquis +curam gerere debet. Et sic unicuique liberum est circa talia +determinare quid sibi expediat facere vel vitare; et cuicumque +praesidenti, circa talia ordinare suis subditis quid sit in talibus +faciendum vel vitandum. Unde etiam quantum ad hoc dicitur lex +Evangelii lex libertatis, nam lex vetus multa determinabat, et +pauca relinquebat hominum libertati determinanda.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The kingdom of God consists chiefly in internal acts: but as a consequence all things that are essential to internal acts + belong also to the kingdom of God. Thus if the kingdom of God is internal righteousness, peace, and spiritual joy, all external + acts that are incompatible with righteousness, peace, and spiritual joy, are in opposition to the kingdom of God; and consequently + should be forbidden in the Gospel of the kingdom. On the other hand, those + things that are indifferent as regards the aforesaid, for instance, to eat of this or that food, are not part of the kingdom + of God; wherefore the Apostle says before the words quoted: "The kingdom of God is not meat and drink." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="38324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38324] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod regnum Dei in interioribus actibus principaliter +consistit, sed ex consequenti etiam ad regnum Dei pertinent omnia +illa sine quibus interiores actus esse non possunt. Sicut si regnum +Dei est interior iustitia et pax et gaudium spirituale, necesse est +quod omnes exteriores actus qui repugnant iustitiae aut paci aut +gaudio spirituali, repugnent regno Dei, et ideo sunt in Evangelio +regni prohibendi. Illa vero quae indifferenter se habent respectu +horum, puta comedere hos vel illos cibos, in his non est regnum +Dei, unde apostolus praemittit, <i>non est regnum Dei esca et +potus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q108_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 2), what is "free is cause of itself." Therefore he acts freely, who acts of his + own accord. Now man does of his own accord that which he does from a habit that is suitable to his nature: since a habit inclines + one as a second nature. If, however, a habit be in opposition to nature, man would not act according to his nature, but according + to some corruption affecting that nature. Since then the grace of the + Holy Ghost is like an interior habit bestowed on us and inclining us to act aright, it makes us do freely those things that + are becoming to grace, and shun what is opposed to it. + </p><p id="FS_Q108_A1-p11"> Accordingly the New Law is called the law of liberty in two respects. First, because it does not bind us to do or avoid certain + things, except such as are of themselves necessary or opposed to salvation, and come under the prescription or prohibition + of the law. Secondly, because it also makes us comply freely with these precepts and prohibitions, inasmuch as we do so through + the promptings of grace. It is for these two reasons that the New Law is called "the law of perfect + liberty" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.25" target="asv">James 1:25</a>). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="38325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38325] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in I Metaphys., <i>liber est +qui sui causa est</i>. Ille ergo libere aliquid agit qui ex seipso +agit. Quod autem homo agit ex habitu suae naturae convenienti, ex +seipso agit, quia habitus inclinat in modum naturae. Si vero +habitus esset naturae repugnans, homo non ageret secundum quod est +ipse, sed secundum aliquam corruptionem sibi supervenientem. Quia +igitur gratia spiritus sancti est sicut interior habitus nobis +infusus inclinans nos ad recte operandum, facit nos libere operari +ea quae conveniunt gratiae, et vitare ea quae gratiae repugnant. +Sic igitur lex nova dicitur lex libertatis dupliciter. Uno modo, +quia non arctat nos ad facienda vel vitanda aliqua, nisi quae de se +sunt vel necessaria vel repugnantia saluti, quae cadunt sub +praecepto vel prohibitione legis. Secundo, quia huiusmodi etiam +praecepta vel prohibitiones facit nos libere implere, inquantum ex +interiori instinctu gratiae ea implemus. Et propter haec duo lex +nova dicitur lex perfectae libertatis, Iac. I.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The New Law, by restraining the mind from inordinate movements, must needs also restrain the hand from inordinate acts, which + ensue from inward movements. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="38326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38326] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod lex nova, cohibendo animum ab inordinatis motibus, +oportet quod etiam cohibeat manum ab inordinatis actibus, qui sunt +effectus interiorum motuum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q108_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q108_A2-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 2. Whether the New Law made sufficient ordinations about external acts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law made insufficient ordinations about external acts. Because faith that worketh through charity + seems chiefly to belong to the New Law, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.6" target="asv"> Gal. 5:6</a>: "In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision: but faith that worketh through charity." But + the New Law declared explicitly certain points of faith which were not set forth explicitly in the Old Law; for instance, + belief in + the Trinity. Therefore it should also have added certain outward moral deeds, which were not fixed in the Old Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="38327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38327] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad +secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex nova insufficienter +exteriores actus ordinaverit. Ad legem enim novam praecipue +pertinere videtur fides per dilectionem operans; secundum illud ad +Gal. V, <i>in Christo Iesu neque circumcisio aliquid valet neque +praeputium, sed fides quae per dilectionem operatur</i>. Sed lex +nova explicavit quaedam credenda quae non erant in veteri lege +explicita, sicut de fide Trinitatis. Ergo etiam debuit superaddere +aliqua exteriora opera moralia, quae non erant in veteri lege +determinata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the Old Law not only were sacraments instituted, but also certain sacred things, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q101_A4" id="FS_Q108_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[101], A[4]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q102_A4" id="FS_Q108_A2-p3.2" shape="rect"> Q[102], A[4]</a>). But in the New Law, although certain sacraments are instituted by Our Lord; for instance, pertaining either to the sanctification + of a temple or of the vessels, or to the celebration of some particular feast. Therefore the New Law made insufficient ordinations + about + external matters. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="38328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38328] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +in veteri lege non solum instituta sunt sacramenta, sed etiam +aliqua sacra, ut supra dictum est. Sed in nova lege, etsi sint +instituta aliqua sacramenta, nulla tamen sacra instituta a domino +videntur, puta quae pertineant vel ad sanctificationem alicuius +templi aut vasorum, vel etiam ad aliquam solemnitatem celebrandam. +Ergo lex nova insufficienter exteriora ordinavit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the Old Law, just as there were certain observances pertaining to God's ministers, so also were there certain + observances pertaining to the people: as was stated above when we were treating of the ceremonial of the Old Law ( + <a href="#FS_Q101_A4" id="FS_Q108_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[101], A[4]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q102_A6" id="FS_Q108_A2-p4.2" shape="rect"> Q[102], A[6]</a>). Now in the New Law certain observances seem to have been prescribed to the ministers of God; as may be gathered from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A2-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.9" target="asv"> Mat. 10:9</a>: + "Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses," nor other things which are mentioned here and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A2-p4.4" href="./asv.html#Luke.9" target="asv">Lk. 9</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A2-p4.5" href="./asv.html#Luke.10" target="asv">10</a>. Therefore certain observances pertaining to the faithful should also have been instituted in the New Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="38329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38329] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +in veteri lege, sicut erant quaedam observantiae pertinentes ad Dei +ministros, ita etiam erant quaedam observantiae pertinentes ad +populum; ut supra dictum est, cum de caeremonialibus veteris legis +ageretur. Sed in nova lege videntur aliquae observantiae esse datae +ministris Dei, ut patet Matth. X, <i>nolite possidere aurum neque +argentum, neque pecuniam in zonis vestris</i>, et cetera quae ibi +sequuntur, et quae dicuntur Luc. IX et X. Ergo etiam debuerunt +aliquae observantiae institui in nova lege ad populum fidelem +pertinentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in the Old Law, besides moral and ceremonial precepts, there were certain judicial precepts. But in the New Law + there are no judicial precepts. Therefore the New Law made insufficient ordinations about external works. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="38330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38330] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +in veteri lege, praeter moralia et caeremonialia, fuerunt quaedam +iudicialia praecepta. Sed in lege nova non traduntur aliqua +iudicialia praecepta. Ergo lex nova insufficienter exteriora opera +ordinavit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.24" target="asv">Mat. 7:24</a>): "Every one . . . that heareth these My words, and doth them, shall be likened to a wise man that built his house upon a + rock." But a wise builder leaves out nothing that is necessary to the building. Therefore Christ's words contain all things + necessary for man's salvation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 2 s. c."><a name="38331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38331] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dominus dicit, Matth. VII, <i>omnis qui audit verba mea +haec et facit ea, assimilabitur viro sapienti qui aedificavit domum +suam supra petram</i>. Sed sapiens aedificator nihil omittit eorum +quae sunt necessaria ad aedificium. Ergo in verbis Christi +sufficienter sunt omnia posita quae pertinent ad salutem +humanam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q108_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q108_A1" id="FS_Q108_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the New Law had to make such prescriptions or prohibitions alone as are essential for the reception or right use of grace. + And since we cannot of ourselves obtain grace, but through Christ alone, hence Christ of Himself instituted the sacraments + whereby we obtain grace: viz. Baptism, Eucharist, Orders of the ministers of the New Law, by the institution of the apostles + and seventy-two disciples, Penance, and + indissoluble Matrimony. He promised Confirmation through the sending of the Holy Ghost: and we read that by His institution + the apostles healed the sick by anointing them with oil ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.6.13" target="asv">Mk. 6:13</a>). These are the sacraments of the New Law. + </p><p id="FS_Q108_A2-p8"> The right use of grace is by means of works of charity. These, in so far as they are essential to virtue, pertain to the + moral precepts, which also formed part of the Old Law. Hence, in this respect, the New Law had nothing to add as regards external + action. The determination of these works in their relation to the divine worship, belongs to the ceremonial precepts of the + Law; and, in relation to our neighbor, to the judicial precepts, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q99_A4" id="FS_Q108_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[99], A[4]</a>). And therefore, since these determinations are not in themselves necessarily connected with inward grace wherein the Law + consists, they do not come under a precept of the New Law, but are left to the decision of man; some relating to inferiors---as + when a precept is given to an individual; others, relating to superiors, temporal or spiritual, referring, namely, to the + common good. + </p><p id="FS_Q108_A2-p9"> Accordingly the New Law had no other external works to determine, by prescribing or forbidding, except the sacraments, and + those moral precepts which have a necessary connection with virtue, for instance, that one must not kill, or steal, and so + forth. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 2 co."><a name="38332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38332] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, lex nova in exterioribus illa +solum praecipere debuit vel prohibere, per quae in gratiam +introducimur, vel quae pertinent ad rectum gratiae usum ex +necessitate. Et quia gratiam ex nobis consequi non possumus, sed +per Christum solum, ideo sacramenta, per quae gratiam consequimur, +ipse dominus instituit per seipsum, scilicet Baptismum, +Eucharistiam, ordinem ministrorum novae legis, instituendo +apostolos et septuaginta duos discipulos, et poenitentiam, et +matrimonium indivisibile. Confirmationem etiam promisit per +spiritus sancti missionem. Ex eius etiam institutione apostoli +leguntur oleo infirmos ungendo sanasse, ut habetur Marc. VI. Quae +sunt novae legis sacramenta. Rectus autem gratiae usus est per +opera caritatis. Quae quidem secundum quod sunt de necessitate +virtutis, pertinent ad praecepta moralia, quae etiam in veteri lege +tradebantur. Unde quantum ad hoc, lex nova super veterem addere non +debuit circa exteriora agenda. Determinatio autem praedictorum +operum in ordine ad cultum Dei, pertinet ad praecepta caeremonialia +legis; in ordine vero ad proximum, ad iudicialia; ut supra dictum +est. Et ideo, quia istae determinationes non sunt secundum se de +necessitate interioris gratiae, in qua lex consistit; idcirco non +cadunt sub praecepto novae legis, sed relinquuntur humano arbitrio; +quaedam quidem quantum ad subditos, quae scilicet pertinent +singillatim ad unumquemque; quaedam vero ad praelatos temporales +vel spirituales, quae scilicet pertinent ad utilitatem communem. +Sic igitur lex nova nulla alia exteriora opera determinare debuit +praecipiendo vel prohibendo, nisi sacramenta, et moralia praecepta +quae de se pertinent ad rationem virtutis, puta non esse +occidendum, non esse furandum, et alia huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Matters of faith are above human reason, and so we cannot attain to them except through grace. Consequently, when grace came + to be bestowed more abundantly, the result was an increase in the number of explicit points of faith. On the other hand, it + is through human reason that we are directed to works of virtue, for it is the rule of human action, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q19_A3" id="FS_Q108_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[3]</a>; + <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q63_A2" id="FS_Q108_A2-p10.2" shape="rect"> Q[63], A[2]</a>). Wherefore + in such matters as these there was no need for any precepts to be given besides the moral precepts of the Law, which proceed + from the dictate of reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="38333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38333] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ea quae sunt fidei, sunt supra rationem humanam, +unde in ea non possumus pervenire nisi per gratiam. Et ideo, +abundantiori gratia superveniente, oportuit plura credenda +explicari. Sed ad opera virtutum dirigimur per rationem naturalem, +quae est regula quaedam operationis humanae, ut supra dictum est. +Et ideo in his non oportuit aliqua praecepta dari ultra moralia +legis praecepta, quae sunt de dictamine rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the sacraments of the New Law grace is bestowed, which cannot be received except through Christ: consequently they had + to be instituted by Him. But in the sacred things no grace is given: for instance, in the consecration of a temple, an altar + or the like, or, again, in the celebration of feasts. Wherefore Our Lord left the institution of such things to the discretion + of the faithful, since they have not of themselves any necessary connection with + inward grace. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="38334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38334] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod in sacramentis novae legis datur gratia, quae non est +nisi a Christo, et ideo oportuit quod ab ipso institutionem +haberent. Sed in sacris non datur aliqua gratia, puta in +consecratione templi vel altaris vel aliorum huiusmodi, aut etiam +in ipsa celebritate solemnitatum. Et ideo talia, quia secundum +seipsa non pertinent ad necessitatem interioris gratiae, dominus +fidelibus instituenda reliquit pro suo arbitrio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q108_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Our Lord gave the apostles those precepts not as ceremonial observances, but as moral statutes: and they can be understood + in two ways. First, following Augustine (De Consensu Evang. 30), as being not commands but permissions. For He permitted them + to set forth to preach without scrip or stick, and so on, since they were empowered to accept their livelihood from those + to whom they preached: wherefore He goes on to say: "For the laborer is worthy of + his hire." Nor is it a sin, but a work of supererogation for a preacher to take means of livelihood with him, without accepting + supplies from those to whom he preaches; as Paul did ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A2-p12.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:4, </a> seqq.). + </p><p id="FS_Q108_A2-p13"> Secondly, according to the explanation of other holy men, they may be considered as temporal commands laid upon the apostles + for the time during which they were sent to preach in Judea before Christ's Passion. For the disciples, being yet as little + children under Christ's care, needed to receive some special commands from Christ, such as all subjects receive from their + superiors: and especially so, since they were to be accustomed little by little to renounce the care of + temporalities, so as to become fitted for the preaching of the Gospel throughout the whole world. Nor must we wonder if He + established certain fixed modes of life, as long as the state of the Old Law endured and the people had not as yet achieved + the perfect liberty of the Spirit. These statutes He abolished shortly before His Passion, as though the disciples had by + their means become sufficiently practiced. Hence He said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A2-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.22.35" target="asv">Lk. 22:35,36</a>) "When I sent you without purse and + scrip and shoes, did you want anything? But they said: Nothing. Then said He unto them: But now, he that hath a purse, let + him take it, and likewise a scrip." Because the time of perfect liberty was already at hand, when they would be left entirely + to their own judgment in matters not necessarily connected with virtue. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="38335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38335] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illa praecepta dominus dedit apostolis non tanquam +caeremoniales observantias, sed tanquam moralia instituta. Et +possunt intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum Augustinum, in +libro de consensu Evangelist., ut non sint praecepta, sed +concessiones. Concessit enim eis ut possent pergere ad +praedicationis officium sine pera et baculo et aliis huiusmodi, +tanquam habentes potestatem necessaria vitae accipiendi ab illis +quibus praedicabant, unde subdit, dignus enim est operarius cibo +suo. Non autem peccat, sed supererogat, qui sua portat, ex quibus +vivat in praedicationis officio, non accipiens sumptum ab his +quibus Evangelium praedicat, sicut Paulus fecit. Alio modo possunt +intelligi, secundum aliorum sanctorum expositionem, ut sint quaedam +statuta temporalia apostolis data pro illo tempore quo mittebantur +ad praedicandum in Iudaea ante Christi passionem. Indigebant enim +discipuli, quasi adhuc parvuli sub Christi cura existentes, +accipere aliqua specialia instituta a Christo, sicut et quilibet +subditi a suis praelatis, et praecipue quia erant paulatim +exercitandi ut temporalium sollicitudinem abdicarent, per quod +reddebantur idonei ad hoc quod Evangelium per universum orbem +praedicarent. Nec est mirum si, adhuc durante statu veteris legis, +et nondum perfectam libertatem spiritus consecutis, quosdam +determinatos modos vivendi instituit. Quae quidem statuta, +imminente passione, removit, tanquam discipulis iam per ea +sufficienter exercitatis. Unde Luc. XXII, dixit, <i>quando misi vos +sine sacculo et pera et calceamentis, numquid aliquid defuit vobis? +At illi dixerunt, nihil. Dixit ergo eis, sed nunc qui habet +sacculum, tollat; similiter et peram</i>. Iam enim imminebat tempus +perfectae libertatis, ut totaliter suo dimitterentur arbitrio in +his quae secundum se non pertinent ad necessitatem virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A2-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Judicial precepts also, are not essential to virtue in respect of any particular determination, but only in regard to the + common notion of justice. Consequently Our Lord left the judicial precepts to the discretion of those who were to have spiritual + or temporal charge of others. But as regards the judicial precepts of the Old Law, some of them He explained, because they + were misunderstood by the Pharisees, as we shall state later on (A[3], ad 2). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="38336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38336] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod iudicialia etiam, secundum se considerata, non sunt +de necessitate virtutis quantum ad talem determinationem sed solum +quantum ad communem rationem iustitiae. Et ideo iudicialia +praecepta reliquit dominus disponenda his qui curam aliorum erant +habituri vel spiritualem vel temporalem. Sed circa iudicialia +praecepta veteris legis quaedam explanavit, propter malum +intellectum Pharisaeorum, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q108_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q108_A3-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 3. Whether the New Law directed man sufficiently as regards interior actions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law directed man insufficiently as regards interior actions. For there are ten commandments of + the decalogue directing man to God and his neighbor. But Our Lord partly fulfilled only three of them: as regards, namely, + the prohibition of murder, of adultery, and of perjury. Therefore it seems that, by omitting to fulfil the other precepts, + He directed man insufficiently. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="38337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38337] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod circa interiores actus lex nova +insufficienter hominem ordinaverit. Sunt enim decem praecepta +Decalogi ordinantia hominem ad Deum et proximum. Sed dominus solum +circa tria illorum aliquid adimplevit, scilicet circa prohibitionem +homicidii, et circa prohibitionem adulterii, et circa prohibitionem +periurii. Ergo videtur quod insufficienter hominem ordinaverit, +adimpletionem aliorum praeceptorum praetermittens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as regards the judicial precepts, Our Lord ordained nothing in the Gospel, except in the matter of divorcing of + wife, of punishment by retaliation, and of persecuting one's enemies. But there are many other judicial precepts of the Old + Law, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q104_A4" id="FS_Q108_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[104], A[4]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q105" id="FS_Q108_A3-p3.2" shape="rect"> Q[105])</a>. Therefore, in this respect, He directed human life insufficiently. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="38338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38338] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +dominus nihil ordinavit in Evangelio de iudicialibus praeceptis +nisi circa repudium uxoris, et circa poenam talionis, et circa +persecutionem inimicorum. Sed multa sunt alia iudicialia praecepta +veteris legis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo quantum ad hoc, +insufficienter vitam hominum ordinavit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the Old Law, besides moral and judicial, there were ceremonial precepts about which Our Lord made no ordination. + Therefore it seems that He ordained insufficiently. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="38339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38339] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +in veteri lege, praeter praecepta moralia et iudicialia, erant +quaedam caeremonialia. Circa quae dominus nihil ordinavit. Ergo +videtur insufficienter ordinasse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in order that the mind be inwardly well disposed, man should do no good deed for any temporal whatever. But there + are many other temporal goods besides the favor of man: and there are many other good works besides fasting, alms-deeds, and + prayer. Therefore Our Lord unbecomingly taught that only in respect of these three works, and of no other earthly goods ought + we to shun the glory of human favor. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="38340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38340] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +ad interiorem bonam mentis dispositionem pertinet ut nullum bonum +opus homo faciat propter quemcumque temporalem finem. Sed multa +sunt alia temporalia bona quam favor humanus, multa etiam alia sunt +bona opera quam ieiunium, eleemosyna et oratio. Ergo inconveniens +fuit quod dominus docuit solum circa haec tria opera gloriam +favoris humani vitari, et nihil aliud terrenorum bonorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, solicitude for the necessary means of livelihood is by nature instilled into man, and this solicitude even other + animals share with man: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.6" target="asv">Prov. 6:6</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.8" target="asv">8</a>): "Go to the ant, O sluggard, and consider her ways . . . she provideth her meat for herself in the summer, and gathereth + her food in the harvest." But every command issued against the inclination of nature is an unjust command, forasmuch as it + is contrary to + the law of nature. Therefore it seems that Our Lord unbecomingly forbade solicitude about food and raiment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 3 arg. 5"><a name="38341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38341] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +naturaliter homini inditum est ut sollicitetur circa ea quae sunt +sibi necessaria ad vivendum, in qua etiam sollicitudine alia +animalia cum homine conveniunt, unde dicitur Prov. VI, <i>vade ad +formicam, o piger, et considera vias eius. Parat in aestate cibum +sibi, et congregat in messe quod comedat</i>. Sed omne praeceptum +quod datur contra inclinationem naturae, est iniquum, utpote contra +legem naturalem existens. Ergo inconvenienter videtur dominus +prohibuisse sollicitudinem victus et vestitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A3-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, no act of virtue should be the subject of a prohibition. Now judgment is an act of justice, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.18.15" target="asv"> Ps. 18:15</a>: "Until justice be turned into judgment." Therefore it seems that Our Lord unbecomingly forbade judgment: and consequently + that the New Law directed man insufficiently in the matter of interior acts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 3 arg. 6"><a name="38342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38342] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +nullus actus virtutis est prohibendus. Sed iudicium est actus +iustitiae; secundum illud Psalmi XCIII, <i>quousque iustitia +convertatur in iudicium</i>. Ergo inconvenienter videtur dominus +iudicium prohibuisse. Et ita videtur lex nova insufficienter +hominem ordinasse circa interiores actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A3-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1): We should take note that, when He said: "'He that heareth these My words,' + He indicates clearly that this sermon of the Lord is replete with all the precepts whereby a Christian's life is formed." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 3 s. c."><a name="38343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38343] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, +<i>considerandum est quia, cum dixit, qui audit verba mea haec, +satis significat sermonem istum domini omnibus praeceptis quibus +Christiana vita formatur, esse perfectum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q108_A3-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As is evident from Augustine's words just quoted, the sermon, contains the whole process of forming the life of a Christian. + Therein man's interior movements are ordered. Because after declaring that his end is Beatitude; and after commending the + authority of the apostles, through whom the teaching of the Gospel was to be promulgated, He orders man's interior movements, + first in regard to man himself, secondly in regard to his neighbor. + </p><p id="FS_Q108_A3-p10"> This he does in regard to man himself, in two ways, corresponding to man's two interior movements in respect of any prospective + action, viz. volition of what has to be done, and intention of the end. Wherefore, in the first place, He directs man's will + in respect of the various precepts of the Law: by prescribing that man should refrain not merely from those external works + that are evil in themselves, but also from internal acts, and from the occasions of evil deeds. In the + second place He directs man's intention, by teaching that in our good works, we should seek neither human praise, nor worldly + riches, which is to lay up treasures on earth. + </p><p id="FS_Q108_A3-p11"> Afterwards He directs man's interior movement in respect of his neighbor, by forbidding us, on the one hand, to judge him + rashly, unjustly, or presumptuously; and, on the other, to entrust him too readily with sacred things if he be unworthy. + </p><p id="FS_Q108_A3-p12"> Lastly, He teaches us how to fulfil the teaching of the Gospel; viz. by imploring the help of God; by striving to enter by + the narrow door of perfect virtue; and by being wary lest we be led astray by evil influences. Moreover, He declares that + we must observe His commandments, and that it is not enough to make profession of faith, or to work miracles, or merely to + hear His words. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 3 co."><a name="38344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38344] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex inducta auctoritate Augustini apparet, +sermo quem dominus in monte proposuit, totam informationem +Christianae vitae continet. In quo perfecte interiores motus +hominis ordinantur. Nam post declaratum beatitudinis finem; et +commendata apostolica dignitate, per quos erat doctrina evangelica +promulganda; ordinat interiores hominis motus, primo quidem quantum +ad seipsum; et deinde quantum ad proximum. Quantum autem ad +seipsum, dupliciter; secundum duos interiores hominis motus circa +agenda, qui sunt voluntas de agendis, et intentio de fine. Unde +primo ordinat hominis voluntatem secundum diversa legis praecepta, +ut scilicet abstineat aliquis non solum ab exterioribus operibus +quae sunt secundum se mala, sed etiam ab interioribus, et ab +occasionibus malorum. Deinde ordinat intentionem hominis, docens +quod in bonis quae agimus, neque quaeramus humanam gloriam, neque +mundanas divitias, quod est thesaurizare in terra. Consequenter +autem ordinat interiorem hominis motum quoad proximum, ut scilicet +eum non temerarie aut iniuste iudicemus, aut praesumptuose; neque +tamen sic simus apud proximum remissi, ut eis sacra committamus, si +sint indigni. Ultimo autem docet modum adimplendi evangelicam +doctrinam, scilicet implorando divinum auxilium; et conatum +apponendo ad ingrediendum per angustam portam perfectae virtutis; +et cautelam adhibendo ne a seductoribus corrumpamur. Et quod +observatio mandatorum eius est necessaria ad virtutem, non autem +sufficit sola confessio fidei, vel miraculorum operatio, vel solus +auditus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our Lord explained the manner of fulfilling those precepts which the Scribes and Pharisees did not rightly understand: and + this affected chiefly those precepts of the decalogue. For they thought that the prohibition of adultery and murder covered + the external act only, and not the internal desire. And they held this opinion about murder and adultery rather than about + theft and false witness, because the movement of anger tending to murder, and the + movement of desire tending to adultery, seem to be in us from nature somewhat, but not the desire of stealing or bearing false + witness. They held a false opinion about perjury, for they thought that perjury indeed was a sin; but that oaths were of themselves + to be desired and to be taken frequently, since they seem to proceed from reverence to God. Hence Our Lord shows that an oath + is not desirable as a good thing; and that it is better to speak without oaths, unless necessity forces us to have + recourse to them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="38345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38345] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod dominus circa illa legis praecepta adimpletionem +apposuit, in quibus Scribae et Pharisaei non rectum intellectum +habebant. Et hoc contingebat praecipue circa tria praecepta +Decalogi. Nam circa prohibitionem adulterii et homicidii, +aestimabant solum exteriorem actum prohiberi, non autem interiorem +appetitum. Quod magis credebant circa homicidium et adulterium quam +circa furtum vel falsum testimonium, quia motus irae in homicidium +tendens, et concupiscentiae motus tendens in adulterium, videntur +aliqualiter nobis a natura inesse; non autem appetitus furandi, vel +falsum testimonium dicendi. Circa periurium vero habebant falsum +intellectum, credentes periurium quidem esse peccatum; iuramentum +autem per se esse appetendum et frequentandum, quia videtur ad Dei +reverentiam pertinere. Et ideo dominus ostendit iuramentum non esse +appetendum tanquam bonum; sed melius esse absque iuramento loqui, +nisi necessitas cogat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q108_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Scribes and Pharisees erred about the judicial precepts in two ways. First, because they considered certain matters contained + in the Law of Moses by way of permission, to be right in themselves: namely, divorce of a wife, and the taking of usury from + strangers. Wherefore Our Lord forbade a man to divorce his wife ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.32" target="asv">Mat. 5:32</a>); and to receive usury ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p14.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.35" target="asv">Lk. 6:35</a>), when He said: "Lend, hoping for nothing + thereby." + </p><p id="FS_Q108_A3-p15"> In another way they erred by thinking that certain things which the Old Law commanded to be done for justice's sake, should + be done out of desire for revenge, or out of lust for temporal goods, or out of hatred of one's enemies; and this in respect + of three precepts. For they thought that desire for revenge was lawful, on account of the precept concerning punishment by + retaliation: whereas this precept was given that justice might be safeguarded, not that man might seek revenge. + Wherefore, in order to do away with this, Our Lord teaches that man should be prepared in his mind to suffer yet more if necessary. + They thought that movements of covetousness were lawful on account of those judicial precepts which prescribed restitution + of what had been purloined, together with something added thereto, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q105_A2" id="FS_Q108_A3-p15.1" shape="rect">Q[105], A[2]</a>, ad 9); whereas the Law commanded this to be done in order to safeguard justice, not to encourage covetousness. Wherefore + Our Lord teaches that we should not demand our goods from motives of cupidity, and that we should be ready to give yet more + if necessary. They thought that the movement of hatred was lawful, on account of the commandments of the Law about the slaying + of one's enemies: whereas the Law ordered this for the fulfilment of justice, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q105_A3" id="FS_Q108_A3-p15.2" shape="rect">Q[105], A[3]</a>, ad 4), not to satisfy hatred. Wherefore Our Lord teaches us that we ought to love our enemies, and to be ready to + do good to them if necessary. For these precepts are to be taken as binding "the mind to be prepared to fulfil them," as Augustine + says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="38346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38346] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod circa iudicialia praecepta dupliciter Scribae et +Pharisaei errabant. Primo quidem, quia quaedam quae in lege Moysi +erant tradita tanquam permissiones, aestimabant esse per se iusta, +scilicet repudium uxoris, et usuras accipere ab extraneis. Et ideo +dominus prohibuit uxoris repudium, Matth. V; et usurarum +acceptionem, Luc. VI, dicens, <i>date mutuum nihil inde +sperantes</i>. Alio modo errabant credentes quaedam quae lex vetus +instituerat facienda propter iustitiam, esse exequenda ex appetitu +vindictae; vel ex cupiditate temporalium rerum; vel ex odio +inimicorum. Et hoc in tribus praeceptis. Appetitum enim vindictae +credebant esse licitum, propter praeceptum datum de poena talionis. +Quod quidem fuit datum ut iustitia servaretur, non ut homo +vindictam quaereret. Et ideo dominus, ad hoc removendum, docet +animum hominis sic debere esse praeparatum ut, si necesse sit, +etiam paratus sit plura sustinere. Motum autem cupiditatis +aestimabant esse licitum, propter praecepta iudicialia in quibus +mandabatur restitutio rei ablatae fieri etiam cum aliqua additione, +ut supra dictum est. Et hoc quidem lex mandavit propter iustitiam +observandam, non ut daret cupiditati locum. Et ideo dominus docet +ut ex cupiditate nostra non repetamus, sed simus parati, si necesse +fuerit, etiam ampliora dare. Motum vero odii credebant esse +licitum, propter praecepta legis data de hostium interfectione. +Quod quidem lex statuit propter iustitiam implendam, ut supra +dictum est, non propter odia exsaturanda. Et ideo dominus docet ut +ad inimicos dilectionem habeamus, et parati simus, si opus fuerit, +etiam benefacere. Haec enim praecepta secundum praeparationem animi +sunt accipienda, ut Augustinus exponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A3-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The moral precepts necessarily retained their force under the New Law, because they are of themselves essential to virtue: + whereas the judicial precepts did not necessarily continue to bind in exactly the same way as had been fixed by the Law: this + was left to man to decide in one way or another. Hence Our Lord directed us becomingly with regard to these two kinds of precepts. + On the other hand, the observance of the ceremonial precepts was totally + abolished by the advent of the reality; wherefore in regard to these precepts He commanded nothing on this occasion when He + was giving the general points of His doctrine. Elsewhere, however, He makes it clear that the entire bodily worship which + was fixed by the Law, was to be changed into spiritual worship: as is evident from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p16.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.21" target="asv"> Jn. 4:21,23, </a> where He says: "The hour cometh when you shall neither on this mountain, nor in Jerusalem adore the Father . . . but . . + . the true + adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="38347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38347] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod praecepta moralia omnino in nova lege remanere +debebant, quia secundum se pertinent ad rationem virtutis. +Praecepta autem iudicialia non remanebant ex necessitate secundum +modum quem lex determinavit; sed relinquebatur arbitrio hominum +utrum sic vel aliter esset determinandum. Et ideo convenienter +dominus circa haec duo genera praeceptorum nos ordinavit. +Praeceptorum autem caeremonialium observatio totaliter per rei +impletionem tollebatur. Et ideo circa huiusmodi praecepta, in illa +communi doctrina, nihil ordinavit. Ostendit tamen alibi quod totus +corporalis cultus qui erat determinatus in lege, erat in +spiritualem commutandus; ut patet Ioan. IV, ubi dixit, <i>venit +hora quando neque in monte hoc neque in Ierosolymis adorabitis +patrem; sed veri adoratores adorabunt patrem in spiritu et +veritate</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A3-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All worldly goods may be reduced to three---honors, riches, and pleasures; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p17.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>: "All that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh," which refers to pleasures of the flesh, "and the concupiscence + of the eyes," which refers to riches, "and the pride of life," which refers to ambition for renown and honor. Now the Law + did not promise an abundance of carnal pleasures; on the contrary, it forbade them. But + it did promise exalted honors and abundant riches; for it is written in reference to the former ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p17.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.28.1" target="asv">Dt. 28:1</a>): "If thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord thy God . . . He will make thee higher than all the nations"; and in reference + to the latter, we read a little further on ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p17.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.28.11" target="asv">Dt. 28:11</a>): "He will make thee abound with all goods." But the Jews so distorted the true meaning of these promises, as to think that + we ought to serve God, with these things as the end + in view. Wherefore Our Lord set this aside by teaching, first of all, that works of virtue should not be done for human glory. + And He mentions three works, to which all others may be reduced: since whatever a man does in order to curb his desires, comes + under the head of fasting; and whatever a man does for the love of his neighbor, comes under the head of alms-deeds; and whatever + a man does for the worship of God, comes under the head of prayer. And He mentions these three specifically, as + they hold the principal place, and are most often used by men in order to gain glory. In the second place He taught us that + we must not place our end in riches, when He said: "Lay not up to yourselves treasures on earth" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p17.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.19" target="asv">Mat. 6:19</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="38348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38348] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod omnes res mundanae ad tria reducuntur, scilicet ad +honores, divitias et delicias; secundum illud I Ioan. II, omne quod +est in mundo, concupiscentia carnis est, quod pertinet ad delicias +carnis; et concupiscentia oculorum, quod pertinet ad divitias; et +superbia vitae, quod pertinet ad ambitum gloriae et honoris. +Superfluas autem carnis delicias lex non repromisit, sed magis +prohibuit. Repromisit autem celsitudinem honoris, et abundantiam +divitiarum, dicitur enim Deut. XXVIII, <i>si audieris vocem domini +Dei tui, faciet te excelsiorem cunctis gentibus</i>, quantum ad +primum; et post pauca subdit, <i>abundare te faciet omnibus +bonis</i>, quantum ad secundum. Quae quidem promissa sic prave +intelligebant Iudaei, ut propter ea esset Deo serviendum, sicut +propter finem. Et ideo dominus hoc removit, docens primo, quod +opera virtutis non sunt facienda propter humanam gloriam. Et ponit +tria opera, ad quae omnia alia reducuntur, nam omnia quae aliquis +facit ad refrenandum seipsum in suis concupiscentiis, reducuntur ad +ieiunium; quaecumque vero fiunt propter dilectionem proximi, +reducuntur ad eleemosynam; quaecumque vero propter cultum Dei +fiunt, reducuntur ad orationem. Ponit autem haec tria specialiter +quasi praecipua, et per quae homines maxime solent gloriam venari. +Secundo, docuit quod non debemus finem constituere in divitiis, cum +dixit, <i>nolite thesaurizare vobis thesauros in terra</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A3-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Our Lord forbade, not necessary, but inordinate solicitude. Now there is a fourfold solicitude to be avoided in temporal + matters. First, we must not place our end in them, nor serve God for the sake of the necessities of food and raiment. Wherefore + He says: "Lay not up for yourselves," etc. Secondly, we must not be so anxious about temporal things, as to despair of God's + help: wherefore Our Lord says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p18.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.32" target="asv">Mat. 6:32</a>): "Your Father + knoweth that you have need of all these things." Thirdly, we must not add presumption to our solicitude; in other words, we + must not be confident of getting the necessaries of life by our own efforts without God's help: such solicitude Our Lord sets + aside by saying that a man cannot add anything to his stature ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p18.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.27" target="asv">Mat. 6:27</a>). We must not anticipate the time for anxiety; namely, by being solicitous now, for the needs, not of the present, but of + a future time: wherefore He says + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p18.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.34" target="asv">Mat. 6:34</a>): "Be not . . . solicitous for tomorrow." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 3 ad 5"><a name="38349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38349] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod dominus sollicitudinem necessariam non prohibuit, sed +sollicitudinem inordinatam. Est autem quadruplex inordinatio +sollicitudinis vitanda circa temporalia. Primo quidem, ut in eis +finem non constituamus, neque Deo serviamus propter necessaria +victus et vestitus. Unde dicit, <i>nolite thesaurizare vobis</i> et +cetera. Secundo, ut non sic sollicitemur de temporalibus, cum +desperatione divini auxilii. Unde dominus dicit, <i>scit pater +vester quia his omnibus indigetis</i>. Tertio, ne sit sollicitudo +praesumptuosa, ut scilicet homo confidat se necessaria vitae per +suam sollicitudinem posse procurare, absque divino auxilio. Quod +dominus removet per hoc quod <i>homo non potest aliquid adiicere ad +staturam suam</i>. Quarto, per hoc quod homo sollicitudinis tempus +praeoccupat, quia scilicet de hoc sollicitus est nunc, quod non +pertinet ad curam praesentis temporis, sed ad curam futuri. Unde +dicit, nolite solliciti esse in crastinum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A3-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Our Lord did not forbid the judgment of justice, without which holy things could not be withdrawn from the unworthy. But + he forbade inordinate judgment, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 3 ad 6"><a name="38350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38350] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 3 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum +dicendum quod dominus non prohibet iudicium iustitiae, sine quo non +possent sancta subtrahi ab indignis. Sed prohibet iudicium +inordinatum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q108_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q108_A4-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 4. Whether certain definite counsels are fittingly proposed in the New Law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that certain definite counsels are not fittingly proposed in the New Law. For counsels are given about that + which is expedient for an end, as we stated above, when treating of counsel ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q14_A2" id="FS_Q108_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[14] , A[2]</a>). But the same things are not expedient for all. Therefore certain definite counsels should not be proposed to all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="38351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38351] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter in lege nova consilia +quaedam determinata sint proposita. Consilia enim dantur de rebus +expedientibus ad finem; ut supra dictum est, cum de consilio +ageretur. Sed non eadem omnibus expediunt. Ergo non sunt aliqua +consilia determinata omnibus proponenda.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, counsels regard a greater good. But there are no definite degrees to the greater good. Therefore definite counsels + should not be given. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="38352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38352] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +consilia dantur de meliori bono. Sed non sunt determinati gradus +melioris boni. Ergo non debent aliqua determinata consilia +dari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, counsels pertain to the life of perfection. But obedience pertains to the life of perfection. Therefore it was unfitting + that no counsel of obedience should be contained in the Gospel. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="38353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38353] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +consilia pertinent ad perfectionem vitae. Sed obedientia pertinet +ad perfectionem vitae. Ergo inconvenienter de ea consilium non +datur in Evangelio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, many matters pertaining to the life of perfection are found among the commandments, as, for instance, "Love your + enemies" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.44" target="asv">Mat. 5:44</a>), and those precepts which Our Lord gave His apostles ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.10" target="asv">Mat. 10</a>). Therefore the counsels are unfittingly given in the New Law: both because they are not all mentioned; and because they + are not distinguished from the commandments. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="38354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38354] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +multa ad perfectionem vitae pertinentia inter praecepta ponuntur, +sicut hoc quod dicitur, diligite inimicos vestros; et praecepta +etiam quae dedit dominus apostolis, Matth. X. Ergo inconvenienter +traduntur consilia in nova lege, tum quia non omnia ponuntur; tum +etiam quia a praeceptis non distinguuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The counsels of a wise friend are of great use, according to Prov. (27:9): "Ointment and perfumes rejoice the heart: and + the good counsels of a friend rejoice the soul." But Christ is our wisest and greatest friend. Therefore His counsels are + supremely useful and becoming. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 4 s. c."><a name="38355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38355] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +consilia sapientis amici magnam utilitatem afferunt; secundum illud +Prov. XXVII, <i>unguento et variis odoribus delectatur cor, et +bonis amici consiliis anima dulcoratur</i>. Sed Christus maxime est +sapiens et amicus. Ergo eius consilia maximam utilitatem continent, +et convenientia sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q108_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The difference between a counsel and a commandment is that a commandment implies obligation, whereas a counsel is left to + the option of the one to whom it is given. Consequently in the New Law, which is the law of liberty, counsels are added to + the commandments, and not in the Old Law, which is the law of bondage. We must therefore understand the commandments of the + New Law to have been given about matters that are necessary to gain the end of eternal bliss, + to which end the New Law brings us forthwith: but that the counsels are about matters that render the gaining of this end + more assured and expeditious. + </p><p id="FS_Q108_A4-p8"> Now man is placed between the things of this world, and spiritual goods wherein eternal happiness consists: so that the more + he cleaves to the one, the more he withdraws from the other, and conversely. Wherefore he that cleaves wholly to the things + of this world, so as to make them his end, and to look upon them as the reason and rule of all he does, falls away altogether + from spiritual goods. Hence this disorder is removed by the commandments. Nevertheless, for man to gain the + end aforesaid, he does not need to renounce the things of the world altogether: since he can, while using the things of this + world, attain to eternal happiness, provided he does not place his end in them: but he will attain more speedily thereto by + giving up the goods of this world entirely: wherefore the evangelical counsels are given for this purpose. + </p><p id="FS_Q108_A4-p9"> Now the goods of this world which come into use in human life, consist in three things: viz. in external wealth pertaining + to the "concupiscence of the eyes"; carnal pleasures pertaining to the "concupiscence of the flesh"; and honors, which pertain + to the "pride of life," according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>: and it is in renouncing these altogether, as far as possible, that the evangelical counsels consist. Moreover, every form + of the religious life that professes the + state of perfection is based on these three: since riches are renounced by poverty; carnal pleasures by perpetual chastity; + and the pride of life by the bondage of obedience. + </p><p id="FS_Q108_A4-p10"> Now if a man observe these absolutely, this is in accordance with the counsels as they stand. But if a man observe any one + of them in a particular case, this is taking that counsel in a restricted sense, namely, as applying to that particular case. + For instance, when anyone gives an alms to a poor man, not being bound so to do, he follows the counsels in that particular + case. In like manner, when a man for some fixed time refrains from carnal pleasures that he may give himself + to prayer, he follows the counsel for that particular time. And again, when a man follows not his will as to some deed which + he might do lawfully, he follows the counsel in that particular case: for instance, if he do good to his enemies when he is + not bound to, or if he forgive an injury of which he might justly seek to be avenged. In this way, too, all particular counsels + may be reduced to these three general and perfect counsels. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 4 co."><a name="38356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38356] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod haec est differentia inter consilium et praeceptum, +quod praeceptum importat necessitatem, consilium autem in optione +ponitur eius cui datur. Et ideo convenienter in lege nova, quae est +lex libertatis, supra praecepta sunt addita consilia, non autem in +veteri lege, quae erat lex servitutis. Oportet igitur quod +praecepta novae legis intelligantur esse data de his quae sunt +necessaria ad consequendum finem aeternae beatitudinis, in quem lex +nova immediate introducit. Consilia vero oportet esse de illis per +quae melius et expeditius potest homo consequi finem praedictum. +Est autem homo constitutus inter res mundi huius et spiritualia +bona, in quibus beatitudo aeterna consistit, ita quod quanto plus +inhaeret uni eorum, tanto plus recedit ab altero, et e converso. +Qui ergo totaliter inhaeret rebus huius mundi, ut in eis finem +constituat, habens eas quasi rationes et regulas suorum operum, +totaliter excidit a spiritualibus bonis. Et ideo huiusmodi +inordinatio tollitur per praecepta. Sed quod homo totaliter ea quae +sunt mundi abiiciat, non est necessarium ad perveniendum in finem +praedictum, quia potest homo utens rebus huius mundi, dummodo in +eis finem non constituat, ad beatitudinem aeternam pervenire. Sed +expeditius perveniet totaliter bona huius mundi abdicando. Et ideo +de hoc dantur consilia Evangelii. Bona autem huius mundi, quae +pertinent ad usum humanae vitae, in tribus consistunt, scilicet in +divitiis exteriorum bonorum, quae pertinent ad concupiscentiam +oculorum; in deliciis carnis, quae pertinent ad concupiscentiam +carnis; et in honoribus, quae pertinent ad superbiam vitae; sicut +patet I Ioan. II. Haec autem tria totaliter derelinquere, secundum +quod possibile est, pertinet ad consilia evangelica. In quibus +etiam tribus fundatur omnis religio, quae statum perfectionis +profitetur, nam divitiae abdicantur per paupertatem; deliciae +carnis per perpetuam castitatem; superbia vitae per obedientiae +servitutem. Haec autem simpliciter observata pertinent ad consilia +simpliciter proposita. Sed observatio uniuscuiusque eorum in aliquo +speciali casu, pertinet ad consilium secundum quid, scilicet in +casu illo. Puta cum homo dat aliquam eleemosynam pauperi quam dare +non tenetur, consilium sequitur quantum ad factum illud. Similiter +etiam quando aliquo tempore determinato a delectationibus carnis +abstinet ut orationibus vacet, consilium sequitur pro tempore illo. +Similiter etiam quando aliquis non sequitur voluntatem suam in +aliquo facto quod licite posset facere, consilium sequitur in casu +illo, puta si benefaciat inimicis quando non tenetur, vel si +offensam remittat cuius iuste posset exigere vindictam. Et sic +etiam omnia consilia particularia ad illa tria generalia et +perfecta reducuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The aforesaid counsels, considered in themselves, are expedient to all; but owing to some people being ill-disposed, it happens + that some of them are inexpedient, because their disposition is not inclined to such things. Hence Our Lord, in proposing + the evangelical counsels, always makes mention of man's fitness for observing the counsels. For in giving the counsel of perpetual + poverty ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.21" target="asv">Mat. 19:21</a>), He begins with the words: "If + thou wilt be perfect," and then He adds: "Go, sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast." In like manner when He gave the counsel + of perpetual chastity, saying ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.12" target="asv">Mat. 19:12</a>): "There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven," He adds straightway: "He that can take, + let him take it." And again, the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p11.3" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.35" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:35</a>), after giving the counsel of virginity, says: "And this I speak for your profit; not to cast a snare upon you." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="38357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38357] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod praedicta consilia, quantum est de se sunt +omnibus expedientia, sed ex indispositione aliquorum contingit quod +alicui expedientia non sunt, quia eorum affectus ad haec non +inclinatur. Et ideo dominus, consilia evangelica proponens, semper +facit mentionem de idoneitate hominum ad observantiam consiliorum. +Dans enim consilium perpetuae paupertatis, Matth. XIX, praemittit, +<i>si vis perfectus esse</i>; et postea subdit, <i>vade et vende +omnia quae habes</i>. Similiter, dans consilium perpetuae +castitatis, cum dixit, <i>sunt eunuchi qui castraverunt seipsos +propter regnum caelorum</i>, statim subdit, <i>qui potest capere, +capiat</i>. Et similiter apostolus, I ad Cor. VII, praemisso +consilio virginitatis, dicit, <i>porro hoc ad utilitatem vestram +dico, non ut laqueum vobis iniiciam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The greater goods are not definitely fixed in the individual; but those which are simply and absolutely the greater good + in general are fixed: and to these all the above particular goods may be reduced, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="38358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38358] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod meliora bona particulariter in singulis sunt +indeterminata. Sed illa quae sunt simpliciter et absolute meliora +bona in universali, sunt determinata. Ad quae etiam omnia illa +particularia reducuntur, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even the counsel of obedience is understood to have been given by Our Lord in the words: "And [let him] follow Me." For we + follow Him not only by imitating His works, but also by obeying His commandments, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p13.1" href="./asv.html#John.10.27" target="asv"> Jn. 10:27</a>: "My sheep hear My voice . . . and they follow Me." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="38359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38359] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam consilium obedientiae dominus intelligitur +dedisse in hoc quod dixit, et sequatur me; quem sequimur non solum +imitando opera, sed etiam obediendo mandatis ipsius; secundum illud +Ioan. X. <i>Oves meae vocem meam audiunt, et sequuntur me</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q108_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those things which Our Lord prescribed about the true love of our enemies, and other similar sayings ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5" target="asv">Mat. 5</a>; + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p14.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.6" target="asv">Lk. 6</a>), may be referred to the preparation of the mind, and then they are necessary for salvation; for instance, that man be prepared + to do good to his enemies, and other similar actions, when there is need. Hence these things are placed among the precepts. + But that anyone should actually and promptly behave thus towards an enemy when there is + no special need, is to be referred to the particular counsels, as stated above. As to those matters which are set down in + + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p14.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.10" target="asv">Mat. 10</a> and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p14.4" href="./asv.html#Luke.9" target="asv">Lk. 9</a> and 10, they were either disciplinary commands for that particular time, or concessions, as stated above (A[2], ad 3). Hence + they are not set down among the counsels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 108 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="38360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[38360] Iª-IIae q. 108 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod ea quae de vera dilectione inimicorum, et similibus, +dominus dicit Matth. V et Luc. VI, si referantur ad praeparationem +animi, sunt de necessitate salutis, ut scilicet homo sit paratus +benefacere inimicis, et alia huiusmodi facere, cum necessitas hoc +requirat. Et ideo inter praecepta ponuntur. Sed ut aliquis hoc +inimicis exhibeat prompte in actu, ubi specialis necessitas non +occurrit, pertinet ad consilia particularia, ut dictum est. Illa +autem quae ponuntur Matth. X, et Luc. IX, et X, fuerunt quaedam +praecepta disciplinae pro tempore illo, vel concessiones quaedam, +ut supra dictum est. Et ideo non inducuntur tanquam consilia.</p></div></div></div></div> + + + ` + </div> + </body> + </html>