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--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/summa/english/XP_iii.html Sun Jan 03 14:43:02 2010 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,7641 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="XP.iii" class="div2"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q68_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69.html"></a> + <h2 id="XP.iii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE RESURRECTION (QQ[69]-86)</h2> + <div id="XP_Q69" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.XP.iii.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="XP_Q69-p0.1">OF MATTERS CONCERNING THE RESURRECTION, AND FIRST OF THE PLACE WHERE SOULS ARE AFTER DEATH (SEVEN ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="XP_Q69-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q69-p2"> In sequence to the foregoing we must treat of matters concerning the state of resurrection: for after speaking of the sacraments + whereby man is delivered from the death of sin, we must next speak of the resurrection whereby man is delivered from the death + of punishment. The treatise on the resurrection offers a threefold consideration, namely the things that precede, those that + accompany, and those that follow the resurrection. Consequently we must speak (1) of those things which + partly, though not wholly, precede the resurrection; (2) of the resurrection itself and its circumstances; (3) of the things + which follow it. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69-p3"> Among the things which precede the resurrection we must consider (1) the places appointed for the reception of bodies after + death; (2) the quality of separated souls, and the punishment inflicted on them by fire; (3) the suffrages whereby the souls + of the departed are assisted by the living; (4) the prayers of the saints in heaven; (5) the signs preceding the general judgment; + (6) the fire of the world's final conflagration which will precede the appearance of the Judge. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69-p4"> Under the first head there are seven points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="XP_Q69-p5"> (1) Whether any places are appointed to receive souls after death?</p> + <p id="XP_Q69-p6"> (2) Whether souls are conveyed thither immediately after death?</p> + <p id="XP_Q69-p7"> (3) Whether they are able to leave those places?</p> + <p id="XP_Q69-p8"> (4) Whether the limbo of hell is the same as Abraham's bosom?</p> + <p id="XP_Q69-p9"> (5) Whether limbo is the same as the hell of the damned?</p> + <p id="XP_Q69-p10"> (6) Whether the limbo of the patriarchs is the same as the limbo of children?</p> + <p id="XP_Q69-p11"> (7) Whether so many places should be distinguished?</p> + <div id="XP_Q69_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q69_A1-p0.1">Whether places are appointed to receive souls after death?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q69_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that places are not appointed to receive souls after death. For as Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "Wise men are + agreed that incorporeal things are not in a place," and this agrees with the words of Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32): "We + can answer without hesitation that the soul is not conveyed to corporeal places, except with a body, or that it is not conveyed + locally." Now the soul separated from the body is without a body, as Augustine also says + (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32). Therefore it is absurd to assign any places for the reception of souls. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever has a definite place has more in common with that place than with any other. Now separated souls, like + certain other spiritual substances, are indifferent to all places; for it cannot be said that they agree with certain bodies, + and differ from others, since they are utterly removed from all corporeal conditions. Therefore places should not be assigned + for their reception. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing is assigned to separated souls after death, except what conduces to their punishment or to their reward. + But a corporeal place cannot conduce to their punishment or reward, since they receive nothing from bodies. Therefore definite + places should not be assigned to receive them. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The empyrean heaven is a corporeal place, and yet as soon as it was made it was filled with the holy angels, as Bede [*Hexaem. + i, ad + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q69_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.2" target="asv"> Gn. 1:2</a>] says. Since then angels even as separated souls are incorporeal, it would seem that some place should also be assigned to + receive separated souls. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A1-p6"> Further, this appears from Gregory's statement (Dial. iv) that souls after death are conveyed to various corporeal places, + as in the case of Paschasius whom Germanus, Bishop of Capua, found at the baths, and of the soul of King Theodoric, which + he asserts to have been conveyed to hell. Therefore after death souls have certain places for their reception. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Although spiritual substances do not depend on a body in respect of their being, nevertheless the corporeal world is governed + by God by means of the spiritual world, as asserted by Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) and Gregory (Dial. iv, 6). Hence it is + that there is a certain fittingness by way of congruity of spiritual substances to corporeal substances, in that the more + noble bodies are adapted to the more noble substances: wherefore also the philosophers held + that the order of separate substances is according to the order of movables. And though after death souls have no bodies assigned + to them whereof they be the forms or determinate motors, nevertheless certain corporeal places are appointed to them by way + of congruity in reference to their degree of nobility (wherein they are as though in a place, after the manner in which incorporeal + things can be in a place), according as they more or less approach to the first substance (to which the highest + place it fittingly assigned), namely God, whose throne the Scriptures proclaim heaven to be ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q69_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.102.19" target="asv">Ps. 102:19, </a> + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q69_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.66.1" target="asv">Is. 66:1</a>). Wherefore we hold that those souls that have a perfect share of the Godhead are in heaven, and that those souls that are + deprived of that share are assigned to a contrary place. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Incorporeal things are not in place after a manner known and familiar to us, in which way we say that bodies are properly + in place; but they are in place after a manner befitting spiritual substances, a manner that cannot be fully manifest to us. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things have something in common with or a likeness to one another in two ways. First, by sharing a same quality: thus hot + things have something in common, and incorporeal things can have nothing in common with corporeal things in this way. Secondly, + by a kind of proportionateness, by reason of which the Scriptures apply the corporeal world to the spiritual metaphorically. + Thus the Scriptures speak of God as the sun, because He is the principle of + spiritual life, as the sun is of corporeal life. In this way certain souls have more in common with certain places: for instance, + souls that are spiritually enlightened, with luminous bodies, and souls that are plunged in darkness by sin, with dark places. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The separated soul receives nothing directly from corporeal places in the same way as bodies which are maintained by their + respective places: yet these same souls, through knowing themselves to be appointed to such places, gather joy or sorrow therefrom; + and thus their place conduces to their punishment or reward. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q69_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q69_A2-p0.1">Whether souls are conveyed to heaven or hell immediately after death?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q69_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no souls are conveyed to heaven or hell immediately after death. For a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q69_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.36.10" target="asv"> Ps. 36:10, </a> "Yet a little while and the wicked shall not be," says that "the saints are delivered at the end of life; yet after this + life they will not yet be where the saints will be when it is said to them: Come ye blessed of My Father." Now those saints + will be in heaven. Therefore after this life the saints do not go immediately up to + heaven. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion cix) that "the time which lies between man's death and the final resurrection holds + the souls in secret receptacles according as each one is worthy of rest or of suffering." Now these secret abodes cannot denote + heaven and hell, since also after the final resurrection the souls will be there together with their bodies: so that he would + have no reason to distinguish between the time before and the time after the + resurrection. Therefore they will be neither in hell nor in heaven until the day of judgment. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the glory of the soul is greater than that of bodies. Now the glory of the body is awarded to all at the same time, + so that each one may have the greater joy in the common rejoicing of all, as appears from a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q69_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.40" target="asv"> Heb. 11:40, </a> "God providing some better thing for us---that the common joy may make each one rejoice the more." Much more, therefore, + ought the glory of souls to be deferred until the end, so as to be awarded to all at + the same time. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, punishment and reward, being pronounced by the sentence of the judge, should not precede the judgment. Now hell + fire and the joys of heaven will be awarded to all by the sentence of Christ judging them, namely at the last judgment, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q69_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25" target="asv">Mat. 25</a>. Therefore no one will go up to heaven or down to hell before the day of judgment. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q69_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.5.1" target="asv">2 Cor. 5:1</a>): "If our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, that we have . . . a house not made with hands, but reserved in + heaven [*Vulg.: 'eternal in heaven'; cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q69_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iPet.1.4" target="asv">1 Pet. 1:4</a>]." Therefore, after the body's dissolution, the soul has an abode, which had been reserved for it in heaven. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A2-p7"> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q69_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.1.23" target="asv">Phil. 1:23</a>): "I desire [Vulg.: 'Having a desire'] to be dissolved and to be with Christ." From these words Gregory argues as follows + (Dial. iv, 25): "If there is no doubt that Christ is in heaven, it cannot be denied that Paul's soul is in heaven likewise." + Now it cannot be gainsaid that Christ is in heaven, since this is an article of faith. Therefore neither is it to be denied + that the souls of the saints are borne to heaven. + That also some souls go down to hell immediately after death is evident from + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q69_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.22" target="asv"> Lk. 16:22, </a> "And the rich man died, and he was buried in hell." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A2-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Even as in bodies there is gravity or levity whereby they are borne to their own place which is the end of their movement, + so in souls there is merit or demerit whereby they reach their reward or punishment, which are the ends of their deeds. Wherefore + just as a body is conveyed at once to its place, by its gravity or levity, unless there be an obstacle, so too the soul, the + bonds of the flesh being broken, whereby it was detained in the state of the way, + receives at once its reward or punishment, unless there be an obstacle. Thus sometimes venial sin, though needing first of + all to be cleansed, is an obstacle to the receiving of the reward; the result being that the reward is delayed. And since + a place is assigned to souls in keeping with their reward or punishment, as soon as the soul is set free from the body it + is either plunged into hell or soars to heaven, unless it be held back by some debt, for which its flight must needs be delayed + until the soul is first of all cleansed. This truth is attested by the manifest authority of the canonical Scriptures and + the doctrine of the holy Fathers; wherefore the contrary must be judged heretical as stated in Dial. iv, 25, and in De Eccl. + Dogm. xlvi. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The gloss explains itself: for it expounds the words, "They will not yet be where the saints will be," etc., by saying immediately + afterwards: "That is to say, they will not have the double stole which the saints will have at the resurrection." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Among the secret abodes of which Augustine speaks, we must also reckon hell and heaven, where some souls are detained before + the resurrection. The reason why a distinction is drawn between the time before and the time after the resurrection is because + before the resurrection they are there without the body whereas afterwards they are with the body, and because in certain + places there are souls now which will not be there after the resurrection. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is a kind of continuity among men as regards the body, because in respect thereof is verified the saying of + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q69_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.17.24" target="asv"> Acts 17:24,26, </a> "God . . . hath made of one all mankind": whereas He has fashioned souls independently of one another. Consequently it is + not so fitting that all men should be glorified together in the soul as that they should be glorified together in the body. + Moreover the glory of the body is not so essential as the + glory of the soul; wherefore it would be more derogatory to the saints if the glory of the soul were delayed, than that the + glory of the body be deferred: nor could this detriment to their glory be compensated on account of the joy of each one being + increased by the common joy. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Gregory proposes and solves this very difficulty (Dial. iv, 25): "If then," he says, "the souls of the just are in heaven + now, what will they receive in reward for their justice on the judgment day?" And he answers: "Surely it will be a gain to + them at the judgment, that whereas now they enjoy only the happiness of the soul, afterwards they will enjoy also that of + the body, so as to rejoice also in the flesh wherein they bore sorrow and torments for + the Lord." The same is to be said in reference to the damned. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A2-p13"></p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A2-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q69_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q69_A3-p0.1">Whether the souls who are in heaven or hell are able to go from thence?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q69_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the souls in heaven or hell are unable to go from thence. For Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xiii): + "If the souls of the dead took any part in the affairs of the living, to say nothing of others, there is myself whom not for + a single night would my loving mother fail to visit since she followed me by land and sea in order to abide with me": and + from this he concludes that the souls of the departed do not mingle in the affairs of the + living. But they would be able to do so if they were to leave their abode. Therefore they do not go forth from their abode. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q69_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.26.4" target="asv">Ps. 26:4</a>): "That I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life," and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q69_A3-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Job.7.9" target="asv">Job 7:9</a>): "He that shall go down to hell shall not come up." Therefore neither the good nor the wicked quit their abode. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as stated above + <a id="XP_Q69_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q69_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, abodes are awarded to souls after death as a reward or punishment. Now after death neither the rewards of the saints nor + the punishments of the damned are increased. Therefore they do not quit their abodes. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome writing against Vigilantius addresses him thus: "For thou sayest that the souls of the apostles and martyrs have taken + up their abode either in Abraham's bosom or in the place of refreshment, or under the altar of God, and that they are unable + to visit their graves when they will. Wouldst thou then lay down the law for God? Wouldst thou put the apostles in chains, + imprison them until the day of judgment, and forbid them to be with their lord, them + of whom it is written: They follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth? And if the Lamb is everywhere, therefore we must believe + that those also who are with Him are everywhere." Therefore it is absurd to say that the souls of the departed do not leave + their abode. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A3-p6"> Further, Jerome argues as follows: "Since the devil and the demons wander throughout the whole world, and are everywhere + present with wondrous speed, why should the martyrs, after shedding their blood be imprisoned and unable to go forth?" Hence + we may infer that not only the good sometimes leave their abode, but also the wicked, since their damnation does not exceed + that of the demons who wander about everywhere. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A3-p7"> Further, the same conclusion may be gathered from Gregory (Dial. iv), where he relates many cases of the dead having appeared + to the living. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A3-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There are two ways of understanding a person to leave hell or heaven. First, that he goes from thence simply, so that heaven + or hell be no longer his place: and in this way no one who is finally consigned to hell or heaven can go from thence, as we + shall state further on ( + <a id="XP_Q69_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q71_A5.html">Q[71], A[5]</a>, ad 5). Secondly, they may be understood to go forth for a time: and here we must distinguish what befits them according + to the order of nature, and + what according to the order of Divine providence; for as Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xvi): "Human affairs have their + limits other than have the wonders of the Divine power, nature's works differ from those which are done miraculously." Consequently, + according to the natural course, the separated souls consigned to their respective abodes are utterly cut off from communication + with the living. For according to the course of nature men living in mortal bodies are not immediately united to + separate substances, since their entire knowledge arises from the senses: nor would it be fitting for them to leave their + abode for any purpose other than to take part in the affairs of the living. Nevertheless, according to the disposition of + Divine providence separated souls sometimes come forth from their abode and appear to men, as Augustine, in the book quoted + above, relates of the martyr Felix who appeared visibly to the people of Nola when they were besieged by the barbarians. It + is also + credible that this may occur sometimes to the damned, and that for man's instruction and intimidation they be permitted to + appear to the living; or again in order to seek our suffrages, as to those who are detained in purgatory, as evidenced by + many instances related in the fourth book of the Dialogues. There is, however, this difference between the saints and the + damned, that the saints can appear when they will to the living, but not the damned; for even as the saints while living in + the + flesh are able by the gifts of gratuitous grace to heal and work wonders, which can only be done miraculously by the Divine + power, and cannot be done by those who lack this gift, so it is not unfitting for the souls of the saints to be endowed with + a power in virtue of their glory, so that they are able to appear wondrously to the living, when they will: while others are + unable to do so unless they be sometimes permitted. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine, as may be gathered from what he says afterwards, is speaking according to the common course of nature, And yet + it does not follow, although the dead be able to appear to the living as they will, that they appear as often as when living + in the flesh: because when they are separated from the flesh, they are either wholly conformed to the divine will, so that + they may do nothing but what they see to be agreeable with the Divine disposition, or + else they are so overwhelmed by their punishments that their grief for their unhappiness surpasses their desire to appear + to others. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The authorities quoted speak in the sense that no one comes forth from heaven or hell simply, and do not imply that one may + not come forth for a time. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (A[1], ad 3) the soul's place conduces to its punishment or reward in so far as the soul, through being consigned + to that place, is affected either by joy or by grief. Now this joy or grief at being consigned to such a place remains in + the soul even when it is outside that place. Thus a bishop who is given the honor of sitting on a throne in the church incurs + no dishonor when he leaves the throne, for though he sits not therein + actually, the place remains assigned to him. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A3-p12"> We must also reply to the arguments in the contrary sense.</p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Jerome is speaking of the apostles and martyrs in reference to that which they gain from their power of glory, and not to + that which befits them as due to them by nature. And when he says that they are everywhere, he does not mean that they are + in several places or everywhere at once, but that they can be wherever they will. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> There is no parity between demons and angels on the one hand and the souls of the saints and of the damned on the other. + For the good or bad angels have allotted to them the office of presiding over men, to watch over them or to try them; but + this cannot be said of the souls of men. Nevertheless, according to the power of glory, it is competent to the souls of the + saints that they can be where they will; and this is what Jerome means to say. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A3-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Although the souls of the saints or of the damned are sometimes actually present where they appear, we are not to believe + that this is always so: for sometimes these apparitions occur to persons whether asleep or awake by the activity of good or + wicked angels in order to instruct or deceive the living. Thus sometimes even the living appear to others and tell them many + things in their sleep; and yet it is clear that they are not present, as Augustine + proves from many instances (De Cura pro Mort. xi, xii). + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A3-p16"></p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A3-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q69_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q69_A4-p0.1">Whether the limbo of hell is the same as Abraham's bosom?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q69_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the limbo of hell is not the same as Abraham's bosom. For according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xxxiii): + "I have not yet found Scripture mentioning hell in a favorable sense." Now Abraham's bosom is taken in a favorable sense, + as Augustine goes on to say (Gen. ad lit. xxxiii): "Surely no one would be allowed to give an unfavorable signification to + Abraham's bosom and the place of rest whither the godly poor man was carried by the angels." + Therefore Abraham's bosom is not the same as the limbo of hell. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those who are in hell see not God. Yet God is seen by those who are in Abraham's bosom, as may be gathered from + Augustine (Confess. ix, 3) who, speaking of Nebridius, says: "Whatever that be, which is signified by thut bosom, there lives + my Nebridius," and further on: "Now lays he not his ear to my mouth, but his spiritual mouth unto Thy fountain, and drinketh + as much as he can receive wisdom in proportion to his thirst, endlessly happy." Therefore + Abraham's bosom is not the same as the limbo of hell. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Church prays not that a man be taken to hell: and yet she prays that the angels may carry the departed soul + to Abraham's bosom. Therefore it would seem that Abraham's bosom is not the same as limbo. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The place whither the beggar Lazarus was taken is called Abraham's bosom. Now he was taken to hell, for as a gloss [*St. + Gregory, Moral. xx] on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q69_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.30.23" target="asv"> Job 30:23, </a> "Where a house is appointed for every one that liveth," says: "Hell was the house of all the living until the coming of Christ." + Therefore Abraham's bosom is the same as limbo. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A4-p6"> Further, Jacob said to his sons ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q69_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.44.38" target="asv">Gn. 44:38</a>): "You will bring down my grey hairs with sorrow to hell": wherefore Jacob knew that he would be taken to hell after his + death. Therefore Abraham likewise was taken to hell after his death; and consequently Abraham's bosom would seem to be a part + of hell. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> After death men's souls cannot find rest save by the merit of faith, because "he that cometh to God must believe" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q69_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.6" target="asv">Heb. 11:6</a>). Now the first example of faith was given to men in the person of Abraham, who was the first to sever himself from the body + of unbelievers, and to receive a special sign of faith: for which reason "the place of rest given to men after death is called + Abraham's bosom," as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. xii). But + the souls of the saints have not at all times had the same rest after death; because, since Christ's coming they have had + complete rest through enjoying the vision of God, whereas before Christ's coming they had rest through being exempt from punishment, + but their desire was not set at rest by their attaining their end. Consequently the state of the saints before Christ's coming + may be considered both as regards the rest it afforded, and thus it is called Abraham's bosom, and as regards its + lack of rest, and thus it is called the limbo of hell. Accordingly, before Christ's coming the limbo of hell and Abraham's + bosom were one place accidentally and not essentially: and consequently, nothing prevents Abraham's bosom from being after + Christ's coming, and from being altogether distinct from limbo, since things that are one accidentally may be parted from + one another. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The state of the holy Fathers as regards what was good in it was called Abraham's bosom, but as regards its deficiencies + it was called hell. Accordingly, neither is Abraham's bosom taken in an unfavorable sense nor hell in a favorable sense, although + in a way they are one. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The place of rest of the holy Fathers was called Abraham's bosom before as well as after Christ's coming, but in different + ways. For since before Christ's coming the saints' rest had a lack of rest attached to it, it was called both hell and Abraham's + bosom, wherefore God was not seen there. But since after the coming of Christ the saints' rest is complete through their seeing + God, this rest is called Abraham's bosom, but not hell by any means. It is + to this bosom of Abraham that the Church prays for the faithful to be brought. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A4-p10"> Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is evident: and the same meaning applies to a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q69_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.22" target="asv"> Lk. 16:22, </a> "It came to pass that the beggar died," etc., which says: "Abraham's bosom is the rest of the blessed poor, whose is the + kingdom of heaven." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q69_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q69_A5-p0.1">Whether limbo is the same as the hell of the damned?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q69_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the limbo of hell is the same as the hell of the damned. For Christ is said to have "bitten" [*Allusion + to + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q69_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.13.14" target="asv"> Osee 13:14</a>] hell, but not to have swallowed it, because He took some from thence but not all. Now He would not be said to have "bitten" + hell if those whom He set free were not part of the multitude shut up in hell. Therefore since those whom He set free were + shut up in hell, the same were shut up in limbo and in + hell. Therefore limbo is either the same as hell, or is a part of hell. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the Creed Christ is said to have descended into hell. But he did not descend save to the limbo of the Fathers. + Therefore the limbo of the Fathers is the same as hell. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q69_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.17.16" target="asv">Job 17:16</a>): "All that I have shall go down into the deepest hell [Douay: 'pit']." Now since Job was a holy and just man, he went down + to limbo. Therefore limbo is the same as the deepest hell. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> In hell there is no redemption [*Office of the Dead, Resp. vii]. But the saints were redeemed from limbo. Therefore limbo + is not the same as hell. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A5-p6"> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii): "I do not see how we can believe that the rest which Lazarus received was in + hell." Now the soul of Lazarus went down into limbo. Therefore limbo is not the same as hell. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The abodes of souls after death may be distinguished in two ways; either as to their situation, or as to the quality of the + places, inasmuch as souls are punished or rewarded in certain places. Accordingly if we consider the limbo of the Fathers + and hell in respect of the aforesaid quality of the places, there is no doubt that they are distinct, both because in hell + there is sensible punishment, which was not in the limbo of the Fathers, and because in hell + there is eternal punishment, whereas the saints were detained but temporally in the limbo of the Fathers. On the other hand, + if we consider them as to the situation of the place, it is probable that hell and limbo are the same place, or that they + are continuous as it were yet so that some higher part of hell be called the limbo of the Fathers. For those who are in hell + receive diverse punishments according to the diversity of their guilt, so that those who are condemned are consigned to darker + and deeper parts of hell according as they have been guilty of graver sins, and consequently the holy Fathers in whom there + was the least amount of sin were consigned to a higher and less darksome part than all those who were condemned to punishment. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When Christ, by His descent, delivered the Fathers from limbo, He is said to have "bitten" hell and to have descended into + hell, in so far as hell and limbo are the same as to situation. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A5-p9"> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Job descended, not to the hell of the damned, but to the limbo of the Fathers. The latter is called the deepest place not + in reference to the places of punishment, but in comparison with other places, as including all penal places under one head. + Again we may reply with Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii): who says of Jacob: "When Jacob said to his sons, 'You will bring down + my grey hairs with sorrow to hell,' he seems to have feared most, lest he should be + troubled with so great a sorrow as to obtain, not the rest of good men, but the hell of sinners." The saying of Job may be + expounded in the same way, as being the utterance of one in fear, rather than an assertion. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A5-p11"></p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A5-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q69_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q69_A6-p0.1">Whether the limbo of children is the same as the limbo of the Fathers?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q69_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the limbo of children is the same as the limbo of the Fathers. For punishment should correspond to sin. + Now the Fathers were detained in limbo for the same sin as children, namely for original sin. Therefore the place of punishment + should be the same for both. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Enchir. xciii): "The punishment of children who die in none but original sin is most lenient." But + no punishment is more lenient than that of the holy Fathers. Therefore the place of punishment is the same for both. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A6-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Even as temporal punishment in purgatory and eternal punishment in hell are due to actual sin, so temporal punishment in + the limbo of the Fathers and eternal punishment in the limbo of the children were due to original sin. If, therefore, hell + and purgatory be not the same it would seem that neither are the limbo of children and the limbo of the Fathers the same. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A6-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The limbo of the Fathers and the limbo of children, without any doubt, differ as to the quality of punishment or reward. + For children have no hope of the blessed life, as the Fathers in limbo had, in whom, moreover, shone forth the light of faith + and grace. But as regards their situation, there is reason to believe that the place of both is the same; except that the + limbo of the Fathers is placed higher than the limbo of children, just as we have stated in + reference to limbo and hell + <a id="XP_Q69_A6-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q69_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A6-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Fathers did not stand in the same relation to original sin as children. For in the Fathers original sin was expiated + in so far as it infected the person, while there remained an obstacle on the part of nature, on account of which their satisfaction + was not yet complete. On the other hand, in children there is an obstacle both on the part of the person and on the part of + nature: and for this reason different abodes are appointed to the Fathers and + to children. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine is speaking of punishments due to some one by reason of his person. Of these the most lenient are due to those + who are burdened with none but original sin. But lighter still is the punishment due to those who are debarred from the reception + of glory by no personal defect but only by a defect of nature, so that this very delay of glory is called a kind of punishment. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A6-p8"></p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A6-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q69_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q70.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q69_A7-p0.1">Whether so many abodes should be distinguished?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q69_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we should not distinguish so many abodes. For after death, just as abodes are due to souls on account + of sin, so are they due on account of merit. Now there is only one abode due on account of merit, namely paradise. Therefore + neither should there be more than one abode due on account of sin, namely hell. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, abodes are appointed to souls after death on account of merits or demerits. Now there is one place where they merit + or demerit. Therefore only one abode should be assigned to them after death. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the places of punishment should correspond to the sins. Now there are only three kinds of sin, namely original, + venial, and mortal. Therefore there should only be three penal abodes. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A7-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> On the other hand, it would seem that there should be many more than those assigned. For this darksome air is the prison + house of the demons ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q69_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.2.17" target="asv">2 Pet. 2:17</a>), and yet it is not reckoned among the five abodes which are mentioned by certain authors. Therefore there are more than + five abodes. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A7-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the earthly paradise is distinct from the heavenly paradise. Now some were borne away to the earthly paradise after + this state of life, as is related of Enoch and Elias. Since then the earthly paradise is not counted among the five abodes, + it would seem that there are more than five. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A7-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, some penal place should correspond to each state of sinners. Now if we suppose a person to die in original sin who + has committed only venial sins, none of the assigned abodes will be befitting to him. For it is clear that he would not be + in heaven, since he would be without grace, and for the same reason neither would he be in the limbo of the Fathers; nor again, + would he be in the limbo of children, since there is no sensible punishment there, which + is due to such a person by reason of venial sin: nor would he be in purgatory, where there is none but temporal punishment, + whereas everlasting punishment is due to him: nor would he be in the hell of the damned, since he is not guilty of actual + mortal sin. Therefore a sixth abode should be assigned. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A7-p8"> + <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, rewards and punishments vary in quantity according to the differences of sins and merits. Now the degrees of merit + and sin are infinite. Therefore we should distinguish an infinite number of abodes, in which souls are punished or rewarded + after death. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A7-p9"> + <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, souls are sometimes punished in the places where they sinned, as Gregory states (Dial. iv, 55). But they sinned + in the place which we inhabit. Therefore this place should be reckoned among the abodes, especially since some are punished + for their sins in this world, as the Master said above (Sent. iv, D, 21). + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A7-p10"> + <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, just as some die in a state of grace and have some venial sins for which they deserve punishment, so some die in + mortal sin and have some good for which they would deserve a reward. Now to those who die in grace with venial sins an abode + is assigned where they are punished ere they receive their reward, which abode is purgatory. Therefore, on the other hand, + there should be equally an abode for those who die in mortal sin together with some good + works. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A7-p11"> + <b>Objection 10:</b> Further, just as the Fathers were delayed from obtaining full glory of the soul before Christ's coming, so are they now detained + from receiving the glory of the body. Therefore as we distinguish an abode of the saints before the coming of Christ from + the one where they are received now, so ought we to distinguish the one in which they are received now from the one where + they will be received after the resurrection. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A7-p12"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The abodes of souls are distinguished according to the souls' various states. Now the soul united to a mortal body is in + the state of meriting, while the soul separated from the body is in the state of receiving good or evil for its merits; so + that after death it is either in the state of receiving its final reward, or in the state of being hindered from receiving + it. If it is in the state of receiving its final retribution, this happens in two ways: either + in the respect of good, and then it is paradise; or in respect of evil, and thus as regards actual sin it is hell, and as + regards original sin it is the limbo of children. On the other hand, if it be in the state where it is hindered from receiving + its final reward, this is either on account of a defect of the person, and thus we have purgatory where souls are detained + from receiving their reward at once on account of the sins they have committed, or else it is on account of a defect of nature, + and thus we have the limbo of the Fathers, where the Fathers were detained from obtaining glory on account of the guilt of + human nature which could not yet be expiated. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A7-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Good happens in one way, but evil in many ways, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6): + wherefore it is not unfitting if there be one place of blissful reward and several places of punishment. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A7-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The state of meriting and demeriting is one state, since the same person is able to merit and demerit: wherefore it is fitting + that one place should be assigned to all: whereas of those who receive according to their merits there are various states, + and consequently the comparison fails. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A7-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One may be punished in two ways for original sin, as stated above, either in reference to the person, or in reference to + nature only. Consequently there is a twofold limbo corresponding to that sin. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A7-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This darksome air is assigned to the demons, not as the place where they receive retribution for their merits, but as a place + befitting their office, in so far as they are appointed to try us. Hence it is not reckoned among the abodes of which we are + treating now: since hell fire is assigned to them in the first place ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q69_A7-p16.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25" target="asv">Mat. 25</a>). + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A7-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The earthly paradise belongs to the state of the wayfarer rather than to the state of those who receive for their merits; + and consequently it is not reckoned among the abodes whereof we are treating now. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A7-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> This supposition is impossible [*Cf. + <a id="XP_Q69_A7-p18.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q89_A6.html">FS, Q[89], A[6]</a>]. If, however, it were possible, such a one would be punished in hell eternally: for it is accidental to venial sin that + it be punished temporally in purgatory, through its having grace annexed to it: wherefore if it be annexed to a mortal sin, + which is without grace, it will be punished eternally in hell. And since this one who dies in original sin has a venial sin + without + grace, it is not unfitting to suppose that he be punished eternally. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A7-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> Diversity of degrees in punishments or rewards does not diversify the state, and it is according to the diversity of state + that we distinguish various abodes. Hence the argument does not prove. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A7-p20"> + <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> Although separated souls are sometimes punished in the place where we dwell, it does not follow that this is their proper + place of punishment: but this is done for our instruction, that seeing their punishment we may be deterred from sin. That + souls while yet in the flesh are punished here for their sins has nothing to do with the question, because a punishment of + this kind does not place a man outside the state of meriting or demeriting: whereas we + are treating now of the abodes to which souls are assigned after the state of merit or demerit. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A7-p21"> + <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> It is impossible for evil to be pure and without the admixture of good, just as the supreme good is without any admixture + of evil. Consequently those who are to be conveyed to beatitude which is a supreme good must be cleansed of all evil. wherefore + there must needs be a place where such persons are cleansed if they go hence without being perfectly clean. But those who + will be thrust into hell will not be free from all good: and consequently the + comparison fails, since those who are in hell can receive the reward of their goods, in so far as their past goods avail for + the mitigation of their punishment. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A7-p22"> + <b>Reply to Objection 10:</b> The essential reward consists in the glory of the soul, but the body's glory, since it overflows from the soul, is entirely + founded as it were on the soul: and consequently lack of the soul's glory causes a difference of state, whereas lack of the + body's glory does not. For this reason, too, the same place, namely the empyrean, is assigned to the holy souls separated + from their bodies and united to glorious bodies: whereas the same place was not + assigned to the souls of the Fathers both before and after the glorification of souls. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A7-p23"></p> + <p id="XP_Q69_A7-p24"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q70.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.XP.iii.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q70" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q70_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="XP_Q70-p0.1">OF THE QUALITY OF THE SOUL AFTER LEAVING THE BODY, AND OF THE PUNISHMENT INFLICTED ON IT BY MATERIAL FIRE (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="XP_Q70-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q70-p2"> We must next consider the general quality of the soul after leaving the body, and the punishment inflicted on it by material + fire. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70-p3"> (1) Whether the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul?</p> + <p id="XP_Q70-p4"> (2) Whether the acts of the aforesaid powers remain in the soul?</p> + <p id="XP_Q70-p5"> (3) Whether the separated soul can suffer from a material fire?</p> + <div id="XP_Q70_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q70.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q70_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q70_A1-p0.1">Whether the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul? [*Cf. FP, Q[77], A[8]]</h4> + <p id="XP_Q70_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sensitive powers remain in the sensitive soul. For Augustine says (De Spir. et Anim. xv): "The soul + withdraws from the body taking all with itself, sense and imagination, reason, understanding and intelligence, the concupiscible + and irascible powers." Now sense, imagination, concupiscible and irascible are sensitive powers. Therefore the sensitive powers + remain in the separated soul. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Eccl. Dogm. xvi): "We believe that man alone has a substantial soul, which lives though separated + from the body, and clings keenly to its senses and wits." Therefore the soul retains its senses after being separated from + the body. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the soul's powers are either its essential parts as some maintain, or at least are its natural properties. Now that + which is in a thing essentially cannot be separated from it, nor is a subject severed from its natural properties. Therefore + it is impossible for the soul to lose any of its powers after being separated from the body. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a whole is not entire if one of its parts be lacking. Now the soul's powers are called its parts. Therefore, if + the soul lose any of its powers after death, it will not be entire after death: and this is unfitting. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the soul's powers co-operate in merit more even than the body, since the body is a mere instrument of action, while + the powers are principles of action. Now the body must of necessity be rewarded together with the soul, since it co-operated + in merit. Much more, therefore, is it necessary that the powers of the soul be rewarded together with it. Therefore the separated + soul does not lose them. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A1-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, if the soul after separation from the body loses its sensitive power, that must needs come to naught. For it cannot + be said that it is dissolved into some matter, since it has no matter as a part of itself. Now that which entirely comes to + naught is not restored in identity; wherefore at the resurrection the soul will not have the same identical sensitive powers. + Now according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1), as the soul is to the body so are the + soul's powers to the parts of the body, for instance the sight to the eye. But if it were not identically the same soul that + returns to the body, it would not be identically the same man. Therefore for the same reason it would not be identically the + same eye, if the visual power were not identically the same; and in like manner no other part would rise again in identity, + and consequently neither would the whole man be identically the same. Therefore it is impossible for the separated soul to + lose its sensitive powers. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A1-p8"> + <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, if the sensitive powers were to be corrupted when the body is corrupted, it would follow that they are weakened + when the body is weakened. Yet this is not the case, for according to De Anima i, "if an old man were given the eye of a young + man, he would, without doubt, see as well as a young man." Therefore neither are the sensitive powers corrupted when the body + is corrupted. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A1-p9"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Eccl. Dogm. xix): "Of two substances alone does man consist, soul and body: the soul with its reason, + and the body with its senses." Therefore the sensitive powers belong to the body: and consequently when the body is corrupted + the sensitive powers remain not in the soul. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A1-p10"> Further, the Philosopher, speaking of the separation of the soul, expresses himself thus (Metaph. xi, 3): "If, however, anything + remain at last, we must ask what this is: because in certain subjects it is not impossible, for instance if the soul be of + such a disposition, not the whole soul but the intellect; for as regards the whole soul this is probably impossible." Hence + it seems that the whole soul is not separated from the body, but only the intellective powers of the soul, + and consequently not the sensitive or vegetative powers. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A1-p11"> Further, the Philosopher, speaking of the intellect, says (De Anima ii, 2): "This alone is ever separated, as the everlasting + from the corruptible: for it is hereby clear that the remaining parts are not separable as some maintain." Therefore the sensitive + powers do not remain in the separated soul. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A1-p12"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There are many opinions on this question. For some, holding the view that all the powers are in the soul in the same way + as color is in a body, hold that the soul separated from the body takes all its powers away with it: because, if it lacked + any one of them, it would follow that the soul is changed in its natural properties, since these cannot change so long as + their subject remains. But the aforesaid view is false, for since a power is so called because + it enables us to do or suffer something, and since to do and to be able belong to the same subject, it follows that the subject + of a power is the same as that which is agent or patient. Hence the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil.) that "where we find + power there we find action." Now it is evident that certain operations, whereof the soul's powers are the principles, do not + belong to the soul properly speaking but to the soul as united to the body, because they are not performed except + through the medium of the body---such as to see, to hear, and so forth. Hence it follows that such like powers belong to the + united soul and body as their subject, but to the soul as their quickening principle, just as the form is the principle of + the properties of a composite being. Some operations, however, are performed by the soul without a bodily organ---for instance + to understand, to consider, to will: wherefore, since these actions are proper to the soul, the powers that are the + principles thereof belong to the soul not only as their principle but also as their subject. Therefore, since so long as the + proper subject remains its proper passions must also remain, and when it is corrupted they also must be corrupted, it follows + that these powers which use no bodily organ for their actions must needs remain in the separated body, while those which use + a bodily organ must needs be corrupted when the body is corrupted: and such are all the powers belonging to the sensitive + and the vegetative soul. On this account some draw a distinction in the sensitive powers of the soul: for they say that they + are of two kinds---some being acts of organs and emanating from the soul into the body are corrupted with the body; others, + whence the former originate, are in the soul, because by them the soul sensitizes the body for seeing, hearing, and so on; + and these primary powers remain in the separated soul. But this statement seems unreasonable: because the soul, by its essence + and not through the medium of certain other powers, is the origin of those powers which are the acts of organs, even as any + form, from the very fact that by its essence it informs its matter, is the origin of the properties which result naturally + in the composite. For were it necessary to suppose other powers in the soul, by means of which the powers that perfect the + organs may flow from the essence of the soul, for the same reason it would be necessary to suppose other powers by means of + which + these mean powers flow from the essence of the soul, and so on to infinity, and if we have to stop it is better to do so at + the first step. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A1-p13"> Hence others say that the sensitive and other like powers do not remain in the separated soul except in a restricted sense, + namely radically, in the same way as a result is in its principle: because there remains in the separated soul the ability + to produce these powers if it should be reunited to the body; nor is it necessary for this ability to be anything in addition + to the essence of the soul, as stated above. This opinion appears to be the more reasonable. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This saying of Augustine is to be understood as meaning that the soul takes away with it some of those powers actually, namely + understanding and intelligence, and some radically, as stated above [*Cf. + <a id="XP_Q70_A1-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q77_A8.html">FP, Q[77], A[8]</a>, ad 1 and infra A[2], ad 1]. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The senses which the soul takes away with it are not these external senses, but the internal, those, namely, which pertain + to the intellective part, for the intellect is sometimes called sense, as Basil states in his commentary on the Proverbs, + and again the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 11). If, however, he means the external senses we must reply as above to the first objection. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A1-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above, the sensitive powers are related to the soul, not as natural passions to their subject, but as compared + to their origin: wherefore the conclusion does not follow. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A1-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The powers of the soul are not called its integral but its potential parts. Now the nature of such like wholes is that the + entire energy of the whole is found perfectly in one of the parts, but partially in the others; thus in the soul the soul's + energy is found perfectly in the intellective part, but partially in the others. Wherefore, as the powers of the intellective + part remain in the separated soul, the latter will remain entire and undiminished, + although the sensitive powers do not remain actually: as neither is the king's power decreased by the death of a mayor who + shared his authority. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A1-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The body co-operates in merit, as an essential part of the man who merits. The sensitive powers, however, do not co-operate + thus, since they are of the genus of accidents. Hence the comparison fails. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A1-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The powers of the sensitive soul are said to be acts of the organs, not as though they were the essential forms of those + organs, except in reference to the soul whose powers they are. But they are the acts of the organs, by perfecting them for + their proper operations, as heat is the act of fire by perfecting it for the purpose of heating. Wherefore, just as a fire + would remain identically the same, although another individual heat were in it (even so + the cold of water that has been heated returns not identically the same, although the water remains the same in identity), + so the organs will be the same identically, although the powers be not identically the same. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A1-p20"> + <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> The Philosopher is speaking there of these powers as being rooted in the soul. This is clear from his saying that "old age + is an affection not of the soul, but of that in which the soul is," namely the body. For in this way the powers of the soul + are neither weakened nor corrupted on account of the body. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A1-p21"></p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A1-p22"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q70.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q70_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q70_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q70_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q70_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q70_A2-p0.1">Whether the acts of the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q70_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the acts of the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul. For Augustine says (De Spiritu et Anima + xv): "When the soul leaves the body it derives pleasure or sorrow through being affected with these" (namely the imagination, + and the concupiscible and irascible faculties) "according to its merits." But the imagination, the concupiscible, and the + irascible are sensitive powers. Therefore the separated soul will be affected as regards the + sensitive powers, and consequently will be in some act by reason of them. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii) that "the body feels not, but the soul through the body," and further on: "The + soul feels certain things, not through the body but without the body." Now that which befits the soul without the body can + be in the soul separated from the body. Therefore the soul will then be able to feel actually. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to see images of bodies, as occurs in sleep, belongs to imaginary vision which is in the sensitive part. Now it + happens that the separated soul sees images of bodies in the same way as when we sleep. Thus Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. + xii): "For I see not why the soul has an image of its own body when, the body lying senseless, yet not quite dead, it sees + some things which many have related after returning to life from this suspended animation and yet + has it not when it has left the body through death having taken place." For it is unintelligible that the soul should have + an image of its body, except in so far as it sees that image: wherefore he said before of those who lie senseless that "they + have a certain image of their own body, by which they are able to be borne to corporeal places and by means of sensible images + to take cognizance of such things as they see." Therefore the separated soul can exercise the acts of the sensitive + powers. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the memory is a power of the sensitive part, as proved in De Memor. et Remin. i. Now separated souls will actually + remember the things they did in this world: wherefore it is said to the rich glutton ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q70_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.25" target="asv">Lk. 16:25</a>): "Remember that thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime." Therefore the separated soul will exercise the act of a + sensitive power. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9) the irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part. But joy + and sorrow, love and hatred, fear and hope, and similar emotions which according to our faith we hold to be in separated souls, + are in the irascible and concupiscible. Therefore separated souls will not be deprived of the acts of the sensitive powers. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A2-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> That which is common to soul and body cannot remain in the separated soul. Now all the operations of the sensitive powers + are common to the soul and body: and this is evident from the fact that no sensitive power exercises an act except through + a bodily organ. Therefore the separated soul will be deprived of the acts of the sensitive powers. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A2-p8"> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), that "when the body is corrupted, the soul neither remembers nor loves," and + the same applies to all the acts of the sensitive powers. Therefore the separated soul does not exercise the act of any sensitive + power. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A2-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some distinguish two kinds of acts in the sensitive powers: external acts which the soul exercises through the body. and + these do not remain in the separated soul; and internal acts which the soul performs by itself; and these will be in the separated + soul. This statement would seem to have originated from the opinion of Plato, who held that the soul is united to the body, + as a perfect substance nowise dependant on the body, and merely as a mover is united + to the thing moved. This is an evident consequence of transmigration which he held. And since according to him nothing is + in motion except what is moved, and lest he should go on indefinitely, he said that the first mover moves itself, and he maintained + that the soul is the cause of its own movement. Accordingly there would be a twofold movement of the soul, one by which it + moves itself, and another whereby the body is moved by the soul: so that this act "to see" is first of all in the soul + itself as moving itself, and secondly in the bodily organ in so far as the soul moves the body. This opinion is refuted by + the Philosopher (De Anima i, 3) who proves that the soul does not move itself, and that it is nowise moved in respect of such + operations as seeing, feeling, and the like, but that such operations are movements of the composite only. We must therefore + conclude that the acts of the sensitive powers nowise remain in the separated soul, except perhaps as in their remote + origin. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some deny that this book is Augustine's: for it is ascribed to a Cistercian who compiled it from Augustine's works and added + things of his own. Hence we are not to take what is written there, as having authority. If, however, its authority should + be maintained, it must be said that the meaning is that the separated soul is affected with imagination and other like powers, + not as though such affection were the act of the aforesaid powers, but in the + sense that the soul will be affected in the future life for good or ill, according to the things which it committed in the + body through the imagination and other like powers: so that the imagination and such like powers are not supposed to elicit + that affection, but to have elicited in the body the merit of that affection. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The soul is said to feel through the body, not as though the act of feeling belonged to the soul by itself, but as belonging + to the whole composite by reason of the soul, just as we say that heat heats. That which is added, namely that the soul feels + some things without the body, such as fear and so forth, means that it feels such things without the outward movement of the + body that takes place in the acts of the proper senses: since fear and like + passions do not occur without any bodily movement. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A2-p12"> It may also be replied that Augustine is speaking according to the opinion of the Platonists who maintained this as stated + above. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Augustine speaks there as nearly throughout that book, as one inquiring and not deciding. For it is clear that there is no + comparison between the soul of a sleeper and the separated soul: since the soul of the sleeper uses the organ of imagination + wherein corporeal images are impressed; which cannot be said of the separated soul. Or we may reply that images of things + are in the soul, both as to the sensitive and imaginative power and as to the + intellective power, with greater or lesser abstraction from matter and material conditions. Wherefore Augustine's comparison + holds in this respect that just as the images of corporeal things are in the soul of the dreamer or of one who is carried + out of his mind, imaginatively, so are they in the separated soul intellectively: but not that they are in the separated soul + imaginatively. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A2-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As stated in the first book (Sent. i, D, 3, qu. 4), memory has a twofold signification. Sometimes it means a power of the + sensitive part, in so far as its gaze extends over past time; and in this way the act of the memory will not be in the separated + soul. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4) that "when this," the body to wit, "is corrupted, the soul remembers + not." In another way memory is used to designate that part of the imagination + which pertains to the intellective faculty, in so far namely as it abstracts from all differences of time, since it regards + not only the past but also the present, and the future as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 11). Taking memory in this sense the + separated soul will remember [*Cf. + <a id="XP_Q70_A2-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q77_A8.html">FP, Q[77], A[8]</a>; + <a id="XP_Q70_A2-p14.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q89_A6.html">FP, Q[89], A[6]</a>]. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A2-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Love, joy, sorrow, and the like, have a twofold signification. Sometimes they denote passions of the sensitive appetite, + and thus they will not be in the separated soul, because in this way they are not exercised without a definite movement of + the heart. In another way they denote acts of the will which is in the intellective part: and in this way they will be in + the separated soul, even as delight will be there without bodily movement, even as it is + in God, namely in so far as it is a simple movement of the will. In this sense the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that + "God's joy is one simple delight." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A2-p16"></p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A2-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q70_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q70_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q70_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q70_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q70_A3-p0.1">Whether the separated soul can suffer from a bodily fire?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the separated soul cannot suffer from a bodily fire. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii): "The things + that affect the soul well or ill after its separation from the body, are not corporeal but resemble corporeal things." Therefore + the separated soul is not punished with a bodily fire. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii) says that "the agent is always more excellent than the patient." But it is impossible + for any body to be more excellent than the separated soul. Therefore it cannot suffer from a body. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. i) and Boethius (De Duab. Natur.) only those things that agree in matter + are active and passive in relation to one another. But the soul and corporeal fire do not agree in matter, since there is + no matter common to spiritual and corporeal things: wherefore they cannot be changed into one another, as Boethius says (De + Duab. Natur.). Therefore the separated soul does not suffer from a bodily fire. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whatsoever is patient receives something from the agent. Therefore if the soul suffer from the bodily fire, it will + receive something therefrom. Now whatsoever is received in a thing is received according to the mode of the recipient. Therefore + that which is received in the soul from the fire, is in it not materially but spiritually. Now the forms of things existing + spiritually in the soul are its perfections. Therefore though it be granted that the + soul suffer from the bodily fire, this will not conduce to its punishment, but rather to its perfection. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if it be said that the soul is punished merely by seeing the fire, as Gregory would seem to say (Dial. iv, 29). + On the contrary, if the soul sees the fire of hell, it cannot see it save by intellectual vision, since it has not the organs + by which sensitive or imaginative vision is effected. But it would seem impossible for intellectual vision to be the cause + of sorrow, since "there is no sorrow contrary to the pleasure of considering," according to + the Philosopher (Topic. i, 13). Therefore the soul is not punished by that vision. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, if it be said that the soul suffers from the corporeal fire, through being held thereby, even as now it is held + by the body while living in the body; on the contrary, the soul while living in the body is held by the body in so far as + there results one thing from the soul and the body, as from form and matter. But the soul will not be the form of that corporeal + fire. Therefore it cannot be held by the fire in the manner aforesaid. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p8"> + <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, every bodily agent acts by contact. But a corporeal fire cannot be in contact with the soul, since contact is only + between corporeal things whose bounds come together. Therefore the soul suffers not from that fire. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p9"> + <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, an organic agent does not act on a remote object, except through acting on the intermediate objects; wherefore it + is able to act at a fixed distance in proportion to its power. But souls, or at least the demons to whom this equally applies, + are sometimes outside the place of hell, since sometimes they appear to men even in this world: and yet they are not then + free from punishment, for just as the glory of the saints is never interrupted, so neither + is the punishment of the damned. And yet we do not find that all the intermediate things suffer from the fire of hell: nor + again is it credible that any corporeal thing of an elemental nature has such a power that its action can reach to such a + distance. Therefore it does not seem that the pains suffered by the souls of the damned are inflicted by a corporeal fire. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p10"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The possibility of suffering from a corporeal fire is equally consistent with separated souls and with demons. Now demons + suffer therefrom since they are punished by that fire into which the bodies of the damned will be cast after the resurrection, + and which must needs be as corporeal fire. This is evident from the words of our Lord ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q70_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.41" target="asv">Mat. 25:41</a>), "Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil," etc. + Therefore separated souls also can suffer from that fire. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p11"> Further, punishment should correspond to sin. Now in sinning the soul subjected itself to the body by sinful concupiscence. + Therefore it is just that it should be punished by being made subject to a bodily thing by suffering therefrom. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p12"> Further, there is greater union between form and matter than between agent and patient. Now the diversity of spiritual and + corporeal nature does not hinder the soul from being the form of the body. Therefore neither is it an obstacle to its suffering + from a body. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p13"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Given that the fire of hell is not so called metaphorically, nor an imaginary fire, but a real corporeal fire, we must needs + say that the soul will suffer punishment from a corporeal fire, since our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q70_A3-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.41" target="asv">Mat. 25:41</a>) that this fire was prepared for the devil and his angels, who are incorporeal even as the soul. But how it is that they + can thus suffer is explained in many ways. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p14"> For some have said that the mere fact that the soul sees the fire makes the soul suffer from the fire: wherefore Gregory + (Dial. iv, 29) says: "The soul suffers from the fire by merely seeing it." But this does not seem sufficient, because whatever + is seen, from the fact that it is seen, is a perfection of the seer. wherefore it cannot conduce to his punishment, as seen. + Sometimes, however, it is of a penal or unpleasant nature accidentally, in so far, to wit, as it is + apprehended as something hurtful, and consequently, besides the fact that the soul sees the fire, there must needs be some + relation of the soul to the fire, according to which the fire is hurtful to the soul. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p15"> Hence others have said that although a corporeal fire cannot burn the soul, the soul nevertheless apprehends it as hurtful + to itself, and in consequence of this apprehension is seized with fear and sorrow, in fulfillment of + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q70_A3-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.13.5" target="asv"> Ps. 13:5, </a> "They have trembled for fear, where there was no fear." Hence Gregory says (Dial. iv, 29) that "the soul burns through seeing + itself aflame." But this, again, seems insufficient, because in this case the soul would suffer from + the fire, not in reality but only in apprehension: for although a real passion of sorrow or pain may result from a false imagination, + as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. xii), it cannot be said in relation to that passion that one really suffers from the thing, + but from the image of the thing that is present to one's fancy. Moreover, this kind of suffering would be more unlike real + suffering than that which results from imaginary vision, since the latter is stated to result from real images of + things, which images the soul carries about with it, whereas the former results from false fancies which the erring soul imagines: + and furthermore, it is not probable that separated souls or demons, who are endowed with keen intelligence, would think it + possible for a corporeal fire to hurt them, if they were nowise distressed thereby. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p16"> Hence others say that it is necessary to admit that the soul suffers even really from the corporeal fire: wherefore Gregory + says (Dial. iv, 29): "We can gather from the words of the Gospel, that the soul suffers from the fire not only by seeing it, + but also by feeling it." They explain the possibility of this as follows. They say that this corporeal fire can be considered + in two ways. First, as a corporeal thing, and thus it has not the power to act on the soul. Secondly, as the + instrument of the vengeance of Divine justice. For the order of Divine justice demands that the soul which by sinning subjected + itself to corporeal things should be subjected to them also in punishment. Now an instrument acts not only in virtue of its + own nature, but also in virtue of the principal agent: wherefore it is not unreasonable if that fire, seeing that it acts + in virtue of a spiritual agent, should act on the spirit of a man or demon, in the same way as we have explained the + sanctification of the soul by the sacraments ( + <a id="XP_Q70_A3-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q62_A1.html">TP, Q[62], AA[1]</a>,4). + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p17"> But, again, this does not seem to suffice, since every instrument, in acting on that on which it is used instrumentally, + has its own connatural action besides the action whereby it acts in virtue of the principal agent: in fact it is by fulfilling + the former that it effects the latter action, even as, in Baptism, it is by laving the body that water sanctifies the soul, + and the saw by cutting wood produces the shape of a house. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p18"> Hence we must allow the fire to exercise on the soul an action connatural to the fire, in order that it may be the instrument + of Divine justice in the punishment of sin: and for this reason we must say that a body cannot naturally act on a spirit, + nor in any way be hurtful or distressful to it, except in so far as the latter is in some way united to a body: for thus we + observe that "the corruptible body is a load upon the soul" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q70_A3-p18.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.15" target="asv">Wis. 9:15</a>). Now a spirit is + united to a body in two ways. In one way as form to matter, so that from their union there results one thing simply: and the + spirit that is thus united to a body both quickens the body and is somewhat burdened by the body: but it is not thus that + the spirit of man or demon is united to the corporeal fire. In another way as the mover is united to the things moved, or + as a thing placed is united to place, even as incorporeal things are in a place. In this way created incorporeal spirits are + confined to a place, being in one place in such a way as not to be in another. Now although of its nature a corporeal thing + is able to confine an incorporeal spirit to a place, it is not able of its nature to detain an incorporeal spirit in the place + to which it is confined, and so to tie it to that place that it be unable to seek another, since a spirit is not by nature + in a place so as to be subject to place. But the corporeal fire is enabled as the instrument of the vengeance of Divine + justice thus to detain a spirit; and thus it has a penal effect on it, by hindering it from fulfilling its own will, that + is by hindering it from acting where it will and as it will. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p19"> This way is asserted by Gregory (Dial. iv, 29). For in explaining how the soul can suffer from that fire by feeling it, he + expresses himself as follows: "Since Truth declares the rich sinner to be condemned to fire, will any wise man deny that the + souls of the wicked are imprisoned in flames?" Julian [*Bishop of Toledo, Prognostic ii, 17] says the same as quoted by the + Master (Sent. iv, D, 44): "If the incorporeal spirit of a living man is held by the body, why shall it not be + held after death by a corporeal fire?" and Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 10) that "just as, although the soul is spiritual + and the body corporeal, man is so fashioned that the soul is united to the body as giving it life, and on account of this + union conceives a great love for its body, so it is chained to the fire, as receiving punishment therefrom, and from this + union conceives a loathing." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p20"> Accordingly we must unite all the aforesaid modes together, in order to understand perfectly how the soul suffers from a + corporeal fire: so as to say that the fire of its nature is able to have an incorporeal spirit united to it as a thing placed + is united to a place; that as the instrument of Divine justice it is enabled to detain it enchained as it were, and in this + respect this fire is really hurtful to the spirit, and thus the soul seeing the fire as something hurtful to it + is tormented by the fire. Hence Gregory (Dial. iv, 29) mentions all these in order, as may be seen from the above quotations. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p21"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine speaks there as one inquiring: wherefore he expresses himself otherwise when deciding the point, as quoted above + (De Civ. Dei xxi). Or we may reply that Augustine means to say that the things which are the proximate occasion of the soul's + pain or sorrow are spiritual, since it would not be distressed unless it apprehended the fire as hurtful to it: wherefore + the fire as apprehended is the proximate cause of its distress, whereas the + corporeal fire which exists outside the soul is the remote cause of its distress. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p22"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the soul is simply more excellent than the fire, the fire is relatively more excellent than the soul, in so far, + to wit, as it is the instrument of Divine justice. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p23"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher and Boethius are speaking of the action whereby the patient is changed into the nature of the agent. Such + is not the action of the fire on the soul: and consequently the argument is not conclusive. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p24"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> By acting on the soul the fire bestows nothing on it but detains it, as stated above. Hence the argument is not to the point. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p25"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> In intellectual vision sorrow is not caused by the fact that something is seen, since the thing seen as such can nowise be + contrary to the intellect. But in the sensible vision the thing seen, by its very action on the sight so as to be seen, there + may be accidentally something corruptive of the sight, in so far as it destroys the harmony of the organ Nevertheless, intellectual + vision may cause sorrow, in so far as the thing seen is apprehended as + hurtful, not that it hurts through being seen, but in some other way no matter which. It is thus that the soul in seeing the + fire is distressed. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p26"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The comparison does not hold in every respect, but it does in some, as explained above. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p27"> + <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> Although there is no bodily contact between the soul and body, there is a certain spiritual contact between them (even as + the mover of the heaven, being spiritual, touches the heaven, when it moves it, with a spiritual contact) in the same way + as a "painful object is said to touch," as stated in De Gener. i. This mode of contact is sufficient for action. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p28"> + <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> The souls of the damned are never outside hell, except by Divine permission, either for the instruction or for the trial + of the elect. And wherever they are outside hell they nevertheless always see the fire thereof as prepared for their punishment. + Wherefore, since this vision is the immediate cause of their distress, as stated above, wherever they are, they suffer from + hell-fire. Even so prisoners, though outside the prison, suffer somewhat from the + prison, seeing themselves condemned thereto. Hence just as the glory of the elect is not diminished, neither as to the essential, + nor as to the accidental reward, if they happen to be outside the empyrean, in fact this somewhat conduces to their glory, + so the punishment of the damned is nowise diminished, if by God's permission they happen to be outside hell for a time. A + gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q70_A3-p28.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.3.6" target="asv"> James 3:6, </a> "inflameth the wheel of our nativity," etc., is in agreement with this, for it is + worded thus: "The devil, wherever he is, whether in the air or under the earth, drags with him the torments of his flames." + But the objection argues as though the corporeal fire tortured the spirit immediately in the same way as it torments bodies. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p29"></p> + <p id="XP_Q70_A3-p30"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q70_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q70_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q71" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q70_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="XP_Q71-p0.1">OF THE SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD (FOURTEEN ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="XP_Q71-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71-p2"> We must now consider the suffrages for the dead. Under this head there are fourteen points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="XP_Q71-p3"> (1) Whether suffrages performed by one person can profit others?</p> + <p id="XP_Q71-p4"> (2) Whether the dead can be assisted by the works of the living?</p> + <p id="XP_Q71-p5"> (3) Whether the suffrages of sinners profit the dead?</p> + <p id="XP_Q71-p6"> (4) Whether suffrages for the dead profit those who perform them?</p> + <p id="XP_Q71-p7"> (5) Whether suffrages profit those who are in hell?</p> + <p id="XP_Q71-p8"> (6) Whether they profit those who are in purgatory?</p> + <p id="XP_Q71-p9"> (7) Whether they avail the children in limbo?</p> + <p id="XP_Q71-p10"> (8) Whether in any way they profit those who are heaven?</p> + <p id="XP_Q71-p11"> (9) Whether the prayer of the Church, the Sacrament of the altar, and almsgiving profit the departed?</p> + <p id="XP_Q71-p12"> (10) Whether indulgences granted by the Church profit them?</p> + <p id="XP_Q71-p13"> (11) Whether the burial service profits the departed?</p> + <p id="XP_Q71-p14"> (12) Whether suffrages for one dead person profit that person more than others?</p> + <p id="XP_Q71-p15"> (13) Whether suffrages for many avail each one as much as if they were offered for each individual?</p> + <p id="XP_Q71-p16"> (14) Whether general suffrages avail those for whom special suffrages are not offered, as much as special and general suffrages + together avail those for whom they are offered? + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71-p17"></p> + <div id="XP_Q71_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q71_A1-p0.1">Whether the suffrages of one person can profit others?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q71_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the suffrages of one person cannot profit others. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q71_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.6.8" target="asv">Gal. 6:8</a>): "What things a man shall sow, those also shall he reap." Now if one person reaped fruit from the suffrages of another, + he would reap from another's sowing. Therefore a person receives no fruit from the suffrages of others. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to God's justice, that each one should receive according to his merits, wherefore the psalm ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q71_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.61.13" target="asv">Ps. 61:13</a>) says: "Thou wilt render to every man according to his works." Now it is impossible for God's justice to fail. Therefore + it is impossible for one man to be assisted by the works of another. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a work is meritorious on the same count as it is praiseworthy, namely inasmuch as it is voluntary. Now one man is + not praised for the work of another. Therefore neither can the work of one man be meritorious and fruitful for another. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it belongs to Divine justice to repay good for good in the same way as evil for evil. But no man is punished for + the evildoings of another; indeed, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q71_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.4" target="asv"> Ezech. 18:4, </a> "the soul that sinneth, the same shall die." Therefore neither does one person profit by another's good. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q71_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.63" target="asv">Ps. 118:63</a>): "I am a partaker with all them that fear Thee," etc. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A1-p7"> Further, all the faithful united together by charity are members of the one body of the Church. Now one member is assisted + by another. Therefore one man can be assisted by the merits of another. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> our actions can avail for two purposes. First, for acquiring a certain state; thus by a meritorious work a man obtains the + state of bliss. Secondly, for something consequent upon a state; thus by some work a man merits an accidental reward, or a + rebate of punishment. And for both these purposes our actions may avail in two ways: first, by way of merit; secondly, by + way of prayer: the difference being that merit relies on justice, and prayer on mercy; since + he who prays obtains his petition from the mere liberality of the one he prays. Accordingly we must say that the work of one + person nowise can avail another for acquiring a state by way of merit, so that, to wit, a man be able to merit eternal life + by the works which I do, because the share of glory is awarded according to the measure of the recipient, and each one is + disposed by his own and not by another's actions---disposed, that is to say, by being worthy of reward. By way of prayer, + however, the work of one may profit another while he is a wayfarer, even for acquiring a state; for instance, one man may + obtain the first grace for another [*Cf. + <a id="XP_Q71_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q114_A6.html">FS, Q[114], A[6]</a>]: and since the impetration of prayer depends on the liberality of God Whom we pray, it may extend to whatever is ordinately + subject to the Divine power. On the other hand, as regards that which is consequent upon or accessory to a state, the work + of one may avail another, not only by way of + prayer but even by way of merit: and this happens in two ways. First, on account of their communion in the root of the work, + which root is charity in meritorious works. Wherefore all who are united together by charity acquire some benefit from one + another's works, albeit according to the measure of each one's state, since even in heaven each one will rejoice in the goods + of others. Hence it is that the communion of saints is laid down as an article of faith. Secondly, through the intention of + the doer who does certain works specially for the purpose that they may profit such persons: so that those works become somewhat + the works of those for whom they are done, as though they were bestowed on them by the doer. Wherefore they can avail them + either for the fulfillment of satisfaction or for some similar purpose that does not change their state. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This reaping is the receiving of eternal life, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q71_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.36" target="asv"> Jn. 4:36, </a> "And he that reapeth . . . gathereth fruit unto life everlasting." Now a share of eternal life is not given to a man save + for his own works, for although we may impetrate for another that he obtain life, this never happens except by means of his + own works, when namely, at the prayers of one, another is given the grace whereby he merits eternal life. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The work that is done for another becomes his for whom it is done: and in like manner the work done by a man who is one with + me is somewhat mine. Hence it is not contrary to Divine justice if a man receives the fruit of the works done by a man who + is one with him in charity, or of works done for him. This also happens according to human justice, so that the satisfaction + offered by one is accepted in lieu of another's. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Praise is not given to a person save according to his relation to an act, wherefore praise is "in relation to something" + (Ethic. i, 12). And since no man is made or shown to be well- or ill-disposed to something by another's deed, it follows that + no man is praised for another's deeds save accidentally in so far as he is somewhat the cause of those deeds, by giving counsel, + assistance, inducement, or by any other means. on the other hand, a work is + meritorious to a person, not only by reason of his disposition, but also in view of something consequent upon his disposition + or state, as evidenced by what has been said. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It is directly contrary to justice to take away from a person that which is his due: but to give a person what is not his + due is not contrary to justice, but surpasses the bounds of justice, for it is liberality. Now a person cannot be hurt by + the ills of another, unless he be deprived of something of his own. Consequently it is not becoming that one should be punished + for another's sins, as it is that one should acquire some advantage from deeds of + another. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A1-p13"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A1-p14"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A1-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q71_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q71_A2-p0.1">Whether the dead can be assisted by the works of the living?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q71_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the dead cannot be assisted by the works of the living. First, because the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q71_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.5.10" target="asv">2 Cor. 5:10</a>): "We must all be manifested before the judgment seat of Christ, that every one may receive the proper things of the body, + according as he hath done." Therefore nothing can accrue to a man from the works of others, which are done after his death + and when he is no longer in the body. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, this also seems to follow from the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q71_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.14.13" target="asv"> Apoc. 14:13, </a> "Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord . . . for their works follow them." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it belongs only to one who is on the way to advance on account of some deed. Now after death men are no longer wayfarers, + because to them the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q71_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.19.8" target="asv"> Job 19:8, </a> refer: "He hath hedged in my path round about, and I cannot pass." Therefore the dead cannot be assisted by a person's suffrages. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, no one is assisted by the deed of another, unless there be some community of life between them. Now there is no + community between the dead and the living, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 11). Therefore the suffrages of the living do + not profit the dead. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A2-p6"> On the contrary are the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q71_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.12.46" target="asv">2 Macc. 12:46</a>: "It is . . . a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead that they may be loosed from sins." But this would not be + profitable unless it were a help to them. Therefore the suffrages of the living profit the dead. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A2-p7"> Further, Augustine says (De Cure pro Mort. i): "Of no small weight is the authority of the Church whereby she clearly approves + of the custom whereby a commendation of the dead has a place in the prayers which the priests pour forth to the Lord God at + His altar." This custom was established by the apostles themselves according to the Damascene in a sermon on suffrages for + the dead [*De his qui in fide dormierunt, 3], where he expresses himself thus: "Realizing the nature of the + Mysteries the disciples of the Saviour and His holy apostles sanctioned a commemoration of those who had died in the faith, + being made in the awe-inspiring and life-giving Mysteries." This is also confirmed by the authority of Dionysius (Hier. Eccl.), + where he mentions the rite of the Early Church in praying for the dead, and, moreover, asserts that the suffrages of the living + profit the dead. Therefore we must believe this without any doubt. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A2-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Charity, which is the bond uniting the members of the Church, extends not only to the living, but also to the dead who die + in charity. For charity which is the life of the soul, even as the soul is the life of the body, has no end: "Charity never + falleth away" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q71_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:8</a>). Moreover, the dead live in the memory of the living: wherefore the intention of the living can be directed to them. Hence + the suffrages of the living profit the dead in two ways even as + they profit the living, both on account of the bond of charity and on account of the intention being directed to them. Nevertheless, + we must not believe that the suffrages of the living profit them so as to change their state from unhappiness to happiness + or "vice versa"; but they avail for the diminution of punishment or something of the kind that involves no change in the state + of the dead. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man while living in the body merited that such things should avail him after death. Wherefore if he is assisted thereby after + this life, this is, nevertheless, the result of the things he has done in the body. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A2-p10"> Or we may reply, according to John Damascene, in the sermon quoted above, that these words refer to the retribution which + will be made at the final judgment, of eternal glory or eternal unhappiness: for then each one will receive only according + as he himself has done in the body. Meanwhile, however, he can be assisted by the suffrages of the living. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The words quoted refer expressly to the sequel of eternal retribution as is clear from the opening words: "Blessed are the + dead," etc. Or we may reply that deeds done on their behalf are somewhat their own, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although, strictly speaking, after death souls are not in the state of the way, yet in a certain respect they are still on + the way, in so far as they are delayed awhile in their advance towards their final award. Wherefore, strictly speaking, their + way is hedged in round about, so that they can no more be changed by any works in respect of the state of happiness or unhappiness. + Yet their way is not so hedged around that they cannot be helped by others + in the matter of their being delayed from receiving their final award, because in this respect they are still wayfarers. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the communion of civic deeds whereof the Philosopher speaks, is impossible between the dead and the living, because + the dead are outside civic life, the communication of the spiritual life is possible between them, for that life is founded + on charity towards God, to Whom the spirits of the dead live. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A2-p14"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A2-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q71_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q71_A3-p0.1">Whether suffrages performed by sinners profit the dead?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q71_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that suffrages performed by sinners do not profit the dead. For, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q71_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.9.31" target="asv"> Jn. 9:31, </a> "God doth not hear sinners." Now if their prayers were to profit those for whom they pray, they would be heard by God. Therefore + the suffrages performed by them do not profit the dead. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says (Pastoral i, 11) that "when an offensive person is sent to intercede, the wrath of the angered party + is provoked to harsher measures." Now every sinner is offensive to God. Therefore God is not inclined to mercy by the suffrages + of sinners, and consequently their suffrages are of no avail. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a person's deed would seem to be more fruitful to the doer than to another. But a sinner merits naught for himself + by his deeds. Much less, therefore, can he merit for another. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every meritorious work must be a living work, that is to say, informed by charity. Now works done by sinners are + dead. Therefore the dead for whom they are done cannot be assisted thereby. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> On the contrary, No man can know for certain about another man whether the latter be in a state of sin or of grace. If, therefore, + only those suffrages were profitable that are done by those who are in a state of grace, a man could not know of whom to ask + suffrages for his dead, and consequently many would be deterred from obtaining suffrages. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A3-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, according to Augustine (Enchiridion cix), as quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45), the dead are assisted by suffrages + according as while living they merited to be assisted after death. Therefore the worth of suffrages is measured according + to the disposition of the person for whom they are performed. Therefore it would appear that it differs not whether they be + performed by good or by wicked persons. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A3-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Two things may be considered in the suffrages performed by the wicked. First, the deed done, for instance the sacrifice of + the altar. And since our sacraments have their efficacy from themselves independently of the deed of the doer, and are equally + efficacious by whomsoever they are performed, in this respect the suffrages of the wicked profit the departed. Secondly, we + may consider the deed of the doer, and then we must draw a distinction; because the deed + of a sinner who offers suffrage may be considered---in one way in so far as it is his own deed, and thus it can nowise be + meritorious either to himself or to another; in another way in so far as it is another's deed, and this happens in two ways. + First, when the sinner, offering suffrages, represents the whole Church; for instance a priest when he performs the burial + service in church. And since one in whose name or in whose stead a thing is done is understood to do it himself as Dionysius + asserts (Coel. Hier. xiii), it follows that the suffrages of that priest, albeit a sinner, profit the departed. Secondly, + when he acts as the instrument of another: for the work of the instrument belongs more to the principal agent. Wherefore, + although he who acts as the instrument of another be not in a state of merit, his act may be meritorious on account of the + principal agent: for instance if a servant being in sin do any work of mercy at the command of his master who has charity. + Hence, if + a person dying in charity command suffrages to be offered for him, or if some other person having charity prescribe them, + those suffrages avail for the departed, even though the persons by whom they are performed be in sin. Nevertheless they would + avail more if those persons were in charity, because then those works would be meritorious on two counts. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The prayer offered by a sinner is sometimes not his but another's, and consequently in this respect is worthy to be heard + by God. Nevertheless, God sometimes hears sinners, when, to wit, they ask for something acceptable to God. For God dispenses + His goods not only to the righteous but also to sinners ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q71_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.45" target="asv">Mat. 5:45</a>), not indeed on account of their merits, but of His loving kindness. Hence a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q71_A3-p9.2" href="./asv.html#John.9.31" target="asv"> Jn. 9:31, </a> "God + doth not hear sinners," says that "he speaks as one unanointed and as not seeing clearly." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the sinner's prayer is not acceptable in so far as he is offensive, it may be acceptable to God on account of another + in whose stead or at whose command he offers the prayer. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason why the sinner who performs these suffrages gains nothing thereby is because he is not capable of profiting by + reason of his own indisposition. Nevertheless, as stated above, it may in some way profit another, who is disposed. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the sinner's deed is not living in so far as it is his own, it may be living in so far as it is another's, as stated + above. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A3-p13"> Since, however, the arguments in the contrary sense would seem to show that it matters not whether one obtain suffrages from + good or from evil persons, we must reply to them also. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Although one cannot know for certain about another whether he be in the state of salvation, one may infer it with probability + from what one sees outwardly of a man: for a tree is known by its fruit ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q71_A3-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.16" target="asv">Mat. 7:16</a>). + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A3-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> In order that suffrage avail another, it is requisite that the one for whom it is performed be capable of availing by it: + and a man has become capable of this by his own works which he did in his life-time. This is what Augustine means to say. + Nevertheless, those works must be such that they can profit him, and this depends not on the person for whom the suffrage + is performed, but rather on the one who offers the suffrages whether by performing them + or by commanding them. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A3-p16"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A3-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q71_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q71_A4-p0.1">Whether suffrages offered by the living for the dead profit those who offer them?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q71_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that suffrages offered by the living for the dead do not profit those who offer them. For according to human + justice a man is not absolved from his own debt if he pay a debt for another man. Therefore a man is not absolved from his + own debt for the reason that by offering suffrages he has paid the debt of the one for whom he offered them. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever a man does, he should do it as best he can. Now it is better to assist two than one. Therefore if one who + by suffrages has paid the debt of a dead person is freed from his own debt, it would seem that one ought never to satisfy + for oneself, but always for another. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the satisfaction of one who satisfies for another profits him equally with the one for whom he satisfies, it + will likewise equally profit a third person if he satisfy for him at the same time, and likewise a fourth and so on. Therefore + he might satisfy for all by one work of satisfaction; which is absurd. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q71_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.34.13" target="asv">Ps. 34:13</a>): "My prayer shall be turned into my bosom." Therefore, in like manner, suffrages that are offered for others profit those + who satisfy. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A4-p6"> Further, the Damascene says in the sermon "On those who fell asleep in the faith: Just as when about to anoint a sick man + with the ointment or other holy oil, first of all he, " namely the anointer, "shares in the anointing and thus proceeds to + anoint the patient, so whoever strives for his neighbor's salvation first of all profits himself and afterwards his neighbor." + And thus the question at issue is answered. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The work of suffrage that is done for another may be considered in two ways. First, as expiating punishment by way of compensation + which is a condition of satisfaction: and in this way the work of suffrage that is counted as belonging to the person for + whom it is done, while absolving him from the debt of punishment, does not absolve the performer from his own debt of punishment, + because in this compensation we have to consider the equality of justice: and + this work of satisfaction can be equal to the one debt without being equal to the other, for the debts of two sinners require + a greater satisfaction than the debt of one. Secondly, it may be considered as meriting eternal life, and this it has as proceeding + from its root, which is charity: and in this way it profits not only the person for whom it is done, but also and still more + the doer. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A4-p8"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first considered the work of suffrage as a work of satisfaction, + while the others consider it as meritorious. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A4-p9"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A4-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q71_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q71_A5-p0.1">Whether suffrages profit those who are in hell?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q71_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that suffrages profit those who are in hell. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q71_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.12.40" target="asv">2 Macc. 12:40</a>): "They found under the coats of the slain some of the donaries of the idols . . . which the law forbiddeth to the Jews," + and yet we read further on ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q71_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.12.43" target="asv">2 Macc. 12:43</a>) that Judas "sent twelve thousand drachms of silver to Jerusalem . . . to be offered for the sins of the dead." Now it is + clear that they sinned mortally through + acting against the Law, and consequently that they died in mortal sin, and were taken to hell. Therefore suffrages profit + those who are in hell. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the text (Sent. iv, D, 45) quotes the saying of Augustine (Enchiridion cx) that "those whom suffrages profit gain + either entire forgiveness, or at least an abatement of their damnation." Now only those who are in hell are said to be damned. + Therefore suffrages profit even those who are in hell. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier.): "If here the prayers of the righteous avail those who are alive, how much more do + they, after death, profit those alone who are worthy of their holy prayers?" Hence we may gather that suffrages are more profitable + to the dead than to the living. Now they profit the living even though they be in mortal sin, for the Church prays daily for + sinners that they be converted to God. Therefore suffrages avail also for the dead who + are in mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in the Lives of the Fathers (iii, 172; vi, 3) we read, and the Damascene relates in his sermon [*De his qui in fide + dormierunt] that Macarius discovered the skull of a dead man on the road, and that after praying he asked whose head it was, + and the head replied that it had belonged to a pagan priest who was condemned to hell; and yet he confessed that he and others + were assisted by the prayers of Macarius. Therefore the suffrages of the Church profit + even those who are in hell. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A5-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Damascene in the same sermon relates that Gregory, while praying for Trajan, heard a voice from heaven saying + to him: "I have heard thy voice, and I pardon Trajan": and of this fact the Damascene adds in the same sermon, "the whole + East and West are witnesses." Yet it is clear that Trajan was in hell, since "he put many martyrs to a cruel death" [*De his + qui fide dormierunt]. Therefore the suffrages of the Church avail even for those who are in + hell. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A5-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vii): "The high priest prays not for the unclean, because by so doing he would act counter to + the Divine order," and consequently he says (Eccl. Hier. vii) that "he prays not that sinners be forgiven, because his prayer + for them would not be heard." Therefore suffrages avail not those who are in hell. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A5-p8"> Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 19): "There is the same reason for not praying then" (namely after the judgment day) + "for men condemned to the everlasting fire, as there is now for not praying for the devil and his angels who are sentenced + to eternal punishment, and for this reason the saints pray not for dead unbelieving and wicked men, because, forsooth, knowing + them to be already condemned to eternal punishment, they shrink from pleading for them by the merit of their + prayers before they are summoned to the presence of the just Judge." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A5-p9"> Further, the text (Sent. iv, D, 45) quotes the words of Augustine (De Verb. A post. Serm. xxxii): "If a man depart this life + without the faith that worketh by charity and its sacraments, in vain do his friends have recourse to such like acts of kindness." + Now all the damned come under that head. Therefore suffrages profit them not. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A5-p10"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There have been three opinions about the damned. For some have said that a twofold distinction must be made in this matter. + First, as to time; for they said that after the judgment day no one in hell will be assisted by any suffrage, but that before + the judgment day some are assisted by the suffrages of the Church. Secondly, they made a distinction among those who are detained + in hell. Some of these, they said, are very bad, those namely who have died + without faith and the sacraments, and these, since they were not of the Church, neither "by grace nor, by name" [*Cf. Oratio + ad Vesperas, Fer. ii, post Dom. Pass.] can the suffrages of the Church avail; while others are not very bad, those namely + who belonged to the Church as actual members, who had the faith, frequented the sacraments and performed works generically + good, and for these the suffrages of the Church ought to avail. Yet they were confronted with a difficulty which troubled + them, + for it would seem to follow from this (since the punishment of hell is finite in intensity although infinite in duration) + that a multiplicity of suffrages would take away that punishment altogether, which is the error of Origen (Peri Archon. i; + cf. Gregory, Moral. xxxiv): and consequently endeavored in various ways to avoid this difficulty. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A5-p11"> Praepositivus [*Gilbert Prevostin, Chancellor of the See of Paris, A.D. 1205-9] said that suffrages for the damned can be + so multiplied that they are entirely freed from punishment, not absolutely as Origen maintained, but for a time, namely till + the judgment day: for their souls will be reunited to their bodies, and will be cast back into the punishments of hell without + hope of pardon. But this opinion seems incompatible with Divine providence, which leaves nothing inordinate + in the world. For guilt cannot be restored to order save by punishment: wherefore it is impossible for punishment to cease, + unless first of all guilt be expiated: so that, as guilt remains for ever in the damned, their punishment will nowise be interrupted. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A5-p12"> For this reason the followers of Gilbert de la Porree devised another explanation. These said that the process in the diminution + of punishments by suffrages is as the process in dividing a line, which though finite, is indefinitely divisible, and is never + destroyed by division, if it be diminished not by equal but by proportionate quantities, for instance if we begin by taking + away a quarter of the whole, and secondly, a quarter of that quarter, and then a quarter of this second + quarter, and so on indefinitely. In like manner, they say by the first suffrage a certain proportion of the punishment is + taken away, and by the second an equally proportionate part of the remainder. But this explanation is in many ways defective. + First, because it seems that indefinite division which is applicable to continuous quantity cannot be transferred to spiritual + quantity: secondly, because there is no reason why the second suffrage, if it be of equal worth, should diminish the + punishment less than the first: thirdly, because punishment cannot be diminished unless guilt be diminished, even as it cannot + be done away unless the guilt be done away: fourthly, because in the division of a line we come at length to something which + is not sensible, for a sensible body is not indefinitely divisible: and thus it would follow that after many suffrages the + remaining punishment would be so little as not to be felt, and thus would no longer be a punishment. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A5-p13"> Hence others found another explanation. For Antissiodorensis [*William of Auxerre, Archdeacon of Beauvais] (Sent. iv, Tract. + 14) said that suffrages profit the damned not by diminishing or interrupting their punishment, but by fortifying the person + punished: even as a man who is carrying a heavy load might bathe his face in water, for thus he would be enabled to carry + it better, and yet his load would be none the lighter. But this again is impossible, because according to + Gregory (Moral. ix) a man suffers more or less from the eternal fire according as his guilt deserves; and consequently some + suffer more, some less, from the same fire. wherefore since the guilt of the damned remains unchanged, it cannot be that he + suffers less punishment. Moreover, the aforesaid opinion is presumptuous, as being in opposition to the statements of holy + men, and groundless as being based on no authority. It is also unreasonable. First, because the damned in hell are cut off + from + the bond of charity in virtue of which the departed are in touch with the works of the living. Secondly, because they have + entirely come to the end of life, and have received the final award for their merits, even as the saints who are in heaven. + For the remaining punishment or glory of the body does not make them to be wayfarers, since glory essentially and radically + resides in the soul. It is the same with the unhappiness of the damned, wherefore their punishment cannot be diminished as + neither can the glory of the saints be increased as to the essential reward. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A5-p14"> However, we may admit, in a certain measure, the manner in which, according to some, suffrages profit the damned, if it be + said that they profit neither by diminishing nor interrupting their punishment, nor again by diminishing their sense of punishment, + but by withdrawing from the damned some matter of grief, which matter they might have if they knew themselves to be so outcast + as to be a care to no one; and this matter of grief is withdrawn from them when suffrages are offered + for them. Yet even this is impossible according to the general law, because as Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xiii)---and + this applies especially to the damned---"the spirits of the departed are where they see nothing of what men do or of what + happens to them in this life," and consequently they know not when suffrages are offered for them, unless this relief be granted + from above to some of the damned in spite of the general law. This, however, is a matter of great uncertainty; wherefore it + is safer to say simply that suffrages profit not the damned, nor does the Church intend to pray for them, as appears from + the authors quoted above. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A5-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The donaries to the idols were not found on those dead so that they might be taken as a sign that they were carried off in + reverence to the idols: but they took them as conquerors because they were due to them by right of war. They sinned, however, + venially by covetousness: and consequently they were not damned in hell, and thus suffrages could profit them. or we may say, + according to some, that in the midst of fighting, seeing they were in danger, + they repented of their sin, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q71_A5-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.77.34" target="asv"> Ps. 77:34, </a> "When He slew them, then they sought Him": and this is a probable opinion. Wherefore the offering was made for them. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A5-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In these words damnation is taken in a broad sense for any kind of punishment, so as to include also the punishment of purgatory + which is sometimes entirely expiated by suffrages, and sometimes not entirety, but diminished. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A5-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Suffrage for a dead person is more acceptable than for a living person, as regards his being in greater want, since he cannot + help himself as a living person can. But a living person is better off in that he can be taken from the state of mortal sin + to the state of grace, which cannot be said of the dead. Hence there is not the same reason for praying for the dead as for + the living. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A5-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This assistance did not consist in a diminishment of their punishment, but in this alone (as stated in the same place) that + when he prayed they were permitted to see one another, and in this they had a certain joy, not real but imaginary, in the + fulfillment of their desire. Even so the demons are said to rejoice when they draw men into sin, although this nowise diminishes + their punishment, as neither is the joy of the angels diminished by the fact + that they take pity on our ills. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A5-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Concerning the incident of Trajan it may be supposed with probability that he was recalled to life at the prayers of blessed + Gregory, and thus obtained the grace whereby he received the pardon of his sins and in consequence was freed from punishment. + The same applies to all those who were miraculously raised from the dead, many of whom were evidently idolaters and damned. + For we must needs say likewise of all such persons that they were consigned to + hell, not finally, but as was actually due to their own merits according to justice: and that according to higher causes, + in view of which it was foreseen that they would be recalled to life, they were to be disposed of otherwise. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A5-p20"> Or we may say with some that Trajan's soul was not simply freed from the debt of eternal punishment, but that his punishment + was suspended for a time, that is, until the judgment day. Nor does it follow that this is the general result of suffrages, + because things happen differently in accordance with the general law from that which is permitted in particular cases and + by privilege. Even so the bounds of human affairs differ from those of the miracles of the Divine power as + Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xvi). + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A5-p21"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A5-p22"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q71_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q71_A6-p0.1">Whether suffrages profit those who are in purgatory?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q71_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that suffrages do not profit even those who are in purgatory. For purgatory is a part of hell. Now "there is + no redemption in hell" [*Office of the Dead, Resp. vii], and it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q71_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.6.6" target="asv">Ps. 6:6</a>), "Who shall confess to Thee in hell?" Therefore suffrages do not profit those who are in purgatory. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the punishment of purgatory is finite. Therefore if some of the punishment is abated by suffrages, it would be possible + to have such a great number of suffrages, that the punishment would be entirely remitted, and consequently the sin entirely + unpunished: and this would seem incompatible with Divine justice. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, souls are in purgatory in order that they may be purified there, and being pure may come to the kingdom. Now nothing + can be purified, unless something be done to it. Therefore suffrages offered by the living do not diminish the punishment + of purgatory. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A6-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if suffrages availed those who are in purgatory, those especially would seem to avail them which are offered at + their behest. Yet these do not always avail: for instance, if a person before dying were to provide for so many suffrages + to be offered for him that if they were offered they would suffice for the remission of his entire punishment. Now supposing + these suffrages to be delayed until he is released from punishment, they will profit him + nothing. For it cannot be said that they profit him before they are discharged; and after they are fulfilled, he no longer + needs them, since he is already released. Therefore suffrages do not avail those who are in purgatory. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A6-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> As quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45), Augustine says (Enchiridion cx): "Suffrages profit those who are not very good or + not very bad." Now such are those who are detained in purgatory. Therefore, etc. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A6-p7"> Further, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vii) that the "godlike priest in praying for the departed prays for those who lived + a holy life, and yet contracted certain stains through human frailty." Now such persons are detained in purgatory. Therefore, + etc. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A6-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The punishment of purgatory is intended to supplement the satisfaction which was not fully completed in the body. Consequently, + since, as stated above ( + <a id="XP_Q71_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q71_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2; Q[13], A[2]), the works of one person can avail for another's satisfaction, whether the latter be living or dead, the + suffrages of the living, without any doubt, profit those who are in purgatory. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words quoted refer to those who are in the hell of the damned, where there is no redemption for those who are finally + consigned to that punishment. We may also reply with Damascene (Serm.: De his qui in fide dormierunt) that such statements + are to be explained with reference to the lower causes, that is according to the demands of the merits of those who are consigned + to those punishments. But according to the Divine mercy which transcends human + merits, it happens otherwise through the prayers of the righteous, than is implied by the expressions quoted in the aforesaid + authorities. Now "God changes His sentence but not his counsel," as Gregory says (Moral. xx): wherefore the Damascene (Serm.: + De his qui in fide dormierunt) quotes as instances of this the Ninevites, Achab and Ezechias, in whom it is apparent that + the sentence pronounced against them by God was commuted by the Divine mercy [*Cf. + <a id="XP_Q71_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A7.html">FP, Q[19], A[7]</a>, + ad 2]. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not unreasonable that the punishment of those who are in purgatory be entirely done away by the multiplicity of suffrages. + But it does not follow that the sins remain unpunished, because the punishment of one undertaken in lieu of another is credited + to that other. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The purifying of the soul by the punishment of purgatory is nothing else than the expiation of the guilt that hinders it + from obtaining glory. And since, as stated above ( + <a id="XP_Q71_A6-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q13_A2.html">Q[13], A[2]</a>), the guilt of one person can be expiated by the punishment which another undergoes in his stead, it is not unreasonable + that one person be purified by another satisfying for him. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A6-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Suffrages avail on two counts, namely the action of the agent [*"Ex opere operante" and "ex opere operato"] and the action + done. By action done I mean not only the sacrament of the Church, but the effect incidental to that action---thus from the + giving of alms there follow the relief of the poor and their prayer to God for the deceased. In like manner the action of + the agent may be considered in relation either to the principal agent or to the + executor. I say, then, that the dying person, as soon as he provides for certain suffrages to be offered for him, receives + the full meed of those suffrages, even before they are discharged, as regards the efficacy of the suffrages that results from + the action as proceeding from the principal agent. But as regards the efficacy of the suffrages arising from the action done + or from the action as proceeding from the executor, he does not receive the fruit before the suffrages are discharged. And + if, before this, he happens to be released from his punishment, he will in this respect be deprived of the fruit of the suffrages, + and this will fall back upon those by whose fault he was then defrauded. For it is not unreasonable that a person be defrauded + in temporal matters by another's fault---and the punishment of purgatory is temporal---although as regards the eternal retribution + none can be defrauded save by his own fault. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A6-p13"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A6-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q71_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q71_A7-p0.1">Whether suffrages avail the children who are in limbo? </h4> + <p id="XP_Q71_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that suffrages avail the children who are in limbo. For they are not detained there except for another's sin. + Therefore it is most becoming that they should be assisted by the suffrages of others. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45) the words of Augustine (Enchiridion cx) are quoted: "The suffrages of the Church obtain + forgiveness for those who are not very bad." Now children are not reckoned among those who are very bad, since their punishment + is very light. Therefore the suffrages of the Church avail them. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A7-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The text (Sent. iv, D, 45) quotes Augustine as saying (Serm. xxxii, De Verb Ap.) that "suffrages avail not those who have + departed hence without the faith that works by love." Now the children departed thus. Therefore suffrages avail them not. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A7-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Unbaptized children are not detained in limbo save because they lack the state of grace. Hence, since the state of the dead + cannot be changed by the works of the living, especially as regards the merit of the essential reward or punishment, the suffrages + of the living cannot profit the children in limbo. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A7-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although original sin is such that one person can be assisted by another on its account, nevertheless the souls of the children + in limbo are in such a state that they cannot be assisted, because after this life there is no time for obtaining grace. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine is speaking of those who are not very bad, but have been baptized. This is clear from what precedes: "Since these + sacrifices, whether of the altar or of any alms whatsoever are offered for those who have been baptized," etc. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A7-p8"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A7-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q71_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A9.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q71_A8-p0.1">Whether suffrages profit the saints in heaven?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q71_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in some way suffrages profit the saints in heaven; on account of the words of the Collect in the Mass + [*Postcommunion, Feast of St. Andrew, Apostle]: "Even as they" (i.e. the sacraments) "avail thy saints unto glory, so may + they profit us unto healing." Now foremost among all suffrages is the sacrifice of the altar. Therefore suffrages profit the + saints in heaven. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sacraments cause what they signify. Now the third part of the host, that namely which is dropped into the chalice, + signifies those who lead a happy life in heaven. Therefore the suffrages of the Church profit those who are in heaven. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the saints rejoice in heaven not only in their own goods, but also in the goods of others: hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q71_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.15.10" target="asv">Lk. 15:10</a>): "There is [Vulg.: 'shall be'] joy before the angels of God upon one sinner doing penance." Therefore the joy of the saints + in heaven increases on account of the good works of the living: and consequently our suffrages also profit them. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A8-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Damascene says (Serm.: De his qui in fide dormierunt) quoting the words of Chrysostom: "For if the heathens," + he says, "burn the dead together with what has belonged to them, how much more shouldst thou, a believer, send forth a believer + together with what has belonged to him, not that they also may be brought to ashes like him, but that thou mayest surround + him with greater glory by so doing; and if he be a sinner who has died, that thou mayest + loose him from his sins, and if he be righteous, that thou mayest add to his meed and reward!" And thus the same conclusion + follows. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A8-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> As quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15), Augustine says (De Verb Ap., Serm. xvii): "It is insulting to pray for a martyr + in church, since we ought to commend ourselves to his prayers." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A8-p7"> Further, to be assisted belongs to one who is in need. But the saints in heaven are without any need whatever. Therefore + they are not assisted by the suffrages of the Church. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A8-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Suffrage by its very nature implies the giving of some assistance, which does not apply to one who suffers no default: since + no one is competent to be assisted except he who is in need. Hence, as the saints in heaven are free from all need, being + inebriated with the plenty of God's house ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q71_A8-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.10" target="asv">Ps. 35:10</a>), they are not competent to be assisted by suffrages. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Such like expressions do not mean that the saints receive an increase of glory in themselves through our observing their + feasts, but that we profit thereby in celebrating their glory with greater solemnity. Thus, through our knowing or praising + God, and through His glory thus increasing some what in us, there accrues something, not to God, but to us. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the sacraments cause what thy signify, they do not produce this effect in respect of everything that they signify: + else, since they signify Christ, they would produce something in Christ (which is absurd). But they produce their effect on + the recipient of the sacrament in virtue of that which is signified by the sacrament. Thus it does not follow that the sacrifices + offered for the faithful departed profit the saints, but that by the merits + of the saints which we commemorate, or which are signified in the sacrament, they profit others for whom they are offered. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A8-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the saints in heaven rejoice in all our goods, it does not follow, that if our joys be increased their joy is also + increased formally, but only materially, because every passion is increased formally in respect of the formal aspect of its + object. Now the formal aspect of the saints' joy, no matter what they rejoice in, is God Himself, in Whom they cannot rejoice + more and less, for otherwise their essential reward, consisting of their joy in + God, would vary. Hence from the fact that the goods are multiplied, wherein they rejoice with God as the formal aspect of + their joy, it does not follow that their joy is intensified, but that they rejoice in more things. Consequently it does not + follow that they are assisted by our works. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A8-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The sense is not that an increase of meed or reward accrues to the saint from the suffrages offered by a person, but that + this accrues to the offerer. Or we may reply that the blessed departed may derive a reward from suffrages through having, + while living, provided for suffrage to be offered for himself, and this was meritorious for him. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A8-p13"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A8-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A9.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q71_A9" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A10.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q71_A9-p0.1">Whether the prayers of the Church, the sacrifice of the altar and alms profit the departed?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q71_A9-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the souls of the departed are not assisted only by the prayers of the Church, the sacrifice of the altar + and alms, or that they are not assisted by them chiefly. For punishment should compensate for punishment. Now fasting is more + penal than almsgiving or prayer. Therefore fasting profits more as suffrage than any of the above. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory reckons fasting together with these three, as stated in the Decretals (xiii, Q. ii, Cap. 22): "The souls + of the departed are released in four ways, either by the offerings of priests, or the alms of their friends, or the prayers + of the saints, or the fasting of their kinsfolk." Therefore the three mentioned above are insufficiently reckoned by Augustine + (De Cura pro Mort. xviii). + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Baptism is the greatest of the sacraments, especially as regards its effect. Therefore Baptism and other sacraments + ought to be offered for the departed equally with or more than the Sacrament of the altar. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A9-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, this would seem to follow from the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q71_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.29" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:29</a>, "If the dead rise not again at all, why are they then baptized for them?" Therefore Baptism avails as suffrage for the dead. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A9-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, in different Masses there is the same Sacrifice of the altar. If, therefore, sacrifice, and not the Mass, be reckoned + among the suffrages, it would seem that the effect would be the same whatever Mass be said for a deceased person, whether + in honor of the Blessed Virgin or of the Holy Ghost, or any other. Yet this seems contrary to the ordinance of the Church + which has appointed a special Mass for the dead. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A9-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the Damascene (Serm.: De his qui in fide dormierunt) teaches that candles and oil should be offered for the dead. + Therefore not only the offering of the sacrifice of the altar, but also other offerings should be reckoned among suffrages + for the dead. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A9-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The suffrages of the living profit the dead in so far as the latter are united to the living in charity, and in so far as + the intention of the living is directed to the dead. Consequently those whose works are by nature best adapted to assist the + dead, which pertain chiefly to the communication of charity, or to the directing of one's intention to another person. Now + the sacrament of the Eucharist belongs chiefly to charity, since it is the sacrament of + ecclesiastical unity, inasmuch as it contains Him in Whom the whole Church is united and incorporated, namely Christ: wherefore + the Eucharist is as it were the origin and bond of charity. Again, chief among the effects of charity is the work of almsgiving: + wherefore on the part of charity these two, namely the sacrifice of the Church and almsgiving are the chief suffrages for + the dead. But on the part of the intention directed to the dead the chief suffrage is prayer, because prayer by its very + nature implies relation not only to the person who prays, even as other works do, but more directly still to that which we + pray for. Hence these three are reckoned the principal means of succoring the dead, although we must allow that any other + goods whatsoever that are done out of charity for the dead are profitable to them. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When one person satisfies for another, the point to consider, in order that the effect of his satisfaction reach the other, + is the thing whereby the satisfaction of one passes to another, rather than even the punishment undergone by way of satisfaction; + although the punishment expiates more the guilt of the one who satisfies, in so far as it is a kind of medicine. And consequently + the three aforesaid are more profitable to the departed than + fasting. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A9-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is true that fasting can profit the departed by reason of charity, and on account of the intention being directed to the + departed. Nevertheless, fasting does not by its nature contain anything pertaining to charity or to the directing of the intention, + and these things are extrinsic thereto as it were, and for this reason Augustine did not reckon, while Gregory did reckon, + fasting among the suffrages for the dead. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A9-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Baptism is a spiritual regeneration, wherefore just as by generation being does not accrue save to the object generated, + so Baptism produces its effect only in the person baptized, as regards the deed done: and yet as regards the deed of the doer + whether of the baptizer or of the baptized, it may profit others even as other meritorious works. On the other hand, the Eucharist + is the sign of ecclesiastical unity, wherefore by reason of the deed done its + effect can pass to another, which is not the case with the other sacraments. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A9-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> According to a gloss this passage may be expounded in two ways. First, thus: "If the dead rise not again, nor did Christ + rise again, why are they baptized for them? i.e. for sins, since they are not pardoned if Christ rose not again, because in + Baptism not only Christ's passion but also His resurrection operates, for the latter is in a sense the cause of our spiritual + resurrection." Secondly, thus: There have been some misguided persons who were + baptized for those who had departed this life without baptism, thinking that this would profit them: and according to this + explanation the Apostle is speaking, in the above words, merely according to the opinion of certain persons. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A9-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> In the office of the Mass there is not only a sacrifice but also prayers. Hence the suffrage of the Mass contains two of + the things mentioned by Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. xviii), namely "prayer" and "sacrifice." As regards the sacrifice offered + the Mass profits equally the departed, no matter in whose honor it be said: and this is the principal thing done in the Mass. + But as regards the prayers, that Mass is most profitable in which the prayers are + appointed for this purpose. Nevertheless, this defect may be supplied by the greater devotion, either of the one who says + Mass, or of the one who orders the Mass to be said, or again, by the intercession of the saint whose suffrage is besought + in the Mass. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A9-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> This offering of candles or oil may profit the departed in so far as they are a kind of alms: for they are given for the + worship of the Church or for the use of the faithful. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A9-p15"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A9-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A10.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q71_A10" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A11.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q71_A10-p0.1">Whether the indulgences of the Church profit the dead?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q71_A10-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A10-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the indulgences granted by the Church profit even the dead. First, on account of the custom of the Church, + who orders the preaching of a crusade in order that some one may gain an indulgence for himself and for two or three and sometimes + even ten souls, both of the living and of the dead. But this would amount to a deception unless they profited the dead. Therefore + indulgences profit the dead. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A10-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the merit of the whole Church is more efficacious than that of one person. Now personal merit serves as a suffrage + for the departed, for instance in the case of almsgiving. Much more therefore does the merit of the Church whereon indulgences + are founded. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A10-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the indulgences of the Church profit those who are members of the Church. Now those who are in purgatory are members + of the Church, else the suffrages of the Church would not profit them. Therefore it would seem that indulgences profit the + departed. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A10-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> In order that indulgences may avail a person, there must be a fitting cause for granting the indulgence [*Cf. + <a id="XP_Q71_A10-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q25_A2.html"> Q[25], A[2]</a>]. Now there can be no such cause on the part of the dead, since they can do nothing that is of profit to the Church, and + it is for such a cause that indulgences are chiefly granted. Therefore, seemingly, indulgences profit not the dead. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A10-p6"> Further, indulgences are regulated according to the decision of the party who grants them. If, therefore, indulgences could + avail the dead, it would be in the power of the party granting them to release a deceased person entirely from punishment: + which is apparently absurd. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A10-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> An indulgence may profit a person in two ways: in one way, principally; in another, secondarily. It profits principally the + person who avails himself of an indulgence, who, namely, does that for which the indulgence is granted, for instance one who + visits the shrine of some saint. Hence since the dead can do none of those things for which indulgences are granted, indulgences + cannot avail them directly. However, they profit secondarily and indirectly the + person for whom one does that which is the cause of the indulgence. This is sometimes feasible and sometimes not, according + to the different forms of indulgence. For if the form of indulgence be such as this: "Whosoever does this or that shall gain + so much indulgence," he who does this cannot transfer the fruit of the indulgence to another, because it is not in his power + to apply to a particular person the intention of the Church who dispenses the common suffrages whence indulgences derive + their value, as stated above ( + <a id="XP_Q71_A10-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q27_A3.html">Q[27], A[3]</a>, ad 2). If, however, the indulgence be granted in this form: "Whosoever does this or that, he, his father, or any other person + connected with him and detained in purgatory, will gain so much indulgence," an indulgence of this kind will avail not only + a living but also a deceased person. For there is no reason why the Church is able to transfer the common merits, whereon + indulgences are based, to the living and not to the dead. + Nor does it follow that a prelate of the Church can release souls from purgatory just as he lists, since for indulgences to + avail there must be a fitting cause for granting them, as stated above ( + <a id="XP_Q71_A10-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q26_A3.html">Q[26], A[3]</a>). + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A10-p8"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A10-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A11.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q71_A11" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A12.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q71_A11-p0.1">Whether the burial service profits the dead?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q71_A11-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A11-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the burial service profits the dead. For Damascene (Serm.: De his qui in fide dormierunt) quotes Athanasius + as saying: "Even though he who has departed in godliness be taken up to heaven, do not hesitate to call upon God and to burn + oil and wax at his tomb; for such things are pleasing to God and receive a great reward from Him." Now the like pertain to + the burial service. Therefore the burial service profits the dead. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A11-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Augustine (De Cura pro mort. iii), "In olden times the funerals of just men were cared for with dutiful + piety, their obsequies celebrated, their graves provided, and themselves while living charged their children touching the + burial or even the translation of their bodies." But they would not have done this unless the tomb and things of this kind + conferred something on the dead. Therefore the like profit the dead somewhat. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A11-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one does a work of mercy on some one's behalf unless it profit him. Now burying the dead is reckoned among the + works of mercy, therefore Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii): "Tobias, as attested by the angel, is declared to have found + favor with God by burying the dead." Therefore such like burial observances profit the dead. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A11-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is unbecoming to assert that the devotion of the faithful is fruitless. Now some, out of devotion, arrange for + their burial in some religious locality. Therefore the burial service profits the dead. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A11-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, God is more inclined to pity than to condemn. Now burial in a sacred place is hurtful to some if they be unworthy: + wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv): "If those who are burdened with grievous sins are buried in the church this will lead to + their more severe condemnation rather than to their release." Much more, therefore, should we say that the burial service + profits the good. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A11-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii): "Whatever service is done the body is no aid to salvation, but an office of humanity." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A11-p8"> Further, Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii; De Civ. Dei i): "The funereal equipment, the disposition of the grace, the + solemnity of the obsequies are a comfort to the living rather than a help to the dead." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A11-p9"> Further, Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q71_A11-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.4" target="asv">Lk. 12:4</a>): "Be not afraid of them who kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do." Now after death the bodies of + the saints can be hindered from being buried, as we read of having been done to certain martyrs at Lyons in Gaul (Eusebius, + Eccl. Hist. v, 1). Therefore the dead take no harm if their bodies remain unburied: and consequently the burial service does + not profit them. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A11-p10"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We have recourse to burial for the sake of both the living and the dead. For the sake of the living, lest their eyes be revolted + by the disfigurement of the corpse, and their bodies be infected by the stench, and this as regards the body. But it profits + the living also spiritually inasmuch as our belief in the resurrection is confirmed thereby. It profits the dead in so far + as one bears the dead in mind and prays for them through looking on their burial + place, wherefore a "monument" takes its name from remembrance, for a monument is something that recalls the mind [monens mentem], + as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei i; De Cura pro Mort. iv). It was, however, a pagan error that burial was profitable to + the dead by procuring rest for his soul: for they believed that the soul could not be at rest until the body was buried, which + is altogether ridiculous and absurd. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A11-p11"> That, moreover, burial in a sacred place profits the dead, does not result from the action done, but rather from the action + itself of the doer: when, to wit, the dead person himself, or another, arranges for his body to be buried in a sacred place, + and commends him to the patronage of some saint, by whose prayers we must believe that he is assisted, as well as to the suffrages + of those who serve the holy place, and pray more frequently and more specially for those who are buried + in their midst. But such things as are done for the display of the obsequies are profitable to the living, as being a consolation + to them; and yet they can also profit the dead, not directly but indirectly, in so far as men are aroused to pity thereby + and consequently to pray, or in so far as the outlay on the burial brings either assistance to the poor or adornment to the + church: for it is in this sense that the burial of the dead is reckoned among the works of mercy. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A11-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By bringing oil and candles to the tombs of the dead we profit them indirectly, either as offering them to the Church and + as giving them to the poor, or as doing this in reverence of God. Hence, after the words quoted we read: "For oil and candles + are a holocaust." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A11-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fathers of old arranged for the burial of their bodies, so as to show that "the bodies of the dead" are the object of + Divine providence, not that there is any feeling in a dead body, but in order to confirm the belief in the resurrection, as + Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 13). Hence, also, they wished to be buried in the land of promise, where they believed Christ's + birth and death would take place, Whose resurrection is the cause of our rising + again. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A11-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since flesh is a part of man's nature, man has a natural affection for his flesh, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q71_A11-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.29" target="asv"> Eph. 5:29, </a> "No man ever hated his own flesh." Hence in accordance with this natural affection a man has during life a certain solicitude + for what will become of his body after death: and he would grieve if he had a presentiment that something untoward would happen + to his body. Consequently those who love a man, through being conformed to + the one they love in his affection for himself, treat his body with loving care. For as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 13): + "If a father's garment and ring, and whatever such like is the more dear to those whom they leave behind the greater their + affection is towards their parents, in no wise are the bodies themselves to be spurned which truly we wear in more familiar + and close conjunction than anything else we put on." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A11-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iv), the devotion of the faithful is not fruitless when they arrange for their friends + to be buried in holy places, since by so doing they commend their dead to the suffrages of the saints, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A11-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The wicked man dead takes no harm by being buried in a holy place, except in so far as he rendered such a burial place unfitting + for him by reason of human glory. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A11-p17"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A11-p18"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A12.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q71_A12" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A11.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A13.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q71_A12-p0.1">Whether suffrages offered for one deceased person profit the person for whom they are offered more than others?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q71_A12-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A12-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that suffrages offered for one deceased person are not more profitable to the one for whom they are offered, + than to others. For spiritual light is more communicable than a material light. Now a material light, for instance of a candle, + though kindled for one person only, avails equally all those who are gathered together, though the candle be not lit for them. + Therefore, since suffrages are a kind of spiritual light, though they be offered for + one person in particular, do not avail him any more than the others who are in purgatory. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A12-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45), suffrages avail the dead "in so far as during this life they merited that + they might avail them afterwards" [*St. Augustine, Enchiridion cx]. Now some merited that suffrages might avail them more + than those for whom they are offered. Therefore they profit more by those suffrages, else their merits would be rendered unavailing. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A12-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the poor have not so many suffrages given them as the rich. Therefore if the suffrages offered for certain people + profit them alone, or profit them more than others, the poor would be worse off: yet this is contrary to our Lord's saying + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q71_A12-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.20" target="asv">Lk. 6:20</a>): "Blessed are ye poor, for yours is the kingdom of God." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A12-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Human justice is copied from Divine justice. But if a person pay another's debt human justice releases the latter alone. + Therefore since he who offers suffrages for another pays the debt, in a sense, of the person for whom he offers them, they + profit this person alone. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A12-p6"> Further, just as a man by offering suffrages satisfies somewhat for a deceased person, so, too, sometimes a person can satisfy + for a living person. Now where one satisfies for a living person the satisfaction counts only for the person for whom it is + offered. Therefore one also who offers suffrages profits him alone for whom he offers them. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A12-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There have been two opinions on this question. Some, like Praepositivus, have said that suffrages offered for one particular + person do avail chiefly, not the person for whom they are offered, but those who are most worthy. And they instanced a candle + which is lit for a rich man and profits those who are with him no less than the rich man himself, and perhaps even more, if + they have keener sight. They also gave the instance of a lesson which profits the + person to whom it is given no more than others who listen with him, but perhaps profits these others more, if they be more + intelligent. And if it were pointed out to them that in this case the Church's ordinance in appointing certain special prayers + for certain persons is futile, they said that the Church did this to excite the devotion of the faithful, who are more inclined + to offer special than common suffrages, and pray more fervently for their kinsfolk than for strangers. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A12-p8"> Others, on the contrary, said that suffrages avail more those for whom they are offered. Now both opinions have a certain + amount of truth: for the value of suffrages may be gauged from two sources. For their value is derived in the first place + from the virtue of charity, which makes all goods common, and in this respect they avail more the person who is more full + of charity, although they are not offered specially for him. In this way the value of suffrages regards more a + certain inward consolation by reason of which one who is in charity rejoices in the goods of another after death in respect + of the diminution of punishment; for after death there is no possibility of obtaining or increasing grace, whereas during + life the works of others avail for this purpose by the virtue of charity. In the second place suffrages derive their value + from being applied to another person by one's intention. In this way the satisfaction of one person counts for another, and + there + can be no doubt that thus they avail more the person for whom they are offered: in fact, they avail him alone in this way, + because satisfaction, properly speaking, is directed to the remission of punishment. Consequently, as regards the remission + of punishment, suffrages avail chiefly the person for whom they are offered, and accordingly there is more truth in the second + opinion than in the first. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A12-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Suffrages avail, after the manner of a light, in so far as they reach the dead, who thereby receive a certain amount of consolation: + and this is all the greater according as they are endowed with a greater charity. But in so far as suffrages are a satisfaction + applied to another by the intention of the offerer, they do not resemble a light, but rather the payment of a debt: and it + does not follow, if one person's debt be paid, that the debt of others + is paid likewise. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A12-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Such a merit is conditional, for in this way they merited that suffrages would profit them if offered for them, and this + was merely to render themselves fit recipients of those suffrages. It is therefore clear that they did not directly merit + the assistance of those suffrages, but made themselves fit by their preceding merits to receive the fruit of suffrages. Hence + it does not follow that their merit is rendered unavailing. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A12-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nothing hinders the rich from being in some respects better off than the poor, for instance as regards the expiation of their + punishment. But this is as nothing in comparison with the kingdom of heaven, where the poor are shown to be better off by + the authority quoted. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A12-p12"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A12-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A11.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A13.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q71_A13" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A12.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A14.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q71_A13-p0.1">Whether suffrages offered for several are of as much value to each one as if they had been offered for each in particular? + + </h4> + <p id="XP_Q71_A13-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A13-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that suffrages offered for several are of as much value to each one as if they had been offered for each in + particular. For it is clear that if one person receives a lesson he loses nothing if others receive the lesson with him. Therefore + in like manner a person for whom a suffrage is offered loses nothing if some one else is reckoned together with him: and consequently + if it be offered for several, it is of as much value to each one as if it + were offered for each in particular. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A13-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is to be observed that according to the common practice of the Church, when Mass is said for one deceased person, + other prayers are added for other deceased persons. Now this would not be done, if the dead person for whom the Mass is said + were to lose something thereby. Therefore the same conclusion follows as above. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A13-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, suffrages, especially of prayers, rely on the Divine power. But with God, just as it makes no difference whether + He helps by means of many or by means of a few, so it differs not whether He assists many or a few. Therefore if the one same + prayer be said for many, each one of them will receive as much assistance as one person would if that same prayer were said + for him alone. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A13-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is better to assist many than one. If therefore a suffrage offered for several is of as much value to each one as if it + were offered for one alone, it would seem that the Church ought not to have appointed a Mass and prayer to be said for one + person in particular, but that Mass ought always to be said for all the faithful departed: and this is evidently false. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A13-p6"> Further, a suffrage has a finite efficiency. Therefore if it be divided among many it avails less for each one than if it + were offered for one only. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A13-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> If the value of suffrages be considered according as it is derived from the virtue of charity uniting the members of the + Church together, suffrages offered for several persons avail each one as much as if they were offered for one alone, because + charity is not diminished if its effect be divided among many, in fact rather is it increased; and in like manner joy increases + through being shared by many, as Augustine says (Confess. viii). Consequently many in + purgatory rejoice in one good deed no less than one does. On the other hand, if we consider the value of suffrages, inasmuch + as they are a kind of satisfaction applied to the dead by the intention of the person offering them, then the suffrage for + some person in particular avails him more than that which is offered for him in common with many others; for in this case + the effect of the suffrages is divided in virtue of Divine justice among those for whom the suffrages are offered. Hence it + is + evident that this question depends on the first; and, moreover, it is made clear why special suffrages are appointed to be + offered in the Church. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A13-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Suffrages considered as works of satisfaction do not profit after the manner of an action as teaching does; for teaching, + like any other action, produces its effect according to the disposition of the recipient. But they profit after the manner + of the payment of a debt, as stated above (A[12], ad 1); and so the comparison fails. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A13-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since suffrages offered for one person avail others in a certain way, as stated + <a id="XP_Q71_A13-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q71_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, it follows that when Mass is said for one person, it is not unfitting for prayers to be said for others also. For these + prayers are said, not that the satisfaction offered by one suffrage be applied to those others chiefly, but that the prayer + offered for them in particular may profit them also. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A13-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prayer may be considered both on the part of the one who prays, and on the part of the person prayed: and its effect depends + on both. Consequently though it is no more difficult to the Divine power to absolve many than to absolve one, nevertheless + the prayer of one who prays thus is not as satisfactory for many as for one. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A13-p11"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A13-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A12.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A14.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q71_A14" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A13.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q72.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q71_A14-p0.1">Whether general suffrages avail those for whom special suffrages are not offered, as much as special suffrages avail those + for whom they are offered in addition to general suffrages? + </h4> + <p id="XP_Q71_A14-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A14-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that general suffrages avail those for whom special suffrages are not offered, as much as special suffrages + avail those for whom they are offered in addition to general suffrages. For in the life to come each one will be rewarded + according to his merits. Now a person for whom no suffrages are offered merited to be assisted after death as much as one + for whom special suffrages are offered. Therefore the former will be assisted by general suffrages + as much as the latter by special and general suffrages. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A14-p3"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Eucharist is the chief of the suffrages of the Church. Now the Eucharist, since it contains Christ whole, has + infinite efficacy so to speak. Therefore one offering of the Eucharist for all in general is of sufficient value to release + all who are in purgatory: and consequently general suffrages alone afford as much assistance as special and general suffrages + together. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A14-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Two goods are more eligible than one. Therefore special suffrages, together with general suffrages, are more profitable to + the person for whom they are offered than general suffrages alone. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A14-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The reply to this question depends on that which is given to the twelfth inquiry + <a id="XP_Q71_A14-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q71_A12.html">(A[12])</a>: for if the suffrages offered for one person in particular avail indifferently for all, then all suffrages are common; and + consequently one for whom the special suffrages are not offered will be assisted as much as the one for whom they are offered, + if he be equally worthy. On the other hand, if the suffrages offered for a person do not profit + all indifferently, but those chiefly for whom they are offered, then there is no doubt that general and special suffrages + together avail a person more than general suffrages alone. Hence the Master, in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45), mentions two opinions: + one, when he says that a rich man derives from general, together with special suffrages, an equal profit to that which a poor + man derives from special suffrages alone; for although the one receives assistance from more sources than the other, he + does not receive a greater assistance: the other opinion he mentions when he says that a person for whom special suffrages + are offered obtains a more speedy but not a more complete release, because each will be finally released from all punishment. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A14-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (A[12], ad 2) the assistance derived from suffrages is not directly and simply an object of merit, but conditionally + as it were: hence the argument does not prove. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A14-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the power of Christ Who is contained in the Sacrament of the Eucharist is infinite, yet there is a definite effect + to which that sacrament is directed. Hence it does not follow that the whole punishment of those who are in purgatory is expiated + by one sacrifice of the altar: even so, by the one sacrifice which a man offers, he is not released from the whole satisfaction + due for his sins, wherefore sometimes several Masses are enjoined in + satisfaction for one sin. Nevertheless, if any thing from special suffrages be left over for those for whom they are offered + (for instance if they need them not) we may well believe that by God's mercy this is granted to others for whom those suffrages + are not offered, if they need them: as affirmed by Damascene (Serm.: De his qui in fide dormierunt) who says: "Truly God, + forasmuch as He is just will adapt ability to the disabled, and will arrange for an exchange of deficiencies": and this + exchange is effected when what is lacking to one is supplied by another. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A14-p8"></p> + <p id="XP_Q71_A14-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A13.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q72.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.XP_Q70_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q72" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A14.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q72_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="XP_Q72-p0.1">OF PRAYERS WITH REGARD TO THE SAINTS IN HEAVEN (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="XP_Q72-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q72-p2"> We must now consider prayer with regard to the saints in heaven. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="XP_Q72-p3"> (1) Whether the saints have knowledge of our prayers?</p> + <p id="XP_Q72-p4"> (2) Whether we should beseech them to pray for us?</p> + <p id="XP_Q72-p5"> (3) Whether the prayers they pour forth for us are always granted?</p> + <div id="XP_Q72_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q72.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q72_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q72_A1-p0.1">Whether the saints have knowledge of our prayers?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q72_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the saints have no knowledge of our prayers. For a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q72_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.62.16" target="asv"> Is. 62:16, </a> "Thou art our father and Abraham hath not known us, and Israel hath been ignorant of us," says that "the dead saints know + not what the living, even their own children, are doing." This is taken from Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), where he + quotes the aforesaid authority, and the following are his words: "If such great men as the patriarchs knew + not what was happening to the people begotten of them, how can the dead occupy themselves in watching and helping the affairs + and actions of the living?" Therefore the saints cannot be cognizant of our prayers. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the following words are addressed to King Joas (4 Kings 22:20): "Therefore" (i.e. because thou hast wept before + Me), "I will gather thee to thy fathers . . . that thy eyes may not see all the evils which I will bring upon this place." + But Joas would have gained no such advantage from his death if he were to know after death what was happening to his people. + Therefore the saints after death know not our actions, and thus they are not cognizant of our + prayers. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more perfect a man is in charity, the more he succors his neighbor when the latter is in danger. Now the saints, + in this life, watch over their neighbor, especially their kinsfolk, when these are in danger, and manifestly assist them. + Since then, after death, their charity is much greater, if they were cognizant of our deeds, much more would they watch over + their friends and kindred and assist them in their needs: and yet, seemingly, they do not. + Therefore it would seem that our deeds and prayers are not known to them. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, even as the saints after death see the Word, so do the angels of whom it is stated ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q72_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.10" target="asv">Mat. 18:10</a>) that "their angels in heaven always see the face of My Father." Yet the angels through seeing the Word do not therefore + know all things, since the lower angels are cleansed from their lack of knowledge by the higher angels [*Cf. + <a id="XP_Q72_A1-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q106_A1.html">FP, Q[106], A[1]</a> ], as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. vii). Therefore although the + saints see the Word, they do not see therein our prayers and other things that happen in our regard. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, God alone is the searcher of hearts. Now prayer is seated chiefly in the heart. Therefore it belongs to God alone + to know our prayers. Therefore our prayers are unknown to the saints. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory, commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q72_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Job.14.21" target="asv"> Job 14:21, </a> "Whether his children come to honor or dishonor, he shall not understand," says (Moral. xii): "This does not apply to the + souls of the saints, for since they have an insight of Almighty God's glory we must nowise believe that anything outside that + glory is unknown to them." Therefore they are cognizant of our prayers. Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii): "All creatures are + little to the soul that sees + God: because however little it sees of the Creator's light, every created thing appears foreshortened to it." Now apparently + the chief obstacle to the souls of the saints being cognizant of our prayers and other happenings in our regard is that they + are far removed from us. Since then distance does not prevent these things, as appears from the authority quoted, it would + seem that the souls of the saints are cognizant of our prayers and of what happens here below. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A1-p8"> Further, unless they were aware of what happens in our regard they would not pray for us, since they would be ignorant of + our needs. But this is the error of Vigilantius, as Jerome asserts in his letter against him. Therefore the saints are cognizant + of what happens in our regard. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A1-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The Divine essence is a sufficient medium for knowing all things, and this is evident from the fact that God, by seeing His + essence, sees all things. But it does not follow that whoever sees God's essence knows all things, but only those who comprehend + the essence of God [*Cf. + <a id="XP_Q72_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A7.html">FP, Q[12], AA[7]</a>,8]: even as the knowledge of a principle does not involve the knowledge of all that follows from that principle unless the + whole virtue of the + principle be comprehended. Wherefore, since the souls of the saints do not comprehend the Divine essence, it does not follow + that they know all that can be known by the Divine essence---for which reason the lower angels are taught concerning certain + matters by the higher angels, though they all see the essence of God; but each of the blessed must needs see in the Divine + essence as many other things as the perfection of his happiness requires. For the perfection of a man's happiness requires + him + to have whatever he will, and to will nothing amiss: and each one wills with a right will, to know what concerns himself. + Hence since no rectitude is lacking to the saints, they wish to know what concerns themselves, and consequently it follows + that they know it in the Word. Now it pertains to their glory that they assist the needy for their salvation: for thus they + become God's co-operators, "than which nothing is more Godlike," as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. iii). Wherefore it is + evident + that the saints are cognizant of such things as are required for this purpose; and so it is manifest that they know in the + Word the vows, devotions, and prayers of those who have recourse to their assistance. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of Augustine is to be understood as referring to the natural knowledge of separated souls, which knowledge is + devoid of obscurity in holy men. But he is not speaking of their knowledge in the Word, for it is clear that when Isaias said + this, Abraham had no such knowledge, since no one had come to the vision of God before Christ's passion. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the saints, after this life, know what happens here below, we must not believe that they grieve through knowing + the woes of those whom they loved in this world: for they are so filled with heavenly joy, that sorrow finds no place in them. + Wherefore if after death they know the woes of their friends, their grief is forestalled by their removal from this world + before their woes occur. Perhaps, however, the non-glorified souls would grieve + somewhat, if they were aware of the distress of their dear ones: and since the soul of Josias was not glorified as soon as + it went out from his body, it is in this respect that Augustine uses this argument to show that the souls of the dead have + no knowledge of the deeds of the living. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The souls of the saints have their will fully conformed to the Divine will even as regards the things willed. and consequently, + although they retain the love of charity towards their neighbor, they do not succor him otherwise than they see to be in conformity + with the disposition of Divine justice. Nevertheless, it is to be believed that they help their neighbor very much by interceding + for him to God. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although it does not follow that those who see the Word see all things in the Word, they see those things that pertain to + the perfection of their happiness, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> God alone of Himself knows the thoughts of the heart: yet others know them, in so far as these are revealed to them, either + by their vision of the Word or by any other means. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A1-p15"></p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A1-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q72.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q72_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q72_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q72_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q72_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q72_A2-p0.1">Whether we ought to call upon the saints to pray for us?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q72_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we ought not to call upon the saints to pray for us. For no man asks anyone's friends to pray for him, + except in so far as he believes he will more easily find favor with them. But God is infinitely more merciful than any saint, + and consequently His will is more easily inclined to give us a gracious hearing, than the will of a saint. Therefore it would + seem unnecessary to make the saints mediators between us and God, that they may intercede + for us. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if we ought to beseech them to pray for us, this is only because we know their prayer to be acceptable to God. Now + among the saints the holier a man is, the more is his prayer acceptable to God. Therefore we ought always to bespeak the greater + saints to intercede for us with God, and never the lesser ones. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Christ, even as man, is called the "Holy of Holies," and, as man, it is competent to Him to pray. Yet we never call + upon Christ to pray for us. Therefore neither should we ask the other saints to do so. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whenever one person intercedes for another at the latter's request, he presents his petition to the one with whom + he intercedes for him. Now it is unnecessary to present anything to one to whom all things are present. Therefore it is unnecessary + to make the saints our intercessors with God. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it is unnecessary to do a thing if, without doing it, the purpose for which it is done would be achieved in the + same way, or else not achieved at all. Now the saints would pray for us just the same, or would not pray for us at all, whether + we pray to them or not: for if we be worthy of their prayers, they would pray for us even though we prayed not to them, while + if we be unworthy they pray not for us even though we ask them to. Therefore it seems + altogether unnecessary to call on them to pray for us. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A2-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q72_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Job.5.1" target="asv">Job 5:1</a>): "Call . . . if there be any that will answer thee, and turn to some of the saints." Now, as Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) + on this passage, "we call upon God when we beseech Him in humble prayer." Therefore when we wish to pray God, we should turn + to the saints, that they may pray God for us. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A2-p8"> Further, the saints who are in heaven are more acceptable to God than those who are on the way. Now we should make the saints, + who are on the way, our intercessors with God, after the example of the Apostle, who said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q72_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.15.30" target="asv">Rom. 15:30</a>): "I beseech you . . . brethren, through our Lord Jesus Christ, and by the charity of the Holy Ghost, that you help me in + your prayers for me to God." Much more, therefore, should we ask the saints who are in heaven to help us by + their prayers to God. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A2-p9"> Further, an additional argument is provided by the common custom of the Church which asks for the prayers of the saints in + the Litany. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A2-p10"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) the order established by God among things is that "the last should be led to God by + those that are midway between." Wherefore, since the saints who are in heaven are nearest to God, the order of the Divine + law requires that we, who while we remain in the body are pilgrims from the Lord, should be brought back to God by the saints + who are between us and Him: and this happens when the Divine goodness pours forth its + effect into us through them. And since our return to God should correspond to the outflow of His boons upon us, just as the + Divine favors reach us by means of the saints intercession, so should we, by their means, be brought back to God, that we + may receive His favors again. Hence it is that we make them our intercessors with God, and our mediators as it were, when + we ask them to pray for us. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is not on account of any defect in God's power that He works by means of second causes, but it is for the perfection of + the order of the universe, and the more manifold outpouring of His goodness on things, through His bestowing on them not only + the goodness which is proper to them, but also the faculty of causing goodness in others. Even so it is not through any defect + in His mercy, that we need to bespeak His clemency through the prayers of the + saints, but to the end that the aforesaid order in things be observed. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the greater saints are more acceptable to God than the lesser, it is sometimes profitable to pray to the lesser; + and this for five reasons. First, because sometimes one has greater devotion for a lesser saint than for a greater, and the + effect of prayer depends very much on one's devotion. Secondly, in order to avoid tediousness, for continual attention to + one thing makes a person weary; whereas by praying to different saints, the fervor of + our devotion is aroused anew as it were. Thirdly, because it is granted to some saints to exercise their patronage in certain + special cases, for instance to Saint Anthony against the fire of hell. Fourthly, that due honor be given by us to all. Fifthly, + because the prayers of several sometimes obtain that which would not have been obtained by the prayers of one. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prayer is an act, and acts belong to particular persons [supposita]. Hence, were we to say: "Christ, pray for us," except + we added something, this would seem to refer to Christ's person, and consequently to agree with the error either of Nestorius, + who distinguished in Christ the person of the son of man from the person of the Son of God, or of Arius, who asserted that + the person of the Son is less than the Father. Wherefore to avoid these errors the + Church says not: "Christ, pray for us," but "Christ, hear us," or "have mercy on us." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A2-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As we shall state further on + <a id="XP_Q72_A2-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q72_A3.html">(A[3])</a> the saints are said to present our prayers to God, not as though they notified things unknown to Him, but because they ask + God to grant those prayers a gracious hearing, or because they seek the Divine truth about them, namely what ought to be done + according to His providence. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A2-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A person is rendered worthy of a saint's prayers for him by the very fact that in his need he has recourse to him with pure + devotion. Hence it is not unnecessary to pray to the saints. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A2-p16"></p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A2-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q72_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q72_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q72_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q72_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q73.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q72_A3-p0.1">Whether the prayers which the saints pour forth to God for us are always granted?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q72_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the prayers which the saints pour forth to God for us are not always granted. For if they were always + granted, the saints would be heard especially in regard to matters concerning themselves. But they are not heard in reference + to these things; wherefore it is stated in the Apocalypse (6:11) that on the martyrs beseeching vengeance on them that dwell + on earth, "it was said to them that they should rest for a little while till the number of + their brethren should be filled up [*Vulg.: 'till their fellow-servants and their brethren . . . should be filled up']." Much + less therefore, are they heard in reference to matters concerning others. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q72_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.15.1" target="asv">Jer. 15:1</a>): "If Moses and Samuel shall stand before Me, My soul is not towards this people." Therefore, the saints are not always heard + when they pray God for us. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the saints in heaven are stated to be equal to the angels of God ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q72_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv">Mat. 22:30</a>). But the angels are not always heard in the prayers which they offer up to God. This is evident from + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q72_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.10.12" target="asv"> Dan. 10:12,13, </a> where it is written: "I am come for thy words: but the prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me one-and-twenty days." + But the angel who spoke had not come to Daniel's aid except by asking of God to be set free; + and yet the fulfillment of his prayer was hindered. Therefore neither are other saints always heard by God when they pray + for us. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whosoever obtains something by prayer merits it in a sense. But the saints in heaven are not in the state of meriting. + Therefore they cannot obtain anything for us from God by their prayers. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the saints, in all things, conform their will to the will of God. Therefore they will nothing but what they know + God to will. But no one prays save for what he wills. Therefore they pray not save for what they know God to will. Now that + which God wills would be done even without their praying for it. Therefore their prayers are not efficacious for obtaining + anything. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A3-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the prayers of the whole heavenly court, if they could obtain anything, would be more efficacious than all the petitions + of the Church here below. Now if the suffrages of the Church here below for some one in purgatory were to be multiplied, he + would be wholly delivered from punishment. Since then the saints in heaven pray for those who are in purgatory on the same + account as for us, if they obtain anything for us, their prayers would deliver entirely + from punishment those who are in purgatory. But this is not true because, then the Church's suffrages for the dead would be + unnecessary. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A3-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q72_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.15.14" target="asv">2 Macc. 15:14</a>): "This is he that prayeth much for the people, and for all the holy city, Jeremias the prophet of God": and that his prayer + was granted is clear from what follows ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q72_A3-p8.2" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.15.15" target="asv">2 Macc. 15:15</a>): "Jeremias stretched forth his right hand, and gave to Judas a sword of gold, saying: Take this holy sword, a gift from + God," etc. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A3-p9"> Further, Jerome says (Ep. contra Vigilant.): "Thou sayest in thy pamphlets, that while we live, we can pray for one another, + but that when we are dead no one's prayer for another will be heard": and afterwards he refutes this in the following words: + "If the apostles and martyrs while yet in the body can pray for others, while they are still solicitous for themselves, how + much more can they do so when the crown, the victory, the triumph is already theirs!" + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A3-p10"> Further, this is confirmed by the custom of the Church, which often asks to be assisted by the prayers of the saints.</p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A3-p11"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The saints are said to pray for us in two ways. First, by "express" prayer, when by their prayers they seek a hearing of + the Divine clemency on our behalf: secondly, by "interpretive" prayer, namely by their merits which, being known to God, avail + not only them unto glory, but also us as suffrages and prayers, even as the shedding of Christ's blood is said to ask pardon + for us. In both ways the saints' prayers considered in themselves avail to obtain what + they ask, yet on our part they may fail so that we obtain not the fruit of their prayers, in so far as they are said to pray + for us by reason of their merits availing on our behalf. But in so far as they pray for us by asking something for us in their + prayers, their prayers are always granted, since they will only what God wills, nor do they ask save for what they will to + be done; and what God wills is always fulfilled---unless we speak of His "antecedent" will, whereby "He wishes all men to + be + saved" [*Cf. + <a id="XP_Q72_A3-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A6.html">FP, Q[19], A[6]</a>, ad 1]. For this will is not always fulfilled; wherefore no wonder if that also which the saints will according to this kind + of will be not fulfilled sometimes. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This prayer of the martyrs is merely their desire to obtain the robe of the body and the fellowship of those who will be + saved, and their consent to God's justice in punishing the wicked. Hence a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q72_A3-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.6.11" target="asv"> Apoc. 6:11, </a> "How long, O Lord," says: "They desire an increase of joy and the fellowship of the saints, and they consent to God's justice." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Lord speaks there of Moses and Samuel according to their state in this life. For we read that they withstood God's anger + by praying for the people. And yet even if they had been living at the time in question, they would have been unable to placate + God towards the people by their prayers, on account of the wickedness of this same people: and it is thus that we are to understand + this passage. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This dispute among the good angels does not mean that they offered contradictory prayers to God, but that they submitted + contrary merits on various sides to the Divine inquiry, with a view of God's pronouncing sentence thereon. This, in fact, + is what Gregory says (Moral. xvii) in explanation of the aforesaid words of Daniel: "The lofty spirits that are set over the + nations never fight in behalf of those that act unjustly, but they justly judge and try + their deeds. And when the guilt or innocence of any particular nation is brought into the debate of the court above, the ruling + spirit of that nation is said to have won or lost in the conflict. Yet the supreme will of their Maker is victorious over + all, for since they have it ever before their eyes, they will not what they are unable to obtain," wherefore neither do they + seek for it. And consequently it is clear that their prayers are always heard. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A3-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the saints are not in a state to merit for themselves, when once they are in heaven, they are in a state to merit + for others, or rather to assist others by reason of their previous merit: for while living they merited that their prayers + should be heard after their death. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A3-p16"> Or we may reply that prayer is meritorious on one count, and impetratory on another. For merit consists in a certain equation + of the act to the end for which it is intended, and which is given to it as its reward; while the impetration of a prayer + depends on the liberality of the person supplicated. Hence prayer sometimes, through the liberality of the person supplicated, + obtains that which was not merited either by the suppliant, or by the person supplicated for: and so, + although the saints are not in the state of meriting, it does not follow that they are not in the state of impetrating. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A3-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> As appears from the authority of Gregory quoted above (ad 3), the saints and angels will nothing but what they see to be + in the Divine will: and so neither do they pray for aught else. Nor is their prayer fruitless, since as Augustine says (De + Praed. Sanct. [*De Dono Persever. xxii]): "The prayers of the saints profit the predestinate, because it is perhaps pre-ordained + that they shall be saved through the prayers of those who intercede for them": and + consequently God also wills that what the saints see Him to will shall be fulfilled through their prayers. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A3-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The suffrages of the Church for the dead are as so many satisfactions of the living in lieu of the dead: and accordingly + they free the dead from the punishment which the latter have not paid. But the saints in heaven are not in the state of making + satisfaction; and consequently the parallel fails between their prayers and the suffrages of the Church. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A3-p19"></p> + <p id="XP_Q72_A3-p20"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q72_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q73.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.XP_Q71_A14.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q72_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q73" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q72_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q73_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="XP_Q73-p0.1">OF THE SIGNS THAT WILL PRECEDE THE JUDGMENT (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="XP_Q73-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q73-p2"> We must next consider the signs that will precede the judgment: and under this head there are three points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="XP_Q73-p3"> (1) Whether any signs will precede the Lord's coming to judgment?</p> + <p id="XP_Q73-p4"> (2) Whether in very truth the sun and moon will be darkened?</p> + <p id="XP_Q73-p5"> (3) Whether the powers of the heavens will be moved when the Lord shall come?</p> + <div id="XP_Q73_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q73.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q73_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q73_A1-p0.1">Whether any signs will precede the Lord's coming to judgment?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q73_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Lord's coming to judgment will not be preceded by any signs. Because it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q73_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.5.3" target="asv">1 Thess. 5:3</a>): "When they shall say: Peace and security; then shall sudden destruction come upon them." Now there would be no peace and + security if men were terrified by previous signs. Therefore signs will not precede that coming + </p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, signs are ordained for the manifestation of something. But His coming is to be hidden; wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q73_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.5.2" target="asv">1 Thess. 5:2</a>): "The day of the Lord shall come as a thief in the night." Therefore signs ought not to precede it. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the time of His first coming was foreknown by the prophets, which does not apply to His second coming. Now no such + signs preceded the first coming of Christ. Therefore neither will they precede the second. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q73_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.21.25" target="asv">Lk. 21:25</a>): "There shall be signs in the sun, and in the moon, and in the stars," etc. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A1-p6"> Further, Jerome [*St. Peter Damian, Opuscul. xlix; he quotes St. Jerome, but the reference is not known.] mentions fifteen + signs preceding the judgment. He says that on the "first" day all the seas will rise fifteen cubits above the mountains; in + the "second" day all the waters will be plunged into the depths, so that scarcely will they be visible; on the "third" day + they will be restored to their previous condition; on the "fourth" day all the great fishes and other things that + move in the waters will gather together and, raising their heads above the sea, roar at one another contentiously; on the + "fifth" day, all the birds of the air will gather together in the fields, wailing to one another, with neither bite nor sup; + on the "sixth" day rivers of fire will arise towards the firmament rushing together from the west to the east; on the "seventh" + day all the stars, both planets and fixed stars, will throw out fiery tails like comets; on the "eighth" day there will be + a + great earthquake, and all animals will be laid low; on the "ninth" day all the plants will be bedewed as it were with blood; + on the "tenth" day all stones, little and great, will be divided into four parts dashing against one another; on the "eleventh" + day all hills and mountains and buildings will be reduced to dust; on the "twelfth" day all animals will come from forest + and mountain to the fields, roaring and tasting of nothing; on the "thirteenth" day all graves from east to west will open + to allow the bodies to rise again; on the "fourteenth" day all men will leave their abode, neither understanding nor speaking, + but rushing hither and thither like madmen; on the "fifteenth" day all will die and will rise again with those who died long + before. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> When Christ shall come to judge He will appear in the form of glory, on account of the authority becoming a judge. Now it + pertains to the dignity of judicial power to have certain signs that induce people to reverence and subjection: and consequently + many signs will precede the advent of Christ when He shall come to judgment, in order that the hearts of men be brought to + subjection to the coming judge, and be prepared for the judgment, being forewarned by + those signs. But it is not easy to know what these signs may be: for the signs of which we read in the gospels, as Augustine + says, writing to Hesychius about the end of the world (Ep. lxxx), refer not only to Christ's coming to judgment, but also + to the time of the sack of Jerusalem, and to the coming of Christ in ceaselessly visiting His Church. So that, perhaps, if + we consider them carefully, we shall find that none of them refers to the coming advent, as he remarks: because these signs + that + are mentioned in the gospels, such as wars, fears, and so forth, have been from the beginning of the human race: unless perhaps + we say that at that time they will be more prevalent: although it is uncertain in what degree this increase will foretell + the imminence of the advent. The signs mentioned by Jerome are not asserted by him; he merely says that he found them written + in the annals of the Hebrews: and, indeed, they contain very little likelihood. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Augustine (Ad Hesych., Ep. lxxx) towards the end of the world there will be a general persecution of the good + by the wicked: so that at the same time some will fear, namely the good, and some will be secure, namely the wicked. The words: + "When they shall say: Peace and security," refer to the wicked, who will pay little heed to the signs of the coming judgment: + while the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q73_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.21.26" target="asv"> Lk. 21:26, </a> "men withering away," etc., + should be referred to the good. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A1-p9"> We may also reply that all these signs that will happen about the time of the judgment are reckoned to occur within the time + occupied by the judgment, so that the judgment day contains them all. Wherefore although men be terrified by the signs appearing + about the judgment day, yet before those signs begin to appear the wicked will think themselves to be in peace and security, + after the death of Antichrist and before the coming of Christ, seeing that the world is not at once + destroyed, as they thought hitherto. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The day of the Lord is said to come as a thief, because the exact time is not known, since it will not be possible to know + it from those signs: although, as we have already said, all these most manifest sings which will precede the judgment immediately + may be comprised under the judgment day. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> At His first advent Christ came secretly, although the appointed time was known beforehand by the prophets. Hence there was + no need for such signs to appear at His first coming, as will appear at His second advent, when He will come openly, although + the appointed time is hidden. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q73.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q73_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q73_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q73_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q73_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q73_A2-p0.1">Whether towards the time of the judgment the sun and moon will be darkened in very truth?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q73_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that towards the time of the judgment the sun and moon will be darkened in very truth. For, as Rabanus says, + commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q73_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.29" target="asv"> Mat. 24:29 </a>"nothing hinders us from gathering that the sun moon, and stars will then be deprived of their light, as we know happened + to the sun at the time of our Lord's passion." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the light of the heavenly bodies is directed to the generation of inferior bodies, because by its means and not + only by their movement they act upon this lower world as Averroes says (De Subst. Orbis.). But generation will cease then. + Therefore neither will light remain in the heavenly bodies. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to some the inferior bodies will be cleansed of the qualities by which they act. Now heavenly bodies act + not only by movement, but also by light, as stated above (OBJ[2]). Therefore as the movement of heaven will cease, so will + the light of the heavenly bodies. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> According to astronomers the sun and moon cannot be eclipsed at the same time. But this darkening of the sun and moon is + stated to be simultaneous, when the Lord shall come to judgment. Therefore the darkening will not be in very truth due to + a natural eclipse. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A2-p6"> Further, it is not seemly for the same to be the cause of a thing's failing and increasing. Now when our Lord shall come + the light of the luminaries will increase according to + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q73_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.30.26" target="asv"> Is. 30:26, </a> "The light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be sevenfold." Therefore it is unfitting + for the light of these bodies to cease when our Lord comes. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of the sun and moon in respect of the very moment of Christ's coming, it is not credible that they will be darkened + through being bereft of their light, since when Christ comes and the saints rise again the whole world will be renewed, as + we shall state further on ( + <a id="XP_Q73_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q74.html">Q[74])</a>. If, however, we speak of them in respect of the time immediately preceding the judgment, it is possible that by the Divine + power the sun, moon, and other + luminaries of the heavens will be darkened, either at various times or all together, in order to inspire men with fear. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Rabanus is speaking of the time preceding the judgment: wherefore he adds that when the judgment day is over the words of + Isaias shall be fulfilled. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Light is in the heavenly bodies not only for the purpose of causing generation in these lower bodies, but also for their + own perfection and beauty. Hence it does not follow that where generation ceases, the light of the heavenly bodies will cease, + but rather that it will increase. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It does not seem probable that the elemental qualities will be removed from the elements, although some have asserted this. + If, however, they be removed, there would still be no parallel between them and light, since the elemental qualities are in + opposition to one another, so that their action is corruptive: whereas light is a principle of action not by way of opposition, + but by way of a principle regulating things in opposition to one another and + bringing them back to harmony. Nor is there a parallel with the movement of heavenly bodies, for movement is the act of that + which is imperfect, wherefore it must needs cease when the imperfection ceases: whereas this cannot be said of light. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q73_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q73_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q73_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q73_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q73_A3-p0.1">Whether the virtues of heaven will be moved when our Lord shall come?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q73_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the virtues of heaven will not be moved when our Lord shall come. For the virtues of heaven can de. note + only the blessed angels. Now immobility is essential to blessedness. Therefore it will be impossible for them to be moved. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, ignorance is the cause of wonder (Metaph. i, 2). Now ignorance, like fear, is far from the angels, for as Gregory + says (Dial. iv, 33; Moral. ii, 3), "what do they not see, who see Him Who sees all." Therefore it will be impossible for them + to be moved with wonder, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 48). + </p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all the angels will be present at the Divine judgment; wherefore it is stated ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q73_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.7.11" target="asv">Apoc. 7:11</a>): "All the angels stood round about the throne." Now the virtues denote one particular order of angels. Therefore it should + not be said of them rather than of others, that they are moved. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q73_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.26.11" target="asv">Job 26:11</a>): "The pillars of heaven tremble, and dread at His beck." Now the pillars of heaven can denote only the virtues of heaven. + Therefore the virtues of heaven will be moved. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A3-p6"> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q73_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.29" target="asv">Mat. 24:29</a>): "The stars shall fall from heaven, and the virtues [Douay: 'powers'] of heaven shall be moved." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Virtue is twofold as applied to the angels, [*Cf. + <a id="XP_Q73_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A5.html">FP, Q[108], A[5]</a>, ad 1] as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. xi). For sometimes the name of "virtues" is appropriated to one order, which according + to him, is the middle order of the middle hierarchy, but according to Gregory (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv) is the highest order + of the lowest hierarchy. In another sense it is employed to denote all the angels: and then they are said to the + question at issue it may be taken either way. For in the text (Sent. iv, D, 48) it is explained according to the second acceptation, + so as to denote all the angels: and then they are said to be moved through wonder at the renewing of the world, as stated + in the text. It can also be explained in reference to virtue as the name of a particular order; and then that order is said + to be moved more than the others by reason of the effect, since according to Gregory (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv) we ascribe + to that order the working of miracles which especially will be worked about that time: or again, because that order---since, + according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xi), it belongs to the middle hierarchy---is not limited in its power, wherefore its ministry + must needs regard universal causes. Consequently the proper office of the virtues is seemingly to move the heavenly bodies + which are the cause of what happens in nature here below. And again the very name denotes this, since they are called the + "virtues of heaven." Accordingly they will be moved then, because they will no more produce their effect, by ceasing to move + the heavenly bodies: even as the angels who are appointed to watch over men will no longer fulfill the office of guardians. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This movement changes nothing pertaining to their state; but refers either to their effects which may vary without any change + on their part, or to some new consideration of things which hitherto they were unable to see by means of their concreated + species, which change of thought is not taken from them by their state of blessedness. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. + viii, 20) that "God moves the spiritual creature through time." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Wonder is wont to be about things surpassing our knowledge or ability: and accordingly the virtues of heaven will wonder + at the Divine power doing such things, in so far as they fail to do or comprehend them. In this sense the blessed Agnes said + that the "sun and moon wonder at His beauty": and this does not imply ignorance in the angels, but removes the comprehension + of God from them. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A3-p10"> The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.</p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="XP_Q73_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q73_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.XP_Q72_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q73_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q74" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q73_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="XP_Q74-p0.1">OF THE FIRE OF THE FINAL CONFLAGRATION (NINE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="XP_Q74-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q74-p2"> We must now consider the fire of the final conflagration: and under this head there are nine points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="XP_Q74-p3"> (1) Whether any cleansing of the world is to take place?</p> + <p id="XP_Q74-p4"> (2) Whether it will be effected by fire?</p> + <p id="XP_Q74-p5"> (3) Whether that fire is of the same species as elemental fire?</p> + <p id="XP_Q74-p6"> (4) Whether that fire will cleanse also the higher heavens?</p> + <p id="XP_Q74-p7"> (5) Whether that fire will consume the other elements?</p> + <p id="XP_Q74-p8"> (6) Whether it will cleanse all the elements?</p> + <p id="XP_Q74-p9"> (7) Whether that fire precedes or follows the judgment?</p> + <p id="XP_Q74-p10"> (8) Whether men are to be consumed by that fire?</p> + <p id="XP_Q74-p11"> (9) Whether the wicked will be involved therein?</p> + <div id="XP_Q74_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q74_A1-p0.1">Whether the world is to be cleansed?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q74_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is not to be any cleansing of the world. For only that which is unclean needs cleansing. Now God's + creatures are not unclean, wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.10.15" target="asv">Acts 10:15</a>): "That which God hath cleansed, do not thou call common," i.e. unclean. Therefore the creatures of the world shall not be + cleansed. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Divine justice cleansing is directed to the removal of the uncleanness of sin, as instanced in the + cleansing after death. But there can be no stain of sin in the elements of this world. Therefore, seemingly, they need not + to be cleansed. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing is said to be cleansed when any foreign matter that depreciates it is removed therefrom: for the removal + of that which ennobles a thing is not called a cleansing, but rather a diminishing. Now it pertains to the perfection and + nobility of the elements that something of a foreign nature is mingled with them, since the form of a mixed body is more noble + than the form of a simple body. Therefore it would seem nowise fitting that the elements of + this world can possibly be cleansed. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> All renewal is effected by some kind of cleansing. But the elements will be renewed; hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.1" target="asv">Apoc. 21:1</a>): "I saw a new heaven and a new earth: for the first heaven and the first earth was gone." Therefore the elements shall be + cleansed. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A1-p6"> Further, a gloss [*St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei xx, 16] on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:31, </a> "The fashion of this earth passeth away," says: "The beauty of this world will perish in the burning of worldly flames." + Therefore the same conclusion follows. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since the world was, in a way, made for man's sake, it follows that, when man shall be glorified in the body, the other bodies + of the world shall also be changed to a better state, so that it is rendered a more fitting place for him and more pleasant + to look upon. Now in order that man obtain the glory of the body, it behooves first of all those things to be removed which + are opposed to glory. There are two, namely the corruption and stain of sin---because + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.50" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:50</a>, "neither shall corruption possess incorruption," and all the unclean shall be without the city of glory ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rev.22.15" target="asv">Apoc. 22:15</a>)---and again, the elements require to be cleansed from the contrary dispositions, ere they be brought to the newness of glory, + proportionately to what we have said with regard to man. Now although, properly speaking, a corporeal thing cannot be the + subject of the stain of sin, nevertheless, on account of sin corporeal things + contract a certain unfittingness for being appointed to spiritual purposes; and for this reason we find that places where + crimes have been committed are reckoned unfit for the performance of sacred actions therein, unless they be cleansed beforehand. + Accordingly that part of the world which is given to our use contracts from men's sins a certain unfitness for being glorified, + wherefore in this respect it needs to be cleansed. In like manner with regard to the intervening space, on account of + the contact of the elements, there are many corruptions, generations and alterations of the elements, which diminish their + purity: wherefore the elements need to be cleansed from these also, so that they be fit to receive the newness of glory. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When it is asserted that every creature of God is clean we are to understand this as meaning that its substance contains + no alloy of evil, as the Manichees maintained, saying that evil and good are two substances in some places severed from one + another, in others mingled together. But it does not exclude a creature from having an admixture of a foreign nature, which + in itself is also good, but is inconsistent with the perfection of that creature. Nor + does this prevent evil from being accidental to a creature, although not mingled with it as part of its substance. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although corporeal elements cannot be the subject of sin, nevertheless, from the sin that is committed in them they contract + a certain unfitness for receiving the perfection of glory. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The form of a mixed body and the form of an element may be considered in two ways: either as regards the perfection of the + species, and thus a mixed body is more perfect---or as regards their continual endurance; and thus the simple body is more + noble, because it has not in itself the cause of corruption, unless it be corrupted by something extrinsic: whereas a mixed + body has in itself the cause of its corruption, namely the composition of contraries. + Wherefore a simple body, although it be corruptible in part is incorruptible as a whole, which cannot be said of a mixed body. + And since incorruption belongs to the perfection of glory, it follows that the perfection of a simple is more in keeping with + the perfection of glory, than the perfection of a mixed body, unless the mixed body has also in itself some principle of incorruption, + as the human body has, the form of which is incorruptible. Nevertheless, although a mixed body is somewhat more + noble than a simple body, a simple body that exists by itself has a more noble being than if it exist in a mixed body, because + in a mixed body simple bodies are somewhat in potentiality, whereas, existing by themselves, they are in their ultimate perfection. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q74_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q74_A2-p0.1">Whether the cleansing of the world will be effected by fire?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q74_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this cleansing will not be effected by fire. For since fire is a part of the world, it needs to be cleansed + like the other parts. Now, the same thing should not be both cleanser and cleansed. Therefore it would seem that the cleansing + will not be by fire. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as fire has a cleansing virtue so has water. Since then all things are not capable of being cleansed by fire, + and some need to be cleansed by water---which distinction is moreover observed by the Old Law---it would seem that fire will + not at any rate cleanse all things. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, this cleansing would seem to consist in purifying the parts of the world by separating them from one another. Now + the separation of the parts of the world from one another at the world's beginning was effected by God's power alone, for + the work of distinction was carried out by that power: wherefore Anaxagoras asserted that the separation was effected by the + act of the intellect which moves all things (cf. Aristotle, Phys. viii, 9). Therefore it would + seem that at the end of the world the cleansing will be done immediately by God and not by fire. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.49.3" target="asv">Ps. 49:3</a>): "A fire shall burn before Him, and a mighty tempest shall be around Him"; and afterwards in reference to the judgment ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.49.4" target="asv">Ps. 49:4</a>): "He shall call heaven from above, and the earth to judge His people." Therefore it would seem that the final cleansing + of the world will be by means of fire. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A2-p6"> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.3.12" target="asv">2 Pet. 3:12</a>): "The heavens being on fire will be dissolved, and the elements shall melt with the burning heat." Therefore this cleansing + will be effected by fire. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="XP_Q74_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q74_A1.html">(A[1])</a> this cleansing of the world will remove from it the stain contracted from sin, and the impurity resulting from mixture, and + will be a disposition to the perfection of glory; and consequently in this threefold respect it will be most fitting for it + to be effected by fire. First, because since fire is the most noble of the elements, its natural properties are more like + the properties of glory, and this is + especially clear in regard to light. Secondly, because fire, on account of the efficacy of its active virtue, is not as susceptible + as the other elements to the admixture of a foreign matter. Thirdly, because the sphere of fire is far removed from our abode; + nor are we so familiar with the use of fire as with that of earth, water, and air, so that it is not so liable to depreciation. + Moreover, it is most efficacious in cleansing and in separating by a process of rarefaction. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fire is not employed by us in its proper matter (since thus it is far removed from us), but only in a foreign matter: and + in this respect it will be possible for the world to be cleansed by fire as existing in its pure state. But in so far as it + has an admixture of some foreign matter it will be possible for it to be cleansed; and thus it will be cleanser and cleansed + under different aspects. and this is not unreasonable. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The first cleansing of the world by the deluge regarded only the stain of sin. Now the sin which was most prevalent then + was the sin of concupiscence, and consequently it was fitting that the cleansing should be by means of its contrary, namely + water. But the second cleansing regards both the stain of sin and the impurity of mixture, and in respect of both it is more + fitting for it to be effected by fire than by water. For the power of water tends to + unite rather than to separate; wherefore the natural impurity of the elements could not be removed by water as by fire. Moreover, + at the end of the world the prevalent sin will be that of tepidity, as though the world were already growing old, because + then, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.12" target="asv"> Mat. 24:12, </a> "the charity of many shall grow cold," and consequently the cleansing will then be fittingly effected by fire. Nor is there + any thing that cannot in some way be cleansed by fire: some things, + however, cannot be cleansed by fire without being destroyed themselves, such as cloths and wooden vessels, and these the Law + ordered to be cleansed with water; yet all these things will be finally destroyed by fire. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> By the work of distinction things received different forms whereby they are distinct from one another: and consequently this + could only be done by Him Who is the author of nature. But by the final cleansing things will be restored to the purity wherein + they were created, wherefore created nature will be able to minister to its Creator to this effect; and for this reason is + a creature employed as a minister, that it is ennobled thereby. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q74_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q74_A3-p0.1">Whether the fire whereby the world will be cleansed will be of the same species with elemental fire?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q74_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the fire in question is not of the same species as elemental fire. For nothing consumes itself. But that + fire will consume the four elements according to a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.3.12" target="asv">2 Pet. 3:12.</a> Therefore that fire will not be of the same species as elemental fire. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as power is made known by operation, so is nature made known by power. Now that fire will have a different power + from the fire which is an element: because it will cleanse the universe, whereas this fire cannot do that. Therefore it will + not be of the same species as this. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in natural bodies those that are of the same species have the same movement. But that fire will have a different + movement from the fire that is an element, because it will move in all directions so as to cleanse the whole. Therefore it + is not of the same species. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 16), and his words are contained in a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:31, </a> that "the fashion of this world will perish in the burning of worldly flames." Therefore that fire will be of the same nature + as the fire which is now in the world. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A3-p6"> Further, just as the future cleansing is to be by fire, so was the past cleansing by water: and they are both compared to + one another, + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.3.5" target="asv">2 Pet. 3:5.</a> Now in the first cleansing the water was of the same species with elemental water. Therefore in like manner the fire of the + second cleansing will be of the same species with elemental fire. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We meet with three opinions on this question. For some say that the element of fire which is in its own sphere will come + down to cleanse the world: and they explain this descent by way of multiplication, because the fire will spread through finding + combustible matter on all sides. And this will result all the more then since the virtue of the fire will be raised over all + the elements. Against this, however, would seem to be not only the fact that this fire + will come down, but also the statement of the saints that it will rise up; thus ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.3.10" target="asv">2 Pet. 3:10</a>) it is declared that the fire of the judgment will rise as high as the waters of the deluge; whence it would seem to follow + that this fire is situated towards the middle of the place of generation. Hence others say that this fire will be generated + towards the intervening space through the focusing together of the rays of the heavenly bodies, just as we see them focused + together in a + burning-glass; for at that time in lieu of glasses there will be concave clouds, on which the rays will strike But this again + does not seem probable: for since the effects of heavenly bodies depend on certain fixed positions and aspects, if this fire + resulted from the virtue of the heavenly bodies, the time of this cleansing would be known to those who observe the movements + of the stars and this is contrary to the authority of Scripture. Consequently others, following Augustine, say that "just + as the deluge resulted from an outpouring of the waters of the world, so the fashion of this world will perish by a burning + of worldly flames" (De Civ. Dei. xx, 16). This burning is nothing else but the assembly of all those lower and higher causes + that by their nature have a kindling virtue: and this assembly will take place not in the ordinary course of things, but by + the Divine power: and from all these causes thus assembled the fire that will burn the surface of this world will result. + If + we consider aright these opinions, we shall find that they differ as to the cause producing this fire and not as to its species. + For fire, whether produced by the sun or by some lower heating cause, is of the same species as fire in its own sphere, except + in so far as the former has some admixture of foreign matter. And this will of necessity be the case then, since fire cannot + cleanse a thing, unless this become its matter in some way. Hence we must grant that the fire in question is simply of + the same species as ours. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The fire in question, although of the same species as ours, is not identically the same. Now we see that of two fires of + the same species one destroys the other, namely the greater destroys the lesser, by consuming its matter. In like manner that + fire will be able to destroy our fire. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as an operation that proceeds from the virtue of a thing is an indication of that virtue, so is its virtue an indication + of its essence or nature, if it proceed from the essential principles of the thing. But an operation that does not proceed + from the virtue of the operator does not indicate its virtue. This appears in instruments: for the action of an instrument + shows forth the virtue of the mover rather than that of the instrument, since it + shows forth the virtue of the agent in so far as the latter is the first principle of the action, whereas it does not show + forth the virtue of the instrument, except in so far as it is susceptive of the influence of the principal agent as moving + that instrument. In like manner a virtue that does not proceed from the essential principles of a thing does not indicate + the nature of that thing except in the point of susceptibility. Thus the virtue whereby hot water can heat is no indication + of the + nature of water except in the point of its being receptive of heat. Consequently nothing prevents water that has this virtue + from being of the same species as water that has it not. In like manner it is not unreasonable that this fire, which will + have the power to cleanse the surface of the world, will be of the same species as the fire to which we are used, since the + heating power therein arises, not from its essential principles but from the divine power or operation: whether we say that + this + power is an absolute quality, such as heat in hot water, or a kind of intention as we have ascribed to instrumental virtue + (Sent. iv, D, 1, qu. 1, A[4]) [*Cf. + <a id="XP_Q74_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q62_A4.html">TP, Q[62], A[4]</a>, ad 1]. The latter is more probable since that fire will not act save as the instrument of the Divine power. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Of its own nature fire tends only upwards; but in so far as it pursues its matter, which it requires when it is outside its + own sphere, it follows the site of combustible matter. Accordingly it is not unreasonable for it to take a circular or a downward + course, especially in so far as it acts as the instrument of the Divine power. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q74_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q74_A4-p0.1">Whether that fire will cleanse also the higher heavens?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q74_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that that fire will cleanse also the higher heavens. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.101.26" target="asv">Ps. 101:26,27</a>): "The heavens are the works of Thy hands: they shall perish but Thou remainest." Now the higher heavens also are the work + of God's hands. Therefore they also shall perish in the final burning of the world. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.3.12" target="asv">2 Pet. 3:12</a>): "The heavens being on fire shall be dissolved, and the elements shall melt with the burning heat of fire." Now the heavens + that are distinct from the elements are the higher heavens, wherein the stars are fixed. Therefore it would seem that they + also will be cleansed by that fire. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the purpose of that fire will be to remove from bodies their indisposition to the perfection of glory. Now in the + higher heaven we find this indisposition both as regards guilt, since the devil sinned there, and as regards natural deficiency, + since a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.22" target="asv"> Rom. 8:22, </a> "We know that every creature groaneth and is in labor even until now," says: "All the elements fulfill their duty with labor: + even as it is not without labor that + the sun and moon travel their appointed course." Therefore the higher heavens also will be cleansed by that fire. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> "The heavenly bodies are not receptive of impressions from without" [*Cf. Sent. Philosop. ex Arist. collect. lit. c.---Among + the works of Bede]. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A4-p6"> Further, a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiThess.1.8" target="asv">2 Thess. 1:8, </a> "In a flame of fire giving vengeance," says: "There will be in the world a fire that shall precede Him, and shall rise in + the air to the same height as did the waters of the deluge." But the waters of the deluge did not rise to the height of the + higher heavens but only 15 cubits higher than the mountain summits ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.7.20" target="asv">Gn. 7:20</a>). Therefore the higher heavens will not be cleansed by that fire. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The cleansing of the world will be for the purpose of removing from bodies the disposition contrary to the perfection of + glory, and this perfection is the final consummation of the universe: and this disposition is to be found in all bodies, but + differently in different bodies. For in some this indisposition regards something inherent to their substance: as in these + lower bodies which by being mixed together fall away from their own purity. In others this + indisposition does not regard something inherent to their substance; as in the heavenly bodies, wherein nothing is to be found + contrary to the final perfection of the universe, except movement which is the way to perfection, and this not any kind of + movement, but only local movement, which changes nothing intrinsic to a thing, such as its substance, quantity, or quality, + but only its place which is extrinsic to it. Consequently there is no need to take anything away from the substance of the + higher heavens, but only to set its movement at rest. Now local movement is brought to rest not by the action of a counter + agent, but by the mover ceasing to move; and therefore the heavenly bodies will not be cleansed, neither by fire nor by the + action of any creature, but in lieu of being cleansed they will be set at rest by God's will alone. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 18,24): "Those words of the psalm refer to the aerial heavens which will be cleansed by + the fire of the final conflagration." Or we may reply that if they refer also to the higher heavens, these are said to perish + as regards their movement whereby now they are moved without cessation. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Peter explains himself to which heavens he refers. For before the words quoted, he had said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.3.5" target="asv">2 Pet. 3:5-7</a>): "The heavens . . . first, and the earth . . . through water . . . perished . . . which . . . now, by the same word are + kept in store, reserved unto fire unto the day of judgment." [*The entire text differs somewhat from St. Thomas's quotation; + but the sense is the same.] Therefore the heavens to be cleansed are those which + before were cleansed by the waters of the deluge, namely the aerial heavens. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This labor and service of the creature, that Ambrose ascribes to the heavenly bodies, is nothing else than the successive + movements whereby they are subject to time, and the lack of that final consummation which they will attain in the end. Nor + did the empyrean heaven contract any stain from the sin of the demons, because they were expelled from that heaven as soon + as they sinned. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q74_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q74_A5-p0.1">Whether that fire will consume the other elements?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q74_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the fire in question will consume the other elements. For a gloss of Bede on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.3.12" target="asv">2 Pet. 3:12 </a>says: "This exceeding great fire will engulf the four elements whereof the world consists: yet it will not so engulf all things + that they will cease to be, but it will consume two of them entirely, and will restore two of them to a better fashion." Therefore + it would seem that at least two of the elements are to be entirely destroyed + by that fire. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.1" target="asv">Apoc. 21:1</a>): "The first heaven and the first earth have passed away and the sea is no more." Now the heaven here denotes the air, as + Augustine states (De Civ. Dei xx, 18); and the sea denotes the gathering together of the waters. Therefore it would seem that + these three elements will be wholly destroyed. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fire does not cleanse except in so far as other things are made to be its matter. If, then, fire cleanses the other + elements, they must needs become its matter. Therefore they must pass into its nature, and consequently be voided of their + own nature. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the form of fire is the most noble of the forms to which elemental matter can attain. Now all things will be brought + to the most noble state by this cleansing. Therefore the other elements will be wholly transformed into fire. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:31, </a> "The fashion of this world passeth away," says: "The beauty, not the substance, passeth." But the very substance of the elements + belongs to the perfection of the world. Therefore the elements will not be consumed as to their substance. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A5-p7"> Further, this final cleansing that will be effected by fire will correspond to the first cleansing which was effected by + water. Now the latter did not corrupt the substance of the elements. Therefore neither will the former which will be the work + of fire. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A5-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There are many opinions on this question. For some say that all the elements will remain as to their matter, while all will + be changed as regards their imperfection; but that two of them will retain their respective substantial form, namely air and + earth, while two of them, namely fire and water, will not retain their substantial form but will be changed to the form of + heaven. In this way three elements, namely air, fire, and water, will be called "heaven"; + although air will retain the same substantial form as it has now, since even now it is called "heaven." Wherefore ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.1" target="asv">Apoc. 21:1</a>) only heaven and earth are mentioned: "I saw," says he, "a new heaven and a new earth." But this opinion is altogether absurd: + for it is opposed both to philosophy---which holds it impossible for the lower bodies to be in potentiality to the form of + heaven, since they have neither a common matter, nor mutual contrariety---and to theology, since + according to this opinion the perfection of the universe with the integrity of its parts will not be assured on account of + two of the elements being destroyed. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A5-p9"> Consequently "heaven" is taken to denote the fifth body, while all the elements are designated by "earth," as expressed in + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.148.7" target="asv"> Ps. 148:7,8, </a> "Praise the Lord from the earth" and afterwards, "fire, hail, snow, ice," etc. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A5-p10"> Hence others say that all the elements will remain as to their substance, but that their active and passive qualities will + be taken from them: even as they say too, that in a mixed body the elements retain their substantial form without having their + proper qualities, since these are reduced to a mean, and a mean is neither of the extremes. And seemingly the following words + of Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 16) would seem in agreement with this: "In this conflagration of the world + the qualities of the corruptible elements that were befitting our corruptible bodies will entirely perish by fire: and the + substance itself will have those qualities that become an immortal body." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A5-p11"> However, this does not seem probable, for since the proper qualities of the elements are the effects of their substantial + form, it seems impossible, as long as the substantial forms remain, for the aforesaid qualities to be changed, except for + a time by some violent action: thus in hot water we see that by virtue of its species it returns to the cold temperature which + it had lost by the action of fire, provided the species of water remain. Moreover, these same elemental + qualities belong to the second perfection of the elements, as being their proper passions: nor is it probable that in this + final consummation the elements will lose anything of their natural perfection. Wherefore it would seem that the reply to + this question should be that the elements will remain as to their substance and proper qualities, but that they will be cleansed + both from the stain which they contracted from the sins of men, and from the impurity resulting in them through their mutual + action and passion: because when once the movement of the first movable body ceases, mutual action and passion will be impossible + in the lower elements: and this is what Augustine calls the "qualities of corruptible elements," namely their unnatural dispositions + by reason of which they come near to corruption. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That fire is said to engulf the four elements in so far as in some way it will cleanse them. But when it is said further + that "it will consume two entirely," this does not mean that two of the elements are to be destroyed as to their substance, + but that two will be more changed from the property which they have now. Some say that these two are fire and water which + excel the others in their active qualities, namely heat and cold, which are the chief + principles of corruption in other bodies; and since then there will be no action of fire and water which surpass the others + in activity, they would seem especially to be changed from the virtue which they have now. Others, however, say that these + two are air and water, on account of the various movements of these two elements, which movements they derive from the movement + of the heavenly bodies. And since these movements will cease (such as the ebb and flow of the sea, and the disturbances of + winds and so forth), therefore these elements especially will be changed from the property which they have now. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 16), when it is stated: "And the sea is no more," by the sea we may understand the present + world of which he had said previously (De Civ. Dei xx, 13): "The sea gave up the dead that were in it." If, however, the sea + be taken literally we must reply that by the sea two things are to be understood, namely the substance of the waters, and + their disposition, as containing salt and as to the movement of the waves. The sea + will remain, not as to this second, but as to the first. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A5-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This fire will not act save as the instrument of God's providence and power; wherefore it will not act on the other elements + so as to consume them but only so as to cleanse them. Nor is it necessary for that which becomes the matter of fire, to be + voided of its proper species entirely, as instanced by incandescent iron, which by virtue of its species that remains returns + to its proper and former state as soon as it is taken from the furnace. It will + be the same with the elements after they are cleansed by fire. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A5-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the elemental parts we must consider not only what is befitting a part considered in itself, but also what is befitting + it in its relation to the whole. I say, then, that although water would be more noble if it had the form of fire, as likewise + would earth and air, yet the universe would be more imperfect, if all elemental matter were to assume the form of fire. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A5-p16"></p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A5-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q74_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q74_A6-p0.1">Whether all the elements will be cleansed by that fire?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q74_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that neither will all the elements be cleansed by that fire. Because that fire, as stated already + <a id="XP_Q74_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q74_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, will not rise higher than the waters of the deluge. But the waters of the deluge did not reach to the sphere of fire. Therefore + neither will the element of fire be cleansed by the final cleansing. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.1" target="asv"> Apoc. 21:1, </a> "I saw a new heaven," etc., says: "There can be no doubt that the transformation of the air and earth will be caused by fire; + but it is doubtful about water, since it is believed to have the power of cleansing itself." Therefore at least it is uncertain + that all the elements will be cleansed. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a place where there is an everlasting stain is never cleansed. Now there will always be a stain in hell. Since, + then, hell is situated among the elements, it would seem that the elements will not be wholly cleansed. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A6-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the earthly paradise is situated on the earth. Yet it will not be cleansed by fire, since not even the waters of + the deluge reached it, as Bede says (Hexaem. i, ad + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.8" target="asv"> Gen. 2:8</a>), as is stated in Sentent. ii, D, 7. Therefore it would seem that the elements will not all be wholly cleansed. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A6-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The gloss quoted above (A[5], OBJ[1]) on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.3.12" target="asv">2 Pet. 3:12 </a>declares that "this fire will engulf the four elements." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A6-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some [*St. Bonaventure, Sentent. iv, D, 47, A[2], Q[3]] say that the fire in question will rise to the summit of the space + containing the four elements: so that the elements would be entirely cleansed both from the stain of sin by which also the + higher parts of the elements were infected (as instanced by the smoke of idolatry which stained the higher regions), and again + from corruption, since the elements are corruptible in all their parts. But this opinion + is opposed to the authority of Scripture, because it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.3.7" target="asv">2 Pet. 3:7</a>) that those heavens are "kept in store unto fire," which were cleansed by water; and Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 18) + that "the same world which perished in the deluge is reserved unto fire." Now it is clear that the waters of the deluge did + not rise to the summit of the space occupied by the elements, but only 15 cubits above the mountain tops; and moreover it + is known that vapors or any smoke + whatever rising from the earth cannot pierce the entire sphere of fire so as to reach its summit; and so the stain of sin + did not reach the aforesaid space. Nor can the elements be cleansed from corruptibility by the removal of something that might + be consumed by fire: whereas it will be possible for the impurities of the elements arising from their mingling together to + be consumed by fire. And these impurities are chiefly round about the earth as far as the middle of the air: wherefore the + fire of the final conflagration will cleanse up to that point, since the waters of the deluge rose to a height which can be + approximately calculated from the height of the mountains which they surpassed in a fixed measure. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A6-p8"> We therefore grant the First Objection.</p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason for doubt is expressed in the gloss, because, to wit, water is believed to have in itself the power of cleansing, + yet not such a power as will be competent to the future state, as stated above + <a id="XP_Q74_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q74_A5.html">(A[5];</a> A[2], ad 2). + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The purpose of this cleansing will be chiefly to remove all imperfection from the abode of the saints; and consequently in + this cleansing all that is foul will be brought together to the place of the damned: so hell will not be cleansed, and the + dregs of the whole earth will be brought thither, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A6-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.74.9" target="asv"> Ps. 74:9, </a> "The dregs thereof are not emptied, all the sinners of the earth shall drink." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the sin of the first man was committed in the earthly paradise, this is not the place of sinners, as neither is + the empyrean heaven: since from both places man and devil were expelled forthwith after their sin. Consequently that place + needs no cleansing. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A6-p12"></p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A6-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q74_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q74_A7-p0.1">Whether the fire of the final conflagration is to follow the judgment?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q74_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the fire of the final conflagration is to follow the judgment. For Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 30) gives + the following order of the things to take place at the judgment, saying: "At this judgment we have learned that the following + things will occur. Elias the Thesbite will appear, the Jews will believe, Antichrist will persecute, Christ will judge, the + dead shall rise again, the good shall be separated from the wicked, the world shall be set + on fire and shall be renewed." Therefore the burning will follow the judgment. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 16): "After the wicked have been judged, and cast into everlasting fire, the figure + of this world will perish in the furnace of worldly flames." Therefore the same conclusion follows. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, when the Lord comes to judgment He will find some men living, as appears from the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.4.16" target="asv">1 Thess. 4:16, </a> where the Apostle speaking in their person says: "Then we who are alive, who remain unto the coming of the Lord [*Vulg.: + 'who are left, shall be taken . . . to meet Christ'---the words "who remain," etc., are from + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A7-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iThess.4.14" target="asv">1 Thess. 4:14</a>]." But it would not be so, if the burning of the world were to come first, + since they would be destroyed by the fire. Therefore this fire will follow the judgment. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A7-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is said that our Lord will come to judge the earth by fire, and consequently the final conflagration would seem + to be the execution of the sentence of Divine judgment. Now execution follows judgment. Therefore that fire will follow the + judgment. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A7-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.96.3" target="asv">Ps. 96:3</a>): "A fire shall go before Him." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A7-p7"> Further, the resurrection will precede the judgment, else every eye would not see Christ judging. Now the burning of the + world will precede the resurrection, for the saints who will rise again will have spiritual and impassible bodies, so that + it will be impossible for the fire to cleanse them, and yet the text (Sent. iv, D, 47) quotes Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 18) + as saying that "whatever needs cleansing in any way shall be cleansed by that fire." Therefore that fire will + precede the judgment. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A7-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The fire in question will in reality, as regards its beginning, precede the judgment. This can clearly be gathered from the + fact that the resurrection of the dead will precede the judgment, since according to + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.4.13" target="asv">1 Thess. 4:13-16</a>, those who have slept "shall be taken up . . . in the clouds . . . into the air . . . to meet Christ coming to judgment." + Now the general resurrection and the glorification of the bodies of the saints will happen at + the same time; for the saints in rising again will assume a glorified body, as evidenced by + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A7-p8.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.43" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:43, </a> "It is sown in dishonor, it shall rise in glory": and at the same time as the saints' bodies shall be glorified, all creatures + shall be renewed, each in its own way, as appears from the statement ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A7-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.21" target="asv">Rom. 8:21</a>) that "the creature . . . itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the + children of God." Since + then the burning of the world is a disposition to the aforesaid renewal, as stated above ( + <a id="XP_Q74_A7-p8.4" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q74_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,4); it can clearly be gathered that this burning, so far as it shall cleanse the world, will precede the judgment, but as + regards a certain action thereof, whereby it will engulf the wicked, it will follow the judgment. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking not as one who decides the point, but as expressing an opinion. This is clear from his continuing thus: + "That all these things are to happen is a matter of faith, but how and in what order we shall learn more then by experience + of the things themselves than now by seeking a definite conclusion by arguing about them. Methinks, however, they will occur + in the order I have given." Hence it is clear that he is speaking as offering + his opinion. The same answer applies to the Second Objection. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All men shall die and rise again: yet those are said to be found alive who will live in the body until the time of the conflagration. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A7-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> That fire will not carry out the sentence of the judge except as regards the engulfing of the wicked: in this respect it + will follow the judgment. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A7-p12"></p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A7-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q74_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A9.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q74_A8-p0.1">Whether that fire will have such an effect on men as is described?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q74_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this fire will not have such an effect on men as is described in the text (Sent. iv, D, 47). For a thing + is said to be consumed when it is reduced to naught. Now the bodies of the wicked will not be reduced to naught, but will + be kept for eternity, that they may bear an eternal punishment. Therefore this fire will not consume the wicked, as stated + in the text. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it be said that it will consume the bodies of the wicked by reducing them to ashes; on the contrary, as the bodies + of the wicked, so will those of the good be brought to ashes: for it is the privilege of Christ alone that His flesh see not + corruption. Therefore it will consume also the good who will then be found. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the stain of sin is more abundant in the elements, as combining together to the formation of the human body wherein + is the corruption of the fomes [*Cf. + <a id="XP_Q74_A8-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q83_A3.html">FS, Q[83], A[3]</a>; + <a id="XP_Q74_A8-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q91_A6.html">FS, Q[91], A[6]</a>] even in the good, than in the elements existing outside the human body. Now the elements existing outside the human body + will be cleansed on account of the stain of sin. Much therefore will the elements in the human + body whether of the good or of the wicked need to be cleansed, and consequently the bodies of both will need to be destroyed. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A8-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as long as the state of the way lasts the elements act in like manner on the good and the wicked. Now the state + of the way will still endure in that conflagration, since after this state of the way death will not be natural, and yet it + will be caused by that fire. Therefore that fire will act equally on good and wicked; and consequently it does not seem that + any distinction is made between them as to their being affected by that fire, as stated in the + text. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A8-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, this fire will have done its work in a moment as it were. Yet there will be many among the living in whom there + will be many things to be cleansed. Therefore that fire will not suffice for their cleansing. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A8-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> This fire of the final conflagration, in so far as it will precede the judgment, will act as the instrument of Divine justice + as well as by the natural virtue of fire. Accordingly, as regards its natural virtue, it will act in like manner on the wicked + and good who will be alive, by reducing the bodies of both to ashes. But in so far as it acts as the instrument of Divine + justice, it will act differently on different people as regards the sense of pain. For + the wicked will be tortured by the action of the fire; whereas the good in whom there will be nothing to cleanse will feel + no pain at all from the fire, as neither did the children in the fiery furnace ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A8-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.3" target="asv">Dan. 3</a>); although their bodies will not be kept whole, as were the bodies of the children: and it will be possible by God's power + for their bodies to be destroyed without their suffering pain. But the good, in whom matter for cleansing will be found, will + suffer pain from that fire, more or less + according to their different merits. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A8-p8"> On the other hand, as regards the action which this fire will have after the judgment, it will act on the damned alone, since + the good will all have impassible bodies. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Consumption there signifies being brought, not to nothing, but to ashes. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the bodies of the good will be reduced to ashes by the fire, they will not suffer pain thereby, as neither did the + children in the Babylonian furnace. In this respect a distinction is drawn between the good and the wicked. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A8-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The elements that are in human bodies, even in the bodies of the elect, will be cleansed by fire. But this will be done, + by God's power, without their suffering pain. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A8-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This fire will act not only according to the natural power of the element, but also as the instrument of Divine justice. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A8-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> There are three reasons why those who will be found living will be able to be cleansed suddenly. One is because there will + be few things in them to be cleansed, since they will be already cleansed by the previous fears and persecutions. The second + is because they will suffer pain both while living and of their own will: and pain suffered in this life voluntarily cleanses + much more than pain inflicted after death, as in the case of the martyrs, because + "if anything needing to be cleansed be found in them, it is cut off by the sickle of suffering," as Augustine says (De Unic. + Bap. xiii), although the pain of martyrdom is of short duration in comparison with the pain endured in purgatory. The third + is because the heat will gain in intensity what it loses in shortness of time. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A8-p14"></p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A8-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A9.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q74_A9" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q75.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q74_A9-p0.1">Whether that fire will engulf the wicked?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q74_A9-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that that fire will not engulf the wicked. For a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A9-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.3.3" target="asv"> Malachi 3:3, </a> "He shall purify the sons of Levi," says that "it is a fire consuming the wicked and refining the good"; and a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A9-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:13, </a> "Fire shall try every man's work," says: "We read that there will be a twofold fire, one that will cleanse the elect and + will precede the judgment, another that will torture the wicked." Now the latter + is the fire of hell that shall engulf the wicked, while the former is the fire of the final conflagration. Therefore the fire + of the final conflagration will not be that which will engulf the wicked. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that fire will obey God in the cleansing of the world: therefore it should receive its reward like the other elements, + especially since fire is the most noble of the elements. Therefore it would seem that it ought not to be cast into hell for + the punishment of the damned. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the fire that will engulf the wicked will be the fire of hell: and this fire was prepared from the beginning of + the world for the damned; hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A9-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.41" target="asv">Mat. 25:41</a>): "Depart . . . you cursed . . . into everlasting fire which was prepared for the devil," etc., and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A9-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.30.33" target="asv">Is. 30:33</a>): "Tophet is prepared from yesterday, prepared by the king," etc., where a gloss observes: "From yesterday, i.e. from the + beginning---Tophet, i.e. the + valley of hell." But this fire of the final conflagration was not prepared from the beginning, but will result from the meeting + together of the fires of the world. Therefore that fire is not the fire of hell which will engulf the wicked. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A9-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> are the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.96.3" target="asv"> Ps. 96:3, </a> where it is said of this fire that it "shall burn His enemies round about." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A9-p6"> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A9-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.7.10" target="asv">Dan. 7:10</a>): "A swift stream of fire issued forth from before Him"; and a gloss adds, "to drag sinners into hell." Now the passage quoted + refers to that fire of which we are now speaking, as appears from a gloss which observes on the same words: "In order to punish + the wicked and cleanse the good." Therefore the fire of the final conflagration will be plunged into hell together with the + wicked + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A9-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The entire cleansing of the world and the renewal for the purpose of cleansing will be directed to the renewal of man: and + consequently the cleansing and renewal of the world must needs correspond with the cleansing and renewal of mankind. Now mankind + will be cleansed in one way by the separation of the wicked from the good: wherefore it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A9-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.3.17" target="asv">Lk. 3:17</a>): "Whose fan is in His hand, and He will purge His poor, and will gather the + wheat," i.e. the elect, "into His barn, but the chaff," i.e. the wicked, "He will burn with unquenchable fire." Hence it will + be thus with the cleansing of the world, so that all that is ugly and vile will be cast with the wicked into hell, and all + that is beautiful and noble will be taken up above for the glory of the elect: and so too will it be with the fire of that + conflagration, as Basil says in + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q74_A9-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.28.7" target="asv"> Ps. 28:7, </a> "The voice of the Lord divideth the flame of fire," because + whatever fire contains of burning heat and gross matter will go down into hell for the punishment of the wicked, and whatever + is subtle and lightsome will remain above for the glory of the elect. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A9-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The fire that will cleanse the elect before the judgment will be the same as the fire that will burn the world, although + some say the contrary. For it is fitting that man, being a part of the world, be cleansed with the same fire as the world. + They are, however, described as two fires, that will cleanse the good, and torture the wicked, both in reference to their + respective offices, and somewhat in reference to their substance: since the substance of + the cleansing fire will not all be cast into hell, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This fire will be rewarded because whatever it contains of gross matter will be separated from it, and cast into hell. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A9-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The punishment of the wicked, even as the glory of the elect, will be greater after the judgment than before. Wherefore, + just as charity will be added to the higher creature in order to increase the glory of the elect, so too whatever is vile + in creatures will be thrust down into hell in order to add to the misery of the damned. Consequently it is not unbecoming + that another fire be added to the fire of the damned that was prepared from the beginning + of the world. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A9-p11"></p> + <p id="XP_Q74_A9-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q75.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.XP_Q73_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q75" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q75_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="XP_Q75-p0.1">OF THE RESURRECTION (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="XP_Q75-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q75-p2"> In the next place we must consider things connected with and accompanying the resurrection. Of these the first to be considered + will be the resurrection itself; the second will be the cause of the resurrection; the third its time and manner. the fourth + its term "wherefrom"; the fifth the condition of those who rise again. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75-p3"> Under the first head there will be three points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="XP_Q75-p4"> (1) Whether there is to be a resurrection of the body?</p> + <p id="XP_Q75-p5"> (2) Whether it is universally of all bodies?</p> + <p id="XP_Q75-p6"> (3) Whether it is natural or miraculous?</p> + <div id="XP_Q75_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q75.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q75_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q75_A1-p0.1">Whether there is to be a resurrection of the body?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q75_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is not to be a resurrection of the body: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q75_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.14.12" target="asv">Job 14:12</a>): "Man, when he is fallen asleep, shall not rise again till the heavens be broken." But the heavens shall never be broken, + since the earth, to which seemingly this is still less applicable, "standeth for ever" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q75_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Eccl.1.4" target="asv">Eccles. 1:4</a>). Therefore the man that is dead shall never rise again. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Our Lord proves the resurrection by quoting the words: "I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God + of Jacob. He is not the God of the dead but of the living" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q75_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.32" target="asv">Mat. 22:32</a>; + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q75_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.3.6" target="asv"> Ex. 3:6</a>). But it is clear that when those words were uttered, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob lived not in body, but only in the soul. + Therefore there will be no resurrection of bodies but only of souls. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q75_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 15</a>) seemingly proves the resurrection from the reward for labors endured by the saints in this life. For if they trusted in + this life alone, they would be the most unhappy of all men. Now there can be sufficient reward for labor in the soul alone: + since it is not necessary for the instrument to be repaid together with the worker, and the body is the soul's instrument. + Wherefore even in purgatory, where souls will be punished for + what they did in the body, the soul is punished without the body. Therefore there is no need to hold a resurrection of the + body, but it is enough to hold a resurrection of souls, which consists in their being taken from the death of sin and unhappiness + to the life of grace and glory. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the last state of a thing is the most perfect, since thereby it attains its end. Now the most perfect state of the + soul is to be separated from the body, since in that state it is more conformed to God and the angels, and is more pure, as + being separated from any extraneous nature. Therefore separation from the body is its final state, and consequently it returns + not from this state to the body, as neither does a man end in becoming a boy. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, bodily death is the punishment inflicted on man for his own transgression, as appears from + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q75_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2" target="asv">Gn. 2</a>, even as spiritual death, which is the separation of the soul from God, is inflicted on man for mortal sin. Now man never + returns to life from spiritual death after receiving the sentence of his damnation. Therefore neither will there be any return + from bodily death to bodily life, and so there will be no resurrection. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q75_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Job.19.25" target="asv">Job 19:25-26</a>): "I know that my Redeemer liveth, and in the last day I shall rise out of the earth, and I shall be clothed again with my + skin," etc. Therefore there will be a resurrection of the body. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A1-p8"> Further, the gift of Christ is greater than the sin of Adam, as appears from + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q75_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.15" target="asv"> Rom. 5:15.</a> Now death was brought in by sin, for if sin had not been, there had been no death. Therefore by the gift of Christ man will + be restored from death to life. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A1-p9"> Further, the members should be conformed to the head. Now our Head lives and will live eternally in body and soul, since + "Christ rising again from the dead dieth now no more" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q75_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.8" target="asv">Rom. 6:8</a>). Therefore men who are His members will live in body and soul; and consequently there must needs be a resurrection of the + body. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A1-p10"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the various opinions about man's last end there have been various opinions holding or denying the resurrection. + For man's last end which all men desire naturally is happiness. Some have held that man is able to attain this end in this + life: wherefore they had no need to admit another life after this, wherein man would be able to attain to his perfection: + and so they denied the resurrection. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A1-p11"> This opinion is confuted with sufficient probability by the changeableness of fortune, the weakness of the human body, the + imperfection and instability of knowledge and virtue, all of which are hindrances to the perfection of happiness, as Augustine + argues at the end of De Civ. Dei (xxii, 22). + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A1-p12"> Hence others maintained that after this there is another life wherein, after death, man lives according to the soul only, + and they held that such a life sufficed to satisfy the natural desire to obtain happiness: wherefore Porphyrius said as Augustine + states (De Civ. De. xxii, 26): "The soul, to be happy, must avoid all bodies": and consequently these did not hold the resurrection. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A1-p13"> This opinion was based by various people on various false foundations. For certain heretics asserted that all bodily things + are from the evil principle, but that spiritual things are from the good principle: and from this it follows that the soul + cannot reach the height of its perfection unless it be separated from the body, since the latter withdraws it from its principle, + the participation of which makes it happy. Hence all those heretical sects that hold corporeal things to + have been created or fashioned by the devil deny the resurrection of the body. The falsehood of this principle has been shown + at the beginning of the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 4, qu. 1, A[3]; *[Cf. + <a id="XP_Q75_A1-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q49_A3.html">FP, Q[49], A[3]</a>]). + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A1-p14"> Others said that the entire nature of man is seated in the soul, so that the soul makes use of the body as an instrument, + or as a sailor uses his ship: wherefore according to this opinion, it follows that if happiness is attained by the soul alone, + man would not be balked in his natural desire for happiness, and so there is no need to hold the resurrection. But the Philosopher + sufficiently destroys this foundation (De Anima ii, 2), where he shows that the soul is united to the + body as form to matter. Hence it is clear that if man cannot be happy in this life, we must of necessity hold the resurrection. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The heavens will never be broken as to their substance, but as to the effect of their power whereby their movement is the + cause of generation and corruption of lower things: for this reason the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q75_A1-p15.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:31</a>): "The fashion of this world passeth away." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A1-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Abraham's soul, properly speaking, is not Abraham himself, but a part of him (and the same as regards the others). Hence + life in Abraham's soul does not suffice to make Abraham a living being, or to make the God of Abraham the God of a living + man. But there needs to be life in the whole composite, i.e. the soul and body: and although this life were not actually when + these words were uttered, it was in each part as ordained to the resurrection. + Wherefore our Lord proves the resurrection with the greatest subtlety and efficacy. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A1-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The soul is compared to the body, not only as a worker to the instrument with which he works, but also as form to matter: + wherefore the work belongs to the composite and not to the soul alone, as the Philosopher shows (De Anima i, 4). And since + to the worker is due the reward of the work, it behooves man himself, who is composed of soul and body, to receive the reward + of his work. Now as venial offenses are called sins as being dispositions to sin, + and not as having simply and perfectly the character of sin, so the punishment which is awarded to them in purgatory is not + a retribution simply, but rather a cleansing, which is wrought separately in the body, by death and by its being reduced to + ashes, and in the soul by the fire of purgatory. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A1-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Other things being equal, the state of the soul in the body is more perfect than outside the body, because it is a part of + the whole composite; and every integral part is material in comparison to the whole: and though it were conformed to God in + one respect, it is not simply. Because, strictly speaking, a thing is more conformed to God when it has all that the condition + of its nature requires, since then most of all it imitates the Divine perfection. + Hence the heart of an animal is more conformed to an immovable God when it is in movement than when it is at rest, because + the perfection of the heart is in its movement, and its rest is its undoing. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A1-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Bodily death was brought about by Adam's sin which was blotted out by Christ's death: hence its punishment lasts not for + ever. But mortal sin which causes everlasting death through impenitence will not be expiated hereafter. Hence that death will + be everlasting. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A1-p20"></p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A1-p21"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q75.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q75_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q75_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q75_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q75_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q75_A2-p0.1">Whether the resurrection will be for all without exception?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q75_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the resurrection will not be for all without exception. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q75_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.1.5" target="asv">Ps. 1:5</a>): "The wicked shall not rise again in judgment." Now men will not rise again except at the time of the general judgment. + Therefore the wicked shall in no way rise again. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q75_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.12.2" target="asv">Dan. 12:2</a>): "Many of those that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake." But these words imply a restriction. Therefore all will + not rise again. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by the resurrection men are conformed to Christ rising again; wherefore the Apostle argues ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q75_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:12, </a> seqq.) that if Christ rose again, we also shall rise again. Now those alone should be conformed to Christ rising again who + have borne His image, and this belongs to the good alone. Therefore they alone shall rise again. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, punishment is not remitted unless the fault be condoned. Now bodily death is the punishment of original sin. Therefore, + as original sin is not forgiven to all, all will not rise again. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, as we are born again by the grace of Christ, even so shall we rise again by His grace. Now those who die in their + mother's womb can never be born again: therefore neither can they rise again, and consequently all will not rise again. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A2-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q75_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.5.28" target="asv">Jn. 5:28</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q75_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#John.5.25" target="asv">25</a>): "All that are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God . . . and they that hear shall live." Therefore the + dead shall all rise again. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A2-p8"> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q75_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.51" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:51</a>): "We shall all indeed rise again," etc. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A2-p9"> Further, the resurrection is necessary in order that those who rise again may receive punishment or reward according to their + merits. Now either punishment or reward is due to all, either for their own merits, as to adults, or for others' merits, as + to children. Therefore all will rise again. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A2-p10"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Those things, the reason of which comes from the nature of a species, must needs be found likewise in all the members of + that same species. Now such is the resurrection: because the reason thereof, as stated above + <a id="XP_Q75_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q75_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, is that the soul cannot have the final perfection of the human species, so long as it is separated from the body. Hence + no soul will remain for ever separated from the body. Therefore it is necessary for all, as + well as for one, to rise again. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As a gloss expounds these words, they refer to the spiritual resurrection whereby the wicked shall not rise again in the + particular judgment. or else they refer to the wicked who are altogether unbelievers, who will not rise again to be judged, + since they are already judged [* + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q75_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#John.3.18" target="asv">Jn. 3:18</a>]. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 23) explains "many" as meaning "all": in fact, this way of speaking is often met with in Holy + Writ. Or else the restriction may refer to the children consigned to limbo who, although they shall rise again, are not properly + said to awake, since they will have no sense either of pain or of glory, and waking is the unchaining of the senses. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All, both good and wicked, are conformed to Christ, while living in this life, as regards things pertaining to the nature + of the species, but not as regards matters pertaining to grace. Hence all will be conformed to Him in the restoration of natural + life, but not in the likeness of glory, except the good alone. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A2-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those who have died in original sin have, by dying, discharged the obligation of death which is the punishment of original + sin. Hence, notwithstanding original sin, they can rise again from death: for the punishment of original sin is to die, rather + than to be detained by death. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A2-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> We are born again by the grace of Christ that is given to us, but we rise again by the grace of Christ whereby it came about + that He took our nature, since it is by this that we are conformed to Him in natural things. Hence those who die in their + mother's womb, although they are not born again by receiving grace, will nevertheless rise again on account of the conformity + of their nature with Him, which conformity they acquired by attaining to the + perfection of the human species. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A2-p16"></p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A2-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q75_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q75_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q75_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q75_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q76.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q75_A3-p0.1">Whether the resurrection is natural?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q75_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the resurrection is natural. For, as the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14), "that which is commonly + observed in all, marks the nature of the individuals contained under it." Now resurrection applies commonly to all. Therefore + it is natural. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. xiv, 55): "Those who do not hold the resurrection on the principle of obedience ought certainly + to hold it on the principle of reason. For what does the world every day but imitate, in its elements, our resurrection?" + And he offers as examples the light which "as it were dies . . . and is withdrawn from our sight . . . and again rises anew, + as it were, and is recalled---the shrubs which lose their greenery, and again by a kind of + resurrection are renewed---and the seeds which rot and die and then sprout and rise again as it were": which same example + is adduced by the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q75_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.36" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:36</a>). Now from the works of nature nothing can be known save what is natural. Therefore the resurrection is natural. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things that are against nature abide not for long, because they are violent, so to speak. But the life that is restored + by the resurrection will last for ever. Therefore the resurrection will be natural. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that to which the entire expectation of nature looks forward would seem to be natural. Now such a thing is the resurrection + and the glorification of the saints according to + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q75_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.19" target="asv"> Rom. 8:19.</a> Therefore the resurrection will be natural. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the resurrection is a kind of movement towards the everlasting union of soul and body. Now movement is natural if + it terminate in a natural rest (Phys. v, 6): and the everlasting union of soul and body will be natural, for since the soul + is the body's proper mover, it has a body proportionate to it: so that the body is likewise for ever capable of being quickened + by it, even as the soul lives for ever. Therefore the resurrection will be natural. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A3-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> There is no natural return from privation to habit. But death is privation of life. Therefore the resurrection whereby one + returns from death to life is not natural. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A3-p8"> Further, things of the one species have one fixed way of origin: wherefore animals begotten of putrefaction are never of + the same species as those begotten of seed, as the Commentator says on Phys. viii. Now the natural way of man's origin is + for him to be begotten of a like in species: and such is not the case in the resurrection. Therefore it will not be natural. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A3-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A movement or an action stands related to nature in three ways. For there is a movement or action whereof nature is neither + the principle nor the term: and such a movement is sometimes from a principle above nature as in the case of a glorified body; + and sometimes from any other principle whatever; for instance, the violent upward movement of a stone which terminates in + a violent rest. Again, there is a movement whereof nature is both principle and term: for + instance, the downward movement of a stone. And there is another movement whereof nature is the term, but not the principle, + the latter being sometimes something above nature (as in giving sight to a blind man, for sight is natural, but the principle + of the sight-giving is above nature), and sometimes something else, as in the forcing of flowers or fruit by artificial process. + It is impossible for nature to be the principle and not the term, because natural principles are appointed to definite + effects, beyond which they cannot extend. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A3-p10"> Accordingly the action or movement that is related to nature in the first way can nowise be natural, but is either miraculous + if it come from a principle above nature, or violent if from any other principle. The action or movement that is related to + nature in the second way is simply natural: but the action that is related to nature in the third way cannot be described + as natural simply, but as natural in a restricted sense, in so far, to wit, as it leads to that which is + according to nature: but it is called either miraculous or artificial or violent. For, properly speaking, natural is that + which is according to nature, and a thing is according to nature if it has that nature and whatever results from that nature + (Phys. ii, 1). Consequently, speaking simply, movement cannot be described as natural unless its principle be natural. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A3-p11"> Now nature cannot be the principle of resurrection, although resurrection terminates in the life of nature. For nature is + the principle of movement in the thing wherein nature is---either the active principle, as in the movement of heavy and light + bodies and in the natural alterations of animals---or the passive principle, as in the generation of simple bodies. The passive + principle of natural generation is the natural passive potentiality which always has an active principle + corresponding to it in nature, according to Metaphysics viii, 1: nor as to this does it matter whether the active principle + in nature correspond to the passive principle in respect of its ultimate perfection, namely the form; or in respect of a disposition + in virtue of which it demands the ultimate form, as in the generation of a man according to the teaching of faith, or in all + other generations according to the opinions of Plato and Avicenna. But in nature there is no active principle of the + resurrection, neither as regards the union of the soul with the body, nor as regards the disposition which is the demand for + that union: since such a disposition cannot be produced by nature, except in a definite way by the process of generation from + seed. Wherefore even granted a passive potentiality on the part of the body, or any kind of inclination to its union with + the soul, it is not such as to suffice for the conditions of natural movement. Therefore the resurrection, strictly speaking, + is miraculous and not natural except in a restricted sense, as we have explained. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Damascene is speaking of those things that are found in all individuals and are caused by the principles of nature. For supposing + by a divine operation all men to be made white, or to be gathered together in one place, as happened at the time of the deluge, + it would not follow that whiteness or existence in some particular place is a natural property of man. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From natural things one does not come by a demonstration of reason to know non-natural things, but by the induction of reason + one may know something above nature, since the natural bears a certain resemblance to the supernatural. Thus the union of + soul and body resembles the union of the soul with God by the glory of fruition, as the Master says (Sent. ii, D, 1): and + in like manner the examples, quoted by the Apostle and Gregory, are confirmatory + evidences of our faith in the resurrection. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument regards an operation which terminates in something that is not natural but contrary to nature. Such is not + the resurrection, and hence the argument is not to the point. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A3-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The entire operation of nature is subordinate to the Divine operation, just as the working of a lower art is subordinate + to the working of a higher art. Hence just as all the work of a lower art has in view an end unattainable save by the operation + of the higher art that produces the form, or makes use of what has been made by art: so the last end which the whole expectation + of nature has in view is unattainable by the operation of nature, and for + which reason the attaining thereto is not natural. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A3-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Although there can be no natural movement terminating in a violent rest, there can be a non-natural movement terminating + in a natural rest, as explained above. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A3-p17"></p> + <p id="XP_Q75_A3-p18"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q75_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q76.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.XP_Q74_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q75_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q76" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q75_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q76_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="XP_Q76-p0.1">OF THE CAUSE OF THE RESURRECTION (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="XP_Q76-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q76-p2"> We must next consider the cause of our resurrection. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="XP_Q76-p3"> (1) Whether Christ's resurrection is the cause of our resurrection?</p> + <p id="XP_Q76-p4"> (2) Whether the sound of the trumpet is?</p> + <p id="XP_Q76-p5"> (3) Whether the angels are?</p> + <div id="XP_Q76_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q76.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q76_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q76_A1-p0.1">Whether the resurrection of Christ is the cause of our resurrection?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q76_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the resurrection of Christ is not the cause of our resurrection. For, given the cause, the effect follows. + Yet given the resurrection of Christ the resurrection of the other dead did not follow at once. Therefore His resurrection + is not the cause of ours. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an effect cannot be unless the cause precede. But the resurrection of the dead would be even if Christ had not risen + again: for God could have delivered man in some other way. Therefore Christ's resurrection is not the cause of ours. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same thing produces the one effect throughout the one same species. Now the resurrection will be common to all + men. Since then Christ's resurrection is not its own cause, it is not the cause of the resurrection of others. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, an effect retains some likeness to its cause. But the resurrection, at least of some, namely the wicked, bears no + likeness to the resurrection of Christ. Therefore Christ's resurrection will not be the cause of theirs. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> "In every genus that which is first is the cause of those that come after it" (Metaph. ii, 1). Now Christ, by reason of His + bodily resurrection, is called "the first-fruits of them that sleep" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q76_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.20" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:20</a>), and "the first-begotten of the dead" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q76_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rev.1.5" target="asv">Apoc. 1:5</a>). Therefore His resurrection is the cause of the resurrection of others. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A1-p7"> Further, Christ's resurrection has more in common with our bodily resurrection than with our spiritual resurrection which + is by justification. But Christ's resurrection is the cause of our justification, as appears from + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q76_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.25" target="asv"> Rom. 4:25, </a> where it is said that He "rose again for our justification." Therefore Christ's resurrection is the cause of our bodily resurrection. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Christ by reason of His nature is called the mediator of God and men: wherefore the Divine gifts are bestowed on men by means + of Christ's humanity. Now just as we cannot be delivered from spiritual death save by the gift of grace bestowed by God, so + neither can we be delivered from bodily death except by resurrection wrought by the Divine power. And therefore as Christ, + in respect of His human nature, received the firstfruits of grace from above, and His + grace is the cause of our grace, because "of His fulness we all have received . . . grace for grace" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q76_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.16" target="asv">Jn. 1:16</a>), so in Christ has our resurrection begun, and His resurrection is the cause of ours. Thus Christ as God is, as it were, + the equivocal cause of our resurrection, but as God and man rising again, He is the proximate and, so to say, the univocal + cause of our resurrection. Now a univocal efficient cause produces its effect in likeness to its own form, so that not only + is it an efficient, but also an exemplar cause in relation to that effect. This happens in two ways. For sometimes this very + form, whereby the agent is likened to its effect, is the direct principle of the action by which the effect is produced, as + heat in the fire that heats: and sometimes it is not the form in respect of which this likeness is observed, that is primarily + and directly the principle of that action, but the principles of that form. For instance, if a white man beget a white man, + the whiteness of the begetter is not the principle of active generation, and yet the whiteness of the begetter is said to + be the cause of the whiteness of the begotten, because the principles of whiteness in the begetter are the generative principles + causing whiteness in the begotten. In this way the resurrection of Christ is the cause of our resurrection, because the same + thing that wrought the resurrection of Christ, which is the univocal efficient cause of our resurrection, is the active + cause of our resurrection, namely the power of Christ's Godhead which is common to Him and the Father. Hence it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q76_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.11" target="asv">Rom. 8:11</a>): "He that raised up Jesus Christ from the dead shall quicken also your mortal bodies." And this very resurrection of Christ + by virtue of His indwelling Godhead is the quasi-instrumental cause of our resurrection: since the Divine operations were + wrought by means of Christ's flesh, as though it were a kind of organ; thus the Damascene + instances as an example (De Fide Orth. iii, 15) the touch of His body whereby He healed the leper ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q76_A1-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.8.3" target="asv">Mat. 8:3</a>). + </p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A sufficient cause produces at once its effect to which it is immediately directed, but not the effect to which it is directed + by means of something else, no matter how sufficient it may be: thus heat, however intense it be, does not cause heat at once + in the first instant, but it begins at once to set up a movement towards heat, because heat is its effect by means of movement. + Now Christ's resurrection is said to be the cause of ours, in that it + works our resurrection, not immediately, but by means of its principle, namely the Divine power which will work our resurrection + in likeness to the resurrection of Christ. Now God's power works by means of His will which is nearest to the effect; hence + it is not necessary that our resurrection should follow straightway after He has wrought the resurrection of Christ, but that + it should happen at the time which God's will has decreed. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's power is not tied to any particular second causes, but that He can produce their effects either immediately or by means + of other causes: thus He might work the generation of lower bodies even though there were no movement of the heaven: and yet + according to the order which He has established in things, the movement of the heaven is the cause of the generation of the + lower bodies. In like manner according to the order appointed to human things by + Divine providence, Christ's resurrection is the cause of ours: and yet He could have appointed another order, and then our + resurrection would have had another cause ordained by God. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument holds when all the things of one species have the same order to the first cause of the effect to be produced + in the whole of that species. But it is not so in the case in point, because Christ's humanity is nearer to His Godhead, Whose + power is the first cause of the resurrection, than is the humanity of others. Hence Christ's Godhead caused His resurrection + immediately, but it causes the resurrection of others by means of Christ-man + rising again. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The resurrection of all men will bear some resemblance to Christ's resurrection, as regards that which pertains to the life + of nature, in respect of which all were conformed to Christ. Hence all will rise again to immortal life; but in the saints + who were conformed to Christ by grace, there will be conformity as to things pertaining to glory. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A1-p13"></p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A1-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q76.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q76_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q76_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q76_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q76_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q76_A2-p0.1">Whether the sound of the trumpet will be the cause of our resurrection?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q76_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sound of the trumpet will not be the cause of our resurrection. For the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. + iv): "Thou must believe that the resurrection will take place by God's will, power, and nod." Therefore since these are a + sufficient cause of our resurrection, we ought not to assign the sound of the trumpet as a cause thereof. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is useless to make sounds to one who cannot hear. But the dead will not have hearing. Therefore it is unfitting + to make a sound to arouse them. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if any sound is the cause of the resurrection, this will only be by a power given by God to the sound: wherefore + a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q76_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.67.34" target="asv">Ps. 67:34</a>, "He will give to His voice the voice of power," says: "to arouse our bodies." Now from the moment that a power is given + to a thing, though it be given miraculously, the act that ensues is natural, as instanced in the man born blind who, after + being restored to sight, saw naturally. Therefore if a sound be the cause of + resurrection, the resurrection would be natural: which is false. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q76_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.4.15" target="asv">1 Thess. 4:15</a>): "The Lord Himself will come down from heaven . . . with the trumpet of God; and the dead who are in Christ shall rise." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A2-p6"> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q76_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#John.5.28" target="asv">Jn. 5:28</a>) that they "who are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God . . . and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q76_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#John.5.25" target="asv">Jn. 5:25</a>) they that hear shall live." Now this voice is called the trumpet, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43). Therefore, etc. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Cause and effect must needs in some way be united together, since mover and moved, maker and made, are simultaneous (Phys. + vii, 2). Now Christ rising again is the univocal cause of our resurrection: wherefore at the resurrection of bodies, it behooves + Christ to work the resurrection at the giving of some common bodily sign. According to some this sign will be literally Christ's + voice commanding the resurrection, even as He commanded the sea and the storm + ceased ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q76_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.8.26" target="asv">Mat. 8:26</a>). Others say that this sign will be nothing else than the manifest appearance of the Son of God in the world, according to + the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q76_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.27" target="asv">Mat. 24:27</a>: "As lightning cometh out of the east, and appeareth even into the west, so shall also the coming of the Son of man be." + These rely on the authority of Gregory [*Moral. xxxi, as quoted by St. Albert the Great, Sentent. iv, D, 42, A[4]] who says + that "the sound of the trumpet is nothing else but the Son appearing to the world as + judge." According to this, the visible presence of the Son of God is called His voice, because as soon as He appears all nature + will obey His command in restoring human bodies: hence He is described as coming "with commandment" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q76_A2-p7.3" href="./asv.html#iThess.4.15" target="asv">1 Thess. 4:15</a>). In this way His appearing, in so far as it has the force of a command, is called His voice: which voice, whatever it be, + is sometimes called a cry [* + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q76_A2-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.6" target="asv">Mt 25:6</a>], as of a crier summoning to judgment; sometimes the sound of a trumpet + [* + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q76_A2-p7.5" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.52" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:52</a>; + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q76_A2-p7.6" href="./asv.html#iThess.4.15" target="asv">1 Thess. 4:15</a>], either on account of its distinctness, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43), or as being in keeping with the use of + the trumpet in the Old Testament: for by the trumpet they were summoned to the council, stirred to the battle, and called + to the feast; and those who rise again will be summoned to the council of judgment, to the battle in which "the world shall + fight . . . against the unwise" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q76_A2-p7.7" href="./asv.html#Wis.5.21" target="asv">Wis. + 5:21 + </a>), and to the feast of everlasting solemnity. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In those words the Damascene touches on three things respecting the material cause of the resurrection: to wit, the Divine + will which commands, the power which executes, and the ease of execution, when he adds "bidding," in resemblance to our own + affairs: since it is very easy for us to do what is done at once at our word. But the ease is much more evident, if before + we say a word, our servants execute our will at once at the first sign of our will, + which sign is called a nod: and this nod is a kind of cause of that execution, in so far as others are led thereby to accomplish + our will. And the Divine nod, at which the resurrection will take place, is nothing but the sign given by God, which all nature + will obey by concurring in the resurrection of the dead. This sign is the same as the sound of the trumpet, as explained above. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the forms of the Sacrament have the power to sanctify, not through being heard, but through being spoken: so this sound, + whatever it be, will have an instrumental efficacy of resuscitation, not through being perceived, but through being uttered. + Even so a sound by the pulsation of the air arouses the sleeper, by loosing the organ of perception, and not because it is + known: since judgment about the sound that reaches the ears is subsequent to the + awakening and is not its cause. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument would avail, if the power given to that sound were a complete being in nature: because then that which would + proceed therefrom would have for principle a power already rendered natural. But this power is not of that kind but such as + we have ascribed above to the forms of the Sacraments (Sent. iv, D, 1; + <a id="XP_Q76_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62_A1.html">FP, Q[62], AA[1]</a>,4). + </p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q76_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q76_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q76_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q76_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q77.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q76_A3-p0.1">Whether the angels will do anything towards the resurrection?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q76_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels will do nothing at all towards the resurrection. For raising the dead shows a greater power + than does begetting men. Now when men are begotten, the soul is not infused into the body by means of the angels. Therefore + neither will the resurrection, which is reunion of soul and body, be wrought by the ministry of the angels. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if this is to be ascribed to the instrumentality of any angels at all, it would seem especially referable to the + virtues, to whom it belongs to work miracles. Yet it is referred, not to them, but to the archangels, according to the text + (Sent. iv, D, 43). Therefore the resurrection will not be wrought by the ministry of the angels. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A3-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q76_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.4.15" target="asv">1 Thess. 4:15</a>) that "the Lord . . . shall come down from heaven . . . with the voice of an archangel . . . and the dead shall rise again." + Therefore the resurrection of the dead will be accomplished by the angelic ministry. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A3-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) "just as the grosser and inferior bodies are ruled in a certain order by the more + subtle and more powerful bodies, so are all bodies ruled by God by the rational spirit of life": and Gregory speaks in the + same sense (Dial. iv, 6). Consequently in all God's bodily works, He employs the ministry of the angels. Now in the resurrection + there is something pertaining to the transmutation of the bodies, to wit the gathering + together of the mortal remains and the disposal thereof for the restoration of the human body; wherefore in this respect God + will employ the ministry of the angels in the resurrection. But the soul, even as it is immediately created by God, so will + it be reunited to the body immediately by God without any operation of the angels: and in like manner He Himself will glorify + the body without the ministry of the angels, just as He immediately glorifies man's soul. This ministry of the angels is + called their voice, according to one explanation given in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43). + </p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A3-p6"> Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident from what has been said.</p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This ministry will be exercised chiefly by one Archangel, namely Michael, who is the prince of the Church as he was of the + Synagogue ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q76_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.10.13" target="asv">Dan. 10:13</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q76_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.10.21" target="asv">21</a>). Yet he will act under the influence of the Virtues and the other higher orders: so that what he shall do, the higher orders + will, in a way, do also. In like manner the lower angels will co-operate with him as to the resurrection of each individual + to whose guardianship they were + appointed: so that this voice can be ascribed either to one or to many angels. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A3-p8"></p> + <p id="XP_Q76_A3-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q76_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q77.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.XP_Q75_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q76_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q77" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q76_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q77_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="XP_Q77-p0.1">OF THE TIME AND MANNER OF THE RESURRECTION (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="XP_Q77-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q77-p2"> We must now consider the time and manner of the resurrection. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="XP_Q77-p3"> (1) Whether the time of the resurrection should be delayed until the end of the world?</p> + <p id="XP_Q77-p4"> (2) Whether that time is hidden?</p> + <p id="XP_Q77-p5"> (3) Whether the resurrection will occur at night-time?</p> + <p id="XP_Q77-p6"> (4) Whether it will happen suddenly?</p> + <div id="XP_Q77_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q77.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q77_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q77_A1-p0.1">Whether the time of our resurrection should be delayed till the end of the world?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q77_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the time of the resurrection ought not to be delayed till the end of the world, so that all may rise together. + For there is more conformity between head and members than between one member and another, as there is more between cause + and effect than between one effect and another. Now Christ, Who is our Head, did not delay His resurrection until the end + of the world, so as to rise again together with all men. Therefore there is no need for + the resurrection of the early saints to be deferred until the end of the world, so that they may rise again together with + the others. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the resurrection of the Head is the cause of the resurrection of the members. But the resurrection of certain members + that desire nobility from their being closely connected with the Head was not delayed till the end of the world, but followed + immediately after Christ's resurrection, as is piously believed concerning the Blessed Virgin and John the Evangelist [*Ep. + de Assump. B.V., cap. ii, among St. Jerome's works]. Therefore the resurrection of + others will be so much nearer Christ's resurrection, according as they have been more conformed to Him by grace and merit. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the state of the New Testament is more perfect, and bears a closer resemblance to Christ, than the state of the + Old Testament. Yet some of the fathers of the Old Testament rose again when Christ rose, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q77_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.27.52" target="asv"> Mat. 27:52</a>: "Many of the bodies of the saints, that had slept, arose." Therefore it would seem that the resurrection of the Old Testament + saints should not be delayed till the end of the world, so that all may rise + together. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there will be no numbering of years after the end of the world. Yet after the resurrection of the dead, the years + are still reckoned until the resurrection of others, as appears from + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q77_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.20.4" target="asv"> Apoc. 20:4,5.</a> For it is stated there that "I saw . . . the souls of them that were beheaded for the testimony of Jesus, and for the word + of God," and further on: "And they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years." And "the rest of the dead + lived not till the thousand years were finished." Therefore the resurrection of all is not delayed until the end of the world, + that all may rise together. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q77_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Job.14.12" target="asv">Job 14:12</a>): "Man when he is fallen asleep shall not rise again till the heavens be broken, he shall not wake, nor rise out of his sleep," + and it is a question of the sleep of death. Therefore the resurrection of men will be delayed until the end of the world when + the heavens shall be broken. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A1-p7"> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q77_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.39" target="asv">Heb. 11:39</a>): "All these being approved by the testimony of faith received not the promise," i.e. full beatitude of soul and body, since + "God has provided something better for us, lest they should be consummated," i.e. perfected, "without us---in order that," + as a gloss observes, "through all rejoicing each one might rejoice the more." But the resurrection will not precede the glorification + of bodies, because "He will reform the body + of our lowness made like to the body of His glory" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q77_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.21" target="asv">Phil. 3:21</a>), and the children of the resurrection will be "as the angels . . . in heaven" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q77_A1-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv">Mat. 22:30</a>). Therefore the resurrection will be delayed till the end of the world, when all shall rise together. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine states (De Trin. iii, 4) "Divine providence decreed that the grosser and lower bodies should be ruled in a certain + order by the more subtle and powerful bodies": wherefore the entire matter of the lower bodies is subject to variation according + to the movement of the heavenly bodies. Hence it would be contrary to the order established in things by Divine providence + if the matter of lower bodies were brought to the state of incorruption, so long + as there remains movement in the higher bodies. And since, according to the teaching of faith, the resurrection will bring + men to immortal life conformably to Christ Who "rising again from the dead dieth now no more" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q77_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.9" target="asv">Rom. 6:9</a>), the resurrection of human bodies will be delayed until the end of the world when the heavenly movement will cease. For + this reason, too, certain philosophers, who held that the movement of the heavens will never cease, maintained that human + souls + will return to mortal bodies such as we have now---whether, as Empedocles, they stated that the soul would return to the same + body at the end of the great year, or that it would return to another body; thus Pythagoras asserted that "any soul will enter + any body," as stated in De Anima i, 3. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the head is more conformed to the members by conformity of proportion (which is requisite in order that it have + influence over the members) than one member is to another, yet the head has a certain causality over the members which the + members have not; and in this the members differ from the head and agree with one another. Hence Christ's resurrection is + an exemplar of ours, and through our faith therein there arises in us the hope of our own + resurrection. But the resurrection of one of Christ's members is not the cause of the resurrection of other members, and consequently + Christ's resurrection had to precede the resurrection of others who have all to rise again at the consummation of the world. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although among the members some rank higher than others and are more conformed to the Head, they do not attain to the character + of headship so as to be the cause of others. Consequently greater conformity to Christ does not give them a right to rise + again before others as though they were exemplar and the others exemplate, as we have said in reference to Christ's resurrection: + and if it has been granted to others that their resurrection should not be + delayed until the general resurrection, this has been by special privilege of grace, and not as due on account of conformity + to Christ. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Jerome, in a sermon on the Assumption [*Ep. x ad Paul. et Eustoch., now recognized as spurious], seems to be doubtful of + this resurrection of the saints with Christ, namely as to whether, having been witnesses to the resurrection, they died again, + so that theirs was a resuscitation (as in the case of Lazarus who died again) rather than a resurrection such as will be at + the end of the world---or really rose again to immortal life, to live for ever in + the body, and to ascend bodily into heaven with Christ, as a gloss says on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q77_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.27.52" target="asv"> Mat. 27:52.</a> The latter seems more probable, because, as Jerome says, in order that they might bear true witness to Christ's true resurrection, + it was fitting that they should truly rise again. Nor was their resurrection hastened for their sake, but for the sake of + bearing witness to Christ's resurrection: and that by bearing witness thereto they might lay the foundation of the faith of + the New + Testament: wherefore it was more fitting that it should be borne by the fathers of the Old Testament, than by those who died + after the foundation of the New. It must, however, be observed that, although the Gospel mentions their resurrection before + Christ's, we must take this statement as made in anticipation, as is often the case with writers of history. For none rose + again with a true resurrection before Christ, since He is the "first-fruits of them that sleep" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q77_A1-p11.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.20" target="asv">1 Cor. + 15:20 + </a>), although some were resuscitated before Christ's resurrection, as in the case of Lazarus. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> On account of these words, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xx, 7), certain heretics asserted that there will be a first + resurrection of the dead that they may reign with Christ on earth for a thousand years; whence they were called "chiliasts" + or "millenarians." Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 7) that these words are to be understood otherwise, namely of the + spiritual resurrection, whereby men shall rise again from their sins to the gift of + grace: while the second resurrection is of bodies. The reign of Christ denotes the Church wherein not only martyrs but also + the other elect reign, the part denoting the whole; or they reign with Christ in glory as regards all, special mention being + made of the martyrs, because they especially reign after death who fought for the truth, even unto death. The number of a + thousand years denotes not a fixed number, but the whole of the present time wherein the saints now reign with Christ, because + the number 1,000 designates universality more than the number 100, since 100 is the square of 10, whereas 1,000 is a cube + resulting from the multiplication of ten by its square, for 10 X 10 = 100, and 100 X 10 = 1,000. Again in + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q77_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.104.8" target="asv"> Ps. 104:8, </a> "The word which He commanded to a thousand," i.e. all, "generations." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A1-p13"></p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A1-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q77.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q77_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q77_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q77_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q77_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q77_A2-p0.1">Whether the time of our resurrection is hidden?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q77_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this time is not hidden. Because when we know exactly the beginning of a thing, we can know its end exactly, + since "all things are measured by a certain period" (De Generat. ii). Now the beginning of the world is known exactly. Therefore + its end can also be known exactly. But this will be the time of the resurrection and judgment. Therefore that time is not + hidden. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is stated ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q77_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.12.6" target="asv">Apoc. 12:6</a>) that "the woman who represents the Church had a place prepared by God, that there she might feed [Vulg.: 'they should feed + her'] a thousand two hundred sixty days." Again ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q77_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.12.11" target="asv">Dan. 12:11</a>), a certain fixed number of days is mentioned, which apparently signify years, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q77_A2-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Ezek.4.6" target="asv"> Ezech. 4:6</a>: "A day for a year, yea a day for a year I have appointed to thee." Therefore the time of the end of + the world and of the resurrection can be known exactly from Holy Writ. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the state of the New Testament was foreshadowed in the Old Testament. Now we know exactly the time wherein the state + of the Old Testament endured. Therefore we can also know exactly the time wherein the state of the New Testament will endure. + But the state of the New Testament will last to the end of the world, wherefore it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q77_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.28.20" target="asv">Mat. 28:20</a>): "Behold I am with you . . . to the consummation of the world." Therefore the time of the end of the world + and of the resurrection can be known exactly. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> That which is unknown to the angels will be much more unknown to men: because those things to which men attain by natural + reason are much more clearly and certainly known to the angels by their natural knowledge. Moreover revelations are not made + to men save by means of the angels as Dionysius asserts (Coel. Hier. iv). Now the angels have no exact knowledge of that time, + as appears from + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q77_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.36" target="asv"> Mat. 24:36</a>: "Of that day and hour no one knoweth, + no not the angels of heaven." Therefore that time is hidden from men. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A2-p6"> Further, the apostles were more cognizant of God's secrets than others who followed them, because they had "the first-fruits + of the spirit" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q77_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.23" target="asv">Rom. 8:23</a>)---" before others in point of time and more abundantly," as a gloss observes. And yet when they questioned our Lord about + this very matter, He answered them ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q77_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Acts.1.7" target="asv">Acts 1:7</a>): "It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father hath put in His own power." Much more, therefore, is it + hidden from + others. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 58) "as to the last age of the human race, which begins from our Lord's coming and lasts + until the end of the world, it is uncertain of how many generations it will consist: even so old age, which is man's last + age, has no fixed time according to the measure of the other ages, since sometimes alone it lasts as long a time as all the + others." The reason of this is because the exact length of future time cannot be known + except either by revelation or by natural reason: and the time until the resurrection cannot be reckoned by natural reason, + because the resurrection and the end of the heavenly movement will be simultaneous as stated above + <a id="XP_Q77_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q77_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. And all things that are foreseen by natural reason to happen at a fixed time are reckoned by movement: and it is impossible + from the movement of the heaven to reckon its end, for since it is circular, it is for this very reason able by its + nature to endure for ever: and consequently the time between this and the resurrection cannot be reckoned by natural reason. + Again it cannot be known by revelation, so that all may be on the watch and ready to meet Christ: and for this reason when + the apostles asked Him about this, Christ answered ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q77_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Acts.1.7" target="asv">Acts 1:7</a>): "It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father hath put in His own power," whereby, as Augustine says + (De Civ. Dei xviii, 53): "He scatters the + fingers of all calculators and bids them be still." For what He refused to tell the apostles, He will not reveal to others: + wherefore all those who have been misled to reckon the aforesaid time have so far proved to be untruthful; for some, as Augustine + says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 53), stated that from our Lord's Ascension to His last coming 400 years would elapse, others 500, + others 1,000. The falseness of these calculators is evident, as will likewise be the falseness of those who even now cease + not to calculate. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When we know a thing's beginning and also its end it follows that its measure is known to us: wherefore if we know the beginning + of a thing the duration of which is measured by the movement of the heaven, we are able to know its end, since the movement + of heaven is known to us. But the measure of the duration of the heavenly movement is God's ordinance alone, which is unknown + to us. Wherefore however much we may know its beginning, we are unable to + know its end. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The thousand two hundred sixty days mentioned in the Apocalypse (12:6) denote all the time during which the Church endures, + and not any definite number of years. The reason whereof is because the preaching of Christ on which the Church is built lasted + three years and a half, which time contains almost an equal number of days as the aforesaid number. Again the number of days + appointed by Daniel does not refer to a number of years to elapse before the + end of the world or until the preaching of Antichrist, but to the time of Antichrist's preaching and the duration of his persecution. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the state of the New Testament in general is foreshadowed by the state of the Old Testament it does not follow that + individuals correspond to individuals: especially since all the figures of the Old Testament were fulfilled in Christ. Hence + Augustine (De Civ. Dei xviii, 52) answers certain persons who wished to liken the number of persecutions suffered by the Church + to the number of the plagues of Egypt, in these words: "I do not think that + the occurrences in Egypt were in their signification prophetic of these persecutions, although those who think so have shown + nicety and ingenuity in adapting them severally the one to the other, not indeed by a prophetic spirit, but by the guess-work + of the human mind, which sometimes reaches the truth and sometimes not." The same remarks would seem applicable to the statements + of Abbot Joachim, who by means of such conjectures about the future foretold some things that were true, and in others + was deceived. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q77_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q77_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q77_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q77_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q77_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q77_A3-p0.1">Whether the resurrection will take place at night-time?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q77_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the resurrection will not be at night-time. For the resurrection will not be "till the heavens be broken" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q77_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.14.12" target="asv">Job 14:12</a>). Now when the heavenly movement ceases, which is signified by its breaking, there will be no time, neither night nor day. + Therefore the resurrection will not be at night-time. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the end of a thing ought to be most perfect. Now the end of time will be then: wherefore it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q77_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.10.6" target="asv">Apoc. 10:6</a>) that "time shall be no longer." Therefore time ought to be then in its most perfect disposition and consequently it should + be the daytime. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the time should be such as to be adapted to what is done therein: wherefore ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q77_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.13.30" target="asv">Jn. 13:30</a>) the night is mentioned as being the time when Judas went out from the fellowship of the light. Now, all things that are + hidden at the present time will then be made most manifest, because when the Lord shall come He "will bring to light the hidden + things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of the hearts" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q77_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.5" target="asv">1 Cor. + 4:5 + </a>). Therefore it ought to be during the day. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of ours. Now Christ's resurrection was at night, as Gregory says in a homily for Easter + (xxi in Evang.). Therefore our resurrection will also be at night-time. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A3-p6"> Further, the coming of our Lord is compared to the coming of a thief into the house ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q77_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.39" target="asv">Lk. 12:39,40</a>). But the thief comes to the house at night-time. Therefore our Lord will also come in the night. Now, when He comes the + resurrection will take place, as stated above ( + <a id="XP_Q77_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q76_A2.html">Q[76], A[2]</a>). Therefore the resurrection will be at night-time. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The exact time and hour at which the resurrection will be cannot be known for certain, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, + 43). Nevertheless some assert with sufficient probability that it will be towards the twilight, the moon being in the east + and the sun in the west; because the sun and moon are believed to have been created in these positions, and thus their revolutions + will be altogether completed by their return to the same point. Wherefore it is said + that Christ arose at such an hour. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When the resurrection occurs, it will not be time but the end of time; because at the very instant that the heavens will + cease to move the dead will rise again. Nevertheless the stars will be in the same position as they occupy now at any fixed + hour: and accordingly it is said that the resurrection will be at this or that hour. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The most perfect disposition of time is said to be midday, on account of the light given by the sun. But then the city of + God will need neither sun nor moon, because the glory of God will enlighten it ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q77_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.22.5" target="asv">Apoc. 22:5</a>). Wherefore in this respect it matters not whether the resurrection be in the day or in the night. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That time should be adapted to manifestation as regards the things that will happen then, and to secrecy as regards the fixing + of the time. Hence either may happen fittingly, namely that the resurrection be in the day or in the night. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q77_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q77_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q77_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q77_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q78.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q77_A4-p0.1">Whether the resurrection will happen suddenly or by degrees?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q77_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the resurrection will not happen suddenly but by degrees. For the resurrection of the dead is foretold + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q77_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.37.7" target="asv">Ezech. 37:7,8</a>) where it is written: "The bones came together . . . and I saw and behold the sinews and the flesh came up upon them, and + the skin was stretched out over them, but there was no spirit in them." Therefore the restoration of the bodies will precede + in time their reunion with the souls, and thus the + resurrection will not be sudden. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing does not happen suddenly if it require several actions following one another. Now the resurrection requires + several actions following one another, namely the gathering of the ashes, the refashioning of the body, the infusion of the + soul. Therefore the resurrection will not be sudden. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all sound is measured by time. Now the sound of the trumpet will be the cause of the resurrection, as stated above + ( + <a id="XP_Q77_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q76_A2.html">Q[76], A[2]</a>). Therefore the resurrection will take time and will not happen suddenly. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, no local movement can be sudden as stated in De Sensu et Sensato vii. Now the resurrection requires local movement + in the gathering of the ashes. Therefore it will not happen suddenly. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q77_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.51" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:51,52</a>): "We shall all indeed rise again . . . in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye." Therefore the resurrection will be sudden. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A4-p7"> Further, infinite power works suddenly. But the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): "Thou shalt believe in the resurrection + to be wrought by the power of God," and it is evident that this is infinite. Therefore the resurrection will be sudden. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A4-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> At the resurrection something will be done by the ministry of the angels, and something immediately by the power of God, + as stated above ( + <a id="XP_Q77_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q76_A3.html">Q[76], A[3]</a>). Accordingly that which is done by the ministry of the angels, will not be instantaneous, if by instant we mean an indivisible + point of time, but it will be instantaneous if by instant we mean an imperceptible time. But that which will be done immediately + by God's power will happen + suddenly, namely at the end of the time wherein the work of the angels will be done, because the higher power brings the lower + to perfection. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Ezechiel spoke, like Moses to a rough people, and therefore, just as Moses divided the works of the six days into days, in + order that the uncultured people might be able to understand, although all things were made together according to Augustine + (Gen. ad lit. iv), so Ezechiel expressed the various things that will happen in the resurrection, although they will all happen + together in an instant. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although these actions follow one another in nature, they are all together in time: because either they are together in the + same instant, or one is in the instant that terminates the other. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A4-p11"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> The same would seem to apply to that sound as to the forms of the sacraments, namely that the sound will produce its effect + in its last instant. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The gathering of the ashes which cannot be without local movement will be done by the ministry of the angels. Hence it will + be in time though imperceptible on account of the facility of operation which is competent to the angels. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A4-p13"></p> + <p id="XP_Q77_A4-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q77_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q78.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.XP_Q76_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q77_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q78" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q77_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q78_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="XP_Q78-p0.1">OF THE TERM "WHEREFROM" OF THE RESURRECTION (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="XP_Q78-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q78-p2"> We must now consider the term "wherefrom" of the resurrection; and under this head there are three points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="XP_Q78-p3"> (1) Whether death is the term "wherefrom" of the resurrection in every case?</p> + <p id="XP_Q78-p4"> (2) Whether ashes are, or dust?</p> + <p id="XP_Q78-p5"> (3) Whether this dust has a natural inclination towards the soul?</p> + <div id="XP_Q78_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q78.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q78_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q78_A1-p0.1">Whether death will be the term "wherefrom" of the resurrection in all cases?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q78_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that death will not be the term "wherefrom" of the resurrection in all cases. Because some shall not die but + shall be clothed with immortality: for it is said in the creed that our Lord "will come to judge the living and the dead." + Now this cannot refer to the time of judgment, because then all will be alive; therefore this distinction must refer to the + previous time, and consequently all will not die before the judgment. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a natural and common desire cannot be empty and vain, but is fulfilled in some cases. Now according to the Apostle + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q78_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.5.4" target="asv">2 Cor. 5:4</a>) it is a common desire that "we would not be unclothed but clothed upon." Therefore there will be some who will never be + stripped of the body by death, but will be arrayed in the glory of the resurrection. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion cxv) that the four last petitions of the Lord's prayer refer to the present life: and + one of them is: "Forgive us our debts [Douay: 'trespasses']." Therefore the Church prays that all debts may be forgiven her + in this life. Now the Church's prayer cannot be void and not granted: "If you ask the Father anything in My name, He will + give it you" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q78_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.16.23" target="asv">Jn. 16:23</a>). Therefore at some time of this life the Church + will receive the remission of all debts: and one of the debts to which we are bound by the sin of our first parent is that + we be born in original sin. Therefore at some time God will grant to the Church that men be born without original sin. But + death is the punishment of original sin. Therefore at the end of the world there will be some men who will not die: and so + the same conclusion follows. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the wise man should always choose the shortest way. Now the shortest way is for the men who shall be found living + to be transferred to the impassibility of the resurrection, than for them to die first, and afterwards rise again from death + to immortality. Therefore God Who is supremely wise will choose this way for those who shall be found living. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q78_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.36" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:36</a>): "That which thou sowest is not quickened except it die first," and he is speaking of the resurrection of the body as compared + to the seed. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A1-p7"> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q78_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.22" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:22</a>): "As in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be made alive." Now all shall be made alive in Christ. Therefore all shall + die in Adam: and so all shall rise again from death. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The saints differ in speaking on this question, as may be seen in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43). However, the safer and more + common opinion is that all shall die and rise again from death: and this for three reasons. First, because it is more in accord + with Divine justice, which condemned human nature for the sin of its first parent, that all who by the act of nature derive + their origin from him should contract the stain of original sin, and consequently be the + debtors of death. Secondly, because it is more in agreement with Divine Scripture which foretells the resurrection of all; + and resurrection is not predicted properly except of that "which has fallen and perished," as the Damascene says (De Fide + Orth. iv). Thirdly, because it is more in harmony with the order of nature where we find that what is corrupted and decayed + is not renewed except by means of corruption: thus vinegar does not become wine unless the vinegar be corrupted and pass into + the + juice of the grape. Wherefore since human nature has incurred the defect of the necessity of death, it cannot return to immortality + save by means of death. It is also in keeping with the order of nature for another reason, because, as it is stated in Phys. + viii, 1, "the movement of heaven is as a kind of life to all existing in nature," just as the movement of the heart is a kind + of life of the whole body: wherefore even as all the members become dead on the heart ceasing to move, so when the + heavenly movement ceases nothing can remain living with that life which was sustained by the influence of that movement. Now + such is the life by which we live now: and therefore it follows that those who shall live after the movement of the heaven + comes to a standstill must depart from this life. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This distinction of the dead and the living does not apply to the time itself of the judgment, nor to the whole preceding + time, since all who are to be judged were living at some time, and dead at some time: but it applies to that particular time + which shall precede the judgment immediately, when, to wit, the signs of the judgment shall begin to appear. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The perfect desire of the saints cannot be void; but nothing prevents their conditional desire being void. Such is the desire + whereby we would not be "unclothed," but "clothed upon," namely if that be possible: and this desire is called by some a "velleity." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is erroneous to say that any one except Christ is conceived without original sin, because those who would be conceived + without original sin would not need the redemption which was wrought by Christ, and thus Christ would not be the Redeemer + of all men [*See Editor's note which follows TP, Q[26]]. Nor can it be said that they needed not this redemption, because + it was granted to them that they should be conceived without sin. For, this grace was + vouchsafed---either to their parents, that the sin of nature might be healed in them (because so long as that sin remained + they were unable to beget without communicating original sin)---or to nature itself which was healed. Now we must allow that + every one needs the redemption of Christ personally, and not only by reason of nature, and one cannot be delivered from an + evil or absolved from a debt unless one incur the debt or incur the evil: and consequently all could not reap in themselves + the + fruit of the Lord's prayer, unless all were born debtors and subject to evil. Hence the forgiveness of debts or delivery from + evil cannot be applied to one who is born without a debt or free from evil, but only to one who is born with a debt and is + afterwards delivered by the grace of Christ. Nor does it follow, if it can be asserted without error that some die not, that + they are born without original sin, although death is a punishment of original sin; because God can of His mercy remit the + punishment which one has incurred by a past fault, as He forgave the adulterous woman without punishment ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q78_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#John.8" target="asv">Jn. 8</a>): and in like manner He can deliver from death those who have contracted the debt of death by being born in original sin. + And thus it does not follow that if they die not, therefore they were born without original sin. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The shortest way is not always the one to be chosen, but only when it is more or equally adapted for attaining the end. It + is not so here, as is clear from what we have said. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A1-p13"></p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A1-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q78.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q78_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q78_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q78_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q78_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q78_A2-p0.1">Whether all will rise again from ashes?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q78_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all will not rise again from ashes. For Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of ours. Yet His resurrection + was not from ashes, for His flesh saw not corruption according to + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q78_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.15.10" target="asv"> Ps. 15:10</a>; + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q78_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Acts.2.27" target="asv"> Acts 2:27,31.</a> Therefore neither will all rise again from ashes. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the human body is not always burned. Yet a thing cannot be reduced to ashes unless it be burned. Therefore not all + will rise again from ashes. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the body of a dead man is not reduced to ashes immediately after death. But some will rise again at once after death, + according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 43), namely those who will be found living. Therefore all will not rise again from ashes. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the term "wherefrom" corresponds to the term "whereto." Now the term "whereto" of the resurrection is not the same + in the good as in the wicked: "We shall all indeed rise again, but we shall not all be changed" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q78_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.51" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:51</a>). Therefore the term "wherefrom" is not the same. And thus, if the wicked rise again from ashes, the good will not rise again + from ashes. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Haymo says (on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q78_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.10" target="asv"> Rom. 5:10, </a> "For if when we were enemies"): "All who are born in original sin lie under the sentence: Earth thou art and into earth shalt + thou go." Now all who shall rise again at the general resurrection were born in original sin, either at their birth within + the womb or at least at their birth from the womb. Therefore all will rise again from ashes. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A2-p7"> Further, there are many things in the human body that do not truly belong to human nature. But all these will be removed. + Therefore all bodies must needs be reduced to ashes. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A2-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The same reasons by which we have shown + <a id="XP_Q78_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q78_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that all rise again from death prove also that at the general resurrection all will rise again from ashes, unless the contrary, + such as the hastening of their resurrection, be vouchsafed to certain persons by a special privilege of grace. For just as + holy writ foretells the resurrection, so does it foretell the reformation of bodies ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q78_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.21" target="asv">Phil. 3:21</a>). And thus it follows + that even as all die that the bodies of all may be able truly to rise again, so will the bodies of all perish that they may + be able to be reformed. For just as death was inflicted by Divine justice as a punishment on man, so was the decay of the + body, as appears from + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q78_A2-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.19" target="asv">Gn. 3:19</a>, "Earth thou art and into earth shalt thou go [*Vulg.: 'Dust thou art and into dust thou shalt return']." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A2-p9"> Moreover the order of nature requires the dissolution not only of the union of soul and body, but also of the mingling of + the elements: even as vinegar cannot be brought back to the quality of wine unless it first be dissolved into the prejacent + matter: for the mingling of the elements is both caused and preserved by the movement of the heaven, and when this ceases + all mixed bodies will be dissolved into pure elements. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of ours as to the term "whereto," but not as to the term "wherefrom." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By ashes we mean all the remains that are left after the dissolution of the body---for two reasons. First, because it was + the common custom in olden times to burn the bodies of the dead, and to keep the ashes, whence it became customary to speak + of the remains of a human body as ashes. Secondly, on account of the cause of dissolution, which is the flame of the fomes + [*Cf. + <a id="XP_Q78_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q82_A3.html">FS, Q[82], A[3]</a>] whereby the human body is radically + infected. Hence, in order to be cleansed of this infection the human body must needs be dissolved into its primary components: + and when a thing is destroyed by fire it is said to be reduced to ashes. wherefore the name of ashes is given to those things + into which the human body is dissolved. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fire that will cleanse the face of the earth will be able to reduce suddenly to ashes the bodies of those that will be + found living, even as it will dissolve other mixed bodies into their prejacent matter. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Movement does not take its species from its term "wherefrom" but from its term "whereto." Hence the resurrection of the saints + which will be glorious must needs differ from the resurrection of the wicked which will not be glorious, in respect of the + term "whereto," and not in respect of the term "wherefrom." And it often happens that the term "whereto" is not the same, + whereas the term "wherefrom" is the same---for instance, a thing may be moved from + blackness to whiteness and to pallor. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A2-p14"></p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A2-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q78_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q78_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q78_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q78_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q79.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q78_A3-p0.1">Whether the ashes from which the human body will be restored have any natural inclination towards the soul which will be united + to them? + </h4> + <p id="XP_Q78_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the ashes from which the human body will be restored will have a natural inclination towards the soul + which will be united to them. For if they had no inclination towards the soul, they would stand in the same relation to that + soul as other ashes. Therefore it would make no difference whether the body that is to be united to that soul were restored + from those ashes or from others: and this is false. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the body is more dependent on the soul than the soul on the body. Now the soul separated from the body is still + somewhat dependent on the body, wherefore its movement towards God is retarded on account of its desire for the body, as Augustine + says (Gen. ad lit. xii). Much more, therefore, has the body when separated from the soul, a natural inclination towards that + soul. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q78_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.20.11" target="asv">Job 20:11</a>): "His bones shall be filled with the vices of his youth, and they shall sleep with him in the dust." But vices are only + in the soul. Therefore there will still remain in those ashes a natural inclination towards the soul. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The human body can be dissolved into the very elements, or changed into the flesh of other animals. But the elements are + homogeneous, and so is the flesh of a lion or other animal. Since then in the other parts of the elements or animals there + is no natural inclination to that soul, neither will there be an inclination towards the soul in those parts into which the + human body has been changed. The first proposition is made evident on the authority of + Augustine (Enchiridion lxxxviii): "The human body, although changed into the substance of other bodies or even into the elements, + although it has become the food and flesh of any animals whatsoever, even of man, will in an instant return to that soul which + erstwhile animated it, making it a living and growing man." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A3-p6"> Further, to every natural inclination there corresponds a natural agent: else nature would fail in necessaries. Now the aforesaid + ashes cannot be reunited to the same soul by any natural agent. Therefore there is not in them any natural inclination to + the aforesaid reunion. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Opinion is threefold on this point. For some say that the human body is never dissolved into its very elements; and so there + always remains in the ashes a certain force besides the elements, which gives a natural inclination to the same soul. But + this assertion is in contradiction with the authority of Augustine quoted above, as well as with the senses and reason: since + whatever is composed of contraries can be dissolved into its component parts. Wherefore + others say that these parts of the elements into which the human body is dissolved retain more light, through having been + united to the soul, and for this reason have a + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A3-p8"> natural inclination to human souls. But this again is nonsensical, since the parts of the elements are of the same nature + and have an equal share of light and darkness. Hence we must say differently that in those ashes there is no natural inclination + to resurrection, but only by the ordering of Divine providence, which decreed that those ashes should be reunited to the soul: + it is on this account that those parts of the elements shall be reunited and not others. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A3-p9"> Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.</p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The soul separated from the body remains in the same nature that it has when united to the body. It is not so with the body, + and consequently the comparison fails. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These words of Job do not mean that the vices actually remain in the ashes of the dead, but that they remain according to + the ordering of Divine justice, whereby those ashes are destined to the restoration of the body which will suffer eternally + for the sins committed. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="XP_Q78_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q78_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q79.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.XP_Q77_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q78_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q79" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q78_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q79_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="XP_Q79-p0.1">OF THE CONDITIONS OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN, AND FIRST OF THEIR IDENTITY (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="XP_Q79-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q79-p2"> In the next place we must consider the conditions of those who rise again. Here we shall consider: (1) Those which concern + the good and wicked in common; (2) those which concern the good only; (3) those which concern only the wicked. Three things + concern the good and wicked in common, namely their identity, their integrity, and their quality: and we shall inquire (1) + about their identity; (2) about their integrity; (3) about their quality. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79-p3"> Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="XP_Q79-p4"> (1) Whether the body will rise again identically the same?</p> + <p id="XP_Q79-p5"> (2) Whether it will be the self-same man?</p> + <p id="XP_Q79-p6"> (3) Whether it is necessary that the same ashes should return to the same parts in which they were before?</p> + <div id="XP_Q79_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q79.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q79_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q79_A1-p0.1">Whether in the resurrection the soul will be reunited to the same identical body?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q79_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul will not be reunited to the same identical body at the resurrection, for "thou sowest not the + body that shall be, but bare grain" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q79_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.37" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:37</a>). Now the Apostle is there comparing death to sowing and resurrection to fructifying. Therefore the same body that is laid + aside in death is not resumed at the resurrection. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to every form some matter is adapted according to its condition, and likewise to every agent some instrument. Now + the body is compared to the soul as matter to form, and as instrument to agent. Since then at the resurrection the soul will + not be of the same condition as now (for it will be either entirely borne away to the heavenly life to which it adhered while + living in the world, or will be cast down into the life of the brutes if it lived as a + brute in this world) it would seem that it will not resume the same body, but either a heavenly or a brutish body. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, after death, as stated above ( + <a id="XP_Q79_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q78_A3.html">Q[78], A[3]</a>), the human body is dissolved into the elements. Now these elemental parts into which the human body has been dissolved do + not agree with the human body dissolved into them, except in primary matter, even as any other elemental parts agree with + that same body. But if the body were to be formed from those other elemental parts, it would not be described as identically + the same. + Therefore neither will it be the self-same body if it be restored from these parts. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there cannot be numerical identity where there is numerical distinction of essential parts. Now the form of the + mixed body, which form is an essential part of the human body, as being its form, cannot be resumed in numerical identity. + Therefore the body will not be identically the same. The minor is proved thus: That which passes away into complete nonentity + cannot be resumed in identity. This is clear from the fact that there cannot be identity where + there is distinction of existence: and existence, which is the act of a being, is differentiated by being interrupted, as + is any interrupted act. Now the form of a mixed body passes away into complete nonentity by death, since it is a bodily form, + and so also do the contrary qualities from which the mixture results. Therefore the form of a mixed body does not return in + identity. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q79_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Job.19.26" target="asv">Job 19:26</a>): "In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour [Vulg.: 'my God']," where he is speaking of the vision after the resurrection, + as appears from the preceding words: "In the last day I shall rise out of the earth." Therefore the selfsame body will rise + again. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A1-p7"> Further, the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 27): "Resurrection is the second rising of that which has fallen." But the + body which we have now fell by death. Therefore it will rise again the same identically. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> on this point the philosophers erred and certain modern heretics err. For some of the philosophers allowed that souls separated + from bodies are reunited to bodies, yet they erred in this in two ways. First, as to the mode of reunion, for some held the + separated soul to be naturally reunited to a body by the way of generation. Secondly, as to the body to which it was reunited, + for they held that this second union was not with the selfsame body that was laid + aside in death, but with another, sometimes of the same, sometimes of a different species. Of a different species when the + soul while existing in the body had led a life contrary to the ordering of reason: wherefore it passed after death from the + body of a man into the body of some other animal to whose manner of living it had conformed in this life, for instance into + the body of a dog on account of lust, into the body of a lion on account of robbery and violence, and so forth---and into + a body + of the same species when the soul has led a good life in the body, and having after death experienced some happiness, after + some centuries began to wish to return to the body; and thus it was reunited to a human body. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A1-p9"> This opinion arises from two false sources. The first of these is that they said that the soul is not united to the body + essentially as form to matter, but only accidentally, as mover to the thing moved, [*Cf. + <a id="XP_Q79_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A1.html">FP, Q[76], A[1]</a>] or as a man to his clothes. Hence it was possible for them to maintain that the soul pre-existed before being infused into + the body begotten of natural generation, as also that it is united to various bodies. The second is that + they held intellect not to differ from sense except accidentally, so that man would be said to surpass other animals in intelligence, + because the sensitive power is more acute in him on account of the excellence of his bodily complexion; and hence it was possible + for them to assert that man's soul passes into the soul of a brute animal, especially when the human soul has been habituated + to brutish actions. But these two sources are refuted by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1), and in consequence + of these being refuted, it is clear that the above opinion is false. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A1-p10"> In like manner the errors of certain heretics are refuted. Some of them fell into the aforesaid opinions of the philosophers: + while others held that souls are reunited to heavenly bodies, or again to bodies subtle as the wind, as Gregory relates of + a certain Bishop of Constantinople, in his exposition of + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q79_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Job.19.26" target="asv"> Job 19:26, </a> "In my flesh I shall see my God," etc. Moreover these same errors of heretics may be refuted by the fact that they are prejudicial + to the truth + of resurrection as witnessed to by Holy Writ. For we cannot call it resurrection unless the soul return to the same body, + since resurrection is a second rising, and the same thing rises that falls: wherefore resurrection regards the body which + after death falls rather than the soul which after death lives. And consequently if it be not the same body which the soul + resumes, it will not be a resurrection, but rather the assuming of a new body. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A comparison does not apply to every particular, but to some. For in the sowing of grain, the grain sown and the grain that + is born thereof are neither identical, nor of the same condition, since it was first sown without a husk, yet is born with + one: and the body will rise again identically the same, but of a different condition, since it was mortal and will rise in + immortality. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The soul rising again and the soul living in this world differ, not in essence but in respect of glory and misery, which + is an accidental difference. Hence it follows that the body in rising again differs, not in identity, but in condition, so + that a difference of bodies corresponds proportionally to the difference of souls. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which is understood as though it were in matter before its form remains in matter after corruption, because when that + which comes afterwards is removed that which came before may yet remain. Now, as the Commentator observes on the First Book + of Physics and in De Substantia Orbis, in the matter of things subject to generation and corruption, we must presuppose undeterminate + dimensions, by reason of which matter is divisible, so as to be able to + receive various forms in its various parts. Wherefore after the separation of the substantial form from matter, these dimensions + still remain the same: and consequently the matter existing under those dimensions, whatever form it receive, is more identified + with that which was generated from it, than any other part of matter existing under any form whatever. Thus the matter that + will be brought back to restore the human body will be the same as that body's previous matter. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even as a simple quality is not the substantial form of an element, but its proper accident, and the disposition whereby + its matter is rendered proper to such a form; so the form of a mixed body, which form is a quality resulting from simple qualities + reduced to a mean, is not the substantial form of the mixed body, but its proper accident, and the disposition whereby the + matter is in need of the form. Now the human body has no substantial form + besides this form of the mixed body, except the rational soul, for if it had any previous substantial form, this would give + it substantial being, and would establish it in the genus of substance: so that the soul would be united to a body already + established in the genus of substance, and thus the soul would be compared to the body as artificial forms are to their matter, + in respect of their being established in the genus of substance by their matter. Hence the union of the soul to the body + would be accidental, which is the error of the ancient philosophers refuted by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 2 [*Cf. + <a id="XP_Q79_A1-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A1.html">FP, Q[76], A[1]</a>]). It would also follow that the human body and each of its parts would not retain their former names in the same sense, + which is contrary to the teaching of the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1). Therefore since the rational soul remains, no substantial + form of the human body falls away into complete nonentity. And the variation of accidental + forms does not make a difference of identity. Therefore the selfsame body will rise again, since the selfsame matter is resumed + as stated in a previous reply (ad 2). + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A1-p15"></p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A1-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q79.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q79_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q79_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q79_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q79_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q79_A2-p0.1">Whether it will be identically the same man that shall rise again?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q79_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it will not be identically the same man that shall rise again. For according to the Philosopher (De Gener. + ii): "Whatsoever things are changed in their corruptible substance are not repeated identically." Now such is man's substance + in his present state. Therefore after the change wrought by death the self-same man cannot be repeated . + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, where there is a distinction of human nature there is not the same identical man: wherefore Socrates and Plato are + two men and not one man, since each has his own distinct human nature. Now the human nature of one who rises again is distinct + from that which he has now. Therefore he is not the same identical man. The minor can be proved in two ways. First, because + human nature which is the form of the whole is not both form and substance as the soul + is, but is a form only. Now such like forms pass away into complete nonentity, and consequently they cannot be restored. Secondly, + because human nature results from union of parts. Now the same identical union as that which was heretofore cannot be resumed, + because repetition is opposed to identity, since repetition implies number, whereas identity implies unity, and these are + incompatible with one another. But resurrection is a repeated union: therefore the union is not the same, and + consequently there is not the same human nature nor the same man. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one same man is not several animals: wherefore if it is not the same animal it is not the same identical man. Now + where sense is not the same, there is not the same animal, since animal is defined from the primary sense, namely touch. But + sense, as it does not remain in the separated soul (as some maintain), cannot be resumed in identity. Therefore the man who + rises again will not be the same identical animal, and consequently he will not be the same + man. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the matter of a statue ranks higher in the statue than the matter of a man does in man: because artificial things + belong to the genus of substance by reason of their matter, but natural things by reason of their form, as appears from the + Philosopher (Phys. ii, 1), and again from the Commentator (De Anima ii). But if a statue is remade from the same brass, it + will not be the same identically. Therefore much less will it be identically the same man if + he be reformed from the same ashes. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q79_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Job.19.27" target="asv">Job 19:27</a>): "Whom I myself shall see . . . and not another," and he is speaking of the vision after the resurrection. Therefore the + same identical man will rise again. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A2-p7"> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 5) that "to rise again is naught else but to live again." Now unless the same identical + man that died return to life, he would not be said to live again. Therefore he would not rise again, which is contrary to + faith. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A2-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The necessity of holding the resurrection arises from this---that man may obtain the last end for which he was made; for + this cannot be accomplished in this life, nor in the life of the separated soul, as stated above ( + <a id="XP_Q79_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q75_A1.html">Q[75], AA[1]</a>,2): otherwise man would have been made in vain, if he were unable to obtain the end for which he was made. And since it behooves + the end to be obtained by the selfsame thing that was made for that end, + lest it appear to be made without purpose, it is necessary for the selfsame man to rise again; and this is effected by the + selfsame soul being united to the selfsame body. For otherwise there would be no resurrection properly speaking, if the same + man were not reformed. Hence to maintain that he who rises again is not the selfsame man is heretical, since it is contrary + to the truth of Scripture which proclaims the resurrection. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking of repetition by movement or natural change. For he shows the difference between the recurrence + that occurs in generation and corruption and that which is observed in the movement of the heavens. Because the selfsame heaven + by local movement returns to the beginning of its movement, since it has a moved incorruptible substance. On the other hand, + things subject to generation and corruption return by generation to specific + but not numerical identity, because from man blood is engendered, from blood seed, and so on until a man is begotten, not + the selfsame man, but the man specifically. In like manner from fire comes air, from air water, from water earth, whence fire + is produced, not the selfsame fire, but the same in species. Hence it is clear that the argument, so far as the meaning of + the Philosopher is concerned, is not to the point. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A2-p10"> We may also reply that the form of other things subject to generation and corruption is not subsistent of itself, so as to + be able to remain after the corruption of the composite, as it is with the rational soul. For the soul, even after separation + from the body, retains the being which accrues to it when in the body, and the body is made to share that being by the resurrection, + since the being of the body and the being of the soul in the body are not distinct from one another, + otherwise the union of soul and body would be accidental. Consequently there has been no interruption in the substantial being + of man, as would make it impossible for the self-same man to return on account of an interruption in his being, as is the + case with other things that are corrupted, the being of which is interrupted altogether, since their form remains not, and + their matter remains under another being. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A2-p11"> Nevertheless neither does the self-same man recur by natural generation, because the body of the man begotten is not composed + of the whole body of his begetter: hence his body is numerically distinct, and consequently his soul and the whole man. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There are two opinions about humanity and about any form of a whole. For some say that the form of the whole and the form + of the part are really one and the same: but that it is called the form of the part inasmuch as it perfects the matter, and + the form of the whole inasmuch as the whole specific nature results therefrom. According to this opinion humanity is really + nothing else than the rational soul: and so, since the selfsame rational soul is + resumed, there will be the same identical humanity, which will remain even after death, albeit not under the aspect of humanity, + because the composite does not derive the specific nature from a separated humanity. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A2-p13"> The other opinion, which seems nearer the truth, is Avicenna's, according to whom the form of the whole is not the form of + a part only, nor some other form besides the form of the part, but is the whole resulting from the composition of form and + matter, embracing both within itself. This form of the whole is called the essence or quiddity. Since then at the resurrection + there will be the selfsame body, and the selfsame rational soul, there will be, of necessity, the same + humanity. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A2-p14"> The first argument proving that there will be a distinction of humanity was based on the supposition that humanity is some + distinct form supervening form and matter; which is false. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A2-p15"> The second reason does not disprove the identity of humanity, because union implies action or passion, and though there be + a different union, this cannot prevent the identity of humanity, because the action and passion from which humanity resulted + are not of the essence of humanity, wherefore a distinction on their part does not involve a distinction of humanity: for + it is clear that generation and resurrection are not the self-same movement. Yet the identity of the rising man + with the begotten man is not hindered for this reason: and in like manner neither is the identity of humanity prevented if + we take union for the relation itself: because this relation is not essential to but concomitant with humanity, since humanity + is not one of those forms that are composition or order (Phys. ii, 1), as are the forms of things produced by art, so that + if there be another distinct composition there is another distinct form of a house. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A2-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument affords a very good proof against those who held a distinction between the sensitive and rational souls in + man: because in that case the sensitive soul in man would not be incorruptible, as neither is it in other animals; and consequently + in the resurrection there would not be the same sensitive soul, and consequently neither the same animal nor the same man. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A2-p17"> But if we assert that in man the same soul is by its substance both rational and sensitive, we shall encounter no difficulty + in this question, because animal is defined from sense, i.e. the sensitive soul as from its essential form: whereas from sense, + i.e. the sensitive power, we know its definition as from an accidental form "that contributes more than another to our knowledge + of the quiddity" (De Anima i, 1). Accordingly after death there remains the sensitive soul, even as + the rational soul, according to its substance: whereas the sensitive powers, according to some, do not remain. And since these + powers are accidental properties, diversity on their part cannot prevent the identity of the whole animal, not even of the + animal's parts: nor are powers to be called perfections or acts of organs unless as principles of action, as heat in fire. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A2-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A statue may be considered in two ways, either as a particular substance, or as something artificial. And since it is placed + in the genus of substance by reason of its matter, it follows that if we consider it as a particular substance, it is the + selfsame statue that is remade from the same matter. On the other hand, it is placed in the genus of artificial things inasmuch + as it has an accidental form which, if the statue be destroyed, passes away + also. Consequently it does not return identically the same, nor can the statue be identically the same. But man's form, namely + the soul, remains after the body has perished: wherefore the comparison fails. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A2-p19"></p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A2-p20"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q79_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q79_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q79_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q79_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q80.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q79_A3-p0.1">Whether the ashes of the human body must needs, by the resurrection, return to the same parts of the body that were dissolved + into them? + </h4> + <p id="XP_Q79_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem necessary for the ashes of the human body to return, by the resurrection, to the same parts that were dissolved + into them. For, according to the Philosopher, "as the whole soul is to the whole body, so is a part of the soul to a part + of the body, as sight to the pupil" (De Anima ii, 1). Now it is necessary that after the resurrection the body be resumed + by the same soul. Therefore it is also necessary for the same parts of the body to return to + the same limbs, in which they were perfected by the same parts of the soul. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, difference of matter causes difference of identity. But if the ashes return not to the same parts, each part will + not be remade from the same matter of which it consisted before. Therefore they will not be the same identically. Now if the + parts are different the whole will also be different, since parts are to the whole as matter is to form (Phys. ii, 3). Therefore + it will not be the self-same man; which is contrary to the truth of the + resurrection. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the resurrection is directed to the end that man may receive the meed of his works. Now different parts of the body + are employed in different works, whether of merit or of demerit. Therefore at the resurrection each part must needs return + to its former state that it may be rewarded in due measure. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Artificial things are more dependent on their matter than natural things. Now in artificial things, in order that the same + artificial thing be remade, from the same matter, there is no need for the parts to be brought back to the same position. + Neither therefore is it necessary in man. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A3-p6"> Further, change of an accident does not cause a change of identity. Now the situation of parts is an accident. Therefore + its change in a man does not cause a change of identity. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In this question it makes a difference whether we ask what can be done without prejudice to identity, and what will be done + for the sake of congruity. As regards the first it must be observed that in man we may speak of parts in two ways: first as + of the various parts of a homogeneous whole, for instance the various parts of flesh, or the various parts of bone; secondly, + as of various parts of various species of a heterogeneous whole, for instance bone and + flesh. Accordingly if it be said that one part of matter will return to another part of the same species, this causes no change + except in the position of the parts: and change of position of parts does not change the species in homogeneous wholes: and + so if the matter of one part return to another part, this is nowise prejudicial to the identity of the whole. Thus is it in + the example given in the text (Sent. iv, D, 44), because a statue, after being remade, is identically the same, not as to + its form, but as to its matter, in respect of which it is a particular substance, and in this way a statue is homogeneous, + although it is not according to its artificial form. But if it be said that the matter of one part returns to another part + of another species, it follows of necessity that there is a change not only in the position of parts, but also in their identity: + yet so that the whole matter, or something belonging to the truth of human nature in one is transferred to another. but not + if what was superfluous in one part is transferred to another. Now the identity of parts being taken away, the identity of + the whole is removed, if we speak of essential parts, but not if we speak of accidental parts, such as hair and nails, to + which apparently Augustine refers (De Civ. Dei xxii). It is thus clear how the transference of matter from one part of another + destroys the identity, and how it does not. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A3-p8"> But speaking of the congruity, it is more probable that even the parts will retain their position at the resurrection, especially + as regards the essential and organic parts, although perhaps not as regards the accidental parts, such as nails and hair. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers organic or heterogeneous parts, but no homogeneous or like parts. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A change in the position of the parts of matter does not cause a change of identity, although difference of matter does. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Operation, properly speaking, is not ascribed to the part but to the whole, wherefore the reward is due, not to the part + but to the whole. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="XP_Q79_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q79_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q80.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.XP_Q78_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q79_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q80" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q79_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q80_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="XP_Q80-p0.1">OF THE INTEGRITY OF THE BODIES IN THE RESURRECTION (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="XP_Q80-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q80-p2"> We must next consider the integrity of the bodies in the resurrection. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="XP_Q80-p3"> (1) Whether all the members of the human body will rise again therein?</p> + <p id="XP_Q80-p4"> (2) Whether the hair and nails will?</p> + <p id="XP_Q80-p5"> (3) Whether the humors will?</p> + <p id="XP_Q80-p6"> (4) Whether whatever the body contained belonging to the truth of human nature will rise again?</p> + <p id="XP_Q80-p7"> (5) Whether whatever it contained materially will rise again?</p> + <div id="XP_Q80_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q80.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q80_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q80_A1-p0.1">Whether all the members of the human body will rise again?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q80_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all the members of the human body will rise again. For if the end be done away it is useless to repair + the means. Now the end of each member is its act. Since then nothing useless is done in the Divine works, and since the use + of certain members is not fitting to man after the resurrection, especially the use of the genital members, for then they + "shall neither marry, nor be married" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q80_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv">Mat. 22:30</a>), it would seem that + not all the members shall rise again. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the entrails are members: and yet they will not rise again. For they can neither rise full, since thus they contain + impurities, nor empty, since nothing is empty in nature. Therefore the members shall not all rise again. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the body shall rise again that it may be rewarded for the works which the soul did through it. Now the member of + which a thief has been deprived for theft, and who has afterwards done penance and is saved, cannot be rewarded at the resurrection, + neither for any good deed, since it has not co-operated in any, nor for evil deeds, since the punishment of the member would + redound to the punishment of man. Therefore the members will not all rise again. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The other members belong more to the truth of human nature than hair and nails. Yet these will be restored to man at the + resurrection according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 4). Much more therefore does this apply to the other members. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A1-p6"> Further, "The works of God are perfect" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q80_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.32.4" target="asv">Dt. 32:4</a>). But the resurrection will be the work of God. Therefore man will be remade perfect in all his members. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in De Anima ii, 4, "the soul stands in relation to the body not only as its form and end, but also as efficient + cause." For the soul is compared to the body as art to the thing made by art, as the Philosopher says (De Anim. Gener. ii, + 4), and whatever is shown forth explicitly in the product of art is all contained implicitly and originally in the art. In + like manner whatever appears in the parts of the body is all contained originally and, in a + way, implicitly in the soul. Thus just as the work of an art would not be perfect, if its product lacked any of the things + contained in the art, so neither could man be perfect, unless the whole that is contained enfolded in the soul be outwardly + unfolded in the body, nor would the body correspond in full proportion to the soul. Since then at the resurrection it behooves + man's body to correspond entirely to the soul, for it will not rise again except according to the relation it bears to the + rational soul, it follows that man also must rise again perfect, seeing that he is thereby repaired in order that he may obtain + his ultimate perfection. Consequently all the members that are now in man's body must needs be restored at the resurrection. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The members may be considered in two ways in relation to the soul: either according to the relation of matter to form, or + according to the relation of instrument to agent, since "the whole body is compared to the whole soul in the same way as one + part is to another" (De Anima ii, 1). If then the members be considered in the light of the first relationship, their end + is not operation, but rather the perfect being of the species, and this is also + required after the resurrection: but if they be considered in the light of the second relationship, then their end is operation. + And yet it does not follow that when the operation fails the instrument is useless, because an instrument serves not only + to accomplish the operation of the agent, but also to show its virtue. Hence it will be necessary for the virtue of the soul's + powers to be shown in their bodily instruments, even though they never proceed to action, so that the wisdom of God be + thereby glorified. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The entrails will rise again in the body even as the other members: and they will be filled not with vile superfluities but + with goodly humors. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The acts whereby we merit are not the acts, properly speaking, of hand or foot but of the whole man; even as the work of + art is ascribed not to the instrument but to the craftsman. Therefore though the member which was cut off before a man's repentance + did not co-operate with him in the state wherein he merits glory, yet man himself merits that the whole man may be rewarded, + who with his whole being serves God. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q80.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q80_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q80_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q80_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q80_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q80_A2-p0.1">Whether the hair and nails will rise again in the human body?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q80_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the hair and nails will not rise again in the human body. For just as hair and nails result from the surplus + of food, so do urine, sweat and other superfluities or dregs. But these will not rise again with the body. Neither therefore + will hair and nails. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, of all the superfluities that are produced from food, seed comes nearest to the truth of human nature, since though + superfluous it is needed. Yet seed will not rise again in the human body. Much less therefore will hair and nails. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing is perfected by a rational soul that is not perfected by a sensitive soul. But hair and nails are not perfected + by a sensitive soul, for "we do not feel with them" (De Anima i, 5; iii, 13). Therefore since the human body rises not again + except because it is perfected by a rational soul, it would seem that the hair and nails will not rise again. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q80_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.21.18" target="asv">Lk. 21:18</a>): "A hair of your head shall not perish." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A2-p6"> Further, hair and nails were given to man as an ornament. Now the bodies of men, especially of the elect, ought to rise again + with all their adornment. Therefore they ought to rise again with the hair. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The soul is to the animated body, as art is to the work of art, and is to the parts of the body as art to its instruments: + wherefore an animated body is called an organic body. Now art employs certain instruments for the accomplishment of the work + intended, and these instruments belong to the primary intention of art: and it also uses other instruments for the safe-keeping + of the principal instruments, and these belong to the secondary intention of art: thus + the art of warfare employs a sword for fighting, and a sheath for the safe-keeping of the sword. And so among the parts of + an animated body, some are directed to the accomplishment of the souls' operations, for instance the heart, liver, hand, foot; + while others are directed to the safe-keeping of the other parts as leaves to cover fruit; and thus hair and nails are in + man for the protection of other parts. Consequently, although they do not belong to the primary perfection of the human body, + they belong to the secondary perfection: and since man will rise again with all the perfections of his nature, it follows + that hair and nails will rise again in him. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those superfluities are voided by nature, as being useful for nothing. Hence they do not belong to the perfection of the + human body. It is not so with the superfluities which nature reserves for the production of hair and nails which she needs + for the protection of the members. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Seed is not required for the perfection of the individual, as hair and nails are, but only for the protection of the species. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hair and nails are nourished and grow, and so it is clear that they share in some operation, which would not be possible + unless they were parts in some way perfected by the soul. And since in man there is but one soul, namely the rational soul, + it is clear that they are perfected by the rational soul, although not so far as to share in the operation of sense, as neither + do bones, and yet it is certain that these will rise again and that they belong to + the integrity of the individual. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q80_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q80_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q80_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q80_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q80_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q80_A3-p0.1">Whether the humors will rise again in the body?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q80_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the humors will not rise again in the body. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q80_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.50" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:50</a>): "Flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom of God." Now blood is the chief humor. Therefore it will not rise again in + the blessed, who will possess the kingdom of God, and much less in others. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, humors are intended to make up for the waste. Now after the resurrection there will be no waste. Therefore the body + will not rise again with humors. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is in process of generation in the human body is not yet perfected by the rational soul. Now the humors + are still in process of generation because they are potentially flesh and bone. Therefore they are not yet perfected by the + rational soul. Now the human body is not directed to the resurrection except in so far as it is perfected by the rational + soul. Therefore the humors will not rise again. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever enters into the constitution of the human body will rise again with it. Now this applies to the humors, as appears + from the statement of Augustine (De Spir. et Anima xv) that "the body consists of functional members; the functional members + of homogeneous parts; and the homogeneous parts of humors." Therefore the humors will rise again in the body. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A3-p6"> Further, our resurrection will be conformed to the resurrection of Christ. Now in Christ's resurrection His blood rose again, + else the wine would not now be changed into His blood in the Sacrament of the altar. Therefore the blood will rise again in + us also, and in like manner the other humors. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Whatever belongs to the integrity of human nature in those who take part in the resurrection will rise again, as stated above + ( + <a id="XP_Q80_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q80_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2). Hence whatever humidity of the body belongs to the integrity of human nature must needs rise again in man. Now there + is a threefold humidity in man. There is one which occurs as receding from the perfection of the individual---either because + it is on the way to corruption, and is voided by nature, + for instance urine, sweat, matter, and so forth---or because it is directed by nature to the preservation of the species in + some individual, either by the act of the generative power, as seed, or by the act of the nutritive power, as milk. None of + these humidities will rise again, because they do not belong to the perfection of the person rising again. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A3-p8"> The second kind of humidity is one that has not yet reached its ultimate perfection, which nature achieves in the individual, + yet it is directed thereto by nature: and this is of two kinds. For there is one kind that has a definite form and is contained + among the parts of the body, for instance the blood and the other humors which nature has directed to the members that are + produced or nourished therefrom: and yet they have certain definite forms like the other parts of the + body, and consequently will rise again with the other parts of the body: while another kind of humidity is in transition from + form to form, namely from the form of humor to the form of member. Humidities of this kind will not rise again, because after + the resurrection each part of the body will be established in its form, so that one will not pass into another. Wherefore + this humidity that is actually in transition from one form to another will not rise again. Now this humidity may be + considered in a twofold state---either as being at the beginning of its transformation, and thus it is called "ros," namely + the humidity that is found in the cavities of the smaller veins---or as in the course of transformation and already beginning + to undergo alteration, and thus it is called "cambium": but in neither state will it rise again. The third kind of humidity + is that which has already reached its ultimate perfection that nature intends in the body of the individual, and has already + undergone transformation and become incorporate with the members. This is called "gluten," and since it belongs to the members + it will rise again just as the members will. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In these words of the Apostle flesh and blood do not denote the substance of flesh and blood but deeds of flesh and blood, + which are either deeds of sin or the operations of the animal life. Or we may say with Augustine in his letter to Consentius + (Ep. cxlvi) that "flesh and blood here signify the corruption which is now predominant in flesh and blood"; wherefore the + Apostle's words continue: "Neither shall corruption possess incorruption." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as the members that serve for generation will be after the resurrection for the integrity of human nature, and not for + the operation accomplished now by them, so will the humors be in the body not to make up for waste, but to restore the integrity + of human nature and to show forth its natural power. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as the elements are in the course of generation in relation to mixed bodies, because they are their matter, yet not + so as to be always in transition when in the mixed body, so too are the humors in relation to the members. And for this reason + as the elements in the parts of the universe have definite forms, by reason of which they, like mixed bodies, belong to the + perfection of the universe, so too the humors belong to the perfection of the human + body, just as the other parts do, although they do not reach its entire perfection, as the other parts do, and although the + elements have not perfect forms as mixed bodies have. But as all the parts of the universe receive their perfection from God, + not equally, but each one according to its mode, so too the humors are in some way perfected by the rational soul, yet not + in the same measure as the more perfect parts. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q80_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q80_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q80_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q80_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q80_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q80_A4-p0.1">Whether whatever in the body belonged to the truth of human nature will rise again in it?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q80_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that what was in the body, belonging to the truth of human nature, will not all rise again in it. For food + is changed into the truth of human nature. Now sometimes the flesh of the ox or of other animals is taken as food. Therefore + if whatever belonged to the truth of human nature will rise again, the flesh of the ox or of other animals will also rise + again: which is inadmissible. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Adam's rib belonged to the truth of human nature in him, as ours does in us. But Adam's rib will rise again not + in Adam but in Eve, else Eve would not rise again at all since she was made from that rib. Therefore whatever belonged in + man to the truth of human nature will not all rise again in him. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is impossible for the same thing from different men to rise again. Yet it is possible for something in different + men to belong to the truth of human nature, for instance if a man were to partake of human flesh which would be changed into + his substance. Therefore there will not rise again in man whatever belonged in him to the truth of human nature. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if it be said that not all the flesh partaken of belongs to the truth of human nature and that consequently some + of it may possibly rise again in the one man and some in the other---on the contrary: That which is derived from one's parents + would especially seem to belong to the truth of human nature. But if one who partook of nothing but human flesh were to beget + children that which his child derives from him must needs be of the flesh of other men + partaken of by his father, since the seed is from the surplus of food, as the Philosopher proves (De Gen. Animal. i). Therefore + what belongs to the truth of human nature in that child belonged also to the truth of human nature in other men of whose flesh + his father had partaken. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if it be said that what was changed into seed was not that which belong to the truth of human nature in the flesh + of the men eaten, but something not belonging to the truth of human nature---on the contrary: Let us suppose that some one + is fed entirely on embryos in which seemingly there is nothing but what belongs to the truth of human nature since whatever + is in them is derived from the parents. If then the surplus food be changed into seed, that + which belonged to the truth of human nature in the embryos---and after these have received a rational soul, the resurrection + applies to them---must needs belong to the truth of human nature in the child begotten of that seed. And thus, since the same + cannot rise again in two subjects, it will be impossible for whatever belonged to the truth of human nature in both to rise + again in both of them. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A4-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever belonged to the truth of human nature was perfected by the rational soul. Now it is through being perfected by the + rational soul that the human body is directed to the resurrection. Therefore whatever belonged to the truth of human nature + will rise again in each one. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A4-p8"> Further, if anything belonging to the truth of human nature in a man be taken from his body, this will not be the perfect + body of a man. Now all imperfection of a man will be removed at the resurrection, especially in the elect, to whom it was + promised ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q80_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.21.18" target="asv">Lk. 21:18</a>) that not a hair of their head should perish. Therefore whatever belonged to the truth of human nature in a man will rise + again in him. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A4-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> "Everything is related to truth in the same way as to being" (Metaph. ii), because a thing is true when it is as it appears + to him who actually knows it. For this reason Avicenna (Metaph. ii) says that "the truth of anything is a property of the + being immutably attached thereto." Accordingly a thing is said to belong to the truth of human nature, because it belongs + properly to the being of human nature, and this is what shares the form of human nature, just + as true gold is what has the true form of gold whence gold derives its proper being. In order therefore to see what it is + that belongs to the truth of human nature, we must observe that there have been three opinions on the question. For some have + maintained that nothing begins anew to belong to the truth of human nature and that whatever belongs to the truth of human + nature, all of it belonged to the truth of human nature when this was created; and that this multiplies by itself, so that + it is + possible for the seed whereof the child is begotten to be detached therefrom by the begetter, and that again the detached + part multiplies in the child, so that he reaches perfect quantity by growth, and so on, and that thus was the whole human + race multiplied. Wherefore according to this opinion, whatever is produced by nourishment. although it seem to have the appearance + of flesh and blood, does not belong to the truth of human nature. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A4-p10"> Others held that something new is added to the truth of human nature by the natural transformation of the food into the human + body, if we consider the truth of human nature in the species to the preservation of which the act of the generative power + is directed: but that if we consider the truth of human nature in the individual, to the preservation and perfection of which + the act of the nutritive power is directed, that which is added by food belongs to the truth of the human + nature of the individual, not primarily but secondarily. For they assert that the truth of human nature, first and foremost, + consists in the radical humor, that namely which is begotten of the seed of which the human race was originally fashioned: + and that what is changed from food into true flesh and blood does not belong principally to the truth of human nature in this + particular individual, but secondarily: and that nevertheless this can belong principally to the truth of human nature in + another individual who is begotten of the seed of the former. For they assert that seed is the surplus from food, either mingled + with something belonging principally to the truth of human nature in the begetter, according to some, or without any such + admixture, as others maintain. And thus the nutrimental humor in one becomes the radical humor in another. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A4-p11"> The third opinion is that something new begins to belong principally to the truth of human nature even in this individual, + because distinction in the human body does not require that any signate material part must needs remain throughout the whole + lifetime; any signate part one may take is indifferent to this, whereas it remains always as regards what belongs to the species + in it, albeit as regards what is material therein it may ebb and flow. And thus the nutrimental humor is + not distinct from the radical on the part of its principle (so that it be called radical when begotten of the seed, and nutrimental + when produced by the food), but rather on the part of the term, so that it be called radical when it reaches the term of generation + by the act of the generative, or even nutritive power, but nutrimental, when it has not yet reached this term, but is still + on the way to give nourishment. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A4-p12"> These three opinions have been more fully exposed and examined in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 30); wherefore there is no + need for repetition here, except in so far as the question at issue is concerned. It must accordingly be observed that this + question requires different answers according to these opinions. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A4-p13"> For the first opinion on account of its explanation of the process of multiplication is able to admit perfection of the truth + of human nature, both as regards the number of individuals and as regards the due quantity of each individual, without taking + into account that which is produced from food; for this is not added except for the purpose of resisting the destruction that + might result from the action of natural heat, as lead is added to silver lest it be destroyed in melting. + Wherefore since at the resurrection it behooves human nature to be restored to its perfection, nor does the natural heat tend + to destroy the natural humor, there will be no need for anything resulting from food to rise again in man, but that alone + will rise again which belonged to the truth of the human nature of the individual, and this reaches the aforesaid perfection + in number and quantity by being detached and multiplied. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A4-p14"> The second opinion, since it maintains that what is produced from food is needed for the perfection of quantity in the individual + and for the multiplication that results from generation, must needs admit that something of this product from food shall rise + again: not all, however, but only so much as is required for the perfect restoration of human nature in all its individuals. + Hence this opinion asserts that all that was in the substance of the seed will rise again in this man + who was begotten of this seed; because this belongs chiefly to the truth of human nature in him: while of that which afterwards + he derives from nourishment, only so much will rise again in him as is needed for the perfection of his quantity; and not + all, because this does not belong to the perfection of human nature, except in so far as nature requires it for the perfection + of quantity. Since however this nutrimental humor is subject to ebb and flow the restoration will be effected in this + order, that what first belonged to the substance of a man's body, will all be restored, and of that which was added secondly, + thirdly, and so on, as much as is required to restore quantity. This is proved by two reasons. First, because that which was + added was intended to restore what was wasted at first, and thus it does not belong principally to the truth of human nature + to the same extent as that which came first. Secondly, because the addition of extraneous humor to the first radical humors + results in the whole mixture not sharing the truth of the specific nature as perfectly as the first did: and the Philosopher + instances as an example (De Gener. i) the mixing of water with wine, which always weakens the strength of the wine, so that + in the end the wine becomes watery: so that although the second water be drawn into the species of wine, it does not share + the species of wine as perfectly as the first water added to the wine. Even so that which is secondly changed from food into + flesh does not so perfectly attain to the species of flesh as that which was changed first, and consequently does not belong + in the same degree to the truth of human nature nor to the resurrection. Accordingly it is clear that this opinion maintains + that the whole of what belongs to the truth of human nature principally will rise again, but not the whole of what belongs + to the truth of human nature secondarily. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A4-p15"> The third opinion differs somewhat from the second and in some respects agrees with it. It differs in that it maintains that + whatever is under the form of flesh and bone all belongs to the truth of human nature, because this opinion does not distinguish + as remaining in man during his whole lifetime any signate matter that belongs essentially and primarily to the truth of human + nature, besides something ebbing and flowing, that belongs. to the truth of human nature merely on + account of the perfection of quantity, and not on account of the primary being of the species, as the second opinion asserted. + But it states that all the parts that are not beside the intention of the nature generated belong to the truth of human nature, + as regards what they have of the species, since thus they remain; but not as regards what they have of matter, since thus + they are indifferent to ebb and flow: so that we are to understand that the same thing happens in the parts of one man as + in the whole population of a city, for each individual is cut off from the population by death, while others take their place: + wherefore the parts of the people flow back and forth materially, but remain formally, since these others occupy the very + same offices and positions from which the former were withdrawn, so that the commonwealth is said to remain the selfsame. + In like manner, while certain parts are on the ebb and others are being restored to the same shape and position, all the parts + flow back and forth as to their matter, but remain as to their species; and nevertheless the selfsame man remains. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A4-p16"> On the other hand, The third opinion agrees with the second, because it holds that the parts which come secondly do not reach + the perfection of the species so perfectly as those which come first: and consequently the third opinion asserts that the + same thing rises again in man as the second opinion maintains, but not for quite the same reason. For it holds that the whole + of what is produced from the seed will rise again, not because it belongs to the truth of human nature + otherwise than that which comes after, but because it shares the truth of human nature more perfectly: which same order the + second opinion applied to those things that are produced afterwards from food, in which point also these two opinions agree. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A4-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A natural thing is what it is, not from its matter but from its form; wherefore, although that part of matter which at one + time was under the form of bovine flesh rises again in man under the form of human flesh, it does not follow that the flesh + of an ox rises again, but the flesh of a man: else one might conclude that the clay from which Adam's body was fashioned shall + rise again. The second opinion, however, grants this argument. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A4-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That rib did not belong to the perfection of the individual in Adam, but was directed to the multiplication of the species. + Hence it will rise again not in Adam but in Eve, just as the seed will rise again, not in the begetter, but in the begotten. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A4-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to the first opinion it is easy to reply to this argument, because the flesh that is eaten never belonged to the + truth of human nature in the eater, but it did belong to the truth of human nature in him whose flesh was eaten: and thus + it will rise again in the latter but not in the former. according to the second and third opinions, each one will rise again + in that wherein he approached nearest to the perfect participation of the virtue of + the species, and if he approached equally in both, he will rise again in that wherein he was first, because in that he first + was directed to the resurrection by union with the rational soul of that man. Hence if there were any surplus in the flesh + eaten, not belonging to the truth of human nature in the first man, it will be possible for it to rise again in the second: + otherwise what belonged to the resurrection in the first will rise again in him and not in the second; but in the second its + place is taken either by something of that which was the product from other food, or if he never partook of any other food + than human flesh, the substitution is made by Divine power so far as the perfection of quantity requires, as it does in those + who die before the perfect age. Nor does this derogate from numerical identity, as neither does the ebb and flow of parts. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A4-p20"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> According to the first opinion this argument is easily answered. For that opinion asserts that the seed is not from the surplus + food: so that the flesh eaten is not changed into the seed whereof the child is begotten. But according to the other two opinions + we must reply that it is impossible for the whole of the flesh eaten to be changed into seed, because it is after much separation + that the seed is distilled from the food, since seed is the + ultimate surplus of food. That part of the eaten flesh which is changed into seed belongs to the truth of human nature in + the one born of the seed more than in the one of whose flesh the seed was the product. Hence according to the rule already + laid down (ad 3), whatever was changed into the seed will rise again in the person born of the seed; while the remaining matter + will rise again in him of whose flesh the seed was the product. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A4-p21"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The embryo is not concerned with the resurrection before it is animated by a rational soul, in which state much has been + added to the seminal substance from the substance of food, since the child is nourished in the mother's womb. Consequently + on the supposition that a man partook of such food, and that some one were begotten of the surplus thereof, that which was + in the seminal substance will indeed rise again in the one begotten of that seed; unless + it contain something that would have belonged to the seminal substance in those from whose flesh being eaten the seed was + produced, for this would rise again in the first but not in the second. The remainder of the eaten flesh, not being changed + into seed, will clearly rise again in the first the Divine power supplying deficiencies in both. The first opinion is not + troubled by this objection, since it does not hold the seed to be from the surplus food: but there are many other reasons + against + it as may be seen in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 30; + <a id="XP_Q80_A4-p21.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q119_A2.html">FP, Q[119], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A4-p22"></p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A4-p23"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q80_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q80_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q80_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q80_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q81.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q80_A5-p0.1">Whether whatever was materially in a man's members will all rise again?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q80_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that whatever was materially in a man's members will all rise again. For the hair, seemingly, is less concerned + in the resurrection than the other members. Yet whatever was in the hair will all rise again, if not in the hair, at least + in other parts of the body, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii) quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 44). Much more therefore + whatever was materially in the other members will all rise again. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as the parts of the flesh are perfected as to species by the rational soul, so are the parts as to matter. + But the human body is directed to the resurrection through being perfected by a rational soul. Therefore not only the parts + of species but also the parts of matter will all rise again. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the body derives its totality from the same cause as it derives its divisibility into parts. But division into parts + belongs to a body in respect of matter the disposition of which is quantity in respect of which it is divided. Therefore totality + is ascribed to the body in respect of its parts of matter. If then all the parts of matter rise not again, neither will the + whole body rise again: which is inadmissible. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The parts of matter are not permanent in the body but ebb and flow, as stated in De Gener. i. If, therefore, all the parts + of matter, which remain not but ebb and flow, rise again, either the body of one who rises again will be very dense, or it + will be immoderate in quantity. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A5-p6"> Further, whatever belongs to the truth of human nature in one man can all be a part of matter in another man, if the latter + were to partake of his flesh. Therefore if all the parts of matter in one man were to rise again it follows that in one man + there will rise again that which belongs to the truth of human nature in another: which is absurd. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> What is in man materially, is not directed to the resurrection, except in so far as it belongs to the truth of human nature; + because it is in this respect that it bears a relation to the human souls. Now all that is in man materially belongs indeed + to the truth of human nature in so far as it has something of the species, but not all, if we consider the totality of matter; + because all the matter that was in a man from the beginning of his life to the end + would surpass the quantity due to his species, as the third opinion states, which opinion seems to me more probable than the + others. Wherefore the whole of what is in man will rise again, if we speak of the totality of the species which is dependent + on quantity, shape, position and order of parts, but the whole will not rise again if we speak of the totality of matter. + The second and first opinions, however, do not make this distinction, but distinguish between parts both of which have the + species and matter. But these two opinions agree in that they both state what is produced from the seed will all rise again + even if we speak of totality of matter: while they differ in this that the first opinion maintains that nothing will rise + again of that which was engendered from food, whereas the second holds that something but not all, thereof will rise again, + as stated above + <a id="XP_Q80_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q80_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as all that is in the other parts of the body will rise again, if we speak of the totality of the species, but not if + we speak of material totality, so is it with the hair. In the other parts something accrues from nourishment which causes + growth, and this is reckoned as another part, if we speak of totality of species, since it occupies another place and position + in the body, and is under other parts of dimension: and there accrues something + which does not cause growth, but serves to make up for waste by nourishing. and this is not reckoned as another part of the + whole considered in relation to the species, since it does not occupy another place or position in the body than that which + was occupied by the part that has passed away: although it may be reckoned another part if we consider the totality of matter. + The same applies to the hair. Augustine, however, is speaking of the cutting of hair that was a part causing growth of the + body; wherefore it must needs rise again, not however as regards the quantity of hair, lest it should be immoderate, but it + will rise again in other parts as deemed expedient by Divine providence. Or else he refers to the case when something will + be lacking to the other parts, for then it will be possible for this to be supplied from the surplus of hair. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to the third opinion parts of species are the same as parts of matter: for the Philosopher does not make this distinction + (De Gener. i) in order to distinguish different parts, but in order to show that the same parts may be considered both in + respect of species, as to what belongs to the form and species in them, and in respect of matter, as to that which is under + the form and species. Now it is clear that the matter of the flesh has no + relation to the rational soul except in so far as it is under such a form, and consequently by reason thereof it is directed + to the resurrection. But the first and second opinions which draw a distinction between parts of species and parts of matter + say that although the rational soul perfects both parts, it does not perfect parts of matter except by means of the parts + of species, wherefore they are not equally directed to the resurrection. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the matter of things subject to generation and corruption it is necessary to presuppose indefinite dimensions before the + reception of the substantial form. Consequently division which is made according to these dimensions belongs properly to matter. + But complete and definite quantity comes to matter after the substantial form; wherefore division that is made in reference + to definite quantity regards the species especially when definite position of + parts belongs to the essence of the species, as in the human body. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A5-p11"></p> + <p id="XP_Q80_A5-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q80_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q81.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.XP_Q79_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q80_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q81" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q80_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q81_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="XP_Q81-p0.1">OF THE QUALITY OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="XP_Q81-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q81-p2"> We must now consider the quality of those who rise again. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="XP_Q81-p3"> (1) Whether all will rise again in the youthful age?</p> + <p id="XP_Q81-p4"> (2) Whether they will be of equal stature?</p> + <p id="XP_Q81-p5"> (3) Whether all will be of the same sex?</p> + <p id="XP_Q81-p6"> (4) Whether they will rise again to the animal life?</p> + <div id="XP_Q81_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q81.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q81_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q81_A1-p0.1">Whether all will rise again of the same age?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q81_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all will not rise again of the same, namely the youthful age. Because God will take nothing pertaining + to man's perfection from those who rise again, especially from the blessed. Now age pertains to the perfection of man, since + old age is the age that demands reverence. Therefore the old will not rise again of a youthful age. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, age is reckoned according to the length of past time. Now it is impossible for past time not to have passed. Therefore + it is impossible for those who were of greater age to be brought back to a youthful age. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which belonged most to the truth of human nature in each individual will especially rise again in him. Now + the sooner a thing was in man the more would it seem to have belonged to the truth of human nature, because in the end, through + the strength of the species being weakened the human body is likened to watery wine according to the Philosopher (De Gener. + i). Therefore if all are to rise again of the same age, it is more fitting that they should + rise again in the age of childhood. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q81_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.13" target="asv">Eph. 4:13</a>): "Until we all meet . . . unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A1-p6"> Now Christ rose again of youthful age, which begins about the age of thirty years, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii). + Therefore others also will rise again of a youthful age. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A1-p7"> Further, man will rise again at the most perfect stage of nature. Now human nature is at the most perfect stage in the age + of youth. Therefore all will rise again of that age. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man will rise again without any defect of human nature, because as God founded human nature without a defect, even so will + He restore it without defect. Now human nature has a twofold defect. First, because it has not yet attained to its ultimate + perfection. Secondly, because it has already gone back from its ultimate perfection. The first defect is found in children, + the second in the aged: and consequently in each of these human nature will be brought by + the resurrection to the state of its ultimate perfection which is in the youthful age, at which the movement of growth terminates, + and from which the movement of decrease begins. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Old age calls for reverence, not on account of the state of the body which is at fault; but on account of the soul's wisdom + which is taken for granted on account of its being advanced in years. Wherefore in the elect there will remain the reverence + due to old age on account of the fulness of Divine wisdom which will be in them, but the defect of old age will not be in + them. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We speak of age not as regards the number of years, but as regards the state which the human body acquires from years. Hence + Adam is said to have been formed in the youthful age on account of the particular condition of body which he had at the first + day of his formation. Thus the argument is not to the point. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The strength of the species is said to be more perfect in a child than in a young man, as regards the ability to transform + nourishment in a certain way, even as it is more perfect in the seed than in the mature man. In youth, however, it is more + perfect as regards the term of completion. Wherefore that which belonged principally to the truth of human nature will be + brought to that perfection which it has in the age of youth, and not to that perfection + which it has in the age of a child, wherein the humors have not yet reached their ultimate disposition. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q81.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q81_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q81_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q81_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q81_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q81_A2-p0.1">Whether all will rise again of the same stature?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q81_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all will rise again of the same stature. For just as man is measured by dimensive quantity, so is he by + the quantity of time. Now the quantity of time will be reduced to the same measure in all, since all will rise again of the + same age. Therefore the dimensive quantity will also be reduced to the same measure in all, so that all will rise again of + the same stature. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "all things in nature have a certain limit end measure of size and growth." + Now this limitation can only arise by virtue of the form, with which the quantity as well as all the other accidents ought + to agree. Therefore since all men have the same specific form, there should be the same measure of quantity in respect of + matter in all, unless an error should occur. But the error of nature will be set right at + the resurrection. Therefore all will rise again of the same stature. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it will be impossible for man in rising again to be of a quantity proportionate to the natural power which first + formed his body; for otherwise those who could not be brought to a greater quantity by the power of nature will never rise + again of a greater quantity, which is false. Therefore that quantity must needs be proportionate to the power which will restore + the human body by the resurrection, and to the matter from which it is restored. Now the + selfsame, namely the Divine, power will restore all bodies; and all the ashes from which the human bodies will be restored + are equally disposed to receive the action of that power. Therefore the resurrection of all men will bring them to the same + quantity: and so the same conclusion follows. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Natural quantity results from each individual's nature. Now the nature of the individual will not be altered at the resurrection. + Therefore neither will its natural quantity. But all are not of the same natural quantity. Therefore all will not rise again + of the same stature. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A2-p6"> Further, human nature will be restored by resurrection unto glory or unto punishment. But there will not be the same quantity + of glory or punishment in all those who rise again. Neither therefore will there be the same quantity of stature. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> At the resurrection human nature will be restored not only in the self-same species but also in the selfsame individual: + and consequently we must observe in the resurrection what is requisite not only to the specific but also to the individual + nature. Now the specific nature has a certain quantity which it neither exceeds nor fails without error, and yet this quantity + has certain degrees of latitude and is not to be attached to one fixed measure; and each + individual in the human species aims at some degree of quantity befitting his individual nature within the bounds of that + latitude, and reaches it at the end of his growth, if there has been no error in the working of nature, resulting in the addition + of something to or the subtraction of something from the aforesaid quantity: the measure whereof is gauged according to the + proportion of heat as expanding, and of humidity as expansive, in point of which all are not of the same power. Therefore + all will not rise again of the same quantity, but each one will rise again of that quantity which would have been his at the + end of his growth if nature had not erred or failed: and the Divine power will subtract or supply what was excessive or lacking + in man. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It has already been explained (A[1], ad 2) that all are said to rise again of the same age, not as though the same length + of time were befitting to each one, but because the same state of perfection will be in all, which state is indifferent to + a great or small quantity. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The quantity of a particular individual corresponds not only to the form of the species, but also to the nature or matter + of the individual: wherefore the conclusion does not follow. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The quantity of those who will be raised from the dead is not proportionate to the restoring power, because the latter does + not belong to the power of the body---nor to the ashes, as to the state in which they are before the resurrection---but to + nature which the individual had at first. Nevertheless if the formative power on account of some defect was unable to effect + the due quantity that is befitting to the species, the Divine power will supply the + defect at the resurrection, as in dwarfs, and in like manner in those who by immoderate size have exceeded the due bounds + of nature. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q81_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q81_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q81_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q81_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q81_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q81_A3-p0.1">Whether all will rise again of the male sex?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q81_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all will rise again of the male sex. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q81_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.13" target="asv">Eph. 4:13</a>) that we shall all meet "unto a perfect man," etc. Therefore there will be none but the male sex. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the world to come all pre-eminence will cease, as a gloss observes on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q81_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.24" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:24.</a> Now woman is subject to man in the natural order. Therefore women will rise again not in the female but in the male sex. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is produced incidentally and beside the intention of nature will not rise again, since all error will + be removed at the resurrection. Now the female sex is produced beside the intention of nature, through a fault in the formative + power of the seed, which is unable to bring the matter of the fetus to the male form: wherefore the Philosopher says (De Anima + xvi, i.e. De Generat. Animal. ii) that "the female is a misbegotten male." Therefore + the female sex will not rise again. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii): "Those are wiser, seemingly, who doubt not that both sexes will rise again." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A3-p6"> Further, at the resurrection God will restore man to what He made him at the creation. Now He made woman from the man's rib + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q81_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.22" target="asv">Gn. 2:22</a>). Therefore He will also restore the female sex at the resurrection. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Just as, considering the nature of the individual, a different quantity is due to different men, so also, considering the + nature of the individual, a different sex is due to different men. Moreover, this same diversity is becoming to the perfection + of the species, the different degrees whereof are filled by this very difference of sex and quantity. Wherefore just as men + will rise again of various stature, so will they rise again of different sex. And though + there be difference of sex there will be no shame in seeing one another, since there will no lust to invite them to shameful + deeds which are the cause of shame. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When it is said: We shall all meet "Christ unto a perfect man," this refers not to the male sex but to the strength of soul + which will be in all, both men and women. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Woman is subject to man on account of the frailty of nature, as regards both vigor of soul and strength of body. After the + resurrection, however, the difference in those points will be not on account of the difference of sex, but by reason of the + difference of merits. Hence the conclusion does not follow. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the begetting of a woman is beside the intention of a particular nature, it is in the intention of universal nature, + which requires both sexes for the perfection of the human species. Nor will any defect result from sex as stated above (ad + 2). + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q81_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q81_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q81_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q81_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q82.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q81_A4-p0.1">Whether all will rise again to animal life so as to exercise the functions of nutrition and generation?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q81_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that they will rise again to the animal life, or in other words that they will make use of the acts of the + nutritive and generative powers. For our resurrection will be conformed to Christ's. But Christ is said to have ate after + His resurrection ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q81_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.21" target="asv">Jn. 21</a>; + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q81_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.24" target="asv">Lk. 24</a>). Therefore, after the resurrection men will eat, and in like manner beget. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the distinction of sexes is directed to generation; and in like manner the instruments which serve the nutritive + power are directed to eating. Now man will rise again with all these. Therefore he will exercise the acts of the generative + and nutritive powers. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the whole man will be beatified both in soul and in body. Now beatitude or happiness, according to the Philosopher + (Ethic. i, 7), consists in a perfect operation. Therefore it must needs be that all the powers of the soul and all the members + should have their respective acts after the resurrection. And so the same conclusion follows as above. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, after the resurrection there will be perfect joy in the blessed. Now such a joy includes all pleasures, since "happiness" + according to Boethius is "a state rendered perfect by the accumulation of all goods" (De Consol. iii), and the perfect is + that which lacks nothing. Since then there is much pleasure in the act of the generative and nutritive powers it would seem + that such acts belonging to animal life will be in the blessed, and much more in + others, who will have less spiritual bodies. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q81_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv">Mat. 22:30</a>): "In the resurrection they shall neither marry nor be married." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A4-p7"> Further, generation is directed to supply the defect resulting from death, and to the multiplication of the human race: and + eating is directed to make up for waste, and to increase quantity. But in the state of the resurrection the human race will + already have the number of individuals preordained by God, since generation will continue up to that point. In like manner + each man will rise again in due quantity; neither will death be any more, nor any waste affect the parts of man. + Therefore the acts of the generative and nutritive powers would be void of purpose. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A4-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The resurrection will not be necessary to man on account of his primary perfection, which consists in the integrity of those + things that belong to his nature, since man can attain to this in his present state of life by the action of natural causes; + but the necessity of the resurrection regards the attainment of his ultimate perfection, which consists in his reaching his + ultimate end. Consequently those natural operations which are directed to cause or + preserve the primary perfection of human nature will not be in the resurrection: such are the actions of the animal life in + man, the action of the elements on one another, and the movement of the heavens; wherefore all these will cease at the resurrection. + And since to eat, drink, sleep, beget, pertain to the animal life, being directed to the primary perfection of nature, it + follows that they will not be in the resurrection. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When Christ partook of that meal, His eating was an act, not of necessity as though human nature needed food after the resurrection, + but of power, so as to prove that He had resumed the true human nature which He had in that state wherein He ate and drank + with His disciples. There will be no need of such proof at the general resurrection, since it will be evident to all. Hence + Christ is said to have ate by dispensation in the sense in which lawyers + say that a "dispensation is a relaxation of the general law": because Christ made an exception to that which is common to + those who rise again (namely not to partake of food) for the aforesaid motive. Hence the argument does not prove. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The distinction of sexes and the difference of members will be for the restoration of the perfection of human nature both + in the species and in the individual. Hence it does not follow that they are without purpose, although they lack their animal + operations. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The aforesaid operations do not belong to man as man, as also the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7), wherefore the happiness + of the human body does not consist therein. But the human body will be glorified by an overflow from the reason whereby man + is man, inasmuch as the body will be subject to reason. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12, x, 5), the pleasures of the body are medicinal, because they are applied to man + for the removal of weariness; or again, they are unhealthy, in so far as man indulges in those pleasures inordinately, as + though they were real pleasures: just as a man whose taste is vitiated delights in things which are not delightful to the + healthy. Consequently it does not follow that such pleasures as these belong to the + perfection of beatitude, as the Jews and Turks maintain, and certain heretics known as the Chiliasts asserted; who, moreover, + according to the Philosopher's teaching, would seem to have an unhealthy appetite, since according to him none but spiritual + pleasures are pleasures simply, and to be sought for their own sake: wherefore these alone are requisite for beatitude. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A4-p13"></p> + <p id="XP_Q81_A4-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q81_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q82.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.XP_Q80_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q81_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q82" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q81_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q82_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="XP_Q82-p0.1">OF THE IMPASSIBILITY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED AFTER THEIR RESURRECTION (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="XP_Q82-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q82-p2"> We must now consider the conditions under which the blessed rise again, and (1) the impassibility of their bodies; (2) their + subtlety; (3) their agility; (4) their clarity. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82-p3"> (1) Whether the bodies of the saints will be impassible after the resurrection?</p> + <p id="XP_Q82-p4"> (2) Whether all will be equally impassible?</p> + <p id="XP_Q82-p5"> (3) Whether this impassibility renders the glorious bodies?</p> + <p id="XP_Q82-p6"> (4) Whether in them all the senses are in act?</p> + <div id="XP_Q82_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q82.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q82_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q82_A1-p0.1">Whether the bodies of the saints will be impassible after the resurrection?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q82_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the bodies of the saints will not be impassible after the resurrection. For everything mortal is passible. + But man, after the resurrection, will be "a mortal rational animal," for such is the definition of man, which will never be + dissociated from him. Therefore the body will be passible. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in potentiality to have the form of another thing is passible in relation to something else; for this + is what is meant by being passive to another thing (De Gener. i). Now the bodies of the saints will be in potentiality to + the form of another thing after the resurrection; since matter, according as it is under one form, does not lose its potentiality + to another form. But the bodies of the saints after the resurrection will have matter in + common with the elements, because they will be restored out of the same matter of which they are now composed. Therefore they + will be in potentiality to another form, and thus will be passible. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. i), contraries have a natural inclination to be active and passive towards + one another. Now the bodies of the saints will be composed of contraries after the resurrection, even as now. Therefore they + will be passible. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in the human body the blood and humors will rise again, as stated above ( + <a id="XP_Q82_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q80_A3.html">Q[80], AA[3]</a>,4). Now, sickness and such like passions arise in the body through the antipathy of the humors. Therefore the bodies of the + saints will be passible after the resurrection. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, actual defect is more inconsistent with perfection than potential defect. But passibility denotes merely potential + defect. Since then there will be certain actual defects in the bodies of the blessed, such as the scars of the wounds in the + martyrs, even as they were in Christ, it would seem that their perfections will not suffer, if we grant their bodies to be + passible. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Everything passible is corruptible, because "increase of passion results in loss of substance" [*Aristotle, Topic. vi, 1]. + Now the bodies of the saints will be incorruptible after the resurrection, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q82_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.42" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:42, </a> "It is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption." Therefore they will be impassible. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A1-p8"> Further, the stronger is not passive to the weaker. But no body will be stronger than the bodies of the saints, of which + it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q82_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.43" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:43</a>): "It is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power." Therefore they will be impassible. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A1-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We speak of a thing being "passive" in two ways [*Cf. + <a id="XP_Q82_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q22_A1.html">FS, Q[22], A[1]</a>]. First in a broad sense, and thus every reception is called a passion, whether the thing received be fitting to the receiver + and perfect it, or contrary to it and corrupt it. The glorious bodies are not said to be impassible by the removal of this + kind of passion, since nothing pertaining to perfection is to be removed from them. In another way we use the word + "passive" properly, and thus the Damascene defines passion (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) as being "a movement contrary to nature." + Hence an immoderate movement of the heart is called its passion, but a moderate movement is called its operation. The reason + of this is that whatever is patient is drawn to the bounds of the agent, since the agent assimilates the patient to itself, + so that, therefore, the patient as such is drawn beyond its own bounds within which it was confined. Accordingly taking + passion in its proper sense there will be no potentiality to passion in the bodies of the saints after resurrection; wherefore + they are said to be impassible. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A1-p10"> The reason however of this impassibility is assigned differently by different persons. Some ascribe it to the condition of + the elements, which will be different then from what it is now. For they say that the elements will remain, then, as to substance, + yet that they will be deprived of their active and passive qualities. But this does not seem to be true: because the active + and passive qualities belong to the perfection of the elements, so that if the elements were restored + without them in the body of the man that rises again, they would be less perfect than now. Moreover since these qualities + are the proper accidents of the elements, being caused by their form and matter, it would seem most absurd for the cause to + remain and the effect to be removed. Wherefore others say that the qualities will remain, but deprived of their proper activities, + the Divine power so doing for the preservation of the human body. This however would seem to be untenable, since the + action and passion of the active and passive qualities is necessary for the mixture (of the elements), and according as one + or the other preponderates the mixed (bodies) differ in their respective complexions, and this must apply to the bodies of + those who rise again, for they will contain flesh and bones and like parts, all of which demand different complexions. Moreover, + according to this, impassibility could not be one of their gifts, because it would not imply a disposition in the + impassible substance, but merely an external preventive to passion, namely the power of God, which might produce the same + effect in a human body even in this state of life. Consequently others say that in the body itself there will be something + preventing the passion of a glorified body, namely the nature of a fifth [*The other four being the elements; this fifth element + was known to the peripatetic philosophers as the quintessence, of which they held heavenly bodies to be formed]: or heavenly + body, which they maintain enters into the composition of a human body, to the effect of blending the elements together in + harmony so as to be fitting matter for the rational soul; but that in this state of life, on account of the preponderance + of the elemental nature, the human body is passible like other elements, whereas in the resurrection the nature of the fifth + body will predominate, so that the human body will be made impassible in likeness to the heavenly body. But this cannot stand, + because the fifth body does not enter materially into the composition of a human body, as was proved above (Sent. ii, D, 12, + Q. 1, A[1]). Moreover it is absurd to say that a natural power, such as the power of a heavenly body, should endow the human + body with a property of glory, such as the impassibility of a glorified body, since the Apostle ascribes to Christ's power + the transformation of the human body, because "such as is the heavenly, such also are they that are heavenly" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q82_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.48" target="asv">1 + Cor. 15:48 + </a>), and "He will reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body of His glory, according to the operation whereby also + He is able to subdue all things unto Himself" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q82_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.21" target="asv">Phil. 3:21</a>). And again, a heavenly nature cannot exercise such power over the human body as to take from it its elemental nature which + is passible by reason of its essential constituents. Consequently we must say otherwise that all passion results from the + agent overcoming the patient, + else it would not draw it to its own bounds. Now it is impossible for agent to overcome patient except through the weakening + of the hold which the form of the patient has over its matter, if we speak of the passion which is against nature, for it + is of passion in this sense that we are speaking now: for matter is not subject to one of two contraries, except through the + cessation or at least the diminution of the hold which the other contrary has on it. Now the human body and all that it + contains will be perfectly subject to the rational soul, even as the soul will be perfectly subject to God. Wherefore it will + be impossible for the glorified body to be subject to any change contrary to the disposition whereby it is perfected by the + soul; and consequently those bodies will be impassible. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Anselm (Cur Deus Homo ii, 11), "mortal is included in the philosophers' definition of man, because they did + not believe that the whole man could be ever immortal, for they had no experience of man otherwise than in this state of mortality." + Or we may say that since, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 12), essential differences are unknown to us, we sometimes + employ accidental differences in order to signify essential differences + from which the accidental differences result. Hence "mortal" is put in the definition of man, not as though mortality were + essential to man, but because that which causes passibility and mortality in the present state of life, namely composition + of contraries, is essential to man, but it will not cause it then, on account of the triumph of the soul over the body. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Potentiality is twofold, tied and free: and this is true not only of active but also of passive potentiality. For the form + ties the potentiality of matter, by determining it to one thing, and it is thus that it overcomes it. And since in corruptible + things form does not perfectly overcome matter, it cannot tie it completely so as to prevent it from sometimes receiving a + disposition contrary to the form through some passion. But in the saints after the + resurrection, the soul will have complete dominion over the body, and it will be altogether impossible for it to lose this + dominion, because it will be immutably subject to God, which was not the case in the state of innocence. Consequently those + bodies will retain substantially the same potentiality as they have now to another form; yet that potentiality will remain + tied by the triumph of the soul over the body, so that it will never be realized by actual passion. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The elemental qualities are the instruments of the soul, as stated in De Anima ii, text. 38, seqq., for the heat of fire + in an animal's body is directed in the act of nutrition by the soul's power. When, however, the principal agent is perfect, + and there is no defect in the instrument, no action proceeds from the instrument, except in accordance with the disposition + of the principal agent. Consequently in the bodies of the saints after the + resurrection, no action or passion will result from the elemental qualities that is contrary to the disposition of the soul + which has the preservation of the body in view. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> According to Augustine (Ep. ad Consent. cxlvi) "the Divine power is able to remove" whatever qualities He will "from this + visible and tangible body, other qualities remaining." Hence even as in a certain respect "He deprived the flames of the Chaldees' + furnace of the power to burn, since the bodies of the children were preserved without hurt, while in another respect that + power remained, since those flames consumed the wood, so will He remove + passibility from the humors while leaving their nature unchanged." It has been explained in the Article how this is brought + about. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The scars of wounds will not be in the saints, nor were they in Christ, in so far as they imply a defect, but as signs of + the most steadfast virtue whereby the saints suffered for the sake of justice and faith: so that this will increase their + own and others' joy (Cf. + <a id="XP_Q82_A1-p15.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q54_A4.html">TP, Q[54], A[4]</a>, ad 3). Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 19): "We feel an undescribable love for the blessed martyrs so as to desire + to see in that + kingdom the scars of the wounds in their bodies, which they bore for Christ's name. Perchance indeed we shall see them for + this will not make them less comely but more glorious. A certain beauty will shine in them, a beauty though in the body, yet + not of the body but of virtue." Nevertheless those martyrs who have been maimed and deprived of their limbs will not be without + those limbs in the resurrection of the dead, for to them it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q82_A1-p15.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.21.18" target="asv">Lk. 21:18</a>): "A hair of your head + shall not perish." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A1-p16"></p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A1-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q82.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q82_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q82_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q82_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q82_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q82_A2-p0.1">Whether all will be equally impassible?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q82_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all will be equally impassible. For a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q82_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.42" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:42, </a> "It is sown in corruption," says that "all have equal immunity from suffering." Now the gift of impassibility consists in + immunity from suffering. Therefore all will be equally impassible. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, negations are not subject to be more or less. Now impassibility is a negation or privation of passibility. Therefore + it cannot be greater in one subject than in another. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing is more white if it have less admixture of black. But there will be no admixture of passibility in any of + the saints' bodies. Therefore they will all be equally impassible. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Reward should be proportionate to merit. Now some of the saints were greater in merit than others. Therefore, since impassibility + is a reward, it would seem to be greater in some than in others. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A2-p6"> Further, impassibility is condivided with the gift of clarity. Now the latter will not be equal in all, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q82_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.41" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:41.</a> Therefore neither will impassibility be equal in all. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Impassibility may be considered in two ways, either in itself, or in respect of its cause. If it be considered in itself, + since it denotes a mere negation or privation, it is not subject to be more or less, but will be equal in all the blessed. + on the other hand, if we consider it in relation to its cause, thus it will be greater in one person than in another. Now + its cause is the dominion of the soul over the body, and this dominion is caused by the soul's + unchangeable enjoyment of God. Consequently in one who enjoys God more perfectly, there is a greater cause of impassibility. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This gloss is speaking of impassibility in itself and not in relation to its cause. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although negations and privations considered in themselves are not increased nor diminished, yet they are subject to increase + and diminution in relation to their causes. Thus a place is said to be more darksome from having more and greater obstacles + to light. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some things increase not only by receding from their contrary, but also by approach to a term: thus light increases. Consequently + impassibility also is greater in one subject than in another, although there is no passibility remaining in any one. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q82_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q82_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q82_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q82_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q82_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q82_A3-p0.1">Whether impassibility excludes actual sensation from glorified bodies?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q82_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that impassibility excludes actual sensation from glorified bodies. For according to the Philosopher (De Anima + ii, 11), "sensation is a kind of passion." But the glorified bodies will be impassible. Therefore they will not have actual + sensation. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, natural alteration precedes spiritual* alteration, just as natural being precedes intentional being. Now glorified + bodies, by reason of their impassibility, will not be subject to natural alteration. [*"Animalem," as though it were derived + from "animus"---the mind. Cf. + <a id="XP_Q82_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html">FS, Q[50], A[1]</a>,3m; + <a id="XP_Q82_A3-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html">FS, Q[52], A[1]</a>,3m.] Therefore they will not be subject to spiritual alteration which is requisite for + sensation. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whenever actual sensation is due to a new perception, there is a new judgment. But in that state there will be no + new judgment, because "our thoughts will not then be unchangeable," as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16). Therefore there will + be no actual sensation. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, when the act of one of the soul's powers is intense, the acts of the other powers are remiss. Now the soul will + be supremely intent on the act of the contemplative power in contemplating God. Therefore the soul will have no actual sensation + whatever. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q82_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.1.7" target="asv">Apoc. 1:7</a>): "Every eye shall see Him." Therefore there will be actual sensation. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A3-p7"> Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima i, 2) "the animate is distinct from the inanimate by sensation and movement." + Now there will be actual movement since they "shall run to and fro like sparks among the reeds" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q82_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.3.7" target="asv">Wis. 3:7</a>). Therefore there will also be actual sensation. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A3-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> All are agreed that there is some sensation in the bodies of the blessed: else the bodily life of the saints after the resurrection + would be likened to sleep rather than to vigilance. Now this is not befitting that perfection, because in sleep a sensible + body is not in the ultimate act of life, for which reason sleep is described as half-life. [*This is what Aristotle says: + "The good and the bad are in sleep least distinguishable: hence men say that for half + their lives there is no difference between the happy and the unhappy" (Ethic. i, 13)] But there is a difference of opinion + as to the mode of sensation. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A3-p9"> For some say that the glorified bodies will be impassible, and consequently "not susceptible to impressions from without" + [*Cf. + <a id="XP_Q82_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q74_A4.html"> Q[74], A[4]</a>, On the contrary] and much less so than the heavenly bodies, because they will have actual sensations, not by receiving species + from sensibles, but by emission of species. But this is impossible, since in the resurrection the specific nature will remain + the same in man and in all his parts. Now the nature of sense is + to be a passive power as the Philosopher proves (De Anima ii, text. 51,54). Wherefore if the saints, in the resurrection, + were to have sensations by emitting and not by receiving species, sense in them would be not a passive but an active power, + and thus it would not be the same specifically with sense as it is now, but would be some other power bestowed on them; for + just as matter never becomes form, so a passive power never becomes active. Consequently others say that the senses will be + actualized by receiving species, not indeed from external sensibles, but by an outflow from the higher powers, so that as + now the higher powers receive from the lower, so on the contrary the lower powers will then receive from the higher. But this + mode of reception does not result in real sensation, because every passive power, according to its specific nature, is determined + to some special active principle, since a power as such bears relation to that with respect to which it is said to be the + power. Wherefore since the proper active principle in external sensation is a thing existing outside the soul and not an intention + thereof existing in the imagination or reason, if the organ of sense be not moved by external things, but by the imagination + or other higher powers, there will be no true sensation. Hence we do not say that madmen or other witless persons (in whom + there is this kind of outflow of species towards the organs of sense, on account of the powerful influence of the + imagination) have real sensations, but that it seems to them that they have sensations. Consequently we must say with others + that sensation in glorified bodies will result from the reception of things outside the soul. It must, however, be observed + that the organs of sense are transmuted by things outside the soul in two ways. First by a natural transmutation, when namely + the organ is disposed by the same natural quality as the thing outside the soul which acts on that organ: for instance, when + the hand is heated by touching a hot object, or becomes fragrant through contact with a fragrant object. Secondly, by a spiritual + transmutation, as when a sensible quality is received in an instrument, according to a spiritual mode of being, when, namely, + the species or the intention of a quality, and not the quality itself is received: thus the pupil receives the species of + whiteness and yet does not itself become white. Accordingly the first reception does not cause sensation, properly + speaking, because the senses are receptive of species in matter but without matter. that is to say without the material "being" + which the species had outside the soul (De Anima ii, text. 121). This reception transmutes the nature of the recipient, because + in this way the quality is received according to its material "being." Consequently this kind of reception will not be in + the glorified bodies, but the second, which of itself causes actual sensation, without changing the nature of the + recipient. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As already explained, by this passion that takes place in actual sensation and is no other than the aforesaid reception of + species, the body is not drawn away from natural quality, but is perfected by a spiritual change. Wherefore the impassibility + of glorified bodies does not exclude this kind of passion. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every subject of passion receives the action of the agent according to its mode. Accordingly if there be a thing that is + naturally adapted to be altered by an active principle, with a natural and a spiritual alteration, the natural alteration + precedes the spiritual alteration, just as natural precedes intentional being. If however a thing be naturally adapted to + be altered only with a spiritual alteration it does not follow that it is altered + naturally. For instance the air is not receptive of color, according to its natural being, but only according to its spiritual + being, wherefore in this way alone is it altered: whereas, on the contrary, inanimate bodies are altered by sensible qualities + only naturally and not spiritually. But in the glorified bodies there cannot be any natural alteration, and consequently there + will be only spiritual alteration. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as there will be new reception of species in the organs of sensation, so there will be new judgment in the common sense: + but there will be no new judgment on the point in the intellect; such is the case with one who sees what he knew before. The + saying of Augustine, that "there our thoughts will not be changeable," refers to the thoughts of the intellectual part: therefore + it is not to the point. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When one of two things is the type of the other, the attention of the soul to the one does not hinder or lessen its attention + to the other: thus a physician while considering urine is not less but more able to bear in mind the rules of his art concerning + the colors of urine. And since God is apprehended by the saints as the type of all things that will be done or known by them, + their attention to perceiving sensibles, or to contemplating or doing + anything else will nowise hinder their contemplation of God, nor conversely. Or we may say that the reason why one power is + hindered in its act when another power is intensely engaged is because one power does not alone suffice for such an intense + operation, unless it be assisted by receiving from the principle of life the inflow that the other powers or members should + receive. And since in the saints all the powers will be most perfect, one will be able to operate intensely without thereby + hindering the operation of another power even as it was with Christ. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A3-p14"></p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A3-p15"></p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A3-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q82_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q82_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q82_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q82_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q83.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q82_A4-p0.1">Whether in the blessed, after the resurrection, all the senses will be in act?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q82_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the senses are not in act there. For touch is the first of all the senses (De Anima ii, 2). But the + glorified body will lack the actual sense of touch, since the sense of touch becomes actual by the alteration of an animal + body by some external body preponderating in some one of the active or passive qualities which touch is capable of discerning: + and such an alteration will then be impossible. Therefore all the senses will not be in act + there. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sense of taste assists the action of the nutritive power. Now after the resurrection there will be no such action, + as stated above ( + <a id="XP_Q82_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q81_A4.html">Q[81], A[4]</a>). Therefore taste would be useless there. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing will be corrupted after the resurrection because the whole creature will be invested with a certain virtue + of incorruption. Now the sense of smell cannot have its act without some corruption having taken place, because smell is not + perceived without a volatile evaporation consisting in a certain dissolution. Therefore the sense of smell is not there in + its act. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, "Hearing assists teaching" (De Sensu et Sensato i). But the blessed, after the resurrection, will require no teaching + by means of sensible objects, since they will be filled with Divine wisdom by the very vision of God. Therefore hearing will + not be there. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further. seeing results from the pupil receiving the species of the thing seen. But after the resurrection this will be impossible + in the blessed. Therefore there will be no actual seeing there, and yet this is the most noble of the senses. The minor is + proved thus: That which is actually lightsome is not receptive of a visible species; and consequently a mirror placed under + the sun's rays does not reflect the image of a body opposite to it. Now the pupil like + the whole body will be endowed with clarity. Therefore it will not receive the image of a colored body. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A4-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, according to the science of perspective, whatever is seen is seen at an angle. But this does not apply to the glorified + bodies. Therefore they will not have actual sense of sight. The minor is proved thus. Whenever a thing is seen at an angle, + the angle must be proportionate to the distance of the object seen: because what is seen from a greater distance is less seen + and at a lesser angle, so that the angle may be so small that nothing is seen of the + object. Therefore if the glorified eye sees at an angle, it follows that it sees things within a certain distance, and that + consequently it does not see a thing from a greater distance than we see now: and this would seem very absurd. And thus it + would seem that the sense of sight will not be actual in glorified bodies. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A4-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A power conjoined to its act is more perfect than one not so conjoined. Now human nature in the blessed will be in its greatest + perfection. Therefore all the senses will be actual there. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A4-p9"> Further, the sensitive powers are nearer to the soul than the body is. But the body will be rewarded or punished on account + of the merits or demerits of the soul. Therefore all the senses in the blessed will also be rewarded and in the wicked will + be punished, with regard to pleasure and pain or sorrow which consist in the operation of the senses. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A4-p10"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There are two opinions on this question. For some say that in the glorified bodies there will be all the sensitive powers, + but that only two senses will be in act, namely touch and sight; nor will this be owing to defective senses, but from lack + of medium and object; and that the senses will not be useless, because they will conduce to the integrity of human nature + and will show forth the wisdom of their Creator. But this is seemingly untrue, because the + medium in these senses is the same as in the others. For in the sight the medium is the air, and this is also the medium in + hearing and smelling (De Anima ii, 7). Again, the taste, like the touch, has the medium in contact, since taste is a kind + of touch (De Anima ii, 9). Smell also which is the object of the sense of smell will be there, since the Church sings that + the bodies of the saints will be a most sweet smell. There will also be vocal praise in heaven; hence a gloss says on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q82_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.149.6" target="asv"> + Ps. 149:6, + </a>"The high praises of God shall be in their mouth" that "hearts and tongues shall not cease to praise God." The same is had + on the authority of a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q82_A4-p10.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">2 Esdra 12:27, </a> "With singing and with cymbals." Wherefore, according to others we may say that smelling and hearing will be in act there, + but taste will not be in act, in the sense of being affected by the taking of food or drink, as appears from what we have + said ( + <a id="XP_Q82_A4-p10.3" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q81_A4.html">Q[81], + A[4] + </a>): unless perchance we say that there will be taste in act through the tongue being affected by some neighboring humor. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The qualities perceived by the touch are those which constitute the animal body. Wherefore the body of an animal has, through + its tangible qualities according to the present state of life, a natural aptitude to be affected with a natural and spiritual + alteration by the object of touch. For this reason the touch is said to be the most material of the senses, since it has a + greater measure of material alteration connected with it. Yet material + alteration is only accidentally related to the act of sensation which is effected by a spiritual alteration. Consequently + the glorified bodies, which by reason of their impassibility are immune from natural alteration, will be subject only to spiritual + alteration by tangible qualities. Thus it was with the body of Adam, which could neither be burned by fire, nor pierced by + sword, although he had the sense of such things. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Taste, in so far as it is the perception of food, will not be in act; but perhaps it will be possible in so far as it is + cognizant of flavors in the way mentioned above. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some have considered smell to be merely a volatile evaporation. But this opinion cannot be true; which is evident from the + fact that vultures hasten to a corpse on perceiving the odor from a very great distance, whereas it would be impossible for + an evaporation to travel from the corpse to a place so remote, even though the whole corpse were to be dissolved into vapor. + This is confirmed by the fact that sensible objects at an equal distance exercise + their influence in all directions: so that smell affects the medium sometimes, and the instrument of sensation with a spiritual + alteration, without any evaporation reaching the organ. That some evaporation should be necessary is due to the fact that + smell in bodies is mixed with humidity; wherefore it is necessary for dissolution to take place in order for the smell to + be perceived. But in the glorified bodies odor will be in its ultimate perfection, being nowise hampered by humidity: wherefore + it will affect the organ with a spiritual alteration, like the odor of a volatile evaporation. Such will be the sense of smell + in the saints, because it will not be hindered by any humidity: and it will take cognizance not only of the excellences of + odors, as happens with us now on account of the very great humidity of the brain, but also of the minutest differences of + odors. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In heaven there will be vocal praise (though indeed some think otherwise), and in the blessed it will affect the organ of + hearing by a merely spiritual alteration. Nor will it be for the sake of learning whereby they may acquire knowledge, but + for the sake of the perfection of the sense and for the sake pleasure. How it is possible for the voice to give sound there, + we have already stated (Sent. ii, D, 2; + <a id="XP_Q82_A4-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q2_A2.html"> Q[2], A[2]</a>, ad 5). + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A4-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The intensity of light does not hinder the spiritual reception of the image of color, so long as the pupil retains its diaphanous + nature; thus it is evident that however much the air be filled with light, it can be the medium of sight, and the more it + is illumined, the more clearly are objects seen through it, unless there be a fault through defective sight. The fact that + the image of an object placed in opposition to a mirror directly opposite the + sun's rays does not appear therein, is not due to the reception being hindered, but to the hindering of reflection: because + for an image to appear in a mirror it must needs be thrown back by an opaque body, for which reason lead is affixed to the + glass in a mirror. The sun's ray dispels this opacity so that no image can appear in the mirror. But the clarity of a glorified + body does not destroy the diaphanous nature of the pupil, since glory does not destroy nature; and consequently the + greatness of clarity in the pupil renders the sight keen rather than defective. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A4-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The more perfect the sense the less does it require to be altered in order to perceive its object. Now the smaller the angle + at which the sight is affected by the visible object, the less is the organ altered. Hence it is that a stronger sight can + see from a distance more than a weaker sight; because the greater the distance the smaller the angle at which a thing is seen. + And since the sight of a glorified body will be most perfect it will be able to + see by the very least alteration (of the organ); and consequently at a very much smaller angle than now, and therefore from + a much greater distance. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A4-p17"></p> + <p id="XP_Q82_A4-p18"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q82_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q83.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.XP_Q81_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q82_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q83" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q82_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q83_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="XP_Q83-p0.1">OF THE SUBTLETY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="XP_Q83-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q83-p2"> We must now consider the subtlety of the bodies of the blessed. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="XP_Q83-p3"> (1) Whether subtlety is a property of the glorified body?</p> + <p id="XP_Q83-p4"> (2) Whether by reason of this subtlety it can be in the same place with another not glorified body?</p> + <p id="XP_Q83-p5"> (3) Whether by a miracle two bodies can be in the same place?</p> + <p id="XP_Q83-p6"> (4) Whether a glorified body can be in the same place with another glorified body?</p> + <p id="XP_Q83-p7"> (5) Whether a glorified body necessarily requires a place equal to itself?</p> + <p id="XP_Q83-p8"> (6) Whether a glorified body is palpable?</p> + <div id="XP_Q83_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q83.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q83_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q83_A1-p0.1">Whether subtlety is a property of the glorified body?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q83_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that subtlety is not a property of the glorified body. For the properties of glory surpass the properties of + nature, even as the clarity of glory surpasses the clarity of the sun, which is the greatest in nature. Accordingly if subtlety + be a property of the glorified body, it would seem that the glorified body will be more subtle than anything which is subtle + in nature, and thus it will be "more subtle than the wind and the air," which was + condemned by Gregory in the city of Constantinople, as he relates (Moral. xiv, 56). + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as heat and cold are simple qualities of bodies, i.e. of the elements, so is subtlety. But heat and other qualities + of the elements will not be intensified in the glorified bodies any more than they are now, in fact, they will be more reduced + to the mean. Neither, therefore, will subtlety be in them more than it is now. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, subtlety is in bodies as a result of scarcity of matter, wherefore bodies that have less matter within equal dimensions + are said to be more subtle; as fire in comparison with air, and air as compared with water, and water as compared with earth. + But there will be as much matter in the glorified bodies as there is now, nor will their dimensions be greater. Therefore + they will not be more subtle then than now. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q83_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.44" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:44</a>): "It is sown a corruptible body, it shall rise a spiritual," i.e. a spirit-like, "body." But the subtlety of a spirit surpasses + all bodily subtlety. Therefore the glorified bodies will be most subtle. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A1-p6"> Further, the more subtle a body is the more exalted it is. But the glorified bodies will be most exalted. Therefore they + will be most subtle. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Subtlety takes its name from the power to penetrate. Hence it is said in De Gener. ii that "a subtle thing fills all the + parts and the parts of parts." Now that a body has the power of penetrating may happen through two causes. First, through + smallness of quantity, especially in respect of depth and breadth, but not of length, because penetration regards depth, wherefore + length is not an obstacle to penetration. Secondly, through paucity of matter, wherefore + rarity is synonymous with subtlety: and since in rare bodies the form is more predominant over the matter, the term "subtlety" + has been transferred to those bodies which are most perfectly subject to their form, and are most fully perfected thereby: + thus we speak of subtlety in the sun and moon and like bodies, just as gold and similar things may be called subtle, when + they are most perfectly complete in their specific being and power. And since incorporeal things lack quantity and matter, + the + term "subtlety" is applied to them, not only by reason of their substance, but also on account of their power. For just as + a subtle thing is said to be penetrative, for the reason that it reaches to the inmost part of a thing, so is an intellect + said to be subtle because it reaches to the insight of the intrinsic principles and the hidden natural properties of a thing. + In like manner a person is said to have subtle sight, because he is able to perceive by sight things of the smallest size: + and + the same applies to the other senses. Accordingly people have differed by ascribing subtlety to the glorified bodies in different + ways. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A1-p8"> For certain heretics, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xiii, 22), ascribed to them the subtlety whereby spiritual substances + are said to be subtle: and they said that at the resurrection the body will be transformed into a spirit, and that for this + reason the Apostle describes as being "spiritual" the bodies of those who rise again ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q83_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.44" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:44</a>). But this cannot be maintained. First, because a body cannot be changed into a spirit, since there is no + community of matter between them: and Boethius proves this (De Duab. Nat.). Secondly, because, if this were possible, and + one's body were changed into a spirit, one would not rise again a man, for a man naturally consists of a soul and body. Thirdly, + because if this were the Apostle's meaning, just as he speaks of spiritual bodies, so would he speak of natural [animale] + bodies, as being changed into souls [animam]: and this is clearly false. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A1-p9"> Hence certain heretics said that the body will remain at the resurrection, but that it will be endowed with subtlety by means + of rarefaction, so that human bodies in rising again will be like the air or the wind, as Gregory relates (Moral. xiv, 56). + But this again cannot be maintained, because our Lord had a palpable body after the Resurrection, as appears from the last + chapter of Luke, and we must believe that His body was supremely subtle. Moreover the human body will rise + again with flesh and bones, as did the body of our Lord, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q83_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.24.39" target="asv"> Lk. 24:39, </a> "A spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see Me to have," and + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q83_A1-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Job.19.26" target="asv"> Job 19:26, </a> "In my flesh I shall see God," my Saviour: and the nature of flesh and bone is incompatible with the aforesaid rarity. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A1-p10"> Consequently another kind of subtlety must be assigned to glorified bodies, by saying that they are subtle on account of + the most complete perfection of the body. But this completeness is explained by some in relation to the fifth, or heavenly, + essence, which will be then predominant in them. This, however, is impossible, since first of all the fifth essence can nowise + enter into the composition of a body, as we have shown above (Sent. D, 12, qu. 1). Secondly, because granted + that it entered into the composition of the human body, it would be impossible to account for its having a greater predominance + over the elemental nature then than now, unless---either the amount of the heavenly nature in human bodies were increased + (thus human bodies would not be of the same stature, unless perhaps elemental matter in man were decreased, which is inconsistent + with the integrity of those who rise again)---or unless elemental nature were endowed with the properties of the + heavenly nature through the latter's dominion over the body, and in that case a natural power would be the cause of a property + of glory, which seems absurd. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A1-p11"> Hence others say that the aforesaid completeness by reason of which human bodies are said to be subtle will result from the + dominion of the glorified soul (which is the form of the body) over the body, by reason of which dominion the glorified body + is said to be "spiritual," as being wholly subject to the spirit. The first subjection whereby the body is subject to the + soul is to the effect of its participating in its specific being, in so far as it is subject to the soul as + matter to form; and secondly it is subject to the soul in respect of the other operations of the soul, in so far as the soul + is a principle of movement. Consequently the first reason for spirituality in the body is subtlety, and, after that, agility + and the other properties of a glorified body. Hence the Apostle, as the masters expound, in speaking of spirituality indicates + subtlety: wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xiv, 56) that "the glorified body is said to be subtle as a result of a spiritual + power." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A1-p12"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections which refer to the subtlety of rarefaction.</p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A1-p13"></p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A1-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q83.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q83_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q83_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q83_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q83_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q83_A2-p0.1">Whether by reason of this subtlety a glorified body is able to be in the same place with another body not glorified?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q83_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that by reason of this subtlety a body is able to be in the same place with another body not glorified. For + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q83_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.21" target="asv"> Phil. 3:21, </a> "He will reform the body of our lowness made like to the body of His glory." Now the body of Christ was able to be in the + same place with another body, as appears from the fact that after His Resurrection He went in to His disciples, the doors + being shut ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q83_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#John.20.19" target="asv">Jn. 20:19</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q83_A2-p2.3" href="./asv.html#John.20.26" target="asv">26</a>). + Therefore also the glorified bodies by reason of their subtlety will be able to be in the same place with other bodies not + glorified. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, glorified bodies will be superior to all other bodies. Yet by reason of their superiority certain bodies, to wit + the solar rays, are able now to occupy the same place together with other bodies. Much more therefore is this befitting glorified + bodies. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a heavenly body cannot be severed, at least as regards the substance of the spheres: hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q83_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.37.18" target="asv">Job 37:18</a>) that "the heavens . . . are most strong, as if they were of molten brass." If then the subtlety of a glorified body will + not enable it to be in the same place together with another body, it will never be able to ascend to the empyrean,* and this + is erroneous. [*The empyrean was the highest of the concentric spheres + or heavens, and was identified by Christian writers with the abode of God. Cf. + <a id="XP_Q83_A2-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q56_A3.html">FP, Q[56], A[3]</a>]. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a body which is unable to be in the same place with another body can be hindered in its movement or even surrounded + by others standing in its way. But this cannot happen to glorified bodies. Therefore they will be able to be together in the + same place with other bodies. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, as point is to point, so is line to line, surface to surface, and body to body. Now two points can be coincident, + as in the case of two lines touching one another, and two lines when two surfaces are in contact with one another, and two + surfaces when two bodies touch one another, because "contiguous things are those whose boundaries coincide" (Phys. vi, 6). + Therefore it is not against the nature of a body to be in the same place together with another + body. Now whatever excellence is competent to the nature of a body will all be bestowed on the glorified body. Therefore a + glorified body, by reason of its subtlety, will be able to be in the same place together with another body. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A2-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Trin. i): "Difference of accidents makes distinction in number. For three men differ not in genus, nor + in species, but in their accidents. If we were to remove absolutely every accident from them, still each one has a different + place; and it is quite conceivable that they should all occupy the same place." Therefore if we suppose two bodies to occupy + the same place, there will be but one body numerically. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A2-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It cannot be maintained that a glorified body, by reason of its subtlety, is able to be in the same place with another body, + unless the obstacle to its being now in the same place with another body be removed by that subtlety. Some say that in the + present state this obstacle is its grossness by virtue of which it is able to occupy a place; and that this grossness is removed + by the gift of subtlety. But there are two reasons why this cannot be maintained. + First, because the grossness which the gift of subtlety removes is a kind of defect, for instance an inordinateness of matter + in not being perfectly subject to its form. For all that pertains to the integrity of the body will rise again in the body, + both as regards the matter and as regards the form. And the fact that a body is able to fill a place belongs to it by reason + of that which pertains to its integrity, and not on account of any defect of nature. For since fulness is opposed to + vacancy, that alone does not fill a place, which being put in a place, nevertheless leaves a place vacant. Now a vacuum is + defined by the Philosopher (Phys. iv, 6,7) as being "a place not filled by a sensible body." And a body is said to be sensible + by reason of its matter, form, and natural accidents, all of which pertain to the integrity of nature. It is also plain that + the glorified body will be sensible even to touch, as evidenced by the body of our Lord ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q83_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.24.39" target="asv">Lk. 24:39</a>): + nor will it lack matter, or form, or natural accidents, namely heat, cold, and so forth. Hence it is evident that the glorified + body, the gift of subtlety notwithstanding, will fill a place: for it would seem madness to say that the place in which there + will be a glorified body will be empty. Secondly their aforesaid argument does not avail, because to hinder the co-existence + of a body in the same place is more than to fill a place. For if we suppose dimensions separate from matter, those + dimensions do not fill a place. Hence some who held the possibility of a vacuum, said that a vacuum is a place wherein such + like dimensions exist apart from a sensible body; and yet those dimensions hinder another body from being together with them + in the same place. This is made clear by the Philosopher (Phys. iv, 1,8; Metaph. ii, 2), where he considers it impossible + for a mathematical body, which is nothing but separate dimensions, to be together with another natural sensible body. + Consequently, granted that the subtlety of a glorified body hindered it from filling a place, nevertheless it would not follow + that for this reason it is able to be in the same place with another body, since the removal of the lesser does not involve + the removal of the greater. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A2-p9"> Accordingly we must say that the obstacle to our body's being now in the same place with another body can nowise be removed + by the gift of subtlety. For nothing can prevent a body from occupying the same place together with another body, except something + in it that requires a different place: since nothing is an obstacle to identity, save that which is a cause of distinction. + Now this distinction of place is not required by any quality of the body, because a body demands a + place, not by reason of its quality: wherefore if we remove from a body the fact of its being hot or cold, heavy or light, + it still retains the necessity of the aforesaid distinction, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. iv), and as is self-evident. + In like manner neither can matter cause the necessity of the aforesaid distinction, because matter does not occupy a place + except through its dimensive quantity. Again neither does form occupy a place, unless it have a place through its matter. + It + remains therefore that the necessity for two bodies occupying each a distinct place results from the nature of dimensive quantity, + to which a place is essentially befitting. For this forms part of its definition, since dimensive quantity is quantity occupying + a place. Hence it is that if we remove all else in a thing from it, the necessity of this distinction is found in its dimensive + quantity alone. Thus take the example of a separate line, supposing there to be two such lines, or two parts of + one line, they must needs occupy distinct places, else one line added to another would not make something greater, and this + is against common sense. The same applies to surfaces and mathematical bodies. And since matter demands place, through being + the subject of dimension, the aforesaid necessity results in placed matter, so that just as it is impossible for there to + be two lines, or two parts of a line, unless they occupy distinct places, so is it impossible for there to be two matters, + or + two parts of matter, without there be distinction of place. And since distinction of matter is the principle of the distinction + between individuals, it follows that, as Boethius says (De Trin.), "we cannot possibly conceive two bodies occupying one place," + so that this distinction of individuals requires this difference of accidents. Now subtlety does not deprive the glorified + body of its dimension; wherefore it nowise removes from it the aforesaid necessity of occupying a distinct place from + another body. Therefore the subtlety of a glorified body will not enable it to be in the same place together with another + body, but it will be possible for it to be together with another body by the operation of the Divine power: even as the body + of Peter had the power whereby the sick were healed at the passing of Peter's shadow ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q83_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.15" target="asv">Acts 5:15</a>) not through any inherent property, but by the power of God for the upbuilding of the faith. Thus will the Divine power make + it + possible for a glorified body to be in the same place together with another body for the perfection of glory. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That Christ's body was able to be together with another body in the same place was not due to its subtlety, but resulted + from the power of His Godhead after His resurrection, even as in His birth [*Cf. + <a id="XP_Q83_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q28_A2.html">TP, Q[28], A[2]</a>, ad 3]. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.): "The same body went into His disciples the doors being shut, which to human + eyes came from the closed womb of the Virgin at His birth." Therefore there is no + reason why this should be befitting to glorified bodies on account of their subtlety. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Light is not a body as we have said above (Sent. ii, Q[13], A[3]; + <a id="XP_Q83_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q67_A2.html">FP, Q[67], A[2]</a>): hence the objection proceeds on a false supposition. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The glorified body will pass through the heavenly spheres without severing them, not by virtue of its subtlety, but by the + Divine power, which will assist them in all things at will. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> From the fact that God will come to the aid of the blessed at will in whatever they desire, it follows that they cannot be + surrounded or imprisoned. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A2-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> As stated in Phys. iv, 5, "a point is not in a place": hence if it be said to be in a place, this is only accidental, because + the body of which it is a term is in a place. And just as the whole place corresponds to the whole body, so the term of the + place corresponds to the term of the body. But it happens that two places have one term, even as two lines terminate in one + point. And consequently though two bodies must needs be in distinct places, yet + the same term of two places corresponds to the two terms of the two bodies. It is in this sense that the bounds of contiguous + bodies are said to coincide. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A2-p15"></p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A2-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q83_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q83_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q83_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q83_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q83_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q83_A3-p0.1">Whether it is possible, by a miracle, for two bodies to be in the same place?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q83_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not even by a miracle is it possible for two bodies to be in the same place. For it is not possible that, + by a miracle, two bodies be at once two and one, since this would imply that contradictions are true at the same time. But + if we suppose two bodies to be in the same place, it would follow that those two bodies are one. Therefore this cannot be + done by a miracle. The minor is proved thus. Suppose two bodies A and B to be in the same + place. The dimensions of A will either be the same as the dimensions of the place, or they will differ from them. If they + differ, then some of the dimensions will be separate: which is impossible, since the dimensions that are within the bounds + of a place are not in a subject unless they be in a placed body. If they be the same, then for the same reason the dimensions + of B will be the same as the dimensions of the place. "Now things that are the same with one and the same thing are the same + with one another." Therefore the dimensions of A and B are the same. But two bodies cannot have identical dimensions just + as they cannot have the same whiteness. Therefore A and B are one body and yet they were two. Therefore they are at the same + time one and two. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing cannot be done miraculously either against the common principles---for instance that the part be not less + than the whole; since what is contrary to common principles implies a direct contradiction---or contrary to the conclusions + of geometry which are infallible deductions from common principles---for instance that the three angles of a triangle should + not be equal to two right angles. In like manner nothing can be done to a line that is + contrary to the definition of a line, because to sever the definition from the defined is to make two contradictories true + at the same time. Now it is contrary to common principles, both to the conclusions of geometry and to the definition of a + line, for two bodies to be in the same place. Therefore this cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is proved as follows: + It is a conclusion of geometry that two circles touch one another only at a point. Now if two circular bodies were in the + same + place, the two circles described in them would touch one another as a whole. Again it is contrary to the definition of a line + that there be more than one straight line between two points: yet this would be the case were two bodies in the same place, + since between two given points in the various surfaces of the place, there would be two straight lines corresponding to the + two bodies in that place. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it would seem impossible that by a miracle a body which is enclosed within another should not be in a place, for + then it would have a common and not a proper place, and this is impossible. Yet this would follow if two bodies were in the + same place. Therefore this cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is proved thus. Supposing two bodies to be in the same place, + the one being greater than the other as to every dimension, the lesser body will be + enclosed in the greater, and the place occupied by the greater body will be its common place; while it will have no proper + place, because no given surface of the body will contain it, and this is essential to place. Therefore it will not have a + proper place. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, place corresponds in proportion to the thing placed. Now it can never happen by a miracle that the same body is + at the same time in different places, except by some kind of transformation, as in the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore it + can nowise happen by a miracle that two bodies be together in the same place. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Blessed Virgin gave birth to her Son by a miracle. Now in this hallowed birth it was necessary for two bodies to be together + in the same place, because the body of her child when coming forth did not break through the enclosure of her virginal purity. + Therefore it is possible for two bodies to be miraculously together in the same place. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A3-p7"> Further, this may again be proved from the fact that our Lord went in to His disciples, the doors being shut ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q83_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.20.19" target="asv">Jn. 20:19</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q83_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#John.20.26" target="asv">26</a>). + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A3-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As shown above + <a id="XP_Q83_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q83_A2.html">(A[2])</a> the reason why two bodies must needs be in two places is that distinction in matter requires distinction in place. Wherefore + we observe that when two bodies merge into one, each loses its distinct being, and one indistinct being accrues to the two + combined, as in the case of mixtures. Hence it is impossible for two bodies to remain two and yet be together unless each + retain its distinct being which it had + hitherto, in so much as each of them was a being undivided in itself and distinct from others. Now this distinct being depends + on the essential principles of a thing as on its proximate causes, but on God as on the first cause. And since the first cause + can preserve a thing in being, though the second causes be done away, as appears from the first proposition of De Causis, + therefore by God's power and by that alone it is possible for an accident to be without substance as in the Sacrament of + the Altar. Likewise by the power of God, and by that alone, it is possible for a body to retain its distinct being from that + of another body, although its matter be not distinct as to place from the matter of the other body: and thus it is possible + by a miracle for two bodies to be together in the same place. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is sophistical because it is based on a false supposition, or begs the question. For it supposes the existence, + between two opposite superficies of a place, of a dimension proper to the place, with which dimension a dimension of the body + put in occupation of the place would have to be identified: because it would then follow that the dimensions of two bodies + occupying a place would become one dimension, if each of them were identified + with the dimension of the place. But this supposition is false, because if it were true whenever a body acquires a new place, + it would follow that a change takes place in the dimensions of the place or of thing placed: since it is impossible for two + things to become one anew, except one of them be changed. Whereas if, as is the case in truth, no other dimensions belong + to a place than those of the thing occupying the place, it is clear that the argument proves nothing, but begs the question, + because according to this nothing else has been said, but that the dimensions of a thing placed are the same as the dimensions + of the place; excepting that the dimensions of the thing placed are contained within the bounds of the place, and that the + distance between the bounds of a place is commensurate with the distance between the bounds of the thing placed, just as the + former would be distant by their own dimensions if they had them. Thus that the dimensions of two bodies be the dimensions + of one place is nothing else than that two bodies be in the same place, which is the chief question at issue. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Granted that by a miracle two bodies be together in the same place, nothing follows either against common principles, or + against the definition of a line, or against any conclusions of geometry. For, as stated above + <a id="XP_Q83_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q83_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, dimensive quantity differs from all other accidents in that it has a special reason of individuality and distinction, namely + on account of the placing of the parts, besides the reason of individuality and + distinction which is common to it and all other accidents, arising namely from the matter which is its subject. Thus then + one line may be understood as being distinct from another, either because it is in another subject (in which case we are considering + a material line), or because it is placed at a distance from another (in which case we are considering a mathematical line, + which is understood apart from matter). Accordingly if we remove matter, there can be no distinction between lines save + in respect of a different placing: and in like manner neither can there be a distinction of points, nor of superficies, nor + of any dimensions whatever. Consequently geometry cannot suppose one line to be added to another, as being distinct therefrom + unless it be distinct as to place. But supposing by a Divine miracle a distinction of subject without a distinction of place, + we can understand a distinction of lines; and these are not distant from one another in place, on account of the + distinction of subjects. Again we can understand a difference of points, and thus different lines described on two bodies + that are in the same place are drawn from different points to different points; for the point that we take is not a point + fixed in the place, but in the placed body, because a line is not said to be drawn otherwise than from a point which is its + term. In like manner the two circles described in two spherical bodies that occupy the same place are two, not on account + of the + difference of place, else they could not touch one another as a whole, but on account of the distinction of subjects, and + thus while wholly touching one another they still remain two. Even so a circle described by a placed spherical body touches, + as a whole, the other circle described by the locating body. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God could make a body not to be in a place; and yet supposing this, it would not follow that a certain body is not in a place, + because the greater body is the place of the lesser body, by reason of its superficies which is described by contact with + the terms of the lesser body. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It is impossible for one body to be miraculously in two places locally (for Christ's body is not locally on the altar), although + it is possible by a miracle for two bodies to be in the same place. Because to be in several places at once is incompatible + with the individual, by reason of its having being undivided in itself, for it would follow that it is divided as to place. + on the other hand, to be in the same place with another body is incompatible + with the individual as distinct from aught else. Now the nature of unity is perfected in indivision (Metaph. v), whereas distinction + from others is a result of the nature of unity. Wherefore that one same body be locally in several places at once implies + a contradiction, even as for a man to lack reason, while for two bodies to be in the same place does not imply a contradiction, + as explained above. Hence the comparison fails. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A3-p13"></p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A3-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q83_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q83_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q83_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q83_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q83_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q83_A4-p0.1">Whether one glorified body can be in the same place together with another glorified body?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q83_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a glorified body can be in the same place together with another glorified body. Because where there is + greater subtlety there is less resistance. If then a glorified body is more subtle than a non-glorified body, it will offer + less resistance to a glorified body: and so if a glorified body can be in the same place with a non-glorified body, much more + can it with a glorified body. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, even as a glorified body will be more subtle than a non-glorified body, so will one glorified body be more subtle + than another. Therefore if a glorified body can be in the same place with a non-glorified body, a more subtle glorified body + can be in the same place with a less subtle glorified body. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the body of heaven is subtle, and will then be glorified. Now the glorified body of a saint will be able to be in + the same place with the body of heaven, since the saints will be able at will to travel to and from earth. Therefore two glorified + bodies will be able to occupy the same place. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The glorified bodies will be spiritual, that is like spirits in a certain respect. Now two spirits cannot be in the same + place, although a body and a spirit can be in the same place, as stated above (Sent. i, D, 37, Q[3], A[3]; + <a id="XP_Q83_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q52_A3.html">FP, Q[52], A[3]</a>). Therefore neither will two glorified bodies be able to be in the same place. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A4-p6"> Further, if two bodies occupy the same place, one is penetrated by the other. But to be penetrated is a mark of imperfection + which will be altogether absent from the glorified bodies. Therefore it will be impossible for two glorified bodies to be + in the same place. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The property of a glorified body does not make it able to be in the same place with another glorified body, nor again to + be in the same place with a non-glorified body. But it would be possible by the Divine power for two glorified bodies or two + non-glorified bodies to be in the same place, even as a glorified body with a non-glorified body. Nevertheless it is not befitting + for a glorified body to be in the same place with another glorified body, both + because a becoming order will be observed in them, which demands distinction, and because one glorified body will not be in + the way of another. Consequently two glorified bodies will never be in the same place. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument supposes that a glorified body is able by reason of its subtlety to be in the same place with another body: + and this is not true. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A4-p9"> The same answer applies to the Second Objection.</p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The body of heaven and the other bodies will be said equivocally to be glorified, in so far as they will have a certain share + in glory, and not as though it were becoming for them to have the gifts of glorified human bodies. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q83_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q83_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q83_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q83_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q83_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q83_A5-p0.1">Whether by virtue of its subtlety a glorified body will no longer need to be in an equal place?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q83_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that by virtue of its subtlety, a glorified body will no longer need to be in an equal place. For the glorified + bodies will be made like to the body of Christ according to + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q83_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.21" target="asv"> Phil. 3:21.</a> Now Christ's body is not bound by this necessity of being in an equal place: wherefore it is contained whole under the small + or great dimensions of a consecrated host. Therefore the same will be true of the glorified bodies. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. iv, 6), that two bodies are not in the same place, because it would follow that the + greatest body would occupy the smallest place, since its various parts could be in the same part of the place: for it makes + no difference whether two bodies or however many be in the same place. Now a glorified body will be in the same place with + another body, as is commonly admitted. Therefore it will be possible for it to be in any place + however small. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, even as a body is seen by reason of its color, so is it measured by reason of its quantity. Now the glorified body + will be so subject to the spirit that it will be able at will to be seen, and not seen, especially by a non-glorified eye, + as evidenced in the case of Christ. Therefore its quantity will be so subject to the spirit's will that it will be able to + be in a little or great place, and to have a little or great quantity at will. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text. 30) that "whatever is in a place occupies a place equal to itself." Now the glorified + body will be in a place. Therefore it will occupy a place equal to itself. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A5-p6"> Further, the dimensions of a place and of that which is in that place are the same, as shown in Phys. iv, text. 30,76,77. + Therefore if the place were larger than that which is in the place the same thing would be greater and smaller than itself, + which is absurd. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A body is not related to place save through the medium of its proper dimensions, in respect of which a located body is confined + through contact with the locating body. Hence it is not possible for a body to occupy a place smaller than its quantity, unless + its proper quantity be made in some way less than itself: and this can only be understood in two ways. First, by a variation + in quantity in respect of the same matter, so that in fact the matter which at + first is subject to a greater quantity is afterwards subject to a lesser. Some have held this to be the case with the glorified + bodies, saying that quantity is subject to them at will, so that when they list, they are able to have a great quantity, and + when they list a small quantity. But this is impossible, because no movement affecting that which is intrinsic to a thing + is possible without passion to the detriment [*Cf. + <a id="XP_Q83_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q22_A1.html">FS, Q[22], A[1]</a>; + <a id="XP_Q83_A5-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q41_A1.html">FS, Q[41], + A[1] + </a>] of its substance. Hence in incorruptible, i.e. heavenly, bodies, there is only local movement, which is not according to + something intrinsic. Thus it is clear that change of quantity in respect of matter would be incompatible with the impassibility + and incorruptibility of a glorified body. Moreover, it would follow that a glorified body would be sometimes rarer and sometimes + denser, because since it cannot be deprived of any of its matter, sometimes the same matter would be under + great dimensions and sometimes under small dimensions, and thus it would be rarefied and densified, which is impossible. Secondly, + that the quantity of a glorified body become smaller than itself may be understood by a variation of place; so, to wit, that + the parts of a glorified body insinuate themselves into one another, so that it is reduced in quantity however small it may + become. And some have held this to be the case, saying that by reason of its subtlety a glorified body will be able to + be in the same place with a non-glorified body: and that in like manner its parts can be one within the other, so much so + that a whole glorified body will be able to pass through the minutest opening in another body: and thus they explain how Christ's + body came out of the Virgin's womb; and how it went into His disciples, the doors being shut. But this is impossible; both + because the glorified body will not be able, by reason of its subtlety, to be in the same place with another body, and + because, even if it were able to be in the same place with another body, this would not be possible if the other were a glorified + body, as many say; and again because this would be inconsistent with the right disposition of the human body, which requires + the parts to be in a certain fixed place and at a certain fixed distance from one another. Wherefore this will never happen, + not even by a miracle. Consequently we must say that the glorified body will always be in a place equal to itself. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Christ's body is not locally in the Sacrament of the Altar, as stated above (Sent. iv, D, 10, Q[1], A[1], ad 5; + <a id="XP_Q83_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q77_A5.html">TP, Q[77], A[5]</a>). + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Philosopher's argument is that for the same reason one part might permeate another. But this permeation of the parts + of a glorified body into one another is impossible, as stated above. Therefore the objection does not prove. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A body is seen because it acts on the sight: but that it does or does not act on the sight causes no change in the body. + Hence it is not unfitting, if it can be seen when it will, and not seen when it will [*Cf. + <a id="XP_Q83_A5-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q55_A4.html">TP, Q[55], A[4]</a>]. On the other hand, being in a place is not an action proceeding from a body by reason of its quantity, as being seen is + by reason of its color. Consequently the comparison fails. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A5-p11"></p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A5-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q83_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q83_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q83_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q83_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q84.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q83_A6-p0.1">Whether the glorified body, by reason of its subtlety, will be impalpable?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q83_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the glorified body, by reason of its subtlety, is impalpable. For Gregory says (Hom. xxv in Evang.): "What + is palpable must needs be corruptible." But the glorified body is incorruptible. Therefore it is impalpable. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is palpable resists one who handles it. But that which can be in the same place with another does not resist + it. Since then a glorified body can be in the same place with another body, it will not be palpable. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every palpable body is tangible. Now every tangible body has tangible qualities in excess of the qualities of the + one touching it. Since then in the glorified bodies the tangible qualities are not in excess but are reduced to a supreme + degree of equality, it would seem that they are impalpable. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> our Lord rose again with a glorified body; and yet His body was palpable, as appears from + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q83_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.24.39" target="asv"> Lk. 24:39</a>: "Handle, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones." Therefore the glorified bodies also will be palpable. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A6-p6"> Further, this is the heresy of Eutychius, Bishop of Constantinople, as Gregory states (Moral. xxiv): for he said that in + the glory of the resurrection our bodies will be impalpable. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A6-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Every palpable body is tangible, but not conversely. For every body is tangible that has qualities whereby the sense of touch + has a natural aptitude to be affected: wherefore air, fire, and the like are tangible bodies: but a palpable body, in addition + to this, resists the touch; wherefore the air which never resists that which passes through it, and is most easily pierced, + is tangible indeed but not palpable. Accordingly it is clear that a body is said to + be palpable for two reasons, namely on account of its tangible qualities, and on account of its resisting that which touches + it, so as to hinder it from piercing it. And since the tangible qualities are hot and cold and so forth, which are not found + save in heavy and light bodies, which through being contrary to one another are therefore corruptible, it follows that the + heavenly bodies, which by their nature are incorruptible, are sensible to the sight but not tangible, and therefore neither + are they palpable. This is what Gregory means when he says (Hom. xxv in Evang.) that "whatever is palpable must needs be corruptible." + Accordingly the glorified body has by its nature those qualities which have a natural aptitude to affect the touch, and yet + since the body is altogether subject to the spirit, it is in its power thereby to affect or not to affect the touch. In like + manner it is competent by its nature to resist any other passing body, so that the latter cannot be in the same + place together with it: although, according to its pleasure, it may happen by the Divine power that it occupy the same place + with another body, and thus offer no resistance to a passing body. Wherefore according to its nature the glorified body is + palpable, but it is competent for it to be impalpable to a non-glorified body by a supernatural power. Hence Gregory says + (Hom. xxv in Evang.) that "our Lord offered His flesh to be handled, which He had brought in through the closed doors, so + as to + afford a complete proof that after His resurrection His body was unchanged in nature though changed in glory." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The incorruptibility of a glorified body does not result from the nature of its component parts; and it is on account of + that nature that whatever is palpable is corruptible, as stated above. Hence the argument does not prove. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although in a way it is possible for a glorified body to be in the same place with another body: nevertheless the glorified + body has it in its power to resist at will any one touching it, and thus it is palpable. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the glorified bodies the tangible qualities are not reduced to the real mean that is measured according to equal distance + from the extremes, but to the proportionate mean, according as is most becoming to the human complexion in each part. Wherefore + the touch of those bodies will be most delightful, because a power always delights in a becoming object, and is grieved by + excess. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A6-p11"></p> + <p id="XP_Q83_A6-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q83_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q84.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.XP_Q82_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q83_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q84" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q83_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q84_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="XP_Q84-p0.1">OF THE AGILITY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="XP_Q84-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q84-p2"> We must now consider the agility of the bodies of the blessed in the resurrection. Under this head there are three points + of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84-p3"> (1) Whether the glorified bodies will be agile?</p> + <p id="XP_Q84-p4"> (2) Whether they will move?</p> + <p id="XP_Q84-p5"> (3) Whether they will move instantaneously?</p> + <div id="XP_Q84_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q84.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q84_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q84_A1-p0.1">Whether the glorified bodies will be agile?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q84_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the glorified bodies will not be agile. For that which is agile by itself needs not to be carried in order + to move. But the glorified bodies will, after the resurrection, be taken up by the angels (according to a gloss) in the clouds + "to meet Christ, into the air" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q84_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.4.16" target="asv">1 Thess. 4:16</a>). Therefore the glorified bodies will not be agile. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no body that moves with labor and pain can be said to be agile. Yet the glorified bodies will move thus, since the + principle of their movement, namely the soul, moves them counter to their nature, else they would always move in the same + direction. Therefore they are not agile. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, of all the animal operations sense surpasses movement in nobility and priority. Yet no property is ascribed to glorified + bodies as perfecting them in sensation. Therefore neither should agility be ascribed to them as perfecting them in movement. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, nature gives different animals instruments of different disposition according to their different powers: hence she + does not give instruments of the same disposition to slow as to fleet animals. Now God's works are much more orderly than + those of nature. Since then the glorified body's members will have the same disposition, shape and quantity as they now have, + it would seem that it will have no agility other than it has now. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q84_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.43" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:43</a>): "It is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power," that is, according to a gloss, "mobile and living." But mobility can + only signify agility in movement. Therefore the glorified bodies will be agile. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A1-p7"> Further, slowness of movement would seem especially inconsistent with the nature of a spirit. But the glorified bodies will + be most spiritual according to + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q84_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.44" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:44.</a> Therefore they will be agile. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The glorified body will be altogether subject to the glorified soul, so that not only will there be nothing in it to resist + the will of the spirit, for it was even so in the case of Adam's body, but also from the glorified soul there will flow into + the body a certain perfection, whereby it will become adapted to that subjection: and this perfection is called "the gift + of the glorified body." Now the soul is united to body not only as its form, but also as + its mover; and in both ways the glorified body must needs be most perfectly subject to the glorified soul. Wherefore even + as by the gift of subtlety the body is wholly subject to the soul as its form, whence it derives its specific being, so by + the gift of agility it is subject to the soul as its mover, so that it is prompt and apt to obey the spirit in all the movements + and actions of the soul. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A1-p9"> Some, however, ascribe the cause of this agility to the fifth, i.e. the heavenly essence, which will then be predominant + in the glorified bodies. But of this we have frequently observed that it does not seem probable ( + <a id="XP_Q84_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q82_A1.html">Q[82], A[1]</a>; + <a id="XP_Q84_A1-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q83_A1.html"> Q[83], A[1]</a>). Wherefore it is better to ascribe it to the soul, whence glory flows to the body. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Glorified bodies are said to be borne by the angels and also on the clouds, not as though they needed them, but in order + to signify the reverence which both angels and all creatures will show them. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The more the power of the moving soul dominates over the body, the less is the labor of movement, even though it be counter + to the body's nature. Hence those in whom the motive power is stronger, and those who through exercise have the body more + adapted to obey the moving spirit, labor less in being moved. And since, after the resurrection, the soul will perfectly dominate + the body, both on account of the perfection of its own power, and on account of + the glorified body's aptitude resulting from the outflow of glory which it receives from the soul, there will be no labor + in the saints' movements, and thus it may be said that the bodies of the saints' will be agile. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> By the gift of agility the glorified body will be rendered apt not only for local movement but also for sensation, and for + the execution of all the other operations of the soul. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even as nature gives to fleeter animals instruments of a different disposition in shape and quantity, so God will give to + the bodies of the saints a disposition other than that which they have now, not indeed in shape and quantity, but in that + property of glory which is called agility. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A1-p14"></p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A1-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q84.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q84_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q84_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q84_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q84_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q84_A2-p0.1">Whether the saints will never use their agility for the purpose of movement?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q84_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the saints will never use their agility for the purpose of movement. For, according to the Philosopher + (Phys. iii, 2), "movement is the act of the imperfect." But there will be no imperfection in glorified bodies. Neither therefore + will there be any movement. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all movement is on account of some need, because whatever is in motion is moved for the sake of obtaining some end. + But glorified bodies will have no need, since as Augustine says (De Spiritu et Anima, lxiii [*Cf. + <a id="XP_Q84_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q70_A2.html"> Q[70], A[2]</a>, ad 1]), "all thou willest will be there, and nothing that thou willest not." Therefore they will not move. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (De Coelo et Mundo ii), "that which shares the Divine goodness without movement shares + it more excellently than that which shares it with movement." Now the glorified body shares the Divine goodness more excellently + than any other body. Since then certain bodies, like the heavenly bodies, will remain altogether without movement, it seems + that much more will human bodies remain so. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii) that the soul being established in God will in consequence establish its body. + Now the soul will be so established in God, that in no way will it move away from Him. Therefore in the body there will be + no movement caused by the soul. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the more noble a body is, the more noble a place is due to it: wherefore Christ's body which is the most exalted + of all has the highest place of all, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q84_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.26" target="asv"> Heb. 7:26, </a> "Made higher than the heavens," where a gloss [*Gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q84_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.3" target="asv"> Heb. 1:3</a>: "On the right hand of the majesty"] says, "in place and dignity." And again each glorified body will, in like manner, have + a place befitting it according to the measure of + its dignity. Now a fitting place is one of the conditions pertaining to glory. Since then after the resurrection the glory + of the saints will never vary, neither by increase nor by decrease, because they will then have reached the final term of + all, it would seem that their bodies will never leave the place assigned to them, and consequently will not be moved. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A2-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q84_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.40.31" target="asv">Is. 40:31</a>): "They shall run and not be weary, they shall walk and not faint"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q84_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.3.7" target="asv">Wis. 3:7</a>): "(The just) shall run to and fro like sparks among the reeds." Therefore there will be some movement in glorified bodies. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A2-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to suppose that the glorified bodies are moved sometimes, since even Christ's body was moved in His ascension, + and likewise the bodies of the saints, which will arise from the earth, will ascend to the empyrean [*The empyrean was the + highest of the concentric spheres or heavens, and was identified by Christian writers with the abode of God. Cf. + <a id="XP_Q84_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q56_A3.html">FP, Q[56], A[3]</a>]. But even after they have climbed the heavens, it is + likely that they will sometimes move according as it pleases them; so that by actually putting into practice that which is + in their power, they may show forth the excellence of Divine wisdom, and that furthermore their vision may be refreshed by + the beauty of the variety of creatures, in which God's wisdom will shine forth with great evidence: for sense can only perceive + that which is present, although glorified bodies can perceive from a greater distance than non-glorified bodies. And yet + movement will nowise diminish their happiness which consists in seeing God, for He will be everywhere present to them; thus + Gregory says of the angels (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.) that "wherever they are sent their course lies in God." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Local movement changes nothing that is intrinsic to a thing, but only that which is without namely place. Hence that which + is moved locally is perfect as to those things which are within (Phys. viii, 7), although it has an imperfection as to place, + because while it is in one place it is in potentiality with regard to another place, since it cannot be in several places + at the same time, for this belongs to God alone. But this defect is not inconsistent + with the perfection of glory, as neither is the defect whereby a creature is formed from nothing. Hence such like defects + will remain in glorified bodies. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A person is said to need a thing in two ways, namely absolutely and relatively. One needs absolutely that without which one + cannot retain one's being or one's perfection: and thus movement in glorified bodies will not be on account of a need, because + their happiness will suffice them for all such things. But we need a thing relatively when without it some end we have in + view cannot be obtained by us, or not so well, or not in some particular way. It + is thus that movement will be in the blessed on account of need, for they will be unable to show forth their motive power + practically, unless they be in motion, since nothing prevents a need of this kind being in glorified bodies. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument would prove if the glorified body were unable even without movement to share the Divine goodness much more + perfectly than the heavenly bodies, which is untrue. Hence glorified bodies will be moved, not in order to gain a perfect + participation in the Divine goodness (since they have this through glory), but in order to show the soul's power. On the other + hand, the movement of the heavenly bodies could not show their power, except the + power they have in moving lower bodies to generation and corruption, which is not becoming to that state. Hence the argument + does not prove. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Local movement takes nothing away from the stability of the soul that is established in God, since it does not affect that + which is intrinsic to a thing, as stated above (ad 1). + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The fitting place assigned to each glorified body according to the degree of its dignity belongs to the accidental reward. + Nor does it follow that this reward is diminished whenever the body is outside its place; because that place pertains to reward, + not as actually containing the body located therein (since nothing flows therefrom into the glorified body, but rather does + it receive splendor therefrom), but as being due to merits. Wherefore, though + out of that place, they will still continue to rejoice in it. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A2-p14"></p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A2-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q84_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q84_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q84_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q84_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q85.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q84_A3-p0.1">Whether the movement of the saints will be instantaneous?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q84_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that movement of the saints will be instantaneous. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 30) that "wherever + the spirit listeth there will the body be." Now the movement of the will, whereby the spirit wishes to be anywhere, is instantaneous. + Therefore the body's movement will be instantaneous. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher (Phys. iv, 8) proves that there is no movement through a vacuum, because it would follow that something + moves instantaneously, since a vacuum offers no resistance whatever to a thing that is in motion, whereas the plenum offers + resistance; and so there would be no proportion between the velocity of movement in a vacuum and that of movement in a plenum, + since the ratio of movements in point of velocity is as the ratio of the resistance + offered by the medium. Now the velocities of any two movements that take place in time must needs be proportional, since any + one space of time is proportional to any other. But in like manner no full place can resist a glorified body since this can + be in the same place with another body, no matter how this may occur; even as neither can a vacuum resist a body. Therefore + if it moves at all, it moves instantaneously. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the power of a glorified soul surpasses the power of a non-glorified soul, out of all proportion so to speak. Now + the non-glorified soul moves the body in time. Therefore the glorified soul moves the body instantaneously. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whatever is moved equally soon to what is near and what is distant, is moved instantaneously. Now such is the movement + of a glorified body, for however distant the space to which it is moved, the time it takes to be moved is imperceptible: wherefore + Augustine says (QQ. De Resurrectione, Ep. cii, qu. 1) that "the glorified body reaches equally soon to any distance, like + the sun's ray." Therefore the glorified body is moved instantaneously. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, whatever is in motion is moved either in time or in an instant. Now after the resurrection the glorified body will + not be moved in time, since time will not be then according to + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q84_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.10.6" target="asv"> Apoc. 10:6.</a> Therefore this movement will be instantaneous. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A3-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> In local movement space. movement and time are equally divisible, as is demonstrated in Phys. vi, 4. Now the space traversed + by a glorified body in motion is divisible. Therefore both the movement and the time are divisible. But an instant is indivisible. + Therefore this movement will not be instantaneous. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A3-p8"> Further, a thing cannot be at the same time wholly in one place and partly in another place, since it would follow that the + remaining part is in two places at the same time, which is impossible. But whatever is in motion is partly in a term "wherefrom" + and partly in a term "whereto," as is proved in Phys. vi, 6: while whatever has been in motion is wholly in the term whereto + the movement is directed; and it is impossible at the same time for it to be moved and to have been + moved. Now that which is moved instantaneously is being moved and has been moved at the same time. Therefore the local movement + of a glorified body cannot be instantaneous. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A3-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Opinion is much divided on this point. For some say that a glorified body passes from one place to another without passing + through the interval, just as the will passes from one place to another without passing through the interval, and that consequently + it is possible for the movement of a glorified body like that of the will to be instantaneous. But this will not hold: because + the glorified body will never attain to the dignity of the spiritual nature, + just as it will never cease to be a body. Moreover, when the will is said to move from one place to another, it is not essentially + transferred from place to place, because in neither place is it contained essentially, but it is directed to one place after + being directed by the intention to another: and in this sense it is said to move from one place to another. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A3-p10"> Hence others [*Alexander of Hales, Sum. Th. III, Q[23], mem. 3] say that it is a property of the nature of a glorified body, + since it is a body, to pass through the interval and consequently to be moved in time, but that by the power of glory, which + raises it to a certain infinitude above the power of nature, it is possible for it not to pass through the interval, and consequently + to be moved instantaneously. But this is impossible since it implies a contradiction: which is + proved as follows. Suppose a body which we will call Z to be in motion from A to B. It is clear that Z, as long as it is wholly + in A is not in motion; and in like manner when it is wholly in B, because then the movement is past. Therefore if it is at + any time in motion it must needs be neither wholly in A nor wholly in B. Therefore while it is in motion, it is either nowhere, + or partly in A, and partly in B, or wholly in some other intervening place, say C, or partly in A and C and partly in C + and B. But it is impossible for it to be nowhere, for then there would be a dimensive quantity without a place, which is impossible. + Nor again is it possible for it to be partly in A and partly in B without being in some way in the intervening space. for + since B is a place distant from A, it would follow that in the intervening space the part of Z which is in B is not continuous + with the part which is in A. Therefore it follows that it is either wholly in C, or partly in C, and partly in some + other place that intervenes between C and A, say D, and so forth. Therefore it follows that Z does not pass form A to B unless + first of all it be in all the intervening places: unless we suppose that it passes from A to B without ever being moved, which + implies a contradiction, because the very succession of places is local movement. The same applies to any change whatever + having two opposite terms, each of which is a positive entity, but not to those changes which have only one positive term, + the other being a pure privation, since between affirmation and negation or privation there is no fixed distance: wherefore + that which is in the negation may be nearer to or more remote from affirmation, and conversely, by reason of something that + causes either of them or disposes thereto: so that while that which is moved is wholly under a negation it is changed into + affirmation, and "vice versa"; wherefore in such things "to be changing precedes to be changed," as is proved in Phys. vi, + 5. + Nor is there any comparison with the movement of an angel, because being in a place is predicated equivocally of a body and + an angel. Hence it is clear that it is altogether impossible for a body to pass from one place to another, unless it pass + through every interval. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A3-p11"> Wherefore others grant this, and yet they maintain that the glorified body is moved instantaneously. But it follows from + this that a glorified body is at the same instant in two or more places together, namely in the ultimate term, and in all + the intervening places, which is impossible. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A3-p12"> To this, however, they reply that, although it is the same instant really, it is not the same logically, like a point at + which different lines terminate. But this is not enough, because an instant measures the instantaneous, according to its reality + and not according to our way of considering it. Wherefore an instant through being considered in a different way is not rendered + capable of measuring things that are not simultaneous in time, just as a point through being considered + in a different way does not make it possible for one point of place to contain things that are locally distant from one another. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A3-p13"> Hence others with greater probability hold that a glorified body moves in time, but that this time is so short as to be imperceptible; + and that nevertheless one glorified body can pass through the same space in less time than another, because there is no limit + to the divisibility of time, no matter how short a space we may take. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That which is little lacking is as it were not lacking at all (Phys. ii, 5); wherefore we say: "I do so and so at once," + when it is to be done after a short time. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks when he says that "wheresoever the will + shall be, there shall the body be forthwith." Or we may say that in the blessed there will never be an inordinate will: so + that they never will wish their body to be instantaneously where it cannot be, and + consequently whatever instant the will shall choose, at that same instant the body will be in whatever place the will shall + determine. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A3-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some have demurred to this proposition of the Philosopher's, as the Commentator thereon observes. They say that the ratio + of one whole movement to another whole movement is not necessarily as the ratio of one resisting medium to another resisting + medium, but that the ratio of the intervening mediums gives us the ratio of retardations attending the movements on account + of the resistance of the medium. For every movement has a certain fixed speed, + either fast or slow, through the mover overcoming the movable, although there be no resistance on the part of the medium; + as evidenced in heavenly bodies, which have nothing to hinder their movement; and yet they do not move instantaneously, but + in a fixed time proportionate to the power of the mover in comparison with the movable. Consequently it is clear that even + if we suppose something to move in a vacuum, it does not follow that it moves instantaneously, but that nothing is added to + the + time which that movement requires in the aforesaid proportion of the mover to the movable, because the movement is not retarded. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A3-p16"> But this reply, as the Commentator observes, proceeds from an error in the imagination; for it is imagined that the retardation + resulting from the resistance of the medium is a part of movement added to the natural movement, the quantity of which is + in proportion to the mover in comparison with the movable, as when one line is added to another: for the proportion of one + total to the other is not the same as the proportion of the lines to which an addition has been made. [*The + same applies to mathematical quantities: for instance the ratio 2 + 1 to 4 + 1 is not as 2 to 4.] And so there would not be + the same proportion between one whole sensible movement and another, as between the retardations resulting from the resistance + of the medium. This is an error of the imagination, because each part of a movement has as much speed as the whole movement: + whereas not every part of a line has as much of the dimensive quantity as the whole line has. Hence any retardation or + acceleration affecting the movement affects each of its parts, which is not the case with lines: and consequently the retardation + that comes to a movement is not another part of the movement, whereas in the case of the lines that which is added is a part + of the total line. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A3-p17"> Consequently, in order to understand the Philosopher's argument, as the Commentator explains, we must take the whole as being + one, that is we must take not only the resistance of the movable to the moving power, but also the resistance of the medium + through which the movement takes place, and again the resistance of anything else, so that we take the amount of retardation + in the whole movement as being proportionate to the moving power in comparison with the resisting movable, + no matter in what way it resist, whether by itself or by reason of something extrinsic. For the movable must needs always + resist the mover somewhat, since mover and moved, agent and patient, as such, are opposed to one another. Now sometimes it + is to be observed that the moved resists the mover by itself, either because it has a force inclining it to a contrary movement, + as appears in violent movements, or at least because it has a place contrary to the place which is in the intention of the + mover; and such like resistance even heavenly bodies offer their movers. Sometimes the movable resists the power of the mover, + by reason only of something else and not by itself. This is seen in the natural movement of heavy and light things, because + by their very form they are inclined to such a movement: for the form is an impression of their generator, which is the mover + as regards heavy and light bodies. On the part of matter we find no resistance, neither of a force inclining to a contrary + movement nor of a contrary place, since place is not due to matter except in so far as the latter, being circumscribed by + its dimensions, is perfected by its natural form. Hence there can be no resistance save on the part of the medium, and this + resistance is connatural to their movement. Sometimes again the resistance results from both, as may be seen in the movements + of animals. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A3-p18"> Accordingly when in a movement there is no resistance save on the part of the movable, as in the heavenly bodies, the time + of the movement is measured according to the proportion of the mover to the movable, and the Philosopher's argument does not + apply to these, since if there be no medium at all their movement is still a movement in time. on the other hand, in those + movements where there is resistance on the part of the medium only, the measure of time is taken only according + to the obstacle on the part of the medium, so that if the medium be removed there will be no longer an obstacle; and so either + it will move instantaneously, or it will move in an equal time through a vacuum and through a plenum, because granted that + it moves in time through a vacuum, that time will bear some proportion to the time in which it moves through a plenum. Now + it is possible to imagine another body more subtle in the same proportion than the body which filled the space, and then if + this body fill some other equal space it will move in as little time through that plenum as it did previously through a vacuum, + since by as much as the subtlety of the medium is increased by so much is the length of time decreased, and the more subtle + the medium the less it resists. But in those other movements where resistance is offered by both the movable and the medium, + the quantity of time must be proportionate to the power of the mover as compared with the resistance of both movable and + medium together. Hence granted that the medium be taken away altogether, or that it cease to hinder, it does not follow that + the movement is instantaneous, but that the time is measured according only to the resistance of the movable. Nor will there + be any inconsistency if it move in an equal time through a vacuum, and through a space filled with the most subtle body imaginable, + since the greater the subtlety we ascribe to the medium the less is it naturally inclined to retard the movement. + Wherefore it is possible to imagine so great a subtlety, as will naturally retard the movement less than does the resistance + of the movable, so that the resistance of the medium will add no retardation to the movement. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A3-p19"> It is therefore evident that although the medium offer no resistance to the glorified bodies, in so far as it is possible + for them to be in the same place with another body, nevertheless their movement will not be instantaneous, because the movable + body itself will resist the motive power from the very fact that it has a determinate place, as we have said in reference + to the heavenly bodies. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A3-p20"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the power of a glorified soul surpasses immeasurably the power of a non-glorified soul, it does not surpass it infinitely, + because both powers are finite: hence it does not follow that it causes instantaneous movement. And even if its power were + simply infinite, it would not follow that it causes an instantaneous movement, unless the resistance of the movable were overcome + altogether. Now although the resistance of the movable to the mover, + that results from opposition to such a movement by reason of its being inclined to a contrary movement, can be altogether + overcome by a mover of infinite power, nevertheless the resistance it offers through contrariety towards the place which the + mover intends by the movement cannot be overcome altogether except by depriving it of its being in such and such a place or + position. For just as white resists black by reason of whiteness, and all the more according as whiteness is the more distant + from blackness, so a body resists a certain place through having an opposite place and its resistance is all the greater, + according as the distance is greater. Now it is impossible to take away from a body its being in some place or position, except + one deprive it of its corporeity, by reason of which it requires a place or position: wherefore so long as it retains the + nature of a body, it can nowise be moved instantaneously, however greater be the motive power. Now the glorified body will + never lose its corporeity, and therefore it will never be possible for it to be moved instantaneously. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A3-p21"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the words of Augustine, the speed is said to be equal because the excess of one over the other is imperceptible, just + as the time taken by the whole movement is imperceptible. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A3-p22"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Although after the resurrection the time which is the measure of the heaven's movement will be no more, there will nevertheless + be time resulting from the before and after in any kind of movement. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A3-p23"></p> + <p id="XP_Q84_A3-p24"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q84_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q85.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.XP_Q83_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q84_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q85" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q84_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q85_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="XP_Q85-p0.1">OF THE CLARITY OF THE BEATIFIED BODIES (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="XP_Q85-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q85-p2"> We must now consider the clarity of the beatified bodies at the resurrection. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="XP_Q85-p3"> (1) Whether there will be clarity in the glorified bodies?</p> + <p id="XP_Q85-p4"> (2) Whether this clarity will be visible to the non-glorified eye?</p> + <p id="XP_Q85-p5"> (3) Whether a glorified body will of necessity be seen by a non-glorified body?</p> + <div id="XP_Q85_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q85.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q85_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q85_A1-p0.1">Whether clarity is becoming to the glorified body?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q85_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that clarity is unbecoming to the glorified body. Because according to Avicenna (Natural. vi, 2), "every luminous + body consists of transparent parts." But the parts of a glorified body will not be transparent, since in some of them, such + as flesh and bones, earth is predominant. Therefore glorified bodies are not lightsome. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every lightsome body hides one that is behind it; wherefore one luminary behind another is eclipsed, and a flame + of fire prevents one seeing what is behind it. But the glorified bodies will not hide that which is within them, for as Gregory + says on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q85_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Job.28.17" target="asv"> Job 28:17, </a> "Gold or crystal cannot equal it" (Moral. xviii, 48). "There," that is in the heavenly country, "the grossness of the members + will not hide one's mind from another's eyes, + and the very harmony of the body will be evident to the bodily sight." Therefore those bodies will not be lightsome. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, light and color require a contrary disposition in their subject, since "light is the extreme point of visibility + in an indeterminate body; color, in a determinate body" (De Sensu et Sensato iii). But glorified bodies will have color, for + as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 3), "the body's beauty is harmony of parts with a certain charm of color": and it will + be impossible for the glorified bodies to lack beauty. Therefore the glorified bodies will + not be lightsome. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if there be clarity in the glorified bodies, it will need to be equal in all the parts of the body, just as all + the parts will be equally impassible, subtle and agile. But this is not becoming, since one part has a greater disposition + to clarity than another, for instance the eye than the hand, the spirits [*"Animalem," as though it were derived from "animus"---the + mind. Cf. + <a id="XP_Q85_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html">FS, Q[50], A[1]</a>,3m; + <a id="XP_Q85_A1-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html">FS, Q[52], + A[1] + </a> ,3m] than the bones, the humors than the flesh or nerves. Therefore it would seem unfitting for those bodies to be lightsome. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q85_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.43" target="asv">Mat. 13:43</a>): "The just shall shine as the sun in the kingdom of their Father," and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q85_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.3.7" target="asv">Wis. 3:7</a>): "The just shall shine, and shall run to and fro like sparks among the reeds." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A1-p7"> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q85_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.43" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:43</a>): "It is sown in dishonor, it shall rise in glory," which refers to clarity, as evidenced by the previous context where the + glory of the rising bodies is compared to the clarity of the stars. Therefore the bodies of the saints will be lightsome. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to assert that after the resurrection the bodies of the saints will be lightsome, on account of the authority + of Scripture which makes this promise. But the cause of this clarity is ascribed by some to the fifth or heavenly essence, + which will then predominate in the human body. Since, however, this is absurd, as we have often remarked ( + <a id="XP_Q85_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q84_A1.html">Q[84], A[1]</a>), it is better to say that this clarity will result from the overflow + of the soul's glory into the body. For whatever is received into anything is received not according to the mode of the source + whence it flows, but according to the mode of the recipient. Wherefore clarity which in the soul is spiritual is received + into the body as corporeal. And consequently according to the greater clarity of the soul by reason of its greater merit, + so too will the body differ in clarity, as the Apostle affirms ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q85_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.41" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:41</a>). Thus in the glorified body + the glory of the soul will be known, even as through a crystal is known the color of a body contained in a crystal vessel, + as Gregory says on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q85_A1-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Job.28.17" target="asv"> Job 28:17, </a> "Gold or crystal cannot equal it." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Avicenna is speaking of a body that has clarity through the nature of its component parts. It is not thus but rather by merit + of virtue that the glorified body will have clarity. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Gregory compares the glorified body to gold on account of clarity, and to crystal on account of its transparency. Wherefore + seemingly we should say that they will be both transparent and lightsome; for that a lightsome body be not transparent is + owing to the fact that the clarity of that body results from the density of the lightsome parts, and density is opposed to + transparency. Then, however, clarity will result from another cause, as stated above: + and the density of the glorified body will not deprive it of transparency, as neither does the density of a crystal deprive + crystal. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A1-p11"> Some, on the other hand, say that they are compared to crystal, not because they are transparent, but on account of this + likeness, for as much as that which is enclosed in crystal is visible, so the glory of the soul enclosed in the glorified + body will not be hidden. But the first explanation is better, because it safeguards better the dignity of the glorified body, + and is more consistent with the words of Gregory. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The glory of the body will not destroy nature but will perfect it. Wherefore the body will retain the color due to it by + reason of the nature of its component parts, but in addition to this it will have clarity resulting from the soul's glory. + Thus we see bodies which have color by their nature aglow with the resplendence of the sun, or from some other cause extrinsic + or intrinsic. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even as the clarity of glory will overflow from the soul into the body according to the mode of the body, and is there otherwise + than in the soul, so again it will overflow into each part of the soul according to the mode of that part. Hence it is not + unreasonable that the different parts should have clarity in different ways, according as they are differently disposed thereto + by their nature. Nor is there any comparison with the other gifts of the + body, for the various parts of the body are not differently disposed in their regard. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A1-p14"></p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A1-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q85.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q85_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q85_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q85_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q85_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q85_A2-p0.1">Whether the clarity of the glorified body is visible to the non-glorified eye?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q85_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the clarity of the glorified body is invisible to the non-glorified eye. For the visible object should + be proportionate to the sight. But a non-glorified eye is not proportionate to see the clarity of glory, since this differs + generically from the clarity of nature. Therefore the clarity of the glorified body will not be seen by a non-glorified eye. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the clarity of the glorified body will be greater than the clarity of the sun is now, since the clarity of the sun + also will then be greater than it is now, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q85_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.30.26" target="asv"> Is. 30:26, </a> and the clarity of the glorified body will be much greater still, for which reason the sun and the entire world will receive + greater clarity. Now a non-glorified eye is unable to gaze on the very orb of the sun on account of the greatness of its + clarity. Therefore still less will it be able to gaze on the clarity of a glorified body. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a visible object that is opposite the eyes of the seer must needs be seen, unless there be some lesion to the eye. + But the clarity of a glorified body that is opposite to non-glorified eyes is not necessarily seen by them: which is evident + in the case of the disciples who saw our Lord's body after the resurrection, without witnessing its clarity. Therefore this + clarity will be invisible to a non-glorified eye. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q85_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.21" target="asv"> Phil. 3:21, </a> "Made like to the body of His glory," says: "It will be like the clarity which He had in the Transfiguration." Now this clarity + was seen by the non-glorified eyes of the disciples. Therefore the clarity of the glorified body will be visible to non-glorified + eyes also. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A2-p6"> Further, the wicked will be tortured in the judgment by seeing the glory of the just, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q85_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.5.2" target="asv"> Wis. 5:2.</a> But they would not fully see their glory unless they gazed on their clarity. Therefore, etc. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have asserted that the clarity of the glorified body will not be visible to the non-glorified eye, except by a miracle. + But this is impossible, unless this clarity were so named equivocally, because light by its essence has a natural tendency + to move the sight, and sight by its essence has a natural tendency to perceive light, even as the true is in relation to the + intellect, and the good to the appetite. Wherefore if there were a sight altogether + incapable of perceiving a light, either this sight is so named equivocally, or else this light is. This cannot be said in + the point at issue, because then nothing would be made known to us when we are told that the glorified bodies will be lightsome: + even so a person who says that a dog [*The dog star] is in the heavens conveys no knowledge to one who knows no other dog + than the animal. Hence we must say that the clarity of a glorified body is naturally visible to the non-glorified eye. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The clarity of glory will differ generically from the clarity of nature, as to its cause, but not as to its species. Hence + just as the clarity of nature is, by reason of its species, proportionate to the sight, so too will the clarity of glory be. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as a glorified body is not passible to a passion of nature but only to a passion of the soul [*Cf. Q[82], A[1]], so + in virtue of its property of glory it acts only by the action of the soul. Now intense clarity does not disturb the sight, + in so far as it acts by the action of the soul, for thus it rather gives delight, but it disturbs it in so far as it acts + by the action of nature by heating and destroying the organ of sight, and by scattering + the spirits* asunder. [*"Animalem," as though it were derived from "animus"---the mind. Cf. + <a id="XP_Q85_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html">FS, Q[50], A[1]</a> ,3m; + <a id="XP_Q85_A2-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html">FS, Q[52], A[1]</a>,3m.] Hence, though the clarity of a glorified body surpasses the clarity of the sun, it does not by its nature disturb the + sight but soothes it: wherefore this clarity is compared to the jasper-stone ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q85_A2-p9.3" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.11" target="asv">Apoc. 21:11</a>). + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The clarity of the glorified body results from the merit of the will and therefore will be subject to the will, so as to + be seen or not seen according to its command. Therefore it will be in the power of the glorified body to show forth its clarity + or to hide it: and this was the opinion of Praepositivus. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q85_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q85_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q85_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q85_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q86.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q85_A3-p0.1">Whether a glorified body will be necessarily seen by a non-glorified body?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q85_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a glorified body will be necessarily seen by a non-glorified body. For the glorified bodies will be lightsome. + Now a lightsome body reveals itself and other things. Therefore the glorified bodies will be seen of necessity. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every body which hides other bodies that are behind it is necessarily perceived by the sight, from the very fact + that the other things behind it are hidden. Now the glorified body will hide other bodies that are behind it from being seen, + because it will be a colored body. Therefore it will be seen of necessity. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as quantity is something in a body, so is the quality whereby a body is seen. Now quantity will not be subject + to the will, so that the glorified body be able to be of greater or smaller quantity. Therefore neither will the quality of + visibility be subject to the will, so that a body be able not to be seen. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> our body will be glorified in being made like to the body of Christ after the resurrection. Now after the resurrection Christ's + body was not necessarily seen; in fact it vanished from the sight of the disciples at Emmaus ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q85_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.24.31" target="asv">Lk. 24:31</a>). Therefore neither will the glorified body be necessarily seen. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A3-p6"> Further, there the body will be in complete obedience to the will. Therefore as the soul lists the body will be visible or + invisible. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A visible object is seen, inasmuch as it acts on the sight. Now there is no change in a thing through its acting or not acting + on an external object. Wherefore a glorified body may be seen or not seen without any property pertaining to its perfection + being changed. Consequently it will be in the power of a glorified soul for its body to be seen or not seen, even as any other + action of the body will be in the soul's power; else the glorified body would not be + a perfectly obedient instrument of its principal agent. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This clarity will be obedient to the glorified body so that this will be able to show it or hide it. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A body's color does not prevent its being transparent except in so far as it affects the sight, because the sight cannot + be affected by two colors at the same time, so as to perceive them both perfectly. But the color of the glorified body will + be completely in the power of the soul, so that it can thereby act or not act on the sight. Hence it will be in its power + to hide or not to hide a body that is behind it. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Quantity is inherent to the glorified body itself, nor would it be possible for the quantity to be altered at the soul's + bidding without the glorified body suffering some alteration incompatible with its impassibility. Hence there is no comparison + between quantity and visibility, because even this quality whereby it is visible cannot be removed at the soul's bidding, + but the action of that quality will be suspended, and thus the body will be hidden at + the soul's command. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="XP_Q85_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q85_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q86.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.XP_Q84_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q85_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q86" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q85_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q86_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="XP_Q86-p0.1">OF THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE BODIES OF THE DAMNED WILL RISE AGAIN (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="XP_Q86-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q86-p2"> We must next consider the conditions in which the bodies of the damned will rise again. Under this head there are three points + of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86-p3"> (1) Whether the bodies of the damned will rise again with their deformities?</p> + <p id="XP_Q86-p4"> (2) Whether their bodies will be corruptible?</p> + <p id="XP_Q86-p5"> (3) Whether they will be impassible?</p> + <div id="XP_Q86_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q86.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q86_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q86_A1-p0.1">Whether the bodies of the damned will rise again with their deformities?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q86_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the bodies of the damned will rise again with their deformities. For that which was appointed as a punishment + for sin should not cease except the sin be forgiven. Now the lack of limbs that results from mutilation, as well as all other + bodily deformities, are appointed as punishments for sin. Therefore these deformities will not be taken away from the damned, + seeing that they will not have received the forgiveness of their sins. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as the saints will rise again to final happiness, so the wicked will rise again to final unhappiness. Now when + the saints rise again nothing will be taken from them that can pertain to their perfection, therefore nothing pertaining to + the defect or unhappiness of the wicked will be taken from them at the resurrection. But such are their deformities. Therefore, + etc. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as deformity is a defect of the passible body, so is slowness of movement. Now slowness of movement will not + be taken from the bodies of the damned at the resurrection, since their bodies will not be agile. Therefore for the same reason + neither will their deformity be taken away. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q86_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.52" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:52</a>): "The dead shall rise again incorruptible"; where a gloss says: "The dead, i.e. sinners, or all the dead in general shall + rise again incorruptible, i.e. without the loss of any limbs." Therefore the wicked will rise again without their deformities. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A1-p6"> Further, there will be nothing in the damned to lessen the sense of pain. But sickness hinders the sense of pain by weakening + the organ of sense, and in like manner the lack of a limb would prevent pain from affecting the whole body. Therefore the + damned will rise again without these defects. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Deformity in the human body is of two kinds. One arises from the lack of a limb: thus we say that a mutilated person is deformed, + because he lacks due proportion of the parts to the whole. Deformities of this kind, without any doubt, will not be in the + bodies of the damned, since all bodies of both wicked and good will rise again whole. Another deformity arises from the undue + disposition of the parts, by reason of undue quantity, quality, or place---which + deformity is, moreover, incompatible with due proportion of parts to whole. Concerning these deformities and like defects + such as fevers and similar ailments which sometimes result in deformity, Augustine remained undecided and doubtful (Enchiridion + xcii) as the Master remarks (Sent. iv, D, 44). Among modern masters, however, there are two opinions on this point. For some + say that such like deformities and defects will remain in the bodies of the damned, because they consider that those who are + damned are sentenced to utmost unhappiness wherefrom no affliction should be rebated. But this would seem unreasonable. For + in the restoration of the rising body we look to its natural perfection rather than to its previous condition: wherefore those + who die under perfect age will rise again in the stature of youth, as stated above ( + <a id="XP_Q86_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q81_A1.html">Q[81], A[1]</a>). Consequently those who had natural defects in the body, or deformities resulting therefrom, will be restored without those + defects or deformities at the resurrection, unless the demerit of sin prevent; and so if a person rise again with such defects + and deformities, this will be for his punishment. Now the mode of punishment is according to the measure of guilt. And a sinner + who is about to be damned may be burdened with less grievous sins and yet have deformities and defects which one who is about + to be damned has not, while burdened with more grievous sins. Wherefore if he who had deformities in this life rise + again with them, while the other who had them not in this life, and therefore, as is clear, will rise again without them, + though deserving of greater punishment, the mode of the punishment would not correspond to the amount of guilt; in fact it + would seem that a man is more punished on account of the pains which he suffered in this world; which is absurd. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A1-p8"> Hence others say with more reason, that He Who fashioned nature will wholly restore the body's nature at the resurrection. + Wherefore whatever defect or deformity was in the body through corruption, or weakness of nature or of natural principles + (for instance fever, purblindness, and so forth) will be entirely done away at the resurrection: whereas those defects in + the human body which are the natural result of its natural principles, such as heaviness, passibility, and the like, + will be in the bodies of the damned, while they will be removed from the bodies of the elect by the glory of the resurrection. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since in every tribunal punishment is inflicted according to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, the punishments which in this + temporal life are inflicted for some particular sin are themselves temporal, and extend not beyond the term of this life. + Hence although the damned are not pardoned their sins, it does not follow that there they will undergo the same punishments + as they have in this world: but the Divine justice demands that there they shall + suffer more severe punishment for eternity. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There is no parity between the good and the wicked, because a thing can be altogether good, but not altogether evil. Hence + the final happiness of the saints requires that they should be altogether exempt from all evil; whereas the final unhappiness + of the wicked will not exclude all good, because "if a thing be wholly evil it destroys itself," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. + iv, 5). Hence it is necessary for the good of their nature to underlie the + unhappiness of the damned, which good is the work of their perfect Creator, Who will restore that same nature to the perfection + of its species. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Slowness of movement is one of those defects which are the natural result of the principles of the human body; but deformity + is not, and consequently the comparison fails. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q86.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q86_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q86_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q86_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q86_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q86_A2-p0.1">Whether the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q86_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the bodies of the damned will be corruptible. For everything composed of contraries must necessarily be + corruptible. Now the bodies of the damned will be composed of the contraries whereof they are composed even now, else they + would not be the same, neither specifically nor, in consequence, numerically. Therefore they will be corruptible. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if the bodies of the damned will not be corruptible, this will be due either to nature, or to grace, or to glory. + But it will not be by nature, since they will be of the same nature as now; nor will it be by grace or glory, since they will + lack these things altogether. Therefore they will be corruptible. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it would seem inconsistent to withdraw the greatest of punishments from those who are in the highest degree of unhappiness. + Now death is the greatest of punishments, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. iii, 6). Therefore death should not be withdrawn + from the damned, since they are in the highest degree of unhappiness. Therefore their bodies will be corruptible. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q86_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.9.6" target="asv">Apoc. 9:6</a>): "In those days men shall seek death, and shall not find it, and they shall desire to die, and death shall fly from them." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A2-p6"> Further, the damned will be punished with an everlasting punishment both in soul and body ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q86_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.46" target="asv">Mat. 25:46</a>): "These shall go into everlasting punishment." But this would not be possible if their bodies were corruptible. Therefore + their bodies will be incorruptible. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since in every movement there must needs be a principle of movement, movement or change may be withdrawn from a movable in + two ways: first through absence of a principle of movement, secondly through an obstacle to the principle of movement. Now + corruption is a kind of change: and consequently a body which is corruptible on account of the nature of its principles may + be rendered incorruptible in two ways. First by the total removal of the principle which + leads to corruption, and in this way the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible. For since the heaven is the first principle + of alteration in virtue of its local movement, and all other secondary agents act in virtue thereof and as though moved thereby, + it follows that at the cessation of the heavenly movement there is no longer any agent that can change the body by altering + it from its natural property. Wherefore after the resurrection, and the cessation of the heavenly movement, there + will be no quality capable of altering the human body from its natural quality. Now corruption, like generation, is the term + of alteration. Hence the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible, and this will serve the purpose of Divine justice, since + living for ever they will be punished for ever. This is in keeping with the demands of Divine justice, as we shall state further + on + <a id="XP_Q86_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q86_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, even as now the corruptibility of bodies serves the purpose of Divine providence, + by which through the corruption of one thing another is generated. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A2-p8"> Secondly, this happens through the principle of corruption being hindered, and in this way the body of Adam was incorruptible, + because the conflicting qualities that exist in man's body were withheld by the grace of innocence from conducing to the body's + dissolution: and much more will they be withheld in the glorified bodies, which will be wholly subject to the spirit. Thus + after the general resurrection the two aforesaid modes of incorruptibility will be united together in the + bodies of the blessed. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The contraries of which bodies are composed are conducive to corruption as secondary principles. For the first active principle + thereof is the heavenly movement: wherefore given the movement of the heaven, it is necessary for a body composed of contraries + to be corrupted unless some more powerful cause prevent it: whereas if the heavenly movement be withdrawn, the contraries + of which a body is composed do not suffice to cause corruption, even in + accordance with nature, as explained above. But the philosophers were ignorant of a cessation in the heavenly movement; and + consequently they held that a body composed of contraries is without fail corrupted in accordance with nature. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This incorruptibility will result from nature, not as though there were some principle of incorruption in the bodies of the + damned, but on account of the cessation of the active principle of corruption, as shown above. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although death is simply the greatest of punishments, yet nothing prevents death conducing, in a certain respect, to a cessation + of punishments; and consequently the removal of death may contribute to the increase of punishment. For as the Philosopher + says (Ethic. ix, 9), "Life is pleasant to all, for all desire to be . . . But we must not apply this to a wicked or corrupt + life, nor one passed in sorrow." Accordingly just as life is simply pleasant, + but not the life that is passed in sorrows, so too death, which is the privation of life, is painful simply, and the greatest + of punishments, inasmuch as it deprives one of the primary good, namely being, with which other things are withdrawn. But + in so far as it deprives one of a wicked life, and of such as is passed in sorrow, it is a remedy for pains, since it puts + an end to them. and consequently the withdrawal of death leads to the increase of punishments by making them everlasting. + If + however we say that death is penal by reason of the bodily pain which the dying feel, without doubt the damned will continue + to feel a far greater pain: wherefore they are said to be in "everlasting death," according to the Psalm (48:15): "Death shall + feed upon them." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q86_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q86_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="XP_Q86_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.XP_Q86_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP.iv.html"></a> + <h4 id="XP_Q86_A3-p0.1">Whether the bodies of the damned will be impassible?</h4> + <p id="XP_Q86_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the bodies of the damned will be impassible. For, according to the Philosopher (Topic. vi), "increase + of passion results in loss of substance." Now "if a finite thing be continually lessened, it must needs at length be done + away" (Phys. i, 4). Therefore if the bodies of the damned will be passible, and will be ever suffering, they will at length + be done away and corrupted: and this has been shown to be false + <a id="XP_Q86_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q86_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. + Therefore they will be impassible. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every agent likens the patient to itself. If then the bodies of the damned are passive to the fire the fire will + liken them to itself. Now fire does not consume bodies except in so far as in likening them to itself it disintegrates them. + Therefore if the bodies of the damned will be passible they will at length be consumed by the fire, and thus the same conclusion + follows as before. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those animals, for instance the salamander, which are said to remain living in fire without being destroyed, are + not distressed by the fire: because an animal is not distressed by bodily pain, unless the body in some way is hurt thereby. + If therefore the bodies of the damned can, like the aforesaid animals, remain in the fire without being corrupted, as Augustine + asserts (De Civ. Dei xxi, 2,4), it would seem that they will suffer no distress there: + which would not be the case unless their bodies were impassible. Therefore, etc. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the bodies of the damned be passible, the pain resulting from their suffering, seemingly, will surpass all present + bodily pain, even as the joy of the saints will surpass all present joy. Now in this life it sometimes happens that the soul + is severed from the body through excess of pain. Much more therefore if those bodies will be passible, the souls will be separate + from the bodies through excess of pain, and thus those bodies will be corrupted: + which is false. Therefore those bodies will be impassible. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q86_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.52" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:52</a>): "And we shall be changed": and a gloss says: "We---the good alone---will be changed with the unchangeableness and impassibility + of glory." + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A3-p7"> Further, even as the body co-operates with the soul in merit, so does it co-operate in sin. Now on account of the former + co-operation not only the soul but also the body will be rewarded after the resurrection. Therefore in like manner the bodies + of the damned will be punished; which would not be the case were they impassible. Therefore they will be passible. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A3-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The principal cause of the bodies of the damned not being consumed by fire will be the Divine justice by which their bodies + will be consigned to everlasting punishment. Now the Divine justice is served also by the natural disposition, whether on + the part of the passive body or on the part of the active causes; for since passiveness is a kind of receptiveness, there + are two kinds of passion, corresponding to two ways in which one thing is receptive of + another. For a form may be received into a subject materially according to its natural being, just as the air receives heat + from fire materially; and corresponding to this manner of reception there is a kind of passion which we call "passion of nature." + In another way one thing is received into another spiritually by way of an "intention," just as the likeness of whiteness + is received into the air and in the pupil: this reception is like that whereby the soul receives the likeness of things: + wherefore corresponding to this mode of reception is another mode of passion which we call "passion of the soul." Since therefore + after the resurrection and the cessation of the heavenly movement it will be impossible for a body to be altered by its natural + quality, as stated above + <a id="XP_Q86_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q86_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, it will not be possible for any body to be passive with a passion of nature. Consequently as regards this mode of passion + the bodies of the damned will be impassible even as they will + be incorruptible. Yet after the heaven has ceased to move, there will still remain the passion which is after the manner of + the soul, since the air will both receive light from the sun, and will convey the variety of colors to the sight. Wherefore + in respect of this mode of passion the bodies of the damned will be passible. But the glorified bodies, albeit they receive + something, and are in a manner patient to sensation, will nevertheless not be passive, since they will receive nothing to + distress or hurt them, as will the bodies of the damned, which for this reason are said to be passible. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking of the passion whereby the patient is changed from its natural disposition. But this kind of + passion will not be in the bodies of the damned, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The likeness of the agent is in the patient in two ways. First, in the same way as in the agent, and thus it is in all univocal + agents, for instance a thing that is hot makes another thing hot, and fire generates fire. Secondly, otherwise than in the + agent, and thus it is in all equivocal agents. In these it happens sometimes that a form which is in the agent spiritually + is received into the patient materially: thus the form of the house built by the + craftsman is materially in itself, but spiritually in the mind of the craftsman. On the other hand, sometimes it is in the + agent materially, but is received into the patient spiritually: thus whiteness is materially on the wall wherein it is received, + whereas it is spiritually in the pupil and in the transferring medium. And so it is in the case at issue, because the species + which is in the fire materially is received spiritually into the bodies of the damned; thus it is that the fire will + assimilate the bodies of the damned to itself, without consuming them withal. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to the Philosopher (De Prop. Element.), "no animal can live in fire." Galen also (De simp. medic.) says "that there + is no body which at length is not consumed by fire"; although sometimes certain bodies may remain in fire without hurt, such + as ebony. The instance of the salamander is not altogether apposite, since it cannot remain in the fire without being at last + consumed, as do the bodies of the damned in hell. Nor does it follow that + because the bodies of the damned suffer no corruption from the fire, they therefore are not tormented by the fire, because + the sensible object has a natural aptitude to please or displease the senses, not only as regards its natural action of stimulating + or injuring the organ, but also as regards its spiritual action: since when the sensible object is duly proportionate to the + sense, it pleases, whereas the contrary is the result when it is in excess or defect. Hence subdued colors and + harmonious sounds are pleasing, whereas discordant sounds displease the hearing. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Pain does not sever the soul from the body, in so far as it is confined to a power of the soul which feels the pain, but + in so far as the passion of the soul leads to the body being changed from its natural disposition. Thus it is that we see + that through anger the body becomes heated, and through fear, chilled: whereas after the resurrection it will be impossible + for the body to be changed from its natural disposition, as stated above + + <a id="XP_Q86_A3-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q86_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Consequently, however great the pain will be, it will not sever the body from the soul. + </p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A3-p13"></p> + <p id="XP_Q86_A3-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.XP_Q86_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP.iv.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.XP_Q85_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q86_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.XP_Q68_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.XP_Q69.html"></a> + ` + </div> \ No newline at end of file