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+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="SS.iv" class="div2">
+            <a href="summa.SS_Q170_A2.html"></a>
+            <a href="summa.SS_Q171.html"></a>
+            <h2 id="SS.iv-p0.1">TREATISE ON GRATUITOUS GRACES (QQ[171]-182)</h2>
+            <div id="SS_Q171" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS.iv.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q171-p0.1">OF PROPHECY (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q171-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q171-p2"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q171-p3"> After treating individually of all the virtues and vices that pertain to men of all conditions and estates, we must now consider
+                  those things which pertain especially to certain men. Now there is a triple difference between men as regards things connected
+                  with the soul's habits and acts. First, in reference to the various gratuitous graces, according to 
+                  <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:4</a>, 
+                  <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.7" target="asv">7</a>: "There are diversities of graces . . . and to one . . . by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to another the
+                  word of knowledge," etc. Another difference arises from the diversities of life, namely the active and the contemplative life,
+                  which correspond to diverse purposes of operation, wherefore it is stated (
+                  <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171-p3.3" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:4</a>, 
+                  <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171-p3.4" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.7" target="asv">7</a>) that "there are diversities of operations." For the purpose of operation in Martha, who "was busy about much serving," which
+                  pertains to the active life, differed from the purpose of operation in Mary, "who sitting . . . at the Lord's feet, heard
+                  His word"
+                  (
+                  <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171-p3.5" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.39" target="asv">Lk. 10:39,40</a>), which pertains to the contemplative life. A third difference corresponds to the various duties and states of life, as expressed
+                  in
+                  <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171-p3.6" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.11" target="asv"> Eph. 4:11, </a> "And He gave some apostles; and some prophets; and other some evangelists; and other some pastors and doctors": and this
+                  pertains to diversity of ministries, of which it is written (
+                  <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171-p3.7" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:5</a>): "There are diversities of ministries."
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q171-p4"> With regard to gratuitous graces, which are the first object to be considered, it must be observed that some of them pertain
+                  to knowledge, some to speech, and some to operation. Now all things pertaining to knowledge may be comprised under "prophecy,"
+                  since prophetic revelation extends not only to future events relating to man, but also to things relating to God, both as
+                  to those which are to be believed by all and are matters of "faith," and as to yet higher mysteries, which
+                  concern the perfect and belong to "wisdom." Again, prophetic revelation is about things pertaining to spiritual substances,
+                  by whom we are urged to good or evil; this pertains to the "discernment of spirits." Moreover it extends to the direction
+                  of human acts, and this pertains to "knowledge," as we shall explain further on (
+                  <a id="SS_Q171-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q177.html">Q[177])</a>. Accordingly we must first of all consider prophecy, and rapture which is a degree of prophecy.
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q171-p5"> Prophecy admits of four heads of consideration: (1) its essence; (2) its cause; (3) the mode of prophetic knowledge; (4)
+                  the division of prophecy.
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q171-p6"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q171-p7"> (1) Whether prophecy pertains to knowledge?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q171-p8"> (2) Whether it is a habit?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q171-p9"> (3) Whether it is only about future contingencies?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q171-p10"> (4) Whether a prophet knows all possible matters of prophecy?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q171-p11"> (5) Whether a prophet distinguishes that which he perceives by the gift of God, from that which he perceives by his own spirit?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q171-p12"> (6) Whether anything false can be the matter of prophecy?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q171_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q171_A1-p0.1">Whether prophecy pertains to knowledge?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prophecy does not pertain to knowledge. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.48.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 48:14</a>) that after death the body of Eliseus prophesied, and further on (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.49.18" target="asv">Ecclus. 49:18</a>) it is said of Joseph that "his bones were visited, and after death they prophesied." Now no knowledge remains in the body
+                     or in the bones after death. Therefore prophecy does not pertain to knowledge.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:3</a>): "He that prophesieth, speaketh to men unto edification." Now speech is not knowledge itself, but its effect. Therefore
+                     it would seem that prophecy does not pertain to knowledge.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every cognitive perfection excludes folly and madness. Yet both of these are consistent with prophecy; for it is
+                     written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.9.7" target="asv">Osee 9:7</a>): "Know ye, O Israel, that the prophet was foolish and mad [*Vulg.: 'the spiritual man was mad']." Therefore prophecy is
+                     not a cognitive perfection.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as revelation regards the intellect, so inspiration regards, apparently, the affections, since it denotes a
+                     kind of motion. Now prophecy is described as "inspiration" or "revelation," according to Cassiodorus [*Prolog. super Psalt.
+                     i]. Therefore it would seem that prophecy does not pertain to the intellect more than to the affections.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.9.9" target="asv">1 Kings 9:9</a>): "For he that is now called a prophet, in time past was called a seer." Now sight pertains to knowledge. Therefore prophecy
+                     pertains to knowledge.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Prophecy first and chiefly consists in knowledge, because, to wit, prophets know things that are far [procul] removed from
+                     man's knowledge. Wherefore they may be said to take their name from {phanos}, "apparition," because things appear to them
+                     from afar. Wherefore, as Isidore states (Etym. vii, 8), "in the Old Testament, they were called Seers, because they saw what
+                     others saw not, and surveyed things hidden in mystery." Hence among heathen nations they
+                     were known as "vates, on account of their power of mind [vi mentis]," [*The Latin 'vates' is from the Greek {phates}, and
+                     may be rendered 'soothsayer'] (Etym. viii, 7).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A1-p8"> Since, however, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:7</a>): "The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit," and further on (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:12</a>): "Seek to abound unto the edification of the Church," it follows that prophecy consists secondarily in speech, in so far
+                     as the prophets declare for the instruction of others, the things they know through being taught of God, according to the
+                     saying of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Isa.21.10" target="asv"> Is. 21:10, </a> "That which
+                     I have heard of the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel, I have declared unto you." Accordingly, as Isidore says (Etym. viii,
+                     7), "prophets" may be described as "proefatores [foretellers], because they tell from afar [porro fantur]," that is, speak
+                     from a distance, "and foretell the truth about things to come."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A1-p9"> Now those things above human ken which are revealed by God cannot be confirmed by human reason, which they surpass as regards
+                     the operation of the Divine power, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.16.20" target="asv"> Mk. 16:20, </a> "They . . . preached everywhere, the Lord working withal and confirming the word with signs that followed." Hence, thirdly,
+                     prophecy is concerned with the working of miracles, as a kind of confirmation of the prophetic utterances. Wherefore it is
+                     written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.34.10" target="asv">Dt.
+                        34:10,11
+                     </a>): "There arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face, in all the signs and wonders."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These passages speak of prophecy in reference to the third point just mentioned, which regards the proof of prophecy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Apostle is speaking there of the prophetic utterances.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those prophets who are described as foolish and mad are not true but false prophets, of whom it is said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.3.16" target="asv">Jer. 3:16</a>): "Hearken not to the words of the prophets that prophesy to you, and deceive you; they speak a vision of their own heart,
+                     and not out of the mouth of the Lord," and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Ezek.13.3" target="asv">Ezech. 13:3</a>): "Woe to the foolish prophets, that follow their own spirit, and see nothing."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It is requisite to prophecy that the intention of the mind be raised to the perception of Divine things: wherefore it is
+                     written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.2.1" target="asv">Ezech. 2:1</a>): "Son of man, stand upon thy feet, and I will speak to thee." This raising of the intention is brought about by the motion
+                     of the Holy Ghost, wherefore the text goes on to say: "And the Spirit entered into me . . . and He set me upon my feet." After
+                     the mind's intention has been raised to
+                     heavenly things, it perceives the things of God; hence the text continues: "And I heard Him speaking to me." Accordingly inspiration
+                     is requisite for prophecy, as regards the raising of the mind, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p13.2" href="./asv.html#Job.32.8" target="asv"> Job 32:8, </a> "The inspiration of the Almighty giveth understanding": while revelation is necessary, as regards the very perception of
+                     Divine things, whereby prophecy is completed; by its means the veil of darkness and ignorance is removed, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p13.3" href="./asv.html#Job.12.22" target="asv"> Job
+                        12:22, 
+                     </a>"He discovereth great things out of darkness."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A1-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q171_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q171_A2-p0.1">Whether prophecy is a habit?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prophecy is a habit. For according to Ethic. ii, 5, "there are three things in the soul, power, passion,
+                     and habit." Now prophecy is not a power, for then it would be in all men, since the powers of the soul are common to them.
+                     Again it is not a passion, since the passions belong to the appetitive faculty, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q171_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q22_A2.html">FS, Q[22] , A[2]</a>); whereas prophecy pertains principally to knowledge, as stated in the
+                     foregoing Article. Therefore prophecy is a habit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every perfection of the soul, which is not always in act, is a habit. Now prophecy is a perfection of the soul;
+                     and it is not always in act, else a prophet could not be described as asleep. Therefore seemingly prophecy is a habit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prophecy is reckoned among the gratuitous graces. Now grace is something in the soul, after the manner of a habit,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q171_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q110_A2.html">FS, Q[110], A[2]</a>). Therefore prophecy is a habit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A habit is something "whereby we act when we will," as the Commentator [*Averroes or Ibn Roshd, 1120-1198] says (De Anima
+                     iii). But a man cannot make use of prophecy when he will, as appears in the case of Eliseus (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 3:15</a>), "who on Josaphat inquiring of him concerning the future, and the spirit of prophecy failing him, caused a minstrel to be
+                     brought to him, that the spirit of prophecy might come down upon him through the praise
+                     of psalmody, and fill his mind with things to come," as Gregory observes (Hom. i super Ezech.). Therefore prophecy is not
+                     a habit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.13" target="asv">Eph. 5:13</a>), "all that is made manifest is light," because, to wit, just as the manifestation of the material sight takes place through
+                     material light, so too the manifestation of intellectual sight takes place through intellectual light. Accordingly manifestation
+                     must be proportionate to the light by means of which it takes place, even as an effect is proportionate to its cause. Since
+                     then prophecy pertains to a
+                     knowledge that surpasses natural reason, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q171_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q171_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, it follows that prophecy requires an intellectual light surpassing the light of natural reason. Hence the saying of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Mic.7.8" target="asv"> Micah 7:8</a>: "When I sit in darkness, the Lord is my light." Now light may be in a subject in two ways: first, by way of an abiding form,
+                     as material light is in the sun, and in fire; secondly, by way of a passion, or passing impression, as light is in the air.
+                     Now the
+                     prophetic light is not in the prophet's intellect by way of an abiding form, else a prophet would always be able to prophesy,
+                     which is clearly false. For Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): "Sometimes the spirit of prophecy is lacking to the prophet,
+                     nor is it always within the call of his mind, yet so that in its absence he knows that its presence is due to a gift." Hence
+                     Eliseus said of the Sunamite woman (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A2-p6.4" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 4:27</a>): "Her soul is in anguish, and the Lord hath hid it
+                     from me, and hath not told me." The reason for this is that the intellectual light that is in a subject by way of an abiding
+                     and complete form, perfects the intellect chiefly to the effect of knowing the principle of the things manifested by that
+                     light; thus by the light of the active intellect the intellect knows chiefly the first principles of all things known naturally.
+                     Now the principle of things pertaining to supernatural knowledge, which are manifested by prophecy, is God Himself, Whom
+                     the prophets do not see in His essence, although He is seen by the blessed in heaven, in whom this light is by way of an abiding
+                     and complete form, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A2-p6.5" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.10" target="asv"> Ps. 35:10, </a> "In Thy light we shall see light."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A2-p7"> It follows therefore that the prophetic light is in the prophet's soul by way of a passion or transitory impression. This
+                     is indicated 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.33.22" target="asv">Ex. 33:22</a>: "When my glory shall pass, I will set thee in a hole of the rock," etc., and 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 19:11</a>: "Go forth and stand upon the mount before the Lord; and behold the Lord passeth," etc. Hence it is that even as the air
+                     is ever in need of a fresh enlightening, so too the prophet's mind is always in need of a fresh
+                     revelation; thus a disciple who has not yet acquired the principles of an art needs to have every detail explained to him.
+                     Wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A2-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Isa.1.4" target="asv">Is. 1:4</a>): "In the morning He wakeneth my ear, so that I may hear Him as a master." This is also indicated by the very manner in which
+                     prophecies are uttered: thus it is stated that "the Lord spake to such and such a prophet," or that "the word of the Lord,"
+                     or "the hand of the Lord was made upon him."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A2-p8"> But a habit is an abiding form. Wherefore it is evident that, properly speaking, prophecy is not a habit.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This division of the Philosopher's does not comprise absolutely all that is in the soul, but only such as can be principles
+                     of moral actions, which are done sometimes from passion, sometimes from habit, sometimes from mere power, as in the case of
+                     those who perform an action from the judgment of their reason before having the habit of that action.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A2-p10"> However, prophecy may be reduced to a passion, provided we understand passion to denote any kind of receiving, in which sense
+                     the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "to understand is, in a way, to be passive." For just as, in natural knowledge,
+                     the possible intellect is passive to the light of the active intellect, so too in prophetic knowledge the human intellect
+                     is passive to the enlightening of the Divine light.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as in corporeal things, when a passion ceases, there remains a certain aptitude to a repetition of the passion---thus
+                     wood once ignited is more easily ignited again, so too in the prophet's intellect, after the actual enlightenment has ceased,
+                     there remains an aptitude to be enlightened anew---thus when the mind has once been aroused to devotion, it is more easily
+                     recalled to its former devotion. Hence Augustine says (De orando Deum. Ep. cxxx, 9)
+                     that our prayers need to be frequent, "lest devotion be extinguished as soon as it is kindled."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A2-p12"> We might, however, reply that a person is called a prophet, even while his prophetic enlightenment ceases to be actual, on
+                     account of his being deputed by God, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A2-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.1.5" target="asv"> Jer. 1:5, </a> "And I made thee a prophet unto the nations."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every gift of grace raises man to something above human nature, and this may happen in two ways. First, as to the substance
+                     of the act---for instance, the working of miracles, and the knowledge of the uncertain and hidden things of Divine wisdom---and
+                     for such acts man is not granted a habitual gift of grace. Secondly, a thing is above human nature as to the mode but not
+                     the substance of the act---for instance to love God and to know Him in the mirror
+                     of His creatures---and for this a habitual gift of grace is bestowed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A2-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q171_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q171_A3-p0.1">Whether prophecy is only about future contingencies?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prophecy is only about future contingencies. For Cassiodorus says [*Prol. super Psalt. i] that "prophecy
+                     is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue of things with unchangeable truth." Now issues pertain to future
+                     contingencies. Therefore the prophetic revelation is about future contingencies alone.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 12</a>, the grace of prophecy is differentiated from wisdom and faith, which are about Divine things; and from the discernment of
+                     spirits, which is about created spirits; and from knowledge, which is about human things. Now habits and acts are differentiated
+                     by their objects, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q171_A3-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">FS, Q[54], A[2]</a>). Therefore it seems that the object of prophecy is not connected with any of the above. Therefore it
+                     follows that it is about future contingencies alone.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, difference of object causes difference of species, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q171_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">FS, Q[54], A[2]</a>). Therefore, if one prophecy is about future contingencies, and another about other things, it would seem to follow that
+                     these are different species of prophecy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.) that some prophecies are "about the future, for instance (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.7.14" target="asv">Is. 7:14</a>), 'Behold a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son'"; some are "about the past, as (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv">Gn. 1:1</a>), 'In the beginning God created heaven and earth'"; some are "about the present," as (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A3-p5.3" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.24" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:24,25</a>), "If all prophesy, and there come in one that believeth not . . . the secrets of his heart are made
+                     manifest." Therefore prophecy is not about future contingencies alone.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A manifestation made by means of a certain light can extend to all those things that are subject to that light: thus the
+                     body's sight extends to all colors, and the soul's natural knowledge extends to whatever is subject to the light of the active
+                     intellect. Now prophetic knowledge comes through a Divine light, whereby it is possible to know all things both Divine and
+                     human, both spiritual and corporeal; and consequently the prophetic revelation extends to
+                     them all. Thus by the ministry of spirits a prophetic revelation concerning the perfections of God and the angels was made
+                     to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.1" target="asv"> Is. 6:1, </a> where it is written, "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high and elevated." Moreover his prophecy contains matters referring
+                     to natural bodies, according to the words of 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.40.12" target="asv"> Is. 40:12, </a> "Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of His hand," etc. It also contains matters relating to human conduct, according
+                     to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A3-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Isa.58.1" target="asv">Is. 58:1</a>,
+                     "Deal thy bread to the hungry," etc.; and besides this it contains things pertaining to future events, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A3-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Isa.47.9" target="asv"> Is. 47:9, </a> "Two things shall come upon thee suddenly in one day, barrenness and widowhood."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A3-p7"> Since, however, prophecy is about things remote from our knowledge, it must be observed that the more remote things are from
+                     our knowledge the more pertinent they are to prophecy. Of such things there are three degrees. One degree comprises things
+                     remote from the knowledge, either sensitive or intellective, of some particular man, but not from the knowledge of all men;
+                     thus a particular man knows by sense things present to him locally, which another man does not know by human
+                     sense, since they are removed from him. Thus Eliseus knew prophetically what his disciple Giezi had done in his absence (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 5:26</a>), and in like manner the secret thoughts of one man are manifested prophetically to another, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.25" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:25</a>; and again in this way what one man knows by demonstration may be revealed to another prophetically.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A3-p8"> The second degree comprises those things which surpass the knowledge of all men without exception, not that they are in themselves
+                     unknowable, but on account of a defect in human knowledge; such as the mystery of the Trinity, which was revealed by the Seraphim
+                     saying: "Holy, Holy, Holy," etc. (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.3" target="asv">Is. 6:3</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A3-p9"> The last degree comprises things remote from the knowledge of all men, through being in themselves unknowable; such are future
+                     contingencies, the truth of which is indeterminate. And since that which is predicated universally and by its very nature,
+                     takes precedence of that which is predicated in a limited and relative sense, it follows that revelation of future events
+                     belongs most properly to prophecy, and from this prophecy apparently takes its name. Hence Gregory says (Hom. i
+                     super Ezech.): "And since a prophet is so called because he foretells the future, his name loses its significance when he
+                     speaks of the past or present."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Prophecy is there defined according to its proper signification; and it is in this sense that it is differentiated from the
+                     other gratuitous graces.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This is evident from what has just been said. We might also reply that all those things that are the matter of prophecy have
+                     the common aspect of being unknowable to man except by Divine revelation; whereas those that are the matter of "wisdom," "knowledge,"
+                     and the "interpretation of speeches," can be known by man through natural reason, but are manifested in a higher way through
+                     the enlightening of the Divine light. As to "faith," although it is
+                     about things invisible to man, it is not concerned with the knowledge of the things believed, but with a man's certitude of
+                     assent to things known by others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The formal element in prophetic knowledge is the Divine light, which being one, gives unity of species to prophecy, although
+                     the things prophetically manifested by the Divine light are diverse.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A3-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q171_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q171_A4-p0.1">Whether by the Divine revelation a prophet knows all that can be known prophetically?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that by the Divine revelation a prophet knows all that can be known prophetically. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Amos.3.7" target="asv">Amos 3:7</a>): "The Lord God doth nothing without revealing His secret to His servants the prophets." Now whatever is revealed prophetically
+                     is something done by God. Therefore there is not one of them but what is revealed to the prophet.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "God's works are perfect" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.32.4" target="asv">Dt. 32:4</a>). Now prophecy is a "Divine revelation," as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q171_A4-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q171_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore it is perfect; and this would not be so unless all possible matters of prophecy were revealed prophetically, since
+                     "the perfect is that which lacks nothing" (Phys. iii, 6). Therefore all possible matters of prophecy are revealed to the prophet.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Divine light which causes prophecy is more powerful than the right of natural reason which is the cause of human
+                     science. Now a man who has acquired a science knows whatever pertains to that science; thus a grammarian knows all matters
+                     of grammar. Therefore it would seem that a prophet knows all matters of prophecy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.) that "sometimes the spirit of prophecy indicates the present to the prophet's mind and
+                     nowise the future; and sometimes it points not to the present but to the future." Therefore the prophet does not know all
+                     matters of prophecy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Things which differ from one another need not exist simultaneously, save by reason of some one thing in which they are connected
+                     and on which they depend: thus it has been stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q171_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">FS, Q[65], AA[1]</a>,2) that all the virtues must needs exist simultaneously on account of prudence and charity. Now all the things that are known
+                     through some principle are connected in that principle and depend thereon. Hence he who knows a principle
+                     perfectly, as regards all to which its virtue extends, knows at the same time all that can be known through that principle;
+                     whereas if the common principle is unknown, or known only in a general way, it does not follow that one knows all those things
+                     at the same time, but each of them has to be manifested by itself, so that consequently some of them may be known, and some
+                     not.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A4-p7"> Now the principle of those things that are prophetically manifested by the Divine light is the first truth, which the prophets
+                     do not see in itself. Wherefore there is no need for their knowing all possible matters of prophecy; but each one knows some
+                     of them according to the special revelation of this or that matter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Lord reveals to the prophets all things that are necessary for the instruction of the faithful; yet not all to every
+                     one, but some to one, and some to another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Prophecy is by way of being something imperfect in the genus of Divine revelation: hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:8</a>) that "prophecies shall be made void," and that "we prophesy in part," i.e. imperfectly. The Divine revelation will be brought
+                     to its perfection in heaven; wherefore the same text continues (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A4-p9.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.113.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 113:10</a>): "When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away."
+                     Consequently it does not follow that nothing is lacking to prophetic revelation, but that it lacks none of those things to
+                     which prophecy is directed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He who has a science knows the principles of that science, whence whatever is pertinent to that science depends; wherefore
+                     to have the habit of a science perfectly, is to know whatever is pertinent to that science. But God Who is the principle of
+                     prophetic knowledge is not known in Himself through prophecy; wherefore the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q171_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q171_A5-p0.1">Whether the prophet always distinguishes what he says by his own spirit from what he says by the prophetic spirit?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the prophet always distinguishes what he says by his own spirit from what he says by the prophetic spirit.
+                     For Augustine states (Confess. vi, 13) that his mother said "she could, through a certain feeling, which in words she could
+                     not express, discern betwixt Divine revelations, and the dreams of her own soul." Now prophecy is a Divine revelation, as
+                     stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q171_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q171_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore the prophet always distinguishes
+                     what he says by the spirit of prophecy, from what he says by his own spirit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God commands nothing impossible, as Jerome [*Pelagius. Ep. xvi, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome] says.
+                     Now the prophets were commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.23.28" target="asv">Jer. 23:28</a>): "The prophet that hath a dream, let him tell a dream; and he that hath My word, let him speak My word with truth." Therefore
+                     the prophet can distinguish what he has through the spirit of prophecy from what he sees otherwise.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the certitude resulting from a Divine light is greater than that which results from the light of natural reason.
+                     Now he that has science, by the light of natural reason knows for certain that he has it. Therefore he that has prophecy by
+                     a Divine light is much more certain that he has it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): "It must be observed that sometimes the holy prophets, when consulted, utter certain
+                     things by their own spirit, through being much accustomed to prophesying, and think they are speaking by the prophetic spirit."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The prophet's mind is instructed by God in two ways: in one way by an express revelation, in another way by a most mysterious
+                     instinct to "which the human mind is subjected without knowing it," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 17). Accordingly the
+                     prophet has the greatest certitude about those things which he knows by an express revelation, and he has it for certain that
+                     they are revealed to him by God; wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.26.15" target="asv">Jer.
+                        26:15
+                     </a>): "In truth the Lord sent me to you, to speak all these words in your hearing." Else, were he not certain about this, the
+                     faith which relies on the utterances of the prophet would not be certain. A sign of the prophet's certitude may be gathered
+                     from the fact that Abraham being admonished in a prophetic vision, prepared to sacrifice his only-begotten son, which he nowise
+                     would have done had he not been most certain of the Divine revelation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A5-p7"> On the other hand, his position with regard to the things he knows by instinct is sometimes such that he is unable to distinguish
+                     fully whether his thoughts are conceived of Divine instinct or of his own spirit. And those things which we know by Divine
+                     instinct are not all manifested with prophetic certitude, for this instinct is something imperfect in the genus of prophecy.
+                     It is thus that we are to understand the saying of Gregory. Lest, however, this should lead to error,
+                     "they are very soon set aright by the Holy Ghost [*For instance, cf. 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiKgdms.7.3" target="asv">2 Kings 7:3 </a>seqq.], and from Him they hear the truth, so that they reproach themselves for having said what was untrue," as Gregory adds
+                     (Hom. i super Ezech.).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A5-p8"> The arguments set down in the first place consider the revelation that is made by the prophetic spirit; wherefore the answer
+                     to all the objections is clear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A5-p9"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A5-p10"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q171_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q171_A6-p0.1">Whether things known or declared prophetically can be false?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that things known or declared prophetically can be false. For prophecy is about future contingencies, as stated
+                     above (A[3] ). Now future contingencies may possibly not happen; else they would happen of necessity. Therefore the matter
+                     of prophecy can be false.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isaias prophesied to Ezechias saying (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.38.1" target="asv">Is. 38:1</a>): "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt surely die, and shalt not live," and yet fifteen years were added to his life
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A6-p3.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 20:6</a>). Again the Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A6-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Jer.18.7" target="asv">Jer. 18:7,8</a>): "I will suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out and to pull down and to destroy it. If that
+                     nation against which I have spoken shall repent of
+                     their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do them." This is instanced in the example of the Ninevites,
+                     according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A6-p3.4" href="./asv.html#John.3.10" target="asv"> Jn. 3:10</a>: "The Lord [Vulg.: 'God'] had mercy with regard to the evil which He had said that He would do to them, and He did it not."
+                     Therefore the matter of prophecy can be false.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in a conditional proposition, whenever the antecedent is absolutely necessary, the consequent is absolutely necessary,
+                     because the consequent of a conditional proposition stands in the same relation to the antecedent, as the conclusion to the
+                     premises in a syllogism, and a syllogism whose premises are necessary always leads to a necessary conclusion, as we find proved
+                     in I Poster. 6. But if the matter of a prophecy cannot be false, the following
+                     conditional proposition must needs be true: "If a thing has been prophesied, it will be." Now the antecedent of this conditional
+                     proposition is absolutely necessary, since it is about the past. Therefore the consequent is also necessary absolutely; yet
+                     this is unfitting, for then prophecy would not be about contingencies. Therefore it is untrue that the matter of prophecy
+                     cannot be false.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Cassiodorus says [*Prol. in Psalt. i] that "prophecy is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue of things
+                     with invariable truth." Now the truth of prophecy would not be invariable, if its matter could be false. Therefore nothing
+                     false can come under prophecy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As may be gathered from what has been said (
+                     <a id="SS_Q171_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q171_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,3,5), prophecy is a kind of knowledge impressed under the form of teaching on the prophet's intellect, by Divine revelation.
+                     Now the truth of knowledge is the same in disciple and teacher since the knowledge of the disciple is a likeness of the knowledge
+                     of the teacher, even as in natural things the form of the thing generated is a likeness of the form of the generator. Jerome
+                     speaks
+                     in this sense when he says [*Comment. in Daniel ii, 10] that "prophecy is the seal of the Divine foreknowledge." Consequently
+                     the same truth must needs be in prophetic knowledge and utterances, as in the Divine knowledge, under which nothing false
+                     can possibly come, as stated in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q171_A6-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A8.html">FP, Q[16], A[8]</a>. Therefore nothing false can come under prophecy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A6-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q171_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html">FP, Q[14], A[13]</a> the certitude of the Divine foreknowledge does not exclude the contingency of future singular events, because that knowledge
+                     regards the future as present and already determinate to one thing. Wherefore prophecy also, which is an "impressed likeness"
+                     or "seal of the Divine foreknowledge," does not by its unchangeable truth exclude the contingency of future things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Divine foreknowledge regards future things in two ways. First, as they are in themselves, in so far, to wit, as it sees
+                     them in their presentiality: secondly, as in their causes, inasmuch as it sees the order of causes in relation to their effects.
+                     And though future contingencies, considered as in themselves, are determinate to one thing, yet, considered as in their causes,
+                     they are not so determined but that they can happen otherwise. Again,
+                     though this twofold knowledge is always united in the Divine intellect, it is not always united in the prophetic revelation,
+                     because an imprint made by an active cause is not always on a par with the virtue of that cause. Hence sometimes the prophetic
+                     revelation is an imprinted likeness of the Divine foreknowledge, in so far as the latter regards future contingencies in themselves:
+                     and such things happen in the same way as foretold, for example this saying of 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.7.14" target="asv">Is. 7:14</a>: "Behold a virgin shall
+                     conceive." Sometimes, however, the prophetic revelation is an imprinted likeness of the Divine foreknowledge as knowing the
+                     order of causes to effects; and then at times the event is otherwise than foretold. Yet the prophecy does not cover a falsehood,
+                     for the meaning of the prophecy is that inferior causes, whether they be natural causes or human acts, are so disposed as
+                     to lead to such a result. In this way we are to understand the saying of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A6-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.38.1" target="asv"> Is. 38:1</a>: "Thou shalt die, and
+                     not live"; in other words, "The disposition of thy body has a tendency to death": and the saying of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A6-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Jonah.3.4" target="asv"> Jonah 3:4, </a> "Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be destroyed," that is to say, "Its merits demand that it should be destroyed." God is
+                     said "to repent," metaphorically, inasmuch as He bears Himself after the manner of one who repents, by "changing His sentence,
+                     although He changes not His counsel" [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="SS_Q171_A6-p8.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A7.html">FP, Q[19], A[7]</a>, ad 2].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since the same truth of prophecy is the same as the truth of Divine foreknowledge, as stated above, the conditional proposition:
+                     "If this was prophesied, it will be," is true in the same way as the proposition: "If this was foreknown, it will be": for
+                     in both cases it is impossible for the antecedent not to be. Hence the consequent is necessary, considered, not as something
+                     future in our regard, but as being present to the Divine foreknowledge, as
+                     stated in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q171_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html">FP, Q[14], A[13]</a>, ad 2.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A6-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q171_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS.iv.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q172" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q172-p0.1">OF THE CAUSE OF PROPHECY (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q172-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q172-p2"> We must now consider the cause of prophecy. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q172-p3"> (1) Whether prophecy is natural?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q172-p4"> (2) Whether it is from God by means of the angels?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q172-p5"> (3) Whether a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q172-p6"> (4) Whether a good life is requisite?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q172-p7"> (5) Whether any prophecy is from the demons?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q172-p8"> (6) Whether prophets of the demons ever tell what is true?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q172_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q172_A1-p0.1">Whether prophecy can be natural?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prophecy can be natural. For Gregory says (Dial. iv, 26) that "sometimes the mere strength of the soul
+                     is sufficiently cunning to foresee certain things": and Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13) that the human soul, according
+                     as it is withdrawn from the sense of the body, is able to foresee the future [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="SS_Q172_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q86_A4.html">FP, Q[86], A[4]</a>, ad 2]. Now this pertains to prophecy. Therefore the soul can acquire prophecy naturally.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the human soul's knowledge is more alert while one wakes than while one sleeps. Now some, during sleep, naturally
+                     foresee the future, as the Philosopher asserts (De Somn. et Vigil. [*De Divinat. per Somn. ii, which is annexed to the work
+                     quoted]). Much more therefore can a man naturally foreknow the future.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man, by his nature, is more perfect than dumb animals. Yet some dumb animals have foreknowledge of future things
+                     that concern them. Thus ants foreknow the coming rains, which is evident from their gathering grain into their nest before
+                     the rain commences; and in like manner fish foreknow a coming storm, as may be gathered from their movements in avoiding places
+                     exposed to storm. Much more therefore can men foreknow the future that concerns themselves,
+                     and of such things is prophecy. Therefore prophecy comes from nature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.29.18" target="asv">Prov. 29:18</a>): "When prophecy shall fail, the people shall be scattered abroad"; wherefore it is evident that prophecy is necessary for
+                     the stability of the human race. Now "nature does not fail in necessaries" [*Aristotle, de Anima iii, 9]. Therefore it seems
+                     that prophecy is from nature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.1.21" target="asv">2 Pet. 1:21</a>): "For prophecy came not by the will of man at any time, but the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Ghost." Therefore
+                     prophecy comes not from nature, but through the gift of the Holy Ghost.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[171], A[6], ad 2) prophetic foreknowledge may regard future things in two ways: in one way, as they are
+                     in themselves; in another way, as they are in their causes. Now, to foreknow future things, as they are in themselves, is
+                     proper to the Divine intellect, to Whose eternity all things are present, as stated in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q172_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html">FP, Q[14], A[13]</a>. Wherefore such like foreknowledge of the future cannot come from nature, but from
+                     Divine revelation alone. On the other hand, future things can be foreknown in their causes with a natural knowledge even by
+                     man: thus a physician foreknows future health or death in certain causes, through previous experimental knowledge of the order
+                     of those causes to such effects. Such like knowledge of the future may be understood to be in a man by nature in two ways.
+                     In one way that the soul, from that which it holds, is able to foreknow the future, and thus Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
+                     xii, 13): "Some have deemed the human soul to contain a certain power of divination." This seems to be in accord with the
+                     opinion of Plato [*Phaed. xxvii; Civit. vi], who held that our souls have knowledge of all things by participating in the
+                     ideas; but that this knowledge is obscured in them by union with the body; yet in some more, in others less, according to
+                     a difference in bodily purity. According to this it might be said that men, whose souls are not much obscured through union
+                     with the
+                     body, are able to foreknow such like future things by their own knowledge. Against this opinion Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
+                     xii, 13): "How is it that the soul cannot always have this power of divination, since it always wishes to have it?"
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p8"> Since, however, it seems truer, according to the opinion of Aristotle, that the soul acquires knowledge from sensibles, as
+                     stated in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q172_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A6.html">FP, Q[84], A[6]</a>, it is better to have recourse to another explanation, and to hold that men have no such foreknowledge of the future, but
+                     that they can acquire it by means of experience, wherein they are helped by their natural disposition, which depends on the
+                     perfection of a man's imaginative power, and the clarity of
+                     his understanding.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p9"> Nevertheless this latter foreknowledge of the future differs in two ways from the former, which comes through Divine revelation.
+                     First, because the former can be about any events whatever, and this infallibly; whereas the latter foreknowledge, which can
+                     be had naturally, is about certain effects, to which human experience may extend. Secondly, because the former prophecy is
+                     "according to the unchangeable truth" [*
+                     <a id="SS_Q172_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q171_A3.html">Q[171], A[3]</a>, OBJ[1]], while the latter
+                     is not, and can cover a falsehood. Now the former foreknowledge, and not the latter, properly belongs to prophecy, because,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q172_A1-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q171_A3.html">Q[171], A[3]</a>), prophetic knowledge is of things which naturally surpass human knowledge. Consequently we must say that prophecy strictly
+                     so called cannot be from nature, but only from Divine revelation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When the soul is withdrawn from corporeal things, it becomes more adapted to receive the influence of spiritual substances
+                     [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="SS_Q172_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q88_A4.html">FP, Q[88], A[4]</a>, ad 2], and also is more inclined to receive the subtle motions which take place in the human imagination through the impression
+                     of natural causes, whereas it is hindered from receiving them while occupied with sensible things. Hence Gregory says (Dial.
+                     iv, 26) that "the soul, at the
+                     approach of death, foresees certain future things, by reason of the subtlety of its nature," inasmuch as it is receptive even
+                     of slight impressions. Or again, it knows future things by a revelation of the angels; but not by its own power, because according
+                     to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13), "if this were so, it would be able to foreknow the future whenever it willed," which
+                     is clearly false.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Knowledge of the future by means of dreams, comes either from the revelation of spiritual substances, or from a corporeal
+                     cause, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q172_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q95_A6.html">Q[95], A[6]</a>), when we were treating of divination. Now both these causes are more applicable to a person while asleep than while awake,
+                     because, while awake, the soul is occupied with external sensibles, so that it is less receptive of the subtle impressions
+                     either of spiritual substances, or
+                     even of natural causes; although as regards the perfection of judgment, the reason is more alert in waking than in sleeping.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even dumb animals have no foreknowledge of future events, except as these are foreknown in their causes, whereby their imagination
+                     is moved more than man's, because man's imagination, especially in waking, is more disposed according to reason than according
+                     to the impression of natural causes. Yet reason effects much more amply in man, that which the impression of natural causes
+                     effects in dumb animals; and Divine grace by inspiring the prophecy
+                     assists man still more.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The prophetic light extends even to the direction of human acts; and in this way prophecy is requisite for the government
+                     of a people, especially in relation to Divine worship; since for this nature is not sufficient, and grace is necessary.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q172_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q172_A2-p0.1">Whether prophetic revelation comes through the angels?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prophetic revelation does not come through the angels. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.27" target="asv">Wis. 7:27</a>) that Divine wisdom "conveyeth herself into holy souls," and "maketh the friends of God, and the prophets." Now wisdom makes
+                     the friends of God immediately. Therefore it also makes the prophets immediately, and not through the medium of the angels.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, prophecy is reckoned among the gratuitous graces. But the gratuitous graces are from the Holy Ghost, according to
+                     
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:4, </a> "There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit." Therefore the prophetic revelation is not made by means of an angel.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Cassiodorus [*Prol. in Psalt. i] says that prophecy is a "Divine revelation": whereas if it were conveyed by the
+                     angels, it would be called an angelic revelation. Therefore prophecy is not bestowed by means of the angels.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "Our glorious fathers received Divine visions by means of the heavenly powers"; and he is
+                     speaking there of prophetic visions. Therefore prophetic revelation is conveyed by means of the angels.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1</a>), "Things that are of God are well ordered [*Vulg.: 'Those that are, are ordained of God.']." Now the Divine ordering, according
+                     to Dionysius [*Coel. Hier. iv; Eccl. Hier. v], is such that the lowest things are directed by middle things. Now the angels
+                     hold a middle position between God and men, in that they have a greater share in the perfection of the Divine goodness than
+                     men have. Wherefore the Divine
+                     enlightenments and revelations are conveyed from God to men by the angels. Now prophetic knowledge is bestowed by Divine enlightenment
+                     and revelation. Therefore it is evident that it is conveyed by the angels.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Charity which makes man a friend of God, is a perfection of the will, in which God alone can form an impression; whereas
+                     prophecy is a perfection of the intellect, in which an angel also can form an impression, as stated in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q172_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A1.html">FP, Q[111], A[1]</a>, wherefore the comparison fails between the two.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The gratuitous graces are ascribed to the Holy Ghost as their first principle: yet He works grace of this kind in men by
+                     means of the angels.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The work of the instrument is ascribed to the principal agent by whose power the instrument acts. And since a minister is
+                     like an instrument, prophetic revelation, which is conveyed by the ministry of the angels, is said to be Divine.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q172_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q172_A3-p0.1">Whether a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy. For prophecy is received by the prophet according to
+                     the disposition of the recipient, since a gloss of Jerome on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Amos.1.2" target="asv"> Amos 1:2, </a> "The Lord will roar from Sion," says: "Anyone who wishes to make a comparison naturally turns to those things of which he
+                     has experience, and among which his life is spent. For example, sailors compare their enemies to the winds, and their losses
+                     to a
+                     shipwreck. In like manner Amos, who was a shepherd, likens the fear of God to that which is inspired by the lion's roar."
+                     Now that which is received by a thing according to the mode of the recipient requires a natural disposition. Therefore prophecy
+                     requires a natural disposition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the considerations of prophecy are more lofty than those of acquired science. Now natural indisposition hinders
+                     the considerations of acquired science, since many are prevented by natural indisposition from succeeding to grasp the speculations
+                     of science. Much more therefore is a natural disposition requisite for the contemplation of prophecy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, natural indisposition is a much greater obstacle than an accidental impediment. Now the considerations of prophecy
+                     are hindered by an accidental occurrence. For Jerome says in his commentary on Matthew [*The quotation is from Origen, Hom.
+                     vi in Num.] that "at the time of the marriage act, the presence of the Holy Ghost will not be vouchsafed, even though it be
+                     a prophet that fulfils the duty of procreation." Much more therefore does a natural
+                     indisposition hinder prophecy; and thus it would seem that a good natural disposition is requisite for prophecy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (xxx in Ev.): "He," namely the Holy Ghost, "fills the boy harpist and makes him a
+                     Psalmist; He fills the herdsman plucking wild figs, and makes him a prophet." Therefore prophecy requires no previous disposition,
+                     but depends on the will alone of the Holy Ghost, of Whom it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:2</a>): "All these things, one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as He will."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q172_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q172_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, prophecy in its true and exact sense comes from Divine inspiration; while that which comes from a natural cause is not called
+                     prophecy except in a relative sense. Now we must observe that as God Who is the universal efficient cause requires neither
+                     previous matter nor previous disposition of matter in His corporeal effects, for He is able at the same instant to bring into
+                     being matter and disposition and
+                     form, so neither does He require a previous disposition in His spiritual effects, but is able to produce both the spiritual
+                     effect and at the same time the fitting disposition as requisite according to the order of nature. More than this, He is able
+                     at the same time, by creation, to produce the subject, so as to dispose a soul for prophecy and give it the prophetic grace,
+                     at the very instant of its creation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It matters not to prophecy by what comparisons the thing prophesied is expressed; and so the Divine operation makes no change
+                     in a prophet in this respect. Yet if there be anything in him incompatible with prophecy, it is removed by the Divine power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The considerations of science proceed from a natural cause, and nature cannot work without a previous disposition in matter.
+                     This cannot be said of God Who is the cause of prophecy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A natural indisposition, if not removed, might be an obstacle to prophetic revelation, for instance if a man were altogether
+                     deprived of the natural senses. In the same way a man might be hindered from the act of prophesying by some very strong passion,
+                     whether of anger, or of concupiscence as in coition, or by any other passion. But such a natural indisposition as this is
+                     removed by the Divine power, which is the cause of prophecy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q172_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q172_A4-p0.1">Whether a good life is requisite for prophecy?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a good life is requisite for prophecy. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.27" target="asv">Wis. 7:27</a>) that the wisdom of God "through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls," and "maketh the friends of God, and prophets."
+                     Now there can be no holiness without a good life and sanctifying grace. Therefore prophecy cannot be without a good life and
+                     sanctifying grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, secrets are not revealed save to a friend, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.15" target="asv"> Jn. 15:15, </a> "But I have called you friends, because all things whatsoever I have heard of My Father, I have made known to you." Now God
+                     reveals His secrets to the prophets (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Amos.3.7" target="asv">Amos 3:7</a>). Therefore it would seem that the prophets are the friends of God; which is impossible without charity. Therefore seemingly
+                     prophecy cannot be without charity; and charity is
+                     impossible without sanctifying grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.15" target="asv">Mat. 7:15</a>): "Beware of false prophets, who come to you in the clothing of sheep, but inwardly they are ravening wolves." Now all who
+                     are without grace are likened inwardly to a ravening wolf, and consequently all such are false prophets. Therefore no man
+                     is a true prophet except he be good by grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*Cf. De Divinat. per Somn. i, which is annexed to the work quoted]) that
+                     "if interpretation of dreams is from God, it is unfitting for it to be bestowed on any but the best." Now it is evident that
+                     the gift of prophecy is from God. Therefore the gift of prophecy is vouchsafed only to the best men.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A4-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> To those who had said, "Lord, have we not prophesied in Thy name?" this reply is made: "I never knew you" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.22" target="asv">Mat. 7:22,23</a>). Now "the Lord knoweth who are His" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.19" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:19</a>). Therefore prophecy can be in those who are not God's by grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A4-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A good life may be considered from two points of view. First, with regard to its inward root, which is sanctifying grace.
+                     Secondly, with regard to the inward passions of the soul and the outward actions. Now sanctifying grace is given chiefly in
+                     order that man's soul may be united to God by charity. Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18): "A man is not transferred
+                     from the left side to the right, unless he receive the Holy Ghost, by Whom he is made a
+                     lover of God and of his neighbor." Hence whatever can be without charity can be without sanctifying grace, and consequently
+                     without goodness of life. Now prophecy can be without charity; and this is clear on two counts. First, on account of their
+                     respective acts: for prophecy pertains to the intellect, whose act precedes the act of the will, which power is perfected
+                     by charity. For this reason the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13</a>) reckons prophecy with other things pertinent to the intellect, that can be had
+                     without charity. Secondly, on account of their respective ends. For prophecy like other gratuitous graces is given for the
+                     good of the Church, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:7, </a> "The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit"; and is not directly intended to unite man's affections
+                     to God, which is the purpose of charity. Therefore prophecy can be without a good life, as regards the first root of this
+                     goodness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A4-p8"> If, however, we consider a good life, with regard to the passions of the soul, and external actions, from this point of view
+                     an evil life is an obstacle to prophecy. For prophecy requires the mind to be raised very high in order to contemplate spiritual
+                     things, and this is hindered by strong passions, and the inordinate pursuit of external things. Hence we read of the sons
+                     of the prophets (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 4:38</a>) that they "dwelt together with [Vulg.: 'before']"
+                     Eliseus, leading a solitary life, as it were, lest worldly employment should be a hindrance to the gift of prophecy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sometimes the gift of prophecy is given to a man both for the good of others, and in order to enlighten his own mind; and
+                     such are those whom Divine wisdom, "conveying itself" by sanctifying grace to their minds, "maketh the friends of God, and
+                     prophets." Others, however, receive the gift of prophecy merely for the good of others. Hence Jerome commenting on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.22" target="asv"> Mat. 7:22, </a> says: "Sometimes prophesying, the working of miracles, and the
+                     casting out of demons are accorded not to the merit of those who do these things, but either to the invoking the name of Christ,
+                     or to the condemnation of those who invoke, and for the good of those who see and hear."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Gregory [*Hom. xxvii in Ev.] expounding this passage [*
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.15" target="asv">Jn. 15:15</a>] says: "Since we love the lofty things of heaven as soon as we hear them, we know them as soon as we love them, for to love
+                     is to know. Accordingly He had made all things known to them, because having renounced earthly desires they were kindled by
+                     the torches of perfect love." In this way the Divine secrets are not always revealed to prophets.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not all wicked men are ravening wolves, but only those whose purpose is to injure others. For Chrysostom says [*Opus Imperf.
+                     in Matth., Hom. xix, among the works of St. John Chrysostom, and falsely ascribed to him] that "Catholic teachers, though
+                     they be sinners, are called slaves of the flesh, but never ravening wolves, because they do not purpose the destruction of
+                     Christians." And since prophecy is directed to the good of others, it is manifest
+                     that such are false prophets, because they are not sent for this purpose by God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> God's gifts are not always bestowed on those who are simply the best, but sometimes are vouchsafed to those who are best
+                     as regards the receiving of this or that gift. Accordingly God grants the gift of prophecy to those whom He judges best to
+                     give it to.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A4-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A4-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q172_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q172_A5-p0.1">Whether any prophecy comes from the demons?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no prophecy comes from the demons. For prophecy is "a Divine revelation," according to Cassiodorus [*Prol.
+                     in Psalt. i]. But that which is done by a demon is not Divine. Therefore no prophecy can be from a demon.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some kind of enlightenment is requisite for prophetic knowledge, as stated above (Q[171], AA[2],3). Now the demons
+                     do not enlighten the human intellect, as stated above in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q172_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q119_A3.html">FP, Q[119], A[3]</a>. Therefore no prophecy can come from the demons.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a sign is worthless if it betokens contraries. Now prophecy is a sign in confirmation of faith; wherefore a gloss
+                     on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.6" target="asv">Rom. 12:6</a>, "Either prophecy to be used according to the rule of faith," says: "Observe that in reckoning the graces, he begins with
+                     prophecy, which is the first proof of the reasonableness of our faith; since believers, after receiving the Spirit, prophesied."
+                     Therefore prophecy cannot be bestowed by the demons.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 18:19</a>): "Gather unto me all Israel unto mount Carmel, and the prophets of Baal four hundred and fifty, and the prophets of the
+                     grove four hundred, who eat at Jezebel's table." Now these were worshippers of demons. Therefore it would seem that there
+                     is also a prophecy from the demons.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q172_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q171_A1.html">Q[171], A[1]</a>), prophecy denotes knowledge far removed from human knowledge. Now it is evident that an intellect of a higher order can
+                     know some things that are far removed from the knowledge of an inferior intellect. Again, above the human intellect there
+                     is not only the Divine intellect, but also the intellects of good and bad angels according to the order of nature. Hence the
+                     demons, even by their natural
+                     knowledge, know certain things remote from men's knowledge, which they can reveal to men: although those things which God
+                     alone knows are remote simply and most of all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A5-p7"> Accordingly prophecy, properly and simply, is conveyed by Divine revelations alone; yet the revelation which is made by the
+                     demons may be called prophecy in a restricted sense. Wherefore those men to whom something is revealed by the demons are styled
+                     in the Scriptures as prophets, not simply, but with an addition, for instance as "false prophets," or "prophets of idols."
+                     Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 19): "When the evil spirit lays hold of a man for such purposes as
+                     these," namely visions, "he makes him either devilish, or possessed, or a false prophet."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Cassiodorus is here defining prophecy in its proper and simple acceptation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The demons reveal what they know to men, not by enlightening the intellect, but by an imaginary vision, or even by audible
+                     speech; and in this way this prophecy differs from true prophecy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The prophecy of the demons can be distinguished from Divine prophecy by certain, and even outward, signs. Hence Chrysostom
+                     says [*Opus Imperf. in Matth., Hom. xix, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that "some prophesy by the spirit of the
+                     devil, such as diviners, but they may be discerned by the fact that the devil sometimes utters what is false, the Holy Ghost
+                     never." Wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A5-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.18.21" target="asv">Dt. 18:21,22</a>): "If in silent thought thou answer:
+                     How shall I know the word that the Lord hath spoken? Thou shalt have this sign: Whatsoever that same prophet foretelleth in
+                     the name of the Lord, and it come not to pass, that thing the Lord hath not spoken."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A5-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q172_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q172_A6-p0.1">Whether the prophets of the demons ever foretell the truth?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the prophets of the demons never foretell the truth. For Ambrose [*Hilary the Deacon (Ambrosiaster) on
+                     
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:3</a>] says that "Every truth, by whomsoever spoken, is from the Holy Ghost." Now the prophets of the demons do not speak from
+                     the Holy Ghost, because "there is no concord between Christ and Belial [*'What concord hath Christ with Belial?']" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A6-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.15" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:15</a>). Therefore it would seem that they
+                     never foretell the truth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as true prophets are inspired by the Spirit of truth, so the prophets of the demons are inspired by the spirit
+                     of untruth, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 22:22, </a> "I will go forth, and be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets." Now the prophets inspired by the Holy Ghost never
+                     speak false, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q172_A6-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q111_A6.html">Q[111], A[6]</a>). Therefore the prophets of the demons never speak truth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is said of the devil (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.8.44" target="asv">Jn. 8:44</a>) that "when he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own, for the devil is a liar, and the father thereof," i.e. of lying. Now
+                     by inspiring his prophets, the devil speaks only of his own, for he is not appointed God's minister to declare the truth,
+                     since "light hath no fellowship with darkness [*Vulg.: 'What fellowship hath light with darkness?']" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A6-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.14" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:14</a>). Therefore the
+                     prophets of the demons never foretell the truth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Num.22.14" target="asv"> Num. 22:14, </a> says that "Balaam was a diviner, for he sometimes foreknew the future by help of the demons and the magic art." Now he foretold
+                     many true things, for instance that which is to be found in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A6-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Num.24.17" target="asv"> Num. 24:17</a>: "A star shall rise out of Jacob, and a scepter shall spring up from Israel." Therefore even the prophets of the demons foretell
+                     the truth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As the good is in relation to things, so is the true in relation to knowledge. Now in things it is impossible to find one
+                     that is wholly devoid of good. Wherefore it is also impossible for any knowledge to be wholly false, without some mixture
+                     of truth. Hence Bede says [*Comment. in Luc. xvii, 12; Cf. Augustine, QQ. Evang. ii, 40] that "no teaching is so false that
+                     it never mingles truth with falsehood." Hence the teaching of the demons, with which they
+                     instruct their prophets, contains some truths whereby it is rendered acceptable. For the intellect is led astray to falsehood
+                     by the semblance of truth, even as the will is seduced to evil by the semblance of goodness. Wherefore Chrysostom says [*Opus
+                     Imperf. in Matth., Hom. xix, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]: "The devil is allowed sometimes to speak true things,
+                     in order that his unwonted truthfulness may gain credit for his lie."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A6-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The prophets of the demons do not always speak from the demons' revelation, but sometimes by Divine inspiration. This was
+                     evidently the case with Balaam, of whom we read that the Lord spoke to him (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Num.22.12" target="asv">Num. 22:12</a>), though he was a prophet of the demons, because God makes use even of the wicked for the profit of the good. Hence He foretells
+                     certain truths even by the demons' prophets, both that the truth may be rendered more credible,
+                     since even its foes bear witness to it, and also in order that men, by believing such men, may be more easily led on to truth.
+                     Wherefore also the Sibyls foretold many true things about Christ.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A6-p8"> Yet even when the demons' prophets are instructed by the demons, they foretell the truth, sometimes by virtue of their own
+                     nature, the author of which is the Holy Ghost, and sometimes by revelation of the good spirits, as Augustine declares (Gen.
+                     ad lit. xii, 19): so that even then this truth which the demons proclaim is from the Holy Ghost.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A true prophet is always inspired by the Spirit of truth, in Whom there is no falsehood, wherefore He never says what is
+                     not true; whereas a false prophet is not always instructed by the spirit of untruth, but sometimes even by the Spirit of truth.
+                     Even the very spirit of untruth sometimes declares true things, sometimes false, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those things are called the demons' own, which they have of themselves, namely lies and sins; while they have, not of themselves
+                     but of God, those things which belong to them by nature: and it is by virtue of their own nature that they sometimes foretell
+                     the truth, as stated above (ad 1). Moreover God makes use of them to make known the truth which is to be accomplished through
+                     them, by revealing Divine mysteries to them through the angels, as already
+                     stated (Gen. ad lit. xii, 19; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q172_A6-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q109_A4.html">FP, Q[109], A[4]</a>, ad 1).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q172_A6-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q173" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q173-p0.1">OF THE MANNER IN WHICH PROPHETIC KNOWLEDGE IS CONVEYED (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q173-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q173-p2"> We must now consider the manner in which prophetic knowledge is conveyed, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q173-p3"> (1) Whether the prophets see God's very essence?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q173-p4"> (2) Whether the prophetic revelation is effected by the infusion of certain species, or by the infusion of Divine light alone?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q173-p5"> (3) Whether prophetic revelation is always accompanied by abstraction from the sense?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q173-p6"> (4) Whether prophecy is always accompanied by knowledge of the things prophesied?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q173_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q173_A1-p0.1">Whether the prophets see the very essence of God?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the prophets see the very essence of God, for a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.38.1" target="asv"> Is. 38:1, </a> "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die and not live," says: "Prophets can read in the book of God's foreknowledge
+                     in which all things are written." Now God's foreknowledge is His very essence. Therefore prophets see God's very essence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 7) that "in that eternal truth from which all temporal things are made, we see with
+                     the mind's eye the type both of our being and of our actions." Now, of all men, prophets have the highest knowledge of Divine
+                     things. Therefore they, especially, see the Divine essence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, future contingencies are foreknown by the prophets "with unchangeable truth." Now future contingencies exist thus
+                     in God alone. Therefore the prophets see God Himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The vision of the Divine essence is not made void in heaven; whereas "prophecy is made void" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:8</a>). Therefore prophecy is not conveyed by a vision of the Divine essence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Prophecy denotes Divine knowledge as existing afar off. Wherefore it is said of the prophets (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.13" target="asv">Heb. 11:13</a>) that "they were beholding . . . afar off." But those who are in heaven and in the state of bliss see, not as from afar off,
+                     but rather, as it were, from near at hand, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.139.14" target="asv"> Ps. 139:14, </a> "The upright shall dwell with Thy countenance." Hence it is evident that prophetic knowledge differs from the perfect
+                     knowledge, which we shall have in heaven, so that it is distinguished therefrom as the imperfect from the perfect, and when
+                     the latter comes the former is made void, as appears from the words of the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:10</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A1-p7"> Some, however, wishing to discriminate between prophetic knowledge and the knowledge of the blessed, have maintained that
+                     the prophets see the very essence of God (which they call the "mirror of eternity") [*Cf. De Veritate, xii, 6; Sent. II, D,
+                     XI, part 2, art. 2, ad 4], not, however, in the way in which it is the object of the blessed, but as containing the types
+                     [*Cf. FP, Q[15]] of future events. But this is altogether impossible. For God is the object of bliss in His very
+                     essence, according to the saying of Augustine (Confess. v, 4): "Happy whoso knoweth Thee, though he know not these," i.e.
+                     creatures. Now it is not possible to see the types of creatures in the very essence of God without seeing It, both because
+                     the Divine essence is Itself the type of all things that are made---the ideal type adding nothing to the Divine essence save
+                     only a relationship to the creature---and because knowledge of a thing in itself---and such is the knowledge of God as the
+                     object
+                     of heavenly bliss---precedes knowledge of that thing in its relation to something else---and such is the knowledge of God
+                     as containing the types of things. Consequently it is impossible for prophets to see God as containing the types of creatures,
+                     and yet not as the object of bliss. Therefore we must conclude that the prophetic vision is not the vision of the very essence
+                     of God, and that the prophets do not see in the Divine essence Itself the things they do see, but that they see them in
+                     certain images, according as they are enlightened by the Divine light.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A1-p8"> Wherefore Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv), in speaking of prophetic visions, says that "the wise theologian calls that vision
+                     divine which is effected by images of things lacking a bodily form through the seer being rapt in divine things." And these
+                     images illumined by the Divine light have more of the nature of a mirror than the Divine essence: since in a mirror images
+                     are formed from other things, and this cannot be said of God. Yet the prophet's mind thus enlightened may be called
+                     a mirror, in so far as a likeness of the truth of the Divine foreknowledge is formed therein, for which reason it is called
+                     the "mirror of eternity," as representing God's foreknowledge, for God in His eternity sees all things as present before Him,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q173_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q172_A1.html">Q[172], A[1]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The prophets are said to read the book of God's foreknowledge, inasmuch as the truth is reflected from God's foreknowledge
+                     on the prophet's mind.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man is said to see in the First Truth the type of his existence, in so far as the image of the First Truth shines forth on
+                     man's mind, so that he is able to know himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From the very fact that future contingencies are in God according to unalterable truth, it follows that God can impress a
+                     like knowledge on the prophet's mind without the prophet seeing God in His essence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q173_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q173_A2-p0.1">Whether, in prophetic revelation, new species of things are impressed on the prophet's mind, or merely a new light?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in prophetic revelation no new species of things are impressed on the prophet's mind, but only a new light.
+                     For a gloss of Jerome on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Amos.1.2" target="asv"> Amos 1:2 </a>says that "prophets draw comparisons from things with which they are conversant." But if prophetic vision were effected by
+                     means of species newly impressed, the prophet's previous experience of things would be inoperative. Therefore no new species
+                     are impressed on the prophet's
+                     soul, but only the prophetic light.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9), "it is not imaginative but intellective vision that makes the prophet";
+                     wherefore it is declared (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.10.1" target="asv">Dan. 10:1</a>) that "there is need of understanding in a vision." Now intellective vision, as stated in the same book (Gen. ad lit. xii,
+                     6) is not effected by means of images, but by the very truth of things. Therefore it would seem that prophetic revelation
+                     is not effected by impressing
+                     species on the soul.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by the gift of prophecy the Holy Ghost endows man with something that surpasses the faculty of nature. Now man can
+                     by his natural faculties form all kinds of species of things. Therefore it would seem that in prophetic revelation no new
+                     species of things are impressed, but merely an intellectual light.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.12.10" target="asv">Osee 12:10</a>): "I have multiplied" their "visions, and I have used similitudes, by the ministry of the prophets." Now multiplicity of
+                     visions results, not from a diversity of intellectual light, which is common to every prophetic vision, but from a diversity
+                     of species, whence similitudes also result. Therefore it seems that in prophetic revelation new species of things are impressed,
+                     and not merely an intellectual
+                     light.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9), "prophetic knowledge pertains most of all to the intellect." Now two things have
+                     to be considered in connection with the knowledge possessed by the human mind, namely the acceptance or representation of
+                     things, and the judgment of the things represented. Now things are represented to the human mind under the form of species:
+                     and according to the order of nature, they must be represented first to the senses, secondly
+                     to the imagination, thirdly to the passive intellect, and these are changed by the species derived from the phantasms, which
+                     change results from the enlightening action of the active intellect. Now in the imagination there are the forms of sensible
+                     things not only as received from the senses, but also transformed in various ways, either on account of some bodily transformation
+                     (as in the case of people who are asleep or out of their senses), or through the coordination of the phantasms, at the
+                     command of reason, for the purpose of understanding something. For just as the various arrangements of the letters of the
+                     alphabet convey various ideas to the understanding, so the various coordinations of the phantasms produce various intelligible
+                     species of the intellect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p7"> As to the judgment formed by the human mind, it depends on the power of the intellectual light.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p8"> Now the gift of prophecy confers on the human mind something which surpasses the natural faculty in both these respects,
+                     namely as to the judgment which depends on the inflow of intellectual light, and as to the acceptance or representation of
+                     things, which is effected by means of certain species. Human teaching may be likened to prophetic revelation in the second
+                     of these respects, but not in the first. For a man represents certain things to his disciple by signs of speech, but
+                     he cannot enlighten him inwardly as God does.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p9"> But it is the first of these two that holds the chief place in prophecy, since judgment is the complement of knowledge. Wherefore
+                     if certain things are divinely represented to any man by means of imaginary likenesses, as happened to Pharaoh (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.41.1" target="asv">Gn. 41:1-7</a>) and to Nabuchodonosor (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A2-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.4.1" target="asv">Dan. 4:1-2</a>), or even by bodily likenesses, as happened to Balthasar (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A2-p9.3" href="./asv.html#Dan.5.5" target="asv">Dan. 5:5</a>), such a man is not to be considered a prophet, unless his mind
+                     be enlightened for the purpose of judgment; and such an apparition is something imperfect in the genus of prophecy. Wherefore
+                     some [*Rabbi Moyses, Doct. Perplex. II, xxxvi] have called this "prophetic ecstasy," and such is divination by dreams. And
+                     yet a man will be a prophet, if his intellect be enlightened merely for the purpose of judging of things seen in imagination
+                     by others, as in the case of Joseph who interpreted Pharaoh's dream. But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9),
+                     "especially is he a prophet who excels in both respects, so," to wit, "as to see in spirit likenesses significant of things
+                     corporeal, and understand them by the quickness of his intellect."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p10"> Now sensible forms are divinely presented to the prophet's mind, sometimes externally by means of the senses---thus Daniel
+                     saw the writing on the wall (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.5.25" target="asv">Dan. 5:25</a>)---sometimes by means of imaginary forms, either of exclusively Divine origin and not received through the senses (for instance,
+                     if images of colors were imprinted on the imagination of one blind from birth), or divinely coordinated from those derived
+                     from the senses---thus Jeremiah saw the "boiling
+                     caldron . . . from the face of the north" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.1.13" target="asv">Jer. 1:13</a>)---or by the direct impression of intelligible species on the mind, as in the case of those who receive infused scientific
+                     knowledge or wisdom, such as Solomon or the apostles.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p11"> But intellectual light is divinely imprinted on the human mind---sometimes for the purpose of judging of things seen by others,
+                     as in the case of Joseph, quoted above, and of the apostles whose understanding our Lord opened "that they might understand
+                     the scriptures" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.24.45" target="asv">Lk. 24:45</a>); and to this pertains the "interpretation of speeches"---sometimes for the purpose of judging according to Divine truth,
+                     of the things which a man apprehends in the ordinary course
+                     of nature---sometimes for the purpose of discerning truthfully and efficaciously what is to be done, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A2-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.63.14" target="asv"> Is. 63:14, </a> "The Spirit of the Lord was their leader."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p12"> Hence it is evident that prophetic revelation is conveyed sometimes by the mere infusion of light, sometimes by imprinting
+                     species anew, or by a new coordination of species.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above, sometimes in prophetic revelation imaginary species previously derived from the senses are divinely coordinated
+                     so as to accord with the truth to be revealed, and then previous experience is operative in the production of the images,
+                     but not when they are impressed on the mind wholly from without.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Intellectual vision is not effected by means of bodily and individual images, but by an intelligible image. Hence Augustine
+                     says (De Trin. ix, 11) that "the soul possesses a certain likeness of the species known to it." Sometimes this intelligible
+                     image is, in prophetic revelation, imprinted immediately by God, sometimes it results from pictures in the imagination, by
+                     the aid of the prophetic light, since a deeper truth is gathered from these pictures
+                     in the imagination by means of the enlightenment of the higher light.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is true that man is able by his natural powers to form all kinds of pictures in the imagination, by simply considering
+                     these pictures, but not so that they be directed to the representation of intelligible truths that surpass his intellect,
+                     since for this purpose he needs the assistance of a supernatural light.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p16"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p17"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q173_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q173_A3-p0.1">Whether the prophetic vision is always accompanied by abstraction from the senses?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the prophetic vision is always accompanied by abstraction from the senses. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Num.12.6" target="asv">Num. 12:6</a>): "If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream." Now
+                     a gloss says at the beginning of the Psalter, "a vision that takes place by dreams and apparitions consists of things which
+                     seem to be said or done." But when things seem to be said or done, which
+                     are neither said nor done, there is abstraction from the senses. Therefore prophecy is always accompanied by abstraction from
+                     the senses.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, when one power is very intent on its own operation, other powers are drawn away from theirs; thus men who are very
+                     intent on hearing something fail to see what takes place before them. Now in the prophetic vision the intellect is very much
+                     uplifted, and intent on its act. Therefore it seems that the prophetic vision is always accompanied by abstraction from the
+                     senses.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same thing cannot, at the same time, tend in opposite directions. Now in the prophetic vision the mind tends
+                     to the acceptance of things from above, and consequently it cannot at the same time tend to sensible objects. Therefore it
+                     would seem necessary for prophetic revelation to be always accompanied by abstraction from the senses.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> On the contrary, It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.32" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:32</a>): "The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets." Now this were impossible if the prophet were not in possession
+                     of his faculties, but abstracted from his senses. Therefore it would seem that prophetic vision is not accompanied by abstraction
+                     from the senses.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in the foregoing Article, the prophetic revelation takes place in four ways: namely, by the infusion of an intelligible
+                     light, by the infusion of intelligible species, by impression or coordination of pictures in the imagination, and by the outward
+                     presentation of sensible images. Now it is evident that there is no abstraction from the senses, when something is presented
+                     to the prophet's mind by means of sensible species---whether these be divinely
+                     formed for this special purpose, as the bush shown to Moses (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.3.2" target="asv">Ex. 3:2</a>), and the writing shown to Daniel (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.5" target="asv">Dan. 5</a>:)---or whether they be produced by other causes; yet so that they are ordained by Divine providence to be prophetically significant
+                     of something, as, for instance, the Church was signified by the ark of Noah.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p7"> Again, abstraction from the external senses is not rendered necessary when the prophet's mind is enlightened by an intellectual
+                     light, or impressed with intelligible species, since in us the perfect judgment of the intellect is effected by its turning
+                     to sensible objects, which are the first principles of our knowledge, as stated in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q173_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A6.html">FP, Q[84], A[6]</a>.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p8"> When, however, prophetic revelation is conveyed by images in the imagination, abstraction from the senses is necessary lest
+                     the things thus seen in imagination be taken for objects of external sensation. Yet this abstraction from the senses is sometimes
+                     complete, so that a man perceives nothing with his senses; and sometimes it is incomplete, so that he perceives something
+                     with his senses, yet does not fully discern the things he perceives outwardly from those he sees in
+                     imagination. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 12): "Those images of bodies which are formed in the soul are seen just
+                     as bodily things themselves are seen by the body, so that we see with our eyes one who is present, and at the same time we
+                     see with the soul one who is absent, as though we saw him with our eyes."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p9"> Yet this abstraction from the senses takes place in the prophets without subverting the order of nature, as is the case with
+                     those who are possessed or out of their senses; but is due to some well-ordered cause. This cause may be natural---for instance,
+                     sleep---or spiritual---for instance, the intenseness of the prophets' contemplation; thus we read of Peter (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.10.9" target="asv">Acts 10:9</a>) that while he was praying in the supper-room [*Vulg.: 'the house-top' or 'upper-chamber']
+                     "he fell into an ecstasy"---or he may be carried away by the Divine power, according to the saying of Ezechiel 1:3: "The hand
+                     of the Lord was upon him."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage quoted refers to prophets in whom imaginary pictures were formed or coordinated, either while asleep, which is
+                     denoted by the word "dream," or while awake, which is signified by the word "vision."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the mind is intent, in its act, upon distant things which are far removed from the senses, the intensity of its application
+                     leads to abstraction from the senses; but when it is intent, in its act, upon the coordination of or judgment concerning objects
+                     of sense, there is no need for abstraction from the senses.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The movement of the prophetic mind results not from its own power, but from a power acting on it from above. Hence there
+                     is no abstraction from the senses when the prophet's mind is led to judge or coordinate matters relating to objects of sense,
+                     but only when the mind is raised to the contemplation of certain more lofty things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The spirit of the prophets is said to be subject to the prophets as regards the prophetic utterances to which the Apostle
+                     refers in the words quoted; because, to wit, the prophets in declaring what they have seen speak their own mind, and are not
+                     thrown off their mental balance, like persons who are possessed, as Priscilla and Montanus maintained. But as regards the
+                     prophetic revelation itself, it would be more correct to say that the prophets are
+                     subject to the. spirit of prophecy, i.e. to the prophetic gift.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q173_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q173_A4-p0.1">Whether prophets always know the things which they prophesy?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the prophets always know the things which they prophesy. For, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9),
+                     "those to whom signs were shown in spirit by means of the likenesses of bodily things, had not the gift of prophecy, unless
+                     the mind was brought into action, so that those signs were also understood by them." Now what is understood cannot be unknown.
+                     Therefore the prophet is not ignorant of what he prophesies.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the light of prophecy surpasses the light of natural reason. Now one who possesses a science by his natural light,
+                     is not ignorant of his scientific acquirements. Therefore he who utters things by the prophetic light cannot ignore them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prophecy is directed for man's enlightenment; wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.1.19" target="asv">2 Pet. 1:19</a>): "We have the more firm prophetical word, whereunto you do well to attend, as to a light that shineth in a dark place."
+                     Now nothing can enlighten others unless it be lightsome in itself. Therefore it would seem that the prophet is first enlightened
+                     so as to know what he declares to others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.11.51" target="asv">Jn. 11:51</a>): "And this he" (Caiphas) "spoke, not of himself, but being the High Priest of that year, he prophesied that Jesus should
+                     die for the nation," etc. Now Caiphas knew this not. Therefore not every prophet knows what he prophesies.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In prophetic revelation the prophet's mind is moved by the Holy Ghost, as an instrument that is deficient in regard to the
+                     principal agent. Now the prophet's mind is moved not only to apprehend something, but also to speak or to do something; sometimes
+                     indeed to all these three together, sometimes to two, sometimes to one only, and in each case there may be a defect in the
+                     prophet's knowledge. For when the prophet's mind is moved to think or apprehend a
+                     thing, sometimes he is led merely to apprehend that thing, and sometimes he is further led to know that it is divinely revealed
+                     to him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A4-p7"> Again, sometimes the prophet's mind is moved to speak something, so that he understands what the Holy Ghost means by the
+                     words he utters; like David who said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiKgdms.23.2" target="asv">2 Kings 23:2</a>): "The Spirit of the Lord hath spoken by me"; while, on the other hand, sometimes the person whose mind is moved to utter
+                     certain words knows not what the Holy Ghost means by them, as was the case with Caiphas (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#John.11.51" target="asv">Jn. 11:51</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A4-p8"> Again, when the Holy Ghost moves a man's mind to do something, sometimes the latter understands the meaning of it, like Jeremias
+                     who hid his loin-cloth in the Euphrates (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.13.1" target="asv">Jer. 13:1-11</a>); while sometimes he does not understand it---thus the soldiers, who divided Christ's garments, understood not the meaning
+                     of what they did.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A4-p9"> Accordingly, when a man knows that he is being moved by the Holy Ghost to think something, or signify something by word or
+                     deed, this belongs properly to prophecy; whereas when he is moved, without his knowing it, this is not perfect prophecy, but
+                     a prophetic instinct. Nevertheless it must be observed that since the prophet's mind is a defective instrument, as stated
+                     above, even true prophets know not all that the Holy Ghost means by the things they see, or speak, or even
+                     do.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A4-p10"> And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections, since the arguments given at the beginning refer to true prophets whose
+                     minds are perfectly enlightened from above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q173_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q174" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q174-p0.1">OF THE DIVISION OF PROPHECY (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q174-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q174-p2"> We must now consider the division of prophecy, and under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q174-p3"> (1) The division of prophecy into its species;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q174-p4"> (2) Whether the more excellent prophecy is that which is without imaginative vision?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q174-p5"> (3) The various degrees of prophecy;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q174-p6"> (4) Whether Moses was the greatest of the prophets?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q174-p7"> (5) Whether a comprehensor can be a prophet?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q174-p8"> (6) Whether prophecy advanced in perfection as time went on?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q174_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q174_A1-p0.1">Whether prophecy is fittingly divided into the prophecy of divine predestination, of foreknowledge, and of denunciation?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prophecy is unfittingly divided according to a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.23" target="asv"> Mat. 1:23, </a> "Behold a virgin shall be with child," where it is stated that "one kind of prophecy proceeds from the Divine predestination,
+                     and must in all respects be accomplished so that its fulfillment is independent of our will, for instance the one in question.
+                     Another prophecy proceeds from God's foreknowledge: and into this our will enters. And another prophecy
+                     is called denunciation, which is significative of God's disapproval." For that which results from every prophecy should not
+                     be reckoned a part of prophecy. Now all prophecy is according to the Divine foreknowledge, since the prophets "read in the
+                     book of foreknowledge," as a gloss says on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.38.1" target="asv"> Is. 38:1.</a> Therefore it would seem that prophecy according to foreknowledge should not be reckoned a species of prophecy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as something is foretold in denunciation, so is something foretold in promise, and both of these are subject
+                     to alteration. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.18.7" target="asv">Jer. 18:7,8</a>): "I will suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it. If that
+                     nation against which I have spoken shall repent of their evil, I also will repent"---and this pertains to the prophecy of
+                     denunciation, and afterwards
+                     the text continues in reference to the prophecy of promise (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.18.9" target="asv">Jer. 18:9,10</a>): "I will suddenly speak of a nation and of a kingdom, to build up and plant it. If it shall do evil in My sight . . . I
+                     will repent of the good that I have spoken to do unto it." Therefore as there is reckoned to be a prophecy of denunciation,
+                     so should there be a prophecy of promise.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Isidore says (Etym. vii, 8): "There are seven kinds of prophecy. The first is an ecstasy, which is the transport
+                     of the mind: thus Peter saw a vessel descending from heaven with all manner of beasts therein. The second kind is a vision,
+                     as we read in Isaias, who says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.1" target="asv">Is. 6:1</a>): 'I saw the Lord sitting,' etc. The third kind is a dream: thus Jacob in a dream, saw a ladder. The fourth kind is from
+                     the midst of a cloud: thus God spake to Moses. The fifth
+                     kind is a voice from heaven, as that which called to Abraham saying (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.22.11" target="asv">Gn. 22:11</a>): 'Lay not thy hand upon the boy.' The sixth kind is taking up a parable, as in the example of Balaam (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A1-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Num.23.7" target="asv">Num. 23:7</a>; 24:15). The seventh kind is the fullness of the Holy Ghost, as in the case of nearly all the prophets." Further, he mentions
+                     three kinds of vision; "one by the eyes of the body, another by the soul's imagination, a third by the eyes of the mind."
+                     Now these are not
+                     included in the aforesaid division. Therefore it is insufficient.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Jerome to whom the gloss above quoted is ascribed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The species of moral habits and acts are distinguished according to their objects. Now the object of prophecy is something
+                     known by God and surpassing the faculty of man. Wherefore, according to the difference of such things, prophecy is divided
+                     into various species, as assigned above. Now it has been stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q174_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q71_A6.html">Q[71], A[6]</a>, ad 2) that the future is contained in the Divine knowledge in two ways. First, as in its cause: and thus we
+                     have the prophecy of "denunciation," which is not always fulfilled. but it foretells the relation of cause to effect, which
+                     is sometimes hindered by some other occurrence supervening. Secondly, God foreknows certain things in themselves---either
+                     as to be accomplished by Himself, and of such things is the prophecy of "predestination," since, according to Damascene (De
+                     Fide Orth. ii, 30), "God predestines things which are not in our power"---or as to be accomplished through man's free-will,
+                     and
+                     of such is the prophecy of "foreknowledge." This may regard either good or evil, which does not apply to the prophecy of predestination,
+                     since the latter regards good alone. And since predestination is comprised under foreknowledge, the gloss in the beginning
+                     of the Psalter assigns only two species to prophecy, namely of "foreknowledge," and of "denunciation."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Foreknowledge, properly speaking, denotes precognition of future events in themselves, and in this sense it is reckoned a
+                     species of prophecy. But in so far as it is used in connection with future events, whether as in themselves, or as in their
+                     causes, it is common to every species of prophecy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The prophecy of promise is included in the prophecy of denunciation, because the aspect of truth is the same in both. But
+                     it is denominated in preference from denunciation, because God is more inclined to remit punishment than to withdraw promised
+                     blessings.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Isidore divides prophecy according to the manner of prophesying. Now we may distinguish the manner of prophesying---either
+                     according to man's cognitive powers, which are sense, imagination, and intellect, and then we have the three kinds of vision
+                     mentioned both by him and by Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6,7)---or according to the different ways in which the prophetic
+                     current is received. Thus as regards the enlightening of the intellect there is the
+                     "fullness of the Holy Ghost" which he mentions in the seventh place. As to the imprinting of pictures on the imagination he
+                     mentions three, namely "dreams," to which he gives the third place; "vision," which occurs to the prophet while awake and
+                     regards any kind of ordinary object, and this he puts in the second place; and "ecstasy," which results from the mind being
+                     uplifted to certain lofty things, and to this he assigns the first place. As regards sensible signs he reckons three kinds
+                     of
+                     prophecy, because a sensible sign is---either a corporeal thing offered externally to the sight, such as "a cloud," which
+                     he mentions in the fourth place---or a "voice" sounding from without and conveyed to man's hearing---this he puts in the fifth
+                     place---or a voice proceeding from a man, conveying something under a similitude, and this pertains to the "parable" to which
+                     he assigns the sixth place.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q174_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q174_A2-p0.1">Whether the prophecy which is accompanied by intellective and imaginative vision is more excellent than that which is accompanied
+                     by intellective vision alone?
+                  </h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the prophecy which has intellective and imaginative vision is more excellent than that which is accompanied
+                     by intellective vision alone. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9): "He is less a prophet, who sees in spirit nothing
+                     but the signs representative of things, by means of the images of things corporeal: he is more a prophet, who is merely endowed
+                     with the understanding of these signs; but most of all is he a prophet, who excels in
+                     both ways," and this refers to the prophet who has intellective together with imaginative vision. Therefore this kind of prophecy
+                     is more excellent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the greater a thing's power is, the greater the distance to which it extends. Now the prophetic light pertains chiefly
+                     to the mind, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q174_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q173_A2.html">Q[173], A[2]</a>). Therefore apparently the prophecy that extends to the imagination is greater than that which is confined to the intellect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Jerome (Prol. in Lib. Reg.) distinguishes the "prophets" from the "sacred writers." Now all those whom he calls
+                     prophets (such as Isaias, Jeremias, and the like) had intellective together with imaginative vision: but not those whom he
+                     calls sacred writers, as writing by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost (such as Job, David, Solomon, and the like). Therefore
+                     it would seem more proper to call prophets those who had intellective together with imaginative
+                     vision, than those who had intellective vision alone.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that "it is impossible for the Divine ray to shine on us, except as screened round
+                     about by the many-colored sacred veils." Now the prophetic revelation is conveyed by the infusion of the divine ray. Therefore
+                     it seems that it cannot be without the veils of phantasms.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss says at the beginning of the Psalter that "the most excellent manner of prophecy is when a man prophesies by the
+                     mere inspiration of the Holy Ghost, apart from any outward assistance of deed, word, vision, or dream."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The excellence of the means is measured chiefly by the end. Now the end of prophecy is the manifestation of a truth that
+                     surpasses the faculty of man. Wherefore the more effective this manifestation is, the more excellent the prophecy. But it
+                     is evident that the manifestation of divine truth by means of the bare contemplation of the truth itself, is more effective
+                     than that which is conveyed under the similitude of corporeal things, for it approaches nearer
+                     to the heavenly vision whereby the truth is seen in God's essence. Hence it follows that the prophecy whereby a supernatural
+                     truth is seen by intellectual vision, is more excellent than that in which a supernatural truth is manifested by means of
+                     the similitudes of corporeal things in the vision of the imagination.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A2-p8"> Moreover the prophet's mind is shown thereby to be more lofty: even as in human teaching the hearer, who is able to grasp
+                     the bare intelligible truth the master propounds, is shown to have a better understanding than one who needs to be taken by
+                     the hand and helped by means of examples taken from objects of sense. Hence it is said in commendation of David's prophecy
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiKgdms.23.3" target="asv">2 Kings 23:3</a>): "The strong one of Israel spoke to me," and further on (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#iiKgdms.23.4" target="asv">2 Kings
+                        23:4
+                     </a>): "As the light of the morning, when the sun riseth, shineth in the morning without clouds."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When a particular supernatural truth has to be revealed by means of corporeal images, he that has both, namely the intellectual
+                     light and the imaginary vision, is more a prophet than he that has only one, because his prophecy is more perfect; and it
+                     is in this sense that Augustine speaks as quoted above. Nevertheless the prophecy in which the bare intelligible truth is
+                     revealed is greater than all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same judgment does not apply to things that are sought for their own sake, as to things sought for the sake of something
+                     else. For in things sought for their own sake, the agent's power is the more effective according as it extends to more numerous
+                     and more remote objects; even so a physician is thought more of, if he is able to heal more people, and those who are further
+                     removed from health. on the other hand, in things sought only for the sake
+                     of something else, that agent would seem to have greater power, who is able to achieve his purpose with fewer means and those
+                     nearest to hand: thus more praise is awarded the physician who is able to heal a sick person by means of fewer and more gentle
+                     remedies. Now, in the prophetic knowledge, imaginary vision is required, not for its own sake, but on account of the manifestation
+                     of the intelligible truth. Wherefore prophecy is all the more excellent according as it needs it less.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact that a particular predicate is applicable to one thing and less properly to another, does not prevent this latter
+                     from being simply better than the former: thus the knowledge of the blessed is more excellent than the knowledge of the wayfarer,
+                     although faith is more properly predicated of the latter knowledge, because faith implies an imperfection of knowledge. In
+                     like manner prophecy implies a certain obscurity, and remoteness from the
+                     intelligible truth; wherefore the name of prophet is more properly applied to those who see by imaginary vision. And yet the
+                     more excellent prophecy is that which is conveyed by intellectual vision, provided the same truth be revealed in either case.
+                     If, however, the intellectual light be divinely infused in a person, not that he may know some supernatural things, but that
+                     he may be able to judge, with the certitude of divine truth, of things that can be known by human reason, such intellectual
+                     prophecy is beneath that which is conveyed by an imaginary vision leading to a supernatural truth. It was this kind of prophecy
+                     that all those had who are included in the ranks of the prophets, who moreover were called prophets for the special reason
+                     that they exercised the prophetic calling officially. Hence they spoke as God's representatives, saying to the people: "Thus
+                     saith the Lord": but not so the authors of the "sacred writings," several of whom treated more frequently of things that
+                     can be known by human reason, not in God's name, but in their own, yet with the assistance of the Divine light withal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the present life the enlightenment by the divine ray is not altogether without any veil of phantasms, because according
+                     to his present state of life it is unnatural to man not to understand without a phantasm. Sometimes, however, it is sufficient
+                     to have phantasms abstracted in the usual way from the senses without any imaginary vision divinely vouchsafed, and thus prophetic
+                     vision is said to be without imaginary vision.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q174_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q174_A3-p0.1">Whether the degrees of prophecy can be distinguished according to the imaginary vision?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the degrees of prophecy cannot be distinguished according to the imaginary vision. For the degrees of
+                     a thing bear relation to something that is on its own account, not on account of something else. Now, in prophecy, intellectual
+                     vision is sought on its own account, and imaginary vision on account of something else, as stated above (A[2], ad 2). Therefore
+                     it would seem that the degrees of prophecy are distinguished not according to
+                     imaginary, but only according to intellectual, vision.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, seemingly for one prophet there is one degree of prophecy. Now one prophet receives revelation through various imaginary
+                     visions. Therefore a difference of imaginary visions does not entail a difference of prophecy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to a gloss [*Cassiodorus, super Prolog. Hieron. in Psalt.], prophecy consists of words, deeds, dreams,
+                     and visions. Therefore the degrees of prophecy should not be distinguished according to imaginary vision, to which vision
+                     and dreams pertain, rather than according to words and deeds.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The medium differentiates the degrees of knowledge: thus science based on direct [*"Propter quid"] proofs is more excellent
+                     than science based on indirect [*"Quia"] premises or than opinion, because it comes through a more excellent medium. Now imaginary
+                     vision is a kind of medium in prophetic knowledge. Therefore the degrees of prophecy should be distinguished according to
+                     imaginary vision.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q174_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q173_A2.html">Q[173], A[2]</a>), the prophecy wherein, by the intelligible light, a supernatural truth is revealed through an imaginary vision, holds the
+                     mean between the prophecy wherein a supernatural truth is revealed without imaginary vision, and that wherein through the
+                     intelligible light and without an imaginary vision, man is directed to know or do things pertaining to human conduct. Now
+                     knowledge is more proper to prophecy
+                     than is action; wherefore the lowest degree of prophecy is when a man, by an inward instinct, is moved to perform some outward
+                     action. Thus it is related of Samson (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Judg.15.14" target="asv">Judges 15:14</a>) that "the Spirit of the Lord came strongly upon him, and as the flax [*'Lina.' St. Thomas apparently read 'ligna' ('wood')]
+                     is wont to be consumed at the approach of fire, so the bands with which he was bound were broken and loosed." The second degree
+                     of prophecy is when a man is enlightened by an
+                     inward light so as to know certain things, which, however, do not go beyond the bounds of natural knowledge: thus it is related
+                     of Solomon (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A3-p6.3" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 4:32,33</a>) that "he spoke . . . parables . . . and he treated about trees from the cedar that is in Libanus unto the hyssop that cometh
+                     out of the wall, and he discoursed of beasts and of fowls, and of creeping things and of fishes": and all of this came from
+                     divine inspiration, for it was stated previously (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A3-p6.4" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings
+                        4:29
+                     </a>): "God gave to Solomon wisdom and understanding exceeding much."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A3-p7"> Nevertheless these two degrees are beneath prophecy properly so called, because they do not attain to supernatural truth.
+                     The prophecy wherein supernatural truth is manifested through imaginary vision is differentiated first according to the difference
+                     between dreams which occur during sleep, and vision which occurs while one is awake. The latter belongs to a higher degree
+                     of prophecy, since the prophetic light that draws the soul away to supernatural things while it is awake
+                     and occupied with sensible things would seem to be stronger than that which finds a man's soul asleep and withdrawn from objects
+                     of sense. Secondly the degrees of this prophecy are differentiated according to the expressiveness of the imaginary signs
+                     whereby the intelligible truth is conveyed. And since words are the most expressive signs of intelligible truth, it would
+                     seem to be a higher degree of prophecy when the prophet, whether awake or asleep, hears words expressive of an intelligible
+                     truth, than when he sees things significative of truth, for instance "the seven full ears of corn" signified "seven years
+                     of plenty" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.41.22" target="asv">Gn. 41:22</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.41.26" target="asv">26</a>). In such like signs prophecy would seem to be the more excellent, according as the signs are more expressive, for instance
+                     when Jeremias saw the burning of the city under the figure of a boiling cauldron (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A3-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Jer.1.13" target="asv">Jer. 1:13</a>). Thirdly, it is evidently a still higher degree of prophecy when a prophet not only sees
+                     signs of words or deeds, but also, either awake or asleep, sees someone speaking or showing something to him, since this proves
+                     the prophet's mind to have approached nearer to the cause of the revelation. Fourthly, the height of a degree of prophecy
+                     may be measured according to the appearance of the person seen: for it is a higher degree of prophecy, if he who speaks or
+                     shows something to the waking or sleeping prophet be seen by him under the form of an angel, than if he be seen by him under
+                     the form of man: and higher still is it, if he be seen by the prophet whether asleep or awake, under the appearance of God,
+                     according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A3-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.1" target="asv">Is. 6:1</a>, "I saw the Lord sitting."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A3-p8"> But above all these degrees there is a third kind of prophecy, wherein an intelligible and supernatural truth is shown without
+                     any imaginary vision. However, this goes beyond the bounds of prophecy properly so called, as stated above (A[2], ad 3); and
+                     consequently the degrees of prophecy are properly distinguished according to imaginary vision.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We are unable to know how to distinguish the intellectual light, except by means of imaginary or sensible signs. Hence the
+                     difference in the intellectual light is gathered from the difference in the things presented to the imagination.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q174_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q171_A2.html">Q[171], A[2]</a>), prophecy is by way, not of an abiding habit, but of a transitory passion; wherefore there is nothing inconsistent if one
+                     and the same prophet, at different times, receive various degrees of prophetic revelation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The words and deeds mentioned there do not pertain to the prophetic revelation, but to the announcement, which is made according
+                     to the disposition of those to whom that which is revealed to the prophet is announced; and this is done sometimes by words,
+                     sometimes by deeds. Now this announcement, and the working of miracles, are something consequent upon prophecy, as stated
+                     above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q174_A3-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q171_A1.html">Q[171], A[1]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q174_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q174_A4-p0.1">Whether Moses was the greatest of the prophets?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Moses was not the greatest of the prophets. For a gloss at the beginning of the Psalter says that "David
+                     is called the prophet by way of excellence." Therefore Moses was not the greatest of all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, greater miracles were wrought by Josue, who made the sun and moon to stand still (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Josh.10.12" target="asv">Josh. 10:12-14</a>), and by Isaias, who made the sun to turn back (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.38.8" target="asv">Is. 38:8</a>), than by Moses, who divided the Red Sea (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A4-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.14.21" target="asv">Ex. 14:21</a>). In like manner greater miracles were wrought by Elias, of whom it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A4-p3.4" href="./asv.html#Sir.48.4" target="asv">Ecclus. 48:4,5</a>): "Who can glory like to thee? Who raisedst up a dead man from below." Therefore Moses was not the greatest of
+                     the prophets.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.11" target="asv">Mat. 11:11</a>) that "there hath not risen, among them that are born of women, a greater than John the Baptist." Therefore Moses was not
+                     greater than all the prophets.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.34.10" target="asv">Dt. 34:10</a>): "There arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Although in some respect one or other of the prophets was greater than Moses, yet Moses was simply the greatest of all. For,
+                     as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q174_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q174_A3.html">(A[3];</a> Q[171], A[1]), in prophecy we may consider not only the knowledge, whether by intellectual or by imaginary vision, but also
+                     the announcement and the confirmation by miracles. Accordingly Moses was greater than the other prophets. First, as regards
+                     the intellectual vision, since he saw
+                     God's very essence, even as Paul in his rapture did, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27). Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Num.12.8" target="asv">Num. 12:8</a>) that he saw God "plainly and not by riddles." Secondly, as regards the imaginary vision, which he had at his call, as it
+                     were, for not only did he hear words, but also saw one speaking to him under the form of God, and this not only while asleep,
+                     but even when he was awake. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A4-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.33.11" target="asv">Ex. 33:11</a>) that "the Lord spoke to Moses face to
+                     face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend." Thirdly, as regards the working of miracles which he wrought on a whole nation
+                     of unbelievers. Wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A4-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Deut.34.10" target="asv">Dt. 34:10,11</a>): "There arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face: in all the signs and wonders,
+                     which He sent by him, to do in the land of Egypt to Pharaoh, and to all his servants, and to his whole land."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The prophecy of David approaches near to the vision of Moses, as regards the intellectual vision, because both received a
+                     revelation of intelligible and supernatural truth, without any imaginary vision. Yet the vision of Moses was more excellent
+                     as regards the knowledge of the Godhead; while David more fully knew and expressed the mysteries of Christ's incarnation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These signs of the prophets mentioned were greater as to the substance of the thing done; yet the miracles of Moses were
+                     greater as regards the way in which they were done, since they were wrought on a whole people.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> John belongs to the New Testament, whose ministers take precedence even of Moses, since they are spectators of a fuller revelation,
+                     as stated in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3" target="asv">2 Cor. 3</a>.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q174_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q174_A5-p0.1">Whether there is a degree of prophecy in the blessed?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is a degree of prophecy in the blessed. For, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q174_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q174_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, Moses saw the Divine essence, and yet he is called a prophet. Therefore in like manner the blessed can be called prophets.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, prophecy is a "divine revelation." Now divine revelations are made even to the blessed angels. Therefore even blessed
+                     angels can be prophets.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Christ was a comprehensor from the moment of His conception; and yet He calls Himself a prophet (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.57" target="asv">Mat. 13:57</a>), when He says: "A prophet is not without honor, save in his own country." Therefore even comprehensors and the blessed can
+                     be called prophets.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written of Samuel (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.46.23" target="asv">Ecclus. 46:23</a>): "He lifted up his voice from the earth in prophecy to blot out the wickedness of the nation." Therefore other saints can
+                     likewise be called prophets after they have died.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The prophetic word is compared (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.1.19" target="asv">2 Pet. 1:19</a>) to a "light that shineth in a dark place." Now there is no darkness in the blessed. Therefore they cannot be called prophets.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Prophecy denotes vision of some supernatural truth as being far remote from us. This happens in two ways. First, on the part
+                     of the knowledge itself, because, to wit, the supernatural truth is not known in itself, but in some of its effects; and this
+                     truth will be more remote if it be known by means of images of corporeal things, than if it be known in its intelligible effects;
+                     and such most of all is the prophetic vision, which is conveyed by images and
+                     likenesses of corporeal things. Secondly, vision is remote on the part of the seer, because, to wit, he has not yet attained
+                     completely to his ultimate perfection, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.5.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 5:6, </a> "While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p8"> Now in neither of these ways are the blessed remote; wherefore they cannot be called prophets.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This vision of Moses was interrupted after the manner of a passion, and was not permanent like the beatific vision, wherefore
+                     he was as yet a seer from afar. For this reason his vision did not entirely lose the character of prophecy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The divine revelation is made to the angels, not as being far distant, but as already wholly united to God; wherefore their
+                     revelation has not the character of prophecy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Christ was at the same time comprehensor and wayfarer [*Cf. TP, QQ[9], seqq.]. Consequently the notion of prophecy is not
+                     applicable to Him as a comprehensor, but only as a wayfarer.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Samuel had not yet attained to the state of blessedness. Wherefore although by God's will the soul itself of Samuel foretold
+                     to Saul the issue of the war as revealed to him by God, this pertains to the nature of prophecy. It is not the same with the
+                     saints who are now in heaven. Nor does it make any difference that this is stated to have been brought about by the demons'
+                     art, because although the demons are unable to evoke the soul of a saint, or to
+                     force it to do any particular thing, this can be done by the power of God, so that when the demon is consulted, God Himself
+                     declares the truth by His messenger: even as He gave a true answer by Elias to the King's messengers who were sent to consult
+                     the god of Accaron (4 Kings 1).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p13"> It might also be replied [*The Book of Ecclesiasticus was not as yet declared by the Church to be Canonical Scripture; Cf.
+                     
+                     <a id="SS_Q174_A5-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q89_A8.html">FP, Q[89], A[8]</a>, ad 2] that it was not the soul of Samuel, but a demon impersonating him; and that the wise man calls him Samuel, and describes
+                     his prediction as prophetic, in accordance with the thoughts of Saul and the bystanders who were of this opinion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q174_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q174_A6-p0.1">Whether the degrees of prophecy change as time goes on?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the degrees of prophecy change as time goes on. For prophecy is directed to the knowledge of Divine things,
+                     as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q174_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q174_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Now according to Gregory (Hom. in Ezech.), "knowledge of God went on increasing as time went on." Therefore degrees of prophecy
+                     should be distinguished according to the process of time.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, prophetic revelation is conveyed by God speaking to man; while the prophets declared both in words and in writing
+                     the things revealed to them. Now it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.3.1" target="asv">1 Kings 3:1</a>) that before the time of Samuel "the word of the Lord was precious," i.e. rare; and yet afterwards it was delivered to many.
+                     In like manner the books of the prophets do not appear to have been written before the time of Isaias, to whom it was said
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.8.1" target="asv">Is. 8:1</a>): "Take thee a great book and write in it with a man's pen," after which many prophets wrote their prophecies. Therefore
+                     it would seem that in course of time the degree of prophecy made progress.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.13" target="asv">Mat. 11:13</a>): "The prophets and the law prophesied until John"; and afterwards the gift of prophecy was in Christ's disciples in a much
+                     more excellent manner than in the prophets of old, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.5" target="asv"> Eph. 3:5, </a> "In other generations" the mystery of Christ "was not known to the sons of men, as it is now revealed to His holy apostles
+                     and prophets in the Spirit." Therefore it would seem that in course
+                     of time the degree of prophecy advanced.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q174_A6-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q174_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, Moses was the greatest of the prophets, and yet he preceded the other prophets. Therefore prophecy did not advance in degree
+                     as time went on.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q174_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q174_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, prophecy is directed to the knowledge of Divine truth, by the contemplation of which we are not only instructed in faith,
+                     but also guided in our actions, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.42.3" target="asv">Ps. 42:3</a>, "Send forth Thy light and Thy truth: they have conducted me." Now our faith consists chiefly in two things: first, in the
+                     true knowledge of God, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.6" target="asv"> Heb. 11:6, </a> "He that cometh to God must believe that He
+                     is"; secondly, in the mystery of Christ's incarnation, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p6.4" href="./asv.html#John.14.1" target="asv">Jn. 14:1</a>, "You believe in God, believe also in Me." Accordingly, if we speak of prophecy as directed to the Godhead as its end, it
+                     progressed according to three divisions of time, namely before the law, under the law, and under grace. For before the law,
+                     Abraham and the other patriarchs were prophetically taught things pertinent to faith in the Godhead. Hence they are called
+                     prophets, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p6.5" href="./asv.html#Ps.104.15" target="asv"> Ps. 104:15,
+                        
+                     </a>"Do no evil to My prophets," which words are said especially on behalf of Abraham and Isaac. Under the Law prophetic revelation
+                     of things pertinent to faith in the Godhead was made in a yet more excellent way than hitherto, because then not only certain
+                     special persons or families but the whole people had to be instructed in these matters. Hence the Lord said to Moses (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p6.6" href="./asv.html#Exod.6.2" target="asv">Ex. 6:2,3</a>): "I am the Lord that appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, by the name of God
+                     almighty, and My name Adonai I did not show to them"; because previously the patriarchs had been taught to believe in a general
+                     way in God, one and Almighty, while Moses was more fully instructed in the simplicity of the Divine essence, when it was said
+                     to him (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p6.7" href="./asv.html#Exod.3.14" target="asv">Ex. 3:14</a>): "I am Who am"; and this name is signified by Jews in the word "Adonai" on account of their veneration for that unspeakable
+                     name. Afterwards in the time of grace the mystery of the Trinity was revealed by
+                     the Son of God Himself, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p6.8" href="./asv.html#Matt.28.19" target="asv"> Mat. 28:19</a>: "Going . . . teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p7"> In each state, however, the most excellent revelation was that which was given first. Now the first revelation, before the
+                     Law, was given to Abraham, for it was at that time that men began to stray from faith in one God by turning aside to idolatry,
+                     whereas hitherto no such revelation was necessary while all persevered in the worship of one God. A less excellent revelation
+                     was made to Isaac, being founded on that which was made to Abraham. Wherefore it was said to him
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.26.24" target="asv">Gn. 26:24</a>): "I am the God of Abraham thy father," and in like manner to Jacob (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.28.13" target="asv">Gn. 28:13</a>): "I am the God of Abraham thy father, and the God of Isaac." Again in the state of the Law the first revelation which was
+                     given to Moses was more excellent, and on this revelation all the other revelations to the prophets were founded. And so,
+                     too, in the time of grace the entire faith of the Church is founded on the revelation vouchsafed to the apostles,
+                     concerning the faith in one God and three Persons, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.16.18" target="asv">Mat. 16:18</a>, "On this rock," i.e. of thy confession, "I will build My Church."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p8"> As to the faith in Christ's incarnation, it is evident that the nearer men were to Christ, whether before or after Him, the
+                     more fully, for the most part, were they instructed on this point, and after Him more fully than before, as the Apostle declares
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.5" target="asv">Eph. 3:5</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p9"> As regards the guidance of human acts, the prophetic revelation varied not according to the course of time, but according
+                     as circumstances required, because as it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.29.18" target="asv">Prov. 29:18</a>), "When prophecy shall fail, the people shall be scattered abroad." Wherefore at all times men were divinely instructed about
+                     what they were to do, according as it was expedient for the spiritual welfare of the elect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of Gregory is to be referred to the time before Christ's incarnation, as regards the knowledge of this mystery.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 27), "just as in the early days of the Assyrian kingdom promises were made most explicitly
+                     to Abraham, so at the outset of the western Babylon," which is Rome, "and under its sway Christ was to come, in Whom were
+                     to be fulfilled the promises made through the prophetic oracles testifying in word and writing to that great event to come,"
+                     the promises, namely, which were made to Abraham. "For while prophets were
+                     scarcely ever lacking to the people of Israel from the time that they began to have kings, it was exclusively for their benefit,
+                     not for that of the nations. But when those prophetic writings were being set up with greater publicity, which at some future
+                     time were to benefit the nations, it was fitting to begin when this city," Rome to wit, "was being built, which was to govern
+                     the nations."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p12"> The reason why it behooved that nation to have a number of prophets especially at the time of the kings, was that then it
+                     was not over-ridden by other nations, but had its own king; wherefore it behooved the people, as enjoying liberty, to have
+                     prophets to teach them what to do.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The prophets who foretold the coming of Christ could not continue further than John, who with his finger pointed to Christ
+                     actually present. Nevertheless as Jerome says on this passage, "This does not mean that there were no more prophets after
+                     John. For we read in the Acts of the apostles that Agabus and the four maidens, daughters of Philip, prophesied." John, too,
+                     wrote a prophetic book about the end of the Church; and at all times there have not
+                     been lacking persons having the spirit of prophecy, not indeed for the declaration of any new doctrine of faith, but for the
+                     direction of human acts. Thus Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 26) that "the emperor Theodosius sent to John who dwelt in the
+                     Egyptian desert, and whom he knew by his ever-increasing fame to be endowed with the prophetic spirit: and from him he received
+                     a message assuring him of victory."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q175" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q175-p0.1">OF RAPTURE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q175-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q175-p2"> We must now consider rapture. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q175-p3"> (1) Whether the soul of man is carried away to things divine?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q175-p4"> (2) Whether rapture pertains to the cognitive or to the appetitive power?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q175-p5"> (3) Whether Paul when in rapture saw the essence of God?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q175-p6"> (4) Whether he was withdrawn from his senses?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q175-p7"> (5) Whether, when in that state, his soul was wholly separated from his body?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q175-p8"> (6) What did he know, and what did he not know about this matter?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q175_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q175_A1-p0.1">Whether the soul of man is carried away to things divine?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul of man is not carried away to things divine. For some define rapture as "an uplifting by the
+                     power of a higher nature, from that which is according to nature to that which is above nature" [*Reference unknown; Cf. De
+                     Veritate xiii, 1]. Now it is in accordance with man's nature that he be uplifted to things divine; for Augustine says at the
+                     beginning of his Confessions: "Thou madest us, Lord, for Thyself, and our heart is restless,
+                     till it rest in Thee." Therefore man's soul is not carried away to things divine.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii) that "God's justice is seen in this that He treats all things according to their
+                     mode and dignity." But it is not in accordance with man's mode and worth that he be raised above what he is according to nature.
+                     Therefore it would seem that man's soul is not carried away to things divine.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, rapture denotes violence of some kind. But God rules us not by violence or force, as Damascene says [*De Fide Orth.
+                     ii, 30]. Therefore man's soul is not carried away to things divine.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.2" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:2</a>): "I know a man in Christ . . . rapt even to the third heaven." On which words a gloss says: "Rapt, that is to say, uplifted
+                     contrary to nature."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Rapture denotes violence of a kind as stated above (OBJ[3]); and "the violent is that which has its principle without, and
+                     in which he that suffers violence concurs not at all" (Ethic. iii, 1). Now everything concurs in that to which it tends in
+                     accordance with its proper inclination, whether voluntary or natural. Wherefore he who is carried away by some external agent,
+                     must be carried to something different from that to which his inclination tends. This
+                     difference arises in two ways: in one way from the end of the inclination---for instance a stone, which is naturally inclined
+                     to be borne downwards, may be thrown upwards; in another way from the manner of tending---for instance a stone may be thrown
+                     downwards with greater velocity than consistent with its natural movement.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A1-p7"> Accordingly man's soul also is said to be carried away, in a twofold manner, to that which is contrary to its nature: in
+                     one way, as regards the term of transport---as when it is carried away to punishment, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.49.22" target="asv"> Ps. 49:22, </a> "Lest He snatch you away, and there be none to deliver you"; in another way, as regards the manner connatural to man, which
+                     is that he should understand the truth through sensible things. Hence when he is withdrawn from the
+                     apprehension of sensibles, he is said to be carried away, even though he be uplifted to things whereunto he is directed naturally:
+                     provided this be not done intentionally, as when a man betakes himself to sleep which is in accordance with nature, wherefore
+                     sleep cannot be called rapture, properly speaking.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A1-p8"> This withdrawal, whatever its term may be, may arise from a threefold cause. First, from a bodily cause, as happens to those
+                     who suffer abstraction from the senses through weakness: secondly, by the power of the demons, as in those who are possessed:
+                     thirdly, by the power of God. In this last sense we are now speaking of rapture, whereby a man is uplifted by the spirit of
+                     God to things supernatural, and withdrawn from his senses, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.8.3" target="asv"> Ezech. 8:3,
+                        
+                     </a>"The spirit lifted me up between the earth and the heaven, and brought me in the vision of God into Jerusalem."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A1-p9"> It must be observed, however, that sometimes a person is said to be carried away, not only through being withdrawn from his
+                     senses, but also through being withdrawn from the things to which he was attending, as when a person's mind wanders contrary
+                     to his purpose. But this is to use the expression in a less proper signification.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is natural to man to tend to divine things through the apprehension of things sensible, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv"> Rom. 1:20, </a> "The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." But the mode, whereby
+                     a man is uplifted to divine things and withdrawn from his senses, is not natural to man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It belongs to man's mode and dignity that he be uplifted to divine things, from the very fact that he is made to God's image.
+                     And since a divine good infinitely surpasses the faculty of man in order to attain that good, he needs the divine assistance
+                     which is bestowed on him in every gift of grace. Hence it is not contrary to nature, but above the faculty of nature that
+                     man's mind be thus uplifted in rapture by God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The saying of Damascene refers to those things which a man does by himself. But as to those things which are beyond the scope
+                     of the free-will, man needs to be uplifted by a stronger operation, which in a certain respect may be called force if we consider
+                     the mode of operation, but not if we consider its term to which man is directed both by nature and by his intention.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q175_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q175_A2-p0.1">Whether rapture pertains to the cognitive rather than to the appetitive power?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that rapture pertains to the appetitive rather than to the cognitive power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv):
+                     "The Divine love causes ecstasy." Now love pertains to the appetitive power. Therefore so does ecstasy or rapture.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 3) that "he who fed the swine debased himself by a dissipated mind and an unclean life;
+                     whereas Peter, when the angel delivered him and carried him into ecstasy, was not beside himself, but above himself." Now
+                     the prodigal son sank into the depths by his appetite. Therefore in those also who are carried up into the heights it is the
+                     appetite that is affected.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.30.1" target="asv"> Ps. 30:1, </a> "In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped, let me never be confounded," says in explaining the title [*Unto the end, a psalm for David,
+                     in an ecstasy]: "{Ekstasis} in Greek signifies in Latin 'excessus mentis,' an aberration of the mind. This happens in two
+                     ways, either through dread of earthly things or through the mind being rapt in heavenly things and forgetful of this lower
+                     world." Now dread of earthly things
+                     pertains to the appetite. Therefore rapture of the mind in heavenly things, being placed in opposition to this dread, also
+                     pertains to the appetite.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.115.2" target="asv"> Ps. 115:2, </a> "I said in my excess: Every man is a liar," says: "We speak of ecstasy, not when the mind wanders through fear, but when
+                     it is carried aloft on the wings of revelation." Now revelation pertains to the intellective power. Therefore ecstasy or rapture
+                     does also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> We can speak of rapture in two ways. First, with regard to the term of rapture, and thus, properly speaking, rapture cannot
+                     pertain to the appetitive, but only to the cognitive power. For it was stated 
+                     <a id="SS_Q175_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q175_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that rapture is outside the inclination of the person who is rapt; whereas the movement of the appetitive power is an inclination
+                     to an appetible good. Wherefore, properly speaking, in desiring something, a man is not rapt, but
+                     is moved by himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A2-p7"> Secondly, rapture may be considered with regard to its cause, and thus it may have a cause on the part of the appetitive
+                     power. For from the very fact that the appetite is strongly affected towards something, it may happen, owing to the violence
+                     of his affection, that a man is carried away from everything else. Moreover, it has an effect on the appetitive power, when
+                     for instance a man delights in the things to which he is rapt. Hence the Apostle said that he was rapt, not only
+                     "to the third heaven"---which pertains to the contemplation of the intellect---but also into "paradise," which pertains to
+                     the appetite.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Rapture adds something to ecstasy. For ecstasy means simply a going out of oneself by being placed outside one's proper order
+                     [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="SS_Q175_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q28_A3.html">FS, Q[28], A[3]</a>]; while rapture denotes a certain violence in addition. Accordingly ecstasy may pertain to the appetitive power, as when
+                     a man's appetite tends to something outside him, and in this sense Dionysius says that "the Divine love causes ecstasy," inasmuch
+                     as it makes man's appetite tend
+                     to the object loved. Hence he says afterwards that "even God Himself, the cause of all things, through the overflow of His
+                     loving goodness, goes outside Himself in His providence for all beings." But even if this were said expressly of rapture,
+                     it would merely signify that love is the cause of rapture.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There is a twofold appetite in man; to wit, the intellective appetite which is called the will, and the sensitive appetite
+                     known as the sensuality. Now it is proper to man that his lower appetite be subject to the higher appetite, and that the higher
+                     move the lower. Hence man may become outside himself as regards the appetite, in two ways. In one way, when a man's intellective
+                     appetite tends wholly to divine things, and takes no account of those
+                     things whereto the sensitive appetite inclines him; thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "Paul being in ecstasy through
+                     the vehemence of Divine love" exclaimed: "I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A2-p10"> In another way, when a man tends wholly to things pertaining to the lower appetite, and takes no account of his higher appetite.
+                     It is thus that "he who fed the swine debased himself"; and this latter kind of going out of oneself, or being beside oneself,
+                     is more akin than the former to the nature of rapture because the higher appetite is more proper to man. Hence when through
+                     the violence of his lower appetite a man is withdrawn from the movement of his higher appetite, it is
+                     more a case of being withdrawn from that which is proper to him. Yet, because there is no violence therein, since the will
+                     is able to resist the passion, it falls short of the true nature of rapture, unless perchance the passion be so strong that
+                     it takes away entirely the use of reason, as happens to those who are mad with anger or love.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A2-p11"> It must be observed. however, that both these excesses affecting the appetite may cause an excess in the cognitive power,
+                     either because the mind is carried away to certain intelligible objects, through being drawn away from objects of sense, or
+                     because it is caught up into some imaginary vision or fanciful apparition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as love is a movement of the appetite with regard to good, so fear is a movement of the appetite with regard to evil.
+                     Wherefore either of them may equally cause an aberration of mind; and all the more since fear arises from love, as Augustine
+                     says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q175_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q175_A3-p0.1">Whether Paul, when in rapture, saw the essence of God?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Paul, when in rapture, did not see the essence of God. For just as we read of Paul that he was rapt to
+                     the third heaven, so we read of Peter (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.10.10" target="asv">Acts 10:10</a>) that "there came upon him an ecstasy of mind." Now Peter, in his ecstasy, saw not God's essence but an imaginary vision.
+                     Therefore it would seem that neither did Paul see the essence of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the vision of God is beatific. But Paul, in his rapture, was not beatified; else he would never have returned to
+                     the unhappiness of this life, but his body would have been glorified by the overflow from his soul, as will happen to the
+                     saints after the resurrection, and this clearly was not the case. Therefore Paul when in rapture saw not the essence of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:10-12</a>, faith and hope are incompatible with the vision of the Divine essence. But Paul when in this state had faith and hope. Therefore
+                     he saw not the essence of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as Augustine states (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6,7), "pictures of bodies are seen in the imaginary vision." Now Paul is
+                     stated (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.2" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:2</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.4" target="asv">4</a>) to have seen certain pictures in his rapture, for instance of the "third heaven" and of "paradise." Therefore he would seem
+                     to have been rapt to an imaginary vision rather than to the vision of the Divine essence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (Ep. CXLVII, 13; ad Paulin., de videndo Deum) concludes that "possibly God's very substance was seen by some while
+                     yet in this life: for instance by Moses, and by Paul who in rapture heard unspeakable words, which it is not granted unto
+                     man to utter."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some have said that Paul, when in rapture, saw "not the very essence of God, but a certain reflection of His clarity." But
+                     Augustine clearly comes to an opposite decision, not only in his book (De videndo Deum), but also in Gen. ad lit. xii, 28
+                     (quoted in a gloss on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.2" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:2</a>). Indeed the words themselves of the Apostle indicate this. For he says that "he heard secret words, which it is not granted
+                     unto man to utter": and such would
+                     seem to be words pertaining to the vision of the blessed, which transcends the state of the wayfarer, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.64.4" target="asv">Is. 64:4</a>, "Eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that love [Vulg.: 'wait for'] Thee" [*
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A3-p7.3" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:9</a>]. Therefore it is more becoming to hold that he saw God in His essence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man's mind is rapt by God to the contemplation of divine truth in three ways. First, so that he contemplates it through certain
+                     imaginary pictures, and such was the ecstasy that came upon Peter. Secondly, so that he contemplates the divine truth through
+                     its intelligible effects; such was the ecstasy of David, who said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.115.11" target="asv">Ps. 115:11</a>): "I said in my excess: Every man is a liar." Thirdly, so that he contemplates it in its essence. Such was the rapture of
+                     Paul, as also of Moses [*Cf. Q[174], A[4]]; and not without reason, since as Moses was the first Teacher of the Jews, so was
+                     Paul the first "Teacher of the gentiles" [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="SS_Q175_A3-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q68_A4.html">FP, Q[68], A[4]</a>].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Divine essence cannot be seen by a created intellect save through the light of glory, of which it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.10" target="asv">Ps. 35:10</a>): "In Thy light we shall see light." But this light can be shared in two ways. First by way of an abiding form, and thus
+                     it beatifies the saints in heaven. Secondly, by way of a transitory passion, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q175_A3-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q171_A2.html">Q[171] , A[2]</a>) of the light of prophecy; and in this way that light
+                     was in Paul when he was in rapture. Hence this vision did not beatify him simply, so as to overflow into his body, but only
+                     in a restricted sense. Consequently this rapture pertains somewhat to prophecy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since, in his rapture, Paul was beatified not as to the habit, but only as to the act of the blessed, it follows that he
+                     had not the act of faith at the same time, although he had the habit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In one way by the third heaven we may understand something corporeal, and thus the third heaven denotes the empyrean [*
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.7" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:7</a>; Cf. 
+                     <a id="SS_Q175_A3-p11.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A11.html">FP, Q[12], A[11]</a>, ad 2], which is described as the "third," in relation to the aerial and starry heavens, or better still, in relation to
+                     the aqueous and crystalline heavens. Moreover Paul is stated to be rapt to the "third heaven," not as though his rapture consisted
+                     in
+                     the vision of something corporeal, but because this place is appointed for the contemplation of the blessed. Hence the gloss
+                     on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A3-p11.3" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12" target="asv">2 Cor. 12</a> says that the "third heaven is a spiritual heaven, where the angels and the holy souls enjoy the contemplation of God: and
+                     when Paul says that he was rapt to this heaven he means that God showed him the life wherein He is to be seen forevermore."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p12"> In another way the third heaven may signify a supra-mundane vision. Such a vision may be called the third heaven in three
+                     ways. First, according to the order of the cognitive powers. In this way the first heaven would indicate a supramundane bodily
+                     vision, conveyed through the senses; thus was seen the hand of one writing on the wall (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A3-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.5.5" target="asv">Dan. 5:5</a>); the second heaven would be an imaginary vision such as Isaias saw, and John in the Apocalypse; and the third
+                     heaven would denote an intellectual vision according to Augustine's explanation (Gen. ad lit. xii, 26,28,34). Secondly, the
+                     third heaven may be taken according to the order of things knowable, the first heaven being "the knowledge of heavenly bodies,
+                     the second the knowledge of heavenly spirits, the third the knowledge of God Himself." Thirdly, the third heaven may denote
+                     the contemplation of God according to the degrees of knowledge whereby God is seen. The first of these degrees belongs to
+                     the angels of the lowest hierarchy [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="SS_Q175_A3-p12.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A1.html">FP, Q[108], A[1]</a>], the second to the angels of the middle hierarchy, the third to the angels of the highest hierarchy, according to the gloss
+                     on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A3-p12.3" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12" target="asv">2 Cor. 12</a>.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p13"> And since the vision of God cannot be without delight, he says that he was not only "rapt to the third heaven" by reason
+                     of his contemplation, but also into "Paradise" by reason of the consequent delight.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q175_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q175_A4-p0.1">Whether Paul, when in rapture, was withdrawn from his senses?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Paul, when in rapture, was not withdrawn from his senses. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 28): "Why
+                     should we not believe that when so great an apostle, the teacher of the gentiles, was rapt to this most sublime vision, God
+                     was willing to vouchsafe him a glimpse of that eternal life which is to take the place of the present life?" Now in that future
+                     life after the resurrection the saints will see the Divine essence without being
+                     withdrawn from the senses of the body. Therefore neither did such a withdrawal take place in Paul.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Christ was truly a wayfarer, and also enjoyed an uninterrupted vision of the Divine essence, without, however, being
+                     withdrawn from His senses. Therefore there was no need for Paul to be withdrawn from his senses in order for him to see the
+                     essence of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, after seeing God in His essence, Paul remembered what he had seen in that vision; hence he said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.4" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:4</a>): "He heard secret words, which it is not granted to man to utter." Now the memory belongs to the sensitive faculty according
+                     to the Philosopher (De Mem. et Remin. i). Therefore it seems that Paul, while seeing the essence of God, was not withdrawn
+                     from his senses.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27): "Unless a man in some way depart this life, whether by going altogether out of his
+                     body or by turning away and withdrawing from his carnal senses, so that he truly knows not as the Apostle said, whether he
+                     be in the body or out of the body, he is not rapt and caught up into that vision.*" [*The text of St. Augustine reads: "when
+                     he is rapt," etc.]
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The Divine essence cannot be seen by man through any cognitive power other than the intellect. Now the human intellect does
+                     not turn to intelligible objects except by means of the phantasms [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="SS_Q175_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">FP, Q[84], A[7]</a>] which it takes from the senses through the intelligible species; and it is in considering these phantasms that the intellect
+                     judges of and coordinates sensible objects. Hence in any operation that requires abstraction of the
+                     intellect from phantasms, there must be also withdrawal of the intellect from the senses. Now in the state of the wayfarer
+                     it is necessary for man's intellect, if it see God's essence, to be withdrawn from phantasms. For God's essence cannot be
+                     seen by means of a phantasm, nor indeed by any created intelligible species [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="SS_Q175_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html">FP, Q[12], A[2]</a>], since God's essence infinitely transcends not only all bodies, which are represented by phantasms, but also all intelligible
+                     creatures. Now when man's intellect is uplifted to the sublime vision of God's essence, it is necessary that his mind's whole
+                     attention should be summoned to that purpose in such a way that he understand naught else by phantasms, and be absorbed entirely
+                     in God. Therefore it is impossible for man while a wayfarer to see God in His essence without being withdrawn from his senses.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (A[3], OBJ[2]), after the resurrection, in the blessed who see God in His essence, there will be an overflow
+                     from the intellect to the lower powers and even to the body. Hence it is in keeping with the rule itself of the divine vision
+                     that the soul will turn towards phantasms and sensible objects. But there is no such overflow in those who are raptured, as
+                     stated (A[3], OBJ[2], ad 2), and consequently the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellect of Christ's soul was glorified by the habit of the light of glory, whereby He saw the Divine essence much more
+                     fully than an angel or a man. He was, however, a wayfarer on account of the passibility of His body, in respect of which He
+                     was "made a little lower than the angels" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.2.9" target="asv">Heb. 2:9</a>), by dispensation, and not on account of any defect on the part of His intellect. Hence there is no comparison between Him
+                     and other
+                     wayfarers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Paul, after seeing God in His essence, remembered what he had known in that vision, by means of certain intelligible species
+                     that remained in his intellect by way of habit; even as in the absence of the sensible object, certain impressions remain
+                     in the soul which it recollects when it turns to the phantasms. And so this was the knowledge that he was unable wholly to
+                     think over or express in words.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q175_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q175_A5-p0.1">Whether, while in this state, Paul's soul was wholly separated from his body?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that, while in this state, Paul's soul was wholly separated from his body. For the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.5.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 5:6,7</a>): "While we are in the body we are absent from the Lord. For we walk by faith, and not by sight" [*'Per speciem,' i.e. by
+                     an intelligible species]. Now, while in that state, Paul was not absent from the Lord, for he saw Him by a species, as stated
+                     above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q175_A5-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q175_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore he was not in the
+                     body.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a power of the soul cannot be uplifted above the soul's essence wherein it is rooted. Now in this rapture the intellect,
+                     which is a power of the soul, was withdrawn from its bodily surroundings through being uplifted to divine contemplation. Much
+                     more therefore was the essence of the soul separated from the body.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the forces of the vegetative soul are more material than those of the sensitive soul. Now in order for him to be
+                     rapt to the vision of God, it was necessary for him to be withdrawn from the forces of the sensitive soul, as stated above
+                     
+                     <a id="SS_Q175_A5-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q175_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. Much more, therefore, was it necessary for him to be withdrawn from the forces of the vegetative soul. Now when these forces
+                     cease to operate, the soul is no longer in any way united to
+                     the body. Therefore it would seem that in Paul's rapture it was necessary for the soul to be wholly separated from the body.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Ep. CXLVII, 13, ad Paulin.; de videndo Deum): "It is not incredible that this sublime revelation" (namely,
+                     that they should see God in His essence) "was vouchsafed certain saints, without their departing this life so completely as
+                     to leave nothing but a corpse for burial." Therefore it was not necessary for Paul's soul, when in rapture, to be wholly separated
+                     from his body.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[1], OBJ[1]), in the rapture of which we are speaking now, man is uplifted by God's power, "from that which
+                     is according to nature to that which is above nature." Wherefore two things have to be considered: first, what pertains to
+                     man according to nature; secondly, what has to be done by God in man above his nature. Now, since the soul is united to the
+                     body as its natural form, it belongs to the soul to have a natural disposition to
+                     understand by turning to phantasms; and this is not withdrawn by the divine power from the soul in rapture, since its state
+                     undergoes no change, as stated above (A[3], ad 2,3). Yet, this state remaining, actual conversion to phantasms and sensible
+                     objects is withdrawn from the soul, lest it be hindered from being uplifted to that which transcends all phantasms, as stated
+                     above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q175_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q175_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. Therefore it was not necessary that his soul in rapture should be so separated from
+                     the body as to cease to be united thereto as its form; and yet it was necessary for his intellect to be withdrawn from phantasms
+                     and the perception of sensible objects.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A5-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In this rapture Paul was absent from the Lord as regards his state, since he was still in the state of a wayfarer, but not
+                     as regards the act by which he saw God by a species, as stated above (A[3], ad 2,3).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A faculty of the soul is not uplifted by the natural power above the mode becoming the essence of the soul; but it can be
+                     uplifted by the divine power to something higher, even as a body by the violence of a stronger power is lifted up above the
+                     place befitting it according to its specific nature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The forces of the vegetative soul do not operate through the soul being intent thereon, as do the sensitive forces, but by
+                     way of nature. Hence in the case of rapture there is no need for withdrawal from them, as from the sensitive powers, whose
+                     operations would lessen the intentness of the soul on intellective knowledge.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A5-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q175_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q176.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q175_A6-p0.1">Did Paul know whether his soul were separated from his body?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Paul was not ignorant whether his soul were separated from his body. For he says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.2" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:2</a>): "I know a man in Christ rapt even to the third heaven." Now man denotes something composed of soul and body; and rapture
+                     differs from death. Seemingly therefore he knew that his soul was not separated from his body by death, which is the more
+                     probable seeing that this is the common opinion of the Doctors.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it appears from the same words of the Apostle that he knew whither he was rapt, since it was "to the third heaven."
+                     Now this shows that he knew whether he was in the body or not, for if he knew the third heaven to be something corporeal,
+                     he must have known that his soul was not separated from his body, since a corporeal thing cannot be an object of sight save
+                     through the body. Therefore it would seem that he was not ignorant whether his soul were
+                     separated from his body.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 28) that "when in rapture, he saw God with the same vision as the saints see Him
+                     in heaven." Now from the very fact that the saints see God, they know whether their soul is separated from their body. Therefore
+                     Paul too knew this.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.3" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:3</a>): "Whether in the body, or out of the body, I know not, God knoweth."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The true answer to this question must be gathered from the Apostle's very words, whereby he says he knew something, namely
+                     that he was "rapt even to the third heaven," and that something he knew not, namely "whether" he were "in the body or out
+                     of the body." This may be understood in two ways. First, the words "whether in the body or out of the body" may refer not
+                     to the very being of the man who was rapt (as though he knew not whether his soul were in his
+                     body or not), but to the mode of rapture, so that he ignored whether his body besides his soul, or, on the other hand, his
+                     soul alone, were rapt to the third heaven. Thus Ezechiel is stated (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.8.3" target="asv">Ezech. 8:3</a>) to have been "brought in the vision of God into Jerusalem." This was the explanation of a certain Jew according to Jerome
+                     (Prolog. super Daniel.), where he says that "lastly our Apostle" (thus said the Jew) "durst not assert that he was rapt in
+                     his body, but said: 'Whether
+                     in the body or out of the body, I know not.'"
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A6-p7"> Augustine, however, disapproves of this explanation (Gen. ad lit. xii, 3 seqq.) for this reason that the Apostle states that
+                     he knew he was rapt even to the third heaven. Wherefore he knew it to be really the third heaven to which he was rapt, and
+                     not an imaginary likeness of the third heaven: otherwise if he gave the name of third heaven to an imaginary third heaven,
+                     in the same way he might state that he was rapt in the body, meaning, by body, an image of his body, such as
+                     appears in one's dreams. Now if he knew it to be really the third heaven, it follows that either he knew it to be something
+                     spiritual and incorporeal, and then his body could not be rapt thither; or he knew it to be something corporeal, and then
+                     his soul could not be rapt thither without his body, unless it were separated from his body. Consequently we must explain
+                     the matter otherwise, by saying that the Apostle knew himself to be rapt both in soul and body, but that he ignored how his
+                     soul
+                     stood in relation to his body, to wit, whether it were accompanied by his body or not.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A6-p8"> Here we find a diversity of opinions. For some say that the Apostle knew his soul to be united to his body as its form, but
+                     ignored whether it were abstracted from its senses, or again whether it were abstracted from the operations of the vegetative
+                     soul. But he could not but know that it was abstracted from the senses, seeing that he knew himself to be rapt; and as to
+                     his being abstracted from the operation of the vegetative soul, this was not of such importance as to require
+                     him to be so careful in mentioning it. It follows, then, that the Apostle ignored whether his soul were united to his body
+                     as its form, or separated from it by death. Some, however, granting this say that the Apostle did not consider the matter
+                     while he was in rapture, because he was wholly intent upon God, but that afterwards he questioned the point, when taking cognizance
+                     of what he had seen. But this also is contrary to the Apostle's words, for he there distinguishes between the past and
+                     what happened subsequently, since he states that at the present time he knows that he was rapt "fourteen years ago," and that
+                     at the present time he knows not "whether he was in the body or out of the body."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A6-p9"> Consequently we must assert that both before and after he ignored whether his soul were separated from his body. Wherefore
+                     Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 5), after discussing the question at length, concludes: "Perhaps then we must infer that he ignored
+                     whether, when he was rapt to the third heaven, his soul was in his body (in the same way as the soul is in the body, when
+                     we speak of a living body either of a waking or of a sleeping man, or of one that is withdrawn from his
+                     bodily senses during ecstasy), or whether his soul went out of his body altogether, so that his body lay dead."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sometimes by the figure of synecdoche a part of man, especially the soul which is the principal part, denotes a man. or again
+                     we might take this to mean that he whom he states to have been rapt was a man not at the time of his rapture, but fourteen
+                     years afterwards: for he says "I know a man," not "I know a rapt man." Again nothing hinders death brought about by God being
+                     called rapture; and thus Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 3): "If the Apostle
+                     doubted the matter, who of us will dare to be certain about it?" Wherefore those who have something to say on this subject
+                     speak with more conjecture than certainty.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A6-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Apostle knew that either the heaven in question was something incorporeal, or that he saw something incorporeal in that
+                     heaven; yet this could be done by his intellect, even without his soul being separated from his body.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A6-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Paul's vision, while he was in rapture, was like the vision of the blessed in one respect, namely as to the thing seen; and,
+                     unlike, in another respect, namely as to the mode of seeing, because he saw not so perfectly as do the saints in heaven. Hence
+                     Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 36): "Although, when the Apostle was rapt from his carnal senses to the third heaven, he
+                     lacked that full and perfect knowledge of things which is in the angels, in that
+                     he knew not whether he was in the body, or out of the body, this will surely not be lacking after reunion with the body in
+                     the resurrection of the dead, when this corruptible will put on incorruption."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A6-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q175_A6-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q176.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q176" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q176_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q176-p0.1">OF THE GRACE OF TONGUES (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q176-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q176-p2"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q176-p3"> We must now consider those gratuitous graces that pertain to speech, and (1) the grace of tongues; (2) the grace of the word
+                  of wisdom and knowledge. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q176-p4"> (1) Whether by the grace of tongues a man acquires the knowledge of all languages?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q176-p5"> (2) Of the comparison between this gift and the grace of prophecy.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q176_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q176.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q176_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q176_A1-p0.1">Whether those who received the gift of tongues spoke in every language?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q176_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q176_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that those who received the gift of tongues did not speak in every language. For that which is granted to certain
+                     persons by the divine power is the best of its kind: thus our Lord turned the water into good wine, as stated in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.2.10" target="asv"> Jn. 2:10.</a> Now those who had the gift of tongues spoke better in their own language; since a gloss on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.1" target="asv">Heb. 1</a>, says that "it is not surprising that the epistle to the Hebrews is more graceful in style than the
+                     other epistles, since it is natural for a man to have more command over his own than over a strange language. For the Apostle
+                     wrote the other epistles in a foreign, namely the Greek, idiom; whereas he wrote this in the Hebrew tongue." Therefore the
+                     apostles did not receive the knowledge of all languages by a gratuitous grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q176_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nature does not employ many means where one is sufficient; and much less does God Whose work is more orderly than
+                     nature's. Now God could make His disciples to be understood by all, while speaking one tongue: hence a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.2.6" target="asv"> Acts 2:6, </a> "Every man heard them speak in his own tongue," says that "they spoke in every tongue, or speaking in their own, namely the
+                     Hebrew language, were understood by all, as though they spoke the language
+                     proper to each." Therefore it would seem that they had not the knowledge to speak in all languages.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q176_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all graces flow from Christ to His body, which is the Church, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.16" target="asv"> Jn. 1:16, </a> "Of His fullness we all have received." Now we do not read that Christ spoke more than one language, nor does each one of
+                     the faithful now speak save in one tongue. Therefore it would seem that Christ's disciples did not receive the grace to the
+                     extent of speaking in all languages.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q176_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.2.4" target="asv">Acts 2:4</a>) that "they were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and they began to speak with divers tongues, according as the Holy Ghost
+                     gave them to speak"; on which passage a gloss of Gregory [*Hom. xxx in Ev.] says that "the Holy Ghost appeared over the disciples
+                     under the form of fiery tongues, and gave them the knowledge of all tongues."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q176_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Christ's first disciples were chosen by Him in order that they might disperse throughout the whole world, and preach His
+                     faith everywhere, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.28.19" target="asv"> Mat. 28:19, </a> "Going . . . teach ye all nations." Now it was not fitting that they who were being sent to teach others should need to be
+                     taught by others, either as to how they should speak to other people, or as to how they were to understand those who spoke
+                     to them; and all the more seeing
+                     that those who were being sent were of one nation, that of Judea, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.27.6" target="asv"> Is. 27:6, </a> "When they shall rush out from Jacob [*Vulg.: 'When they shall rush in unto Jacob,' etc.] . . . they shall fill the face
+                     of the world with seed." Moreover those who were being sent were poor and powerless; nor at the outset could they have easily
+                     found someone to interpret their words faithfully to others, or to explain what others said to them, especially as they were
+                     sent to
+                     unbelievers. Consequently it was necessary, in this respect, that God should provide them with the gift of tongues; in order
+                     that, as the diversity of tongues was brought upon the nations when they fell away to idolatry, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.11" target="asv">Gn. 11</a>, so when the nations were to be recalled to the worship of one God a remedy to this diversity might be applied by the gift
+                     of tongues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q176_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:7</a>), "the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit"; and consequently both Paul and the other apostles
+                     were divinely instructed in the languages of all nations sufficiently for the requirements of the teaching of the faith. But
+                     as regards the grace and elegance of style which human art adds to a language, the Apostle was instructed in his own, but
+                     not in a foreign tongue. Even so
+                     they were sufficiently instructed in wisdom and scientific knowledge, as required for teaching the faith, but not as to all
+                     things known by acquired science, for instance the conclusions of arithmetic and geometry.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q176_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although either was possible, namely that, while speaking in one tongue they should be understood by all, or that they should
+                     speak in all tongues, it was more fitting that they should speak in all tongues, because this pertained to the perfection
+                     of their knowledge, whereby they were able not only to speak, but also to understand what was said by others. Whereas if their
+                     one language were intelligible to all, this would either have been due to the
+                     knowledge of those who understood their speech, or it would have amounted to an illusion, since a man's words would have had
+                     a different sound in another's ears, from that with which they were uttered. Hence a gloss says on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.2.6" target="asv"> Acts 2:6 </a>that "it was a greater miracle that they should speak all kinds of tongues"; and Paul says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.18" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:18</a>): "I thank my God I speak with all your tongues."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q176_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Christ in His own person purposed preaching to only one nation, namely the Jews. Consequently, although without any doubt
+                     He possessed most perfectly the knowledge of all languages, there was no need for Him to speak in every tongue. And therefore,
+                     as Augustine says (Tract. xxxii in Joan.), "whereas even now the Holy Ghost is received, yet no one speaks in the tongues
+                     of all nations, because the Church herself already speaks the languages of all
+                     nations: since whoever is not in the Church, receives not the Holy Ghost."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q176_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q176_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q176.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q176_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q176_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q176_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q177.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q176_A2-p0.1">Whether the gift of tongues is more excellent than the grace of prophecy?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q176_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q176_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the grace of prophecy. For, seemingly, better things are proper
+                     to better persons, according to the Philosopher (Topic. iii, 1). Now the gift of tongues is proper to the New Testament, hence
+                     we sing in the sequence of Pentecost [*The sequence: 'Sancti Spiritus adsit nobis gratia' ascribed to King Robert of France,
+                     the reputed author of the 'Veni Sancte Spiritus.' Cf. Migne, Patr. Lat. tom. CXLI]:
+                     "On this day Thou gavest Christ's apostles an unwonted gift, a marvel to all time": whereas prophecy is more pertinent to
+                     the Old Testament, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.1" target="asv"> Heb. 1:1, </a> "God Who at sundry times and in divers manners spoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets." Therefore it would seem
+                     that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the gift of prophecy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q176_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that whereby we are directed to God is seemingly more excellent than that whereby we are directed to men. Now, by
+                     the gift of tongues, man is directed to God, whereas by prophecy he is directed to man; for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:2,3</a>): "He that speaketh in a tongue, speaketh not unto men, but unto God . . . but he that prophesieth, speaketh unto men unto
+                     edification." Therefore it would seem that the gift of tongues is more
+                     excellent than the gift of prophecy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q176_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the gift of tongues abides like a habit in the person who has it, and "he can use it when he will"; wherefore it
+                     is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.18" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:18</a>): "I thank my God I speak with all your tongues." But it is not so with the gift of prophecy, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q176_A2-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q171_A2.html">Q[171], A[2]</a>). Therefore the gift of tongues would seem to be more excellent than the gift of prophecy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q176_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the "interpretation of speeches" would seem to be contained under prophecy, because the Scriptures are expounded
+                     by the same Spirit from Whom they originated. Now the interpretation of speeches is placed after "divers kinds of tongues"
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:10</a>). Therefore it seems that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the gift of prophecy, particularly as regards a part
+                     of the latter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q176_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:5</a>): "Greater is he that prophesieth than he that speaketh with tongues."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q176_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The gift of prophecy surpasses the gift of tongues, in three ways. First, because the gift of tongues regards the utterance
+                     of certain words, which signify an intelligible truth, and this again is signified by the phantasms which appear in an imaginary
+                     vision; wherefore Augustine compares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 8) the gift of tongues to an imaginary vision. On the other hand,
+                     it has been stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q176_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q173_A2.html">Q[173], A[2]</a>) that the gift of
+                     prophecy consists in the mind itself being enlightened so as to know an intelligible truth. Wherefore, as the prophetic enlightenment
+                     is more excellent than the imaginary vision, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q176_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q174_A2.html">Q[174], A[2]</a>), so also is prophecy more excellent than the gift of tongues considered in itself. Secondly, because the gift of prophecy
+                     regards the knowledge of things, which is more excellent than the knowledge of words, to which the gift of tongues pertains.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q176_A2-p8"> Thirdly, because the gift of prophecy is more profitable. The Apostle proves this in three ways (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14" target="asv">1 Cor. 14</a>); first, because prophecy is more profitable to the edification of the Church, for which purpose he that speaketh in tongues
+                     profiteth nothing, unless interpretation follow (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:4,5</a>). Secondly, as regards the speaker himself, for if he be enabled to speak in divers tongues without understanding them, which
+                     pertains to the gift of prophecy, his
+                     own mind would not be edified (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A2-p8.3" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:7-14</a>). Thirdly, as to unbelievers for whose especial benefit the gift of tongues seems to have been given; since perchance they
+                     might think those who speak in tongues to be mad (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A2-p8.4" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.23" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:23</a>), for instance the Jews deemed the apostles drunk when the latter spoke in various tongues (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A2-p8.5" href="./asv.html#Acts.2.13" target="asv">Acts 2:13</a>): whereas by prophecies the unbeliever is convinced, because the secrets of his heart are made
+                     manifest (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A2-p8.6" href="./asv.html#Acts.2.25" target="asv">Acts 2:25</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q176_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q176_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q174_A3.html">Q[174], A[3]</a>, ad 1), it belongs to the excellence of prophecy that a man is not only enlightened by an intelligible light, but also that
+                     he should perceive an imaginary vision: and so again it belongs to the perfection of the Holy Ghost's operation, not only
+                     to fill the mind with the prophetic light, and the imagination with the imaginary vision, as happened in the Old Testament,
+                     but also to endow the tongue
+                     with external erudition, in the utterance of various signs of speech. All this is done in the New Testament, according to
+                     
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A2-p9.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.26" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:26, </a> "Every one of you hath a psalm, hath a doctrine, hath a tongue, hath a revelation," i.e. a prophetic revelation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q176_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By the gift of prophecy man is directed to God in his mind, which is more excellent than being directed to Him in his tongue.
+                     "He that speaketh in a tongue "is said to speak "not unto men," i.e. to men's understanding or profit, but unto God's understanding
+                     and praise. On the other hand, by prophecy a man is directed both to God and to man; wherefore it is the more perfect gift.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q176_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prophetic revelation extends to the knowledge of all things supernatural; wherefore from its very perfection it results that
+                     in this imperfect state of life it cannot be had perfectly by way of habit, but only imperfectly by way of passion. on the
+                     other hand, the gift of tongues is confined to a certain particular knowledge, namely of human words; wherefore it is not
+                     inconsistent with the imperfection of this life, that it should be had perfectly and
+                     by way of habit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q176_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The interpretation of speeches is reducible to the gift of prophecy, inasmuch as the mind is enlightened so as to understand
+                     and explain any obscurities of speech arising either from a difficulty in the things signified, or from the words uttered
+                     being unknown, or from the figures of speech employed, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A2-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.5.16" target="asv"> Dan. 5:16, </a> "I have heard of thee, that thou canst interpret obscure things, and resolve difficult things." Hence the
+                     interpretation of speeches is more excellent than the gift of tongues, as appears from the saying of the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A2-p12.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:5</a>), "Greater is he that prophesieth than he that speaketh with tongues; unless perhaps he interpret." Yet the interpretation
+                     of speeches is placed after the gift of tongues, because the interpretation of speeches extends even to the interpretation
+                     of divers kinds of tongues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q176_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q176_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q176_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q177.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q176_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q177" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q176_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q177_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q177-p0.1">OF THE GRATUITOUS GRACE CONSISTING IN WORDS (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q177-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q177-p2"> We must now consider the gratuitous grace that attaches to words; of which the Apostle says (
+                  <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:8</a>): "To one . . . by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, and to another the word of knowledge." Under this head there are
+                  two points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q177-p3"> (1) Whether any gratuitous grace attaches to words?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q177-p4"> (2) To whom is the grace becoming?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q177_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q177.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q177_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q177_A1-p0.1">Whether any gratuitous grace attaches to words?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q177_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q177_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a gratuitous grace does not attach to words. For grace is given for that which surpasses the faculty of
+                     nature. But natural reason has devised the art of rhetoric whereby a man is able to speak so as to teach, please, and persuade,
+                     as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iv, 12). Now this belongs to the grace of words. Therefore it would seem that the grace
+                     of words is not a gratuitous grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q177_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all grace pertains to the kingdom of God. But the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.20" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:20</a>): "The kingdom of God is not in speech, but in power." Therefore there is no gratuitous grace connected with words.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q177_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no grace is given through merit, since "if by grace, it is not now of works" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.6" target="asv">Rom. 11:6</a>). But the word is sometimes given to a man on his merits. For Gregory says (Moral. xi, 15) in explanation of 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.43" target="asv">Ps. 118:43</a>, "Take not Thou the word of truth utterly out of my mouth" that "the word of truth is that which Almighty God gives to them
+                     that do it, and takes away from them that do it not." Therefore it would seem that the gift of the word
+                     is not a gratuitous grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q177_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it behooves man to declare in words things pertaining to the virtue of faith, no less than those pertaining to the
+                     gift of wisdom or of knowledge. Therefore if the word of wisdom and the word of knowledge are reckoned gratuitous graces,
+                     the word of faith should likewise be placed among the gratuitous graces.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q177_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.6.5" target="asv">Ecclus. 6:5</a>): "A gracious tongue in a good man shall abound [Vulg.: 'aboundeth']." Now man's goodness is by grace. Therefore graciousness
+                     in words is also by grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q177_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The gratuitous graces are given for the profit of others, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q177_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q111_A1.html">FS, Q[111], AA[1]</a>,4). Now the knowledge a man receives from God cannot be turned to another's profit, except by means of speech. And since
+                     the Holy Ghost does not fail in anything that pertains to the profit of the Church, He provides also the members of the Church
+                     with speech; to the effect that a man not only speaks so as to be understood by different
+                     people, which pertains to the gift of tongues, but also speaks with effect, and this pertains to the grace "of the word."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q177_A1-p8"> This happens in three ways. First, in order to instruct the intellect, and this is the case when a man speaks so as "to teach."
+                     Secondly, in order to move the affections, so that a man willingly hearkens to the word of God. This is the case when a man
+                     speaks so as "to please" his hearers, not indeed with a view to his own favor, but in order to draw them to listen to God's
+                     word. Thirdly, in order that men may love that which is signified by the word, and desire to fulfill it,
+                     and this is the case when a man so speaks as "to sway" his hearers. In order to effect this the Holy Ghost makes use of the
+                     human tongue as of an instrument; but He it is Who perfects the work within. Hence Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost
+                     (Hom. xxx in Ev.): "Unless the Holy Ghost fill the hearts of the hearers, in vain does the voice of the teacher resound in
+                     the ears of the body."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q177_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as by a miracle God sometimes works in a more excellent way those things which nature also can work, so too the Holy
+                     Ghost effects more excellently by the grace of words that which art can effect in a less efficient manner.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q177_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Apostle is speaking there of the word that relies on human eloquence without the power of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore he
+                     says just before (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.19" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:19</a>): "I . . . will know, not the speech of them that are puffed up, but the power": and of himself he had already said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:4</a>): "My speech and my preaching was not in the persuasive words of human wisdom, but in the showing of the spirit and power."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q177_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above, the grace of the word is given to a man for the profit of others. Hence it is withdrawn sometimes through
+                     the fault of the hearer, and sometimes through the fault of the speaker. The good works of either of them do not merit this
+                     grace directly, but only remove the obstacles thereto. For sanctifying grace also is withdrawn on account of a person's fault,
+                     and yet he does not merit it by his good works, which, however, remove the
+                     obstacles to grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q177_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As stated above, the grace of the word is directed to the profit of others. Now if a man communicates his faith to others
+                     this is by the word of knowledge or of wisdom. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "to know how faith may profit the
+                     godly and be defended against the ungodly, is apparently what the Apostle means by knowledge." Hence it was not necessary
+                     for him to mention the word of faith, but it was sufficient for him to mention the
+                     word of knowledge and of wisdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q177_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q177_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q177.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q177_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q177_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q177_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q178.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q177_A2-p0.1">Whether the grace of the word of wisdom and knowledge is becoming to women?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q177_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q177_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the grace of the word of wisdom and knowledge is becoming even to women. For teaching is pertinent to
+                     this grace, as stated in the foregoing Article. Now it is becoming to a woman to teach; for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.4.3" target="asv">Prov. 4:3,4</a>): "I was an only son in the sight of my mother, and she taught me [*Vulg.: 'I was my father's son, tender, and as an only
+                     son in the sight of my mother. And he taught me.']." Therefore this grace is
+                     becoming to women.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q177_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the grace of prophecy is greater than the grace of the word, even as the contemplation of truth is greater than
+                     its utterance. But prophecy is granted to women, as we read of Deborah (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Judg.4.4" target="asv">Judges 4:4</a>), and of Holda the prophetess, the wife of Sellum (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 22:14</a>), and of the four daughters of Philip (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A2-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Acts.21.9" target="asv">Acts 21:9</a>). Moreover the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A2-p3.4" href="./asv.html#iCor.11.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 11:5</a>): "Every woman praying or prophesying,"
+                     etc. Much more therefore would it seem that the grace of the word is becoming to a woman.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q177_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.4.10" target="asv">1 Pet. 4:10</a>): "As every man hath received grace ministering the same one to another." Now some women receive the grace of wisdom and
+                     knowledge, which they cannot minister to others except by the grace of the word. Therefore the grace of the word is becoming
+                     to women.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q177_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.34" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:34</a>): "Let women keep silence in the churches," and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.12" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:12</a>): "I suffer not a woman to teach." Now this pertains especially to the grace of the word. Therefore the grace of the word
+                     is not becoming to women.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q177_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Speech may be employed in two ways: in one way privately, to one or a few, in familiar conversation, and in this respect
+                     the grace of the word may be becoming to women; in another way, publicly, addressing oneself to the whole church, and this
+                     is not permitted to women. First and chiefly, on account of the condition attaching to the female sex, whereby woman should
+                     be subject to man, as appears from 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.16" target="asv">Gn. 3:16</a>. Now teaching and persuading publicly in the
+                     church belong not to subjects but to the prelates (although men who are subjects may do these things if they be so commissioned,
+                     because their subjection is not a result of their natural sex, as it is with women, but of some thing supervening by accident).
+                     Secondly, lest men's minds be enticed to lust, for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.9.11" target="asv">Ecclus. 9:11</a>): "Her conversation burneth as fire." Thirdly, because as a rule women are not perfected in wisdom, so as to be fit to be
+                     intrusted with
+                     public teaching.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q177_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage quoted speaks of private teaching whereby a father instructs his son.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q177_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The grace of prophecy consists in God enlightening the mind, on the part of which there is no difference of sex among men,
+                     according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Col.3.10" target="asv"> Col. 3:10,11, </a> "Putting on the new" man, "him who is renewed unto knowledge, according to the image of Him that created him, where there
+                     is neither male nor female [*Vulg.: 'Neither Gentile nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian nor Scythian, bond
+                     nor free.' Cf. 
+                     <a id="SS_Q177_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q93_A6.html">FP, Q[93], A[6]</a>, ad 2 footnote]." Now the grace of the word pertains to the instruction of men among whom the difference of sex is found.
+                     Hence the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q177_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The recipients of a divinely conferred grace administer it in different ways according to their various conditions. Hence
+                     women, if they have the grace of wisdom or of knowledge, can administer it by teaching privately but not publicly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q177_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q177_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q177_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q178.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q176_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q177_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q178" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q177_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q178_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q178-p0.1">OF THE GRACE OF MIRACLES (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q178-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q178-p2"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q178-p3"> We must next consider the grace of miracles, under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q178-p4"> (1) Whether there is a gratuitous grace of working miracles?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q178-p5"> (2) To whom is it becoming?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q178_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q178.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q178_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q178_A1-p0.1">Whether there is a gratuitous grace of working miracles?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no gratuitous grace is directed to the working of miracles. For every grace puts something in the one
+                     to whom it is given (Cf. 
+                     <a id="SS_Q178_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A1.html">FS, Q[90], A[1]</a>). Now the working of miracles puts nothing in the soul of the man who receives it since miracles are wrought at the touch
+                     even of a dead body. Thus we read (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 13:21</a>) that "some . . . cast the body into the sepulchre of Eliseus. And when it had touched
+                     the bones of Eliseus, the man came to life, and stood upon his feet." Therefore the working of miracles does not belong to
+                     a gratuitous grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the gratuitous graces are from the Holy Ghost, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:4, </a> "There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit." Now the working of miracles is effected even by the unclean spirit,
+                     according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.24" target="asv"> Mat. 24:24, </a> "There shall arise false Christs and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders." Therefore it would seem that
+                     the working of miracles does not belong to a gratuitous grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, miracles are divided into "signs," "wonders" or "portents," and "virtues." [*Cf. 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiThess.2.9" target="asv">2 Thess. 2:9, </a> where the Douay version renders 'virtus' by 'power.' The use of the word 'virtue' in the sense of a miracle is now obsolete,
+                     and the generic term 'miracle' is elsewhere used in its stead: Cf. 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:10</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p4.3" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.28" target="asv">28</a>;
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p4.4" href="./asv.html#Heb.2.4" target="asv"> Heb. 2:4</a>;
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p4.5" href="./asv.html#Acts.2.22" target="asv"> Acts 2:22</a>]. Therefore it is unreasonable to reckon the
+                     "working of miracles" a gratuitous grace, any more than the "working of signs" and "wonders."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the miraculous restoring to health is done by the power of God. Therefore the grace of healing should not be distinguished
+                     from the working of miracles.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the working of miracles results from faith---either of the worker, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:2, </a> "If I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains," or of other persons for whose sake miracles are wrought,
+                     according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.58" target="asv"> Mat. 13:58, </a> "And He wrought not many miracles there, because of their unbelief." Therefore, if faith be reckoned a gratuitous grace,
+                     it is superfluous to reckon in addition the working of
+                     signs as another gratuitous grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:9,10</a>) says that among other gratuitous graces, "to another" is given "the grace of healing . . . to another, the working of miracles."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q178_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q177_A1.html">Q[177], A[1]</a>), the Holy Ghost provides sufficiently for the Church in matters profitable unto salvation, to which purpose the gratuitous
+                     graces are directed. Now just as the knowledge which a man receives from God needs to be brought to the knowledge of others
+                     through the gift of tongues and the grace of the word, so too the word uttered needs to be confirmed in order that it be rendered
+                     credible. This is done by
+                     the working of miracles, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.16.20" target="asv"> Mk. 16:20, </a> "And confirming the word with signs that followed": and reasonably so. For it is natural to man to arrive at the intelligible
+                     truth through its sensible effects. Wherefore just as man led by his natural reason is able to arrive at some knowledge of
+                     God through His natural effects, so is he brought to a certain degree of supernatural knowledge of the objects of faith by
+                     certain supernatural effects which are called miracles.
+                     Therefore the working of miracles belongs to a gratuitous grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as prophecy extends to whatever can be known supernaturally, so the working of miracles extends to all things that can
+                     be done supernaturally; the cause whereof is the divine omnipotence which cannot be communicated to any creature. Hence it
+                     is impossible for the principle of working miracles to be a quality abiding as a habit in the soul. On the other hand, just
+                     as the prophet's mind is moved by divine inspiration to know something
+                     supernaturally, so too is it possible for the mind of the miracle worker to be moved to do something resulting in the miraculous
+                     effect which God causes by His power. Sometimes this takes place after prayer, as when Peter raised to life the dead Tabitha
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.9.40" target="asv">Acts 9:40</a>): sometimes without any previous prayer being expressed, as when Peter by upbraiding the lying Ananias and Saphira delivered
+                     them to death (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.4" target="asv">Acts 5:4</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p9.3" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.9" target="asv">9</a>). Hence Gregory says (Dial. ii, 30) that "the saints work
+                     miracles, sometimes by authority, sometimes by prayer." In either case, however, God is the principal worker, for He uses
+                     instrumentally either man's inward movement, or his speech, or some outward action, or again the bodily contact of even a
+                     dead body. Thus when Josue had said as though authoritatively (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p9.4" href="./asv.html#Josh.10.12" target="asv">Josh. 10:12</a>): "Move not, O sun, toward Gabaon," it is said afterwards (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p9.5" href="./asv.html#Josh.10.14" target="asv">Josh. 10:14</a>): "There was not before or after so long a day, the Lord obeying
+                     the voice of a man."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Our Lord is speaking there of the miracles to be wrought at the time of Antichrist, of which the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iiThess.2.9" target="asv">2 Thess. 2:9</a>) that the coming of Antichrist will be "according to the working of Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders." To
+                     quote the words of Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 19), "it is a matter of debate whether they are called signs and lying wonders,
+                     because he will deceive the senses of mortals by imaginary
+                     visions, in that he will seem to do what he does not, or because, though they be real wonders, they will seduce into falsehood
+                     them that believe." They are said to be real, because the things themselves will be real, just as Pharaoh's magicians made
+                     real frogs and real serpents; but they will not be real miracles, because they will be done by the power of natural causes,
+                     as stated in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q178_A1-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q114_A4.html">FP, Q[114], A[4]</a>; whereas the working of miracles which is ascribed to a
+                     gratuitous grace, is done by God's power for man's profit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Two things may be considered in miracles. One is that which is done: this is something surpassing the faculty of nature,
+                     and in this respect miracles are called "virtues." The other thing is the purpose for which miracles are wrought, namely the
+                     manifestation of something supernatural, and in this respect they are commonly called "signs": but on account of some excellence
+                     they receive the name of "wonder" or "prodigy," as showing something from afar
+                     [procul].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The "grace of healing" is mentioned separately, because by its means a benefit, namely bodily health, is conferred on man
+                     in addition to the common benefit bestowed in all miracles, namely the bringing of men to the knowledge of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The working of miracles is ascribed to faith for two reasons. First, because it is directed to the confirmation of faith,
+                     secondly, because it proceeds from God's omnipotence on which faith relies. Nevertheless, just as besides the grace of faith,
+                     the grace of the word is necessary that people may be instructed in the faith, so too is the grace of miracles necessary that
+                     people may be confirmed in their faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q178.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q178_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q178_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q178_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q179.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q178_A2-p0.1">Whether the wicked can work miracles?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the wicked cannot work miracles. For miracles are wrought through prayer, as stated above (A[1], ad 1).
+                     Now the prayer of a sinner is not granted, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.9.31" target="asv"> Jn. 9:31, </a> "We know that God doth not hear sinners," and
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.28.9" target="asv"> Prov. 28:9, </a> "He that turneth away his ear from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an abomination." Therefore it would seem that the
+                     wicked cannot work miracles.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, miracles are ascribed to faith, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.17.19" target="asv"> Mat. 17:19, </a> "If you have faith as a grain of mustard seed you shall say to this mountain: Remove from hence hither, and it shall remove."
+                     Now "faith without works is dead," according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.20" target="asv"> James 2:20, </a> so that, seemingly, it is devoid of its proper operation. Therefore it would seem that the wicked, since they do not good
+                     works, cannot work miracles.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, miracles are divine attestations, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.2.4" target="asv"> Heb. 2:4, </a> "God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders and divers miracles": wherefore in the Church the canonization of certain
+                     persons is based on the attestation of miracles. Now God cannot bear witness to a falsehood. Therefore it would seem that
+                     wicked men cannot work miracles.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the good are more closely united to God than the wicked. But the good do not all work miracles. Much less therefore
+                     do the wicked.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:2</a>): "If I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing." Now whosoever has not
+                     charity is wicked, because "this gift alone of the Holy Ghost distinguishes the children of the kingdom from the children
+                     of perdition," as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18). Therefore it would seem that even the wicked can work miracles.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some miracles are not true but imaginary deeds, because they delude man by the appearance of that which is not; while others
+                     are true deeds, yet they have not the character of a true miracle, because they are done by the power of some natural cause.
+                     Both of these can be done by the demons, as stated above (A[1], ad 2).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p8"> True miracles cannot be wrought save by the power of God, because God works them for man's benefit, and this in two ways:
+                     in one way for the confirmation of truth declared, in another way in proof of a person's holiness, which God desires to propose
+                     as an example of virtue. In the first way miracles can be wrought by any one who preaches the true faith and calls upon Christ's
+                     name, as even the wicked do sometimes. In this way even the wicked can work miracles. Hence Jerome
+                     commenting on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.22" target="asv">Mat. 7:22</a>, "Have not we prophesied in Thy name?" says: "Sometimes prophesying, the working of miracles, and the casting out of demons
+                     are accorded not to the merit of those who do these things, but to the invoking of Christ's name, that men may honor God,
+                     by invoking Whom such great miracles are wrought."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p9"> In the second way miracles are not wrought except by the saints, since it is in proof of their holiness that miracles are
+                     wrought during their lifetime or after death, either by themselves or by others. For we read (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.19.11" target="asv">Acts 19:11,12</a>) that "God wrought by the hand of Paul . . . miracles" and "even there were brought from his body to the sick, handkerchiefs
+                     . . . and the diseases departed from them." In this way indeed there is nothing to prevent a sinner from
+                     working miracles by invoking a saint; but the miracle is ascribed not to him, but to the one in proof of whose holiness such
+                     things are done.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q178_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q83_A16.html">Q[83], A[16]</a>) when we were treating of prayer, the prayer of impetration relies not on merit but on God's mercy, which extends even to
+                     the wicked, wherefore the prayers even of sinners are sometimes granted by God. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xliv in Joan.)
+                     that "the blind man spoke these words before he was anointed," that is, before he was perfectly enlightened; "since God does
+                     hear sinners." When it is
+                     said that the prayer of one who hears not the law is an abomination, this must be understood so far as the sinner's merit
+                     is concerned; yet it is sometimes granted, either for the spiritual welfare of the one who prays---as the publican was heard
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.18.14" target="asv">Lk. 18:14</a>)---or for the good of others and for God's glory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faith without works is said to be dead, as regards the believer, who lives not, by faith, with the life of grace. But nothing
+                     hinders a living thing from working through a dead instrument, as a man through a stick. It is thus that God works while employing
+                     instrumentally the faith of a sinner.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Miracles are always true witnesses to the purpose for which they are wrought. Hence wicked men who teach a false doctrine
+                     never work true miracles in confirmation of their teaching, although sometimes they may do so in praise of Christ's name which
+                     they invoke, and by the power of the sacraments which they administer. If they teach a true doctrine, sometimes they work
+                     true miracles as confirming their teaching, but not as an attestation of holiness.
+                     Hence Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 79): "Magicians work miracles in one way, good Christians in another, wicked Christians
+                     in another. Magicians by private compact with the demons, good Christians by their manifest righteousness, evil Christians
+                     by the outward signs of righteousness."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 79), "the reason why these are not granted to all holy men is lest by a most baneful
+                     error the weak be deceived into thinking such deeds to imply greater gifts than the deeds of righteousness whereby eternal
+                     life is obtained."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q178_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q179.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q177_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q178_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q179" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q178_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q179_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q179-p0.1">OF THE DIVISION OF LIFE INTO ACTIVE AND CONTEMPLATIVE (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q179-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q179-p2"> We must next consider active and contemplative life. This consideration will be fourfold: (1) Of the division of life into
+                  active and contemplative; (2) Of the contemplative life; (3) Of the active life; (4) Of the comparison between the active
+                  and the contemplative life.
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q179-p3"> Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q179-p4"> (1) Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q179-p5"> (2) Whether this is an adequate division?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q179_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q179.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q179_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q179_A1-p0.1">Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q179_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q179_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that life is not fittingly divided into active and contemplative. For the soul is the principle of life by
+                     its essence: since the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "in living things to live is to be." Now the soul is the principle
+                     of action and contemplation by its powers. Therefore it would seem that life is not fittingly divided into active and contemplative.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q179_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the division of that which comes afterwards is unfittingly applied to that which comes first. Now active and contemplative,
+                     or "speculative" and "practical," are differences of the intellect (De Anima iii, 10); while "to live" comes before "to understand,"
+                     since "to live" comes first to living things through the vegetative soul, as the Philosopher states (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore
+                     life is unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q179_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the word "life" implies movement, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. vi): whereas contemplation consists rather in
+                     rest, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q179_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.16" target="asv"> Wis. 8:16</a>: "When I enter into my house, I shall repose myself with her." Therefore it would seem that life is unfittingly divided into
+                     active and contemplative.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q179_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. xiv super Ezech.): "There is a twofold life wherein Almighty God instructs us by His holy word, the active
+                     life and the contemplative."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q179_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Properly speaking, those things are said to live whose movement or operation is from within themselves. Now that which is
+                     proper to a thing and to which it is most inclined is that which is most becoming to it from itself; wherefore every living
+                     thing gives proof of its life by that operation which is most proper to it, and to which it is most inclined. Thus the life
+                     of plants is said to consist in nourishment and generation; the life of animals in sensation
+                     and movement; and the life of men in their understanding and acting according to reason. Wherefore also in men the life of
+                     every man would seem to be that wherein he delights most, and on which he is most intent; thus especially does he wish "to
+                     associate with his friends" (Ethic. ix, 12).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q179_A1-p7"> Accordingly since certain men are especially intent on the contemplation of truth, while others are especially intent on
+                     external actions, it follows that man's life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q179_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Each thing's proper form that makes it actually "to be" is properly that thing's principle of operation. Hence "to live"
+                     is, in living things, "to be," because living things through having "being" from their form, act in such and such a way.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q179_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Life in general is not divided into active and contemplative, but the life of man, who derives his species from having an
+                     intellect, wherefore the same division applies to intellect and human life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q179_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is true that contemplation enjoys rest from external movements. Nevertheless to contemplate is itself a movement of the
+                     intellect, in so far as every operation is described as a movement; in which sense the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7)
+                     that sensation and understanding are movements of a kind, in so far as movement is defined "the act of a perfect thing." In
+                     this way Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) ascribes three movements to the soul in
+                     contemplation, namely, "straight," "circular," and "oblique" [*Cf.
+                     <a id="SS_Q179_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q180_A6.html"> Q[180], A[6]</a>].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q179_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q179_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q179.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q179_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q179_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q179_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q179_A2-p0.1">Whether life is adequately divided into active and contemplative?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q179_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q179_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that life is not adequately divided into active and contemplative. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5) that
+                     there are three most prominent kinds of life, the life of "pleasure," the "civil" which would seem to be the same as the active,
+                     and the "contemplative" life. Therefore the division of life into active and contemplative would seem to be inadequate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q179_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1,2,3,19) mentions three kinds of life, namely the life of "leisure" which pertains
+                     to the contemplative, the "busy" life which pertains to the active, and a third "composed of both." Therefore it would seem
+                     that life is inadequately divided into active and contemplative.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q179_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man's life is diversified according to the divers actions in which men are occupied. Now there are more than two
+                     occupations of human actions. Therefore it would seem that life should be divided into more kinds than the active and the
+                     contemplative.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q179_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> These two lives are signified by the two wives of Jacob; the active by Lia, and the contemplative by Rachel: and by the two
+                     hostesses of our Lord; the contemplative life by Mary, and the active life by Martha, as Gregory declares (Moral. vi, 37 [*Hom.
+                     xiv in Ezech.]). Now this signification would not be fitting if there were more than two lives. Therefore life is adequately
+                     divided into active and contemplative.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q179_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[1], ad 2), this division applies to the human life as derived from the intellect. Now the intellect is
+                     divided into active and contemplative, since the end of intellective knowledge is either the knowledge itself of truth, which
+                     pertains to the contemplative intellect, or some external action, which pertains to the practical or active intellect. Therefore
+                     life too is adequately divided into active and contemplative.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q179_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The life of pleasure places its end in pleasures of the body, which are common to us and dumb animals; wherefore as the Philosopher
+                     says (Ethic. Ethic. i, 5), it is the life "of a beast." Hence it is not included in this division of the life of a man into
+                     active and contemplative.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q179_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A mean is a combination of extremes, wherefore it is virtually contained in them, as tepid in hot and cold, and pale in white
+                     and black. In like manner active and contemplative comprise that which is composed of both. Nevertheless as in every mixture
+                     one of the simples predominates, so too in the mean state of life sometimes the contemplative, sometimes the active element,
+                     abounds.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q179_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All the occupations of human actions, if directed to the requirements of the present life in accord with right reason, belong
+                     to the active life which provides for the necessities of the present life by means of well-ordered activity. If, on the other
+                     hand, they minister to any concupiscence whatever, they belong to the life of pleasure, which is not comprised under the active
+                     life. Those human occupations that are directed to the consideration of
+                     truth belong to the contemplative life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q179_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q179_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q179_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q178_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q179_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q180" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q179_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q180-p0.1">OF THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q180-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q180-p2"> We must now consider the contemplative life, under which head there are eight points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q180-p3"> (1) Whether the contemplative life pertains to the intellect only, or also to the affections?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q180-p4"> (2) Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q180-p5"> (3) Whether the contemplative life consists in one action or in several?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q180-p6"> (4) Whether the consideration of any truth whatever pertains to the contemplative life?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q180-p7"> (5) Whether the contemplative life of man in this state can arise to the vision of God?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q180-p8"> (6) Of the movements of contemplation assigned by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv);</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q180-p9"> (7) Of the pleasure of contemplation;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q180-p10"> (8) Of the duration of contemplation.</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q180-p11"></p>
+               <div id="SS_Q180_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q180_A1-p0.1">Whether the contemplative life has nothing to do with the affections, and pertains wholly to the intellect?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to do with the affections and pertains wholly to the intellect. For
+                     the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, text. 3 [*Ed Did. ia, 1]) that "the end of contemplation is truth." Now truth pertains wholly
+                     to the intellect. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life wholly regards the intellect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37; Hom. xix in Ezech.) that "Rachel, which is interpreted 'vision of the principle' [*Or
+                     rather, 'One seeing the principle,' if derived from {rah} and {irzn}; Cf. Jerome, De Nom. Hebr.], signifies the contemplative
+                     life." Now the vision of a principle belongs properly to the intellect. Therefore the contemplative life belongs properly
+                     to the intellect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that it belongs to the contemplative life, "to rest from external action." Now
+                     the affective or appetitive power inclines to external actions. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life has nothing
+                     to do with the appetitive power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the contemplative life is to cling with our whole mind to the love of God and our
+                     neighbor, and to desire nothing beside our Creator." Now desire and love pertain to the affective or appetitive power, as
+                     stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q180_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A2.html">FS, Q[25], A[2]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q180_A1-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q26_A2.html">FS, Q[26], A[2]</a>). Therefore the contemplative life has also something to do with the affective or appetitive power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[179], A[1]) theirs is said to be the contemplative who are chiefly intent on the contemplation of truth.
+                     Now intention is an act of the will, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q180_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q12_A1.html">FS, Q[12], A[1]</a>), because intention is of the end which is the object of the will. Consequently the contemplative life, as regards the essence
+                     of the action, pertains to the intellect, but as regards the motive cause of the exercise of that action it belongs
+                     to the will, which moves all the other powers, even the intellect, to their actions, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q180_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q82_A4.html">FP, Q[82], A[4]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q180_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">FS, Q[9], A[1]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A1-p7"> Now the appetitive power moves one to observe things either with the senses or with the intellect, sometimes for love of
+                     the thing seen because, as it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.21" target="asv">Mat. 6:21</a>), "where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also," sometimes for love of the very knowledge that one acquires by observation.
+                     Wherefore Gregory makes the contemplative life to consist in the "love of God," inasmuch as through loving God we are aflame
+                     to gaze on His beauty. And since
+                     everyone delights when he obtains what he loves, it follows that the contemplative life terminates in delight, which is seated
+                     in the affective power, the result being that love also becomes more intense.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From the very fact that truth is the end of contemplation, it has the aspect of an appetible good, both lovable and delightful,
+                     and in this respect it pertains to the appetitive power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We are urged to the vision of the first principle, namely God, by the love thereof; wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.)
+                     that "the contemplative life tramples on all cares and longs to see the face of its Creator."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The appetitive power moves not only the bodily members to perform external actions, but also the intellect to practice the
+                     act of contemplation, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q180_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q180_A2-p0.1">Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the contemplative
+                     life is to cling to the love of God and our neighbor with the whole mind." Now all the moral virtues, since their acts are
+                     prescribed by the precepts of the Law, are reducible to the love of God and of our neighbor, for "love . . . is the fulfilling
+                     of the Law" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.10" target="asv">Rom. 13:10</a>). Therefore it would seem that the
+                     moral virtues belong to the contemplative life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the contemplative life is chiefly directed to the contemplation of God; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that
+                     "the mind tramples on all cares and longs to gaze on the face of its Creator." Now no one can accomplish this without cleanness
+                     of heart, which is a result of moral virtue [*Cf.
+                     <a id="SS_Q180_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q8_A7.html"> Q[8], A[7]</a>]. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.8" target="asv">Mat. 5:8</a>): "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God": and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A2-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Heb.12.14" target="asv">Heb. 12:14</a>):
+                     "Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God." Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues
+                     pertain to the contemplative life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the contemplative life gives beauty to the soul," wherefore it is signified
+                     by Rachel, of whom it is said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.29.17" target="asv">Gn. 29:17</a>) that she was "of a beautiful countenance." Now the beauty of the soul consists in the moral virtues, especially temperance,
+                     as Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43,45,46). Therefore it seems that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The moral virtues are directed to external actions. Now Gregory says (Moral. vi [*Hom. xiv in Ezech.; Cf. A[1], OBJ[3]])
+                     that it belongs to the contemplative life "to rest from external action." Therefore the moral virtues do not pertain to the
+                     contemplative life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may belong to the contemplative life in two ways, essentially or dispositively. The moral virtues do not belong to
+                     the contemplative life essentially, because the end of the contemplative life is the consideration of truth: and as the Philosopher
+                     states (Ethic. ii, 4), "knowledge," which pertains to the consideration of truth, "has little influence on the moral virtues":
+                     wherefore he declares (Ethic. x, 8) that the moral virtues pertain to active but
+                     not to contemplative happiness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A2-p7"> On the other hand, the moral virtues belong to the contemplative life dispositively. For the act of contemplation, wherein
+                     the contemplative life essentially consists, is hindered both by the impetuosity of the passions which withdraw the soul's
+                     intention from intelligible to sensible things, and by outward disturbances. Now the moral virtues curb the impetuosity of
+                     the passions, and quell the disturbance of outward occupations. Hence moral virtues belong dispositively to the
+                     contemplative life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q180_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q180_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the contemplative life has its motive cause on the part of the affections, and in this respect the love of God and our neighbor
+                     is requisite to the contemplative life. Now motive causes do not enter into the essence of a thing, but dispose and perfect
+                     it. Wherefore it does not follow that the moral virtues belong essentially to the contemplative life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Holiness or cleanness of heart is caused by the virtues that are concerned with the passions which hinder the purity of the
+                     reason; and peace is caused by justice which is about operations, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.32.17" target="asv"> Is. 32:17, </a> "The work of justice shall be peace": since he who refrains from wronging others lessens the occasions of quarrels and disturbances.
+                     Hence the moral virtues dispose one to the contemplative life by causing peace and
+                     cleanness of heart.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Beauty, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q180_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q145_A2.html">Q[145], A[2]</a>), consists in a certain clarity and due proportion. Now each of these is found radically in the reason; because both the
+                     light that makes beauty seen, and the establishing of due proportion among things belong to reason. Hence since the contemplative
+                     life consists in an act of the reason, there is beauty in it by its very nature and essence; wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.2" target="asv">Wis.
+                        8:2
+                     </a>) of the contemplation of wisdom: "I became a lover of her beauty."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A2-p11"> On the other hand, beauty is in the moral virtues by participation, in so far as they participate in the order of reason;
+                     and especially is it in temperance, which restrains the concupiscences which especially darken the light of reason. Hence
+                     it is that the virtue of chastity most of all makes man apt for contemplation, since venereal pleasures most of all weigh
+                     the mind down to sensible objects, as Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q180_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q180_A3-p0.1">Whether there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life. For Richard of St. Victor [*De Grat. Contempl.
+                     i, 3,4] distinguishes between "contemplation," "meditation," and "cogitation." Yet all these apparently pertain to contemplation.
+                     Therefore it would seem that there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.18" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:18</a>): "But we . . . beholding [speculantes] the glory of the Lord with open face, are transformed into the same clarity [*Vulg.:
+                     'into the same image from glory to glory.']." Now this belongs to the contemplative life. Therefore in addition to the three
+                     aforesaid, vision [speculatio] belongs to the contemplative life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that "the first and greatest contemplation is admiration of the Majesty." Now according
+                     to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) admiration is a kind of fear. Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite
+                     for the contemplative life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, "Prayer," "reading," and "meditation" [*Hugh of St. Victor, Alleg. in N.T. iii, 4] are said to belong to the contemplative
+                     life. Again, "hearing" belongs to the contemplative life: since it is stated that Mary (by whom the contemplative life is
+                     signified) "sitting . . . at the Lord's feet, heard His word" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.39" target="asv">Lk. 10:39</a>). Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for the contemplative life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A3-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Life signifies here the operation on which a man is chiefly intent. Wherefore if there are several operations of the contemplative
+                     life, there will be, not one, but several contemplative lives.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> We are now speaking of the contemplative life as applicable to man. Now according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) between man
+                     and angel there is this difference, that an angel perceives the truth by simple apprehension, whereas man arrives at the perception
+                     of a simple truth by a process from several premises. Accordingly, then, the contemplative life has one act wherein it is
+                     finally completed, namely the contemplation of truth, and from this act it derives
+                     its unity. Yet it has many acts whereby it arrives at this final act. Some of these pertain to the reception of principles,
+                     from which it proceeds to the contemplation of truth; others are concerned with deducing from the principles, the truth, the
+                     knowledge of which is sought; and the last and crowning act is the contemplation itself of the truth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Richard of St. Victor "cogitation" would seem to regard the consideration of the many things from which a person
+                     intends to gather one simple truth. Hence cogitation may comprise not only the perceptions of the senses in taking cognizance
+                     of certain effects, but also the imaginations. and again the reason's discussion of the various signs or of anything that
+                     conduces to the truth in view: although, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv,
+                     7), cogitation may signify any actual operation of the intellect. "Meditation" would seem to be the process of reason from
+                     certain principles that lead to the contemplation of some truth: and "consideration" has the same meaning, according to Bernard
+                     (De Consid. ii, 2), although, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1), every operation of the intellect may be called
+                     "consideration." But "contemplation" regards the simple act of gazing on the truth; wherefore Richard says again (De Grat.
+                     Contempl. i, 4) that "contemplation is the soul's clear and free dwelling upon the object of its gaze; meditation is the survey
+                     of the mind while occupied in searching for the truth: and cogitation is the mind's glance which is prone to wander."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to a gloss [*Cf. De Trin. xv, 8] of Augustine on this passage, "beholding" [speculatio] denotes "seeing in a mirror
+                     [speculo], not from a watch-tower [specula]." Now to see a thing in a mirror is to see a cause in its effect wherein its likeness
+                     is reflected. Hence "beholding" would seem to be reducible to meditation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Admiration is a kind of fear resulting from the apprehension of a thing that surpasses our faculties: hence it results from
+                     the contemplation of the sublime truth. For it was stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q180_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q180_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that contemplation terminates in the affections.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Man reaches the knowledge of truth in two ways. First, by means of things received from another. In this way, as regards
+                     the things he receives from God, he needs "prayer," according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.7" target="asv"> Wis. 7:7, </a> "I called upon" God, "and the spirit of wisdom came upon me": while as regards the things he receives from man, he needs
+                     "hearing," in so far as he receives from the spoken word, and "reading," in so far as he receives from the tradition
+                     of Holy Writ. Secondly, he needs to apply himself by his personal study, and thus he requires "meditation."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q180_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q180_A4-p0.1">Whether the contemplative life consists in the mere contemplation of God, or also in the consideration of any truth whatever?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the contemplative life consists not only in the contemplation of God, but also in the consideration of
+                     any truth. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.138.14" target="asv">Ps. 138:14</a>): "Wonderful are Thy works, and my soul knoweth right well." Now the knowledge of God's works is effected by any contemplation
+                     of the truth. Therefore it would seem that it pertains to the contemplative life to contemplate not only the divine truth,
+                     but also any other.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that "contemplation consists in admiration first of God's majesty, secondly of His
+                     judgments, thirdly of His benefits, fourthly of His promises." Now of these four the first alone regards the divine truth,
+                     and the other three pertain to His effects. Therefore the contemplative life consists not only in the contemplation of the
+                     divine truth, but also in the consideration of truth regarding the divine effects.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Richard of St. Victor [*De Grat. Contempl. i, 6] distinguishes six species of contemplation. The first belongs to
+                     "the imagination alone," and consists in thinking of corporeal things. The second is in "the imagination guided by reason,"
+                     and consists in considering the order and disposition of sensible objects. The third is in "the reason based on the imagination";
+                     when, to wit, from the consideration of the visible we rise to the invisible. The
+                     fourth is in "the reason and conducted by the reason," when the mind is intent on things invisible of which the imagination
+                     has no cognizance. The fifth is "above the reason," but not contrary to reason, when by divine revelation we become cognizant
+                     of things that cannot be comprehended by the human reason. The sixth is "above reason and contrary to reason"; when, to wit,
+                     by the divine enlightening we know things that seem contrary to human reason, such as the doctrine of the mystery of the
+                     Trinity. Now only the last of these would seem to pertain to the divine truth. Therefore the contemplation of truth regards
+                     not only the divine truth, but also that which is considered in creatures.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in the contemplative life the contemplation of truth is sought as being the perfection of man. Now any truth is
+                     a perfection of the human intellect. Therefore the contemplative life consists in the contemplation of any truth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "in contemplation we seek the principle which is God."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q180_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q180_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, a thing may belong to the contemplative life in two ways: principally, and secondarily, or dispositively. That which belongs
+                     principally to the contemplative life is the contemplation of the divine truth, because this contemplation is the end of the
+                     whole human life. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "the contemplation of God is promised us as being the goal of
+                     all our actions and the everlasting
+                     perfection of our joys." This contemplation will be perfect in the life to come, when we shall see God face to face, wherefore
+                     it will make us perfectly happy: whereas now the contemplation of the divine truth is competent to us imperfectly, namely
+                     "through a glass" and "in a dark manner" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:12</a>). Hence it bestows on us a certain inchoate beatitude, which begins now and will be continued in the life to come; wherefore
+                     the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 7) places man's
+                     ultimate happiness in the contemplation of the supreme intelligible good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p8"> Since, however, God's effects show us the way to the contemplation of God Himself, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv"> Rom. 1:20, </a> "The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made," it follows that the contemplation
+                     of the divine effects also belongs to the contemplative life, inasmuch as man is guided thereby to the knowledge of God. Hence
+                     Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxix) that "in the study of creatures we must not exercise an
+                     empty and futile curiosity, but should make them the stepping-stone to things unperishable and everlasting."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p9"> Accordingly it is clear from what has been said (
+                     <a id="SS_Q180_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q180_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2,3) that four things pertain, in a certain order, to the contemplative life; first, the moral virtues; secondly, other acts
+                     exclusive of contemplation; thirdly, contemplation of the divine effects; fourthly, the complement of all which is the contemplation
+                     of the divine truth itself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> David sought the knowledge of God's works, so that he might be led by them to God; wherefore he says elsewhere (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.142.5" target="asv">Ps. 142:5,6</a>): "I meditated on all Thy works: I meditated upon the works of Thy hands: I stretched forth my hands to Thee."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By considering the divine judgments man is guided to the consideration of the divine justice; and by considering the divine
+                     benefits and promises, man is led to the knowledge of God's mercy or goodness, as by effects already manifested or yet to
+                     be vouchsafed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These six denote the steps whereby we ascend by means of creatures to the contemplation of God. For the first step consists
+                     in the mere consideration of sensible objects; the second step consists in going forward from sensible to intelligible objects;
+                     the third step is to judge of sensible objects according to intelligible things; the fourth is the absolute consideration
+                     of the intelligible objects to which one has attained by means of sensibles; the
+                     fifth is the contemplation of those intelligible objects that are unattainable by means of sensibles, but which the reason
+                     is able to grasp; the sixth step is the consideration of such intelligible things as the reason can neither discover nor grasp,
+                     which pertain to the sublime contemplation of divine truth, wherein contemplation is ultimately perfected.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The ultimate perfection of the human intellect is the divine truth: and other truths perfect the intellect in relation to
+                     the divine truth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q180_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q180_A5-p0.1">Whether in the present state of life the contemplative life can reach to the vision of the Divine essence?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the present state of life the contemplative life can reach to the vision of the Divine essence. For,
+                     as stated in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.32.30" target="asv">Gn. 32:30</a>, Jacob said: "I have seen God face to face, and my soul has been saved." Now the vision of God's face is the vision of the
+                     Divine essence. Therefore it would seem that in the present life one may come, by means of contemplation, to see God in His
+                     essence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "contemplative men withdraw within themselves in order to explore spiritual things,
+                     nor do they ever carry with them the shadows of things corporeal, or if these follow them they prudently drive them away:
+                     but being desirous of seeing the incomprehensible light, they suppress all the images of their limited comprehension, and
+                     through longing to reach what is above them, they overcome that which they are." Now man is
+                     not hindered from seeing the Divine essence, which is the incomprehensible light, save by the necessity of turning to corporeal
+                     phantasms. Therefore it would seem that the contemplation of the present life can extend to the vision of the incomprehensible
+                     light in its essence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 35): "All creatures are small to the soul that sees its Creator: wherefore when the man
+                     of God," the blessed Benedict, to wit, "saw a fiery globe in the tower and angels returning to heaven, without doubt he could
+                     only see such things by the light of God." Now the blessed Benedict was still in this life. Therefore the contemplation of
+                     the present life can extend to the vision of the essence of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "As long as we live in this mortal flesh, no one reaches such a height of contemplation
+                     as to fix the eyes of his mind on the ray itself of incomprehensible light."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27), "no one seeing God lives this mortal life wherein the bodily senses have their
+                     play: and unless in some way he depart this life, whether by going altogether out of his body, or by withdrawing from his
+                     carnal senses, he is not caught up into that vision." This has been carefully discussed above (Q[175], AA[4],5), where we
+                     spoke of rapture, and in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q180_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html">FP, Q[12], A[2]</a>, where we treated of the
+                     vision of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A5-p7"> Accordingly we must state that one may be in this life in two ways. First, with regard to act, that is to say by actually
+                     making use of the bodily senses, and thus contemplation in the present life can nowise attain to the vision of God's essence.
+                     Secondly, one may be in this life potentially and not with regard to act, that is to say, when the soul is united to the mortal
+                     body as its form, yet so as to make use neither of the bodily senses, nor even of the imagination, as
+                     happens in rapture; and in this way the contemplation of the present life can attain to the vision of the Divine essence.
+                     Consequently the highest degree of contemplation in the present life is that which Paul had in rapture, whereby he was in
+                     a middle state between the present life and the life to come.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Dionysius says (Ep. i ad Caium. Monach.), "if anyone seeing God, understood what he saw, he saw not God Himself, but something
+                     belonging to God." And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "By no means is God seen now in His glory; but the soul sees something
+                     of lower degree, and is thereby refreshed so that afterwards it may attain to the glory of vision." Accordingly the words
+                     of Jacob, "I saw God face to face" do not imply that he saw God's essence,
+                     but that he saw some shape [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="SS_Q180_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A11.html">FP, Q[12], A[11]</a>, ad 1], imaginary of course, wherein God spoke to him. Or, "since we know a man by his face, by the face of God he signified
+                     his knowledge of Him," according to a gloss of Gregory on the same passage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the present state of life human contemplation is impossible without phantasms, because it is connatural to man to see
+                     the intelligible species in the phantasms, as the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, 7). Yet intellectual knowledge does not
+                     consist in the phantasms themselves, but in our contemplating in them the purity of the intelligible truth: and this not only
+                     in natural knowledge, but also in that which we obtain by revelation. For Dionysius
+                     says (Coel. Hier. i) that "the Divine glory shows us the angelic hierarchies under certain symbolic figures, and by its power
+                     we are brought back to the single ray of light," i.e. to the simple knowledge of the intelligible truth. It is in this sense
+                     that we must understand the statement of Gregory that "contemplatives do not carry along with them the shadows of things corporeal,"
+                     since their contemplation is not fixed on them, but on the consideration of the intelligible truth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> By these words Gregory does not imply that the blessed Benedict, in that vision, saw God in His essence, but he wishes to
+                     show that because "all creatures are small to him that sees God," it follows that all things can easily be seen through the
+                     enlightenment of the Divine light. Wherefore he adds: "For however little he may see of the Creator's light, all created things
+                     become petty to him."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A5-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q180_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q180_A6-p0.1">Whether the operation of contemplation is fittingly divided into a threefold movement, circular, straight and oblique?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the operation of contemplation is unfittingly divided into a threefold movement, "circular," "straight,"
+                     and "oblique" (Div. Nom. iv). For contemplation pertains exclusively to rest, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.16" target="asv"> Wis. 8:16, </a> "When I go into my house, I shall repose myself with her." Now movement is opposed to rest. Therefore the operations of the
+                     contemplative life should not be described as movements.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the action of the contemplative life pertains to the intellect, whereby man is like the angels. Now Dionysius describes
+                     these movements as being different in the angels from what they are in the soul. For he says (Div. Nom. iv) that the "circular"
+                     movement in the angel is "according to his enlightenment by the beautiful and the good." On the other hand, he assigns the
+                     circular movement of the soul to several things: the first of which is the
+                     "withdrawal of the soul into itself from externals"; the second is "a certain concentration of its powers, whereby it is rendered
+                     free of error and of outward occupation"; and the third is "union with those things that are above it." Again, he describes
+                     differently their respective straight movements. For he says that the straight movement of the angel is that by which he proceeds
+                     to the care of those things that are beneath him. On the other hand, he describes the straight movement of the soul
+                     as being twofold: first, "its progress towards things that are near it"; secondly, "its uplifting from external things to
+                     simple contemplation." Further, he assigns a different oblique movement to each. For he assigns the oblique movement of the
+                     angels to the fact that "while providing for those who have less they remain unchanged in relation to God": whereas he assigns
+                     the oblique movement of the soul to the fact that "the soul is enlightened in Divine knowledge by reasoning and discoursing."
+                     Therefore it would seem that the operations of contemplation are unfittingly assigned according to the ways mentioned above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Richard of St. Victor (De Contempl. i, 5) mentions many other different movements in likeness to the birds of the
+                     air. "For some of these rise at one time to a great height, at another swoop down to earth, and they do so repeatedly; others
+                     fly now to the right, now to the left again and again; others go forwards or lag behind many times; others fly in a circle
+                     now more now less extended; and others remain suspended almost immovably in one place."
+                     Therefore it would seem that there are only three movements of contemplation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q180_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q119_A1.html">Q[119], A[1]</a>, ad 3), the operation of the intellect, wherein contemplation essentially consists, is called a movement, in so far as movement
+                     is the act of a perfect thing, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 1). Since, however, it is through sensible objects
+                     that we come to the knowledge of intelligible things, and since sensible operations do not take place without movement, the
+                     result is that even
+                     intelligible operations are described as movements, and are differentiated in likeness to various movements. Now of bodily
+                     movements, local movements are the most perfect and come first, as proved in Phys. viii, 7; wherefore the foremost among intelligible
+                     operations are described by being likened to them. These movements are of three kinds; for there is the "circular" movement,
+                     by which a thing moves uniformly round one point as center, another is the "straight" movement, by which a thing goes
+                     from one point to another; the third is "oblique," being composed as it were of both the others. Consequently, in intelligible
+                     operations, that which is simply uniform is compared to circular movement; the intelligible operation by which one proceeds
+                     from one point to another is compared to the straight movement; while the intelligible operation which unites something of
+                     uniformity with progress to various points is compared to the oblique movement.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A6-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> External bodily movements are opposed to the quiet of contemplation, which consists in rest from outward occupations: but
+                     the movements of intellectual operations belong to the quiet of contemplation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man is like the angels in intellect generically, but the intellective power is much higher in the angel than in man. Consequently
+                     these movements must be ascribed to souls and angels in different ways, according as they are differently related to uniformity.
+                     For the angelic intellect has uniform knowledge in two respects. First, because it does not acquire intelligible truth from
+                     the variety of composite objects; secondly, because it understands the
+                     truth of intelligible objects not discursively, but by simple intuition. On the other hand, the intellect of the soul acquires
+                     intelligible truth from sensible objects, and understands it by a certain discoursing of the reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A6-p9"> Wherefore Dionysius assigns the "circular" movement of the angels to the fact that their intuition of God is uniform and
+                     unceasing, having neither beginning nor end: even as a circular movement having neither beginning nor end is uniformly around
+                     the one same center. But on the part of the soul, ere it arrive at this uniformity, its twofold lack of uniformity needs to
+                     be removed. First, that which arises from the variety of external things: this is removed by the soul
+                     withdrawing from externals, and so the first thing he mentions regarding the circular movement of the soul is "the soul's
+                     withdrawal into itself from external objects." Secondly, another lack of uniformity requires to be removed from the soul,
+                     and this is owing to the discoursing of reason. This is done by directing all the soul's operations to the simple contemplation
+                     of the intelligible truth, and this is indicated by his saying in the second place that "the soul's intellectual powers must
+                     be
+                     uniformly concentrated," in other words that discoursing must be laid aside and the soul's gaze fixed on the contemplation
+                     of the one simple truth. In this operation of the soul there is no error, even as there is clearly no error in the understanding
+                     of first principles which we know by simple intuition. Afterwards these two things being done, he mentions thirdly the uniformity
+                     which is like that of the angels, for then all things being laid aside, the soul continues in the contemplation of
+                     God alone. This he expresses by saying: "Then being thus made uniform unitedly," i.e. conformably, "by the union of its powers,
+                     it is conducted to the good and the beautiful." The "straight" movement of the angel cannot apply to his proceeding from one
+                     thing to another by considering them, but only to the order of his providence, namely to the fact that the higher angel enlightens
+                     the lower angels through the angels that are intermediate. He indicates this when he says: "The angel's movement
+                     takes a straight line when he proceeds to the care of things subject to him, taking in his course whatever things are direct,"
+                     i.e. in keeping with the dispositions of the direct order. Whereas he ascribes the "straight" movement in the soul to the
+                     soul's proceeding from exterior sensibles to the knowledge of intelligible objects. The "oblique" movement in the angels he
+                     describes as being composed of the straight and circular movements, inasmuch as their care for those beneath them is in
+                     accordance with their contemplation of God: while the "oblique" movement in the soul he also declares to be partly straight
+                     and partly circular, in so far as in reasoning it makes use of the light received from God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These varieties of movement that are taken from the distinction between above and below, right and left, forwards and backwards,
+                     and from varying circles, are all comprised under either straight and oblique movement, because they all denote discursions
+                     of reason. For if the reason pass from the genus to the species, or from the part to the whole, it will be, as he explains,
+                     from above to below: if from one opposite to another, it will be from right to
+                     left; if from the cause to the effect, it will be backwards and forwards; if it be about accidents that surround a thing near
+                     at hand or far remote, the movement will be circular. The discoursing of reason from sensible to intelligible objects, if
+                     it be according to the order of natural reason, belongs to the straight movement; but if it be according to the Divine enlightenment,
+                     it will belong to the oblique movement as explained above (ad 2). That alone which he describes as immobility belongs
+                     to the circular movement.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A6-p11"> Wherefore it is evident that Dionysius describes the movement of contemplation with much greater fulness and depth.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A6-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A6-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q180_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q180_A7-p0.1">Whether there is delight in contemplation?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no delight in contemplation. For delight belongs to the appetitive power; whereas contemplation
+                     resides chiefly in the intellect. Therefore it would seem that there is no delight in contemplation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all strife and struggle is a hindrance to delight. Now there is strife and struggle in contemplation. For Gregory
+                     says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "when the soul strives to contemplate God, it is in a state of struggle; at one time it almost
+                     overcomes, because by understanding and feeling it tastes something of the incomprehensible light, and at another time it
+                     almost succumbs, because even while tasting, it fails." Therefore there is no delight in
+                     contemplation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, delight is the result of a perfect operation, as stated in Ethic. x, 4. Now the contemplation of wayfarers is imperfect,
+                     according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:12, </a> "We see now through a glass in a dark manner." Therefore seemingly there is no delight in the contemplative life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A7-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a lesion of the body is an obstacle to delight. Now contemplation causes a lesion of the body; wherefore it is stated
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.32" target="asv">Gn. 32</a>) that after Jacob had said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A7-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.32.30" target="asv">Gn. 32:30</a>), "'I have seen God face to face' . . . he halted on his foot (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A7-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.32.31" target="asv">Gn. 32:31</a>) . . . because he touched the sinew of his thigh and it shrank" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A7-p5.4" href="./asv.html#Gen.32.32" target="asv">Gn. 32:32</a>). Therefore seemingly there is no delight in contemplation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A7-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written of the contemplation of wisdom (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.16" target="asv">Wis. 8:16</a>): "Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness": and Gregory says (Hom. xiv
+                     in Ezech.) that "the contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly lovable."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A7-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> There may be delight in any particular contemplation in two ways. First by reason of the operation itself [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="SS_Q180_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A5.html">FS, Q[3], A[5]</a>], because each individual delights in the operation which befits him according to his own nature or habit. Now contemplation
+                     of the truth befits a man according to his nature as a rational animal: the result being that "all men naturally desire to
+                     know," so that consequently they delight in the knowledge of
+                     truth. And more delightful still does this become to one who has the habit of wisdom and knowledge, the result of which is
+                     that he contemplates without difficulty. Secondly, contemplation may be delightful on the part of its object, in so far as
+                     one contemplates that which one loves; even as bodily vision gives pleasure, not only because to see is pleasurable in itself,
+                     but because one sees a person whom one loves. Since, then, the contemplative life consists chiefly in the contemplation of
+                     God, of which charity is the motive, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q180_A7-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q180_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2, ad 1), it follows that there is delight in the contemplative life, not only by reason of the contemplation itself, but
+                     also by reason of the Divine love.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A7-p8"> In both respects the delight thereof surpasses all human delight, both because spiritual delight is greater than carnal pleasure,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q180_A7-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A5.html">FS, Q[31], A[5]</a>), when we were treating of the passions, and because the love whereby God is loved out of charity surpasses all love. Hence
+                     it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A7-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.9" target="asv">Ps. 33:9</a>): "O taste and see that the Lord is sweet."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A7-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the contemplative life consists chiefly in an act of the intellect, it has its beginning in the appetite, since
+                     it is through charity that one is urged to the contemplation of God. And since the end corresponds to the beginning, it follows
+                     that the term also and the end of the contemplative life has its being in the appetite, since one delights in seeing the object
+                     loved, and the very delight in the object seen arouses a yet greater love.
+                     Wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "when we see one whom we love, we are so aflame as to love him more." And
+                     this is the ultimate perfection of the contemplative life, namely that the Divine truth be not only seen but also loved.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A7-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Strife or struggle arising from the opposition of an external thing, hinders delight in that thing. For a man delights not
+                     in a thing against which he strives: but in that for which he strives; when he has obtained it, other things being equal,
+                     he delights yet more: wherefore Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3) that "the more peril there was in the battle, the greater
+                     the joy in the triumph." But there is no strife or struggle in contemplation on the
+                     part of the truth which we contemplate, though there is on the part of our defective understanding and our corruptible body
+                     which drags us down to lower things, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A7-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.15" target="asv"> Wis. 9:15, </a> "The corruptible body ss a load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that museth upon many things."
+                     Hence it is that when man attains to the contemplation of truth, he loves it yet more, while he hates the more his own deficiency
+                     and the weight of his corruptible
+                     body, so as to say with the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A7-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.24" target="asv">Rom. 7:24</a>): "Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" Wherefore Gregory say (Hom. xiv in Ezech.):
+                     "When God is once known by desire and understanding, He withers all carnal pleasure in us."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A7-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The contemplation of God in this life is imperfect in comparison with the contemplation in heaven; and in like manner the
+                     delight of the wayfarer's contemplation is imperfect as compared with the delight of contemplation in heaven, of which it
+                     is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A7-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.9" target="asv">Ps. 35:9</a>): "Thou shalt make them drink of the torrent of Thy pleasure." Yet, though the contemplation of Divine things which is to
+                     be had by wayfarers is imperfect, it is more
+                     delightful than all other contemplation however perfect, on account of the excellence of that which is contemplated. Hence
+                     the Philosopher says (De Part. Animal. i, 5): "We may happen to have our own little theories about those sublime beings and
+                     godlike substances, and though we grasp them but feebly, nevertheless so elevating is the knowledge that they give us more
+                     delight than any of those things that are round about us": and Gregory says in the same sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The
+                     contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly lovable; for it carries the soul away above itself, it opens heaven and discovers
+                     the spiritual world to the eyes of the mind."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A7-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> After contemplation Jacob halted with one foot, "because we need to grow weak in the love of the world ere we wax strong
+                     in the love of God," as Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.). "Thus when we have known the sweetness of God, we have one foot
+                     sound while the other halts; since every one who halts on one foot leans only on that foot which is sound."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A7-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A7-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q180_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q180_A8-p0.1">Whether the contemplative life is continuous?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the contemplative life is not continuous. For the contemplative life consists essentially in things pertaining
+                     to the intellect. Now all the intellectual perfections of this life will be made void, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:8, </a> "Whether prophecies shall be made void, or tongues shall cease, or knowledge shall be destroyed." Therefore the contemplative
+                     life is made void.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a man tastes the sweetness of contemplation by snatches and for a short time only: wherefore Augustine says (Confess.
+                     x, 40), "Thou admittest me to a most unwonted affection in my inmost soul, to a strange sweetness . . . yet through my grievous
+                     weight I sink down again." Again, Gregory commenting on the words of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Job.4.15" target="asv"> Job 4:15, </a> "When a spirit passed before me," says (Moral. v, 33): "The mind does not remain long at rest in the
+                     sweetness of inward contemplation, for it is recalled to itself and beaten back by the very immensity of the light." Therefore
+                     the contemplative life is not continuous.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is not connatural to man cannot be continuous. Now the contemplative life, according to the Philosopher
+                     (Ethic. x, 7), "is better than the life which is according to man." Therefore seemingly the contemplative life is not continuous.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A8-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.42" target="asv">Lk. 10:42</a>): "Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her," since as Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.), "the
+                     contemplative life begins here so that it may be perfected in our heavenly home."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A8-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be described as continuous in two ways: first, in regard to its nature; secondly, in regard to us. It is evident
+                     that in regard to itself contemplative life is continuous for two reasons: first, because it is about incorruptible and unchangeable
+                     things; secondly, because it has no contrary, for there is nothing contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, as stated in
+                     Topic. i, 13. But even in our regard contemplative life is continuous---both
+                     because it is competent to us in respect of the incorruptible part of the soul, namely the intellect, wherefore it can endure
+                     after this life---and because in the works of the contemplative life we work not with our bodies, so that we are the more
+                     able to persevere in the works thereof, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. x, 7).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A8-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The manner of contemplation is not the same here as in heaven: yet the contemplative life is said to remain by reason of
+                     charity, wherein it has both its beginning and its end. Gregory speaks in this sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The contemplative
+                     life begins here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home, because the fire of love which begins to burn here is aflame
+                     with a yet greater love when we see Him Whom we love."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A8-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> No action can last long at its highest pitch. Now the highest point of contemplation is to reach the uniformity of Divine
+                     contemplation, according to Dionysius [*Cf. Coel. Hier. iii], and as we have stated above (A[6], ad 2). Hence although contemplation
+                     cannot last long in this respect, it can be of long duration as regards the other contemplative acts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A8-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher declares the contemplative life to be above man, because it befits us "so far as there is in us something
+                     divine" (Ethic. x, 7), namely the intellect, which is incorruptible and impassible in itself, wherefore its act can endure
+                     longer.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A8-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q180_A8-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q179_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q181" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q181-p0.1">OF THE ACTIVE LIFE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q181-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q181-p2"> We must now consider the active life, under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q181-p3"> (1) Whether all the works of the moral virtues pertain to the active life?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q181-p4"> (2) Whether prudence pertains to the active life?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q181-p5"> (3) Whether teaching pertains to the active life?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q181-p6"> (4) Of the duration of the active life.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q181_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q181_A1-p0.1">Whether all the actions of the moral virtues pertain to the active life?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the acts of the moral virtues do not all pertain to the active life. For seemingly the active life regards
+                     only our relations with other persons: hence Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the active life is to give bread to the
+                     hungry," and after mentioning many things that regard our relations with other people he adds finally, "and to give to each
+                     and every one whatever he needs." Now we are directed in our relations to others, not by
+                     all the acts of moral virtues, but only by those of justice and its parts, as stated above (Q[58], AA[2],8; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q181_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A2.html">FS, Q[60], AA[2]</a>,3). Therefore the acts of the moral virtues do not all pertain to the active life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that Lia who was blear-eyed but fruitful signifies the active life: which "being
+                     occupied with work, sees less, and yet since it urges one's neighbor both by word and example to its imitation it begets a
+                     numerous offspring of good deeds." Now this would seem to belong to charity, whereby we love our neighbor, rather than to
+                     the moral virtues. Therefore seemingly the acts of moral virtue do not pertain to the active
+                     life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q181_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q180_A2.html">Q[180], A[2]</a>), the moral virtues dispose one to the contemplative life. Now disposition and perfection belong to the same thing. Therefore
+                     it would seem that the moral virtues do not pertain to the active life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, 15): "In the active life all vices must first of all be extirpated by the practice of good
+                     works, in order that in the contemplative life the mind's eye being purified one may advance to the contemplation of the Divine
+                     light." Now all vices are not extirpated save by acts of the moral virtues. Therefore the acts of the moral virtues pertain
+                     to the active life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q181_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q179_A1.html">Q[179], A[1]</a>) the active and the contemplative life differ according to the different occupations of men intent on different ends: one
+                     of which occupations is the consideration of the truth; and this is the end of the contemplative life, while the other is
+                     external work to which the active life is directed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A1-p7"> Now it is evident that the moral virtues are directed chiefly, not to the contemplation of truth but to operation. Wherefore
+                     the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that "for virtue knowledge is of little or no avail." Hence it is clear that the moral
+                     virtues belong essentially to the active life; for which reason the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 8) subordinates the moral virtues
+                     to active happiness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The chief of the moral virtues is justice by which one man is directed in his relations towards another, as the Philosopher
+                     proves (Ethic. v, 1). Hence the active life is described with reference to our relations with other people, because it consists
+                     in these things, not exclusively, but principally.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is possible, by the acts of all the moral virtues, for one to direct one's neighbor to good by example: and this is what
+                     Gregory here ascribes to the active life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even as the virtue that is directed to the end of another virtue passes, as it were, into the species of the latter virtue,
+                     so again when a man makes use of things pertaining to the active life, merely as dispositions to contemplation, such things
+                     are comprised under the contemplative life. On the other hand, when we practice the works of the moral virtues, as being good
+                     in themselves, and not as dispositions to the contemplative life, the moral
+                     virtues belong to the active life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A1-p11"> It may also be replied, however, that the active life is a disposition to the contemplative life.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q181_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q181_A2-p0.1">Whether prudence pertains to the active life?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prudence does not pertain to the active life. For just as the contemplative life belongs to the cognitive
+                     power, so the active life belongs to the appetitive power. Now prudence belongs not to the appetitive but to the cognitive
+                     power. Therefore prudence does not belong to the active life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that the "active life being occupied with work, sees less," wherefore it is signified
+                     by Lia who was blear-eyed. But prudence requires clear eyes, so that one may judge aright of what has to be done. Therefore
+                     it seems that prudence does not pertain to the active life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prudence stands between the moral and the intellectual virtues. Now just as the moral virtues belong to the active
+                     life, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q181_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q181_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, so do the intellectual virtues pertain to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that prudence pertains neither
+                     to the active nor to the contemplative life, but to an intermediate kind of life, of which Augustine makes mention (De Civ.
+                     Dei xix, 2,3,19).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that prudence pertains to active happiness, to which the moral virtues belong.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[1], ad 3; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q181_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html">FS, Q[18], A[6]</a>), if one thing be directed to another as its end, it is drawn, especially in moral matters, to the species of the thing to
+                     which it is directed: for instance "he who commits adultery that he may steal, is a thief rather than an adulterer," according
+                     to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2). Now it is evident that the knowledge of prudence is directed to the works of the moral virtues
+                     as its end,
+                     since it is "right reason applied to action" (Ethic. vi, 5); so that the ends of the moral virtues are the principles of prudence,
+                     as the Philosopher says in the same book. Accordingly, as it was stated above (A[1], ad 3) that the moral virtues in one who
+                     directs them to the quiet of contemplation belong to the contemplative life, so the knowledge of prudence, which is of itself
+                     directed to the works of the moral virtues, belongs directly to the active life, provided we take prudence in its
+                     proper sense as the Philosopher speaks of it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A2-p7"> If, however, we take it in a more general sense, as comprising any kind of human knowledge, then prudence, as regards a certain
+                     part thereof, belongs to the contemplative life. In this sense Tully (De Offic. i, 5) says that "the man who is able most
+                     clearly and quickly to grasp the truth and to unfold his reasons, is wont to be considered most prudent and wise."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Moral works take their species from their end, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q181_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A4.html">FS, Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6), wherefore the knowledge pertaining to the contemplative life is that which has its end in the very knowledge of truth;
+                     whereas the knowledge of prudence, through having its end in an act of the appetitive power, belongs to the active life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> External occupation makes a man see less in intelligible things, which are separated from sensible objects with which the
+                     works of the active life are concerned. Nevertheless the external occupation of the active life enables a man to see more
+                     clearly in judging of what is to be done, which belongs to prudence, both on account of experience, and on account of the
+                     mind's attention, since "brains avail when the mind is attentive" as Sallust observes
+                     [*Bell. Catilin., LI].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prudence is said to be intermediate between the intellectual and the moral virtues because it resides in the same subject
+                     as the intellectual virtues, and has absolutely the same matter as the moral virtues. But this third kind of life is intermediate
+                     between the active and the contemplative life as regards the things about which it is occupied, because it is occupied sometimes
+                     with the contemplation of the truth, sometimes with eternal things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q181_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q181_A3-p0.1">Whether teaching is a work of the active or of the contemplative life?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that teaching is a work not of the active but of the contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.)
+                     that "the perfect who have been able to contemplate heavenly goods, at least through a glass, proclaim them to their brethren,
+                     whose minds they inflame with love for their hidden beauty." But this pertains to teaching. Therefore teaching is a work of
+                     the contemplative life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, act and habit would seem to be referable to the same kind of life. Now teaching is an act of wisdom: for the Philosopher
+                     says (Metaph. i, 1) that "to be able to teach is an indication of knowledge." Therefore since wisdom or knowledge pertain
+                     to the contemplative life, it would seem that teaching also belongs to the contemplative life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prayer, no less than contemplation, is an act of the contemplative life. Now prayer, even when one prays for another,
+                     belongs to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that it belongs also to the contemplative life to acquaint another,
+                     by teaching him, of the truth we have meditated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The active life is to give bread to the hungry, to teach the ignorant the words of wisdom."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The act of teaching has a twofold object. For teaching is conveyed by speech, and speech is the audible sign of the interior
+                     concept. Accordingly one object of teaching is the matter or object of the interior concept; and as to this object teaching
+                     belongs sometimes to the active, sometimes to the contemplative life. It belongs to the active life, when a man conceives
+                     a truth inwardly, so as to be directed thereby in his outward action; but it belongs to the
+                     contemplative life when a man conceives an intelligible truth, in the consideration and love whereof he delights. Hence Augustine
+                     says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ, 1): "Let them choose for themselves the better part," namely the contemplative life, "let them
+                     be busy with the word, long for the sweetness of teaching, occupy themselves with salutary knowledge," thus stating clearly
+                     that teaching belongs to the contemplative life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A3-p7"> The other object of teaching is on the part of the speech heard, and thus the object of teaching is the hearer. As to this
+                     object all doctrine belongs to the active life to which external actions pertain.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The authority quoted speaks expressly of doctrine as to its matter, in so far as it is concerned with the consideration and
+                     love of truth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Habit and act have a common object. Hence this argument clearly considers the matter of the interior concept. For it pertains
+                     to the man having wisdom and knowledge to be able to teach, in so far as he is able to express his interior concept in words,
+                     so as to bring another man to understand the truth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He who prays for another does nothing towards the man for whom he prays, but only towards God Who is the intelligible truth;
+                     whereas he who teaches another does something in his regard by external action. Hence the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q181_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q181_A4-p0.1">Whether the active life remains after this life?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the active life remains after this life. For the acts of the moral virtues belong to the active life,
+                     as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q181_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q181_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But the moral virtues endure after this life according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9). Therefore the active life remains
+                     after this life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, teaching others belongs to the active life, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q181_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q181_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. But in the life to come when "we shall be like the angels," teaching will be possible: even as apparently it is in the angels
+                     of whom one "enlightens, cleanses, and perfects" [*Coel. Hier. iii, viii] another, which refers to the "receiving of knowledge,"
+                     according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii). Therefore it would seem that the active life remains after this
+                     life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more lasting a thing is in itself, the more is it able to endure after this life. But the active life is seemingly
+                     more lasting in itself: for Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that "we can remain fixed in the active life, whereas we are nowise
+                     able to maintain an attentive mind in the contemplative life." Therefore the active life is much more able than the contemplative
+                     to endure after this life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The active life ends with this world, but the contemplative life begins here, to be perfected
+                     in our heavenly home."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q181_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q181_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the active life has its end in external actions: and if these be referred to the quiet of contemplation, for that very reason
+                     they belong to the contemplative life. But in the future life of the blessed the occupation of external actions will cease,
+                     and if there be any external actions at all, these will be referred to contemplation as their end. For, as Augustine says
+                     at the end of De Civitate Dei xxii, 30,
+                     "there we shall rest and we shall see, we shall see and love, we shall love and praise." And he had said before (De Civ. Dei
+                     xxii, 30) that "there God will be seen without end, loved without wearying, praised without tiring: such will be the occupation
+                     of all, the common love, the universal activity."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q181_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q136_A1.html">Q[136], A[1]</a>, ad 1), the moral virtues will remain not as to those actions which are about the means, but as to the actions which are
+                     about the end. Such acts are those that conduce to the quiet of contemplation, which in the words quoted above Augustine denotes
+                     by "rest," and this rest excludes not only outward disturbances but also the inward disturbance of the passions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The contemplative life, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q181_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q180_A4.html">Q[180], A[4]</a>), consists chiefly in the contemplation of God, and as to this, one angel does not teach another, since according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q181_A4-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.10" target="asv"> Mat. 18:10, </a> "the little ones' angels," who belong to the lower order, "always see the face of the Father"; and so, in the life to come,
+                     no man will teach another of God, but "we shall" all "see Him as He is" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q181_A4-p8.3" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn.
+                        3:2
+                     </a>). This is in keeping with the saying of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q181_A4-p8.4" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.34" target="asv"> Jeremiah 31:34</a>: "They shall teach no more every man his neighbor . . . saying: Know the Lord: for all shall know me, from the least of them
+                     even to the greatest."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A4-p9"> But as regards things pertaining to the "dispensation of the mysteries of God," one angel teaches another by cleansing, enlightening,
+                     and perfecting him: and thus they have something of the active life so long as the world lasts, from the fact that they are
+                     occupied in administering to the creatures below them. This is signified by the fact that Jacob saw angels "ascending" the
+                     ladder---which refers to contemplation---and "descending" ---which refers to action. Nevertheless, as
+                     Gregory remarks (Moral. ii, 3), "they do not wander abroad from the Divine vision, so as to be deprived of the joys of inward
+                     contemplation." Hence in them the active life does not differ from the contemplative life as it does in us for whom the works
+                     of the active life are a hindrance to contemplation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A4-p10"> Nor is the likeness to the angels promised to us as regards the administering to lower creatures, for this is competent to
+                     us not by reason of our natural order, as it is to the angels, but by reason of our seeing God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That the durability of the active life in the present state surpasses the durability of the contemplative life arises not
+                     from any property of either life considered in itself, but from our own deficiency, since we are withheld from the heights
+                     of contemplation by the weight of the body. Hence Gregory adds (Moral. ii, 3) that "the mind through its very weakness being
+                     repelled from that immense height recoils on itself."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q181_A4-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q182" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q182_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q182-p0.1">OF THE ACTIVE LIFE IN COMPARISON WITH THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q182-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q182-p2"> We must now consider the active life in comparison with the contemplative life, under which head there are four points of
+                  inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q182-p3"> (1) Which of them is of greater import or excellence?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q182-p4"> (2) Which of them has the greater merit?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q182-p5"> (3) Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the active life?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q182-p6"> (4) Of their order.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q182_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q182_A1-p0.1">Whether the active life is more excellent than the contemplative?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the active life is more excellent than the contemplative. For "that which belongs to better men would
+                     seem to be worthier and better," as the Philosopher says (Top. iii, 1). Now the active life belongs to persons of higher rank,
+                     namely prelates, who are placed in a position of honor and power; wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "in
+                     our actions we must not love honor or power in this life." Therefore it would seem that the
+                     active life is more excellent than the contemplative.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in all habits and acts, direction belongs to the more important; thus the military art, being the more important,
+                     directs the art of the bridle-maker [*Ethic. i, 1]. Now it belongs to the active life to direct and command the contemplative,
+                     as appears from the words addressed to Moses (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.19.21" target="asv">Ex. 19:21</a>), "Go down and charge the people, lest they should have a mind to pass the" fixed "limits to see the Lord." Therefore the
+                     active life is
+                     more excellent than the contemplative.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no man should be taken away from a greater thing in order to be occupied with lesser things: for the Apostle says
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:31</a>): "Be zealous for the better gifts." Now some are taken away from the state of the contemplative life to the occupations
+                     of the active life, as in the case of those who are transferred to the state of prelacy. Therefore it would seem that the
+                     active life is more excellent than the contemplative.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.42" target="asv">Lk. 10:42</a>): "Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her." Now Mary figures the contemplative life. Therefore
+                     the contemplative life is more excellent than the active.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing prevents certain things being more excellent in themselves, whereas they are surpassed by another in some respect.
+                     Accordingly we must reply that the contemplative life is simply more excellent than the active: and the Philosopher proves
+                     this by eight reasons (Ethic. x, 7,8). The first is, because the contemplative life becomes man according to that which is
+                     best in him, namely the intellect, and according to its proper objects, namely things
+                     intelligible; whereas the active life is occupied with externals. Hence Rachael, by whom the contemplative life is signified,
+                     is interpreted "the vision of the principle," [*Or rather, 'One seeing the principle,' if derived from {rah} and {irzn}; Cf.
+                     Jerome, De Nom. Hebr.] whereas as Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) the active life is signified by Lia who was blear-eyed. The
+                     second reason is because the contemplative life can be more continuous, although not as regards the highest degree of
+                     contemplation, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q182_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q180_A8.html">Q[180], A[8]</a>, ad 2;
+                     <a id="SS_Q182_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q181_A4.html"> Q[181], A[4]</a>, ad 3), wherefore Mary, by whom the contemplative life is signified, is described as "sitting" all the time "at the Lord's
+                     feet." Thirdly, because the contemplative life is more delightful than the active; wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom.
+                     Serm. ciii) that "Martha was troubled, but Mary feasted." Fourthly, because in the contemplative life man is more self-sufficient,
+                     since
+                     he needs fewer things for that purpose; wherefore it was said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.41" target="asv">Lk. 10:41</a>): "Martha, Martha, thou art careful and art troubled about many things." Fifthly, because the contemplative life is loved
+                     more for its own sake, while the active life is directed to something else. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A1-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.36.4" target="asv">Ps. 36:4</a>): "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of
+                     my life, that I may see the delight of the Lord."
+                     Sixthly, because the contemplative life consists in leisure and rest, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A1-p6.5" href="./asv.html#Ps.45.11" target="asv"> Ps. 45:11, </a> "Be still and see that I am God." Seventhly, because the contemplative life is according to Divine things, whereas active
+                     life is according to human things; wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ): "'In the beginning was the Word': to
+                     Him was Mary hearkening: 'The Word was made flesh': Him was Martha serving." Eighthly, because the contemplative life is according
+                     to that
+                     which is most proper to man, namely his intellect; whereas in the works of the active life the lower powers also, which are
+                     common to us and brutes, have their part; wherefore (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A1-p6.6" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.7" target="asv">Ps. 35:7</a>) after the words, "Men and beasts Thou wilt preserve, O Lord," that which is special to man is added (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A1-p6.7" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.10" target="asv">Ps. 35:10</a>): "In Thy light we shall see light."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A1-p7"> Our Lord adds a ninth reason (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.42" target="asv">Lk. 10:42</a>) when He says: "Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her," which words Augustine (De Verb.
+                     Dom. Serm. ciii) expounds thus: "Not---Thou hast chosen badly but---She has chosen better. Why better? Listen---because it
+                     shall not be taken away from her. But the burden of necessity shall at length be taken from thee: whereas the sweetness of
+                     truth is eternal."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A1-p8"> Yet in a restricted sense and in a particular case one should prefer the active life on account of the needs of the present
+                     life. Thus too the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2): "It is better to be wise than to be rich, yet for one who is in need,
+                     it is better to be rich . . ."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not only the active life concerns prelates, they should also excel in the contemplative life; hence Gregory says (Pastor.
+                     ii, 1): "A prelate should be foremost in action, more uplifted than others in contemplation."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The contemplative life consists in a certain liberty of mind. For Gregory says (Hom. iii in Ezech.) that "the contemplative
+                     life obtains a certain freedom of mind, for it thinks not of temporal but of eternal things." And Boethius says (De Consol.
+                     v, 2): "The soul of man must needs be more free while it continues to gaze on the Divine mind, and less so when it stoops
+                     to bodily things." Wherefore it is evident that the active life does not directly
+                     command the contemplative life, but prescribes certain works of the active life as dispositions to the contemplative life;
+                     which it accordingly serves rather than commands. Gregory refers to this when he says (Hom. iii in Ezech.) that "the active
+                     life is bondage, whereas the contemplative life is freedom."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sometimes a man is called away from the contemplative life to the works of the active life, on account of some necessity
+                     of the present life, yet not so as to be compelled to forsake contemplation altogether. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
+                     xix, 19): "The love of truth seeks a holy leisure, the demands of charity undertake an honest toil," the work namely of the
+                     active life. "If no one imposes this burden upon us we must devote ourselves to the
+                     research and contemplation of truth, but if it be imposed on us, we must bear it because charity demands it of us. Yet even
+                     then we must not altogether forsake the delights of truth, lest we deprive ourselves of its sweetness, and this burden overwhelm
+                     us." Hence it is clear that when a person is called from the contemplative life to the active life, this is done by way not
+                     of subtraction but of addition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q182_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q182_A2-p0.1">Whether the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative. For merit implies relation to meed; and meed
+                     is due to labor, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:8, </a> "Every man shall receive his own reward according to his own labor." Now labor is ascribed to the active life, and rest to
+                     the contemplative life; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "Whosoever is converted to God must first of all sweat from
+                     labor, i.e. he must take Lia,
+                     that afterwards he may rest in the embraces of Rachel so as to see the principle." Therefore the active life is of greater
+                     merit than the contemplative.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the contemplative life is a beginning of the happiness to come; wherefore Augustine commenting on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.21.22" target="asv"> Jn. 21:22, </a> "So I will have him to remain till I come," says (Tract. cxxiv in Joan.): "This may be expressed more clearly: Let perfect
+                     works follow Me conformed to the example of My passion, and let contemplation begun here remain until I come, that it may
+                     be perfected when I shall come." And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that
+                     "contemplation begins here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home." Now the life to come will be a state not of meriting
+                     but of receiving the reward of our merits. Therefore the contemplative life would seem to have less of the character of merit
+                     than the active, but more of the character of reward.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Hom. xii in Ezech.) that "no sacrifice is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls." Now by the
+                     zeal for souls a man turns to the occupations of the active life. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life is not
+                     of greater merit than the active.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Great are the merits of the active life, but greater still those of the contemplative."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q182_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q114_A4.html">FS, Q[114], A[4]</a>), the root of merit is charity; and, while, as stated above (Q[25], A[1]), charity consists in the love of God and our neighbor,
+                     the love of God is by itself more meritorious than the love of our neighbor, as stated above (Q[27], A[8]). Wherefore that
+                     which pertains more directly to the love of God is generically more meritorious than that which pertains directly to the love
+                     of our neighbor for
+                     God's sake. Now the contemplative life pertains directly and immediately to the love of God; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
+                     xix, 19) that "the love of" the Divine "truth seeks a holy leisure," namely of the contemplative life, for it is that truth
+                     above all which the contemplative life seeks, as stated above (Q[181], A[4], ad 2). On the other hand, the active life is
+                     more directly concerned with the love of our neighbor, because it is "busy about much serving" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.40" target="asv">Lk. 10:40</a>).
+                     Wherefore the contemplative life is generically of greater merit than the active life. This is moreover asserted by Gregory
+                     (Hom. iii in Ezech.): "The contemplative life surpasses in merit the active life, because the latter labors under the stress
+                     of present work," by reason of the necessity of assisting our neighbor, "while the former with heartfelt relish has a foretaste
+                     of the coming rest," i.e. the contemplation of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A2-p7"> Nevertheless it may happen that one man merits more by the works of the active life than another by the works of the contemplative
+                     life. For instance through excess of Divine love a man may now and then suffer separation from the sweetness of Divine contemplation
+                     for the time being, that God's will may be done and for His glory's sake. Thus the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.3" target="asv">Rom. 9:3</a>): "I wished myself to be an anathema from Christ, for my brethren"; which words Chrysostom
+                     expounds as follows (De Compunct. i, 7 [*Ad Demetr. de Compunct. Cordis.]): "His mind was so steeped in the love of Christ
+                     that, although he desired above all to be with Christ, he despised even this, because thus he pleased Christ."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> External labor conduces to the increase of the accidental reward; but the increase of merit with regard to the essential
+                     reward consists chiefly in charity, whereof external labor borne for Christ's sake is a sign. Yet a much more expressive sign
+                     thereof is shown when a man, renouncing whatsoever pertains to this life, delights to occupy himself entirely with Divine
+                     contemplation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the state of future happiness man has arrived at perfection, wherefore there is no room for advancement by merit; and
+                     if there were, the merit would be more efficacious by reason of the greater charity. But in the present life contemplation
+                     is not without some imperfection, and can always become more perfect; wherefore it does not remove the idea of merit, but
+                     causes a yet greater merit on account of the practice of greater Divine charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A sacrifice is rendered to God spiritually when something is offered to Him; and of all man's goods, God specially accepts
+                     that of the human soul when it is offered to Him in sacrifice. Now a man ought to offer to God, in the first place, his soul,
+                     according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.30.24" target="asv"> Ecclus. 30:24, </a> "Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God"; in the second place, the souls of others, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Rev.22.17" target="asv"> Apoc. 22:17, </a> "He that heareth, let him
+                     say: Come." And the more closely a man unites his own or another's soul to God, the more acceptable is his sacrifice to God;
+                     wherefore it is more acceptable to God that one apply one's own soul and the souls of others to contemplation than to action.
+                     Consequently the statement that "no sacrifice is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls," does not mean that the merit
+                     of the active life is preferable to the merit of the contemplative life, but that it is more meritorious to offer to God
+                     one's own soul and the souls of others, than any other external gifts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q182_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q182_A3-p0.1">Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the active life?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the contemplative life is hindered by the active life. For the contemplative life requires a certain stillness
+                     of mind, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.45.11" target="asv"> Ps. 45:11, </a> "Be still, and see that I am God"; whereas the active life involves restlessness, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.41" target="asv"> Lk. 10:41, </a> "Martha, Martha, thou art careful and troubled about many things." Therefore the active life hinders the contemplative.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, clearness of vision is a requisite for the contemplative life. Now active life is a hindrance to clear vision; for
+                     Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that it "is blear-eyed and fruitful, because the active life, being occupied with work,
+                     sees less." Therefore the active life hinders the contemplative.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one contrary hinders the other. Now the active and the contemplative life are apparently contrary to one another,
+                     since the active life is busy about many things, while the contemplative life attends to the contemplation of one; wherefore
+                     they differ in opposition to one another. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life is hindered by the active.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Those who wish to hold the fortress of contemplation, must first of all train in the camp
+                     of action."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The active life may be considered from two points of view. First, as regards the attention to and practice of external works:
+                     and thus it is evident that the active life hinders the contemplative, in so far as it is impossible for one to be busy with
+                     external action, and at the same time give oneself to Divine contemplation. Secondly, active life may be considered as quieting
+                     and directing the internal passions of the soul; and from this point of view the
+                     active life is a help to the contemplative, since the latter is hindered by the inordinateness of the internal passions. Hence
+                     Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Those who wish to hold the fortress of contemplation must first of all train in the camp of
+                     action. Thus after careful study they will learn whether they no longer wrong their neighbor, whether they bear with equanimity
+                     the wrongs their neighbors do to them, whether their soul is neither overcome with joy in the presence of temporal goods,
+                     nor cast down with too great a sorrow when those goods are withdrawn. In this way they will known when they withdraw within
+                     themselves, in order to explore spiritual things, whether they no longer carry with them the shadows of the things corporeal,
+                     or, if these follow them, whether they prudently drive them away." Hence the work of the active life conduces to the contemplative,
+                     by quelling the interior passions which give rise to the phantasms whereby contemplation is hindered.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A3-p7"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections; for these arguments consider the occupation itself of external actions,
+                     and not the effect which is the quelling of the passions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A3-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A3-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q182_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS.v.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q182_A4-p0.1">Whether the active life precedes the contemplative?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the active life does not precede the contemplative. For the contemplative life pertains directly to the
+                     love of God; while the active life pertains to the love of our neighbor. Now the love of God precedes the love of our neighbor,
+                     since we love our neighbor for God's sake. Seemingly therefore the contemplative life also precedes the active life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "It should be observed that while a well-ordered life proceeds from action to
+                     contemplation, sometimes it is useful for the soul to turn from the contemplative to the active life." Therefore the active
+                     is not simply prior to the contemplative.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it would seem that there is not necessarily any order between things that are suitable to different subjects. Now
+                     the active and the contemplative life are suitable to different subjects; for Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Often those who
+                     were able to contemplate God so long as they were undisturbed have fallen when pressed with occupation; and frequently they
+                     who might live advantageously occupied with the service of their fellow-creatures are killed
+                     by the sword of their inaction."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A4-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing is said to precede in two ways. First, with regard to its nature; and in this way the contemplative life precedes
+                     the active, inasmuch as it applies itself to things which precede and are better than others, wherefore it moves and directs
+                     the active life. For the higher reason which is assigned to contemplation is compared to the lower reason which is assigned
+                     to action, and the husband is compared to his wife, who should be ruled by her husband, as
+                     Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3,7,12).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A4-p6"> Secondly, a thing precedes with regard to us, because it comes first in the order of generation. In this way the active precedes
+                     the contemplative life, because it disposes one to it, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q182_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q182_A1.html">(A[1];</a> Q[181], A[1], ad 3); and, in the order of generation, disposition precedes form, although the latter precedes simply and
+                     according to its nature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The contemplative life is directed to the love of God, not of any degree, but to that which is perfect; whereas the active
+                     life is necessary for any degree of the love of our neighbor. Hence Gregory says (Hom. iii in Ezech.): "Without the contemplative
+                     life it is possible to enter the heavenly kingdom, provided one omit not the good actions we are able to do; but we cannot
+                     enter therein without the active life, if we neglect to do the good we can do."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A4-p8"> From this it is also evident that the active precedes the contemplative life, as that which is common to all precedes, in
+                     the order of generation, that which is proper to the perfect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Progress from the active to the contemplative life is according to the order of generation; whereas the return from the contemplative
+                     life to the active is according to the order of direction, in so far as the active life is directed by the contemplative.
+                     Even thus habit is acquired by acts, and by the acquired habit one acts yet more perfectly, as stated in Ethic. ii, 7.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that is prone to yield to his passions on account of his impulse to action is simply more apt for the active life by reason
+                     of his restless spirit. Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "there be some so restless that when they are free from labor
+                     they labor all the more, because the more leisure they have for thought, the worse interior turmoil they have to bear." Others,
+                     on the contrary, have the mind naturally pure and restful, so that they
+                     are apt for contemplation, and if they were to apply themselves wholly to action, this would be detrimental to them. Wherefore
+                     Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "some are so slothful of mind that if they chance to have any hard work to do they give
+                     way at the very outset." Yet, as he adds further on, "often . . . love stimulates slothful souls to work, and fear restrains
+                     souls that are disturbed in contemplation." Consequently those who are more adapted to the active life can prepare themselves
+                     for the contemplative by the practice of the active life; while none the less, those who are more adapted to the contemplative
+                     life can take upon themselves the works of the active life, so as to become yet more apt for contemplation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q182_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS.v.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q182_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <a href="summa.SS_Q170_A2.html"></a>
+            <a href="summa.SS_Q171.html"></a>
+         `
+     </div>
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