Mercurial > hg > Aquinas
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| date | Sun, 03 Jan 2010 14:43:02 +0000 |
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--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/summa/english/SS_ii.html Sun Jan 03 14:43:02 2010 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,25463 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="SS.ii" class="div2"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q46_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47.html"></a> + <h2 id="SS.ii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (QQ[47]-170)</h2> + <div id="SS_Q47" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS.ii.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q47-p0.1">OF PRUDENCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q47-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47-p2"> After treating of the theological virtues, we must in due sequence consider the cardinal virtues. In the first place we shall + consider prudence in itself; secondly, its parts; thirdly, the corresponding gift; fourthly, the contrary vices; fifthly, + the precepts concerning prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47-p3"> Under the first head there are sixteen points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q47-p4"> (1) Whether prudence is in the will or in the reason?</p> + <p id="SS_Q47-p5"> (2) If in the reason, whether it is only in the practical, or also in the speculative reason?</p> + <p id="SS_Q47-p6"> (3) Whether it takes cognizance of singulars?</p> + <p id="SS_Q47-p7"> (4) Whether it is virtue?</p> + <p id="SS_Q47-p8"> (5) Whether it is a special virtue?</p> + <p id="SS_Q47-p9"> (6) Whether it appoints the end to the moral virtues?</p> + <p id="SS_Q47-p10"> (7) Whether it fixes the mean in the moral virtues?</p> + <p id="SS_Q47-p11"> (8) Whether its proper act is command?</p> + <p id="SS_Q47-p12"> (9) Whether solicitude or watchfulness belongs to prudence?</p> + <p id="SS_Q47-p13"> (10) Whether prudence extends to the governing of many?</p> + <p id="SS_Q47-p14"> (11) Whether the prudence which regards private good is the same in species as that which regards the common good?</p> + <p id="SS_Q47-p15"> (12) Whether prudence is in subjects, or only in their rulers?</p> + <p id="SS_Q47-p16"> (13) Whether prudence is in the wicked?</p> + <p id="SS_Q47-p17"> (14) Whether prudence is in all good men?</p> + <p id="SS_Q47-p18"> (15) Whether prudence is in us naturally?</p> + <p id="SS_Q47-p19"> (16) Whether prudence is lost by forgetfulness ?</p> + <div id="SS_Q47_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q47_A1-p0.1">Whether prudence is in the cognitive or in the appetitive faculty?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q47_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prudence is not in the cognitive but in the appetitive faculty. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv): + "Prudence is love choosing wisely between the things that help and those that hinder." Now love is not in the cognitive, but + in the appetitive faculty. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive faculty. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as appears from the foregoing definition it belongs to prudence "to choose wisely." But choice is an act of the + appetitive faculty, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q47_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q13_A1.html">FS, Q[13], A[1]</a>). Therefore prudence is not in the cognitive but in the appetitive faculty. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "in art it is better to err voluntarily than involuntarily, whereas in + the case of prudence, as of the virtues, it is worse." Now the moral virtues, of which he is treating there, are in the appetitive + faculty, whereas art is in the reason. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive rather than in the rational faculty. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 61): "Prudence is the knowledge of what to seek and what to avoid." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Isidore says (Etym. x): "A prudent man is one who sees as it were from afar, for his sight is keen, and he foresees the + event of uncertainties." Now sight belongs not to the appetitive but to the cognitive faculty. Wherefore it is manifest that + prudence belongs directly to the cognitive, and not to the sensitive faculty, because by the latter we know nothing but what + is within reach and offers itself to the senses: while to obtain knowledge of the future + from knowledge of the present or past, which pertains to prudence, belongs properly to the reason, because this is done by + a process of comparison. It follows therefore that prudence, properly speaking, is in the reason. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q47_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q82_A4.html">FP, Q[82], A[4]</a>) the will moves all the faculties to their acts. Now the first act of the appetitive faculty is love, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q47_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A1.html">FS, Q[25], AA[1]</a>,2). Accordingly prudence is said to be love, not indeed essentially, but in so far as love moves to the act of prudence. + Wherefore Augustine goes on to say that "prudence is love discerning aright that which helps from that which + hinders us in tending to God." Now love is said to discern because it moves the reason to discern. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The prudent man considers things afar off, in so far as they tend to be a help or a hindrance to that which has to be done + at the present time. Hence it is clear that those things which prudence considers stand in relation to this other, as in relation + to the end. Now of those things that are directed to the end there is counsel in the reason, and choice in the appetite, of + which two, counsel belongs more properly to prudence, since the Philosopher + states (Ethic. vi, 5,7,9) that a prudent man "takes good counsel." But as choice presupposes counsel, since it is "the desire + for what has been already counselled" (Ethic. iii, 2), it follows that choice can also be ascribed to prudence indirectly, + in so far, to wit, as prudence directs the choice by means of counsel. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The worth of prudence consists not in thought merely, but in its application to action, which is the end of the practical + reason. Wherefore if any defect occur in this, it is most contrary to prudence, since, the end being of most import in everything, + it follows that a defect which touches the end is the worst of all. Hence the Philosopher goes on to say (Ethic. vi, 5) that + prudence is "something more than a merely rational habit," such as art is, + since, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q47_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A4.html">FS, Q[57] , A[4]</a>) it includes application to action, which application is an act of the will. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q47_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q47_A2-p0.1">Whether prudence belongs to the practical reason alone or also to the speculative reason?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q47_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prudence belongs not only to the practical, but also to the speculative reason. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q47_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.10.23" target="asv">Prov. 10:23</a>): "Wisdom is prudence to a man." Now wisdom consists chiefly in contemplation. Therefore prudence does also. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): "Prudence is concerned with the quest of truth, and fills us with the desire of + fuller knowledge." Now this belongs to the speculative reason. Therefore prudence resides also in the speculative reason. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher assigns art and prudence to the same part of the soul (Ethic. vi, 1). Now art may be not only practical + but also speculative, as in the case of the liberal arts. Therefore prudence also is both practical and speculative. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence is right reason applied to action. Now this belongs to none but the practical + reason. Therefore prudence is in the practical reason only. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) "a prudent man is one who is capable of taking good counsel." Now counsel is + about things that we have to do in relation to some end: and the reason that deals with things to be done for an end is the + practical reason. Hence it is evident that prudence resides only in the practical reason. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q47_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q45_A1.html">Q[45], AA[1]</a>,3), wisdom considers the absolutely highest cause: so that the consideration of the highest cause in any particular genus + belongs to wisdom in that genus. Now in the genus of human acts the highest cause is the common end of all human life, and + it is this end that prudence intends. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that just as he who reasons well for the realization + of a particular end, + such as victory, is said to be prudent, not absolutely, but in a particular genus, namely warfare, so he that reasons well + with regard to right conduct as a whole, is said to be prudent absolutely. Wherefore it is clear that prudence is wisdom about + human affairs: but not wisdom absolutely, because it is not about the absolutely highest cause, for it is about human good, + and this is not the best thing of all. And so it is stated significantly that "prudence is wisdom for man," but not wisdom + absolutely. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Ambrose, and Tully also (De Invent. ii, 53) take the word prudence in a broad sense for any human knowledge, whether speculative + or practical. And yet it may also be replied that the act itself of the speculative reason, in so far as it is voluntary, + is a matter of choice and counsel as to its exercise; and consequently comes under the direction of prudence. On the other + hand, as regards its specification in relation to its object which is the + "necessary true," it comes under neither counsel nor prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every application of right reason in the work of production belongs to art: but to prudence belongs only the application + of right reason in matters of counsel, which are those wherein there is no fixed way of obtaining the end, as stated in Ethic. + iii, 3. Since then, the speculative reason makes things such as syllogisms, propositions and the like, wherein the process + follows certain and fixed rules, consequently in respect of such things it is + possible to have the essentials of art, but not of prudence; and so we find such a thing as a speculative art, but not a speculative + prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q47_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q47_A3-p0.1">Whether prudence takes cognizance of singulars?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q47_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prudence does not take cognizance of singulars. For prudence is in the reason, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q47_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2). But "reason deals with universals," according to Phys. i, 5. Therefore prudence does not take cognizance except of universals. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, singulars are infinite in number. But the reason cannot comprehend an infinite number of things. Therefore prudence + which is right reason, is not about singulars. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, particulars are known by the senses. But prudence is not in a sense, for many persons who have keen outward senses + are devoid of prudence. Therefore prudence does not take cognizance of singulars. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that "prudence does not deal with universals only, but needs to take cognizance of singulars + also." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[1], ad 3), to prudence belongs not only the consideration of the reason, but also the application to action, + which is the end of the practical reason. But no man can conveniently apply one thing to another, unless he knows both the + thing to be applied, and the thing to which it has to be applied. Now actions are in singular matters: and so it is necessary + for the prudent man to know both the universal principles of reason, and the + singulars about which actions are concerned. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reason first and chiefly is concerned with universals, and yet it is able to apply universal rules to particular cases: hence + the conclusions of syllogisms are not only universal, but also particular, because the intellect by a kind of reflection extends + to matter, as stated in De Anima iii. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is because the infinite number of singulars cannot be comprehended by human reason, that "our counsels are uncertain" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q47_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.14" target="asv">Wis. 9:14</a>). Nevertheless experience reduces the infinity of singulars to a certain finite number which occur as a general rule, and + the knowledge of these suffices for human prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8), prudence does not reside in the external senses whereby we know sensible objects, + but in the interior sense, which is perfected by memory and experience so as to judge promptly of particular cases. This does + not mean however that prudence is in the interior sense as in its principle subject, for it is chiefly in the reason, yet + by a kind of application it extends to this sense. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q47_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q47_A4-p0.1">Whether prudence is a virtue?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q47_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prudence is not a virtue. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 13) that "prudence is the science of what + to desire and what to avoid." Now science is condivided with virtue, as appears in the Predicaments (vi). Therefore prudence + is not a virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no virtue of a virtue: but "there is a virtue of art," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5): wherefore + art is not a virtue. Now there is prudence in art, for it is written (2 Paralip. ii, 14) concerning Hiram, that he knew "to + grave all sort of graving, and to devise ingeniously [prudenter] all that there may be need of in the work." Therefore prudence + is not a virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no virtue can be immoderate. But prudence is immoderate, else it would be useless to say ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q47_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.23.4" target="asv">Prov. 23:4</a>): "Set bounds to thy prudence." Therefore prudence is not a virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory states (Moral. ii, 49) that prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice are four virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q47_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A3.html">FS, Q[55], A[3]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q47_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q56_A1.html">FS, Q[56], A[1]</a>) when we were treating of virtues in general, "virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise." + Now good may be understood in a twofold sense: first, materially, for the thing that is good, secondly, formally, under the + aspect of good. Good, under the aspect of good, is the object of the appetitive power. Hence if any habits rectify + the consideration of reason, without regarding the rectitude of the appetite, they have less of the nature of a virtue since + they direct man to good materially, that is to say, to the thing which is good, but without considering it under the aspect + of good. On the other hand those virtues which regard the rectitude of the appetite, have more of the nature of virtue, because + they consider the good not only materially, but also formally, in other words, they consider that which is good under the + aspect of good. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A4-p7"> Now it belongs to prudence, as stated above (A[1], ad 3; A[3]) to apply right reason to action, and this is not done without + a right appetite. Hence prudence has the nature of virtue not only as the other intellectual virtues have it, but also as + the moral virtues have it, among which virtues it is enumerated. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine there takes science in the broad sense for any kind of right reason. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art, because art does not require rectitude of the appetite; wherefore in + order that a man may make right use of his art, he needs to have a virtue which will rectify his appetite. Prudence however + has nothing to do with the matter of art, because art is both directed to a particular end, and has fixed means of obtaining + that end. And yet, by a kind of comparison, a man may be said to act prudently in + matters of art. Moreover in certain arts, on account of the uncertainty of the means for obtaining the end, there is need + for counsel, as for instance in the arts of medicine and navigation, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This saying of the wise man does not mean that prudence itself should be moderate, but that moderation must be imposed on + other things according to prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q47_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q47_A5-p0.1">Whether prudence is a special virtue?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q47_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prudence is not a special virtue. For no special virtue is included in the definition of virtue in general, + since virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) "an elective habit that follows a mean appointed by reason in relation to ourselves, + even as a wise man decides." Now right reason is reason in accordance with prudence, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore + prudence is not a special virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 13) that "the effect of moral virtue is right action as regards the end, and that + of prudence, right action as regards the means." Now in every virtue certain things have to be done as means to the end. Therefore + prudence is in every virtue, and consequently is not a special virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a special virtue has a special object. But prudence has not a special object, for it is right reason "applied to + action" (Ethic. vi, 5); and all works of virtue are actions. Therefore prudence is not a special virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is distinct from and numbered among the other virtues, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q47_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.7" target="asv">Wis. 8:7</a>): "She teacheth temperance and prudence, justice and fortitude." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since acts and habits take their species from their objects, as shown above ( + <a id="SS_Q47_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html">FS, Q[1], A[3]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q47_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A2.html">FS, Q[18], A[2]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q47_A5-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">FS, Q[54], A[2]</a> ), any habit that has a corresponding special object, distinct from other objects, must needs be a special habit, and if + it be a good habit, it must be a special virtue. Now an object is called special, not merely according to the consideration + of its matter, + but rather according to its formal aspect, as explained above ( + <a id="SS_Q47_A5-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">FS, Q[54], A[2]</a>, ad 1). Because one and the same thing is the subject matter of the acts of different habits, and also of different powers, + according to its different formal aspects. Now a yet greater difference of object is requisite for a difference of powers + than for a difference of habits, since several habits are found in the same power, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q47_A5-p6.5" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A1.html">FS, Q[54], A[1]</a>). + Consequently any difference in the aspect of an object, that requires a difference of powers, will "a fortiori" require a + difference of habits. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A5-p7"> Accordingly we must say that since prudence is in the reason, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q47_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, it is differentiated from the other intellectual virtues by a material difference of objects. "Wisdom," "knowledge" and + "understanding" are about necessary things, whereas "art" and "prudence" are about contingent things, art being concerned + with "things made," that is, with things produced in external matter, such as a house, a knife and so forth; and prudence, + being + concerned with "things done," that is, with things that have their being in the doer himself, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q47_A5-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A4.html">FS, Q[57], A[4]</a>). On the other hand prudence is differentiated from the moral virtues according to a formal aspect distinctive of powers, + i.e. the intellective power, wherein is prudence, and the appetitive power, wherein is moral virtue. Hence it is evident that + prudence is a special virtue, distinct from all other virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This is not a definition of virtue in general, but of moral virtue, the definition of which fittingly includes an intellectual + virtue, viz., prudence, which has the same matter in common with moral virtue; because, just as the subject of moral virtue + is something that partakes of reason, so moral virtue has the aspect of virtue, in so far as it partakes of intellectual virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument proves that prudence helps all the virtues, and works in all of them; but this does not suffice to prove that + it is not a special virtue; for nothing prevents a certain genus from containing a species which is operative in every other + species of that same genus, even as the sun has an influence over all bodies. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things done are indeed the matter of prudence, in so far as they are the object of reason, that is, considered as true: but + they are the matter of the moral virtues, in so far as they are the object of the appetitive power, that is, considered as + good. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A5-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A5-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q47_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q47_A6-p0.1">Whether prudence appoints the end to moral virtues?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q47_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prudence appoints the end to moral virtues. Since prudence is in the reason, while moral virtue is in + the appetite, it seems that prudence stands in relation to moral virtue, as reason to the appetite. Now reason appoints the + end to the appetitive power. Therefore prudence appoints the end to the moral virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man surpasses irrational beings by his reason, but he has other things in common with them. Accordingly the other + parts of man are in relation to his reason, what man is in relation to irrational creatures. Now man is the end of irrational + creatures, according to Polit. i, 3. Therefore all the other parts of man are directed to reason as to their end. But prudence + is "right reason applied to action," as stated above + <a id="SS_Q47_A6-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. + Therefore all actions are directed to prudence as their end. Therefore prudence appoints the end to all moral virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it belongs to the virtue, art, or power that is concerned about the end, to command the virtues or arts that are + concerned about the means. Now prudence disposes of the other moral virtues, and commands them. Therefore it appoints their + end to them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that "moral virtue ensures the rectitude of the intention of the end, while prudence + ensures the rectitude of the means." Therefore it does not belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but only + to regulate the means. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The end of moral virtues is human good. Now the good of the human soul is to be in accord with reason, as Dionysius declares + (Div. Nom. iv). Wherefore the ends of moral virtue must of necessity pre-exist in the reason. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A6-p7"> Now, just as, in the speculative reason, there are certain things naturally known, about which is "understanding," and certain + things of which we obtain knowledge through them, viz. conclusions, about which is "science," so in the practical reason, + certain things pre-exist, as naturally known principles, and such are the ends of the moral virtues, since the end is in practical + matters what principles are in speculative matters, as stated above (Q[23], A[7], ad 2; + + <a id="SS_Q47_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q13_A3.html">FS, Q[13], A[3]</a>); while certain things are in the practical reason by way of conclusions, and such are the means which we gather from the + ends themselves. About these is prudence, which applies universal principles to the particular conclusions of practical matters. + Consequently it does not belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to regulate the means. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Natural reason known by the name of "synderesis" appoints the end to moral virtues, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q47_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A12.html">FP, Q[79], A[12]</a>): but prudence does not do this for the reason given above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A6-p9"> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The end concerns the moral virtues, not as though they appointed the end, but because they tend to the end which is appointed + by natural reason. In this they are helped by prudence, which prepares the way for them, by disposing the means. Hence it + follows that prudence is more excellent than the moral virtues, and moves them: yet "synderesis" moves prudence, just as the + understanding of principles moves science. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A6-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A6-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q47_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q47_A7-p0.1">Whether it belongs to prudence to find the mean in moral virtues?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q47_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it does not belong to prudence to find the mean in moral virtues. For the achievement of the mean is the + end of moral virtues. But prudence does not appoint the end to moral virtues, as shown above + <a id="SS_Q47_A7-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A6.html">(A[6])</a>. Therefore it does not find the mean in them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which of itself has being, would seem to have no cause, but its very being is its cause, since a thing is said + to have being by reason of its cause. Now "to follow the mean" belongs to moral virtue by reason of itself, as part of its + definition, as shown above (A[5], OBJ[1]). Therefore prudence does not cause the mean in moral virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prudence works after the manner of reason. But moral virtue tends to the mean after the manner of nature, because, + as Tully states (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53), "virtue is a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Therefore prudence + does not appoint the mean to moral virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> In the foregoing definition of moral virtue (A[5], OBJ[1]) it is stated that it "follows a mean appointed by reason . . . + even as a wise man decides." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The proper end of each moral virtue consists precisely in conformity with right reason. For temperance intends that man should + not stray from reason for the sake of his concupiscences; fortitude, that he should not stray from the right judgment of reason + through fear or daring. Moreover this end is appointed to man according to natural reason, since natural reason dictates to + each one that he should act according to reason. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A7-p7"> But it belongs to the ruling of prudence to decide in what manner and by what means man shall obtain the mean of reason in + his deeds. For though the attainment of the mean is the end of a moral virtue, yet this mean is found by the right disposition + of these things that are directed to the end. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A7-p8"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as a natural agent makes form to be in matter, yet does not make that which is essential to the form to belong to it, + so too, prudence appoints the mean in passions and operations, and yet does not make the searching of the mean to belong to + virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Moral virtue after the manner of nature intends to attain the mean. Since, however, the mean as such is not found in all + matters after the same manner, it follows that the inclination of nature which ever works in the same manner, does not suffice + for this purpose, and so the ruling of prudence is required. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A7-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A7-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q47_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A9.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q47_A8-p0.1">Whether command is the chief act of prudence?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q47_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that command is not the chief act of prudence. For command regards the good to be ensued. Now Augustine (De + Trin. xiv, 9) states that it is an act of prudence "to avoid ambushes." Therefore command is not the chief act of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "the prudent man takes good counsel." Now "to take counsel" and "to command" + seem to be different acts, as appears from what has been said above ( + <a id="SS_Q47_A8-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A6.html">FS, Q[57], A[6]</a>). Therefore command is not the chief act of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it seems to belong to the will to command and to rule, since the will has the end for its object, and moves the + other powers of the soul. Now prudence is not in the will, but in the reason. Therefore command is not an act of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 10) that "prudence commands." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Prudence is "right reason applied to action," as stated above + <a id="SS_Q47_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Hence that which is the chief act of reason in regard to action must needs be the chief act of prudence. Now there are three + such acts. The first is "to take counsel," which belongs to discovery, for counsel is an act of inquiry, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q47_A8-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q14_A1.html">FS, Q[14], A[1]</a>). The second act is "to judge of what one has discovered," and this is an act + of the speculative reason. But the practical reason, which is directed to action, goes further, and its third act is "to command," + which act consists in applying to action the things counselled and judged. And since this act approaches nearer to the end + of the practical reason, it follows that it is the chief act of the practical reason, and consequently of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A8-p7"> In confirmation of this we find that the perfection of art consists in judging and not in commanding: wherefore he who sins + voluntarily against his craft is reputed a better craftsman than he who does so involuntarily, because the former seems to + do so from right judgment, and the latter from a defective judgment. On the other hand it is the reverse in prudence, as stated + in Ethic. vi, 5, for it is more imprudent to sin voluntarily, since this is to be lacking in the chief act + of prudence, viz. command, than to sin involuntarily. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The act of command extends both to the ensuing of good and to the avoidance of evil. Nevertheless Augustine ascribes "the + avoidance of ambushes" to prudence, not as its chief act, but as an act of prudence that does not continue in heaven. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good counsel is required in order that the good things discovered may be applied to action: wherefore command belongs to + prudence which takes good counsel. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Simply to move belongs to the will: but command denotes motion together with a kind of ordering, wherefore it is an act of + the reason, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q47_A8-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q17_A1.html">FS, Q[17], A[1]</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A8-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A8-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A9.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q47_A9" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A10.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q47_A9-p0.1">Whether solicitude belongs to prudence?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q47_A9-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that solicitude does not belong to prudence. For solicitude implies disquiet, wherefore Isidore says (Etym. + x) that "a solicitous man is a restless man." Now motion belongs chiefly to the appetitive power: wherefore solicitude does + also. But prudence is not in the appetitive power, but in the reason, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q47_A9-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore solicitude does not belong to prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the certainty of truth seems opposed to solicitude, wherefore it is related ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q47_A9-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.9.20" target="asv">1 Kings 9:20</a>) that Samuel said to Saul: "As for the asses which were lost three days ago, be not solicitous, because they are found." + Now the certainty of truth belongs to prudence, since it is an intellectual virtue. Therefore solicitude is in opposition + to prudence rather than belonging to it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) the "magnanimous man is slow and leisurely." Now slowness is contrary to solicitude. + Since then prudence is not opposed to magnanimity, for "good is not opposed to good," as stated in the Predicaments (viii) + it would seem that solicitude does not belong to prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A9-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q47_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.4.7" target="asv">1 Pet. 4:7</a>): "Be prudent . . . and watch in prayers." But watchfulness is the same as solicitude. Therefore solicitude belongs to prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A9-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to Isidore (Etym. x), a man is said to be solicitous through being shrewd [solers] and alert [citus], in so far + as a man through a certain shrewdness of mind is on the alert to do whatever has to be done. Now this belongs to prudence, + whose chief act is a command about what has been already counselled and judged in matters of action. Hence the Philosopher + says (Ethic. vi, 9) that "one should be quick in carrying out the counsel taken, but slow in + taking counsel." Hence it is that solicitude belongs properly to prudence, and for this reason Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. + xxiv) that "prudence keeps most careful watch and ward, lest by degrees we be deceived unawares by evil counsel." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A9-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Movement belongs to the appetitive power as to the principle of movement, in accordance however, with the direction and command + of reason, wherein solicitude consists. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A9-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3), "equal certainty should not be sought in all things, but in each matter according + to its proper mode." And since the matter of prudence is the contingent singulars about which are human actions, the certainty + of prudence cannot be so great as to be devoid of all solicitude. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The magnanimous man is said to be "slow and leisurely" not because he is solicitous about nothing, but because he is not + over-solicitous about many things, and is trustful in matters where he ought to have trust, and is not over-solicitous about + them: for over-much fear and distrust are the cause of over-solicitude, since fear makes us take counsel, as stated above + ( + <a id="SS_Q47_A9-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q44_A2.html">FS, Q[44], A[2]</a>) when we were treating of the passion of + fear. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A9-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A9-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A10.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q47_A10" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A11.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q47_A10-p0.1">Whether solicitude belongs to prudence?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q47_A10-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A10-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prudence does not extend to the governing of many, but only to the government of oneself. For the Philosopher + says (Ethic. v, 1) that virtue directed to the common good is justice. But prudence differs from justice. Therefore prudence + is not directed to the common good. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A10-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he seems to be prudent, who seeks and does good for himself. Now those who seek the common good often neglect their + own. Therefore they are not prudent. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A10-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prudence is specifically distinct from temperance and fortitude. But temperance and fortitude seem to be related + only to a man's own good. Therefore the same applies to prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A10-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q47_A10-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.45" target="asv">Mat. 24:45</a>): "Who, thinkest thou, is a faithful and prudent [Douay: 'wise'] servant whom his lord hath appointed over his family?" + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A10-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) some have held that prudence does not extend to the common good, but only to + the good of the individual, and this because they thought that man is not bound to seek other than his own good. But this + opinion is opposed to charity, which "seeketh not her own" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q47_A10-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:5</a>): wherefore the Apostle says of himself ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q47_A10-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.33" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:33</a>): "Not seeking that which is profitable to myself, + but to many, that they may be saved." Moreover it is contrary to right reason, which judges the common good to be better than + the good of the individual. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A10-p7"> Accordingly, since it belongs to prudence rightly to counsel, judge, and command concerning the means of obtaining a due + end, it is evident that prudence regards not only the private good of the individual, but also the common good of the multitude. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A10-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking there of moral virtue. Now just as every moral virtue that is directed to the common good is + called "legal" justice, so the prudence that is directed to the common good is called "political" prudence, for the latter + stands in the same relation to legal justice, as prudence simply so called to moral virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A10-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He that seeks the good of the many, seeks in consequence his own good, for two reasons. First, because the individual good + is impossible without the common good of the family, state, or kingdom. Hence Valerius Maximus says [*Fact. et Dict. Memor. + iv, 6] of the ancient Romans that "they would rather be poor in a rich empire than rich in a poor empire." Secondly, because, + since man is a part of the home and state, he must needs consider what is good for + him by being prudent about the good of the many. For the good disposition of parts depends on their relation to the whole; + thus Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8) that "any part which does not harmonize with its whole, is offensive." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A10-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even temperance and fortitude can be directed to the common good, hence there are precepts of law concerning them as stated + in Ethic. v, 1: more so, however, prudence and justice, since these belong to the rational faculty which directly regards + the universal, just as the sensitive part regards singulars. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A10-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A10-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A11.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q47_A11" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A12.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q47_A11-p0.1">Whether prudence about one's own good is specifically the same as that which extends to the common good?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q47_A11-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A11-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that prudence about one's own good is the same specifically as that which extends to the common good. For the Philosopher + says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "political prudence, and prudence are the same habit, yet their essence is not the same." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A11-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that "virtue is the same in a good man and in a good ruler." Now political + prudence is chiefly in the ruler, in whom it is architectonic, as it were. Since then prudence is a virtue of a good man, + it seems that prudence and political prudence are the same habit. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A11-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a habit is not diversified in species or essence by things which are subordinate to one another. But the particular + good, which belongs to prudence simply so called, is subordinate to the common good, which belongs to political prudence. + Therefore prudence and political prudence differ neither specifically nor essentially. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A11-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> "Political prudence," which is directed to the common good of the state, "domestic economy" which is of such things as relate + to the common good of the household or family, and "monastic economy" which is concerned with things affecting the good of + one person, are all distinct sciences. Therefore in like manner there are different kinds of prudence, corresponding to the + above differences of matter. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A11-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q47_A11-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A5.html">(A[5];</a> Q[54], A[2], ad 1), the species of habits differ according to the difference of object considered in its formal aspect. Now + the formal aspect of all things directed to the end, is taken from the end itself, as shown above (FS, Prolog.; + <a id="SS_Q47_A11-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q102_A1.html">FS, Q[102], A[1]</a>), wherefore the species of habits differ by their relation to different ends. Again the individual good, the good of the + family, and + the good of the city and kingdom are different ends. Wherefore there must needs be different species of prudence corresponding + to these different ends, so that one is "prudence" simply so called, which is directed to one's own good; another, "domestic + prudence" which is directed to the common good of the home; and a third, "political prudence," which is directed to the common + good of the state or kingdom. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A11-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher means, not that political prudence is substantially the same habit as any kind of prudence, but that it is + the same as the prudence which is directed to the common good. This is called "prudence" in respect of the common notion of + prudence, i.e. as being right reason applied to action, while it is called "political," as being directed to the common good. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A11-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Philosopher declares (Polit. iii, 2), "it belongs to a good man to be able to rule well and to obey well," wherefore + the virtue of a good man includes also that of a good ruler. Yet the virtue of the ruler and of the subject differs specifically, + even as the virtue of a man and of a woman, as stated by the same authority (Polit. iii, 2). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A11-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even different ends, one of which is subordinate to the other, diversify the species of a habit, thus for instance, habits + directed to riding, soldiering, and civic life, differ specifically although their ends are subordinate to one another. In + like manner, though the good of the individual is subordinate to the good of the many, that does not prevent this difference + from making the habits differ specifically; but it follows that the habit which is + directed to the last end is above the other habits and commands them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A11-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A11-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A12.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q47_A12" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A11.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A13.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q47_A12-p0.1">Whether prudence is in subjects, or only in their rulers?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q47_A12-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A12-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prudence is not in subjects but only in their rulers. For the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that "prudence + alone is the virtue proper to a ruler, while other virtues are common to subjects and rulers, and the prudence of the subject + is not a virtue but a true opinion." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A12-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is stated in Polit. i, 5 that "a slave is not competent to take counsel." But prudence makes a man take good + counsel (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence is not befitting slaves or subjects. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A12-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prudence exercises command, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q47_A12-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A8.html">(A[8])</a>. But command is not in the competency of slaves or subjects but only of rulers. Therefore prudence is not in subjects but + only in rulers. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A12-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are two kinds of political prudence, one of which is "legislative" and belongs + to rulers, while the other "retains the common name political," and is about "individual actions." Now it belongs also to + subjects to perform these individual actions. Therefore prudence is not only in rulers but also in subjects. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A12-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Prudence is in the reason. Now ruling and governing belong properly to the reason; and therefore it is proper to a man to + reason and be prudent in so far as he has a share in ruling and governing. But it is evident that the subject as subject, + and the slave as slave, are not competent to rule and govern, but rather to be ruled and governed. Therefore prudence is not + the virtue of a slave as slave, nor of a subject as subject. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A12-p7"> Since, however, every man, for as much as he is rational, has a share in ruling according to the judgment of reason, he is + proportionately competent to have prudence. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence is in the ruler "after the manner of a + mastercraft" (Ethic. vi, 8), but in the subjects, "after the manner of a handicraft." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A12-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood strictly, namely, that prudence is not the virtue of a subject as such. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A12-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A slave is not capable of taking counsel, in so far as he is a slave (for thus he is the instrument of his master), but he + does take counsel in so far as he is a rational animal. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A12-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> By prudence a man commands not only others, but also himself, in so far as the reason is said to command the lower powers. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A12-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A12-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A11.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A13.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q47_A13" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A12.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A14.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q47_A13-p0.1">Whether prudence can be in sinners?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q47_A13-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A13-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there can be prudence in sinners. For our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q47_A13-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.8" target="asv">Lk. 16:8</a>): "The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser'] in their generation than the children of light." Now the + children of this world are sinners. Therefore there be prudence in sinners. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A13-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, faith is a more excellent virtue than prudence. But there can be faith in sinners. Therefore there can be prudence + also. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A13-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Ethic. vi, 7, "we say that to be of good counsel is the work of prudent man especially." Now many sinners + can take good counsel. Therefore sinners can have prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A13-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 12) that "it is impossible for a man be prudent unless he be good." Now no inner is + a good man. Therefore no sinner is prudent. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A13-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Prudence is threefold. There is a false prudence, which takes its name from its likeness to true prudence. For since a prudent + man is one who disposes well of the things that have to be done for a good end, whoever disposes well of such things as are + fitting for an evil end, has false prudence, in far as that which he takes for an end, is good, not in truth but in appearance. + Thus man is called "a good robber," and in this way may speak of "a prudent + robber," by way of similarity, because he devises fitting ways of committing robbery. This is the prudence of which the Apostle + says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q47_A13-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.6" target="asv">Rom. 8:6</a>): "The prudence [Douay: 'wisdom'] of the flesh is death," because, to wit, it places its ultimate end in the pleasures of + the flesh. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A13-p7"> The second prudence is indeed true prudence, because it devises fitting ways of obtaining a good end; and yet it is imperfect, + from a twofold source. First, because the good which it takes for an end, is not the common end of all human life, but of + some particular affair; thus when a man devises fitting ways of conducting business or of sailing a ship, he is called a prudent + businessman, or a prudent sailor; secondly, because he fails in the chief act of prudence, as when a man + takes counsel aright, and forms a good judgment, even about things concerning life as a whole, but fails to make an effective + command. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A13-p8"> The third prudence is both true and perfect, for it takes counsel, judges and commands aright in respect of the good end + of man's whole life: and this alone is prudence simply so-called, and cannot be in sinners, whereas the first prudence is + in sinners alone, while imperfect prudence is common to good and wicked men, especially that which is imperfect through being + directed to a particular end, since that which is imperfect on account of a failing in the chief act, is only in + the wicked. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A13-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This saying of our Lord is to be understood of the first prudence, wherefore it is not said that they are prudent absolutely, + but that they are prudent in "their generation." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A13-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The nature of faith consists not in conformity with the appetite for certain right actions, but in knowledge alone. On the + other hand prudence implies a relation to a right appetite. First because its principles are the ends in matters of action; + and of such ends one forms a right estimate through the habits of moral virtue, which rectify the appetite: wherefore without + the moral virtues there is no prudence, as shown above ( + <a id="SS_Q47_A13-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q58_A5.html">FS, + Q[58], A[5] + </a>); secondly because prudence commands right actions, which does not happen unless the appetite be right. Wherefore though + faith on account of its object is more excellent than prudence, yet prudence, by its very nature, is more opposed to sin, + which arises from a disorder of the appetite. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A13-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sinners can take good counsel for an evil end, or for some particular good, but they do not perfectly take good counsel for + the end of their whole life, since they do not carry that counsel into effect. Hence they lack prudence which is directed + to the good only; and yet in them, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12) there is "cleverness," [*{deinotike}] i.e. + natural diligence which may be directed to both good and evil; or "cunning," + [*{panourgia}] which is directed only to evil, and which we have stated above, to be "false prudence" or "prudence of the + flesh." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A13-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A13-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A12.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A14.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q47_A14" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A13.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A15.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q47_A14-p0.1">Whether prudence is in all who have grace?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q47_A14-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A14-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prudence is not in all who have grace. Prudence requires diligence, that one may foresee aright what has + to be done. But many who have grace have not this diligence. Therefore not all who have grace have prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A14-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a prudent man is one who takes good counsel, as stated above (A[8], OBJ[2]; A[13], OBJ[3]). Yet many have grace + who do not take good counsel, and need to be guided by the counsel of others. Therefore not all who have grace, have prudence + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A14-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that "young people are not obviously prudent." Yet many young people have grace. + Therefore prudence is not to be found in all who have grace. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A14-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> No man has grace unless he be virtuous. Now no man can be virtuous without prudence, for Gregory says (Moral. ii, 46) that + "the other virtues cannot be virtues at all unless they effect prudently what they desire to accomplish." Therefore all who + have grace have prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A14-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The virtues must needs be connected together, so that whoever has one has all, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q47_A14-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">FS, Q[65], A[1]</a>). Now whoever has grace has charity, so that he must needs have all the other virtues, and hence, since prudence is a virtue, + as shown above + <a id="SS_Q47_A14-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, he must, of necessity, have prudence also. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A14-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Diligence is twofold: one is merely sufficient with regard to things necessary for salvation; and such diligence is given + to all who have grace, whom "His unction teacheth of all things" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q47_A14-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.27" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:27</a>). There is also another diligence which is more than sufficient, whereby a man is able to make provision both for himself + and for others, not only in matters necessary for salvation, but also in all things relating to human life; and + such diligence as this is not in all who have grace. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A14-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who require to be guided by the counsel of others, are able, if they have grace, to take counsel for themselves in + this point at least, that they require the counsel of others and can discern good from evil counsel. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A14-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Acquired prudence is caused by the exercise of acts, wherefore "its acquisition demands experience and time" (Ethic. ii, + 1), hence it cannot be in the young, neither in habit nor in act. On the other hand gratuitous prudence is caused by divine + infusion. Wherefore, in children who have been baptized but have not come to the use of reason, there is prudence as to habit + but not as to act, even as in idiots; whereas in those who have come to the use of + reason, it is also as to act, with regard to things necessary for salvation. This by practice merits increase, until it becomes + perfect, even as the other virtues. Hence the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q47_A14-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.5.14" target="asv">Heb. 5:14</a>) that "strong meat is for the perfect, for them who by custom have their senses exercised to the discerning of good and evil." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A14-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A14-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A13.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A15.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q47_A15" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A14.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A16.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q47_A15-p0.1">Whether prudence is in us by nature?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q47_A15-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A15-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prudence is in us by nature. The Philosopher says that things connected with prudence "seem to be natural," + namely "synesis, gnome" [*{synesis} and {gnome}, Cf. + <a id="SS_Q47_A15-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A6.html">FS, Q[57], A[6]</a>] and the like, but not those which are connected with speculative wisdom. Now things belonging to the same genus have the + same kind of origin. Therefore prudence also is in us from nature. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A15-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the changes of age are according to nature. Now prudence results from age, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q47_A15-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Job.12.12" target="asv"> Job 12:12</a>: "In the ancient is wisdom, and in length of days prudence." Therefore prudence is natural. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A15-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prudence is more consistent with human nature than with that of dumb animals. Now there are instances of a certain + natural prudence in dumb animals, according to the Philosopher (De Hist. Anim. viii, 1). Therefore prudence is natural. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A15-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual virtue is both originated and fostered by teaching; it therefore demands + experience and time." Now prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q47_A15-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. Therefore prudence is in us, not by nature, but by teaching and experience. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A15-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As shown above + <a id="SS_Q47_A15-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, prudence includes knowledge both of universals, and of the singular matters of action to which prudence applies the universal + principles. Accordingly, as regards the knowledge of universals, the same is to be said of prudence as of speculative science, + because the primary universal principles of either are known naturally, as shown above + <a id="SS_Q47_A15-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A6.html">(A[6])</a>: except that the common principles of + prudence are more connatural to man; for as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 7) "the life which is according to the speculative + reason is better than that which is according to man": whereas the secondary universal principles, whether of the speculative + or of the practical reason, are not inherited from nature, but are acquired by discovery through experience, or through teaching. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A15-p7"> On the other hand, as regards the knowledge of particulars which are the matter of action, we must make a further distinction, + because this matter of action is either an end or the means to an end. Now the right ends of human life are fixed; wherefore + there can be a natural inclination in respect of these ends; thus it has been stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q47_A15-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q51_A1.html">FS, Q[51], A[1]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q47_A15-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q63_A1.html">FS, Q[63], A[1]</a>) that some, from a natural inclination, have certain + virtues whereby they are inclined to right ends; and consequently they also have naturally a right judgment about such like + ends. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A15-p8"> But the means to the end, in human concerns, far from being fixed, are of manifold variety according to the variety of persons + and affairs. Wherefore since the inclination of nature is ever to something fixed, the knowledge of those means cannot be + in man naturally, although, by reason of his natural disposition, one man has a greater aptitude than another in discerning + them, just as it happens with regard to the conclusions of speculative sciences. Since then prudence is not + about the ends, but about the means, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q47_A15-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A6.html">(A[6];</a> + <a id="SS_Q47_A15-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A5.html">FS, Q[57], A[5]</a>), it follows that prudence is not from nature. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A15-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking there of things relating to prudence, in so far as they are directed to ends. Wherefore he had + said before (Ethic. vi, 5,11) that "they are the principles of the {ou heneka}" [*Literally, 'for the sake of which' (are + the means)], namely, the end; and so he does not mention {euboulia} among them, because it takes counsel about the means. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A15-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Prudence is rather in the old, not only because their natural disposition calms the movement of the sensitive passions, but + also because of their long experience. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A15-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even in dumb animals there are fixed ways of obtaining an end, wherefore we observe that all the animals of a same species + act in like manner. But this is impossible in man, on account of his reason, which takes cognizance of universals, and consequently + extends to an infinity of singulars. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A15-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A15-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A14.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A16.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q47_A16" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A15.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q48.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q47_A16-p0.1">Whether prudence can be lost through forgetfulness?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q47_A16-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A16-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prudence can be lost through forgetfulness. For since science is about necessary things, it is more certain + than prudence which is about contingent matters of action. But science is lost by forgetfulness. Much more therefore is prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A16-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) "the same things, but by a contrary process, engender and corrupt virtue." + Now the engendering of prudence requires experience which is made up "of many memories," as he states at the beginning of + his Metaphysics (i, 1). Therefore since forgetfulness is contrary to memory, it seems that prudence can be lost through forgetfulness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A16-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there is no prudence without knowledge of universals. But knowledge of universals can be lost through forgetfulness. + Therefore prudence can also. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A16-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "forgetfulness is possible to art but not to prudence." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A16-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Forgetfulness regards knowledge only, wherefore one can forget art and science, so as to lose them altogether, because they + belong to the reason. But prudence consists not in knowledge alone, but also in an act of the appetite, because as stated + above + <a id="SS_Q47_A16-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A8.html">(A[8])</a>, its principal act is one of command, whereby a man applies the knowledge he has, to the purpose of appetition and operation. + Hence prudence is not taken away directly by + forgetfulness, but rather is corrupted by the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "pleasure and sorrow + pervert the estimate of prudence": wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q47_A16-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.13.56" target="asv">Dan. 13:56</a>): "Beauty hath deceived thee, and lust hath subverted thy heart," and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q47_A16-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.8" target="asv">Ex. 23:8</a>): "Neither shalt thou take bribes which blind even the prudent [Douay: 'wise']." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A16-p7"> Nevertheless forgetfulness may hinder prudence, in so far as the latter's command depends on knowledge which may be forgotten.</p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A16-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Science is in the reason only: hence the comparison fails, as stated above [*Cf. + <a id="SS_Q47_A16-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q53_A1.html">FS, Q[53], A[1]</a>]. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A16-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The experience required by prudence results not from memory alone, but also from the practice of commanding aright. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A16-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prudence consists chiefly, not in the knowledge of universals, but in applying them to action, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q47_A16-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Wherefore forgetting the knowledge of universals does not destroy the principal part of prudence, but hinders it somewhat, + as stated above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A16-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q47_A16-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A15.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q48.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS.ii.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q48" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A16.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q48_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q48-p0.1">OF THE PARTS OF PRUDENCE (ONE ARTICLE)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q48-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q48-p2"> We must now consider the parts of prudence, under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q48-p3"> (1) Which are the parts of prudence?</p> + <p id="SS_Q48-p4"> (2) Of its integral parts;</p> + <p id="SS_Q48-p5"> (3) Of its subjective parts;</p> + <p id="SS_Q48-p6"> (4) Of its potential parts.</p> + <div id="SS_Q48_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q48.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q48_A1-p0.1">Whether three parts of prudence are fittingly assigned?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q48_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q48_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the parts of prudence are assigned unfittingly. Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) assigns three parts of + prudence, namely, "memory," "understanding" and "foresight." Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i) following the opinion of Plotinus + ascribes to prudence six parts, namely, "reasoning," "understanding," "circumspection," "foresight," "docility" and "caution." + Aristotle says (Ethic. vi, 9,10,11) that "good counsel," "synesis" and "gnome" belong to + prudence. Again under the head of prudence he mentions "conjecture," "shrewdness," "sense" and "understanding." And another + Greek philosopher [*Andronicus; Cf. Q[80], OBJ[4]] says that ten things are connected with prudence, namely, "good counsel," + "shrewdness," "foresight," "regnative [*Regnativa]," "military," "political" and "domestic prudence," "dialectics," "rhetoric" + and "physics." Therefore it seems that one or the other enumeration is either excessive or deficient. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q48_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, prudence is specifically distinct from science. But politics, economics, logic, rhetoric, physics are sciences. + Therefore they are not parts of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q48_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the parts do not exceed the whole. Now the intellective memory or intelligence, reason, sense and docility, belong + not only to prudence but also to all the cognitive habits. Therefore they should not be set down as parts of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q48_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as counselling, judging and commanding are acts of the practical reason, so also is using, as stated above + ( + <a id="SS_Q48_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q16_A1.html">FS, Q[16], A[1]</a> ). Therefore, just as "eubulia" which refers to counsel, is connected with prudence, and "synesis" and "gnome" which refer + to judgment, so also ought something to have been assigned corresponding to use. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q48_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, solicitude pertains to prudence, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q48_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A9.html">Q[47], A[9]</a>). Therefore solicitude also should have been mentioned among the parts of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q48_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Parts are of three kinds, namely, "integral," as wall, roof, and foundations are parts of a house; "subjective," as ox and + lion are parts of animal; and "potential," as the nutritive and sensitive powers are parts of the soul. Accordingly, parts + can be assigned to a virtue in three ways. First, in likeness to integral parts, so that the things which need to concur for + the perfect act of a virtue, are called the parts of that virtue. In this way, out of all + the things mentioned above, eight may be taken as parts of prudence, namely, the six assigned by Macrobius; with the addition + of a seventh, viz. "memory" mentioned by Tully; and {eustochia} or "shrewdness" mentioned by Aristotle. For the "sense" of + prudence is also called "understanding": wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11): "Of such things one needs to have + the sense, and this is understanding." Of these eight, five belong to prudence as a cognitive virtue, namely, "memory," + "reasoning," "understanding," "docility" and "shrewdness": while the three others belong thereto, as commanding and applying + knowledge to action, namely, "foresight," "circumspection" and "caution." The reason of their difference is seen from the + fact that three things may be observed in reference to knowledge. In the first place, knowledge itself, which, if it be of + the past, is called "memory," if of the present, whether contingent or necessary, is called "understanding" or "intelligence." + Secondly, the acquiring of knowledge, which is caused either by teaching, to which pertains "docility," or by "discovery," + and to this belongs to {eustochia}, i.e. "a happy conjecture," of which "shrewdness" is a part, which is a "quick conjecture + of the middle term," as stated in Poster. i, 9. Thirdly, the use of knowledge, in as much as we proceed from things known + to knowledge or judgment of other things, and this belongs to "reasoning." And the reason, in order to command aright, requires + to have three conditions. First, to order that which is befitting the end, and this belongs to "foresight"; secondly, to attend + to the circumstances of the matter in hand, and this belongs to "circumspection"; thirdly, to avoid obstacles, and this belongs + to "caution." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q48_A1-p8"> The subjective parts of a virtue are its various species. In this way the parts of prudence, if we take them properly, are + the prudence whereby a man rules himself, and the prudence whereby a man governs a multitude, which differ specifically as + stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q48_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A11.html">Q[47], A[11]</a>). Again, the prudence whereby a multitude is governed, is divided into various species according to the various kinds of + multitude. There is the multitude which is united together for + some particular purpose; thus an army is gathered together to fight, and the prudence that governs this is called "military." + There is also the multitude that is united together for the whole of life; such is the multitude of a home or family, and + this is ruled by "domestic prudence": and such again is the multitude of a city or kingdom, the ruling principle of which + is "regnative prudence" in the ruler, and "political prudence," simply so called, in the subjects. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q48_A1-p9"> If, however, prudence be taken in a wide sense, as including also speculative knowledge, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q48_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A2.html">Q[47], A[2]</a>, ad 2) then its parts include "dialectics," "rhetoric" and "physics," according to three methods of prudence in the sciences. + The first of these is the attaining of science by demonstration, which belongs to "physics" (if physics be understood to comprise + all demonstrative sciences). The second method is to arrive at an opinion through + probable premises, and this belongs to "dialectics." The third method is to employ conjectures in order to induce a certain + suspicion, or to persuade somewhat, and this belongs to "rhetoric." It may be said, however, that these three belong also + to prudence properly so called, since it argues sometimes from necessary premises, sometimes from probabilities, and sometimes + from conjectures. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q48_A1-p10"> The potential parts of a virtue are the virtues connected with it, which are directed to certain secondary acts or matters, + not having, as it were, the whole power of the principal virtue. In this way the parts of prudence are "good counsel," which + concerns counsel, "synesis," which concerns judgment in matters of ordinary occurrence, and "gnome," which concerns judgment + in matters of exception to the law: while "prudence" is about the chief act, viz. that of commanding. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q48_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The various enumerations differ, either because different kinds of parts are assigned, or because that which is mentioned + in one enumeration includes several mentioned in another enumeration. Thus Tully includes "caution" and "circumspection" under + "foresight," and "reasoning," "docility" and "shrewdness" under "understanding." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q48_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Here domestic and civic prudence are not to be taken as sciences, but as kinds of prudence. As to the other three, the reply + may be gathered from what has been said. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q48_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All these things are reckoned parts of prudence, not by taking them altogether, but in so far as they are connected with + things pertaining to prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q48_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Right command and right use always go together, because the reason's command is followed by obedience on the part of the + lower powers, which pertain to use. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q48_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Solicitude is included under foresight. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q48_A1-p16"></p> + <p id="SS_Q48_A1-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q48.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47_A16.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q48_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q49" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q48_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q49-p0.1">OF EACH QUASI-INTEGRAL PART OF PRUDENCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q49-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q49-p2"> We must now consider each quasi-integral part of prudence, and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q49-p3"> (1) Memory;</p> + <p id="SS_Q49-p4"> (2) Understanding or Intelligence;</p> + <p id="SS_Q49-p5"> (3) Docility;</p> + <p id="SS_Q49-p6"> (4) Shrewdness;</p> + <p id="SS_Q49-p7"> (5) Reason;</p> + <p id="SS_Q49-p8"> (6) Foresight;</p> + <p id="SS_Q49-p9"> (7) Circumspection;</p> + <p id="SS_Q49-p10"> (8) Caution.</p> + <div id="SS_Q49_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q49_A1-p0.1">Whether memory is a part of prudence?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q49_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that memory is not a part of prudence. For memory, as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. i), is in + the sensitive part of the soul: whereas prudence is in the rational part (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore memory is not a part of + prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, prudence is acquired and perfected by experience, whereas memory is in us from nature. Therefore memory is not a + part of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, memory regards the past, whereas prudence regards future matters of action, about which counsel is concerned, as + stated in Ethic. vi, 2,7. Therefore memory is not a part of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) places memory among the parts of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Prudence regards contingent matters of action, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q49_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A5.html">Q[47], A[5]</a>). Now in such like matters a man can be directed, not by those things that are simply and necessarily true, but by those + which occur in the majority of cases: because principles must be proportionate to their conclusions, and "like must be concluded + from like" (Ethic. vi [*Anal. Post. i. 32]). But we need experience to discover what is true in the majority of + cases: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual virtue is engendered and fostered by experience and + time." Now experience is the result of many memories as stated in Metaph. i, 1, and therefore prudence requires the memory + of many things. Hence memory is fittingly accounted a part of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q49_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A3.html">Q[47], AA[3]</a>,6), prudence applies universal knowledge to particulars which are objects of sense: hence many things belonging to the sensitive + faculties are requisite for prudence, and memory is one of them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as aptitude for prudence is in our nature, while its perfection comes through practice or grace, so too, as Tully says + in his Rhetoric [*Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii, 16,24], memory not only arises from nature, but is also aided by art and diligence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A1-p9"> There are four things whereby a man perfects his memory. First, when a man wishes to remember a thing, he should take some + suitable yet somewhat unwonted illustration of it, since the unwonted strikes us more, and so makes a greater and stronger + impression on the mind; the mind; and this explains why we remember better what we saw when we were children. Now the reason + for the necessity of finding these illustrations or images, is that simple and spiritual impressions easily slip + from the mind, unless they be tied as it were to some corporeal image, because human knowledge has a greater hold on sensible + objects. For this reason memory is assigned to the sensitive part of the soul. Secondly, whatever a man wishes to retain in + his memory he must carefully consider and set in order, so that he may pass easily from one memory to another. Hence the Philosopher + says (De Memor. et Remin. ii): "Sometimes a place brings memories back to us: the reason being that we pass quickly + from the one to the other." Thirdly, we must be anxious and earnest about the things we wish to remember, because the more + a thing is impressed on the mind, the less it is liable to slip out of it. Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric [*Ad Herenn. + de Arte Rhet. iii.] that "anxiety preserves the figures of images entire." Fourthly, we should often reflect on the things + we wish to remember. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memoria i) that "reflection preserves memories," because as he remarks + (De + Memoria ii) "custom is a second nature": wherefore when we reflect on a thing frequently, we quickly call it to mind, through + passing from one thing to another by a kind of natural order. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It behooves us to argue, as it were, about the future from the past; wherefore memory of the past is necessary in order to + take good counsel for the future. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q49_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q49_A2-p0.1">Whether understanding* is a part of prudence? [*Otherwise intuition; Aristotle's word is {nous}]</h4> + <p id="SS_Q49_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that understanding is not a part of prudence. When two things are members of a division, one is not part of + the other. But intellectual virtue is divided into understanding and prudence, according to Ethic. vi, 3. Therefore understanding + should not be reckoned a part of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, understanding is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, and corresponds to faith, as stated above (Q[8], AA[1],8). + But prudence is a virtue other than faith, as is clear from what has been said above (Q[4], A[8]; + <a id="SS_Q49_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A2.html">FS, Q[62], A[2]</a>). Therefore understanding does not pertain to prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prudence is about singular matters of action (Ethic. vi, 7): whereas understanding takes cognizance of universal + and immaterial objects (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore understanding is not a part of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully [*De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53] accounts "intelligence" a part of prudence, and Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] mentions + "understanding," which comes to the same. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Understanding denotes here, not the intellectual power, but the right estimate about some final principle, which is taken + as self-evident: thus we are said to understand the first principles of demonstrations. Now every deduction of reason proceeds + from certain statements which are taken as primary: wherefore every process of reasoning must needs proceed from some understanding. + Therefore since prudence is right reason applied to action, the whole process of + prudence must needs have its source in understanding. Hence it is that understanding is reckoned a part of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The reasoning of prudence terminates, as in a conclusion, in the particular matter of action, to which, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q49_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A3.html">Q[47], AA[3]</a>,6), it applies the knowledge of some universal principle. Now a singular conclusion is argued from a universal and a singular + proposition. Wherefore the reasoning of prudence must proceed from a twofold understanding. The one is cognizant of universals, + and this belongs to the understanding + which is an intellectual virtue, whereby we know naturally not only speculative principles, but also practical universal principles, + such as "One should do evil to no man," as shown above ( + <a id="SS_Q49_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A6.html">Q[47], A[6]</a>). The other understanding, as stated in Ethic. vi, 11, is cognizant of an extreme, i.e. of some primary singular and contingent + practical matter, viz. the minor premiss, which must needs be singular in the syllogism of prudence, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q49_A2-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A3.html">Q[47], + AA[3] + </a>,6). Now this primary singular is some singular end, as stated in the same place. Wherefore the understanding which is a part + of prudence is a right estimate of some particular end. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, is a quick insight into divine things, as shown above ( + <a id="SS_Q49_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q8_A1.html">Q[8], AA[1]</a>,2). It is in another sense that it is accounted a part of prudence, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The right estimate about a particular end is called both "understanding," in so far as its object is a principle, and "sense," + in so far as its object is a particular. This is what the Philosopher means when he says (Ethic. v, 11): "Of such things we + need to have the sense, and this is understanding." But this is to be understood as referring, not to the particular sense + whereby we know proper sensibles, but to the interior sense, whereby we judge of + a particular. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q49_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q49_A3-p0.1">Whether docility should be accounted a part of prudence?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q49_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that docility should not be accounted a part of prudence. For that which is a necessary condition of every + intellectual virtue, should not be appropriated to one of them. But docility is requisite for every intellectual virtue. Therefore + it should not be accounted a part of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which pertains to a human virtue is in our power, since it is for things that are in our power that we are + praised or blamed. Now it is not in our power to be docile, for this is befitting to some through their natural disposition. + Therefore it is not a part of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, docility is in the disciple: whereas prudence, since it makes precepts, seems rather to belong to teachers, who + are also called "preceptors." Therefore docility is not a part of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] following the opinion of Plotinus places docility among the parts of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[2], ad 1; + <a id="SS_Q49_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A3.html"> Q[47], A[3]</a>) prudence is concerned with particular matters of action, and since such matters are of infinite variety, no one man can + consider them all sufficiently; nor can this be done quickly, for it requires length of time. Hence in matters of prudence + man stands in very great need of being taught by others, especially by old folk who have acquired a sane understanding of + the ends in practical matters. + Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11): "It is right to pay no less attention to the undemonstrated assertions and + opinions of such persons as are experienced, older than we are, and prudent, than to their demonstrations, for their experience + gives them an insight into principles." Thus it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q49_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.5" target="asv">Prov. 3:5</a>): "Lean not on thy own prudence," and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q49_A3-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Sir.6.35" target="asv">Ecclus. 6:35</a>): "Stand in the multitude of the ancients" (i.e. the old men), "that are wise, and + join thyself from thy heart to their wisdom." Now it is a mark of docility to be ready to be taught: and consequently docility + is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although docility is useful for every intellectual virtue, yet it belongs to prudence chiefly, for the reason given above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man has a natural aptitude for docility even as for other things connected with prudence. Yet his own efforts count for much + towards the attainment of perfect docility: and he must carefully, frequently and reverently apply his mind to the teachings + of the learned, neither neglecting them through laziness, nor despising them through pride. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> By prudence man makes precepts not only for others, but also for himself, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q49_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A12.html">Q[47], A[12]</a>, ad 3). Hence as stated (Ethic. vi, 11), even in subjects, there is place for prudence; to which docility pertains. And yet + even the learned should be docile in some respects, since no man is altogether self-sufficient in matters of prudence, as + stated above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q49_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q49_A4-p0.1">Whether shrewdness is part of prudence?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q49_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that shrewdness is not a part of prudence. For shrewdness consists in easily finding the middle term for demonstrations, + as stated in Poster. i, 34. Now the reasoning of prudence is not a demonstration since it deals with contingencies. Therefore + shrewdness does not pertain to prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good counsel pertains to prudence according to Ethic. vi, 5,7,9. Now there is no place in good counsel for shrewdness + [*Ethic. vi, 9; Poster. i, 34] which is a kind of {eustochia}, i.e. "a happy conjecture": for the latter is "unreasoning and + rapid," whereas counsel needs to be slow, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9. Therefore shrewdness should not be accounted a part of + prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, shrewdness as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q49_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q48.html">Q[48])</a> is a "happy conjecture." Now it belongs to rhetoricians to make use of conjectures. Therefore shrewdness belongs to rhetoric + rather than to prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (Etym. x): "A solicitous man is one who is shrewd and alert [solers citus]." But solicitude belongs to prudence, + as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q49_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A9.html">Q[47], A[9]</a>). Therefore shrewdness does also. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Prudence consists in a right estimate about matters of action. Now a right estimate or opinion is acquired in two ways, both + in practical and in speculative matters, first by discovering it oneself, secondly by learning it from others. Now just as + docility consists in a man being well disposed to acquire a right opinion from another man, so shrewdness is an apt disposition + to acquire a right estimate by oneself, yet so that shrewdness be taken for + {eustochia}, of which it is a part. For {eustochia} is a happy conjecture about any matter, while shrewdness is "an easy and + rapid conjecture in finding the middle term" (Poster. i, 34). Nevertheless the philosopher [*Andronicus; Cf. Q[48], OBJ[1]] + who calls shrewdness a part of prudence, takes it for {eustochia}, in general, hence he says: "Shrewdness is a habit whereby + congruities are discovered rapidly." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Shrewdness is concerned with the discovery of the middle term not only in demonstrative, but also in practical syllogisms, + as, for instance, when two men are seen to be friends they are reckoned to be enemies of a third one, as the Philosopher says + (Poster. i, 34). In this way shrewdness belongs to prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Philosopher adduces the true reason (Ethic. vi, 9) to prove that {euboulia}, i.e. good counsel, is not {eustochia}, which + is commended for grasping quickly what should be done. Now a man may take good counsel, though he be long and slow in so doing, + and yet this does not discount the utility of a happy conjecture in taking good counsel: indeed it is sometimes a necessity, + when, for instance, something has to be done without warning. It is for this + reason that shrewdness is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Rhetoric also reasons about practical matters, wherefore nothing hinders the same thing belonging both to rhetoric and prudence. + Nevertheless, conjecture is taken here not only in the sense in which it is employed by rhetoricians, but also as applicable + to all matters whatsoever wherein man is said to conjecture the truth. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q49_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q49_A5-p0.1">Whether reason should be reckoned a part of prudence?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q49_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For the subject of an accident is not a part thereof. + But prudence is in the reason as its subject (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is common to many, should not be reckoned a part of any one of them; or if it be so reckoned, it should + be reckoned a part of that one to which it chiefly belongs. Now reason is necessary in all the intellectual virtues, and chiefly + in wisdom and science, which employ a demonstrative reason. Therefore reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, reason as a power does not differ essentially from the intelligence, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q49_A5-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A8.html">FP, Q[79], A[8]</a>). If therefore intelligence be reckoned a part of prudence, it is superfluous to add reason. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i], following the opinion of Plotinus, numbers reason among the parts of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The work of prudence is to take good counsel, as stated in Ethic. vi, 7. Now counsel is a research proceeding from certain + things to others. But this is the work of reason. Wherefore it is requisite for prudence that man should be an apt reasoner. + And since the things required for the perfection of prudence are called requisite or quasi-integral parts of prudence, it + follows that reason should be numbered among these parts. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reason denotes here, not the power of reason, but its good use. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The certitude of reason comes from the intellect. Yet the need of reason is from a defect in the intellect, since those things + in which the intellective power is in full vigor, have no need for reason, for they comprehend the truth by their simple insight, + as do God and the angels. On the other hand particular matters of action, wherein prudence guides, are very far from the condition + of things intelligible, and so much the farther, as they are less + certain and fixed. Thus matters of art, though they are singular, are nevertheless more fixed and certain, wherefore in many + of them there is no room for counsel on account of their certitude, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Hence, although in certain + other intellectual virtues reason is more certain than in prudence, yet prudence above all requires that man be an apt reasoner, + so that he may rightly apply universals to particulars, which latter are various and uncertain. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although intelligence and reason are not different powers, yet they are named after different acts. For intelligence takes + its name from being an intimate penetration of the truth [*Cf. + <a id="SS_Q49_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q8_A1.html">SS, Q[8], A[1]</a>], while reason is so called from being inquisitive and discursive. Hence each is accounted a part of reason as explained + above + <a id="SS_Q49_A5-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q49_A2.html">(A[2];</a> Q[47], A[2] ,3). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q49_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q49_A6-p0.1">Whether foresight* should be accounted a part of prudence? [*"Providentia," which may be translated either "providence" or + "foresight."] + </h4> + <p id="SS_Q49_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that foresight should not be accounted a part of prudence. For nothing is part of itself. Now foresight seems + to be the same as prudence, because according to Isidore (Etym. x), "a prudent man is one who sees from afar [porro videns]": + and this is also the derivation of "providentia [foresight]," according to Boethius (De Consol. v). Therefore foresight is + not a part of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, prudence is only practical, whereas foresight may be also speculative, because "seeing," whence we have the word + "to foresee," has more to do with speculation than operation. Therefore foresight is not a part of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the chief act of prudence is to command, while its secondary act is to judge and to take counsel. But none of these + seems to be properly implied by foresight. Therefore foresight is not part of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A6-p5"> On the contrary stands the authority of Tully and Macrobius, who number foresight among the parts of prudence, as stated + above ( + <a id="SS_Q49_A6-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q48.html">Q[48])</a>. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q49_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A1.html">Q[47], A[1]</a>, ad 2, AA[6],13), prudence is properly about the means to an end, and its proper work is to set them in due order to the + end. And although certain things are necessary for an end, which are subject to divine providence, yet nothing is subject + to human providence except the contingent matters of actions which can be done by man for an end. Now the past has become + a kind of necessity, since what has been + done cannot be undone. In like manner, the present as such, has a kind of necessity, since it is necessary that Socrates sit, + so long as he sits. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A6-p7"> Consequently, future contingents, in so far as they can be directed by man to the end of human life, are the matter of prudence: + and each of these things is implied in the word foresight, for it implies the notion of something distant, to which that which + occurs in the present has to be directed. Therefore foresight is part of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Whenever many things are requisite for a unity, one of them must needs be the principal to which all the others are subordinate. + Hence in every whole one part must be formal and predominant, whence the whole has unity. Accordingly foresight is the principal + of all the parts of prudence, since whatever else is required for prudence, is necessary precisely that some particular thing + may be rightly directed to its end. Hence it is that the very name of + prudence is taken from foresight [providentia] as from its principal part. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Speculation is about universal and necessary things, which, in themselves, are not distant, since they are everywhere and + always, though they are distant from us, in so far as we fail to know them. Hence foresight does not apply properly to speculative, + but only to practical matters. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Right order to an end which is included in the notion of foresight, contains rectitude of counsel, judgment and command, + without which no right order to the end is possible. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A6-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A6-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q49_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q49_A7-p0.1">Whether circumspection can be a part of prudence?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q49_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that circumspection cannot be a part of prudence. For circumspection seems to signify looking at one's surroundings. + But these are of infinite number, and cannot be considered by the reason wherein is prudence. Therefore circumspection should + not be reckoned a part of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, circumstances seem to be the concern of moral virtues rather than of prudence. But circumspection seems to denote + nothing but attention to circumstances. Therefore circumspection apparently belongs to the moral virtues rather than to prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever can see things afar off can much more see things that are near. Now foresight enables a man to look on distant + things. Therefore there is no need to account circumspection a part of prudence in addition to foresight. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A7-p5"> On the contrary stands the authority of Macrobius, quoted above ( + <a id="SS_Q49_A7-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q48.html">Q[48])</a>. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q49_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q49_A6.html">(A[6])</a>, it belongs to prudence chiefly to direct something aright to an end; and this is not done aright unless both the end be + good, and the means good and suitable. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A7-p7"> Since, however, prudence, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q49_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A3.html">Q[47], A[3]</a>) is about singular matters of action, which contain many combinations of circumstances, it happens that a thing is good in + itself and suitable to the end, and nevertheless becomes evil or unsuitable to the end, by reason of some combination of circumstances. + Thus to show signs of love to someone seems, considered in itself, to be a fitting way to arouse love in his heart, yet if + pride or suspicion of + flattery arise in his heart, it will no longer be a means suitable to the end. Hence the need of circumspection in prudence, + viz. of comparing the means with the circumstances. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Though the number of possible circumstances be infinite, the number of actual circumstances is not; and the judgment of reason + in matters of action is influenced by things which are few in number + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Circumstances are the concern of prudence, because prudence has to fix them; on the other hand they are the concern of moral + virtues, in so far as moral virtues are perfected by the fixing of circumstances. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as it belongs to foresight to look on that which is by its nature suitable to an end, so it belongs to circumspection + to consider whether it be suitable to the end in view of the circumstances. Now each of these presents a difficulty of its + own, and therefore each is reckoned a distinct part of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A7-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A7-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q49_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q50.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q49_A8-p0.1">Whether caution should be reckoned a part of prudence?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q49_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that caution should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For when no evil is possible, no caution is required. + Now no man makes evil use of virtue, as Augustine declares (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore caution does not belong to prudence + which directs the virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to foresee good and to avoid evil belong to the same faculty, just as the same art gives health and cures ill-health. + Now it belongs to foresight to foresee good, and consequently, also to avoid evil. Therefore caution should not be accounted + a part of prudence, distinct from foresight. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no prudent man strives for the impossible. But no man can take precautions against all possible evils. Therefore + caution does not belong to prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q49_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.15" target="asv">Eph. 5:15</a>): "See how you walk cautiously [Douay: 'circumspectly']." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The things with which prudence is concerned, are contingent matters of action, wherein, even as false is found with true, + so is evil mingled with good, on account of the great variety of these matters of action, wherein good is often hindered by + evil, and evil has the appearance of good. Wherefore prudence needs caution, so that we may have such a grasp of good as to + avoid evil. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Caution is required in moral acts, that we may be on our guard, not against acts of virtue, but against the hindrance of + acts of virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is the same in idea, to ensue good and to avoid the opposite evil, but the avoidance of outward hindrances is different + in idea. Hence caution differs from foresight, although they both belong to the one virtue of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Of the evils which man has to avoid, some are of frequent occurrence; the like can be grasped by reason, and against them + caution is directed, either that they may be avoided altogether, or that they may do less harm. Others there are that occur + rarely and by chance, and these, since they are infinite in number, cannot be grasped by reason, nor is man able to take precautions + against them, although by exercising prudence he is able to prepare against + all the surprises of chance, so as to suffer less harm thereby. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A8-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q49_A8-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q50.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q48_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q50" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q50_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q50-p0.1">OF THE SUBJECTIVE PARTS OF PRUDENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q50-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q50-p2"> We must, in due sequence, consider the subjective parts of prudence. And since we have already spoken of the prudence with + which a man rules himself (Q[47], seqq.), it remains for us to discuss the species of prudence whereby a multitude is governed. + Under this head there are four points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50-p3"> (1) Whether a species of prudence is regnative?</p> + <p id="SS_Q50-p4"> (2) Whether political and (3) domestic economy are species of prudence?</p> + <p id="SS_Q50-p5"> (4) Whether military prudence is?</p> + <div id="SS_Q50_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q50.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q50_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q50_A1-p0.1">Whether a species of prudence is regnative?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q50_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that regnative should not be reckoned a species of prudence. For regnative prudence is directed to the preservation + of justice, since according to Ethic. v, 6 the prince is the guardian of justice. Therefore regnative prudence belongs to + justice rather than to prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 5) a kingdom [regnum] is one of six species of government. But no species + of prudence is ascribed to the other five forms of government, which are "aristocracy," "polity," also called "timocracy" + [*Cf. Ethic. viii, 10], "tyranny," "oligarchy" and "democracy." Therefore neither should a regnative species be ascribed to + a kingdom. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, lawgiving belongs not only to kings, but also to certain others placed in authority, and even to the people, according + to Isidore (Etym. v). Now the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) reckons a part of prudence to be "legislative." Therefore it is not + becoming to substitute regnative prudence in its place. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 11) that "prudence is a virtue which is proper to the prince." Therefore a special kind + of prudence is regnative. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q50_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A8.html">Q[47], AA[8]</a>,10), it belongs to prudence to govern and command, so that wherever in human acts we find a special kind of governance and + command, there must be a special kind of prudence. Now it is evident that there is a special and perfect kind of governance + in one who has to govern not only himself but also the perfect community of a city or kingdom; because a government is the + more perfect according as it is more + universal, extends to more matters, and attains a higher end. Hence prudence in its special and most perfect sense, belongs + to a king who is charged with the government of a city or kingdom: for which reason a species of prudence is reckoned to be + regnative. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All matters connected with moral virtue belong to prudence as their guide, wherefore "right reason in accord with prudence" + is included in the definition of moral virtue, as stated above (Q[47], A[5], ad 1; + <a id="SS_Q50_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q58_A2.html">FS, Q[58], A[2]</a>, ad 4). For this reason also the execution of justice in so far as it is directed to the common good, which is part of the + kingly office, needs the guidance of prudence. Hence these two virtues---prudence + and justice---belong most properly to a king, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q50_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.23.5" target="asv"> Jer. 23:5</a>: "A king shall reign and shall be wise, and shall execute justice and judgment in the earth." Since, however, direction belongs + rather to the king, and execution to his subjects, regnative prudence is reckoned a species of prudence which is directive, + rather than to justice which is executive. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A kingdom is the best of all governments, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10: wherefore the species of prudence should be denominated + rather from a kingdom, yet so as to comprehend under regnative all other rightful forms of government, but not perverse forms + which are opposed to virtue, and which, accordingly, do not pertain to prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher names regnative prudence after the principal act of a king which is to make laws, and although this applies + to the other forms of government, this is only in so far as they have a share of kingly government. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q50.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q50_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q50_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q50_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q50_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q50_A2-p0.1">Whether political prudence is fittingly accounted a part of prudence?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q50_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that political prudence is not fittingly accounted a part of prudence. For regnative is a part of political + prudence, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q50_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q50_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But a part should not be reckoned a species with the whole. Therefore political prudence should not be reckoned a part of + prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the species of habits are distinguished by their various objects. Now what the ruler has to command is the same + as what the subject has to execute. Therefore political prudence as regards the subjects, should not be reckoned a species + of prudence distinct from regnative prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, each subject is an individual person. Now each individual person can direct himself sufficiently by prudence commonly + so called. Therefore there is no need of a special kind of prudence called political. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "of the prudence which is concerned with the state one kind is a master-prudence + and is called legislative; another kind bears the common name political, and deals with individuals." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A slave is moved by his master, and a subject by his ruler, by command, but otherwise than as irrational and inanimate beings + are set in motion by their movers. For irrational and inanimate beings are moved only by others and do not put themselves + in motion, since they have no free-will whereby to be masters of their own actions, wherefore the rectitude of their government + is not in their power but in the power of their movers. On the other hand, men who are + slaves or subjects in any sense, are moved by the commands of others in such a way that they move themselves by their free-will; + wherefore some kind of rectitude of government is required in them, so that they may direct themselves in obeying their superiors; + and to this belongs that species of prudence which is called political. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above, regnative is the most perfect species of prudence, wherefore the prudence of subjects, which falls short + of regnative prudence, retains the common name of political prudence, even as in logic a convertible term which does not denote + the essence of a thing retains the name of "proper." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A different aspect of the object diversifies the species of a habit, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q50_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A5.html">Q[47], A[5]</a>). Now the same actions are considered by the king, but under a more general aspect, as by his subjects who obey: since many + obey one king in various departments. Hence regnative prudence is compared to this political prudence of which we are speaking, + as mastercraft to handicraft. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man directs himself by prudence commonly so called, in relation to his own good, but by political prudence, of which we speak, + he directs himself in relation to the common good. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q50_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q50_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q50_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q50_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q50_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q50_A3-p0.1">Whether a part of prudence should be reckoned to be domestic?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q50_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that domestic should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) "prudence + is directed to a good life in general": whereas domestic prudence is directed to a particular end, viz. wealth, according + to Ethic. i, 1. Therefore a species of prudence is not domestic. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q50_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A13.html">Q[47], A[13]</a>) prudence is only in good people. But domestic prudence may be also in wicked people, since many sinners are provident in + governing their household. Therefore domestic prudence should not be reckoned a species of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as in a kingdom there is a ruler and subject, so also is there in a household. If therefore domestic like political + is a species of prudence, there should be a paternal corresponding to regnative prudence. Now there is no such prudence. Therefore + neither should domestic prudence be accounted a species of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are various kinds of prudence in the government of a multitude, "one of + which is domestic, another legislative, and another political." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Different aspects of an object, in respect of universality and particularity, or of totality and partiality, diversify arts + and virtues; and in respect of such diversity one act of virtue is principal as compared with another. Now it is evident that + a household is a mean between the individual and the city or kingdom, since just as the individual is part of the household, + so is the household part of the city or kingdom. And therefore, just as prudence + commonly so called which governs the individual, is distinct from political prudence, so must domestic prudence be distinct + from both. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Riches are compared to domestic prudence, not as its last end, but as its instrument, as stated in Polit. i, 3. On the other + hand, the end of political prudence is "a good life in general" as regards the conduct of the household. In Ethic. i, 1 the + Philosopher speaks of riches as the end of political prudence, by way of example and in accordance with the opinion of many. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some sinners may be provident in certain matters of detail concerning the disposition of their household, but not in regard + to "a good life in general" as regards the conduct of the household, for which above all a virtuous life is required. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The father has in his household an authority like that of a king, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10, but he has not the full power + of a king, wherefore paternal government is not reckoned a distinct species of prudence, like regnative prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q50_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q50_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q50_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q50_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q51.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q50_A4-p0.1">Whether military prudence should be reckoned a part of prudence?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q50_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that military prudence should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For prudence is distinct from art, according + to Ethic. vi, 3. Now military prudence seems to be the art of warfare, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8). Therefore + military prudence should not be accounted a species of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as military business is contained under political affairs, so too are many other matters, such as those of + tradesmen, craftsmen, and so forth. But there are no species of prudence corresponding to other affairs in the state. Neither + therefore should any be assigned to military business. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the soldiers' bravery counts for a great deal in warfare. Therefore military prudence pertains to fortitude rather + than to prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q50_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.24.6" target="asv">Prov. 24:6</a>): "War is managed by due ordering, and there shall be safety where there are many counsels." Now it belongs to prudence to + take counsel. Therefore there is great need in warfare for that species of prudence which is called "military." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Whatever things are done according to art or reason, should be made to conform to those which are in accordance with nature, + and are established by the Divine Reason. Now nature has a twofold tendency: first, to govern each thing in itself, secondly, + to withstand outward assailants and corruptives: and for this reason she has provided animals not only with the concupiscible + faculty, whereby they are moved to that which is conducive to their well-being, but + also with the irascible power, whereby the animal withstands an assailant. Therefore in those things also which are in accordance + with reason, there should be not only "political" prudence, which disposes in a suitable manner such things as belong to the + common good, but also a "military" prudence, whereby hostile attacks are repelled. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Military prudence may be an art, in so far as it has certain rules for the right use of certain external things, such as + arms and horses, but in so far as it is directed to the common good, it belongs rather to prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Other matters in the state are directed to the profit of individuals, whereas the business of soldiering is directed to the + service belongs to fortitude, but the direction, protection of the entire common good. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The execution of military service belongs to fortitude, but the direction, especially in so far as it concerns the commander-in-chief, + belongs to prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q50_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q50_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q51.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q49_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q50_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q51" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q50_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q51_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q51-p0.1">OF THE VIRTUES WHICH ARE CONNECTED WITH PRUDENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q51-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q51-p2"> In due sequence, we must consider the virtues that are connected with prudence, and which are its quasi-potential parts. + Under this head there are four points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51-p3"> (1) Whether {euboulia}, is a virtue?</p> + <p id="SS_Q51-p4"> (2) Whether it is a special virtue, distinct from prudence?</p> + <p id="SS_Q51-p5"> (3) Whether {synesis} is a special virtue?</p> + <p id="SS_Q51-p6"> (4) Whether {gnome} is a special virtue?</p> + <p id="SS_Q51-p7"> [*These three Greek words may be rendered as the faculties of deliberating well {euboulia}, of judging well according to + common law {synesis}, and of judging well according to general law {gnome}, respectively.] + </p> + <div id="SS_Q51_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q51.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q51_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q51_A1-p0.1">Whether {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a virtue?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q51_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a virtue. For, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) "no + man makes evil use of virtue." Now some make evil use of {euboulia} (deliberating well) or good counsel, either through devising + crafty counsels in order to achieve evil ends, or through committing sin in order that they may achieve good ends, as those + who rob that they may give alms. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a + virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is a perfection, according to Phys. vii. But {euboulia} (deliberating well) is concerned with counsel, which + implies doubt and research, and these are marks of imperfection. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q51_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65.html">FS, Q[65])</a>. Now {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not connected with the other virtues, since many sinners take good-counsel, and many + godly men are slow in taking counsel. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9) {euboulia} (deliberating well) "is a right counselling." Now the perfection of + virtue consists in right reason. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q51_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A4.html">Q[47], A[4]</a>) the nature of a human virtue consists in making a human act good. Now among the acts of man, it is proper to him to take + counsel, since this denotes a research of the reason about the actions he has to perform and whereof human life consists, + for the speculative life is above man, as stated in Ethic. x. But {euboulia} (deliberating well) signifies goodness of counsel, + for it is derived from the {eu}, + good, and {boule}, counsel, being "a good counsel" or rather "a disposition to take good counsel." Hence it is evident that + {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a human virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is no good counsel either in deliberating for an evil end, or in discovering evil means for attaining a good end, even + as in speculative matters, there is no good reasoning either in coming to a false conclusion, or in coming to a true conclusion + from false premisses through employing an unsuitable middle term. Hence both the aforesaid processes are contrary to {euboulia} + (deliberating well), as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although virtue is essentially a perfection, it does not follow that whatever is the matter of a virtue implies perfection. + For man needs to be perfected by virtues in all his parts, and this not only as regards the acts of reason, of which counsel + is one, but also as regards the passions of the sensitive appetite, which are still more imperfect. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A1-p9"> It may also be replied that human virtue is a perfection according to the mode of man, who is unable by simple insight to + comprehend with certainty the truth of things, especially in matters of action which are contingent. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In no sinner as such is {euboulia} (deliberating well) to be found: since all sin is contrary to taking good counsel. For + good counsel requires not only the discovery or devising of fit means for the end, but also other circumstances. Such are + suitable time, so that one be neither too slow nor too quick in taking counsel, and the mode of taking counsel, so that one + be firm in the counsel taken, and other like due circumstances, which sinners fail to + observe when they sin. On the other hand, every virtuous man takes good counsel in those things which are directed to the + end of virtue, although perhaps he does not take good counsel in other particular matters, for instance in matters of trade, + or warfare, or the like. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q51.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q51_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q51_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q51_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q51_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q51_A2-p0.1">Whether {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a special virtue, distinct from prudence?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q51_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence. For, according to the Philosopher + (Ethic. vi, 5), the "prudent man is, seemingly, one who takes good counsel." Now this belongs to {euboulia} (deliberating + well) as stated above. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not distinct from prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, human acts to which human virtues are directed, are specified chiefly by their end, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q51_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html">FS, Q[1], A[3]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q51_A2-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A4.html">FS, Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6). Now {euboulia} (deliberating well) and prudence are directed to the same end, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9, not indeed to + some particular end, but to the common end of all life. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue + from prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in speculative sciences, research and decision belong to the same science. Therefore in like manner these belong + to the same virtue in practical matters. Now research belongs to {euboulia} (deliberating well), while decision belongs to + prudence. There {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Prudence is preceptive, according to Ethic. vi, 10. But this does not apply to {euboulia} (deliberating well). Therefore + {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a distinct virtue from prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q51_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q51_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, virtue is properly directed to an act which it renders good; and consequently virtues must differ according to different + acts, especially when there is a different kind of goodness in the acts. For, if various acts contained the same kind of goodness, + they would belong to the same virtue: thus the goodness of love, desire and joy depends on the same, wherefore all these belong + to the same virtue of + charity. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A2-p7"> Now acts of the reason that are ordained to action are diverse, nor have they the same kind of goodness: since it is owing + to different causes that a man acquires good counsel, good judgment, or good command, inasmuch as these are sometimes separated + from one another. Consequently {euboulia} (deliberating well) which makes man take good counsel must needs be a distinct virtue + from prudence, which makes man command well. And since counsel is directed to command as to that which + is principal, so {euboulia} (deliberating well) is directed to prudence as to a principal virtue, without which it would be + no virtue at all, even as neither are the moral virtues without prudence, nor the other virtues without charity. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It belongs to prudence to take good counsel by commanding it, to {euboulia} (deliberating well) by eliciting it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Different acts are directed in different degrees to the one end which is "a good life in general" [*Ethic. vi, 5]: for counsel + comes first, judgment follows, and command comes last. The last named has an immediate relation to the last end: whereas the + other two acts are related thereto remotely. Nevertheless these have certain proximate ends of their own, the end of counsel + being the discovery of what has to be done, and the end of judgment, + certainty. Hence this proves not that {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence, but that it is + subordinate thereto, as a secondary to a principal virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even in speculative matters the rational science of dialectics, which is directed to research and discovery, is distinct + from demonstrative science, which decides the truth. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q51_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q51_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q51_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q51_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q51_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q51_A3-p0.1">Whether {synesis} (judging well according to common law) is a virtue?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q51_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that {synesis} is not a virtue. Virtues are not in us by nature, according to Ethic. ii, 1. But {synesis} (judging + well according to common law) is natural to some, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 11). Therefore {synesis} (judging + well according to common law) is not a virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated in the same book (10), {synesis} (judging well according to common law) is nothing but "a faculty of judging." + But judgment without command can be even in the wicked. Since then virtue is only in the good, it seems that {synesis} (judging + well according to common law) is not a virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there is never a defective command, unless there be a defective judgment, at least in a particular matter of action; + for it is in this that every wicked man errs. If therefore {synesis} (judging well according to common law) be reckoned a + virtue directed to good judgment, it seems that there is no need for any other virtue directed to good command: and consequently + prudence would be superfluous, which is not reasonable. Therefore {synesis} (judging + well according to common law) is not a virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Judgment is more perfect than counsel. But {euboulia}, or good counsel, is a virtue. Much more, therefore, is {synesis} (judging + well according to common law) a virtue, as being good judgment. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> {synesis} (judging well according to common law) signifies a right judgment, not indeed about speculative matters, but about + particular practical matters, about which also is prudence. Hence in Greek some, in respect of {synesis} (judging well according + to common law) are said to be {synetoi}, i.e. "persons of sense," or {eusynetoi}, i.e. "men of good sense," just as on the + other hand, those who lack this virtue are called {asynetoi}, i.e. "senseless." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A3-p7"> Now, different acts which cannot be ascribed to the same cause, must correspond to different virtues. And it is evident that + goodness of counsel and goodness of judgment are not reducible to the same cause, for many can take good counsel, without + having good sense so as to judge well. Even so, in speculative matters some are good at research, through their reason being + quick at arguing from one thing to another (which seems to be due to a disposition of their power of + imagination, which has a facility in forming phantasms), and yet such persons sometimes lack good judgment (and this is due + to a defect in the intellect arising chiefly from a defective disposition of the common sense which fails to judge aright). + Hence there is need, besides {euboulia} (deliberating well), for another virtue, which judges well, and this is called {synesis} + (judging well according to common law). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Right judgment consists in the cognitive power apprehending a thing just as it is in reality, and this is due to the right + disposition of the apprehensive power. Thus if a mirror be well disposed the forms of bodies are reflected in it just as they + are, whereas if it be ill disposed, the images therein appear distorted and misshapen. Now that the cognitive power be well + disposed to receive things just as they are in reality, is radically due to + nature, but, as to its consummation, is due to practice or to a gift of grace, and this in two ways. First directly, on the + part of the cognitive power itself, for instance, because it is imbued, not with distorted, but with true and correct ideas: + this belongs to {synesis} (judging well according to common law) which in this respect is a special virtue. Secondly indirectly, + through the good disposition of the appetitive power, the result being that one judges well of the objects of appetite: + and thus a good judgment of virtue results from the habits of moral virtue; but this judgment is about the ends, whereas {synesis} + (judging well according to common law) is rather about the means. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In wicked men there may be right judgment of a universal principle, but their judgment is always corrupt in the particular + matter of action, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q51_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A13.html">Q[47], A[13]</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sometimes after judging aright we delay to execute or execute negligently or inordinately. Hence after the virtue which judges + aright there is a further need of a final and principal virtue, which commands aright, and this is prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q51_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q51_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q51_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q51_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q52.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q51_A4-p0.1">Whether {gnome} (judging well according to general law) is a special virtue?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q51_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that {gnome} (judging well according to general law) is not a special virtue distinct from {synesis} (judging + well according to common law). For a man is said, in respect of {synesis} (judging well according to common law), to have + good judgment. Now no man can be said to have good judgment, unless he judge aright in all things. Therefore {synesis} (judging + well according to common law) extends to all matters of judgment, and consequently there + is no other virtue of good judgment called {gnome} (judging well according to general law). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, judgment is midway between counsel and precept. Now there is only one virtue of good counsel, viz. {euboulia} (deliberating + well) and only one virtue of good command, viz. prudence. Therefore there is only one virtue of good judgment, viz. {synesis} + (judging well according to common law). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, rare occurrences wherein there is need to depart from the common law, seem for the most part to happen by chance, + and with such things reason is not concerned, as stated in Phys. ii, 5. Now all the intellectual virtues depend on right reason. + Therefore there is no intellectual virtue about such matters. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher concludes (Ethic. vi, 11) that {gnome} (judging well according to general law) is a special virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A4-p6"> I answer that cognitive habits differ according to higher and lower principles: thus in speculative matters wisdom considers + higher principles than science does, and consequently is distinguished from it; and so must it be also in practical matters. + Now it is evident that what is beside the order of a lower principle or cause, is sometimes reducible to the order of a higher + principle; thus monstrous births of animals are beside the order of the active seminal force, and yet they + come under the order of a higher principle, namely, of a heavenly body, or higher still, of Divine Providence. Hence by considering + the active seminal force one could not pronounce a sure judgment on such monstrosities, and yet this is possible if we consider + Divine Providence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A4-p7"> Now it happens sometimes that something has to be done which is not covered by the common rules of actions, for instance + in the case of the enemy of one's country, when it would be wrong to give him back his deposit, or in other similar cases. + Hence it is necessary to judge of such matters according to higher principles than the common laws, according to which {synesis} + (judging according to common law) judges: and corresponding to such higher principles it is necessary to have + a higher virtue of judgment, which is called {gnome} (judging according to general law), and which denotes a certain discrimination + in judgment. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> {Synesis} (judging well according to common law) judges rightly about all actions that are covered by the common rules: but + certain things have to be judged beside these common rules, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Judgment about a thing should be formed from the proper principles thereof, whereas research is made by employing also common + principles. Wherefore also in speculative matters, dialectics which aims at research proceeds from common principles; while + demonstration which tends to judgment, proceeds from proper principles. Hence {euboulia} (deliberating well) to which the + research of counsel belongs is one for all, but not so {synesis} (judging well + according to common law) whose act is judicial. Command considers in all matters the one aspect of good, wherefore prudence + also is only one. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It belongs to Divine Providence alone to consider all things that may happen beside the common course. On the other hand, + among men, he who is most discerning can judge a greater number of such things by his reason: this belongs to {gnome} (judging + well according to general law), which denotes a certain discrimination in judgment. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q51_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q51_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q52.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q50_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q51_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q52" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q51_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q52_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q52-p0.1">OF THE GIFT OF COUNSEL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q52-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q52-p2"> We must now consider the gift of counsel which corresponds to prudence. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q52-p3"> (1) Whether counsel should be reckoned among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost?</p> + <p id="SS_Q52-p4"> (2) Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence?</p> + <p id="SS_Q52-p5"> (3) Whether the gift of counsel remains in heaven?</p> + <p id="SS_Q52-p6"> (4) Whether the fifth beatitude, "Blessed are the merciful," etc. corresponds to the gift of counsel?</p> + <p id="SS_Q52-p7"></p> + <div id="SS_Q52_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q52.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q52_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q52_A1-p0.1">Whether counsel should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q52_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that counsel should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. The gifts of the Holy Ghost are given + as a help to the virtues, according to Gregory (Moral. ii, 49). Now for the purpose of taking counsel, man is sufficiently + perfected by the virtue of prudence, or even of {euboulia} (deliberating well), as is evident from what has been said ( + <a id="SS_Q52_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A1.html">Q[47], A[1]</a>, ad 2; + <a id="SS_Q52_A1-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q51_A1.html"> Q[51], AA[1]</a>,2). Therefore + counsel should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the difference between the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost and the gratuitous graces seems to be that the latter are + not given to all, but are divided among various people, whereas the gifts of the Holy Ghost are given to all who have the + Holy Ghost. But counsel seems to be one of those things which are given by the Holy Ghost specially to certain persons, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q52_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iMacc.2.65" target="asv">1 Macc. 2:65</a>: "Behold . . . your brother Simon is a man of + counsel." Therefore counsel should be numbered among the gratuitous graces rather than among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q52_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.14" target="asv">Rom. 8:14</a>): "Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God." But counselling is not consistent with being led by + another. Since then the gifts of the Holy Ghost are most befitting the children of God, who "have received the spirit of adoption + of sons," it would seem that counsel should not be numbered among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q52_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv">Is. 11:2</a>): "(The Spirit of the Lord) shall rest upon him . . . the spirit of counsel, and of fortitude." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q52_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A1.html">FS, Q[68], A[1]</a>), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are dispositions whereby the soul is rendered amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now + God moves everything according to the mode of the thing moved: thus He moves the corporeal creature through time and place, + and the spiritual creature through time, but not through place, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22). Again, it + is proper to the rational creature + to be moved through the research of reason to perform any particular action, and this research is called counsel. Hence the + Holy Ghost is said to move the rational creature by way of counsel, wherefore counsel is reckoned among the gifts of the Holy + Ghost. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Prudence or {euboulia} (deliberating well), whether acquired or infused, directs man in the research of counsel according + to principles that the reason can grasp; hence prudence or {euboulia} (deliberating well) makes man take good counsel either + for himself or for another. Since, however, human reason is unable to grasp the singular and contingent things which may occur, + the result is that "the thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels + uncertain" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q52_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.14" target="asv">Wis. 9:14</a>). Hence in the research of counsel, man requires to be directed by God who comprehends all things: and this is done through + the gift of counsel, whereby man is directed as though counseled by God, just as, in human affairs, those who are unable to + take counsel for themselves, seek counsel from those who are wiser. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That a man be of such good counsel as to counsel others, may be due to a gratuitous grace; but that a man be counselled by + God as to what he ought to do in matters necessary for salvation is common to all holy persons. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The children of God are moved by the Holy Ghost according to their mode, without prejudice to their free-will which is the + "faculty of will and reason" [*Sent. iii, D, 24]. Accordingly the gift of counsel is befitting the children of God in so far + as the reason is instructed by the Holy Ghost about what we have to do. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q52.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q52_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q52_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q52_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q52_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q52_A2-p0.1">Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to the virtue of prudence?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q52_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gift of counsel does not fittingly correspond to the virtue of prudence. For "the highest point of + that which is underneath touches that which is above," as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. vii), even as a man comes into contact + with the angel in respect of his intellect. Now cardinal virtues are inferior to the gifts, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q52_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A8.html">FS, Q[68], A[8]</a>). Since, then, counsel is the first and lowest act of prudence, + while command is its highest act, and judgment comes between, it seems that the gift corresponding to prudence is not counsel, + but rather a gift of judgment or command. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one gift suffices to help one virtue, since the higher a thing is the more one it is, as proved in De Causis. Now + prudence is helped by the gift of knowledge, which is not only speculative but also practical, as shown above ( + <a id="SS_Q52_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q9_A3.html">Q[9], A[3]</a>). Therefore the gift of counsel does not correspond to the virtue of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it belongs properly to prudence to direct, as stated above (Q[47], A[8]). But it belongs to the gift of counsel + that man should be directed by God, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q52_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q52_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore the gift of counsel does not correspond to the virtue of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The gift of counsel is about what has to be done for the sake of the end. Now prudence is about the same matter. Therefore + they correspond to one another. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A lower principle of movement is helped chiefly, and is perfected through being moved by a higher principle of movement, + as a body through being moved by a spirit. Now it is evident that the rectitude of human reason is compared to the Divine + Reason, as a lower motive principle to a higher: for the Eternal Reason is the supreme rule of all human rectitude. Consequently + prudence, which denotes rectitude of reason, is chiefly perfected and helped through being + ruled and moved by the Holy Ghost, and this belongs to the gift of counsel, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q52_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q52_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence, as helping and perfecting it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To judge and command belongs not to the thing moved, but to the mover. Wherefore, since in the gifts of the Holy Ghost, the + position of the human mind is of one moved rather than of a mover, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q52_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q52_A1.html">(A[1];</a> + <a id="SS_Q52_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A1.html">FS, Q[68], A[1]</a>), it follows that it would be unfitting to call the gift corresponding to prudence by the name of command or judgment rather + than of counsel whereby it is possible to signify + that the counselled mind is moved by another counselling it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The gift of knowledge does not directly correspond to prudence, since it deals with speculative matters: yet by a kind of + extension it helps it. On the other hand the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence directly, because it is concerned about + the same things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The mover that is moved, moves through being moved. Hence the human mind, from the very fact that it is directed by the Holy + Ghost, is enabled to direct itself and others. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q52_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q52_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q52_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q52_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q52_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q52_A3-p0.1">Whether the gift of counsel remains in heaven?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q52_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gift of counsel does not remain in heaven. For counsel is about what has to be done for the sake of + an end. But in heaven nothing will have to be done for the sake of an end, since there man possesses the last end. Therefore + the gift of counsel is not in heaven. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, counsel implies doubt, for it is absurd to take counsel in matters that are evident, as the Philosopher observes + (Ethic. iii, 3). Now all doubt will cease in heaven. Therefore there is no counsel in heaven. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the saints in heaven are most conformed to God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q52_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2, </a> "When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him." But counsel is not becoming to God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q52_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.34" target="asv"> Rom. 11:34, </a> "Who hath been His counsellor?" Therefore neither to the saints in heaven is the gift of counsel becoming. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xvii, 12): "When either the guilt or the righteousness of each nation is brought into the debate of + the heavenly Court, the guardian of that nation is said to have won in the conflict, or not to have won." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q52_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q52_A2.html">(A[2];</a> + <a id="SS_Q52_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A1.html">FS, Q[68], A[1]</a>), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected with the motion of the rational creature by God. Now we must observe two points + concerning the motion of the human mind by God. First, that the disposition of that which is moved, differs while it is being + moved from its disposition when it is in the term of movement. Indeed if the mover is the principle of the movement alone, + when the movement ceases, the action of the mover ceases as regards the thing moved, since it has already reached the term + of movement, even as a house, after it is built, ceases being built by the builder. On the other hand, when the mover is cause + not only of the movement, but also of the form to which the movement tends, then the action of the mover does not cease even + after the form has been attained: thus the sun lightens the air even after it is lightened. In this way, then, God causes + in + us virtue and knowledge, not only when we first acquire them, but also as long as we persevere in them: and it is thus that + God causes in the blessed a knowledge of what is to be done, not as though they were ignorant, but by continuing that knowledge + in them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A3-p7"> Nevertheless there are things which the blessed, whether angels or men, do not know: such things are not essential to blessedness, + but concern the government of things according to Divine Providence. As regards these, we must make a further observation, + namely, that God moves the mind of the blessed in one way, and the mind of the wayfarer, in another. For God moves the mind + of the wayfarer in matters of action, by soothing the pre-existing anxiety of doubt; whereas there is + simple nescience in the mind of the blessed as regards the things they do not know. From this nescience the angel's mind is + cleansed, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), nor does there precede in them any research of doubt, for they simply + turn to God; and this is to take counsel of God, for as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) "the angels take counsel of God + about things beneath them": wherefore the instruction which they receive from God in such matters is called "counsel." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A3-p8"> Accordingly the gift of counsel is in the blessed, in so far as God preserves in them the knowledge that they have, and enlightens + them in their nescience of what has to be done. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even in the blessed there are acts directed to an end, or resulting, as it were, from their attainment of the end, such as + the acts of praising God, or of helping on others to the end which they themselves have attained, for example the ministrations + of the angels, and the prayers of the saints. In this respect the gift of counsel finds a place in them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Doubt belongs to counsel according to the present state of life, but not to that counsel which takes place in heaven. Even + so neither have the theological virtues quite the same acts in heaven as on the way thither. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Counsel is in God, not as receiving but as giving it: and the saints in heaven are conformed to God, as receivers to the + source whence they receive. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q52_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q52_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q52_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q52_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q53.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q52_A4-p0.1">Whether the fifth beatitude, which is that of mercy, corresponds to the gift of counsel?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q52_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the fifth beatitude, which is that of mercy, does not correspond to the gift of counsel. For all the beatitudes + are acts of virtue, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q52_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q69_A1.html">FS, Q[69], A[1]</a>). Now we are directed by counsel in all acts of virtue. Therefore the fifth beatitude does not correspond more than any other + to counsel. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, precepts are given about matters necessary for salvation, while counsel is given about matters which are not necessary + for salvation. Now mercy is necessary for salvation, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q52_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.13" target="asv">James 2:13</a>, "Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy." On the other hand poverty is not necessary for salvation, but + belongs to the life of perfection, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q52_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.21" target="asv"> Mat. 19:21.</a> Therefore the beatitude of poverty corresponds to the gift + of counsel, rather than to the beatitude of mercy. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the fruits result from the beatitudes, for they denote a certain spiritual delight resulting from perfect acts of + virtue. Now none of the fruits correspond to the gift of counsel, as appears from + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q52_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv">Gal. 5:22, 23</a>. Therefore neither does the beatitude of mercy correspond to the gift of counsel. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. iv): "Counsel is befitting the merciful, because the one remedy is to be delivered from evils + so great, to pardon, and to give." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Counsel is properly about things useful for an end. Hence such things as are of most use for an end, should above all correspond + to the gift of counsel. Now such is mercy, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q52_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.8" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:8, </a> "Godliness [*'Pietas,' which our English word 'pity,' which is the same as mercy; see note on + <a id="SS_Q52_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q30_A1.html">SS, Q[30], A[1]</a>] is profitable to all things." Therefore the beatitude of mercy specially corresponds to the gift of counsel, + not as eliciting but as directing mercy. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although counsel directs in all the acts of virtue, it does so in a special way in works of mercy, for the reason given above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Counsel considered as a gift of the Holy Ghost guides us in all matters that are directed to the end of eternal life whether + they be necessary for salvation or not, and yet not every work of mercy is necessary for salvation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Fruit denotes something ultimate. Now the ultimate in practical matters consists not in knowledge but in an action which + is the end. Hence nothing pertaining to practical knowledge is numbered among the fruits, but only such things as pertain + to action, in which practical knowledge is the guide. Among these we find "goodness" and "benignity" which correspond to mercy. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q52_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q52_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q53.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q51_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q52_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q53" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q52_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q53_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q53-p0.1">OF IMPRUDENCE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q53-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q53-p2"> We must now consider the vices opposed to prudence. For Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3): "There are vices opposed to + every virtue, not only vices that are in manifest opposition to virtue, as temerity is opposed to prudence, but also vices + which have a kind of kinship and not a true but a spurious likeness to virtue; thus in opposition to prudence we have craftiness." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53-p3"> Accordingly we must consider first of all those vices which are in evident opposition to prudence, those namely which are + due to a defect either of prudence or of those things which are requisite for prudence, and secondly those vices which have + a false resemblance to prudence, those namely which are due to abuse of the things required for prudence. And since solicitude + pertains to prudence, the first of these considerations will be twofold: (1) Of imprudence; (2) Of negligence + which is opposed to solicitude. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53-p4"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q53-p5"> (1) Concerning imprudence, whether it is a sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q53-p6"> (2) Whether it is a special sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q53-p7"> (3) Of precipitation or temerity;</p> + <p id="SS_Q53-p8"> (4) Of thoughtlessness;</p> + <p id="SS_Q53-p9"> (5) Of inconstancy;</p> + <p id="SS_Q53-p10"> (6) Concerning the origin of these vices.</p> + <div id="SS_Q53_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q53.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q53_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q53_A1-p0.1">Whether imprudence is a sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q53_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that imprudence is not a sin. For every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine [*De Vera Relig. xiv]; whereas + imprudence is not voluntary, since no man wishes to be imprudent. Therefore imprudence is not a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, none but original sin comes to man with his birth. But imprudence comes to man with his birth, wherefore the young + are imprudent; and yet it is not original sin which is opposed to original justice. Therefore imprudence is not a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every sin is taken away by repentance. But imprudence is not taken away by repentance. Therefore imprudence is not + a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The spiritual treasure of grace is not taken away save by sin. But it is taken away by imprudence, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q53_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.21.20" target="asv"> Prov. 21:20, </a> "There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the dwelling of the just, and the imprudent [Douay: 'foolish'] man shall spend + it." Therefore imprudence is a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Imprudence may be taken in two ways, first, as a privation, secondly, as a contrary. Properly speaking it is not taken as + a negation, so as merely to signify the absence of prudence, for this can be without any sin. Taken as a privation, imprudence + denotes lack of that prudence which a man can and ought to have, and in this sense imprudence is a sin by reason of a man's + negligence in striving to have prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A1-p7"> Imprudence is taken as a contrary, in so far as the movement or act of reason is in opposition to prudence: for instance, + whereas the right reason of prudence acts by taking counsel, the imprudent man despises counsel, and the same applies to the + other conditions which require consideration in the act of prudence. In this way imprudence is a sin in respect of prudence + considered under its proper aspect, since it is not possible for a man to act against prudence, except by + infringing the rules on which the right reason of prudence depends. Wherefore, if this should happen through aversion from + the Divine Law, it will be a mortal sin, as when a man acts precipitately through contempt and rejection of the Divine teaching: + whereas if he act beside the Law and without contempt, and without detriment to things necessary for salvation, it will be + a venial sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> No man desires the deformity of imprudence, but the rash man wills the act of imprudence, because he wishes to act precipitately. + Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "he who sins willingly against prudence is less to be commended." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument takes imprudence in the negative sense. It must be observed however that lack of prudence or of any other virtue + is included in the lack of original justice which perfected the entire soul. Accordingly all such lack of virtue may be ascribed + to original sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Repentance restores infused prudence, and thus the lack of this prudence ceases; but acquired prudence is not restored as + to the habit, although the contrary act is taken away, wherein properly speaking the sin of imprudence consists. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q53.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q53_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q53_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q53_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q53_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q53_A2-p0.1">Whether imprudence is a special sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q53_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that imprudence is not a special sin. For whoever sins, acts against right reason, i.e. against prudence. But + imprudence consists in acting against prudence, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q53_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q53_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore imprudence is not a special sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, prudence is more akin to moral action than knowledge is. But ignorance which is opposed to knowledge, is reckoned + one of the general causes of sin. Much more therefore should imprudence be reckoned among those causes. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin consists in the corruption of the circumstances of virtue, wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil + results from each single defect." Now many things are requisite for prudence; for instance, reason, intelligence docility, + and so on, as stated above (QQ[48],49). Therefore there are many species of imprudence, so that it is not a special sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Imprudence is opposed to prudence, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q53_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q53_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now prudence is a special virtue. Therefore imprudence too is one special vice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A vice or sin may be styled general in two ways; first, absolutely, because, to wit, it is general in respect of all sins; + secondly, because it is general in respect of certain vices, which are its species. In the first way, a vice may be said to + be general on two counts: first, essentially, because it is predicated of all sins: and in this way imprudence is not a general + sin, as neither is prudence a general virtue: since it is concerned with special acts, + namely the very acts of reason: secondly, by participation; and in this way imprudence is a general sin: for, just as all + the virtues have a share of prudence, in so far as it directs them, so have all vices and sins a share of imprudence, because + no sin can occur, without some defect in an act of the directing reason, which defect belongs to imprudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A2-p7"> If, on the other hand, a sin be called general, not simply but in some particular genus, that is, as containing several species + of sin, then imprudence is a general sin. For it contains various species in three ways. First, by opposition to the various + subjective parts of prudence, for just as we distinguish the prudence that guides the individual, from other kinds that govern + communities, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q53_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q48.html">Q[48];</a> + <a id="SS_Q53_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q50_A7.html"> Q[50], A[7]</a> ), so + also we distinguish various kinds of imprudence. Secondly, in respect of the quasi-potential parts of prudence, which are + virtues connected with it, and correspond to the several acts of reason. Thus, by defect of "counsel" to which {euboulia} + (deliberating well) corresponds, "precipitation" or "temerity" is a species of imprudence; by defect of "judgment," to which + {synesis} (judging well according to common law) and {gnome} (judging well according to general law) refer, there is + "thoughtlessness"; while "inconstancy" and "negligence" correspond to the "command" which is the proper act of prudence. Thirdly, + this may be taken by opposition to those things which are requisite for prudence, which are the quasi-integral parts of prudence. + Since however all these things are intended for the direction of the aforesaid three acts of reason, it follows that all the + opposite defects are reducible to the four parts mentioned above. Thus incautiousness and incircumspection are + included in "thoughtlessness"; lack of docility, memory, or reason is referable to "precipitation"; improvidence, lack of + intelligence and of shrewdness, belong to "negligence" and "inconstancy." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers generality by participation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since knowledge is further removed from morality than prudence is, according to their respective proper natures, it follows + that ignorance has the nature of mortal sin, not of itself, but on account either of a preceding negligence, or of the consequent + result, and for this reason it is reckoned one of the general causes of sin. On the other hand imprudence, by its very nature, + denotes a moral vice; and for this reason it can be called a special + sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When various circumstances are corrupted for the same motive, the species of sin is not multiplied: thus it is the same species + of sin to take what is not one's own, where one ought not, and when one ought not. If, however, there be various motives, + there are various species: for instance, if one man were to take another's property from where he ought not, so as to wrong + a sacred place, this would constitute the species called sacrilege, while if + another were to take another's property when he ought not, merely through the lust of possession, this would be a case of + simple avarice. Hence the lack of those things which are requisite for prudence, does not constitute a diversity of species, + except in so far as they are directed to different acts of reason, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q53_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q53_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q53_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q53_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q53_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q53_A3-p0.1">Whether precipitation is a sin included in imprudence?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q53_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that precipitation is not a sin included in imprudence. Imprudence is opposed to the virtue of prudence; whereas + precipitation is opposed to the gift of counsel, according to Gregory, who says (Moral. ii, 49) that the gift of "counsel + is given as a remedy to precipitation." Therefore precipitation is not a sin contained under imprudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, precipitation seemingly pertains to rashness. Now rashness implies presumption, which pertains to pride. Therefore + precipitation is not a vice contained under imprudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, precipitation seems to denote inordinate haste. Now sin happens in counselling not only through being over hasty + but also through being over slow, so that the opportunity for action passes by, and through corruption of other circumstances, + as stated in Ethic. vi, 9. Therefore there is no reason for reckoning precipitation as a sin contained under imprudence, rather + than slowness, or something else of the kind pertaining to inordinate counsel. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q53_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.4.19" target="asv">Prov. 4:19</a>): "The way of the wicked is darksome, they know not where they fall." Now the darksome ways of ungodliness belong to imprudence. + Therefore imprudence leads a man to fall or to be precipitate. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Precipitation is ascribed metaphorically to acts of the soul, by way of similitude to bodily movement. Now a thing is said + to be precipitated as regards bodily movement, when it is brought down from above by the impulse either of its own movement + or of another's, and not in orderly fashion by degrees. Now the summit of the soul is the reason, and the base is reached + in the action performed by the body; while the steps that intervene by which one ought to + descend in orderly fashion are "memory" of the past, "intelligence" of the present, "shrewdness" in considering the future + outcome, "reasoning" which compares one thing with another, "docility" in accepting the opinions of others. He that takes + counsel descends by these steps in due order, whereas if a man is rushed into action by the impulse of his will or of a passion, + without taking these steps, it will be a case of precipitation. Since then inordinate counsel pertains to imprudence, it is + evident that the vice of precipitation is contained under imprudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Rectitude of counsel belongs to the gift of counsel and to the virtue of prudence; albeit in different ways, as stated above + ( + <a id="SS_Q53_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q52_A2.html">Q[52], A[2]</a>), and consequently precipitation is opposed to both. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things are said to be done rashly when they are not directed by reason: and this may happen in two ways; first through the + impulse of the will or of a passion, secondly through contempt of the directing rule; and this is what is meant by rashness + properly speaking, wherefore it appears to proceed from that root of pride, which refuses to submit to another's ruling. But + precipitation refers to both, so that rashness is contained under precipitation, + although precipitation refers rather to the first. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Many things have to be considered in the research of reason; hence the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9) that "one should + be slow in taking counsel." Hence precipitation is more directly opposed to rectitude of counsel than over slowness is, for + the latter bears a certain likeness to right counsel. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q53_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q53_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q53_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q53_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q53_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q53_A4-p0.1">Whether thoughtlessness is a special sin included in prudence?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q53_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that thoughtlessness is not a special sin included in imprudence. For the Divine law does not incite us to + any sin, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q53_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.18.8" target="asv"> Ps. 18:8, </a> "The law of the Lord is unspotted"; and yet it incites us to be thoughtless, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q53_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.19" target="asv"> Mat. 10:19, </a> "Take no thought how or what to speak." Therefore thoughtlessness is not a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever takes counsel must needs give thought to many things. Now precipitation is due to a defect of counsel and + therefore to a defect of thought. Therefore precipitation is contained under thoughtlessness: and consequently thoughtlessness + is not a special sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prudence consists in acts of the practical reason, viz. "counsel," "judgment" about what has been counselled, and + "command" [*Cf. + <a id="SS_Q53_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A8.html"> Q[47], A[8]</a>]. Now thought precedes all these acts, since it belongs also to the speculative intellect. Therefore thoughtlessness is not + a special sin contained under imprudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q53_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.4.25" target="asv">Prov. 4:25</a>): "Let thy eyes look straight on, and let thine eye-lids go before thy steps." Now this pertains to prudence, while the contrary + pertains to thoughtlessness. Therefore thoughtlessness is a special sin contained under imprudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Thought signifies the act of the intellect in considering the truth about. something. Now just as research belongs to the + reason, so judgment belongs to the intellect. Wherefore in speculative matters a demonstrative science is said to exercise + judgment, in so far as it judges the truth of the results of research by tracing those results back to the first indemonstrable + principles. Hence thought pertains chiefly to judgment; and consequently the lack of + right judgment belongs to the vice of thoughtlessness, in so far, to wit, as one fails to judge rightly through contempt or + neglect of those things on which a right judgment depends. It is therefore evident that thoughtlessness is a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our Lord did not forbid us to take thought, when we have the opportunity, about what we ought to do or say, but, in the words + quoted, He encourages His disciples, so that when they had no opportunity of taking thought, either through lack of knowledge + or through a sudden call, they should trust in the guidance of God alone, because "as we know not what to do, we can only + turn our eyes to God," according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q53_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiChr.20.12" target="asv">2 Paral 20:12</a>: else if man, instead of doing + what he can, were to be content with awaiting God's assistance, he would seem to tempt God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All thought about those things of which counsel takes cognizance, is directed to the formation of a right judgment, wherefore + this thought is perfected in judgment. Consequently thoughtlessness is above all opposed to the rectitude of judgment. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Thoughtlessness is to be taken here in relation to a determinate matter, namely, that of human action, wherein more things + have to be thought about for the purpose of right judgment, than in speculative matters, because actions are about singulars. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q53_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q53_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q53_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q53_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q53_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q53_A5-p0.1">Whether inconstancy is a vice contained under prudence?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q53_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that inconstancy is not a vice contained under imprudence. For inconstancy consists seemingly in a lack of + perseverance in matters of difficulty. But perseverance in difficult matters belongs to fortitude. Therefore inconstancy is + opposed to fortitude rather than to prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q53_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.3.16" target="asv">James 3:16</a>): "Where jealousy [Douay: 'envy'] and contention are, there are inconstancy and every evil work." But jealousy pertains to + envy. Therefore inconstancy pertains not to imprudence but to envy. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a man would seem to be inconstant who fails to persevere in what he has proposed to do. Now this is a mark of "incontinency" + in pleasurable matters, and of "effeminacy" or "squeamishness" in unpleasant matters, according to Ethic. vii, 1. Therefore + inconstancy does not pertain to imprudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It belongs to prudence to prefer the greater good to the lesser. Therefore to forsake the greater good belongs to imprudence. + Now this is inconstancy. Therefore inconstancy belongs to imprudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Inconstancy denotes withdrawal from a definite good purpose. Now the origin of this withdrawal is in the appetite, for a + man does not withdraw from a previous good purpose, except on account of something being inordinately pleasing to him: nor + is this withdrawal completed except through a defect of reason, which is deceived in rejecting what before it had rightly + accepted. And since it can resist the impulse of the passions, if it fail to do this, it is due + to its own weakness in not standing to the good purpose it has conceived; hence inconstancy, as to its completion, is due + to a defect in the reason. Now just as all rectitude of the practical reason belongs in some degree to prudence, so all lack + of that rectitude belongs to imprudence. Consequently inconstancy, as to its completion, belongs to imprudence. And just as + precipitation is due to a defect in the act of counsel, and thoughtlessness to a defect in the act of judgment, so inconstancy + arises from a defect in the act of command. For a man is stated to be inconstant because his reason fails in commanding what + has been counselled and judged. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The good of prudence is shared by all the moral virtues, and accordingly perseverance in good belongs to all moral virtues, + chiefly, however, to fortitude, which suffers a greater impulse to the contrary. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Envy and anger, which are the source of contention, cause inconstancy on the part of the appetite, to which power the origin + of inconstancy is due, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Continency and perseverance seem to be not in the appetitive power, but in the reason. For the continent man suffers evil + concupiscences, and the persevering man suffers grievous sorrows (which points to a defect in the appetitive power); but reason + stands firm, in the continent man, against concupiscence, and in the persevering man, against sorrow. Hence continency and + perseverance seem to be species of constancy which pertains to reason; and to this + power inconstancy pertains also. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q53_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q53_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q53_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q53_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q54.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q53_A6-p0.1">Whether the aforesaid vices arise from lust?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q53_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the aforesaid vices do not arise from lust. For inconstancy arises from envy, as stated above (A[5], ad + 2). But envy is a distinct vice from lust. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q53_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.8" target="asv">James 1:8</a>): "A double-minded man is inconstant in all his ways." Now duplicity does not seem to pertain to lust, but rather to deceitfulness, + which is a daughter of covetousness, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore the aforesaid vices do not arise from + lust. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the aforesaid vices are connected with some defect of reason. Now spiritual vices are more akin to the reason than + carnal vices. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise from spiritual vices rather than from carnal vices. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory declares (Moral. xxxi, 45) that the aforesaid vices arise from lust. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5) "pleasure above all corrupts the estimate of prudence," and chiefly sexual pleasure + which absorbs the mind, and draws it to sensible delight. Now the perfection of prudence and of every intellectual virtue + consists in abstraction from sensible objects. Wherefore, since the aforesaid vices involve a defect of prudence and of the + practical reason, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q53_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q53_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,5), it follows that they + arise chiefly from lust. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Envy and anger cause inconstancy by drawing away the reason to something else; whereas lust causes inconstancy by destroying + the judgment of reason entirely. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "the man who is incontinent through anger + listens to reason, yet not perfectly, whereas he who is incontinent through lust does not listen to it at all." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Duplicity also is something resulting from lust, just as inconstancy is, if by duplicity we understand fluctuation of the + mind from one thing to another. Hence Terence says (Eunuch. act 1, sc. 1) that "love leads to war, and likewise to peace and + truce." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Carnal vices destroy the judgment of reason so much the more as they lead us away from reason. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A6-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q53_A6-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q53_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q54.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q52_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q53_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q54" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q53_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q54_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q54-p0.1">OF NEGLIGENCE (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q54-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q54-p2"> We must now consider negligence, under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q54-p3"> (1) Whether negligence is a special sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q54-p4"> (2) To which virtue is it opposed?</p> + <p id="SS_Q54-p5"> (3) Whether negligence is a mortal sin?</p> + <div id="SS_Q54_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q54.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q54_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q54_A1-p0.1">Whether negligence is a special sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q54_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that negligence is not a special sin. For negligence is opposed to diligence. But diligence is required in + every virtue. Therefore negligence is not a special sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is common to every sin is not a special sin. Now negligence is common to every sin, because he who sins + neglects that which withdraws him from sin, and he who perseveres in sin neglects to be contrite for his sin. Therefore negligence + is not a special sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every special sin had a determinate matter. But negligence seems to have no determinate matter: since it is neither + about evil or indifferent things (for no man is accused of negligence if he omit them), nor about good things, for if these + be done negligently, they are no longer good. Therefore it seems that negligence is not a special vice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Sins committed through negligence, are distinguished from those which are committed through contempt. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Negligence denotes lack of due solicitude. Now every lack of a due act is sinful: wherefore it is evident that negligence + is a sin, and that it must needs have the character of a special sin according as solicitude is the act of a special virtue. + For certain sins are special through being about a special matter, as lust is about sexual matters, while some vices are special + on account of their having a special kind of act which extends to all kinds of matter, + and such are all vices affecting an act of reason, since every act of reason extends to any kind of moral matter. Since then + solicitude is a special act of reason, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q54_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A9.html">Q[47], A[9]</a>), it follows that negligence, which denotes lack of solicitude, is a special sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Diligence seems to be the same as solicitude, because the more we love [diligimus] a thing the more solicitous are we about + it. Hence diligence, no less than solicitude, is required for every virtue, in so far as due acts of reason are requisite + for every virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In every sin there must needs be a defect affecting an act of reason, for instance a defect in counsel or the like. Hence + just as precipitation is a special sin on account of a special act of reason which is omitted, namely counsel, although it + may be found in any kind of sin; so negligence is a special sin on account of the lack of a special act of reason, namely + solicitude, although it is found more or less in all sins. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Properly speaking the matter of negligence is a good that one ought to do, not that it is a good when it is done negligently, + but because on account of negligence it incurs a lack of goodness, whether a due act be entirely omitted through lack of solicitude, + or some due circumstance be omitted. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q54.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q54_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q54_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q54_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q54_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q54_A2-p0.1">Whether negligence is opposed to prudence?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q54_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that negligence is not opposed to prudence. For negligence seems to be the same as idleness or laziness, which + belongs to sloth, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Now sloth is not opposed to prudence, but to charity, as stated + above ( + <a id="SS_Q54_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q35_A3.html">Q[35], A[3]</a>). Therefore negligence is not opposed to prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every sin of omission seems to be due to negligence. But sins of omission are not opposed to prudence, but to the + executive moral virtues. Therefore negligence is not opposed to prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, imprudence relates to some act of reason. But negligence does not imply a defect of counsel, for that is "precipitation," + nor a defect of judgment, since that is "thoughtlessness," nor a defect of command, because that is "inconstancy." Therefore + negligence does not pertain to imprudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q54_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.19" target="asv">Eccles. 7:19</a>): "He that feareth God, neglecteth nothing." But every sin is excluded by the opposite virtue. Therefore negligence is opposed + to fear rather than to prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q54_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.20.7" target="asv">Ecclus. 20:7</a>): "A babbler and a fool [imprudens] will regard no time." Now this is due to negligence. Therefore negligence is opposed + to prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Negligence is directly opposed to solicitude. Now solicitude pertains to the reason, and rectitude of solicitude to prudence. + Hence, on the other hand, negligence pertains to imprudence. This appears from its very name, because, as Isidore observes + (Etym. x) "a negligent man is one who fails to choose [nec eligens]": and the right choice of the means belongs to prudence. + Therefore negligence pertains to imprudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Negligence is a defect in the internal act, to which choice also belongs: whereas idleness and laziness denote slowness of + execution, yet so that idleness denotes slowness in setting about the execution, while laziness denotes remissness in the + execution itself. Hence it is becoming that laziness should arise from sloth, which is "an oppressive sorrow," i.e. hindering, + the mind from action [*Cf. Q[35], A[1]; + <a id="SS_Q54_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q35_A8.html">FS, Q[35], + A[8] + </a>]. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Omission regards the external act, for it consists in failing to perform an act which is due. Hence it is opposed to justice, + and is an effect of negligence, even as the execution of a just deed is the effect of right reason. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Negligence regards the act of command, which solicitude also regards. Yet the negligent man fails in regard to this act otherwise + than the inconstant man: for the inconstant man fails in commanding, being hindered as it were, by something, whereas the + negligent man fails through lack of a prompt will. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The fear of God helps us to avoid all sins, because according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q54_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.27" target="asv"> Prov. 15:27, </a> "by the fear of the Lord everyone declineth from evil." Hence fear makes us avoid negligence, yet not as though negligence + were directly opposed to fear, but because fear incites man to acts of reason. Wherefore also it has been stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q54_A2-p11.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q44_A2.html">FS, Q[44], A[2]</a>) when we were treating of the passions, that "fear makes us take + counsel." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q54_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q54_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q54_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q54_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q54_A3-p0.1">Whether negligence can be a mortal sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q54_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that negligence cannot be a mortal sin. For a gloss of Gregory [*Moral. ix. 34] on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q54_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.9.28" target="asv"> Job 9:28, </a> "I feared all my works," etc. says that "too little love of God aggravates the former," viz. negligence. But wherever there + is mortal sin, the love of God is done away with altogether. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q54_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.7.34" target="asv"> Ecclus. 7:34, </a> "For thy negligences purify thyself with a few," says: "Though the offering be small it cleanses the negligences of many + sins." Now this would not be, if negligence were a mortal sin. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, under the law certain sacrifices were prescribed for mortal sins, as appears from the book of Leviticus. Yet no + sacrifice was prescribed for negligence. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q54_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.19.16" target="asv">Prov. 19:16</a>): "He that neglecteth his own life [Vulg.: 'way'] shall die." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[2], ad 3), negligence arises out of a certain remissness of the will, the result being a lack of solicitude + on the part of the reason in commanding what it should command, or as it should command. Accordingly negligence may happen + to be a mortal sin in two ways. First on the part of that which is omitted through negligence. If this be either an act or + a circumstance necessary for salvation, it will be a mortal sin. Secondly on the part of + the cause: for if the will be so remiss about Divine things, as to fall away altogether from the charity of God, such negligence + is a mortal sin, and this is the case chiefly when negligence is due to contempt. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A3-p7"> But if negligence consists in the omission of an act or circumstance that is not necessary for salvation, it is not a mortal + but a venial sin, provided the negligence arise, not from contempt, but from some lack of fervor, to which venial sin is an + occasional obstacle. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man may be said to love God less in two ways. First through lack of the fervor of charity, and this causes the negligence + that is a venial sin: secondly through lack of charity itself, in which sense we say that a man loves God less when he loves + Him with a merely natural love; and this causes the negligence that is a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to the same authority (gloss), a small offering made with a humble mind and out of pure love, cleanses man not + only from venial but also from mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When negligence consists in the omission of that which is necessary for salvation, it is drawn to the other more manifest + genus of sin. Because those sins that consist of inward actions, are more hidden, wherefore no special sacrifices were prescribed + for them in the Law, since the offering of sacrifices was a kind of public confession of sin, whereas hidden sins should not + be confessed in public. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q54_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q54_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q53_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q54_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q55" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q54_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q55-p0.1">OF VICES OPPOSED TO PRUDENCE BY WAY OF RESEMBLANCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q55-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q55-p2"> We must now consider those vices opposed to prudence, which have a resemblance thereto. Under this head there are eight points + of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55-p3"> (1) Whether prudence of the flesh is a sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q55-p4"> (2) Whether it is a mortal sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q55-p5"> (3) Whether craftiness is a special sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q55-p6"> (4) Of guile;</p> + <p id="SS_Q55-p7"> (5) Of fraud;</p> + <p id="SS_Q55-p8"> (6) Of solicitude about temporal things;</p> + <p id="SS_Q55-p9"> (7) Of solicitude about the future;</p> + <p id="SS_Q55-p10"> (8) Of the origin of these vices.</p> + <div id="SS_Q55_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q55_A1-p0.1">Whether prudence of the flesh is a sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q55_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prudence of the flesh is not a sin. For prudence is more excellent than the other moral virtues, since + it governs them all. But no justice or temperance is sinful. Neither therefore is any prudence a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is not a sin to act prudently for an end which it is lawful to love. But it is lawful to love the flesh, "for + no man ever hated his own flesh" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.29" target="asv">Eph. 5:29</a>). Therefore prudence of the flesh is not a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as man is tempted by the flesh, so too is he tempted by the world and the devil. But no prudence of the world, + or of the devil is accounted a sin. Therefore neither should any prudence of the flesh be accounted among sins. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> No man is an enemy to God save for wickedness according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.9" target="asv"> Wis. 14:9, </a> "To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike." Now it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.7" target="asv">Rom. 8:7</a>): "The prudence [Vulg.: 'wisdom'] of the flesh is an enemy to God." Therefore prudence of the flesh is a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[47], A[13]), prudence regards things which are directed to the end of life as a whole. Hence prudence + of the flesh signifies properly the prudence of a man who looks upon carnal goods as the last end of his life. Now it is evident + that this is a sin, because it involves a disorder in man with respect to his last end, which does not consist in the goods + of the body, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q55_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q2_A5.html">FS, Q[2], A[5]</a>). Therefore + prudence of the flesh is a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Justice and temperance include in their very nature that which ranks them among the virtues, viz. equality and the curbing + of concupiscence; hence they are never taken in a bad sense. On the other hand prudence is so called from foreseeing [providendo], + as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q55_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A1.html">Q[47], A[1]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q55_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q49_A6.html"> Q[49], A[6]</a>), which can extend to evil things also. Therefore, although prudence is taken simply in a good sense, yet, if + something be added, it may be taken in a bad sense: and it is thus that prudence of the flesh is said to be a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The flesh is on account of the soul, as matter is on account of the form, and the instrument on account of the principal + agent. Hence the flesh is loved lawfully, if it be directed to the good of the soul as its end. If, however, a man place his + last end in a good of the flesh, his love will be inordinate and unlawful, and it is thus that the prudence of the flesh is + directed to the love of the flesh. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The devil tempts us, not through the good of the appetible object, but by way of suggestion. Wherefore, since prudence implies + direction to some appetible end, we do not speak of "prudence of the devil," as of a prudence directed to some evil end, which + is the aspect under which the world and the flesh tempt us, in so far as worldly or carnal goods are proposed to our appetite. + Hence we speak of "carnal" and again of "worldly" prudence, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.8" target="asv"> Lk. 16:8, </a> "The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser'] in their generation," etc. The Apostle includes all in the + "prudence of the flesh," because we covet the external things of the world on account of the flesh. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A1-p10"> We may also reply that since prudence is in a certain sense called "wisdom," as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q55_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A2.html">Q[47], A[2]</a>, ad 1), we may distinguish a threefold prudence corresponding to the three kinds of temptation. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Jas.3.15" target="asv">James 3:15</a>) that there is a wisdom which is "earthly, sensual and devilish," as explained above ( + <a id="SS_Q55_A1-p10.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q45_A1.html">Q[45], A[1]</a>, ad 1), when we were treating of wisdom. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q55_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q55_A2-p0.1">Whether prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q55_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin. For it is a mortal sin to rebel against the Divine law, since this + implies contempt of God. Now "the prudence [Douay: 'wisdom'] of the flesh . . . is not subject to the law of God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.7" target="asv">Rom. 8:7</a>). Therefore prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every sin against the Holy Ghost is a mortal sin. Now prudence of the flesh seems to be a sin against the Holy Ghost, + for "it cannot be subject to the law of God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.7" target="asv">Rom. 8:7</a>), and so it seems to be an unpardonable sin, which is proper to the sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore prudence of the + flesh is a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the greatest evil is opposed to the greatest good, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10. Now prudence of the flesh is opposed + to that prudence which is the chief of the moral virtues. Therefore prudence of the flesh is chief among mortal sins, so that + it is itself a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> That which diminishes a sin has not of itself the nature of a mortal sin. Now the thoughtful quest of things pertaining to + the care of the flesh, which seems to pertain to carnal prudence, diminishes sin [*Cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.30" target="asv"> Prov. 6:30</a>]. Therefore prudence of the flesh has not of itself the nature of a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[47], A[2], ad 1; A[13]), a man is said to be prudent in two ways. First, simply, i.e. in relation to the + end of life as a whole. Secondly, relatively, i.e. in relation to some particular end; thus a man is said to be prudent in + business or something else of the kind. Accordingly if prudence of the flesh be taken as corresponding to prudence in its + absolute signification, so that a man place the last end of his whole life in the care of the + flesh, it is a mortal sin, because he turns away from God by so doing, since he cannot have several last ends, as stated above + ( + <a id="SS_Q55_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A5.html">FS, Q[1], A[5]</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A2-p7"> If, on the other hand, prudence of the flesh be taken as corresponding to particular prudence, it is a venial sin. For it + happens sometimes that a man has an inordinate affection for some pleasure of the flesh, without turning away from God by + a mortal sin; in which case he does not place the end of his whole life in carnal pleasure. To apply oneself to obtain this + pleasure is a venial sin and pertains to prudence of the flesh. But if a man actually refers the care of the flesh + to a good end, as when one is careful about one's food in order to sustain one's body, this is no longer prudence of the flesh, + because then one uses the care of the flesh as a means to an end. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle is speaking of that carnal prudence whereby a man places the end of his whole life in the goods of the flesh, + and this is a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Prudence of the flesh does not imply a sin against the Holy Ghost. For when it is stated that "it cannot be subject to the + law of God," this does not mean that he who has prudence of the flesh, cannot be converted and submit to the law of God, but + that carnal prudence itself cannot be subject to God's law, even as neither can injustice be just, nor heat cold, although + that which is hot may become cold. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every sin is opposed to prudence, just as prudence is shared by every virtue. But it does not follow that every sin opposed + to prudence is most grave, but only when it is opposed to prudence in some very grave matter. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q55_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q55_A3-p0.1">Whether craftiness is a special sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q55_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that craftiness is not a special sin. For the words of Holy Writ do not induce anyone to sin; and yet they + induce us to be crafty, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.1.4" target="asv"> Prov. 1:4, </a> "To give craftiness [Douay: 'subtlety'] to little ones." Therefore craftiness is not a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.13.16" target="asv">Prov. 13:16</a>): "The crafty [Douay: 'prudent'] man doth all things with counsel." Therefore, he does so either for a good or for an evil + end. If for a good end, there is no sin seemingly, and if for an evil end, it would seem to pertain to carnal or worldly prudence. + Therefore craftiness is not a special sin distinct from prudence of the flesh. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory expounding the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.12" target="asv">Job 12</a>, "The simplicity of the just man is laughed to scorn," says (Moral. x, 29): "The wisdom of this world is to hide one's thoughts + by artifice, to conceal one's meaning by words, to represent error as truth, to make out the truth to be false," and further + on he adds: "This prudence is acquired by the young, it is learnt at a price by children." Now the above things seem to belong + to craftiness. Therefore craftiness + is not distinct from carnal or worldly prudence, and consequently it seems not to be a special sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.4.2" target="asv">2 Cor. 4:2</a>): "We renounce the hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness, nor adulterating the word of God." Therefore craftiness + is a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Prudence is "right reason applied to action," just as science is "right reason applied to knowledge." In speculative matters + one may sin against rectitude of knowledge in two ways: in one way when the reason is led to a false conclusion that appears + to be true; in another way when the reason proceeds from false premises, that appear to be true, either to a true or to a + false conclusion. Even so a sin may be against prudence, through having some resemblance + thereto, in two ways. First, when the purpose of the reason is directed to an end which is good not in truth but in appearance, + and this pertains to prudence of the flesh; secondly, when, in order to obtain a certain end, whether good or evil, a man + uses means that are not true but fictitious and counterfeit, and this belongs to the sin of craftiness. This is consequently + a sin opposed to prudence, and distinct from prudence of the flesh. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine observes (Contra Julian. iv, 3) just as prudence is sometimes improperly taken in a bad sense, so is craftiness + sometimes taken in a good sense, and this on account of their mutual resemblance. Properly speaking, however, craftiness is + taken in a bad sense, as the Philosopher states in Ethic. vi, 12. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Craftiness can take counsel both for a good end and for an evil end: nor should a good end be pursued by means that are false + and counterfeit but by such as are true. Hence craftiness is a sin if it be directed to a good end. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Under "worldly prudence" Gregory included everything that can pertain to false prudence, so that it comprises craftiness + also. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q55_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q55_A4-p0.1">Whether guile is a sin pertaining to craftiness?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q55_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that guile is not a sin pertaining to craftiness. For sin, especially mortal, has no place in perfect men. + Yet a certain guile is to be found in them, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.16" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:16, </a> "Being crafty I caught you by guile." Therefore guile is not always a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, guile seems to pertain chiefly to the tongue, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.5.11" target="asv"> Ps. 5:11, </a> "They dealt deceitfully with their tongues." Now craftiness like prudence is in the very act of reason. Therefore guile does + not pertain to craftiness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.12.20" target="asv">Prov. 12:20</a>): "Guile [Douay: 'Deceit'] is in the heart of them that think evil things." But the thought of evil things does not always + pertain to craftiness. Therefore guile does not seem to belong to craftiness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Craftiness aims at lying in wait, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.14" target="asv">Eph. 4:14</a>, "By cunning craftiness by which they lie in wait to deceive": and guile aims at this also. Therefore guile pertains to craftiness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q55_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q55_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, it belongs to craftiness to adopt ways that are not true but counterfeit and apparently true, in order to attain some end + either good or evil. Now the adopting of such ways may be subjected to a twofold consideration; first, as regards the process + of thinking them out, and this belongs properly to craftiness, even as thinking out right ways to a due end belongs to prudence. + Secondly the adopting of such like + ways may be considered with regard to their actual execution, and in this way it belongs to guile. Hence guile denotes a certain + execution of craftiness, and accordingly belongs thereto. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as craftiness is taken properly in a bad sense, and improperly in a good sense, so too is guile which is the execution + of craftiness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The execution of craftiness with the purpose of deceiving, is effected first and foremost by words, which hold the chief + place among those signs whereby a man signifies something to another man, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), hence + guile is ascribed chiefly to speech. Yet guile may happen also in deeds, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.104.25" target="asv">Ps. 104:25</a>, "And to deal deceitfully with his servants." Guile is also in the heart, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A4-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.19.23" target="asv"> Ecclus. + 19:23, + </a>"His interior is full of deceit," but this is to devise deceits, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A4-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.37.13" target="asv"> Ps. 37:13</a>: "They studied deceits all the day long." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Whoever purposes to do some evil deed, must needs devise certain ways of attaining his purpose, and for the most part he + devises deceitful ways, whereby the more easily to obtain his end. Nevertheless it happens sometimes that evil is done openly + and by violence without craftiness and guile; but as this is more difficult, it is of less frequent occurrence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q55_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q55_A5-p0.1">Whether fraud pertains to craftiness?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q55_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fraud does not pertain to craftiness. For a man does not deserve praise if he allows himself to be deceived, + which is the object of craftiness; and yet a man deserves praise for allowing himself to be defrauded, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.1" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:1, </a> "Why do you not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?" Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fraud seems to consist in unlawfully taking or receiving external things, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.1" target="asv">Acts 5:1</a>) that "a certain man named Ananias with Saphira his wife, sold a piece of land, and by fraud kept back part of the price + of the land." Now it pertains to injustice or illiberality to take possession of or retain external things unjustly. Therefore + fraud does not belong to craftiness which is opposed to prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no man employs craftiness against himself. But the frauds of some are against themselves, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.1.18" target="asv">Prov. 1:18</a>) concerning some "that they practice frauds [Douay: 'deceits'] against their own souls." Therefore fraud does not belong + to craftiness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The object of fraud is to deceive, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.13.9" target="asv">Job 13:9</a>, "Shall he be deceived as a man, with your fraudulent [Douay: 'deceitful'] dealings?" Now craftiness is directed to the same + object. Therefore fraud pertains to craftiness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Just as "guile" consists in the execution of craftiness, so also does "fraud." But they seem to differ in the fact that "guile" + belongs in general to the execution of craftiness, whether this be effected by words, or by deeds, whereas "fraud" belongs + more properly to the execution of craftiness by deeds. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle does not counsel the faithful to be deceived in their knowledge, but to bear patiently the effect of being deceived, + and to endure wrongs inflicted on them by fraud. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The execution of craftiness may be carried out by another vice, just as the execution of prudence by the virtues: and accordingly + nothing hinders fraud from pertaining to covetousness or illiberality. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those who commit frauds, do not design anything against themselves or their own souls; it is through God's just judgment + that what they plot against others, recoils on themselves, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.7.16" target="asv">Ps. 7:16</a>, "He is fallen into the hole he made." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q55_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q55_A6-p0.1">Whether it is lawful to be solicitous about temporal matters?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q55_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem lawful to be solicitous about temporal matters. Because a superior should be solicitous for his subjects, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.8" target="asv"> Rom. 12:8, </a> "He that ruleth, with solicitude." Now according to the Divine ordering, man is placed over temporal things, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A6-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.8.8" target="asv"> Ps. 8:8, </a> "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet," etc. Therefore man should be solicitous about temporal things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everyone is solicitous about the end for which he works. Now it is lawful for a man to work for the temporal things + whereby he sustains life, wherefore the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiThess.3.10" target="asv">2 Thess. 3:10</a>): "If any man will not work, neither let him eat." Therefore it is lawful to be solicitous about temporal things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, solicitude about works of mercy is praiseworthy, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.1.17" target="asv">2 Tim. 1:17, </a> "When he was come to Rome, he carefully sought me." Now solicitude about temporal things is sometimes connected with works + of mercy; for instance, when a man is solicitous to watch over the interests of orphans and poor persons. Therefore solicitude + about temporal things is not unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.31" target="asv">Mat. 6:31</a>): "Be not solicitous . . . saying, What shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewith shall we be clothed?" And yet + such things are very necessary. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Solicitude denotes an earnest endeavor to obtain something. Now it is evident that the endeavor is more earnest when there + is fear of failure, so that there is less solicitude when success is assured. Accordingly solicitude about temporal things + may be unlawful in three ways. First on the part of the object of solicitude; that is, if we seek temporal things as an end. + Hence Augustine says (De Operibus Monach. xxvi): "When Our Lord said: 'Be not solicitous,' + etc. . . . He intended to forbid them either to make such things their end, or for the sake of these things to do whatever + they were commanded to do in preaching the Gospel." Secondly, solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful, through too + much earnestness in endeavoring to obtain temporal things, the result being that a man is drawn away from spiritual things + which ought to be the chief object of his search, wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.22" target="asv">Mat. 13:22</a>) that "the care of this world . . . chokes + up the word." Thirdly, through over much fear, when, to wit, a man fears to lack necessary things if he do what he ought to + do. Now our Lord gives three motives for laying aside this fear. First, on account of the yet greater favors bestowed by God + on man, independently of his solicitude, viz. his body and soul ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A6-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.26" target="asv">Mat. 6:26</a>); secondly, on account of the care with which God watches over animals and plants without the assistance of man, according + to the requirements of their + nature; thirdly, because of Divine providence, through ignorance of which the gentiles are solicitous in seeking temporal + goods before all others. Consequently He concludes that we should be solicitous most of all about spiritual goods, hoping + that temporal goods also may be granted us according to our needs, if we do what we ought to do. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Temporal goods are subjected to man that he may use them according to his needs, not that he may place his end in them and + be over solicitous about them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The solicitude of a man who gains his bread by bodily labor is not superfluous but proportionate; hence Jerome says on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.31" target="asv"> Mat. 6:31, </a> "Be not solicitous," that "labor is necessary, but solicitude must be banished," namely superfluous solicitude which unsettles + the mind. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the works of mercy solicitude about temporal things is directed to charity as its end, wherefore it is not unlawful, unless + it be superfluous. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A6-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A6-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q55_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q55_A7-p0.1">Whether we should be solicitous about the future?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q55_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we should be solicitous about the future. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.6" target="asv">Prov. 6:6-8</a>): "Go to the ant, O sluggard, and consider her ways and learn wisdom; which, although she hath no guide, nor master . . . + provideth her meat for herself in the summer, and gathereth her food in the harvest." Now this is to be solicitous about the + future. Therefore solicitude about the future is praiseworthy. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, solicitude pertains to prudence. But prudence is chiefly about the future, since its principal part is "foresight + of future things," as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q55_A7-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q49_A6.html">Q[49], A[6]</a>, ad 1). Therefore it is virtuous to be solicitous about the future. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever puts something by that he may keep it for the morrow, is solicitous about the future. Now we read ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.12.6" target="asv">Jn. 12:6</a>) that Christ had a bag for keeping things in, which Judas carried, and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A7-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Acts.4.34" target="asv">Acts 4:34-37</a>) that the Apostles kept the price of the land, which had been laid at their feet. Therefore it is lawful to be solicitous + about the future. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.34" target="asv">Mat. 6:34</a>): "Be not . . . solicitous for tomorrow"; where "tomorrow" stands for the future, as Jerome says in his commentary on this + passage. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> No work can be virtuous, unless it be vested with its due circumstances, and among these is the due time, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q55_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.8.6" target="asv"> Eccles. 8:6, </a> "There is a time and opportunity for every business"; which applies not only to external deeds but also to internal solicitude. + For every time has its own fitting proper solicitude; thus solicitude about the crops belongs to the summer time, and solicitude + about the vintage to the time of autumn. Accordingly + if a man were solicitous about the vintage during the summer, he would be needlessly forestalling the solicitude belonging + to a future time. Hence Our Lord forbids such like excessive solicitude, saying: "Be . . . not solicitous for tomorrow," wherefore + He adds, "for the morrow will be solicitous for itself," that is to say, the morrow will have its own solicitude, which will + be burden enough for the soul. This is what He means by adding: "Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof," namely, + the burden of solicitude. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The ant is solicitous at a befitting time, and it is this that is proposed for our example. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Due foresight of the future belongs to prudence. But it would be an inordinate foresight or solicitude about the future, + if a man were to seek temporal things, to which the terms "past" and "future" apply, as ends, or if he were to seek them in + excess of the needs of the present life, or if he were to forestall the time for solicitude. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 17), "when we see a servant of God taking thought lest he lack these needful + things, we must not judge him to be solicitous for the morrow, since even Our Lord deigned for our example to have a purse, + and we read in the Acts of the Apostles that they procured the necessary means of livelihood in view of the future on account + of a threatened famine. Hence Our Lord does not condemn those who according to + human custom, provide themselves with such things, but those who oppose themselves to God for the sake of these things." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A7-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A7-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q55_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q56.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q55_A8-p0.1">Whether these vices arise from covetousness?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q55_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that these vices do not arise from covetousness. As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q55_A8-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q43_A6.html">Q[43], A[6]</a>) lust is the chief cause of lack of rectitude in the reason. Now these vices are opposed to right reason, i.e. to prudence. + Therefore they arise chiefly from lust; especially since the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "Venus is full of guile + and her girdle is many colored" and that "he who is incontinent in desire acts with cunning." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, these vices bear a certain resemblance to prudence, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q55_A8-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A13.html">Q[47], A[13]</a>). Now, since prudence is in the reason, the more spiritual vices seem to be more akin thereto, such as pride and vainglory. + Therefore the aforesaid vices seem to arise from pride rather than from covetousness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, men make use of stratagems not only in laying hold of other people's goods, but also in plotting murders, the former + of which pertains to covetousness, and the latter to anger. Now the use of stratagems pertains to craftiness, guile, and fraud. + Therefore the aforesaid vices arise not only from covetousness, but also from anger. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states that fraud is a daughter of covetousness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q55_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q55_A3.html">(A[3];</a> Q[47], A[13]), carnal prudence and craftiness, as well as guile and fraud, bear a certain resemblance to prudence in some + kind of use of the reason. Now among all the moral virtues it is justice wherein the use of right reason appears chiefly, + for justice is in the rational appetite. Hence the undue use of reason appears chiefly in the vices opposed to justice, the + chief of which is covetousness. Therefore the + aforesaid vices arise chiefly from covetousness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> On account of the vehemence of pleasure and of concupiscence, lust entirely suppresses the reason from exercising its act: + whereas in the aforesaid vices there is some use of reason, albeit inordinate. Hence these vices do not arise directly from + lust. When the Philosopher says that "Venus is full of guile," he is referring to a certain resemblance, in so far as she + carries man away suddenly, just as he is moved in deceitful actions, yet not by means + of craftiness but rather by the vehemence of concupiscence and pleasure; wherefore he adds that "Venus doth cozen the wits + of the wisest man" [*Cf. Iliad xiv, 214-217]. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To do anything by stratagem seems to be due to pusillanimity: because a magnanimous man wishes to act openly, as the Philosopher + says (Ethic. iv, 3). Wherefore, as pride resembles or apes magnanimity, it follows that the aforesaid vices which make use + of fraud and guile, do not arise directly from pride, but rather from covetousness, which seeks its own profit and sets little + by excellence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Anger's movement is sudden, hence it acts with precipitation, and without counsel, contrary to the use of the aforesaid vices, + though these use counsel inordinately. That men use stratagems in plotting murders, arises not from anger but rather from + hatred, because the angry man desires to harm manifestly, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2,3) [*Cf. Ethic. vii, 6]. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A8-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q55_A8-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q56.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q54_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q56" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q56_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q56-p0.1">OF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO PRUDENCE (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q56-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q56-p2"> We must now consider the precepts relating to prudence, under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q56-p3"> (1) The precepts of prudence;</p> + <p id="SS_Q56-p4"> (2) The precepts relating to the opposite vices.</p> + <div id="SS_Q56_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q56.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q56_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q56_A1-p0.1">Whether the precepts of the decalogue should have included a precept of prudence?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q56_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q56_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue should have included a precept of prudence. For the chief precepts should + include a precept of the chief virtue. Now the chief precepts are those of the decalogue. Since then prudence is the chief + of the moral virtues, it seems that the precepts of the decalogue should have included a precept of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q56_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the teaching of the Gospel contains the Law especially with regard to the precepts of the decalogue. Now the teaching + of the Gospel contains a precept of prudence ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q56_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.16" target="asv">Mat. 10:16</a>): "Be ye . . . prudent [Douay: 'wise'] as serpents." Therefore the precepts of the decalogue should have included a precept + of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q56_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the other lessons of the Old Testament are directed to the precepts of the decalogue: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q56_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.4.4" target="asv">Malach. 4:4</a>): "Remember the law of Moses My servant, which I commanded him in Horeb." Now the other lessons of the Old Testament include + precepts of prudence; for instance ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q56_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.5" target="asv">Prov. 3:5</a>): "Lean not upon thy own prudence"; and further on ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q56_A1-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Prov.4.25" target="asv">Prov. 4:25</a>): "Let thine eyelids go before thy + steps." Therefore the Law also should have contained a precept of prudence, especially among the precepts of the decalogue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q56_A1-p5"> The contrary however appears to anyone who goes through the precepts of the decalogue.</p> + <p id="SS_Q56_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q56_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q100_A3.html">FS, Q[100], A[3]</a>; A[5], ad 1) when we were treating of precepts, the commandments of the decalogue being given to the whole people, are a + matter of common knowledge to all, as coming under the purview of natural reason. Now foremost among the things dictated by + natural reason are the ends of human life, which are to the practical order what naturally known principles are to the speculative + order, as shown above + (Q[47], A[6]). Now prudence is not about the end, but about the means, as stated above (Q[47], A[6]). Hence it was not fitting + that the precepts of the decalogue should include a precept relating directly to prudence. And yet all the precepts of the + decalogue are related to prudence, in so far as it directs all virtuous acts. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q56_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although prudence is simply foremost among all the moral virtues, yet justice, more than any other virtue, regards its object + under the aspect of something due, which is a necessary condition for a precept, as stated above (Q[44], A[1]; + <a id="SS_Q56_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q99_A1.html">FS, Q[99], AA[1]</a>,5). Hence it behooved the chief precepts of the Law, which are those of the decalogue, to refer to justice rather than to + prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q56_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The teaching of the Gospel is the doctrine of perfection. Therefore it needed to instruct man perfectly in all matters relating + to right conduct, whether ends or means: wherefore it behooved the Gospel teaching to contain precepts also of prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q56_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as the rest of the teaching of the Old Testament is directed to the precepts of the decalogue as its end, so it behooved + man to be instructed by the subsequent lessons of the Old Testament about the act of prudence which is directed to the means. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q56_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q56_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q56.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q56_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q56_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q56_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q57.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q56_A2-p0.1">Whether the prohibitive precepts relating to the vices opposed to prudence are fittingly propounded in the Old Law?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q56_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q56_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the prohibitive precepts relating to the vices opposed to prudence are unfittingly propounded in the Old + Law. For such vices as imprudence and its parts which are directly opposed to prudence are not less opposed thereto, than + those which bear a certain resemblance to prudence, such as craftiness and vices connected with it. Now the latter vices are + forbidden in the Law: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q56_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.13" target="asv">Lev. 19:13</a>): "Thou shalt not calumniate thy + neighbor," and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q56_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.13" target="asv">Dt. 25:13</a>): "Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag, a greater and a less." Therefore there should have also been prohibitive + precepts about the vices directly opposed to prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q56_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is room for fraud in other things than in buying and selling. Therefore the Law unfittingly forbade fraud + solely in buying and selling. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q56_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there is the same reason for prescribing an act of virtue as for prohibiting the act of a contrary vice. But acts + of prudence are not prescribed in the Law. Therefore neither should any contrary vices have been forbidden in the Law. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q56_A2-p5"> The contrary, however, appears from the precepts of the Law which are quoted in the first objection.</p> + <p id="SS_Q56_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q56_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q56_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, justice, above all, regards the aspect of something due, which is a necessary condition for a precept, because justice tends + to render that which is due to another, as we shall state further on (Q[58], A[2]). Now craftiness, as to its execution, is + committed chiefly in matters of justice, as stated above (Q[55], A[8]): and so it was fitting that the Law should contain + precepts forbidding the execution of + craftiness, in so far as this pertains to injustice, as when a man uses guile and fraud in calumniating another or in stealing + his goods. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q56_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those vices that are manifestly opposed to prudence, do not pertain to injustice in the same way as the execution of craftiness, + and so they are not forbidden in the Law, as fraud and guile are, which latter pertain to injustice + </p> + <p id="SS_Q56_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All guile and fraud committed in matters of injustice, can be understood to be forbidden in the prohibition of calumny ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q56_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.13" target="asv">Lev. 19:13</a>). Yet fraud and guile are wont to be practiced chiefly in buying and selling, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q56_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.26.28" target="asv"> Ecclus. 26:28, </a> "A huckster shall not be justified from the sins of the lips": and it is for this reason that the Law contained a special + precept forbidding fraudulent buying and selling. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q56_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All the precepts of the Law that relate to acts of justice pertain to the execution of prudence, even as the precepts prohibitive + of stealing, calumny and fraudulent selling pertain to the execution of craftiness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q56_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q56_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q56_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q57.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q55_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q56_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q57" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q56_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q57_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q57-p0.1">OF RIGHT (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q57-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q57-p2"></p> + <p id="SS_Q57-p3"> After considering prudence we must in due sequence consider justice, the consideration of which will be fourfold:</p> + <p id="SS_Q57-p4"> (1) Of justice;</p> + <p id="SS_Q57-p5"> (2) Of its parts;</p> + <p id="SS_Q57-p6"> (3) Of the corresponding gift;</p> + <p id="SS_Q57-p7"> (4) Of the precepts relating to justice.</p> + <p id="SS_Q57-p8"> Four points will have to be considered about justice: (1) Right; (2) Justice itself; (3) Injustice; (4) Judgment.</p> + <p id="SS_Q57-p9"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q57-p10"> (1) Whether right is the object of justice?</p> + <p id="SS_Q57-p11"> (2) Whether right is fittingly divided into natural and positive right?</p> + <p id="SS_Q57-p12"> (3) Whether the right of nations is the same as natural right?</p> + <p id="SS_Q57-p13"> (4) Whether right of dominion and paternal right are distinct species?</p> + <div id="SS_Q57_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q57.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q57_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q57_A1-p0.1">Whether right is the object of justice?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q57_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that right is not the object of justice. For the jurist Celsus says [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 1] that + "right is the art of goodness and equality." Now art is not the object of justice, but is by itself an intellectual virtue. + Therefore right is not the object of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Law," according to Isidore (Etym. v, 3), "is a kind of right." Now law is the object not of justice but of prudence, + wherefore the Philosopher [*Ethic. vi, 8] reckons "legislative" as one of the parts of prudence. Therefore right is not the + object of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, justice, before all, subjects man to God: for Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "justice is love serving + God alone, and consequently governing aright all things subject to man." Now right [jus] does not pertain to Divine things, + but only to human affairs, for Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that "'fas' is the Divine law, and 'jus,' the human law." Therefore + right is not the object of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that "'jus' [right] is so called because it is just." Now the "just" is the object of justice, + for the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that "all are agreed in giving the name of justice to the habit which makes men + capable of doing just actions." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is proper to justice, as compared with the other virtues, to direct man in his relations with others: because it denotes + a kind of equality, as its very name implies; indeed we are wont to say that things are adjusted when they are made equal, + for equality is in reference of one thing to some other. On the other hand the other virtues perfect man in those matters + only which befit him in relation to himself. Accordingly that which is right in the works of + the other virtues, and to which the intention of the virtue tends as to its proper object, depends on its relation to the + agent only, whereas the right in a work of justice, besides its relation to the agent, is set up by its relation to others. + Because a man's work is said to be just when it is related to some other by way of some kind of equality, for instance the + payment of the wage due for a service rendered. And so a thing is said to be just, as having the rectitude of justice, when + it is + the term of an act of justice, without taking into account the way in which it is done by the agent: whereas in the other + virtues nothing is declared to be right unless it is done in a certain way by the agent. For this reason justice has its own + special proper object over and above the other virtues, and this object is called the just, which is the same as "right." + Hence it is evident that right is the object of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is usual for words to be distorted from their original signification so as to mean something else: thus the word "medicine" + was first employed to signify a remedy used for curing a sick person, and then it was drawn to signify the art by which this + is done. In like manner the word "jus" [right] was first of all used to denote the just thing itself, but afterwards it was + transferred to designate the art whereby it is known what is just, and further + to denote the place where justice is administered, thus a man is said to appear "in jure" [*In English we speak of a court + of law, a barrister at law, etc.], and yet further, we say even that a man, who has the office of exercising justice, administers + the jus even if his sentence be unjust. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as there pre-exists in the mind of the craftsman an expression of the things to be made externally by his craft, which + expression is called the rule of his craft, so too there pre-exists in the mind an expression of the particular just work + which the reason determines, and which is a kind of rule of prudence. If this rule be expressed in writing it is called a + "law," which according to Isidore (Etym. v, 1) is "a written decree": and so law is not + the same as right, but an expression of right. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since justice implies equality, and since we cannot offer God an equal return, it follows that we cannot make Him a perfectly + just repayment. For this reason the Divine law is not properly called "jus" but "fas," because, to wit, God is satisfied if + we accomplish what we can. Nevertheless justice tends to make man repay God as much as he can, by subjecting his mind to Him + entirely. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q57.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q57_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q57_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q57_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q57_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q57_A2-p0.1">Whether right is fittingly divided into natural right and positive right?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q57_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that right is not fittingly divided into natural right and positive right. For that which is natural is unchangeable, + and is the same for all. Now nothing of the kind is to be found in human affairs, since all the rules of human right fail + in certain cases, nor do they obtain force everywhere. Therefore there is no such thing as natural right. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is called "positive" when it proceeds from the human will. But a thing is not just, simply because it proceeds + from the human will, else a man's will could not be unjust. Since then the "just" and the "right" are the same, it seems that + there is no positive right. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Divine right is not natural right, since it transcends human nature. In like manner, neither is it positive right, + since it is based not on human, but on Divine authority. Therefore right is unfittingly divided into natural and positive. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "political justice is partly natural and partly legal," i.e. established by law. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q57_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q57_A1.html">(A[1])</a> the "right" or the "just" is a work that is adjusted to another person according to some kind of equality. Now a thing can + be adjusted to a man in two ways: first by its very nature, as when a man gives so much that he may receive equal value in + return, and this is called "natural right." In another way a thing is adjusted or commensurated to another person, by agreement, + or by common consent, when, to wit, a + man deems himself satisfied, if he receive so much. This can be done in two ways: first by private agreement, as that which + is confirmed by an agreement between private individuals; secondly, by public agreement, as when the whole community agrees + that something should be deemed as though it were adjusted and commensurated to another person, or when this is decreed by + the prince who is placed over the people, and acts in its stead, and this is called "positive right." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That which is natural to one whose nature is unchangeable, must needs be such always and everywhere. But man's nature is + changeable, wherefore that which is natural to man may sometimes fail. Thus the restitution of a deposit to the depositor + is in accordance with natural equality, and if human nature were always right, this would always have to be observed; but + since it happens sometimes that man's will is unrighteous there are cases in which a + deposit should not be restored, lest a man of unrighteous will make evil use of the thing deposited: as when a madman or an + enemy of the common weal demands the return of his weapons. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The human will can, by common agreement, make a thing to be just provided it be not, of itself, contrary to natural justice, + and it is in such matters that positive right has its place. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "in the case of + the legal just, it does not matter in the first instance whether it takes one form or another, it only matters when once it + is laid down." If, however, a thing is, of itself, contrary to natural right, the + human will cannot make it just, for instance by decreeing that it is lawful to steal or to commit adultery. Hence it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q57_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.10.1" target="asv">Is. 10:1</a>): "Woe to them that make wicked laws." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Divine right is that which is promulgated by God. Such things are partly those that are naturally just, yet their justice + is hidden to man, and partly are made just by God's decree. Hence also Divine right may be divided in respect of these two + things, even as human right is. For the Divine law commands certain things because they are good, and forbids others, because + they are evil, while others are good because they are prescribed, and others + evil because they are forbidden. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q57_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q57_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q57_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q57_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q57_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q57_A3-p0.1">Whether the right of nations is the same as the natural right?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q57_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the right of nations is the same as the natural right. For all men do not agree save in that which is + natural to them. Now all men agree in the right of nations; since the jurist [*Ulpian: Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i] "the + right of nations is that which is in use among all nations." Therefore the right of nations is the natural right. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, slavery among men is natural, for some are naturally slaves according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2). Now "slavery + belongs to the right of nations," as Isidore states (Etym. v, 4). Therefore the right of nations is a natural right. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, right as stated above + <a id="SS_Q57_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q57_A2.html">(A[2])</a> is divided into natural and positive. Now the right of nations is not a positive right, since all nations never agreed to + decree anything by common agreement. Therefore the right of nations is a natural right. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (Etym. v, 4) that "right is either natural, or civil, or right of nations," and consequently the right of nations + is distinct from natural right. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q57_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q57_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, the natural right or just is that which by its very nature is adjusted to or commensurate with another person. Now this + may happen in two ways; first, according as it is considered absolutely: thus a male by its very nature is commensurate with + the female to beget offspring by her, and a parent is commensurate with the offspring to nourish it. Secondly a thing is naturally + commensurate with another person, not + according as it is considered absolutely, but according to something resultant from it, for instance the possession of property. + For if a particular piece of land be considered absolutely, it contains no reason why it should belong to one man more than + to another, but if it be considered in respect of its adaptability to cultivation, and the unmolested use of the land, it + has a certain commensuration to be the property of one and not of another man, as the Philosopher shows (Polit. ii, 2). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A3-p7"> Now it belongs not only to man but also to other animals to apprehend a thing absolutely: wherefore the right which we call + natural, is common to us and other animals according to the first kind of commensuration. But the right of nations falls short + of natural right in this sense, as the jurist [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i] says because "the latter is common to all + animals, while the former is common to men only." On the other hand to consider a thing by comparing it with + what results from it, is proper to reason, wherefore this same is natural to man in respect of natural reason which dictates + it. Hence the jurist Gaius says (Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i, 9): "whatever natural reason decrees among all men, is + observed by all equally, and is called the right of nations." This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Considered absolutely, the fact that this particular man should be a slave rather than another man, is based, not on natural + reason, but on some resultant utility, in that it is useful to this man to be ruled by a wiser man, and to the latter to be + helped by the former, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 2). Wherefore slavery which belongs to the right of nations is + natural in the second way, but not in the first. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since natural reason dictates matters which are according to the right of nations, as implying a proximate equality, it follows + that they need no special institution, for they are instituted by natural reason itself, as stated by the authority quoted + above + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q57_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q57_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q57_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q57_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q57_A4-p0.1">Whether paternal right and right of dominion should be distinguished as special species?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q57_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "paternal right" and "right of dominion" should not be distinguished as special species. For it belongs + to justice to render to each one what is his, as Ambrose states (De Offic. i, 24). Now right is the object of justice, as + stated above + <a id="SS_Q57_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q57_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore right belongs to each one equally; and we ought not to distinguish the rights of fathers and masters as distinct + species. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the law is an expression of what is just, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Now a law looks to the common good of a + city or kingdom, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q57_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A2.html">FS, Q[90], A[2]</a>), but not to the private good of an individual or even of one household. Therefore there is no need for a special right of + dominion or paternal right, since the master and the father pertain to a household, as stated in Polit. i, 2. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there are many other differences of degrees among men, for instance some are soldiers, some are priests, some are + princes. Therefore some special kind of right should be allotted to them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) distinguishes right of dominion, paternal right and so on as species distinct from civil right. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Right or just depends on commensuration with another person. Now "another" has a twofold signification. First, it may denote + something that is other simply, as that which is altogether distinct; as, for example, two men neither of whom is subject + to the other, and both of whom are subjects of the ruler of the state; and between these according to the Philosopher (Ethic. + v, 6) there is the "just" simply. Secondly a thing is said to be other from something + else, not simply, but as belonging in some way to that something else: and in this way, as regards human affairs, a son belongs + to his father, since he is part of him somewhat, as stated in Ethic. viii, 12, and a slave belongs to his master, because + he is his instrument, as stated in Polit. i, 2 [*Cf. Ethic. viii, 11]. Hence a father is not compared to his son as to another + simply, and so between them there is not the just simply, but a kind of just, called "paternal." In like manner neither is + there the just simply, between master and servant, but that which is called "dominative." A wife, though she is something + belonging to the husband, since she stands related to him as to her own body, as the Apostle declares ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q57_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.28" target="asv">Eph. 5:28</a>), is nevertheless more distinct from her husband, than a son from his father, or a slave from his master: for she is received + into a kind of social life, that of matrimony, wherefore according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) there is more + scope for justice between husband and wife than between father and son, or master and slave, because, as husband and wife + have an immediate relation to the community of the household, as stated in Polit. i, 2,5, it follows that between them there + is "domestic justice" rather than "civic." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It belongs to justice to render to each one his right, the distinction between individuals being presupposed: for if a man + gives himself his due, this is not strictly called "just." And since what belongs to the son is his father's, and what belongs + to the slave is his master's, it follows that properly speaking there is not justice of father to son, or of master to slave. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A son, as such, belongs to his father, and a slave, as such, belongs to his master; yet each, considered as a man, is something + having separate existence and distinct from others. Hence in so far as each of them is a man, there is justice towards them + in a way: and for this reason too there are certain laws regulating the relations of father to his son, and of a master to + his slave; but in so far as each is something belonging to another, the perfect + idea of "right" or "just" is wanting to them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All other differences between one person and another in a state, have an immediate relation to the community of the state + and to its ruler, wherefore there is just towards them in the perfect sense of justice. This "just" however is distinguished + according to various offices, hence when we speak of "military," or "magisterial," or "priestly" right, it is not as though + such rights fell short of the simply right, as when we speak of "paternal" right, or + right of "dominion," but for the reason that something proper is due to each class of person in respect of his particular + office. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q57_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q57_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q56_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q57_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q58" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q57_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q58-p0.1">OF JUSTICE (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q58-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q58-p2"> We must now consider justice. Under this head there are twelve points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q58-p3"> (1) What is justice?</p> + <p id="SS_Q58-p4"> (2) Whether justice is always towards another?</p> + <p id="SS_Q58-p5"> (3) Whether it is a virtue?</p> + <p id="SS_Q58-p6"> (4) Whether it is in the will as its subject?</p> + <p id="SS_Q58-p7"> (5) Whether it is a general virtue?</p> + <p id="SS_Q58-p8"> (6) Whether, as a general virtue, it is essentially the same as every virtue?</p> + <p id="SS_Q58-p9"> (7) Whether there is a particular justice?</p> + <p id="SS_Q58-p10"> (8) Whether particular justice has a matter of its own?</p> + <p id="SS_Q58-p11"> (9) Whether it is about passions, or about operations only?</p> + <p id="SS_Q58-p12"> (10) Whether the mean of justice is the real mean?</p> + <p id="SS_Q58-p13"> (11) Whether the act of justice is to render to everyone his own?</p> + <p id="SS_Q58-p14"> (12) Whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues?</p> + <div id="SS_Q58_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q58_A1-p0.1">Whether justice is fittingly defined as being the perpetual and constant will to render to each one his right?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q58_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that lawyers have unfittingly defined justice as being "the perpetual and constant will to render to each one + his right" [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 10]. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1), justice is a habit which + makes a man "capable of doing what is just, and of being just in action and in intention." Now "will" denotes a power, or + also an act. Therefore justice is unfittingly defined as being a will. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, rectitude of the will is not the will; else if the will were its own rectitude, it would follow that no will is + unrighteous. Yet, according to Anselm (De Veritate xii), justice is rectitude. Therefore justice is not the will. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no will is perpetual save God's. If therefore justice is a perpetual will, in God alone will there be justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whatever is perpetual is constant, since it is unchangeable. Therefore it is needless in defining justice, to say + that it is both "perpetual" and "constant." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it belongs to the sovereign to give each one his right. Therefore, if justice gives each one his right, it follows + that it is in none but the sovereign: which is absurd. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A1-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "justice is love serving God alone." Therefore it does not render to each + one his right. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The aforesaid definition of justice is fitting if understood aright. For since every virtue is a habit that is the principle + of a good act, a virtue must needs be defined by means of the good act bearing on the matter proper to that virtue. Now the + proper matter of justice consists of those things that belong to our intercourse with other men, as shall be shown further + on + <a id="SS_Q58_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Hence the act of justice in relation to its proper + matter and object is indicated in the words, "Rendering to each one his right," since, as Isidore says (Etym. x), "a man is + said to be just because he respects the rights [jus] of others." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A1-p9"> Now in order that an act bearing upon any matter whatever be virtuous, it requires to be voluntary, stable, and firm, because + the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that in order for an act to be virtuous it needs first of all to be done "knowingly," + secondly to be done "by choice," and "for a due end," thirdly to be done "immovably." Now the first of these is included in + the second, since "what is done through ignorance is involuntary" (Ethic. iii, 1). Hence the definition of + justice mentions first the "will," in order to show that the act of justice must be voluntary; and mention is made afterwards + of its "constancy" and "perpetuity" in order to indicate the firmness of the act. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A1-p10"> Accordingly, this is a complete definition of justice; save that the act is mentioned instead of the habit, which takes its + species from that act, because habit implies relation to act. And if anyone would reduce it to the proper form of a definition, + he might say that "justice is a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a constant and perpetual will": and this + is about the same definition as that given by the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5) who says that "justice is a + habit whereby a man is said to be capable of doing just actions in accordance with his choice." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Will here denotes the act, not the power: and it is customary among writers to define habits by their acts: thus Augustine + says (Tract. in Joan. xl) that "faith is to believe what one sees not." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Justice is the same as rectitude, not essentially but causally; for it is a habit which rectifies the deed and the will. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will may be called perpetual in two ways. First on the part of the will's act which endures for ever, and thus God's + will alone is perpetual. Secondly on the part of the subject, because, to wit, a man wills to do a certain thing always. and + this is a necessary condition of justice. For it does not satisfy the conditions of justice that one wish to observe justice + in some particular matter for the time being, because one could scarcely find a man + willing to act unjustly in every case; and it is requisite that one should have the will to observe justice at all times and + in all cases. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since "perpetual" does not imply perpetuity of the act of the will, it is not superfluous to add "constant": for while the + "perpetual will" denotes the purpose of observing justice always, "constant" signifies a firm perseverance in this purpose. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A judge renders to each one what belongs to him, by way of command and direction, because a judge is the "personification + of justice," and "the sovereign is its guardian" (Ethic. v, 4). On the other hand, the subjects render to each one what belongs + to him, by way of execution. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A1-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Just as love of God includes love of our neighbor, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q58_A1-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q25_A1.html">Q[25], A[1]</a>), so too the service of God includes rendering to each one his due. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A1-p17"></p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A1-p18"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q58_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q58_A2-p0.1">Whether justice is always towards one another?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q58_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that justice is not always towards another. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q58_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.22" target="asv">Rom. 3:22</a>) that "the justice of God is by faith of Jesus Christ." Now faith does not concern the dealings of one man with another. + Neither therefore does justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv), "it belongs to justice that man should direct to the service of God + his authority over the things that are subject to him." Now the sensitive appetite is subject to man, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q58_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.4.7" target="asv"> Gn. 4:7, </a> where it is written: "The lust thereof," viz. of sin, "shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it." Therefore + it belongs to justice to have dominion over one's own appetite: so that + justice is towards oneself. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the justice of God is eternal. But nothing else is co-eternal with God. Therefore justice is not essentially towards + another. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, man's dealings with himself need to be rectified no less than his dealings with another. Now man's dealings are + rectified by justice, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q58_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.11.5" target="asv"> Prov. 11:5, </a> "The justice of the upright shall make his way prosperous." Therefore justice is about our dealings not only with others, + but also with ourselves. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully says (De Officiis i, 7) that "the object of justice is to keep men together in society and mutual intercourse." Now + this implies relationship of one man to another. Therefore justice is concerned only about our dealings with others. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[57], A[1]) since justice by its name implies equality, it denotes essentially relation to another, for + a thing is equal, not to itself, but to another. And forasmuch as it belongs to justice to rectify human acts, as stated above + (Q[57], A[1]; + <a id="SS_Q58_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q113_A1.html">FS, Q[113], A[1]</a>) this otherness which justice demands must needs be between beings capable of action. Now actions belong to supposits [*Cf. + + <a id="SS_Q58_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q29_A2.html">FP, Q[29], + A[2] + </a>] and wholes and, properly speaking, not to parts and forms or powers, for we do not say properly that the hand strikes, but + a man with his hand, nor that heat makes a thing hot, but fire by heat, although such expressions may be employed metaphorically. + Hence, justice properly speaking demands a distinction of supposits, and consequently is only in one man towards another. + Nevertheless in one and the same man we may speak metaphorically of his various principles of action such as the + reason, the irascible, and the concupiscible, as though they were so many agents: so that metaphorically in one and the same + man there is said to be justice in so far as the reason commands the irascible and concupiscible, and these obey reason; and + in general in so far as to each part of man is ascribed what is becoming to it. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 11) calls + this "metaphorical justice." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The justice which faith works in us, is that whereby the ungodly is justified it consists in the due coordination of the + parts of the soul, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q58_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q113_A1.html">FS, Q[113], A[1]</a>) where we were treating of the justification of the ungodly. Now this belongs to metaphorical justice, which may be found + even in a man who lives all by himself. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A2-p9"> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God's justice is from eternity in respect of the eternal will and purpose (and it is chiefly in this that justice consists); + although it is not eternal as regards its effect, since nothing is co-eternal with God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Man's dealings with himself are sufficiently rectified by the rectification of the passions by the other moral virtues. But + his dealings with others need a special rectification, not only in relation to the agent, but also in relation to the person + to whom they are directed. Hence about such dealings there is a special virtue, and this is justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q58_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q58_A3-p0.1">Whether justice is a virtue?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q58_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that justice is not a virtue. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q58_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.17.10" target="asv">Lk. 17:10</a>): "When you shall have done all these things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done that + which we ought to do." Now it is not unprofitable to do a virtuous deed: for Ambrose says (De Officiis ii, 6): "We look to + a profit that is estimated not by pecuniary gain but by the acquisition of godliness." Therefore to do what one ought to do, + is not a virtuous deed. And yet it is an act of justice. Therefore justice is not a virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is done of necessity, is not meritorious. But to render to a man what belongs to him, as justice requires, + is of necessity. Therefore it is not meritorious. Yet it is by virtuous actions that we gain merit. Therefore justice is not + a virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every moral virtue is about matters of action. Now those things which are wrought externally are not things concerning + behavior but concerning handicraft, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix) [*Didot ed., viii, 8]. Therefore since it belongs + to justice to produce externally a deed that is just in itself, it seems that justice is not a moral virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "the entire structure of good works is built on four virtues," viz. temperance, prudence, + fortitude and justice + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A human virtue is one "which renders a human act and man himself good" [*Ethic. ii, 6], and this can be applied to justice. + For a man's act is made good through attaining the rule of reason, which is the rule whereby human acts are regulated. Hence, + since justice regulates human operations, it is evident that it renders man's operations good, and, as Tully declares (De + Officiis i, 7), good men are so called chiefly from their justice, wherefore, as he says + again (De Officiis i, 7) "the luster of virtue appears above all in justice." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When a man does what he ought, he brings no gain to the person to whom he does what he ought, but only abstains from doing + him a harm. He does however profit himself, in so far as he does what he ought, spontaneously and readily, and this is to + act virtuously. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q58_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.7" target="asv">Wis. 8:7</a>) that Divine wisdom "teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such things as men (i.e. virtuous + men) can have + nothing more profitable in life." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Necessity is twofold. One arises from "constraint," and this removes merit, since it runs counter to the will. The other + arises from the obligation of a "command," or from the necessity of obtaining an end, when, to wit, a man is unable to achieve + the end of virtue without doing some particular thing. The latter necessity does not remove merit, when a man does voluntarily + that which is necessary in this way. It does however exclude the credit of + supererogation, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q58_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.16" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:16, </a> "If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to me, for a necessity lieth upon me." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Justice is concerned about external things, not by making them, which pertains to art, but by using them in our dealings + with other men. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q58_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q58_A4-p0.1">Whether justice is in the will as its subject?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q58_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that justice is not in the will as its subject. For justice is sometimes called truth. But truth is not in + the will, but in the intellect. Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, justice is about our dealings with others. Now it belongs to the reason to direct one thing in relation to another. + Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject but in the reason. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, justice is not an intellectual virtue, since it is not directed to knowledge; wherefore it follows that it is a + moral virtue. Now the subject of moral virtue is the faculty which is "rational by participation," viz. the irascible and + the concupiscible, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 13). Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject, but in + the irascible and concupiscible. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Anselm says (De Verit. xii) that "justice is rectitude of the will observed for its own sake." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The subject of a virtue is the power whose act that virtue aims at rectifying. Now justice does not aim at directing an act + of the cognitive power, for we are not said to be just through knowing something aright. Hence the subject of justice is not + the intellect or reason which is a cognitive power. But since we are said to be just through doing something aright, and because + the proximate principle of action is the appetitive power, justice must needs be in + some appetitive power as its subject. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A4-p7"> Now the appetite is twofold; namely, the will which is in the reason and the sensitive appetite which follows on sensitive + apprehension, and is divided into the irascible and the concupiscible, as stated in the + <a id="SS_Q58_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q81_A2.html">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>. Again the act of rendering his due to each man cannot proceed from the sensitive appetite, because sensitive apprehension + does not go so far as to be able to consider the relation of one thing to another; but this is proper to the + reason. Therefore justice cannot be in the irascible or concupiscible as its subject, but only in the will: hence the Philosopher + (Ethic. v, 1) defines justice by an act of the will, as may be seen above + <a id="SS_Q58_A4-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since the will is the rational appetite, when the rectitude of the reason which is called truth is imprinted on the will + on account of its nighness to the reason, this imprint retains the name of truth; and hence it is that justice sometimes goes + by the name of truth. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will is borne towards its object consequently on the apprehension of reason: wherefore, since the reason directs one + thing in relation to another, the will can will one thing in relation to another, and this belongs to justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not only the irascible and concupiscible parts are "rational by participation," but the entire "appetitive" faculty, as stated + in Ethic. i, 13, because all appetite is subject to reason. Now the will is contained in the appetitive faculty, wherefore + it can be the subject of moral virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q58_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q58_A5-p0.1">Whether justice is a general virtue?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q58_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that justice is not a general virtue. For justice is specified with the other virtues, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q58_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.7" target="asv"> Wis. 8:7, </a> "She teacheth temperance and prudence, and justice, and fortitude." Now the "general" is not specified or reckoned together + with the species contained under the same "general." Therefore justice is not a general virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as justice is accounted a cardinal virtue, so are temperance and fortitude. Now neither temperance nor fortitude + is reckoned to be a general virtue. Therefore neither should justice in any way be reckoned a general virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, justice is always towards others, as stated above (A[2] ). But a sin committed against one's neighbor cannot be + a general sin, because it is condivided with sin committed against oneself. Therefore neither is justice a general virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "justice is every virtue." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Justice, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q58_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A2.html">(A[2])</a> directs man in his relations with other men. Now this may happen in two ways: first as regards his relation with individuals, + secondly as regards his relations with others in general, in so far as a man who serves a community, serves all those who + are included in that community. Accordingly justice in its proper acceptation can be directed to another in both these senses. + Now it is evident that all who + are included in a community, stand in relation to that community as parts to a whole; while a part, as such, belongs to a + whole, so that whatever is the good of a part can be directed to the good of the whole. It follows therefore that the good + of any virtue, whether such virtue direct man in relation to himself, or in relation to certain other individual persons, + is referable to the common good, to which justice directs: so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice, in so far as + it + directs man to the common good. It is in this sense that justice is called a general virtue. And since it belongs to the law + to direct to the common good, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q58_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A2.html">FS, Q[90], A[2]</a>), it follows that the justice which is in this way styled general, is called "legal justice," because thereby man is in harmony + with the law which directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Justice is specified or enumerated with the other virtues, not as a general but as a special virtue, as we shall state further + on ( + <a id="SS_Q58_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A7.html">AA[7]</a>,12). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Temperance and fortitude are in the sensitive appetite, viz. in the concupiscible and irascible. Now these powers are appetitive + of certain particular goods, even as the senses are cognitive of particulars. On the other hand justice is in the intellective + appetite as its subject, which can have the universal good as its object, knowledge whereof belongs to the intellect. Hence + justice can be a general virtue rather than temperance or fortitude. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things referable to oneself are referable to another, especially in regard to the common good. Wherefore legal justice, in + so far as it directs to the common good, may be called a general virtue: and in like manner injustice may be called a general + sin; hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q58_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.4" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:4</a>) that all "sin is iniquity." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q58_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q58_A6-p0.1">Whether justice, as a general virtue, is essentially the same as all virtue?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q58_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that justice, as a general virtue, is essentially the same as all virtue. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. + v, 1) that "virtue and legal justice are the same as all virtue, but differ in their mode of being." Now things that differ + merely in their mode of being or logically do not differ essentially. Therefore justice is essentially the same as every virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every virtue that is not essentially the same as all virtue is a part of virtue. Now the aforesaid justice, according + to the Philosopher (Ethic. v. 1) "is not a part but the whole of virtue." Therefore the aforesaid justice is essentially the + same as all virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the essence of a virtue does not change through that virtue directing its act to some higher end even as the habit + of temperance remains essentially the same even though its act be directed to a Divine good. Now it belongs to legal justice + that the acts of all the virtues are directed to a higher end, namely the common good of the multitude, which transcends the + good of one single individual. Therefore it seems that legal justice is essentially all + virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A6-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every good of a part can be directed to the good of the whole, so that if it be not thus directed it would seem + without use or purpose. But that which is in accordance with virtue cannot be so. Therefore it seems that there can be no + act of any virtue, that does not belong to general justice, which directs to the common good; and so it seems that general + justice is essentially the same as all virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A6-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "many are able to be virtuous in matters affecting themselves, but are unable to + be virtuous in matters relating to others," and (Polit. iii, 2) that "the virtue of the good man is not strictly the same + as the virtue of the good citizen." Now the virtue of a good citizen is general justice, whereby a man Is directed to the + common good. Therefore general justice is not the same as virtue in general, and it is possible + to have one without the other. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A6-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing is said to be "general" in two ways. First, by "predication": thus "animal" is general in relation to man and horse + and the like: and in this sense that which is general must needs be essentially the same as the things in relation to which + it is general, for the reason that the genus belongs to the essence of the species, and forms part of its definition. Secondly + a thing is said to be general "virtually"; thus a universal cause is general in + relation to all its effects, the sun, for instance, in relation to all bodies that are illumined, or transmuted by its power; + and in this sense there is no need for that which is "general" to be essentially the same as those things in relation to which + it is general, since cause and effect are not essentially the same. Now it is in the latter sense that, according to what + has been said + <a id="SS_Q58_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A5.html">(A[5])</a>, legal justice is said to be a general virtue, in as much, to wit, as it + directs the acts of the other virtues to its own end, and this is to move all the other virtues by its command; for just as + charity may be called a general virtue in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the Divine good, so too is legal + justice, in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good. Accordingly, just as charity which regards + the Divine good as its proper object, is a special virtue in respect of its essence, so too legal justice is a special + virtue in respect of its essence, in so far as it regards the common good as its proper object. And thus it is in the sovereign + principally and by way of a mastercraft, while it is secondarily and administratively in his subjects. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A6-p8"> However the name of legal justice can be given to every virtue, in so far as every virtue is directed to the common good + by the aforesaid legal justice, which though special essentially is nevertheless virtually general. Speaking in this way, + legal justice is essentially the same as all virtue, but differs therefrom logically: and it is in this sense that the Philosopher + speaks. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A6-p9"> Wherefore the Replies to the First and Second Objections are manifest.</p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument again takes legal justice for the virtue commanded by legal justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Every virtue strictly speaking directs its act to that virtue's proper end: that it should happen to be directed to a further + end either always or sometimes, does not belong to that virtue considered strictly, for it needs some higher virtue to direct + it to that end. Consequently there must be one supreme virtue essentially distinct from every other virtue, which directs + all the virtues to the common good; and this virtue is legal justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A6-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A6-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q58_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q58_A7-p0.1">Whether there is a particular besides a general justice?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q58_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is not a particular besides a general justice. For there is nothing superfluous in the virtues, + as neither is there in nature. Now general justice directs man sufficiently in all his relations with other men. Therefore + there is no need for a particular justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the species of a virtue does not vary according to "one" and "many." But legal justice directs one man to another + in matters relating to the multitude, as shown above ( + <a id="SS_Q58_A7-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A5.html">AA[5]</a>,6). Therefore there is not another species of justice directing one man to another in matters relating to the individual. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, between the individual and the general public stands the household community. Consequently, if in addition to general + justice there is a particular justice corresponding to the individual, for the same reason there should be a domestic justice + directing man to the common good of a household: and yet this is not the case. Therefore neither should there be a particular + besides a legal justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Chrysostom in his commentary on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q58_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.6" target="asv"> Mat. 5:6, </a> "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," says (Hom. xv in Matth.): "By justice He signifies either the general + virtue, or the particular virtue which is opposed to covetousness." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q58_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A6.html">(A[6])</a>, legal justice is not essentially the same as every virtue, and besides legal justice which directs man immediately to the + common good, there is a need for other virtues to direct him immediately in matters relating to particular goods: and these + virtues may be relative to himself or to another individual person. Accordingly, just as in addition to legal justice there + is a need for particular virtues to direct + man in relation to himself, such as temperance and fortitude, so too besides legal justice there is need for particular justice + to direct man in his relations to other individuals. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Legal justice does indeed direct man sufficiently in his relations towards others. As regards the common good it does so + immediately, but as to the good of the individual, it does so mediately. Wherefore there is need for particular justice to + direct a man immediately to the good of another individual. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The common good of the realm and the particular good of the individual differ not only in respect of the "many" and the "few," + but also under a formal aspect. For the aspect of the "common" good differs from the aspect of the "individual" good, even + as the aspect of "whole" differs from that of "part." Wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1) that "they are wrong who + maintain that the State and the home and the like differ only as many and few and + not specifically." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The household community, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2), differs in respect of a threefold fellowship; namely + "of husband and wife, father and son, master and slave," in each of which one person is, as it were, part of the other. Wherefore + between such persons there is not justice simply, but a species of justice, viz. "domestic" justice, as stated in Ethic. v, + 6. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A7-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A7-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q58_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A9.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q58_A8-p0.1">Whether particular justice has a special matter?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q58_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that particular justice has no special matter. Because a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q58_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.14" target="asv"> Gn. 2:14, </a> "The fourth river is Euphrates," says: "Euphrates signifies 'fruitful'; nor is it stated through what country it flows, because + justice pertains to all the parts of the soul." Now this would not be the case, if justice had a special matter, since every + special matter belongs to a special power. Therefore particular justice has no special matter. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 61) that "the soul has four virtues whereby, in this life, it lives spiritually, + viz. temperance, prudence, fortitude and justice;" and he says that "the fourth is justice, which pervades all the virtues." + Therefore particular justice, which is one of the four cardinal virtues, has no special matter. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, justice directs man sufficiently in matters relating to others. Now a man can be directed to others in all matters + relating to this life. Therefore the matter of justice is general and not special. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher reckons (Ethic. v, 2) particular justice to be specially about those things which belong to social life. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Whatever can be rectified by reason is the matter of moral virtue, for this is defined in reference to right reason, according + to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now the reason can rectify not only the internal passions of the soul, but also external + actions, and also those external things of which man can make use. And yet it is in respect of external actions and external + things by means of which men can communicate with one another, that the relation of + one man to another is to be considered; whereas it is in respect of internal passions that we consider man's rectitude in + himself. Consequently, since justice is directed to others, it is not about the entire matter of moral virtue, but only about + external actions and things, under a certain special aspect of the object, in so far as one man is related to another through + them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is true that justice belongs essentially to one part of the soul, where it resides as in its subject; and this is the + will which moves by its command all the other parts of the soul; and accordingly justice belongs to all the parts of the soul, + not directly but by a kind of diffusion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q58_A8-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A3.html">FS, Q[61], AA[3]</a>,4), the cardinal virtues may be taken in two ways: first as special virtues, each having a determinate matter; secondly, + as certain general modes of virtue. In this latter sense Augustine speaks in the passage quoted: for he says that "prudence + is knowledge of what we should seek and avoid, temperance is the curb on the lust for fleeting pleasures, fortitude is strength + of mind in bearing with + passing trials, justice is the love of God and our neighbor which pervades the other virtues, that is to say, is the common + principle of the entire order between one man and another." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A man's internal passions which are a part of moral matter, are not in themselves directed to another man, which belongs + to the specific nature of justice; yet their effects, i.e. external actions, are capable of being directed to another man. + Consequently it does not follow that the matter of justice is general. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A8-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A8-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A9.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q58_A9" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A10.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q58_A9-p0.1">Whether justice is about the passions?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q58_A9-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that justice is about the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue is about pleasure + and pain." Now pleasure or delight, and pain are passions, as stated above [* + <a id="SS_Q58_A9-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A4.html">FS, Q[23], A[4]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q58_A9-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A1.html">FS, Q[31], A[1]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q58_A9-p2.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q35_A1.html">FS, Q[35], A[1]</a>] when we were treating of the passions. Therefore justice, being a moral virtue, is about the passions. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, justice is the means of rectifying a man's operations in relation to another man. Now such like operations cannot + be rectified unless the passions be rectified, because it is owing to disorder of the passions that there is disorder in the + aforesaid operations: thus sexual lust leads to adultery, and overmuch love of money leads to theft. Therefore justice must + needs be about the passions. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, even as particular justice is towards another person so is legal justice. Now legal justice is about the passions, + else it would not extend to all the virtues, some of which are evidently about the passions. Therefore justice is about the + passions. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A9-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is about operations. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A9-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The true answer to this question may be gathered from a twofold source. First from the subject of justice, i.e. from the + will, whose movements or acts are not passions, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q58_A9-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q22_A3.html">FS, Q[22], A[3]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q58_A9-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q59_A4.html">FS, Q[59], A[4]</a>), for it is only the sensitive appetite whose movements are called passions. Hence justice is not about the passions, as + are temperance and fortitude, which are in the irascible and + concupiscible parts. Secondly, on he part of the matter, because justice is about man's relations with another, and we are + not directed immediately to another by the internal passions. Therefore justice is not about the passions. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A9-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every moral virtue is about pleasure and pain as its proper matter, since fortitude is about fear and daring: but every + moral virtue is directed to pleasure and pain, as to ends to be acquired, for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11), "pleasure + and pain are the principal end in respect of which we say that this is an evil, and that a good": and in this way too they + belong to justice, since "a man is not just unless he rejoice in just + actions" (Ethic. i, 8). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A9-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> External operations are as it were between external things, which are their matter, and internal passions, which are their + origin. Now it happens sometimes that there is a defect in one of these, without there being a defect in the other. Thus a + man may steal another's property, not through the desire to have the thing, but through the will to hurt the man; or vice + versa, a man may covet another's property without wishing to steal it. Accordingly the + directing of operations in so far as they tend towards external things, belongs to justice, but in so far as they arise from + the passions, it belongs to the other moral virtues which are about the passions. Hence justice hinders theft of another's + property, in so far as stealing is contrary to the, equality that should be maintained in external things, while liberality + hinders it as resulting from an immoderate desire for wealth. Since, however, external operations take their species, not + from + the internal passions but from external things as being their objects, it follows that, external operations are essentially + the matter of justice rather than of the other moral virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The common good is the end of each individual member of a community, just as the good of the whole is the end of each part. + On the other hand the good of one individual is not the end of another individual: wherefore legal justice which is directed + to the common good, is more capable of extending to the internal passions whereby man is disposed in some way or other in + himself, than particular justice which is directed to the good of another + individual: although legal justice extends chiefly to other virtues in the point of their external operations, in so far, + to wit, as "the law commands us to perform the actions of a courageous person . . . the actions of a temperate person . . + . and the actions of a gentle person" (Ethic. v, 5). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A9-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A9-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A10.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q58_A10" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A11.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q58_A10-p0.1">Whether the mean of justice is the real mean?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q58_A10-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A10-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the mean of justice is not the real mean. For the generic nature remains entire in each species. Now moral + virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) to be "an elective habit which observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason." Therefore + justice observes the rational and not the real mean. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A10-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in things that are good simply, there is neither excess nor defect, and consequently neither is there a mean; as + is clearly the case with the virtues, according to Ethic. ii, 6. Now justice is about things that are good simply, as stated + in Ethic. v. Therefore justice does not observe the real mean. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A10-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the reason why the other virtues are said to observe the rational and not the real mean, is because in their case + the mean varies according to different persons, since what is too much for one is too little for another (Ethic. ii, 6). Now + this is also the case in justice: for one who strikes a prince does not receive the same punishment as one who strikes a private + individual. Therefore justice also observes, not the real, but the rational mean. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A10-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6; v, 4) that the mean of justice is to be taken according to "arithmetical" proportion, + so that it is the real mean. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A10-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q58_A10-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A9.html">(A[9];</a> + <a id="SS_Q58_A10-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q59_A4.html">FS, Q[59], A[4]</a>), the other moral virtues are chiefly concerned with the passions, the regulation of which is gauged entirely by a comparison + with the very man who is the subject of those passions, in so far as his anger and desire are vested with their various due + circumstances. Hence the mean in such like virtues is measured not by the proportion of one thing to another, but merely by + comparison with the virtuous man himself, so that with them the mean is only that which is fixed by reason in our regard. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A10-p7"> On the other hand, the matter of justice is external operation, in so far as an operation or the thing used in that operation + is duly proportionate to another person, wherefore the mean of justice consists in a certain proportion of equality between + the external thing and the external person. Now equality is the real mean between greater and less, as stated in Metaph. x + [*Didot ed., ix, 5; Cf. Ethic. v, 4]: wherefore justice observes the real mean. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A10-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This real mean is also the rational mean, wherefore justice satisfies the conditions of a moral virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A10-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We may speak of a thing being good simply in two ways. First a thing may be good in every way: thus the virtues are good; + and there is neither mean nor extremes in things that are good simply in this sense. Secondly a thing is said to be good simply + through being good absolutely i.e. in its nature, although it may become evil through being abused. Such are riches and honors; + and in the like it is possible to find excess, deficiency and mean, as + regards men who can use them well or ill: and it is in this sense that justice is about things that are good simply. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A10-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The injury inflicted bears a different proportion to a prince from that which it bears to a private person: wherefore each + injury requires to be equalized by vengeance in a different way: and this implies a real and not merely a rational diversity. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A10-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A10-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A11.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q58_A11" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A12.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q58_A11-p0.1">Whether the act of justice is to render to each one his own?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q58_A11-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A11-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the act of justice is not to render to each one his own. For Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9) ascribes to justice + the act of succoring the needy. Now in succoring the needy we give them what is not theirs but ours. Therefore the act of + justice does not consist in rendering to each one his own. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A11-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 7) that "beneficence which we may call kindness or liberality, belongs to justice." Now + it pertains to liberality to give to another of one's own, not of what is his. Therefore the act of justice does not consist + in rendering to each one his own. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A11-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it belongs to justice not only to distribute things duly, but also to repress injurious actions, such as murder, + adultery and so forth. But the rendering to each one of what is his seems to belong solely to the distribution of things. + Therefore the act of justice is not sufficiently described by saying that it consists in rendering to each one his own. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A11-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): "It is justice that renders to each one what is his, and claims not another's property; it + disregards its own profit in order to preserve the common equity." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A11-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q58_A11-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A8.html">AA[8]</a>,10), the matter of justice is an external operation in so far as either it or the thing we use by it is made proportionate + to some other person to whom we are related by justice. Now each man's own is that which is due to him according to equality + of proportion. Therefore the proper act of justice is nothing else than to render to each one his own. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A11-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since justice is a cardinal virtue, other secondary virtues, such as mercy, liberality and the like are connected with it, + as we shall state further on ( + <a id="SS_Q58_A11-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q80_A1.html">Q[80], A[1]</a>). Wherefore to succor the needy, which belongs to mercy or pity, and to be liberally beneficent, which pertains to liberality, + are by a kind of reduction ascribed to justice as to their principal virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A11-p8"> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A11-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 4), in matters of justice, the name of "profit" is extended to whatever is excessive, + and whatever is deficient is called "loss." The reason for this is that justice is first of all and more commonly exercised + in voluntary interchanges of things, such as buying and selling, wherein those expressions are properly employed; and yet + they are transferred to all other matters of justice. The same applies to the + rendering to each one of what is his own. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A11-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A11-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A12.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q58_A12" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A11.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q59.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q58_A12-p0.1">Whether justice stands foremost among all moral virtues?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q58_A12-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A12-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that justice does not stand foremost among all the moral virtues. Because it belongs to justice to render to + each one what is his, whereas it belongs to liberality to give of one's own, and this is more virtuous. Therefore liberality + is a greater virtue than justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A12-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing is adorned by a less excellent thing than itself. Now magnanimity is the ornament both of justice and of + all the virtues, according to Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is more excellent than justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A12-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, virtue is about that which is "difficult" and "good," as stated in Ethic. ii, 3. But fortitude is about more difficult + things than justice is, since it is about dangers of death, according to Ethic. iii, 6. Therefore fortitude is more excellent + than justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A12-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully says (De Offic. i, 7): "Justice is the most resplendent of the virtues, and gives its name to a good man." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A12-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of legal justice, it is evident that it stands foremost among all the moral virtues, for as much as the common + good transcends the individual good of one person. In this sense the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that "the most excellent + of the virtues would seem to be justice, and more glorious than either the evening or the morning star." But, even if we speak + of particular justice, it excels the other moral virtues for two reasons. The first + reason may be taken from the subject, because justice is in the more excellent part of the soul, viz. the rational appetite + or will, whereas the other moral virtues are in the sensitive appetite, whereunto appertain the passions which are the matter + of the other moral virtues. The second reason is taken from the object, because the other virtues are commendable in respect + of the sole good of the virtuous person himself, whereas justice is praiseworthy in respect of the virtuous person being + well disposed towards another, so that justice is somewhat the good of another person, as stated in Ethic. v, 1. Hence the + Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9): "The greatest virtues must needs be those which are most profitable to other persons, because + virtue is a faculty of doing good to others. For this reason the greatest honors are accorded the brave and the just, since + bravery is useful to others in warfare, and justice is useful to others both in warfare and in time of peace." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A12-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the liberal man gives of his own, yet he does so in so far as he takes into consideration the good of his own virtue, + while the just man gives to another what is his, through consideration of the common good. Moreover justice is observed towards + all, whereas liberality cannot extend to all. Again liberality which gives of a man's own is based on justice, whereby one + renders to each man what is his. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A12-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When magnanimity is added to justice it increases the latter's goodness; and yet without justice it would not even be a virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A12-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although fortitude is about the most difficult things, it is not about the best, for it is only useful in warfare, whereas + justice is useful both in war and in peace, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A12-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q58_A12-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A11.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q59.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q57_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q59" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A12.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q59_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q59-p0.1">OF INJUSTICE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q59-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q59-p2"> We must now consider injustice, under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q59-p3"> (1) Whether injustice is a special vice?</p> + <p id="SS_Q59-p4"> (2) Whether it is proper to the unjust man to do unjust deeds?</p> + <p id="SS_Q59-p5"> (3) Whether one can suffer injustice willingly?</p> + <p id="SS_Q59-p6"> (4) Whether injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus?</p> + <div id="SS_Q59_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q59.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q59_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q59_A1-p0.1">Whether injustice is a special virtue?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q59_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that injustice is not a special vice. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q59_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.4" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:4</a>): "All sin is iniquity [*Vulg.: 'Whosoever committeth sin, committeth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity']." Now iniquity + would seem to be the same as injustice, because justice is a kind of equality, so that injustice is apparently the same as + inequality or iniquity. Therefore injustice is not a special sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no special sin is contrary to all the virtues. But injustice is contrary to all the virtues: for as regards adultery + it is opposed to chastity, as regards murder it is opposed to meekness, and in like manner as regards the other sins. Therefore + injustice is not a special sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, injustice is opposed to justice which is in the will. But every sin is in the will, as Augustine declares (De Duabus + Anim. x). Therefore injustice is not a special sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Injustice is contrary to justice. But justice is a special virtue. Therefore injustice is a special vice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Injustice is twofold. First there is illegal injustice which is opposed to legal justice: and this is essentially a special + vice, in so far as it regards a special object, namely the common good which it contemns; and yet it is a general vice, as + regards the intention, since contempt of the common good may lead to all kinds of sin. Thus too all vices, as being repugnant + to the common good, have the character of injustice, as though they arose from injustice, + in accord with what has been said above about justice ( + <a id="SS_Q59_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A5.html">Q[58], AA[5]</a>,6). Secondly we speak of injustice in reference to an inequality between one person and another, when one man wishes to have + more goods, riches for example, or honors, and less evils, such as toil and losses, and thus injustice has a special matter + and is a particular vice opposed to particular justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as legal justice is referred to human common good, so Divine justice is referred to the Divine good, to which all sin + is repugnant, and in this sense all sin is said to be iniquity. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even particular justice is indirectly opposed to all the virtues; in so far, to wit, as even external acts pertain both to + justice and to the other moral virtues, although in different ways as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q59_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A9.html">Q[58], A[9]</a>, ad 2). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will, like the reason, extends to all moral matters, i.e. passions and those external operations that relate to another + person. On the other hand justice perfects the will solely in the point of its extending to operations that relate to another: + and the same applies to injustice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q59.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q59_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q59_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q59_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q59_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q59_A2-p0.1">Whether a man is called unjust through doing an unjust thing?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q59_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man is called unjust through doing an unjust thing. For habits are specified by their objects, as stated + above ( + <a id="SS_Q59_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">FS, Q[54], A[2]</a>). Now the proper object of justice is the just, and the proper object of injustice is the unjust. Therefore a man should + be called just through doing a just thing, and unjust through doing an unjust thing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9) that they hold a false opinion who maintain that it is in a man's power to + do suddenly an unjust thing, and that a just man is no less capable of doing what is unjust than an unjust man. But this opinion + would not be false unless it were proper to the unjust man to do what is unjust. Therefore a man is to be deemed unjust from + the fact that he does an unjust thing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every virtue bears the same relation to its proper act, and the same applies to the contrary vices. But whoever + does what is intemperate, is said to be intemperate. Therefore whoever does an unjust thing, is said to be unjust. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6) that "a man may do an unjust thing without being unjust." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Even as the object of justice is something equal in external things, so too the object of injustice is something unequal, + through more or less being assigned to some person than is due to him. To this object the habit of injustice is compared by + means of its proper act which is called an injustice. Accordingly it may happen in two ways that a man who does an unjust + thing, is not unjust: first, on account of a lack of correspondence between the operation and + its proper object. For the operation takes its species and name from its direct and not from its indirect object: and in things + directed to an end the direct is that which is intended, and the indirect is what is beside the intention. Hence if a man + do that which is unjust, without intending to do an unjust thing, for instance if he do it through ignorance, being unaware + that it is unjust, properly speaking he does an unjust thing, not directly, but only indirectly, and, as it were, doing + materially that which is unjust: hence such an operation is not called an injustice. Secondly, this may happen on account + of a lack of proportion between the operation and the habit. For an injustice may sometimes arise from a passion, for instance, + anger or desire, and sometimes from choice, for instance when the injustice itself is the direct object of one's complacency. + In the latter case properly speaking it arises from a habit, because whenever a man has a habit, whatever befits that habit + is, of itself, pleasant to him. Accordingly, to do what is unjust intentionally and by choice is proper to the unjust man, + in which sense the unjust man is one who has the habit of injustice: but a man may do what is unjust, unintentionally or through + passion, without having the habit of injustice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A habit is specified by its object in its direct and formal acceptation, not in its material and indirect acceptation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not easy for any man to do an unjust thing from choice, as though it were pleasing for its own sake and not for the + sake of something else: this is proper to one who has the habit, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The object of temperance is not something established externally, as is the object of justice: the object of temperance, + i.e. the temperate thing, depends entirely on proportion to the man himself. Consequently what is accidental and unintentional + cannot be said to be temperate either materially or formally. In like manner neither can it be called intemperate: and in + this respect there is dissimilarity between justice and the other moral virtues; but + as regards the proportion between operation and habit, there is similarity in all respects. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q59_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q59_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q59_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q59_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q59_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q59_A3-p0.1">Whether we can suffer injustice willingly?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q59_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one can suffer injustice willingly. For injustice is inequality, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q59_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q59_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Now a man by injuring himself, departs from equality, even as by injuring another. Therefore a man can do an injustice to + himself, even as to another. But whoever does himself an injustice, does so involuntarily. Therefore a man can voluntarily + suffer injustice especially if it be inflicted by himself. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no man is punished by the civil law, except for having committed some injustice. Now suicides were formerly punished + according to the law of the state by being deprived of an honorable burial, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore + a man can do himself an injustice, and consequently it may happen that a man suffers injustice voluntarily. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no man does an injustice save to one who suffers that injustice. But it may happen that a man does an injustice + to one who wishes it, for instance if he sell him a thing for more than it is worth. Therefore a man may happen to suffer + an injustice voluntarily. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> To suffer an injustice and to do an injustice are contraries. Now no man does an injustice against his will. Therefore on + the other hand no man suffers an injustice except against his will. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Action by its very nature proceeds from an agent, whereas passion as such is from another: wherefore the same thing in the + same respect cannot be both agent and patient, as stated in Phys. iii, 1; viii, 5. Now the proper principle of action in man + is the will, wherefore man does properly and essentially what he does voluntarily, and on the other hand a man suffers properly + what he suffers against his will, since in so far as he is willing, he is a principle + in himself, and so, considered thus, he is active rather than passive. Accordingly we must conclude that properly and strictly + speaking no man can do an injustice except voluntarily, nor suffer an injustice save involuntarily; but that accidentally + and materially so to speak, it is possible for that which is unjust in itself either to be done involuntarily (as when a man + does anything unintentionally), or to be suffered voluntarily (as when a man voluntarily gives to another more than he owes + him). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When one man gives voluntarily to another that which he does not owe him, he causes neither injustice nor inequality. For + a man's ownership depends on his will, so there is no disproportion if he forfeit something of his own free-will, either by + his own or by another's action. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An individual person may be considered in two ways. First, with regard to himself; and thus, if he inflict an injury on himself, + it may come under the head of some other kind of sin, intemperance for instance or imprudence, but not injustice; because + injustice no less than justice, is always referred to another person. Secondly, this or that man may be considered as belonging + to the State as part thereof, or as belonging to God, as His creature and + image; and thus a man who kills himself, does an injury not indeed to himself, but to the State and to God. Wherefore he is + punished in accordance with both Divine and human law, even as the Apostle declares in respect of the fornicator ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q59_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.17" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:17</a>): "If any man violate the temple of God, him shall God destroy." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Suffering is the effect of external action. Now in the point of doing and suffering injustice, the material element is that + which is done externally, considered in itself, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q59_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q59_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, and the formal and essential element is on the part of the will of agent and patient, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q59_A3-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q59_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Accordingly we must reply that injustice suffered by one man and injustice done by another man + always accompany one another, in the material sense. But if we speak in the formal sense a man can do an injustice with the + intention of doing an injustice, and yet the other man does not suffer an injustice, because he suffers voluntarily; and on + the other hand a man can suffer an injustice if he suffer an injustice against his will, while the man who does the injury + unknowingly, does an injustice, not formally but only materially. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q59_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q59_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q59_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q59_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q60.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q59_A4-p0.1">Whether whoever does an injustice sins mortally?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q59_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not everyone who does an injustice sins mortally. For venial sin is opposed to mortal sin. Now it is sometimes + a venial sin to do an injury: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 8) in reference to those who act unjustly: "Whatever they + do not merely in ignorance but through ignorance is a venial matter." Therefore not everyone that does an injustice sins mortally. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who does an injustice in a small matter, departs but slightly from the mean. Now this seems to be insignificant + and should be accounted among the least of evils, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. ii, 9). Therefore not everyone that + does an injustice sins mortally. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is the "mother of all the virtues" [*Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D. 23], and it is through being contrary + thereto that a sin is called mortal. But not all the sins contrary to the other virtues are mortal. Therefore neither is it + always a mortal sin to do an injustice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is contrary to the law of God is a mortal sin. Now whoever does an injustice does that which is contrary to the + law of God, since it amounts either to theft, or to adultery, or to murder, or to something of the kind, as will be shown + further on (Q[64], seqq.). Therefore whoever does an injustice sins mortally. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q59_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q12_A5.html">FS, Q[12], A[5]</a>), when we were treating of the distinction of sins, a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity which gives life to the + soul. Now every injury inflicted on another person is of itself contrary to charity, which moves us to will the good of another. + And so since injustice always consists in an injury inflicted on another person, it is evident that to do an injustice is + a mortal sin according to its + genus. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This saying of the Philosopher is to be understood as referring to ignorance of fact, which he calls "ignorance of particular + circumstances" [*Ethic. iii, 1], and which deserves pardon, and not to ignorance of the law which does not excuse: and he + who does an injustice through ignorance, does no injustice except accidentally, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q59_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q59_A2.html">(A[2])</a> + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He who does an injustice in small matters falls short of the perfection on an unjust deed, in so far as what he does may + be deemed not altogether contrary to the will of the person who suffers therefrom: for instance, if a man take an apple or + some such thing from another man, in which case it is probable that the latter is not hurt or displeased. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sins which are contrary to the other virtues are not always hurtful to another person, but imply a disorder affecting + human passions; hence there is no comparison. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q59_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q59_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q60.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q58_A12.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q59_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q60" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q59_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q60_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q60-p0.1">OF JUDGMENT (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q60-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q60-p2"> In due sequence we must consider judgment, under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q60-p3"> (1) Whether judgment is an act of justice?</p> + <p id="SS_Q60-p4"> (2) Whether it is lawful to judge?</p> + <p id="SS_Q60-p5"> (3) Whether judgment should be based on suspicions?</p> + <p id="SS_Q60-p6"> (4) Whether doubts should be interpreted favorably?</p> + <p id="SS_Q60-p7"> (5) Whether judgment should always be given according to the written law?</p> + <p id="SS_Q60-p8"> (6) Whether judgment is perverted by being usurped?</p> + <div id="SS_Q60_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q60.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q60_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q60_A1-p0.1">Whether judgment is an act of justice?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q60_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that judgment is not an act of justice. The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 3) that "everyone judges well of what + he knows," so that judgment would seem to belong to the cognitive faculty. Now the cognitive faculty is perfected by prudence. + Therefore judgment belongs to prudence rather than to justice, which is in the will, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q60_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A4.html">Q[58], A[4]</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:15</a>): "The spiritual man judgeth all things." Now man is made spiritual chiefly by the virtue of charity, which "is poured forth + in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv">Rom. 5:5</a>). Therefore judgment belongs to charity rather than to justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it belongs to every virtue to judge aright of its proper matter, because "the virtuous man is the rule and measure + in everything," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 4). Therefore judgment does not belong to justice any more than + to the other moral virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, judgment would seem to belong only to judges. But the act of justice is to be found in every just man. Since then + judges are not the only just men, it seems that judgment is not the proper act of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.93.15" target="asv">Ps. 93:15</a>): "Until justice be turned into judgment." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Judgment properly denotes the act of a judge as such. Now a judge [judex] is so called because he asserts the right [jus + dicens] and right is the object of justice, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q60_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q57_A1.html">Q[57], A[1]</a>). Consequently the original meaning of the word "judgment" is a statement or decision of the just or right. Now to decide + rightly about virtuous deeds proceeds, properly speaking, from the virtuous habit; thus a chaste person decides rightly + about matters relating to chastity. Therefore judgment, which denotes a right decision about what is just, belongs properly + to justice. For this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4) that "men have recourse to a judge as to one who is the personification + of justice." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The word "judgment," from its original meaning of a right decision about what is just, has been extended to signify a right + decision in any matter whether speculative or practical. Now a right judgment in any matter requires two things. The first + is the virtue itself that pronounces judgment: and in this way, judgment is an act of reason, because it belongs to the reason + to pronounce or define. The other is the disposition of the one who judges, on + which depends his aptness for judging aright. In this way, in matters of justice, judgment proceeds from justice, even as + in matters of fortitude, it proceeds from fortitude. Accordingly judgment is an act of justice in so far as justice inclines + one to judge aright, and of prudence in so far as prudence pronounces judgment: wherefore {synesis} (judging well according + to common law) which belongs to prudence is said to "judge rightly," as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q60_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q51_A3.html">Q[51], A[3]</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The spiritual man, by reason of the habit of charity, has an inclination to judge aright of all things according to the Divine + rules; and it is in conformity with these that he pronounces judgment through the gift of wisdom: even as the just man pronounces + judgment through the virtue of prudence conformably with the ruling of the law. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The other virtues regulate man in himself, whereas justice regulates man in his dealings with others, as shown above ( + <a id="SS_Q60_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A2.html">Q[58], A[2]</a>). Now man is master in things concerning himself, but not in matters relating to others. Consequently where the other virtues + are in question, there is no need for judgment other than that of a virtuous man, taking judgment in its broader sense, as + explained above (ad 1). But in matters of justice, + there is further need for the judgment of a superior, who is "able to reprove both, and to put his hand between both" [* + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Job.9.33" target="asv">Job 9:33</a>]. Hence judgment belongs more specifically to justice than to any other virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Justice is in the sovereign as a master-virtue [*Cf. + <a id="SS_Q60_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A6.html"> Q[58], A[6]</a>], commanding and prescribing what is just; while it is in the subjects as an executive and administrative virtue. Hence judgment, + which denotes a decision of what is just, belongs to justice, considered as existing chiefly in one who has authority. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q60.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q60_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q60_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q60_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q60_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q60_A2-p0.1">Whether it is lawful to judge?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q60_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unlawful to judge. For nothing is punished except what is unlawful. Now those who judge are threatened with + punishment, which those who judge not will escape, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.1" target="asv"> Mat. 7:1, </a> "Judge not, and ye shall not be judged." Therefore it is unlawful to judge. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.4" target="asv">Rom. 14:4</a>): "Who art thou that judgest another man's servant. To his own lord he standeth or falleth." Now God is the Lord of all. + Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no man is sinless, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.1.8" target="asv">1 Jn. 1:8, </a> "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Now it is unlawful for a sinner to judge, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.1" target="asv"> Rom. 2:1, </a> "Thou art inexcusable, O man, whosoever thou art, that judgest; for wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself, + for thou dost the same things which thou judgest." Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.16.18" target="asv">Dt. 16:18</a>): "Thou shalt appoint judges and magistrates in all thy gates . . . that they may judge the people with just judgment." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Judgment is lawful in so far as it is an act of justice. Now it follows from what has been stated above (A[1], ad 1,3) that + three conditions are requisite for a judgment to be an act of justice: first, that it proceed from the inclination of justice; + secondly, that it come from one who is in authority; thirdly, that it be pronounced according to the right ruling of prudence. + If any one of these be lacking, the judgment will be faulty and unlawful. First, + when it is contrary to the rectitude of justice, and then it is called "perverted" or "unjust": secondly, when a man judges + about matters wherein he has no authority, and this is called judgment "by usurpation": thirdly, when the reason lacks certainty, + as when a man, without any solid motive, forms a judgment on some doubtful or hidden matter, and then it is called judgment + by "suspicion" or "rash" judgment. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In these words our Lord forbids rash judgment which is about the inward intention, or other uncertain things, as Augustine + states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18). Or else He forbids judgment about Divine things, which we ought not to judge, but + simply believe, since they are above us, as Hilary declares in his commentary on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5" target="asv">Mat. 5</a>. Or again according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John of the Cross], + He forbids the judgment which proceeds not from benevolence but from bitterness of heart. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A judge is appointed as God's servant; wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.1.16" target="asv">Dt. 1:16</a>): "Judge that which is just," and further on ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.1.17" target="asv">Dt. 1:17</a>), "because it is the judgment of God." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those who stand guilty of grievous sins should not judge those who are guilty of the same or lesser sins, as Chrysostom [*Hom. + xxiv] says on the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.1" target="asv"> Mat. 7:1, </a> "Judge not." Above all does this hold when such sins are public, because there would be an occasion of scandal arising in + the hearts of others. If however they are not public but hidden, and there be an urgent necessity for the judge to pronounce + judgment, because it is + his duty, he can reprove or judge with humility and fear. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19): "If we find + that we are guilty of the same sin as another man, we should groan together with him, and invite him to strive against it + together with us." And yet it is not through acting thus that a man condemns himself so as to deserve to be condemned once + again, but when, in condemning another, he shows himself to be equally deserving of condemnation on account of another or + a like + sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q60_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q60_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q60_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q60_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q60_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q60_A3-p0.1">Whether it is unlawful to form a judgment from suspicions?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q60_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not unlawful to form a judgment from suspicions. For suspicion is seemingly an uncertain opinion + about an evil, wherefore the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 3) that suspicion is about both the true and the false. Now it + is impossible to have any but an uncertain opinion about contingent singulars. Since then human judgment is about human acts, + which are about singular and contingent matters, it seems that no judgment would be lawful, + if it were not lawful to judge from suspicions. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a man does his neighbor an injury by judging him unlawfully. But an evil suspicion consists in nothing more than + a man's opinion, and consequently does not seem to pertain to the injury of another man. Therefore judgment based on suspicion + is not unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it is unlawful, it must needs be reducible to an injustice, since judgment is an act of justice, as stated above + + <a id="SS_Q60_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q60_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now an injustice is always a mortal sin according to its genus, as stated above (Q[59], A[4]). Therefore a judgment based + on suspicion would always be a mortal sin, if it were unlawful. But this is false, because "we cannot avoid suspicions," according + to a gloss of Augustine (Tract. xc in Joan.) on + + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:5, </a> "Judge not before the time." Therefore a judgment based on suspicion would seem not to be unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John of the Cross] in comment on the words + of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.1" target="asv"> Mat. 7:1, </a> "Judge not," etc., says: "By this commandment our Lord does not forbid Christians to reprove others from kindly motives, + but that Christian should despise Christian by boasting his own righteousness, by hating and condemning others for the most + part on mere suspicion." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), suspicion denotes evil thinking based on slight indications, and this is due to three + causes. First, from a man being evil in himself, and from this very fact, as though conscious of his own wickedness, he is + prone to think evil of others, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.10.3" target="asv"> Eccles. 10:3, </a> "The fool when he walketh in the way, whereas he himself is a fool, esteemeth all men fools." Secondly, this is due to a + man being + ill-disposed towards another: for when a man hates or despises another, or is angry with or envious of him, he is led by slight + indications to think evil of him, because everyone easily believes what he desires. Thirdly, this is due to long experience: + wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 13) that "old people are very suspicious, for they have often experienced the faults + of others." The first two causes of suspicion evidently connote perversity of the affections, while the third + diminishes the nature of suspicion, in as much as experience leads to certainty which is contrary to the nature of suspicion. + Consequently suspicion denotes a certain amount of vice, and the further it goes, the more vicious it is. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A3-p7"> Now there are three degrees of suspicion. The first degree is when a man begins to doubt of another's goodness from slight + indications. This is a venial and a light sin; for "it belongs to human temptation without which no man can go through this + life," according to a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:5, </a> "Judge not before the time." The second degree is when a man, from slight indications, esteems another man's wickedness as + certain. This is a mortal sin, if it be about a + grave matter, since it cannot be without contempt of one's neighbor. Hence the same gloss goes on to say: "If then we cannot + avoid suspicions, because we are human, we must nevertheless restrain our judgment, and refrain from forming a definite and + fixed opinion." The third degree is when a judge goes so far as to condemn a man on suspicion: this pertains directly to injustice, + and consequently is a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some kind of certainty is found in human acts, not indeed the certainty of a demonstration, but such as is befitting the + matter in point, for instance when a thing is proved by suitable witnesses. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that a man thinks evil of another without sufficient cause, he despises him unduly, and therefore does + him an injury. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since justice and injustice are about external operations, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q60_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A8.html">Q[58], AA[8]</a>,10,11; + <a id="SS_Q60_A3-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q59_A1.html"> Q[59], A[1]</a>, ad 3), the judgment of suspicion pertains directly to injustice when it is betrayed by external action, and then it is a + mortal sin, as stated above. The internal judgment pertains to justice, in so far as it is related to the external judgment, + even as the internal to the external act, for + instance as desire is related to fornication, or anger to murder. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q60_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q60_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q60_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q60_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q60_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q60_A4-p0.1">Whether doubts should be interpreted for the best?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q60_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that doubts should not be interpreted for the best. Because we should judge from what happens for the most + part. But it happens for the most part that evil is done, since "the number of fools is infinite" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.1.15" target="asv">Eccles. 1:15</a>), "for the imagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil from his youth" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.8.21" target="asv">Gn. 8:21</a>). Therefore doubts should be interpreted for the worst rather than for the best. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that "he leads a godly and just life who is sound in his estimate of things, + and turns neither to this side nor to that." Now he who interprets a doubtful point for the best, turns to one side. Therefore + this should not be done. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now with regard to himself, a man should interpret doubtful matters for + the worst, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.9.28" target="asv"> Job 9:28, </a> "I feared all my works." Therefore it seems that doubtful matters affecting one's neighbor should be interpreted for the + worst. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.3" target="asv"> Rom. 14:3, </a> "He that eateth not, let him not judge him that eateth," says: "Doubts should be interpreted in the best sense." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[3], ad 2), things from the very fact that a man thinks ill of another without sufficient cause, he injures + and despises him. Now no man ought to despise or in any way injure another man without urgent cause: and, consequently, unless + we have evident indications of a person's wickedness, we ought to deem him good, by interpreting for the best whatever is + doubtful about him. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> He who interprets doubtful matters for the best, may happen to be deceived more often than not; yet it is better to err frequently + through thinking well of a wicked man, than to err less frequently through having an evil opinion of a good man, because in + the latter case an injury is inflicted, but not in the former. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is one thing to judge of things and another to judge of men. For when we judge of things, there is no question of the + good or evil of the thing about which we are judging, since it will take no harm no matter what kind of judgment we form about + it; but there is question of the good of the person who judges, if he judge truly, and of his evil if he judge falsely because + "the true is the good of the intellect, and the false is its evil," as stated in + Ethic. vi, 2, wherefore everyone should strive to make his judgment accord with things as they are. On the other hand when + we judge of men, the good and evil in our judgment is considered chiefly on the part of the person about whom judgment is + being formed; for he is deemed worthy of honor from the very fact that he is judged to be good, and deserving of contempt + if he is judged to be evil. For this reason we ought, in this kind of judgment, to aim at judging a man good, unless there + is + evident proof of the contrary. And though we may judge falsely, our judgment in thinking well of another pertains to our good + feeling and not to the evil of the intellect, even as neither does it pertain to the intellect's perfection to know the truth + of contingent singulars in themselves. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One may interpret something for the worst or for the best in two ways. First, by a kind of supposition; and thus, when we + have to apply a remedy to some evil, whether our own or another's, in order for the remedy to be applied with greater certainty + of a cure, it is expedient to take the worst for granted, since if a remedy be efficacious against a worse evil, much more + is it efficacious against a lesser evil. Secondly we may interpret something for + the best or for the worst, by deciding or determining, and in this case when judging of things we should try to interpret + each thing according as it is, and when judging of persons, to interpret things for the best as stated above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q60_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q60_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q60_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q60_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q60_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q60_A5-p0.1">Whether we should always judge according to the written law?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q60_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we ought not always to judge according to the written law. For we ought always to avoid judging unjustly. + But written laws sometimes contain injustice, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.10.1" target="asv"> Is. 10:1, </a> "Woe to them that make wicked laws, and when they write, write injustice." Therefore we ought not always to judge according + to the written law. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, judgment has to be formed about individual happenings. But no written law can cover each and every individual happening, + as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 10). Therefore it seems that we are not always bound to judge according to the written + law. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a law is written in order that the lawgiver's intention may be made clear. But it happens sometimes that even if + the lawgiver himself were present he would judge otherwise. Therefore we ought not always to judge according to the written + law. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): "In these earthly laws, though men judge about them when they are making them, when + once they are established and passed, the judges may judge no longer of them, but according to them." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q60_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q60_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, judgment is nothing else but a decision or determination of what is just. Now a thing becomes just in two ways: first by + the very nature of the case, and this is called "natural right," secondly by some agreement between men, and this is called + "positive right," as stated above (Q[57], A[2]). Now laws are written for the purpose of manifesting both these rights, but + in different ways. For the written law does + indeed contain natural right, but it does not establish it, for the latter derives its force, not from the law but from nature: + whereas the written law both contains positive right, and establishes it by giving it force of authority. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A5-p7"> Hence it is necessary to judge according to the written law, else judgment would fall short either of the natural or of the + positive right. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as the written law does not give force to the natural right, so neither can it diminish or annul its force, because + neither can man's will change nature. Hence if the written law contains anything contrary to the natural right, it is unjust + and has no binding force. For positive right has no place except where "it matters not," according to the natural right, "whether + a thing be done in one way or in another"; as stated above (Q[57], A[2], ad 2). + Wherefore such documents are to be called, not laws, but rather corruptions of law, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q60_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q95_A2.html">FS, Q[95], A[2]</a>): and consequently judgment should not be delivered according to them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even as unjust laws by their very nature are, either always or for the most part, contrary to the natural right, so too laws + that are rightly established, fail in some cases, when if they were observed they would be contrary to the natural right. + Wherefore in such cases judgment should be delivered, not according to the letter of the law, but according to equity which + the lawgiver has in view. Hence the jurist says [*Digest. i, 3; De leg. senatusque + consult. 25]: "By no reason of law, or favor of equity, is it allowable for us to interpret harshly, and render burdensome, + those useful measures which have been enacted for the welfare of man." In such cases even the lawgiver himself would decide + otherwise; and if he had foreseen the case, he might have provided for it by law. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A5-p10"> This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.</p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A5-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A5-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q60_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q60_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q60_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q60_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q61.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q60_A6-p0.1">Whether judgment is rendered perverse by being usurped?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q60_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that judgment is not rendered perverse by being usurped. For justice is rectitude in matters of action. Now + truth is not impaired, no matter who tells it, but it may suffer from the person who ought to accept it. Therefore again justice + loses nothing, no matter who declares what is just, and this is what is meant by judgment. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to judgment to punish sins. Now it is related to the praise of some that they punished sins without having + authority over those whom they punished; such as Moses in slaying the Egyptian ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.2.12" target="asv">Ex. 2:12</a>), and Phinees the son of Eleazar in slaying Zambri the son of Salu ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A6-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Num.25.7" target="asv">Num. 25:7-14</a>), and "it was reputed to him unto justice" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A6-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.105.31" target="asv">Ps. 105:31</a>). Therefore usurpation of judgment pertains not to injustice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, spiritual power is distinct from temporal. Now prelates having spiritual power sometimes interfere in matters concerning + the secular power. Therefore usurped judgment is not unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A6-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, even as the judge requires authority in order to judge aright, so also does he need justice and knowledge, as shown + above (A[1], ad 1,3; A[2]). But a judgment is not described as unjust, if he who judges lacks the habit of justice or the + knowledge of the law. Neither therefore is it always unjust to judge by usurpation, i.e. without authority. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A6-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.4" target="asv">Rom. 14:4</a>): "Who art thou that judgest another man's servant?" + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A6-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since judgment should be pronounced according to the written law, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q60_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q60_A5.html">(A[5])</a>, he that pronounces judgment, interprets, in a way, the letter of the law, by applying it to some particular case. Now since + it belongs to the same authority to interpret and to make a law, just as a law cannot be made save by public authority, so + neither can a judgment be pronounced except by public authority, which extends over those who are + subject to the community. Wherefore even as it would be unjust for one man to force another to observe a law that was not + approved by public authority, so too it is unjust, if a man compels another to submit to a judgment that is pronounced by + other than the public authority. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When the truth is declared there is no obligation to accept it, and each one is free to receive it or not, as he wishes. + On the other hand judgment implies an obligation, wherefore it is unjust for anyone to be judged by one who has no public + authority. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Moses seems to have slain the Egyptian by authority received as it were, by divine inspiration; this seems to follow from + + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.7.24" target="asv"> Acts 7:24, 25, </a> where it is said that "striking the Egyptian . . . he thought that his brethren understood that God by his hand would save + Israel [Vulg.: 'them']." Or it may be replied that Moses slew the Egyptian in order to defend the man who was unjustly attacked, + without himself exceeding the limits of a + blameless defence. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 36) that "whoever does not ward off a blow from a fellow man when + he can, is as much in fault as the striker"; and he quotes the example of Moses. Again we may reply with Augustine (QQ. Exod. + qu. 2) [*Cf. Contra Faust. xxii, 70] that just as "the soil gives proof of its fertility by producing useless herbs before + the useful seeds have grown, so this deed of Moses was sinful although it gave a sign of great fertility," in so far, to wit, + as + it was a sign of the power whereby he was to deliver his people. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A6-p10"> With regard to Phinees the reply is that he did this out of zeal for God by Divine inspiration; or because though not as + yet high-priest, he was nevertheless the high-priest's son, and this judgment was his concern as of the other judges, to whom + this was commanded [* + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A6-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.20" target="asv">Ex. 22:20</a>; + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A6-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.20" target="asv">Lev. 20</a>; + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A6-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.13" target="asv">Dt. 13</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q60_A6-p10.4" href="./asv.html#Deut.17" target="asv">17</a>]. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The secular power is subject to the spiritual, even as the body is subject to the soul. Consequently the judgment is not + usurped if the spiritual authority interferes in those temporal matters that are subject to the spiritual authority or which + have been committed to the spiritual by the temporal authority. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A6-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The habits of knowledge and justice are perfections of the individual, and consequently their absence does not make a judgment + to be usurped, as in the absence of public authority which gives a judgment its coercive force. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A6-p13"></p> + <p id="SS_Q60_A6-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q60_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q61.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q59_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q60_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q61" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q60_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q61_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q61-p0.1">OF THE PARTS OF JUSTICE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q61-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q61-p2"> We must now consider the parts of justice; (1) the subjective parts, which are the species of justice, i.e. distributive + and commutative justice; (2) the quasi-integral parts; (3) the quasi-potential parts, i.e. the virtues connected with justice. + The first consideration will be twofold: (1) The parts of justice; (2) their opposite vices. And since restitution would seem + to be an act of commutative justice, we must consider (1) the distinction between commutative and distributive + justice; (2) restitution. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q61-p4"> (1) Whether there are two species of justice, viz. distributive and commutative?</p> + <p id="SS_Q61-p5"> (2) Whether in either case the mean is take in the same way?</p> + <p id="SS_Q61-p6"> (3) Whether their matter is uniform or manifold?</p> + <p id="SS_Q61-p7"> (4) Whether in any of these species the just is the same as counter-passion?</p> + <div id="SS_Q61_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q61.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q61_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q61_A1-p0.1">Whether two species of justice are suitably assigned, viz. commutative and distributive?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q61_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the two species of justice are unsuitably assigned, viz. distributive and commutative. That which is hurtful + to the many cannot be a species of justice, since justice is directed to the common good. Now it is hurtful to the common + good of the many, if the goods of the community are distributed among many, both because the goods of the community would + be exhausted, and because the morals of men would be corrupted. For Tully says (De Offic. + ii, 15): "He who receives becomes worse, and the more ready to expect that he will receive again." Therefore distribution + does not belong to any species of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the act of justice is to render to each one what is his own, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q61_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A2.html">Q[58], A[2]</a>). But when things are distributed, a man does not receive what was his, but becomes possessed of something which belonged + to the community. Therefore this does not pertain to justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, justice is not only in the sovereign, but also in the subject, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q61_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A6.html">Q[58], A[6]</a>). But it belongs exclusively to the sovereign to distribute. Therefore distribution does not always belong to justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, "Distributive justice regards common goods" (Ethic. v, 4). Now matters regarding the community pertain to legal + justice. Therefore distributive justice is a part, not of particular, but of legal justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, unity or multitude do not change the species of a virtue. Now commutative justice consists in rendering something + to one person, while distributive justice consists in giving something to many. Therefore they are not different species of + justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher assigns two parts to justice and says (Ethic. v, 2) that "one directs distributions, the other, commutations." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q61_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A7.html">Q[58], AA[7]</a>,8), particular justice is directed to the private individual, who is compared to the community as a part to the whole. Now + a twofold order may be considered in relation to a part. In the first place there is the order of one part to another, to + which corresponds the order of one private individual to another. This order is directed by commutative justice, which is + concerned about the mutual dealings + between two persons. In the second place there is the order of the whole towards the parts, to which corresponds the order + of that which belongs to the community in relation to each single person. This order is directed by distributive justice, + which distributes common goods proportionately. Hence there are two species of justice, distributive and commutative. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as a private individual is praised for moderation in his bounty, and blamed for excess therein, so too ought moderation + to be observed in the distribution of common goods, wherein distributive justice directs. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even as part and whole are somewhat the same, so too that which pertains to the whole, pertains somewhat to the part also: + so that when the goods of the community are distributed among a number of individuals each one receives that which, in a way, + is his own. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The act of distributing the goods of the community, belongs to none but those who exercise authority over those goods; and + yet distributive justice is also in the subjects to whom those goods are distributed in so far as they are contented by a + just distribution. Moreover distribution of common goods is sometimes made not to the state but to the members of a family, + and such distribution can be made by authority of a private individual. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Movement takes its species from the term "whereunto." Hence it belongs to legal justice to direct to the common good those + matters which concern private individuals: whereas on the contrary it belongs to particular justice to direct the common good + to particular individuals by way of distribution. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Distributive and commutative justice differ not only in respect of unity and multitude, but also in respect of different + kinds of due: because common property is due to an individual in one way, and his personal property in another way. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A1-p14"></p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A1-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q61.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q61_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q61_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q61_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q61_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q61_A2-p0.1">Whether the mean is to be observed in the same way in distributive as in commutative justice?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q61_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the mean in distributive justice is to be observed in the same way as in commutative justice. For each + of these is a kind of particular justice, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q61_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q61_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now the mean is taken in the same way in all the parts of temperance or fortitude. Therefore the mean should also be observed + in the same way in both distributive and commutative justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the form of a moral virtue consists in observing the mean which is determined in accordance with reason. Since, + then, one virtue has one form, it seems that the mean for both should be the same. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in order to observe the mean in distributive justice we have to consider the various deserts of persons. Now a person's + deserts are considered also in commutative justice, for instance, in punishments; thus a man who strikes a prince is punished + more than one who strikes a private individual. Therefore the mean is observed in the same way in both kinds of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3,4) that the mean in distributive justice is observed according to "geometrical proportion," + whereas in commutative justice it follows "arithmetical proportion." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q61_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q61_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, in distributive justice something is given to a private individual, in so far as what belongs to the whole is due to the + part, and in a quantity that is proportionate to the importance of the position of that part in respect of the whole. Consequently + in distributive justice a person receives all the more of the common goods, according as he holds a more prominent position + in the community. This prominence in + an aristocratic community is gauged according to virtue, in an oligarchy according to wealth, in a democracy according to + liberty, and in various ways according to various forms of community. Hence in distributive justice the mean is observed, + not according to equality between thing and thing, but according to proportion between things and persons: in such a way that + even as one person surpasses another, so that which is given to one person surpasses that which is allotted to another. Hence + the + Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3,4) that the mean in the latter case follows "geometrical proportion," wherein equality depends + not on quantity but on proportion. For example we say that 6 is to 4 as 3 is to 2, because in either case the proportion equals + 1-1/2; since the greater number is the sum of the lesser plus its half: whereas the equality of excess is not one of quantity, + because 6 exceeds 4 by 2, while 3 exceeds 2 by 1. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A2-p7"> On the other hand in commutations something is paid to an individual on account of something of his that has been received, + as may be seen chiefly in selling and buying, where the notion of commutation is found primarily. Hence it is necessary to + equalize thing with thing, so that the one person should pay back to the other just so much as he has become richer out of + that which belonged to the other. The result of this will be equality according to the "arithmetical mean" which + is gauged according to equal excess in quantity. Thus 5 is the mean between 6 and 4, since it exceeds the latter and is exceeded + by the former, by 1. Accordingly if, at the start, both persons have 5, and one of them receives 1 out of the other's belongings, + the one that is the receiver, will have 6, and the other will be left with 4: and so there will be justice if both be brought + back to the mean, 1 being taken from him that has 6, and given to him that has 4, for then both will have 5 which + is the mean. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the other moral virtues the rational, not the real mean, is to be followed: but justice follows the real mean; wherefore + the mean, in justice, depends on the diversity of things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Equality is the general form of justice, wherein distributive and commutative justice agree: but in one we find equality + of geometrical proportion, whereas in the other we find equality of arithmetical proportion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In actions and passions a person's station affects the quantity of a thing: for it is a greater injury to strike a prince + than a private person. Hence in distributive justice a person's station is considered in itself, whereas in commutative justice + it is considered in so far as it causes a diversity of things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q61_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q61_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q61_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q61_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q61_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q61_A3-p0.1">Whether there is a different matter for both kinds of justice?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q61_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is not a different matter for both kinds of justice. Diversity of matter causes diversity of virtue, + as in the case of fortitude and temperance. Therefore, if distributive and commutative justice have different matters, it + would seem that they are not comprised under the same virtue, viz. justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the distribution that has to do with distributive justice is one of "wealth or of honors, or of whatever can be + distributed among the members of the community" (Ethic. v, 2), which very things are the subject matter of commutations between + one person and another, and this belongs to commutative justice. Therefore the matters of distributive and commutative justice + are not distinct. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the matter of distributive justice differs from that of commutative justice, for the reason that they differ + specifically, where there is no specific difference, there ought to be no diversity of matter. Now the Philosopher (Ethic. + v, 2) reckons commutative justice as one species, and yet this has many kinds of matter. Therefore the matter of these species + of justice is, seemingly, not of many kinds. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in Ethic. v, 2 that "one kind of justice directs distributions, and another commutations." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q61_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q51_A8.html">Q[51], AA[8]</a>,10), justice is about certain external operations, namely distribution and commutation. These consist in the use of certain + externals, whether things, persons or even works: of things, as when one man takes from or restores to another that which + is his; of persons, as when a man does an injury to the very person of another, for instance by striking or insulting him, + or even by showing respect for him; + and of works, as when a man justly exacts a work of another, or does a work for him. Accordingly, if we take for the matter + of each kind of justice the things themselves of which the operations are the use, the matter of distributive and commutative + justice is the same, since things can be distributed out of the common property to individuals, and be the subject of commutation + between one person and another; and again there is a certain distribution and payment of laborious works. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A3-p7"> If, however, we take for the matter of both kinds of justice the principal actions themselves, whereby we make use of persons, + things, and works, there is then a difference of matter between them. For distributive justice directs distributions, while + commutative justice directs commutations that can take place between two persons. of these some are involuntary, some voluntary. + They are involuntary when anyone uses another man's chattel, person, or work against his will, and this + may be done secretly by fraud, or openly by violence. In either case the offence may be committed against the other man's + chattel or person, or against a person connected with him. If the offence is against his chattel and this be taken secretly, + it is called "theft," if openly, it is called "robbery." If it be against another man's person, it may affect either the very + substance of his person, or his dignity. If it be against the substance of his person, a man is injured secretly if he is + treacherously slain, struck or poisoned, and openly, if he is publicly slain, imprisoned, struck or maimed. If it be against + his personal dignity, a man is injured secretly by false witness, detractions and so forth, whereby he is deprived of his + good name, and openly, by being accused in a court of law, or by public insult. If it be against a personal connection, a + man is injured in the person of his wife, secretly (for the most part) by adultery, in the person of his slave, if the latter + be + induced to leave his master: which things can also be done openly. The same applies to other personal connections, and whatever + injury may be committed against the principal, may be committed against them also. Adultery, however, and inducing a slave + to leave his master are properly injuries against the person; yet the latter, since a slave is his master's chattel, is referred + to theft. Voluntary commutations are when a man voluntarily transfers his chattel to another person. And if he transfer + it simply so that the recipient incurs no debt, as in the case of gifts, it is an act, not of justice but of liberality. A + voluntary transfer belongs to justice in so far as it includes the notion of debt, and this may occur in many ways. First + when one man simply transfers his thing to another in exchange for another thing, as happens in selling and buying. Secondly + when a man transfers his thing to another, that the latter may have the use of it with the obligation of returning it to its + owner. If he grant the use of a thing gratuitously, it is called "usufruct" in things that bear fruit; and simply "borrowing" + on "loan" in things that bear no fruit, such as money, pottery, etc.; but if not even the use is granted gratis, it is called + "letting" or "hiring." Thirdly, a man transfers his thing with the intention of recovering it, not for the purpose of its + use, but that it may be kept safe, as in a "deposit," or under some obligation, as when a man pledges his property, or when + one man stands security for another. In all these actions, whether voluntary or involuntary, the mean is taken in the same + way according to the equality of repayment. Hence all these actions belong to the one same species of justice, namely commutative + justice. And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A3-p8"></p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A3-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q61_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q61_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q61_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q61_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q61_A4-p0.1">Whether the just is absolutely the same as retaliation?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q61_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the just is absolutely the same as retaliation. For the judgment of God is absolutely just. Now the judgment + of God is such that a man has to suffer in proportion with his deeds, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q61_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.2" target="asv"> Mat. 7:2</a>: "With what measure you judge, you shall be judged: and with what measure you mete, it shall be measured to you again." Therefore + the just is absolutely the same as retaliation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in either kind of justice something is given to someone according to a kind of equality. In distributive justice + this equality regards personal dignity, which would seem to depend chiefly on what a person has done for the good of the community; + while in commutative justice it regards the thing in which a person has suffered loss. Now in respect of either equality there + is retaliation in respect of the deed committed. Therefore it would seem that the + just is absolutely the same as retaliation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the chief argument against retaliation is based on the difference between the voluntary and the involuntary; for + he who does an injury involuntarily is less severely punished. Now voluntary and involuntary taken in relation to ourselves, + do not diversify the mean of justice since this is the real mean and does not depend on us. Therefore it would seem that the + just is absolutely the same as retaliation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher proves (Ethic. v, 5) that the just is not always the same as retaliation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Retaliation [contrapassum] denotes equal passion repaid for previous action; and the expression applies most properly to + injurious passions and actions, whereby a man harms the person of his neighbor; for instance if a man strike, that he be struck + back. This kind of just is laid down in the Law ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q61_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.23" target="asv">Ex. 21:23,24</a>): "He shall render life for life, eye for eye," etc. And since also to take away what belongs to another is to do an unjust + thing, + it follows that secondly retaliation consists in this also, that whosoever causes loss to another, should suffer loss in his + belongings. This just loss is also found in the Law ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q61_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.1" target="asv">Ex. 22:1</a>): "If any man steal an ox or a sheep, and kill or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for one ox and four sheep for one sheep." + Thirdly retaliation is transferred to voluntary commutations, where action and passion are on both sides, although voluntariness + detracts from the nature of + passion, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q61_A4-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q59_A3.html">Q[59], A[3]</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A4-p7"> In all these cases, however, repayment must be made on a basis of equality according to the requirements of commutative justice, + namely that the meed of passion be equal to the action. Now there would not always be equality if passion were in the same + species as the action. Because, in the first place, when a person injures the person of one who is greater, the action surpasses + any passion of the same species that he might undergo, wherefore he that strikes a prince, is not only + struck back, but is much more severely punished. In like manner when a man despoils another of his property against the latter's + will, the action surpasses the passion if he be merely deprived of that thing, because the man who caused another's loss, + himself would lose nothing, and so he is punished by making restitution several times over, because not only did he injure + a private individual, but also the common weal, the security of whose protection he has infringed. Nor again would there be + equality of passion in voluntary commutations, were one always to exchange one's chattel for another man's, because it might + happen that the other man's chattel is much greater than our own: so that it becomes necessary to equalize passion and action + in commutations according to a certain proportionate commensuration, for which purpose money was invented. Hence retaliation + is in accordance with commutative justice: but there is no place for it in distributive justice, because in distributive + justice we do not consider the equality between thing and thing or between passion and action (whence the expression 'contrapassum'), + but according to proportion between things and persons, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q61_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q61_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This form of the Divine judgment is in accordance with the conditions of commutative justice, in so far as rewards are apportioned + to merits, and punishments to sins. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a man who has served the community is paid for his services, this is to be referred to commutative, not distributive, + justice. Because distributive justice considers the equality, not between the thing received and the thing done, but between + the thing received by one person and the thing received by another according to the respective conditions of those persons. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When the injurious action is voluntary, the injury is aggravated and consequently is considered as a greater thing. Hence + it requires a greater punishment in repayment, by reason of a difference, not on part, but on the part of the thing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q61_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q61_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q60_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q61_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q62" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q61_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q62-p0.1">OF RESTITUTION (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q62-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q62-p2"> We must now consider restitution, under which head there are eight points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q62-p3"> (1) of what is it an act?</p> + <p id="SS_Q62-p4"> (2) Whether it is always of necessity for salvation to restore what one has taken away?</p> + <p id="SS_Q62-p5"> (3) Whether it is necessary to restore more than has been taken away?</p> + <p id="SS_Q62-p6"> (4) Whether it is necessary to restore what one has not taken away?</p> + <p id="SS_Q62-p7"> (5) Whether it is necessary to make restitution to the person from whom something has been taken?</p> + <p id="SS_Q62-p8"> (6) Whether the person who has taken something away is bound to restore it?</p> + <p id="SS_Q62-p9"> (7) Whether any other person is bound to restitution?</p> + <p id="SS_Q62-p10"> (8) Whether one is bound to restore at once?</p> + <div id="SS_Q62_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q62_A1-p0.1">Whether restitution is an act of commutative justice?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q62_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that restitution is not an act of commutative justice. For justice regards the notion of what is due. Now one + may restore, even as one may give, that which is not due. Therefore restitution is not the act of any part of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which has passed away and is no more cannot be restored. Now justice and injustice are about certain actions + and passions, which are unenduring and transitory. Therefore restitution would not seem to be the act of a part of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, restitution is repayment of something taken away. Now something may be taken away from a man not only in commutation, + but also in distribution, as when, in distributing, one gives a man less than his due. Therefore restitution is not more an + act of commutative than of distributive justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Restitution is opposed to taking away. Now it is an act of commutative injustice to take away what belongs to another. Therefore + to restore it is an act of that justice which directs commutations. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> To restore is seemingly the same as to reinstate a person in the possession or dominion of his thing, so that in restitution + we consider the equality of justice attending the payment of one thing for another, and this belongs to commutative justice. + Hence restitution is an act of commutative justice, occasioned by one person having what belongs to another, either with his + consent, for instance on loan or deposit, or against his will, as in robbery or + theft. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That which is not due to another is not his properly speaking, although it may have been his at some time: wherefore it is + a mere gift rather than a restitution, when anyone renders to another what is not due to him. It is however somewhat like + a restitution, since the thing itself is materially the same; yet it is not the same in respect of the formal aspect of justice, + which considers that thing as belonging to this particular man: and so it is not + restitution properly so called. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In so far as the word restitution denotes something done over again, it implies identity of object. Hence it would seem originally + to have applied chiefly to external things, which can pass from one person to another, since they remain the same both substantially + and in respect of the right of dominion. But, even as the term "commutation" has passed from such like things to those actions + and passions which confer reverence or injury, harm or profit on + another person, so too the term "restitution" is applied, to things which though they be transitory in reality, yet remain + in their effect; whether this touch his body, as when the body is hurt by being struck, or his reputation, as when a man remains + defamed or dishonored by injurious words. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Compensation is made by the distributor to the man to whom less was given than his due, by comparison of thing with thing, + when the latter receives so much the more according as he received less than his due: and consequently it pertains to commutative + justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q62_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q62_A2-p0.1">Whether restitution of what has been taken away is necessary for salvation?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q62_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not necessary to restore what has been taken away. For that which is impossible is not necessary + for salvation. But sometimes it is impossible to restore what has been taken, as when a man has taken limb or life. Therefore + it does not seem necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from another. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the commission of a sin is not necessary for salvation, for then a man would be in a dilemma. But sometimes it is + impossible, without sin, to restore what has been taken, as when one has taken away another's good name by telling the truth. + Therefore it is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from another. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is done cannot be undone. Now sometimes a man loses his personal honor by being unjustly insulted. Therefore + that which has been taken from him cannot be restored to him: so that it is not necessary for salvation to restore what one + has taken. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, to prevent a person from obtaining a good thing is seemingly the same as to take it away from him, since "to lack + little is almost the same as to lack nothing at all," as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 5). Now when anyone prevents a man + from obtaining a benefice or the like, seemingly he is not bound to restore the benefice, since this would be sometimes impossible. + Therefore it is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Ep. ad Maced. cxliii): "Unless a man restore what he has purloined, his sin is not forgiven." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Restitution as stated above + <a id="SS_Q62_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q62_A1.html">(A[1])</a> is an act of commutative justice, and this demands a certain equality. Wherefore restitution denotes the return of the thing + unjustly taken; since it is by giving it back that equality is reestablished. If, however, it be taken away justly, there + will be equality, and so there will be no need for restitution, for justice consists in equality. Since therefore the safeguarding + of justice is necessary + for salvation, it follows that it is necessary for salvation to restore what has been taken unjustly. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When it is impossible to repay the equivalent, it suffices to repay what one can, as in the case of honor due to God and + our parents, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). Wherefore when that which has been taken cannot be restored in equivalent, + compensation should be made as far as possible: for instance if one man has deprived another of a limb, he must make compensation + either in money or in honor, the condition of either party being duly + considered according to the judgment of a good man. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There are three ways in which one may take away another's good name. First, by saying what is true, and this justly, as when + a man reveals another's sin, while observing the right order of so doing, and then he is not bound to restitution. Secondly, + by saying what is untrue and unjustly, and then he is bound to restore that man's good name, by confessing that he told an + untruth. Thirdly, by saying what is true, but unjustly, as when a man reveals + another's sin contrarily to the right order of so doing, and then he is bound to restore his good name as far as he can, and + yet without telling an untruth; for instance by saying that he spoke ill, or that he defamed him unjustly; or if he be unable + to restore his good name, he must compensate him otherwise, the same as in other cases, as stated above (ad 1). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The action of the man who has defamed another cannot be undone, but it is possible, by showing him deference, to undo its + effect, viz. the lowering of the other man's personal dignity in the opinion of other men. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> There are several ways of preventing a man from obtaining a benefice. First, justly: for instance, if having in view the + honor of God or the good of the Church, one procures its being conferred on a more worthy subject, and then there is no obligation + whatever to make restitution or compensation. Secondly, unjustly, if the intention is to injure the person whom one hinders, + through hatred, revenge or the like. In this case, if before the benefice has + been definitely assigned to anyone, one prevents its being conferred on a worthy subject by counseling that it be not conferred + on him, one is bound to make some compensation, after taking account of the circumstances of persons and things according + to the judgment of a prudent person: but one is not bound in equivalent, because that man had not obtained the benefice and + might have been prevented in many ways from obtaining it. If, on the other hand, the benefice had already been assigned to + a + certain person, and someone, for some undue cause procures its revocation, it is the same as though he had deprived a man + of what he already possessed, and consequently he would be bound to compensation in equivalent, in proportion, however, to + his means. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q62_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q62_A3-p0.1">Whether it suffices to restore the exact amount taken?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q62_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not sufficient to restore the exact amount taken. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q62_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.1" target="asv">Ex. 22:1</a>): "If a man shall steal an ox or a sheep and kill or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one + sheep." Now everyone is bound to keep the commandments of the Divine law. Therefore a thief is bound to restore four- or fivefold. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "What things soever were written, were written for our learning" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q62_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.15.4" target="asv">Rom. 15:4</a>). Now Zachaeus said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q62_A3-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.19.8" target="asv">Lk. 19:8</a>) to our Lord: "If I have wronged any man of any thing, I restore him fourfold." Therefore a man is bound to restore several + times over the amount he has taken unjustly. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one can be unjustly deprived of what he is not bound to give. Now a judge justly deprives a thief of more than + the amount of his theft, under the head of damages. Therefore a man is bound to pay it, and consequently it is not sufficient + to restore the exact amount. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Restitution re-establishes equality where an unjust taking has caused inequality. Now equality is restored by repaying the + exact amount taken. Therefore there is no obligation to restore more than the exact amount taken. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> When a man takes another's thing unjustly, two things must be considered. One is the inequality on the part of the thing, + which inequality is sometimes void of injustice, as is the case in loans. The other is the sin of injustice, which is consistent + with equality on the part of the thing, as when a person intends to use violence but fails. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A3-p7"> As regards the first, the remedy is applied by making restitution, since thereby equality is re-established; and for this + it is enough that a man restore just so much as he has belonging to another. But as regards the sin, the remedy is applied + by punishment, the infliction of which belongs to the judge: and so, until a man is condemned by the judge, he is not bound + to restore more than he took, but when once he is condemned, he is bound to pay the penalty. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A3-p8"> Hence it is clear how to answer the First Objection: because this law fixes the punishment to be inflicted by the judge. + Nor is this commandment to be kept now, because since the coming of Christ no man is bound to keep the judicial precepts, + as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q62_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q104_A3.html">FS, Q[104], A[3]</a>). Nevertheless the same might be determined by human law, and then the same answer would apply. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Zachaeus said this being willing to do more than he was bound to do; hence he had said already: "Behold . . . the half of + my goods I give to the poor." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> By condemning the man justly, the judge can exact more by way of damages; and yet this was not due before the sentence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q62_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q62_A4-p0.1">Whether a man is bound to restore what he has not taken?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q62_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man is bound to restore what he has not taken. For he that has inflicted a loss on a man is bound to + remove that loss. Now it happens sometimes that the loss sustained is greater than the thing taken: for instance, if you dig + up a man's seeds, you inflict on the sower a loss equal to the coming harvest, and thus you would seem to be bound to make + restitution accordingly. Therefore a man is bound to restore what he has not taken. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who retains his creditor's money beyond the stated time, would seem to occasion his loss of all his possible + profits from that money, and yet he does not really take them. Therefore it seems that a man is bound to restore what he did + not take. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, human justice is derived from Divine justice. Now a man is bound to restore to God more than he has received from + Him, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q62_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.26" target="asv"> Mat. 25:26, </a> "Thou knewest that I reap where I sow not, and gather where I have not strewed." Therefore it is just that one should restore + to a man also, something that one has not taken. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Restitution belongs to justice, because it re-establishes equality. But if one were to restore what one did not take, there + would not be equality. Therefore it is not just to make such a restitution. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Whoever brings a loss upon another person, seemingly, takes from him the amount of the loss, since, according to the Philosopher + (Ethic. v, 4) loss is so called from a man having "less"* than his due. [*The derivation is more apparent in English than + in Latin, where 'damnum' stands for 'loss,' and 'minus' for 'less.' Aristotle merely says that to have more than your own + is called 'gain,' and to have less than you started with is called 'loss.'] Therefore a + man is bound to make restitution according to the loss he has brought upon another. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A4-p7"> Now a man suffers a loss in two ways. First, by being deprived of what he actually has; and a loss of this kind is always + to be made good by repayment in equivalent: for instance if a man damnifies another by destroying his house he is bound to + pay him the value of the house. Secondly, a man may damnify another by preventing him from obtaining what he was on the way + to obtain. A loss of this kind need not be made good in equivalent; because to have a thing virtually is less than + to have it actually, and to be on the way to obtain a thing is to have it merely virtually or potentially, and so were he + to be indemnified by receiving the thing actually, he would be paid, not the exact value taken from him, but more, and this + is not necessary for salvation, as stated above. However he is bound to make some compensation, according to the condition + of persons and things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A4-p8"> From this we see how to answer the First and Second Objections: because the sower of the seed in the field, has the harvest, + not actually but only virtually. In like manner he that has money has the profit not yet actually but only virtually: and + both may be hindered in many ways. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God requires nothing from us but what He Himself has sown in us. Hence this saying is to be understood as expressing either + the shameful thought of the lazy servant, who deemed that he had received nothing from the other, or the fact that God expects + from us the fruit of His gifts, which fruit is from Him and from us, although the gifts themselves are from God without us. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q62_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q62_A5-p0.1">Whether restitution must always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q62_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that restitution need not always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken. For it is not lawful + to injure anyone. Now it would sometimes be injurious to the man himself, or to others, were one to restore to him what has + been taken from him; if, for instance, one were to return a madman his sword. Therefore restitution need not always be made + to the person from whom a thing has been taken. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if a man has given a thing unlawfully, he does not deserve to recover it. Now sometimes a man gives unlawfully that + which another accepts unlawfully, as in the case of the giver and receiver who are guilty of simony. Therefore it is not always + necessary to make restitution to the person from whom one has taken something. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no man is bound to do what is impossible. Now it is sometimes impossible to make restitution to the person from + whom a thing has been taken, either because he is dead, or because he is too far away, or because he is unknown to us. Therefore + restitution need not always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, we owe more compensation to one from whom we have received a greater favor. Now we have received greater favors + from others (our parents for instance) than from a lender or depositor. Therefore sometimes we ought to succor some other + person rather than make restitution to one from whom we have taken something. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A5-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it is useless to restore a thing which reverts to the restorer by being restored. Now if a prelate has unjustly + taken something from the Church and makes restitution to the Church, it reverts into his hands, since he is the guardian of + the Church's property. Therefore he ought not to restore to the Church from whom he has taken: and so restitution should not + always be made to the person from whom something has been taken away + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A5-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q62_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.7" target="asv">Rom. 13:7</a>): "Render . . . to all men their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A5-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Restitution re-establishes the equality of commutative justice, which equality consists in the equalizing of thing to thing, + as stated above + <a id="SS_Q62_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q62_A2.html">(A[2];</a> Q[58], A[10]). Now this equalizing of things is impossible, unless he that has less than his due receive what is lacking + to him: and for this to be done, restitution must be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When the thing to be restored appears to be grievously injurious to the person to whom it is to be restored, or to some other, + it should not be restored to him there and then, because restitution is directed to the good of the person to whom it is made, + since all possessions come under the head of the useful. Yet he who retains another's property must not appropriate it, but + must either reserve it, that he may restore it at a fitting time, or hand it + over to another to keep it more securely. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A person may give a thing unlawfully in two ways. First through the giving itself being illicit and against the law, as is + the case when a man gives a thing simoniacally. Such a man deserves to lose what he gave, wherefore restitution should not + be made to him: and, since the receiver acted against the law in receiving, he must not retain the price, but must use it + for some pious object. Secondly a man gives unlawfully, through giving for an unlawful + purpose, albeit the giving itself is not unlawful, as when a woman receives payment for fornication: wherefore she may keep + what she has received. If, however, she has extorted overmuch by fraud or deceit, she would be bound to restitution. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the person to whom restitution is due is unknown altogether, restitution must be made as far as possible, for instance + by giving an alms for his spiritual welfare (whether he be dead or living): but not without previously making a careful inquiry + about his person. If the person to whom restitution is due be dead, restitution should be made to his heir, who is looked + upon as one with him. If he be very far away, what is due to him should be sent to + him, especially if it be of great value and can easily be sent: else it should be deposited in a safe place to be kept for + him, and the owner should be advised of the fact. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A man is bound, out of his own property, to succor his parents, or those from whom he has received greater benefits; but + he ought not to compensate a benefactor out of what belongs to others; and he would be doing this if he were to compensate + one with what is due to another. Exception must be made in cases of extreme need, for then he could and should even take what + belongs to another in order to succor a parent. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> There are three ways in which a prelate can rob the Church of her property. First by laying hands on Church property which + is committed, not to him but to another; for instance, if a bishop appropriates the property of the chapter. In such a case + it is clear that he is bound to restitution, by handing it over to those who are its lawful owners. Secondly by transferring + to another person (for instance a relative or a friend) Church property committed + to himself: in which case he must make restitution to the Church, and have it under his own care, so as to hand it over to + his successor. Thirdly, a prelate may lay hands on Church property, merely in intention, when, to wit, he begins to have a + mind to hold it as his own and not in the name of the Church: in which case he must make restitution by renouncing his intention. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A5-p14"></p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A5-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q62_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q62_A6-p0.1">Whether he that has taken a thing is always bound to restitution?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q62_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that he who has taken a thing is not always bound to restore it. Restitution re-establishes the equality of + justice, by taking away from him that has more and giving to him that has less. Now it happens sometimes that he who has taken + that which belongs to another, no longer has it, through its having passed into another's hands. Therefore it should be restored, + not by the person that took it, but by the one that has it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no man is bound to reveal his own crime. But by making restitution a man would sometimes reveal his crime, as in + the case of theft. Therefore he that has taken a thing is not always bound to restitution. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same thing should not be restored several times. Now sometimes several persons take a thing at the same time, + and one of them restores it in its entirety. Therefore he that takes a thing is not always bound to restitution. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> He that has sinned is bound to satisfaction. Now restitution belongs to satisfaction. Therefore he that has taken a thing + is bound to restore it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> With regard to a man who has taken another's property, two points must be considered: the thing taken, and the taking. By + reason of the thing taken, he is bound to restore it as long as he has it in his possession, since the thing that he has in + addition to what is his, should be taken away from him, and given to him who lacks it according to the form of commutative + justice. On the other hand, the taking of the thing that is another's property, may be + threefold. For sometimes it is injurious, i.e. against the will of the owner, as in theft and robbery: in which case the thief + is bound to restitution not only by reason of the thing, but also by reason of the injurious action, even though the thing + is no longer in his possession. For just as a man who strikes another, though he gain nothing thereby, is bound to compensate + the injured person, so too he that is guilty of theft or robbery, is bound to make compensation for the loss incurred, + although he be no better off; and in addition he must be punished for the injustice committed. Secondly, a man takes another's + property for his own profit but without committing an injury, i.e. with the consent of the owner, as in the case of a loan: + and then, the taker is bound to restitution, not only by reason of the thing, but also by reason of the taking, even if he + has lost the thing: for he is bound to compensate the person who has done him a favor, and he would not be doing so if the + latter were to lose thereby. Thirdly, a man takes another's property without injury to the latter or profit to himself, as + in the case of a deposit; wherefore he that takes a thing thus, incurs no obligation on account of the taking, in fact by + taking he grants a favor; but he is bound to restitution on account of the thing taken. Consequently if this thing be taken + from him without any fault on his part, he is not bound to restitution, although he would be, if he were to lose the thing + through + a grievous fault on his part. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The chief end of restitution is, not that he who has more than his due may cease to have it, but that he who has less than + his due may be compensated. Wherefore there is no place for restitution in those things which one man may receive from another + without loss to the latter, as when a person takes a light from another's candle. Consequently although he that has taken + something from another, may have ceased to have what he took, through having + transferred it to another, yet since that other is deprived of what is his, both are bound to restitution, he that took the + thing, on account of the injurious taking, and he that has it, on account of the thing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although a man is not bound to reveal his crime to other men, yet is he bound to reveal it to God in confession; and so he + may make restitution of another's property through the priest to whom he confesses. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since restitution is chiefly directed to the compensation for the loss incurred by the person from whom a thing has been + taken unjustly, it stands to reason that when he has received sufficient compensation from one, the others are not bound to + any further restitution in his regard: rather ought they to refund the person who has made restitution, who, nevertheless, + may excuse them from so doing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A6-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A6-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q62_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q62_A7-p0.1">Whether restitution is binding on those who have not taken?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q62_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that restitution is not binding on those who have not taken. For restitution is a punishment of the taker. + Now none should be punished except the one who sinned. Therefore none are bound to restitution save the one who has taken. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, justice does not bind one to increase another's property. Now if restitution were binding not only on the man who + takes a thing but also on all those who cooperate with him in any way whatever, the person from whom the thing was taken would + be the gainer, both because he would receive restitution many times over, and because sometimes a person cooperates towards + a thing being taken away from someone, without its being taken away in effect. Therefore + the others are not bound to restitution. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no man is bound to expose himself to danger, in order to safeguard another's property. Now sometimes a man would + expose himself to the danger of death, were he to betray a thief, or withstand him. Therefore one is not bound to restitution, + through not betraying or withstanding a thief. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q62_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.32" target="asv">Rom. 1:32</a>): "They who do such things are worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but also they that consent to them that do + them." Therefore in like manner they that consent are bound to restitution. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q62_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q62_A6.html">(A[6])</a>, a person is bound to restitution not only on account of someone else's property which he has taken, but also on account + of the injurious taking. Hence whoever is cause of an unjust taking is bound to restitution. This happens in two ways, directly + and indirectly. Directly, when a man induces another to take, and this in three ways. First, on the part of the taking, by + moving a man to take, either by express + command, counsel, or consent, or by praising a man for his courage in thieving. Secondly, on the part of the taker, by giving + him shelter or any other kind of assistance. Thirdly, on the part of the thing taken, by taking part in the theft or robbery, + as a fellow evil-doer. Indirectly, when a man does not prevent another from evil-doing (provided he be able and bound to prevent + him), either by omitting the command or counsel which would hinder him from thieving or robbing, or by omitting to do + what would have hindered him, or by sheltering him after the deed. All these are expressed as follows: + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A7-p7"> "By command, by counsel, by consent, by flattery, by receiving, by participation, by silence, by not preventing, by not denouncing."</p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A7-p8"> It must be observed, however, that in five of these cases the cooperator is always bound to restitution. First, in the case + of command: because he that commands is the chief mover, wherefore he is bound to restitution principally. Secondly, in the + case of consent; namely of one without whose consent the robbery cannot take place. Thirdly, in the case of receiving; when, + to wit, a man is a receiver of thieves, and gives them assistance. Fourthly, in the case of participation; + when a man takes part in the theft and in the booty. Fifthly, he who does not prevent the theft, whereas he is bound to do + so; for instance, persons in authority who are bound to safeguard justice on earth, are bound to restitution, if by their + neglect thieves prosper, because their salary is given to them in payment of their preserving justice here below. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A7-p9"> In the other cases mentioned above, a man is not always bound to restitution: because counsel and flattery are not always + the efficacious cause of robbery. Hence the counsellor or flatterer is bound to restitution, only when it may be judged with + probability that the unjust taking resulted from such causes. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not only is he bound to restitution who commits the sin, but also he who is in any way cause of the sin, whether by counselling, + or by commanding, or in any other way whatever. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A7-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He is bound chiefly to restitution, who is the principal in the deed; first of all, the "commander"; secondly, the "executor," + and in due sequence, the others: yet so that, if one of them make restitution, another is not bound to make restitution to + the same person. Yet those who are principals in the deed, and who took possession of the thing, are bound to compensate those + who have already made restitution. When a man commands an unjust taking that + does not follow, no restitution has to be made, since its end is chiefly to restore the property of the person who has been + unjustly injured. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A7-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that fails to denounce a thief or does not withstand or reprehend him is not always bound to restitution, but only when + he is obliged, in virtue of his office, to do so: as in the case of earthly princes who do not incur any great danger thereby; + for they are invested with public authority, in order that they may maintain justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A7-p13"></p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A7-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q62_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q63.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q62_A8-p0.1">Whether a man is bound to immediate restitution, or may he put it off?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q62_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man is not bound to immediate restitution, and can lawfully delay to restore. For affirmative precepts + do not bind for always. Now the necessity of making restitution is binding through an affirmative precept. Therefore a man + is not bound to immediate restitution. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no man is bound to do what is impossible. But it is sometimes impossible to make restitution at once. Therefore + no man is bound to immediate restitution. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, restitution is an act of virtue, viz. of justice. Now time is one of the circumstances requisite for virtuous acts. + Since then the other circumstances are not determinate for acts of virtue, but are determinable according to the dictate of + prudence, it seems that neither in restitution is there any fixed time, so that a man be bound to restore at once. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> All matters of restitution seem to come under one head. Now a man who hires the services of a wage-earner, must not delay + compensation, as appears from + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q62_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.13" target="asv"> Lev. 19:13, </a> "The wages of him that hath been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until the morning." Therefore neither is it lawful, + in other cases of restitution, to delay, and restitution should be made at once. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Even as it is a sin against justice to take another's property, so also is it to withhold it, since, to withhold the property + of another against the owner's will, is to deprive him of the use of what belongs to him, and to do him an injury. Now it + is clear that it is wrong to remain in sin even for a short time; and one is bound to renounce one's sin at once, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q62_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.21.2" target="asv"> Ecclus. 21:2, </a> "Flee from sin as from the face of a serpent." + Consequently one is bound to immediate restitution, if possible, or to ask for a respite from the person who is empowered + to grant the use of the thing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the precept about the making of restitution is affirmative in form, it implies a negative precept forbidding us + to withhold another's property. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When one is unable to restore at once, this very inability excuses one from immediate restitution: even as a person is altogether + excused from making restitution if he is altogether unable to make it. He is, however, bound either himself or through another + to ask the person to whom he owes compensation to grant him a remission or a respite. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Whenever the omission of a circumstance is contrary to virtue that circumstance must be looked upon as determinate, and we + are bound to observe it: and since delay of restitution involves a sin of unjust detention which is opposed to just detention, + it stands to reason that the time is determinate in the point of restitution being immediate. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A8-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q62_A8-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q63.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q61_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q63" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q63_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q63-p0.1">VICES OPPOSED TO DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (Q[63])</h3> + <p id="SS_Q63-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q63-p2">OF RESPECT OF PERSONS (FOUR ARTICLES)</p> + <p id="SS_Q63-p3"> We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid parts of justice. First we shall consider respect of persons which + is opposed to distributive justice; secondly we shall consider the vices opposed to commutative justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63-p4"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q63-p5"> (1) Whether respect of persons is a sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q63-p6"> (2) Whether it takes place in the dispensation of spiritualities?</p> + <p id="SS_Q63-p7"> (3) Whether it takes place in showing honor?</p> + <p id="SS_Q63-p8"> (4) Whether it takes place in judicial sentences?</p> + <div id="SS_Q63_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q63.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q63_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q63_A1-p0.1">Whether respect of persons is a sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q63_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that respect of persons is not a sin. For the word "person" includes a reference to personal dignity [*Cf. + + <a id="SS_Q63_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q29_A3.html">FP, Q[29], A[3]</a>, ad 2]. Now it belongs to distributive justice to consider personal dignity. Therefore respect of persons is not a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in human affairs persons are of more importance than things, since things are for the benefit of persons and not + conversely. But respect of things is not a sin. Much less, therefore, is respect of persons. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no injustice or sin can be in God. Yet God seems to respect persons, since of two men circumstanced alike He sometimes + upraises one by grace, and leaves the other in sin, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q63_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.40" target="asv">Mat. 24:40</a>: "Two shall be in a bed [Vulg.: 'field' [*'Bed' is the reading of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q63_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.17.34" target="asv"> Luk. 17:34</a>], one shall be taken, and one shall be left." Therefore respect of persons is not a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing but sin is forbidden in the Divine law. Now respect of persons is forbidden, + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q63_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.1.17" target="asv"> Dt. 1:17</a>: "Neither shall you respect any man's person." Therefore respect of persons is a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Respect of persons is opposed to distributive justice. For the equality of distributive justice consists in allotting various + things to various persons in proportion to their personal dignity. Accordingly, if one considers that personal property by + reason of which the thing allotted to a particular person is due to him, this is respect not of the person but of the cause. + Hence a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q63_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.6.9" target="asv"> Eph. 6:9, </a> "There is no respect of persons with God + [Vulg.: 'Him']," says that "a just judge regards causes, not persons." For instance if you promote a man to a professorship + on account of his having sufficient knowledge, you consider the due cause, not the person; but if, in conferring something + on someone, you consider in him not the fact that what you give him is proportionate or due to him, but the fact that he is + this particular man (e.g. Peter or Martin), then there is respect of the person, since you give him something not for some + cause + that renders him worthy of it, but simply because he is this person. And any circumstance that does not amount to a reason + why this man be worthy of this gift, is to be referred to his person: for instance if a man promote someone to a prelacy or + a professorship, because he is rich or because he is a relative of his, it is respect of persons. It may happen, however, + that a circumstance of person makes a man worthy as regards one thing, but not as regards another: thus consanguinity makes + a man + worthy to be appointed heir to an estate, but not to be chosen for a position of ecclesiastical authority: wherefore consideration + of the same circumstance of person will amount to respect of persons in one matter and not in another. It follows, accordingly, + that respect of persons is opposed to distributive justice in that it fails to observe due proportion. Now nothing but sin + is opposed to virtue: and therefore respect of persons is a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In distributive justice we consider those circumstances of a person which result in dignity or right, whereas in respect + of persons we consider circumstances that do not so result. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Persons are rendered proportionate to and worthy of things which are distributed among them, by reason of certain things + pertaining to circumstances of person, wherefore such conditions ought to be considered as the proper cause. But when we consider + the persons themselves, that which is not a cause is considered as though it were; and so it is clear that although persons + are more worthy, absolutely speaking, yet they are not more worthy in this + regard. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is a twofold giving. one belongs to justice, and occurs when we give a man his due: in such like givings respect of + persons takes place. The other giving belongs to liberality, when one gives gratis that which is not a man's due: such is + the bestowal of the gifts of grace, whereby sinners are chosen by God. In such a giving there is no place for respect of persons, + because anyone may, without injustice, give of his own as much as he will, and to + whom he will, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q63_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.20.14" target="asv"> Mat. 20:14,15, </a> "Is it not lawful for me to do what I will? . . . Take what is thine, and go thy way." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q63.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q63_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q63_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q63_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q63_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q63_A2-p0.1">Whether respect of persons takes place in the dispensation of spiritual goods?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q63_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that respect of persons does not take place in the dispensation of spiritual goods. For it would seem to savor + of respect of persons if a man confers ecclesiastical dignity or benefice on account of consanguinity, since consanguinity + is not a cause whereby a man is rendered worthy of an ecclesiastical benefice. Yet this apparently is not a sin, for ecclesiastical + prelates are wont to do so. Therefore the sin of respect of persons does not take + place in the conferring of spiritual goods. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to give preference to a rich man rather than to a poor man seems to pertain to respect of persons, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q63_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.2" target="asv"> James 2:2,3.</a> Nevertheless dispensations to marry within forbidden degrees are more readily granted to the rich and powerful than to others. + Therefore the sin of respect of persons seems not to take place in the dispensation of spiritual goods. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to jurists [*Cap. Cum dilectus.] it suffices to choose a good man, and it is not requisite that one choose + the better man. But it would seem to savor of respect of persons to choose one who is less good for a higher position. Therefore + respect of persons is not a sin in spiritual matters. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to the law of the Church (Cap. Cum dilectus.) the person to be chosen should be "a member of the flock." + Now this would seem to imply respect of persons, since sometimes more competent persons would be found elsewhere. Therefore + respect of persons is not a sin in spiritual matters. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q63_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.1" target="asv">James 2:1</a>): "Have not the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ . . . with respect of persons." On these words a gloss of Augustine says: + "Who is there that would tolerate the promotion of a rich man to a position of honor in the Church, to the exclusion of a + poor man more learned and holier?" [*Augustine, Ep. ad Hieron. clxvii.] + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q63_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q63_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, respect of persons is a sin, in so far as it is contrary to justice. Now the graver the matter in which justice is transgressed, + the more grievous the sin: so that, spiritual things being of greater import than temporal, respect of persons is a more grievous + sin in dispensing spiritualities than in dispensing temporalities. And since it is respect of persons when something is allotted + to a person out of + proportion to his deserts, it must be observed that a person's worthiness may be considered in two ways. First, simply and + absolutely: and in this way the man who abounds the more in the spiritual gifts of grace is the more worthy. Secondly, in + relation to the common good; for it happens at times that the less holy and less learned man may conduce more to the common + good, on account of worldly authority or activity, or something of the kind. And since the dispensation of spiritualities + is + directed chiefly to the common good, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q63_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:7, </a> "The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit," it follows that in the dispensation of spiritualities + the simply less good are sometimes preferred to the better, without respect of persons, just as God sometimes bestows gratuitous + graces on the less worthy. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We must make a distinction with regard to a prelate's kinsfolk: for sometimes they are less worthy, both absolutely speaking, + and in relation to the common good: and then if they are preferred to the more worthy, there is a sin of respect of persons + in the dispensation of spiritual goods, whereof the ecclesiastical superior is not the owner, with power to give them away + as he will, but the dispenser, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q63_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.1" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:1, </a> "Let + a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries of God." Sometimes however the prelate's + kinsfolk are as worthy as others, and then without respect of persons he can lawfully give preference to his kindred since + there is at least this advantage, that he can trust the more in their being of one mind with him in conducting the business + of the Church. Yet he would have to forego so doing for fear of scandal, if anyone might take an example from him and + give the goods of the Church to their kindred without regard to their deserts. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Dispensations for contracting marriage came into use for the purpose of strengthening treaties of peace: and this is more + necessary for the common good in relation to persons of standing, so that there is no respect of persons in granting dispensations + more readily to such persons. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In order that an election be not rebutted in a court of law, it suffices to elect a good man, nor is it necessary to elect + the better man, because otherwise every election might have a flaw. But as regards the conscience of an elector, it is necessary + to elect one who is better, either absolutely speaking, or in relation to the common good. For if it is possible to have one + who is more competent for a post, and yet another be preferred, it is + necessary to have some cause for this. If this cause have anything to do with the matter in point, he who is elected will, + in this respect, be more competent; and if that which is taken for cause have nothing to do with the matter, it will clearly + be respect of persons. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The man who is taken from among the members of a particular Church, is generally speaking more useful as regards the common + good, since he loves more the Church wherein he was brought up. For this reason it was commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q63_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.17.15" target="asv">Dt. 17:15</a>): "Thou mayest not make a man of another nation king, who is not thy brother." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q63_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q63_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q63_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q63_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q63_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q63_A3-p0.1">Whether respect of persons takes place in showing honor and respect?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q63_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that respect of persons does not take place in showing honor and respect. For honor is apparently nothing else + than "reverence shown to a person in recognition of his virtue," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 5). Now prelates and + princes should be honored although they be wicked, even as our parents, of whom it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q63_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.12" target="asv">Ex. 20:12</a>): "Honor thy father and thy mother." Again masters, though they be wicked, should be + honored by their servants, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q63_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.1" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:1</a>: "Whoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their masters worthy of all honor." Therefore it seems that it is not + a sin to respect persons in showing honor. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q63_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.32" target="asv">Lev. 19:32</a>): "Rise up before the hoary head, and, honor the person of the aged man." But this seems to savor of respect of persons, + since sometimes old men are not virtuous; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q63_A3-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.13.5" target="asv"> Dan. 13:5</a>: "Iniquity came out from the ancients of the people [*Vulg.: 'Iniquity came out of Babylon from the ancient judges, that + seemed to govern the people.']." Therefore it is not a sin to respect persons + in showing honor. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, on the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q63_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.1" target="asv"> James 2:1, </a> "Have not the faith . . . with respect of persons," a gloss of Augustine [*Ep. ad Hieron. clxvii.] says: "If the saying of + James, 'If there shall come into your assembly a man having a golden ring,' etc., refer to our daily meetings, who sins not + here, if however he sin at all?" Yet it is respect of persons to honor the rich for their riches, for Gregory says in a homily + (xxviii in Evang.): "Our pride is + blunted, since in men we honor, not the nature wherein they are made to God's image, but wealth," so that, wealth not being + a due cause of honor, this will savor of respect of persons. Therefore it is not a sin to respect persons in showing honor. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q63_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.1" target="asv"> James 2:1, </a> says: "Whoever honors the rich for their riches, sins," and in like manner, if a man be honored for other causes that do + not render him worthy of honor. Now this savors of respect of persons. Therefore it is a sin to respect persons in showing + honor. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> To honor a person is to recognize him as having virtue, wherefore virtue alone is the due cause of a person being honored. + Now it is to be observed that a person may be honored not only for his own virtue, but also for another's: thus princes and + prelates, although they be wicked, are honored as standing in God's place, and as representing the community over which they + are placed, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q63_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.26.8" target="asv"> Prov. 26:8, </a> "As he that casteth a stone into + the heap of Mercury, so is he that giveth honor to a fool." For, since the gentiles ascribed the keeping of accounts to Mercury, + "the heap of Mercury" signifies the casting up of an account, when a merchant sometimes substitutes a pebble [*'Lapillus' + or 'calculus' whence the English word 'calculate'] for one hundred marks. So too, is a fool honored if he stand in God's place + or represent the whole community: and in the same way parents and masters should be honored, on account of their having a + share of the dignity of God Who is the Father and Lord of all. The aged should be honored, because old age is a sign of virtue, + though this sign fail at times: wherefore, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q63_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.4.8" target="asv"> Wis. 4:8,9, </a> "venerable old age is not that of long time, nor counted by the number of years; but the understanding of a man is gray hairs, + and a spotless life is old age." The rich ought to be honored by reason of their occupying a higher position in the community: + but if they be honored + merely for their wealth, it will be the sin of respect of persons. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A3-p7"> Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear.</p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A3-p8"></p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A3-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q63_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q63_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q63_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q63_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q63_A4-p0.1">Whether the sin of respect of persons takes place in judicial sentences?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q63_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sin of respect of persons does not take place in judicial sentences. For respect of persons is opposed + to distributive justice, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q63_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q63_A1.html">(A[1])</a>: whereas judicial sentences seem to pertain chiefly to commutative justice. Therefore respect of persons does not take place + in judicial sentences. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, penalties are inflicted according to a sentence. Now it is not a sin to respect persons in pronouncing penalties, + since a heavier punishment is inflicted on one who injures the person of a prince than on one who injures the person of others. + Therefore respect of persons does not take place in judicial sentences. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q63_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.4.10" target="asv">Ecclus. 4:10</a>): "In judging be merciful to the fatherless." But this seems to imply respect of the person of the needy. Therefore in judicial + sentences respect of persons is not a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q63_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.18.5" target="asv">Prov. 18:5</a>): "It is not good to accept the person in judgment [*Vulg.: 'It is not good to accept the person of the wicked, to decline + from the truth of judgment.']." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q63_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q60_A1.html">Q[60], A[1]</a>), judgment is an act of justice, in as much as the judge restores to the equality of justice, those things which may cause + an opposite inequality. Now respect of persons involves a certain inequality, in so far as something is allotted to a person + out of that proportion to him in which the equality of justice consists. Wherefore it is evident that judgment is rendered + corrupt by respect of persons. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A judgment may be looked at in two ways. First, in view of the thing judged, and in this way judgment is common to commutative + and distributive justice: because it may be decided by judgment how some common good is to be distributed among many, and + how one person is to restore to another what he has taken from him. Secondly, it may be considered in view of the form of + judgment, in as much as, even in commutative justice, the judge takes from one and + gives to another, and this belongs to distributive justice. In this way respect of persons may take place in any judgment. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a person is more severely punished on account of a crime committed against a greater person, there is no respect of + persons, because the very difference of persons causes, in that case, a diversity of things, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q63_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A10.html">Q[58], A[10]</a>, ad 3; + <a id="SS_Q63_A4-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q61_A2.html"> Q[61], A[2]</a>, ad 3). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In pronouncing judgment one ought to succor the needy as far as possible, yet without prejudice to justice: else the saying + of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q63_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.3" target="asv">Ex. 23:3</a> would apply: "Neither shalt thou favor a poor man in judgment." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q63_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q63_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q62_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q63_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q64" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q63_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q64-p0.1">OF MURDER (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q64-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q64-p2"> In due sequence we must consider the vices opposed to commutative justice. We must consider (1) those sins that are committed + in relation to involuntary commutations; (2) those that are committed with regard to voluntary commutations. Sins are committed + in relation to involuntary commutations by doing an injury to one's neighbor against his will: and this can be done in two + ways, namely by deed or by word. By deed when one's neighbor is injured either in his own person, or in a + person connected with him, or in his possessions. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64-p3"> We must therefore consider these points in due order, and in the first place we shall consider murder whereby a man inflicts + the greatest injury on his neighbor. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64-p4"> (1) Whether it is a sin to kill dumb animals or even plants?(2) Whether it is lawful to kill a sinner?</p> + <p id="SS_Q64-p5"> (3) Whether this is lawful to a private individual, or to a public person only?</p> + <p id="SS_Q64-p6"> (4) Whether this is lawful to a cleric?</p> + <p id="SS_Q64-p7"> (5) Whether it is lawful to kill oneself?</p> + <p id="SS_Q64-p8"> (6) Whether it is lawful to kill a just man?</p> + <p id="SS_Q64-p9"> (7) Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?</p> + <p id="SS_Q64-p10"> (8) Whether accidental homicide is a mortal sin?</p> + <div id="SS_Q64_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q64_A1-p0.1">Whether it is unlawful to kill any living thing?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q64_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unlawful to kill any living thing. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.2" target="asv">Rom. 13:2</a>): "They that resist the ordinance of God purchase to themselves damnation [*Vulg.: 'He that resisteth the power, resisteth + the ordinance of God: and they that resist, purchase themselves damnation.']." Now Divine providence has ordained that all + living things should be preserved, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.146.8" target="asv"> Ps. 146:8,9, </a> "Who maketh grass to grow on the + mountains . . . Who giveth to beasts their food." Therefore it seems unlawful to take the life of any living thing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, murder is a sin because it deprives a man of life. Now life is common to all animals and plants. Hence for the same + reason it is apparently a sin to slay dumb animals and plants. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the Divine law a special punishment is not appointed save for a sin. Now a special punishment had to be inflicted, + according to the Divine law, on one who killed another man's ox or sheep ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.1" target="asv">Ex. 22:1</a>). Therefore the slaying of dumb animals is a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): "When we hear it said, 'Thou shalt not kill,' we do not take it as referring to trees, + for they have no sense, nor to irrational animals, because they have no fellowship with us. Hence it follows that the words, + 'Thou shalt not kill' refer to the killing of a man." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There is no sin in using a thing for the purpose for which it is. Now the order of things is such that the imperfect are + for the perfect, even as in the process of generation nature proceeds from imperfection to perfection. Hence it is that just + as in the generation of a man there is first a living thing, then an animal, and lastly a man, so too things, like the plants, + which merely have life, are all alike for animals, and all animals are for man. Wherefore + it is not unlawful if man use plants for the good of animals, and animals for the good of man, as the Philosopher states (Polit. + i, 3). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A1-p7"> Now the most necessary use would seem to consist in the fact that animals use plants, and men use animals, for food, and + this cannot be done unless these be deprived of life: wherefore it is lawful both to take life from plants for the use of + animals, and from animals for the use of men. In fact this is in keeping with the commandment of God Himself: for it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.29" target="asv">Gn. 1:29,30</a>): "Behold I have given you every herb . . . and all trees . . . to be your + meat, and to all beasts of the earth": and again ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.9.3" target="asv">Gn. 9:3</a>): "Everything that moveth and liveth shall be meat to you." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to the Divine ordinance the life of animals and plants is preserved not for themselves but for man. Hence, as Augustine + says (De Civ. Dei i, 20), "by a most just ordinance of the Creator, both their life and their death are subject to our use." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Dumb animals and plants are devoid of the life of reason whereby to set themselves in motion; they are moved, as it were + by another, by a kind of natural impulse, a sign of which is that they are naturally enslaved and accommodated to the uses + of others. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that kills another's ox, sins, not through killing the ox, but through injuring another man in his property. Wherefore + this is not a species of the sin of murder but of the sin of theft or robbery. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q64_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q64_A2-p0.1">Whether it is lawful to kill sinners?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q64_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unlawful to kill men who have sinned. For our Lord in the parable ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.13" target="asv">Mat. 13</a>) forbade the uprooting of the cockle which denotes wicked men according to a gloss. Now whatever is forbidden by God is a + sin. Therefore it is a sin to kill a sinner. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, human justice is conformed to Divine justice. Now according to Divine justice sinners are kept back for repentance, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.33.11" target="asv"> Ezech. 33:11, </a> "I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live." Therefore it seems altogether unjust + to kill sinners. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is not lawful, for any good end whatever, to do that which is evil in itself, according to Augustine (Contra + Mendac. vii) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now to kill a man is evil in itself, since we are bound to have charity towards + all men, and "we wish our friends to live and to exist," according to Ethic. ix, 4. Therefore it is nowise lawful to kill + a man who has sinned. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.18" target="asv">Ex. 22:18</a>): "Wizards thou shalt not suffer to live"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.100.8" target="asv">Ps. 100:8</a>): "In the morning I put to death all the wicked of the land." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q64_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q64_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, it is lawful to kill dumb animals, in so far as they are naturally directed to man's use, as the imperfect is directed to + the perfect. Now every part is directed to the whole, as imperfect to perfect, wherefore every part is naturally for the sake + of the whole. For this reason we observe that if the health of the whole body demands the excision of a member, through its + being decayed or infectious to the other + members, it will be both praiseworthy and advantageous to have it cut away. Now every individual person is compared to the + whole community, as part to whole. Therefore if a man be dangerous and infectious to the community, on account of some sin, + it is praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the common good, since "a little leaven corrupteth + the whole lump" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.5.6" target="asv">1 Cor. 5:6</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our Lord commanded them to forbear from uprooting the cockle in order to spare the wheat, i.e. the good. This occurs when + the wicked cannot be slain without the good being killed with them, either because the wicked lie hidden among the good, or + because they have many followers, so that they cannot be killed without danger to the good, as Augustine says (Contra Parmen. + iii, 2). Wherefore our Lord teaches that we should rather allow the wicked to live, + and that vengeance is to be delayed until the last judgment, rather than that the good be put to death together with the wicked. + When, however, the good incur no danger, but rather are protected and saved by the slaying of the wicked, then the latter + may be lawfully put to death. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to the order of His wisdom, God sometimes slays sinners forthwith in order to deliver the good, whereas sometimes + He allows them time to repent, according as He knows what is expedient for His elect. This also does human justice imitate + according to its powers; for it puts to death those who are dangerous to others, while it allows time for repentance to those + who sin without grievously harming others. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> By sinning man departs from the order of reason, and consequently falls away from the dignity of his manhood, in so far as + he is naturally free, and exists for himself, and he falls into the slavish state of the beasts, by being disposed of according + as he is useful to others. This is expressed in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.48.21" target="asv"> Ps. 48:21</a>: "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like to them," and + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A2-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.11.29" target="asv">Prov. + 11:29 + </a>: "The fool shall serve the wise." Hence, although it be evil in itself to kill a man so long as he preserve his dignity, + yet it may be good to kill a man who has sinned, even as it is to kill a beast. For a bad man is worse than a beast, and is + more harmful, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 1 and Ethic. vii, 6). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q64_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q64_A3-p0.1">Whether it is lawful for a private individual to kill a man who has sinned?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q64_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem lawful for a private individual to kill a man who has sinned. For nothing unlawful is commanded in the Divine + law. Yet, on account of the sin of the molten calf, Moses commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.32.27" target="asv">Ex. 32:27</a>): "Let every man kill his brother, and friend, and neighbor." Therefore it is lawful for private individuals to kill a sinner. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated above (A[2], ad 3), man, on account of sin, is compared to the beasts. Now it is lawful for any private + individual to kill a wild beast, especially if it be harmful. Therefore for the same reason, it is lawful for any private + individual to kill a man who has sinned. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a man, though a private individual, deserves praise for doing what is useful for the common good. Now the slaying + of evildoers is useful for the common good, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q64_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q64_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore it is deserving of praise if even private individuals kill evil-doers. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) [*Can. Quicumque percutit, caus. xxiii, qu. 8]: "A man who, without exercising public authority, + kills an evil-doer, shall be judged guilty of murder, and all the more, since he has dared to usurp a power which God has + not given him." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q64_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q64_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, it is lawful to kill an evildoer in so far as it is directed to the welfare of the whole community, so that it belongs to + him alone who has charge of the community's welfare. Thus it belongs to a physician to cut off a decayed limb, when he has + been entrusted with the care of the health of the whole body. Now the care of the common good is entrusted to persons of rank + having public authority: wherefore they + alone, and not private individuals, can lawfully put evildoers to death. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The person by whose authority a thing is done really does the thing as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. iii). Hence according + to Augustine (De Civ. Dei i, 21), "He slays not who owes his service to one who commands him, even as a sword is merely the + instrument to him that wields it." Wherefore those who, at the Lord's command, slew their neighbors and friends, would seem + not to have done this themselves, but rather He by whose authority they acted + thus: just as a soldier slays the foe by the authority of his sovereign, and the executioner slays the robber by the authority + of the judge. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A beast is by nature distinct from man, wherefore in the case of a wild beast there is no need for an authority to kill it; + whereas, in the case of domestic animals, such authority is required, not for their sake, but on account of the owner's loss. + On the other hand a man who has sinned is not by nature distinct from good men; hence a public authority is requisite in order + to condemn him to death for the common good. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is lawful for any private individual to do anything for the common good, provided it harm nobody: but if it be harmful + to some other, it cannot be done, except by virtue of the judgment of the person to whom it pertains to decide what is to + be taken from the parts for the welfare of the whole. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q64_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q64_A4-p0.1">Whether it is lawful for clerics to kill evil-doers?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q64_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem lawful for clerics to kill evil-doers. For clerics especially should fulfil the precept of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.16" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:16</a>): "Be ye followers of me as I also am of Christ," whereby we are called upon to imitate God and His saints. Now the very + God whom we worship puts evildoers to death, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.135.10" target="asv"> Ps. 135:10, </a> "Who smote Egypt with their firstborn." Again Moses made the Levites slay twenty-three thousand men + on account of the worship of the calf ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A4-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.32" target="asv">Ex. 32</a>), the priest Phinees slew the Israelite who went in to the woman of Madian ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A4-p2.4" href="./asv.html#Num.25" target="asv">Num. 25</a>), Samuel killed Agag king of Amalec ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A4-p2.5" href="./asv.html#iKgs.15" target="asv">1 Kings 15</a>), Elias slew the priests of Baal ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A4-p2.6" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 18</a>), Mathathias killed the man who went up to the altar to sacrifice ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A4-p2.7" href="./asv.html#iMacc.2" target="asv">1 Mac. 2</a>); and, in the New Testament, Peter killed Ananias and Saphira ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A4-p2.8" href="./asv.html#Acts.5" target="asv">Acts 5</a>). Therefore it seems that even clerics may kill evil-doers. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, spiritual power is greater than the secular and is more united to God. Now the secular power as "God's minister" + lawfully puts evil-doers to death, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.4" target="asv"> Rom. 13:4.</a> Much more therefore may clerics, who are God's ministers and have spiritual power, put evil-doers to death. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whosoever lawfully accepts an office, may lawfully exercise the functions of that office. Now it belongs to the + princely office to slay evildoers, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q64_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q64_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore those clerics who are earthly princes may lawfully slay malefactors. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.3.2" target="asv">1 Tim. 3:2,3</a>): "It behooveth . . . a bishop to be without crime [*Vulg.: 'blameless.' 'Without crime' is the reading in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Titus.1.7" target="asv"> Tit. 1:7</a>] . . . not given to wine, no striker." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is unlawful for clerics to kill, for two reasons. First, because they are chosen for the ministry of the altar, whereon + is represented the Passion of Christ slain "Who, when He was struck did not strike [Vulg.: 'When He suffered, He threatened + not']" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.2.23" target="asv">1 Pet. 2:23</a>). Therefore it becomes not clerics to strike or kill: for ministers should imitate their master, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.2" target="asv"> Ecclus. 10:2, </a> "As the judge of the people is + himself, so also are his ministers." The other reason is because clerics are entrusted with the ministry of the New Law, wherein + no punishment of death or of bodily maiming is appointed: wherefore they should abstain from such things in order that they + may be fitting ministers of the New Testament. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God works in all things without exception whatever is right, yet in each one according to its mode. Wherefore everyone should + imitate God in that which is specially becoming to him. Hence, though God slays evildoers even corporally, it does not follow + that all should imitate Him in this. As regards Peter, he did not put Ananias and Saphira to death by his own authority or + with his own hand, but published their death sentence pronounced by God. The + Priests or Levites of the Old Testament were the ministers of the Old Law, which appointed corporal penalties, so that it + was fitting for them to slay with their own hands. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The ministry of clerics is concerned with better things than corporal slayings, namely with things pertaining to spiritual + welfare, and so it is not fitting for them to meddle with minor matters. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Ecclesiastical prelates accept the office of earthly princes, not that they may inflict capital punishment themselves, but + that this may be carried into effect by others in virtue of their authority. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q64_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q64_A5-p0.1">Whether it is lawful to kill oneself?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q64_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem lawful for a man to kill himself. For murder is a sin in so far as it is contrary to justice. But no man can + do an injustice to himself, as is proved in Ethic. v, 11. Therefore no man sins by killing himself. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is lawful, for one who exercises public authority, to kill evil-doers. Now he who exercises public authority + is sometimes an evil-doer. Therefore he may lawfully kill himself. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is lawful for a man to suffer spontaneously a lesser danger that he may avoid a greater: thus it is lawful for + a man to cut off a decayed limb even from himself, that he may save his whole body. Now sometimes a man, by killing himself, + avoids a greater evil, for example an unhappy life, or the shame of sin. Therefore a man may kill himself. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Samson killed himself, as related in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Judg.16" target="asv">Judges 16</a>, and yet he is numbered among the saints ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A5-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.11" target="asv">Heb. 11</a>). Therefore it is lawful for a man to kill himself. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A5-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it is related ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.14.42" target="asv">2 Mac. 14:42</a>) that a certain Razias killed himself, "choosing to die nobly rather than to fall into the hands of the wicked, and to suffer + abuses unbecoming his noble birth." Now nothing that is done nobly and bravely is unlawful. Therefore suicide is not unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A5-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): "Hence it follows that the words 'Thou shalt not kill' refer to the killing of a man---not + another man; therefore, not even thyself. For he who kills himself, kills nothing else than a man." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A5-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is altogether unlawful to kill oneself, for three reasons. First, because everything naturally loves itself, the result + being that everything naturally keeps itself in being, and resists corruptions so far as it can. Wherefore suicide is contrary + to the inclination of nature, and to charity whereby every man should love himself. Hence suicide is always a mortal sin, + as being contrary to the natural law and to charity. Secondly, because every part, as + such, belongs to the whole. Now every man is part of the community, and so, as such, he belongs to the community. Hence by + killing himself he injures the community, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Thirdly, because life is God's gift + to man, and is subject to His power, Who kills and makes to live. Hence whoever takes his own life, sins against God, even + as he who kills another's slave, sins against that slave's master, and as he who usurps to himself judgment of a matter not + entrusted to him. For it belongs to God alone to pronounce sentence of death and life, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.32.39" target="asv"> Dt. 32:39, </a> "I will kill and I will make to live." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Murder is a sin, not only because it is contrary to justice, but also because it is opposed to charity which a man should + have towards himself: in this respect suicide is a sin in relation to oneself. In relation to the community and to God, it + is sinful, by reason also of its opposition to justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One who exercises public authority may lawfully put to death an evil-doer, since he can pass judgment on him. But no man + is judge of himself. Wherefore it is not lawful for one who exercises public authority to put himself to death for any sin + whatever: although he may lawfully commit himself to the judgment of others. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man is made master of himself through his free-will: wherefore he can lawfully dispose of himself as to those matters which + pertain to this life which is ruled by man's free-will. But the passage from this life to another and happier one is subject + not to man's free-will but to the power of God. Hence it is not lawful for man to take his own life that he may pass to a + happier life, nor that he may escape any unhappiness whatsoever of the present life, + because the ultimate and most fearsome evil of this life is death, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 6). Therefore to + bring death upon oneself in order to escape the other afflictions of this life, is to adopt a greater evil in order to avoid + a lesser. In like manner it is unlawful to take one's own life on account of one's having committed a sin, both because by + so doing one does oneself a very great injury, by depriving oneself of the time needful for repentance, and because it is + not + lawful to slay an evildoer except by the sentence of the public authority. Again it is unlawful for a woman to kill herself + lest she be violated, because she ought not to commit on herself the very great sin of suicide, to avoid the lesser sir; of + another. For she commits no sin in being violated by force, provided she does not consent, since "without consent of the mind + there is no stain on the body," as the Blessed Lucy declared. Now it is evident that fornication and adultery are less + grievous sins than taking a man's, especially one's own, life: since the latter is most grievous, because one injures oneself, + to whom one owes the greatest love. Moreover it is most dangerous since no time is left wherein to expiate it by repentance. + Again it is not lawful for anyone to take his own life for fear he should consent to sin, because "evil must not be done that + good may come" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A5-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.8" target="asv">Rom. 3:8</a>) or that evil may be avoided especially if the evil be of small account and an uncertain event, + for it is uncertain whether one will at some future time consent to a sin, since God is able to deliver man from sin under + any temptation whatever. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 21), "not even Samson is to be excused that he crushed himself together with his enemies + under the ruins of the house, except the Holy Ghost, Who had wrought many wonders through him, had secretly commanded him + to do this." He assigns the same reason in the case of certain holy women, who at the time of persecution took their own lives, + and who are commemorated by the Church. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> It belongs to fortitude that a man does not shrink from being slain by another, for the sake of the good of virtue, and that + he may avoid sin. But that a man take his own life in order to avoid penal evils has indeed an appearance of fortitude (for + which reason some, among whom was Razias, have killed themselves thinking to act from fortitude), yet it is not true fortitude, + but rather a weakness of soul unable to bear penal evils, as the Philosopher + (Ethic. iii, 7) and Augustine (De Civ. Dei 22,23) declare. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A5-p14"></p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A5-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q64_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q64_A6-p0.1">Whether it is lawful to kill the innocent?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q64_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in some cases it is lawful to kill the innocent. The fear of God is never manifested by sin, since on + the contrary "the fear of the Lord driveth out sin" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.27" target="asv">Ecclus. 1:27</a>). Now Abraham was commended in that he feared the Lord, since he was willing to slay his innocent son. Therefore one may, + without sin, kill an innocent person. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, among those sins that are committed against one's neighbor, the more grievous seem to be those whereby a more grievous + injury is inflicted on the person sinned against. Now to be killed is a greater injury to a sinful than to an innocent person, + because the latter, by death, passes forthwith from the unhappiness of this life to the glory of heaven. Since then it is + lawful in certain cases to kill a sinful man, much more is it lawful to slay an + innocent or a righteous person. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is done in keeping with the order of justice is not a sin. But sometimes a man is forced, according to the + order of justice, to slay an innocent person: for instance, when a judge, who is bound to judge according to the evidence, + condemns to death a man whom he knows to be innocent but who is convicted by false witnesses; and again the executioner, who + in obedience to the judge puts to death the man who has been unjustly sentenced. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.7" target="asv">Ex. 23:7</a>): "The innocent and just person thou shalt not put to death." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> An individual man may be considered in two ways: first, in himself; secondly, in relation to something else. If we consider + a man in himself, it is unlawful to kill any man, since in every man though he be sinful, we ought to love the nature which + God has made, and which is destroyed by slaying him. Nevertheless, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q64_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q64_A2.html">(A[2])</a> the slaying of a sinner becomes lawful in relation to the common good, which is corrupted by sin. + On the other hand the life of righteous men preserves and forwards the common good, since they are the chief part of the community. + Therefore it is in no way lawful to slay the innocent. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is Lord of death and life, for by His decree both the sinful and the righteous die. Hence he who at God's command kills + an innocent man does not sin, as neither does God Whose behest he executes: indeed his obedience to God's commands is a proof + that he fears Him. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In weighing the gravity of a sin we must consider the essential rather than the accidental. Wherefore he who kills a just + man, sins more grievously than he who slays a sinful man: first, because he injures one whom he should love more, and so acts + more in opposition to charity: secondly, because he inflicts an injury on a man who is less deserving of one, and so acts + more in opposition to justice: thirdly, because he deprives the community of a + greater good: fourthly, because he despises God more, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.16" target="asv"> Lk. 10:16, </a> "He that despiseth you despiseth Me." On the other hand it is accidental to the slaying that the just man whose life is taken + be received by God into glory. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the judge knows that man who has been convicted by false witnesses, is innocent he must, like Daniel, examine the witnesses + with great care, so as to find a motive for acquitting the innocent: but if he cannot do this he should remit him for judgment + by a higher tribunal. If even this is impossible, he does not sin if he pronounce sentence in accordance with the evidence, + for it is not he that puts the innocent man to death, but they who stated him + to be guilty. He that carries out the sentence of the judge who has condemned an innocent man, if the sentence contains an + inexcusable error, he should not obey, else there would be an excuse for the executions of the martyrs: if however it contain + no manifest injustice, he does not has no right to discuss the judgment of his superior; nor is it he who slays the innocent + man, but the judge whose minister he is. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A6-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A6-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q64_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q65.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q64_A7-p0.1">Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q64_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that nobody may lawfully kill a man in self-defense. For Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): "I do not + agree with the opinion that one may kill a man lest one be killed by him; unless one be a soldier, exercise a public office, + so that one does it not for oneself but for others, having the power to do so, provided it be in keeping with one's person." + Now he who kills a man in self-defense, kills him lest he be killed by him. Therefore this + would seem to be unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): "How are they free from sin in sight of Divine providence, who are guilty of taking + a man's life for the sake of these contemptible things?" Now among contemptible things he reckons "those which men may forfeit + unwillingly," as appears from the context (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): and the chief of these is the life of the body. Therefore it + is unlawful for any man to take another's life for the sake of the life of his own + body. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Pope Nicolas [*Nicolas I, Dist. 1, can. De his clericis] says in the Decretals: "Concerning the clerics about whom + you have consulted Us, those, namely, who have killed a pagan in self-defense, as to whether, after making amends by repenting, + they may return to their former state, or rise to a higher degree; know that in no case is it lawful for them to kill any + man under any circumstances whatever." Now clerics and laymen are alike bound to observe + the moral precepts. Therefore neither is it lawful for laymen to kill anyone in self-defense. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A7-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, murder is a more grievous sin than fornication or adultery. Now nobody may lawfully commit simple fornication or + adultery or any other mortal sin in order to save his own life; since the spiritual life is to be preferred to the life of + the body. Therefore no man may lawfully take another's life in self-defense in order to save his own life. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A7-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if the tree be evil, so is the fruit, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.17" target="asv">Mat. 7:17</a>. Now self-defense itself seems to be unlawful, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A7-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.19" target="asv">Rom. 12:19</a>: "Not defending [Douay: 'revenging'] yourselves, my dearly beloved." Therefore its result, which is the slaying of a man, + is also unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A7-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A7-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.2" target="asv">Ex. 22:2</a>): "If a thief be found breaking into a house or undermining it, and be wounded so as to die; he that slew him shall not be + guilty of blood." Now it is much more lawful to defend one's life than one's house. Therefore neither is a man guilty of murder + if he kill another in defense of his own life. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A7-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. + Now moral acts take their species according to what is intended, and not according to what is beside the intention, since + this is accidental as explained above (Q[43], A[3]; + <a id="SS_Q64_A7-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q12_A1.html">FS, Q[12], A[1]</a>). Accordingly the act of self-defense may have two effects, one is the saving of one's life, the other is the slaying of + the + aggressor. Therefore this act, since one's intention is to save one's own life, is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural + to everything to keep itself in "being," as far as possible. And yet, though proceeding from a good intention, an act may + be rendered unlawful, if it be out of proportion to the end. Wherefore if a man, in self-defense, uses more than necessary + violence, it will be unlawful: whereas if he repel force with moderation his defense will be lawful, because according to + the + jurists [*Cap. Significasti, De Homicid. volunt. vel casual.], "it is lawful to repel force by force, provided one does not + exceed the limits of a blameless defense." Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate self-defense + in order to avoid killing the other man, since one is bound to take more care of one's own life than of another's. But as + it is unlawful to take a man's life, except for the public authority acting for the common good, as stated above + + <a id="SS_Q64_A7-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q64_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, it is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense, except for such as have public authority, who while + intending to kill a man in self-defense, refer this to the public good, as in the case of a soldier fighting against the foe, + and in the minister of the judge struggling with robbers, although even these sin if they be moved by private animosity. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words quoted from Augustine refer to the case when one man intends to kill another to save himself from death. The passage + quoted in the Second Objection is to be understood in the same sense. Hence he says pointedly, "for the sake of these things," + whereby he indicates the intention. This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Irregularity results from the act though sinless of taking a man's life, as appears in the case of a judge who justly condemns + a man to death. For this reason a cleric, though he kill a man in self-defense, is irregular, albeit he intends not to kill + him, but to defend himself. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A7-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The act of fornication or adultery is not necessarily directed to the preservation of one's own life, as is the act whence + sometimes results the taking of a man's life. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A7-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The defense forbidden in this passage is that which comes from revengeful spite. Hence a gloss says: "Not defending yourselves---that + is, not striking your enemy back." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A7-p13">Whether one is guilty of murder through killing someone by chance?</p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A7-p14"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one is guilty of murder through killing someone by chance. For we read ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A7-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.4.23" target="asv">Gn. 4:23,24</a>) that Lamech slew a man in mistake for a wild beast [*The text of the Bible does not say so, but this was the Jewish traditional + commentary on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A7-p14.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.4.23" target="asv"> Gn. 4:23</a>], and that he was accounted guilty of murder. Therefore one incurs the guilt of murder through killing a man by chance. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A7-p15"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q64_A7-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.22" target="asv">Ex. 21:22</a>): "If . . . one strike a woman with child, and she miscarry indeed . . . if her death ensue thereupon, he shall render life + for life." Yet this may happen without any intention of causing her death. Therefore one is guilty of murder through killing + someone by chance. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A7-p16"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Decretals [*Dist. 1] contain several canons prescribing penalties for unintentional homicide. Now penalty is + not due save for guilt. Therefore he who kills a man by chance, incurs the guilt of murder. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A7-p17"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): "When we do a thing for a good and lawful purpose, if thereby we unintentionally + cause harm to anyone, it should by no means be imputed to us." Now it sometimes happens by chance that a person is killed + as a result of something done for a good purpose. Therefore the person who did it is not accounted guilty. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A7-p18"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 6) "chance is a cause that acts beside one's intention." Hence chance happenings, + strictly speaking, are neither intended nor voluntary. And since every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. + xiv) it follows that chance happenings, as such, are not sins. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A7-p19"> Nevertheless it happens that what is not actually and directly voluntary and intended, is voluntary and intended accidentally, + according as that which removes an obstacle is called an accidental cause. Wherefore he who does not remove something whence + homicide results whereas he ought to remove it, is in a sense guilty of voluntary homicide. This happens in two ways: first + when a man causes another's death through occupying himself with unlawful things which he ought to avoid: + secondly, when he does not take sufficient care. Hence, according to jurists, if a man pursue a lawful occupation and take + due care, the result being that a person loses his life, he is not guilty of that person's death: whereas if he be occupied + with something unlawful, or even with something lawful, but without due care, he does not escape being guilty of murder, if + his action results in someone's death. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A7-p20"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Lamech did not take sufficient care to avoid taking a man's life: and so he was not excused from being guilty of homicide. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A7-p21"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He that strikes a woman with child does something unlawful: wherefore if there results the death either of the woman or of + the animated fetus, he will not be excused from homicide, especially seeing that death is the natural result of such a blow. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A7-p22"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to the canons a penalty, is inflicted on those who cause death unintentionally, through doing something unlawful, + or failing to take sufficient care. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A7-p23"></p> + <p id="SS_Q64_A7-p24"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q65.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q63_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q65" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q65_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q65-p0.1">OF OTHER INJURIES COMMITTED ON THE PERSON (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q65-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q65-p2"> We must now consider other sinful injuries committed on the person. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q65-p3"> (1) The mutilation of members;</p> + <p id="SS_Q65-p4"> (2) Blows;</p> + <p id="SS_Q65-p5"> (3) Imprisonment;</p> + <p id="SS_Q65-p6"> (4) Whether the sins that consist in inflicting such like injuries are aggravated through being perpetrated on persons connected + with others? + </p> + <div id="SS_Q65_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q65.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q65_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q65_A1-p0.1">Whether in some cases it may be lawful to maim anyone?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q65_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in no case can it be lawful to maim anyone. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20) that "sin consists + in departing from what is according to nature, towards that which is contrary to nature." Now according to nature it is appointed + by God that a man's body should be entire in its members, and it is contrary to nature that it should be deprived of a member. + Therefore it seems that it is always a sin to maim a person. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the whole soul is to the whole body, so are the parts of the soul to the parts of the body (De Anima ii, 1). + But it is unlawful to deprive a man of his soul by killing him, except by public authority. Therefore neither is it lawful + to maim anyone, except perhaps by public authority. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the welfare of the soul is to be preferred to the welfare of the body. Now it is not lawful for a man to maim himself + for the sake of the soul's welfare: since the council of Nicea [*P. I, sect. 4, can. i] punished those who castrated themselves + that they might preserve chastity. Therefore it is not lawful for any other reason to maim a person. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q65_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.24" target="asv">Ex. 21:24</a>): "Eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since a member is part of the whole human body, it is for the sake of the whole, as the imperfect for the perfect. Hence + a member of the human body is to be disposed of according as it is expedient for the body. Now a member of the human body + is of itself useful to the good of the whole body, yet, accidentally it may happen to be hurtful, as when a decayed member + is a source of corruption to the whole body. Accordingly so long as a member is healthy and + retains its natural disposition, it cannot be cut off without injury to the whole body. But as the whole of man is directed + as to his end to the whole of the community of which he is a part, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q65_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q61_A1.html">Q[61], A[1]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q65_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q64_A2.html"> Q[64], AA[2]</a>,5), it may happen that although the removal of a member may be detrimental to the whole body, it may nevertheless be directed + to the good of the community, in so far as it is applied to a person as a punishment for + the purpose of restraining sin. Hence just as by public authority a person is lawfully deprived of life altogether on account + of certain more heinous sins, so is he deprived of a member on account of certain lesser sins. But this is not lawful for + a private individual, even with the consent of the owner of the member, because this would involve an injury to the community, + to whom the man and all his parts belong. If, however, the member be decayed and therefore a source of corruption to the + whole body, then it is lawful with the consent of the owner of the member, to cut away the member for the welfare of the whole + body, since each one is entrusted with the care of his own welfare. The same applies if it be done with the consent of the + person whose business it is to care for the welfare of the person who has a decayed member: otherwise it is altogether unlawful + to maim anyone. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing prevents that which is contrary to a particular nature from being in harmony with universal nature: thus death and + corruption, in the physical order, are contrary to the particular nature of the thing corrupted, although they are in keeping + with universal nature. In like manner to maim anyone, though contrary to the particular nature of the body of the person maimed, + is nevertheless in keeping with natural reason in relation to the common + good. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The life of the entire man is not directed to something belonging to man; on the contrary whatever belongs to man is directed + to his life. Hence in no case does it pertain to a person to take anyone's life, except to the public authority to whom is + entrusted the procuring of the common good. But the removal of a member can be directed to the good of one man, and consequently + in certain cases can pertain to him. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A member should not be removed for the sake of the bodily health of the whole, unless otherwise nothing can be done to further + the good of the whole. Now it is always possible to further one's spiritual welfare otherwise than by cutting off a member, + because sin is always subject to the will: and consequently in no case is it allowable to maim oneself, even to avoid any + sin whatever. Hence Chrysostom, in his exposition on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q65_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.12" target="asv"> Mat. 19:12 + + </a>(Hom. lxii in Matth.), "There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven," says: "Not by maiming + themselves, but by destroying evil thoughts, for a man is accursed who maims himself, since they are murderers who do such + things." And further on he says: "Nor is lust tamed thereby, on the contrary it becomes more importunate, for the seed springs + in us from other sources, and chiefly from an incontinent purpose and a careless mind: and temptation is curbed + not so much by cutting off a member as by curbing one's thoughts." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q65.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q65_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q65_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q65_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q65_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q65_A2-p0.1">Whether it is lawful for parents to strike their children, or masters their slaves?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q65_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unlawful for parents to strike their children, or masters their slaves. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q65_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.6.4" target="asv">Eph. 6:4</a>): "You, fathers, provoke not your children to anger"; and further on ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q65_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.9.6" target="asv">Eph. 9:6</a>): "And you, masters, do the same thing to your slaves [Vulg.: 'to them'] forbearing threatenings." Now some are provoked + to anger by blows, and become more troublesome when threatened. Therefore neither should parents strike + their children, nor masters their slaves. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9) that "a father's words are admonitory and not coercive." Now blows are a kind + of coercion. Therefore it is unlawful for parents to strike their children. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everyone is allowed to impart correction, for this belongs to the spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q65_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q32_A2.html">Q[32], A[2]</a>). If, therefore, it is lawful for parents to strike their children for the sake of correction, for the same reason it will + be lawful for any person to strike anyone, which is clearly false. Therefore the same conclusion follows. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q65_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.13.24" target="asv">Prov. 13:24</a>): "He that spareth the rod hateth his son," and further on ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q65_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.23.13" target="asv">Prov. 23:13</a>): "Withhold not correction from a child, for if thou strike him with the rod, he shall not die. Thou shalt beat him with + the rod, and deliver his soul from hell." Again it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q65_A2-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Sir.33.28" target="asv">Ecclus. 33:28</a>): "Torture and fetters are for a malicious slave." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Harm is done a body by striking it, yet not so as when it is maimed: since maiming destroys the body's integrity, while a + blow merely affects the sense with pain, wherefore it causes much less harm than cutting off a member. Now it is unlawful + to do a person a harm, except by way of punishment in the cause of justice. Again, no man justly punishes another, except + one who is subject to his jurisdiction. Therefore it is not lawful for a man to strike another, + unless he have some power over the one whom he strikes. And since the child is subject to the power of the parent, and the + slave to the power of his master, a parent can lawfully strike his child, and a master his slave that instruction may be enforced + by correction. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since anger is a desire for vengeance, it is aroused chiefly when a man deems himself unjustly injured, as the Philosopher + states (Rhet. ii). Hence when parents are forbidden to provoke their children to anger, they are not prohibited from striking + their children for the purpose of correction, but from inflicting blows on them without moderation. The command that masters + should forbear from threatening their slaves may be understood in two ways. First + that they should be slow to threaten, and this pertains to the moderation of correction; secondly, that they should not always + carry out their threats, that is that they should sometimes by a merciful forgiveness temper the judgment whereby they threatened + punishment. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The greater power should exercise the greater coercion. Now just as a city is a perfect community, so the governor of a city + has perfect coercive power: wherefore he can inflict irreparable punishments such as death and mutilation. On the other hand + the father and the master who preside over the family household, which is an imperfect community, have imperfect coercive + power, which is exercised by inflicting lesser punishments, for instance by blows, + which do not inflict irreparable harm. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is lawful for anyone to impart correction to a willing subject. But to impart it to an unwilling subject belongs to those + only who have charge over him. To this pertains chastisement by blows. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q65_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q65_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q65_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q65_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q65_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q65_A3-p0.1">Whether it is lawful to imprison a man?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q65_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unlawful to imprison a man. An act which deals with undue matter is evil in its genus, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q65_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A2.html">FS, Q[18], A[2]</a>). Now man, having a free-will, is undue matter for imprisonment which is inconsistent with free-will. Therefore it is unlawful + to imprison a man. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, human justice should be ruled by Divine justice. Now according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q65_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.14" target="asv"> Ecclus. 15:14, </a> "God left man in the hand of his own counsel." Therefore it seems that a man ought not to be coerced by chains or prisons. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no man should be forcibly prevented except from doing an evil deed; and any man can lawfully prevent another from + doing this. If, therefore, it were lawful to imprison a man, in order to restrain him from evil deeds, it would be lawful + for anyone to put a man in prison; and this is clearly false. Therefore the same conclusion follows. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> We read in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q65_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.24" target="asv">Lev. 24</a> that a man was imprisoned for the sin of blasphemy. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the goods three things may be considered in due order. First, the substantial integrity of the body, and this is injured + by death or maiming. Secondly, pleasure or rest of the senses, and to this striking or anything causing a sense of pain is + opposed. Thirdly, the movement or use of the members, and this is hindered by binding or imprisoning or any kind of detention. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A3-p7"> Therefore it is unlawful to imprison or in any way detain a man, unless it be done according to the order of justice, either + in punishment, or as a measure of precaution against some evil. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A man who abuses the power entrusted to him deserves to lose it, and therefore when a man by sinning abuses the free use + of his members, he becomes a fitting matter for imprisonment. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to the order of His wisdom God sometimes restrains a sinner from accomplishing a sin, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q65_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Job.5.12" target="asv"> Job 5:12</a>: "Who bringeth to nought the designs of the malignant, so that their hand cannot accomplish what they had begun, while sometimes + He allows them to do what they will." In like manner, according to human justice, men are imprisoned, not for every sin but + for certain ones. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is lawful for anyone to restrain a man for a time from doing some unlawful deed there and then: as when a man prevents + another from throwing himself over a precipice, or from striking another. But to him alone who has the right of disposing + in general of the actions and of the life of another does it belong primarily to imprison or fetter, because by so doing he + hinders him from doing not only evil but also good deeds. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q65_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q65_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q65_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q65_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q65_A4-p0.1">Whether the sin is aggravated by the fact that the aforesaid injuries are perpetrated on those who are connected with others?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q65_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sin is not aggravated by the fact that the aforesaid injuries are perpetrated on those who are connected + with others. Such like injuries take their sinful character from inflicting an injury on another against his will. Now the + evil inflicted on a man's own person is more against his will than that which is inflicted on a person connected with him. + Therefore an injury inflicted on a person connected with another is less grievous. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Holy Writ reproves those especially who do injuries to orphans and widows: hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q65_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.35.17" target="asv">Ecclus. 35:17</a>): "He will not despise the prayers of the fatherless, nor the widow when she poureth out her complaint." Now the widow and + the orphan are not connected with other persons. Therefore the sin is not aggravated through an injury being inflicted on + one who is connected with others. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the person who is connected has a will of his own just as the principal person has, so that something may be voluntary + for him and yet against the will of the principal person, as in the case of adultery which pleases the woman but not the husband. + Now these injuries are sinful in so far as they consist in an involuntary commutation. Therefore such like injuries are of + a less sinful nature. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q65_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.28.32" target="asv">Dt. 28:32</a>) as though indicating an aggravating circumstance: "Thy sons and thy daughters shall be given to another people, thy eyes + looking on [*Vulg.: 'May thy sons and thy daughters be given,' etc.]." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Other things being equal, an injury is a more grievous sin according as it affects more persons; and hence it is that it + is a more grievous sin to strike or injure a person in authority than a private individual, because it conduces to the injury + of the whole community, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q65_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q73_A9.html">FS, Q[73], A[9]</a>). Now when an injury is inflicted on one who is connected in any way with another, that injury affects two persons, so that, + other + things being equal, the sin is aggravated by this very fact. It may happen, however, that in view of certain circumstances, + a sin committed against one who is not connected with any other person, is more grievous, on account of either the dignity + of the person, or the greatness of the injury. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> An injury inflicted on a person connected with others is less harmful to the persons with whom he is connected, than if it + were perpetrated immediately on them, and from this point of view it is a less grievous sin. But all that belongs to the injury + of the person with whom he is connected, is added to the sin of which a man is guilty through injuring the other one in himself. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Injuries done to widows and orphans are more insisted upon both through being more opposed to mercy, and because the same + injury done to such persons is more grievous to them since they have no one to turn to for relief. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact that the wife voluntarily consents to the adultery, lessens the sin and injury, so far as the woman is concerned, + for it would be more grievous, if the adulterer oppressed her by violence. But this does not remove the injury as affecting + her husband, since "the wife hath not power of her own body; but the husband" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q65_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:4</a>). The same applies to similar cases. of adultery, however, as it is opposed not only to justice but also to chastity, + we shall speak in the treatise on Temperance ( + <a id="SS_Q65_A4-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q154_A8.html">Q[154], A[8]</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q65_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q65_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q64_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q65_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q66" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q65_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q66-p0.1">OF THEFT AND ROBBERY (NINE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q66-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q66-p2"> We must now consider the sins opposed to justice, whereby a man injures his neighbor in his belongings; namely theft and + robbery. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66-p3"> Under this head there are nine points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q66-p4"> (1) Whether it is natural to man to possess external things?</p> + <p id="SS_Q66-p5"> (2) Whether it is lawful for a man to possess something as his own?</p> + <p id="SS_Q66-p6"> (3) Whether theft is the secret taking of another's property?</p> + <p id="SS_Q66-p7"> (4) Whether robbery is a species of sin distinct from theft?</p> + <p id="SS_Q66-p8"> (5) Whether every theft is a sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q66-p9"> (6) Whether theft is a mortal sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q66-p10"> (7) Whether it is lawful to thieve in a case of necessity?</p> + <p id="SS_Q66-p11"> (8) Whether every robbery is a mortal sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q66-p12"> (9) Whether robbery is a more grievous sin than theft?</p> + <div id="SS_Q66_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q66_A1-p0.1">Whether it is natural for man to possess external things?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q66_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not natural for man to possess external things. For no man should ascribe to himself that which + is God's. Now the dominion over all creatures is proper to God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q66_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.23.1" target="asv"> Ps. 23:1, </a> "The earth is the Lord's," etc. Therefore it is not natural for man to possess external things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q66_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.18" target="asv">Lk. 12:18</a>), "I will gather all things that are grown to me, and my goods," says [*Hom. in Luc. xii, 18]: "Tell me: which are thine? + where did you take them from and bring them into being?" Now whatever man possesses naturally, he can fittingly call his own. + Therefore man does not naturally possess external things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Ambrose (De Trin. i [*De Fide, ad Gratianum, i, 1]) "dominion denotes power." But man has no power + over external things, since he can work no change in their nature. Therefore the possession of external things is not natural + to man. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q66_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.8.8" target="asv">Ps. 8:8</a>): "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> External things can be considered in two ways. First, as regards their nature, and this is not subject to the power of man, + but only to the power of God Whose mere will all things obey. Secondly, as regards their use, and in this way, man has a natural + dominion over external things, because, by his reason and will, he is able to use them for his own profit, as they were made + on his account: for the imperfect is always for the sake of the perfect, as stated + above ( + <a id="SS_Q66_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q64_A1.html">Q[64], A[1]</a>). It is by this argument that the Philosopher proves (Polit. i, 3) that the possession of external things is natural to man. + Moreover, this natural dominion of man over other creatures, which is competent to man in respect of his reason wherein God's + image resides, is shown forth in man's creation ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q66_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>) by the words: "Let us make man to our image and likeness: and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea," etc. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God has sovereign dominion over all things: and He, according to His providence, directed certain things to the sustenance + of man's body. For this reason man has a natural dominion over things, as regards the power to make use of them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The rich man is reproved for deeming external things to belong to him principally, as though he had not received them from + another, namely from God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the dominion over external things as regards their nature. Such a dominion belongs to God alone, + as stated above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q66_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q66_A2-p0.1">Whether it is lawful for a man to possess a thing as his own?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q66_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unlawful for a man to possess a thing as his own. For whatever is contrary to the natural law is unlawful. + Now according to the natural law all things are common property: and the possession of property is contrary to this community + of goods. Therefore it is unlawful for any man to appropriate any external thing to himself. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man quoted above (A[1], OBJ[2]), says: "The rich who deem as their own + property the common goods they have seized upon, are like to those who by going beforehand to the play prevent others from + coming, and appropriate to themselves what is intended for common use." Now it would be unlawful to prevent others from obtaining + possession of common goods. Therefore it is unlawful to appropriate to oneself what + belongs to the community. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Ambrose says [*Serm. lxiv, de temp.], and his words are quoted in the Decretals [*Dist. xlvii., Can. Sicut hi.]: + "Let no man call his own that which is common property": and by "common" he means external things, as is clear from the context. + Therefore it seems unlawful for a man to appropriate an external thing to himself. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Haeres., haer. 40): "The 'Apostolici' are those who with extreme arrogance have given themselves that + name, because they do not admit into their communion persons who are married or possess anything of their own, such as both + monks and clerics who in considerable number are to be found in the Catholic Church." Now the reason why these people are + heretics was because severing themselves from the Church, they think that those who enjoy the + use of the above things, which they themselves lack, have no hope of salvation. Therefore it is erroneous to maintain that + it is unlawful for a man to possess property. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Two things are competent to man in respect of exterior things. One is the power to procure and dispense them, and in this + regard it is lawful for man to possess property. Moreover this is necessary to human life for three reasons. First because + every man is more careful to procure what is for himself alone than that which is common to many or to all: since each one + would shirk the labor and leave to another that which concerns the community, as happens where + there is a great number of servants. Secondly, because human affairs are conducted in more orderly fashion if each man is + charged with taking care of some particular thing himself, whereas there would be confusion if everyone had to look after + any one thing indeterminately. Thirdly, because a more peaceful state is ensured to man if each one is contented with his + own. Hence it is to be observed that quarrels arise more frequently where there is no division of the things possessed. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A2-p7"> The second thing that is competent to man with regard to external things is their use. In this respect man ought to possess + external things, not as his own, but as common, so that, to wit, he is ready to communicate them to others in their need. + Hence the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q66_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.17" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:17,18</a>): "Charge the rich of this world . . . to give easily, to communicate to others," etc. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Community of goods is ascribed to the natural law, not that the natural law dictates that all things should be possessed + in common and that nothing should be possessed as one's own: but because the division of possessions is not according to the + natural law, but rather arose from human agreement which belongs to positive law, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q66_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q57_A2.html">Q[57], AA[2]</a>,3). Hence the ownership of possessions is not contrary to the natural + law, but an addition thereto devised by human reason. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man would not act unlawfully if by going beforehand to the play he prepared the way for others: but he acts unlawfully + if by so doing he hinders others from going. In like manner a rich man does not act unlawfully if he anticipates someone in + taking possession of something which at first was common property, and gives others a share: but he sins if he excludes others + indiscriminately from using it. Hence Basil says (Hom. in Luc. xii, 18): "Why are + you rich while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the merit of a good stewardship, and he the reward of patience?" + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When Ambrose says: "Let no man call his own that which is common," he is speaking of ownership as regards use, wherefore + he adds: "He who spends too much is a robber." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q66_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q66_A3-p0.1">Whether the essence of theft consists in taking another's thing secretly?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q66_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not essential to theft to take another's thing secretly. For that which diminishes a sin, does not, + apparently, belong to the essence of a sin. Now to sin secretly tends to diminish a sin, just as, on the contrary, it is written + as indicating an aggravating circumstance of the sin of some ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q66_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.3.9" target="asv">Is. 3:9</a>): "They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not hid it." Therefore it is not essential to theft + that it should consist in taking another's thing secretly. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Ambrose says [*Serm. lxiv, de temp., A[2], OBJ[3], Can. Sicut hi.]: and his words are embodied in the Decretals + [*Dist. xlvii]: "It is no less a crime to take from him that has, than to refuse to succor the needy when you can and are + well off." Therefore just as theft consists in taking another's thing, so does it consist in keeping it back. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a man may take by stealth from another, even that which is his own, for instance a thing that he has deposited with + another, or that has been taken away from him unjustly. Therefore it is not essential to theft that it should consist in taking + another's thing secretly. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (Etym. x): "'Fur' [thief] is derived from 'furvus' and so from 'fuscus' [dark], because he takes advantage of + the night." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Three things combine together to constitute theft. The first belongs to theft as being contrary to justice, which gives to + each one that which is his, so that it belongs to theft to take possession of what is another's. The second thing belongs + to theft as distinct from those sins which are committed against the person, such as murder and adultery, and in this respect + it belongs to theft to be about a thing possessed: for if a man takes what is another's not + as a possession but as a part (for instance, if he amputates a limb), or as a person connected with him (for instance, if + he carry off his daughter or his wife), it is not strictly speaking a case of theft. The third difference is that which completes + the nature of theft, and consists in a thing being taken secretly: and in this respect it belongs properly to theft that it + consists in "taking another's thing secretly." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Secrecy is sometimes a cause of sin, as when a man employs secrecy in order to commit a sin, for instance in fraud and guile. + In this way it does not diminish sin, but constitutes a species of sin: and thus it is in theft. In another way secrecy is + merely a circumstance of sin, and thus it diminishes sin, both because it is a sign of shame, and because it removes scandal. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To keep back what is due to another, inflicts the same kind of injury as taking a thing unjustly: wherefore an unjust detention + is included in an unjust taking. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nothing prevents that which belongs to one person simply, from belonging to another in some respect: thus a deposit belongs + simply to the depositor, but with regard to its custody it is the depositary's, and the thing stolen is the thief's, not simply, + but as regards its custody. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q66_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q66_A4-p0.1">Whether theft and robbery are sins of different species?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q66_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that theft and robbery are not sins of different species. For theft and robbery differ as "secret" and "manifest": + because theft is taking something secretly, while robbery is to take something violently and openly. Now in the other kinds + of sins, the secret and the manifest do not differ specifically. Therefore theft and robbery are not different species of + sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, moral actions take their species from the end, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q66_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html">FS, Q[1], A[3]</a>; Q[18], A[6]). Now theft and robbery are directed to the same end, viz. the possession of another's property. Therefore they + do not differ specifically. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as a thing is taken by force for the sake of possession, so is a woman taken by force for pleasure: wherefore + Isidore says (Etym. x) that "he who commits a rape is called a corrupter, and the victim of the rape is said to be corrupted." + Now it is a case of rape whether the woman be carried off publicly or secretly. Therefore the thing appropriated is said to + be taken by force, whether it be done secretly or publicly. Therefore theft and robbery + do not differ. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2) distinguishes theft from robbery, and states that theft is done in secret, but that robbery + is done openly. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Theft and robbery are vices contrary to justice, in as much as one man does another an injustice. Now "no man suffers an + injustice willingly," as stated in Ethic. v, 9. Wherefore theft and robbery derive their sinful nature, through the taking + being involuntary on the part of the person from whom something is taken. Now the involuntary is twofold, namely, through + violence and through ignorance, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1. Therefore the sinful aspect of + robbery differs from that of theft: and consequently they differ specifically. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the other kinds of sin the sinful nature is not derived from something involuntary, as in the sins opposed to justice: + and so where there is a different kind of involuntary, there is a different species of sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The remote end of robbery and theft is the same. But this is not enough for identity of species, because there is a difference + of proximate ends, since the robber wishes to take a thing by his own power, but the thief, by cunning. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The robbery of a woman cannot be secret on the part of the woman who is taken: wherefore even if it be secret as regards + the others from whom she is taken, the nature of robbery remains on the part of the woman to whom violence is done. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q66_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q66_A5-p0.1">Whether theft is always a sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q66_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that theft is not always a sin. For no sin is commanded by God, since it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q66_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.21" target="asv">Ecclus. 15:21</a>): "He hath commanded no man to do wickedly." Yet we find that God commanded theft, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q66_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.12.35" target="asv">Ex. 12:35,36</a>): "And the children of Israel did as the Lord had commanded Moses [Vulg.: 'as Moses had commanded']. . . and they stripped + the Egyptians." Therefore theft is not always a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if a man finds a thing that is not his and takes it, he seems to commit a theft, for he takes another's property. + Yet this seems lawful according to natural equity, as the jurists hold. [*See loc. cit. in Reply.] Therefore it seems that + theft is not always a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, he that takes what is his own does not seem to sin, because he does not act against justice, since he does not destroy + its equality. Yet a man commits a theft even if he secretly take his own property that is detained by or in the safe-keeping + of another. Therefore it seems that theft is not always a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q66_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.15" target="asv">Ex. 20:15</a>): "Thou shalt not steal." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> If anyone consider what is meant by theft, he will find that it is sinful on two counts. First, because of its opposition + to justice, which gives to each one what is his, so that for this reason theft is contrary to justice, through being a taking + of what belongs to another. Secondly, because of the guile or fraud committed by the thief, by laying hands on another's property + secretly and cunningly. Wherefore it is evident that every theft is a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is no theft for a man to take another's property either secretly or openly by order of a judge who has commanded him to + do so, because it becomes his due by the very fact that it is adjudicated to him by the sentence of the court. Hence still + less was it a theft for the Israelites to take away the spoils of the Egyptians at the command of the Lord, Who ordered this + to be done on account of the ill-treatment accorded to them by the Egyptians without + any cause: wherefore it is written significantly ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q66_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.10.19" target="asv">Wis. 10:19</a>): "The just took the spoils of the wicked." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> With regard to treasure-trove a distinction must be made. For some there are that were never in anyone's possession, for + instance precious stones and jewels, found on the seashore, and such the finder is allowed to keep [*Dig. I, viii, De divis. + rerum: Inst. II, i, De rerum divis.]. The same applies to treasure hidden underground long since and belonging to no man, + except that according to civil law the finder is bound to give half to the owner of the + land, if the treasure trove be in the land of another person [*Inst. II, i, 39: Cod. X, xv, De Thesauris]. Hence in the parable + of the Gospel ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q66_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.44" target="asv">Mat. 13:44</a>) it is said of the finder of the treasure hidden in a field that he bought the field, as though he purposed thus to acquire + the right of possessing the whole treasure. On the other Land the treasure-trove may be nearly in someone's possession: and + then if anyone take it with the intention, not of keeping it but of returning + it to the owner who does not look upon such things as unappropriated, he is not guilty of theft. In like manner if the thing + found appears to be unappropriated, and if the finder believes it to be so, although he keep it, he does not commit a theft + [*Inst. II, i, 47]. In any other case the sin of theft is committed [*Dig. XLI, i, De acquirend, rerum dominio, 9: Inst. II, + i, 48]: wherefore Augustine says in a homily (Serm. clxxviii; De Verb. Apost.): "If thou hast found a thing and not returned + it, thou hast stolen it" (Dig. xiv, 5, can. Si quid invenisti). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He who by stealth takes his own property which is deposited with another man burdens the depositary, who is bound either + to restitution, or to prove himself innocent. Hence he is clearly guilty of sin, and is bound to ease the depositary of his + burden. On the other hand he who, by stealth, takes his own property, if this be unjustly detained by another, he sins indeed; + yet not because he burdens the retainer, and so he is not bound to restitution or + compensation: but he sins against general justice by disregarding the order of justice and usurping judgment concerning his + own property. Hence he must make satisfaction to God and endeavor to allay whatever scandal he may have given his neighbor + by acting this way. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A5-p10">Whether theft is a mortal sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A5-p11"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that theft is not a mortal sin. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q66_A5-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.30" target="asv">Prov. 6:30</a>): "The fault is not so great when a man hath stolen." But every mortal sin is a great fault. Therefore theft is not a mortal + sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A5-p12"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mortal sin deserves to be punished with death. But in the Law theft is punished not by death but by indemnity, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q66_A5-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.1" target="asv">Ex. 22:1</a>, "If any man steal an ox or a sheep . . . he shall restore have oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep." Therefore + theft is not a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A5-p13"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, theft can be committed in small even as in great things. But it seems unreasonable for a man to be punished with + eternal death for the theft of a small thing such as a needle or a quill. Therefore theft is not a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A5-p14"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> No man is condemned by the Divine judgment save for a mortal sin. Yet a man is condemned for theft, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q66_A5-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Zech.5.3" target="asv"> Zech. 5:3, </a> "This is the curse that goeth forth over the face of the earth; for every thief shall be judged as is there written." Therefore + theft is a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A5-p15"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[59], A[4]; + <a id="SS_Q66_A5-p15.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A5.html">FS, Q[72], A[5]</a>), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity as the spiritual life of the soul. Now charity consists principally in + the love of God, and secondarily in the love of our neighbor, which is shown in our wishing and doing him well. But theft + is a means of doing harm to our neighbor in his belongings; and if men were to rob one another habitually, human society would + be undone. Therefore + theft, as being opposed to charity, is a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A5-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The statement that theft is not a great fault is in view of two cases. First, when a person is led to thieve through necessity. + This necessity diminishes or entirely removes sin, as we shall show further on + <a id="SS_Q66_A5-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q66_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Hence the text continues: "For he stealeth to fill his hungry soul." Secondly, theft is stated not to be a great fault in + comparison with the guilt of adultery, which is punished with death. Hence the text goes on + to say of the thief that "if he be taken, he shall restore sevenfold . . . but he that is an adulterer . . . shall destroy + his own soul." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A5-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The punishments of this life are medicinal rather than retributive. For retribution is reserved to the Divine judgment which + is pronounced against sinners "according to truth" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q66_A5-p17.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.2" target="asv">Rom. 2:2</a>). Wherefore, according to the judgment of the present life the death punishment is inflicted, not for every mortal sin, but + only for such as inflict an irreparable harm, or again for such as contain some horrible deformity. Hence according to the + present judgment the pain of death is not inflicted for theft which does not inflict an irreparable harm, except when it is + aggravated by some grave circumstance, as in the case of sacrilege which is the theft of a sacred thing, of peculation, which + is theft of common property, as Augustine states (Tract. 1, Super Joan.), and of kidnaping which is stealing a man, for which + the pain of death is inflicted ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q66_A5-p17.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.16" target="asv">Ex. 21:16</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A5-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reason accounts as nothing that which is little: so that a man does not consider himself injured in very little matters: + and the person who takes such things can presume that this is not against the will of the owner. And if a person take such + like very little things, he may be proportionately excused from mortal sin. Yet if his intention is to rob and injure his + neighbor, there may be a mortal sin even in these very little things, even as there may + be through consent in a mere thought. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A5-p19"></p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A5-p20"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q66_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q66_A7-p0.1">Whether it is lawful to steal through stress of need?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q66_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unlawful to steal through stress of need. For penance is not imposed except on one who has sinned. Now it is + stated (Extra, De furtis, Cap. Si quis): "If anyone, through stress of hunger or nakedness, steal food, clothing or beast, + he shall do penance for three weeks." Therefore it is not lawful to steal through stress of need. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "there are some actions whose very name implies wickedness," and among + these he reckons theft. Now that which is wicked in itself may not be done for a good end. Therefore a man cannot lawfully + steal in order to remedy a need. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a man should love his neighbor as himself. Now, according to Augustine (Contra Mendac. vii), it is unlawful to steal + in order to succor one's neighbor by giving him an alms. Therefore neither is it lawful to steal in order to remedy one's + own needs. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> In cases of need all things are common property, so that there would seem to be no sin in taking another's property, for + need has made it common. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Things which are of human right cannot derogate from natural right or Divine right. Now according to the natural order established + by Divine Providence, inferior things are ordained for the purpose of succoring man's needs by their means. Wherefore the + division and appropriation of things which are based on human law, do not preclude the fact that man's needs have to be remedied + by means of these very things. Hence whatever certain people have in + superabundance is due, by natural law, to the purpose of succoring the poor. For this reason Ambrose [*Loc. cit., A[2], OBJ[3]] + says, and his words are embodied in the Decretals (Dist. xlvii, can. Sicut ii): "It is the hungry man's bread that you withhold, + the naked man's cloak that you store away, the money that you bury in the earth is the price of the poor man's ransom and + freedom." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A7-p7"> Since, however, there are many who are in need, while it is impossible for all to be succored by means of the same thing, + each one is entrusted with the stewardship of his own things, so that out of them he may come to the aid of those who are + in need. Nevertheless, if the need be so manifest and urgent, that it is evident that the present need must be remedied by + whatever means be at hand (for instance when a person is in some imminent danger, and there is no other possible + remedy), then it is lawful for a man to succor his own need by means of another's property, by taking it either openly or + secretly: nor is this properly speaking theft or robbery. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This decretal considers cases where there is no urgent need. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not theft, properly speaking, to take secretly and use another's property in a case of extreme need: because that which + he takes for the support of his life becomes his own property by reason of that need. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In a case of a like need a man may also take secretly another's property in order to succor his neighbor in need. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A7-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A7-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q66_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A9.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q66_A8-p0.1">Whether robbery may be committed without sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q66_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that robbery may be committed without sin. For spoils are taken by violence, and this seems to belong to the + essence of robbery, according to what has been said + <a id="SS_Q66_A8-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q66_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. Now it is lawful to take spoils from the enemy; for Ambrose says (De Patriarch. 4 [*De Abraham i, 3]): "When the conqueror + has taken possession of the spoils, military discipline demands that all should be reserved for the sovereign," in order, + to wit, + that he may distribute them. Therefore in certain cases robbery is lawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is lawful to take from a man what is not his. Now the things which unbelievers have are not theirs, for Augustine + says (Ep. ad Vincent. Donat. xciii.): "You falsely call things your own, for you do not possess them justly, and according + to the laws of earthly kings you are commanded to forfeit them." Therefore it seems that one may lawfully rob unbelievers. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, earthly princes violently extort many things from their subjects: and this seems to savor of robbery. Now it would + seem a grievous matter to say that they sin in acting thus, for in that case nearly every prince would be damned. Therefore + in some cases robbery is lawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is taken lawfully may be offered to God in sacrifice and oblation. Now this cannot be done with the proceeds of + robbery, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q66_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.61.8" target="asv"> Is. 61:8, </a> "I am the Lord that love judgment, and hate robbery in a holocaust." Therefore it is not lawful to take anything by robbery. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Robbery implies a certain violence and coercion employed in taking unjustly from a man that which is his. Now in human society + no man can exercise coercion except through public authority: and, consequently, if a private individual not having public + authority takes another's property by violence, he acts unlawfully and commits a robbery, as burglars do. As regards princes, + the public power is entrusted to them that they may be the guardians of justice: hence + it is unlawful for them to use violence or coercion, save within the bounds of justice---either by fighting against the enemy, + or against the citizens, by punishing evil-doers: and whatever is taken by violence of this kind is not the spoils of robbery, + since it is not contrary to justice. On the other hand to take other people's property violently and against justice, in the + exercise of public authority, is to act unlawfully and to be guilty of robbery; and whoever does so is bound to + restitution. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A distinction must be made in the matter of spoils. For if they who take spoils from the enemy, are waging a just war, such + things as they seize in the war become their own property. This is no robbery, so that they are not bound to restitution. + Nevertheless even they who are engaged in a just war may sin in taking spoils through cupidity arising from an evil intention, + if, to wit, they fight chiefly not for justice but for spoil. For Augustine says + (De Verb. Dom. xix; Serm. lxxxii) that "it is a sin to fight for booty." If, however, those who take the spoil, are waging + an unjust war, they are guilty of robbery, and are bound to restitution. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Unbelievers possess their goods unjustly in so far as they are ordered by the laws of earthly princes to forfeit those goods. + Hence these may be taken violently from them, not by private but by public authority. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is no robbery if princes exact from their subjects that which is due to them for the safe-guarding of the common good, + even if they use violence in so doing: but if they extort something unduly by means of violence, it is robbery even as burglary + is. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 4): "If justice be disregarded, what is a king but a mighty robber? since what is + a robber but a little king?" And it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q66_A8-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.22.27" target="asv">Ezech. + 22:27 + </a>): "Her princes in the midst of her, are like wolves ravening the prey." Wherefore they are bound to restitution, just as + robbers are, and by so much do they sin more grievously than robbers, as their actions are fraught with greater and more universal + danger to public justice whose wardens they are. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A8-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A8-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A9.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q66_A9" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q67.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q66_A9-p0.1">Whether theft is a more grievous sin than robbery?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q66_A9-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that theft is a more grievous sin than robbery. For theft adds fraud and guile to the taking of another's property: + and these things are not found in robbery. Now fraud and guile are sinful in themselves, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q66_A9-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q55_A4.html">Q[55], AA[4]</a>,5). Therefore theft is a more grievous sin than robbery. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, shame is fear about a wicked deed, as stated in Ethic. iv, 9. Now men are more ashamed of theft than of robbery. + Therefore theft is more wicked than robbery. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more persons a sin injures the more grievous it would seem to be. Now the great and the lowly may be injured + by theft: whereas only the weak can be injured by robbery, since it is possible to use violence towards them. Therefore the + sin of theft seems to be more grievous than the sin of robbery. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A9-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> According to the laws robbery is more severely punished than theft. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A9-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Robbery and theft are sinful, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q66_A9-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q66_A4.html">AA[4]</a>,6), on account of the involuntariness on the part of the person from whom something is taken: yet so that in theft the involuntariness + is due to ignorance, whereas in robbery it is due to violence. Now a thing is more involuntary through violence than through + ignorance, because violence is more directly opposed to the will than ignorance. Therefore robbery is a more grievous sin + than theft. There is also another reason, since robbery not only inflicts a loss on a person in his things, but also conduces + to the ignominy and injury of his person, and this is of graver import than fraud or guile which belong to theft. Hence the + Reply to the First Objection is evident. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A9-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Men who adhere to sensible things think more of external strength which is evidenced in robbery, than of internal virtue + which is forfeit through sin: wherefore they are less ashamed of robbery than of theft. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A9-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although more persons may be injured by theft than by robbery, yet more grievous injuries may be inflicted by robbery than + by theft: for which reason also robbery is more odious. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A9-p9"></p> + <p id="SS_Q66_A9-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q67.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q65_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q67" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q67_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q67-p0.1">OF THE INJUSTICE OF A JUDGE, IN JUDGING (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q67-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q67-p2"> We must now consider those vices opposed to commutative justice, that consist in words injurious to our neighbors. We shall + consider (1) those which are connected with judicial proceedings, and (2) injurious words uttered extra-judicially. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67-p3"> Under the first head five points occur for our consideration: (1) The injustice of a judge in judging; (2) The injustice + of the prosecutor in accusing; (3) The injustice of the defendant in defending himself; (4) The injustice of the witnesses + in giving evidence; (5) The injustice of the advocate in defending. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67-p4"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q67-p5"> (1) Whether a man can justly judge one who is not his subject?</p> + <p id="SS_Q67-p6"> (2) Whether it is lawful for a judge, on account of the evidence, to deliver judgment in opposition to the truth which is + known to him? + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67-p7"> (3) Whether a judge can justly sentence a man who is not accused?</p> + <p id="SS_Q67-p8"> (4) Whether he can justly remit the punishment?</p> + <div id="SS_Q67_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q67.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q67_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q67_A1-p0.1">Whether a man can justly judge one who is not subject to his jurisdiction?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q67_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man can justly judge one who is not subject to his jurisdiction. For it is stated ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q67_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.13" target="asv">Dan. 13</a>) that Daniel sentenced the ancients who were convicted of bearing false witness. But these ancients were not subject to Daniel; + indeed they were judges of the people. Therefore a man may lawfully judge one that is not subject to his jurisdiction. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Christ was no man's subject, indeed He was "King of kings and Lord of lords" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q67_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.19.16" target="asv">Apoc. 19:16</a>). Yet He submitted to the judgment of a man. Therefore it seems that a man may lawfully judge one that is not subject to + his jurisdiction. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the law [*Cap. Licet ratione, de Foro Comp.] a man is tried in this or that court according to his + kind of offense. Now sometimes the defendant is not the subject of the man whose business it is to judge in that particular + place, for instance when the defendant belongs to another diocese or is exempt. Therefore it seems that a man may judge one + that is not his subject. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory [*Regist. xi, epist. 64] in commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q67_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.25" target="asv">Dt. 23:25</a>, "If thou go into thy friend's corn," etc. says: "Thou mayest not put the sickle of judgment to the corn that is entrusted + to another." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A judge's sentence is like a particular law regarding some particular fact. Wherefore just as a general law should have coercive + power, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 9), so too the sentence of a judge should have coercive power, whereby either + party is compelled to comply with the judge's sentence; else the judgment would be of no effect. Now coercive power is not + exercised in human affairs, save by those who hold public authority: and those who have + this authority are accounted the superiors of those over whom they preside whether by ordinary or by delegated authority. + Hence it is evident that no man can judge others than his subjects and this in virtue either of delegated or of ordinary authority. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In judging those ancients Daniel exercised an authority delegated to him by Divine instinct. This is indicated where it is + said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q67_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.13.45" target="asv">Dan. 13:45</a>) that "the Lord raised up the . . . spirit of a young boy." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In human affairs a man may submit of his own accord to the judgment of others although these be not his superiors, an example + of which is when parties agree to a settlement by arbitrators. Wherefore it is necessary that the arbitrator should be upheld + by a penalty, since the arbitrators through not exercising authority in the case, have not of themselves full power of coercion. + Accordingly in this way did Christ of his own accord submit to human + judgment: and thus too did Pope Leo [*Leo IV] submit to the judgment of the emperor [*Can. Nos si incompetenter, caus. ii, + qu. 7]. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The bishop of the defendant's diocese becomes the latter's superior as regards the fault committed, even though he be exempt: + unless perchance the defendant offend in a matter exempt from the bishop's authority, for instance in administering the property + of an exempt monastery. But if an exempt person commits a theft, or a murder or the like, he may be justly condemned by the + ordinary. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q67.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q67_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q67_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q67_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q67_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q67_A2-p0.1">Whether it is lawful for a judge to pronounce judgment against the truth that he knows, on account of evidence to the contrary?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q67_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unlawful for a judge to pronounce judgment against the truth that he knows, on account of evidence to the contrary. + For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q67_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.17.9" target="asv">Dt. 17:9</a>): "Thou shalt come to the priests of the Levitical race, and to the judge that shall be at that time; and thou shalt ask + of them, and they shall show thee the truth of the judgment." Now sometimes certain things are alleged against the truth, + as when something is proved by means of + false witnesses. Therefore it is unlawful for a judge to pronounce judgment according to what is alleged and proved in opposition + to the truth which he knows. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in pronouncing judgment a man should conform to the Divine judgment, since "it is the judgment of God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q67_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.1.17" target="asv">Dt. 1:17</a>). Now "the judgment of God is according to the truth" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q67_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.2" target="asv">Rom. 2:2</a>), and it was foretold of Christ ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q67_A2-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.3" target="asv">Is. 11:3,4</a>): "He shall not judge according to the sight of the eyes, nor reprove according to the hearing of the ears. But He shall + judge the poor with justice, and shall reprove with + equity for the meek of the earth." Therefore the judge ought not to pronounce judgment according to the evidence before him + if it be contrary to what he knows himself. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the reason why evidence is required in a court of law, is that the judge may have a faithful record of the truth + of the matter, wherefore in matters of common knowledge there is no need of judicial procedure, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q67_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.5.24" target="asv">1 Tim. 5:24, </a> "Some men's sins are manifest, going before to judgment." Consequently, if the judge by his personal knowledge is aware of + the truth, he should pay no heed to the evidence, but should pronounce + sentence according to the truth which he knows. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the word "conscience" denotes application of knowledge to a matter of action as stated in the + <a id="SS_Q67_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A13.html">FP, Q[79], A[13]</a>. Now it is a sin to act contrary to one's knowledge. Therefore a judge sins if he pronounces sentence according to the evidence + but against his conscience of the truth. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine [*Ambrose, Super + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q67_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118" target="asv">Ps. 118</a>, serm. 20] says in his commentary on the Psalter: "A good judge does nothing according to his private opinion but pronounces + sentence according to the law and the right." Now this is to pronounce judgment according to what is alleged and proved in + court. Therefore a judge ought to pronounce judgment in accordance with these things, and not according to his private opinion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q67_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q67_A1.html">(A[1];</a> Q[60], AA[2],6) it is the duty of a judge to pronounce judgment in as much as he exercises public authority, wherefore his + judgment should be based on information acquired by him, not from his knowledge as a private individual, but from what he + knows as a public person. Now the latter knowledge comes to him both in general and in particular ---in general through the + public laws, whether Divine or human, and he + should admit no evidence that conflicts therewith---in some particular matter, through documents and witnesses, and other + legal means of information, which in pronouncing his sentence, he ought to follow rather than the information he has acquired + as a private individual. And yet this same information may be of use to him, so that he can more rigorously sift the evidence + brought forward, and discover its weak points. If, however, he is unable to reject that evidence juridically, he must, as + stated above, follow it in pronouncing sentence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The reason why, in the passage quoted, it is stated that the judges should first of all be asked their reasons, is to make + it clear that the judges ought to judge the truth in accordance with the evidence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To judge belongs to God in virtue of His own power: wherefore His judgment is based on the truth which He Himself knows, + and not on knowledge imparted by others: the same is to be said of Christ, Who is true God and true man: whereas other judges + do not judge in virtue of their own power, so that there is no comparison. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Apostle refers to the case where something is well known not to the judge alone, but both to him and to others, so that + the guilty party can by no means deny his guilt (as in the case of notorious criminals), and is convicted at once from the + evidence of the fact. If, on the other hand, it be well known to the judge, but not to others, or to others, but not to the + judge, then it is necessary for the judge to sift the evidence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In matters touching his own person, a man must form his conscience from his own knowledge, but in matters concerning the + public authority, he must form his conscience in accordance with the knowledge attainable in the public judicial procedure. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q67_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q67_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q67_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q67_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q67_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q67_A3-p0.1">Whether a judge may condemn a man who is not accused?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q67_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a judge may pass sentence on a man who is not accused. For human justice is derived from Divine justice. + Now God judges the sinner even though there be no accuser. Therefore it seems that a man may pass sentence of condemnation + on a man even though there be no accuser. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an accuser is required in judicial procedure in order that he may relate the crime to the judge. Now sometimes the + crime may come to the judge's knowledge otherwise than by accusation; for instance, by denunciation, or by evil report, or + through the judge himself being an eye-witness. Therefore a judge may condemn a man without there being an accuser. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the deeds of holy persons are related in Holy Writ, as models of human conduct. Now Daniel was at the same time + the accuser and the judge of the wicked ancients ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q67_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.13" target="asv">Dan. 13</a>). Therefore it is not contrary to justice for a man to condemn anyone as judge while being at the same time his accuser. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose in his commentary on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q67_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.5.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 5:2, </a> expounding the Apostle's sentence on the fornicator, says that "a judge should not condemn without an accuser, since our + Lord did not banish Judas, who was a thief, yet was not accused." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A judge is an interpreter of justice. Wherefore, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have recourse to a judge as + to one who is the personification of justice." Now, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q67_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A2.html">Q[58], A[2]</a> ), justice is not between a man and himself but between one man and another. Hence a judge must needs judge between two parties, + which is the case when one is the prosecutor, and the other the defendant. Therefore in criminal cases the + judge cannot sentence a man unless the latter has an accuser, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q67_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Acts.25.16" target="asv"> Acts 25:16</a>: "It is not the custom of the Romans to condemn any man, before that he who is accused have his accusers present, and have + liberty to make his answer, to clear himself of the crimes" of which he is accused. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God, in judging man, takes the sinner's conscience as his accuser, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q67_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.15" target="asv"> Rom. 2:15, </a> "Their thoughts between themselves accusing, or also defending one another"; or again, He takes the evidence of the fact + as regards the deed itself, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q67_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.4.10" target="asv"> Gn. 4:10, </a> "The voice of thy brother's blood crieth to Me from the earth." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Public disgrace takes the place of an accuser. Hence a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q67_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.4.10" target="asv"> Gn. 4:10, </a> "The voice of thy brother's blood," etc. says: "There is no need of an accuser when the crime committed is notorious." In + a case of denunciation, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q67_A3-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q33_A7.html">Q[33], A[7]</a>), the amendment, not the punishment, of the sinner is intended: wherefore when a man is denounced for a sin, nothing is done + against him, but for him, so that + no accuser is required. The punishment that is inflicted is on account of his rebellion against the Church, and since this + rebellion is manifest, it stands instead of an accuser. The fact that the judge himself was an eye-witness, does not authorize + him to proceed to pass sentence, except according to the order of judicial procedure. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God, in judging man, proceeds from His own knowledge of the truth, whereas man does not, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q67_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q67_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Hence a man cannot be accuser, witness and judge at the same time, as God is. Daniel was at once accuser and judge, because + he was the executor of the sentence of God, by whose instinct he was moved, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q67_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q67_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q67_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q67_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q68.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q67_A4-p0.1">Whether the judge can lawfully remit the punishment?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q67_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the judge can lawfully remit the punishment. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q67_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.13" target="asv">James 2:13</a>): "Judgment without mercy" shall be done "to him that hath not done mercy." Now no man is punished for not doing what he + cannot do lawfully. Therefore any judge can lawfully do mercy by remitting the punishment. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, human judgment should imitate the Divine judgment. Now God remits the punishment to sinners, because He desires + not the death of the sinner, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q67_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.23" target="asv"> Ezech. 18:23.</a> Therefore a human judge also may lawfully remit the punishment to one who repents. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is lawful for anyone to do what is profitable to some one and harmful to none. Now the remission of his punishment + profits the guilty man and harms nobody. Therefore the judge can lawfully loose a guilty man from his punishment. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q67_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.13.8" target="asv">Dt. 13:8,9</a>) concerning anyone who would persuade a man to serve strange gods: "Neither let thy eye spare him to pity and conceal him, + but thou shalt presently put him to death": and of the murderer it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q67_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.19.12" target="asv">Dt. 19:12,13</a>): "He shall die. Thou shalt not pity him." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As may be gathered from what has been said ( + <a id="SS_Q67_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q67_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3), with regard to the question in point, two things may be observed in connection with a judge. One is that he has to judge + between accuser and defendant, while the other is that he pronounces the judicial sentence, in virtue of his power, not as + a private individual but as a public person. Accordingly on two counts a judge is hindered from loosing a guilty person from + his + punishment. First on the part of the accuser, whose right it sometimes is that the guilty party should be punished---for instance + on account of some injury committed against the accuser---because it is not in the power of a judge to remit such punishment, + since every judge is bound to give each man his right. Secondly, he finds a hindrance on the part of the commonwealth, whose + power he exercises, and to whose good it belongs that evil-doers should be punished. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A4-p7"> Nevertheless in this respect there is a difference between judges of lower degree and the supreme judge, i.e. the sovereign, + to whom the entire public authority is entrusted. For the inferior judge has no power to exempt a guilty man from punishment + against the laws imposed on him by his superior. Wherefore Augustine in commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q67_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.19.11" target="asv"> John 19:11, </a> "Thou shouldst not have any power against Me," says (Tract. cxvi in Joan.): "The power which God gave Pilate was + such that he was under the power of Caesar, so that he was by no means free to acquit the person accused." On the other hand + the sovereign who has full authority in the commonwealth, can lawfully remit the punishment to a guilty person, provided the + injured party consent to the remission, and that this do not seem detrimental to the public good. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is a place for the judge's mercy in matters that are left to the judge's discretion, because in like matters a good + man is slow to punish as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10). But in matters that are determined in accordance with Divine + or human laws, it is not left to him to show mercy. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God has supreme power of judging, and it concerns Him whatever is done sinfully against anyone. Therefore He is free to remit + the punishment, especially since punishment is due to sin chiefly because it is done against Him. He does not, however, remit + the punishment, except in so far as it becomes His goodness, which is the source of all laws. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the judge were to remit punishment inordinately, he would inflict an injury on the community, for whose good it behooves + ill-deeds to be punished, in order that. men may avoid sin. Hence the text, after appointing the punishment of the seducer, + adds ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q67_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.13.11" target="asv">Dt. 13:11</a>): "That all Israel hearing may fear, and may do no more anything like this." He would also inflict harm on the injured person; + who is compensated by having his honor + restored in the punishment of the man who has injured him. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q67_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q67_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q68.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q66_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q67_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q68" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q67_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q68_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q68-p0.1">OF MATTERS CONCERNING UNJUST ACCUSATION (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q68-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q68-p2"> We must now consider matters pertaining to unjust accusation. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q68-p3"> (1) Whether a man is bound to accuse?</p> + <p id="SS_Q68-p4"> (2) Whether the accusation should be made in writing?</p> + <p id="SS_Q68-p5"> (3) How is an accusation vitiated?</p> + <p id="SS_Q68-p6"> (4) How should those be punished who have accused a man wrongfully?</p> + <div id="SS_Q68_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q68.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q68_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q68_A1-p0.1">Whether a man is bound to accuse?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q68_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man is not bound to accuse. For no man is excused on account of sin from fulfilling a Divine precept, + since he would thus profit by his sin. Yet on account of sin some are disqualified from accusing, such as those who are excommunicate + or of evil fame, or who are accused of grievous crimes and are not yet proved to be innocent [* + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q68_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.5" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:5</a>]. Therefore a man is not bound by a Divine precept to accuse. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every duty depends on charity which is "the end of the precept" [*Can. Definimus, caus. iv, qu. 1; caus. vi, qu. + 1]: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q68_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.8" target="asv">Rom. 13:8</a>): "Owe no man anything, but to love one another." Now that which belongs to charity is a duty that man owes to all both of + high and of low degree, both superiors and inferiors. Since therefore subjects should not accuse their superiors, nor persons + of lower degree, those of a higher + degree, as shown in several chapters (Decret. II, qu. vii), it seems that it is no man's duty to accuse. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no man is bound to act against the fidelity which he owes his friend; because he ought not to do to another what + he would not have others do to him. Now to accuse anyone is sometimes contrary to the fidelity that one owes a friend; for + it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q68_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.11.13" target="asv">Prov. 11:13</a>): "He that walketh deceitfully, revealeth secrets; but he that is faithful, concealeth the thing committed to him by his + friend." Therefore a man is not bound to + accuse. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q68_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.5.1" target="asv">Lev. 5:1</a>): "If any one sin, and hear the voice of one swearing, and is a witness either because he himself hath seen, or is privy + to it: if he do not utter it, he shall bear his iniquity." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q68_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q33_A6.html">Q[33], AA[6]</a>,7; + <a id="SS_Q68_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q67_A3.html"> Q[67], A[3]</a>, ad 2), the difference between denunciation and accusation is that in denunciation we aim at a brother's amendment, whereas + in accusation we intend the punishment of his crime. Now the punishments of this life are sought, not for their own sake, + because this is not the final time of retribution, but in their character of medicine, conducing either to the amendment + of the sinner, or to the good of the commonwealth whose calm is ensured by the punishment of evil-doers. The former of these + is intended in denunciation, as stated, whereas the second regards properly accusation. Hence in the case of a crime that + conduces to the injury of the commonwealth, a man is bound to accusation, provided he can offer sufficient proof, since it + is the accuser's duty to prove: as, for example, when anyone's sin conduces to the bodily or spiritual corruption of the + community. If, however, the sin be not such as to affect the community, or if he cannot offer sufficient proof, a man is not + bound to attempt to accuse, since no man is bound to do what he cannot duly accomplish. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing prevents a man being debarred by sin from doing what men are under an obligation to do: for instance from meriting + eternal life, and from receiving the sacraments of the Church. Nor does a man profit by this: indeed it is a most grievous + fault to fail to do what one is bound to do, since virtuous acts are perfections of man. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Subjects are debarred from accusing their superiors, "if it is not the affection of charity but their own wickedness that + leads them to defame and disparage the conduct of their superiors" [*Append. Grat. ad can. Sunt nonnulli, caus. ii, qu. 7] + ---or again if the subject who wishes to accuse his superior is himself guilty of crime [*Decret. II, qu. vii, can. Praesumunt.]. + Otherwise, provided they be in other respects qualified to accuse, it is lawful + for subjects to accuse their superiors out of charity. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is contrary to fidelity to make known secrets to the injury of a person; but not if they be revealed for the good of the + community, which should always be preferred to a private good. Hence it is unlawful to receive any secret in detriment to + the common good: and yet a thing is scarcely a secret when there are sufficient witnesses to prove it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q68.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q68_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q68_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q68_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q68_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q68_A2-p0.1">Whether it is necessary for the accusation to be made in writing?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q68_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unnecessary for the accusation to be made in writing. For writing was devised as an aid to the human memory + of the past. But an accusation is made in the present. Therefore the accusation needs not to be made in writing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is laid down (Decret. II, qu. viii, can. Per scripta) that "no man may accuse or be accused in his absence." + Now writing seems to be useful in the fact that it is a means of notifying something to one who is absent, as Augustine declares + (De Trin. x, 1). Therefore the accusation need not be in writing: and all the more that the canon declares that "no accusation + in writing should be accepted." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a man's crime is made known by denunciation, even as by accusation. Now writing is unnecessary in denunciation. + Therefore it is seemingly unnecessary in accusation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is laid down (Decret. II, qu. viii, can. Accusatorum) that "the role of accuser must never be sanctioned without the accusation + be in writing." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q68_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q67_A3.html">Q[67], A[3]</a>), when the process in a criminal case goes by way of accusation, the accuser is in the position of a party, so that the judge + stands between the accuser and the accused for the purpose of the trial of justice, wherein it behooves one to proceed on + certainties, as far as possible. Since however verbal utterances are apt to escape one's memory, the judge would be unable + to know for certain what had been + said and with what qualifications, when he comes to pronounce sentence, unless it were drawn up in writing. Hence it has with + reason been established that the accusation, as well as other parts of the judicial procedure, should be put into writing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Words are so many and so various that it is difficult to remember each one. A proof of this is the fact that if a number + of people who have heard the same words be asked what was said, they will not agree in repeating them, even after a short + time. And since a slight difference of words changes the sense, even though the judge's sentence may have to be pronounced + soon afterwards, the certainty of judgment requires that the accusation be drawn up in + writing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Writing is needed not only on account of the absence of the person who has something to notify, or of the person to whom + something is notified, but also on account of the delay of time as stated above (ad 1). Hence when the canon says, "Let no + accusation be accepted in writing" it refers to the sending of an accusation by one who is absent: but it does not exclude + the necessity of writing when the accuser is present. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The denouncer does not bind himself to give proofs: wherefore he is not punished if he is unable to prove. For this reason + writing is unnecessary in a denunciation: and it suffices that the denunciation be made verbally to the Church, who will proceed, + in virtue of her office, to the correction of the brother. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q68_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q68_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q68_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q68_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q68_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q68_A3-p0.1">Whether an accusation is rendered unjust by calumny, collusion or evasion?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q68_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an accusation is not rendered unjust by calumny, collusion or evasion. For according to Decret. II, qu. + iii [*Append. Grat. ad can. Si quem poenituerit.], "calumny consists in falsely charging a person with a crime." Now sometimes + one man falsely accuses another of a crime through ignorance of fact which excuses him. Therefore it seems that an accusation + is not always rendered unjust through being slanderous. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is stated by the same authority that "collusion consists in hiding the truth about a crime." But seemingly this + is not unlawful, because one is not bound to disclose every crime, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q68_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q68_A1.html">(A[1];</a> Q[33], A[7]). Therefore it seems that an accusation is not rendered unjust by collusion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is stated by the same authority that "evasion consists in withdrawing altogether from an accusation." But this + can be done without injustice: for it is stated there also: "If a man repent of having made a wicked accusation and inscription* + in a matter which he cannot prove, and come to an understanding with the innocent party whom he has accused, let them acquit + one another." [*The accuser was bound by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the writ + of accusation. The effect of this endorsement or inscription was that the accuser bound himself, if he failed to prove the + accusation, to suffer the same punishment as the accused would have to suffer if proved guilty.] Therefore evasion does not + render an accusation unjust. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated by the same authority: "The rashness of accusers shows itself in three ways. For they are guilty either of calumny, + or of collusion, or of evasion." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q68_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q68_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, accusation is ordered for the common good which it aims at procuring by means of knowledge of the crime. Now no man ought + to injure a person unjustly, in order to promote the common good. Wherefore a man may sin in two ways when making an accusation: + first through acting unjustly against the accused, by charging him falsely with the commission of a crime, i.e. by calumniating + him; secondly, on the part of the + commonwealth, whose good is intended chiefly in an accusation, when anyone with wicked intent hinders a sin being punished. + This again happens in two ways: first by having recourse to fraud in making the accusation. This belongs to collusion [prevaricatio] + for "he that is guilty of collusion is like one who rides astraddle [varicator], because he helps the other party, and betrays + his own side" [*Append. Grat. ad can. Si quem poenituerit.]. Secondly by withdrawing altogether from the + accusation. This is evasion [tergiversatio] for by desisting from what he had begun he seems to turn his back [tergum vertere]. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A man ought not to proceed to accuse except of what he is quite certain about, wherein ignorance of fact has no place. Yet + he who falsely charges another with a crime is not a calumniator unless he gives utterance to false accusations out of malice. + For it happens sometimes that a man through levity of mind proceeds to accuse someone, because he believes too readily what + he hears, and this pertains to rashness; while, on the other hand sometimes a man + is led to make an accusation on account of an error for which he is not to blame. All these things must be weighed according + to the judge's prudence, lest he should declare a man to have been guilty of calumny, who through levity of mind or an error + for which he is not to be blamed has uttered a false accusation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not everyone who hides the truth about a crime is guilty of collusion, but only he who deceitfully hides the matter about + which he makes the accusation, by collusion with the defendant, dissembling his proofs, and admitting false excuses. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Evasion consists in withdrawing altogether from the accusation, by renouncing the intention of accusing, not anyhow, but + inordinately. There are two ways, however, in which a man may rightly desist from accusing without committing a sin ---in + one way, in the very process of accusation, if it come to his knowledge that the matter of his accusation is false, and then + by mutual consent the accuser and the defendant acquit one another---in another way, if + the accusation be quashed by the sovereign to whom belongs the care of the common good, which it is intended to procure by + the accusation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q68_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q68_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q68_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q68_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q69.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q68_A4-p0.1">Whether an accuser who fails to prove his indictment is bound to the punishment of retaliation?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q68_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the accuser who fails to prove his indictment is not bound to the punishment of retaliation. For sometimes + a man is led by a just error to make an accusation, in which case the judge acquit the accuser, as stated in Decret. II, qu. + iii. [*Append. Grat., ad can. Si quem poenituerit.] Therefore the accuser who fails to prove his indictment is not bound to + the punishment of retaliation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if the punishment of retaliation ought to be inflicted on one who has accused unjustly, this will be on account + of the injury he has done to someone---but not on account of any injury done to the person of the accused, for in that case + the sovereign could not remit this punishment, nor on account of an injury to the commonwealth, because then the accused could + not acquit him. Therefore the punishment of retaliation is not due to one who has failed to + prove his accusation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the one same sin does not deserve a twofold punishment, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q68_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Nah.1.9" target="asv"> Nahum 1:9</a> [*Septuagint version]: "God shall not judge the same thing a second time." But he who fails to prove his accusation, incurs + the punishment due to defamation [*Can. Infames, caus. vi, qu. 1], which punishment even the Pope seemingly cannot remit, + according to a statement of Pope Gelasius [*Callist. I, Epist. ad omn. Gall. episc.]: "Although we are able + to save souls by Penance, we are unable to remove the defamation." Therefore he is not bound to suffer the punishment of retaliation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Pope Hadrian I says (Cap. lii): "He that fails to prove his accusation, must himself suffer the punishment which his accusation + inferred." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q68_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q68_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, in a case, where the procedure is by way of accusation, the accuser holds the position of a party aiming at the punishment + of the accused. Now the duty of the judge is to establish the equality of justice between them: and the equality of justice + requires that a man should himself suffer whatever harm he has intended to be inflicted on another, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q68_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.24" target="asv"> Ex. 21:24, </a> "Eye for eye, tooth + for tooth." Consequently it is just that he who by accusing a man has put him in danger of being punished severely, should + himself suffer a like punishment. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5) justice does not always require counterpassion, because it matters considerably whether + a man injures another voluntarily or not. Voluntary injury deserves punishment, involuntary deserves forgiveness. Hence when + the judge becomes aware that a man has made a false accusation, not with a mind to do harm, but involuntarily through ignorance + or a just error, he does not impose the punishment of retaliation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He who accuses wrongfully sins both against the person of the accused and against the commonwealth; wherefore he is punished + on both counts. This is the meaning of what is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q68_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.19.18" target="asv">Dt. 19:18-20</a>): "And when after most diligent inquisition, they shall find that the false witness hath told a lie against his brother: + then shall render to him as he meant to do to his brother," and this refers to the injury done to the person: and + afterwards, referring to the injury done to the commonwealth, the text continues: "And thou shalt take away the evil out of + the midst of thee, that others hearing may fear, and may not dare to do such things." Specially, however, does he injure the + person of the accused, if he accuse him falsely. Wherefore the accused, if innocent, may condone the injury done to himself, + particularly if the accusation were made not calumniously but out of levity of mind. But if the accuser desist from accusing + an innocent man, through collusion with the latter's adversary, he inflicts an injury on the commonwealth: and this cannot + be condoned by the accused, although it can be remitted by the sovereign, who has charge of the commonwealth. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The accuser deserves the punishment of retaliation in compensation for the harm he attempts to inflict on his neighbor: but + the punishment of disgrace is due to him for his wickedness in accusing another man calumniously. Sometimes the sovereign + remits the punishment, and not the disgrace, and sometimes he removes the disgrace also: wherefore the Pope also can remove + this disgrace. When Pope Gelasius says: "We cannot remove the disgrace," he may mean + either the disgrace attaching to the deed [infamia facti], or that sometimes it is not expedient to remove it, or again he + may be referring to the disgrace inflicted by the civil judge, as Gratian states (Callist. I, Epist. ad omn. Gall. episc.). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q68_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q68_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q69.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q67_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q68_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q69" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q68_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q69_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q69-p0.1">OF SINS COMMITTED AGAINST JUSTICE ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q69-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q69-p2"> We must now consider those sins which are committed against justice on the part of the defendant. Under this head there are + four points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69-p3"> (1) Whether it is a mortal sin to deny the truth which would lead to one's condemnation?</p> + <p id="SS_Q69-p4"> (2) Whether it is lawful to defend oneself with calumnies?</p> + <p id="SS_Q69-p5"> (3) Whether it is lawful to escape condemnation by appealing?</p> + <p id="SS_Q69-p6"> (4) Whether it is lawful for one who has been condemned to defend himself by violence if he be able to do so?</p> + <div id="SS_Q69_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q69.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q69_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q69_A1-p0.1">Whether one can, without a mortal sin, deny the truth which would lead to one's condemnation?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q69_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem one can, without a mortal sin, deny the truth which would lead to one's condemnation. For Chrysostom says (Hom. + xxxi super Ep. ad Heb.): "I do not say that you should lay bare your guilt publicly, nor accuse yourself before others." Now + if the accused were to confess the truth in court, he would lay bare his guilt and be his own accuser. Therefore he is not + bound to tell the truth: and so he does not sin mortally if he tell a lie in court. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as it is an officious lie when one tells a lie in order to rescue another man from death, so is it an officious + lie when one tells a lie in order to free oneself from death, since one is more bound towards oneself than towards another. + Now an officious lie is considered not a mortal but a venial sin. Therefore if the accused denies the truth in court, in order + to escape death, he does not sin mortally. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q69_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q24_A12.html">Q[24], A[12]</a>). But that the accused lie by denying himself to be guilty of the crime laid to his charge is not contrary to charity, neither + as regards the love we owe God, nor as to the love due to our neighbor. Therefore such a lie is not a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is opposed to the glory of God is a mortal sin, because we are bound by precept to "do all to the glory of God" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q69_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:31</a>). Now it is to the glory of God that the accused confess that which is alleged against him, as appears from the words of + Josue to Achan, "My son, give glory to the Lord God of Israel, and confess and tell me what thou hast done, hide it not" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q69_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Josh.7.19" target="asv">Joshua 7:19</a>). Therefore it is a mortal + sin to lie in order to cover one's guilt. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Whoever acts against the due order of justice, sins mortally, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q69_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q59_A4.html">Q[59], A[4]</a>). Now it belongs to the order of justice that a man should obey his superior in those matters to which the rights of his + authority extend. Again, the judge, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q69_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q67_A1.html">Q[67] , A[1]</a>), is the superior in relation to the person whom he judges. Therefore the accused is in duty bound to tell the judge the + truth which + the latter exacts from him according to the form of law. Hence if he refuse to tell the truth which he is under obligation + to tell, or if he mendaciously deny it, he sins mortally. If, on the other hand, the judge asks of him that which he cannot + ask in accordance with the order of justice, the accused is not bound to satisfy him, and he may lawfully escape by appealing + or otherwise: but it is not lawful for him to lie. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When a man is examined by the judge according to the order of justice, he does not lay bare his own guilt, but his guilt + is unmasked by another, since the obligation of answering is imposed on him by one whom he is bound to obey. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To lie, with injury to another person, in order to rescue a man from death is not a purely officious lie, for it has an admixture + of the pernicious lie: and when a man lies in court in order to exculpate himself, he does an injury to one whom he is bound + to obey, since he refuses him his due, namely an avowal of the truth. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He who lies in court by denying his guilt, acts both against the love of God to whom judgment belongs, and against the love + of his neighbor, and this not only as regards the judge, to whom he refuses his due, but also as regards his accuser, who + is punished if he fail to prove his accusation. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q69_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.140.4" target="asv">Ps. 140:4</a>): "Incline not my heart to evil words, to make excuses in sins": on which words a gloss says: "Shameless men + are wont by lying to deny their guilt when they have been found out." And Gregory in expounding + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q69_A1-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Job.31.33" target="asv"> Job 31:33, </a> "If as a man I have hid my sin," says (Moral. xxii, 15): "It is a common vice of mankind to sin in secret, by lying to hide + the sin that has been committed, and when convicted to aggravate the sin by defending oneself." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q69.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q69_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q69_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q69_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q69_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q69_A2-p0.1">Whether it is lawful for the accused to defend himself with calumnies?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q69_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem lawful for the accused to defend himself with calumnies. Because, according to civil law (Cod. II, iv, De transact. + 18), when a man is on trial for his life it is lawful for him to bribe his adversary. Now this is done chiefly by defending + oneself with calumnies. Therefore the accused who is on trial for his life does not sin if he defend himself with calumnies. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an accuser who is guilty of collusion with the accused, is punishable by law (Decret. II, qu. iii, can. Si quem + poenit.). Yet no punishment is imposed on the accused for collusion with the accuser. Therefore it would seem lawful for the + accused to defend himself with calumnies. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q69_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.14.16" target="asv">Prov. 14:16</a>): "A wise man feareth and declineth from evil, the fool leapeth over and is confident." Now what is done wisely is no sin. + Therefore no matter how a man declines from evil, he does not sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> In criminal cases an oath has to be taken against calumnious allegations (Extra, De juramento calumniae, cap. Inhaerentes): + and this would not be the case if it were lawful to defend oneself with calumnies. Therefore it is not lawful for the accused + to defend himself with calumnies. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is one thing to withhold the truth, and another to utter a falsehood. The former is lawful sometimes, for a man is not + bound to divulge all truth, but only such as the judge can and must require of him according to the order of justice; as, + for instance, when the accused is already disgraced through the commission of some crime, or certain indications of his guilt + have already been discovered, or again when his guilt is already more or less proven. On the + other hand it is never lawful to make a false declaration. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A2-p7"> As regards what he may do lawfully, a man can employ either lawful means, and such as are adapted to the end in view, which + belongs to prudence; or he can use unlawful means, unsuitable to the proposed end, and this belongs to craftiness, which is + exercised by fraud and guile, as shown above ( + <a id="SS_Q69_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q55_A3.html">Q[55], AA[3]</a>, seqq.). His conduct in the former case is praiseworthy, in the latter sinful. Accordingly it is lawful for the accused to + defend himself by + withholding the truth that he is not bound to avow, by suitable means, for instance by not answering such questions as he + is not bound to answer. This is not to defend himself with calumnies, but to escape prudently. But it is unlawful for him, + either to utter a falsehood, or to withhold a truth that he is bound to avow, or to employ guile or fraud, because fraud and + guile have the force of a lie, and so to use them would be to defend oneself with calumnies. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Human laws leave many things unpunished, which according to the Divine judgment are sins, as, for example, simple fornication; + because human law does not exact perfect virtue from man, for such virtue belongs to few and cannot be found in so great a + number of people as human law has to direct. That a man is sometimes unwilling to commit a sin in order to escape from the + death of the body, the danger of which threatens the accused who is on trial for + his life, is an act of perfect virtue, since "death is the most fearful of all temporal things" (Ethic. iii, 6). Wherefore + if the accused, who is on trial for his life, bribes his adversary, he sins indeed by inducing him to do what is unlawful, + yet the civil law does not punish this sin, and in this sense it is said to be lawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If the accuser is guilty of collusion with the accused and the latter is guilty, he incurs punishment, and so it is evident + that he sins. Wherefore, since it is a sin to induce a man to sin, or to take part in a sin in any way---for the Apostle says + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q69_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.32" target="asv">Rom. 1:32</a>), that "they . . . are worthy of death . . . that consent" to those who sin---it is evident that the accused also sins if + he is guilty of collusion with his adversary. + Nevertheless according to human laws no punishment is inflicted on him, for the reason given above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The wise man hides himself not by slandering others but by exercising prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q69_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q69_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q69_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q69_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q69_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q69_A3-p0.1">Whether it is lawful for the accused to escape judgment by appealing?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q69_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unlawful for the accused to escape judgment by appealing. The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q69_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1</a>): "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers." Now the accused by appealing refuses to be subject to a higher power, + viz. the judge. Therefore he commits a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, ordinary authority is more binding than that which we choose for ourselves. Now according to the Decretals (II, + qu. vi, cap. A judicibus) it is unlawful to appeal from the judges chosen by common consent. Much less therefore is it lawful + to appeal from ordinary judges. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is lawful once is always lawful. But it is not lawful to appeal after the tenth day [*Can. Anteriorum, + caus. ii, qu. 6], nor a third time on the same point [*Can. Si autem, caus. ii, qu. 6]. Therefore it would seem that an appeal + is unlawful in itself. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Paul appealed to Caesar ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q69_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.25" target="asv">Acts 25</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There are two motives for which a man appeals. First through confidence in the justice of his cause, seeing that he is unjustly + oppressed by the judge, and then it is lawful for him to appeal, because this is a prudent means of escape. Hence it is laid + down (Decret. II, qu. vi, can. Omnis oppressus): "All those who are oppressed are free, if they so wish, to appeal to the + judgment of the priests, and no man may stand in their way." Secondly, a man appeals in + order to cause a delay, lest a just sentence be pronounced against him. This is to defend oneself calumniously, and is unlawful + as stated above + <a id="SS_Q69_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q69_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. For he inflicts an injury both on the judge, whom he hinders in the exercise of his office, and on his adversary, whose + justice he disturbs as far as he is able. Hence it is laid down (II, qu. vi, can. Omnino puniendus): "Without doubt a man + should be punished if his appeal be declared unjust." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A man should submit to the lower authority in so far as the latter observes the order of the higher authority. If the lower + authority departs from the order of the higher, we ought not to submit to it, for instance "if the proconsul order one thing + and the emperor another," according to a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q69_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.2" target="asv"> Rom. 13:2.</a> Now when a judge oppresses anyone unjustly, in this respect he departs from the order of the higher authority, whereby he + is + obliged to judge justly. Hence it is lawful for a man who is oppressed unjustly, to have recourse to the authority of the + higher power, by appealing either before or after sentence has been pronounced. And since it is to be presumed that there + is no rectitude where true faith is lacking, it is unlawful for a Catholic to appeal to an unbelieving judge, according to + Decretals II, qu. vi, can. Catholicus: "The Catholic who appeals to the decision of a judge of another faith shall be + excommunicated, whether his case be just or unjust." Hence the Apostle also rebuked those who went to law before unbelievers + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q69_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.6" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:6</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is due to a man's own fault or neglect that, of his own accord, he submits to the judgment of one in whose justice he + has no confidence. Moreover it would seem to point to levity of mind for a man not to abide by what he has once approved of. + Hence it is with reason that the law refuses us the faculty of appealing from the decision of judges of our own choice, who + have no power save by virtue of the consent of the litigants. On the other hand the + authority of an ordinary judge depends, not on the consent of those who are subject to his judgment, but on the authority + of the king or prince who appointed him. Hence, as a remedy against his unjust oppression, the law allows one to have recourse + to appeal, so that even if the judge be at the same time ordinary and chosen by the litigants, it is lawful to appeal from + his decision, since seemingly his ordinary authority occasioned his being chosen as arbitrator. Nor is it to be imputed as + a + fault to the man who consented to his being arbitrator, without adverting to the fact that he was appointed ordinary judge + by the prince. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The equity of the law so guards the interests of the one party that the other is not oppressed. Thus it allows ten days for + appeal to be made, this being considered sufficient time for deliberating on the expediency of an appeal. If on the other + hand there were no fixed time limit for appealing, the certainty of judgment would ever be in suspense, so that the other + party would suffer an injury. The reason why it is not allowed to appeal a third time + on the same point, is that it is not probable that the judges would fail to judge justly so many times. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q69_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q69_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q69_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q69_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q70.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q69_A4-p0.1">Whether a man who is condemned to death may lawfully defend himself if he can?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q69_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man who is condemned to death may lawfully defend himself if he can. For it is always lawful to do that + to which nature inclines us, as being of natural right, so to speak. Now, to resist corruption is an inclination of nature + not only in men and animals but also in things devoid of sense. Therefore if he can do so, the accused, after condemnation, + may lawfully resist being put to death. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as a man, by resistance, escapes the death to which he has been condemned, so does he by flight. Now it is + lawful seemingly to escape death by flight, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q69_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.9.18" target="asv">Ecclus. 9:18</a>, "Keep thee far from the man that hath power to kill [and not to quicken]" [*The words in the brackets are not in the Vulgate]. + Therefore it is also lawful for the accused to resist. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q69_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.24.11" target="asv">Prov. 24:11</a>): "Deliver them that are led to death: and those that are drawn to death forbear not to deliver." Now a man is under greater + obligation to himself than to another. Therefore it is lawful for a condemned man to defend himself from being put to death. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q69_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.2" target="asv">Rom. 13:2</a>): "He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist, purchase to themselves damnation." + Now a condemned man, by defending himself, resists the power in the point of its being ordained by God "for the punishment + of evil-doers, and for the praise of the good" [* + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q69_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iPet.2.14" target="asv">1 Pet. 2:14</a>]. Therefore he sins in defending himself. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A man may be condemned to death in two ways. First justly, and then it is not lawful for the condemned to defend himself, + because it is lawful for the judge to combat his resistance by force, so that on his part the fight is unjust, and consequently + without any doubt he sins. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A4-p7"> Secondly a man is condemned unjustly: and such a sentence is like the violence of robbers, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q69_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.22.21" target="asv"> Ezech. 22:21, </a> "Her princes in the midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey to shed blood." Wherefore even as it is lawful to resist + robbers, so is it lawful, in a like case, to resist wicked princes; except perhaps in order to avoid scandal, whence some + grave disturbance might be feared to arise. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reason was given to man that he might ensue those things to which his nature inclines, not in all cases, but in accordance + with the order of reason. Hence not all self-defense is lawful, but only such as is accomplished with due moderation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a man is condemned to death, he has not to kill himself, but to suffer death: wherefore he is not bound to do anything + from which death would result, such as to stay in the place whence he would be led to execution. But he may not resist those + who lead him to death, in order that he may not suffer what is just for him to suffer. Even so, if a man were condemned to + die of hunger, he does not sin if he partakes of food brought to him secretly, + because to refrain from taking it would be to kill himself. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This saying of the wise man does not direct that one should deliver a man from death in opposition to the order of justice: + wherefore neither should a man deliver himself from death by resisting against justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q69_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q69_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q70.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q68_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q69_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q70" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q69_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q70_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q70-p0.1">OF INJUSTICE WITH REGARD TO THE PERSON OF THE WITNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q70-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q70-p2"> We must now consider injustice with regard to the person of the witness. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q70-p3"> (1) Whether a man is bound to give evidence?</p> + <p id="SS_Q70-p4"> (2) Whether the evidence of two or three witnesses suffices?</p> + <p id="SS_Q70-p5"> (3) Whether a man's evidence may be rejected without any fault on his part?</p> + <p id="SS_Q70-p6"> (4) Whether it is a mortal sin to bear false witness?</p> + <div id="SS_Q70_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q70.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q70_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q70_A1-p0.1">Whether a man is bound to give evidence?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q70_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man is not bound to give evidence. Augustine say (QQ. + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q70_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv"> Gn. 1:26</a>) [*Cf. Contra Faust. xxii, 33,34], that when Abraham said of his wife ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q70_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.20.2" target="asv">Gn. 20:2</a>), "She is my sister," he wished the truth to be concealed and not a lie be told. Now, by hiding the truth a man abstains + from giving evidence. Therefore a man is not bound to give evidence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no man is bound to act deceitfully. Now it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q70_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.11.13" target="asv">Prov. 11:13</a>): "He that walketh deceitfully revealeth secrets, but he that is faithful concealeth the thing committed to him by his friend." + Therefore a man is not always bound to give evidence, especially on matters committed to him as a secret by a friend. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, clerics and priests, more than others, are bound to those things that are necessary for salvation. Yet clerics and + priests are forbidden to give evidence when a man is on trial for his life. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation to + give evidence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine [*Can. Quisquis, caus. xi, qu. 3, cap. Falsidicus; cf. Isidore, Sentent. iii, 55] says: "Both he who conceals the + truth and he who tells a lie are guilty, the former because he is unwilling to do good, the latter because he desires to hurt." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We must make a distinction in the matter of giving evidence: because sometimes a certain man's evidence is necessary, and + sometimes not. If the necessary evidence is that of a man subject to a superior whom, in matters pertaining to justice, he + is bound to obey, without doubt he is bound to give evidence on those points which are required of him in accordance with + the order of justice, for instance on manifest things or when ill-report has preceded. If + however he is required to give evidence on other points, for instance secret matters, and those of which no ill-report has + preceded, he is not bound to give evidence. On the other hand, if his evidence be required by authority of a superior whom + he is bound to obey, we must make a distinction: because if his evidence is required in order to deliver a man from an unjust + death or any other penalty, or from false defamation, or some loss, in such cases he is bound to give evidence. Even if his + evidence is not demanded, he is bound to do what he can to declare the truth to someone who may profit thereby. For it is + written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q70_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.81.4" target="asv">Ps. 81:4</a>): "Rescue the poor, and deliver the needy from the hand of the sinner"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q70_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.24.11" target="asv">Prov. 24:11</a>): "Deliver them that are led to death"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q70_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.32" target="asv">Rom. 1:32</a>): "They are worthy of death, not only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do them," on which words + a gloss says: "To be silent + when one can disprove is to consent." In matters pertaining to a man's condemnation, one is not bound to give evidence, except + when one is constrained by a superior in accordance with the order of justice; since if the truth of such a matter be concealed, + no particular injury is inflicted on anyone. Or, if some danger threatens the accuser, it matters not since he risked the + danger of his own accord: whereas it is different with the accused, who incurs the danger against his will. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of concealment of the truth in a case when a man is not compelled by his superior's authority to declare + the truth, and when such concealment is not specially injurious to any person. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man should by no means give evidence on matters secretly committed to him in confession, because he knows such things, + not as man but as God's minister: and the sacrament is more binding than any human precept. But as regards matters committed + to man in some other way under secrecy, we must make a distinction. Sometimes they are of such a nature that one is bound + to make them known as soon as they come to our knowledge, for instance if they conduce + to the spiritual or corporal corruption of the community, or to some grave personal injury, in short any like matter that + a man is bound to make known either by giving evidence or by denouncing it. Against such a duty a man cannot be obliged to + act on the plea that the matter is committed to him under secrecy, for he would break the faith he owes to another. On the + other hand sometimes they are such as one is not bound to make known, so that one may be under obligation not to do so on + account + of their being committed to one under secrecy. In such a case one is by no means bound to make them known, even if the superior + should command; because to keep faith is of natural right, and a man cannot be commanded to do what is contrary to natural + right. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is unbecoming for ministers of the altar to slay a man or to cooperate in his slaying, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q70_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q64_A4.html">Q[64], A[4]</a>); hence according to the order of justice they cannot be compelled to give evidence when a man is on trial for his life. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q70.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q70_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q70_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q70_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q70_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q70_A2-p0.1">Whether the evidence of two or three persons suffices?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q70_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the evidence of two or three persons is not sufficient. For judgment requires certitude. Now certitude + of the truth is not obtained by the assertions of two or three witnesses, for we read that Naboth was unjustly condemned on + the evidence of two witnesses ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q70_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 21</a>). Therefore the evidence of two or three witnesses does not suffice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in order for evidence to be credible it must agree. But frequently the evidence of two or three disagrees in some + point. Therefore it is of no use for proving the truth in court. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is laid down (Decret. II, qu. iv, can. Praesul.): "A bishop shall not be condemned save on the evidence of seventy-two + witnesses; nor a cardinal priest of the Roman Church, unless there be sixty-four witnesses. Nor a cardinal deacon of the Roman + Church, unless there be twenty-seven witnesses; nor a subdeacon, an acolyte, an exorcist, a reader or a doorkeeper without + seven witnesses." Now the sin of one who is of higher dignity is more grievous, and + consequently should be treated more severely. Therefore neither is the evidence of two or three witnesses sufficient for the + condemnation of other persons. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q70_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.17.6" target="asv">Dt. 17:6</a>): "By the mouth of two or three witnesses shall he die that is to be slain," and further on ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q70_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.19.15" target="asv">Dt. 19:15</a>): "In the mouth of two or three witnesses every word shall stand." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3), "we must not expect to find certitude equally in every matter." For in human + acts, on which judgments are passed and evidence required, it is impossible to have demonstrative certitude, because they + a about things contingent and variable. Hence the certitude of probability suffices, such as may reach the truth in the greater + number, cases, although it fail in the minority. No it is probable that the assertion of + sever witnesses contains the truth rather than the assertion of one: and since the accused is the only one who denies, while + several witness affirm the same as the prosecutor, it is reasonably established both by Divine and by human law, that the + assertion of several witnesses should be upheld. Now all multitude is comprised of three elements, the beginning, the middle + and the end. Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (De Coelo i, 1), "we reckon 'all' and 'whole' to consist of three parts." + Now we have a triple voucher when two agree with the prosecutor: hence two witnesses are required; or for the sake of greater + certitude three, which is the perfect number. Wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q70_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.4.12" target="asv">Eccles. 4:12</a>): "A threefold cord is not easily broken": and Augustine, commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q70_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#John.8.17" target="asv"> Jn. 8:17, </a> "The testimony of two men is true," says (Tract. xxxvi) that "there is here a mystery by which we are given to understand + that Trinity wherein is perpetual stability + of truth." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> No matter how great a number of witnesses may be determined, the evidence might sometimes be unjust, since is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q70_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.2" target="asv">Ex. 23:2</a>): "Thou shalt not follow the multitude to do evil." And yet the fact that in so many it is not possible to have certitude + without fear of error, is no reason why we should reject the certitude which can probably be had through two or three witnesses, + as stated above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If the witnesses disagree certain principal circumstances which change the substance of the fact, for instance in time, place, + or persons, which are chiefly in question, their evidence is of no weight, because if they disagree in such things, each one + would seem to be giving distinct evidence and to be speaking of different facts. For instance, one say that a certain thing + happened at such and such a time or place, while another says it happened at + another time or place, they seem not to be speaking of the same event. The evidence is not weakened if one witness says that + he does not remember, while the other attests to a determinate time or place And if on such points as these the witness for + prosecution and defense disagree altogether, and if they be equal in number on either side, and of equal standing, the accused + should have the benefit of the doubt, because the judge ought to be more inclined to acquit than to condemn, except perhaps + in favorable suits, such as a pleading for liberty and the like. If, however, the witnesses for the same side disagree, the + judge ought to use his own discretion in discerning which side to favor, by considering either the number of witnesses, or + their standing, or the favorableness of the suit, or the nature of the business and of the evidence + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A2-p9"> Much more ought the evidence of one witness to be rejected if he contradict himself when questioned about what he has seen + and about what he knows; not, however, if he contradict himself when questioned about matters of opinion and report, since + he may be moved to answer differently according to the different things he has seen and heard. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A2-p10"> On the other hand if there be discrepancy of evidence in circumstances not touching the substance of the fact, for instance, + whether the weather were cloudy or fine, whether the house were painted or not, or such like matters, such discrepancy does + not weaken the evidence, because men are not wont to take much notice of such things, wherefore they easily forget them. Indeed, + a discrepancy of this kind renders the evidence more credible, as Chrysostom states (Hom. i in Matth.), + because if the witnesses agreed in every point, even in the minutest of details, they would seem to have conspired together + to say the same thing: but this must be left to the prudent discernment of the judge. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This passage refers specially to the bishops, priests, deacons and clerics of the Roman Church, on account of its dignity: + and this for three reasons. First because in that Church those men ought to be promoted whose sanctity makes their evidence + of more weight than that of many witnesses. Secondly, because those who have to judge other men, often have many opponents + on account of their justice, wherefore those who give evidence against them should + not be believed indiscriminately, unless they be very numerous. Thirdly, because the condemnation of any one of them would + detract in public opinion from the dignity and authority of that Church, a result which would be more fraught with danger + than if one were to tolerate a sinner in that same Church, unless he were very notorious and manifest, so that a grave scandal + would arise if he were tolerated. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q70_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q70_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q70_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q70_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q70_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q70_A3-p0.1">Whether a man's evidence can be rejected without any fault of his?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q70_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man's evidence ought not to be rejected except on account of some fault. For it a penalty on some that + their evidence is inadmissible, as in the case of those who are branded with infamy. Now a penalty must not be inflicted save + for a fault. Therefore it would seem that no man's evidence ought to be rejected save on account of a fault. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Good is to be presumed of every one, unless the contrary appear" [*Cap. Dudum, de Praesumpt.]. Now it pertains + to a man's goodness that he should give true evidence. Since therefore there can be no proof of the contrary, unless there + be some fault of his, it would seem that no man's evidence should be rejected save for some fault. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no man is rendered unfit for things necessary for salvation except by some sin. But it is necessary for salvation + to give true evidence, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q70_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q70_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore no man should be excluded from giving evidence save for some fault. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Regist. xiii, 44): "As to the bishop who is said to have been accused by his servants, you are to know that + they should by no means have been heard": which words are embodied in the Decretals II, qu. 1, can. Imprimis. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q70_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q70_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, the authority of evidence is not infallible but probable; and consequently the evidence for one side is weakened by whatever + strengthens the probability of the other. Now the reliability of a person's evidence is weakened, sometimes indeed on account + of some fault of his, as in the case of unbelievers and persons of evil repute, as well as those who are guilty of a public + crime and who are not allowed even to + accuse; sometimes, without any fault on his part, and this owing either to a defect in the reason, as in the case of children, + imbeciles and women, or to personal feeling, as in the case of enemies, or persons united by family or household ties, or + again owing to some external condition, as in the case of poor people, slaves, and those who are under authority, concerning + whom it is to be presumed that they might easily be induced to give evidence against the truth. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A3-p7"> Thus it is manifest that a person's evidence may be rejected either with or without some fault of his.</p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If a person is disqualified from giving evidence this is done as a precaution against false evidence rather than as a punishment. + Hence the argument does not prove. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good is to be presumed of everyone unless the contrary appear, provided this does not threaten injury to another: because, + in that case, one ought to be careful not to believe everyone readily, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q70_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.1" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:1</a>: "Believe not every spirit." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To give evidence is necessary for salvation, provided the witness be competent, and the order of justice observed. Hence + nothing hinders certain persons being excused from giving evidence, if they be considered unfit according to law. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q70_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q70_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q70_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q70_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q71.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q70_A4-p0.1">Whether it is always a mortal sin to give false evidence?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q70_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not always a mortal sin to give false evidence. For a person may happen to give false evidence, + through ignorance of fact. Now such ignorance excuses from mortal sin. Therefore the giving of false evidence is not always + a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a lie that benefits someone and hurts no man is officious, and this is not a mortal sin. Now sometimes a lie of + this kind occurs in false evidence, as when a person gives false evidence in order to save a man from death, or from an unjust + sentence which threatens him through other false witnesses or a perverse judge. Therefore in such cases it is not a mortal + sin to give false evidence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a witness is required to take an oath in order that he may fear to commit a mortal sin of perjury. But this would + not be necessary, if it were already a mortal sin to give false evidence. Therefore the giving of false evidence is not always + mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q70_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.19.5" target="asv">Prov. 19:5</a>): "A false witness shall not be unpunished." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> False evidence has a threefold deformity. The first is owing to perjury, since witnesses are admitted only on oath and on + this count it is always a mortal sin. Secondly, owing to the violation of justice, and on this account it is a mortal sin + generically, even as any kind of injustice. Hence the prohibition of false evidence by the precept of the decalogue is expressed + in this form when it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q70_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.16" target="asv">Ex. 20:16</a>), "Thou shalt not bear false + witness against thy neighbor." For one does nothing against a man by preventing him from doing someone an injury, but only + by taking away his justice. Thirdly, owing to the falsehood itself, by reason of which every lie is a sin: on this account, + the giving of false evidence is not always a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In giving evidence a man ought not to affirm as certain, as though he knew it, that about which he is not certain and he + should confess his doubt in doubtful terms, and that which he is certain about, in terms of certainty. Owing however to the + frailty of the human memory, a man sometimes thinks he is certain about something that is not true; and then if after thinking + over the matter with due care he deems himself certain about that false thing, he + does not sin mortally if he asserts it, because the evidence which he gives is not directly an intentionally, but accidentally + contrary to what he intends. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An unjust judgment is not a judgment, wherefore the false evidence given in an unjust judgment, in order to prevent injustice + is not a mortal sin by virtue of the judgment, but only by reason of the oath violated. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Men abhor chiefly those sin that are against God, as being most grievous and among them is perjury: whereas they do not abhor + so much sins against their neighbor. Consequently, for the greater certitude of evidence, the witness is required to take + a oath. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q70_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q70_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q71.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q69_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q70_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q71" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q70_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q71_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q71-p0.1">OF INJUSTICE IN JUDGMENT ON THE PART OF COUNSEL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q71-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q71-p2"> We must now consider the injustice which takes place in judgment on the part of counsel, and under this head there are four + points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71-p3"> (1) Whether an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor?</p> + <p id="SS_Q71-p4"> (2) Whether certain persons should be prohibited from exercising the office of advocate?</p> + <p id="SS_Q71-p5"> (3) Whether an advocate sins by defending an unjust cause?</p> + <p id="SS_Q71-p6"> (4) Whether he sins if he accept a fee for defending a suit?</p> + <div id="SS_Q71_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q71.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q71_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q71_A1-p0.1">Whether an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q71_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q71_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.5" target="asv">Ex. 23:5</a>): "If thou see the ass of him that hateth thee lie underneath his burden, thou shalt not pass by, but shall lift him up with + him." Now no less a danger threatens the poor man whose suit is being unjustly prejudiced, than if his ass were to lie underneath + its burden. Therefore an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says in a homily (ix in Evang.): "Let him that hath understanding beware lest he withhold his knowledge; + let him that hath abundance of wealth watch lest he slacken his merciful bounty; let him who is a servant to art share his + skill with his neighbor; let him who has an opportunity of speaking with the wealthy plead the cause of the poor: for the + slightest gift you have received will be reputed a talent." Now every man is bound, not to hide + but faithfully to dispense the talent committed to him; as evidenced by the punishment inflicted on the servant who hid his + talent ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q71_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.30" target="asv">Mat. 25:30</a>). Therefore an advocate is bound to plead for the poor. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the precept about performing works of mercy, being affirmative, is binding according to time and place, and this + is chiefly in cases of need. Now it seems to be a case of need when the suit of a poor man is being prejudiced. Therefore + it seems that in such a case an advocate is bound to defend the poor man's suit. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> He that lacks food is no less in need than he that lacks an advocate. Yet he that is able to give food is not always bound + to feed the needy. Therefore neither is an advocate always bound to defend the suits of the poor. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since defense of the poor man's suit belongs to the works of mercy, the answer to this inquiry is the same as the one given + above with regard to the other works of mercy ( + <a id="SS_Q71_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q32_A5.html">Q[32], AA[5]</a>,9). Now no man is sufficient to bestow a work of mercy on all those who need it. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Doctr. + Christ. i, 28), "since one cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by reason of place, time, or any + other + circumstance, by a kind of chance are more closely united to us." He says "by reason of place," because one is not bound to + search throughout the world for the needy that one may succor them; and it suffices to do works of mercy to those one meets + with. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q71_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.4" target="asv">Ex. 23:4</a>): "If thou meet thy enemy's ass going astray, bring it back to him." He says also "by reason of time," because one is not + bound to provide for the future needs of others, and it suffices to + succor present needs. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q71_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.17" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:17</a>): "He that . . . shall see his brother in need, and shall put up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of God abide in + him?" Lastly he says, "or any other circumstance," because one ought to show kindness to those especially who are by any tie + whatever united to us, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q71_A1-p6.4" href="./asv.html#iTim.5.8" target="asv">1 Tim. 5:8, </a> "If any man have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith and is + worse than an infidel." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A1-p7"> It may happen however that these circumstances concur, and then we have to consider whether this particular man stands in + such a need that it is not easy to see how he can be succored otherwise, and then one is bound to bestow the work of mercy + on him. If, however, it is easy to see how he can be otherwise succored, either by himself, or by some other person still + more closely united to him, or in a better position to help him, one is not bound so strictly to help the one in + need that it would be a sin not to do so: although it would be praiseworthy to do so where one is not bound to. Therefore + an advocate is not always bound to defend the suits of the poor, but only when the aforesaid circumstances concur, else he + would have to put aside all other business, and occupy himself entirely in defending the suits of poor people. The same applies + to a physician with regard to attendance on the sick. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> So long as the ass lies under the burden, there is no means of help in this case, unless those who are passing along come + to the man's aid, and therefore they are bound to help. But they would not be so bound if help were possible from another + quarter. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man is bound to make good use of the talent bestowed on him, according to the opportunities afforded by time, place, and + other circumstances, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not every need is such that it is one's duty to remedy it, but only such as we have stated above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q71.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q71_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q71_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q71_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q71_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q71_A2-p0.1">Whether it is fitting that the law should debar certain persons from the office of advocate?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q71_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unfitting for the law to debar certain persons from the office of advocate. For no man should be debarred from + doing works of mercy. Now it belongs to the works of mercy to defend a man's suit, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q71_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q71_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore no man should be debarred from this office. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contrary causes have not, seemingly, the same effect. Now to be busy with Divine things and to be busy about sin + are contrary to one another. Therefore it is unfitting that some should be debarred from the office of advocate, on account + of religion, as monks and clerics, while others are debarred on account of sin, as persons of ill-repute and heretics. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a man should love his neighbor as himself. Now it is a duty of love for an advocate to plead a person's cause. Therefore + it is unfitting that certain persons should be debarred from pleading the cause of others, while they are allowed to advocate + their own cause. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> According to Decretals III, qu. vii, can. Infames, many persons are debarred from the office of advocate. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In two ways a person is debarred from performing a certain act: first because it is impossible to him, secondly because it + is unbecoming to him: but, whereas the man to whom a certain act is impossible, is absolutely debarred from performing it, + he to whom an act is unbecoming is not debarred altogether, since necessity may do away with its unbecomingness. Accordingly + some are debarred from the office of advocate because it is impossible to them through lack + of sense---either interior, as in the case of madmen and minors---or exterior, as in the case of the deaf and dumb. For an + advocate needs to have both interior skill so that he may be able to prove the justice of the cause he defends, and also speech + and hearing, that he may speak and hear what is said to him. Consequently those who are defective in these points, are altogether + debarred from being advocates either in their own or in another's cause. The becomingness of exercising this office is + removed in two ways. First, through a man being engaged in higher things. Wherefore it is unfitting that monks or priests + should be advocates in any cause whatever, or that clerics should plead in a secular court, because such persons are engaged + in Divine things. Secondly, on account of some personal defect, either of body (for instance a blind man whose attendance + in a court of justice would be unbecoming) or of soul, for it ill becomes one who has disdained to be just himself, to plead + for + the justice of another. Wherefore it is unbecoming that persons of ill repute, unbelievers, and those who have been convicted + of grievous crimes should be advocates. Nevertheless this unbecomingness is outweighed by necessity: and for this reason such + persons can plead either their own cause or that of persons closely connected with them. Moreover, clerics can be advocates + in the cause of their own church, and monks in the cause of their own monastery, if the abbot direct them to do so. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Certain persons are sometimes debarred by unbecomingness, and others by inability from performing works of mercy: for not + all the works of mercy are becoming to all persons: thus it ill becomes a fool to give counsel, or the ignorant to teach. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as virtue is destroyed by "too much" and "too little," so does a person become incompetent by "more" and "less." For + this reason some, like religious and clerics, are debarred from pleading in causes, because they are above such an office; + and others because they are less than competent to exercise it, such as persons of ill-repute and unbelievers. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The necessity of pleading the causes of others is not so pressing as the necessity of pleading one's own cause, because others + are able to help themselves otherwise: hence the comparison fails. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q71_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q71_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q71_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q71_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q71_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q71_A3-p0.1">Whether an advocate sins by defending an unjust cause?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q71_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an advocate does not sin by defending an unjust cause. For just as a physician proves his skill by healing + a desperate disease, so does an advocate prove his skill, if he can defend an unjust cause. Now a physician is praised if + he heals a desperate malady. Therefore an advocate also commits no sin, but ought to be praised, if he defends an unjust cause. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is always lawful to desist from committing a sin. Yet an advocate is punished if he throws up his brief (Decret. + II, qu. iii, can. Si quem poenit.). Therefore an advocate does not sin by defending an unjust cause, when once he has undertaken + its defense. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it would seem to be a greater sin for an advocate to use unjust means in defense of a just cause (e.g. by producing + false witnesses, or alleging false laws), than to defend an unjust cause, since the former is a sin against the form, the + latter against the matter of justice. Yet it is seemingly lawful for an advocate to make use of such underhand means, even + as it is lawful for a soldier to lay ambushes in a battle. Therefore it would seem that an + advocate does not sin by defending an unjust cause. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q71_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiChr.19.2" target="asv">2 Paralip. 19:2</a>): "Thou helpest the ungodly . . . and therefore thou didst deserve . . . the wrath of the Lord." Now an advocate by defending + an unjust cause, helps the ungodly. Therefore he sins and deserves the wrath of the Lord. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is unlawful to cooperate in an evil deed, by counseling, helping, or in any way consenting, because to counsel or assist + an action is, in a way, to do it, and the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q71_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.32" target="asv">Rom. 1:32</a>) that "they . . . are worthy of death, not only they that do" a sin, "but they also that consent to them that do" it. Hence + it was stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q71_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q62_A7.html">Q[62], A[7]</a>), that all such are bound to restitution. Now it is evident that an + advocate provides both assistance and counsel to the party for whom he pleads. Wherefore, if knowingly he defends an unjust + cause, without doubt he sins grievously, and is bound to restitution of the loss unjustly incurred by the other party by reason + of the assistance he has provided. If, however, he defends an unjust cause unknowingly, thinking it just, he is to be excused + according to the measure in which ignorance is excusable. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The physician injures no man by undertaking to heal a desperate malady, whereas the advocate who accepts service in an unjust + cause, unjustly injures the party against whom he pleads unjustly. Hence the comparison fails. For though he may seem to deserve + praise for showing skill in his art, nevertheless he sins by reason of injustice in his will, since he abuses his art for + an evil end. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If an advocate believes from the outset that the cause is just, and discovers afterwards while the case is proceeding that + it is unjust, he ought not to throw up his brief in such a way as to help the other side, or so as to reveal the secrets of + his client to the other party. But he can and must give up the case, or induce his client to give way, or make some compromise + without prejudice to the opposing party. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q71_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q40_A3.html">Q[40], A[3]</a>), it is lawful for a soldier, or a general to lay ambushes in a just war, by prudently concealing what he has a mind to do, + but not by means of fraudulent falsehoods, since we should keep faith even with a foe, as Tully says (De offic. iii, 29). + Hence it is lawful for an advocate, in defending his case, prudently to conceal whatever might hinder its happy issue, but + it is unlawful for him to employ + any kind of falsehood. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q71_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q71_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q71_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q71_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q72.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q71_A4-p0.1">Whether it is lawful for an advocate to take a fee for pleading?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q71_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unlawful for an advocate to take a fee for pleading. Works of mercy should not be done with a view to human + remuneration, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q71_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.14.12" target="asv"> Lk. 14:12, </a> "When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy friends . . . nor thy neighbors who are rich: lest perhaps they also + invite thee again, and a recompense be made to thee." Now it is a work of mercy to plead another's cause, as stated above + (A[1] ). Therefore it is not lawful for + an advocate to take payment in money for pleading. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, spiritual things are not to be bartered with temporal things. But pleading a person's cause seems to be a spiritual + good since it consists in using one's knowledge of law. Therefore it is not lawful for an advocate to take a fee for pleading. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as the person of the advocate concurs towards the pronouncement of the verdict, so do the persons of the judge + and of the witness. Now, according to Augustine (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.), "the judge should not sell a just sentence, nor the + witness true evidence." Therefore neither can an advocate sell a just pleading. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.) that "an advocate may lawfully sell his pleading, and a lawyer his advice." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A man may justly receive payment for granting what he is not bound to grant. Now it is evident that an advocate is not always + bound to consent to plead, or to give advice in other people's causes. Wherefore, if he sell his pleading or advice, he does + not act against justice. The same applies to the physician who attends on a sick person to heal him, and to all like persons; + provided, however, they take a moderate fee, with due consideration for persons, for + the matter in hand, for the labor entailed, and for the custom of the country. If, however, they wickedly extort an immoderate + fee, they sin against justice. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.) that "it is customary to demand from them restitution + of what they have extorted by a wicked excess, but not what has been given to them in accordance with a commendable custom." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man is not bound to do gratuitously whatever he can do from motives of mercy: else no man could lawfully sell anything, since + anything may be given from motives of mercy. But when a man does give a thing out of mercy, he should seek, not a human, but + a Divine reward. In like manner an advocate, when he mercifully pleads the cause of a poor man, should have in view not a + human but a Divine meed; and yet he is not always bound to give his services + gratuitously. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Though knowledge of law is something spiritual, the use of that knowledge is accomplished by the work of the body: hence + it is lawful to take money in payment of that use, else no craftsman would be allowed to make profit by his art. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The judge and witnesses are common to either party, since the judge is bound to pronounce a just verdict, and the witness + to give true evidence. Now justice and truth do not incline to one side rather than to the other: and consequently judges + receive out of the public funds a fixed pay for their labor; and witnesses receive their expenses (not as payment for giving + evidence, but as a fee for their labor) either from both parties or from the party by + whom they are adduced, because no man "serveth as a soldier at any time at his own charge [*Vulg.: 'Who serveth as a soldier,']" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q71_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:7</a>). On the other hand an advocate defends one party only, and so he may lawfully accept fee from the party he assists. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q71_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q71_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q72.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q70_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q71_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q72" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q71_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q72_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q72-p0.1">OF REVILING (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q72-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q72-p2"> We must now consider injuries inflicted by words uttered extrajudicially. We shall consider (1) reviling, (2) backbiting, + (3) tale bearing, (4) derision, (5) cursing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q72-p4"> (1) What is reviling?</p> + <p id="SS_Q72-p5"> (2) Whether every reviling is a mortal sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q72-p6"> (3) Whether one ought to check revilers?</p> + <p id="SS_Q72-p7"> (4) Of the origin of reviling.</p> + <div id="SS_Q72_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q72.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q72_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q72_A1-p0.1">Whether reviling consists in words?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q72_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that reviling does not consist in words. Reviling implies some injury inflicted on one's neighbor, since it + is a kind of injustice. But words seem to inflict no injury on one's neighbor, either in his person, or in his belongings. + Therefore reviling does not consist in words. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, reviling seems to imply dishonor. But a man can be dishonored or slighted by deeds more than by words. Therefore + it seems that reviling consists, not in words but in deeds. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a dishonor inflicted by words is called a railing or a taunt. But reviling seems to differ from railing or taunt. + Therefore reviling does not consist in words. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing, save words, is perceived by the hearing. Now reviling is perceived by the hearing according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q72_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.20.10" target="asv"> Jer. 20:10, </a> "I heard reviling [Douay: 'contumelies'] on every side." Therefore reviling consists in words. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Reviling denotes the dishonoring of a person, and this happens in two ways: for since honor results from excellence, one + person dishonors another, first, by depriving him of the excellence for which he is honored. This is done by sins of deed, + whereof we have spoken above (Q[64], seqq.). Secondly, when a man publishes something against another's honor, thus bringing + it to the knowledge of the latter and of other men. This reviling properly so called, and is + done I some kind of signs. Now, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), "compared with words all other signs are + very few, for words have obtained the chief place among men for the purpose of expressing whatever the mind conceives." Hence + reviling, properly speaking consists in words: wherefore, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a reviler [contumeliosus] "is hasty + and bursts out [tumet] in injurious words." Since, however, things are also signified by deeds, which on this account have + the + same significance as words, it follows that reviling in a wider sense extends also to deeds. Wherefore a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q72_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.30" target="asv"> Rom. 1:30, </a> "contumelious, proud," says: "The contumelious are those who by word or deed revile and shame others." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our words, if we consider them in their essence, i.e. as audible sound injure no man, except perhaps by jarring of the ear, + as when a person speaks too loud. But, considered as signs conveying something to the knowledge of others, they may do many + kinds of harm. Such is the harm done to a man to the detriment of his honor, or of the respect due to him from others. Hence + the reviling is greater if one man reproach another in the presence of many: and + yet there may still be reviling if he reproach him by himself. in so far as the speaker acts unjustly against the respect + due to the hearer. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One man slights another by deeds in so far as such deeds cause or signify that which is against that other man's honor. In + the former case it is not a matter of reviling but of some other kind of injustice, of which we have spoken above (QQ[64],65,66): + where as in the latter case there is reviling, in so far as deeds have the significant force of words. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Railing and taunts consist in words, even as reviling, because by all of them a man's faults are exposed to the detriment + of his honor. Such faults are of three kinds. First, there is the fault of guilt, which is exposed by "reviling" words. Secondly, + there is the fault of both guilt and punishment, which is exposed by "taunts" [convicium], because "vice" is commonly spoken + of in connection with not only the soul but also the body. Hence if one man + says spitefully to another that he is blind, he taunts but does not revile him: whereas if one man calls another a thief, + he not only taunts but also reviles him. Thirdly, a man reproaches another for his inferiority or indigence, so as to lessen + the honor due to him for any kind of excellence. This is done by "upbraiding" words, and properly speaking, occurs when one + spitefully reminds a man that one has succored him when he was in need. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q72_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.20.15" target="asv">Ecclus. + 20:15 + </a>): "He will give a few things and upbraid much." Nevertheless these terms are sometimes employed one for the other. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q72.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q72_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q72_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q72_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q72_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q72_A2-p0.1">Whether reviling or railing is a mortal sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q72_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that reviling or railing is not a mortal sin. For no mortal sin is an act of virtue. Now railing is the act + of a virtue, viz. of wittiness {eutrapelia} [*Cf. + <a id="SS_Q72_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A5.html">FS, Q[60], A[5]</a>] to which it pertains to rail well, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 8). Therefore railing or reviling is not a mortal + sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mortal sin is not to be found in perfect men; and yet these sometimes give utterance to railing or reviling. Thus + the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q72_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.1" target="asv">Gal. 3:1</a>): "O senseless Galatians!," and our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q72_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.24.25" target="asv">Lk. 24:25</a>): "O foolish and slow of heart to believe!" Therefore railing or reviling is not a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, although that which is a venial sin by reason of its genus may become mortal, that which is mortal by reason of + its genus cannot become venial, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q72_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A4.html">FS, Q[88], AA[4]</a>,6). Hence if by reason of its genus it were a mortal sin to give utterance to railing or reviling, it would follow that it + is always a mortal sin. But this is apparently untrue, as may be seen in the case of one who utters a reviling word + indeliberately or through slight anger. Therefore reviling or railing is not a mortal sin, by reason of its genus. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing but mortal sin deserves the eternal punishment of hell. Now railing or reviling deserves the punishment of hell, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q72_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.22" target="asv"> Mat. 5:22, </a> "Whosoever shall say to his brother . . . Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire." Therefore railing or reviling is a + mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q72_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q72_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, words are injurious to other persons, not as sounds, but as signs, and this signification depends on the speaker's inward + intention. Hence, in sins of word, it seems that we ought to consider with what intention the words are uttered. Since then + railing or reviling essentially denotes a dishonoring, if the intention of the utterer is to dishonor the other man, this + is properly and essentially to give utterance + to railing or reviling: and this is a mortal sin no less than theft or robbery, since a man loves his honor no less than his + possessions. If, on the other hand, a man says to another a railing or reviling word, yet with the intention, not of dishonoring + him, but rather perhaps of correcting him or with some like purpose, he utters a railing or reviling not formally and essentially, + but accidentally and materially, in so far to wit as he says that which might be a railing or reviling. Hence this + may be sometimes a venial sin, and sometimes without any sin at all. Nevertheless there is need of discretion in such matters, + and one should use such words with moderation, because the railing might be so grave that being uttered inconsiderately it + might dishonor the person against whom it is uttered. In such a case a man might commit a mortal sin, even though he did not + intend to dishonor the other man: just as were a man incautiously to injure grievously another by striking him in fun, he + would not be without blame. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It belongs to wittiness to utter some slight mockery, not with intent to dishonor or pain the person who is the object of + the mockery, but rather with intent to please and amuse: and this may be without sin, if the due circumstances be observed. + On the other hand if a man does not shrink from inflicting pain on the object of his witty mockery, so long as he makes others + laugh, this is sinful, as stated in the passage quoted. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as it is lawful to strike a person, or damnify him in his belongings for the purpose of correction, so too, for the + purpose of correction, may one say a mocking word to a person whom one has to correct. It is thus that our Lord called the + disciples "foolish," and the Apostle called the Galatians "senseless." Yet, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, + 19), "seldom and only when it is very necessary should we have recourse to invectives, + and then so as to urge God's service, not our own." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since the sin of railing or reviling depends on the intention of the utterer, it may happen to be a venial sin, if it be + a slight railing that does not inflict much dishonor on a man, and be uttered through lightness of heart or some slight anger, + without the fixed purpose of dishonoring him, for instance when one intends by such a word to give but little pain. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q72_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q72_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q72_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q72_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q72_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q72_A3-p0.1">Whether one ought to suffer oneself to be reviled?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q72_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one ought not to suffer oneself to be reviled. For he that suffers himself to be reviled, encourages the + reviler. But one ought not to do this. Therefore one ought not to suffer oneself to be reviled, but rather reply to the reviler. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one ought to love oneself more than another. Now one ought not to suffer another to be reviled, wherefore it is + written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q72_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.26.10" target="asv">Prov. 26:10</a>): "He that putteth a fool to silence appeaseth anger." Therefore neither should one suffer oneself to be reviled. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a man is not allowed to revenge himself, for it is said: "Vengeance belongeth to Me, I will repay" [* + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q72_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.30" target="asv">Heb. 10:30</a>]. Now by submitting to be reviled a man revenges himself, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxii, in Ep. ad Rom.): "If thou wilt + be revenged, be silent; thou hast dealt him a fatal blow." Therefore one ought not by silence to submit to reviling words, + but rather answer back. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q72_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.37.13" target="asv">Ps. 37:13</a>): "They that sought evils to me spoke vain things," and afterwards ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q72_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.37.14" target="asv">Ps. 37:14</a>) he says: "But I as a deaf man, heard not; and as a dumb man not opening his mouth." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Just as we need patience in things done against us, so do we need it in those said against us. Now the precepts of patience + in those things done against us refer to the preparedness of the mind, according to Augustine's (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, + 19) exposition on our Lord's precept, "If one strike thee on thy right cheek, turn to him also the other" [*The words as quoted + by St. Thomas are a blending of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q72_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.39" target="asv"> Mat. 5:39 </a>and + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q72_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.29" target="asv"> Lk. + 6:29 + </a>]: that is to say, a man ought to be prepared to do so if necessary. But he is not always bound to do this actually: since + not even did our Lord do so, for when He received a blow, He said: "Why strikest thou Me?" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q72_A3-p6.3" href="./asv.html#John.18.23" target="asv">Jn. 18:23</a>). Consequently the same applies to the reviling words that are said against us. For we are bound to hold our minds prepared + to submit to be reviled, if it should be expedient. Nevertheless it sometimes behooves us to withstand against + being reviled, and this chiefly for two reasons. First, for the good of the reviler; namely, that his daring may be checked, + and that he may not repeat the attempt, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q72_A3-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Prov.26.5" target="asv"> Prov. 26:5, </a> "Answer a fool according to his folly, lest he imagine himself to be wise." Secondly, for the good of many who would be prevented + from progressing in virtue on account of our being reviled. Hence Gregory says (Hom. ix, Super Ezech.): "Those who are so + placed that their life should be an + example to others, ought, if possible, to silence their detractors, lest their preaching be not heard by those who could have + heard it, and they continue their evil conduct through contempt of a good life." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The daring of the railing reviler should be checked with moderation, i.e. as a duty of charity, and not through lust for + one's own honor. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q72_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.26.4" target="asv">Prov. 26:4</a>): "Answer not a fool according to his folly, lest thou be like him." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When one man prevents another from being reviled there is not the danger of lust for one's own honor as there is when a man + defends himself from being reviled: indeed rather would it seem to proceed from a sense of charity. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It would be an act of revenge to keep silence with the intention of provoking the reviler to anger, but it would be praiseworthy + to be silent, in order to give place to anger. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q72_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.8.4" target="asv">Ecclus. 8:4</a>): "Strive not with a man that is full of tongue, and heap not wood upon his fire." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q72_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q72_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q72_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q72_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q73.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q72_A4-p0.1">Whether reviling arises from anger?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q72_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that reviling does not arise from anger. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q72_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.11.2" target="asv">Prov. 11:2</a>): "Where pride is, there shall also be reviling [Douay: 'reproach']." But anger is a vice distinct from pride. Therefore + reviling does not arise from anger. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q72_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.20.3" target="asv">Prov. 20:3</a>): "All fools are meddling with revilings [Douay: 'reproaches']." Now folly is a vice opposed to wisdom, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q72_A4-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q46_A1.html">Q[46], A[1]</a>); whereas anger is opposed to meekness. Therefore reviling does not arise from anger. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no sin is diminished by its cause. But the sin of reviling is diminished if one gives vent to it through anger: + for it is a more grievous sin to revile out of hatred than out of anger. Therefore reviling does not arise from anger. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "anger gives rise to revilings." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> While one sin may arise from various causes, it is nevertheless said to have its source chiefly in that one from which it + is wont to arise most frequently, through being closely connected with its end. Now reviling is closely connected with anger's + end, which is revenge: since the easiest way for the angry man to take revenge on another is to revile him. Therefore reviling + arises chiefly from anger. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reviling is not directed to the end of pride which is excellency. Hence reviling does not arise directly from pride. Nevertheless + pride disposes a man to revile, in so far as those who think themselves to excel, are more prone to despise others and inflict + injuries on them, because they are more easily angered, through deeming it an affront to themselves whenever anything is done + against their will. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 6) "anger listens imperfectly to reason": wherefore an angry man suffers a defect + of reason, and in this he is like the foolish man. Hence reviling arises from folly on account of the latter's kinship with + anger. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) "an angry man seeks an open offense, but he who hates does not worry about this." + Hence reviling which denotes a manifest injury belongs to anger rather than to hatred. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q72_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q72_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q73.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q71_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q72_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q73" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q72_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q73_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q73-p0.1">OF BACKBITING [*Or detraction] (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q73-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q73-p2"> We must now consider backbiting, under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q73-p3"> (1) What is backbiting?</p> + <p id="SS_Q73-p4"> (2) Whether it is a mortal sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q73-p5"> (3) Of its comparison with other sins;</p> + <p id="SS_Q73-p6"> (4) Whether it is a sin to listen to backbiting?</p> + <div id="SS_Q73_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q73.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q73_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q73_A1-p0.1">Whether backbiting is suitably defined as the blackening of another's character by secret words?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q73_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that backbiting is not as defined by some [*Albert the Great, Sum. Theol. II, cxvii.], "the blackening of another's + good name by words uttered in secret." For "secretly" and "openly" are circumstances that do not constitute the species of + a sin, because it is accidental to a sin that it be known by many or by few. Now that which does not constitute the species + of a sin, does not belong to its essence, and should not be included in its definition. + Therefore it does not belong to the essence of backbiting that it should be done by secret words. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the notion of a good name implies something known to the public. If, therefore, a person's good name is blackened + by backbiting, this cannot be done by secret words, but by words uttered openly. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to detract is to subtract, or to diminish something already existing. But sometimes a man's good name is blackened, + even without subtracting from the truth: for instance, when one reveals the crimes which a man has in truth committed. Therefore + not every blackening of a good name is backbiting. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q73_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.10.11" target="asv">Eccles. 10:11</a>): "If a serpent bite in silence, he is nothing better that backbiteth." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Just as one man injures another by deed in two ways---openly, as by robbery or by doing him any kind of violence---and secretly, + as by theft, or by a crafty blow, so again one man injures another by words in two ways---in one way, openly, and this is + done by reviling him, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q73_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q72_A1.html">Q[72], A[1]</a>)---and in another way secretly, and this is done by backbiting. Now from the fact that one man openly utters words against + another man, + he would appear to think little of him, so that for this reason he dishonors him, so that reviling is detrimental to the honor + of the person reviled. On the other hand, he that speaks against another secretly, seems to respect rather than slight him, + so that he injures directly, not his honor but his good name, in so far as by uttering such words secretly, he, for his own + part, causes his hearers to have a bad opinion of the person against whom he speaks. For the backbiter apparently intends + and aims at being believed. It is therefore evident that backbiting differs from reviling in two points: first, in the way + in which the words are uttered, the reviler speaking openly against someone, and the backbiter secretly; secondly, as to the + end in view, i.e. as regards the injury inflicted, the reviler injuring a man's honor, the backbiter injuring his good name. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In involuntary commutations, to which are reduced all injuries inflicted on our neighbor, whether by word or by deed, the + kind of sin is differentiated by the circumstances "secretly" and "openly," because involuntariness itself is diversified + by violence and by ignorance, as stated above (Q[65], A[4]; + <a id="SS_Q73_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q6_A5.html">FS, Q[6], AA[5]</a>,8). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The words of a backbiter are said to be secret, not altogether, but in relation to the person of whom they are said, because + they are uttered in his absence and without his knowledge. On the other hand, the reviler speaks against a man to his face. + Wherefore if a man speaks ill of another in the presence of several, it is a case of backbiting if he be absent, but of reviling + if he alone be present: although if a man speak ill of an absent person to + one man alone, he destroys his good name not altogether but partly. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A man is said to backbite [detrehere] another, not because he detracts from the truth, but because he lessens his good name. + This is done sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly. Directly, in four ways: first, by saying that which is false about + him; secondly, by stating his sin to be greater than it is; thirdly, by revealing something unknown about him; fourthly, by + ascribing his good deeds to a bad intention. Indirectly, this is done either by + gainsaying his good, or by maliciously concealing it, or by diminishing it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q73.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q73_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q73_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q73_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q73_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q73_A2-p0.1">Whether backbiting is a mortal sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q73_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that backbiting is not a mortal sin. For no act of virtue is a mortal sin. Now, to reveal an unknown sin, which + pertains to backbiting, as stated above (A[1], ad 3), is an act of the virtue of charity, whereby a man denounces his brother's + sin in order that he may amend: or else it is an act of justice, whereby a man accuses his brother. Therefore backbiting is + not a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q73_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.24.21" target="asv"> Prov. 24:21, </a> "Have nothing to do with detractors," says: "The whole human race is in peril from this vice." But no mortal sin is to be + found in the whole of mankind, since many refrain from mortal sin: whereas they are venial sins that are found in all. Therefore + backbiting is a venial sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine in a homily On the Fire of Purgatory [*Serm. civ in the appendix to St. Augustine's work] reckons it a + slight sin "to speak ill without hesitation or forethought." But this pertains to backbiting. Therefore backbiting is a venial + sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q73_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.30" target="asv">Rom. 1:30</a>): "Backbiters, hateful to God," which epithet, according to a gloss, is inserted, "lest it be deemed a slight sin because + it consists in words." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q73_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q72_A2.html">Q[72], A[2]</a>), sins of word should be judged chiefly from the intention of the speaker. Now backbiting by its very nature aims at blackening + a man's good name. Wherefore, properly speaking, to backbite is to speak ill of an absent person in order to blacken his good + name. Now it is a very grave matter to blacken a man's good name, because of all temporal things a man's good name seems the + most precious, since for lack + of it he is hindered from doing many things well. For this reason it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q73_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.41.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 41:15</a>): "Take care of a good name, for this shall continue with thee, more than a thousand treasures precious and great." Therefore + backbiting, properly speaking, is a mortal sin. Nevertheless it happens sometimes that a man utters words, whereby someone's + good name is tarnished, and yet he does not intend this, but something else. This is not backbiting strictly and formally + speaking, + but only materially and accidentally as it were. And if such defamatory words be uttered for the sake of some necessary good, + and with attention to the due circumstances, it is not a sin and cannot be called backbiting. But if they be uttered out of + lightness of heart or for some unnecessary motive, it is not a mortal sin, unless perchance the spoken word be of such a grave + nature, as to cause a notable injury to a man's good name, especially in matters pertaining to his moral character, + because from the very nature of the words this would be a mortal sin. And one is bound to restore a man his good name, no + less than any other thing one has taken from him, in the manner stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q73_A2-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q62_A2.html">Q[62], A[2]</a>) when we were treating of restitution. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above, it is not backbiting to reveal a man's hidden sin in order that he may mend, whether one denounce it, or + accuse him for the good of public justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This gloss does not assert that backbiting is to be found throughout the whole of mankind, but "almost," both because "the + number of fools is infinite," [* + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q73_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.1.15" target="asv">Eccles. 1:15</a>] and few are they that walk in the way of salvation, [*Cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q73_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.14" target="asv"> Mat. 7:14</a>] and because there are few or none at all who do not at times speak from lightness of heart, so as to injure someone's good + name at least slightly, for it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q73_A2-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Jas.3.2" target="asv">James 3:2</a>): "If any man offend not in word, the same is a perfect man." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Augustine is referring to the case when a man utters a slight evil about someone, not intending to injure him, but through + lightness of heart or a slip of the tongue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q73_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q73_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q73_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q73_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q73_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q73_A3-p0.1">Whether backbiting is the gravest of all sins committed against one's neighbor?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q73_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that backbiting is the gravest of all sins committed against one's neighbor. Because a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q73_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.108.4" target="asv"> Ps. 108:4, </a> "Instead of making me a return of love they detracted me," a gloss says: "Those who detract Christ in His members and slay + the souls of future believers are more guilty than those who killed the flesh that was soon to rise again." From this it seems + to follow that backbiting is by so much a graver sin than murder, as it + is a graver matter to kill the soul than to kill the body. Now murder is the gravest of the other sins that are committed + against one's neighbor. Therefore backbiting is absolutely the gravest of all. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, backbiting is apparently a graver sin than reviling, because a man can withstand reviling, but not a secret backbiting. + Now backbiting is seemingly a graver sin than adultery, because adultery unites two persons in one flesh, whereas reviling + severs utterly those who were united. Therefore backbiting is more grievous than adultery: and yet of all other sins a man + commits against his neighbor, adultery is most grave. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, reviling arises from anger, while backbiting arises from envy, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). But envy + is a graver sin than anger. Therefore backbiting is a graver sin than reviling; and so the same conclusion follows as before. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the gravity of a sin is measured by the gravity of the defect that it causes. Now backbiting causes a most grievous + defect, viz. blindness of mind. For Gregory says (Regist. xi, + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q73_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">Ep. 2</a>): "What else do backbiters but blow on the dust and stir up the dirt into their eyes, so that the more they breathe of detraction, + the less they see of the truth?" Therefore backbiting is the most grievous sin committed against one's neighbor. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is more grievous to sin by deed than by word. But backbiting is a sin of word, while adultery, murder, and theft are sins + of deed. Therefore backbiting is not graver than the other sins committed against one's neighbor. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The essential gravity of sins committed against one's neighbor must be weighed by the injury they inflict on him, since it + is thence that they derive their sinful nature. Now the greater the good taken away, the greater the injury. And while man's + good is threefold, namely the good of his soul, the good of his body, and the good of external things; the good of the soul, + which is the greatest of all, cannot be taken from him by another save as an occasional + cause, for instance by an evil persuasion, which does not induce necessity. On the other hand the two latter goods, viz. of + the body and of external things, can be taken away by violence. Since, however, the goods of the body excel the goods of external + things, those sins which injure a man's body are more grievous than those which injure his external things. Consequently, + among other sins committed against one's neighbor, murder is the most grievous, since it deprives man of the life which he + already possesses: after this comes adultery, which is contrary to the right order of human generation, whereby man enters + upon life. In the last place come external goods, among which a man's good name takes precedence of wealth because it is more + akin to spiritual goods, wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q73_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.22.1" target="asv">Prov. 22:1</a>): "A good name is better than great riches." Therefore backbiting according to its genus is a more grievous sin than theft, + but is less grievous than murder or + adultery. Nevertheless the order may differ by reason of aggravating or extenuating circumstances. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A3-p8"> The accidental gravity of a sin is to be considered in relation to the sinner, who sins more grievously, if he sins deliberately + than if he sins through weakness or carelessness. In this respect sins of word have a certain levity, in so far as they are + apt to occur through a slip of the tongue, and without much forethought. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those who detract Christ by hindering the faith of His members, disparage His Godhead, which is the foundation of our faith. + Wherefore this is not simple backbiting but blasphemy. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reviling is a more grievous sin than backbiting, in as much as it implies greater contempt of one's neighbor: even as robbery + is a graver sin than theft, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q73_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q66_A9.html">Q[66], A[9]</a>). Yet reviling is not a more grievous sin than adultery. For the gravity of adultery is measured, not from its being a union + of bodies, but from being a disorder in human generation. Moreover the reviler is not the sufficient cause of + unfriendliness in another man, but is only the occasional cause of division among those who were united, in so far, to wit, + as by declaring the evils of another, he for his own part severs that man from the friendship of other men, though they are + not forced by his words to do so. Accordingly a backbiter is a murderer "occasionally," since by his words he gives another + man an occasion for hating or despising his neighbor. For this reason it is stated in the Epistle of Clement [*Ad Jacob. Ep. + i], that "backbiters are murderers," i.e. occasionally; because "he that hateth his brother is a murderer" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q73_A3-p10.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.15" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:15</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Anger seeks openly to be avenged, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2): wherefore backbiting which takes place in secret, + is not the daughter of anger, as reviling is, but rather of envy, which strives by any means to lessen one's neighbor's glory. + Nor does it follow from this that backbiting is more grievous than reviling: since a lesser vice can give rise to a greater + sin, just as anger gives birth to murder and blasphemy. For the origin of a sin + depends on its inclination to an end, i.e. on the thing to which the sin turns, whereas the gravity of a sin depends on what + it turns away from. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since "a man rejoiceth in the sentence of his mouth" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q73_A3-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.23" target="asv">Prov. 15:23</a>), it follows that a backbiter more and more loves and believes what he says, and consequently more and more hates his neighbor, + and thus his knowledge of the truth becomes less and less. This effect however may also result from other sins pertaining + to hate of one's neighbor. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A3-p13"></p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A3-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q73_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q73_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q73_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q73_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q74.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q73_A4-p0.1">Whether it is a grave sin for the listener to suffer the backbiter?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q73_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the listener who suffers a backbiter does not sin grievously. For a man is not under greater obligations + to others than to himself. But it is praiseworthy for a man to suffer his own backbiters: for Gregory says (Hom. ix, super + Ezech): "Just as we ought not to incite the tongue of backbiters, lest they perish, so ought we to suffer them with equanimity + when they have been incited by their own wickedness, in order that our merit may be the + greater." Therefore a man does not sin if he does not withstand those who backbite others. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q73_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.4.30" target="asv">Ecclus. 4:30</a>): "In no wise speak against the truth." Now sometimes a person tells the truth while backbiting, as stated above (A[1], ad + 3). Therefore it seems that one is not always bound to withstand a backbiter. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no man should hinder what is profitable to others. Now backbiting is often profitable to those who are backbitten: + for Pope Pius [*St. Pius I] says [*Append. Grat. ad can. Oves, caus. vi, qu. 1]: "Not unfrequently backbiting is directed + against good persons, with the result that those who have been unduly exalted through the flattery of their kindred, or the + favor of others, are humbled by backbiting." Therefore one ought not to withstand + backbiters. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii): "Take care not to have an itching tongue, nor tingling ears, that is, neither detract others + nor listen to backbiters." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q73_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.32" target="asv">Rom. 1:32</a>), they "are worthy of death . . . not only they that" commit sins, "but they also that consent to them that do them." Now + this happens in two ways. First, directly, when, to wit, one man induces another to sin, or when the sin is pleasing to him: + secondly, indirectly, that is, if he does not withstand him when he might do so, and this happens sometimes, not because the + sin is pleasing to him, but on + account of some human fear. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A4-p7"> Accordingly we must say that if a man list ens to backbiting without resisting it, he seems to consent to the backbiter, + so that he becomes a participator in his sin. And if he induces him to backbite, or at least if the detraction be pleasing + to him on account of his hatred of the person detracted, he sins no less than the detractor, and sometimes more. Wherefore + Bernard says (De Consid. ii, 13): "It is difficult to say which is the more to be condemned the backbiter or he that + listens to backbiting." If however the sin is not pleasing to him, and he fails to withstand the backbiter, through fear negligence, + or even shame, he sins indeed, but much less than the backbiter, and, as a rule venially. Sometimes too this may be a mortal + sin, either because it is his official duty to cor. rect the backbiter, or by reason of some consequent danger; or on account + of the radical reason for which human fear may sometimes be a mortal sin, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q73_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> No man hears himself backbitten, because when a man is spoken evil of in his hearing, it is not backbiting, properly speaking, + but reviling, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Yet it is possible for the detractions uttered against a person to come to his + knowledge through others telling him, and then it is left to his discretion whether he will suffer their detriment to his + good name, unless this endanger the good of others, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q73_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q72_A3.html">Q[72], A[3]</a>). Wherefore his patience may deserve commendation for as much as he suffers patiently being detracted himself. But it is + not left to his discretion to permit an injury to be done to another's good name, hence he is accounted guilty if he fails + to resist when he can, for the same reason whereby a man is bound to raise another man's ass lying "underneath his burden," + as commanded in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q73_A4-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.4" target="asv"> Dt. 21:4</a> [* + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q73_A4-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.5" target="asv">Ex. 23:5</a>]. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One ought not always to withstand a backbiter by endeavoring to convince him of falsehood, especially if one knows that he + is speaking the truth: rather ought one to reprove him with words, for that he sins in backbiting his brother, or at least + by our pained demeanor show him that we are displeased with his backbiting, because according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q73_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.25.23" target="asv"> Prov. 25:23, </a> "the north wind driveth away rain, as doth a sad countenance a backbiting + tongue." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The profit one derives from being backbitten is due, not to the intention of the backbiter, but to the ordinance of God Who + produces good out of every evil. Hence we should none the less withstand backbiters, just as those who rob or oppress others, + even though the oppressed and the robbed may gain merit by patience. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q73_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q73_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q74.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q72_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q73_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q74" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q73_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q74_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q74-p0.1">OF TALE-BEARING [*'Susurratio,' i.e. whispering] (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q74-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q74-p2"> We must now consider tale-bearing: under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q74-p3"> (1) Whether tale-bearing is a sin distinct from backbiting?</p> + <p id="SS_Q74-p4"> (2) Which of the two is the more grievous?</p> + <div id="SS_Q74_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q74.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q74_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q74_A1-p0.1">Whether tale-bearing is a sin distinct from backbiting?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q74_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q74_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that tale-bearing is not a distinct sin from backbiting. Isidore says (Etym. x): "The susurro [tale-bearer] + takes his name from the sound of his speech, for he speaks disparagingly not to the face but into the ear." But to speak of + another disparagingly belongs to backbiting. Therefore tale-bearing is not a distinct sin from backbiting. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q74_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q74_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.16" target="asv">Lev. 19:16</a>): "Thou shalt not be an informer [Douay: 'a detractor'] nor a tale-bearer [Douay: 'whisperer'] among the people." But an + informer is apparently the same as a backbiter. Therefore neither does tale-bearing differ from backbiting. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q74_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q74_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.28.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 28:15</a>): "The tale-bearer [Douay: 'whisperer'] and the double-tongued is accursed." But a double-tongued man is apparently the same + as a backbiter, because a backbiter speaks with a double tongue, with one in your absence, with another in your presence. + Therefore a tale-bearer is the same as a backbiter. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q74_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q74_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.29" target="asv"> Rom. 1:29,30, </a> "Tale-bearers, backbiters [Douay: 'whisperers, detractors']" says: "Tale-bearers sow discord among friends; backbiters deny + or disparage others' good points." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q74_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The tale-bearer and the backbiter agree in matter, and also in form or mode of speaking, since they both speak evil secretly + of their neighbor: and for this reason these terms are sometimes used one for the other. Hence a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q74_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.5.16" target="asv"> Ecclus. 5:16, </a> "Be not called a tale-bearer [Douay: 'whisperer']" says: "i.e. a backbiter." They differ however in end, because the backbiter + intends to blacken his neighbor's good name, wherefore he brings + forward those evils especially about his neighbor which are likely to defame him, or at least to depreciate his good name: + whereas a tale-bearer intends to sever friendship, as appears from the gloss quoted above and from the saying of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q74_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.26.20" target="asv"> Prov. 26:20, </a> "Where the tale-bearer is taken away, contentions shall cease." Hence it is that a tale-bearer speaks such ill about his + neighbors as may stir his hearer's mind against them, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q74_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Sir.28.11" target="asv"> Ecclus. 28:11, </a> "A + sinful man will trouble his friends, and bring in debate in the midst of them that are at peace." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q74_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A tale-bearer is called a backbiter in so far as he speaks ill of another; yet he differs from a backbiter since he intends + not to speak ill as such, but to say anything that may stir one man against another, though it be good simply, and yet has + a semblance of evil through being unpleasant to the hearer. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q74_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An informer differs from a tale-bearer and a backbiter, for an informer is one who charges others publicly with crimes, either + by accusing or by railing them, which does not apply to a backbiter or tale-bearer. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q74_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A double-tongued person is properly speaking a tale-bearer. For since friendship is between two, the tale-bearer strives + to sever friendship on both sides. Hence he employs a double tongue towards two persons, by speaking ill of one to the other: + wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q74_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.28.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 28:15</a>): "The tale-bearer [Douay: 'whisperer'] and the double-tongued is accursed," and then it is added, "for he hath troubled + many that were peace." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q74_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q74_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q74.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q74_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q74_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q74_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q75.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q74_A2-p0.1">Whether backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q74_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q74_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing. For sins of word consist in speaking evil. Now a backbiter + speaks of his neighbor things that are evil simply, for such things lead to the loss or depreciation of his good name: whereas + a tale-bearer is only intent on saying what is apparently evil, because to wit they are unpleasant to the hearer. Therefore + backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q74_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he that deprives. a man of his good name, deprives him not merely of one friend, but of many, because everyone is + minded to scorn the friendship of a person with a bad name. Hence it is reproached against a certain individual [*King Josaphat] + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q74_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiChr.19.2" target="asv">2 Paralip 19:2</a>): "Thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord." But tale-bearing deprives one of only one friend. Therefore + backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q74_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q74_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.11" target="asv">James 4:11</a>): "He that backbiteth [Douay:,'detracteth'] his brother . . . detracteth the law," and consequently God the giver of the + law. Wherefore the sin of backbiting seems to be a sin against God, which is most grievous, as stated above (Q[20], A[3]; + + <a id="SS_Q74_A2-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q73_A3.html">FS, Q[73], A[3]</a>). On the other hand the sin of tale-bearing is against one's neighbor. Therefore the sin of backbiting is graver than the + sin of tale-bearing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q74_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q74_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.5.17" target="asv">Ecclus. 5:17</a>): "An evil mark of disgrace is upon the double-tongued; but to the tale-bearer [Douay: 'whisperer'] hatred, and enmity, and + reproach." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q74_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[73], A[3]; + <a id="SS_Q74_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q73_A8.html">FS, Q[73], A[8]</a>), sins against one's neighbor are the more grievous, according as they inflict a greater injury on him: and an injury is + so much the greater, according to the greatness of the good which it takes away. Now of all one's external goods a friend + takes the first place, since "no man can live without friends," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 1). Hence it is + written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q74_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.6.15" target="asv">Ecclus. + 6:15 + </a>): "Nothing can be compared to a faithful friend." Again, a man's good name whereof backbiting deprives him, is most necessary + to him that he may be fitted for friendship. Therefore tale-bearing is a greater sin than backbiting or even reviling, because + a friend is better than honor, and to be loved is better than to be honored, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q74_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The species and gravity of a sin depend on the end rather than on the material object, wherefore, by reason of its end, tale-bearing + is worse than backbiting, although sometimes the backbiter says worse things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q74_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A good name is a disposition for friendship, and a bad name is a disposition for enmity. But a disposition falls short of + the thing for which it disposes. Hence to do anything that leads to a disposition for enmity is a less grievous sin than to + do what conduces directly to enmity. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q74_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that backbites his brother, seems to detract the law, in so far as he despises the precept of love for one's neighbor: + while he that strives to sever friendship seems to act more directly against this precept. Hence the latter sin is more specially + against God, because "God is charity" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q74_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:16</a>), and for this reason it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q74_A2-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.16" target="asv">Prov. 6:16</a>): "Six things there are, which the Lord hateth, and the seventh + His soul detesteth," and the seventh is "he ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q74_A2-p9.3" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.19" target="asv">Prov. 6:19</a>) that soweth discord among brethren." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q74_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q74_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q74_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q75.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q73_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q74_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q75" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q74_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q75_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q75-p0.1">OF DERISION [*Or mockery] (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q75-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q75-p2"> We must now speak of derision, under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q75-p3"> (1) Whether derision is a special sin distinct from the other sins whereby one's neighbor is injured by words?</p> + <p id="SS_Q75-p4"> (2) Whether derision is a mortal sin?</p> + <div id="SS_Q75_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q75.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q75_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q75_A1-p0.1">Whether derision is a special sin distinct from those already mentioned?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q75_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q75_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that derision is not a special sin distinct from those mentioned above. For laughing to scorn is apparently + the same as derision. But laughing to scorn pertains to reviling. Therefore derision would seem not to differ from reviling. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q75_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no man is derided except for something reprehensible which puts him to shame. Now such are sins; and if they be + imputed to a person publicly, it is a case of reviling, if privately, it amounts to backbiting or tale-bearing. Therefore + derision is not distinct from the foregoing vices. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q75_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sins of this kind are distinguished by the injury they inflict on one's neighbor. Now the injury inflicted on a + man by derision affects either his honor, or his good name, or is detrimental to his friendship. Therefore derision is not + a sin distinct from the foregoing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q75_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Derision is done in jest, wherefore it is described as "making fun." Now all the foregoing are done seriously and not in + jest. Therefore derision differs from all of them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q75_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q75_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q72_A2.html">Q[72], A[2]</a>), sins of word should be weighed chiefly by the intention of the speaker, wherefore these sins are differentiated according + to the various intentions of those who speak against another. Now just as the railer intends to injure the honor of the person + he rails, the backbiter to depreciate a good name, and the tale-bearer to destroy friendship, so too the derider intends to + shame the person he derides. And + since this end is distinct from the others, it follows that the sin of derision is distinct from the foregoing sins. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q75_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Laughing to scorn and derision agree as to the end but differ in mode, because derision is done with the "mouth," i.e. by + words and laughter, while laughing to scorn is done by wrinkling the nose, as a gloss says on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q75_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.2.4" target="asv"> Ps. 2:4, </a> "He that dwelleth in heaven shall laugh at them": and such a distinction does not differentiate the species. Yet they both + differ from reviling, as being shamed differs from being dishonored: for to be ashamed + is "to fear dishonor," as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 15). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q75_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> For doing a virtuous deed a man deserves both respect and a good name in the eyes of others, and in his own eyes the glory + of a good conscience, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q75_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.1.12" target="asv">2 Cor. 1:12, </a> "Our glory is this, the testimony of our conscience." Hence, on the other hand, for doing a reprehensible, i.e. a vicious + action, a man forfeits his honor and good name in the eyes of others---and for this purpose the reviler and the backbiter + speak of another + person---while in his own eyes, he loses the glory of his conscience through being confused and ashamed at reprehensible deeds + being imputed to him---and for this purpose the derider speaks ill of him. It is accordingly evident that derision agrees + with the foregoing vices as to the matter but differs as to the end. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q75_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A secure and calm conscience is a great good, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q75_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.15" target="asv"> Prov. 15:15, </a> "A secure mind is like a continual feast." Wherefore he that disturbs another's conscience by confounding him inflicts a + special injury on him: hence derision is a special kind of sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q75_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q75_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q75.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q75_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q75_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q75_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q76.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q75_A2-p0.1">Whether derision can be a mortal sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q75_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q75_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that derision cannot be a mortal sin. Every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But derision does not seem contrary + to charity, for sometimes it takes place in jest among friends, wherefore it is known as "making fun." Therefore derision + cannot be a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q75_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the greatest derision would appear to be that which is done as an injury to God. But derision is not always a mortal + sin when it tends to the injury of God: else it would be a mortal sin to relapse into a venial sin of which one has repented. + For Isidore says (De Sum. Bon. ii, 16) that "he who continues to do what he has repented of, is a derider and not a penitent." + It would likewise follow that all hypocrisy is a mortal sin, because, according to + Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 15) "the ostrich signifies the hypocrite, who derides the horse, i.e. the just man, and his rider, i.e. + God." Therefore derision is not a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q75_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, reviling and backbiting seem to be graver sins than derision, because it is more to do a thing seriously than in + jest. But not all backbiting or reviling is a mortal sin. Much less therefore is derision a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q75_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q75_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.34" target="asv">Prov. 3:34</a>): "He derideth [Vulg.: 'shall scorn'] the scorners." But God's derision is eternal punishment for mortal sin, as appears + from the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q75_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.2.4" target="asv"> Ps. 2:4, </a> "He that dwelleth in heaven shall laugh at them." Therefore derision is a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q75_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The object of derision is always some evil or defect. Now when an evil is great, it is taken, not in jest, but seriously: + consequently if it is taken in jest or turned to ridicule (whence the terms 'derision' and 'jesting'), this is because it + is considered to be slight. Now an evil may be considered to be slight in two ways: first, in itself, secondly, in relation + to the person. When anyone makes game or fun of another's evil or defect, because it is a + slight evil in itself, this is a venial sin by reason of its genus. on the other hand this defect may be considered as a slight + evil in relation to the person, just as we are wont to think little of the defects of children and imbeciles: and then to + make game or fun of a person, is to scorn him altogether, and to think him so despicable that his misfortune troubles us not + one whit, but is held as an object of derision. In this way derision is a mortal sin, and more grievous than reviling, which + is also done openly: because the reviler would seem to take another's evil seriously; whereas the derider does so in fun, + and so would seem the more to despise and dishonor the other man. Wherefore, in this sense, derision is a grievous sin, and + all the more grievous according as a greater respect is due to the person derided. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q75_A2-p7"> Consequently it is an exceedingly grievous sin to deride God and the things of God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q75_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.37.23" target="asv"> Is. 37:23, </a> "Whom hast thou reproached, and whom hast thou blasphemed, and against whom hast thou exalted thy voice?" and he replies: + "Against the Holy One of Israel." In the second place comes derision of one's parents, wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q75_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.30.17" target="asv">Prov. 30:17</a>): "The eye that mocketh at his father, and that despiseth the labor of his mother in + bearing him, let the ravens of the brooks pick it out, and the young eagles eat it." Further, the derision of good persons + is grievous, because honor is the reward of virtue, and against this it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q75_A2-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Job.12.4" target="asv">Job 12:4</a>): "The simplicity of the just man is laughed to scorn." Such like derision does very much harm: because it turns men away + from good deeds, according to Gregory (Moral. xx, 14), "Who when they perceive any good points appearing in the acts of others, + directly + pluck them up with the hand of a mischievous reviling." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q75_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Jesting implies nothing contrary to charity in relation to the person with whom one jests, but it may imply something against + charity in relation to the person who is the object of the jest, on account of contempt, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q75_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Neither he that relapses into a sin of which he has repented, nor a hypocrite, derides God explicitly, but implicitly, in + so far as either's behavior is like a derider's. Nor is it true that to commit a venial sin is to relapse or dissimulate altogether, + but only dispositively and imperfectly. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q75_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Derision considered in itself is less grievous than backbiting or reviling, because it does not imply contempt, but jest. + Sometimes however it includes greater contempt than reviling does, as stated above, and then it is a grave sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q75_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q75_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q75_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q76.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q74_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q75_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q76" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q75_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q76_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q76-p0.1">OF CURSING (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q76-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q76-p2"> We must now consider cursing. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q76-p3"> (1) Whether one may lawfully curse another?</p> + <p id="SS_Q76-p4"> (2) Whether one may lawfully curse an irrational creature?</p> + <p id="SS_Q76-p5"> (3) Whether cursing is a mortal sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q76-p6"> (4) Of its comparison with other sins.</p> + <div id="SS_Q76_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q76.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q76_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q76_A1-p0.1">Whether it is lawful to curse anyone?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q76_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unlawful to curse anyone. For it is unlawful to disregard the command of the Apostle in whom Christ spoke, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q76_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.13.3" target="asv">2 Cor. 13:3.</a> Now he commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q76_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.14" target="asv">Rom. 12:14</a>), "Bless and curse not." Therefore it is not lawful to curse anyone. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all are bound to bless God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q76_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.3.82" target="asv"> Dan. 3:82, </a> "O ye sons of men, bless the Lord." Now the same mouth cannot both bless God and curse man, as proved in the third chapter + of James. Therefore no man may lawfully curse another man. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, he that curses another would seem to wish him some evil either of fault or of punishment, since a curse appears + to be a kind of imprecation. But it is not lawful to wish ill to anyone, indeed we are bound to pray that all may be delivered + from evil. Therefore it is unlawful for any man to curse. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the devil exceeds all in malice on account of his obstinacy. But it is not lawful to curse the devil, as neither + is it lawful to curse oneself; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q76_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.21.30" target="asv">Ecclus. 21:30</a>): "While the ungodly curseth the devil, he curseth his own soul." Much less therefore is it lawful to curse a man. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q76_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Num.23.8" target="asv"> Num. 23:8, </a> "How shall I curse whom God hath not cursed?" says: "There cannot be a just cause for cursing a sinner if one be ignorant + of his sentiments." Now one man cannot know another man's sentiments, nor whether he is cursed by God. Therefore no man may + lawfully curse another. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q76_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.27.26" target="asv">Dt. 27:26</a>): "Cursed be he that abideth not in the words of this law." Moreover Eliseus cursed the little boys who mocked him ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q76_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 2:24</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> To curse [maledicere] is the same as to speak ill [malum dicere]. Now "speaking" has a threefold relation to the thing spoken. + First, by way of assertion, as when a thing is expressed in the indicative mood: in this way "maledicere" signifies simply + to tell someone of another's evil, and this pertains to backbiting, wherefore tellers of evil [maledici] are sometimes called + backbiters. Secondly, speaking is related to the thing spoken, by way of cause, and + this belongs to God first and foremost, since He made all things by His word, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q76_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.32.9" target="asv"> Ps. 32:9, </a> "He spoke and they were made"; while secondarily it belongs to man, who, by his word, commands others and thus moves them + to do something: it is for this purpose that we employ verbs in the imperative mood. Thirdly, "speaking" is related to the + thing spoken by expressing the sentiments of one who desires that which is expressed in words; and for this purpose we employ + the + verb in the optative mood. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A1-p9"> Accordingly we may omit the first kind of evil speaking which is by way of simple assertion of evil, and consider the other + two kinds. And here we must observe that to do something and to will it are consequent on one another in the matter of goodness + and wickedness, as shown above ( + <a id="SS_Q76_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q20_A3.html">FS, Q[20], A[3]</a>). Hence in these two ways of evil speaking, by way of command and by way of desire, there is the same aspect of lawfulness + and unlawfulness, for if a man + commands or desires another's evil, as evil, being intent on the evil itself, then evil speaking will be unlawful in both + ways, and this is what is meant by cursing. On the other hand if a man commands or desires another's evil under the aspect + of good, it is lawful; and it may be called cursing, not strictly speaking, but accidentally, because the chief intention + of the speaker is directed not to evil but to good. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A1-p10"> Now evil may be spoken, by commanding or desiring it, under the aspect of a twofold good. Sometimes under the aspect of just, + and thus a judge lawfully curses a man whom he condemns to a just penalty: thus too the Church curses by pronouncing anathema. + In the same way the prophets in the Scriptures sometimes call down evils on sinners, as though conforming their will to Divine + justice, although such like imprecation may be taken by way of foretelling. Sometimes evil is spoken + under the aspect of useful, as when one wishes a sinner to suffer sickness or hindrance of some kind, either that he may himself + reform, or at least that he may cease from harming others. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle forbids cursing strictly so called with an evil intent: and the same answer applies to the Second Objection. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To wish another man evil under the aspect of good, is not opposed to the sentiment whereby one wishes him good simply, in + fact rather is it in conformity therewith. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the devil both nature and guilt must be considered. His nature indeed is good and is from God nor is it lawful to curse + it. On the other hand his guilt is deserving of being cursed, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q76_A1-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Job.3.8" target="asv">Job 3:8</a>, "Let them curse it who curse the day." Yet when a sinner curses the devil on account of his guilt, for the same reason he + judges himself worthy of being cursed; and in this sense he is said to curse his own soul. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Although the sinner's sentiments cannot be perceived in themselves, they can be perceived through some manifest sin, which + has to be punished. Likewise although it is not possible to know whom God curses in respect of final reprobation, it is possible + to know who is accursed of God in respect of being guilty of present sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A1-p15"></p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A1-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q76.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q76_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q76_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q76_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q76_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q76_A2-p0.1">Whether it is lawful to curse an irrational creature?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q76_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is unlawful to curse an irrational creature. Cursing would seem to be lawful chiefly in its relation + to punishment. Now irrational creatures are not competent subjects either of guilt or of punishment. Therefore it is unlawful + to curse them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in an irrational creature there is nothing but the nature which God made. But it is unlawful to curse this even + in the devil, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q76_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q76_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse an irrational creature. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, irrational creatures are either stable, as bodies, or transient, as the seasons. Now, according to Gregory (Moral. + iv, 2), "it is useless to curse what does not exist, and wicked to curse what exists." Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse + an irrational creature. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> our Lord cursed the fig tree, as related in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q76_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.21.19" target="asv"> Mat. 21:19</a>; and Job cursed his day, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q76_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Job.3.1" target="asv"> Job 3:1.</a> + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Benediction and malediction, properly speaking, regard things to which good or evil may happen, viz. rational creatures: + while good and evil are said to happen to irrational creatures in relation to the rational creature for whose sake they are. + Now they are related to the rational creature in several ways. First by way of ministration, in so far as irrational creatures + minister to the needs of man. In this sense the Lord said to man ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q76_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.17" target="asv">Gn. + 3:17 + </a>): "Cursed is the earth in thy work," so that its barrenness would be a punishment to man. Thus also David cursed the mountains + of Gelboe, according to Gregory's expounding (Moral. iv, 3). Again the irrational creature is related to the rational creature + by way of signification: and thus our Lord cursed the fig tree in signification of Judea. Thirdly, the irrational creature + is related to rational creatures as something containing them, namely by way of time or place: and thus + Job cursed the day of his birth, on account of the original sin which he contracted in birth, and on account of the consequent + penalties. In this sense also we may understand David to have cursed the mountains of Gelboe, as we read in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q76_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iiKgdms.1.21" target="asv">2 Kings 1:21, </a> namely on account of the people slaughtered there. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A2-p7"> But to curse irrational beings, considered as creatures of God, is a sin of blasphemy; while to curse them considered in + themselves is idle and vain and consequently unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A2-p8"> From this the Replies to the objections may easily be gathered.</p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A2-p9"></p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A2-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q76_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q76_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q76_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q76_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q76_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q76_A3-p0.1">Whether cursing is a mortal sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q76_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that cursing is not a mortal sin. For Augustine in a homily On the Fire of Purgatory [*Serm. civ in the appendix + of St. Augustine's works] reckons cursing among slight sins. But such sins are venial. Therefore cursing is not a mortal but + a venial Sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which proceeds from a slight movement of the mind does not seem to be generically a mortal sin. But cursing + sometimes arises from a slight movement. Therefore cursing is not a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, evil deeds are worse than evil words. But evil deeds are not always mortal sins. Much less therefore is cursing + a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing save mortal sin excludes one from the kingdom of God. But cursing excludes from the kingdom of God, according to + + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q76_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:10</a>, "Nor cursers [Douay: 'railers'], nor extortioners shall possess the kingdom of God." Therefore cursing is a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The evil words of which we are speaking now are those whereby evil is uttered against someone by way of command or desire. + Now to wish evil to another man, or to conduce to that evil by commanding it, is, of its very nature, contrary to charity + whereby we love our neighbor by desiring his good. Consequently it is a mortal sin, according to its genus, and so much the + graver, as the person whom we curse has a greater claim on our love and respect. Hence it is + written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q76_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.20.9" target="asv">Lev. 20:9</a>): "He that curseth his father, or mother, dying let him die." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A3-p7"> It may happen however that the word uttered in cursing is a venial sin either through the slightness of the evil invoked + on another in cursing him, or on account of the sentiments of the person who utters the curse; because he may say such words + through some slight movement, or in jest, or without deliberation, and sins of word should be weighed chiefly with regard + to the speaker's intention, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q76_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q72_A2.html">Q[72], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A3-p8"> From this the Replies to the Objections may be easily gathered.</p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A3-p9"></p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A3-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q76_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q76_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q76_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q76_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q77.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q76_A4-p0.1">Whether cursing is a graver sin than backbiting?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q76_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that cursing is a graver sin than backbiting. Cursing would seem to be a kind of blasphemy, as implied in the + canonical epistle of Jude (verse 9) where it is said that "when Michael the archangel, disputing with the devil, contended + about the body of Moses, he durst not bring against him the judgment of blasphemy [Douay: 'railing speech']," where blasphemy + stands for cursing, according to a gloss. Now blasphemy is a graver sin than backbiting. + Therefore cursing is a graver sin than backbiting. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, murder is more grievous than backbiting, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q76_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q73_A3.html">Q[73], A[3]</a>). But cursing is on a par with the sin of murder; for Chrysostom says (Hom. xix, super Matth.): "When thou sayest: 'Curse + him down with his house, away with everything,' you are no better than a murderer." Therefore cursing is graver than backbiting. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to cause a thing is more than to signify it. But the curser causes evil by commanding it, whereas the backbiter + merely signifies an evil already existing. Therefore the curser sins more grievously than the backbiter. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is impossible to do well in backbiting, whereas cursing may be either a good or an evil deed, as appears from what has + been said + <a id="SS_Q76_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q76_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore backbiting is graver than cursing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in the + <a id="SS_Q76_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A5.html">FP, Q[48], A[5]</a>, evil is twofold, evil of fault, and evil of punishment; and of the two, evil of fault is the worse ( + <a id="SS_Q76_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A6.html">FP, Q[48], A[6]</a>). Hence to speak evil of fault is worse than to speak evil of punishment, provided the mode of speaking be the same. Accordingly + it belongs to the reviler, the tale-bearer, the backbiter and the derider to speak evil of fault, whereas it belongs to the + evil-speaker, as we understand it here, to speak evil of punishment, and not evil of fault except under the aspect of punishment. + But the mode of speaking is not the same, for in the case of the four vices mentioned above, evil of fault is spoken by way + of assertion, whereas in the case of cursing evil of punishment is spoken, either by causing it in the form of a command, + or by wishing it. Now the utterance itself of a person's fault is a sin, in as much as it inflicts an injury on one's + neighbor, and it is more grievous to inflict an injury, than to wish to inflict it, other things being equal. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A4-p7"> Hence backbiting considered in its generic aspect is a graver sin than the cursing which expresses a mere desire; while the + cursing which is expressed by way of command, since it has the aspect of a cause, will be more or less grievous than backbiting, + according as it inflicts an injury more or less grave than the blackening of a man's good name. Moreover this must be taken + as applying to these vices considered in their essential aspects: for other accidental points might be + taken into consideration, which would aggravate or extenuate the aforesaid vices. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To curse a creature, as such, reflects on God, and thus accidentally it has the character of blasphemy; not so if one curse + a creature on account of its fault: and the same applies to backbiting. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q76_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q76_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, cursing, in one way, includes the desire for evil, where if the curser desire the evil of another's violent death, he does + not differ, in desire, from a murderer, but he differs from him in so far as the external act adds something to the act of + the will. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers cursing by way of command. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q76_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q76_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q77.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q75_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q76_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q77" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q76_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q77_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q77-p0.1">(D) BY SINS COMMITTED IN BUYING AND SELLING (Q[77])</h3> + <p id="SS_Q77-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q77-p2">OF CHEATING, WHICH IS COMMITTED IN BUYING AND SELLING (FOUR ARTICLES)</p> + <p id="SS_Q77-p3"> We must now consider those sins which relate to voluntary commutations. First, we shall consider cheating, which is committed + in buying and selling: secondly, we shall consider usury, which occurs in loans. In connection with the other voluntary commutations + no special kind of sin is to be found distinct from rapine and theft. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77-p4"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q77-p5"> (1) Of unjust sales as regards the price; namely, whether it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth?</p> + <p id="SS_Q77-p6"> (2) Of unjust sales on the part of the thing sold;</p> + <p id="SS_Q77-p7"> (3) Whether the seller is bound to reveal a fault in the thing sold?</p> + <p id="SS_Q77-p8"> (4) Whether it is lawful in trading to sell a thing at a higher price than was paid for it?</p> + <div id="SS_Q77_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q77.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q77_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q77_A1-p0.1">Whether it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q77_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth. In the commutations of human life, civil laws determine + that which is just. Now according to these laws it is just for buyer and seller to deceive one another (Cod. IV, xliv, De + Rescind. Vend. 8,15): and this occurs by the seller selling a thing for more than its worth, and the buyer buying a thing + for less than its worth. Therefore it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is common to all would seem to be natural and not sinful. Now Augustine relates that the saying of a + certain jester was accepted by all, "You wish to buy for a song and to sell at a premium," which agrees with the saying of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q77_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.20.14" target="asv"> Prov. 20:14, </a> "It is naught, it is naught, saith every buyer: and when he is gone away, then he will boast." Therefore it is lawful to + sell a thing for more than its worth. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it does not seem unlawful if that which honesty demands be done by mutual agreement. Now, according to the Philosopher + (Ethic. viii, 13), in the friendship which is based on utility, the amount of the recompense for a favor received should depend + on the utility accruing to the receiver: and this utility sometimes is worth more than the thing given, for instance if the + receiver be in great need of that thing, whether for the purpose of avoiding a + danger, or of deriving some particular benefit. Therefore, in contracts of buying and selling, it is lawful to give a thing + in return for more than its worth. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q77_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.12" target="asv">Mat. 7:12</a>): "All things . . . whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them." But no man wishes to buy a thing + for more than its worth. Therefore no man should sell a thing to another man for more than its worth. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is altogether sinful to have recourse to deceit in order to sell a thing for more than its just price, because this is + to deceive one's neighbor so as to injure him. Hence Tully says (De Offic. iii, 15): "Contracts should be entirely free from + double-dealing: the seller must not impose upon the bidder, nor the buyer upon one that bids against him." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A1-p7"> But, apart from fraud, we may speak of buying and selling in two ways. First, as considered in themselves, and from this + point of view, buying and selling seem to be established for the common advantage of both parties, one of whom requires that + which belongs to the other, and vice versa, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3). Now whatever is established for the common + advantage, should not be more of a burden to one party than to another, and consequently all contracts + between them should observe equality of thing and thing. Again, the quality of a thing that comes into human use is measured + by the price given for it, for which purpose money was invented, as stated in Ethic. v, 5. Therefore if either the price exceed + the quantity of the thing's worth, or, conversely, the thing exceed the price, there is no longer the equality of justice: + and consequently, to sell a thing for more than its worth, or to buy it for less than its worth, is in itself unjust and + unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A1-p8"> Secondly we may speak of buying and selling, considered as accidentally tending to the advantage of one party, and to the + disadvantage of the other: for instance, when a man has great need of a certain thing, while an other man will suffer if he + be without it. In such a case the just price will depend not only on the thing sold, but on the loss which the sale brings + on the seller. And thus it will be lawful to sell a thing for more than it is worth in itself, though the price + paid be not more than it is worth to the owner. Yet if the one man derive a great advantage by becoming possessed of the other + man's property, and the seller be not at a loss through being without that thing, the latter ought not to raise the price, + because the advantage accruing to the buyer, is not due to the seller, but to a circumstance affecting the buyer. Now no man + should sell what is not his, though he may charge for the loss he suffers. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A1-p9"> On the other hand if a man find that he derives great advantage from something he has bought, he may, of his own accord, + pay the seller something over and above: and this pertains to his honesty. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q77_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q96_A2.html">FS, Q[96], A[2]</a>) human law is given to the people among whom there are many lacking virtue, and it is not given to the virtuous alone. Hence + human law was unable to forbid all that is contrary to virtue; and it suffices for it to prohibit whatever is destructive + of human intercourse, while it treats other matters as though they were lawful, not by approving of them, but by not punishing + them. Accordingly, if + without employing deceit the seller disposes of his goods for more than their worth, or the buyer obtain them for less than + their worth, the law looks upon this as licit, and provides no punishment for so doing, unless the excess be too great, because + then even human law demands restitution to be made, for instance if a man be deceived in regard to more than half the amount + of the just price of a thing [*Cod. IV, xliv, De Rescind. Vend. 2,8]. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A1-p11"> On the other hand the Divine law leaves nothing unpunished that is contrary to virtue. Hence, according to the Divine law, + it is reckoned unlawful if the equality of justice be not observed in buying and selling: and he who has received more than + he ought must make compensation to him that has suffered loss, if the loss be considerable. I add this condition, because + the just price of things is not fixed with mathematical precision, but depends on a kind of estimate, so that a + slight addition or subtraction would not seem to destroy the equality of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says "this jester, either by looking into himself or by his experience of others, thought that all men are inclined + to wish to buy for a song and sell at a premium. But since in reality this is wicked, it is in every man's power to acquire + that justice whereby he may resist and overcome this inclination." And then he gives the example of a man who gave the just + price for a book to a man who through ignorance asked a low price for it. + Hence it is evident that this common desire is not from nature but from vice, wherefore it is common to many who walk along + the broad road of sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In commutative justice we consider chiefly real equality. On the other hand, in friendship based on utility we consider equality + of usefulness, so that the recompense should depend on the usefulness accruing, whereas in buying it should be equal to the + thing bought. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A1-p14"></p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A1-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q77.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q77_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q77_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q77_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q77_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q77_A2-p0.1">Whether a sale is rendered unlawful through a fault in the thing sold?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q77_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a sale is not rendered unjust and unlawful through a fault in the thing sold. For less account should + be taken of the other parts of a thing than of what belongs to its substance. Yet the sale of a thing does not seem to be + rendered unlawful through a fault in its substance: for instance, if a man sell instead of the real metal, silver or gold + produced by some chemical process, which is adapted to all the human uses for which silver and gold + are necessary, for instance in the making of vessels and the like. Much less therefore will it be an unlawful sale if the + thing be defective in other ways. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, any fault in the thing, affecting the quantity, would seem chiefly to be opposed to justice which consists in equality. + Now quantity is known by being measured: and the measures of things that come into human use are not fixed, but in some places + are greater, in others less, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 7). Therefore just as it is impossible to avoid defects + on the part of the thing sold, it seems that a sale is not rendered unlawful through + the thing sold being defective. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the thing sold is rendered defective by lacking a fitting quality. But in order to know the quality of a thing, + much knowledge is required that is lacking in most buyers. Therefore a sale is not rendered unlawful by a fault (in the thing + sold). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Offic. iii, 11): "It is manifestly a rule of justice that a good man should not depart from the truth, nor + inflict an unjust injury on anyone, nor have any connection with fraud." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A threefold fault may be found pertaining to the thing which is sold. One, in respect of the thing's substance: and if the + seller be aware of a fault in the thing he is selling, he is guilty of a fraudulent sale, so that the sale is rendered unlawful. + Hence we find it written against certain people ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q77_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.1.22" target="asv">Is. 1:22</a>), "Thy silver is turned into dross, thy wine is mingled with water": because that which is mixed is defective in its substance. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A2-p7"> Another defect is in respect of quantity which is known by being measured: wherefore if anyone knowingly make use of a faulty + measure in selling, he is guilty of fraud, and the sale is illicit. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q77_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.13" target="asv">Dt. 25:13,14</a>): "Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag, a greater and a less: neither shall there be in thy house a greater bushel + and a less," and further on ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q77_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.16" target="asv">Dt. 25:16</a>): "For the Lord . . . abhorreth him that doth + these things, and He hateth all injustice." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A2-p8"> A third defect is on the part of the quality, for instance, if a man sell an unhealthy animal as being a healthy one: and + if anyone do this knowingly he is guilty of a fraudulent sale, and the sale, in consequence, is illicit. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A2-p9"> In all these cases not only is the man guilty of a fraudulent sale, but he is also bound to restitution. But if any of the + foregoing defects be in the thing sold, and he knows nothing about this, the seller does not sin, because he does that which + is unjust materially, nor is his deed unjust, as shown above ( + <a id="SS_Q77_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q59_A2.html">Q[59], A[2]</a>). Nevertheless he is bound to compensate the buyer, when the defect comes to his knowledge. Moreover what has been said of + the seller + applies equally to the buyer. For sometimes it happens that the seller thinks his goods to be specifically of lower value, + as when a man sells gold instead of copper, and then if the buyer be aware of this, he buys it unjustly and is bound to restitution: + and the same applies to a defect in quantity as to a defect in quality. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gold and silver are costly not only on account of the usefulness of the vessels and other like things made from them, but + also on account of the excellence and purity of their substance. Hence if the gold or silver produced by alchemists has not + the true specific nature of gold and silver, the sale thereof is fraudulent and unjust, especially as real gold and silver + can produce certain results by their natural action, which the counterfeit gold and + silver of alchemists cannot produce. Thus the true metal has the property of making people joyful, and is helpful medicinally + against certain maladies. Moreover real gold can be employed more frequently, and lasts longer in its condition of purity + than counterfeit gold. If however real gold were to be produced by alchemy, it would not be unlawful to sell it for the genuine + article, for nothing prevents art from employing certain natural causes for the production of natural and true effects, as + Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) of things produced by the art of the demons. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The measures of salable commodities must needs be different in different places, on account of the difference of supply: + because where there is greater abundance, the measures are wont to be larger. However in each place those who govern the state + must determine the just measures of things salable, with due consideration for the conditions of place and time. Hence it + is not lawful to disregard such measures as are established by public authority or + custom. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 16) the price of things salable does not depend on their degree of nature, since at times + a horse fetches a higher price than a slave; but it depends on their usefulness to man. Hence it is not necessary for the + seller or buyer to be cognizant of the hidden qualities of the thing sold, but only of such as render the thing adapted to + man's use, for instance, that the horse be strong, run well and so forth. Such + qualities the seller and buyer can easily discover. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A2-p13"></p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A2-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q77_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q77_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q77_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q77_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q77_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q77_A3-p0.1">Whether the seller is bound to state the defects of the thing sold?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q77_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the seller is not bound to state the defects of the thing sold. Since the seller does not bind the buyer + to buy, he would seem to leave it to him to judge of the goods offered for sale. Now judgment about a thing and knowledge + of that thing belong to the same person. Therefore it does not seem imputable to the seller if the buyer be deceived in his + judgment, and be hurried into buying a thing without carefully inquiring into its + condition. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it seems foolish for anyone to do what prevents him carrying out his work. But if a man states the defects of the + goods he has for sale, he prevents their sale: wherefore Tully (De Offic. iii, 13) pictures a man as saying: "Could anything + be more absurd than for a public crier, instructed by the owner, to cry: 'I offer this unhealthy horse for sale?'" Therefore + the seller is not bound to state the defects of the thing sold. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man needs more to know the road of virtue than to know the faults of things offered for sale. Now one is not bound + to offer advice to all or to tell them the truth about matters pertaining to virtue, though one should not tell anyone what + is false. Much less therefore is a seller bound to tell the faults of what he offers for sale, as though he were counseling + the buyer. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if one were bound to tell the faults of what one offers for sale, this would only be in order to lower the price. + Now sometimes the price would be lowered for some other reason, without any defect in the thing sold: for instance, if the + seller carry wheat to a place where wheat fetches a high price, knowing that many will come after him carrying wheat; because + if the buyers knew this they would give a lower price. But apparently the seller need not + give the buyer this information. Therefore, in like manner, neither need he tell him the faults of the goods he is selling. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Offic. iii, 10): "In all contracts the defects of the salable commodity must be stated; and unless the seller + make them known, although the buyer has already acquired a right to them, the contract is voided on account of the fraudulent + action." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is always unlawful to give anyone an occasion of danger or loss, although a man need not always give another the help + or counsel which would be for his advantage in any way; but only in certain fixed cases, for instance when someone is subject + to him, or when he is the only one who can assist him. Now the seller who offers goods for sale, gives the buyer an occasion + of loss or danger, by the very fact that he offers him defective goods, if such defect may + occasion loss or danger to the buyer---loss, if, by reason of this defect, the goods are of less value, and he takes nothing + off the price on that account---danger, if this defect either hinder the use of the goods or render it hurtful, for instance, + if a man sells a lame for a fleet horse, a tottering house for a safe one, rotten or poisonous food for wholesome. Wherefore + if such like defects be hidden, and the seller does not make them known, the sale will be illicit and fraudulent, and the + seller will be bound to compensation for the loss incurred. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A3-p8"> On the other hand, if the defect be manifest, for instance if a horse have but one eye, or if the goods though useless to + the buyer, be useful to someone else, provided the seller take as much as he ought from the price, he is not bound to state + the defect of the goods, since perhaps on account of that defect the buyer might want him to allow a greater rebate than he + need. Wherefore the seller may look to his own indemnity, by withholding the defect of the goods. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Judgment cannot be pronounced save on what is manifest: for "a man judges of what he knows" (Ethic. i, 3). Hence if the defects + of the goods offered for sale be hidden, judgment of them is not sufficiently left with the buyer unless such defects be made + known to him. The case would be different if the defects were manifest. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There is no need to publish beforehand by the public crier the defects of the goods one is offering for sale, because if + he were to begin by announcing its defects, the bidders would be frightened to buy, through ignorance of other qualities that + might render the thing good and serviceable. Such defect ought to be stated to each individual that offers to buy: and then + he will be able to compare the various points one with the other, the good with the + bad: for nothing prevents that which is defective in one respect being useful in many others. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although a man is not bound strictly speaking to tell everyone the truth about matters pertaining to virtue, yet he is so + bound in a case when, unless he tells the truth, his conduct would endanger another man in detriment to virtue: and so it + is in this case. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The defect in a thing makes it of less value now than it seems to be: but in the case cited, the goods are expected to be + of less value at a future time, on account of the arrival of other merchants, which was not foreseen by the buyers. Wherefore + the seller, since he sells his goods at the price actually offered him, does not seem to act contrary to justice through not + stating what is going to happen. If however he were to do so, or if he lowered his + price, it would be exceedingly virtuous on his part: although he does not seem to be bound to do this as a debt of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A3-p13"></p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A3-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q77_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q77_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q77_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q77_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q78.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q77_A4-p0.1">Whether, in trading, it is lawful to sell a thing at a higher price than what was paid for it?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q77_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not lawful, in trading, to sell a thing for a higher price than we paid for it. For Chrysostom [*Hom. + xxxviii in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q77_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.21.12" target="asv"> Mat. 21:12</a>: "He that buys a thing in order that he may sell it, entire and unchanged, at a profit, is the trader who is cast out of + God's temple." Cassiodorus speaks in the same sense in his commentary on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q77_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.70.15" target="asv"> Ps. 70:15, + + </a>"Because I have not known learning, or trading" according to another version [*The Septuagint]: "What is trade," says he, + "but buying at a cheap price with the purpose of retailing at a higher price?" and he adds: "Such were the tradesmen whom + Our Lord cast out of the temple." Now no man is cast out of the temple except for a sin. Therefore such like trading is sinful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is contrary to justice to sell goods at a higher price than their worth, or to buy them for less than their value, + as shown above + <a id="SS_Q77_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q77_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now if you sell a thing for a higher price than you paid for it, you must either have bought it for less than its value, + or sell it for more than its value. Therefore this cannot be done without sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii): "Shun, as you would the plague, a cleric who from being poor has become wealthy, + or who, from being a nobody has become a celebrity." Now trading would net seem to be forbidden to clerics except on account + of its sinfulness. Therefore it is a sin in trading, to buy at a low price and to sell at a higher price. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q77_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.70.15" target="asv"> Ps. 70:15, </a> "Because I have not known learning," [*Cf. OBJ 1] says: "The greedy tradesman blasphemes over his losses; he lies and perjures + himself over the price of his wares. But these are vices of the man, not of the craft, which can be exercised without these + vices." Therefore trading is not in itself unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A tradesman is one whose business consists in the exchange of things. According to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), exchange + of things is twofold; one, natural as it were, and necessary, whereby one commodity is exchanged for another, or money taken + in exchange for a commodity, in order to satisfy the needs of life. Such like trading, properly speaking, does not belong + to tradesmen, but rather to housekeepers or civil servants who have to provide the household + or the state with the necessaries of life. The other kind of exchange is either that of money for money, or of any commodity + for money, not on account of the necessities of life, but for profit, and this kind of exchange, properly speaking, regards + tradesmen, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3). The former kind of exchange is commendable because it supplies a natural + need: but the latter is justly deserving of blame, because, considered in itself, it satisfies the greed for gain, which + knows no limit and tends to infinity. Hence trading, considered in itself, has a certain debasement attaching thereto, in + so far as, by its very nature, it does not imply a virtuous or necessary end. Nevertheless gain which is the end of trading, + though not implying, by its nature, anything virtuous or necessary, does not, in itself, connote anything sinful or contrary + to virtue: wherefore nothing prevents gain from being directed to some necessary or even virtuous end, and thus trading becomes + lawful. Thus, for instance, a man may intend the moderate gain which he seeks to acquire by trading for the upkeep of his + household, or for the assistance of the needy: or again, a man may take to trade for some public advantage, for instance, + lest his country lack the necessaries of life, and seek gain, not as an end, but as payment for his labor. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of Chrysostom refers to the trading which seeks gain as a last end. This is especially the case where a man sells + something at a higher price without its undergoing any change. For if he sells at a higher price something that has changed + for the better, he would seem to receive the reward of his labor. Nevertheless the gain itself may be lawfully intended, not + as a last end, but for the sake of some other end which is necessary or virtuous, + as stated above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not everyone that sells at a higher price than he bought is a tradesman, but only he who buys that he may sell at a profit. + If, on the contrary, he buys not for sale but for possession, and afterwards, for some reason wishes to sell, it is not a + trade transaction even if he sell at a profit. For he may lawfully do this, either because he has bettered the thing, or because + the value of the thing has changed with the change of place or time, or on + account of the danger he incurs in transferring the thing from one place to another, or again in having it carried by another. + In this sense neither buying nor selling is unjust. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Clerics should abstain not only from things that are evil in themselves, but even from those that have an appearance of evil. + This happens in trading, both because it is directed to worldly gain, which clerics should despise, and because trading is + open to so many vices, since "a merchant is hardly free from sins of the lips" [*'A merchant is hardly free from negligence, + and a huckster shall not be justified from the sins of the lips'] + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q77_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.26.28" target="asv">Ecclus. 26:28</a>). There is also another reason, because trading engages the mind too much with worldly cares, and consequently withdraws + it from spiritual cares; wherefore the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q77_A4-p9.2" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.4" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:4</a>): "No man being a soldier to God entangleth himself with secular businesses." Nevertheless it is lawful for clerics to engage + in the first mentioned kind of exchange, which is directed to supply the necessaries of life, either by buying or by selling. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q77_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q77_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q78.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q76_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q77_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q78" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q77_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q78_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q78-p0.1">(E) BY SINS COMMITTED IN LOANS (Q[78])</h3> + <p id="SS_Q78-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q78-p2">OF THE SIN OF USURY (FOUR ARTICLES)</p> + <p id="SS_Q78-p3"> We must now consider the sin of usury, which is committed in loans: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q78-p4"> (1) Whether it is a sin to take money as a price for money lent, which is to receive usury?</p> + <p id="SS_Q78-p5"> (2) Whether it is lawful to lend money for any other kind of consideration, by way of payment for the loan?</p> + <p id="SS_Q78-p6"> (3) Whether a man is bound to restore just gains derived from money taken in usury?</p> + <p id="SS_Q78-p7"> (4) Whether it is lawful to borrow money under a condition of usury?</p> + <div id="SS_Q78_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q78.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q78_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q78_A1-p0.1">Whether it is a sin to take usury for money lent?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q78_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not a sin to take usury for money lent. For no man sins through following the example of Christ. + But Our Lord said of Himself ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q78_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.19.23" target="asv">Lk. 19:23</a>): "At My coming I might have exacted it," i.e. the money lent, "with usury." Therefore it is not a sin to take usury for + lending money. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q78_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.18.8" target="asv"> Ps. 18:8, </a> "The law of the Lord is unspotted," because, to wit, it forbids sin. Now usury of a kind is allowed in the Divine law, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q78_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.19" target="asv"> Dt. 23:19,20</a>: "Thou shalt not fenerate to thy brother money, nor corn, nor any other thing, but to the stranger": nay more, it is even + promised as a reward for the observance of the Law, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q78_A1-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.28.12" target="asv"> Dt. 28:12</a>: "Thou shalt fenerate* to + many nations, and shalt not borrow of any one." [*'Faeneraberis'---'Thou shalt lend upon usury.' The Douay version has simply + 'lend.' The objection lays stress on the word 'faeneraberis': hence the necessity of rendering it by 'fenerate.'] Therefore + it is not a sin to take usury. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in human affairs justice is determined by civil laws. Now civil law allows usury to be taken. Therefore it seems + to be lawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the counsels are not binding under sin. But, among other counsels we find ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q78_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.35" target="asv">Lk. 6:35</a>): "Lend, hoping for nothing thereby." Therefore it is not a sin to take usury. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it does not seem to be in itself sinful to accept a price for doing what one is not bound to do. But one who has + money is not bound in every case to lend it to his neighbor. Therefore it is lawful for him sometimes to accept a price for + lending it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A1-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, silver made into coins does not differ specifically from silver made into a vessel. But it is lawful to accept a + price for the loan of a silver vessel. Therefore it is also lawful to accept a price for the loan of a silver coin. Therefore + usury is not in itself a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A1-p8"> + <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, anyone may lawfully accept a thing which its owner freely gives him. Now he who accepts the loan, freely gives the + usury. Therefore he who lends may lawfully take the usury. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A1-p9"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q78_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.25" target="asv">Ex. 22:25</a>): "If thou lend money to any of thy people that is poor, that dwelleth with thee, thou shalt not be hard upon them as an + extortioner, nor oppress them with usuries." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A1-p10"> + <b>I answer that,</b> To take usury for money lent is unjust in itself, because this is to sell what does not exist, and this evidently leads to + inequality which is contrary to justice. In order to make this evident, we must observe that there are certain things the + use of which consists in their consumption: thus we consume wine when we use it for drink and we consume wheat when we use + it for food. Wherefore in such like things the use of the thing must not be reckoned apart + from the thing itself, and whoever is granted the use of the thing, is granted the thing itself and for this reason, to lend + things of this kin is to transfer the ownership. Accordingly if a man wanted to sell wine separately from the use of the wine, + he would be selling the same thing twice, or he would be selling what does not exist, wherefore he would evidently commit + a sin of injustice. In like manner he commits an injustice who lends wine or wheat, and asks for double payment, viz. one, + the return of the thing in equal measure, the other, the price of the use, which is called usury. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A1-p11"> On the other hand, there are things the use of which does not consist in their consumption: thus to use a house is to dwell + in it, not to destroy it. Wherefore in such things both may be granted: for instance, one man may hand over to another the + ownership of his house while reserving to himself the use of it for a time, or vice versa, he may grant the use of the house, + while retaining the ownership. For this reason a man may lawfully make a charge for the use of his house, and, + besides this, revendicate the house from the person to whom he has granted its use, as happens in renting and letting a house. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A1-p12"> Now money, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5; Polit. i, 3) was invented chiefly for the purpose of exchange: and + consequently the proper and principal use of money is its consumption or alienation whereby it is sunk in exchange. Hence + it is by its very nature unlawful to take payment for the use of money lent, which payment is known as usury: and just as + a man is bound to restore other ill-gotten goods, so is he bound to restore the money which he has taken in usury. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In this passage usury must be taken figuratively for the increase of spiritual goods which God exacts from us, for He wishes + us ever to advance in the goods which we receive from Him: and this is for our own profit not for His. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Jews were forbidden to take usury from their brethren, i.e. from other Jews. By this we are given to understand that + to take usury from any man is evil simply, because we ought to treat every man as our neighbor and brother, especially in + the state of the Gospel, whereto all are called. Hence it is said without any distinction in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q78_A1-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.14.5" target="asv"> Ps. 14:5</a>: "He that hath not put out his money to usury," and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q78_A1-p14.2" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.8" target="asv">Ezech. 18:8</a>): + "Who hath not taken usury [*Vulg.: 'If a man . . . hath not lent upon money, nor taken any increase . . . he is just.']." + They were permitted, however, to take usury from foreigners, not as though it were lawful, but in order to avoid a greater + evil, lest, to wit, through avarice to which they were prone according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q78_A1-p14.3" href="./asv.html#Isa.56.11" target="asv"> Is. 56:11, </a> they should take usury from the Jews who were worshippers of God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A1-p15"> Where we find it promised to them as a reward, "Thou shalt fenerate to many nations," etc., fenerating is to be taken in + a broad sense for lending, as in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q78_A1-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.29.10" target="asv"> Ecclus. 29:10, </a> where we read: "Many have refused to fenerate, not out of wickedness," i.e. they would not lend. Accordingly the Jews are + promised in reward an abundance of wealth, so that they would be able to lend to others. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A1-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Human laws leave certain things unpunished, on account of the condition of those who are imperfect, and who would be deprived + of many advantages, if all sins were strictly forbidden and punishments appointed for them. Wherefore human law has permitted + usury, not that it looks upon usury as harmonizing with justice, but lest the advantage of many should be hindered. Hence + it is that in civil law [*Inst. II, iv, de Usufructu] it is stated that "those + things according to natural reason and civil law which are consumed by being used, do not admit of usufruct," and that "the + senate did not (nor could it) appoint a usufruct to such things, but established a quasi-usufruct," namely by permitting usury. + Moreover the Philosopher, led by natural reason, says (Polit. i, 3) that "to make money by usury is exceedingly unnatural." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A1-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A man is not always bound to lend, and for this reason it is placed among the counsels. Yet it is a matter of precept not + to seek profit by lending: although it may be called a matter of counsel in comparison with the maxims of the Pharisees, who + deemed some kinds of usury to be lawful, just as love of one's enemies is a matter of counsel. Or again, He speaks here not + of the hope of usurious gain, but of the hope which is put in man. For we ought not + to lend or do any good deed through hope in man, but only through hope in God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A1-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> He that is not bound to lend, may accept repayment for what he has done, but he must not exact more. Now he is repaid according + to equality of justice if he is repaid as much as he lent. Wherefore if he exacts more for the usufruct of a thing which has + no other use but the consumption of its substance, he exacts a price of something non-existent: and so his exaction is unjust. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A1-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The principal use of a silver vessel is not its consumption, and so one may lawfully sell its use while retaining one's ownership + of it. On the other hand the principal use of silver money is sinking it in exchange, so that it is not lawful to sell its + use and at the same time expect the restitution of the amount lent. It must be observed, however, that the secondary use of + silver vessels may be an exchange, and such use may not be lawfully sold. In + like manner there may be some secondary use of silver money; for instance, a man might lend coins for show, or to be used + as security. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A1-p20"> + <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> He who gives usury does not give it voluntarily simply, but under a certain necessity, in so far as he needs to borrow money + which the owner is unwilling to lend without usury. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A1-p21"></p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A1-p22"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q78.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q78_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q78_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q78_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q78_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q78_A2-p0.1">Whether it is lawful to ask for any other kind of consideration for money lent?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q78_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one may ask for some other kind of consideration for money lent. For everyone may lawfully seek to indemnify + himself. Now sometimes a man suffers loss through lending money. Therefore he may lawfully ask for or even exact something + else besides the money lent. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated in Ethic. v, 5, one is in duty bound by a point of honor, to repay anyone who has done us a favor. Now + to lend money to one who is in straits is to do him a favor for which he should be grateful. Therefore the recipient of a + loan, is bound by a natural debt to repay something. Now it does not seem unlawful to bind oneself to an obligation of the + natural law. Therefore it is not unlawful, in lending money to anyone, to demand some sort of + compensation as condition of the loan. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as there is real remuneration, so is there verbal remuneration, and remuneration by service, as a gloss says + on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q78_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.33.15" target="asv"> Is. 33:15, </a> "Blessed is he that shaketh his hands from all bribes [*Vulg.: 'Which of you shall dwell with everlasting burnings? . . . + He that shaketh his hands from all bribes.']." Now it is lawful to accept service or praise from one to whom one has lent + money. Therefore in like manner it is lawful to accept any + other kind of remuneration. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, seemingly the relation of gift to gift is the same as of loan to loan. But it is lawful to accept money for money + given. Therefore it is lawful to accept repayment by loan in return for a loan granted. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the lender, by transferring his ownership of a sum of money removes the money further from himself than he who entrusts + it to a merchant or craftsman. Now it is lawful to receive interest for money entrusted to a merchant or craftsman. Therefore + it is also lawful to receive interest for money lent. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A2-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, a man may accept a pledge for money lent, the use of which pledge he might sell for a price: as when a man mortgages + his land or the house wherein he dwells. Therefore it is lawful to receive interest for money lent. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A2-p8"> + <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, it sometimes happens that a man raises the price of his goods under guise of loan, or buys another's goods at a + low figure; or raises his price through delay in being paid, and lowers his price that he may be paid the sooner. Now in all + these cases there seems to be payment for a loan of money: nor does it appear to be manifestly illicit. Therefore it seems + to be lawful to expect or exact some consideration for money lent. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A2-p9"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Among other conditions requisite in a just man it is stated ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q78_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.17" target="asv">Ezech. 18:17</a>) that he "hath not taken usury and increase." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A2-p10"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1), a thing is reckoned as money "if its value can be measured by money." Consequently, + just as it is a sin against justice, to take money, by tacit or express agreement, in return for lending money or anything + else that is consumed by being used, so also is it a like sin, by tacit or express agreement to receive anything whose price + can be measured by money. Yet there would be no sin in receiving something of the + kind, not as exacting it, nor yet as though it were due on account of some agreement tacit or expressed, but as a gratuity: + since, even before lending the money, one could accept a gratuity, nor is one in a worse condition through lending. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A2-p11"> On the other hand it is lawful to exact compensation for a loan, in respect of such things as are not appreciated by a measure + of money, for instance, benevolence, and love for the lender, and so forth. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A lender may without sin enter an agreement with the borrower for compensation for the loss he incurs of something he ought + to have, for this is not to sell the use of money but to avoid a loss. It may also happen that the borrower avoids a greater + loss than the lender incurs, wherefore the borrower may repay the lender with what he has gained. But the lender cannot enter + an agreement for compensation, through the fact that he makes no profit out of + his money: because he must not sell that which he has not yet and may be prevented in many ways from having. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Repayment for a favor may be made in two ways. In one way, as a debt of justice; and to such a debt a man may be bound by + a fixed contract; and its amount is measured according to the favor received. Wherefore the borrower of money or any such + thing the use of which is its consumption is not bound to repay more than he received in loan: and consequently it is against + justice if he be obliged to pay back more. In another way a man's obligation to + repayment for favor received is based on a debt of friendship, and the nature of this debt depends more on the feeling with + which the favor was conferred than on the greatness of the favor itself. This debt does not carry with it a civil obligation, + involving a kind of necessity that would exclude the spontaneous nature of such a repayment. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A2-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If a man were, in return for money lent, as though there had been an agreement tacit or expressed, to expect or exact repayment + in the shape of some remuneration of service or words, it would be the same as if he expected or exacted some real remuneration, + because both can be priced at a money value, as may be seen in the case of those who offer for hire the labor which they exercise + by work or by tongue. If on the other hand the remuneration by + service or words be given not as an obligation, but as a favor, which is not to be appreciated at a money value, it is lawful + to take, exact, and expect it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A2-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Money cannot be sold for a greater sum than the amount lent, which has to be paid back: nor should the loan be made with + a demand or expectation of aught else but of a feeling of benevolence which cannot be priced at a pecuniary value, and which + can be the basis of a spontaneous loan. Now the obligation to lend in return at some future time is repugnant to such a feeling, + because again an obligation of this kind has its pecuniary value. Consequently + it is lawful for the lender to borrow something else at the same time, but it is unlawful for him to bind the borrower to + grant him a loan at some future time. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A2-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> He who lends money transfers the ownership of the money to the borrower. Hence the borrower holds the money at his own risk + and is bound to pay it all back: wherefore the lender must not exact more. On the other hand he that entrusts his money to + a merchant or craftsman so as to form a kind of society, does not transfer the ownership of his money to them, for it remains + his, so that at his risk the merchant speculates with it, or the craftsman uses it + for his craft, and consequently he may lawfully demand as something belonging to him, part of the profits derived from his + money. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A2-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> If a man in return for money lent to him pledges something that can be valued at a price, the lender must allow for the use + of that thing towards the repayment of the loan. Else if he wishes the gratuitous use of that thing in addition to repayment, + it is the same as if he took money for lending, and that is usury, unless perhaps it were such a thing as friends are wont + to lend to one another gratis, as in the case of the loan of a book. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A2-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> If a man wish to sell his goods at a higher price than that which is just, so that he may wait for the buyer to pay, it is + manifestly a case of usury: because this waiting for the payment of the price has the character of a loan, so that whatever + he demands beyond the just price in consideration of this delay, is like a price for a loan, which pertains to usury. In like + manner if a buyer wishes to buy goods at a lower price than what is just, for the + reason that he pays for the goods before they can be delivered, it is a sin of usury; because again this anticipated payment + of money has the character of a loan, the price of which is the rebate on the just price of the goods sold. On the other hand + if a man wishes to allow a rebate on the just price in order that he may have his money sooner, he is not guilty of the sin + of usury. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A2-p19"></p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A2-p20"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q78_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q78_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q78_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q78_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q78_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q78_A3-p0.1">Whether a man is bound to restore whatever profits he has made out of money gotten by usury?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q78_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man is bound to restore whatever profits he has made out of money gotten by usury. For the Apostle says + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q78_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.16" target="asv">Rom. 11:16</a>): "If the root be holy, so are the branches." Therefore likewise if the root be rotten so are the branches. But the root + was infected with usury. Therefore whatever profit is made therefrom is infected with usury. Therefore he is bound to restore + it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is laid down (Extra, De Usuris, in the Decretal: 'Cum tu sicut asseris'): "Property accruing from usury must + be sold, and the price repaid to the persons from whom the usury was extorted." Therefore, likewise, whatever else is acquired + from usurious money must be restored. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which a man buys with the proceeds of usury is due to him by reason of the money he paid for it. Therefore + he has no more right to the thing purchased than to the money he paid. But he was bound to restore the money gained through + usury. Therefore he is also bound to restore what he acquired with it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A man may lawfully hold what he has lawfully acquired. Now that which is acquired by the proceeds of usury is sometimes lawfully + acquired. Therefore it may be lawfully retained. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q78_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q78_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, there are certain things whose use is their consumption, and which do not admit of usufruct, according to law (ibid., ad + 3). Wherefore if such like things be extorted by means of usury, for instance money, wheat, wine and so forth, the lender + is not bound to restore more than he received (since what is acquired by such things is the fruit not of the thing but of + human industry), unless indeed the other party + by losing some of his own goods be injured through the lender retaining them: for then he is bound to make good the loss. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A3-p7"> On the other hand, there are certain things whose use is not their consumption: such things admit of usufruct, for instance + house or land property and so forth. Wherefore if a man has by usury extorted from another his house or land, he is bound + to restore not only the house or land but also the fruits accruing to him therefrom, since they are the fruits of things owned + by another man and consequently are due to him. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The root has not only the character of matter, as money made by usury has; but has also somewhat the character of an active + cause, in so far as it administers nourishment. Hence the comparison fails. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Further, Property acquired from usury does not belong to the person who paid usury, but to the person who bought it. Yet + he that paid usury has a certain claim on that property just as he has on the other goods of the usurer. Hence it is not prescribed + that such property should be assigned to the persons who paid usury, since the property is perhaps worth more than what they + paid in usury, but it is commanded that the property be sold, and the price + be restored, of course according to the amount taken in usury. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The proceeds of money taken in usury are due to the person who acquired them not by reason of the usurious money as instrumental + cause, but on account of his own industry as principal cause. Wherefore he has more right to the goods acquired with usurious + money than to the usurious money itself. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q78_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q78_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q78_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q78_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q79.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q78_A4-p0.1">Whether it is lawful to borrow money under a condition of usury?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q78_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not lawful to borrow money under a condition of usury. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q78_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.32" target="asv">Rom. 1:32</a>) that they "are worthy of death . . . not only they that do" these sins, "but they also that consent to them that do them." + Now he that borrows money under a condition of usury consents in the sin of the usurer, and gives him an occasion of sin. + Therefore he sins also. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, for no temporal advantage ought one to give another an occasion of committing a sin: for this pertains to active + scandal, which is always sinful, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q78_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q43_A2.html">Q[43], A[2]</a>). Now he that seeks to borrow from a usurer gives him an occasion of sin. Therefore he is not to be excused on account of + any temporal advantage. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it seems no less necessary sometimes to deposit one's money with a usurer than to borrow from him. Now it seems + altogether unlawful to deposit one's money with a usurer, even as it would be unlawful to deposit one's sword with a madman, + a maiden with a libertine, or food with a glutton. Neither therefore is it lawful to borrow from a usurer. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> He that suffers injury does not sin, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 11), wherefore justice is not a mean between + two vices, as stated in the same book (ch. 5). Now a usurer sins by doing an injury to the person who borrows from him under + a condition of usury. Therefore he that accepts a loan under a condition of usury does not sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is by no means lawful to induce a man to sin, yet it is lawful to make use of another's sin for a good end, since even + God uses all sin for some good, since He draws some good from every evil as stated in the Enchiridion (xi). Hence when Publicola + asked whether it were lawful to make use of an oath taken by a man swearing by false gods (which is a manifest sin, for he + gives Divine honor to them) Augustine (Ep. xlvii) answered that he who uses, not for a + bad but for a good purpose, the oath of a man that swears by false gods, is a party, not to his sin of swearing by demons, + but to his good compact whereby he kept his word. If however he were to induce him to swear by false gods, he would sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A4-p7"> Accordingly we must also answer to the question in point that it is by no means lawful to induce a man to lend under a condition + of usury: yet it is lawful to borrow for usury from a man who is ready to do so and is a usurer by profession; provided the + borrower have a good end in view, such as the relief of his own or another's need. Thus too it is lawful for a man who has + fallen among thieves to point out his property to them (which they sin in taking) in order to save his + life, after the example of the ten men who said to Ismahel ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q78_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.41.8" target="asv">Jer. 41:8</a>): "Kill us not: for we have stores in the field." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> He who borrows for usury does not consent to the usurer's sin but makes use of it. Nor is it the usurer's acceptance of usury + that pleases him, but his lending, which is good. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He who borrows for usury gives the usurer an occasion, not for taking usury, but for lending; it is the usurer who finds + an occasion of sin in the malice of his heart. Hence there is passive scandal on his part, while there is no active scandal + on the part of the person who seeks to borrow. Nor is this passive scandal a reason why the other person should desist from + borrowing if he is in need, since this passive scandal arises not from weakness or + ignorance but from malice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If one were to entrust one's money to a usurer lacking other means of practising usury; or with the intention of making a + greater profit from his money by reason of the usury, one would be giving a sinner matter for sin, so that one would be a + participator in his guilt. If, on the other hand, the usurer to whom one entrusts one's money has other means of practising + usury, there is no sin in entrusting it to him that it may be in safer keeping, since + this is to use a sinner for a good purpose. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q78_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q78_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q79.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q77_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q78_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q79" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q78_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q79_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q79-p0.1">OF THE QUASI-INTEGRAL PARTS OF JUSTICE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q79-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q79-p2"> We must now consider the quasi-integral parts of justice, which are "to do good," and "to decline from evil," and the opposite + vices. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79-p3"> (1) Whether these two are parts of justice?</p> + <p id="SS_Q79-p4"> (2) Whether transgression is a special sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q79-p5"> (3) Whether omission is a special sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q79-p6"> (4) Of the comparison between omission and transgression.</p> + <div id="SS_Q79_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q79.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q79_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q79_A1-p0.1">Whether to decline from evil and to do good are parts of justice?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q79_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to decline from evil and to do good are not parts of justice. For it belongs to every virtue to perform + a good deed and to avoid an evil one. But parts do not exceed the whole. Therefore to decline from evil and to do good should + not be reckoned parts of justice, which is a special kind of virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q79_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.15" target="asv"> Ps. 33:15, </a> "Turn away from evil and do good," says: "The former," i.e. to turn away from evil, "avoids sin, the latter," i.e. to do + good, "deserves the life and the palm." But any part of a virtue deserves the life and the palm. Therefore to decline from + evil is not a part of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things that are so related that one implies the other, are not mutually distinct as parts of a whole. Now declining + from evil is implied in doing good: since no one does evil and good at the same time. Therefore declining from evil and doing + good are not parts of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Correp. et Grat. i) declares that "declining from evil and doing good" belong to the justice of the law. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of good and evil in general, it belongs to every virtue to do good and to avoid evil: and in this sense they + cannot be reckoned parts of justice, except justice be taken in the sense of "all virtue" [*Cf. + <a id="SS_Q79_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A5.html"> Q[58], A[5]</a>]. And yet even if justice be taken in this sense it regards a certain special aspect of good; namely, the good as due in + respect of Divine or human law. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A1-p7"> On the other hand justice considered as a special virtue regards good as due to one's neighbor. And in this sense it belongs + to special justice to do good considered as due to one's neighbor, and to avoid the opposite evil, that, namely, which is + hurtful to one's neighbor; while it belongs to general justice to do good in relation to the community or in relation to God, + and to avoid the opposite evil. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A1-p8"> Now these two are said to be quasi-integral parts of general or of special justice, because each is required for the perfect + act of justice. For it belongs to justice to establish equality in our relations with others, as shown above ( + <a id="SS_Q79_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A2.html">Q[58], A[2]</a>): and it pertains to the same cause to establish and to preserve that which it has established. Now a person establishes + the equality of justice by doing good, i.e. by rendering to another his due: and he + preserves the already established equality of justice by declining from evil, that is by inflicting no injury on his neighbor. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Good and evil are here considered under a special aspect, by which they are appropriated to justice. The reason why these + two are reckoned parts of justice under a special aspect of good and evil, while they are not reckoned parts of any other + moral virtue, is that the other moral virtues are concerned with the passions wherein to do good is to observe the mean, which + is the same as to avoid the extremes as evils: so that doing good and avoiding evil + come to the same, with regard to the other virtues. On the other hand justice is concerned with operations and external things, + wherein to establish equality is one thing, and not to disturb the equality established is another. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To decline from evil, considered as a part of justice, does not denote a pure negation, viz."not to do evil"; for this does + not deserve the palm, but only avoids the punishment. But it implies a movement of the will in repudiating evil, as the very + term "decline" shows. This is meritorious; especially when a person resists against an instigation to do evil. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Doing good is the completive act of justice, and the principal part, so to speak, thereof. Declining from evil is a more + imperfect act, and a secondary part of that virtue. Hence it is a. material part, so to speak, thereof, and a necessary condition + of the formal and completive part. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q79.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q79_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q79_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q79_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q79_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q79_A2-p0.1">Whether transgression is a special sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q79_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that transgression is not a special sin. For no species is included in the definition of its genus. Now transgression + is included in the definition of sin; because Ambrose says (De Parad. viii) that sin is "a transgression of the Divine law." + Therefore transgression is not a species of sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no species is more comprehensive than its genus. But transgression is more comprehensive than sin, because sin is + a "word, deed or desire against the law of God," according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27), while transgression is also + against nature, or custom. Therefore transgression is not a species of sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no species contains all the parts into which its genus is divided. Now the sin of transgression extends to all the + capital vices, as well as to sins of thought, word and deed. Therefore transgression is not a special sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is opposed to a special virtue, namely justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The term transgression is derived from bodily movement and applied to moral actions. Now a person is said to transgress in + bodily movement, when he steps [graditur] beyond [trans] a fixed boundary---and it is a negative precept that fixes the boundary + that man must not exceed in his moral actions. Wherefore to transgress, properly speaking, is to act against a negative precept. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A2-p7"> Now materially considered this may be common to all the species of sin, because man transgresses a Divine precept by any + species of mortal sin. But if we consider it formally, namely under its special aspect of an act against a negative precept, + it is a special sin in two ways. First, in so far as it is opposed to those kinds of sin that are opposed to the other virtues: + for just as it belongs properly to legal justice to consider a precept as binding, so it belongs properly to + a transgression to consider a precept as an object of contempt. Secondly, in so far as it is distinct from omission which + is opposed to an affirmative precept. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as legal justice is "all virtue" ( + <a id="SS_Q79_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A5.html">Q[58], A[5]</a>) as regards its subject and matter, so legal injustice is materially "all sin." It is in this way that Ambrose defined sin, + considering it from the point of view of legal injustice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The natural inclination concerns the precepts of the natural law. Again, a laudable custom has the force of a precept; since + as Augustine says in an epistle On the Fast of the Sabbath (Ep. xxxvi), "a custom of God's people should be looked upon as + law." Hence both sin and transgression may be against a laudable custom and against a natural inclination. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All these species of sin may include transgression, if we consider them not under their proper aspects, but under a special + aspect, as stated above. The sin of omission, however, is altogether distinct from the sin of transgression. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q79_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q79_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q79_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q79_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q79_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q79_A3-p0.1">Whether omission is a special sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q79_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that omission is not a special sin. For every sin is either original or actual. Now omission is not original + sin, for it is not contracted through origin nor is it actual sin, for it may be altogether without act, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q79_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A5.html">FS, Q[71], A[5]</a>) when we were treating of sins in general. Therefore omission is not a special sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every sin is voluntary. Now omission sometimes is not voluntary but necessary, as when a woman is violated after + taking a vow of virginity, or when one lose that which one is under an obligation to restore, or when a priest is bound to + say Mass, and is prevented from doing so. Therefore omission is not always a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is possible to fix the time when any special sin begins. But this is not possible in the case of omission, since + one is not altered by not doing a thing, no matter when the omission occurs, and yet the omission is not always sinful. Therefore + omission is not a special sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every special sin is opposed to a special virtue. But it is not possible to assign any special virtue to which omission + is opposed, both because the good of any virtue can be omitted, and because justice to which it would seem more particularly + opposed, always requires an act, even in declining from evil, as stated above (A[1], ad 2), while omission may be altogether + without act. Therefore omission is not a special sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q79_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.17" target="asv">James 4:17</a>): "To him . . . who knoweth to do good and doth it not, to him it is sin." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> omission signifies the non-fulfilment of a good, not indeed of any good, but of a good that is due. Now good under the aspect + of due belongs properly to justice; to legal justice, if the thing due depends on Divine or human law; to special justice, + if the due is something in relation to one's neighbor. Wherefore, in the same way as justice is a special virtue, as stated + above ( + <a id="SS_Q79_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A6.html">Q[58], AA[6]</a>,7), omission is a special sin distinct from + the sins which are opposed to the other virtues; and just as doing good, which is the opposite of omitting it, is a special + part of justice, distinct from avoiding evil, to which transgression is opposed, so too is omission distinct from transgression. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Omission is not original but actual sin, not as though it had some act essential to it, but for as much as the negation of + an act is reduced to the genus of act, and in this sense non-action is a kind of action, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q79_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A6.html">FS, Q[71], A[6]</a>, ad 1). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Omission, as stated above, is only of such good as is due and to which one is bound. Now no man is bound to the impossible: + wherefore no man sins by omission, if he does not do what he cannot. Accordingly she who is violated after vowing virginity, + is guilty of an omission, not through not having virginity, but through not repenting of her past sin, or through not doing + what she can to fulfil her vow by observing continence. Again a priest is not + bound to say Mass, except he have a suitable opportunity, and if this be lacking, there is no omission. And in like manner, + a person is bound to restitution, supposing he has the wherewithal; if he has not and cannot have it, he is not guilty of + an omission, provided he does what he can. The same applies to other similar cases. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as the sin of transgression is opposed to negative precepts which regard the avoidance of evil, so the sin of omission + is opposed to affirmative precepts, which regard the doing of good. Now affirmative precepts bind not for always, but for + a fixed time, and at that time the sin of omission begins. But it may happen that then one is unable to do what one ought, + and if this inability is without any fault on his part, he does not omit his duty, as + stated above (ad 2; + <a id="SS_Q79_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A5.html">FS, Q[71], A[5]</a>). On the other hand if this inability is due to some previous fault of his (for instance, if a man gets drunk at night, and + cannot get up for matins, as he ought to), some say that the sin of omission begins when he engages in an action that is illicit + and incompatible with the act to which he is bound. But this does not seem to be true, for supposing one were to rouse him + by violence and that he went to matins, he would not omit to + go, so that, evidently, the previous drunkenness was not an omission, but the cause of an omission. Consequently, we must + say that the omission begins to be imputed to him as a sin, when the time comes for the action; and yet this is on account + of a preceding cause by reason of which the subsequent omission becomes voluntary. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Omission is directly opposed to justice, as stated above; because it is a non-fulfilment of a good of virtue, but only under + the aspect of due, which pertains to justice. Now more is required for an act to be virtuous and meritorious than for it to + be sinful and demeritorious, because "good results from an entire cause, whereas evil arises from each single defect" [*Dionysius, + De Div. Nom. iv]. Wherefore the merit of justice requires an act, whereas + an omission does not. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q79_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q79_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q79_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q79_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q80.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q79_A4-p0.1">Whether a sin of omission is more grievous than a sin of transgression?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q79_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a sin of omission is more grievous than a sin of transgression. For "delictum" would seem to signify the + same as "derelictum" [*Augustine, QQ. in Levit., qu. xx], and therefore is seemingly the same as an omission. But "delictum" + denotes a more grievous offence than transgression, because it deserves more expiation as appears from + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q79_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.5" target="asv">Lev. 5</a>. Therefore the sin of omission is more grievous than the sin of transgression. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the greater evil is opposed to the greater good, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 10). Now to do good is + a more excellent part of justice, than to decline from evil, to which transgression is opposed, as stated above (A[1], ad + 3). Therefore omission is a graver sin than transgression. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sins of transgression may be either venial or mortal. But sins of omission seem to be always mortal, since they + are opposed to an affirmative precept. Therefore omission would seem to be a graver sin than transgression. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the pain of loss which consists in being deprived of seeing God and is inflicted for the sin of omission, is a greater + punishment than the pain of sense, which is inflicted for the sin of transgression, as Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiii super + Matth.). Now punishment is proportionate to fault. Therefore the sin of omission is graver than the sin of transgression. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is easier to refrain from evil deeds than to accomplish good deeds. Therefore it is a graver sin not to refrain from an + evil deed, i.e. "to transgress," than not to accomplish a good deed, which is "to omit." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The gravity of a sin depends on its remoteness from virtue. Now contrariety is the greatest remoteness, according to Metaph. + x [*Didot. ed. ix, 4]. Wherefore a thing is further removed from its contrary than from its simple negation; thus black is + further removed from white than not-white is, since every black is not-white, but not conversely. Now it is evident that transgression + is contrary to an act of virtue, while omission denotes the negation thereof: + for instance it is a sin of omission, if one fail to give one's parents due reverence, while it is a sin of transgression + to revile them or injure them in any way. Hence it is evident that, simply and absolutely speaking, transgression is a graver + sin than omission, although a particular omission may be graver than a particular transgression. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Delictum" in its widest sense denotes any kind of omission; but sometimes it is taken strictly for the omission of something + concerning God, or for a man's intentional and as it were contemptuous dereliction of duty: and then it has a certain gravity, + for which reason it demands a greater expiation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The opposite of "doing good" is both "not doing good," which is an omission, and "doing evil," which is a transgression: + but the first is opposed by contradiction, the second by contrariety, which implies greater remoteness: wherefore transgression + is the more grievous sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as omission is opposed to affirmative precepts, so is transgression opposed to negative precepts: wherefore both, strictly + speaking, have the character of mortal sin. Transgression and omission, however, may be taken broadly for any infringement + of an affirmative or negative precept, disposing to the opposite of such precept: and so taking both in a broad sense they + may be venial sins. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> To the sin of transgression there correspond both the pain of loss on account of the aversion from God, and the pain of sense, + on account of the inordinate conversion to a mutable good. In like manner omission deserves not only the pain of loss, but + also the pain of sense, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q79_A4-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.19" target="asv"> Mat. 7:19, </a> "Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit shall be cut down, and shall be cast into the fire"; and this on account of + the root from + which it grows, although it does not necessarily imply conversion to any mutable good. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A4-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q79_A4-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q79_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q80.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q78_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q79_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q80" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q79_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q80_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q80-p0.1">OF THE POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE (ONE ARTICLE)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q80-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q80-p2"> We must now consider the potential parts of justice, namely the virtues annexed thereto; under which head there are two points + of consideration: + </p> + <p id="SS_Q80-p3"> (1) What virtues are annexed to justice?</p> + <p id="SS_Q80-p4"> (2) The individual virtues annexed to justice.</p> + <div id="SS_Q80_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q80.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q80_A1-p0.1">Whether the virtues annexed to justice are suitably enumerated?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q80_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q80_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the virtues annexed to justice are unsuitably enumerated Tully [*De Invent. ii, 53] reckons six, viz. + "religion, piety, gratitude, revenge, observance, truth." Now revenge is seemingly a species of commutative justice whereby + revenge is taken for injuries inflicted, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q80_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q61_A4.html">Q[61], A[4]</a>). Therefore it should not be reckoned among the virtues annexed to justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q80_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons seven, viz. "innocence, friendship, concord, piety, religion, affection, + humanity," several of which are omitted by Tully. Therefore the virtues annexed to justice would seem to be insufficiently + enumerated. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q80_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, others reckon five parts of justice, viz. "obedience" in respect of one's superiors, "discipline" with regard to + inferiors, "equity" as regards equals, "fidelity" and "truthfulness" towards all; and of these "truthfulness" alone is mentioned + by Tully. Therefore he would seem to have enumerated insufficiently the virtues annexed to justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q80_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the peripatetic Andronicus [*De Affectibus] reckons nine parts annexed to justice viz. "liberality, kindliness, + revenge, commonsense, [*{eugnomosyne}] piety, gratitude, holiness, just exchange" and "just lawgiving"; and of all these it + is evident that Tully mentions none but "revenge." Therefore he would appear to have made an incomplete enumeration. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q80_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Aristotle (Ethic. v, 10) mentions {epieikeia} as being annexed to justice: and yet seemingly it is not included + in any of the foregoing enumerations. Therefore the virtues annexed to justice are insufficiently enumerated. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q80_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Two points must be observed about the virtues annexed to a principal virtue. The first is that these virtues have something + in common with the principal virtue; and the second is that in some respect they fall short of the perfection of that virtue. + Accordingly since justice is of one man to another as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q80_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A2.html">Q[58], A[2]</a>), all the virtues that are directed to another person may by reason of this common aspect be annexed to + justice. Now the essential character of justice consists in rendering to another his due according to equality, as stated + above ( + <a id="SS_Q80_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A11.html">Q[58], A[11]</a>). Wherefore in two ways may a virtue directed to another person fall short of the perfection of justice: first, by falling + short of the aspect of equality; secondly, by falling short of the aspect of due. For certain virtues there are which render + another his due, but are unable to render the equal due. In the first place, + whatever man renders to God is due, yet it cannot be equal, as though man rendered to God as much as he owes Him, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q80_A1-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.115.12" target="asv"> Ps. 115:12, </a> "What shall I render to the Lord for all the things that He hath rendered to me?" In this respect "religion" is annexed to + justice since, according to Tully (De invent. ii, 53), it consists in offering service and ceremonial rites or worship to + "some superior nature that men call divine." Secondly, it is not possible to make to one's + parents an equal return of what one owes to them, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 14); and thus "piety" is annexed + to justice, for thereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), a man "renders service and constant deference to his kindred and + the well-wishers of his country." Thirdly, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), man is unable to offer an equal meed + for virtue, and thus "observance" is annexed to justice, consisting according to Tully (De invent. ii, 53) in the "deference + and honor rendered to those who excel in worth." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q80_A1-p8"> A falling short of the just due may be considered in respect of a twofold due, moral or legal: wherefore the Philosopher + (Ethic. viii, 13) assigns a corresponding twofold just. The legal due is that which one is bound to render by reason of a + legal obligation; and this due is chiefly the concern of justice, which is the principal virtue. On the other hand, the moral + due is that to which one is bound in respect of the rectitude of virtue: and since a due implies necessity, this + kind of due has two degrees. For one due is so necessary that without it moral rectitude cannot be ensured: and this has more + of the character of due. Moreover this due may be considered from the point of view of the debtor, and in this way it pertains + to this kind of due that a man represent himself to others just as he is, both in word and deed. Wherefore to justice is annexed + "truth," whereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), present, past and future things are told without perversion. It + may also be considered from the point of view of the person to whom it is due, by comparing the reward he receives with what + he has done---sometimes in good things; and then annexed to justice we have "gratitude" which "consists in recollecting the + friendship and kindliness shown by others, and in desiring to pay them back," as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53)---and sometimes + in evil things, and then to justice is annexed "revenge," whereby, as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53), "we resist + force, injury or anything obscure* by taking vengeance or by self-defense." [*St. Thomas read 'obscurum,' and explains it + as meaning 'derogatory,' infra + <a id="SS_Q80_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q108_A2.html"> Q[108], A[2]</a>. Cicero, however, wrote 'obfuturum,' i.e. 'hurtful.'] + </p> + <p id="SS_Q80_A1-p9"> There is another due that is necessary in the sense that it conduces to greater rectitude, although without it rectitude + may be ensured. This due is the concern of "liberality," "affability" or "friendship," or the like, all of which Tully omits + in the aforesaid enumeration because there is little of the nature of anything due in them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q80_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The revenge taken by authority of a public power, in accordance with a judge's sentence, belongs to commutative justice: + whereas the revenge which a man takes on his own initiative, though not against the law, or which a man seeks to obtain from + a judge, belongs to the virtue annexed to justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q80_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Macrobius appears to have considered the two integral parts of justice, namely, "declining from evil," to which "innocence" + belongs, and "doing good," to which the six others belong. Of these, two would seem to regard relations between equals, namely, + "friendship" in the external conduct and "concord" internally; two regard our relations toward superiors, namely, "piety" + to parents, and "religion" to God; while two regard our relations towards + inferiors, namely, "condescension," in so far as their good pleases us, and "humanity," whereby we help them in their needs. + For Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man is said to be "humane, through having a feeling of love and pity towards men: this gives + its name to humanity whereby we uphold one another." In this sense "friendship" is understood as directing our external conduct + towards others, from which point of view the Philosopher treats of it in Ethic. iv, 6. "Friendship" may also be taken + as regarding properly the affections, and as the Philosopher describes it in Ethic. viii and ix. In this sense three things + pertain to friendship, namely, "benevolence" which is here called "affection"; "concord," and "beneficence" which is here + called "humanity." These three, however, are omitted by Tully, because, as stated above, they have little of the nature of + a due. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q80_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "Obedience" is included in observance, which Tully mentions, because both reverential honor and obedience are due to persons + who excel. "Faithfulness whereby a man's acts agree with his words" [*Cicero, De Repub. iv, De Offic. i, 7], is contained + in "truthfulness" as to the observance of one's promises: yet "truthfulness" covers a wider ground, as we shall state further + on ( + <a id="SS_Q80_A1-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q109_A1.html">Q[109], AA[1]</a>,3). "Discipline" is not due as a + necessary duty, because one is under no obligation to an inferior as such, although a superior may be under an obligation + to watch over his inferiors, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q80_A1-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.45" target="asv"> Mat. 24:45, </a> "A faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family": and for this reason it is omitted by Tully. + It may, however, be included in humanity mentioned by Macrobius; and equity under {epieikeia} or under "friendship." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q80_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This enumeration contains some belonging to true justice. To particular justice belongs "justice of exchange," which he describes + as "the habit of observing equality in commutations." To legal justice, as regards things to be observed by all, he ascribes + "legislative justice," which he describes as "the science of political commutations relating to the community." As regards + things which have to be done in particular cases beside the general laws, he + mentions "common sense" or "good judgment*," which is our guide in such like matters, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q80_A1-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q51_A4.html">Q[51], A[4]</a>) in the treatise on prudence: wherefore he says that it is a "voluntary justification," because by his own free will man + observes what is just according to his judgment and not according to the written law. [*St. Thomas indicates the Greek derivation: + {eugnomosyne} quasi 'bona {gnome}.'] These two are ascribed to prudence as their director, and to justice + as their executor. {Eusebeia} [piety] means "good worship" and consequently is the same as religion, wherefore he says that + it is the science of "the service of God" (he speaks after the manner of Socrates who said that 'all the virtues are sciences') + [*Aristotle, Ethic. vi, 13]: and "holiness" comes to the same, as we shall state further on ( + <a id="SS_Q80_A1-p13.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q81_A8.html">Q[81], A[8]</a>). {Eucharistia} (gratitude) means "good thanksgiving," and is mentioned by Macrobius: wherefore Isidore says (Etym. + x) that "a kind man is one who is ready of his own accord to do good, and is of gentle speech": and Andronicus too says that + "kindliness is a habit of voluntary beneficence." "Liberality" would seem to pertain to "humanity." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q80_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> {Epieikeia} is annexed, not to particular but to legal justice, and apparently is the same as that which goes by the name + of {eugnomosyne} [common sense]. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q80_A1-p15"></p> + <p id="SS_Q80_A1-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q80.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q79_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q80_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q81" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q80_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q81-p0.1">OF RELIGION (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q81-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q81-p2"> We must now consider each of the foregoing virtues, in so far as our present scope demands. We shall consider (1) religion, + (2) piety, (3) observance, (4) gratitude, (5) revenge, (6) truth, (7) friendship, (8) liberality, (9) {epieikeia}. Of the + other virtues that have been mentioned we have spoken partly in the treatise on charity, viz. of concord and the like, and + partly in this treatise on justice, for instance, of right commutations and of innocence. of legislative justice we + spoke in the treatise on prudence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81-p3"> Religion offers a threefold consideration: (1) Religion considered in itself; (2) its acts; (3) the opposite vices.</p> + <p id="SS_Q81-p4"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q81-p5"> (1) Whether religion regards only our relation to God?</p> + <p id="SS_Q81-p6"> (2) Whether religion is a virtue?</p> + <p id="SS_Q81-p7"> (3) Whether religion is one virtue?</p> + <p id="SS_Q81-p8"> (4) Whether religion is a special virtue?</p> + <p id="SS_Q81-p9"> (5) Whether religion is a theological virtue?</p> + <p id="SS_Q81-p10"> (6) Whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues?</p> + <p id="SS_Q81-p11"> (7) Whether religion has any external actions?</p> + <p id="SS_Q81-p12"> (8) Whether religion is the same as holiness?</p> + <div id="SS_Q81_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q81_A1-p0.1">Whether religion directs man to God alone?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q81_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that religion does not direct man to God alone. It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q81_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.27" target="asv">James 1:27</a>): "Religion clean and undefiled before God and the Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation, + and to keep oneself unspotted from this world." Now "to visit the fatherless and widows" indicates an order between oneself + and one's neighbor, and "to keep oneself unspotted from this world" belongs to the order of a man within + himself. Therefore religion does not imply order to God alone. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 1) that "since in speaking Latin not only unlettered but even most cultured persons + ere wont to speak of religion as being exhibited, to our human kindred and relations as also to those who are linked with + us by any kind of tie, that term does not escape ambiguity when it is a question of Divine worship, so that we be able to + say without hesitation that religion is nothing else but the worship of God." Therefore religion + signifies a relation not only to God but also to our kindred. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, seemingly "latria" pertains to religion. Now "latria signifies servitude," as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). + And we are bound to serve not only God, but also our neighbor, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q81_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.13" target="asv">Gal. 5:13</a>, "By charity of the spirit serve one another." Therefore religion includes a relation to one's neighbor also. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, worship belongs to religion. Now man is said to worship not only God, but also his neighbor, according to the saying + of Cato [*Dionysius Cato, Breves Sententiae], "Worship thy parents." Therefore religion directs us also to our neighbor, and + not only to God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, all those who are in the state of grace are subject to God. Yet not all who are in a state of grace are called religious, + but only those who bind themselves by certain vows and observances, and to obedience to certain men. Therefore religion seemingly + does not denote a relation of subjection of man to God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully says (Rhet. ii, 53) that "religion consists in offering service and ceremonial rites to a superior nature that men + call divine." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> as Isidore says (Etym. x), "according to Cicero, a man is said to be religious from 'religio,' because he often ponders over, + and, as it were, reads again [relegit], the things which pertain to the worship of God," so that religion would seem to take + its name from reading over those things which belong to Divine worship because we ought frequently to ponder over such things + in our hearts, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q81_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.6" target="asv">Prov. 3:6</a>, "In all thy ways think on Him." According to + Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3) it may also take its name from the fact that "we ought to seek God again, whom we had lost by + our neglect" [*St. Augustine plays on the words 'reeligere,' i.e. to choose over again, and 'negligere,' to neglect or despise.]. + Or again, religion may be derived from "religare" [to bind together], wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55): "May religion + bind us to the one Almighty God." However, whether religion take its name from frequent reading, or from a repeated + choice of what has been lost through negligence, or from being a bond, it denotes properly a relation to God. For it is He + to Whom we ought to be bound as to our unfailing principle; to Whom also our choice should be resolutely directed as to our + last end; and Whom we lose when we neglect Him by sin, and should recover by believing in Him and confessing our faith. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Religion has two kinds of acts. Some are its proper and immediate acts, which it elicits, and by which man is directed to + God alone, for instance, sacrifice, adoration and the like. But it has other acts, which it produces through the medium of + the virtues which it commands, directing them to the honor of God, because the virtue which is concerned with the end, commands + the virtues which are concerned with the means. Accordingly "to visit the + fatherless and widows in their tribulation" is an act of religion as commanding, and an act of mercy as eliciting; and "to + keep oneself unspotted from this world" is an act of religion as commanding, but of temperance or of some similar virtue as + eliciting. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Religion is referred to those things one exhibits to one's human kindred, if we take the term religion in a broad sense, + but not if we take it in its proper sense. Hence, shortly before the passage quoted, Augustine says: "In a stricter sense + religion seems to denote, not any kind of worship, but the worship of God." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since servant implies relation to a lord, wherever there is a special kind of lordship there must needs be a special kind + of service. Now it is evident that lordship belongs to God in a special and singular way, because He made all things, and + has supreme dominion over all. Consequently a special kind of service is due to Him, which is known as "latria" in Greek; + and therefore it belongs to religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> We are said to worship those whom we honor, and to cultivate [*In the Latin the same word 'colere' stands for 'worship' and + 'cultivate']: a man's memory or presence: we even speak of cultivating things that are beneath us, thus a farmer [agricola] + is one who cultivates the land, and an inhabitant [incola] is one who cultivates the place where he dwells. Since, however, + special honor is due to God as the first principle of all things, to Him also is + due a special kind of worship, which in Greek is {Eusebeia} or {Theosebeia}, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Although the name "religious" may be given to all in general who worship God, yet in a special way religious are those who + consecrate their whole life to the Divine worship, by withdrawing from human affairs. Thus also the term "contemplative" is + applied, not to those who contemplate, but to those who give up their whole lives to contemplation. Such men subject themselves + to man, not for man's sake but for God's sake, according to the word of the + Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q81_A1-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.14" target="asv">Gal. 4:14</a>), "You . . . received me as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A1-p14"></p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A1-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q81_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q81_A2-p0.1">Whether religion is a virtue?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q81_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that religion is not a virtue. Seemingly it belongs to religion to pay reverence to God. But reverence is an + act of fear which is a gift, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q81_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q19_A9.html">Q[19], A[9]</a>). Therefore religion is not a virtue but a gift + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every virtue is a free exercise of the will, wherefore it is described as an "elective" or voluntary "habit" [*Ethic. + ii, 6]. Now, as stated above (A[1], ad 3) "latria" belongs to religion, and "latria" denotes a kind of servitude. Therefore + religion is not a virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Ethic. ii, 1, aptitude for virtue is in us by nature, wherefore things pertaining to virtue belong + to the dictate of natural reason. Now, it belongs to religion "to offer ceremonial worship to the Godhead" [*Cf. A[1]], and + ceremonial matters, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q81_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q99_A3.html">FS, Q[99], A[3]</a>, ad 2; + <a id="SS_Q81_A2-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q101.html">FS, Q[101])</a>, do not belong to the dictate of natural reason. Therefore religion is not a + virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is enumerated with the other virtues, as appears from what has been said above ( + <a id="SS_Q81_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q80.html">Q[80])</a>. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[58], A[3]; + <a id="SS_Q81_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A3.html">FS, Q[55], AA[3]</a>,4) "a virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his act good likewise," wherefore we must needs say that every good + act belongs to a virtue. Now it is evident that to render anyone his due has the aspect of good, since by rendering a person + his due, one becomes suitably proportioned to him, through being ordered to him in a becoming manner. But order comes under + the aspect of + good, just as mode and species, according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii). Since then it belongs to religion to pay due honor + to someone, namely, to God, it is evident that religion is a virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To pay reverence to God is an act of the gift of fear. Now it belongs to religion to do certain things through reverence + for God. Hence it follows, not that religion is the same as the gift of fear, but that it is referred thereto as to something + more excellent; for the gifts are more excellent than the moral virtues, as stated above (Q[9], A[1], ad 3; + <a id="SS_Q81_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A8.html">FS, Q[68], A[8]</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even a slave can voluntarily do his duty by his master, and so "he makes a virtue of necessity" [*Jerome, Ep. liv, ad Furiam.], + by doing his duty voluntarily. In like manner, to render due service to God may be an act of virtue, in so far as man does + so voluntarily. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It belongs to the dictate of natural reason that man should do something through reverence for God. But that he should do + this or that determinate thing does not belong to the dictate of natural reason, but is established by Divine or human law. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q81_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q81_A3-p0.1">Whether religion is one virtue?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q81_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that religion is not one virtue. Religion directs us to God, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q81_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q81_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now in God there are three Persons; and also many attributes, which differ at least logically from one another. Now a logical + difference in the object suffices for a difference of virtue, as stated above (Q[50], A[2], ad 2). Therefore religion is not + one virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, of one virtue there is seemingly one act, since habits are distinguished by their acts. Now there are many acts + of religion, for instance to worship, to serve, to vow, to pray, to sacrifice and many such like. Therefore religion is not + one virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, adoration belongs to religion. Now adoration is paid to images under one aspect, and under another aspect to God + Himself. Since, then, a difference of aspect distinguishes virtues, it would seem that religion is not one virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q81_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.5" target="asv">Eph. 4:5</a>): "One God [Vulg.: 'Lord'], one faith." Now true religion professes faith in one God. Therefore religion is one virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q81_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">FS, Q[54], A[2]</a>, ad 1), habits are differentiated according to a different aspect of the object. Now it belongs to religion to show reverence + to one God under one aspect, namely, as the first principle of the creation and government of things. Wherefore He Himself + says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q81_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Mal.1.6" target="asv">Malach. 1:6</a>): "If . . . I be a father, where is My honor?" For it belongs to a father to beget and to govern. Therefore it is + evident that religion is one virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The three Divine Persons are the one principle of the creation and government of things, wherefore they are served by one + religion. The different aspects of the attributes concur under the aspect of first principle, because God produces all things, + and governs them by the wisdom, will and power of His goodness. Wherefore religion is one virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By the one same act man both serves and worships God, for worship regards the excellence of God, to Whom reverence is due: + while service regards the subjection of man who, by his condition, is under an obligation of showing reverence to God. To + these two belong all acts ascribed to religion, because, by them all, man bears witness to the Divine excellence and to his + own subjection to God, either by offering something to God, or by assuming something + Divine. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The worship of religion is paid to images, not as considered in themselves, nor as things, but as images leading us to God + incarnate. Now movement to an image as image does not stop at the image, but goes on to the thing it represents. Hence neither + "latria" nor the virtue of religion is differentiated by the fact that religious worship is paid to the images of Christ. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q81_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q81_A4-p0.1">Whether religion is a special virtue, distinct from the others?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q81_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that religion is not a special virtue distinct from the others. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 6): "Any action + whereby we are united to God in holy fellowship, is a true sacrifice." But sacrifice belongs to religion. Therefore every + virtuous deed belongs to religion; and consequently religion is not a special virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q81_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:31</a>): "Do all to the glory of God." Now it belongs to religion to do anything in reverence of God, as stated above (A[1], ad + 2; A[2]). Therefore religion is not a special virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the charity whereby we love God is not distinct from the charity whereby we love our neighbor. But according to + Ethic. viii, 8 "to be honored is almost to be loved." Therefore the religion whereby we honor God is not a special virtue + distinct from observance, or "dulia," or piety whereby we honor our neighbor. Therefore religion is not a special virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is reckoned a part of justice, distinct from the other parts. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since virtue is directed to the good, wherever there is a special aspect of good, there must be a special virtue. Now the + good to which religion is directed, is to give due honor to God. Again, honor is due to someone under the aspect of excellence: + and to God a singular excellence is competent, since He infinitely surpasses all things and exceeds them in every way. Wherefore + to Him is special honor due: even as in human affairs we see that different honor + is due to different personal excellences, one kind of honor to a father, another to the king, and so on. Hence it is evident + that religion is a special virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Every virtuous deed is said to be a sacrifice, in so far as it is done out of reverence of God. Hence this does not prove + that religion is a general virtue, but that it commands all other virtues, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every deed, in so far as it is done in God's honor, belongs to religion, not as eliciting but as commanding: those belong + to religion as eliciting which pertain to the reverence of God by reason of their specific character. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The object of love is the good, but the object of honor and reverence is something excellent. Now God's goodness is communicated + to the creature, but the excellence of His goodness is not. Hence the charity whereby God is loved is not distinct from the + charity whereby our neighbor is loved; whereas the religion whereby God is honored, is distinct from the virtues whereby we + honor our neighbor. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q81_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q81_A5-p0.1">Whether religion is a theological virtue?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q81_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that religion is a theological virtue. Augustine says (Enchiridion iii) that "God is worshiped by faith, hope + and charity," which are theological virtues. Now it belongs to religion to pay worship to God. Therefore religion is a theological + virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now religion has God for its object, since it directs us + to God alone, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q81_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q81_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore religion is a theological virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every virtue is either theological, or intellectual, or moral, as is clear from what has been said (FS, QQ[57],58,62). + Now it is evident that religion is not an intellectual virtue, because its perfection does not depend on the consideration + of truth: nor is it a moral virtue, which consists properly in observing the mean between too much and too little. for one + cannot worship God too much, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q81_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.43.33" target="asv"> Ecclus. 43:33, </a> "Blessing + the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can; for He is above all praise." Therefore it remains that it is a theological virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is reckoned a part of justice which is a moral virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q81_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q81_A4.html">(A[4])</a> religion pays due worship to God. Hence two things are to be considered in religion: first that which it offers to God, viz. + worship, and this is by way of matter and object in religion; secondly, that to which something is offered, viz. God, to Whom + worship is paid. And yet the acts whereby God is worshiped do not reach out to God himself, as when we believe God we reach + out to Him by believing; for which + reason it was stated (Q[1], AA[1],2,4) that God is the object of faith, not only because we believe in a God, but because + we believe God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A5-p7"> Now due worship is paid to God, in so far as certain acts whereby God is worshiped, such as the offering of sacrifices and + so forth, are done out of reverence for God. Hence it is evident that God is related to religion not as matter or object, + but as end: and consequently religion is not a theological virtue whose object is the last end, but a moral virtue which is + properly about things referred to the end. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The power or virtue whose action deals with an end, moves by its command the power or virtue whose action deals with matters + directed to that end. Now the theological virtues, faith, hope and charity have an act in reference to God as their proper + object: wherefore, by their command, they cause the act of religion, which performs certain deeds directed to God: and so + Augustine says that God is worshiped by faith, hope and charity. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Religion directs man to God not as its object but as its end. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Religion is neither a theological nor an intellectual, but a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and observes a + mean, not in the passions, but in actions directed to God, by establishing a kind of equality in them. And when I say "equality," + I do not mean absolute equality, because it is not possible to pay God as much as we owe Him, but equality in consideration + of man's ability and God's acceptance. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A5-p11"> And it is possible to have too much in matters pertaining to the Divine worship, not as regards the circumstance of quantity, + but as regards other circumstances, as when Divine worship is paid to whom it is not due, or when it is not due, or unduly + in respect of some other circumstance. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A5-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A5-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q81_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q81_A6-p0.1">Whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q81_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that religion should not be preferred to the other moral virtues. The perfection of a moral virtue consists + in its observing the mean, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. But religion fails to observe the mean of justice, since it does not + render an absolute equal to God. Therefore religion is not more excellent than the other moral virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is offered by one man to another is the more praiseworthy, according as the person it is offered to is in greater + need: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q81_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.57.7" target="asv">Is. 57:7</a>): "Deal thy bread to the hungry." But God needs nothing that we can offer Him, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q81_A6-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.15.2" target="asv"> Ps. 15:2, </a> "I have said: Thou art my God, for Thou hast no need of my goods." Therefore religion would seem less praiseworthy than the + other virtues whereby man's + needs are relieved. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the greater. the obligation to do a thing, the less praise does it deserve, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q81_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.16" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:16, </a> "If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to me: a necessity lieth upon me." Now the more a thing is due, the greater the obligation + of paying it. Since, then, what is paid to God by man is in the highest degree due to Him, it would seem that religion is + less praiseworthy than the other human virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The precepts pertaining to religion are given precedence ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q81_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20" target="asv">Ex. 20</a>) as being of greatest importance. Now the order of precepts is proportionate to the order of virtues, since the precepts + of the Law prescribe acts of virtue. Therefore religion is the chief of the moral virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Whatever is directed to an end takes its goodness from being ordered to that end; so that the nearer it is to the end the + better it is. Now moral virtues, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q81_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q81_A5.html">(A[5];</a> Q[4], A[7]), are about matters that are ordered to God as their end. And religion approaches nearer to God than the other + moral virtues, in so far as its actions are directly and immediately ordered to the honor of God. Hence religion excels among + the moral + virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue is praised because of the will, not because of the ability: and therefore if a man fall short of equality which is + the mean of justice, through lack of ability, his virtue deserves no less praise, provided there be no failing on the part + of his will. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In offering a thing to a man on account of its usefulness to him, the more needy the man the more praiseworthy the offering, + because it is more useful: whereas we offer a thing to God not on account of its usefulness to Him, but for the sake of His + glory, and on account of its usefulness to us. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Where there is an obligation to do a thing it loses the luster of supererogation, but not the merit of virtue, provided it + be done voluntarily. Hence the argument proves nothing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A6-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A6-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q81_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q81_A7-p0.1">Whether religion has an external act?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q81_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that religion has not an external act. It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q81_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.24" target="asv">Jn. 4:24</a>): "God is a spirit, and they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth." Now external acts pertain, not to the + spirit but to the body. Therefore religion, to which adoration belongs, has acts that are not external but internal. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the end of religion is to pay God reverence and honor. Now it would savor of irreverence towards a superior, if + one were to offer him that which properly belongs to his inferior. Since then whatever man offers by bodily actions, seems + to be directed properly to the relief of human needs, or to the reverence of inferior creatures, it would seem unbecoming + to employ them in showing reverence to God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) commends Seneca for finding fault with those who offered to idols those things that + are wont to be offered to men, because, to wit, that which befits mortals is unbecoming to immortals. But such things are + much less becoming to the true God, Who is "exalted above all gods" [* + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q81_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.94.3" target="asv">Ps. 94:3</a>]. Therefore it would seem wrong to worship God with bodily actions. Therefore religion has no bodily actions. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q81_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.3" target="asv">Ps. 83:3</a>): "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God." Now just as internal actions belong to the heart, so do external + actions belong to the members of the flesh. Therefore it seems that God ought to be worshiped not only by internal but also + by external actions. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We pay God honor and reverence, not for His sake (because He is of Himself full of glory to which no creature can add anything), + but for our own sake, because by the very fact that we revere and honor God, our mind is subjected to Him; wherein its perfection + consists, since a thing is perfected by being subjected to its superior, for instance the body is perfected by being quickened + by the soul, and the air by being enlightened by the sun. Now the human + mind, in order to be united to God, needs to be guided by the sensible world, since "invisible things . . . are clearly seen, + being understood by the things that are made," as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q81_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv">Rom. 1:20</a>). Wherefore in the Divine worship it is necessary to make use of corporeal things, that man's mind may be aroused thereby, + as by signs, to the spiritual acts by means of which he is united to God. Therefore the internal acts of religion take precedence + of the others and + belong to religion essentially, while its external acts are secondary, and subordinate to the internal acts. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our Lord is speaking of that which is most important and directly intended in the worship of God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These external things are offered to God, not as though He stood in need of them, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q81_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.49.13" target="asv"> Ps. 49:13, </a> "Shall I eat the flesh of bullocks? or shall I drink the blood of goats?" but as signs of the internal and spiritual works, + which are of themselves acceptable to God. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5): "The visible sacrifice is the sacrament + or sacred sign of the invisible sacrifice." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Idolaters are ridiculed for offering to idols things pertaining to men, not as signs arousing them to certain spiritual things, + but as though they were of themselves acceptable to the idols; and still more because they were foolish and wicked. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A7-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A7-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q81_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q82.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q81_A8-p0.1">Whether religion is the same as sanctity?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q81_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that religion is not the same as sanctity. Religion is a special virtue, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q81_A8-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q81_A4.html">(A[4])</a>: whereas sanctity is a general virtue, because it makes us faithful, and fulfil our just obligations to God, according to + Andronicus [*De Affectibus]. Therefore sanctity is not the same as religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sanctity seems to denote a kind of purity. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii) that "sanctity is free from all uncleanness, + and is perfect and altogether unspotted purity." Now purity would seem above all to pertain to temperance which repels bodily + uncleanness. Since then religion belongs to justice, it would seem that sanctity is not the same as religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things that are opposite members of a division are not identified with one another. But in an enumeration given + above (Q[80], ad 4) of the parts of justice, sanctity is reckoned as distinct from religion. Therefore sanctity is not the + same as religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q81_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.1.74" target="asv">Lk. 1:74,75</a>): "That . . . we may serve Him . . . in holiness and justice." Now, "to serve God" belongs to religion, as stated above (A[1], + ad 3; A[3], ad 2). Therefore religion is the same as sanctity. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The word "sanctity" seems to have two significations. In one way it denotes purity; and this signification fits in with the + Greek, for {hagios} means "unsoiled." In another way it denotes firmness, wherefore in olden times the term "sancta" was applied + to such things as were upheld by law and were not to be violated. Hence a thing is said to be sacred [sancitum] when it is + ratified by law. Again, in Latin, this word "sanctus" may be connected with purity, if + it be resolved into "sanguine tinctus, since, in olden times, those who wished to be purified were sprinkled with the victim's + blood," according to Isidore (Etym. x). In either case the signification requires sanctity to be ascribed to those things + that are applied to the Divine worship; so that not only men, but also the temple, vessels and such like things are said to + be sanctified through being applied to the worship of God. For purity is necessary in order that the mind be applied to God, + since the human mind is soiled by contact with inferior things, even as all things depreciate by admixture with baser things, + for instance, silver by being mixed with lead. Now in order for the mind to be united to the Supreme Being it must be withdrawn + from inferior things: and hence it is that without purity the mind cannot be applied to God. Wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q81_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.12.14" target="asv">Heb. 12:14</a>): "Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God." Again, + firmness is required for the mind to be applied to God, for it is applied to Him as its last end and first beginning, and + such things must needs be most immovable. Hence the Apostle said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q81_A8-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.38" target="asv">Rom. 8:38,39</a>): "I am sure that neither death, nor life . . . shall separate me [*Vulg.: 'shall be able to separate us'] from the love + of God." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A8-p7"> Accordingly, it is by sanctity that the human mind applies itself and its acts to God: so that it differs from religion not + essentially but only logically. For it takes the name of religion according as it gives God due service in matters pertaining + specially to the Divine worship, such as sacrifices, oblations, and so forth; while it is called sanctity, according as man + refers to God not only these but also the works of the other virtues, or according as man by means of certain + good works disposes himself to the worship of God + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sanctity is a special virtue according to its essence; and in this respect it is in a way identified with religion. But it + has a certain generality, in so far as by its command it directs the acts of all the virtues to the Divine good, even as legal + justice is said to be a general virtue, in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Temperance practices purity, yet not so as to have the character of sanctity unless it be referred to God. Hence of virginity + itself Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that "it is honored not for what it is, but for being consecrated to God." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sanctity differs from religion as explained above, not really but logically. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A8-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q81_A8-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q82.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q80_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q82" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q82_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q82-p0.1">OF DEVOTION (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q82-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q82-p2"> We must now consider the acts of religion. First, we shall consider the interior acts, which, as stated above, are its principal + acts; secondly, we shall consider its exterior acts, which are secondary. The interior acts of religion are seemingly devotion + and prayer. Accordingly we shall treat first of devotion, and afterwards of prayer. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q82-p4"> (1) Whether devotion is a special act?</p> + <p id="SS_Q82-p5"> (2) Whether it is an act of religion?</p> + <p id="SS_Q82-p6"> (3) Of the cause of devotion?</p> + <p id="SS_Q82-p7"> (4) Of its effect?</p> + <div id="SS_Q82_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q82.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q82_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q82_A1-p0.1">Whether devotion is a special act?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q82_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that devotion is not a special act. That which qualifies other acts is seemingly not a special act. Now devotion + seems to qualify other acts, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q82_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiChr.29.31" target="asv">2 Paralip 29:31</a>): "All the multitude offered victims, and praises, and holocausts with a devout mind." Therefore devotion is not a special + act. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no special kind of act is common to various genera of acts. But devotion is common to various genera of acts, namely, + corporal and spiritual acts: for a person is said to meditate devoutly and to genuflect devoutly. Therefore devotion is not + a special act. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every special act belongs either to an appetitive or to a cognitive virtue or power. But devotion belongs to neither, + as may be seen by going through the various species of acts of either faculty, as enumerated above (FP, QQ[78], seqq.; + <a id="SS_Q82_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A4.html">FS, Q[23], A[4]</a>). Therefore devotion is not a special act. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Merits are acquired by acts as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q82_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q21_A34.html">FS, Q[21], AA[34]</a>). But devotion has a special reason for merit. Therefore devotion is a special act. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Devotion is derived from "devote" [*The Latin 'devovere' means 'to vow']; wherefore those persons are said to be "devout" + who, in a way, devote themselves to God, so as to subject themselves wholly to Him. Hence in olden times among the heathens + a devotee was one who vowed to his idols to suffer death for the safety of his army, as Livy relates of the two Decii (Decad. + I, viii, 9; x, 28). Hence devotion is apparently nothing else but the will to give oneself + readily to things concerning the service of God. Wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q82_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.35.20" target="asv">Ex. 35:20,21</a>) that "the multitude of the children of Israel . . . offered first-fruits to the Lord with a most ready and devout mind." + Now it is evident that the will to do readily what concerns the service of God is a special kind of act. Therefore devotion + is a special act of the will. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The mover prescribes the mode of the movement of the thing moved. Now the will moves the other powers of the soul to their + acts, and the will, in so far as it regards the end, moves both itself and whatever is directed to the end, as stated above + ( + <a id="SS_Q82_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A3.html">FS, Q[9], A[3]</a>). Wherefore, since devotion is an act of the will whereby a man offers himself for the service of God Who is the last end, + it follows that devotion prescribes the mode + to human acts, whether they be acts of the will itself about things directed to the end, or acts of the other powers that + are moved by the will. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Devotion is to be found in various genera of acts, not as a species of those genera, but as the motion of the mover is found + virtually in the movements of the things moved. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Devotion is an act of the appetitive part of the soul, and is a movement of the will, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q82.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q82_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q82_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q82_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q82_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q82_A2-p0.1">Whether devotion is an act of religion?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q82_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that devotion is not an act of religion. Devotion, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q82_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q82_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, consists in giving oneself up to God. But this is done chiefly by charity, since according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) "the + Divine love produces ecstasy, for it takes the lover away from himself and gives him to the beloved." Therefore devotion is + an act of charity rather than of religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, charity precedes religion; and devotion seems to precede charity; since, in the Scriptures, charity is represented + by fire, while devotion is signified by fatness which is the material of fire [* + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q82_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Song.8.6" target="asv">Cant. 8:6</a>; + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q82_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.52.6" target="asv"> Ps. 52:6</a>]. Therefore devotion is not an act of religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by religion man is directed to God alone, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q82_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q81_A1.html">Q[81], A[1]</a>). But devotion is directed also to men; for we speak of people being devout to certain holy men, and subjects are said to + be devoted to their masters; thus Pope Leo says [*Serm. viii, De Pass. Dom.] that the Jews "out of devotion to the Roman laws," + said: "We have no king but Caesar." Therefore devotion is not an act of religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Devotion is derived from "devovere," as stated + <a id="SS_Q82_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q82_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But a vow is an act of religion. Therefore devotion is also an act of religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It belongs to the same virtue, to will to do something, and to have the will ready to do it, because both acts have the same + object. For this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1): "It is justice whereby men both will end do just actions." Now + it is evident that to do what pertains to the worship or service of God, belongs properly to religion, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q82_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q81.html">Q[81])</a>. Wherefore it belongs to that virtue to have the will ready to do + such things, and this is to be devout. Hence it is evident that devotion is an act of religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It belongs immediately to charity that man should give himself to God, adhering to Him by a union of the spirit; but it belongs + immediately to religion, and, through the medium of religion, to charity which is the principle of religion, that man should + give himself to God for certain works of Divine worship. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Bodily fatness is produced by the natural heat in the process of digestion, and at the same time the natural heat thrives, + as it were, on this fatness. In like manner charity both causes devotion (inasmuch as love makes one ready to serve one's + friend) and feeds on devotion. Even so all friendship is safeguarded and increased by the practice and consideration of friendly + deeds. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Devotion to God's holy ones, dead or living, does not terminate in them, but passes on to God, in so far as we honor God + in His servants. But the devotion of subjects to their temporal masters is of another kind, just as service of a temporal + master differs from the service of God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q82_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q82_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q82_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q82_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q82_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q82_A3-p0.1">Whether contemplation or meditation is the cause of devotion?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q82_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that contemplation or meditation is not the cause of devotion. No cause hinders its effect. But subtle considerations + about abstract matters are often a hindrance to devotion. Therefore contemplation or meditation is not the cause of devotion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if contemplation were the proper and essential cause of devotion, the higher objects of contemplation would arouse + greater devotion. But the contrary is the case: since frequently we are urged to greater devotion by considering Christ's + Passion and other mysteries of His humanity than by considering the greatness of His Godhead. Therefore contemplation is not + the proper cause of devotion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if contemplation were the proper cause of devotion, it would follow that those who are most apt for contemplation, + are also most apt for devotion. Yet the contrary is to be noticed, for devotion is frequently found in men of simplicity and + members of the female sex, who are defective in contemplation. Therefore contemplation is not the proper cause of devotion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q82_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.38.4" target="asv">Ps. 38:4</a>): "In my meditation a fire shall flame out." But spiritual fire causes devotion. Therefore meditation is the cause of devotion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The extrinsic and chief cause of devotion is God, of Whom Ambrose, commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q82_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.9.55" target="asv"> Lk. 9:55, </a> says that "God calls whom He deigns to call, and whom He wills He makes religious: the profane Samaritans, had He so willed, + He would have made devout." But the intrinsic cause on our part must needs be meditation or contemplation. For it was stated + above + <a id="SS_Q82_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q82_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that devotion is an act of the will to the effect that man + surrenders himself readily to the service of God. Now every act of the will proceeds from some consideration, since the object + of the will is a good understood. Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 12; xv, 23) that "the will arises from the intelligence." + Consequently meditation must needs be the cause of devotion, in so far as through meditation man conceives the thought of + surrendering himself to God's service. Indeed a twofold consideration leads him thereto. The one is the consideration + of God's goodness and loving kindness, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q82_A3-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.72.28" target="asv"> Ps. 72:28, </a> "It is good for me to adhere to my God, to put my hope in the Lord God": and this consideration wakens love [*'Dilectio,' + the interior act of charity; cf. Q[27]] which is the proximate cause of devotion. The other consideration is that of man's + own shortcomings, on account of which he needs to lean on God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q82_A3-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.120.1" target="asv"> Ps. 120:1,2, </a> "I have lifted up my eyes to the mountains, from whence help + shall come to me: my help is from the Lord, Who made heaven and earth"; and this consideration shuts out presumption whereby + man is hindered from submitting to God, because he leans on His strength. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The consideration of such things as are of a nature to awaken our love [*'Dilectio,' the interior act of charity; cf. Q[27]] + of God, causes devotion; whereas the consideration of foreign matters that distract the mind from such things is a hindrance + to devotion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Matters concerning the Godhead are, in themselves, the strongest incentive to love ['dilectio,' the interior act of charity; + cf. Q[27]] and consequently to devotion, because God is supremely lovable. Yet such is the weakness of the human mind that + it needs a guiding hand, not only to the knowledge, but also to the love of Divine things by means of certain sensible objects + known to us. Chief among these is the humanity of Christ, according to the words + of the Preface [*Preface for Christmastide], "that through knowing God visibly, we may be caught up to the love of things + invisible." Wherefore matters relating to Christ's humanity are the chief incentive to devotion, leading us thither as a guiding + hand, although devotion itself has for its object matters concerning the Godhead. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Science and anything else conducive to greatness, is to man an occasion of self-confidence, so that he does not wholly surrender + himself to God. The result is that such like things sometimes occasion a hindrance to devotion; while in simple souls and + women devotion abounds by repressing pride. If, however, a man perfectly submits to God his science or any other perfection, + by this very fact his devotion is increased. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q82_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q82_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q82_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q82_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q82_A4-p0.1">Whether joy is an effect of devotion? </h4> + <p id="SS_Q82_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that joy is not an effect of devotion. As stated above (A[3], ad 2), Christ's Passion is the chief incentive + to devotion. But the consideration thereof causes an affliction of the soul, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q82_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Lam.3.19" target="asv"> Lam. 3:19, </a> "Remember my poverty . . . the wormwood and the gall," which refers to the Passion, and afterwards ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q82_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Lam.3.20" target="asv">Lam. 3:20</a>) it is said: "I will be mindful and remember, and my soul shall languish within me." + Therefore delight or joy is not the effect of devotion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, devotion consists chiefly in an interior sacrifice of the spirit. But it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q82_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.50.19" target="asv">Ps. 50:19</a>): "A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit." Therefore affliction is the effect of devotion rather than gladness or joy. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory of Nyssa says (De Homine xii) [*Orat. funebr. de Placilla Imp.] that "just as laughter proceeds from joy, + so tears and groans are signs of sorrow." But devotion makes some people shed tears. Therefore gladness or joy is not the + effect of devotion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> We say in the Collect [*Thursday after fourth Sunday of Lent]: "That we who are punished by fasting may be comforted by a + holy devotion." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The direct and principal effect of devotion is the spiritual joy of the mind, though sorrow is its secondary and indirect + effect. For it has been stated + <a id="SS_Q82_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q82_A3.html">(A[3])</a> that devotion is caused by a twofold consideration: chiefly by the consideration of God's goodness, because this consideration + belongs to the term, as it were, of the movement of the will in surrendering itself to God, and the direct result of this + consideration is joy, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q82_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.76.4" target="asv"> Ps. 76:4, </a> "I remembered God, and was delighted"; but accidentally this consideration causes a certain sorrow in those who do not yet + enjoy God fully, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q82_A4-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.41.3" target="asv"> Ps. 41:3, </a> "My soul hath thirsted after the strong living God," and afterwards it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q82_A4-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.41.4" target="asv">Ps. 41:4</a>): "My tears have been my bread," etc. Secondarily devotion is caused as stated + <a id="SS_Q82_A4-p6.5" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q82_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, by the consideration of one's own failings; for + this consideration regards the term from which man withdraws by the movement of his devout will, in that he trusts not in + himself, but subjects himself to God. This consideration has an opposite tendency to the first: for it is of a nature to cause + sorrow directly (when one thinks over one's own failings), and joy accidentally, namely, through hope of the Divine assistance. + It is accordingly evident that the first and direct effect of devotion is joy, while the secondary and accidental effect + is that "sorrow which is according to God" [* + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q82_A4-p6.6" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.10" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:10</a>]. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the consideration of Christ's Passion there is something that causes sorrow, namely, the human defect, the removal of + which made it necessary for Christ to suffer [* + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q82_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.24.25" target="asv">Lk. 24:25</a>]; and there is something that causes joy, namely, God's loving-kindness to us in giving us such a deliverance. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The spirit which on the one hand is afflicted on account of the defects of the present life, on the other hand is rejoiced, + by the consideration of God's goodness, and by the hope of the Divine help. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Tears are caused not only through sorrow, but also through a certain tenderness of the affections, especially when one considers + something that gives joy mixed with pain. Thus men are wont to shed tears through a sentiment of piety, when they recover + their children or dear friends, whom they thought to have lost. In this way tears arise from devotion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q82_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q82_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q81_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q82_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q83" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q82_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q83-p0.1">OF PRAYER (SEVENTEEN ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q83-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83-p2"> We must now consider prayer, under which head there are seventeen points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q83-p3"> (1) Whether prayer is an act of the appetitive or of the cognitive power?</p> + <p id="SS_Q83-p4"> (2) Whether it is fitting to pray to God?</p> + <p id="SS_Q83-p5"> (3) Whether prayer is an act of religion?</p> + <p id="SS_Q83-p6"> (4) Whether we ought to pray to God alone?</p> + <p id="SS_Q83-p7"> (5) Whether we ought to ask for something definite when we pray?</p> + <p id="SS_Q83-p8"> (6) Whether we ought to ask for temporal things when we pray?</p> + <p id="SS_Q83-p9"> (7) Whether we ought to pray for others?</p> + <p id="SS_Q83-p10"> (8) Whether we ought to pray for our enemies?</p> + <p id="SS_Q83-p11"> (9) Of the seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer;</p> + <p id="SS_Q83-p12"> (10) Whether prayer is proper to the rational creature?</p> + <p id="SS_Q83-p13"> (11) Whether the saints in heaven pray for us?</p> + <p id="SS_Q83-p14"> (12) Whether prayer should be vocal?</p> + <p id="SS_Q83-p15"> (13) Whether attention is requisite in prayer?</p> + <p id="SS_Q83-p16"> (14) Whether prayer should last a long time?</p> + <p id="SS_Q83-p17"> (15) Whether prayer is meritorious? [*Art. 16]</p> + <p id="SS_Q83-p18"> (16) Whether sinners impetrate anything from God by praying? [*Art. 15]</p> + <p id="SS_Q83-p19"> (17) of the different kinds of prayer.</p> + <div id="SS_Q83_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q83_A1-p0.1">Whether prayer is an act of the appetitive power?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q83_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prayer is an act of the appetitive power. It belongs to prayer to be heard. Now it is the desire that + is heard by God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.9.38" target="asv"> Ps. 9:38, </a> "The Lord hath heard the desire of the poor." Therefore prayer is desire. But desire is an act of the appetitive power: and + therefore prayer is also. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii): "It is useful to begin everything with prayer, because thereby we surrender ourselves + to God and unite ourselves to Him." Now union with God is effected by love which belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore + prayer belongs to the appetitive power. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, 6) that there are two operations of the intellective part. Of these the first + is "the understanding of indivisibles," by which operation we apprehend what a thing is: while the second is "synthesis" and + "analysis," whereby we apprehend that a thing is or is not. To these a third may be added, namely, "reasoning," whereby we + proceed from the known to the unknown. Now prayer is not reducible to any of these + operations. Therefore it is an operation, not of the intellective, but of the appetitive power. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (Etym. x) that "to pray is to speak." Now speech belongs to the intellect. Therefore prayer is an act, not of + the appetitive, but of the intellective power. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to Cassiodorus [*Comment. in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.38.13" target="asv"> Ps. 38:13</a>] "prayer [oratio] is spoken reason [oris ratio]." Now the speculative and practical reason differ in this, that the speculative + merely apprehends its object, whereas the practical reason not only apprehends but causes. Now one thing is the cause of another + in two ways: first perfectly, when it necessitates its effect, and this happens when the effect is wholly subject to the power + of the + cause; secondly imperfectly, by merely disposing to the effect, for the reason that the effect is not wholly subject to the + power of the cause. Accordingly in this way the reason is cause of certain things in two ways: first, by imposing necessity; + and in this way it belongs to reason, to command not only the lower powers and the members of the body, but also human subjects, + which indeed is done by commanding; secondly, by leading up to the effect, and, in a way, disposing to it, and in this + sense the reason asks for something to be done by things not subject to it, whether they be its equals or its superiors. Now + both of these, namely, to command and to ask or beseech, imply a certain ordering, seeing that man proposes something to be + effected by something else, wherefore they pertain to the reason to which it belongs to set in order. For this reason the + Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that the "reason exhorts us to do what is best." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A1-p7"> Now in the present instance we are speaking of prayer [*This last paragraph refers to the Latin word 'oratio' [prayer] which + originally signified a speech, being derived in the first instance from 'os,' 'oris' (the mouth).] as signifying a beseeching + or petition, in which sense Augustine [*Rabanus, De Univ. vi, 14]: says (De Verb. Dom.) that "prayer is a petition," and Damascene + states (De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that "to pray is to ask becoming things of God." Accordingly it is + evident that prayer, as we speak of it now, is an act of reason. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Lord is said to hear the desire of the poor, either because desire is the cause of their petition, since a petition is + like the interpreter of a desire, or in order to show how speedily they are heard, since no sooner do the poor desire something + than God hears them before they put up a prayer, according to the saying of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.65.24" target="asv"> Is. 65:24, </a> "And it shall come to pass, that before they call, I will hear." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q83_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q82_A4.html">FP, Q[82], A[4]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q83_A1-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">FS, Q[9], A[1]</a>, ad 3), the will moves the reason to its end: wherefore nothing hinders the act of reason, under the motion of the will, + from tending to an end such as charity which is union with God. Now prayer tends to God through being moved by the will of + charity, as it were, and this in two ways. First, on the part of the object of our petition, because when we pray + we ought principally to ask to be united to God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A1-p9.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.26.4" target="asv"> Ps. 26:4, </a> "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my + life." Secondly, on the part of the petitioner, who ought to approach the person whom he petitions, either locally, as when + he petitions a man, or mentally, as when he petitions God. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "when we call upon God + in our prayers, we unveil our mind + in His presence": and in the same sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that "prayer is the raising up of the mind + to God." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These three acts belong to the speculative reason, but to the practical reason it belongs in addition to cause something + by way of command or of petition, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q83_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q83_A2-p0.1">Whether it is becoming to pray?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q83_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is unbecoming to pray. Prayer seems to be necessary in order that we may make our needs known to the + person to whom we pray. But according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.32" target="asv"> Mat. 6:32, </a> "Your Father knoweth that you have need of all these things." Therefore it is not becoming to pray to God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by prayer we bend the mind of the person to whom we pray, so that he may do what is asked of him. But God's mind + is unchangeable and inflexible, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.15.29" target="asv">1 Kings 15:29, </a> "But the Triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to repentance." Therefore it is not fitting that we should + pray to God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is more liberal to give to one that asks not, than to one who asks because, according to Seneca (De Benefic. + ii, 1), "nothing is bought more dearly than what is bought with prayers." But God is supremely liberal. Therefore it would + seem unbecoming to pray to God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.18.1" target="asv">Lk. 18:1</a>): "We ought always to pray, and not to faint." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Among the ancients there was a threefold error concerning prayer. Some held that human affairs are not ruled by Divine providence; + whence it would follow that it is useless to pray and to worship God at all: of these it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.3.14" target="asv">Malach. 3:14</a>): "You have said: He laboreth in vain that serveth God." Another opinion held that all things, even in human affairs, happen + of necessity, whether by reason of the unchangeableness of Divine + providence, or through the compelling influence of the stars, or on account of the connection of causes: and this opinion + also excluded the utility of prayer. There was a third opinion of those who held that human affairs are indeed ruled by Divine + providence, and that they do not happen of necessity; yet they deemed the disposition of Divine providence to be changeable, + and that it is changed by prayers and other things pertaining to the worship of God. All these opinions were disproved in + the + + <a id="SS_Q83_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A7.html">FP, Q[19], AA[7]</a>,8; + <a id="SS_Q83_A2-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">FP, Q[22], AA[2]</a>,4; + <a id="SS_Q83_A2-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q115_A6.html">FP, Q[115], A[6]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q83_A2-p6.5" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q116.html">FP, Q[116].</a> Wherefore it behooves us so to account for the utility of prayer as neither to impose necessity on human affairs subject + to Divine providence, nor to imply changeableness on the part of the Divine disposition. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A2-p7"> In order to throw light on this question we must consider that Divine providence disposes not only what effects shall take + place, but also from what causes and in what order these effects shall proceed. Now among other causes human acts are the + causes of certain effects. Wherefore it must be that men do certain actions. not that thereby they may change the Divine disposition, + but that by those actions they may achieve certain effects according to the order of the Divine + disposition: and the same is to be said of natural causes. And so is it with regard to prayer. For we pray not that we may + change the Divine disposition, but that we may impetrate that which God has disposed to be fulfilled by our prayers in other + words "that by asking, men may deserve to receive what Almighty God from eternity has disposed to give," as Gregory says (Dial. + i, 8) + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We need to pray to God, not in order to make known to Him our needs or desires but that we ourselves may be reminded of the + necessity of having recourse to God's help in these matters. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above, our motive in praying is, not Divine disposition, we may change the Divine disposition, but that, by our + prayers, we may obtain what God has appointed. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God bestows many things on us out of His liberality, even without our asking for them: but that He wishes to bestow certain + things on us at our asking, is for the sake of our good, namely, that we may acquire confidence in having recourse to God, + and that we may recognize in Him the Author of our goods. Hence Chrysostom says [*Implicitly [Hom. ii, de Orat.: Hom. xxx + in Genes. ]; Cf. Caten. Aur. on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.18" target="asv">Lk. 18</a>]: "Think what happiness is granted thee, what + honor bestowed on thee, when thou conversest with God in prayer, when thou talkest with Christ, when thou askest what thou + wilt, whatever thou desirest." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q83_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q83_A3-p0.1">Whether prayer is an act of religion?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q83_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prayer is not an act of religion. Since religion is a part of justice, it resides in the will as in its + subject. But prayer belongs to the intellective part, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q83_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q83_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore prayer seems to be an act, not of religion, but of the gift of understanding whereby the mind ascends to God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the act of "latria" falls under a necessity of precept. But prayer does not seem to come under a necessity of precept, + but to come from the mere will, since it is nothing else than a petition for what we will. Therefore prayer seemingly is not + an act of religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it seems to belong to religion that one "offers worship end ceremonial rites to the Godhead" [*Cicero, Rhet. ii, + 53]. But prayer seems not to offer anything to God, but to. ask to obtain something from Him. Therefore prayer is not an act + of religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.140.2" target="asv">Ps. 140:2</a>): "Let my prayer be directed as incense in Thy sight": and a gloss on the passage says that "it was to signify this that + under the old Law incense was said to be offered for a sweet smell to the Lord." Now this belongs to religion. Therefore prayer + is an act of religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q83_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q81_A2.html">Q[81], AA[2]</a>,4), it belongs properly to religion to show honor to God, wherefore all those things through which reverence is shown to + God, belong to religion. Now man shows reverence to God by means of prayer, in so far as he subjects himself to Him, and by + praying confesses that he needs Him as the Author of his goods. Hence it is evident that prayer is properly an act of religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will moves the other powers of the soul to its end, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q83_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q82_A1.html">Q[82], A[1]</a>, ad 1), and therefore religion, which is in the will, directs the acts of the other powers to the reverence of God. Now among + the other powers of the soul the intellect is the highest, and the nearest to the will; and consequently after devotion which + belongs to the will, prayer which belongs to the intellective part is the chief of the acts + of religion, since by it religion directs man's intellect to God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is a matter of precept not only that we should ask for what we desire, but also that we should desire aright. But to desire + comes under a precept of charity, whereas to ask comes under a precept of religion, which precept is expressed in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.7" target="asv"> Mat. 7:7, </a> where it is said: "Ask and ye shall receive" [*Vulg.: 'Ask and it shall be given you.']. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> By praying man surrenders his mind to God, since he subjects it to Him with reverence and, so to speak, presents it to Him, + as appears from the words of Dionysius quoted above (A[1], OBJ[2]). Wherefore just as the human mind excels exterior things, + whether bodily members, or those external things that are employed for God's service, so too, prayer surpasses other acts + of religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q83_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q83_A4-p0.1">Whether we ought to pray to God alone?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q83_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we ought to pray to God alone. Prayer is an act of religion, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q83_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q83_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. But God alone is to be worshiped by religion. Therefore we should pray to God alone. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is useless to pray to one who is ignorant of the prayer. But it belongs to God alone to know one's prayer, both + because frequently prayer is uttered by an interior act which God alone knows, rather than by words, according to the saying + of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:15</a>), "I will pray with the spirit, I will pray also with the understanding": and again because, as Augustine says (De Cura pro + mortuis xiii) the "dead, even the saints, know not what the + living, even their own children, are doing." Therefore we ought to pray to God alone. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if we pray to any of the saints, this is only because they are united to God. Now some yet living in this world, + or even some who are in Purgatory, are closely united to God by grace, and yet we do not pray to them. Therefore neither should + we pray to the saints who are in Paradise. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.5.1" target="asv">Job 5:1</a>), "Call . . . if there be any that will answer thee, and turn to some of the saints." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Prayer is offered to a person in two ways: first, as to be fulfilled by him, secondly, as to be obtained through him. In + the first way we offer prayer to God alone, since all our prayers ought to be directed to the acquisition of grace and glory, + which God alone gives, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.12" target="asv"> Ps. 83:12, </a> "The Lord will give grace and glory." But in the second way we pray to the saints, whether angels or men, not that God may + through them know our + petitions, but that our prayers may be effective through their prayers and merits. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rev.8.4" target="asv">Apoc. 8:4</a>) that "the smoke of the incense," namely "the prayers of the saints ascended up before God." This is also clear from the + very style employed by the Church in praying: since we beseech the Blessed Trinity "to have mercy on us," while we ask any + of the saints "to pray for us." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To Him alone do we offer religious worship when praying, from Whom we seek to obtain what we pray for, because by so doing + we confess that He is the Author of our goods: but not to those whom we call upon as our advocates in God's presence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The dead, if we consider their natural condition, do not know what takes place in this world, especially the interior movements + of the heart. Nevertheless, according to Gregory (Moral. xii, 21), whatever it is fitting the blessed should know about what + happens to us, even as regards the interior movements of the heart, is made known to them in the Word: and it is most becoming + to their exalted position that they should know the petitions we make to + them by word or thought; and consequently the petitions which we raise to them are known to them through Divine manifestation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those who are in this world or in Purgatory, do not yet enjoy the vision of the Word, so as to be able to know what we think + or say. Wherefore we do not seek their assistance by praying to them, but ask it of the living by speaking to them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q83_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q83_A5-p0.1">Whether we ought to ask for something definite when we pray?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q83_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we ought not to ask for anything definite when we pray to God. According to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, + 24), "to pray is to ask becoming things of God"; wherefore it is useless to pray for what is inexpedient, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.3" target="asv"> James 4:3, </a> "You ask, and receive not: because you ask amiss." Now according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.26" target="asv"> Rom. 8:26, </a> "we know not what we should pray for as we ought." Therefore we ought not to ask for + anything definite when we pray. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those who ask another person for something definite strive to incline his will to do what they wish themselves. + But we ought not to endeavor to make God will what we will; on the contrary, we ought to strive to will what He wills, according + to a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.32.1" target="asv"> Ps. 32:1, </a> "Rejoice in the Lord, O ye just." Therefore we ought not to ask God for anything definite when we pray. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, evil things are not to be sought from God; and as to good things, God Himself invites us to take them. Now it is + useless to ask a person to give you what he invites you to take. Therefore we ought not to ask God for anything definite in + our prayers. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> our Lord ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6" target="asv">Mat. 6</a> and + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A5-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.11" target="asv">Lk. 11</a>) taught His disciples to ask definitely for those things which are contained in the petitions of the Lord's Prayer. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to Valerius Maximus [*Fact. et Dict. Memor. vii, 2], "Socrates deemed that we should ask the immortal gods for + nothing else but that they should grant us good things, because they at any rate know what is good for each one whereas when + we pray we frequently ask for what it had been better for us not to obtain." This opinion is true to a certain extent, as + to those things which may have an evil result, and which man may use ill or well, such as + "riches, by which," as stated by the same authority (Fact. et Dict. Memor. vii, 2), "many have come to an evil end; honors, + which have ruined many; power, of which we frequently witness the unhappy results; splendid marriages, which sometimes bring + about the total wreck of a family." Nevertheless there are certain goods which man cannot ill use, because they cannot have + an evil result. Such are those which are the object of beatitude and whereby we merit it: and these the saints seek absolutely + when they pray, as in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.79.4" target="asv"> Ps. 79:4, </a> "Show us Thy face, and we shall be saved," and again in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.35" target="asv"> Ps. 118:35, </a> "Lead me into the path of Thy commandments." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although man cannot by himself know what he ought to pray for, "the Spirit," as stated in the same passage, "helpeth our + infirmity," since by inspiring us with holy desires, He makes us ask for what is right. Hence our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.24" target="asv">Jn. 4:24</a>) that true adorers "must adore . . . in spirit and in truth." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When in our prayers we ask for things concerning our salvation, we conform our will to God's, of Whom it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:4</a>) that "He will have all men to be saved." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God so invites us to take good things, that we may approach to them not by the steps of the body, but by pious desires and + devout prayers. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q83_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q83_A6-p0.1">Whether man ought to ask God for temporal things when he prays?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q83_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man ought not to ask God for temporal things when he prays. We seek what we ask for in prayer. But we + should not seek for temporal things, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.33" target="asv">Mat. 6:33</a>): "Seek ye . . . first the kingdom of God, and His justice: and all these things shall be added unto you," that is to say, + temporal things, which, says He, we are not to seek, but they will be added to what we seek. Therefore temporal things are + not to be + asked of God in prayer. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no one asks save for that which he is solicitous about. Now we ought not to have solicitude for temporal things, + according to the saying of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.25" target="asv"> Mat. 6:25, </a> "Be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat." Therefore we ought not to ask for temporal things when we pray. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by prayer our mind should be raised up to God. But by asking for temporal things, it descends to things beneath + it, against the saying of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.4.18" target="asv">2 Cor. 4:18</a>), "While we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen. For the things which are seen are + temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal." Therefore man ought not to ask God for temporal things when he prays. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A6-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, man ought not to ask of God other than good and useful things. But sometimes temporal things, when we have them, + are harmful, not only in a spiritual sense, but also in a material sense. Therefore we should not ask God for them in our + prayers. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A6-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.30.8" target="asv">Prov. 30:8</a>): "Give me only the necessaries of life." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A6-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (ad Probam, de orando Deum, Ep. cxxx, 12): "It is lawful to pray for what it is lawful to desire." Now + it is lawful to desire temporal things, not indeed principally, by placing our end therein, but as helps whereby we are assisted + in tending towards beatitude, in so far, to wit, as they are the means of supporting the life of the body, and are of service + to us as instruments in performing acts of virtue, as also the Philosopher states + (Ethic. i, 8). Augustine too says the same to Proba (ad Probam, de orando Deum, Ep. cxxx, 6,7) when he states that "it is + not unbecoming for anyone to desire enough for a livelihood, and no more; for this sufficiency is desired, not for its own + sake, but for the welfare of the body, or that we should desire to be clothed in a way befitting one's station, so as not + to be out of keeping with those among whom we have to live. Accordingly we ought to pray that we may keep these things if + we have + them, and if we have them not, that we may gain possession of them." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We should seek temporal things not in the first but in the second place. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, + 16): "When He says that this" (i.e. the kingdom of God) "is to be sought first, He implies that the other" (i.e. temporal + goods) "is to be sought afterwards, not in time but in importance, this as being our good, the other as our need." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not all solicitude about temporal things is forbidden, but that which is superfluous and inordinate, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q83_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q55_A6.html">Q[55], A[6]</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When our mind is intent on temporal things in order that it may rest in them, it remains immersed therein; but when it is + intent on them in relation to the acquisition of beatitude, it is not lowered by them, but raises them to a higher level. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> From the very fact that we ask for temporal things not as the principal object of our petition, but as subordinate to something + else, we ask God for them in the sense that they may be granted to us in so far as they are expedient for salvation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A6-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A6-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q83_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q83_A7-p0.1">Whether we ought to pray for others?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q83_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we ought not to pray for others. In praying we ought to conform to the pattern given by our Lord. Now + in the Lord's Prayer we make petitions for ourselves, not for others; thus we say: "Give us this day our daily bread," etc. + Therefore we should not pray for others. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, prayer is offered that it may be heard. Now one of the conditions required for prayer that it may be heard is that + one pray for oneself, wherefore Augustine in commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.16.23" target="asv"> Jn. 16:23, </a> "If you ask the Father anything in My name He will give it you," says (Tract. cii): "Everyone is heard when he prays for + himself, not when he prays for all; wherefore He does not say simply 'He will give it,' but 'He will give it you. '" Therefore + it would seem that we ought not to pray for others, but only for ourselves. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we are forbidden to pray for others, if they are wicked, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.7.16" target="asv"> Jer. 7:16, </a> "Therefore do not then pray for this people . . . and do not withstand Me, for I will not hear thee." On the other hand we + are not bound to pray for the good, since they are heard when they pray for themselves. Therefore it would seem that we ought + not to pray for others. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.16" target="asv">James 5:16</a>): "Pray one for another, that you may be saved." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q83_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q83_A6.html">(A[6])</a>, when we pray we ought to ask for what we ought to desire. Now we ought to desire good things not only for ourselves, but + also for others: for this is essential to the love which we owe to our neighbor, as stated above (Q[25], AA[1],12; Q[27], + A[2]; Q[31], A[1]). Therefore charity requires us to pray for others. Hence Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Matth.) [*Opus Imperfectum, + falsely ascribed to St. John + Chrysostom]: "Necessity binds us to pray for ourselves, fraternal charity urges us to pray for others: and the prayer that + fraternal charity proffers is sweeter to God than that which is the outcome of necessity." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Cyprian says (De orat. Dom.), "We say 'Our Father' and not 'My Father,' 'Give us' and not 'Give me,' because the Master + of unity did not wish us to pray privately, that is for ourselves alone, for He wished each one to pray for all, even as He + Himself bore all in one." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is a condition of prayer that one pray for oneself: not as though it were necessary in order that prayer be meritorious, + but as being necessary in order that prayer may not fail in its effect of impetration. For it sometimes happens that we pray + for another with piety and perseverance, and ask for things relating to his salvation, and yet it is not granted on account + of some obstacle on the part of the person we are praying for, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.15.1" target="asv"> Jer. 15:1, </a> "If Moses and Samuel shall stand before Me, My soul is not towards this people." And yet the prayer will be meritorious for + the person who prays thus out of charity, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A7-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.34.13" target="asv"> Ps. 34:13, </a> "My prayer shall be turned into my bosom, i.e. though it profit them not, I am not deprived of my reward," as the gloss expounds + it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We ought to pray even for sinners, that they may be converted, and for the just that they may persevere and advance in holiness. + Yet those who pray are heard not for all sinners but for some: since they are heard for the predestined, but not for those + who are foreknown to death; even as the correction whereby we correct the brethren, has an effect in the predestined but not + in the reprobate, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A7-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.14" target="asv"> Eccles. 7:14, </a> "No man can + correct whom God hath despised." Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A7-p9.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.5.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 5:16</a>): "He that knoweth his brother to sin a sin which is not to death, let him ask, and life shall be given to him, who sinneth + not to death." Now just as the benefit of correction must not be refused to any man so long as he lives here below, because + we cannot distinguish the predestined from the reprobate, as Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xv), so too no man should + be denied the help of prayer. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A7-p10"> We ought also to pray for the just for three reasons: First, because the prayers of a multitude are more easily heard, wherefore + a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A7-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.15.30" target="asv">Rom. 15:30</a>, "Help me in your prayers," says: "The Apostle rightly tells the lesser brethren to pray for him, for many lesser ones, if + they be united together in one mind, become great, and it is impossible for the prayers of a multitude not to obtain" that + which is possible to be obtained by prayer. Secondly, that many may thank God for the + graces conferred on the just, which graces conduce to the profit of many, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A7-p10.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.1.11" target="asv">2 Cor. 1:11</a>). Thirdly, that the more perfect may not wax proud, seeing that they find that they need the prayers of the less perfect. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A7-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A7-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q83_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A9.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q83_A8-p0.1">Whether we ought to pray for our enemies?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q83_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we ought not to pray for our enemies. According to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.15.4" target="asv"> Rom. 15:4, </a> "what things soever were written, were written for our learning." Now Holy Writ contains many imprecations against enemies; + thus it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A8-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.6.11" target="asv">Ps. 6:11</a>): "Let all my enemies be ashamed and be . . . troubled, let them be ashamed and be troubled very speedily [*Vulg.: 'Let them + be turned back and be ashamed.']." Therefore we too should pray + against rather than for our enemies. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to be revenged on one's enemies is harmful to them. But holy men seek vengeance of their enemies according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.6.10" target="asv"> Apoc. 6:10, </a> "How long . . . dost Thou not . . . revenge our blood on them that dwell on earth?" Wherefore they rejoice in being revenged + on their enemies, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A8-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.57.11" target="asv"> Ps. 57:11, </a> "The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge." Therefore we should not pray for our enemies, but against them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man's deed should not be contrary to his prayer. Now sometimes men lawfully attack their enemies, else all wars + would be unlawful, which is opposed to what we have said above ( + <a id="SS_Q83_A8-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q40_A1.html">Q[40], A[1]</a>). Therefore we should not pray for our enemies. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.44" target="asv">Mat. 5:44</a>): "Pray for them that persecute and calumniate you." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> To pray for another is an act of charity, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q83_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q83_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Wherefore we are bound to pray for our enemies in the same manner as we are bound to love them. Now it was explained above + in the treatise on charity (Q[25], AA[8],9), how we are bound to love our enemies, namely, that we must love in them their + nature, not their sin. and that to love our enemies in general is a matter of precept, while to love them in the individual + is not a matter of precept, except in the preparedness of the mind, so that a man must be prepared to love his enemy even + in the individual and to help him in a case of necessity, or if his enemy should beg his forgiveness. But to love one's enemies + absolutely in the individual, and to assist them, is an act of perfection. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A8-p7"> In like manner it is a matter of obligation that we should not exclude our enemies from the general prayers which we offer + up for others: but it is a matter of perfection, and not of obligation, to pray for them individually, except in certain special + cases. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The imprecations contained in Holy Writ may be understood in four ways. First, according to the custom of the prophets "to + foretell the future under the veil of an imprecation," as Augustine states [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 21]. Secondly, in the + sense that certain temporal evils are sometimes inflicted by God on the wicked for their correction. Thirdly, because they + are understood to be pronounced, not against the men themselves, but against the + kingdom of sin, with the purpose, to wit, of destroying sin by the correction of men. Fourthly, by way of conformity of our + will to the Divine justice with regard to the damnation of those who are obstinate in sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine states in the same book (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 22), "the martyrs' vengeance is the overthrow of the kingdom + of sin, because they suffered so much while it reigned": or as he says again (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. lxviii), "their prayer + for vengeance is expressed not in words but in their minds, even as the blood of Abel cried from the earth." They rejoice + in vengeance not for its own sake, but for the sake of Divine justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is lawful to attack one's enemies, that they may be restrained from sin: and this is for their own good and for the good + of others. Consequently it is even lawful in praying to ask that temporal evils be inflicted on our enemies in order that + they may mend their ways. Thus prayer and deed will not be contrary to one another. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A8-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A8-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A9.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q83_A9" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A10.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q83_A9-p0.1">Whether the seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer are fittingly assigned?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q83_A9-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer are not fittingly assigned. It is useless to ask for that to + be hallowed which is always holy. But the name of God is always holy, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A9-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.1.49" target="asv"> Lk. 1:49, </a> "Holy is His name." Again, His kingdom is everlasting, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A9-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.144.13" target="asv"> Ps. 144:13, </a> "Thy kingdom is a kingdom of all ages." Again, God's will is always fulfilled, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A9-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Isa.46.10" target="asv"> Isa 46:10, + + </a>"All My will shall be done." Therefore it is useless to ask for "the name of God to be hallowed," for "His kingdom to come," + and for "His will to be done." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one must withdraw from evil before attaining good. Therefore it seems unfitting for the petitions relating to the + attainment of good to be set forth before those relating to the removal of evil. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one asks for a thing that it may be given to one. Now the chief gift of God is the Holy Ghost, and those gifts that + we receive through Him. Therefore the petitions seem to be unfittingly assigned, since they do not correspond to the gifts + of the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A9-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to Luke, only five petitions are mentioned in the Lord's Prayer, as appears from the eleventh chapter. + Therefore it was superfluous for Matthew to mention seven. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A9-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it seems useless to seek to win the benevolence of one who forestalls us by his benevolence. Now God forestalls + us by His benevolence, since "He first hath loved us" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A9-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.19" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:19</a>). Therefore it is useless to preface the petitions with the words our "Father Who art in heaven," which seem to indicate + a desire to win God's benevolence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A9-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The authority of Christ, who composed this prayer, suffices. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A9-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The Lord's Prayer is most perfect, because, as Augustine says (ad Probam Ep. cxxx, 12), "if we pray rightly and fittingly, + we can say nothing else but what is contained in this prayer of our Lord." For since prayer interprets our desires, as it + were, before God, then alone is it right to ask for something in our prayers when it is right that we should desire it. Now + in the Lord's Prayer not only do we ask for all that we may rightly desire, but also in the + order wherein we ought to desire them, so that this prayer not only teaches us to ask, but also directs all our affections. + Thus it is evident that the first thing to be the object of our desire is the end, and afterwards whatever is directed to + the end. Now our end is God towards Whom our affections tend in two ways: first, by our willing the glory of God, secondly, + by willing to enjoy His glory. The first belongs to the love whereby we love God in Himself, while the second belongs to the + love + whereby we love ourselves in God. Wherefore the first petition is expressed thus: "Hallowed be Thy name," and the second thus: + "Thy kingdom come," by which we ask to come to the glory of His kingdom. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A9-p9"> To this same end a thing directs us in two ways: in one way, by its very nature, in another way, accidentally. Of its very + nature the good which is useful for an end directs us to that end. Now a thing is useful in two ways to that end which is + beatitude: in one way, directly and principally, according to the merit whereby we merit beatitude by obeying God, and in + this respect we ask: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven"; in another way instrumentally, and as it were + helping us to merit, and in this respect we say: "Give us this day our daily bread," whether we understand this of the sacramental + Bread, the daily use of which is profitable to man, and in which all the other sacraments are contained, or of the bread of + the body, so that it denotes all sufficiency of food, as Augustine says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 11), since the Eucharist is + the chief sacrament, and bread is the chief food: thus in the Gospel of Matthew we read, "supersubstantial," i.e. + "principal," as Jerome expounds it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A9-p10"> We are directed to beatitude accidentally by the removal of obstacles. Now there are three obstacles to our attainment of + beatitude. First, there is sin, which directly excludes a man from the kingdom, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A9-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:9,10, </a> "Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, etc., shall possess the kingdom of God"; and to this refer the words, "Forgive us our + trespasses." Secondly, there is temptation which hinders us from keeping God's will, and to this we refer + when we say: "And lead us not into temptation," whereby we do not ask not to be tempted, but not to be conquered by temptation, + which is to be led into temptation. Thirdly, there is the present penal state which is a kind of obstacle to a sufficiency + of life, and to this we refer in the words, "Deliver us from evil." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A9-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 5), when we say, "Hallowed be Thy name, we do not mean that God's name is not + holy, but we ask that men may treat it as a holy thing," and this pertains to the diffusion of God's glory among men. When + we say, "Thy kingdom come, we do not imply that God is not reigning now," but "we excite in ourselves the desire for that + kingdom, that it may come to us, and that we may reign therein," as Augustine says (ad + Probam, Ep. cxxx, 11). The words, "Thy will be done rightly signify, 'May Thy commandments be obeyed' on earth as in heaven, + i.e. by men as well as by angels" (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 6). Hence these three petitions will be perfectly fulfilled + in the life to come; while the other four, according to Augustine (Enchiridion cxv), belong to the needs of the present life + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A9-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since prayer is the interpreter of desire, the order of the petitions corresponds with the order, not of execution, but of + desire or intention, where the end precedes the things that are directed to the end, and attainment of good precedes removal + of evil. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A9-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 11) adapts the seven petitions to the gifts and beatitudes. He says: "If it is fear + God whereby blessed are the poor in spirit, let us ask that God's name be hallowed among men with a chaste fear. If it is + piety whereby blessed are the meek, let us ask that His kingdom may come, so that we become meek and no longer resist Him. + If it is knowledge whereby blessed are they that mourn, let us pray that His will be + done, for thus we shall mourn no more. If it is fortitude whereby blessed ere they that hunger, let us pray that our daily + bread be given to us. If it is counsel whereby blessed are the merciful, let us forgive the trespasses of others that our + own may be forgiven. If it is understanding whereby blessed are the pure in heart, let us pray lest we have a double heart + by seeking after worldly things which ere the occasion of our temptations. If it is wisdom whereby blessed are the peacemakers + for + they shall be called the children of God, let us pray to be delivered from evil: for if we be delivered we shall by that very + fact become the free children of God." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A9-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> According to Augustine (Enchiridion cxvi), "Luke included not seven but five petitions in the Lord's Prayer, for by omitting + it, he shows that the third petition is a kind of repetition of the two that precede, and thus helps us to understand it"; + because, to wit, the will of God tends chiefly to this---that we come to the knowledge of His holiness and to reign together + with Him. Again the last petition mentioned by Matthew, "Deliver us from evil," is + omitted by Luke, so that each one may know himself to be delivered from evil if he be not led into temptation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A9-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Prayer is offered up to God, not that we may bend Him, but that we may excite in ourselves the confidence to ask: which confidence + is excited in us chiefly by the consideration of His charity in our regard, whereby he wills our good---wherefore we say: + "Our Father"; and of His excellence, whereby He is able to fulfil it---wherefore we say: "Who art in heaven." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A9-p16"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A9-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A10.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q83_A10" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A11.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q83_A10-p0.1">Whether prayer is proper to the rational creature?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q83_A10-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A10-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prayer is not proper to the rational creature. Asking and receiving apparently belong to the same subject. + But receiving is becoming also to uncreated Persons, viz. the Son and Holy Ghost. Therefore it is competent to them to pray: + for the Son said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A10-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.16" target="asv">Jn. 14:16</a>): "I will ask My [Vulg.: 'the'] Father," and the Apostle says of the Holy Ghost ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A10-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.26" target="asv">Rom. 8:26</a>): "The Spirit . . . asketh for us." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A10-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Angels are above rational creatures, since they are intellectual substances. Now prayer is becoming to the angels, wherefore + we read in the + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A10-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.96.7" target="asv"> Ps. 96:7</a>: "Adore Him, all you His angels." Therefore prayer is not proper to the rational creature. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A10-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same subject is fitted to pray as is fitted to call upon God, since this consists chiefly in prayer. But dumb + animals are fitted to call upon God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A10-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.146.9" target="asv"> Ps. 146:9, </a> "Who giveth to beasts their food and to the young ravens that call upon Him." Therefore prayer is not proper to the rational + creatures. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A10-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Prayer is an act of reason, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q83_A10-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q83_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But the rational creature is so called from his reason. Therefore prayer is proper to the rational creature. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A10-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q83_A10-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q83_A1.html">(A[1])</a> prayer is an act of reason, and consists in beseeching a superior; just as command is an act of reason, whereby an inferior + is directed to something. Accordingly prayer is properly competent to one to whom it is competent to have reason, and a superior + whom he may beseech. Now nothing is above the Divine Persons; and dumb animals are devoid of reason. Therefore prayer is unbecoming + both the Divine Persons and + dumb animals, and it is proper to the rational creature. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A10-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Receiving belongs to the Divine Persons in respect of their nature, whereas prayer belongs to one who receives through grace. + The Son is said to ask or pray in respect of His assumed, i.e. His human, nature and not in respect of His Godhead: and the + Holy Ghost is said to ask, because He makes us ask. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A10-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated in the + <a id="SS_Q83_A10-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A8.html">FP, Q[79], A[8]</a>, intellect and reason are not distinct powers in us: but they differ as the perfect from the imperfect. Hence intellectual + creatures which are the angels are distinct from rational creatures, and sometimes are included under them. In this sense + prayer is said to be proper to the rational creature. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A10-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The young ravens are said to call upon God, on account of the natural desire whereby all things, each in its own way, desire + to attain the Divine goodness. Thus too dumb animals are said to obey God, on account of the natural instinct whereby they + are moved by God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A10-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A10-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A11.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q83_A11" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A12.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q83_A11-p0.1">Whether the saints in heaven pray for us?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q83_A11-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A11-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the saints in heaven do not pray for us. A man's action is more meritorious for himself than for others. + But the saints in heaven do not merit for themselves, neither do they pray for themselves, since they are already established + in the term. Neither therefore do they pray for us. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A11-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the saints conform their will to God perfectly, so that they will only what God wills. Now what God wills is always + fulfilled. Therefore it would be useless for the saints to pray for us. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A11-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as the saints in heaven are above, so are those in Purgatory, for they can no longer sin. Now those in Purgatory + do not pray for us, on the contrary we pray for them. Therefore neither do the saints in heaven pray for us. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A11-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the saints in heaven pray for us, the prayers of the higher saints would be more efficacious; and so we ought + not to implore the help of the lower saints' prayers but only of those of the higher saints. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A11-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the soul of Peter is not Peter. If therefore the souls of the saints pray for us, so long as they are separated + from their bodies, we ought not to call upon Saint Peter, but on his soul, to pray for us: yet the Church does the contrary. + The saints therefore do not pray for us, at least before the resurrection. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A11-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A11-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.15.14" target="asv">2 Macc. 15:14</a>): "This is . . . he that prayeth much for the people, and for all the holy city, Jeremias the prophet of God." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A11-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Jerome says (Cont. Vigilant. 6), the error of Vigilantius consisted in saying that "while we live, we can pray one for + another; but that after we are dead, none of our prayers for others can be heard, seeing that not even the martyrs' prayers + are granted when they pray for their blood to be avenged." But this is absolutely false, because, since prayers offered for + others proceed from charity, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q83_A11-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q83_A7.html">AA[7]</a>,8), the greater + the charity of the saints in heaven, the more they pray for wayfarers, since the latter can be helped by prayers: and the + more closely they are united to God, the more are their prayers efficacious: for the Divine order is such that lower beings + receive an overflow of the excellence of the higher, even as the air receives the brightness of the sun. Wherefore it is said + of Christ ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A11-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.25" target="asv">Heb. 7:25</a>): "Going to God by His own power . . . to make intercession for us" [*Vulg.: 'He is + able to save for ever them that come to God by Him, always living to make intercession for us.']. Hence Jerome says (Cont. + Vigilant. 6): "If the apostles and martyrs while yet in the body and having to be solicitous for themselves, can pray for + others, how much more now that they have the crown of victory and triumph." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A11-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saints in heaven, since they are blessed, have no lack of bliss, save that of the body's glory, and for this they pray. + But they pray for us who lack the ultimate perfection of bliss: and their prayers are efficacious in impetrating through their + previous merits and through God's acceptance. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A11-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The saints impetrate what ever God wishes to take place through their prayers: and they pray for that which they deem will + be granted through their prayers according to God's will. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A11-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those who are in Purgatory though they are above us on account of their impeccability, yet they are below us as to the pains + which they suffer: and in this respect they are not in a condition to pray, but rather in a condition that requires us to + pray for them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A11-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It is God's will that inferior beings should be helped by all those that are above them, wherefore we ought to pray not only + to the higher but also to the lower saints; else we should have to implore the mercy of God alone. Nevertheless it happens + sometime that prayers addressed to a saint of lower degree are more efficacious, either because he is implored with greater + devotion, or because God wishes to make known his sanctity. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A11-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> It is because the saints while living merited to pray for us, that we invoke them under the names by which they were known + in this life, and by which they are better known to us: and also in order to indicate our belief in the resurrection, according + to the saying of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A11-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.3.6" target="asv">Ex. 3:6</a>, "I am the God of Abraham," etc. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A11-p14"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A11-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A12.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q83_A12" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A11.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A13.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q83_A12-p0.1">Whether prayer should be vocal?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q83_A12-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A12-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prayer ought not to be vocal. As stated above + <a id="SS_Q83_A12-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q83_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, prayer is addressed chiefly to God. Now God knows the language of the heart. Therefore it is useless to employ vocal prayer. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A12-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, prayer should lift man's mind to God, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). But words, like other sensible objects, prevent + man from ascending to God by contemplation. Therefore we should not use words in our prayers. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A12-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prayer should be offered to God in secret, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A12-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.6" target="asv"> Mat. 6:6, </a> "But thou, when thou shalt pray, enter into thy chamber, and having shut the door, pray to thy Father in secret." But prayer + loses its secrecy by being expressed vocally. Therefore prayer should not be vocal. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A12-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A12-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.141.2" target="asv">Ps. 141:2</a>): "I cried to the Lord with my voice, with my voice I made supplication to the Lord." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A12-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Prayer is twofold, common and individual. Common prayer is that which is offered to God by the ministers of the Church representing + the body of the faithful: wherefore such like prayer should come to the knowledge of the whole people for whom it is offered: + and this would not be possible unless it were vocal prayer. Therefore it is reasonably ordained that the ministers of the + Church should say these prayers even in a loud voice, so that they may come to the + knowledge of all. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A12-p7"> On the other hand individual prayer is that which is offered by any single person, whether he pray for himself or for others; + and it is not essential to such a prayer as this that it be vocal. And yet the voice is employed in such like prayers for + three reasons. First, in order to excite interior devotion, whereby the mind of the person praying is raised to God, because + by means of external signs, whether of words or of deeds, the human mind is moved as regards apprehension, and + consequently also as regards the affections. Hence Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx, 9) that "by means of words and other + signs we arouse ourselves more effectively to an increase of holy desires." Hence then alone should we use words and such + like signs when they help to excite the mind internally. But if they distract or in any way impede the mind we should abstain + from them; and this happens chiefly to those whose mind is sufficiently prepared for devotion without having recourse to those + signs. Wherefore the Psalmist ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A12-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.26.8" target="asv">Ps. 26:8</a>) said: "My heart hath said to Thee: 'My face hath sought Thee,'" and we read of Anna ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A12-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iKgs.1.13" target="asv">1 Kings 1:13</a>) that "she spoke in her heart." Secondly, the voice is used in praying as though to pay a debt, so that man may serve God + with all that he has from God, that is to say, not only with his mind, but also with his body: and this applies to prayer + considered especially as satisfactory. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A12-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Hos.14.3" target="asv">Osee + 14:3 + </a>): "Take away all iniquity, and receive the good: and we will render the calves of our lips." Thirdly, we have recourse to + vocal prayer, through a certain overflow from the soul into the body, through excess of feeling, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A12-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.15.9" target="asv"> Ps. 15:9, </a> "My heart hath been glad, and my tongue hath rejoiced." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A12-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Vocal prayer is employed, not in order to tell God something He does not know, but in order to lift up the mind of the person + praying or of other persons to God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A12-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Words about other matters distract the mind and hinder the devotion of those who pray: but words signifying some object of + devotion lift up the mind, especially one that is less devout. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A12-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], "Our Lord forbids one to + pray in presence of others in order that one may be seen by others. Hence when you pray, do nothing strange to draw men's + attention, either by shouting so as to be heard by others, or by openly striking the heart, or extending the hands, so as + to be seen by many. And yet, "according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 3), "it + is not wrong to be seen by men, but to do this or that in order to be seen by men." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A12-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A12-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A11.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A13.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q83_A13" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A12.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A14.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q83_A13-p0.1">Whether attention is a necessary condition of prayer?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q83_A13-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A13-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that attention is a necessary condition of prayer. It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A13-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.24" target="asv">Jn. 4:24</a>): "God is a spirit, and they that adore Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth." But prayer is not in spirit unless it + be attentive. Therefore attention is a necessary condition of prayer. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A13-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, prayer is "the ascent of the mind to God" [*Damascene, De Fide Orth. iii, 24]. But the mind does not ascend to God + if the prayer is inattentive. Therefore attention is a necessary condition of prayer. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A13-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is a necessary condition of prayer that it should be altogether sinless. Now if a man allows his mind to wander + while praying he is not free of sin, for he seems to make light of God; even as if he were to speak to another man without + attending to what he was saying. Hence Basil says [*De Constit. Monach. i] that the "Divine assistance is to be implored, + not lightly, nor with a mind wandering hither and thither: because he that prays thus not only + will not obtain what he asks, nay rather will he provoke God to anger." Therefore it would seem a necessary condition of prayer + that it should be attentive. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A13-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Even holy men sometimes suffer from a wandering of the mind when they pray, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A13-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.39.13" target="asv"> Ps. 39:13, </a> "My heart hath forsaken me." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A13-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> This question applies chiefly to vocal prayer. Accordingly we must observe that a thing is necessary in two ways. First, + a thing is necessary because thereby the end is better obtained: and thus attention is absolutely necessary for prayer. Secondly, + a thing is said to be necessary when without it something cannot obtain its effect. Now the effect of prayer is threefold. + The first is an effect which is common to all acts quickened by charity, and this is + merit. In order to realize this effect, it is not necessary that prayer should be attentive throughout; because the force + of the original intention with which one sets about praying renders the whole prayer meritorious, as is the case with other + meritorious acts. The second effect of prayer is proper thereto, and consists in impetration: and again the original intention, + to which God looks chiefly, suffices to obtain this effect. But if the original intention is lacking, prayer lacks both merit + and impetration: because, as Gregory [*Hugh St. Victor, Expos. in Reg. S. Aug. iii] says, "God hears not the prayer of those + who pay no attention to their prayer." The third effect of prayer is that which it produces at once; this is the spiritual + refreshment of the mind, and for this effect attention is a necessary condition: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A13-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.14" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:14</a>): "If I pray in a tongue . . . my understanding is without fruit." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A13-p7"> It must be observed, however, that there are three kinds of attention that can be brought to vocal prayer: one which attends + to the words, lest we say them wrong, another which attends to the sense of the words, and a third, which attends to the end + of prayer, namely, God, and to the thing we are praying for. That last kind of attention is most necessary, and even idiots + are capable of it. Moreover this attention, whereby the mind is fixed on God, is sometimes so strong that the + mind forgets all other things, as Hugh of St. Victor states [*De Modo Orandi ii]. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A13-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To pray in spirit and in truth is to set about praying through the instigation of the Spirit, even though afterwards the + mind wander through weakness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A13-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The human mind is unable to remain aloft for long on account of the weakness of nature, because human weakness weighs down + the soul to the level of inferior things: and hence it is that when, while praying, the mind ascends to God by contemplation, + of a sudden it wanders off through weakness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A13-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Purposely to allow one's mind to wander in prayer is sinful and hinders the prayer from having fruit. It is against this + that Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "When you pray God with psalms and hymns, let your mind attend to that which your + lips pronounce." But to wander in mind unintentionally does not deprive prayer of its fruit. Hence Basil says (De Constit. + Monach. i): "If you are so truly weakened by sin that you are unable to pray + attentively, strive as much as you can to curb yourself, and God will pardon you, seeing that you are unable to stand in His + presence in a becoming manner, not through negligence but through frailty." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A13-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A13-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A12.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A14.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q83_A14" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A13.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A15.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q83_A14-p0.1">Whether prayer should last a long time?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q83_A14-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A14-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prayer should not be continual. It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A14-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.7" target="asv">Mat. 6:7</a>): "When you are praying, speak not much." Now one who prays a long time needs to speak much, especially if his be vocal prayer. + Therefore prayer should not last a long time. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A14-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, prayer expresses the desire. Now a desire is all the holier according as it is centered on one thing, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A14-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.26.4" target="asv"> Ps. 26:4, </a> "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after." Therefore the shorter prayer is, the more is it acceptable + to God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A14-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it seems to be wrong to transgress the limits fixed by God, especially in matters concerning Divine worship, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A14-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.19.21" target="asv">Ex. 19:21</a>: "Charge the people, lest they should have a mind to pass the limits to see the Lord, and a very great multitude of them + should perish." But God has fixed for us the limits of prayer by instituting the Lord's Prayer ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A14-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.6" target="asv">Mat. 6</a>). Therefore it is not right to prolong our prayer beyond its limits. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A14-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> On the contrary, It would seem that we ought to pray continually. For our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A14-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.18.1" target="asv">Lk. 18:1</a>): "We ought always to pray, and not to faint": and it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A14-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iThess.5.17" target="asv">1 Thess. 5:17</a>): "Pray without ceasing." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A14-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak about prayer in two ways: first, by considering it in itself; secondly, by considering it in its cause. The + not cause of prayer is the desire of charity, from which prayer ought to arise: and this desire ought to be in us continually, + either actually or virtually, for the virtue of this desire remains in whatever we do out of charity; and we ought to "do + all things to the glory of God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A14-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:31</a>). From this point of view prayer ought to be + continual: wherefore Augustine says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 9): "Faith, hope and charity are by themselves a prayer of continual + longing." But prayer, considered in itself, cannot be continual, because we have to be busy about other works, and, as Augustine + says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx, 9), "we pray to God with our lips at certain intervals and seasons, in order to admonish ourselves + by means of such like signs, to take note of the amount of our progress in that desire, and to arouse ourselves more + eagerly to an increase thereof." Now the quantity of a thing should be commensurate with its end, for instance the quantity + of the dose should be commensurate with health. And so it is becoming that prayer should last long enough to arouse the fervor + of the interior desire: and when it exceeds this measure, so that it cannot be continued any longer without causing weariness, + it should be discontinued. Wherefore Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx): "It is said that the brethren in Egypt make + frequent but very short prayers, rapid ejaculations, as it were, lest that vigilant and erect attention which is so necessary + in prayer slacken and languish, through the strain being prolonged. By so doing they make it sufficiently clear not only that + this attention must not be forced if we are unable to keep it up, but also that if we are able to continue, it should not + be broken off too soon." And just as we must judge of this in private prayers by considering the attention of the person + praying, so too, in public prayers we must judge of it by considering the devotion of the people. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A14-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx), "to pray with many words is not the same as to pray long; to speak long is one thing, + to be devout long is another. For it is written that our Lord passed the whole night in prayer, and that He 'prayed the longer' + in order to set us an example." Further on he says: "When praying say little, yet pray much so long as your attention is fervent. + For to say much in prayer is to discuss your need in too many words: + whereas to pray much is to knock at the door of Him we pray, by the continuous and devout clamor of the heart. Indeed this + business is frequently done with groans rather than with words, with tears rather than with speech." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A14-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Length of prayer consists, not in praying for many things, but in the affections persisting in the desire of one thing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A14-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Our Lord instituted this prayer, not that we might use no other words when we pray, but that in our prayers we might have + none but these things in view, no matter how we express them or think of them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A14-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> One may pray continually, either through having a continual desire, as stated above; or through praying at certain fixed + times, though interruptedly; or by reason of the effect, whether in the person who prays---because he remains more devout + even after praying, or in some other person---as when by his kindness a man incites another to pray for him, even after he + himself has ceased praying. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A14-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A14-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A13.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A15.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q83_A15" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A14.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A16.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q83_A15-p0.1">Whether prayer is meritorious?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q83_A15-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A15-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prayer is not meritorious. All merit proceeds from grace. But prayer precedes grace, since even grace + is obtained by means of prayer according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A15-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.11.13" target="asv"> Lk. 11:13, </a> "(How much more) will your Father from heaven give the good Spirit to them that ask Him!" Therefore prayer is not a meritorious + act. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A15-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if prayer merits anything, this would seem to be chiefly that which is besought in prayer. Yet it does not always + merit this, because even the saints' prayers are frequently not heard; thus Paul was not heard when he besought the sting + of the flesh to be removed from him. Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A15-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prayer is based chiefly on faith, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A15-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.6" target="asv">James 1:6</a>, "But let him ask in faith, nothing wavering." Now faith is not sufficient for merit, as instanced in those who have lifeless + faith. Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A15-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A15-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.34.13" target="asv"> Ps. 34:13, </a> "My prayer shall be turned into my bosom," explains them as meaning, "if my prayer does not profit them, yet shall not I + be deprived of my reward." Now reward is not due save to merit. Therefore prayer is meritorious. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A15-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q83_A15-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q83_A13.html">(A[13])</a> prayer, besides causing spiritual consolation at the time of praying, has a twofold efficacy in respect of a future effect, + namely, efficacy in meriting and efficacy in impetrating. Now prayer, like any other virtuous act, is efficacious in meriting, + because it proceeds from charity as its root, the proper object of which is the eternal good that we merit to enjoy. Yet prayer + proceeds from charity through the + medium of religion, of which prayer is an act, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q83_A15-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q83_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, and with the concurrence of other virtues requisite for the goodness of prayer, viz. humility and faith. For the offering + of prayer itself to God belongs to religion, while the desire for the thing. that we pray to be accomplished belongs to charity. + Faith is necessary in reference to God to Whom we pray; that is, we need to believe that we can obtain from Him what we seek. + Humility is necessary on + the part of the person praying, because he recognizes his neediness. Devotion too is necessary: but this belongs to religion, + for it is its first act and a necessary condition of all its secondary acts, as stated above (Q[82], AA[1],2). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A15-p7"> As to its efficacy in impetrating, prayer derives this from the grace of God to Whom we pray, and Who instigates us to pray. + Wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. cv, 1): "He would not urge us to ask, unless He were willing to give"; and + Chrysostom [*Cf. Catena Aurea of St. Thomas on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A15-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.18" target="asv">Lk. 18</a>. The words as quoted are not to be found in the words of Chrysostom] says: "He never refuses to grant our prayers, since + in His loving-kindness He urged us not to faint in + praying." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A15-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Neither prayer nor any other virtuous act is meritorious without sanctifying grace. And yet even that prayer which impetrates + sanctifying grace proceeds from some grace, as from a gratuitous gift, since the very act of praying is "a gift of God," as + Augustine states (De Persever. xxiii). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A15-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sometimes the merit of prayer regards chiefly something distinct from the object of one's petition. For the chief object + of merit is beatitude, whereas the direct object of the petition of prayer extends sometimes to certain other things, as stated + above ( + <a id="SS_Q83_A15-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q83_A6.html">AA[6]</a>,7). Accordingly if this other thing that we ask for ourselves be not useful for our beatitude, we do not merit it; and sometimes + by asking for and desiring such things + we lose merit for instance if we ask of God the accomplishment of some sin, which would be an impious prayer. And sometimes + it is not necessary for salvation, nor yet manifestly contrary thereto; and then although he who prays may merit eternal life + by praying, yet he does not merit to obtain what he asks for. Hence Augustine says (Liber. Sentent. Prosperi sent. ccxii): + "He who faithfully prays God for the necessaries of this life, is both mercifully heard, and mercifully not heard. For the + physician knows better than the sick man what is good for the disease." For this reason, too, Paul was not heard when he prayed + for the removal of the sting in his flesh, because this was not expedient. If, however, we pray for something that is useful + for our beatitude, through being conducive to salvation, we merit it not only by praying, but also by doing other good deeds: + therefore without any doubt we receive what we ask for, yet when we ought to receive it: "since certain things are not + denied us, but are deferred that they may be granted at a suitable time," according to Augustine (Tract. cii in Joan.): and + again this may be hindered if we persevere not in asking for it. Wherefore Basil says (De Constit. Monast. i): "The reason + why sometimes thou hast asked and not received, is because thou hast asked amiss, either inconsistently, or lightly, or because + thou hast asked for what was not good for thee, or because thou hast ceased asking." Since, however, a man cannot condignly + merit eternal life for another, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q83_A15-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q114_A6.html">FS, Q[114], A[6]</a>), it follows that sometimes one cannot condignly merit for another things that pertain to eternal life. For this reason we + are not always heard when we pray for others, as stated above (A[7], ad 2,3). Hence it is that four conditions are laid down; + namely, to ask---"for ourselves---things necessary for salvation---piously---perseveringly"; when all these four concur, we + always obtain what we ask for. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A15-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prayer depends chiefly on faith, not for its efficacy in meriting, because thus it depends chiefly on charity, but for its + efficacy in impetrating, because it is through faith that man comes to know of God's omnipotence and mercy, which are the + source whence prayer impetrates what it asks for. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A15-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A15-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A14.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A16.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q83_A16" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A15.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A17.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q83_A16-p0.1">Whether sinners impetrate anything from God by their prayers?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q83_A16-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A16-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sinners impetrate nothing from God by their prayers. It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A16-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.9.31" target="asv">Jn. 9:31</a>): "We know that God doth not hear sinners"; and this agrees with the saying of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A16-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.28.9" target="asv"> Prov. 28:9, </a> "He that turneth away his ears from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an abomination." Now an abominable prayer impetrates + nothing from God. Therefore sinners impetrate nothing from God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A16-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the just impetrate from God what they merit, as stated above (A[15], ad 2). But sinners cannot merit anything since + they lack grace and charity which is the "power of godliness," according to a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A16-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.3.5" target="asv">2 Tim. 3:5, </a> "Having an appearance indeed of godliness, but denying the power thereof." and so their prayer is impious, and yet piety + it required in order that prayer may be impetrative, as stated above (A[15], ad 2). Therefore + sinners impetrate nothing by their prayers. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A16-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Chrysostom [*Hom. xiv in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "The Father is unwilling + to hear the prayer which the Son has not inspired." Now in the prayer inspired by Christ we say: "Forgive us our trespasses + as we forgive them that trespass against us": and sinners do not fulfil this. Therefore either they lie in saying this, and + so are unworthy to be heard, or, if they do not say it, they are not heard, because they + do not observe the form of prayer instituted by Christ. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A16-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Tract. xliv, super Joan.): "If God were not to hear sinners, the publican would have vainly said: Lord, be + merciful to me a sinner"; and Chrysostom [*Hom. xviii of the same Opus Imperfectum] says: "Everyone that asketh shall receive, + that is to say whether he be righteous or sinful." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A16-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the sinner, two things are to be considered: his nature which God loves, and the sin which He hates. Accordingly when + a sinner prays for something as sinner, i.e. in accordance with a sinful desire, God hears him not through mercy but sometimes + through vengeance when He allows the sinner to fall yet deeper into sin. For "God refuses in mercy what He grants in anger," + as Augustine declares (Tract. lxxiii in Joan.). On the other hand God hears the sinner's + prayer if it proceed from a good natural desire, not out of justice, because the sinner does not merit to be heard, but out + of pure mercy [*Cf. A[15], ad 1], provided however he fulfil the four conditions given above, namely, that he beseech for + himself things necessary for salvation, piously and perseveringly. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A16-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine states (Tract. xliv super Joan.), these words were spoken by the blind man before being anointed, i.e. perfectly + enlightened, and consequently lack authority. And yet there is truth in the saying if it refers to a sinner as such, in which + sense also the sinner's prayer is said to be an abomination. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A16-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There can be no godliness in the sinner's prayer as though his prayer were quickened by a habit of virtue: and yet his prayer + may be godly in so far as he asks for something pertaining to godliness. Even so a man who has not the habit of justice is + able to will something just, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q83_A16-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q59_A2.html">Q[59], A[2]</a>). And though his prayer is not meritorious, it can be impetrative, because merit depends on justice, whereas impetration + rests on grace. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A16-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (A[7], ad 1) the Lord's Prayer is pronounced in the common person of the whole Church: and so if anyone say + the Lord's Prayer while unwilling to forgive his neighbor's trespasses, he lies not, although his words do not apply to him + personally: for they are true as referred to the person of the Church, from which he is excluded by merit, and consequently + he is deprived of the fruit of his prayer. Sometimes, however, a sinner is prepared + to forgive those who have trespassed against him, wherefore his prayers are heard, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A16-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.28.2" target="asv"> Ecclus. 28:2, </a> "Forgive thy neighbor if he hath hurt thee, and then shall thy sins be forgiven to thee when thou prayest." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A16-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A16-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A15.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A17.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q83_A17" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A16.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q84.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q83_A17-p0.1">Whether the parts of prayer are fittingly described as supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q83_A17-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A17-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the parts of prayer are unfittingly described as supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings. + Supplication would seem to be a kind of adjuration. Yet, according to Origen (Super Matth. Tract. xxxv), "a man who wishes + to live according to the gospel need not adjure another, for if it be unlawful to swear, it is also unlawful to adjure." Therefore + supplication is unfittingly reckoned a part of prayer. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A17-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 24), "to pray is to ask becoming things of God." Therefore it is unfitting + to distinguish "prayers" from "intercessions." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A17-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, thanksgivings regard the past, while the others regard the future. But the past precedes the future. Therefore thanksgivings + are unfittingly placed after the others. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A17-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> suffices the authority of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A17-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.1" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:1</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A17-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Three conditions are requisite for prayer. First, that the person who prays should approach God Whom he prays: this is signified + in the word "prayer," because prayer is "the raising up of one's mind to God." The second is that there should be a petition, + and this is signified in the word "intercession." In this case sometimes one asks for something definite, and then some say + it is "intercession" properly so called, or we may ask for some thing indefinitely, + for instance to be helped by God, or we may simply indicate a fact, as in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A17-p6.1" href="./asv.html#John.11.3" target="asv"> Jn. 11:3, </a> "Behold, he whom Thou lovest is sick," and then they call it "insinuation." The third condition is the reason for impetrating + what we ask for: and this either on the part of God, or on the part of the person who asks. The reason of impetration on the + part of God is His sanctity, on account of which we ask to be heard, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A17-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.9.17" target="asv"> Dan. 9:17,18, </a> "For Thy own sake, + incline, O God, Thy ear"; and to this pertains "supplication" [obsecratio] which means a pleading through sacred things, as + when we say, "Through Thy nativity, deliver us, O Lord." The reason for impetration on the part of the person who asks is + "thanksgiving"; since "through giving thanks for benefits received we merit to receive yet greater benefits," as we say in + the collect [*Ember Friday in September and Postcommunion of the common of a Confessor Bishop]. Hence a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q83_A17-p6.3" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.1" target="asv">1 Tim. + 2:1 + </a>says that "in the Mass, the consecration is preceded by supplication," in which certain sacred things are called to mind; + that "prayers are in the consecration itself," in which especially the mind should be raised up to God; and that "intercessions + are in the petitions that follow, and thanksgivings at the end." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A17-p7"> We may notice these four things in several of the Church's collects. Thus in the collect of Trinity Sunday the words, "Almighty + eternal God" belong to the offering up of prayer to God; the words, "Who hast given to Thy servants," etc. belong to thanksgiving; + the words, "grant, we beseech Thee," belong to intercession; and the words at the end, "Through Our Lord," etc. belong to + supplication. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A17-p8"> In the "Conferences of the Fathers" (ix, cap. 11, seqq.) we read: "Supplication is bewailing one's sins; prayer is vowing + something to God; intercession is praying for others; thanksgiving is offered by the mind to God in ineffable ecstasy." The + first explanation, however, is the better. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A17-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Supplication" is an adjuration not for the purpose of compelling, for this is forbidden, but in order to implore mercy. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A17-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Prayer" in the general sense includes all the things mentioned here; but when distinguished from the others it denotes properly + the ascent to God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A17-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Among things that are diverse the past precedes the future; but the one and same thing is future before it is past. Hence + thanksgiving for other benefits precedes intercession: but one and the same benefit is first sought, and finally, when it + has been received, we give thanks for it. Intercession is preceded by prayer whereby we approach Him of Whom we ask: and prayer + is preceded by supplication, whereby through the consideration of God's goodness we + dare approach Him. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A17-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q83_A17-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A16.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q84.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q82_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q84" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A17.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q84_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q84-p0.1">OF ADORATION (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q84-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q84-p2"> In due sequence we must consider the external acts of latria, and in the first place, adoration whereby one uses one's body + to reverence God; secondly, those acts whereby some external thing is offered to God; thirdly, those acts whereby something + belonging to God is assumed. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q84-p3"> Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q84-p4"> (1) Whether adoration is an act of latria?</p> + <p id="SS_Q84-p5"> (2) Whether adoration denotes an internal or an external act?</p> + <p id="SS_Q84-p6"> (3) Whether adoration requires a definite place?</p> + <div id="SS_Q84_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q84.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q84_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q84_A1-p0.1">Whether adoration is an act of latria or religion?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q84_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that adoration is not an act of latria or religion. The worship of religion is due to God alone. But adoration + is not due to God alone: since we read ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q84_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.18.2" target="asv">Gn. 18:2</a>) that Abraham adored the angels; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q84_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 1:23</a>) that the prophet Nathan, when he was come in to king David, "worshiped him bowing down to the ground." Therefore adoration + is not an act of religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the worship of religion is due to God as the object of beatitude, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3): whereas + adoration is due to Him by reason of His majesty, since a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q84_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.28.2" target="asv"> Ps. 28:2, </a> "Adore ye the Lord in His holy court," says: "We pass from these courts into the court where we adore His majesty." Therefore + adoration is not an act of latria. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the worship of one same religion is due to the three Persons. But we do not adore the three Persons with one adoration, + for we genuflect at each separate invocation of Them [*At the adoration of the Cross, on Good Friday]. Therefore adoration + is nol an act of latria. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> are the words quoted + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q84_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.10" target="asv"> Mat. 4:10</a>: "The Lord thy God shalt thou adore and Him only shalt thou serve." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Adoration is directed to the reverence of the person adored. Now it is evident from what we have said ( + <a id="SS_Q84_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q81_A2.html">Q[81], AA[2]</a>,4) that it is proper to religion to show reverence to God. Hence the adoration whereby we adore God is an act of religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reverence is due to God on account of His excellence, which is communicated to certain creatures not in equal measure, but + according to a measure of proportion; and so the reverence which we pay to God, and which belongs to latria, differs from + the reverence which we pay to certain excellent creatures; this belongs to dulia, and we shall speak of it further on ( + <a id="SS_Q84_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q103.html">Q[103])</a>. And since external actions are signs of internal reverence, + certain external tokens significative of reverence are offered to creatures of excellence, and among these tokens the chief + is adoration: yet there is one thing which is offered to God alone, and that is sacrifice. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei + x, 4): "Many tokens of Divine worship are employed in doing honor to men, either through excessive humility, or through pernicious + flattery; yet so that those to whom these honors are given are recognized as being men to whom we owe esteem and + reverence and even adoration if they be far above us. But who ever thought it his duty to sacrifice to any other than one + whom he either knew or deemed or pretended to be a God?" Accordingly it was with the reverence due to an excellent creature + that Nathan adored David; while it was the reverence due to God with which Mardochai refused to adore Aman fearing "lest he + should transfer the honor of his God to a man" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q84_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Esth.13.14" target="asv">Esther 13:14</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A1-p8"> Again with the reverence due to an excellent creature Abraham adored the angels, as did also Josue ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q84_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Josh.5.15" target="asv">Jos. 5:15</a>): though we may understand them to have adored, with the adoration of latria, God Who appeared and spoke to them in the guise + of an angel. It was with the reverence due to God that John was forbidden to adore the angel ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q84_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Rev.22.9" target="asv">Apoc. 22:9</a>), both to indicate the dignity which he had acquired through Christ, whereby man is made equal to an + angel: wherefore the same text goes on: "I am thy fellow-servant and of thy brethren"; as also to exclude any occasion of + idolatry, wherefore the text continues: "Adore God." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every Divine excellency is included in His majesty: to which it pertains that we should be made happy in Him as in the sovereign + good. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since there is one excellence of the three Divine Persons, one honor and reverence is due to them and consequently one adoration. + It is to represent this that where it is related ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q84_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.18.2" target="asv">Gn. 18:2</a>) that three men appeared to Abraham, we are told that he addressed one, saying: "Lord, if I have found favor in thy sight," + etc. The triple genuflection represents the Trinity of Persons, not a difference of adoration. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q84.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q84_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q84_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q84_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q84_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q84_A2-p0.1">Whether adoration denotes an action of the body?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q84_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that adoration does not denote an act of the body. It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q84_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.23" target="asv">Jn. 4:23</a>): "The true adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth." Now what is done in spirit has nothing to do with an + act of the body. Therefore adoration does not denote an act of the body. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the word adoration is taken from "oratio" [prayer]. But prayer consists chiefly in an interior act, according to + + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q84_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:15, </a> "I will pray with the spirit, I will pray also with the understanding." Therefore adoration denotes chiefly a spiritual act. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, acts of the body pertain to sensible knowledge: whereas we approach God not by bodily but by spiritual sense. Therefore + adoration does not denote an act of the body. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q84_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.5" target="asv"> Ex. 20:5, </a> "Thou shalt not adore them, nor serve them," says: "Thou shalt neither worship them in mind, nor adore them outwardly." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 12), since we are composed of a twofold nature, intellectual and sensible, we offer + God a twofold adoration; namely, a spiritual adoration, consisting in the internal devotion of the mind; and a bodily adoration, + which consists in an exterior humbling of the body. And since in all acts of latria that which is without is referred to that + which is within as being of greater import, it follows that exterior adoration is + offered on account of interior adoration, in other words we exhibit signs of humility in our bodies in order to incite our + affections to submit to God, since it is connatural to us to proceed from the sensible to the intelligible. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even bodily adoration is done in spirit, in so far as it proceeds from and is directed to spiritual devotion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as prayer is primarily in the mind, and secondarily expressed in words, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q84_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q83_A12.html">Q[83], A[12]</a>), so too adoration consists chiefly in an interior reverence of God, but secondarily in certain bodily signs of humility; + thus when we genuflect we signify our weakness in comparison with God, and when we prostrate ourselves we profess that we + are nothing of ourselves. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Though we cannot reach God with the senses, our mind is urged by sensible signs to approach God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q84_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q84_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q84_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q84_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q85.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q84_A3-p0.1">Whether adoration requires a definite place?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q84_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that adoration does not require a definite place. It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q84_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.21" target="asv">Jn. 4:21</a>): "The hour cometh, when you shall neither on this mountain, nor in Jerusalem, adore the Father"; and the same reason seems + to apply to other places. Therefore a definite place is not necessary for adoration. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, exterior adoration is directed to interior adoration. But interior adoration is shown to God as existing everywhere. + Therefore exterior adoration does not require a definite place. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same God is adored in the New as in the Old Testament. Now in the Old Testament they adored towards the west, + because the door of the Tabernacle looked to the east ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q84_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.26.18" target="asv">Ex. 26:18 </a>seqq.). Therefore for the same reason we ought now to adore towards the west, if any definite place be requisite for adoration. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q84_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.56.7" target="asv">Is. 56:7</a>): "My house shall be called the house of prayer," which words are also quoted ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q84_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#John.2.16" target="asv">Jn. 2:16</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q84_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q84_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, the chief part of adoration is the internal devotion of the mind, while the secondary part is something external pertaining + to bodily signs. Now the mind internally apprehends God as not comprised in a place; while bodily signs must of necessity + be in some definite place and position. Hence a definite place is required for adoration, not chiefly, as though it were essential + thereto, but by reason of a certain + fittingness, like other bodily signs. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By these words our Lord foretold the cessation of adoration, both according to the rite of the Jews who adored in Jerusalem, + and according to the rite of the Samaritans who adored on Mount Garizim. For both these rites ceased with the advent of the + spiritual truth of the Gospel, according to which "a sacrifice is offered to God in every place," as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q84_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.1.11" target="asv"> Malach. 1:11.</a> + </p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A definite place is chosen for adoration, not on account of God Who is adored, as though He were enclosed in a place, but + on account of the adorers; and this for three reasons. First, because the place is consecrated, so that those who pray there + conceive a greater devotion and are more likely to be heard, as may be seen in the prayer of Solomon ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q84_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 8</a>). Secondly, on account of the sacred mysteries and other signs of holiness contained therein. + Thirdly, on account of the concourse of many adorers, by reason of which their prayer is more likely to be heard, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q84_A3-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.20" target="asv"> Mat. 18:20, </a> "Where there are two or three gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of them." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is a certain fittingness in adoring towards the east. First, because the Divine majesty is indicated in the movement + of the heavens which is from the east. Secondly, because Paradise was situated in the east according to the Septuagint version + of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q84_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.8" target="asv"> Gn. 2:8, </a> and so we signify our desire to return to Paradise. Thirdly, on account of Christ Who is "the light of the world" [* + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q84_A3-p9.2" href="./asv.html#John.8.12" target="asv">Jn. 8:12</a>; 9:5], and is called "the + Orient" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q84_A3-p9.3" href="./asv.html#Zech.6.12" target="asv">Zech. 6:12</a>). Who mounteth above the heaven of heavens to the east ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q84_A3-p9.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.67.34" target="asv">Ps. 67:34</a>), and is expected to come from the east, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q84_A3-p9.5" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.27" target="asv">Mat. 24:27</a>, "As lightning cometh out of the east, and appeareth even into the west; so shall also the coming of the Son of Man be." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q84_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q84_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q85.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q83_A17.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q84_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q85" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q84_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q85_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q85-p0.1">OF SACRIFICE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q85-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q85-p2"> In due sequence we must consider those acts whereby external things are offered to God. These give rise to a twofold consideration: + (1) Of things given to God by the faithful; (2) Of vows, whereby something is promised to Him. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85-p3"> Under the first head we shall consider sacrifices, oblations, first-fruits, and tithes. About sacrifices there are four points + of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85-p4"> (1) Whether offering a sacrifice to God is of the law of nature?</p> + <p id="SS_Q85-p5"> (2) Whether sacrifice should be offered to God alone?</p> + <p id="SS_Q85-p6"> (3) Whether the offering of a sacrifice is a special act of virtue?</p> + <p id="SS_Q85-p7"> (4) Whether all are bound to offer sacrifice?</p> + <div id="SS_Q85_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q85.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q85_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q85_A1-p0.1">Whether offering a sacrifice to God is of the law of nature?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q85_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that offering a sacrifice to God is not of the natural law. Things that are of the natural law are common among + all men. Yet this is not the case with sacrifices: for we read of some, e.g. Melchisedech ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q85_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.14.18" target="asv">Gn. 14:18</a>), offering bread and wine in sacrifice, and of certain animals being offered by some, and others by others. Therefore the + offering of sacrifices is not of the natural law. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things that are of the natural law were observed by all just men. Yet we do not read that Isaac offered sacrifice; + nor that Adam did so, of whom nevertheless it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q85_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.10.2" target="asv">Wis. 10:2</a>) that wisdom "brought him out of his sin." Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not of the natural law. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5,19) that sacrifices are offered in signification of something. Now words which + are chief among signs, as he again says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), "signify, not by nature but by convention," according to + the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i, 2). Therefore sacrifices are not of the natural law. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> At all times and among all nations there has always been the offering of sacrifices. Now that which is observed by all is + seemingly natural. Therefore the offering of sacrifices is of the natural law. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Natural reason tells man that he is subject to a higher being, on account of the defects which he perceives in himself, and + in which he needs help and direction from someone above him: and whatever this superior being may be, it is known to all under + the name of God. Now just as in natural things the lower are naturally subject to the higher, so too it is a dictate of natural + reason in accordance with man's natural inclination that he should tender + submission and honor, according to his mode, to that which is above man. Now the mode befitting to man is that he should employ + sensible signs in order to signify anything, because he derives his knowledge from sensibles. Hence it is a dictate of natural + reason that man should use certain sensibles, by offering them to God in sign of the subjection and honor due to Him, like + those who make certain offerings to their lord in recognition of his authority. Now this is what we mean by a sacrifice, + and consequently the offering of sacrifice is of the natural law. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q85_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q95_A2.html">FS, Q[95], A[2]</a>), certain things belong generically to the natural law, while their determination belongs to the positive law; thus the natural + law requires that evildoers should be punished; but that this or that punishment should be inflicted on them is a matter determined + by God or by man. In like manner the offering of sacrifice belongs generically to the natural law, and consequently all are + agreed on + this point, but the determination of sacrifices is established by God or by man, and this is the reason for their difference. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Adam, Isaac and other just men offered sacrifice to God in a manner befitting the times in which they lived, according to + Gregory, who says (Moral. iv, 3) that in olden times original sin was remitted through the offering of sacrifices. Nor does + Scripture mention all the sacrifices of the just, but only those that have something special connected with them. Perhaps + the reason why we read of no sacrifice being offered by Adam may be that, as the origin + of sin is ascribed to him, the origin of sanctification ought not to be represented as typified in him. Isaac was a type of + Christ, being himself offered in sacrifice; and so there was no need that he should be represented as offering a sacrifice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is natural to man to express his ideas by signs, but the determination of those signs depends on man's pleasure. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q85.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q85_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q85_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q85_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q85_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q85_A2-p0.1">Whether sacrifice should be offered to God alone?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q85_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sacrifice should not be offered to the most high God alone. Since sacrifice ought to be offered to God, + it would seem that it ought to be offered to all such as are partakers of the Godhead. Now holy men are made "partakers of + the Divine nature," according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q85_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.1.4" target="asv">2 Pet. 1:4</a>; wherefore of them is it written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q85_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.81.6" target="asv">Ps. 81:6</a>): "I have said, You are gods": and angels too are called "sons of God," according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q85_A2-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Job.1.6" target="asv"> Job 1:6.</a> Thus sacrifice should be offered to all these. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the greater a person is the greater the honor due to him from man. Now the angels and saints are far greater than + any earthly princes: and yet the subjects of the latter pay them much greater honor, by prostrating before them, and offering + them gifts, than is implied by offering an animal or any other thing in sacrifice. Much more therefore may one offer sacrifice + to the angels and saints. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, temples and altars are raised for the offering of sacrifices. Yet temples and altars are raised to angels and saints. + Therefore sacrifices also may be offered to them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q85_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.20" target="asv">Ex. 22:20</a>): "He that sacrificeth to gods shall be put to death, save only to the Lord." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q85_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q85_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, a sacrifice is offered in order that something may be represented. Now the sacrifice that is offered outwardly represents + the inward spiritual sacrifice, whereby the soul offers itself to God according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q85_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.50.19" target="asv"> Ps. 50:19, </a> "A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit," since, as stated above (Q[81], A[7]; Q[84], A[2]), the outward acts of religion + are directed to the inward acts. Again the soul + offers itself in sacrifice to God as its beginning by creation, and its end by beatification: and according to the true faith + God alone is the creator of our souls, as stated in the + <a id="SS_Q85_A2-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q90_A3.html">FP, Q[90], A[3]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q85_A2-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q118_A2.html">FS, Q[118], A[2]</a>, while in Him alone the beatitude of our soul consists, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q85_A2-p6.5" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A8.html">FS, Q[1], A[8]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q85_A2-p6.6" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q2_A8.html">FS, Q[2], A[8]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q85_A2-p6.7" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A1.html">FS, Q[3], AA[1]</a>,7,8). Wherefore just as to God alone + ought we to offer spiritual sacrifice, so too ought we to offer outward sacrifices to Him alone: even so "in our prayers and + praises we proffer significant words to Him to Whom in our hearts we offer the things which we designate thereby," as Augustine + states (De Civ. Dei x, 19). Moreover we find that in every country the people are wont to show the sovereign ruler some special + sign of honor, and that if this be shown to anyone else, it is a crime of high-treason. Therefore, in the Divine law, + the death punishment is assigned to those who offer Divine honor to another than God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The name of the Godhead is communicated to certain ones, not equally with God, but by participation; hence neither is equal + honor due to them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The offering of a sacrifice is measured not by the value of the animal killed, but by its signification, for it is done in + honor of the sovereign Ruler of the whole universe. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 19), "the demons rejoice, + not in the stench of corpses, but in receiving divine honors." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei viii, 19), "we do not raise temples and priesthoods to the martyrs, because not they but their + God is our God. Wherefore the priest says not: I offer sacrifice to thee, Peter or Paul. But we give thanks to God for their + triumphs, and urge ourselves to imitate them." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q85_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q85_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q85_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q85_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q85_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q85_A3-p0.1">Whether the offering of sacrifice is a special act of virtue?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q85_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the offering of sacrifice is not a special act of virtue. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 6): "A true sacrifice + is any work done that we may cleave to God in holy fellowship." But not every good work is a special act of some definite + virtue. Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not a special act of a definite virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the mortification of the body by fasting belongs to abstinence, by continence belongs to chastity, by martyrdom + belongs to fortitude. Now all these things seem to be comprised in the offering of sacrifice, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q85_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.1" target="asv"> Rom. 12:1, </a> "Present your bodies a living sacrifice." Again the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q85_A3-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.13.16" target="asv">Heb. 13:16</a>): "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God's favor is obtained." Now it belongs + to charity, mercy and liberality to do good and to impart. Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not a special act of a definite + virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a sacrifice is apparently anything offered to God. Now many things are offered to God, such as devotion, prayer, + tithes, first-fruits, oblations, and holocausts. Therefore sacrifice does not appear to be a special act of a definite virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The law contains special precepts about sacrifices, as appears from the beginning of Leviticus. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q85_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html">FS, Q[18], AA[6]</a>,7), where an act of one virtue is directed to the end of another virtue it partakes somewhat of its species; thus when a + man thieves in order to commit fornication, his theft assumes, in a sense, the deformity of fornication, so that even though + it were not a sin otherwise, it would be a sin from the very fact that it was directed to fornication. Accordingly, sacrifice + is a special act deserving of + praise in that it is done out of reverence for God; and for this reason it belongs to a definite virtue, viz. religion. But + it happens that the acts of the other virtues are directed to the reverence of God, as when a man gives alms of his own things + for God's sake, or when a man subjects his own body to some affliction out of reverence for God; and in this way the acts + also of other virtues may be called sacrifices. On the other hand there are acts that are not deserving of praise save through + being done out of reverence for God: such acts are properly called sacrifices, and belong to the virtue of religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The very fact that we wish to cling to God in a spiritual fellowship pertains to reverence for God: and consequently the + act of any virtue assumes the character of a sacrifice through being done in order that we may cling to God in holy fellowship. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man's good is threefold. There is first his soul's good which is offered to God in a certain inward sacrifice by devotion, + prayer and other like interior acts: and this is the principal sacrifice. The second is his body's good, which is, so to speak, + offered to God in martyrdom, and abstinence or continency. The third is the good which consists of external things: and of + these we offer a sacrifice to God, directly when we offer our possession to God + immediately, and indirectly when we share them with our neighbor for God's sake. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A "sacrifice," properly speaking, requires that something be done to the thing which is offered to God, for instance animals + were slain and burnt, the bread is broken, eaten, blessed. The very word signifies this, since "sacrifice" is so called because + a man does something sacred [facit sacrum]. On the other hand an "oblation" is properly the offering of something to God even + if nothing be done thereto, thus we speak of offering money or bread at the + altar, and yet nothing is done to them. Hence every sacrifice is an oblation, but not conversely. "First-fruits" are oblations, + because they were offered to God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q85_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.26" target="asv">Dt. 26</a>, but they are not a sacrifice, because nothing sacred was done to them. "Tithes," however, are neither a sacrifice nor an + oblation, properly speaking, because they are not offered immediately to God, but to the ministers of Divine worship. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q85_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q85_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q85_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q85_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q86.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q85_A4-p0.1">Whether all are bound to offer sacrifices?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q85_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all are not bound to offer sacrifices. The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q85_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.19" target="asv">Rom. 3:19</a>): "What things soever the Law speaketh, it speaketh to them that are in the Law." Now the law of sacrifices was not given + to all, but only to the Hebrew people. Therefore all are not bound to offer sacrifices. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sacrifices are offered to God in order to signify something. But not everyone is capable of understanding these + significations. Therefore not all are bound to offer sacrifices. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, priests [*'Sacerdotes': Those who give or administer sacred things (sacra dantes): cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q85_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.1" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:1</a>] are so called because they offer sacrifice to God. But all are not priests. Therefore not all are bound to offer sacrifices. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The offering of sacrifices of is of the natural law, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q85_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q85_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now all are bound to do that which is of the natural law. Therefore all are bound to offer sacrifice to God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Sacrifice is twofold, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q85_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q85_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. The first and principal is the inward sacrifice, which all are bound to offer, since all are obliged to offer to God a devout + mind. The other is the outward sacrifice, and this again is twofold. There is a sacrifice which is deserving of praise merely + through being offered to God in protestation of our subjection to God: and the obligation of offering this sacrifice was not + the same for + those under the New or the Old Law, as for those who were not under the Law. For those who are under the Law are bound to + offer certain definite sacrifices according to the precepts of the Law, whereas those who were not under the Law were bound + to perform certain outward actions in God's honor, as became those among whom they dwelt, but not definitely to this or that + action. The other outward sacrifice is when the outward actions of the other virtues are performed out of reverence for God; + some of which are a matter of precept; and to these all are bound, while others are works of supererogation, and to these + all are not bound. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All were not bound to offer those particular sacrifices which were prescribed in the Law: but they were bound to some sacrifices + inward or outward, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Though all do not know explicitly the power of the sacrifices, they know it implicitly, even as they have implicit faith, + as stated above (Q[2], AA 6,7). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The priests offer those sacrifices which are specially directed to the Divine worship, not only for themselves but also for + others. But there are other sacrifices, which anyone can offer to God for himself as explained above ( + <a id="SS_Q85_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q85_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q85_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q85_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q86.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q84_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q85_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q86" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q85_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q86_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q86-p0.1">OF OBLATIONS AND FIRST-FRUITS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q86-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q86-p2"> We must next consider oblations and first-fruits. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q86-p3"> (1) Whether any oblations are necessary as a matter of precept?</p> + <p id="SS_Q86-p4"> (2) To whom are oblations due?</p> + <p id="SS_Q86-p5"> (3) of what things they should be made?</p> + <p id="SS_Q86-p6"> (4) In particular, as to first-fruits, whether men are bound to offer them?</p> + <div id="SS_Q86_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q86.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q86_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q86_A1-p0.1">Whether men are under a necessity of precept to make oblations?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q86_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men are not bound by precept to make oblations. Men are not bound, at the time of the Gospel, to observe + the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q86_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q103_A3.html">FS, Q[103], AA[3]</a> ,4). Now the offering of oblations is one of the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law, since it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.14" target="asv">Ex. 23:14</a>): "Three times every year you shall celebrate feasts with Me," and further on ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A1-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.15" target="asv">Ex. + 23:15 + </a>): "Thou shalt not appear empty before Me." Therefore men are not now under a necessity of precept to make oblations. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, before they are made, oblations depend on man's will, as appears from our Lord's saying ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.23" target="asv">Mat. 5:23</a>), "If . . . thou offer thy gift at the altar," as though this were left to the choice of the offerer: and when once oblations + have been made, there is no way of offering them again. Therefore in no way is a man under a necessity of precept to make + oblations. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if anyone is bound to give a certain thing to the Church, and fails to give it, he can be compelled to do so by + being deprived of the Church's sacraments. But it would seem unlawful to refuse the sacraments of the Church to those who + refuse to make oblations according to a decree of the sixth council [*Can. Trullan, xxiii], quoted I, qu. i, can. Nullus: + "Let none who dispense Holy Communion exact anything of the recipient, and if they exact anything + let them be deposed." Therefore it is not necessary that men should make oblations. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says [*Gregory VII; Concil. Roman. v, can. xii]: "Let every Christian take care that he offer something to God at + the celebration of Mass." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q86_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q85_A3.html">Q[85], A[3]</a>, ad 3), the term "oblation" is common to all things offered for the Divine worship, so that if a thing be offered to be destroyed + in worship of God, as though it were being made into something holy, it is both an oblation and a sacrifice. Wherefore it + is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.29.18" target="asv">Ex. 29:18</a>): "Thou shalt offer the whole ram for a burnt-offering upon the altar; it is an oblation to the Lord, a most + sweet savor of the victim of the Lord"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Lev.2.1" target="asv">Lev. 2:1</a>): "When anyone shall offer an oblation of sacrifice to the Lord, his offering shall be of fine flour." If, on the other hand, + it be offered with a view to its remaining entire and being deputed to the worship of God or to the use of His ministers, + it will be an oblation and not a sacrifice. Accordingly it is essential to oblations of this kind that they be offered voluntarily, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A1-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Exod.25.2" target="asv"> Ex. 25:2, + + </a>of "every man that offereth of his own accord you shall take them." Nevertheless it may happen in four ways that one is bound + to make oblations. First, on account of a previous agreement: as when a person is granted a portion of Church land, that he + may make certain oblations at fixed times, although this has the character of rent. Secondly, by reason of a previous assignment + or promise; as when a man offers a gift among the living, or by will bequeaths to the Church something + whether movable or immovable to be delivered at some future time. Thirdly, on account of the need of the Church, for instance + if her ministers were without means of support. Fourthly, on account of custom; for the faithful are bound at certain solemn + feasts to make certain customary oblations. In the last two cases, however, the oblation remains voluntary, as regards, to + wit, the quantity or kind of the thing offered. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Under the New Law men are not bound to make oblations on account of legal solemnities, as stated in Exodus, but on account + of certain other reasons, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some are bound to make oblations, both before making them, as in the first, third, and. fourth cases, and after they have + made them by assignment or promise: for they are bound to offer in reality that which has been already offered to the Church + by way of assignment. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those who do not make the oblations they are bound to make may be punished by being deprived of the sacraments, not by the + priest himself to whom the oblations should be made, lest he seem to exact, something for bestowing the sacraments, but by + someone superior to him. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q86.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q86_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q86_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q86_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q86_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q86_A2-p0.1">Whether oblations are due to priests alone?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q86_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that oblations are not due to priests alone. For chief among oblations would seem to be those that are deputed + to the sacrifices of victims. Now whatever is given to the poor is called a "victim in Scripture according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.13.16" target="asv"> Heb. 13:16, </a> "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such victims [Douay: 'sacrifices'] God's favor is obtained. Much more therefore + are oblations due to the poor. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in many parishes monks have a share in the oblations. Now "the case of clerics is distinct from the case of monks," + as Jerome states [*Ep. xiv, ad Heliod.]. Therefore oblations art not due to priests alone. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, lay people with the consent of the Church buy oblations such as loaves and so forth, and they do so for no other + reason than that they may make use thereof themselves. Therefore oblations may have reference to the laity. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A canon of Pope Damasus [*Damasus I] quoted X, qu. i [*Can. Hanc consuetudinem], says: "None but the priests whom day by + day we see serving the Lord may eat and drink of the oblations which are offered within the precincts of the Holy Church: + because in the Old Testament the Lord forbade the children of Israel to eat the sacred loaves, with the exception of Aaron + and his sons" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.24.8" target="asv">Lev. 24:8,9</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The priest is appointed mediator and stands, so to speak, "between" the people and God, as we read of Moses ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.5.5" target="asv">Dt. 5:5</a>), wherefore it belongs to him to set forth the Divine teachings and sacraments before the people; and besides to offer to + the Lord things appertaining to the people, their prayers, for instance, their sacrifices and oblations. Thus the Apostle + says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.5.1" target="asv">Heb. 5:1</a>): "Every high priest taken from among men is + ordained for men in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins." Hence the oblations + which the people offer to God concern the priests, not only as regards their turning them to their own use, but also as regards + the faithful dispensation thereof, by spending them partly on things appertaining to the Divine worship, partly on things + touching their own livelihood (since they that serve the altar partake with the altar, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.13" target="asv">1 Cor. + 9:13 + </a>), and partly for the good of the poor, who, as far as possible, should be supported from the possessions of the Church: for + our Lord had a purse for the use of the poor, as Jerome observes on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A2-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.17.26" target="asv"> Mat. 17:26, </a> "That we may not scandalize them." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Whatever is given to the poor is not a sacrifice properly speaking; yet it is called a sacrifice in so far as it is given + to them for God's sake. In like manner, and for the same reason, it can be called an oblation, though not properly speaking, + since it is not given immediately to God. Oblations properly so called fall to the use of the poor, not by the dispensation + of the offerers, but by the dispensation of the priests. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Monks or other religious may receive oblations under three counts. First, as poor, either by the dispensation of the priests, + or by ordination of the Church; secondly, through being ministers of the altar, and then they can accept oblations that are + freely offered; thirdly, if the parishes belong to them, and they can accept oblations, having a right to them as rectors + of the Church. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Oblations when once they are consecrated, such as sacred vessels and vestments, cannot be granted to the use of the laity: + and this is the meaning of the words of Pope Damasus. But those which are unconsecrated may be allowed to the use of layfolk + by permission of the priests, whether by way of gift or by way of sale. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q86_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q86_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q86_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q86_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q86_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q86_A3-p0.1">Whether a man may make oblations of whatever he lawfully possesses?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q86_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man may not make oblations of whatever he lawfully possesses. According to human law [*Dig. xii, v, + de Condict. ob. turp. vel iniust. caus. 4] "the whore's is a shameful trade in what she does but not in what she takes," and + consequently what she takes she possesses lawfully. Yet it is not lawful for her to make an oblation with her gains, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.18" target="asv"> Dt. 23:18, </a> "Thou shalt not offer the hire of a strumpet . . . in + the house of the Lord thy God." Therefore it is not lawful to make an oblation of whatever one possesses lawfully. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the same passage it is forbidden to offer "the price of a dog" in the house of God. But it is evident that a + man possesses lawfully the price of a dog he has lawfully sold. Therefore it is not lawful to make an oblation of whatever + we possess lawfully. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.1.8" target="asv">Malachi 1:8</a>): "If you offer the lame and the sick, is it not evil?" Yet an animal though lame or sick is a lawful possession. Therefore + it would seem that not of every lawful possession may one make an oblation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.9" target="asv">Prov. 3:9</a>): "Honor the Lord with thy substance." Now whatever a man possesses lawfully belongs to his substance. Therefore he may make + oblations of whatever he possesses lawfully. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. cxiii), "shouldst thou plunder one weaker than thyself and give some of the spoil + to the judge, if he should pronounce in thy favor, such is the force of justice that even thou wouldst not be pleased with + him: and if this should not please thee, neither does it please thy God." Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.34.21" target="asv">Ecclus. 34:21</a>): "The offering of him that sacrificeth of a thing wrongfully gotten is stained." + Therefore it is evident that an oblation must not be made of things unjustly acquired or possessed. In the Old Law, however, + wherein the figure was predominant, certain things were reckoned unclean on account of their signification, and it was forbidden + to offer them. But in the New Law all God's creatures are looked upon as clean, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Titus.1.15" target="asv"> Titus 1:15</a>: and consequently anything that is lawfully possessed, considered in itself, may be offered in oblation. But it may + happen accidentally that one may not make an oblation of what one possesses lawfully; for instance if it be detrimental to + another person, as in the case of a son who offers to God the means of supporting his father (which our Lord condemns, + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A3-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.5" target="asv"> Mat. 15:5</a>), or if it give rise to scandal or contempt, or the like. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the Old Law it was forbidden to make an offering of the hire of a strumpet on account of its uncleanness, and in the New + Law, on account of scandal, lest the Church seem to favor sin if she accept oblations from the profits of sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to the Law, a dog was deemed an unclean animal. Yet other unclean animals were redeemed and their price could be + offered, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.27.27" target="asv"> Lev. 27:27, </a> "If it be an unclean animal, he that offereth it shall redeem it." But a dog was neither offered nor redeemed, both because + idolaters used dogs in sacrifices to their idols, and because they signify robbery, the proceeds of which cannot be offered + in oblation. However, this + prohibition ceased under the New Law. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The oblation of a blind or lame animal was declared unlawful for three reasons. First, on account of the purpose for which + it was offered, wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.1.8" target="asv">Malach. 1:8</a>): "If you offer the blind in sacrifice, is it not evil?" and it behooved sacrifices to be without blemish. Secondly, on account + of contempt, wherefore the same text goes on ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A3-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Mal.1.12" target="asv">Malach. 1:12</a>): "You have profaned" My name, "in that you say: + The table of the Lord is defiled and that which is laid thereupon is contemptible." Thirdly, on account of a previous vow, + whereby a man has bound himself to offer without blemish whatever he has vowed: hence the same text says further on ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A3-p9.3" href="./asv.html#Mal.1.14" target="asv">Malach. 1:14</a>): "Cursed is the deceitful man that hath in his flock a male, and making a vow offereth in sacrifice that which is feeble + to the Lord." The same reasons avail still in the New Law, but when they do not apply the unlawfulness + ceases. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q86_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q86_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q86_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q86_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q87.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q86_A4-p0.1">Whether men are bound to pay first-fruits?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q86_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men are not bound to pay first-fruits. After giving the law of the first-born the text continues ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.13.9" target="asv">Ex. 13:9</a>): "It shall be as a sign in thy hand," so that, apparently, it is a ceremonial precept. But ceremonial precepts are not to + be observed in the New Law. Neither therefore ought first-fruits to be paid. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, first-fruits were offered to the Lord for a special favor conferred on that people, wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.26.2" target="asv">Dt. 26:2,3</a>): "Thou shalt take the first of all thy fruits . . . and thou shalt go to the priest that shall be in those days, and say + to him: I profess this day before the Lord thy God, that I am come into the land, for which He swore to our fathers, that + He would give it us." Therefore other nations are not bound to pay + first-fruits. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> That which one is bound to do should be something definite. But neither in the New Law nor in the Old do we find mention + of a definite amount of first-fruits. Therefore one is not bound of necessity to pay them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is laid down (16, qu. vii, can. Decimas): "We confirm the right of priests to tithes and first-fruits, and everybody must + pay them." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> First-fruits are a kind of oblation, because they are offered to God with a certain profession ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.26" target="asv">Dt. 26</a>); where the same passage continues: "The priest taking the basket containing the first-fruits from the hand of him that bringeth + the first-fruits, shall set it before the altar of the Lord thy God," and further on ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.26.10" target="asv">Dt. 26:10</a>) he is commanded to say: "Therefore now I offer the first-fruits of the land, which the Lord hath given me." Now + the first-fruits were offered for a special reason, namely, in recognition of the divine favor, as though man acknowledged + that he had received the fruits of the earth from God, and that he ought to offer something to God in return, according to + + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A4-p6.3" href="./asv.html#iChr.29.14" target="asv">1 Paral 29:14, </a> "We have given Thee what we received of Thy hand." And since what we offer God ought to be something special, hence it is + that man was commanded to offer God his first-fruits, as being a special part of the fruits of + the earth: and since a priest is "ordained for the people "in the things that appertain to God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A4-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Heb.5.1" target="asv">Heb. 5:1</a>), the first-fruits offered by the people were granted to the priest's use." Wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A4-p6.5" href="./asv.html#Num.18.8" target="asv">Num. 18:8</a>): "The Lord said to Aaron: Behold I have given thee the charge of My first-fruits." Now it is a point of natural law that + man should make an offering in God's honor out of the things he has received from God, but that the offering should be + made to any particular person, or out of his first-fruits, or in such or such a quantity, was indeed determined in the Old + Law by divine command; but in the New Law it is fixed by the declaration of the Church, in virtue of which men are bound to + pay first-fruits according to the custom of their country and the needs of the Church's ministers. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The ceremonial observances were properly speaking signs of the future, and consequently they ceased when the foreshadowed + truth was actually present. But the offering of first-fruits was for a sign of a past favor, whence arises the duty of acknowledgment + in accordance with the dictate of natural reason. Hence taken in a general sense this obligation remains. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> First-fruits were offered in the Old Law, not only on account of the favor of the promised land given by God, but also on + account of the favor of the fruits of the earth, which were given by God. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.26.10" target="asv">Dt. 26:10</a>): "I offer the first-fruits of the land which the Lord hath given me," which second motive is common among all people. We + may also reply that just as God granted the land of promise to the Jews by a special + favor, so by a general favor He bestowed the lordship of the earth on the whole of mankind, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A4-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.113.24" target="asv"> Ps. 113:24, </a> "The earth He has given to the children of men." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Jerome says [*Comment. in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q86_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.45.13" target="asv"> Ezech. 45:13,14</a>; cf. Cap. Decimam, de Decim. Primit. et Oblat.]: "According to the tradition of the ancients the custom arose for those who + had most to give the priests a fortieth part, and those who had least, one sixtieth, in lieu of first-fruits." Hence it would + seem that first-fruits should vary between these limits according to the custom of one's country. And it was reasonable that + the amount of + first-fruits should not be fixed by law, since, as stated above, first-fruits are offered by way of oblation, a condition + of which is that it should be voluntary. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q86_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q86_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q87.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q85_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q86_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q87" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q86_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q87_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q87-p0.1">OF TITHES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q87-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q87-p2"> Next we must consider tithes, under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q87-p3"> (1) Whether men are bound by precept to pay tithes?</p> + <p id="SS_Q87-p4"> (2) Of what things ought tithes to be paid?</p> + <p id="SS_Q87-p5"> (3) To whom ought they to be paid?</p> + <p id="SS_Q87-p6"> (4) Who ought to pay tithes?</p> + <div id="SS_Q87_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q87.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q87_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q87_A1-p0.1">Whether men are bound to pay tithes under a necessity of precept?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q87_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men are not bound by precept to pay tithes. The commandment to pay tithes is contained in the Old Law + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.27.30" target="asv">Lev. 27:30</a>), "All tithes of the land, whether of corn or of the fruits of trees, are the Lord's," and further on ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.27.32" target="asv">Lev. 27:32</a>): "Of all the tithes of oxen and sheep and goats, that pass under the shepherd's rod, every tenth that cometh shall be sanctified + to the Lord." This cannot be reckoned among + the moral precepts, because natural reason does not dictate that one ought to give a tenth part, rather than a ninth or eleventh. + Therefore it is either a judicial or a ceremonial precept. Now, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q87_A1-p2.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q103_A3.html">FS, Q[103], A[3]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q87_A1-p2.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q104_A3.html">FS, Q[104], A[3]</a>), during the time of grace men are hound neither to the ceremonial nor to the judicial precepts of the Old Law. Therefore + men are not bound now to pay tithes. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, during the time of grace men are bound only to those things which were commanded by Christ through the Apostles, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.28.20" target="asv"> Mat. 28:20, </a> "Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you"; and Paul says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Acts.20.27" target="asv">Acts 20:27</a>): "I have not spared to declare unto you all the counsel of God." Now neither in the teaching of Christ nor in that of the + apostles is there any mention of the paying of tithes: + for the saying of our Lord about tithes ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A1-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.23.23" target="asv">Mat. 23:23</a>), "These things you ought to have done" seems to refer to the past time of legal observance: thus Hilary says (Super Matth. + can. xxiv): "The tithing of herbs, which was useful in foreshadowing the future, was not to be omitted." Therefore during + the time of grace men are not bound to pay tithes. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, during the time of grace, men are not more bound to the legal observances than before the Law. But before the Law + tithes were given, by reason not of a precept but of a vow. For we read ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.28.20" target="asv">Gn. 28:20</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.28.22" target="asv">22</a>) that Jacob "made a vow" saying: "If God shall be with me, and shall keep me in the way by which I walk . . . of all the + things that Thou shalt give to me, I will offer tithes to Thee." Neither, therefore, during the time of grace are men bound + to pay + tithes. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in the Old Law men were bound to pay three kinds of tithe. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Num.18.23" target="asv">Num. 18:23,24</a>): "The sons of Levi . . . shall . . . be content with the oblation of tithes, which I have separated for their uses and necessities." + Again, there were other tithes of which we read ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.14.22" target="asv">Dt. 14:22,23</a>): "Every year thou shalt set aside the tithes of all thy fruits, that the earth bringeth forth year by year; and thou shalt + eat before the Lord thy God in the place which He shall choose." And there were yet other tithes, of which it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A1-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.14.28" target="asv">Dt. 14:28</a>): "The third year thou shalt separate another tithe of all things that grow to thee at that time, and shalt lay it up within + thy gates. And the Levite that hath no other part nor possession with thee, and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the + widow, that are within thy gates, shall . . . eat and be filled." Now during the time of grace men + are not bound to pay the second and third tithes. Neither therefore are they bound to pay the first. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, a debt that is due without any time being fixed for its payment, must be paid at once under pain of sin. Accordingly + if during the time of grace men are bound, under necessity of precept, to pay tithes in those countries where tithes are not + paid, they would all be in a state of mortal sin, and so would also be the ministers of the Church for dissembling. But this + seems unreasonable. Therefore during the time of grace men are not bound under necessity + of precept to pay tithes. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine [*Append. Serm. cclxxcii], whose words are quoted 16, qu. i [*Can. Decimae], says: "It is a duty to pay tithes, + and whoever refuses to pay them takes what belongs to another." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the Old Law tithes were paid for the sustenance of the ministers of God. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.3.10" target="asv">Malach. 3:10</a>): "Bring all the tithes into My [Vulg.: 'the'] store-house that there may be meat in My house." Hence the precept about the + paying of tithes was partly moral and instilled in the natural reason; and partly judicial, deriving its force from its divine + institution. Because natural reason dictates that the people should administer + the necessaries of life to those who minister the divine worship for the welfare of the whole people even as it is the people's + duty to provide a livelihood for their rulers and soldiers and so forth. Hence the Apostle proves this from human custom, + saying ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:7</a>): "Who serveth as a soldier at any time at his own charge? Who planteth a vineyard and eateth not of the fruit thereof?" + But the fixing of the proportion to be offered to the ministers of divine worship does not belong to the + natural law, but was determined by divine institution, in accordance with the condition of that people to whom the law was + being given. For they were divided into twelve tribes, and the twelfth tribe, namely that of Levi, was engaged exclusively + in the divine ministry and had no possessions whence to derive a livelihood: and so it was becomingly ordained that the remaining + eleven tribes should give one-tenth part of their revenues to the Levites [* + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A1-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Num.18.21" target="asv">Num. 18:21</a>] that the + latter might live respectably; and also because some, through negligence, would disregard this precept. Hence, so far as the + tenth part was fixed, the precept was judicial, since all institutions established among this people for the special purpose + of preserving equality among men, in accordance with this people's condition, are called "judicial precepts." Nevertheless + by way of consequence these institutions foreshadowed something in the future, even as everything else connected with them, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A1-p8.4" href="./asv.html#iCor.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 12</a>, "All these things happened to them in figure." In this respect they had something in common with the "ceremonial precepts," + which were instituted chiefly that they might be signs of the future. Hence the precept about paying tithes foreshadowed something + in the future. For ten is, in a way, the perfect number (being the first numerical limit, since the figures do not go beyond + ten but begin over again from one), and therefore he that gave a tenth, which is the sign of + perfection, reserving the nine other parts for himself, acknowledged by a sign that imperfection was his part, and that the + perfection which was to come through Christ was to be hoped for from God. Yet this proves it to be, not a ceremonial but a + judicial precept, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A1-p9"> There is this difference between the ceremonial and judicial precepts of the Law, as we stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q87_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q104_A3.html">FS, Q[104], A[3]</a>), that it is unlawful to observe the ceremonial precepts at the time of the New Law, whereas there is no sin in keeping the + judicial precepts during the time of grace although they are not binding. Indeed they are bound to be observed by some, if + they be ordained by the authority of those who have power to make laws. Thus it was a + judicial precept of the Old Law that he who stole a sheep should restore four sheep ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A1-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.1" target="asv">Ex. 22:1</a>), and if any king were to order this to be done his subjects would be bound to obey. In like manner during the time of the + New Law the authority of the Church has established the payment of tithe; thus showing a certain kindliness, lest the people + of the New Law should give less to the ministers of the New Testament than did the people of the Old Law to the ministers + of the Old + Testament; for the people of the New Law are under greater obligations, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A1-p9.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.20" target="asv"> Mat. 5:20, </a> "Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven," + and, moreover, the ministers of the New Testament are of greater dignity than the ministers of the Old Testament, as the Apostle + shows ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A1-p9.4" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.7" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:7,8</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A1-p10"> Accordingly it is evident that man's obligation to pay tithes arises partly from natural law, partly from the institution + of the Church; who, nevertheless, in consideration of the requirements of time and persons might ordain the payment of some + other proportion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A1-p11"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The precept about paying tithes, in so far as it was a moral precept, was given in the Gospel by our Lord when He said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.10" target="asv">Mat. 10:10</a>) [*The words as quoted are from + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A1-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.7" target="asv"> Lk. 10:7</a>: Matthew has 'meat' instead of 'hire']: "The workman is worthy of his hire," and the Apostle says the same ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A1-p12.3" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:4 </a>seqq.). But the fixing of the particular proportion is left to the ordinance of the Church. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Before the time of the Old Law the ministry of the divine worship was not entrusted to any particular person; although it + is stated that the first-born were priests, and that they received a double portion. For this very reason no particular portion + was directed to be given to the ministers of the divine worship: but when they met with one, each man of his own accord gave + him what he deemed right. Thus Abraham by a kind of prophetic instinct gave + tithes to Melchisedech, the priest of the Most High God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A1-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.14.20" target="asv"> Gn. 14:20, </a> and again Jacob made a vow to give tithes [* + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A1-p13.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.28.20" target="asv">Gn. 28:20</a>], although he appears to have vowed to do so, not by paying them to ministers, but for the purpose of the divine worship, + for instance for the fulfilling of sacrifices, hence he said significantly: "I will offer tithes to Thee." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The second kind of tithe, which was reserved for the offering of sacrifices, has no place in the New Law, since the legal + victims had ceased. But the third kind of tithe which they had to eat with the poor, is increased in the New Law, for our + Lord commanded us to give to the poor not merely the tenth part, but all our surplus, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A1-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.11.41" target="asv"> Lk. 11:41</a>: "That which remaineth, give alms." Moreover the tithes that are given to the + ministers of the Church should be dispensed by them for the use of the poor. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The ministers of the Church ought to be more solicitous for the increase of spiritual goods in the people, than for the amassing + of temporal goods: and hence the Apostle was unwilling to make use of the right given him by the Lord of receiving his livelihood + from those to whom he preached the Gospel, lest he should occasion a hindrance to the Gospel of Christ [* + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A1-p15.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:12</a>]. Nor did they sin who did not contribute to his upkeep, + else the Apostle would not have omitted to reprove them. In like manner the ministers of the Church rightly refrain from demanding + the Church's tithes, when they could not demand them without scandal, on account of their having fallen into desuetude, or + for some other reason. Nevertheless those who do not give tithes in places where the Church does not demand them are not in + a state of damnation, unless they be obstinate, and unwilling to pay even if tithes were demanded of them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A1-p16"></p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A1-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q87.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q87_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q87_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q87_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q87_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q87_A2-p0.1">Whether men are bound to pay tithes of all things?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q87_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men are not bound to give tithes of all things. The paying of tithes seems to be an institution of the + Old Law. Now the Old Law contains no precept about personal tithes, viz. those that are payable on property acquired by one's + own act, for instance by commerce or soldiering. Therefore no man is bound to pay tithes on such things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is not right to make oblations of that which is ill-gotten, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q87_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q86_A3.html">Q[86], A[3]</a>). Now oblations, being offered to God immediately, seem to be more closely connected with the divine worship than tithes + which are offered to the ministers. Therefore neither should tithes be paid on ill-gotten goods. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the last chapter of Leviticus (30,32) the precept of paying tithes refers only to "corn, fruits of trees" and + animals "that pass under the shepherd's rod." But man derives a revenue from other smaller things, such as the herbs that + grow in his garden and so forth. Therefore neither on these things is a man bound to pay tithes. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, man cannot pay except what is in his power. Now a man does not always remain in possession of all his profit from + land and stock, since sometimes he loses them by theft or robbery; sometimes they are transferred to another person by sale; + sometimes they are due to some other person, thus taxes are due to princes, and wages due to workmen. Therefore one ought + not to pay tithes on such like things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.28.22" target="asv">Gn. 28:22</a>): "Of all things that Thou shalt give to me, I will offer tithes to Thee." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In judging about a thing we should look to its principle. Now the principle of the payment of tithes is the debt whereby + carnal things are due to those who sow spiritual things, according to the saying of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:11</a>), "If we have sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great matter if we reap your carnal things?" [thus implying that on + the contrary "it is no great matter if we reap your carnal things"] [*The phrase in the + brackets is omitted in the Leonine edition]. For this debt is the principle on which is based the commandment of the Church + about the payment of tithes. Now whatever man possesses comes under the designation of carnal things. Therefore tithes must + be paid on whatever one possesses. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In accordance with the condition of that people there was a special reason why the Old Law did not include a precept about + personal tithes; because, to wit, all the other tribes had certain possessions wherewith they were able to provide a sufficient + livelihood for the Levites who had no possessions, but were not forbidden to make a profit out of other lawful occupations + as the other Jews did. On the other hand the people of the New Law are spread + abroad throughout the world, and many of them have no possessions, but live by trade, and these would contribute nothing to + the support of God's ministers if they did not pay tithes on their trade profits. Moreover the ministers of the New Law are + more strictly forbidden to occupy themselves in money-making trades, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.4" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:4, </a> "No man being a soldier to God, entangleth himself with secular business." Wherefore in the New Law men are bound to pay + personal + tithes, according to the custom of their country and the needs of the ministers: hence Augustine, whose words are quoted 16, + qu. 1, cap. Decimae, says [*Append. Serm. cclxxvii]: "Tithes must be paid on the profits of soldiering, trade or craft." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things are ill-gotten in two ways. First, because the getting itself was unjust: such, for instance, are things gotten by + robbery, theft or usury: and these a man is bound to restore, and not to pay tithes on them. If, however, a field be bought + with the profits of usury, the usurer is bound to pay tithes on the produce, because the latter is not gotten usuriously but + given by God. On the other hand certain things are said to be ill-gotten, because + they are gotten of a shameful cause, for instance of whoredom or stage-playing, and the like. Such things a man is not bound + to restore, and consequently he is bound to pay tithes on them in the same way as other personal tithes. Nevertheless the + Church must not accept the tithe so long as those persons remain in sin, lest she appear to have a share in their sins: but + when they have done penance, tithes may be accepted from them on these things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things directed to an end must be judged according to their fittingness to the end. Now the payment of tithes is due not + for its own sake, but for the sake of the ministers, to whose dignity it is unbecoming that they should demand minute things + with careful exactitude, for this is reckoned sinful according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 2). Hence the Old Law did not + order the payment of tithes on such like minute things, but left it to the judgment + of those who are willing to pay, because minute things are counted as nothing. Wherefore the Pharisees who claimed for themselves + the perfect justice of the Law, paid tithes even on these minute things: nor are they reproved by our Lord on that account, + but only because they despised greater, i.e. spiritual, precepts; and rather did He show them to be deserving of praise in + this particular, when He said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.23.23" target="asv">Mat. 23:23</a>): "These things you ought to have done," i.e. during the + time of the Law, according to Chrysostom's [*Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] commentary. + This also seems to denote fittingness rather than obligation. Therefore now too men are not bound to pay tithes on such minute + things, except perhaps by reason of the custom of one's country. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A man is not bound to pay tithes on what he has lost by theft or robbery, before he recovers his property: unless he has + incurred the loss through his own fault or neglect, because the Church ought not to be the loser on that account. If he sell + wheat that has not been tithed, the Church can command the tithes due to her, both from the buyer who has a thing due to the + Church, and from the seller, because so far as he is concerned he has defrauded the + Church: yet if one pays, the other is not bound. Tithes are due on the fruits of the earth, in so far as these fruits are + the gift of God. Wherefore tithes do not come under a tax, nor are they subject to workmen's wages. Hence it is not right + to deduct one's taxes and the wages paid to workmen, before paying tithes: but tithes must be paid before anything else on + one's entire produce. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q87_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q87_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q87_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q87_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q87_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q87_A3-p0.1">Whether tithes should be paid to the clergy?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q87_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that tithes should not be paid to the clergy. Tithes were paid to the Levites in the Old Testament, because + they had no portion in the people's possessions, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Num.18.23" target="asv"> Num. 18:23,24.</a> But in the New Testament the clergy have possessions not only ecclesiastical, but sometimes also patrimonial: moreover they + receive first-fruits, and oblations for the living and the dead. Therefore it is unnecessary to pay tithes to them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it sometimes happens that a man dwells in one parish, and farms in another; or a shepherd may take his flock within + the bounds of one parish during one part of the year, and within the bounds of one parish during one part of the year, and + within the bounds of another parish during the other part of the year; or he may have his sheepfold in one parish, and graze + the sheep in another. Now in all these and similar cases it seems impossible to decide to + which clergy the tithes ought to be paid. Therefore it would seem that no fixed tithe ought to be paid to the clergy. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is the general custom in certain countries for the soldiers to hold the tithes from the Church in fee; and certain + religious receive tithes. Therefore seemingly tithes are not due only to those of the clergy who have care of souls. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Num.18.21" target="asv">Num. 18:21</a>): "I have given to the sons of Levi all the tithes of Israel for a possession, for the ministry wherewith they serve Me in + the Tabernacle." Now the clergy are the successors of the sons of Levi in the New Testament. Therefore tithes are due to the + clergy alone. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Two things have to be considered with regard to tithes: namely, the right to receive tithes, and the things given in the + name of tithes. The right to receive tithes is a spiritual thing, for it arises from the debt in virtue of which the ministers + of the altar have a right to the expenses of their ministry, and temporal things are due to those who sow spiritual things. + This debt concerns none but the clergy who have care of souls, and so they alone are + competent to have this right. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A3-p7"> On the other hand the things given in the name of tithes are material, wherefore they may come to be used by anyone, and + thus it is that they fall into the hands of the laity. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the Old Law, as stated above (A[1], ad 4), special tithes were earmarked for the assistance of the poor. But in the New + Law the tithes are given to the clergy, not only for their own support, but also that the clergy may use them in assisting + the poor. Hence they are not unnecessary; indeed Church property, oblations and first-fruits as well as tithes are all necessary + for this same purpose. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Personal tithes are due to the church in whose parish a man dwells, while predial tithes seem more reasonably to belong to + the church within whose bounds the land is situated. The law, however, prescribes that in this matter a custom that has obtained + for a long time must be observed [*Cap. Cum sint, and Cap. Ad apostolicae, de Decimis, etc.]. The shepherd who grazes his + flock at different seasons in two parishes, should pay tithe proportionately to + both churches. And since the fruit of the flock is derived from the pasture, the tithe of the flock is due to the church in + whose lands the flock grazes, rather than to the church on whose land the fold is situated. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as the Church can hand over to a layman the things she receives under the title of tithe, so too can she allow him to + receive tithes that are yet to be paid, the right of receiving being reserved to the ministers of the Church. The motive may + be either the need of the Church, as when tithes are due to certain soldiers through being granted to them in fee by the Church, + or it may be the succoring of the poor; thus certain tithes have been granted + by way of alms to certain lay religious, or to those that have no care of souls. Some religious, however, are competent to + receive tithes, because they have care of souls. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q87_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q87_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q87_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q87_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q87_A4-p0.1">Whether the clergy also are bound to pay tithes?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q87_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that clerics also are bound to pay tithes. By common law [*Cap. Cum homines, de Decimis, etc.] the parish church + should receive the tithes on the lands which are in its territory. Now it happens sometimes that the clergy have certain lands + of their own on the territory of some parish church, or that one church has ecclesiastical property on the territory of another. + Therefore it would seem that the clergy are bound to pay predial tithes. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some religious are clerics; and yet they are bound to pay tithes to churches on account of the lands which they + cultivate even with their own hands [*Cap. Ex parte, and Cap. Nuper.]. Therefore it would seem that the clergy are not immune + from the payment of tithes. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the eighteenth chapter of Numbers (26,28), it is prescribed not only that the Levites should receive tithes from + the people, but also that they should themselves pay tithes to the high-priest. Therefore the clergy are bound to pay tithes + to the Sovereign Pontiff, no less than the laity are bound to pay tithes to the clergy. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, tithes should serve not only for the support of the clergy, but also for the assistance of the poor. Therefore, + if the clergy are exempt from paying tithes, so too are the poor. Yet the latter is not true. Therefore the former is false. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A decretal of Pope Paschal [*Paschal II] says: "It is a new form of exaction when the clergy demand tithes from the clergy" + [*Cap. Novum genus, de Decimis, etc.]. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The cause of giving cannot be the cause of receiving, as neither can the cause of action be the cause of passion; yet it + happens that one and the same person is giver and receiver, even as agent and patient, on account of different causes and + from different points of view. Now tithes are due to the clergy as being ministers of the altar and sowers of spiritual things + among the people. Wherefore those members of the clergy as such, i.e. as having + ecclesiastical property, are not bound to pay tithes; whereas from some other cause through holding property in their own + right, either by inheriting it from their kindred, or by purchase, or in any other similar manner, they are bound to the payment + of tithes. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A4-p8"> Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear, because the clergy like anyone else are bound to pay tithes on their own + lands to the parish church, even though they be the clergy of that same church, because to possess a thing as one's private + property is not the same as possessing it in common. But church lands are not tithable, even though they be within the boundaries + of another parish. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Religious who are clerics, if they have care of souls, and dispense spiritual things to the people, are not bound to pay + tithes, but they may receive them. Another reason applies to other religious, who though clerics do not dispense spiritual + things to the people; for according to the ordinary law they are bound to pay tithes, but they are somewhat exempt by reason + of various concessions granted by the Apostolic See [*Cap. Ex multiplici, Ex parte, + and Ad audientiam, de Decimis, etc.]. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the Old Law first-fruits were due to the priests, and tithes to the Levites; and since the Levites were below the priests, + the Lord commanded that the former should pay the high-priest "the tenth part of the tenth" [* + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q87_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Num.18.26" target="asv">Num. 18:26</a>] instead of first-fruits: wherefore for the same reason the clergy are bound now to pay tithes to the Sovereign Pontiff, + if he demanded them. For natural reason dictates that he who has charge of the + common estate of a multitude should be provided with all goods, so that he may be able to carry out whatever is necessary + for the common welfare. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Tithes should be employed for the assistance of the poor, through the dispensation of the clergy. Hence the poor have no + reason for accepting tithes, but they are bound to pay them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A4-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q87_A4-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q87_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q86_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q87_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q88" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q87_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q88-p0.1">SERVICE BY PROMISE (Q[88])</h3> + <p id="SS_Q88-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q88-p2">OF VOWS (TWELVE ARTICLES)</p> + <p id="SS_Q88-p3"> We must now consider vows, whereby something is promised to God. Under this head there are twelve points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q88-p4"> (1) What is a vow?</p> + <p id="SS_Q88-p5"> (2) What is the matter of a vow?</p> + <p id="SS_Q88-p6"> (3) Of the obligation of vows;</p> + <p id="SS_Q88-p7"> (4) Of the use of taking vows;</p> + <p id="SS_Q88-p8"> (5) Of what virtue is it an act?</p> + <p id="SS_Q88-p9"> (6) Whether it is more meritorious to do a thing from a vow, than without a vow?</p> + <p id="SS_Q88-p10"> (7) Of the solemnizing of a vow;</p> + <p id="SS_Q88-p11"> (8) Whether those who are under another's power can take vows?</p> + <p id="SS_Q88-p12"> (9) Whether children may be bound by vow to enter religion?</p> + <p id="SS_Q88-p13"> (10) Whether a vow is subject to dispensation or commutation?</p> + <p id="SS_Q88-p14"> (11) Whether a dispensation can be granted in a solemn vow of continence?</p> + <p id="SS_Q88-p15"> (12) Whether the authority of a superior is required in a dispensation from a vow?</p> + <div id="SS_Q88_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q88_A1-p0.1">Whether a vow consists in a mere purpose of the will?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q88_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a vow consists in nothing but a purpose of the will. According to some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. + III, xxviii, qu. 1; Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38], "a vow is a conception of a good purpose after a firm deliberation + of the mind, whereby a man binds himself before God to do or not to do a certain thing." But the conception of a good purpose + and so forth, may consist in a mere movement of the will. Therefore a vow consists in a mere + purpose of the will. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the very word vow seems to be derived from "voluntas" [will], for one is said to do a thing "proprio voto" [by one's + own vow] when one does it voluntarily. Now to "purpose" is an act of the will, while to "promise" is an act of the reason. + Therefore a vow consists in a mere act of the will. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.9.62" target="asv">Lk. 9:62</a>): "No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God." Now from the very fact that a + man has a purpose of doing good, he puts his hand to the plough. Consequently, if he look back by desisting from his good + purpose, he is not fit for the kingdom of God. Therefore by a mere good purpose a man is bound before God, even without making + a promise; and consequently it would + seem that a vow consists in a mere purpose of the will. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.5.3" target="asv">Eccles. 5:3</a>): "If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth Him." Therefore + to vow is to promise, and a vow is a promise. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A vow denotes a binding to do or omit some particular thing. Now one man binds himself to another by means of a promise, + which is an act of the reason to which faculty it belongs to direct. For just as a man by commanding or praying, directs, + in a fashion, what others are to do for him, so by promising he directs what he himself is to do for another. Now a promise + between man and man can only be expressed in words or any other outward signs; whereas a + promise can be made to God by the mere inward thought, since according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.16.7" target="asv">1 Kings 16:7, </a> "Man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart." Yet we express words outwardly sometimes, either + to arouse ourselves, as was stated above with regard to prayer ( + <a id="SS_Q88_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q83_A12.html">Q[83], A[12]</a>), or to call others to witness, so that one may refrain from breaking the vow, not only through fear of God, but also through + respect of men. Now a promise is the + outcome from a purpose of doing something: and a purpose presupposes deliberation, since it is the act of a deliberate will. + Accordingly three things are essential to a vow: the first is deliberation. the second is a purpose of the will; and the third + is a promise, wherein is completed the nature of a vow. Sometimes, however, two other things are added as a sort of confirmation + of the vow, namely, pronouncement by word of mouth, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.65.13" target="asv"> Ps. 65:13, </a> "I will pay Thee my + vows which my lips have uttered"; and the witnessing of others. Hence the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 38) that a vow is "the + witnessing of a spontaneous promise and ought to be made to God and about things relating to God": although the "witnessing" + may strictly refer to the inward protestation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The conceiving of a good purpose is not confirmed by the deliberation of the mind, unless the deliberation lead to a promise. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man's will moves the reason to promise something relating to things subject to his will, and a vow takes its name from the + will forasmuch as it proceeds from the will as first mover. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that puts his hand to the plough does something already; while he that merely purposes to do something does nothing so + far. When, however, he promises, he already sets about doing, although he does not yet fulfil his promise: even so, he that + puts his hand to the plough does not plough yet, nevertheless he stretches out his hand for the purpose of ploughing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q88_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q88_A2-p0.1">Whether a vow should always be about a better good?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q88_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a vow need not be always about a better good. A greater good is one that pertains to supererogation. But + vows are not only about matters of supererogation, but also about matters of salvation: thus in Baptism men vow to renounce + the devil and his pomps, and to keep the faith, as a gloss observes on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.75.12" target="asv"> Ps. 75:12, </a> "Vow ye, and pay to the Lord your God"; and Jacob vowed ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.28.21" target="asv">Gn. 28:21</a>) that the Lord should be + his God. Now this above all is necessary for salvation. Therefore vows are not only about a better good. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Jephte is included among the saints ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.32" target="asv">Heb. 11:32</a>). Yet he killed his innocent daughter on account of his vow ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Judg.11" target="asv">Judges 11</a>). Since, then, the slaying of an innocent person is not a better good, but is in itself unlawful, it seems that a vow may + be made not only about a better good, but also about something unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things that tend to be harmful to the person, or that are quite useless, do not come under the head of a better + good. Yet sometimes vows are made about immoderate vigils or fasts which tend to injure the person: and sometimes vows are + about indifferent matters and such as are useful to no purpose. Therefore a vow is not always about a better good. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.22" target="asv">Dt. 23:22</a>): "If thou wilt not promise thou shalt be without sin." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q88_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q88_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, a vow is a promise made to God. Now a promise is about something that one does voluntarily for someone else: since it would + be not a promise but a threat to say that one would do something against someone. In like manner it would be futile to promise + anyone something unacceptable to him. Wherefore, as every sin is against God, and since no work is acceptable to God unless + it be virtuous, it follows that + nothing unlawful or indifferent, but only some act of virtue, should be the matter of a vow. But as a vow denotes a voluntary + promise, while necessity excludes voluntariness, whatever is absolutely necessary, whether to be or not to be, can nowise + be the matter of a vow. For it would be foolish to vow that one would die or that one would not fly. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A2-p7"> On the other hand, if a thing be necessary. not absolutely but on the supposition of an end---for instance if salvation be + unattainable without it---it may be the matter of a vow in so far as it is done voluntarily, but not in so far as there is + a necessity for doing it. But that which is not necessary, neither absolutely, nor on the supposition of an end, is altogether + voluntary, and therefore is most properly the matter of a vow. And this is said to be a greater good in + comparison with that which is universally necessary for salvation. Therefore, properly speaking, a vow is said to be about + a better good. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Renouncing the devil's pomps and keeping the faith of Christ are the matter of baptismal vows, in so far as these things + are done voluntarily, although they are necessary for salvation. The same answer applies to Jacob's vow: although it may also + be explained that Jacob vowed that he would have the Lord for his God, by giving Him a special form of worship to which he + was not bound, for instance by offering tithes and so forth as mentioned further on + in the same passage. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Certain things are good, whatever be their result; such are acts of virtue, and these can be, absolutely speaking, the matter + of a vow: some are evil, whatever their result may be; as those things which are sins in themselves, and these can nowise + be the matter of a vow: while some, considered in themselves, are good, and as such may be the matter of a vow, yet they may + have an evil result, in which case the vow must not be kept. It was thus with the + vow of Jephte, who as related in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Judg.11.30" target="asv"> Judges 11:30,31, </a> "made a vow to the Lord, saying: If Thou wilt deliver the children of Ammon into my hands, whosoever shall first come forth + out of the doors of my house, and shall meet me when I return in peace . . . the same will I offer a holocaust to the Lord." + For this could have an evil result if, as indeed happened, he were to be met by some animal which it would be unlawful to + sacrifice, such as an ass or a human being. Hence Jerome + says [*Implicitly 1 Contra Jovin.: Comment. in Micheam vi, viii: Comment. in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A2-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.7" target="asv">Jerem. vii.</a> The quotation is from Peter Comestor, Hist. Scholast.]: "In vowing he was foolish, through lack of discretion, and in keeping + his vow he was wicked." Yet it is premised ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A2-p9.3" href="./asv.html#Judg.11.29" target="asv">Judges 11:29</a>) that "the Spirit of the Lord came upon him," because his faith and devotion, which moved him to make that vow, were from + the Holy Ghost; and for this reason he is reckoned among the saints, as also by + reason of the victory which he obtained, and because it is probable that he repented of his sinful deed, which nevertheless + foreshadowed something good. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The mortification of one's own body, for instance by vigils and fasting, is not acceptable to God except in so far as it + is an act of virtue; and this depends on its being done with due discretion, namely, that concupiscence be curbed without + overburdening nature. on this condition such things may be the matter of a vow. Hence the Apostle after saying ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.1" target="asv">Rom. 12:1</a>), "Present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing to God," + adds, "your reasonable service." Since, however, man is easily mistaken in judging of matters concerning himself, such vows + as these are more fittingly kept or disregarded according to the judgment of a superior, yet so that, should a man find that + without doubt he is seriously burdened by keeping such a vow, and should he be unable to appeal to his superior, he ought + not to keep it. As to vows about vain and useless things they should be ridiculed rather than kept. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q88_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q88_A3-p0.1">Whether all vows are binding?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q88_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that vows are not all binding. For man needs things that are done by another, more than God does, since He + has no need for our goods ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.15.2" target="asv">Ps. 15:2</a>). Now according to the prescription of human laws [*Dig. L. xii, de pollicitat., i] a simple promise made to a man is not + binding; and this seems to be prescribed on account of the changeableness of the human will. Much less binding therefore is + a simple promise made to God, which we + call a vow. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no one is bound to do what is impossible. Now sometimes that which a man has vowed becomes impossible to him, either + because it depends on another's decision, as when, for instance, a man vows to enter a monastery, the monks of which refuse + to receive him: or on account of some defect arising, for instance when a woman vows virginity, and afterwards is deflowered; + or when a man vows to give a sum of money, and afterwards loses it. Therefore a vow is + not always binding. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a man is bound to pay something, he must do so at once. But a man is not bound to pay his vow at once, especially + if it be taken under a condition to be fulfilled in the future. Therefore a vow is not always binding. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.5.3" target="asv">Eccles. 5:3,4</a>): "Whatsoever thou hast vowed, pay it; and it is much better not to vow, than after a vow not to perform the things promised." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> For one to be accounted faithful one must keep one's promises. Wherefore, according to Augustine [*Ep. xxxii, 2: De Mendac. + xx] faith takes its name "from a man's deed agreeing with his word" [*'Fides . . . fiunt dicta' Cicero gives the same etymology + (De Offic. i, 7)]. Now man ought to be faithful to God above all, both on account of God's sovereignty, and on account of + the favors he has received from God. Hence man is obliged before all to fulfill the vows + he has made to God, since this is part of the fidelity he owes to God. On the other hand, the breaking of a vow is a kind + of infidelity. Wherefore Solomon gives the reason why vows should be paid to God, because "an unfaithful . . . promise displeaseth + Him" [* + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.5.3" target="asv">Eccles. 5:3</a>]. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Honesty demands that a man should keep any promise he makes to another man, and this obligation is based on the natural law. + But for a man to be under a civil obligation through a promise he has made, other conditions are requisite. And although God + needs not our goods, we are under a very great obligation to Him: so that a vow made to Him is most binding. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If that which a man has vowed becomes impossible to him through any cause whatsoever, he must do what he can, so that he + have at least a will ready to do what he can. Hence if a man has vowed to enter a monastery, he must endeavor to the best + of his power to be received there. And if his intention was chiefly to bind himself to enter the religious life, so that, + in consequence, he chose this particular form of religious life, or this place, as being + most agreeable to him, he is bound, should he be unable to be received there, to enter the religious life elsewhere. But if + his principal intention is to bind himself to this particular kind of religious life, or to this particular place, because + the one or the other pleases him in some special way, he is not bound to enter another religious house, if they are unwilling + to receive him into this particular one. on the other hand, if he be rendered incapable of fulfilling his vow through his + own + fault, he is bound over and above to do penance for his past fault: thus if a woman has vowed virginity and is afterwards + violated, she is bound not only to observe what is in her power, namely, perpetual continency, but also to repent of what + she has lost by sinning. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The obligation of a vow is caused by our own will and intention, wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.23" target="asv">Dt. 23:23</a>): "That which is once gone out of thy lips, thou shalt observe, and shalt do as thou hast promised to the Lord thy God, and + hast spoken with thy own will and with thy own mouth." Wherefore if in taking a vow, it is one's intention and will to bind + oneself to fulfil it at once, one is bound to fulfil it immediately. But if one intend + to fulfil it at a certain time, or under a certain condition, one is not bound to immediate fulfilment. And yet one ought + not to delay longer than one intended to bind oneself, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A3-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.21" target="asv">Dt. 23:21</a>): "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God thou shalt not delay to pay it: because the Lord thy God will require it; + and if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q88_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q88_A4-p0.1">Whether it is expedient to take vows?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q88_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not expedient to take vows. It is not expedient to anyone to deprive himself of the good that God + has given him. Now one of the greatest goods that God has given man is liberty whereof he seems to be deprived by the necessity + implicated in a vow. Therefore it would seem inexpedient for man to take vows. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no one should expose himself to danger. But whoever takes a vow exposes himself to danger, since that which, before + taking a vow, he could omit without danger, becomes a source of danger to him if he should not fulfil it after taking the + vow. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): "Since thou hast vowed, thou hast bound thyself, thou canst + not do otherwise. If thou dost not what thou hast vowed thou wilt not be as thou wouldst have + been hadst thou not vowed. For then thou wouldst have been less great, not less good: whereas now if thou breakest faith with + God (which God forbid) thou art the more unhappy, as thou wouldst have been happier, hadst thou kept thy vow." Therefore it + is not expedient to take vows. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.16" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:16</a>): "Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ." But we do not read that either Christ or the Apostles took any vows. Therefore + it would seem inexpedient to take vows. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.75.12" target="asv">Ps. 75:12</a>): "Vow ye and pay to the Lord your God." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q88_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q88_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2), a vow is a promise made to God. Now one makes a promise to a man under one aspect, and to God under another. Because + we promise something to a man for his own profit; since it profits him that we should be of service to him, and that we should + at first assure him of the future fulfilment of that service: whereas we make promises to God not for His but for our own + profit. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad + Arment. et Paulin.): "He is a kind and not a needy exactor, for he does not grow rich on our payments, but makes those who + pay Him grow rich in Him." And just as what we give God is useful not to Him but to us, since "what is given Him is added + to the giver," as Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.), so also a promise whereby we vow something to God, does + not conduce to His profit, nor does He need to be assured by us, but it conduces to our profit, in so far as by vowing we + fix + our wills immovably on that which it is expedient to do. Hence it is expedient to take vows. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as one's liberty is not lessened by one being unable to sin, so, too, the necessity resulting from a will firmly fixed + to good does not lessen the liberty, as instanced in God and the blessed. Such is the necessity implied by a vow, bearing + a certain resemblance to the confirmation of the blessed. Hence, Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.) that "happy + is the necessity that compels us to do the better things." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When danger arises from the deed itself, this deed is not expedient, for instance that one cross a river by a tottering bridge: + but if the danger arise through man's failure in the deed, the latter does not cease to be expedient: thus it is expedient + to mount on horseback, though there be the danger of a fall from the horse: else it would behoove one to desist from all good + things, that may become dangerous accidentally. Wherefore it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.11.4" target="asv">Eccles. 11:4</a>): "He that observeth the wind shall not sow, and he that considereth the clouds shall never reap." Now a man incurs danger, + not from the vow itself, but from his fault, when he changes his mind by breaking his vow. Hence, Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, + ad Arment. et Paulin.): "Repent not of thy vow: thou shouldst rather rejoice that thou canst no longer do what thou mightest + lawfully have done to thy detriment." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It was incompetent for Christ, by His very nature, to take a vow, both because He was God, and because, as man, His will + was firmly fixed on the good, since He was a "comprehensor." By a kind of similitude, however, He is represented as saying + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.21.26" target="asv">Ps. 21:26</a>): "I will pay my vows in the sight of them that fear Him," when He is speaking of His body, which is the Church. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A4-p10"> The apostles are understood to have vowed things pertaining to the state of perfection when "they left all things and followed + Christ." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q88_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q88_A5-p0.1">Whether a vow is an act of latria or religion?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q88_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a vow is not an act of latria or religion. Every act of virtue is matter for a vow. Now it would seem + to pertain to the same virtue to promise a thing and to do it. Therefore a vow pertains to any virtue and not to religion + especially. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Tully (De Invent. ii, 53) it belongs to religion to offer God worship and ceremonial rites. But he + who takes a vow does not yet offer something to God, but only promises it. Therefore, a vow is not an act of religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, religious worship should be offered to none but God. But a vow is made not only to God, but also to the saints and + to one's superiors, to whom religious vow obedience when they make their profession. Therefore, a vow is not an act of religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.19.21" target="asv">Is. 19:21</a>): "(The Egyptians) shall worship Him with sacrifices and offerings and they shall make vows to the Lord, and perform them." + Now, the worship of God is properly the act of religion or latria. Therefore, a vow is an act of latria or religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q88_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q81_A1.html">Q[81], A[1]</a>, ad 1), every act of virtue belongs to religion or latria by way of command, in so far as it is directed to the reverence + of God which is the proper end of latria. Now the direction of other actions to their end belongs to the commanding virtue, + not to those which are commanded. Therefore the direction of the acts of any virtue to the service of God is the proper act + of latria. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A5-p7"> Now, it is evident from what has been said above ( + <a id="SS_Q88_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q88_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2) that a vow is a promise made to God, and that a promise is nothing else than a directing of the thing promised to the + person to whom the promise is made. Hence a vow is a directing of the thing vowed to the worship or service of God. And thus + it is clear that to take a vow is properly an act of latria or religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The matter of a vow is sometimes the act of another virtue, as, for instance, keeping the fast or observing continency; while + sometimes it is an act of religion, as offering a sacrifice or praying. But promising either of them to God belongs to religion, + for the reason given above. Hence it is evident that some vows belong to religion by reason only of the promise made to God, + which is the essence of a vow, while others belong thereto by reason also + of the thing promised, which is the matter of the vow. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He who promises something gives it already in as far as he binds himself to give it: even as a thing is said to be made when + its cause is made, because the effect is contained virtually in its cause. This is why we thank not only a giver, but also + one who promises to give. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A vow is made to God alone, whereas a promise may be made to a man also: and this very promise of good, which is fore made + to a man, may be the matter of a vow, and in so far as it is a virtuous act. This is how we are to understand vows whereby + we vow something to the saints or to one's superiors: so that the promise made to the saints or to one's superiors is the + matter of the vow, in so far as one vows to God to fulfil what one has promised to the + saints or one's superiors. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A5-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A5-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q88_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q88_A6-p0.1">Whether it is more praiseworthy and meritorious to do something in fulfilment of a vow, than without a vow?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q88_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is more praiseworthy and meritorious to do a thing without a vow than in fulfilment of a vow. Prosper + says (De Vita Contempl. ii): "We should abstain or fast without putting ourselves under the necessity of fasting, lest that + which we are free to do be done without devotion and unwillingly." Now he who vows to fast puts himself under the necessity + of fasting. Therefore it would be better for him to fast without taking the vow. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.9.7" target="asv">2 Cor. 9:7</a>): "Everyone as he hath determined in his heart, not with sadness, or of necessity: for God loveth a cheerful giver." Now + some fulfil sorrowfully what they have vowed: and this seems to be due to the necessity arising from the vow, for necessity + is a cause of sorrow according to Metaph. v [*Ed. Did. iv, 5]. Therefore, it is better to do something without a vow, than + in fulfilment of a vow. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a vow is necessary for the purpose of fixing the will on that which is vowed, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q88_A6-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q88_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. But the will cannot be more fixed on a thing than when it actually does that thing. Therefore it is no better to do a thing + in fulfilment of a vow than without a vow. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.75.12" target="asv"> Ps. 75:12, </a> "Vow ye and pay," says: "Vows are counseled to the will." But a counsel is about none but a better good. Therefore it is + better to do a deed in fulfilment of a vow than without a vow: since he that does it without a vow fulfils only one counsel, + viz. the counsel to do it, whereas he that does it with a vow, fulfils two counsels, viz. the counsel to vow and the counsel + to do it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> For three reasons it is better and more meritorious to do one and the same deed with a vow than without. First, because to + vow, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q88_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q88_A5.html">(A[5])</a> is an act of religion which is the chief of the moral virtues. Now the more excellent the virtue the better and more meritorious + the deed. Wherefore the act of an inferior virtue is the better the more meritorious for being commanded by a superior virtue, + whose act it becomes through + being commanded by it, just as the act of faith or hope is better if it be commanded by charity. Hence the works of the other + moral virtues (for instance, fasting, which is an act of abstinence; and being continent, which is an act of chastity) are + better and more meritorious, if they be done in fulfilment of a vow, since thus they belong to the divine worship, being like + sacrifices to God. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virg. viii) that "not even is virginity honorable as such, but only when it + is consecrated to God, and cherished by godly continence." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A6-p7"> Secondly, because he that vows something and does it, subjects himself to God more than he that only does it; for he subjects + himself to God not only as to the act, but also as to the power, since in future he cannot do something else. Even so he gives + more who gives the tree with its fruit, than he that gives the fruit only, as Anselm [*Eadmer] observes (De Simil. viii). + For this reason, we thank even those who promise, as stated above (A[5], ad 2). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A6-p8"> Thirdly, because a vow fixes the will on the good immovably and to do anything of a will that is fixed on the good belongs + to the perfection of virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 4), just as to sin with an obstinate mind aggravates + the sin, and is called a sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q88_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q14_A2.html">Q[14], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage quoted should be understood as referring to necessity of coercion which causes an act to be involuntary and excludes + devotion. Hence he says pointedly: "Lest that which we are free to do be done without devotion and unwillingly." On the other + hand the necessity resulting from a vow is caused by the immobility of the will, wherefore it strengthens the will and increases + devotion. Hence the argument does not conclude. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to the Philosopher, necessity of coercion, in so far as it is opposed to the will, causes sorrow. But the necessity + resulting from a vow, in those who are well disposed, in so far as it strengthens the will, causes not sorrow but joy. Hence + Augustine says (Ep. ad Arment. et Paulin. cxxcii): "Repent not of thy vow: thou shouldst rather rejoice that thou canst no + longer do what thou mightest lawfully have done to thy detriment." If, however, + the very deed, considered in itself, were to become disagreeable and involuntary after one has taken the vow, the will to + fulfil it remaining withal, it is still more meritorious than if it were done without the vow, since the fulfilment of a vow + is an act of religion which is a greater virtue than abstinence, of which fasting is an act. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He who does something without having vowed it has an immovable will as regards the individual deed which he does and at the + time when he does it; but his will does not remain altogether fixed for the time to come, as does the will of one who makes + a vow: for the latter has bound his will to do something, both before he did that particular deed, and perchance to do it + many times. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A6-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A6-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q88_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q88_A7-p0.1">Whether a vow is solemnized by the reception of holy orders, and by the profession of a certain rule?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q88_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a vow is not solemnized by the reception of holy orders and by the profession of a certain rule. As stated + above + <a id="SS_Q88_A7-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q88_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, a vow is a promise made to God. Now external actions pertaining to solemnity seem to be directed, not to God, but to men. + Therefore they are related to vows accidentally: and consequently a solemnization of this kind is not a proper circumstance + of a vow. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever belongs to the condition of a thing, would seem to be applicable to all in which that thing is found. Now + many things may be the subject of a vow, which have no connection either with holy orders, or to any particular rule: as when + a man vows a pilgrimage, or something of the kind. Therefore the solemnization that takes place in the reception of holy orders + or in the profession of a certain rule does not belong to the condition of a vow. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a solemn vow seems to be the same as a public vow. Now many other vows may be made in public besides that which + is pronounced in receiving holy orders or in professing a certain rule; which latter, moreover, may be made in private. Therefore + not only these vows are solemn. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> These vows alone are an impediment to the contract of marriage, and annul marriage if it be contracted, which is the effect + of a solemn vow, as we shall state further on in the Third Part of this work [* + <a id="SS_Q88_A7-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q53_A2.html">XP, Q[53], A[2]</a>]. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The manner in which a thing is solemnized depends on its nature [conditio]: thus when a man takes up arms he solemnizes the + fact in one way, namely, with a certain display of horses and arms and a concourse of soldiers, while a marriage is solemnized + in another way, namely, the array of the bridegroom and bride and the gathering of their kindred. Now a vow is a promise made + to God: wherefore, the solemnization of a vow consists in something spiritual + pertaining to God; i.e. in some spiritual blessing or consecration which, in accordance with the institution of the apostles, + is given when a man makes profession of observing a certain rule, in the second degree after the reception of holy orders, + as Dionysius states (Eccl. Hier. vi). The reason of this is that solemnization is not wont to be employed, save when a man + gives himself up entirely to some particular thing. For the nuptial solemnization takes place only when the marriage is + celebrated, and when the bride and bridegroom mutually deliver the power over their bodies to one another. In like manner + a vow is solemnized when a man devotes himself to the divine ministry by receiving holy orders, or embraces the state of perfection + by renouncing the world and his own will by the profession of a certain rule. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This kind of solemnization regards not only men but also God in so far as it is accompanied by a spiritual consecration or + blessing, of which God is the author, though man is the minister, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A7-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Num.6.27" target="asv"> Num. 6:27, </a> "They shall invoke My name upon the children of Israel, and I will bless them." Hence a solemn vow is more binding with God + than a simple vow, and he who breaks a solemn vow sins more grievously. When it is said that a + simple vow is no less binding than a solemn vow, this refers to the fact that the transgressor of either commits a mortal + sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not customary to solemnize particular acts, but the embracing of a new state, as we have said above. Hence when a man + vows particular deeds, such as a pilgrimage, or some special fast, such a vow is not competent to be solemnized, but only + such as the vow whereby a man entirely devotes himself to the divine ministry or service: and yet many particular works are + included under this vow as under a universal. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Through being pronounced in public vows may have a certain human solemnity, but not a spiritual and divine solemnity, as + the aforesaid vows have, even when they are pronounced before a few persons. Hence the publicity of a vow differs from its + solemnization. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A7-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A7-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q88_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A9.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q88_A8-p0.1">Whether those who are subject to another's power are hindered from taking vows?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q88_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that those who are subject to another's power are not hindered from taking vows. The lesser bond is surpassed + by the greater. Now the obligation of one man subject to another is a lesser bond than a vow whereby one is under an obligation + to God. Therefore those who are subject to another's power are not hindered from taking vows. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, children are under their parents' power. Yet children may make religious profession even without the consent of + their parents. Therefore one is not hindered from taking vows, through being subject to another's power. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to do is more than to promise. But religious who are under the power of their superiors can do certain things such + as to say some psalms, or abstain from certain things. Much more therefore seemingly can they promise such things to God by + means of vows. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A8-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whoever does what he cannot do lawfully sins. But subjects do not sin by taking vows, since nowhere do we find this + forbidden. Therefore it would seem that they can lawfully take vows. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A8-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is commanded ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Num.30.4" target="asv">Num. 30:4-6</a>) that "if a woman vow any thing . . . being in her father's house, and yet but a girl in age," she is not bound by the vow, + unless her father consent: and the same is said there ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A8-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Num.30.7" target="asv">Num. 30:7-9</a>) of the woman that has a husband. Therefore in like manner other persons that are subject to another's power cannot bind + themselves by vow. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A8-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q88_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q88_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, a vow is a promise made to God. Now no man can firmly bind himself by a promise to do what is in another's power, but only + to that which is entirely in his own power. Now whoever is subject to another, as to the matter wherein he is subject to him, + it does not lie in his power to do as he will, but it depends on the will of the other. And therefore without the consent + of his superior he cannot bind himself + firmly by a vow in those matters wherein he is subject to another. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing but what is virtuous can be the subject of a promise made to God, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q88_A8-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q88_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Now it is contrary to virtue for a man to offer to God that which belongs to another, as stated above (Q[86], A[3]). Hence + the conditions necessary for a vow are not altogether ensured, when a man who is under another's power vows that which is + in that other's power, except under the condition that he whose power it concerns does + not gainsay it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As soon as a man comes of age, if he be a freeman he is in his own power in all matters concerning his person, for instance + with regard to binding himself by vow to enter religion, or with regard to contracting marriage. But he is not in his own + power as regards the arrangements of the household, so that in these matters he cannot vow anything that shall be valid without + the consent of his father. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A8-p10"> A slave, through being in his master's power, even as regards his personal deeds, cannot bind himself by vow to enter religion, + since this would withdraw him from his master's service. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A8-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A religious is subject to his superior as to his actions connected with his profession of his rule. Wherefore even though + one may be able to do something now and then, when one is not being occupied with other things by one's superior, yet since + there is no time when his superior cannot occupy him with something, no vow of a religious stands without the consent of his + superior, as neither does the vow of a girl while in (her father's) house without + his consent; nor of a wife, without the consent of her husband. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A8-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the vow of one who is subject to another's power does not stand without the consent of the one to whom he is subject, + he does not sin by vowing; because his vow is understood to contain the requisite condition, providing, namely, that his superior + approve or do not gainsay it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A8-p13"></p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A8-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A9.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q88_A9" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A10.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q88_A9-p0.1">Whether children can bind themselves by vow to enter religion?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q88_A9-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that children cannot bind themselves by vow to enter religion. Since a vow requires deliberation of the mind, + it is fitting that those alone should vow who have the use of reason. But this is lacking in children just as in imbeciles + and madmen. Therefore just as imbeciles and madmen cannot bind themselves to anything by vow, so neither, seemingly, can children + bind themselves by vow to enter religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which can be validly done by one cannot be annulled by another. Now a vow to enter religion made by a boy or + girl before the age of puberty can be revoked by the parents or guardian (20, qu. ii, cap. Puella). Therefore it seems that + a boy or girl cannot validly make a vow before the age of fourteen. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the rule of Blessed Benedict [*Ch. 58] and a statute of Innocent IV, a year's probation is granted + to those who enter religion, so that probation may precede the obligation of the vow. Therefore it seems unlawful, before + the year of probation, for children to be bound by vow to enter religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A9-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> That which is not done aright is invalid without being annulled by anyone. But the vow pronounced by a maiden, even before + attaining the age of puberty, is valid, unless it be annulled by her parents within a year (20, qu. ii, cap. Puella). Therefore + even before attaining to puberty children can lawfully and validly be bound by a vow to enter religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A9-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As may be gathered from what has been said above + <a id="SS_Q88_A9-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q88_A7.html">(A[7])</a>, vows are of two kinds, simple and solemn. And since, as stated in the same article, the solemnization of a vow consists + in a spiritual blessing and consecration bestowed through the ministry of the Church, it follows that it comes under the Church's + dispensation. Now a simple vow takes its efficacy from the deliberation of the mind, whereby one intends to put oneself under + an + obligation. That such an obligation be of no force may happen in two ways. First, through defect of reason, as in madmen and + imbeciles, who cannot bind themselves by vow so long as they remain in a state of madness or imbecility. Secondly, through + the maker of a vow being subject to another's power, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q88_A9-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q88_A8.html">(A[8])</a>. Now these two circumstances concur in children before the age of puberty, because in most instances they are lacking in + reason, and besides are + naturally under the care of their parents, or guardians in place of their parents: wherefore in both events their vows are + without force. It happens, however, through a natural disposition which is not subject to human laws, that the use of reason + is accelerated in some, albeit few, who on this account are said to be capable of guile: and yet they are not, for this reason, + exempt in any way from the care of their parents; for this care is subject to human law, which takes into account that + which is of most frequent occurrence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A9-p7"> Accordingly we must say that boys or girls who have not reached the years of puberty and have not attained the use of reason + can nowise bind themselves to anything by vow. If, however, they attain the use of reason, before reaching the years of puberty, + they can for their own part, bind themselves by vow; but their vows can be annulled by their parents, under whose care they + are still subject. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A9-p8"> Yet no matter how much they be capable of guile before the years of puberty, they cannot be bound by a solemn religious vow, + on account of the Church's decree [*Sext. Decret. cap. Is qui, de Reg. et transeunt. ad Relig.] which considers the majority + of cases. But after the years of puberty have been reached, they can bind themselves by religious vows, simple or solemn, + without the consent of their parents. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument avails in the case of children who have not yet reached the use of reason: for their vows then are invalid, + as stated above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A9-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The vows of persons subject to another's power contain an implied condition, namely, that they be not annulled by the superior. + This condition renders them licit and valid if it be fulfilled, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A9-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument avails in the case of solemn vows which are taken in profession. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A9-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A9-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A10.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q88_A10" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A11.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q88_A10-p0.1">Whether vows admit of dispensation?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q88_A10-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A10-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that vows are not subject to dispensation. It is less to have a vow commuted than to be dispensed from keeping + it. But a vow cannot be commuted, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A10-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.27.9" target="asv"> Lev. 27:9,10, </a> "A beast that may be sacrificed to the Lord, if anyone shall vow, shall be holy, and cannot be changed, neither a better + for a worse, nor a worse for a better." Much less, therefore, do vows admit of dispensation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A10-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no man can grant a dispensation in matters concerning the natural law and in the Divine precepts, especially those + of the First Table, since these aim directly at the love of God, which is the last end of the precepts. Now the fulfilment + of a vow is a matter of the natural law, and is commanded by the Divine law, as shown above + <a id="SS_Q88_A10-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q88_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, and belongs to the precepts of the First Table since it is an act of religion. Therefore + vows do not admit of dispensation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A10-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the obligation of a vow is based on the fidelity which a man owes to God, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q88_A10-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q88_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. But no man can dispense in such a matter as this. Neither, therefore, can any one grant a dispensation from a vow. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A10-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> That which proceeds from the common will of many has apparently greater stability than that which proceeds from the individual + will of some one person. Now the law which derives its force from the common will admits of dispensation by a man. Therefore + it seems that vows also admit of dispensation by a man. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A10-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The dispensation from a vow is to be taken in the same sense as a dispensation given in the observance of a law because, + as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q88_A10-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q96_A6.html">FS, Q[96], A[6]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q88_A10-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q97_A4.html">FS, Q[97], A[4]</a>), a law is made with an eye to that which is good in the majority of instances. But since, in certain cases this is not good, + there is need for someone to decide that in that particular case the law is not to be observed. This is properly + speaking to dispense in the law: for a dispensation would seem to denote a commensurate distribution or application of some + common thing to those that are contained under it, in the same way as a person is said to dispense food to a household. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A10-p7"> In like manner a person who takes a vow makes a law for himself as it were, and binds himself to do something which in itself + and in the majority of cases is a good. But it may happen that in some particular case this is simply evil, or useless, or + a hindrance to a greater good: and this is essentially contrary to that which is the matter of a vow, as is clear from what + has been said above + <a id="SS_Q88_A10-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q88_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore it is necessary, in such a case, to decide that + the vow is not to be observed. And if it be decided absolutely that a particular vow is not to be observed, this is called + a "dispensation" from that vow; but if some other obligation be imposed in lieu of that which was to have been observed, the + vow is said to be "commuted." Hence it is less to commute a vow than to dispense from a vow: both, however, are in the power + of the Church. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A10-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> An animal that could be lawfully sacrificed was deemed holy from the very moment that it was the subject of a vow, being, + as it were, dedicated to the worship of God: and for this reason it could not be changed: even so neither may one now exchange + for something better, or worse, that which one has vowed, if it be already consecrated, e.g. a chalice or a house. On the + other hand, an animal that could not be sacrificed, through not being the lawful + matter of a sacrifice, could and had to be bought back, as the law requires. Even so, vows can be commuted now, if no consecration + has intervened. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A10-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even as man is bound by natural law and Divine precept to fulfil his vow, so, too, is he bound under the same heads to obey + the law or commands of his superiors. And yet when he is dispensed from keeping a human law, this does not involve disobedience + to that human law, for this would be contrary to the natural law and the Divine command; but it amounts to this---that what + was law is not law in this particular case. Even so, when a superior grants a + dispensation, that which was contained under a vow is by his authority no longer so contained, in so far as he decides that + in this case such and such a thing is not fitting matter for a vow. Consequently when an ecclesiastical superior dispenses + someone from a vow, he does not dispense him from keeping a precept of the natural or of the Divine law, but he pronounces + a decision on a matter to which a man had bound himself of his own accord, and of which he was unable to consider every + circumstance. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A10-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fidelity we owe to God does not require that we fulfil that which it would be wrong or useless to vow, or which would + be an obstacle to the greater good whereunto the dispensation from that vow would conduce. Hence the dispensation from a vow + is not contrary to the fidelity due to God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A10-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A10-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A11.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q88_A11" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A12.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q88_A11-p0.1">Whether it is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of continency?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q88_A11-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A11-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of continency. As stated above, one reason for granting + a dispensation from a vow is if it be an obstacle to a greater good. But a vow of continency, even though it be solemn, may + be an obstacle to a greater good, since the common good is more God-like than the good of an individual. Now one man's continency + may be an obstacle to the good of the whole community, for instance, in the case + where, if certain persons who have vowed continency were to marry, the peace of their country might be procured. Therefore + it seems that it is possible to be dispensed even from a solemn vow of continency. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A11-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, religion is a more excellent virtue than chastity. Now if a man vows an act of religion, e.g. to offer sacrifice + to God he can be dispensed from that vow. Much more, therefore, can he be dispensed from the vow of continency which is about + an act of chastity. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A11-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as the observance of a vow of abstinence may be a source of danger to the person, so too may be the observance + of a vow of continency. Now one who takes a vow of abstinence can be dispensed from that vow if it prove a source of danger + to his body. Therefore for the same reason one may be dispensed from a vow of continency. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A11-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as the vow of continency is part of the religious profession, whereby the vow is solemnized, so also are the + vows of poverty and obedience. But it is possible to be dispensed from the vows of poverty and obedience, as in the case of + those who are appointed bishops after making profession. Therefore it seems that it is possible to be dispensed from a solemn + vow of continency. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A11-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A11-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.26.20" target="asv">Ecclus. 26:20</a>): "No price is worthy of a continent soul." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A11-p7"> Further, (Extra, De Statu Monach.) at the end of the Decretal, Cum ad Monasterium it is stated that the "renouncing of property, + like the keeping of chastity, is so bound up with the monastic rule, that not even the Sovereign Pontiff can disperse from + its observance." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A11-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Three things may be considered in a solemn vow of continency: first, the matter of the vow, namely, continency; secondly, + the perpetuity of the vow, namely, when a person binds himself by vow to the perpetual observance of chastity: thirdly, the + solemnity of the vow. Accordingly, some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III. vii. 1, qu. 5] say that the solemn vow cannot + be a matter of dispensation, on account of the continency itself for which no worthy price + can be found, as is stated by the authority quoted above. The reason for this is assigned by some to the fact that by continency + man overcomes a foe within himself, or to the fact that by continency man is perfectly conformed to Christ in respect of purity + of both body and soul. But this reason does not seem to be cogent since the goods of the soul, such as contemplation and prayer, + far surpass the goods of the body and still more conform us to God, and yet one may be dispensed from a vow of + prayer or contemplation. Therefore, continency itself absolutely considered seems no reason why the solemn vow thereof cannot + be a matter of dispensation; especially seeing that the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A11-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.34" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:34</a>) exhorts us to be continent on account of contemplation, when he says that the unmarried woman . . . "thinketh on the things + of God [Vulg.: 'the Lord']," and since the end is of more account than the means. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A11-p9"> Consequently others [*Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38] find the reason for this in the perpetuity and universality of this + vow. For they assert that the vow of continency cannot be canceled, save by something altogether contrary thereto, which is + never lawful in any vow. But this is evidently false, because just as the practice of carnal intercourse is contrary to continency, + so is eating flesh or drinking wine contrary to abstinence from such things, and yet these latter vows + may be a matter for dispensation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A11-p10"> For this reason others [*Innocent IV, on the above decretal] maintain that one may be dispensed even from a solemn vow of + continency, for the sake of some common good or common need, as in the case of the example given above (OBJ[1]), of a country + being restored to peace through a certain marriage to be contracted. Yet since the Decretal quoted says explicitly that "not + even the Sovereign Pontiff can dispense a monk from keeping chastity," it follows seemingly, that we must + maintain that, as stated above (A[10], ad 1; cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A11-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.27.9" target="asv">Lev. 27:9</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A11-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.27.10" target="asv">10</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A11-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Lev.27.28" target="asv">28</a>), whatsoever has once been sanctified to the Lord cannot be put to any other use. For no ecclesiastical prelate can make + that which is sanctified to lose its consecration, not even though it be something inanimate, for instance a consecrated chalice + to be not consecrated, so long as it remains entire. Much less, therefore, can a prelate make a man that is consecrated to + God cease to be consecrated, so long as + he lives. Now the solemnity of a vow consists in a kind of consecration or blessing of the person who takes the vow, as stated + above + <a id="SS_Q88_A11-p10.4" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q88_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Hence no prelate of the Church can make a man, who has pronounced a solemn vow, to be quit of that to which he was consecrated, + e.g. one who is a priest, to be a priest no more, although a prelate may, for some particular reason, inhibit him from exercising + his order. In like manner the Pope cannot make a man who has made his + religious profession cease to be a religious, although certain jurists have ignorantly held the contrary. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A11-p11"> We must therefore consider whether continency is essentially bound up with the purpose for which the vow is solemnized. because + if not, the solemnity of the consecration can remain without the obligation of continency, but not if continency is essentially + bound up with that for which the vow is solemnized. Now the obligation of observing continency is connected with Holy orders, + not essentially but by the institution of the Church; wherefore it seems that the Church can grant a + dispensation from the vow of continency solemnized by the reception of Holy Orders. on the other hand the obligation of observing; + continency is an essential condition of the religious state, whereby a man renounces the world and binds himself wholly to + God's service, for this is incompatible with matrimony, in which state a man is under the obligation of taking to himself + a wife, of begetting children, of looking after his household, and of procuring whatever is necessary for these purposes. + Wherefore the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A11-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.33" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:33</a>) that "he that is with a wife, is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may please his wife; and he is divided." + Hence the "monk" takes his name from "unity" [*The Greek {monos}] in contrast with this division. For this reason the Church + cannot dispense from a vow solemnized by the religious profession; and the reason assigned by the Decretal is because "chastity + is bound up with the monastic rule." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A11-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Perils occasioned by human affairs should be obviated by human means, not by turning divine things to a human use. Now a + professed religious is dead to the world and lives to God, and so he must not be called back to the human life on the pretext + of any human contingency. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A11-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A vow of temporal continency can be a matter of dispensation, as also a vow of temporal prayer or of temporal abstinence. + But the fact that no dispensation can be granted from a vow of continency solemnized by profession is due, not to its being + an act of chastity, but because through the religious profession it is already an act of religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A11-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Food is directly ordered to the upkeep of the person, therefore abstinence from food may be a direct source of danger to + the person: and so on this count a vow of abstinence is a matter of dispensation. On the other hand sexual intercourse is + directly ordered to the upkeep not of the person but of the species, wherefore to abstain from such intercourse by continency + does not endanger the person. And if indeed accidentally it prove a source of danger + to the person, this danger may be obviated by some other means, for instance by abstinence, or other corporal remedies. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A11-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A religious who is made a bishop is no more absolved from his vow of poverty than from his vow of continency, since he must + have nothing of his own and must hold himself as being the dispenser of the common goods of the Church. In like manner neither + is he dispensed from his vow of obedience; it is an accident that he is not bound to obey if he have no superior; just as + the abbot of a monastery, who nevertheless is not dispensed from his vow of + obedience. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A11-p16"> The passage of Ecclesiasticus, which is put forward in the contrary sense, should be taken as meaning that neither fruitfulness + of the of the flesh nor any bodily good is to be compared with continency, which is reckoned one of the goods of the soul, + as Augustine declares (De Sanct. Virg. viii). Wherefore it is said pointedly "of a continent soul," not "of a continent body." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A11-p17"></p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A11-p18"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A12.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q88_A12" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A11.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q88_A12-p0.1">Whether the authority of a prelate is required for commutation or the dispensation of a vow?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q88_A12-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A12-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the authority of a prelate is not required for the commutation or dispensation of a vow. A person may + enter religion without the authority of a superior prelate. Now by entering religion one is absolved from the vows he made + in the world, even from the vow of making a pilgrimage to the Holy Land [*Cap. Scripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt.]. Therefore + the commutation or dispensation of a vow is possible without the authority of a superior + prelate. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A12-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to dispense anyone from a vow seems to consist in deciding in what circumstances he need not keep that vow. But + if the prelate is at fault in his decision, the person who took the vow does not seem to be absolved from his vow, since no + prelate can grant a dispensation contrary to the divine precept about keeping one's vows, as stated above (A[10], ad 2; A[11]). + Likewise, when anyone rightly determines of his own authority that in his case a vow is not + to be kept, he would seem not to be bound; since a vow need not be kept if it have an evil result (A[2], ad 2). Therefore + the Authority of a prelate is not required that one may be dispensed from a vow. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A12-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it belongs to a prelate's power to grant dispensations from vows, on the same count it is competent to all prelates, + but it does not belong to all to dispense from every vow. Therefore it does not belong to the power of a prelate to dispense + from vows. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A12-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A vow binds one to do something, even as a law does. Now the superior's authority is requisite for a dispensation from a + precept of the law, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q88_A12-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q96_A6.html">FS, Q[96], A[6]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q88_A12-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q97_A4.html">FS, Q[97], A[4]</a>). Therefore it is likewise required in a dispensation from a vow. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A12-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q88_A12-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q88_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2), a vow is a promise made to God about something acceptable to Him. Now if you promise something to anyone it depends on + his decision whether he accept what you promise. Again in the Church a prelate stands in God's place. Therefore a commutation + or dispensation of vows requires the authority of a prelate who in God's stead declares what is acceptable to God, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A12-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.2.10" target="asv">2 Cor. 2:10</a>: + "For . . . have pardoned . . . for your sakes . . . in the person of Christ." And he says significantly "for your sakes," + since whenever we ask a prelate for a dispensation we should do so to honor Christ in Whose person he dispenses, or to promote + the interests of the Church which is His Body. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A12-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All other vows are about some particular works, whereas by the religious life a man consecrates his whole life to God's service. + Now the particular is included in the universal, wherefore a Decretal [*Cap. Scripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt.] says that + "a man is not deemed a vow-breaker if he exchange a temporal service for the perpetual service of religion." And yet a man + who enters religion is not bound to fulfil the vows, whether of fasting or of + praying or the like, which he made when in the world, because by entering religion he dies to his former life, and it is unsuitable + to the religious life that each one should have his own observances, and because the burden of religion is onerous enough + without requiring the addition of other burdens. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A12-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some have held that prelates can dispense from vows at their will, for the reason that every vow supposes as a condition + that the superior prelate be willing; thus it was stated above + <a id="SS_Q88_A12-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q88_A8.html">(A[8])</a> that the vow of a subject, e.g. of a slave or a son, supposes this condition, if "the father or master consent," or "does + not dissent." And thus a subject might break his vow without any remorse of conscience, whenever his superior tells + him to. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A12-p9"> But this opinion is based on a false supposition: because a spiritual prelate being, not a master, but a dispenser, his power + is given "unto edification, not for destruction" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q88_A12-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.10.8" target="asv">2 Cor. 10:8</a>), and consequently, just as he cannot command that which is in itself displeasing to God, namely, sin, so neither can he + forbid what is in itself pleasing to God, namely, works of virtue. Therefore absolutely speaking man can vow them. But it + does belong to a prelate to + decide what is the more virtuous and the more acceptable to God. Consequently in matters presenting no difficulty, the prelate's + dispensation would not excuse one from sin: for instance, if a prelate were to dispense a person from a vow to enter the religious + life, without any apparent cause to prevent him from fulfilling his vow. But if some cause were to appear, giving rise, at + least, to doubt, he could hold to the prelate's decision whether of commutation or of dispensation. He could not, + however, follow his own judgment in the matter, because he does not stand in the place of God; except perhaps in the case + when the thing he has vowed is clearly unlawful, and he is unable to have recourse to the prelate. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A12-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since the Sovereign Pontiff holds the place of Christ throughout the whole Church, he exercises absolute power of dispensing + from all vows that admit of dispensation. To other and inferior prelates is the power committed of dispensing from those vows + that are commonly made and frequently require dispensation, in order that men may easily have recourse to someone; such are + the vows of pilgrimage (Cap. de Peregin., de Voto et Voti redempt.), fasting and + the like, and of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, are reserved to the Sovereign Pontiff [*Cap. Ex multa]. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A12-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q88_A12-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A11.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q87_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q89" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A12.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q89-p0.1">OF OATHS (TEN ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q89-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q89-p2"> We must now consider those external acts of religion, whereby something Divine is taken by man: and this is either a sacrament + or the Name of God. The place for treating of the taking of a sacrament will be in the Third Part of this work: of the taking + of God's Name we shall treat now. The Name of God is taken by man in three ways. First, by way of oath in order to confirm + one's own assertion: secondly, by way of adjuration as an inducement to others: thirdly, by way of invocation + for the purpose of prayer or praise. Accordingly we must first treat of oaths: and under this head there are ten points of + inquiry: + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89-p3"> (1) What is an oath?</p> + <p id="SS_Q89-p4"> (2) Whether it is lawful?</p> + <p id="SS_Q89-p5"> (3) What are the accompanying conditions of an oath?</p> + <p id="SS_Q89-p6"> (4) Of what virtue is it an act?</p> + <p id="SS_Q89-p7"> (5) Whether oaths are desirable, and to be employed frequently as something useful and good?</p> + <p id="SS_Q89-p8"> (6) Whether it is lawful to swear by a creature?</p> + <p id="SS_Q89-p9"> (7) Whether an oath is binding?</p> + <p id="SS_Q89-p10"> (8) Which is more binding, an oath or a vow?</p> + <p id="SS_Q89-p11"> (9) Whether an oath is subject to dispensation?</p> + <p id="SS_Q89-p12"> (10) Who may lawfully swear, and when?</p> + <div id="SS_Q89_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q89_A1-p0.1">Whether to swear is to call God to witness?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q89_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to swear is not to call God to witness. Whoever invokes the authority of Holy Writ calls God to witness, + since it is His word that Holy Writ contains. Therefore, if to swear is to call God to witness, whoever invoked the authority + of Holy Writ would swear. But this is false Therefore the antecedent is false also. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one does not pay anything to a person by calling him to witness. But he who swears by God pays something to Him + for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.33" target="asv">Mat. 5:33</a>): "Thou shall pay [Douay: 'perform'] thy oaths to the Lord"; and Augustine says [*Serm. clxxx] that to swear [jurare] is + "to pay the right [jus reddere] of truth to God." Therefore to swear is not to call God to witness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the duties of a judge differ from the duties of a witness, as shown above (QQ[67],70). Now sometimes a man, by swearing, + implores the Divine judgment, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.7.5" target="asv"> Ps. 7:5, </a> "If I have rendered to them that repaid me evils, let me deservedly fall empty before my enemies." Therefore to swear is + not to call God to witness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says in a sermon on perjury (Serm. clxxx): "When a man says: 'By God,' what else does he mean but that God is his + witness?" + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.6.16" target="asv">Heb. 6:16</a>), oaths are taken for the purpose of confirmation. Now speculative propositions receive confirmation from reason, which proceeds + from principles known naturally and infallibly true. But particular contingent facts regarding man cannot be confirmed by + a necessary reason, wherefore propositions regarding such things are wont to be confirmed by witnesses. Now a human witness + does not suffice to confirm such + matters for two reasons. First, on account of man's lack of truth, for many give way to lying, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.16.10" target="asv"> Ps. 16:10, </a> "Their mouth hath spoken lies [Vulg.: 'proudly']." Secondly, on account of this lack of knowledge, since he can know neither + the future, nor secret thoughts, nor distant things: and yet men speak about such things, and our everyday life requires that + we should have some certitude about them. Hence the need to have recourse to a Divine witness, for neither + can God lie, nor is anything hidden from Him. Now to call God to witness is named "jurare" [to swear] because it is established + as though it were a principle of law [jure] that what a man asserts under the invocation of God as His witness should be accepted + as true. Now sometimes God is called to witness when we assert present or past events, and this is termed a "declaratory oath"; + while sometimes God is called to witness in confirmation of something future, and this is termed a "promissory + oath." But oaths are not employed in order to substantiate necessary matters, and such as come under the investigation of + reason; for it would seem absurd in a scientific discussion to wish to prove one's point by an oath. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is one thing to employ a Divine witness already given, as when one adduces the authority of Holy Scripture; and another + to implore God to bear witness, as in an oath. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man is said to pay his oaths to God because he performs what he swears to do, or because, from the very fact that he calls + upon God to witness, he recognizes Him as possessing universal knowledge and unerring truth. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A person is called to give witness, in order that he may make known the truth about what is alleged. Now there are two ways + in which God makes known whether the alleged facts are true or not. In one way He reveals the truth simply, either by inward + inspiration, or by unveiling the facts, namely, by making public what was hitherto secret: in another way by punishing the + lying witness, and then He is at once judge and witness, since by punishing the + liar He makes known his lie. Hence oaths are of two kinds: one is a simple contestation of God, as when a man says "God is + my witness," or, "I speak before God," or, "By God," which has the same meaning, as Augustine states [*See argument On the + contrary]; the other is by cursing, and consists in a man binding himself or something of his to punishment if what is alleged + be not true. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q89_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q89_A2-p0.1">Whether it is lawful to swear?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q89_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not lawful to swear. Nothing forbidden in the Divine Law is lawful. Now swearing is forbidden ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.34" target="asv">Mat. 5:34</a>), "But I say to you not to swear at all"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.12" target="asv">James 5:12</a>), "Above all things, my brethren, swear not." Therefore swearing is unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever comes from an evil seems to be unlawful, because according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.18" target="asv"> Mat. 7:18, </a> "neither can an evil tree bring forth good fruit." Now swearing comes from an evil, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.37" target="asv">Mat. 5:37</a>): "But let your speech be: Yea, yea: No, no. And that which is over and above these is of evil." Therefore swearing is apparently + unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to seek a sign of Divine Providence is to tempt God, and this is altogether unlawful, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.16" target="asv"> Dt. 6:16, </a> "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God." Now he that swears seems to seek a sign of Divine Providence, since he asks God + to bear witness, and this must be by some evident effect. Therefore it seems that swearing is altogether unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.13" target="asv">Dt. 6:13</a>): "Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God . . . and shalt swear by His name." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing prevents a thing being good in itself, and yet becoming a source of evil to one who makes use thereof unbecomingly: + thus to receive the Eucharist is good, and yet he that receives it "unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.11.29" target="asv">1 Cor. 11:29</a>). Accordingly in answer to the question in point it must be stated that an oath is in itself lawful and commendable. This + is proved from its origin and from its end. From its origin, + because swearing owes its introduction to the faith whereby man believes that God possesses unerring truth and universal knowledge + and foresight of all things: and from its end, since oaths are employed in order to justify men, and to put an end to controversy + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.6.16" target="asv">Heb. 6:16</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A2-p7"> Yet an oath becomes a source of evil to him that makes evil use of it, that is who employs it without necessity and due caution. + For if a man calls God as witness, for some trifling reason, it would seemingly prove him to have but little reverence for + God, since he would not treat even a good man in this manner. Moreover, he is in danger of committing perjury, because man + easily offends in words, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.3.2" target="asv"> James 3:2, </a> "If any man offend not in word, the + same is a perfect man." Wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.23.9" target="asv">Ecclus. 23:9</a>): "Let not thy mouth be accustomed to swearing, for in it there are many falls." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Jerome, commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.34" target="asv"> Mat. 5:34, </a> says: "Observe that our Saviour forbade us to swear, not by God, but by heaven and earth. For it is known that the Jews have + this most evil custom of swearing by the elements." Yet this answer does not suffice, because James adds, "nor by any other + oath." Wherefore we must reply that, as Augustine states (De Mendacio xv), "when the Apostle employs an oath in his epistles, + he shows how we are to + understand the saying, 'I say to you, not to swear at all'; lest, to wit, swearing lead us to swear easily and from swearing + easily, we contract the habit, and, from swearing habitually, we fall into perjury. Hence we find that he swore only when + writing, because thought brings caution and avoids hasty words." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i. 17): "If you have to swear, note that the necessity arises from the infirmity + of those whom you convince, which infirmity is indeed an evil. Accordingly He did not say: 'That which is over and above is + evil,' but 'is of evil.' For you do no evil; since you make good use of swearing, by persuading another to a useful purpose: + yet it 'comes of the evil' of the person by whose infirmity you are forced to + swear." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He who swears tempts not God, because it is not without usefulness and necessity that he implores the Divine assistance. + Moreover, he does not expose himself to danger, if God be unwilling to bear witness there and then: for He certainly will + bear witness at some future time, when He "will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels + of hearts" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:5</a>). And this witness will be lacking to + none who swears, neither for nor against him. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q89_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q89_A3-p0.1">Whether three accompanying conditions of an oath are suitably assigned, namely, justice, judgment, and truth?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q89_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that justice, judgment and truth are unsuitably assigned as the conditions accompanying an oath. Things should + not be enumerated as diverse, if one of them includes the other. Now of these three, one includes another, since truth is + a part of justice, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53): and judgment is an act of justice, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q89_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q60_A1.html">Q[60], A[1]</a>). Therefore the three accompanying conditions of an oath are + unsuitably assigned. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, many other things are required for an oath, namely, devotion, and faith whereby we believe that God knows all things + and cannot lie. Therefore the accompanying conditions of an oath are insufficiently enumerated. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, these three are requisite in man's every deed: since he ought to do nothing contrary to justice and truth, or without + judgment, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.5.21" target="asv">1 Tim. 5:21, </a> "Do nothing without prejudice," i.e. without previous judgment [*Vulg.: 'Observe these things without prejudice, doing nothing + by declining to either side.']. Therefore these three should not be associated with an oath any more than with other human + actions. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.4.2" target="asv">Jer. 4:2</a>): "Thou shalt swear: As the Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice": which words Jerome expounds, saying: + "Observe that an oath must be accompanied by these conditions, truth, judgment and justice." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q89_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q89_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, an oath is not good except for one who makes good use of it. Now two conditions are required for the good use of an oath. + First, that one swear, not for frivolous, but for urgent reasons, and with discretion; and this requires judgment or discretion + on the part of the person who swears. Secondly, as regards the point to be confirmed by oath, that it be neither false, nor + unlawful, and this requires both truth, + so that one employ an oath in order to confirm what is true, and justice, so that one confirm what is lawful. A rash oath + lacks judgment, a false oath lacks truth, and a wicked or unlawful oath lacks justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Judgment does not signify here the execution of justice, but the judgment of discretion, as stated above. Nor is truth here + to be taken for the part of justice, but for a condition of speech. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Devotion, faith and like conditions requisite for the right manner of swearing are implied by judgment: for the other two + regard the things sworn to as stated above. We might also reply that justice regards the reason for swearing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is great danger in swearing, both on account of the greatness of God Who is called upon to bear witness, and on account + of the frailty of the human tongue, the words of which are confirmed by oath. Hence these conditions are more requisite for + an oath than for other human actions. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q89_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q89_A4-p0.1">Whether an oath is an act of religion or latria?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q89_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an oath is not an act of religion, or latria. Acts of religion are about holy and divine things. But oaths + are employed in connection with human disputes, as the Apostle declares ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.6.16" target="asv">Heb. 6:16</a>). Therefore swearing is not an act of religion or latria. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to religion to give worship to God, as Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). But he who swears offers + nothing to God, but calls God to be his witness. Therefore swearing is not an act of religion or latria. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end of religion or latria is to show reverence to God. But the end of an oath is not this, but rather the confirmation + of some assertion. Therefore swearing is not an act of religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.13" target="asv">Dt. 6:13</a>): "Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and shalt serve Him only, and thou shalt swear by His name." Now he speaks there of + the servitude of religion. Therefore swearing is an act of religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As appears from what has been said above + <a id="SS_Q89_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q89_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, he that swears calls God to witness in confirmation of what he says. Now nothing is confirmed save by what is more certain + and more powerful. Therefore in the very fact that a man swears by God, he acknowledges God to be more powerful, by reason + of His unfailing truth and His universal knowledge; and thus in a way he shows reverence to God. For this reason the Apostle + says + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.6.16" target="asv">Heb. 6:16</a>) that "men swear by one greater than themselves," and Jerome commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A4-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.34" target="asv"> Mat. 5:34, </a> says that "he who swears either reveres or loves the person by whom he swears." The Philosopher, too, states (Metaph. i, + 3) that "to swear is to give very great honor." Now to show reverence to God belongs to religion or latria. wherefore it is + evident that an oath is an act of religion or latria. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Two things may be observed in an oath. The witness adduced, and this is Divine: and the thing witnessed to, or that which + makes it necessary to call the witness, and this is human. Accordingly an oath belongs to religion by reason of the former, + and not of the latter. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the very fact that a man takes God as witness by way of an oath, he acknowledges Him to be greater: and this pertains + to the reverence and honor of God, so that he offers something to God, namely, reverence and honor. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Whatsoever we do, we should do it in honor of God: wherefore there is no hindrance, if by intending to assure a man, we show + reverence to God. For we ought so to perform our actions in God's honor that they may conduce to our neighbor's good, since + God also works for His own glory and for our good. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q89_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q89_A5-p0.1">Whether oaths are desirable and to be used frequently as something useful and good?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q89_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that oaths are desirable and to be used frequently as something useful and good. Just as a vow is an act of + religion, so is an oath. Now it is commendable and more meritorious to do a thing by vow, because a vow is an act of religion, + as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q89_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q88_A5.html">Q[88], A[5]</a>). Therefore for the same reason, to do or say a thing with an oath is more commendable, and consequently oaths are desirable + as being good essentially. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Jerome, commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.34" target="asv"> Mat. 5:34, </a> says that "he who swears either reveres or loves the person by whom he swears." Now reverence and love of God are desirable + as something good essentially. Therefore swearing is also. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, swearing is directed to the purpose of confirming or assuring. But it is a good thing for a man to confirm his assertion. + Therefore an oath is desirable as a good thing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.23.12" target="asv">Ecclus. 23:12</a>): "A man that sweareth much shall be filled with iniquity": and Augustine says (De Mendacio xv) that "the Lord forbade swearing, + in order that for your own part you might not be fond of it, and take pleasure in seeking occasions of swearing, as though + it were a good thing." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Whatever is required merely as a remedy for an infirmity or a defect, is not reckoned among those things that are desirable + for their own sake, but among those that are necessary: this is clear in the case of medicine which is required as a remedy + for sickness. Now an oath is required as a remedy to a defect, namely, some man's lack of belief in another man. Wherefore + an oath is not to be reckoned among those things that are desirable for their own sake, but + among those that are necessary for this life; and such things are used unduly whenever they are used outside the bounds of + necessity. For this reason Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 17): "He who understands that swearing is not to be held + as a good thing," i.e. desirable for its own sake, "restrains himself as far as he can from uttering oaths, unless there be + urgent need." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is no parity between a vow and an oath: because by a vow we direct something to the honor of God, so that for this + very reason a vow is an act of religion. On the other hand, in an oath reverence for the name of God is taken in confirmation + of a promise. Hence what is confirmed by oath does not, for this reason, become an act of religion, since moral acts take + their species from the end. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He who swears does indeed make use of his reverence or love for the person by whom he swears: he does not, however, direct + his oath to the reverence or love of that person, but to something else that is necessary for the present life. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even as a medicine is useful for healing, and yet, the stronger it is, the greater harm it does if it be taken unduly, so + too an oath is useful indeed as a means of confirmation, yet the greater the reverence it demands the more dangerous it is, + unless it be employed aright; for, as it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.23.13" target="asv">Ecclus. 23:13</a>), "if he make it void," i.e. if he deceive his brother, "his sin shall be upon him: and if he dissemble it," by swearing + falsely, and with + dissimulation, "he offendeth double," [because, to wit, "pretended equity is a twofold iniquity," as Augustine [*Enarr. in + Ps. lxiii, 7] declares]: "and if he swear in vain," i.e. without due cause and necessity, "he shall not be justified." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q89_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q89_A6-p0.1">Whether it is lawful to swear by creatures?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q89_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not lawful to swear by creatures. It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.34" target="asv">Mat. 5:34-36</a>): "I say to you not to swear at all, neither by heaven . . . nor by the earth . . . nor by Jerusalem . . . nor by thy head": + and Jerome, expounding these words, says: "Observe that the Saviour does not forbid swearing by God, but by heaven and earth," + etc. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, punishment is not due save for a fault. Now a punishment is appointed for one who swears by creatures: for it is + written (22, qu. i, can. Clericum): "If a cleric swears by creatures he must be very severely rebuked: and if he shall persist + in this vicious habit we wish that he be excommunicated." Therefore it is unlawful to swear by creatures. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an oath is an act of religion, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q89_A6-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q89_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. But religious worship is not due to any creature, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A6-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.23" target="asv">Rom. 1:23</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A6-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.25" target="asv">25</a>. Therefore it is not lawful to swear by a creature. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Joseph swore "by the health of Pharaoh" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.42.16" target="asv">Gn. 42:16</a>). Moreover it is customary to swear by the Gospel, by relics, and by the saints. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[1], ad 3), there are two kinds of oath. One is uttered a simple contestation or calling God as witness: + and this kind of oath, like faith, is based on God's truth. Now faith is essentially and chiefly about God Who is the very + truth, and secondarily about creatures in which God's truth is reflected, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q89_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q1_A1.html">Q[1], A[1]</a>). In like manner an oath is chiefly referred to God Whose testimony is invoked; and + secondarily an appeal by oath is made to certain creatures considered, not in themselves, but as reflecting the Divine truth. + Thus we swear by the Gospel, i.e. by God Whose truth is made known in the Gospel; and by the saints who believed this truth + and kept it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A6-p7"> The other way of swearing is by cursing and in this kind of oath a creature is adduced that the judgment of God may be wrought + therein. Thus a man is wont to swear by his head, or by his son, or by some other thing that he loves, even as the Apostle + swore ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.1.23" target="asv">2 Cor. 1:23</a>), saying: "I call God to witness upon my soul." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A6-p8"> As to Joseph's oath by the health of Pharaoh this may be understood in both ways: either by way of a curse, as though he + pledged Pharao's health to God; or by way of contestation, as though he appealed to the truth of God's justice which the princes + of the earth are appointed to execute. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our Lord forbade us to swear by creatures so as to give them the reverence due to God. Hence Jerome adds that "the Jews, + through swearing by the angels and the like, worshipped creatures with a Divine honor." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A6-p10"> In the same sense a cleric is punished, according to the canons (22, qu. i, can. Clericum, OBJ[2]), for swearing by a creature, + for this savors of the blasphemy of unbelief. Hence in the next chapter, it is said: "If any one swears by God's hair or head, + or otherwise utter blasphemy against God, and he be in ecclesiastical orders, let him be degraded." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A6-p11"> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A6-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Religious worship is shown to one whose testimony is invoked by oath: hence the prohibition ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A6-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.13" target="asv">Ex. 23:13</a>): "By the name of strange gods you shall not swear." But religious worship is not given to creatures employed in an oath + in the ways mentioned above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A6-p13"></p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A6-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q89_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q89_A7-p0.1">Whether an oath has a binding force?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q89_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an oath has no binding force. An oath is employed in order to confirm the truth of an assertion. But when + a person makes an assertion about the future his assertion is true, though it may not be verified. Thus Paul lied not ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.1.15" target="asv">2 Cor. 1:15, </a> seqq.) though he went not to Corinth, as he had said he would ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A7-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.16.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 16:5</a>). Therefore it seems that an oath is not binding. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is not contrary to virtue (Categ. viii, 22). Now an oath is an act of virtue, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q89_A7-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q89_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. But it would sometimes be contrary to virtue, or an obstacle thereto, if one were to fulfil what one has sworn to do: for + instance, if one were to swear to commit a sin, or to desist from some virtuous action. Therefore an oath is not always binding. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sometimes a man is compelled against his will to promise something under oath. Now, "such a person is loosed by + the Roman Pontiffs from the bond of his oath" (Extra, De Jurejur., cap. Verum in ea quaest., etc.). Therefore an oath is not + always binding. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A7-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, no person can be under two opposite obligations. Yet sometimes the person who swears and the person to whom he swears + have opposite intentions. Therefore an oath cannot always be binding. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A7-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.33" target="asv">Mat. 5:33</a>): "Thou shalt perform thy oaths to the Lord." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A7-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> An obligation implies something to be done or omitted; so that apparently it regards neither the declaratory oath (which + is about something present or past), nor such oaths as are about something to be effected by some other cause (as, for example, + if one were to swear that it would rain tomorrow), but only such as are about things to be done by the person who swears. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A7-p8"> Now just as a declaratory oath, which is about the future or the present, should contain the truth, so too ought the oath + which is about something to be done by us in the future. Yet there is a difference: since, in the oath that is about the past + or present, this obligation affects, not the thing that already has been or is, but the action of the swearer, in the point + of his swearing to what is or was already true; whereas, on the contrary, in the oath that is made about + something to be done by us, the obligation falls on the thing guaranteed by oath. For a man is bound to make true what he + has sworn, else his oath lacks truth. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A7-p9"> Now if this thing be such as not to be in his power, his oath is lacking in judgment of discretion: unless perchance what + was possible when he swore become impossible to him through some mishap. as when a man swore to pay a sum of money, which + is subsequently taken from him by force or theft. For then he would seem to be excused from fulfilling his oath, although + he is bound to do what he can, as, in fact, we have already stated with regard to the obligation of a vow ( + <a id="SS_Q89_A7-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q88_A3.html">Q[88], A[3]</a>, ad 2). If, on the other hand, it be something that he can do, but ought not to, either because it is essentially evil, or + because it is a hindrance to a good, then his oath is lacking in justice: wherefore an oath must not be kept when it involves + a sin or a hindrance to good. For in either case "its result is evil" [*Cf. Bede, Homil. xix, in Decoll. S. Joan. Bapt.] + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A7-p10"> Accordingly we must conclude that whoever swears to do something is bound to do what he can for the fulfilment of truth; + provided always that the other two accompanying conditions be present, namely, judgment and justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A7-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is not the same with a simple assertion, and with an oath wherein God is called to witness: because it suffices for the + truth of an assertion, that a person say what he proposes to do, since it is already true in its cause, namely, the purpose + of the doer. But an oath should not be employed, save in a matter about which one is firmly certain: and, consequently, if + a man employ an oath, he is bound, as far as he can, to make true what he has sworn, + through reverence of the Divine witness invoked, unless it leads to an evil result, as stated. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A7-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An oath may lead to an evil result in two ways. First, because from the very outset it has an evil result, either through + being evil of its very nature (as, if a man were to swear to commit adultery), or through being a hindrance to a greater good, + as if a man were to swear not to enter religion, or not to become a cleric, or that he would not accept a prelacy, supposing + it would be expedient for him to accept, or in similar cases. For oaths of this + kind are unlawful from the outset: yet with a difference: because if a man swear to commit a sin, he sinned in swearing, and + sins in keeping his oath: whereas if a man swear not to perform a greater good, which he is not bound to do withal, he sins + indeed in swearing (through placing an obstacle to the Holy Ghost, Who is the inspirer of good purposes), yet he does not + sin in keeping his oath, though he does much better if he does not keep it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A7-p13"> Secondly, an oath leads to an evil result through some new and unforeseen emergency. An instance is the oath of Herod, who + swore to the damsel, who danced before him, that he would give her what she would ask of him. For this oath could be lawful + from the outset, supposing it to have the requisite conditions, namely, that the damsel asked what it was right to grant. + but the fulfilment of the oath was unlawful. Hence Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 50): "Sometimes it is wrong to + fulfil a promise, and to keep an oath; as Herod, who granted the slaying of John, rather than refuse what he had promised." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A7-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is a twofold obligation in the oath which a man takes under compulsion: one, whereby he is beholden to the person to + whom he promises something; and this obligation is cancelled by the compulsion, because he that used force deserves that the + promise made to him should not be kept. The other is an obligation whereby a man is beholden to God, in virtue of which he + is bound to fulfil what he has promised in His name. This obligation is not removed + in the tribunal of conscience, because that man ought rather to suffer temporal loss, than violate his oath. He can, however, + seek in a court of justice to recover what he has paid, or denounce the matter to his superior even if he has sworn to the + contrary, because such an oath would lead to evil results since it would be contrary to public justice. The Roman Pontiffs, + in absolving men from oaths of this kind, did not pronounce such oaths to be unbinding, but relaxed the obligation for some + just cause. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A7-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When the intention of the swearer is not the same as the intention of the person to whom he swears, if this be due to the + swearer's guile, he must keep his oath in accordance with the sound understanding of the person to whom the oath is made. + Hence Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 31): "However artful a man may be in wording his oath, God Who witnesses his conscience + accepts his oath as understood by the person to whom it is made." And that this + refers to the deceitful oath is clear from what follows: "He is doubly guilty who both takes God's name in vain, and tricks + his neighbor by guile." If, however, the swearer uses no guile, he is bound in accordance with his own intention. Wherefore + Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 7): "The human ear takes such like words in their natural outward sense, but the Divine judgment + interprets them according to our inward intention." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A7-p16"></p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A7-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q89_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A9.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q89_A8-p0.1">Whether an oath is more binding than a vow?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q89_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an oath is more binding than a vow. A vow is a simple promise: whereas an oath includes, besides a promise, + an appeal to God as witness. Therefore an oath is more binding than a vow. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the weaker is wont to be confirmed by the stronger. Now a vow is sometimes confirmed by an oath. Therefore an oath + is stronger than a vow. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the obligation of a vow arises from the deliberation of the mind, a stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q89_A8-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q88_A1.html">Q[88], A[1]</a>); while the obligation of an oath results from the truth of God Whose testimony is invoked. Since therefore God's truth is + something greater than human deliberation, it seems that the obligation of an oath is greater than that of a vow. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A vow binds one to God while an oath sometimes binds one to man. Now one is more bound to God than to man. Therefore a vow + is more binding than an oath. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The obligation both of vow and of an oath arises from something Divine; but in different ways. For the obligation of a vow + arises from the fidelity we owe God, which binds us to fulfil our promises to Him. On the other hand, the obligation of an + oath arises from the reverence we owe Him which binds us to make true what we promise in His name. Now every act of infidelity + includes an irreverence, but not conversely, because the infidelity of a subject to his + lord would seem to be the greatest irreverence. Hence a vow by its very nature is more binding than an oath. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A vow is not any kind of promise, but a promise made to God; and to be unfaithful to God is most grievous. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An oath is added to a vow not because it is more stable, but because greater stability results from "two immutable things" + [* + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A8-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.6.18" target="asv">Heb. 6:18</a>]. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Deliberation of the mind gives a vow its stability, on the part of the person who takes the vow: but it has a greater cause + of stability on the part of God, to Whom the vow is offered. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A8-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A8-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A9.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q89_A9" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A10.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q89_A9-p0.1">Whether anyone can dispense from an oath?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q89_A9-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no one can dispense from an oath. Just as truth is required for a declaratory oath, which is about the + past or the present, so too is it required for a promissory oath, which is about the future. Now no one can dispense a man + from swearing to the truth about present or past things. Therefore neither can anyone dispense a man from making truth that + which he has promised by oath to do in the future. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a promissory oath is used for the benefit of the person to whom the promise is made. But, apparently, he cannot + release the other from his oath, since it would be contrary to the reverence of God. Much less therefore can a dispensation + from this oath be granted by anyone. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, any bishop can grant a dispensation from a vow, except certain vows reserved to the Pope alone, as stated above + ( + <a id="SS_Q89_A9-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q88_A12.html">Q[88], A[12]</a>, ad 3). Therefore in like manner, if an oath admits of dispensation, any bishop can dispense from an oath. And yet seemingly + this is to be against the law [*Caus. XV, qu. 6, can. Auctoritatem, seqq.: Cap. Si vero, de Jurejurando]. Therefore it would + seem that an oath does not admit of dispensation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A9-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A vow is more binding than an oath, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q89_A9-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q89_A8.html">(A[8])</a>. But a vow admits of dispensation and therefore an oath does also. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A9-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q89_A9-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q88_A10.html">Q[88], A[10]</a>), the necessity of a dispensation both from the law and from a vow arises from the fact that something which is useful and + morally good in itself and considered in general, may be morally evil and hurtful in respect of some particular emergency: + and such a case comes under neither law nor vow. Now anything morally evil or hurtful is incompatible with the matter of an + oath: for if it be morally evil it + is opposed to justice, and if it be hurtful it is contrary to judgment. Therefore an oath likewise admits of dispensation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A9-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A dispensation from an oath does not imply a permission to do anything against the oath: for this is impossible, since the + keeping of an oath comes under a Divine precept, which does not admit of dispensation: but it implies that what hitherto came + under an oath no longer comes under it, as not being due matter for an oath, just as we have said with regard to vows ( + <a id="SS_Q89_A9-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q88_A10.html">Q[88], A[10]</a>, ad 2). Now the matter of a declaratory oath, + which is about something past or present, has already acquired a certain necessity, and has become unchangeable, wherefore + the dispensation will regard not the matter but the act itself of the oath: so that such a dispensation would be directly + contrary to the Divine precept. On the other hand, the matter of a promissory oath is something future, which admits of change, + so that, to wit, in certain emergencies, it may be unlawful or hurtful, and consequently undue matter for an oath. Therefore + a + promissory oath admits of dispensation, since such dispensation regards the matter of an oath, and is not contrary to the + Divine precept about the keeping of oaths. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A9-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One man may promise something under oath to another in two ways. First, when he promises something for his benefit: for instance, + if he promise to serve him, or to give him money: and from such a promise he can be released by the person to whom he made + it: for he is understood to have already kept his promise to him when he acts towards him according to his will. Secondly, + one man promises another something pertaining to God's honor or to the benefit + of others: for instance, if a man promise another under oath that he will enter religion, or perform some act of kindness. + In this case the person to whom the promise is made cannot release him that made the promise, because it was made principally + not to him but to God: unless perchance it included some condition, for instance, "provided he give his consent" or some such + like condition. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sometimes that which is made the matter of a promissory oath is manifestly opposed to justice, either because it is a sin, + as when a man swears to commit a murder, or because it is an obstacle to a greater good, as when a man swears not to enter + a religion: and such an oath requires no dispensation. But in the former case a man is bound not to keep such an oath, while + in the latter it is lawful for him to keep or not to keep the oath, as stated above + (A[7], ad 2). Sometimes what is promised on oath is doubtfully right or wrong, useful or harmful, either in itself or under + the circumstance. In this case any bishop can dispense. Sometimes, however, that which is promised under oath is manifestly + lawful and beneficial. An oath of this kind seemingly admits not of dispensation but of commutation, when there occurs something + better to be done for the common good, in which case the matter would seem to belong chiefly to the power of the Pope, who + has charge over the whole Church; and even of absolute relaxation, for this too belongs in general to the Pope in all matters + regarding the administration of things ecclesiastical. Thus it is competent to any man to cancel an oath made by one of his + subjects in matters that come under his authority: for instance, a father may annul his daughter's oath, and a husband his + wife's ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A9-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Num.30.6" target="asv">Num. 30:6, </a> seqq.), as stated above with regard to vows ( + <a id="SS_Q89_A9-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q88_A8.html">Q[88], + AA[8] + </a>,9). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A9-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A9-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A10.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q89_A10" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q90.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q89_A10-p0.1">Whether an oath is voided by a condition of person or time?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q89_A10-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A10-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an oath is not voided by a condition of person or time. An oath, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A10-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.6.16" target="asv">Heb. 6:16</a>), is employed for the purpose of confirmation. Now it is competent to anyone to confirm his assertion, and at any time. Therefore + it would seem that an oath is not voided by a condition of person or time. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A10-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to swear by God is more than to swear by the Gospels: wherefore Chrysostom [*Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum falsely + ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "If there is a reason for swearing, it seems a small thing to swear by God, but a great + thing to swear by the Gospels. To those who think thus, it must be said: Nonsense! the Scriptures were made for God's sake, + not God for the sake of the Scriptures." Now men of all conditions and at all times + are wont to swear by God. Much more, therefore, is it lawful to swear by the Gospels. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A10-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same effect does not proceed from contrary causes, since contrary causes produce contrary effects. Now some + are debarred from swearing on account of some personal defect; children, for instance, before the age of fourteen, and persons + who have already committed perjury. Therefore it would seem that a person ought not to be debarred from swearing either on + account of his dignity, as clerics, or on account of the solemnity of the time. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A10-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in this world no living man is equal in dignity to an angel: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A10-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.11" target="asv">Mat. 11:11</a>) that "he that is the lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he," namely than John the Baptist, while yet living. + Now an angel is competent to swear, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A10-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Rev.10.6" target="asv">Apoc. 10:6</a>) that the angel "swore by Him that liveth for ever and ever." Therefore no man ought to be excused from swearing, on account + of his + dignity. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A10-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated (II, qu. v, can. Si quis presbyter): "Let a priest be examined 'by his sacred consecration,' instead of being + put on his oath": and (22, qu. v, can. Nullus): "Let no one in ecclesiastical orders dare to swear on the Holy Gospels to + a layman." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A10-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Two things are to be considered in an oath. One is on the part of God, whose testimony is invoked, and in this respect we + should hold an oath in the greatest reverence. For this reason children before the age of puberty are debarred from taking + oaths [*Caus. XXII, qu. 5, can. Parvuli], and are not called upon to swear, because they have not yet attained the perfect + use of reason, so as to be able to take a oath with due reverence. Perjurers also are debarred + from taking an oath, because it is presumed from their antecedents that they will not treat an oath with the reverence due + to it. For this same reason, in order that oaths might be treated with due reverence the law says (22, qu. v, can. Honestum): + "It is becoming that he who ventures to swear on holy things should do so fasting, with all propriety and fear of God." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A10-p8"> The other thing to be considered is on the part of the man, whose assertion is confirmed by oath. For a man's assertion needs + no confirmation save because there is a doubt about it. Now it derogates from a person's dignity that one should doubt about + the truth of what he says, wherefore "it becomes not persons of great dignity to swear." For this reason the law says (II, + qu. v, can. Si quis presbyter) that "priests should not swear for trifling reasons." Nevertheless it is + lawful for them to swear if there be need for it, or if great good may result therefrom. Especially is this the case in spiritual + affairs, when moreover it is becoming that they should take oath on days of solemnity, since they ought then to devote themselves + to spiritual matters. Nor should they on such occasions take oaths temporal matters, except perhaps in cases grave necessity. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A10-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some are unable to confirm their own assertions on account of their own defect: and some there are whose words should be + so certain that they need no confirmation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A10-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The greater the thing sworn by, the holier and the more binding is the oath, considered in itself, as Augustine states (Ad + Public., Ep. xlvii): and accordingly is a graver matter to swear by God than the Gospels. Yet the contrary may be the case + on account of the manner of swearing for instance, an oath by the Gospels might be taken with deliberation and solemnity, + and an oath by God frivolously and without deliberation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A10-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nothing prevents the same thing from arising out of contrary causes, by way of superabundance and defect. It is in this way + that some are debarred from swearing, through being of so great authority that it is unbecoming for them to swear; while others + are of such little authority that their oaths have no standing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A10-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The angel's oath is adduced not on account of any defect in the angel, as though one ought not to credit his mere word, but + in order to show that the statement made issues from God's infallible disposition. Thus too God is sometimes spoken of by + Scripture as swearing, in order to express the immutability of His word, as the Apostle declares ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q89_A10-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.6.17" target="asv">Heb. 6:17</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A10-p13"></p> + <p id="SS_Q89_A10-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q90.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q88_A12.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q90" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q90_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q90-p0.1">OF THE TAKING OF GOD'S NAME BY WAY OF ADJURATION (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q90-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q90-p2"> We must now consider the taking of God's name by way of adjuration: under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q90-p3"> (1) Whether it is lawful to adjure a man?</p> + <p id="SS_Q90-p4"> (2) Whether it is lawful to adjure the demons?</p> + <p id="SS_Q90-p5"> (3) Whether it is lawful to adjure irrational creatures?</p> + <div id="SS_Q90_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q90.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q90_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q90_A1-p0.1">Whether it is lawful to adjure a man?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q90_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not lawful to adjure a man. Origen says (Tract. xxxv super Matth.): "I deem that a man who wishes + to live according to the Gospel should not adjure another man. For if, according to the Gospel mandate of Christ, it be unlawful + to swear, it is evident that neither is it lawful to adjure: and consequently it is manifest that the high-priest unlawfully + adjured Jesus by the living God." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever adjures a man, compels him after a fashion. But it is unlawful to compel a man against his will. Therefore + seemingly it is also unlawful to adjure a man. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to adjure is to induce a person to swear. Now it belongs to man's superior to induce him to swear, for the superior + imposes an oath on his subject. Therefore subjects cannot adjure their superiors. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Even when we pray God we implore Him by certain holy things: and the Apostle too besought the faithful "by the mercy of God" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q90_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.1" target="asv">Rom. 12:1</a>): and this seems to be a kind of adjuration. Therefore it is lawful to adjure. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A man who utters a promissory oath, swearing by his reverence for the Divine name, which he invokes in confirmation of his + promise, binds himself to do what he has undertaken, and so orders himself unchangeably to do a certain thing. Now just as + a man can order himself to do a certain thing, so too can he order others, by beseeching his superiors, or by commanding his + inferiors, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q90_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q83_A1.html">Q[83], A[1]</a>). Accordingly when either + of these orderings is confirmed by something Divine it is an adjuration. Yet there is this difference between them, that man + is master of his own actions but not of those of others; wherefore he can put himself under an obligation by invoking the + Divine name, whereas he cannot put others under such an obligation unless they be his subjects, whom he can compel on the + strength of the oath they have taken. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A1-p7"> Therefore, if a man by invoking the name of God, or any holy thing, intends by this adjuration to put one who is not his + subject under an obligation to do a certain thing, in the same way as he would bind himself by oath, such an adjuration is + unlawful, because he usurps over another a power which he has not. But superiors may bind their inferiors by this kind of + adjuration, if there be need for it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A1-p8"> If, however, he merely intend, through reverence of the Divine name or of some holy thing, to obtain something from the other + man without putting him under any obligation, such an adjuration may be lawfully employed in respect of anyone. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Origen is speaking of an adjuration whereby a man intends to put another under an obligation, in the same way as he would + bind himself by oath: for thus did the high-priest presume to adjure our Lord Jesus Christ [* + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q90_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.26.63" target="asv">Mat. 26:63</a>]. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers the adjuration which imposes an obligation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To adjure is not to induce a man to swear, but to employ terms resembling an oath in order to provoke another to do a certain + thing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A1-p12"> Moreover, we adjure God in one way and man in another; because when we adjure a man we intend to alter his will by appealing + to his reverence for a holy thing: and we cannot have such an intention in respect of God Whose will is immutable. If we obtain + something from God through His eternal will, it is due, not to our merits, but to His goodness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A1-p13"></p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A1-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q90.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q90_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q90_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q90_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q90_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q90_A2-p0.1">Whether it is lawful to adjure the demons?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q90_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unlawful to adjure the demons. Origen says (Tract. xxxv, super Matth.): "To adjure the demons is not accordance + with the power given by our Saviour: for this is a Jewish practice." Now rather than imitate the rites of the Jews, we should + use the power given by Christ. Therefore it is not lawful to adjure the demons. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, many make use of necromantic incantations when invoking the demons by something Divine: and this is an adjuration. + Therefore, if it be lawful to adjure the demons, it is lawful to make use of necromantic incantations, which is evidently + false. Therefore the antecedent is false also. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever adjures a person, by that very fact associates himself with him. Now it is not lawful to have fellowship + with the demons, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q90_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.20" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:20, </a> "I would not that you should be made partakers with devils." Therefore it is not lawful to adjure the demons. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q90_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.16.17" target="asv">Mk. 16:17</a>): "In My name they shall cast out devils." Now to induce anyone to do a certain thing for the sake of God's name is to adjure. + Therefore it is lawful to adjure the demons. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in the preceding article, there are two ways of adjuring: one by way of prayer or inducement through reverence + of some holy thing: the other by way of compulsion. In the first way it is not lawful to adjure the demons because such a + way seems to savor of benevolence or friendship, which it is unlawful to bear towards the demons. As to the second kind of + adjuration, which is by compulsion, we may lawfully use it for some purposes, and not for + others. For during the course of this life the demons are our adversaries: and their actions are not subject to our disposal + but to that of God and the holy angels, because, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4), "the rebel spirit is ruled by the just + spirit." Accordingly we may repulse the demons, as being our enemies, by adjuring them through the power of God's name, lest + they do us harm of soul or body, in accord with the Divine power given by Christ, as recorded by + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q90_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.19" target="asv"> Lk. + 10:19 + </a>: "Behold, I have given you power to tread upon serpents and scorpions, and upon all the power of the enemy: and nothing shall + hurt you." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A2-p7"> It is not, however, lawful to adjure them for the purpose of learning something from them, or of obtaining something through + them, for this would amount to holding fellowship with them: except perhaps when certain holy men, by special instinct or + Divine revelation, make use of the demons' actions in order to obtain certain results: thus we read of the Blessed James [*the + Greater; cf. Apocrypha, N.T., Hist. Certam. Apost. vi, 19] that he caused Hermogenes to be brought to him, by + the instrumentality of the demons. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Origen is speaking of adjuration made, not authoritatively by way of compulsion, but rather by way of a friendly appeal. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Necromancers adjure and invoke the demons in order to obtain or learn something from them: and this is unlawful, as stated + above. Wherefore Chrysostom, commenting on our Lord's words to the unclean spirit ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q90_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.1.25" target="asv">Mk. 1:25</a>), "Speak no more, and go out of the man," says: "A salutary teaching is given us here, lest we believe the demons, however + much they speak the truth." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the adjuration whereby the demon's help is besought in doing or learning something: for this savors + of fellowship with them. On the other hand, to repulse the demons by adjuring them, is to sever oneself from their fellowship. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q90_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q90_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q90_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q90_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q91.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q90_A3-p0.1">Whether it is lawful to adjure an irrational creature?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q90_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unlawful to adjure an irrational creature. An adjuration consists of spoken words. But it is useless to speak + to one that understands not, such as an irrational creature. Therefore it is vain and unlawful to adjure an irrational creature. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, seemingly wherever adjuration is admissible, swearing is also admissible. But swearing is not consistent with an + irrational creature. Therefore it would seem unlawful to employ adjuration towards one. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there are two ways of adjuring, as explained above ( + <a id="SS_Q90_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q90_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2). One is by way of appeal; and this cannot be employed towards irrational creatures, since they are not masters of their + own actions. The other kind of adjuration is by way of compulsion: and, seemingly, neither is it lawful to use this towards + them, because we have not the power to command irrational creatures, but only He of Whom it was said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q90_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.8.27" target="asv">Mat. + 8:27 + </a>): "For the winds and the sea obey Him." Therefore in no way, apparently, is it lawful to adjure irrational creatures. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Simon and Jude are related to have adjured dragons and to have commanded them to withdraw into the desert. [*From the apocryphal + Historiae Certam. Apost. vi. 19.] + </p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Irrational creatures are directed to their own actions by some other agent. Now the action of what is directed and moved + is also the action of the director and mover: thus the movement of the arrow is an operation of the archer. Wherefore the + operation of the irrational creature is ascribed not only to it, but also and chiefly to God, Who disposes the movements of + all things. It is also ascribed to the devil, who, by God's permission, makes use of irrational + creatures in order to inflict harm on man. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A3-p7"> Accordingly the adjuration of an irrational creature may be of two kinds. First, so that the adjuration is referred to the + irrational creature in itself: and in this way it would be vain to adjure an irrational creature. Secondly, so that it be + referred to the director and mover of the irrational creature, and in this sense a creature of this kind may be adjured in + two ways. First, by way of appeal made to God, and this relates to those who work miracles by calling on God: + secondly, by way of compulsion, which relates to the devil, who uses the irrational creature for our harm. This is the kind + of adjuration used in the exorcisms of the Church, whereby the power of the demons is expelled from an irrational creature. + But it is not lawful to adjure the demons by beseeching them to help us. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A3-p8"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A3-p9"></p> + <p id="SS_Q90_A3-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q90_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q91.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q89_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q90_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q91" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q90_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q91_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q91-p0.1">OF TAKING THE DIVINE NAME FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVOKING IT BY MEANS OF PRAISE (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q91-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q91-p2"> We must now consider the taking of the Divine name for the purpose of invoking it by prayer or praise. Of prayer we have + already spoken (Q[83] ). Wherefore we must speak now of praise. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="SS_Q91-p3"> (1) Whether God should be praised with the lips?</p> + <p id="SS_Q91-p4"> (2) Whether God should be praised with song?</p> + <div id="SS_Q91_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q91.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q91_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q91_A1-p0.1">Whether God should be praised with the lips?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q91_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q91_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God should not be praised with the lips. The Philosopher says (Ethic. 1,12): "The best of men ere accorded + not praise, but something greater." But God transcends the very best of all things. Therefore God ought to be given, not praise, + but something greater than praise: wherefore He is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q91_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.43.33" target="asv">Ecclus. 43:33</a>) to be "above all praise." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q91_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, divine praise is part of divine worship, for it is an act of religion. Now God is worshiped with the mind rather + than with the lips: wherefore our Lord quoted against certain ones the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q91_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.29.13" target="asv">Is. 29:13</a>, "This people . . . honors [Vulg.: 'glorifies'] Me with their lips, but their heart is far from Me." Therefore the praise + of God lies in the heart rather than on the lips. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q91_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, men are praised with the lips that they may be encouraged to do better: since just as being praised makes the wicked + proud, so does it incite the good to better things. Wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q91_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.27.21" target="asv">Prov. 27:21</a>): "As silver is tried in the fining-pot . . . so a man is tried by the mouth of him that praiseth." But God is not incited + to better things by man's words, both because He is unchangeable, and because He is supremely good, and + it is not possible for Him to grow better. Therefore God should not be praised with the lips. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q91_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q91_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.62.6" target="asv">Ps. 62:6</a>): "My mouth shall praise Thee with joyful lips." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q91_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We use words, in speaking to God, for one reason, and in speaking to man, for another reason. For when speaking to man we + use words in order to tell him our thoughts which are unknown to him. Wherefore we praise a man with our lips, in order that + he or others may learn that we have a good opinion of him: so that in consequence we may incite him to yet better things; + and that we may induce others, who hear him praised, to think well of him, to reverence him, + and to imitate him. On the other hand we employ words, in speaking to God, not indeed to make known our thoughts to Him Who + is the searcher of hearts, but that we may bring ourselves and our hearers to reverence Him. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q91_A1-p7"> Consequently we need to praise God with our lips, not indeed for His sake, but for our own sake; since by praising Him our + devotion is aroused towards Him, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q91_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.49.23" target="asv"> Ps. 49:23</a>: "The sacrifice of praise shall glorify Me, and there is the way by which I will show him the salvation of God." And forasmuch + as man, by praising God, ascends in his affections to God, by so much is he withdrawn from things opposed to God, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q91_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.48.9" target="asv"> Is. 48:9, + + </a>"For My praise I will bridle thee lest thou shouldst perish." The praise of the lips is also profitable to others by inciting + their affections towards God, wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q91_A1-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.2" target="asv">Ps. 33:2</a>): "His praise shall always be in my mouth," and farther on: "Let the meek hear and rejoice. O magnify the Lord with me." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q91_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We may speak of God in two ways. First, with regard to His essence; and thus, since He is incomprehensible and ineffable, + He is above all praise. In this respect we owe Him reverence and the honor of latria; wherefore + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q91_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.64.2" target="asv"> Ps. 64:2 </a>is rendered by Jerome in his Psalter [*Translated from the Hebrew]: "Praise to Thee is speechless, O God," as regards the + first, and as to the second, "A vow shall be paid to Thee." Secondly, we may speak of + God as to His effects which are ordained for our good. In this respect we owe Him praise; wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q91_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.63.7" target="asv">Is. 63:7</a>): "I will remember the tender mercies of the Lord, the praise of the Lord for all the things that the Lord hath bestowed + upon us." Again, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): "Thou wilt find that all the sacred hymns," i.e. divine praises "of the sacred + writers, are directed respectively to the Blessed Processions of the Thearchy," i.e. of the Godhead, "showing forth and praising + the names of God." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q91_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It profits one nothing to praise with the lips if one praise not with the heart. For the heart speaks God's praises when + it fervently recalls "the glorious things of His works" [*Cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q91_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.17.7" target="asv">Ecclus. 17:7,8</a>]. Yet the outward praise of the lips avails to arouse the inward fervor of those who praise, and to incite others to praise + God, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q91_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We praise God, not for His benefit, but for ours as stated. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q91_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q91_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q91.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q91_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q91_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q91_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q92.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q91_A2-p0.1">Whether God should be praised with song?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q91_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q91_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God should not be praised with song. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q91_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Col.3.16" target="asv">Col. 3:16</a>): "Teaching and admonishing one another in psalms, hymns and spiritual canticles." Now we should employ nothing in the divine + worship, save what is delivered to us on the authority of Scripture. Therefore it would seem that, in praising God, we should + employ, not corporal but spiritual canticles. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q91_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Jerome in his commentary on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q91_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.19" target="asv"> Eph. 5:19, </a> "Singing and making melody in your hearts to the Lord," says: "Listen, young men whose duty it is to recite the office in + church: God is to be sung not with the voice but with the heart. Nor should you, like play-actors, ease your throat and jaws + with medicaments, and make the church resound with theatrical measures and airs." Therefore God should not be praised with + song. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q91_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the praise of God is competent to little and great, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q91_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.14" target="asv">Apoc. 14</a>, "Give praise to our God, all ye His servants; and you that fear Him, little and great." But the great, who are in the church, + ought not to sing: for Gregory says (Regist. iv, ep. 44): "I hereby ordain that in this See the ministers of the sacred altar + must not sing" (Cf. Decret., dist. xcii., cap. In sancta Romana Ecclesia). Therefore singing is unsuitable to the divine + praises. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q91_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in the Old Law God was praised with musical instruments and human song, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q91_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.32.2" target="asv"> Ps. 32:2,3</a>: "Give praise to the Lord on the harp, sing to Him with the psaltery, the instrument of ten strings. Sing to Him a new canticle." + But the Church does not make use of musical instruments such as harps and psalteries, in the divine praises, for fear of seeming + to imitate the Jews. Therefore in like manner neither should song be used in + the divine praises. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q91_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the praise of the heart is more important than the praise of the lips. But the praise of the heart is hindered by + singing, both because the attention of the singers is distracted from the consideration of what they are singing, so long + as they give all their attention to the chant, and because others are less able to understand the thing that are sung than + if they were recited without chant. Therefore chants should not be employed in the divine + praises. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q91_A2-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Blessed Ambrose established singing in the Church of Milan, a Augustine relates (Confess. ix). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q91_A2-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q91_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q91_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the praise of the voice is necessary in order to arouse man's devotion towards God. Wherefore whatever is useful in conducing + to this result is becomingly adopted in the divine praises. Now it is evident that the human soul is moved in various ways + according to various melodies of sound, as the Philosopher state (Polit. viii, 5), and also Boethius (De Musica, prologue). + Hence the use of music in the divine + praises is a salutary institution, that the souls of the faint-hearted may be the more incited to devotion. Wherefore Augustine + say (Confess. x, 33): "I am inclined to approve of the usage of singing in the church, that so by the delight of the ears + the faint-hearted may rise to the feeling of devotion": and he says of himself (Confess. ix, 6): "I wept in Thy hymns and + canticles, touched to the quick by the voices of Thy sweet-attuned Church." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q91_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The name of spiritual canticle may be given not only to those that are sung inwardly in spirit, but also to those that are + sung outwardly with the lips, inasmuch as such like canticles arouse spiritual devotion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q91_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Jerome does not absolutely condemn singing, but reproves those who sing theatrically in church not in order to arouse devotion, + but in order to show off, or to provoke pleasure. Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 33): "When it befalls me to be more moved + by the voice than by the words sung, I confess to have sinned penally, and then had rather not hear the singer." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q91_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To arouse men to devotion by teaching and preaching is a more excellent way than by singing. Wherefore deacons and prelates, + whom it becomes to incite men's minds towards God by means of preaching and teaching, ought not to be instant in singing, + lest thereby they be withdrawn from greater things. Hence Gregory says (Regist. iv, ep. 44): "It is a most discreditable custom + for those who have been raised to the diaconate to serve as choristers, for it + behooves them to give their whole time to the duty of preaching and to taking charge of the alms." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q91_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the Philosopher says (Polit. viii, 6), "Teaching should not be accompanied with a flute or any artificial instrument such + as the harp or anything else of this kind: but only with such things as make good hearers." For such like musical instruments + move the soul to pleasure rather than create a good disposition within it. In the Old Testament instruments of this description + were employed, both because the people were more coarse and carnal---so that + they needed to be aroused by such instruments as also by earthly promises---and because these material instruments were figures + of something else. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q91_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The soul is distracted from that which is sung by a chant that is employed for the purpose of giving pleasure. But if the + singer chant for the sake of devotion, he pays more attention to what he says, both because he lingers more thereon, and because, + as Augustine remarks (Confess. x, 33), "each affection of our spirit, according to its variety, has its own appropriate measure + in the voice, and singing, by some hidden correspondence wherewith it is + stirred." The same applies to the hearers, for even if some of them understand not what is sung, yet they understand why it + is sung, namely, for God's glory: and this is enough to arouse their devotion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q91_A2-p14"></p> + <p id="SS_Q91_A2-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q91_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q92.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q90_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q91_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q92" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q91_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q92_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q92-p0.1">OF SUPERSTITION (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q92-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q92-p2"> In due sequence we must consider the vices that are opposed to religion. First we shall consider those which agree with religion + in giving worship to God; secondly, we shall treat of those vices which are manifestly contrary to religion, through showing + contempt of those things that pertain to the worship of God. The former come under the head of superstition, the latter under + that of irreligion. Accordingly we must consider in the first place, superstition and its parts, and + afterwards irreligion and its parts. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q92-p3"> Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q92-p4"> (1) Whether superstition is a vice opposed to religion?</p> + <p id="SS_Q92-p5"> (2) Whether it has several parts or species?</p> + <div id="SS_Q92_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q92.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q92_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q92_A1-p0.1">Whether superstition is a vice contrary to religion?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q92_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q92_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that superstition is not a vice contrary to religion. One contrary is not included in the definition of the + other. But religion is included in the definition of superstition: for the latter is defined as being "immoderate observance + of religion," according to a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q92_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Col.2.23" target="asv"> Col. 2:23, </a> "Which things have indeed a show of wisdom in superstition." Therefore superstition is not a vice contrary to religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q92_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isidore says (Etym. x): "Cicero [*De Natura Deorum ii, 28] states that the superstitious were so called because + they spent the day in praying and offering sacrifices that their children might survive [superstites] them." But this may + be done even in accordance with true religious worship. Therefore superstition is not a vice opposed to religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q92_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, superstition seems to denote an excess. But religion admits of no excess, since, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q92_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q81_A5.html">Q[81], A[5]</a>, ad 3), there is no possibility of rendering to God, by religion, the equal of what we owe Him. Therefore superstition is + not a vice contrary to religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q92_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Decem Chord. Serm. ix): "Thou strikest the first chord in the worship of one God, and the beast of superstition + hath fallen." Now the worship of one God belongs to religion. Therefore superstition is contrary to religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q92_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[81], A[5]), religion is a moral virtue. Now every moral virtue observes a mean, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q92_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q64_A1.html">FS, Q[64], A[1]</a>). Therefore a twofold vice is opposed to a moral virtue. One by way of excess, the other by way of deficiency. Again, the + mean of virtue may be exceeded, not only with regard to the circumstance called "how much," but also with regard to other + circumstances: so that, in certain virtues such as + magnanimity and magnificence; vice exceeds the mean of virtue, not through tending to something greater than the virtue, but + possibly to something less, and yet it goes beyond the mean of virtue, through doing something to whom it ought not, or when + it ought not, and in like manner as regards other circumstances, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. iv, 1,2,3). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q92_A1-p7"> Accordingly superstition is a vice contrary to religion by excess, not that it offers more to the divine worship than true + religion, but because it offers divine worship either to whom it ought not, or in a manner it ought not. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q92_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as we speak metaphorically of good among evil things---thus we speak of a good thief---so too sometimes the names of + the virtues are employed by transposition in an evil sense. Thus prudence is sometimes used instead of cunning, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q92_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.8" target="asv"> Lk. 16:8, </a> "The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser'] in their generation than the children of light." It is in this + way that superstition is described as religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q92_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The etymology of a word differs from its meaning. For its etymology depends on what it is taken from for the purpose of signification: + whereas its meaning depends on the thing to which it is applied for the purpose of signifying it. Now these things differ + sometimes: for "lapis" [a stone] takes its name from hurting the foot [laedere pedem], but this is not its meaning, else iron, + since it hurts the foot, would be a stone. In like manner it does not + follow that "superstition" means that from which the word is derived. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q92_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Religion does not admit of excess, in respect of absolute quantity, but it does admit of excess in respect of proportionate + quantity, in so far, to wit, as something may be done in divine worship that ought not to be done. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q92_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q92_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q92.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q92_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q92_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q92_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q93.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q92_A2-p0.1">Whether there are various species of superstition?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q92_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q92_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not various species of superstition. According to the Philosopher (Topic. i, 13), "if one contrary + includes many kinds, so does the other." Now religion, to which superstition is contrary, does not include various species; + but all its acts belong to the one species. Therefore neither has superstition various species. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q92_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But religion, to which superstition is opposed, relates to those things whereby + we are directed to God, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q92_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q81_A1.html">Q[81], A[1]</a>). Therefore superstition, which is opposed to religion, is not specified according to divinations of human occurrences, or + by the observances of certain human actions. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q92_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q92_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Col.2.23" target="asv"> Col. 2:23, </a> "Which things have . . . a show of wisdom in superstition," adds: "that is to say in a hypocritical religion." Therefore + hypocrisy should be reckoned a species of superstition. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q92_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine assigns the various species of superstition (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q92_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above, sins against religion consist in going beyond the mean of virtue in respect of certain circumstances + <a id="SS_Q92_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q92_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. For as we have stated ( + <a id="SS_Q92_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A9.html">FS, Q[72], A[9]</a>), not every diversity of corrupt circumstances differentiates the species of a sin, but only that which is referred to diverse + objects, for diverse ends: since it is in this respect that moral acts are diversified specifically, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q92_A2-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html">FS, Q[1], A[3]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q92_A2-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A2.html">FS, Q[18], AA[2]</a>,6). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q92_A2-p7"> Accordingly the species of superstition are differentiated, first on the part of the mode, secondly on the part of the object. + For the divine worship may be given either to whom it ought to be given, namely, to the true God, but "in an undue mode," + and this is the first species of superstition; or to whom it ought not to be given, namely, to any creature whatsoever, and + this is another genus of superstition, divided into many species in respect of the various ends of divine + worship. For the end of divine worship is in the first place to give reverence to God, and in this respect the first species + of this genus is "idolatry," which unduly gives divine honor to a creature. The second end of religion is that man may be + taught by God Whom he worships; and to this must be referred "divinatory" superstition, which consults the demons through + compacts made with them, whether tacit or explicit. Thirdly, the end of divine worship is a certain direction of human acts + according to the precepts of God the object of that worship: and to this must be referred the superstition of certain "observances." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q92_A2-p8"> Augustine alludes to these three (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20), where he says that "anything invented by man for making and + worshipping idols is superstitious," and this refers to the first species. Then he goes on to say, "or any agreement or covenant + made with the demons for the purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens," which refers to the second species; and a + little further on he adds: "To this kind belong all sorts of amulets and such like," and this refers to the + third species. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q92_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "good results from a cause that is one and entire, whereas evil arises from each single + defect." Wherefore several vices are opposed to one virtue, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q92_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q92_A1.html">(A[1];</a> Q[10], A[5]). The saying of the Philosopher is true of opposites wherein there is the same reason of multiplicity. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q92_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Divinations and certain observances come under the head of superstition, in so far as they depend on certain actions of the + demons: and thus they pertain to compacts made with them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q92_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hypocritical religion is taken here for "religion as applied to human observances," as the gloss goes on to explain. Wherefore + this hypocritical religion is nothing else than worship given to God in an undue mode: as, for instance, if a man were, in + the time of grace, to wish to worship God according to the rite of the Old Law. It is of religion taken in this sense that + the gloss speaks literally. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q92_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q92_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q92_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q93.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q91_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q92_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q93" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q92_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q93_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q93-p0.1">OF SUPERSTITION CONSISTING IN UNDUE WORSHIP OF THE TRUE GOD (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q93-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q93-p2"> We must now consider the species of superstition. We shall treat (1) Of the superstition which consists in giving undue worship + to the true God; (2) Of the superstition of idolatry; (3) of divinatory superstition; (4) of the superstition of observances. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q93-p3"> Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q93-p4"> (1) Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the true God?</p> + <p id="SS_Q93-p5"> (2) Whether there can be anything superfluous therein?</p> + <div id="SS_Q93_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q93.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q93_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q93_A1-p0.1">Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the true God? </h4> + <p id="SS_Q93_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q93_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be anything pernicious in the worship of the true God. It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q93_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Joel.2.32" target="asv">Joel 2:32</a>): "Everyone that shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved." Now whoever worships God calls upon His name. Therefore + all worship of God is conducive to salvation, and consequently none is pernicious. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q93_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is the same God that is worshiped by the just in any age of the world. Now before the giving of the Law the just + worshiped God in whatever manner they pleased, without committing mortal sin: wherefore Jacob bound himself by his own vow + to a special kind of worship, as related in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q93_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.28" target="asv">Genesis 28</a>. Therefore now also no worship of God is pernicious. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q93_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing pernicious is tolerated in the Church. Yet the Church tolerates various rites of divine worship: wherefore + Gregory, replying to Augustine, bishop of the English (Regist. xi, ep. 64), who stated that there existed in the churches + various customs in the celebration of Mass, wrote: "I wish you to choose carefully whatever you find likely to be most pleasing + to God, whether in the Roman territory, or in the land of the Gauls, or in any part of the + Church." Therefore no way of worshiping God is pernicious. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q93_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine [*Jerome (Ep. lxxv, ad Aug.) See Opp. August. Ep. lxxxii] in a letter to Jerome (and the words are quoted in a + gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q93_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.2.14" target="asv"> Gal. 2:14</a>) says that "after the Gospel truth had been preached the legal observances became deadly," and yet these observances belonged + to the worship of God. Therefore there can be something deadly in the divine worship. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q93_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine states (Cont. Mendac. xiv), "a most pernicious lie is that which is uttered in matters pertaining to Christian + religion." Now it is a lie if one signify outwardly that which is contrary to the truth. But just as a thing is signified + by word, so it is by deed: and it is in this signification by deed that the outward worship of religion consists, as shown + above ( + <a id="SS_Q93_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q81_A7.html">Q[81], A[7]</a>). Consequently, if anything false is signified by + outward worship, this worship will be pernicious. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q93_A1-p7"> Now this happens in two ways. In the first place, it happens on the part of the thing signified, through the worship signifying + something discordant therefrom: and in this way, at the time of the New Law, the mysteries of Christ being already accomplished, + it is pernicious to make use of the ceremonies of the Old Law whereby the mysteries of Christ were foreshadowed as things + to come: just as it would be pernicious for anyone to declare that Christ has yet to suffer. In the + second place, falsehood in outward worship occurs on the part of the worshiper, and especially in common worship which is + offered by ministers impersonating the whole Church. For even as he would be guilty of falsehood who would, in the name of + another person, proffer things that are not committed to him, so too does a man incur the guilt of falsehood who, on the part + of the Church, gives worship to God contrary to the manner established by the Church or divine authority, and according to + ecclesiastical custom. Hence Ambrose [*Comment. in 1 ad + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q93_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.11.27" target="asv">1 Cor. 11:27, </a> quoted in the gloss of Peter Lombard] says: "He is unworthy who celebrates the mystery otherwise than Christ delivered it." + For this reason, too, a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q93_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Col.2.23" target="asv"> Col. 2:23 </a>says that superstition is "the use of human observances under the name of religion." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q93_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since God is truth, to invoke God is to worship Him in spirit and truth, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q93_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.23" target="asv"> Jn. 4:23.</a> Hence a worship that contains falsehood, is inconsistent with a salutary calling upon God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q93_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Before the time of the Law the just were instructed by an inward instinct as to the way of worshiping God, and others followed + them. But afterwards men were instructed by outward precepts about this matter, and it is wicked to disobey them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q93_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The various customs of the Church in the divine worship are in no way contrary to the truth: wherefore we must observe them, + and to disregard them is unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q93_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q93_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q93.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q93_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q93_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q93_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q94.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q93_A2-p0.1">Whether there can be any excess in the worship of God?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q93_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q93_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be excess in the worship of God. It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q93_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.43.32" target="asv">Ecclus. 43:32</a>): "Glorify the Lord as much as ever you can, for He will yet far exceed." Now the divine worship is directed to the glorification + of God. Therefore there can be no excess in it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q93_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, outward worship is a profession of inward worship, "whereby God is worshiped with faith, hope, and charity," as + Augustine says (Enchiridion iii). Now there can be no excess in faith, hope, and charity. Neither, therefore, can there be + in the worship of God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q93_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to worship God consists in offering to Him what we have received from Him. But we have received all our goods from + God. Therefore if we do all that we possibly can for God's honor, there will be no excess in the divine worship. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q93_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 18) "that the good and true Christian rejects also superstitious fancies, from Holy + Writ." But Holy Writ teaches us to worship God. Therefore there can be superstition by reason of excess even in the worship + of God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q93_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing is said to be in excess in two ways. First, with regard to absolute quantity, and in this way there cannot be excess + in the worship of God, because whatever man does is less than he owes God. Secondly, a thing is in excess with regard to quantity + of proportion, through not being proportionate to its end. Now the end of divine worship is that man may give glory to God, + and submit to Him in mind and body. Consequently, whatever a man may do conducing + to God's glory, and subjecting his mind to God, and his body, too, by a moderate curbing of the concupiscences, is not excessive + in the divine worship, provided it be in accordance with the commandments of God and of the Church, and in keeping with the + customs of those among whom he lives. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q93_A2-p7"> On the other hand if that which is done be, in itself, not conducive to God's glory, nor raise man's mind to God, nor curb + inordinate concupiscence, or again if it be not in accordance with the commandments of God and of the Church, or if it be + contrary to the general custom---which, according to Augustine [*Ad Casulan. Ep. xxxvi], "has the force of law"---all this + must be reckoned excessive and superstitious, because consisting, as it does, of mere externals, it has no + connection with the internal worship of God. Hence Augustine (De Vera Relig. iii) quotes the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q93_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.17.21" target="asv"> Lk. 17:21, </a> "The kingdom of God is within you," against the "superstitious," those, to wit, who pay more attention to externals. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q93_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The glorification of God implies that what is done is done for God's glory: and this excludes the excess denoted by superstition. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q93_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faith, hope and charity subject the mind to God, so that there can be nothing excessive in them. It is different with external + acts, which sometimes have no connection with these virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q93_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers excess by way of absolute quantity. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q93_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q93_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q93_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q94.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q92_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q93_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q94" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q93_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q94_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q94-p0.1">OF IDOLATRY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q94-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q94-p2"> We must now consider idolatry: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q94-p3"> (1) Whether idolatry is a species of superstition?</p> + <p id="SS_Q94-p4"> (2) Whether it is a sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q94-p5"> (3) Whether it is the gravest sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q94-p6"> (4) Of the cause of this sin.</p> + <div id="SS_Q94_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q94.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q94_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q94_A1-p0.1">Whether idolatry is rightly reckoned a species of superstition?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q94_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that idolatry is not rightly reckoned a species of superstition. Just as heretics are unbelievers, so are idolaters. + But heresy is a species of unbelief, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q94_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q11_A1.html">Q[11], A[1]</a>). Therefore idolatry is also a species of unbelief and not of superstition. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, latria pertains to the virtue of religion to which superstition is opposed. But latria, apparently, is univocally + applied to idolatry and to that which belongs to the true religion. For just as we speak univocally of the desire of false + happiness, and of the desire of true happiness, so too, seemingly, we speak univocally of the worship of false gods, which + is called idolatry, and of the worship of the true God, which is the latria of true religion. + Therefore idolatry is not a species of superstition. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is nothing cannot be the species of any genus. But idolatry, apparently, is nothing: for the Apostle + says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q94_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.8.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 8:4</a>): "We know that an idol is nothing in the world," and further on ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q94_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.19" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:19</a>): "What then? Do I say that what is offered in sacrifice to idols is anything? Or that the idol is anything?" implying an + answer in the negative. Now offering things to idols belongs properly to idolatry. Therefore since + idolatry is like to nothing, it cannot be a species of superstition. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it belongs to superstition to give divine honor to whom that honor is not due. Now divine honor is undue to idols, + just as it is undue to other creatures, wherefore certain people are reproached ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q94_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.25" target="asv">Rom. 1:25</a>) for that they "worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator." Therefore this species of superstition is unfittingly + called idolatry, and should rather be named "worship of creatures." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is related ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q94_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.17.16" target="asv">Acts 17:16</a>) that when Paul awaited Silas and Timothy at Athens, "his spirit was stirred within him seeing the whole city given to idolatry," + and further on ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q94_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Acts.17.22" target="asv">Acts 17:22</a>) he says: "Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things you are too superstitious." Therefore idolatry belongs to superstition. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q94_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q92_A2.html">Q[92], A[2]</a>), it belongs to superstition to exceed the due mode of divine worship, and this is done chiefly when divine worship is given + to whom it should not be given. Now it should be given to the most high uncreated God alone, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q94_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q81_A1.html">Q[81], A[1]</a>) when we were treating of religion. Therefore it is superstition to give worship to any creature whatsoever. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A1-p8"> Now just as this divine worship was given to sensible creatures by means of sensible signs, such as sacrifices, games, and + the like, so too was it given to a creature represented by some sensible form or shape, which is called an "idol." Yet divine + worship was given to idols in various ways. For some, by means of a nefarious art, constructed images which produced certain + effects by the power of the demons: wherefore they deemed that the images themselves contained something + God-like, and consequently that divine worship was due to them. This was the opinion of Hermes Trismegistus [*De Natura Deorum, + ad Asclep], as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei viii, 23): while others gave divine worship not to the images, but to the creatures + represented thereby. The Apostle alludes to both of these ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q94_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.23" target="asv">Rom. 1:23</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q94_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.25" target="asv">25</a>). For, as regards the former, he says: "They changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of + a corruptible man, and of + birds, and of four-footed beasts, and of creeping things," and of the latter he says: "Who worshipped and served the creature + rather than the Creator." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A1-p9"> These latter were of three ways of thinking. For some deemed certain men to have been gods, whom they worshipped in the images + of those men: for instance, Jupiter, Mercury, and so forth. Others again deemed the whole world to be one god, not by reason + of its material substance, but by reason of its soul, which they believed to be God, for they held God to be nothing else + than a soul governing the world by movement and reason: even as a man is said to be wise in respect not of + his body but of his soul. Hence they thought that divine worship ought to be given to the whole world and to all its parts, + heaven, air, water, and to all such things: and to these they referred the names of their gods, as Varro asserted, and Augustine + relates (De Civ. Dei vii, 5). Lastly, others, namely, the Platonists, said that there is one supreme god, the cause of all + things. After him they placed certain spiritual substances created by the supreme god. These they called "gods," on account + of their having a share of the godhead; but we call them "angels." After these they placed the souls of the heavenly bodies, + and beneath these the demons which they stated to be certain animal denizens of the air, and beneath these again they placed + human souls, which they believed to be taken up into the fellowship of the gods or of the demons by reason of the merit of + their virtue. To all these they gave divine worship, as Augustine relates (De Civ . . Dei xviii, 14). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A1-p10"> The last two opinions were held to belong to "natural theology" which the philosophers gathered from their study of the world + and taught in the schools: while the other, relating to the worship of men, was said to belong to "mythical theology" which + was wont to be represented on the stage according to the fancies of poets. The remaining opinion relating to images was held + to belong to "civil theology," which was celebrated by the pontiffs in the temples [*De Civ. Dei vi, 5]. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A1-p11"> Now all these come under the head of the superstition of idolatry. Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20): "Anything + invented by man for making and worshipping idols, or for giving Divine worship to a creature or any part of a creature, is + superstitious." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as religion is not faith, but a confession of faith by outward signs, so superstition is a confession of unbelief by + external worship. Such a confession is signified by the term idolatry, but not by the term heresy, which only means a false + opinion. Therefore heresy is a species of unbelief, but idolatry is a species of superstition. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The term latria may be taken in two senses. In one sense it may denote a human act pertaining to the worship of God: and + then its signification remains the same, to whomsoever it be shown, because, in this sense, the thing to which it is shown + is not included in its definition. Taken thus latria is applied univocally, whether to true religion or to idolatry, just + as the payment of a tax is univocally the same, whether it is paid to the true or to a + false king. In another sense latria denotes the same as religion, and then, since it is a virtue, it is essential thereto + that divine worship be given to whom it ought to be given; and in this way latria is applied equivocally to the latria of + true religion, and to idolatry: just as prudence is applied equivocally to the prudence that is a virtue, and to that which + is carnal. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The saying of the Apostle that "an idol is nothing in the world" means that those images which were called idols, were not + animated, or possessed of a divine power, as Hermes maintained, as though they were composed of spirit and body. In the same + sense we must understand the saying that "what is offered in sacrifice to idols is not anything," because by being thus sacrificed + the sacrificial flesh acquired neither sanctification, as the Gentiles + thought, nor uncleanness, as the Jews held. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It was owing to the general custom among the Gentiles of worshipping any kind of creature under the form of images that the + term "idolatry" was used to signify any worship of a creature, even without the use of images. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A1-p16"></p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A1-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q94.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q94_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q94_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q94_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q94_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q94_A2-p0.1">Whether idolatry is a sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q94_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that idolatry is not a sin. Nothing is a sin that the true faith employs in worshipping God. Now the true faith + employs images for the divine worship: since both in the Tabernacle were there images of the cherubim, as related in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q94_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.25" target="asv">Ex. 25</a>, and in the Church are images set up which the faithful worship. Therefore idolatry, whereby idols are worshipped, is not + a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, reverence should be paid to every superior. But the angels and the souls of the blessed are our superiors. Therefore + it will be no sin to pay them reverence by worship, of sacrifices or the like. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the most high God should be honored with an inward worship, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q94_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.24" target="asv"> Jn. 4:24, </a> "God . . . they must adore . . . in spirit and in truth": and Augustine says (Enchiridion iii), that "God is worshipped by + faith, hope and charity." Now a man may happen to worship idols outwardly, and yet not wander from the true faith inwardly. + Therefore it seems that we may worship idols outwardly without prejudice to the divine worship. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q94_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.5" target="asv">Ex. 20:5</a>): "Thou shalt not adore them," i.e. outwardly, "nor serve them," i.e. inwardly, as a gloss explains it: and it is a question + of graven things and images. Therefore it is a sin to worship idols whether outwardly or inwardly. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There has been a twofold error in this matter. For some [*The School of Plato] have thought that to offer sacrifices and + other things pertaining to latria, not only to God but also to the others aforesaid, is due and good in itself, since they + held that divine honor should be paid to every superior nature, as being nearer to God. But this is unreasonable. For though + we ought to revere all superiors, yet the same reverence is not due to them all: and + something special is due to the most high God Who excels all in a singular manner: and this is the worship of latria. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A2-p7"> Nor can it be said, as some have maintained, that "these visible sacrifices are fitting with regard to other gods, and that + to the most high God, as being better than those others, better sacrifices, namely, the service of a pure mind, should be + offered" [*Augustine, as quoted below]. The reason is that, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 19), "external sacrifices are + signs of internal, just as audible words are signs of things. Wherefore, just as by prayer and praise we utter + significant words to Him, and offer to Him in our hearts the things they signify, so too in our sacrifices we ought to realize + that we should offer a visible sacrifice to no other than to Him Whose invisible sacrifice we ourselves should be in our hearts." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A2-p8"> Others held that the outward worship of latria should be given to idols, not as though it were something good or fitting + in itself, but as being in harmony with the general custom. Thus Augustine (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) quotes Seneca as saying: "We + shall adore," says he, "in such a way as to remember that our worship ss in accordance with custom rather than with the reality": + and (De Vera Relig. v) Augustine says that "we must not seek religion from the philosophers, who accepted + the same things for sacred, as did the people; and gave utterance in the schools to various and contrary opinions about the + nature of their gods, and the sovereign good." This error was embraced also by certain heretics [*The Helcesaitae], who affirmed + that it is not wrong for one who is seized in time of persecution to worship idols outwardly so long as he keeps the faith + in his heart. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A2-p9"> But this is evidently false. For since outward worship is a sign of the inward worship, just as it is a wicked lie to affirm + the contrary of what one holds inwardly of the true faith so too is it a wicked falsehood to pay outward worship to anything + counter to the sentiments of one's heart. Wherefore Augustine condemns Seneca (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) in that "his worship of + idols was so much the more infamous forasmuch as the things he did dishonestly were so done by him that the + people believed him to act honestly." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Neither in the Tabernacle or Temple of the Old Law, nor again now in the Church are images set up that the worship of latria + may be paid to them, but for the purpose of signification, in order that belief in the excellence of angels and saints may + be impressed and confirmed in the mind of man. It is different with the image of Christ, to which latria is due on account + of His Divinity, as we shall state in the + <a id="SS_Q94_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q25_A3.html">TP, Q[25], A[3]</a>. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A2-p11"> The Replies to the Second and Third Objections are evident from what has been said above.</p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q94_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q94_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q94_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q94_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q94_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q94_A3-p0.1">Whether idolatry is the gravest of sins?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q94_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that idolatry is not the gravest of sins. The worst is opposed to the best (Ethic. viii, 10). But interior + worship, which consists of faith, hope and charity, is better than external worship. Therefore unbelief, despair and hatred + of God, which are opposed to internal worship, are graver sins than idolatry, which is opposed to external worship. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more a sin is against God the more grievous it is. Now, seemingly, a man acts more directly against God by blaspheming, + or denying the faith, than by giving God's worship to another, which pertains to idolatry. Therefore blasphemy and denial + of the faith are more grievous sins than idolatry. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it seems that lesser evils are punished with greater evils. But the sin of idolatry was punished with the sin against + nature, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q94_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.26" target="asv"> Rom. 1:26.</a> Therefore the sin against nature is a graver sin than idolatry. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xx, 5): "Neither do we say that you," viz. the Manichees, "are pagans, or a sect of + pagans, but that you bear a certain likeness to them since you worship many gods: and yet you are much worse than they are, + for they worship things that exist, but should not be worshiped as gods, whereas you worship things that exist not at all." + Therefore the vice of heretical depravity is more grievous than idolatry. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, a gloss of Jerome on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q94_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.9" target="asv"> Gal. 4:9, </a> "How turn you again to the weak and needy elements?" says: "The observance of the Law, to which they were then addicted, + was a sin almost equal to the worship of idols, to which they had been given before their conversion." Therefore idolatry + is not the most grievous sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A3-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on the saying of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q94_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.15.25" target="asv"> Lev. 15:25, </a> about the uncleanness of a woman suffering from an issue of blood, says: "Every sin is an uncleanness of the soul, but especially + idolatry." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A3-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The gravity of a sin may be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the sin itself, and thus idolatry is the most grievous + sin. For just as the most heinous crime in an earthly commonwealth would seem to be for a man to give royal honor to another + than the true king, since, so far as he is concerned, he disturbs the whole order of the commonwealth, so, in sins that are + committed against God, which indeed are the greater sins, the greatest of all seems + to be for a man to give God's honor to a creature, since, so far as he is concerned, he sets up another God in the world, + and lessens the divine sovereignty. Secondly, the gravity of a sin may be considered on the part of the sinner. Thus the sin + of one that sins knowingly is said to be graver than the sin of one that sins through ignorance: and in this way nothing hinders + heretics, if they knowingly corrupt the faith which they have received, from sinning more grievously than idolaters who sin + through ignorance. Furthermore other sins may be more grievous on account of greater contempt on the part of the sinner. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Idolatry presupposes internal unbelief, and to this it adds undue worship. But in a case of external idolatry without internal + unbelief, there is an additional sin of falsehood, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q94_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q94_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Idolatry includes a grievous blasphemy, inasmuch as it deprives God of the singleness of His dominion and denies the faith + by deeds. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since it is essential to punishment that it be against the will, a sin whereby another sin is punished needs to be more manifest, + in order that it may make the man more hateful to himself and to others; but it need not be a more grievous sin: and in this + way the sin against nature is less grievous than the sin of idolatry. But since it is more manifest, it is assigned as a fitting + punishment of the sin of idolatry, in order that, as by idolatry man + abuses the order of the divine honor, so by the sin against nature he may suffer confusion from the abuse of his own nature. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even as to the genus of the sin, the Manichean heresy is more grievous than the sin of other idolaters, because it is more + derogatory to the divine honor, since they set up two gods in opposition to one another, and hold many vain and fabulous fancies + about God. It is different with other heretics, who confess their belief in one God and worship Him alone. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The observance of the Law during the time of grace is not quite equal to idolatry as to the genus of the sin, but almost + equal, because both are species of pestiferous superstition. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A3-p14"></p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A3-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q94_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q94_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q94_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q94_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q94_A4-p0.1">Whether the cause of idolatry was on the part of man?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q94_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the cause of idolatry was not on the part of man. In man there is nothing but either nature, virtue, or + guilt. But the cause of idolatry could not be on the part of man's nature, since rather does man's natural reason dictate + that there is one God, and that divine worship should not be paid to the dead or to inanimate beings. Likewise, neither could + idolatry have its cause in man on the part of virtue, since "a good tree cannot bring forth + evil fruit," according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q94_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.18" target="asv"> Mat. 7:18</a>: nor again could it be on the part of guilt, because, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q94_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.27" target="asv"> Wis. 14:27, </a> "the worship of abominable idols is the cause and the beginning and end of all evil." Therefore idolatry has no cause on + the part of man. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those things which have a cause in man are found among men at all times. Now idolatry was not always, but is stated + [*Peter Comestor, Hist. Genes. xxxvii, xl] to have been originated either by Nimrod, who is related to have forced men to + worship fire, or by Ninus, who caused the statue of his father Bel to be worshiped. Among the Greeks, as related by Isidore + (Etym. viii, 11), Prometheus was the first to set up statues of men: and the Jews say that + Ismael was the first to make idols of clay. Moreover, idolatry ceased to a great extent in the sixth age. Therefore idolatry + had no cause on the part of man. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6): "It was not possible to learn, for the first time, except from their" (i.e. + the demons') "teaching, what each of them desired or disliked, and by what name to invite or compel him: so as to give birth + to the magic arts and their professors": and the same observation seems to apply to idolatry. Therefore idolatry had no cause + on the part of man. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q94_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.14" target="asv">Wis. 14:14</a>): "By the vanity of men they," i.e. idols, "came into the world." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Idolatry had a twofold cause. One was a dispositive cause; this was on the part of man, and in three ways. First, on account + of his inordinate affections, forasmuch as he gave other men divine honor, through either loving or revering them too much. + This cause is assigned ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q94_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.15" target="asv">Wis. 14:15</a>): "A father being afflicted with bitter grief, made to himself the image of his son, who was quickly taken away: and him + who then had died as a man he began + to worship as a god." The same passage goes on to say ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q94_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.21" target="asv">Wis. 14:21</a>) that "men serving either their affection, or their kings, gave the incommunicable name [Vulg.: 'names']," i.e. of the Godhead, + "to stones and wood." Secondly, because man takes a natural pleasure in representations, as the Philosopher observes (Poet. + iv), wherefore as soon as the uncultured man saw human images skillfully fashioned by the diligence of the craftsman, he gave + them divine worship; hence it is + written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q94_A4-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Wis.13.11" target="asv">Wis. 13:11-17</a>): "If an artist, a carpenter, hath cut down a tree, proper for his use, in the wood . . . and by the skill of his art fashioneth + it, and maketh it like the image of a man . . . and then maketh prayer to it, inquiring concerning his substance, and his + children, or his marriage." Thirdly, on account of their ignorance of the true God, inasmuch as through failing to consider + His excellence men gave divine worship to certain creatures, on account of their + beauty or power, wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q94_A4-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Wis.13.1" target="asv">Wis. 13:1,2</a>): "All men . . . neither by attending to the works have acknowledged who was the workman, but have imagined either the fire, + or the wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun and the moon, to be the gods that + rule the world." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A4-p7"> The other cause of idolatry was completive, and this was on the part of the demons, who offered themselves to be worshipped + by men, by giving answers in the idols, and doing things which to men seemed marvelous. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q94_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.95.5" target="asv">Ps. 95:5</a>): "All the gods of the Gentiles are devils." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The dispositive cause of idolatry was, on the part of man, a defect of nature, either through ignorance in his intellect, + or disorder in his affections, as stated above; and this pertains to guilt. Again, idolatry is stated to be the cause, beginning + and end of all sin, because there is no kind of sin that idolatry does not produce at some time, either through leading expressly + to that sin by causing it, or through being an occasion thereof, either as + a beginning or as an end, in so far as certain sins were employed in the worship of idols; such as homicides, mutilations, + and so forth. Nevertheless certain sins may precede idolatry and dispose man thereto. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There was no idolatry in the first age, owing to the recent remembrance of the creation of the world, so that man still retained + in his mind the knowledge of one God. In the sixth age idolatry was banished by the doctrine and power of Christ, who triumphed + over the devil. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the consummative cause of idolatry. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q94_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q94_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q93_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q94_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q95" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q94_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q95-p0.1">OF SUPERSTITION IN DIVINATIONS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q95-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q95-p2"> We must now consider superstition in divinations, under which head there are eight points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q95-p3"> (1) Whether divination is a sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q95-p4"> (2) Whether it is a species of superstition?</p> + <p id="SS_Q95-p5"> (3) Of the species of divination;</p> + <p id="SS_Q95-p6"> (4) Of divination by means of demons;</p> + <p id="SS_Q95-p7"> (5) Of divination by the stars;</p> + <p id="SS_Q95-p8"> (6) Of divination by dreams;</p> + <p id="SS_Q95-p9"> (7) Of divination by auguries and like observances;</p> + <p id="SS_Q95-p10"> (8) Of divination by lots.</p> + <div id="SS_Q95_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q95_A1-p0.1">Whether divination is a sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q95_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that divination is not a sin. Divination is derived from something "divine": and things that are divine pertain + to holiness rather than to sin. Therefore it seems that divination is not a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 1): "Who dares to say that learning is an evil?" and again: "I could nowise admit + that intelligence can be an evil." But some arts are divinatory, as the Philosopher states (De Memor. i): and divination itself + would seem to pertain to a certain intelligence of the truth. Therefore it seems that divination is not a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there is no natural inclination to evil; because nature inclines only to its like. But men by natural inclination + seek to foreknow future events; and this belongs to divination. Therefore divination is not a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.18.10" target="asv">Dt. 18:10,11</a>): "Neither let there be found among you . . . any one that consulteth pythonic spirits, or fortune tellers": and it is stated + in the Decretals (26, qu. v, can. Qui divinationes): "Those who seek for divinations shall be liable to a penance of five + years' duration, according to the fixed grades of penance." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Divination denotes a foretelling of the future. The future may be foreknown in two ways: first in its causes, secondly in + itself. Now the causes of the future are threefold: for some produce their effects, of necessity and always; and such like + future effects can be foreknown and foretold with certainty, from considering their causes, even as astrologers foretell a + coming eclipse. Other causes produce their effects, not of necessity and always, but for the + most part, yet they rarely fail: and from such like causes their future effects can be foreknown, not indeed with certainty, + but by a kind of conjecture, even as astrologers by considering the stars can foreknow and foretell things concerning rains + and droughts, and physicians, concerning health and death. Again, other causes, considered in themselves, are indifferent; + and this is chiefly the case in the rational powers, which stand in relation to opposites, according to the Philosopher + [*Metaph. viii, 2,5,8]. Such like effects, as also those which ensue from natural causes by chance and in the minority of + instances, cannot be foreknown from a consideration of their causes, because these causes have no determinate inclination + to produce these effects. Consequently such like effects cannot be foreknown unless they be considered in themselves. Now + man cannot consider these effects in themselves except when they are present, as when he sees Socrates running or walking: + the + consideration of such things in themselves before they occur is proper to God, Who alone in His eternity sees the future as + though it were present, as stated in the + <a id="SS_Q95_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html">FP, Q[14], A[13]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q95_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q57_A3.html">FP, Q[57], A[3]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q95_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q86_A4.html">FP, Q[86], A[4]</a>. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A1-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Isa.41.23" target="asv">Is. 41:23</a>): "Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods." Therefore if anyone presume to foreknow + or foretell such like future things by any means + whatever, except by divine revelation, he manifestly usurps what belongs to God. It is for this reason that certain men are + called divines: wherefore Isidore says (Etym. viii, 9): "They are called divines, as though they were full of God. For they + pretend to be filled with the Godhead, and by a deceitful fraud they forecast the future to men." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A1-p7"> Accordingly it is not called divination, if a man foretells things that happen of necessity, or in the majority of instances, + for the like can be foreknown by human reason: nor again if anyone knows other contingent future things, through divine revelation: + for then he does not divine, i.e. cause something divine, but rather receives something divine. Then only is a man said to + divine, when he usurps to himself, in an undue manner, the foretelling of future events: and this is + manifestly a sin. Consequently divination is always a sin; and for this reason Jerome says in his commentary on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Mic.3.9" target="asv"> Mic. 3:9, </a> seqq. that "divination is always taken in an evil sense." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Divination takes its name not from a rightly ordered share of something divine, but from an undue usurpation thereof, as + stated above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There are certain arts for the foreknowledge of future events that occur of necessity or frequently, and these do not pertain + to divination. But there are no true arts or sciences for the knowledge of other future events, but only vain inventions of + the devil's deceit, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 8). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man has a natural inclination to know the future by human means, but not by the undue means of divination. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q95_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q95_A2-p0.1">Whether divination is a species of superstition?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q95_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that divination is not a species of superstition. The same thing cannot be a species of diverse genera. Now + divination is apparently a species of curiosity, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxviii) [*Cf. De Doctr. Christ. ii, + 23,24; De Divin. Daem. 3]. Therefore it is not, seemingly, a species of superstition. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as religion is due worship, so is superstition undue worship. But divination does not seem to pertain to undue + worship. Therefore it does not pertain to superstition. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, superstition is opposed to religion. But in true religion nothing is to be found corresponding as a contrary to + divination. Therefore divination is not a species of superstition. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Origen says in his Peri Archon [*The quotation is from his sixteenth homily on the Book of Numbers]: "There is an operation + of the demons in the administering of foreknowledge, comprised, seemingly, under the head of certain arts exercised by those + who have enslaved themselves to the demons, by means of lots, omens, or the observance of shadows. I doubt not that all these + things are done by the operation of the demons." Now, according to Augustine (De + Doctr. Christ. ii, 20,23), "whatever results from fellowship between demons and men is superstitious." Therefore divination + is a species of superstition. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q95_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q95_A1.html">(A[1];</a> QQ[92],94), superstition denotes undue divine worship. Now a thing pertains to the worship of God in two ways: in one way, + it is something offered to God; as a sacrifice, an oblation, or something of the kind: in another way, it is something divine + that is assumed, as stated above with regard to an oath (Q[89], A[4], ad 2). Wherefore superstition includes not only idolatrous + sacrifices offered to demons, but + also recourse to the help of the demons for the purpose of doing or knowing something. But all divination results from the + demons' operation, either because the demons are expressly invoked that the future may be made known, or because the demons + thrust themselves into futile searchings of the future, in order to entangle men's minds with vain conceits. Of this kind + of vanity it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.39.5" target="asv">Ps. 39:5</a>): "Who hath not regard to vanities and lying follies." Now it is vain to seek knowledge of the + future, when one tries to get it from a source whence it cannot be foreknown. Therefore it is manifest that divination is + a species of superstition. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Divination is a kind of curiosity with regard to the end in view, which is foreknowledge of the future; but it is a kind + of superstition as regards the mode of operation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This kind of divination pertains to the worship of the demons, inasmuch as one enters into a compact, tacit or express with + the demons. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the New Law man's mind is restrained from solicitude about temporal things: wherefore the New Law contains no institution + for the foreknowledge of future events in temporal matters. On the other hand in the Old Law, which contained earthly promises, + there were consultations about the future in connection with religious matters. Hence where it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.8.19" target="asv">Is. 8:19</a>): "And when they shall say to you: Seek of pythons and of + diviners, who mutter in their enchantments," it is added by way of answer: "Should not the people seek of their God, a vision + for the living and the dead? [*Vulg.: 'seek of their God, for the living of the dead?']" + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A2-p10"> In the New Testament, however, there were some possessed of the spirit of prophecy, who foretold many things about future + events. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A2-p11"> In the New Testament, however, there were some possessed of the spirit of prophecy, who foretold many things about future + events. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q95_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q95_A3-p0.1">Whether we ought to distinguish several species of divination?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q95_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we should not distinguish several species of divination. Where the formality of sin is the same, there + are not seemingly several species of sin. Now there is one formality of sin in all divinations, since they consist in entering + into compact with the demons in order to know the future. Therefore there are not several species of divination. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a human act takes it species from its end, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q95_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html">FS, Q[1], A[3]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q95_A3-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html">FS, Q[18], A[6]</a>). But all divination is directed to one end, namely, the foretelling of the future. Therefore all divinations are of one + species. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, signs do not vary the species of a sin, for whether one detracts by word writing or gestures, it is the same species + of sin. Now divinations seem to differ merely according to the various signs whence the foreknowledge of the future is derived. + Therefore there are not several species of divination. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore enumerates various species of divination (Etym. viii, 9). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q95_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q95_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, all divinations seek to acquire foreknowledge of future events, by means of some counsel and help of a demon, who is either + expressly called upon to give his help, or else thrusts himself in secretly, in order to foretell certain future things unknown + to men, but known to him in such manners as have been explained in the + <a id="SS_Q95_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q57_A3.html">FP, Q[57], A[3]</a>. When demons are expressly invoked, they are wont + to foretell the future in many ways. Sometimes they offer themselves to human sight and hearing by mock apparitions in order + to foretell the future: and this species is called "prestigiation" because man's eyes are blindfolded [praestringuntur]. Sometimes + they make use of dreams, and this is called "divination by dreams": sometimes they employ apparitions or utterances of the + dead, and this species is called "necromancy," for as Isidore observes (Etym. viii) in Greek, {nekron} "means dead and + {manteia} divination, because after certain incantations and the sprinkling of blood, the dead seem to come to life, to divine + and to answer questions." Sometimes they foretell the future through living men, as in the case of those who are possessed: + this is divination by "pythons," of whom Isidore says that "pythons are so called from Pythius Apollo, who was said to be + the inventor of divination." Sometimes they foretell the future by means of shapes or signs which appear in inanimate beings. + If these signs appear in some earthly body such as wood, iron or polished stone, it is called "geomancy," if in water "hydromancy," + if in the air "aeromancy," if in fire "pyromancy," if in the entrails of animals sacrificed on the altars of demons, "aruspicy." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A3-p7"> The divination which is practiced without express invocation of the demons is of two kinds. The first is when, with a view + to obtain knowledge of the future, we take observations in the disposition of certain things. If one endeavor to know the + future by observing the position and movements of the stars, this belongs to "astrologers," who are also called "genethliacs," + because they take note of the days on which people are born. If one observe the movements and cries of birds or + of any animals, or the sneezing of men, or the sudden movements of limbs, this belongs in general to "augury," which is so + called from the chattering of birds [avium garritu], just as "auspice" is derived from watching birds [avium inspectione]. + These are chiefly wont to be observed in birds, the former by the ear, the latter by the eye. If, however, these observations + have for their object men's words uttered unintentionally, which someone twist so as to apply to the future that he wishes + to + foreknow, then it is called an "omen": and as Valerius Maximus [*De Dict. Fact. Memor. i, 5] remarks, "the observing of omens + has a touch of religion mingled with it, for it is believed to be founded not on a chance movement, but on divine providence. + It was thus that when the Romans were deliberating whether they would change their position, a centurion happened to exclaim + at the time: 'Standard-bearer, fix the banner, we had best stand here': and on hearing these words they took them as an + omen, and abandoned their intention of advancing further." If, however, the observation regards the dispositions, that occur + to the eye, of figures in certain bodies, there will be another species of divination: for the divination that is taken from + observing the lines of the hand is called "chiromancy," i.e. divination of the hand (because {cheir} is the Greek for hand): + while the divination which is taken from signs appearing in the shoulder-blades of an animal is called "spatulamancy." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A3-p8"> To this second species of divination, which is without express invocation of the demons, belongs that which is practiced + by observing certain things done seriously by men in the research of the occult, whether by drawing lots, which is called + "geomancy"; or by observing the shapes resulting from molten lead poured into water; or by observing which of several sheets + of paper, with or without writing upon them, a person may happen to draw; or by holding out several unequal sticks + and noting who takes the greater or the lesser. or by throwing dice, and observing who throws the highest score; or by observing + what catches the eye when one opens a book, all of which are named "sortilege." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A3-p9"> Accordingly it is clear that there are three kinds of divination. The first is when the demons are invoked openly, this comes + under the head of "necromancy"; the second is merely an observation of the disposition or movement of some other being, and + this belongs to "augury"; while the third consists in doing something in order to discover the occult; and this belongs to + "sortilege." Under each of these many others are contained, as explained above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In all the aforesaid there is the same general, but not the same special, character of sin: for it is much more grievous + to invoke the demons than to do things that deserve the demons' interference. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Knowledge of the future or of the occult is the ultimate end whence divination takes its general formality. But the various + species are distinguished by their proper objects or matters, according as the knowledge of the occult is sought in various + things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The things observed by diviners are considered by them, not as signs expressing what they already know, as happens in detraction, + but as principles of knowledge. Now it is evident that diversity of principles diversifies the species, even in demonstrative + sciences. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A3-p13"></p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A3-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q95_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q95_A4-p0.1">Whether divination practiced by invoking the demons is unlawful?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q95_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that divination practiced by invoking the demons is not unlawful. Christ did nothing unlawful, according to + + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.2.22" target="asv">1 Pet. 2:22, </a> "Who did no sin." Yet our Lord asked the demon: "What is thy name?" and the latter replied: "My name is Legion, for we are + many" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.5.9" target="asv">Mk. 5:9</a>). Therefore it seems lawful to question the demons about the occult. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the souls of the saints do not encourage those who ask unlawfully. Yet Samuel appeared to Saul when the latter inquired + of the woman that had a divining spirit, concerning the issue of the coming war ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.28.8" target="asv">1 Kings 28:8, </a> sqq.). Therefore the divination that consists in questioning demons is not unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it seems lawful to seek the truth from one who knows, if it be useful to know it. But it is sometimes useful to + know what is hidden from us, and can be known through the demons, as in the discovery of thefts. Therefore divination by questioning + demons is not unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.18.10" target="asv">Dt. 18:10,11</a>): "Neither let there be found among you . . . anyone that consulteth soothsayers . . . nor . . . that consulteth pythonic + spirits." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> All divination by invoking demons is unlawful for two reasons. The first is gathered from the principle of divination, which + is a compact made expressly with a demon by the very fact of invoking him. This is altogether unlawful; wherefore it is written + against certain persons ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.28.15" target="asv">Is. 28:15</a>): "You have said: We have entered into a league with death, and we have made a covenant with hell." And still more grievous + would it be if sacrifice were + offered or reverence paid to the demon invoked. The second reason is gathered from the result. For the demon who intends man's + perdition endeavors, by his answers, even though he sometimes tells the truth, to accustom men to believe him, and so to lead + him on to something prejudicial to the salvation of mankind. Hence Athanasius, commenting on the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.4.35" target="asv"> Lk. 4:35, </a> "He rebuked him, saying: Hold thy peace," says: "Although the demon confessed the truth, Christ put a stop to + his speech, lest together with the truth he should publish his wickedness and accustom us to care little for such things, + however much he may seem to speak the truth. For it is wicked, while we have the divine Scriptures, to seek knowledge from + the demons." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Bede's commentary on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.8.30" target="asv"> Lk. 8:30, </a> "Our Lord inquired, not through ignorance, but in order that the disease, which he tolerated, being made public, the power + of the Healer might shine forth more graciously." Now it is one thing to question a demon who comes to us of his own accord + (and it is lawful to do so at times for the good of others, especially when he can be compelled, by the power of God, to tell + the truth) and + another to invoke a demon in order to gain from him knowledge of things hidden from us. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to Augustine (Ad Simplic. ii, 3), "there is nothing absurd in believing that the spirit of the just man, being + about to smite the king with the divine sentence, was permitted to appear to him, not by the sway of magic art or power, but + by some occult dispensation of which neither the witch nor Saul was aware. Or else the spirit of Samuel was not in reality + aroused from his rest, but some phantom or mock apparition formed by the machinations + of the devil, and styled by Scripture under the name of Samuel, just as the images of things are wont to be called by the + names of those things." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No temporal utility can compare with the harm to spiritual health that results from the research of the unknown by invoking + the demon. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q95_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q95_A5-p0.1">Whether divination by the stars is unlawful?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q95_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that divination by the stars is not unlawful. It is lawful to foretell effects by observing their causes: thus + a physician foretells death from the disposition of the disease. Now the heavenly bodies are the cause of what takes place + in the world, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore divination by the stars is not unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, human science originates from experiments, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 1). Now it has been discovered + through many experiments that the observation of the stars is a means whereby some future events may be known beforehand. + Therefore it would seem not unlawful to make use of this kind of divination. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, divination is declared to be unlawful in so far as it is based on a compact made with the demons. But divination + by the stars contains nothing of the kind, but merely an observation of God's creatures. Therefore it would seem that this + species of divination is not unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. iv, 3): "Those astrologers whom they call mathematicians, I consulted without scruple; because they + seemed to use no sacrifice, nor to pray to any spirit for their divinations which art, however, Christian and true piety rejects + and condemns." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q95_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q95_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2), the operation of the demon thrusts itself into those divinations which are based on false and vain opinions, in order + that man's mind may become entangled in vanity and falsehood. Now one makes use of a vain and false opinion if, by observing + the stars, one desires to foreknow the future that cannot be forecast by their means. Wherefore we must consider what things + can be foreknown by observing the stars: + and it is evident that those things which happen of necessity can be foreknown by this mean,: even so astrologers forecast + a future eclipse. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A5-p7"> However, with regard to the foreknowledge of future events acquired by observing the stars there have been various opinions. + For some have stated that the stars signify rather than cause the things foretold by means of their observation. But this + is an unreasonable statement: since every corporeal sign is either the effect of that for which it stands (thus smoke signifies + fire whereby it is caused), or it proceeds from the same cause, so that by signifying the cause, in + consequence it signifies the effect (thus a rainbow is sometimes a sign of fair weather, in so far as its cause is the cause + of fair weather). Now it cannot be said that the dispositions and movements of the heavenly bodies are the effect of future + events; nor again can they be ascribed to some common higher cause of a corporeal nature, although they are referable to a + common higher cause, which is divine providence. on the contrary the appointment of the movements and positions of the heavenly + bodies by divine providence is on a different principle from the appointment of the occurrence of future contingencies, because + the former are appointed on a principle of necessity, so that they always occur in the same way, whereas the latter are appointed + on a principle of contingency, so that the manner of their occurrence is variable. Consequently it is impossible to acquire + foreknowledge of the future from an observation of the stars, except in so far as effects can be foreknown from their + causes. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A5-p8"> Now two kinds of effects escape the causality of heavenly bodies. In the first place all effects that occur accidentally, + whether in human affairs or in the natural order, since, as it is proved in Metaph. vi [*Ed. Did. v, 3], an accidental being + has no cause, least of all a natural cause, such as is the power of a heavenly body, because what occurs accidentally, neither + is a "being" properly speaking, nor is "one"---for instance, that an earthquake occur when a stone falls, or + that a treasure be discovered when a man digs a grave---for these and like occurrences are not one thing, but are simply several + things. Whereas the operation of nature has always some one thing for its term, just as it proceeds from some one principle, + which is the form of a natural thing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A5-p9"> In the second place, acts of the free-will, which is the faculty of will and reason, escape the causality of heavenly bodies. + For the intellect or reason is not a body, nor the act of a bodily organ, and consequently neither is the will, since it is + in the reason, as the Philosopher shows (De Anima iii, 4,9). Now no body can make an impression on an incorporeal body. Wherefore + it is impossible for heavenly bodies to make a direct impression on the intellect and will: for this + would be to deny the difference between intellect and sense, with which position Aristotle reproaches (De Anima iii, 3) those + who held that "such is the will of man, as is the day which the father of men and of gods," i.e. the sun or the heavens, "brings + on" [*Odyssey xviii, 135]. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A5-p10"> Hence the heavenly bodies cannot be the direct cause of the free-will's operations. Nevertheless they can be a dispositive + cause of an inclination to those operations, in so far as they make an impression on the human body, and consequently on the + sensitive powers which are acts of bodily organs having an inclination for human acts. Since, however, the sensitive powers + obey reason, as the Philosopher shows (De Anima iii, 11; Ethic. i, 13), this does not impose any necessity on + the free-will, and man is able, by his reason, to act counter to the inclination of the heavenly bodies. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A5-p11"> Accordingly if anyone take observation of the stars in order to foreknow casual or fortuitous future events, or to know with + certitude future human actions, his conduct is based on a false and vain opinion; and so the operation of the demon introduces + itself therein, wherefore it will be a superstitious and unlawful divination. On the other hand if one were to apply the observation + of the stars in order to foreknow those future things that are caused by heavenly bodies, for + instance, drought or rain and so forth, it will be neither an unlawful nor a superstitious divination. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A5-p12"> Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident.</p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That astrologers not unfrequently forecast the truth by observing the stars may be explained in two ways. First, because + a great number of men follow their bodily passions, so that their actions are for the most part disposed in accordance with + the inclination of the heavenly bodies: while there are few, namely, the wise alone, who moderate these inclinations by their + reason. The result is that astrologers in many cases foretell the truth, especially + in public occurrences which depend on the multitude. Secondly, because of the interference of the demons. Hence Augustine + says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 17): "When astrologers tell the truth, it must be allowed that this is due to an instinct that, unknown + to man, lies hidden in his mind. And since this happens through the action of unclean and lying spirits who desire to deceive + man for they are permitted to know certain things about temporal affairs." Wherefore he concludes: "Thus a good Christian + should beware of astrologers, and of all impious diviners, especially of those who tell the truth, lest his soul become the + dupe of the demons and by making a compact of partnership with them enmesh itself in their fellowship." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A5-p14"> This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.</p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A5-p15"></p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A5-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q95_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q95_A6-p0.1">Whether divination by dreams is unlawful?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q95_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that divination by dreams is not unlawful. It is not unlawful to make use of divine instruction. Now men are + instructed by God in dreams, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.33.15" target="asv">Job 33:15,16</a>): "By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, and they are sleeping in their beds, then He," God + to wit, "openeth the ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn." Therefore it is not unlawful to + make use of + divination by dreams. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those who interpret dreams, properly speaking, make use of divination by dreams. Now we read of holy men interpreting + dreams: thus Joseph interpreted the dreams of Pharaoh's butler and of his chief baker ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.40" target="asv">Gn. 40</a>), and Daniel interpreted the dream of the king of Babylon ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A6-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.2" target="asv">Dan. 2</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A6-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Dan.4" target="asv">4</a>). Therefore divination by dreams is not unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is unreasonable to deny the common experiences of men. Now it is the experience of all that dreams are significative + of the future. Therefore it is useless to deny the efficacy of dreams for the purpose of divination, and it is lawful to listen + to them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.18.10" target="asv">Dt. 18:10</a>): "Neither let there be found among you any one that . . . observeth dreams." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q95_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q95_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,6), divination is superstitious and unlawful when it is based on a false opinion. Wherefore we must consider what is true + in the matter of foreknowing the future from dreams. Now dreams are sometimes the cause of future occurrences; for instance, + when a person's mind becomes anxious through what it has seen in a dream and is thereby led to do something or avoid something: + while sometimes dreams are signs of + future happenings, in so far as they are referable to some common cause of both dreams and future occurrences, and in this + way the future is frequently known from dreams. We must, then, consider what is the cause of dreams, and whether it can be + the cause of future occurrences, or be cognizant of them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A6-p7"> Accordingly it is to be observed that the cause of dreams is sometimes in us and sometimes outside us. The inward cause of + dreams is twofold: one regards the soul, in so far as those things which have occupied a man's thoughts and affections while + awake recur to his imagination while asleep. A such like cause of dreams is not a cause of future occurrences, so that dreams + of this kind are related accidentally to future occurrences, and if at any time they concur it will be by + chance. But sometimes the inward cause of dreams regards the body: because the inward disposition of the body leads to the + formation of a movement in the imagination consistent with that disposition; thus a man in whom there is abundance of cold + humors dreams that he is in the water or snow: and for this reason physicians say that we should take note of dreams in order + to discover internal dispositions. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A6-p8"> In like manner the outward cause of dreams is twofold, corporal and spiritual. It is corporal in so far as the sleeper's + imagination is affected either by the surrounding air, or through an impression of a heavenly body, so that certain images + appear to the sleeper, in keeping with the disposition of the heavenly bodies. The spiritual cause is sometimes referable + to God, Who reveals certain things to men in their dreams by the ministry of the angels, according + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Num.12.6" target="asv"> Num. + 12:6, + </a>"If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream." Sometimes, + however, it is due to the action of the demons that certain images appear to persons in their sleep, and by this means they, + at times, reveal certain future things to those who have entered into an unlawful compact with them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A6-p9"> Accordingly we must say that there is no unlawful divination in making use of dreams for the foreknowledge of the future, + so long as those dreams are due to divine revelation, or to some natural cause inward or outward, and so far as the efficacy + of that cause extends. But it will be an unlawful and superstitious divination if it be caused by a revelation of the demons, + with whom a compact has been made, whether explicit, through their being invoked for the purpose, or implicit, + through the divination extending beyond its possible limits. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A6-p10"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A6-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A6-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q95_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q95_A7-p0.1">Whether divination by auguries, omens, and by like observations of external things is unlawful?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q95_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that divination by auguries, omens, and by like observations of external things is not unlawful. If it were + unlawful holy men would not make use thereof. Now we read of Joseph that he paid attention to auguries, for it is related + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.44.5" target="asv">Gn. 44:5</a>) that Joseph's steward said: "The cup which you have stolen is that in which my lord drinketh and in which he is wont to + divine [augurari]": and he himself afterwards said to his brethren + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A7-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.44.15" target="asv">Gn. 44:15</a>): "Know you not that there is no one like me in the science of divining?" Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of this + kind of divination. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, birds naturally know certain things regarding future occurrences of the seasons, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.8.7" target="asv"> Jer. 8:7, </a> "The kite in the air hath known her time; the turtle, the swallow, and the stork have observed the time of their coming." + Now natural knowledge is infallible and comes from God. Therefore it seems not unlawful to make use of the birds' knowledge + in order to know the future, and this is divination by augury. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gedeon is numbered among the saints ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.32" target="asv">Heb. 11:32</a>). Yet Gedeon made use of an omen, when he listened to the relation and interpreting of a dream ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A7-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Judg.7.15" target="asv">Judges 7:15</a>): and Eliezer, Abraham's servant, acted in like manner ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A7-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.24" target="asv">Gn. 24</a>). Therefore it seems that this kind of divination is not unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.18.10" target="asv">Dt. 18:10</a>): "Neither let there be found among you anyone . . . that observeth omens." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The movements or cries of birds, and whatever dispositions one may consider in such things, are manifestly not the cause + of future events: wherefore the future cannot be known therefrom as from its cause. It follows therefore that if anything + future can be known from them, it will be because the causes from which they proceed are also the causes of future occurrences + or are cognizant of them. Now the cause of dumb animals' actions is a certain instinct + whereby they are inclined by a natural movement, for they are not masters of their actions. This instinct may proceed from + a twofold cause. In the first place it may be due to a bodily cause. For since dumb animals have naught but a sensitive soul, + every power of which is the act of a bodily organ, their soul is subject to the disposition of surrounding bodies, and primarily + to that of the heavenly bodies. Hence nothing prevents some of their actions from being signs of the future, in so far as + they are conformed to the dispositions of the heavenly bodies and of the surrounding air, to which certain future events are + due. Yet in this matter we must observe two things: first, that such observations must not be applied to the foreknowledge + of future things other than those which can be foreknown from the movements of heavenly bodies, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q95_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q95_A5.html">AA[5]</a>,6): secondly, that they be not applied to other matters than those which in some way may have reference to + these animals (since they acquire through the heavenly bodies a certain natural knowledge and instinct about things necessary + for their life---such as changes resulting from rain and wind and so forth). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A7-p7"> In the second place, this instinct is produced by a spiritual cause, namely, either by God, as may be seen in the dove that + descended upon Christ, the raven that fed Elias, and the whale that swallowed and vomited Jonas, or by demons, who make use + of these actions of dumb animals in order to entangle our minds with vain opinions. This seems to be true of all such like + things; except omens, because human words which are taken for an omen are not subject to the disposition of the + stars, yet are they ordered according to divine providence and sometimes according to the action of the demons. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A7-p8"> Accordingly we must say that all such like divinations are superstitious and unlawful, if they be extended beyond the limits + set according to the order of nature or of divine providence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Augustine [*QQ. in Genes., qu. cxlv], when Joseph said that there was no one like him in the science of divining, + he spoke in joke and not seriously, referring perhaps to the common opinion about him: in this sense also spoke his steward. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The passage quoted refers to the knowledge that birds have about things concerning them; and in order to know these things + it is not unlawful to observe their cries and movements: thus from the frequent cawing of crows one might say that it will + rain soon. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A7-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Gedeon listened to the recital and interpretation of a dream, seeing therein an omen, ordered by divine providence for his + instruction. In like manner Eliezer listened to the damsel's words, having previously prayed to God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A7-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A7-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q95_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q96.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q95_A8-p0.1">Whether divination by drawing lots is unlawful? </h4> + <p id="SS_Q95_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that divination by drawing lots is not unlawful, because a gloss of Augustine on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.30.16" target="asv"> Ps. 30:16, </a> "My lots are in Thy hands," says: "It is not wrong to cast lots, for it is a means of ascertaining the divine will when a + man is in doubt." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> There is, seemingly, nothing unlawful in the observances which the Scriptures relate as being practiced by holy men. Now + both in the Old and in the New Testament we find holy men practicing the casting of lots. For it is related ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Josh.7.14" target="asv">Jos. 7:14, </a> sqq.) that Josue, at the Lord's command, pronounced sentence by lot on Achan who had stolen of the anathema. Again Saul, + by drawing lots, found that his son Jonathan had eaten honey ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A8-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iKgs.14.58" target="asv">1 Kings + 14:58, + </a>sqq.): Jonas, when fleeing from the face of the Lord, was discovered and thrown into the sea ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A8-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Jonah.1.7" target="asv">Jonah 1:7, </a> sqq.): Zacharias was chosen by lot to offer incense ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A8-p3.4" href="./asv.html#Luke.1.9" target="asv">Lk. 1:9</a>): and the apostles by drawing lots elected Matthias to the apostleship ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A8-p3.5" href="./asv.html#Acts.1.26" target="asv">Acts 1:26</a>). Therefore it would seem that divination by lots is not unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fighting with the fists, or "monomachy," i.e. single combat as it is called, and trial by fire and water, which + are called "popular" trials, seem to come under the head of sortilege, because something unknown is sought by their means. + Yet these practices seem to be lawful, because David is related to have engaged in single combat with the Philistine ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.17.32" target="asv">1 Kings 17:32, </a> sqq.). Therefore it would seem that divination by lot is not + unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written in the Decretals (XXVI, qu. v, can. Sortes): "We decree that the casting of lots, by which means you make up + your mind in all your undertakings, and which the Fathers have condemned, is nothing but divination and witchcraft. For which + reason we wish them to be condemned altogether, and henceforth not to be mentioned among Christians, and we forbid the practice + thereof under pain of anathema." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q95_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q95_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, sortilege consists, properly speaking, in doing something, that by observing the result one may come to the knowledge of + something unknown. If by casting lots one seeks to know what is to be given to whom, whether it be a possession, an honor, + a dignity, a punishment, or some action or other, it is called "sortilege of allotment"; if one seeks to know what ought to + be done, it is called "sortilege of + consultation"; if one seeks to know what is going to happen, it is called "sortilege of divination." Now the actions of man + that are required for sortilege and their results are not subject to the dispositions of the stars. Wherefore if anyone practicing + sortilege is so minded as though the human acts requisite for sortilege depended for their result on the dispositions of the + stars, his opinion is vain and false, and consequently is not free from the interference of the demons, so that a + divination of this kind is superstitious and unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A8-p7"> Apart from this cause, however, the result of sortilegious acts must needs be ascribed to chance, or to some directing spiritual + cause. If we ascribe it to chance, and this can only take place in "sortilege of allotment," it does not seem to imply any + vice other than vanity, as in the case of persons who, being unable to agree upon the division of something or other, are + willing to draw lots for its division, thus leaving to chance what portion each is to receive. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A8-p8"> If, on the other hand, the decision by lot be left to a spiritual cause, it is sometimes ascribed to demons. Thus we read + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A8-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.21.21" target="asv">Ezech. 21:21</a>) that "the king of Babylon stood in the highway, at the head of two ways, seeking divination, shuffling arrows; he inquired + of the idols, and consulted entrails": sortilege of this kind is unlawful, and forbidden by the canons. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A8-p9"> Sometimes, however, the decision is left to God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A8-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.33" target="asv">Prov. 16:33</a>, "Lots are cast into the lap, but they are disposed of by the Lord": sortilege of this kind is not wrong in itself, as Augustine + declares [*Enarr. ii in Ps. xxx, serm. 2; cf. OBJ[1]]. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A8-p10"> Yet this may happen to be sinful in four ways. First, if one have recourse to lots without any necessity: for this would + seem to amount to tempting God. Hence Ambrose, commenting on the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q95_A8-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.1.8" target="asv"> Lk. 1:8, </a> says: "He that is chosen by lot is not bound by the judgment of men." Secondly, if even in a case of necessity one were to + have recourse to lots without reverence. Hence, on the Acts of the Apostles, Bede says (Super Act. Apost. i): "But if anyone, + compelled + by necessity, thinks that he ought, after the apostles' example, to consult God by casting lots, let him take note that the + apostles themselves did not do so, except after calling together the assembly of the brethren and pouring forth prayer to + God." Thirdly, if the Divine oracles be misapplied to earthly business. Hence Augustine says (ad inquisit. Januar. ii; Ep. + lv): "Those who tell fortunes from the Gospel pages, though it is to be hoped that they do so rather than have recourse to + consulting the demons, yet does this custom also displease me, that anyone should wish to apply the Divine oracles to worldly + matters and to the vain things of this life." Fourthly, if anyone resort to the drawing of lots in ecclesiastical elections, + which should be carried out by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore, as Bede says (Super Act. Apost. i): "Before Pentecost + the ordination of Matthias was decided by lot," because as yet the fulness of the Holy Ghost was not yet poured forth + into the Church: "whereas the same deacons were ordained not by lot but by the choice of the disciples." It is different with + earthly honors, which are directed to the disposal of earthly things: in elections of this kind men frequently have recourse + to lots, even as in the distribution of earthly possessions. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A8-p11"> If, however, there be urgent necessity it is lawful to seek the divine judgment by casting lots, provided due reverence be + observed. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Honor. ccxxviii), "If, at a time of persecution, the ministers of God do not agree + as to which of them is to remain at his post lest all should flee, and which of them is to flee, lest all die and the Church + be forsaken, should there be no other means of coming to an agreement, so far as I can see, they must be chosen + by lot." Again he says (De Doctr. Christ. xxviii): "If thou aboundest in that which it behooves thee to give to him who hath + not, and which cannot be given to two; should two come to you, neither of whom surpasses the other either in need or in some + claim on thee, thou couldst not act more justly than in choosing by lot to whom thou shalt give that which thou canst not + give to both." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A8-p12"> This suffices for the Reply to the First and Second Objections.</p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A8-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The trial by hot iron or boiling water is directed to the investigation of someone's hidden sin, by means of something done + by a man, and in this it agrees with the drawing of lots. But in so far as a miraculous result is expected from God, it surpasses + the common generality of sortilege. Hence this kind of trial is rendered unlawful, both because it is directed to the judgment + of the occult, which is reserved to the divine judgment, and because such + like trials are not sanctioned by divine authority. Hence we read in a decree of Pope Stephen V [*II, qu. v., can. Consuluist + i]: "The sacred canons do not approve of extorting a confession from anyone by means of the trial by hot iron or boiling water, + and no one must presume, by a superstitious innovation, to practice what is not sanctioned by the teaching of the holy fathers. + For it is allowable that public crimes should be judged by our authority, after the culprit has made spontaneous + confession, or when witnesses have been approved, with due regard to the fear of God; but hidden and unknown crimes must be + left to Him Who alone knows the hearts of the children of men." The same would seem to apply to the law concerning duels, + save that it approaches nearer to the common kind of sortilege, since no miraculous effect is expected thereupon, unless the + combatants be very unequal in strength or skill. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A8-p14"></p> + <p id="SS_Q95_A8-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q96.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q94_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q96" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q96_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q96-p0.1">OF SUPERSTITION IN OBSERVANCES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q96-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q96-p2"> We must now consider superstition in observances, under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q96-p3"> (1) Of observances for acquiring knowledge, which are prescribed by the magic art;</p> + <p id="SS_Q96-p4"> (2) Of observances for causing alterations in certain bodies;</p> + <p id="SS_Q96-p5"> (3) Of observances practiced in fortune-telling;</p> + <p id="SS_Q96-p6"> (4) Of wearing sacred words at the neck.</p> + <div id="SS_Q96_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q96.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q96_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q96_A1-p0.1">Whether it be unlawful to practice the observances of the magic art?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q96_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not unlawful to practice the observances of the magic art. A thing is said to be unlawful in two + ways. First, by reason of the genus of the deed, as murder and theft: secondly, through being directed to an evil end, as + when a person gives an alms for the sake of vainglory. Now the observances of the magic art are not evil as to the genus of + the deed, for they consist in certain fasts and prayers to God; moreover, they are directed to a + good end, namely, the acquisition of science. Therefore it is not unlawful to practice these observances. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q96_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.1.17" target="asv">Dan. 1:17</a>) that "to the children" who abstained, "God gave knowledge, and understanding in every book, and wisdom." Now the observances + of the magic art consist in certain fasts and abstinences. Therefore it seems that this art achieves its results through God: + and consequently it is not unlawful to practice it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, seemingly, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q96_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q96_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the reason why it is wrong to inquire of the demons concerning the future is because they have no knowledge of it, this + knowledge being proper to God. Yet the demons know scientific truths: because sciences are about things necessary and invariable, + and such things are subject to human knowledge, and much more to the knowledge of demons, who are of keener intellect, as + Augustine says [*Gen. + ad lit. ii, 17; De Divin. Daemon. 3,4]. Therefore it seems to be no sin to practice the magic art, even though it achieve + its result through the demons. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q96_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.18.10" target="asv">Dt. 18:10,11</a>): "Neither let there be found among you . . . anyone . . . that seeketh the truth from the dead": which search relies on + the demons' help. Now through the observances of the magic art, knowledge of the truth is sought "by means of certain signs + agreed upon by compact with the demons" [*Augustine, De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20; see above + <a id="SS_Q96_A1-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q92_A2.html"> Q[92], A[2]</a>]. Therefore it is unlawful to practice + the notary art. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The magic art is both unlawful and futile. It is unlawful, because the means it employs for acquiring knowledge have not + in themselves the power to cause science, consisting as they do in gazing certain shapes, and muttering certain strange words, + and so forth. Wherefore this art does not make use of these things as causes, but as signs; not however as signs instituted + by God, as are the sacramental signs. It follows, therefore, that they are empty signs, + and consequently a kind of "agreement or covenant made with the demons for the purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens" + [*Augustine, De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20; see above Q[92], A[2]]. Wherefore the magic art is to be absolutely repudiated and + avoided by Christian, even as other arts of vain and noxious superstition, as Augustine declares (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23). + This art is also useless for the acquisition of science. For since it is not intended by means of this art to acquire + science in a manner connatural to man, namely, by discovery and instruction, the consequence is that this effect is expected + either from God or from the demons. Now it is certain that some have received wisdom and science infused into them by God, + as related of Solomon ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q96_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 3</a> and + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q96_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iiChr.1" target="asv">2 Paralip 1</a>). Moreover, our Lord said to His disciples ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q96_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Luke.21.15" target="asv">Lk. 21:15</a>): "I will give you a mouth and wisdom, which all your adversaries shall not be able to resist and gainsay." However, this + gift + is not granted to all, or in connection with any particular observance, but according to the will of the Holy Ghost, as stated + in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q96_A1-p6.4" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:8, </a> "To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit," + and afterwards it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q96_A1-p6.5" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:11</a>): "All these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to everyone according as He will." On the other hand it does + not belong to the demons to + enlighten the intellect, as stated in the + <a id="SS_Q96_A1-p6.6" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q109_A3.html">FP, Q[109], A[3]</a>. Now the acquisition of knowledge and wisdom is effected by the enlightening of the intellect, wherefore never did anyone + acquire knowledge by means of the demons. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 9): "Porphyry confesses that the intellectual + soul is in no way cleansed by theurgic inventions," i.e. the operations "of the demons, so as to be fitted to see its God, + and discern what is true," such as are all + scientific conclusions. The demons may, however, be able by speaking to men to express in words certain teachings of the sciences, + but this is not what is sought by means of magic. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is a good thing to acquire knowledge, but it is not good to acquire it by undue means, and it is to this end that the + magic art tends. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The abstinence of these children was not in accordance with a vain observance of the notary art, but according to the authority + of the divine law, for they refused to be defiled by the meat of Gentiles. Hence as a reward for their obedience they received + knowledge from God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q96_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.100" target="asv"> Ps. 118:100, </a> "I have had understanding above the ancients, because I have sought Thy commandments." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To seek knowledge of the future from the demons is a sin not only because they are ignorant of the future, but also on account + of the fellowship entered into with them, which also applies to the case in point. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q96.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q96_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q96_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q96_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q96_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q96_A2-p0.1">Whether observances directed to the alteration of bodies, as for the purpose of acquiring health or the like, are unlawful?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q96_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that observances directed to the alteration of bodies, as for the purpose of acquiring health, or the like, + are lawful. It is lawful to make use of the natural forces of bodies in order to produce their proper effects. Now in the + physical order things have certain occult forces, the reason of which man is unable to assign; for instance that the magnet + attracts iron, and many like instances, all of which Augustine enumerates (De Civ. Dei xxi, + 5,7). Therefore it would seem lawful to employ such like forces for the alteration of bodies. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, artificial bodies are subject to the heavenly bodies, just as natural bodies are. Now natural bodies acquire certain + occult forces resulting from their species through the influence of the heavenly bodies. Therefore artificial bodies, e.g. + images, also acquire from the heavenly bodies a certain occult force for the production of certain effects. Therefore it is + not unlawful to make use of them and of such like things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the demons too are able to alter bodies in many ways, as Augustine states (De Trin. iii, 8,9). But their power is + from God. Therefore it is lawful to make use of their power for the purpose of producing these alterations. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20) that "to superstition belong the experiments of magic arts, amulets and nostrums + condemned by the medical faculty, consisting either of incantations or of certain cyphers which they call characters, or of + any kind of thing worn or fastened on." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In things done for the purpose of producing some bodily effect we must consider whether they seem able to produce that effect + naturally: for if so it will not be unlawful to do so, since it is lawful to employ natural causes in order to produce their + proper effects. But, if they seem unable to produce those effects naturally, it follows that they are employed for the purpose + of producing those effects, not as causes but only as signs, so that they come under + the head of "compact by tokens entered into with the demons" [*Augustine, De Doctr. Christ.; see above + <a id="SS_Q96_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q92_A2.html"> Q[92], A[2]</a>]. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6): "The demons are allured by means of creatures, which were made, not by them, + but by God. They are enticed by various objects differing according to the various things in which they delight, not as animals + by meat, but as spirits by signs, such as are to each one's liking, by means of various kinds of stones, + herbs, trees, animals, songs and rites." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is nothing superstitious or unlawful in employing natural things simply for the purpose of causing certain effects + such as they are thought to have the natural power of producing. But if in addition there be employed certain characters, + words, or any other vain observances which clearly have no efficacy by nature, it will be superstitious and unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The natural forces of natural bodies result from their substantial forms which they acquire through the influence of heavenly + bodies; wherefore through this same influence they acquire certain active forces. On the other hand the forms of artificial + bodies result from the conception of the craftsman; and since they are nothing else but composition, order and shape, as stated + in Phys. i, 5, they cannot have a natural active force. Consequently, no + force accrues to them from the influence of heavenly bodies, in so far as they are artificial, but only in respect of their + natural matter. Hence it is false, what Porphyry held, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11), that "by herbs, stones, + animals, certain particular sounds, words, shapes and devices, or again by certain movements of the stars observed in the + course of the heavens it is possible for men to fashion on earth forces capable of carrying into effect the various dispositions + of the stars," as though the results of the magic arts were to be ascribed to the power of the heavenly bodies. In fact as + Augustine adds (De Civ. Dei x, 11), "all these things are to be ascribed to the demons, who delude the souls that are subject + to them." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A2-p9"> Wherefore those images called astronomical also derive their efficacy from the actions of the demons: a sign of this is that + it is requisite to inscribe certain characters on them which do not conduce to any effect naturally, since shape is not a + principle of natural action. Yet astronomical images differ from necromantic images in this, that the latter include certain + explicit invocations and trickery, wherefore they come under the head of explicit agreements made with the + demons: whereas in the other images there are tacit agreements by means of tokens in certain shapes or characters. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It belongs to the domain of the divine majesty, to Whom the demons are subject, that God should employ them to whatever purpose + He will. But man has not been entrusted with power over the demons, to employ them to whatsoever purpose he will; on the contrary, + it is appointed that he should wage war against the demons. Hence in no way is it lawful for man to make use of the demons' + help by compacts either tacit or express. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q96_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q96_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q96_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q96_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q96_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q96_A3-p0.1">Whether observances directed to the purpose of fortune-telling are unlawful?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q96_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that observances directed to the purpose of fortune-telling are not unlawful. Sickness is one of the misfortunes + that occur to man. Now sickness in man is preceded by certain symptoms, which the physician observes. Therefore it seems not + unlawful to observe such like signs. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is unreasonable to deny that which nearly everybody experiences. Now nearly everyone experiences that certain + times, or places, hearing of certain words meetings of men or animals, uncanny or ungainly actions, are presages of good or + evil to come. Therefore it seems not unlawful to observe these things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, human actions and occurrences are disposed by divine providence in a certain order: and this order seems to require + that precedent events should be signs of subsequent occurrences: wherefore, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q96_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.6" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:6</a>), the things that happened to the fathers of old are signs of those that take place in our time. Now it is not unlawful to + observe the order that proceeds from divine providence. Therefore it is seemingly + not unlawful to observe these presages. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20) that "a thousand vain observances are comprised under the head of compacts entered + into with the demons: for instance, the twitching of a limb; a stone, a dog, or a boy coming between friends walking together; + kicking the door-post when anyone passes in front of one's house; to go back to bed if you happen to sneeze while putting + on your shoes; to return home if you trip when going forth; when the rats have gnawed + a hole in your clothes, to fear superstitiously a future evil rather than to regret the actual damage." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Men attend to all these observances, not as causes but as signs of future events, good or evil. Nor do they observe them + as signs given by God, since these signs are brought forward, not on divine authority, but rather by human vanity with the + cooperation of the malice of the demons, who strive to entangle men's minds with such like trifles. Accordingly it is evident + that all these observances are superstitious and unlawful: they are apparently remains of + idolatry, which authorized the observance of auguries, of lucky and unlucky days which is allied to divination by the stars, + in respect of which one day differentiated from another: except that these observances are devoid of reason and art, wherefore + they are yet more vain and superstitious. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The causes of sickness are seated in us, and they produce certain signs of sickness to come, which physicians lawfully observe. + Wherefore it is not unlawful to consider a presage of future events as proceeding from its cause; as when a slave fears a + flogging when he sees his master's anger. Possibly the same might be said if one were to fear for child lest it take harm + from the evil eye, of which we have spoken in the + <a id="SS_Q96_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q117_A3.html">FP, Q[117], + A[3] + </a>, ad 2. But this does not apply to this kind of observances. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That men have at first experienced a certain degree of truth in these observances is due to chance. But afterwards when a + man begins to entangle his mind with observances of this kind, many things occur in connection with them through the trickery + of the demons, "so that men, through being entangled in these observances, become yet more curious, and more and more embroiled + in the manifold snares of a pernicious error," as Augustine says (De Doctr. + Christ. ii, 23). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Among the Jewish people of whom Christ was to be born, not only words but also deeds were prophetic, as Augustine states + (Contra Faust. iv, 2; xxii, 24). Wherefore it is lawful to apply those deeds to our instruction, as signs given by God. Not + all things, however, that occur through divine providence are ordered so as to be signs of the future. Hence the argument + does not prove. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q96_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q96_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q96_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q96_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q97.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q96_A4-p0.1">Whether it is unlawful to wear divine words at the neck?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q96_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not unlawful to wear divine words at the neck. Divine words are no less efficacious when written + than when uttered. But it is lawful to utter sacred words for the purpose of producing certain effects; (for instance, in + order to heal the sick), such as the "Our Father" or the "Hail Mary," or in any way whatever to call on the Lord's name, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q96_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.16.17" target="asv"> Mk. 16:17,18, </a> "In My name they shall cast out devils, they shall + speak with new tongues, they shall take up serpents." Therefore it seems to be lawful to wear sacred words at one's neck, + as a remedy for sickness or for any kind of distress. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sacred words are no less efficacious on the human body than on the bodies of serpents and other animals. Now certain + incantations are efficacious in checking serpents, or in healing certain other animals: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q96_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.57.5" target="asv">Ps. 57:5</a>): "Their madness is according to the likeness of a serpent, like the deaf asp that stoppeth her ears, which will not hear + the voice of the charmers, nor of the wizard that charmeth wisely." + Therefore it is lawful to wear sacred words as a remedy for men. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God's word is no less holy than the relics of the saints; wherefore Augustine says (Lib. L. Hom. xxvi) that "God's + word is of no less account than the Body of Christ." Now it is lawful for one to wear the relics of the saints at one's neck, + or to carry them about one in any way for the purpose of self-protection. Therefore it is equally lawful to have recourse + to the words of Holy Writ, whether uttered or written, for one's protection. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> On the other hand, Chrysostom says (Hom. xliii in Matth.) [*Cf. the Opus Imperfectum in Matthaeum, among St. Chrysostom's + works, and falsely ascribed to him]: "Some wear round their necks a passage in writing from the Gospel. Yet is not the Gospel + read in church and heard by all every day? How then, if it does a man no good to have the Gospels in his ears, will he find + salvation by wearing them round his neck? Moreover, where is the power of the Gospel? In the + shapes of the letters or in the understanding of the sense? If in the shapes, you do well to wear them round your neck; if + in the understanding, you will then do better to bear them in your heart than to wear them round your neck." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In every incantation or wearing of written words, two points seem to demand caution. The first is the thing said or written, + because if it is connected with invocation of the demons it is clearly superstitious and unlawful. In like manner it seems + that one should beware lest it contain strange words, for fear that they conceal something unlawful. Hence Chrysostom says + [*Cf. the Opus Imperfectum in Matthaeum, among St. Chrysostom's works, falsely ascribed to + him] that "many now after the example of the Pharisees who enlarged their fringes, invent and write Hebrew names of angels, + and fasten them to their persons. Such things seem fearsome to those who do not understand them." Again, one should take care + lest it contain anything false, because in that case also the effect could not be ascribed to God, Who does not bear witness + to a falsehood. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A4-p7"> In the second place, one should beware lest besides the sacred words it contain something vain, for instance certain written + characters, except the sign of the Cross; or if hope be placed in the manner of writing or fastening, or in any like vanity, + having no connection with reverence for God, because this would be pronounced superstitious: otherwise, however, it is lawful. + Hence it is written in the Decretals (XXVI, qu. v, cap. Non liceat Christianis): "In blending together + medicinal herbs, it is not lawful to make use of observances or incantations, other than the divine symbol, or the Lord's + Prayer, so as to give honor to none but God the Creator of all." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is indeed lawful to pronounce divine words, or to invoke the divine name, if one do so with a mind to honor God alone, + from Whom the result is expected: but it is unlawful if it be done in connection with any vain observance. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even in the case of incantations of serpents or any animals whatever, if the mind attend exclusively to the sacred words + and to the divine power, it will not be unlawful. Such like incantations, however, often include unlawful observances, and + rely on the demons for their result, especially in the case of serpents, because the serpent was the first instrument employed + by the devil in order to deceive man. Hence a gloss on the passage quoted says: + "Note that Scripture does not commend everything whence it draws its comparisons, as in the case of the unjust judge who scarcely + heard the widow's request." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same applies to the wearing of relics, for if they be worn out of confidence in God, and in the saints whose relics they + are, it will not be unlawful. But if account were taken in this matter of some vain circumstance (for instance that the casket + be three-cornered, or the like, having no bearing on the reverence due to God and the saints), it would be superstitious and + unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Chrysostom is speaking the case in which more attention is paid the written characters than to the understanding of the words. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A4-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q96_A4-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q96_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q97.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q95_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q96_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q97" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q96_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q97_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q97-p0.1">OF THE TEMPTATION OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q97-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q97-p2"> We must now consider the vices that are opposed to religion, through lack of religion, and which are manifestly contrary + thereto, so that they come under the head of irreligion. Such are the vices which pertain to contempt or irreverence for God + and holy things. Accordingly we shall consider: (1) Vices pertaining directly to irreverence for God; (2) Vices pertaining + to irreverence for holy things. With regard to the first we shall consider the temptation whereby God is tempted, + and perjury, whereby God's name is taken with irreverence. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97-p3"> (1) In what the temptation of God consists;</p> + <p id="SS_Q97-p4"> (2) Whether it is a sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q97-p5"> (3) To what virtue it is opposed;</p> + <p id="SS_Q97-p6"> (4) Of its comparison with other vices.</p> + <div id="SS_Q97_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q97.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q97_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q97_A1-p0.1">Whether the temptation of God consists in certain deeds, wherein the expected result is ascribed to the power of God alone?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q97_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the temptation of God does not consist in certain deeds wherein the result is expected from the power + of God alone. Just as God is tempted by man so is man tempted by God, man, and demons. But when man is tempted the result + is not always expected from his power. Therefore neither is God tempted when the result is expected from His power alone. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all those who work miracles by invoking the divine name look for an effect due to God's power alone. Therefore, + if the temptation of God consisted in such like deeds, all who work miracles would tempt God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it seems to belong to man's perfection that he should put aside human aids and put his hope in God alone. Hence + Ambrose, commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q97_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.9.3" target="asv"> Lk. 9:3, </a> "Take nothing for your journey," etc. says: "The Gospel precept points out what is required of him that announces the kingdom + of God, namely, that he should not depend on worldly assistance, and that, taking assurance from his faith, he should hold + himself to be the more able to provide + for himself, the less he seeks these things." And the Blessed Agatha said: "I have never treated my body with bodily medicine, + I have my Lord Jesus Christ, Who restores all things by His mere word." [*Office of St. Agatha, eighth Responsory (Dominican + Breviary).] But the temptation of God does not consist in anything pertaining to perfection. Therefore the temptation of God + does not consist in such like deeds, wherein the help of God alone is expected. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 36): "Christ who gave proof of God's power by teaching and reproving openly, yet not + allowing the rage of His enemies to prevail against Him, nevertheless by fleeing and hiding, instructed human weakness, lest + it should dare to tempt God when it has to strive to escape from that which it needs to avoid." From this it would seem that + the temptation of God consists in omitting to do what one can in order to escape from + danger, and relying on the assistance of God alone. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Properly speaking, to tempt is to test the person tempted. Now we put a person to the test by words or by deeds. By words, + that we may find out whether he knows what we ask, or whether he can and will grant it: by deeds, when, by what we do, we + probe another's prudence, will or power. Either of these may happen in two ways. First, openly, as when one declares oneself + a tempter: thus Samson ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q97_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Judg.14.12" target="asv">Judges 14:12</a>) proposed a riddle to the Philistines in order to tempt + them. In the second place it may be done with cunning and by stealth, as the Pharisees tempted Christ, as we read in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q97_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.15" target="asv"> Mat. 22:15, </a> sqq. Again this is sometimes done explicitly, as when anyone intends, by word or deed, to put some person to the test; and + sometimes implicitly, when, to wit, though he does not intend to test a person, yet that which he does or says can seemingly + have no other purpose than putting him to a test. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A1-p7"> Accordingly, man tempts God sometimes by words, sometimes by deeds. Now we speak with God in words when we pray. Hence a + man tempts God explicitly in his prayers when he asks something of God with the intention of probing God's knowledge, power + or will. He tempts God explicitly by deeds when he intends, by whatever he does, to experiment on God's power, good will or + wisdom. But He will tempt God implicitly, if, though he does not intend to make an experiment on God, yet he asks + for or does something which has no other use than to prove God's power, goodness or knowledge. Thus when a man wishes his + horse to gallop in order to escape from the enemy, this is not giving the horse a trial: but if he make the horse gallop with + out any useful purpose, it seems to be nothing else than a trial of the horse's speed; and the same applies to all other things. + Accordingly when a man in his prayers or deeds entrusts himself to the divine assistance for some urgent or useful motive, + this is not to tempt God: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q97_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiChr.20.12" target="asv">2 Paralip 20:12</a>): "As we know not what to do, we can only turn our eyes to Thee." But if this be done without any useful or urgent motive, + this is to tempt God implicitly. Wherefore a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q97_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.16" target="asv"> Dt. 6:16, </a> "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God," says: "A man tempts God, if having the means at hand, without reason he chooses + a dangerous course, trying whether he can be delivered by God." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man also is sometimes tempted by means of deeds, to test his ability or knowledge or will to uphold or oppose those same + deeds. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When saints work miracles by their prayers, they are moved by a motive of necessity or usefulness to ask for that which is + an effect of the divine power. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The preachers of God's kingdom dispense with temporal aids, so as to be freer to give their time to the word of God: wherefore + if they depend on God alone, it does not follow that they tempt God. But if they were to neglect human assistance without + any useful or urgent motive, they would be tempting God. Hence Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 36) says that "Paul fled, not + through ceasing to believe in God, but lest he should tempt God, were he not to + flee when he had the means of flight." The Blessed Agatha had experience of God's kindness towards her, so that either she + did not suffer such sickness as required bodily medicine, or else she felt herself suddenly cured by God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q97.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q97_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q97_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q97_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q97_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q97_A2-p0.1">Whether it is a sin to tempt God?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q97_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not a sin to tempt God. For God has not commanded sin. Yet He has commanded men to try, which is + the same as to tempt, Him: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q97_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.3.10" target="asv">Malach. 3:10</a>): "Bring all the tithes into the storehouse, that there may be meat in My house; and try Me in this, saith the Lord, if I + open not unto you the flood-gates of heaven." Therefore it seems not to be a sin to tempt God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a man is tempted not only in order to test his knowledge and his power, but also to try his goodness or his will. + Now it is lawful to test the divine goodness or will, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q97_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.9" target="asv">Ps. 33:9</a>): "O taste and see that the Lord is sweet," and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q97_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.2" target="asv">Rom. 12:2</a>): "That you may prove what is the good, and the acceptable, and the perfect will of God." Therefore it is not a sin to tempt + God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Scripture never blames a man for ceasing from sin, but rather for committing a sin. Now Achaz is blamed because + when the Lord said: "Ask thee a sign of the Lord thy God," he replied: "I will not ask, and I will not tempt the Lord," and + then it was said to him: "Is it a small thing for you to be grievous to men, that you are grievous to my God also?" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q97_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.7.11" target="asv">Is. 7:11-13</a>). And we read of Abraham ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q97_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.15.8" target="asv">Gn. 15:8</a>) that he said + to the Lord: "Whereby may I know that I shall possess it?" namely, the land which God had promised him. Again Gedeon asked + God for a sign of the victory promised to him ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q97_A2-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Judg.6.36" target="asv">Judges 6:36, </a> sqq.). Yet they were not blamed for so doing. Therefore it is not a sin to tempt God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is forbidden in God's Law, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q97_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.10" target="asv">Dt. 6:10</a>): "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q97_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q97_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, to tempt a person is to put him to a test. Now one never tests that of which one is certain. Wherefore all temptation proceeds + from some ignorance or doubt, either in the tempter (as when one tests a thing in order to know its qualities), or in others + (as when one tests a thing in order to prove it to others), and in this latter way God is said to tempt us. Now it is a sin + to be ignorant of or to doubt that + which pertains to God's perfection. Wherefore it is evident that it is a sin to tempt God in order that the tempter himself + may know God's power. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A2-p7"> On the other hand, if one were to test that which pertains to the divine perfection, not in order to know it oneself, but + to prove it to others: this is not tempting God, provided there be just motive of urgency, or a pious motive of usefulness, + and other requisite conditions. For thus did the apostles ask the Lord that signs might be wrought in the name of Jesus Christ, + as related in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q97_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.4.30" target="asv"> Acts 4:30, </a> in order, to wit, that Christ's power might be made manifest to + unbelievers. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The paying of tithes was prescribed in the Law, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q97_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q87_A1.html">Q[87], A[1]</a>). Hence there was a motive of urgency to pay it, through the obligation of the Law, and also a motive of usefulness, as stated + in the text quoted---"that there may be meat in God's house": wherefore they did not tempt God by paying tithes. The words + that follow, "and try Me," are not to be understood causally, as though they had to pay tithes in order + to try if "God would open the flood-gates of heaven," but consecutively, because, to wit, if they paid tithes, they would + prove by experience the favors which God would shower upon them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There is a twofold knowledge of God's goodness or will. One is speculative and as to this it is not lawful to doubt or to + prove whether God's will be good, or whether God is sweet. The other knowledge of God's will or goodness is effective or experimental + and thereby a man experiences in himself the taste of God's sweetness, and complacency in God's will, as Dionysius says of + Hierotheos (Div. Nom. ii) that "he learnt divine thing through experience of + them." It is in this way that we are told to prove God's will, and to taste His sweetness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God wished to give a sign to Achaz, not for him alone, but for the instruction of the whole people. Hence he was reproved + because, by refusing to ask a sign, he was an obstacle to the common welfare. Nor would he have tempted God by asking, both + because he would have asked through God commanding him to do so, and because it was a matter relating to the common good. + Abraham asked for a sign through the divine instinct, and so he did not sin. Gedeon + seems to have asked a sign through weakness of faith, wherefore he is not to be excused from sin, as a gloss observes: just + as Zachary sinned in saying to the angel ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q97_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.1.18" target="asv">Lk. 1:18</a>): "Whereby shall I know this?" so that he was punished for his unbelief. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A2-p11"> It must be observed, however, that there are two ways of asking God for a sign: first in order to test God's power or the + truth of His word, and this of its very nature pertains to the temptation of God. Secondly, in order to be instructed as to + what is God's pleasure in some particular matter; and this nowise comes under the head of temptation of God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q97_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q97_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q97_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q97_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q97_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q97_A3-p0.1">Whether temptation of God is opposed to the virtue of religion?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q97_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the temptation of God is not opposed to the virtue of religion. The temptation of God is sinful, because + a man doubts God, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q97_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q97_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Now doubt about God comes under the head of unbelief, which is opposed to faith. Therefore temptation of God is opposed + to faith rather than to religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q97_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.18.23" target="asv">Ecclus. 18:23</a>): "Before prayer prepare thy soul, and be not as a man that tempteth God. Such a man," that is, who tempts God, says the + interlinear gloss, "prays for what God taught him to pray for, yet does not what God has commanded him to do." Now this pertains + to imprudence which is opposed to hope. Therefore it seems that temptation of God is a sin opposed to hope. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q97_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.77.18" target="asv"> Ps. 77:18, </a> "And they tempted God in their hearts," says that "to tempt God is to pray to Him deceitfully, with simplicity in our words + and wickedness in our hearts." Now deceit is opposed to the virtue of truth. Therefore temptation of God is opposed, not to + religion, but to truth. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> According to the gloss quoted above "to tempt God is to pray to Him inordinately." Now to pray to God becomingly is an act + of religion as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q97_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q83_A15.html">Q[83], A[15]</a>). Therefore to tempt God is a sin opposed to religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As clearly shown above ( + <a id="SS_Q97_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q81_A5.html">Q[81], A[5]</a>), the end of religion is to pay reverence to God. Wherefore whatever pertains directly to irreverence for God is opposed + to religion. Now it is evident that to tempt a person pertains to irreverence for him: since no one presumes to tempt one + of whose excellence he is sure. Hence it is manifest that to tempt God is a sin opposed to religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q97_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q81_A7.html">Q[81], A[7]</a>), it belongs to religion to declare one's faith by certain signs indicative of reverence towards God. Consequently it belongs + to irreligion that, through doubtful faith, a man does things indicative of irreverence towards God. To tempt God is one of + these; wherefore it is a species of irreligion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He that prepares not his soul before prayer by forgiving those against whom he has anything, or in some other way disposing + himself to devotion, does not do what he can to be heard by God, wherefore he tempts God implicitly as it were. And though + this implicit temptation would seem to arise from presumption or indiscretion, yet the very fact that a man behaves presumptuously + and without due care in matters relating to God implies irreverence towards + Him. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q97_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.5.6" target="asv">1 Pet. 5:6</a>): "Be you humbled . . . under the mighty hand of God," and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q97_A3-p8.2" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.15" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:15</a>): "Carefully study to present thyself approved unto God." Therefore also this kind of temptation is a species of irreligion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A man is said to pray deceitfully, not in relation to God, Who knows the secrets of the heart, but in relation to man. Wherefore + deceit is accidental to the temptation of God, and consequently it does not follow that to tempt God is directly opposed to + the truth. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q97_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q97_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q97_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q97_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q98.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q97_A4-p0.1">Whether the temptation of God is a graver sin than superstition?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q97_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the temptation of God is a graver sin than superstition. The greater sin receives the greater punishment. + Now the sin of tempting God was more severely punished in the Jews than was the sin of idolatry; and yet the latter is the + chief form of superstition: since for the sin of idolatry three thousand men of their number were slain, as related in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q97_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.32.28" target="asv"> Ex. 32:28</a> [*Septuagint version. The Vulgate has "twenty-three thousand."], + whereas for the sin of temptation they all without exception perished in the desert, and entered not into the land of promise, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q97_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.94.9" target="asv"> Ps. 94:9, </a> "Your fathers tempted Me," and further on, "so I swore in My wrath that they should not enter into My rest." Therefore to + tempt God is a graver sin than superstition. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more a sin is opposed to virtue the graver it would seem to be. Now irreligion, of which the temptation of God + is a species, is more opposed to the virtue of religion, than superstition which bears some likeness to religion. Therefore + to tempt God is a graver sin than superstition. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it seems to be a greater sin to behave disrespectfully to one's parents, than to pay others the respect we owe to + our parents. Now God should be honored by us as the Father of all ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q97_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.1.6" target="asv">Malach. 1:6</a>). Therefore. temptation of God whereby we behave irreverently to God, seems to be a greater sin than idolatry, whereby we + give to a creature the honor we owe to God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q97_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.17.2" target="asv"> Dt. 17:2, </a> "When there shall be found among you," etc. says: "The Law detests error and idolatry above all: for it is a very great sin + to give to a creature the honor that belongs to the Creator." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Among sins opposed to religion, the more grievous is that which is the more opposed to the reverence due to God. Now it is + less opposed to this reverence that one should doubt the divine excellence than that one should hold the contrary for certain. + For just as a man is more of an unbeliever if he be confirmed in his error, than if he doubt the truth of faith, so, too, + a man acts more against the reverence due to God, if by his deeds he professes an error + contrary to the divine excellence, than if he expresses a doubt. Now the superstitious man professes an error, as shown above + (Q[94], A[1], ad 1), whereas he who tempts God by words or deeds expresses a doubt of the divine excellence, as stated above + + <a id="SS_Q97_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q97_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore the sin of superstition is graver than the sin of tempting God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sin of idolatry was not punished in the above manner, as though it were a sufficient punishment; because a more severe + punishment was reserved in the future for that sin, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q97_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.32.34" target="asv">Ex. 32:34</a>): "And I, in the day of revenge, will visit this sin also of theirs." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Superstition bears a likeness to religion, as regards the material act which it pays just as religion does. But, as regards + the end, it is more contrary to religion than the temptation of God, since it implies greater irreverence for God, as stated. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It belongs essentially to the divine excellence that it is singular and incommunicable. Consequently to give divine reverence + to another is the same as to do a thing opposed to the divine excellence. There is no comparison with the honor due to our + parents, which can without sin be given to others. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q97_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q97_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q98.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q96_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q97_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q98" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q97_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q98_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q98-p0.1">OF PERJURY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q98-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q98-p2"> We must now consider perjury: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q98-p3"> (1) Whether falsehood is necessary for perjury?</p> + <p id="SS_Q98-p4"> (2) Whether perjury is always a sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q98-p5"> (3) Whether it is always a mortal sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q98-p6"> (4) Whether it is a sin to enjoin an oath on a perjurer?</p> + <div id="SS_Q98_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q98.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q98_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q98_A1-p0.1">Whether it is necessary for perjury that the statement confirmed on oath be false?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q98_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not necessary for perjury that the statement confirmed on oath be false. As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q98_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q89_A3.html">Q[89], A[3]</a>), an oath should be accompanied by judgment and justice no less than by truth. Since therefore perjury is incurred through + lack of truth, it is incurred likewise through lack of judgment, as when one swears indiscreetly, and through lack of justice, + as when one swears to something unjust. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which confirms is more weighty than the thing confirmed thereby: thus in a syllogism the premises are more + weighty than the conclusion. Now in an oath a man's statement is confirmed by calling on the name of God. Therefore perjury + seems to consist in swearing by false gods rather than in a lack of truth in the human statement which is confirmed on oath. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. clxxx): "Men swear falsely both in deceiving others and when they + are deceived themselves"; and he gives three examples. The first is: "Supposing a man to swear, thinking that what he swears + to is true, whereas it is false"; the second is: "Take the instance of another who knows the statement to be false, and swears + to it as though it were true"; and the third is: "Take another, who thinks his statement + false, and swears to its being true, while perhaps it is true," of whom he says afterwards that he is a perjurer. Therefore + one may be a perjurer while swearing to the truth. Therefore falsehood is not necessary for perjury. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Perjury is defined "a falsehood confirmed by oath" [*Hugh of St. Victor, Sum. Sent. iv, 5]. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q98_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q92_A2.html">Q[92], A[2]</a>), moral acts take their species from their end. Now the end of an oath is the confirmation of a human assertion. To this + confirmation falsehood is opposed: since an assertion is confirmed by being firmly shown to be true; and this cannot happen + to that which is false. Hence falsehood directly annuls the end of an oath: and for this reason, that perversity in swearing, + which is called perjury, takes its + species chiefly from falsehood. Consequently falsehood is essential to perjury. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Jerome says on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q98_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.4.2" target="asv"> Jer. 4:2, </a> "whichever of these three be lacking, there is perjury," but in different order. For first and chiefly perjury consists in + a lack of truth, for the reason stated in the Article. Secondly, there is perjury when justice is lacking, for in whatever + way a man swears to that which is unlawful, for this very reason he is guilty of falsehood, since he is under an obligation + to do the contrary. Thirdly, there + is perjury when judgment is lacking, since by the very fact that a man swears indiscreetly, he incurs the danger of lapsing + into falsehood. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In syllogisms the premises are of greater weight, since they are in the position of active principle, as stated in Phys. + ii, 3: whereas in moral matters the end is of greater importance than the active principle. Hence though it is a perverse + oath when a man swears to the truth by false gods, yet perjury takes its name from that kind of perversity in an oath, that + deprives the oath of its end, by swearing what is false. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Moral acts proceed from the will, whose object is the apprehended good. Wherefore if the false be apprehended as true, it + will be materially false, but formally true, as related to the will. If something false be apprehended as false, it will be + false both materially and formally. If that which is true be apprehended as false, it will be materially true, and formally + false. Hence in each of these cases the conditions required for perjury are to be + found in some way, on account of some measure of falsehood. Since, however, that which is formal in anything is of greater + importance than that which is material, he that swears to a falsehood thinking it true is not so much of a perjurer as he + that swears to the truth thinking it false. For Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. clxxx): "It depends how the + assertion proceeds from the mind, for the tongue is not guilty except the mind be guilty." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q98.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q98_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q98_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q98_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q98_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q98_A2-p0.1">Whether all perjury is sinful?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q98_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all perjury is sinful. Whoever does not fulfil what he has confirmed on oath is seemingly a perjurer. + Yet sometimes a man swears he will do something unlawful (adultery, for instance, or murder): and if he does it, he commits + a sin. If therefore he would commit a sin even if he did it not, it would follow that he is perplexed. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no man sins by doing what is best. Yet sometimes by committing a perjury one does what is best: as when a man swears + not to enter religion, or not to do some kind of virtuous deed. Therefore not all perjury is sinful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, he that swears to do another's will would seem to be guilty of perjury unless he do it. Yet it may happen sometimes + that he sins not, if he do not the man's will: for instance, if the latter order him to do something too hard and unbearable. + Therefore seemingly not all perjury is sinful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a promissory oath extends to future, just as a declaratory oath extends to past and present things. Now the obligation + of an oath may be removed by some future occurrence: thus a state may swear to fulfil some obligation, and afterwards other + citizens come on the scene who did not take the oath; or a canon may swear to keep the statutes of a certain church, and afterwards + new statutes are made. Therefore seemingly he that breaks an oath does not + sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. cxxx), in speaking of perjury: "See how you should detest this horrible beast + and exterminate it from all human business." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q98_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q89_A1.html">Q[89], A[1]</a>), to swear is to call God as witness. Now it is an irreverence to God to call Him to witness to a falsehood, because by so + doing one implies either that God ignores the truth or that He is willing to bear witness to a falsehood. Therefore perjury + is manifestly a sin opposed to religion, to which it belongs to show reverence to God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> He that swears to do what is unlawful is thereby guilty of perjury through lack of justice: though, if he fails to keep his + oath, he is not guilty of perjury in this respect, since that which he swore to do was not a fit matter of an oath. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A person who swears not to enter religion, or not to give an alms, or the like, is guilty of perjury through lack of judgment. + Hence when he does that which is best it is not an act of perjury, but contrary thereto: for the contrary of that which he + is doing could not be a matter of an oath. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When one man swears or promises to do another's will, there is to be understood this requisite condition---that the thing + commanded be lawful and virtuous, and not unbearable or immoderate. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> An oath is a personal act, and so when a man becomes a citizen of a state, he is not bound, as by oath, to fulfil whatever + the state has sworn to do. Yet he is bound by a kind of fidelity, the nature of which obligation is that he should take his + share of the state's burdens if he takes a share of its goods. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A2-p12"> The canon who swears to keep the statutes that have force in some particular "college" is not bound by his oath to keep any + that may be made in the future, unless he intends to bind himself to keep all, past and future. Nevertheless he is bound to + keep them by virtue of the statutes themselves, since they are possessed of coercive force, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q98_A2-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q96_A4.html">FS, Q[96], A[4]</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A2-p13"></p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A2-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q98_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q98_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q98_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q98_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q98_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q98_A3-p0.1">Whether all perjury is a mortal sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q98_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all perjury is a mortal sin. It is laid down (Extra, De Jurejur, cap. Verum): "Referring to the question + whether an oath is binding on those who have taken one in order to safeguard their life and possessions, we have no other + mind than that which our predecessors the Roman Pontiffs are known to have had, and who absolved such persons from the obligations + of their oath. Henceforth, that discretion may be observed, and in order to avoid + occasions of perjury, let them not be told expressly not to keep their oath: but if they should not keep it, they are not + for this reason to be punished as for a mortal sin." Therefore not all perjury is a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A3-p3"> OBJ 2. Further, as Chrysostom [*Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum on St. Matthew, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] + says, "it is a greater thing to swear by God than by the Gospels." Now it is not always a mortal sin to swear by God to something + false; for instance, if we were to employ such an oath in fun or by a slip of the tongue in the course of an ordinary conversation. + Therefore neither is it always a mortal sin to break an oath that has been taken solemnly on the + Gospels. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Law a man incurs infamy through committing perjury (VI, qu. i, cap. Infames). Now it would seem + that infamy is not incurred through any kind of perjury, as it is prescribed in the case of a declaratory oath violated by + perjury [*Cap. Cum dilectus, de Ord. Cognit.]. Therefore, seemingly, not all perjury is a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Every sin that is contrary to a divine precept is a mortal sin. Now perjury is contrary to a divine precept, for it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q98_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.12" target="asv">Lev. 19:12</a>): "Thou shalt not swear falsely by My name." Therefore it is a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the teaching of the Philosopher (Poster. i, 2), "that which causes a thing to be such is yet more so." Now we + know that an action which is, by reason of its very nature, a venial sin, or even a good action, is a mortal sin if it be + done out of contempt of God. Wherefore any action that of its nature, implies contempt of God is a mortal sin. Now perjury, + of its very nature implies contempt of God, since, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q98_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q98_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, the reason why it is sinful is because it is an act of irreverence towards God. Therefore it is manifest that perjury, of + its very nature, is a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q98_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q89_A7.html">Q[89], A[7]</a>, ad 3), coercion does not deprive a promissory oath of its binding force, as regards that which can be done lawfully. Wherefore + he who fails to fulfil an oath which he took under coercion is guilty of perjury and sins mortally. Nevertheless the Sovereign + Pontiff can, by his authority, absolve a man from an obligation even of an oath, especially if the latter should have been + coerced into taking the + oath through such fear as may overcome a high-principled man. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A3-p8"> When, however, it is said that these persons are not to be punished as for a mortal sin, this does not mean that they are + not guilty of mortal sin, but that a lesser punishment is to be inflicted on them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He that swears falsely in fun is nonetheless irreverent to God, indeed, in a way, he is more so, and consequently is not + excused from mortal sin. He that swears falsely by a slip of tongue, if he adverts to the fact that he is swearing, and that + he is swearing to something false, is not excused from mortal sin, as neither is he excused from contempt of God. If, however, + he does not advert to this, he would seem to have no intention of swearing, and + consequently is excused from the sin of perjury. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A3-p10"> It is, however, a more grievous sin to swear solemnly by the Gospels, than to swear by God in ordinary conversation, both + on account of scandal and on account of the greater deliberation. But if we consider them equally in comparison with one another, + it is more grievous to commit perjury in swearing by God than in swearing by the Gospels. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not every sin makes a man infamous in the eye of the law. Wherefore, if a man who has sworn falsely in a declaratory oath + be not infamous in the eye of the law, but only when he has been so declared by sentence in a court of law, it does not follow + that he has not sinned mortally. The reason why the law attaches infamy rather to one who breaks a promissory oath taken solemnly + is that he still has it in his power after he has sworn to substantiate his + oath, which is not the case in a declaratory oath. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q98_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q98_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q98_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q98_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q99.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q98_A4-p0.1">Whether he sins who demands an oath of a perjurer?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q98_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that he who demands an oath of a perjurer commits a sin. Either he knows that he swears truly, or he knows + that he swears falsely. If he knows him to swear truly, it is useless for him to demand an oath: and if he believes him to + swear falsely, for his own part he leads him into sin. Therefore nowise seemingly should one enjoin an oath on another person. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to receive an oath from a person is less than to impose an oath on him. Now it would seem unlawful to receive an + oath from a person, especially if he swear falsely, because he would then seem to consent in his sin. Much less therefore + would it seem lawful to impose an oath on one who swears falsely. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q98_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.5.1" target="asv">Lev. 5:1</a>): "If anyone sin, and hear the voice of one swearing falsely [*'Falsely' is not in the Vulgate'], and is a witness either + because he himself hath seen, or is privy to it: if he do not utter it, he shall bear his iniquity." Hence it would seem that + when a man knows another to be swearing falsely, he is bound to denounce him. Therefore it is not lawful to demand an oath + of such a man. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> On the other hand, Just as it is a sin to swear falsely so is it to swear by false gods. Yet it is lawful to take advantage + of an oath of one who has sworn by false gods, as Augustine says (ad Public. Ep. xlvii). Therefore it is lawful to demand + an oath from one who swears falsely. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As regards a person who demands an oath from another, a distinction would seem to be necessary. For either he demands the + oath on his own account and of his own accord, or he demands it on account of the exigencies of a duty imposed on him. If + a man demands an oath on his own account as a private individual, we must make a distinction, as does Augustine (de Perjuriis. + serm. clxxx): "For if he knows not that the man will swear falsely, and says to him + accordingly: 'Swear to me' in order that he may be credited, there is no sin: yet it is a human temptation" (because, to wit, + it proceeds from his weakness in doubting whether the man will speak the truth). "This is the evil whereof Our Lord says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q98_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.37" target="asv">Mat. 5:37</a>): That which is over and above these, is of evil. But if he knows the man to have done so," i.e. the contrary of what he + swears to, "and yet forces him to swear, he is a murderer: for the other destroys himself by his perjury, but it is he + who urged the hand of the slayer." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A4-p7"> If, on the other hand, a man demands an oath as a public person, in accordance with the requirements of the law, on the requisition + of a third person: he does not seem to be at fault, if he demands an oath of a person, whether he knows that he will swear + falsely or truly, because seemingly it is not he that exacts the oath but the person at whose instance he demands it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument avails in the case of one who demands an oath on his own account. Yet he does not always know that the other + will swear truly or falsely, for at times he has doubts about the fact, and believes he will swear truly. In such a case he + exacts an oath in order that he may be more certain. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (ad Public. serm. xlvii), "though we are forbidden to swear, I do not remember ever to have read in the + Holy Scriptures that we must not accept oaths from others." Hence he that accepts an oath does not sin, except perchance when + of his own accord he forces another to swear, knowing that he will swear falsely. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (QQ. Super Lev, qu. i), Moses in the passage quoted did not state to whom one man had to denounce another's + perjury: wherefore it must be understood that the matter had to be denounced "to those who would do the perjurer good rather + than harm." Again, neither did he state in what order the denunciation was to be made: wherefore seemingly the Gospel order + should be followed, if the sin of perjury should be hidden, especially when it + does not tend to another person's injury: because if it did, the Gospel order would not apply to the case, as stated above + ( + <a id="SS_Q98_A4-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q33_A7.html">Q[33], A[7]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q98_A4-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q68_A1.html"> Q[68], A[1]</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It is lawful to make use of an evil for the sake of good, as God does, but it is not lawful to lead anyone to do evil. Consequently + it is lawful to accept the oath of one who is ready to swear by false gods, but it is not lawful to induce him to swear by + false gods. Yet it seems to be different in the case of one who swears falsely by the true God, because an oath of this kind + lacks the good of faith, which a man makes use of in the oath of one who + swears truly by false gods, as Augustine says (ad Public. Ep. xlvii). Hence when a man swears falsely by the true God his + oath seems to lack any good that one may use lawfully. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A4-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q98_A4-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q98_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q99.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q97_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q98_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q99" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q98_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q99_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q99-p0.1">OF SACRILEGE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q99-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q99-p2"> We must now consider the vices which pertain to irreligion, whereby sacred things are treated with irreverence. We shall + consider (1) Sacrilege; (2) Simony. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q99-p4"> (1) What is sacrilege?</p> + <p id="SS_Q99-p5"> (2) Whether it is a special sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q99-p6"> (3) Of the species of sacrilege;</p> + <p id="SS_Q99-p7"> (4) Of the punishment of sacrilege.</p> + <div id="SS_Q99_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q99.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q99_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q99_A1-p0.1">Whether sacrilege is the violation of a sacred thing?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q99_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sacrilege is not the violation of a sacred thing. It is stated (XVII, qu. iv [*Append. Gratian, on can. + Si quis suadente]): "They are guilty of sacrilege who disagree about the sovereign's decision, and doubt whether the person + chosen by the sovereign be worthy of honor." Now this seems to have no connection with anything sacred. Therefore sacrilege + does not denote the violation of something sacred. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is stated further on [*Append. Gratian, on can. Constituit.] that if any man shall allow the Jews to hold public + offices, "he must be excommunicated as being guilty of sacrilege." Yet public offices have nothing to do with anything sacred. + Therefore it seems that sacrilege does not denote the violation of a sacred thing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God's power is greater than man's. Now sacred things receive their sacred character from God. Therefore they cannot + be violated by man: and so a sacrilege would not seem to be the violation of a sacred thing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (Etym. x) that "a man is said to be sacrilegious because he selects," i.e. steals, "sacred things." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[81], A[5]; + <a id="SS_Q99_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q101_A4.html">FS, Q[101], A[4]</a>), a thing is called "sacred" through being deputed to the divine worship. Now just as a thing acquires an aspect of good + through being deputed to a good end, so does a thing assume a divine character through being deputed to the divine worship, + and thus a certain reverence is due to it, which reverence is referred to God. Therefore whatever pertains to irreverence + for sacred things is + an injury to God, and comes under the head of sacrilege. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2) the common good of the nation is a divine thing, wherefore in olden times the + rulers of a commonwealth were called divines, as being the ministers of divine providence, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q99_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.5" target="asv"> Wis. 6:5, </a> "Being ministers of His kingdom, you have not judged rightly." Hence by an extension of the term, whatever savors of irreverence + for the sovereign, such as disputing his judgment, and questioning + whether one ought to follow it, is called sacrilege by a kind of likeness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Christians are sanctified by faith and the sacraments of Christ, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q99_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:11, </a> "But you are washed, but you are sanctified." Wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q99_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#iPet.2.9" target="asv">1 Pet. 2:9</a>): "You are a chosen generation, a kingly priesthood, a holy nation, a purchased people." Therefore any injury inflicted on + the Christian people, for instance that unbelievers should be put in authority over it, is an irreverence for a sacred + thing, and is reasonably called a sacrilege. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Violation here means any kind of irreverence or dishonor. Now as "honor is in the person who honors and not in the one who + is honored" (Ethic. i, 5), so again irreverence is in the person who behaves irreverently even though he do no harm to the + object of his irreverence. Hence, so far he is concerned, he violates the sacred thing, though the latter be not violated + in itself. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q99.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q99_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q99_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q99_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q99_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q99_A2-p0.1">Whether sacrilege is a special sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q99_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sacrilege not a special sin. It is stated (XVII, qu. iv) "They are guilty of sacrilege who through ignorance + sin against the sanctity of the law, violate and defile it by their negligence." But this is done in every sin, because sin + is "a word, deed or desire contrary to the law of God," according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxi, 27). Therefore sacrilege + is a general sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no special sin is comprised under different kinds of sin. Now sacrilege comprised under different kinds of sin, + for instance under murder, if one kill a priest under lust, as the violation of a consecrate virgin, or of any woman in a + sacred place under theft, if one steal a sacred thing. Therefore sacrilege is not a special sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every special sin is to found apart from other sins as the Philosopher states, in speaking of special justice (Ethic. + v, 11). But, seemingly, sacrilege is not to be found apart from other sins; for it is sometimes united to theft, sometimes + to murder, as stated in the preceding objection. Therefore it is not a special sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> That which is opposed to a special virtue is a special sin. But sacrilege is opposed to a special virtue, namely religion, + to which it belongs to reverence God and divine things. Therefore sacrilege is a special sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Wherever we find a special aspect of deformity, there must needs be a special sin; because the species of a thing is derived + chiefly from its formal aspect, and not from its matter or subject. Now in sacrilege we find a special aspect of deformity, + namely, the violation of a sacred thing by treating it irreverently. Hence it is a special sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A2-p7"> Moreover, it is opposed to religion. For according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv, 3), "When the purple has been made into + a royal robe, we pay it honor and homage, and if anyone dishonor it he is condemned to death," as acting against the king: + and in the same way if a man violate a sacred thing, by so doing his behavior is contrary to the reverence due to God and + consequently he is guilty of irreligion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those are said to sin against the sanctity of the divine law who assail God's law, as heretics and blasphemers do. These + are guilty of unbelief, through not believing in God; and of sacrilege, through perverting the words of the divine law. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Nothing prevents one specific kind of sin being found in various generic kinds of sin, inasmuch as various sins are directed + to the end of one sin, just as happens in the case of virtues commanded by one virtue. In this way, by whatever kind of sin + a man acts counter to reverence due to sacred things, he commits a sacrilege formally; although his act contains various kinds + of sin materially. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sacrilege is sometimes found apart from other sins, through its act having no other deformity than the violation of a sacred + thing: for instance, if a judge were to take a person from a sacred place for he might lawfully have taken him from elsewhere. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q99_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q99_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q99_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q99_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q99_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q99_A3-p0.1">Whether the species of sacrilege are distinguished according to the sacred things?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q99_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the species of sacrilege are not distinguished according to the sacred things. Material diversity does + not differentiate species, if the formal aspect remains the same. Now there would seem to be the same formal aspect of sin + in all violations of sacred things, and that the only difference is one of matter. Therefore the species of sacrilege are + not distinguished thereby. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it does not seem possible that things belonging to the same species should at the same time differ specifically. + Now murder, theft, and unlawful intercourse, are different species of sin. Therefore they cannot belong to the one same species + of sacrilege: and consequently it seems that the species of sacrilege are distinguished in accordance with the species of + other sins, and not according to the various sacred things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among sacred things sacred persons are reckoned. If, therefore, one species of sacrilege arises from the violation + of a sacred person, it would follow that every sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege, since every sin violates the + person of the sinner. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not reckoned according to the sacred things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Acts and habits are distinguished by their objects. Now the sacred thing is the object of sacrilege, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q99_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q99_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore the species of sacrilege are distinguished according to the sacred things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q99_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q99_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the sin of sacrilege consists in the irreverent treatment of a sacred thing. Now reverence is due to a sacred thing by reason + of its holiness: and consequently the species of sacrilege must needs be distinguished according to the different aspects + of sanctity in the sacred things which are treated irreverently: for the greater the holiness ascribed to the sacred thing + that is sinned against, the more grievous + the sacrilege. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A3-p7"> Now holiness is ascribed, not only to sacred persons, namely, those who are consecrated to the divine worship, but also to + sacred places and to certain other sacred things. And the holiness of a place is directed to the holiness of man, who worships + God in a holy place. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q99_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.5.19" target="asv">2 Macc. 5:19</a>): "God did not choose the people for the place's sake, but the place for the people's sake." Hence sacrilege committed against + a sacred person is a graver sin + than that which is committed against a sacred place. Yet in either species there are various degrees of sacrilege, according + to differences of sacred persons and places. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A3-p8"> In like manner the third species of sacrilege, which is committed against other sacred things, has various degrees, according + to the differences of sacred things. Among these the highest place belongs to the sacraments whereby man is sanctified: chief + of which is the sacrament of the Eucharist, for it contains Christ Himself. Wherefore the sacrilege that is committed against + this sacrament is the gravest of all. The second place, after the sacraments, belongs to the vessels + consecrated for the administration of the sacraments; also sacred images, and the relics of the saints, wherein the very persons + of the saints, so to speak, are reverenced and honored. After these come things connected with the apparel of the Church and + its ministers; and those things, whether movable or immovable, that are deputed to the upkeep of the ministers. And whoever + sins against any one of the aforesaid incurs the crime of sacrilege. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is not the same aspect of holiness in all the aforesaid: wherefore the diversity of sacred things is not only a material, + but also a formal difference. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Nothing hinders two things from belonging to one species in one respect, and to different species in another respect. Thus + Socrates and Plato belong to the one species, "animal," but differ in the species "colored thing," if one be white and the + other black. In like manner it is possible for two sins to differ specifically as to their material acts, and to belong to + the same species as regards the one formal aspect of sacrilege: for instance, the + violation of a nun by blows or by copulation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege materially and accidentally as it were. Hence Jerome [*The quotation + is from St. Bernard, De Consideration, ii, 13] says that "a trifle on a priest's lips is a sacrilege or a blasphemy." But + formally and properly speaking a sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege only when it is committed against his holiness, + for instance if a virgin consecrated to God be guilty of fornication: and the + same is to be said of other instances. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q99_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q99_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q99_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q99_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q100.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q99_A4-p0.1">Whether the punishment of sacrilege should be pecuniary?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q99_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the punishment of sacrilege should not be pecuniary. A pecuniary punishment is not wont to be inflicted + for a criminal fault. But sacrilege is a criminal fault, wherefore it is punished by capital sentence according to civil law + [*Dig. xlviii, 13; Cod. i, 3, de Episc. et Cleric.]. Therefore sacrilege should not be awarded a pecuniary punishment. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the same sin should not receive a double punishment, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q99_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Nah.1.9" target="asv"> Nahum 1:9, </a> "There shall not rise a double affliction." But sacrilege is punished with excommunication; major excommunication, for violating + a sacred person, and for burning or destroying a church, and minor excommunication for other sacrileges. Therefore sacrilege + should not be awarded a pecuniary punishment. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q99_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.2.5" target="asv">1 Thess. 2:5</a>): "Neither have we taken an occasion of covetousness." But it seems to involve an occasion of covetousness that a pecuniary + punishment should be exacted for the violation of a sacred thing. Therefore this does not seem to be a fitting punishment + of sacrilege. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written [*XVII, qu. iv, can. Si quis contumax]: "If anyone contumaciously or arrogantly take away by force an escaped + slave from the confines of a church he shall pay nine hundred soldi": and again further on (XVII, qu. iv, can. Quisquis inventus, + can. 21): "Whoever is found guilty of sacrilege shall pay thirty pounds of tried purest silver." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the award of punishments two points must be considered. First equality, in order that the punishment may be just, and + that "by what things a man sinneth by the same . . . he may be tormented" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q99_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.17" target="asv">Wis. 11:17</a>). In this respect the fitting punishment of one guilty of sacrilege, since he has done an injury to a sacred thing, is excommunication + [*Append. Gratian. on can. Si quis contumax, quoted above] whereby sacred things are withheld from + him. The second point to be considered is utility. For punishments are inflicted as medicines, that men being deterred thereby + may desist from sin. Now it would seem that the sacrilegious man, who reverences not sacred things, is not sufficiently deterred + from sinning by sacred things being withheld from him, since he has no care for them. Wherefore according to human laws he + is sentenced to capital punishment, and according to the statutes of the Church, which does not inflict the death of the + body, a pecuniary punishment is inflicted, in order that men may be deterred from sacrilege, at least by temporal punishments. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Church inflicts not the death of the body, but excommunication in its stead. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When one punishment is not sufficient to deter a man from sin, a double punishment must be inflicted. Wherefore it was necessary + to inflict some kind of temporal punishment in addition to the punishment of excommunication, in order to coerce those who + despise spiritual things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If money were exacted without a reasonable cause, this would seem to involve an occasion of covetousness. But when it is + exacted for the purpose of man's correction, it has a manifest utility, and consequently involves no occasion of avarice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q99_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q99_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q100.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q98_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q99_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q100" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q99_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q100_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q100-p0.1">ON SIMONY (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q100-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q100-p2"> We must now consider simony, under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q100-p3"> (1) What is simony?</p> + <p id="SS_Q100-p4"> (2) Whether it is lawful to accept money for the sacraments?</p> + <p id="SS_Q100-p5"> (3) Whether it is lawful to accept money for spiritual actions?</p> + <p id="SS_Q100-p6"> (4) Whether it is lawful to sell things connected with spirituals?</p> + <p id="SS_Q100-p7"> (5) Whether real remuneration alone makes a man guilty of simony, or also oral remuneration or remuneration by service?</p> + <p id="SS_Q100-p8"> (6) Of the punishment of simony.</p> + <div id="SS_Q100_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q100.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q100_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q100_A1-p0.1">Whether simony is an intentional will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q100_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that simony is not "an express will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing." + Simony is heresy, since it is written (I, qu. i [*Can. Eos qui per pecunias.]): "The impious heresy of Macedonius and of those + who with him impugned the Holy Ghost, is more endurable than that of those who are guilty of simony: since the former in their + ravings maintained that the Holy Spirit of Father and Son is a creature and the slave + of God, whereas the latter make the same Holy Spirit to be their own slave. For every master sells what he has just as he + wills, whether it be his slave or any other of his possessions." But unbelief, like faith, is an act not of the will but of + the intellect, as shown above ( + <a id="SS_Q100_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q10_A2.html">Q[10], A[2]</a>). Therefore simony should not be defined as an act of the will. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to sin intentionally is to sin through malice, and this is to sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore, if simony is + an intentional will to sin, it would seem that it is always a sin against the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing is more spiritual than the kingdom of heaven. But it is lawful to buy the kingdom of heaven: for Gregory + says in a homily (v, in Ev.): "The kingdom of heaven is worth as much as you possess." Therefore simony does not consist in + a will to buy something spiritual. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, simony takes its name from Simon the magician, of whom we read ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q100_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.8.18" target="asv">Acts 8:18,19</a>) that "he offered the apostles money" that he might buy a spiritual power, in order, to wit, "that on whomsoever he imposed + his hand they might receive the Holy Ghost." But we do not read that he wished to sell anything. Therefore simony is not the + will to sell a spiritual thing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, there are many other voluntary commutations besides buying and selling, such as exchange and transaction [*A kind + of legal compromise---Oxford Dictionary]. Therefore it would seem that simony is defined insufficiently. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A1-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, anything connected with spiritual things is itself spiritual. Therefore it is superfluous to add "or connected with + spiritual things." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A1-p8"> + <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, according to some, the Pope cannot commit simony: yet he can buy or sell something spiritual. Therefore simony is + not the will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A1-p9"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory VII says (Regist. [*Caus. I, qu. i, can. Presbyter, qu. iii, can. Altare]): "None of the faithful is ignorant that + buying or selling altars, tithes, or the Holy Ghost is the heresy of simony." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A1-p10"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q100_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A2.html">FS, Q[18], A[2]</a>) an act is evil generically when it bears on undue matter. Now a spiritual thing is undue matter for buying and selling for + three reasons. First, because a spiritual thing cannot be appraised at any earthly price, even as it is said concerning wisdom + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q100_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.15" target="asv">Prov. 3:15</a>), "she is more precious than all riches, and all things that are desired, are not to be compared with her": and for this + reason Peter, in condemning the wickedness of Simon in its very source, said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q100_A1-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Acts.8.20" target="asv">Acts 8:20</a>): "Keep thy money to thyself to perish with thee, because thou hast thought that the gift of God may be purchased with money." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A1-p11"> Secondly, because a thing cannot be due matter for sale if the vendor is not the owner thereof, as appears from the authority + quoted (OBJ[1]). Now ecclesiastical superiors are not owners, but dispensers of spiritual things, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q100_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.1" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:1, </a> "Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the ministers of God." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A1-p12"> Thirdly, because sale is opposed to the source of spiritual things, since they flow from the gratuitous will of God. Wherefore + Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q100_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.8" target="asv">Mat. 10:8</a>): "Freely have you received, freely give." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A1-p13"> Therefore by buying or selling a spiritual thing, a man treats God and divine things with irreverence, and consequently commits + a sin of irreligion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as religion consists in a kind of protestation of faith, without, sometimes, faith being in one's heart, so too the + vices opposed to religion include a certain protestation of unbelief without, sometimes, unbelief being in the mind. Accordingly + simony is said to be a "heresy," as regards the outward protestation, since by selling a gift of the Holy Ghost a man declares, + in a way, that he is the owner of a spiritual gift; and this is heretical. It + must, however, be observed that Simon Magus, besides wishing the apostles to sell him a grace of the Holy Ghost for money, + said that the world was not created by God, but by some heavenly power, as Isidore states (Etym. viii, 5): and so for this + reason simoniacs are reckoned with other heretics, as appears from Augustine's book on heretics. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q100_A1-p15.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A4.html">Q[58], A[4]</a>), justice, with all its parts, and consequently all the opposite vices, is in the will as its subject. Hence simony is fittingly + defined from its relation to the will. This act is furthermore described as "express," in order to signify that it proceeds + from choice, which takes the principal part in virtue and vice. Nor does everyone sin against the Holy Ghost that sins from + choice, but only he who + chooses sin through contempt of those things whereby man is wont to be withdrawn from sin, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q100_A1-p15.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q14_A1.html">Q[14], A[1]</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A1-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The kingdom of heaven is said to be bought when a man gives what he has for God's sake. But this is to employ the term "buying" + in a wide sense, and as synonymous with merit: nor does it reach to the perfect signification of buying, both because neither + "the sufferings of this time," nor any gift or deed of ours, "are worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall + be revealed in us" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q100_A1-p16.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.18" target="asv">Rom. 8:18</a>), and because merit consists + chiefly, not in an outward gift, action or passion, but in an inward affection. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A1-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Simon the magician wished to buy a spiritual power in order that afterwards he might sell it. For it is written (I, qu. iii + [*Can. Salvator]), that "Simon the magician wished to buy the gift of the Holy Ghost, in order that he might make money by + selling the signs to be wrought by him." Hence those who sell spiritual things are likened in intention to Simon the magician: + while those who wish to buy them are likened to him in act. Those who sell them + imitate, in act, Giezi the disciple of Eliseus, of whom we read ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q100_A1-p17.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 5:20-24</a>) that he received money from the leper who was healed: wherefore the sellers of spiritual things may be called not only "simoniacs" + but also "giezites." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A1-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The terms "buying" and "selling" cover all kinds of non-gratuitous contracts. Wherefore it is impossible for the exchange + or agency of prebends or ecclesiastical benefices to be made by authority of the parties concerned without danger of committing + simony, as laid down by law [*Cap. Quaesitum, de rerum Permutat.; cap. Super, de Transact.]. Nevertheless the superior, in + virtue of his office, can cause these exchanges to be made for useful or necessary + reasons. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A1-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Even as the soul lives by itself, while the body lives through being united to the soul; so, too, certain things are spiritual + by themselves, such as the sacraments and the like, while others are called spiritual, through adhering to those others. Hence + (I, qu. iii, cap. Siquis objecerit) it is stated that "spiritual things do not progress without corporal things, even as the + soul has no bodily life without the body." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A1-p20"> + <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> The Pope can be guilty of the vice of simony, like any other man, since the higher a man's position the more grievous is + his sin. For although the possessions of the Church belong to him as dispenser in chief, they are not his as master and owner. + Therefore, were he to accept money from the income of any church in exchange for a spiritual thing, he would not escape being + guilty of the vice of simony. In like manner he might commit simony by accepting + from a layman moneys not belonging to the goods of the Church. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A1-p21"></p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A1-p22"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q100.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q100_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q100_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q100_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q100_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q100_A2-p0.1">Whether it is always unlawful to give money for the sacraments?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q100_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not always unlawful to give money for the sacraments. Baptism is the door of the sacraments, as + we shall state in the + <a id="SS_Q100_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q68_A6.html">TP, Q[68], A[6]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q100_A2-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q73_A3.html">TP, Q[73], A[3]</a>. But seemingly it is lawful in certain cases to give money for Baptism, for instance if a priest were unwilling to baptize + a dying child without being paid. Therefore it is not always unlawful to buy or sell the sacraments. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the greatest of the sacraments is the Eucharist, which is consecrated in the Mass. But some priests receive a prebend + or money for singing masses. Much more therefore is it lawful to buy or sell the other sacraments. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sacrament of Penance is a necessary sacrament consisting chiefly in the absolution. But some persons demand + money when absolving from excommunication. Therefore it is not always unlawful to buy or sell a sacrament. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, custom makes that which otherwise were sinful to be not sinful; thus Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 47) that + "it was no crime to have several wives, so long as it was the custom." Now it is the custom in some places to give something + in the consecration of bishops, blessings of abbots, ordinations of the clergy, in exchange for the chrism, holy oil, and + so forth. Therefore it would seem that it is not unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it happens sometimes that someone maliciously hinders a person from obtaining a bishopric or some like dignity. + But it is lawful for a man to make good his grievance. Therefore it is lawful, seemingly, in such a case to give money for + a bishopric or a like ecclesiastical dignity. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A2-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, marriage is a sacrament. But sometimes money is given for marriage. Therefore it is lawful to sell a sacrament. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A2-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (I, qu. i [*Can. Qui per pecunias]): "Whosoever shall consecrate anyone for money, let him be cut off from + the priesthood." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A2-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The sacraments of the New Law are of all things most spiritual, inasmuch as they are the cause of spiritual grace, on which + no price can be set, and which is essentially incompatible with a non-gratuitous giving. Now the sacraments are dispensed + through the ministers of the Church, whom the people are bound to support, according to the words of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q100_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:13</a>), "Know you not, that they who work in the holy place, eat the things + that are of the holy place; and they that serve the altar, partake with the altar?" + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A2-p10"> Accordingly we must answer that to receive money for the spiritual grace of the sacraments, is the sin of simony, which cannot + be excused by any custom whatever, since "custom does not prevail over natural or divine law" [*Cap. Cum tanto, de Consuetud.; + cf. + <a id="SS_Q100_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q97_A3.html">FS, Q[97], A[3]</a>]. Now by money we are to understand anything that has a pecuniary value, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 1). On the + other hand, to receive anything for the support of those who + administer the sacraments, in accordance with the statutes of the Church and approved customs, is not simony, nor is it a + sin. For it is received not as a price of goods, but as a payment for their need. Hence a gloss of Augustine on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q100_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.5.17" target="asv">1 Tim. 5:17, </a> "Let the priests that rule well," says: "They should look to the people for a supply to their need, but to the Lord for the + reward of their ministry." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In a case of necessity anyone may baptize. And since nowise ought one to sin, if the priest be unwilling to baptize without + being paid, one must act as though there were no priest available for the baptism. Hence the person who is in charge of the + child can, in such a case, lawfully baptize it, or cause it to be baptized by anyone else. He could, however, lawfully buy + the water from the priest, because it is merely a bodily element. But if it were an + adult in danger of death that wished to be baptized, and the priest were unwilling to baptize him without being paid, he ought, + if possible, to be baptized by someone else. And if he is unable to have recourse to another, he must by no means pay a price + for Baptism, and should rather die without being baptized, because for him the baptism of desire would supply the lack of + the sacrament. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The priest receives money, not as the price for consecrating the Eucharist, or for singing the Mass (for this would be simoniacal), + but as payment for his livelihood, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The money exacted of the person absolved is not the price of his absolution (for this would be simoniacal), but a punishment + of a past crime for which he was excommunicated. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A2-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As stated above, "custom does not prevail over natural or divine law" whereby simony is forbidden. Wherefore the custom, + if such there be, of demanding anything as the price of a spiritual thing, with the intention of buying or selling it, is + manifestly simoniacal, especially when the demand is made of a person unwilling to pay. But if the demand be made in payment + of a stipend recognized by custom it is not simoniacal, provided there be no intention + of buying or selling, but only of doing what is customary, and especially if the demand be acceded to voluntarily. In all + these cases, however, one must beware of anything having an appearance of simony or avarice, according to the saying of the + Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q100_A2-p14.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.5.22" target="asv">1 Thess. 5:22</a>), "From all appearance of evil restrain yourselves." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A2-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> It would be simoniacal to buy off the opposition of one's rivals, before acquiring the right to a bishopric or any dignity + or prebend, by election, appointment or presentation, since this would be to use money as a means of obtaining a spiritual + thing. But it is lawful to use money as a means of removing unjust opposition, after one has already acquired that right. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A2-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Some [*Innocent IV on Cap. Cum in Ecclesia, de Simonia] say that it is lawful to give money for Matrimony because no grace + is conferred thereby. But this is not altogether true, as we shall state in the Third Part of the work [* + <a id="SS_Q100_A2-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q42_A3.html">XP, Q[42], A[3]</a>]. Wherefore we must reply that Matrimony is not only a sacrament of the Church, but also an office of nature. Consequently + it is lawful to give money for Matrimony considered as an + office of nature, but unlawful if it be considered as a sacrament of the Church. Hence, according to the law [*Cap. Cum in + Ecclesia, de Simonia], it is forbidden to demand anything for the Nuptial Blessing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A2-p17"></p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A2-p18"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q100_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q100_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q100_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q100_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q100_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q100_A3-p0.1">Whether it is lawful to give and receive money for spiritual actions?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q100_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that it is lawful to give and receive money for spiritual actions. The use of prophecy is a spiritual action. But + something used to be given of old for the use of prophecy, as appears from + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q100_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.9.7" target="asv">1 Kings 9:7,8, </a> and + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q100_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 14:3.</a> Therefore it would seem that it is lawful to give and receive money for a spiritual action. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, prayer, preaching, divine praise, are most spiritual actions. Now money is given to holy persons in order to obtain + the assistance of their prayers, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q100_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.9" target="asv"> Lk. 16:9, </a> "Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity." To preachers also, who sow spiritual things, temporal things are due according + to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q100_A3-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.14" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:14</a>). Moreover, something is given to those who celebrate the divine praises in the + ecclesiastical office, and make processions: and sometimes an annual income is assigned to them. Therefore it is lawful to + receive something for spiritual actions. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, science is no less spiritual than power. Now it is lawful to receive money for the use of science: thus a lawyer + may sell his just advocacy, a physician his advice for health, and a master the exercise of his teaching. Therefore in like + manner it would seem lawful for a prelate to receive something for the use of his spiritual power, for instance, for correction, + dispensation, and so forth. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, religion is the state of spiritual perfection. Now in certain monasteries something is demanded from those who are + received there. Therefore it is lawful to demand something for spiritual things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated (I, qu. i [*Can. Quidquid invisibilis]): "It is absolutely forbidden to make a charge for what is acquired by + the consolation of invisible grace, whether by demanding a price or by seeking any kind of return whatever." Now all these + spiritual things are acquired through an invisible grace. Therefore it is not lawful to charge a price or return for them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Just as the sacraments are called spiritual, because they confer a spiritual grace, so, too, certain other things are called + spiritual, because they flow from spiritual grace and dispose thereto. And yet these things are obtainable through the ministry + of men, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q100_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:7, </a> "Who serveth as a soldier at any time at his own charges? Who feedeth the flock, and eateth not of the milk of the flock?" + Hence it is simoniacal to sell + or buy that which is spiritual in such like actions; but to receive or give something for the support of those who minister + spiritual things in accordance with the statutes of the Church and approved customs is lawful, yet in such wise that there + be no intention of buying or selling, and that no pressure be brought to bear on those who are unwilling to give, by withholding + spiritual things that ought to be administered, for then there would be an appearance of simony. But after the spiritual + things have been freely bestowed, then the statutory and customary offerings and other dues may be exacted from those who + are unwilling but able to pay, if the superior authorize this to be done. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Jerome says in his commentary on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q100_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Mic.3.9" target="asv"> Mic. 3:9, </a> certain gifts were freely offered to the good prophets, for their livelihood, but not as a price for the exercise of their + gift of prophecy. Wicked prophets, however, abused this exercise by demanding payment for it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who give alms to the poor in order to obtain from them the assistance of their prayers do not give with the intent + of buying their prayers; but by their gratuitous beneficence inspire the poor with the mind to pray for them freely and out + of charity. Temporal things are due to the preacher as means for his support, not as a price of the words he preaches. Hence + a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q100_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.5.11" target="asv">1 Tim. 5:11, </a> "Let the priests that rule well," says: + "Their need allows them to receive the wherewithal to live, charity demands that this should be given to them: yet the Gospel + is not for sale, nor is a livelihood the object of preaching: for if they sell it for this purpose, they sell a great thing + for a contemptible price." In like manner temporal things are given to those who praise God by celebrating the divine office + whether for the living or for the dead, not as a price but as a means of livelihood; and the same purpose is fulfilled when + alms are received for making processions in funerals. Yet it is simoniacal to do such things by contract, or with the intention + of buying or selling. Hence it would be an unlawful ordinance if it were decreed in any church that no procession would take + place at a funeral unless a certain sum of money were paid, because such an ordinance would preclude the free granting of + pious offices to any person. The ordinance would be more in keeping with the law, if it were decreed that this honor would + be accorded to all who gave a certain alms, because this would not preclude its being granted to others. Moreover, the former + ordinance has the appearance of an exaction, whereas the latter bears a likeness to a gratuitous remuneration. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A person to whom a spiritual power is entrusted is bound by virtue of his office to exercise the power entrusted to him in + dispensing spiritual things. Moreover, he receives a statutory payment from the funds of the Church as a means of livelihood. + Therefore, if he were to accept anything for the exercise of his spiritual power, this would imply, not a hiring of his labor + (which he is bound to give, as a duty arising out of the office he has + accepted), but a sale of the very use of a spiritual grace. For this reason it is unlawful for him to receive anything for + any dispensing whatever, or for allowing someone else to take his duty, or for correcting his subjects, or for omitting to + correct them. On the other hand it is lawful for him to receive "procurations," when he visits his subjects, not as a price + for correcting them, but as a means of livelihood. He that is possessed of science, without having taken upon himself the + obligation of using it for the benefit of others can lawfully receive a price for his learning or advice, since this is not + a sale of truth or science, but a hiring of labor. If, on the other hand, he be so bound by virtue of his office, this would + amount to a sale of the truth, and consequently he would sin grievously. For instance, those who in certain churches are appointed + to instruct the clerics of that church and other poor persons, and are in receipt of an ecclesiastical benefice for so + doing, are not allowed to receive anything in return, either for teaching, or for celebrating or omitting any feasts. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It is unlawful to exact or receive anything as price for entering a monastery: but, in the case of small monasteries, that + are unable to support so many persons, it is lawful, while entrance to the monastery is free, to accept something for the + support of those who are about to be received into the monastery, if its revenues are insufficient. In like manner it is lawful + to be easier in admitting to a monastery a person who has proved his regard for + that monastery by the generosity of his alms: just as, on the other hand, it is lawful to incite a person's regard for a monastery + by means of temporal benefits, in order that he may thereby be induced to enter the monastery; although it is unlawful to + agree to give or receive something for entrance into a monastery (I, qu. ii, cap. Quam pio). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q100_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q100_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q100_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q100_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q100_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q100_A4-p0.1">Whether it is lawful to receive money for things annexed to spiritual things?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q100_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem lawful to receive money for things annexed to spiritual things. Seemingly all temporal things are annexed to + spiritual things, since temporal things ought to be sought for the sake of spiritual things. If, therefore, it is unlawful + to sell what is annexed to spiritual things, it will be unlawful to sell anything temporal, and this is clearly false. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing would seem to be more annexed to spiritual things than consecrated vessels. Yet it is lawful to sell a chalice + for the ransom of prisoners, according to Ambrose (De Offic. ii, 28). Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual + things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things annexed to spiritual things include right of burial, right of patronage, and, according to ancient writers, + right of the first-born (because before the Lord the first-born exercised the priestly office), and the right to receive tithes. + Now Abraham bought from Ephron a double cave for a burying-place ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q100_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.23.8" target="asv">Gn. 23:8, </a> sqq.), and Jacob bought from Esau the right of the first-born ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q100_A4-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.25.31" target="asv">Gn. 25:31, </a> sqq.). Again the + right of patronage is transferred with the property sold, and is granted "in fee." Tithes are granted to certain soldiers, + and can be redeemed. Prelates also at times retain for themselves the revenues of prebends of which they have the presentation, + although a prebend is something annexed to a spiritual thing. Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Pope Paschal [*Paschal II] says (cf. I, qu. iii, cap. Si quis objecerit): "Whoever sells one of two such things, that the + one is unproductive without the other, leaves neither unsold. Wherefore let no person sell a church, or a prebend, or anything + ecclesiastical." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be annexed to spiritual things in two ways. First, as being dependent on spiritual things. Thus to have to spiritual + things, because it is not competent save to those who hold a clerical office. Hence such things can by no means exist apart + from spiritual things. Consequently it is altogether unlawful to sell such things, because the sale thereof implies the sale + of things spiritual. Other things are annexed to spiritual things through being + directed thereto, for instance the right of patronage, which is directed to the presentation of clerics to ecclesiastical + benefices; and sacred vessels, which are directed to the use of the sacraments. Wherefore such things as these do not presuppose + spiritual things, but precede them in the order of time. Hence in a way they can be sold, but not as annexed to spiritual + things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All things temporal are annexed to spiritual things, as to their end, wherefore it is lawful to sell temporal things, but + their relation to spiritual things cannot be the matter of a lawful sale. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sacred vessels also are annexed to spiritual things as to their end, wherefore their consecration cannot be sold. Yet their + material can be sold for the needs of the Church or of the poor provided they first be broken, after prayer has been said + over them, since when once broken, they are considered to be no longer sacred vessels but mere metal: so that if like vessels + were to be made out of the same material they would have to be consecrated + again. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We have no authority for supposing that the double cave which Abraham bought for a burial place was consecrated for that + purpose: wherefore Abraham could lawfully buy that site to be used for burial, in order to turn it into a sepulchre: even + so it would be lawful now to buy an ordinary field as a site for a cemetery or even a church. Nevertheless because even among + the Gentiles burial places are looked upon as religious, if Ephron intended to accept + the price as payment for a burial place, he sinned in selling, though Abraham did not sin in buying, because he intended merely + to buy an ordinary plot of ground. Even now, it is lawful in a case of necessity to sell or buy land on which there has previously + been a church, as we have also said with regard to sacred vessels (Reply OBJ[2]). Or again, Abraham is to be excused because + he thus freed himself of a grievance. For although Ephron offered him the burial place for nothing, Abraham deemed + that he could not accept it gratis without prejudice to himself. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A4-p10"> The right of the first-born was due to Jacob by reason of God's choice, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q100_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.1.2" target="asv"> Malach. 1:2,3, </a> "I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau." Wherefore Esau sinned by selling his birthright, yet Jacob sinned not in buying, + because he is understood to have freed himself of his grievance. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A4-p11"> The right of patronage cannot be the matter of a direct sale, nor can it be granted "in fee," but is transferred with the + property sold or granted. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A4-p12"> The spiritual right of receiving tithes is not granted to layfolk, but merely the temporal commodities which are granted + in the name of tithe, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q100_A4-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q87_A3.html">Q[87], A[3]</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A4-p13"> With regard to the granting of benefices it must, however, be observed, that it is not unlawful for a bishop, before presenting + a person to a benefice, to decide, for some reason, to retain part of the revenues of the benefice in question, and to spend + it on some pious object. But, on the other hand, if he were to require part of the revenues of that benefice to be given to + him by the beneficiary, it would be the same as though he demanded payment from him, and he would not + escape the guilt of simony. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A4-p14"></p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A4-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q100_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q100_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q100_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q100_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q100_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q100_A5-p0.1">Whether it is lawful to grant spiritual things in return for an equivalent of service, or for an oral remuneration?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q100_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is lawful to grant spiritual things in return for an equivalent of service, or an oral remuneration. + Gregory says (Regist. iii, ep. 18): "It is right that those who serve the interests of the Church should be rewarded." Now + an equivalent of service denotes serving the interests of the Church. Therefore it seems lawful to confer ecclesiastical benefices + for services received. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to confer an ecclesiastical benefice for service received seems to indicate a carnal intention, no less than to + do so on account of kinship. Yet the latter seemingly is not simoniacal since it implies no buying or selling. Therefore neither + is the former simoniacal. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is done only at another's request would seem to be done gratis: so that apparently it does not involve + simony, which consists in buying or selling. Now oral remuneration denotes the conferring of an ecclesiastical benefice at + some person's request. Therefore this is not simoniacal. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, hypocrites perform spiritual deeds in order that they may receive human praise, which seems to imply oral remuneration: + and yet hypocrites are not said to be guilty of simony. Therefore oral remuneration does not entail simony. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Pope Urban [*Urban II, Ep. xvii ad Lucium] says: "Whoever grants or acquires ecclesiastical things, not for the purpose for + which they were instituted but for his own profit, in consideration of an oral remuneration or of an equivalent in service + rendered or money received, is guilty of simony." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q100_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q100_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, the term "money" denotes "anything that can have a pecuniary value." Now it is evident that a man's service is directed + to some kind of usefulness, which has a pecuniary value, wherefore servants are hired for a money wage. Therefore to grant + a spiritual thing for a service rendered or to be rendered is the same as to grant it for the money, received or promised, + at which that service could be valued. If + likewise, to grant a person's request for the bestowal of a temporary favor is directed to some kind of usefulness which has + a pecuniary value. Wherefore just as a man contracts the guilt of simony by accepting money or any eternal thing which comes + under the head of "real remuneration," so too does he contract it, by receiving "oral remuneration" or an "equivalent in service + rendered." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If a cleric renders a prelate a lawful service, directed to spiritual things (e.g. to the good of the Church, or benefit + of her ministers), he becomes worthy of an ecclesiastical benefice by reason of the devotion that led him to render the service, + as he would by reason of any other good deed. Hence this is not a case of remuneration for service rendered, such as Gregory + has in mind. But if the service be unlawful, or directed to carnal things (e.g. + a service rendered to the prelate for the profit of his kindred, or the increase of his patrimony, or the like), it will be + a case of remuneration for service rendered, and this will be simony. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The bestowal of a spiritual thing gratis on a person by reason of kinship or of any carnal affection is unlawful and carnal, + but not simoniacal: since nothing is received in return, wherefore it does not imply a contract of buying and selling, on + which simony is based. But to present a person to an ecclesiastical benefice with the understanding or intention that he provide + for one's kindred from the revenue is manifest simony. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Oral remuneration denotes either praise that pertains to human favor, which has its price, or a request whereby man's favor + is obtained or the contrary avoided. Hence if one intend this chiefly one commits simony. Now to grant a request made for + an unworthy person implies, seemingly, that this is one's chief intention wherefore the deed itself is simoniacal. But if + the request be made for a worthy person, the deed itself is not simoniacal, because it + is based on a worthy cause, on account of which a spiritual thing is granted to the person for whom the request is made. Nevertheless + there may be simony in the intention, if one look, not to the worthiness of the person, but to human favor. If, however, a + person asks for himself, that he may obtain the cure of souls, his very presumption renders him unworthy, and so his request + is made for an unworthy person. But, if one be in need, one may lawfully seek for oneself an ecclesiastical benefice + without the cure of souls. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A hypocrite does not give a spiritual thing for the sake of praise, he only makes a show of it, and under false pretenses + stealthily purloins rather than buys human praise: so that seemingly the hypocrite is not guilty of simony. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A5-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A5-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q100_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q100_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q100_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q100_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q101.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q100_A6-p0.1">Whether those who are guilty of simony are fittingly punished by being deprived of what they have acquired by simony?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q100_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that those who are guilty of simony are not fittingly punished by being deprived of what they have acquired + by simony. Simony is committed by acquiring spiritual things in return for a remuneration. Now certain spiritual things cannot + be lost when once acquired, such as all characters that are imprinted by a consecration. Therefore it is not a fitting punishment + for a person to be deprived of what he has acquired simoniacally. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it sometimes happens that one who has obtained the episcopate by simony commands a subject of his to receive orders + from him: and apparently the subject should obey, so long as the Church tolerates him. Yet no one ought to receive from him + that has not the power to give. Therefore a bishop does not lose his episcopal power, if he has acquired it by simony. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one should be punished for what was done without his knowledge and consent, since punishment is due for sin which + is voluntary, as was shown above ( + <a id="SS_Q100_A6-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A1.html">FS, Q[74], AA[1]</a>,2; + <a id="SS_Q100_A6-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A7.html">FS, Q[77], A[7]</a>). Now it happens sometimes that a person acquires something spiritual, which others have procured for him without his knowledge + and consent. Therefore he should not be punished by being deprived of what has been + bestowed on him. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A6-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, no one should profit by his own sin. Yet, if a person who has acquired an ecclesiastical benefice by simony, were + to restore what he has received, this would sometimes turn to the profit of those who had a share in his simony; for instance, + when a prelate and his entire chapter have consented to the simony. Therefore that which has been acquired by simony ought + not always to be restored. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A6-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, sometimes a person obtains admission to a monastery by simony, and there takes the solemn vow of profession. But + no one should be freed from the obligation of a vow on account of a fault he has committed. Therefore he should not be expelled + from the monastic state which he has acquired by simony. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A6-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, in this world external punishment is not inflicted for the internal movements of the heart, whereof God alone is + the judge. Now simony is committed in the mere intention or will, wherefore it is defined in reference to the will, as stated + above (A[1], ad 2). Therefore a person should not always be deprived of what he has acquired by simony. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A6-p8"> + <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, to be promoted to greater dignity is much less than to retain that which one has already received. Now sometimes + those who are guilty of simony are, by dispensation, promoted to greater dignity. Therefore they should not always be deprived + of what they have received. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A6-p9"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (I, qu. i, cap. Si quis Episcopus): "He that has been ordained shall profit nothing from his ordination or + promotion that he has acquired by the bargain, but shall forfeit the dignity or cure that he has acquired with his money." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A6-p10"> + <b>I answer that,</b> No one can lawfully retain that which he has acquired against the owner's will. For instance, if a steward were to give some + of his lord's property to a person, against his lord's will and orders, the recipient could not lawfully retain what he received. + Now Our Lord, Whose stewards and ministers are the prelates of churches, ordered spiritual things to be given gratis, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q100_A6-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.8" target="asv"> Mat. 10:8, </a> "Freely have you received, freely give." + Wherefore whosoever acquires spiritual things in return for a remuneration cannot lawfully retain them. Moreover, those who + are guilty of simony, by either selling or buying spiritual things, as well as those who act as go-between, are sentenced + to other punishments, namely, infamy and deposition, if they be clerics, and excommunication if they be laymen, as stated + qu. i, cap. Si quis Episcopus [*Qu. iii, can. Si quis praebendas]. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> He that has received a sacred Order simoniacally, receives the character of the Order on account of the efficacy of the sacrament: + but he does not receive the grace nor the exercise of the Order, because he has received the character by stealth as it were, + and against the will of the Supreme Lord. Wherefore he is suspended, by virtue of the law, both as regards himself, namely, + that he should not busy himself about exercising his Order, and as regards + others, namely, that no one may communicate with him in the exercise of his Order, whether his sin be public or secret. Nor + may he reclaim the money which he basely gave, although the other party unjustly retains it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A6-p12"> Again, a man who is guilty of simony, through having conferred Orders simoniacally, or through having simoniacally granted + or received a benefice, or through having been a go-between in a simoniacal transaction, if he has done so publicly, is suspended + by virtue of the law, as regards both himself and others; but if he has acted in secret he is suspended by virtue of the law, + as regards himself alone, and not as regards others. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A6-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One ought not to receive Orders from a bishop one knows to have been promoted simoniacally, either on account of his command + or for fear of his excommunication: and such as receive Orders from him do not receive the exercise of their Orders, even + though they are ignorant of his being guilty of simony; and they need to receive a dispensation. Some, however, maintain that + one ought to receive Orders in obedience to his command unless one can prove him + to be guilty of simony, but that one ought not to exercise the Order without a dispensation. But this is an unreasonable statement, + because no one should obey a man to the extent of communicating with him in an unlawful action. Now he that is, by virtue + of the law, suspended as regards both himself and others, confers Orders unlawfully: wherefore no one should communicate with + him, by receiving Orders from him for any cause whatever. If, however, one be not certain on the point, one ought not + to give credence to another's sin, and so one ought with a good conscience to receive Orders from him. And if the bishop has + been guilty of simony otherwise than by a simoniacal promotion, and the fact be a secret, one can receive Orders from him + because he is not suspended as regards others, but only as regards himself, as stated above (ad 1). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A6-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To be deprived of what one has received is not only the punishment of a sin, but is also sometimes the effect of acquiring + unjustly, as when one buys a thing of a person who cannot sell it. Wherefore if a man, knowingly and spontaneously, receives + Orders or an ecclesiastical benefice simoniacally, not only is he deprived of what he has received, by forfeiting the exercise + of his order, and resigning the benefice and the fruits acquired therefrom, but + also in addition to this he is punished by being marked with infamy. Moreover, he is bound to restore not only the fruit actually + acquired, but also such as could have been acquired by a careful possessor (which, however, is to be understood of the net + fruits, allowance being made for expenses incurred on account of the fruits), excepting those fruits that have been expended + for the good of the Church. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A6-p15"> On the other hand, if a man's promotion be procured simoniacally by others, without his knowledge and consent, he forfeits + the exercise of his Order, and is bound to resign the benefice obtained together with fruits still extant; but he is not bound + to restore the fruits which he has consumed, since he possessed them in good faith. Exception must be made in the case when + his promotion has been deceitfully procured by an enemy of his; or when he expressly opposes the transaction, + for then he is not bound to resign, unless subsequently he agree to the transaction, by paying what was promised. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A6-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Money, property, or fruits simoniacally received, must be restored to the Church that has incurred loss by their transfer, + notwithstanding the fact that the prelate or a member of the chapter of that church was at fault, since others ought not to + be the losers by his sin: in suchwise, however, that, as far as possible, the guilty parties be not the gainers. But if the + prelate and the entire chapter be at fault, restitution must be made, with the + consent of superior authority, either to the poor or to some other church. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A6-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> If there are any persons who have been simoniacally admitted into a monastery, they must quit: and if the simony was committed + with their knowledge since the holding of the General Council [*Fourth Lateran Council, A.D. 1215, held by Innocent III], + they must be expelled from their monastery without hope of return, and do perpetual penance under a stricter rule, or in some + house of the same order, if a stricter one be not found. If, however, this took + place before the Council, they must be placed in other houses of the same order. If this cannot be done, they must be received + into monasteries of the same order, by way of compensation, lest they wander about the world, but they must not be admitted + to their former rank, and must be assigned a lower place. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A6-p18"> On the other hand, if they were received simoniacally, without their knowledge, whether before or after the Council, then + after quitting they may be received again, their rank being changed as stated. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A6-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> In God's sight the mere will makes a man guilty of simony; but as regards the external ecclesiastical punishment he is not + punished as a simoniac, by being obliged to resign, but is bound to repent of his evil intention. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A6-p20"> + <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> The Pope alone can grant a dispensation to one who has knowingly received a benefice (simoniacally). In other cases the bishop + also can dispense, provided the beneficiary first of all renounce what he has received simoniacally, so that he will receive + either the lesser dispensation allowing him to communicate with the laity, or a greater dispensation, allowing him after doing + penance to retain his order in some other Church; or again a greater + dispensation, allowing him to remain in the same Church, but in minor orders; or a full dispensation allowing him to exercise + even the major orders in the same Church, but not to accept a prelacy. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A6-p21"></p> + <p id="SS_Q100_A6-p22"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q100_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q101.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q99_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q100_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q101" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q100_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q101_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q101-p0.1">OF PIETY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q101-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q101-p2"> After religion we must consider piety, the consideration of which will render the opposite vices manifest. Accordingly four + points of inquiry arise with regard to piety: + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101-p3"> (1) To whom does piety extend?</p> + <p id="SS_Q101-p4"> (2) What does piety make one offer a person?</p> + <p id="SS_Q101-p5"> (3) Whether piety is a special virtue?</p> + <p id="SS_Q101-p6"> (4) Whether the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of religion?</p> + <div id="SS_Q101_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q101.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q101_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q101_A1-p0.1">Whether piety extends to particular human individuals?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q101_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that piety does not extend to particular human individuals. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x) that piety denotes, + properly speaking, the worship of God, which the Greeks designate by the term {eusebeia}. But the worship of God does not + denote relation to man, but only to God. Therefore piety does not extend definitely to certain human individuals. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. i): "Piety, on her day, provides a banquet, because she fills the inmost recesses of the heart + with works of mercy." Now the works of mercy are to be done to all, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i). Therefore + piety does not extend definitely to certain special persons. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in human affairs there are many other mutual relations besides those of kindred and citizenship, as the Philosopher + states (Ethic. viii, 11,12), and on each of them is founded a kind of friendship, which would seem to be the virtue of piety, + according to a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q101_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.3.5" target="asv">2 Tim. 3:5, </a> "Having an appearance indeed of piety [Douay: 'godliness']." Therefore piety extends not only to one's kindred and fellow-citizens. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by piety that we do our duty towards our kindred and well-wishers of our country + and render them faithful service." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man becomes a debtor to other men in various ways, according to their various excellence and the various benefits received + from them. on both counts God holds first place, for He is supremely excellent, and is for us the first principle of being + and government. In the second place, the principles of our being and government are our parents and our country, that have + given us birth and nourishment. Consequently man is debtor chiefly to his parents and his + country, after God. Wherefore just as it belongs to religion to give worship to God, so does it belong to piety, in the second + place, to give worship to one's parents and one's country. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A1-p7"> The worship due to our parents includes the worship given to all our kindred, since our kinsfolk are those who descend from + the same parents, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12). The worship given to our country includes homage to all + our fellow-citizens and to all the friends of our country. Therefore piety extends chiefly to these. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The greater includes the lesser: wherefore the worship due to God includes the worship due to our parents as a particular. + Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q101_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.1.6" target="asv">Malach. 1:6</a>): "If I be a father, where is My honor?" Consequently the term piety extends also to the divine worship. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), "the term piety is often used in connection with works of mercy, in the language of the + common people; the reason for which I consider to be the fact that God Himself has declared that these works are more pleasing + to Him than sacrifices. This custom has led to the application of the word 'pious' to God Himself." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The relations of a man with his kindred and fellow-citizens are more referable to the principles of his being than other + relations: wherefore the term piety is more applicable to them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q101.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q101_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q101_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q101_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q101_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q101_A2-p0.1">Whether piety provides support for our parents?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q101_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that piety does not provide support for our parents. For, seemingly, the precept of the decalogue, "Honor thy father + and mother," belongs to piety. But this prescribes only the giving of honor. Therefore it does not belong to piety to provide + support for one's parents. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a man is bound to lay up for those whom he is bound to support. Now according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q101_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.14" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:14</a>), "neither ought the children to lay up for the parents." Therefore piety does not oblige them to support their parents. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, piety extends not only to one's parents, but also to other kinsmen and to one's fellow-citizens, as stated above + + <a id="SS_Q101_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q101_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But one is not bound to support all one's kindred and fellow-citizens. Therefore neither is one bound to support one's parents. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> our Lord ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q101_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.3" target="asv">Mat. 15:3-6</a>) reproved the Pharisees for hindering children from supporting their parents. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We owe something to our parents in two ways: that is to say, both essentially, and accidentally. We owe them essentially + that which is due to a father as such: and since he is his son's superior through being the principle of his being, the latter + owes him reverence and service. Accidentally, that is due to a father, which it befits him to receive in respect of something + accidental to him, for instance, if he be ill, it is fitting that his children should + visit him and see to his cure; if he be poor, it is fitting that they should support him; and so on in like instance, all + of which come under the head of service due. Hence Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "piety gives both duty and homage": + "duty" referring to service, and "homage" to reverence or honor, because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), "we are said + to give homage to those whose memory or presence we honor." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to our Lord's interpretation ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q101_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.3" target="asv">Mat. 15:3-6</a>) the honor due to our parents includes whatever support we owe them; and the reason for this is that support is given to + one's father because it is due to him as to one greater. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since a father stands in the relation of principle, and his son in the relation of that which is from a principle, it is + essentially fitting for a father to support his son: and consequently he is bound to support him not only for a time, but + for all his life, and this is to lay by. On the other hand, for the son to bestow something on his father is accidental, arising + from some momentary necessity, wherein he is bound to support him, but not to lay + by as for a long time beforehand, because naturally parents are not the successors of their children, but children of their + parents. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), "we offer homage and duty to all our kindred and to the well-wishers of our country"; + not, however, equally to all, but chiefly to our parents, and to others according to our means and their personal claims. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q101_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q101_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q101_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q101_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q101_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q101_A3-p0.1">Whether piety is a special virtue distinct from other virtues?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q101_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that piety is not a special virtue distinct from other virtues. For the giving of service and homage to anyone proceeds + from love. But it belongs to piety. Therefore piety is not a distinct virtue from charity. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is proper to religion to give worship to God. But piety also gives worship to God, according to Augustine (De + Civ. Dei x). Therefore piety is not distinct from religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, piety, whereby we give our country worship and duty, seems to be the same as legal justice, which looks to the common + good. But legal justice is a general virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1,2). Therefore piety is not a special + virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is accounted by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) as a part of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A special virtue is one that regards an object under a special aspect. Since, then, the nature of justice consists in rendering + another person his due, wherever there is a special aspect of something due to a person, there is a special virtue. Now a + thing is indebted in a special way to that which is its connatural principle of being and government. And piety regards this + principle, inasmuch as it pays duty and homage to our parents and country, and to those + who are related thereto. Therefore piety is a special virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as religion is a protestation of faith, hope and charity, whereby man is primarily directed to God, so again piety is + a protestation of the charity we bear towards our parents and country. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is the principle of our being and government in a far more excellent manner than one's father or country. Hence religion, + which gives worship to God, is a distinct virtue from piety, which pays homage to our parents and country. But things relating + to creatures are transferred to God as the summit of excellence and causality, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): wherefore, + by way of excellence, piety designates the worship of God, even as God, by way + of excellence, is called "Our Father." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Piety extends to our country in so far as the latter is for us a principle of being: but legal justice regards the good of + our country, considered as the common good: wherefore legal justice has more of the character of a general virtue than piety + has. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q101_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q101_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q101_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q101_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q102.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q101_A4-p0.1">Whether the duties of piety towards one's parents should be omitted for the sake of religion? </h4> + <p id="SS_Q101_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the duties of piety towards one's parents should be omitted for the sake of religion. For Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q101_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.14.26" target="asv">Lk. 14:26</a>): "If any man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea and + his own life also, he cannot be My disciple." Hence it is said in praise of James and John ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q101_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.22" target="asv">Mat. 4:22</a>) that they left "their nets and father, and followed" Christ. Again it + is said in praise of the Levites ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q101_A4-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.33.9" target="asv">Dt. 33:9</a>): "Who hath said to his father, and to his mother: I do not know you; and to his brethren: I know you not; and their own + children they have not known. These have kept Thy word." Now a man who knows not his parents and other kinsmen, or who even + hates them, must needs omit the duties of piety. Therefore the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q101_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.9.59" target="asv">Lk. 9:59,60</a>) that in answer to him who said: "Suffer me first to go and bury my father," Our Lord replied: "Let the dead bury their dead: + but go thou, and preach the kingdom of God." Now the latter pertains to religion, while it is a duty of piety to bury one's + father. Therefore a duty of piety should be omitted for the sake of religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God is called "Our Father" by excellence. Now just as we worship our parents by paying them the duties of piety + so do we worship God by religion. Therefore the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of the worship of religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, religious are bound by a vow which they may not break to fulfil the observances of religion. Now in accordance with + those observances they are hindered from supporting their parents, both on the score of poverty, since they have nothing of + their own, and on the score of obedience, since they may not leave the cloister without the permission of their superior. + Therefore the duties of piety towards one's parents should be omitted for the sake of + religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord reproved the Pharisees ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q101_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.3" target="asv">Mat. 15:3-6</a>) who taught that for the sake of religion one ought to refrain from paying one's parents the honor we owe them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Religion and piety are two virtues. Now no virtue is opposed to another virtue, since according to the Philosopher, in his + book on the Categories (Cap. De oppos.), "good is not opposed to good." Therefore it is impossible that religion and piety + mutually hinder one another, so that the act of one be excluded by the act of the other. Now, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q101_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q7_A2.html">FS, Q[7], A[2]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q101_A4-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A3.html">FS, Q[18], A[3]</a>), the act of every + virtue is limited by the circumstances due thereto, and if it overstep them it will be an act no longer of virtue but of vice. + Hence it belongs to piety to pay duty and homage to one's parents according to the due mode. But it is not the due mode that + man should tend to worship his father rather than God, but, as Ambrose says on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q101_A4-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.52" target="asv"> Lk. 12:52, </a> "the piety of divine religion takes precedence of the claims of kindred." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A4-p8"> Accordingly, if the worship of one's parents take one away from the worship of God it would no longer be an act of piety + to pay worship to one's parents to the prejudice of God. Hence Jerome says (Ep. ad Heliod.): "Though thou trample upon thy + father, though thou spurn thy mother, turn not aside, but with dry eyes hasten to the standard of the cross; it is the highest + degree of piety to be cruel in this matter." Therefore in such a case the duties of piety towards one's parents + should be omitted for the sake of the worship religion gives to God. If, however, by paying the services due to our parents, + we are not withdrawn from the service of God, then will it be an act of piety, and there will be no need to set piety aside + for the sake of religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory expounding this saying of our Lord says (Hom. xxxvii in Ev.) that "when we find our parents to be a hindrance in + our way to God, we must ignore them by hating and fleeing from them." For if our parents incite us to sin, and withdraw us + from the service of God, we must, as regards this point, abandon and hate them. It is in this sense that the Levites are said + to have not known their kindred, because they obeyed the Lord's command, and spared + not the idolaters ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q101_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.32" target="asv">Ex. 32</a>). James and John are praised for leaving their parents and following our Lord, not that their father incited them to evil, + but because they deemed it possible for him to find another means of livelihood, if they followed Christ. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Our Lord forbade the disciple to bury his father because, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matth.), "Our Lord by so + doing saved him from many evils, such as the sorrows and worries and other things that one anticipates under these circumstances. + For after the burial the will had to be read, the estate had to be divided, and so forth: but chiefly, because there were + others who could see to the funeral." Or, according to Cyril's commentary on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q101_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.9" target="asv">Lk. + 9 + </a>, "this disciple's request was, not that he might bury a dead father, but that he might support a yet living father in the + latter's old age, until at length he should bury him. This is what Our Lord did not grant, because there were others, bound + by the duties of kindred, to take care of him." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Whatever we give our parents out of piety is referred by us to God; just as other works of mercy which we perform with regard + to any of our neighbors are offered to God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q101_A4-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.40" target="asv"> Mat. 25:40</a>: "As long as you did it to one of . . . My least . . . you did it to Me." Accordingly, if our carnal parents stand in need + of our assistance, so that they have no other means of support, provided they incite us to nothing against God, we + must not abandon them for the sake of religion. But if we cannot devote ourselves to their service without sin, or if they + can be supported without our assistance, it is lawful to forego their service, so as to give more time to religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> We must speak differently of one who is yet in the world, and of one who has made his profession in religion. For he that + is in the world, if he has parents unable to find support without him, he must not leave them and enter religion, because + he would be breaking the commandment prescribing the honoring of parents. Some say, however, that even then he might abandon + them, and leave them in God's care. But this, considered aright, would be to tempt + God: since, while having human means at hand, he would be exposing his parents to danger, in the hope of God's assistance. + on the other hand, if the parents can find means of livelihood without him, it is lawful for him to abandon them and enter + religion, because children are not bound to support their parents except in cases of necessity, as stated above. He that has + already made his profession in religion is deemed to be already dead to the world: wherefore he ought not, under pretext of + supporting his parents, to leave the cloister where he is buried with Christ, and busy himself once more with worldly affairs. + Nevertheless he is bound, saving his obedience to his superiors, and his religious state withal, to make points efforts for + his parents' support. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A4-p13"></p> + <p id="SS_Q101_A4-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q101_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q102.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q100_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q101_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q102" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q101_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q102_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q102-p0.1">OF OBSERVANCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF, AND OF ITS PARTS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q102-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q102-p2"> We must now consider observance and its parts, the considerations of which will manifest the contrary vices.</p> + <p id="SS_Q102-p3"> Under the head of observance there are three points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q102-p4"> (1) Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues?</p> + <p id="SS_Q102-p5"> (2) What does observance offer?</p> + <p id="SS_Q102-p6"> (3) Of its comparison with piety.</p> + <div id="SS_Q102_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q102.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q102_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q102_A1-p0.1">Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q102_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that observance is not a special virtue, distinct from other virtues. For virtues are distinguished by their objects. + But the object of observance is not distinct from the object of piety: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by + observance that we pay worship and honor to those who excel in some kind of dignity." But worship and honor are paid also + by piety to our parents, who excel in dignity. Therefore observance is not a distinct virtue + from piety. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as honor and worship are due to those that are in a position of dignity, so also are they due to those who + excel in science and virtue. But there is no special virtue whereby we pay honor and worship to those who excel in science + and virtue. Therefore observance, whereby we pay worship and honor to those who excel in dignity, is not a special virtue + distinct from other virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we have many duties towards those who are in a position of dignity, the fulfilment of which is required by law, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q102_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.7" target="asv">Rom. 13:7</a>, "Render . . . to all men their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due," etc. Now the fulfilment of the requirements of the + law belongs to legal justice, or even to special justice. Therefore observance is not by itself a special virtue distinct + from other virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons observance along with the other parts of justice, which are special virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As explained above ( + <a id="SS_Q102_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q101_A1.html">Q[101], AA[1]</a>,3; + <a id="SS_Q102_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q80.html"> Q[80])</a>, according to the various excellences of those persons to whom something is due, there must needs be a corresponding distinction + of virtues in a descending order. Now just as a carnal father partakes of the character of principle in a particular way, + which character is found in God in a universal way, so too a person who, in some way, exercises providence in one + respect, partakes of the character of father in a particular way, since a father is the principle of generation, of education, + of learning and of whatever pertains to the perfection of human life: while a person who is in a position of dignity is as + a principle of government with regard to certain things: for instance, the governor of a state in civil matters, the commander + of an army in matters of warfare, a professor in matters of learning, and so forth. Hence it is that all such persons are + designated as "fathers," on account of their being charged with like cares: thus the servants of Naaman said to him ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q102_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 5:13</a>): "Father, if the prophet had bid thee do some great thing," etc. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A1-p7"> Therefore, just as, in a manner, religion, whereby worship is given to find piety, whereby we worship our so under piety + we find observance, whereby worship and honor are paid to persons in positions of dignity. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q102_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q101_A3.html">Q[101], A[3]</a>, ad 2), religion goes by the name of piety by way of supereminence, although piety properly so called is distinct from religion; + and in the same way piety can be called observance by way of excellence, although observance properly speaking is distinct + from piety. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By the very fact of being in a position of dignity a man not only excels as regards his position, but also has a certain + power of governing subjects, wherefore it is fitting that he should be considered as a principle inasmuch as he is the governor + of others. On the other hand, the fact that a man has perfection of science and virtue does not give him the character of + a principle in relation to others, but merely a certain excellence in himself. + Wherefore a special virtue is appointed for the payment of worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity. Yet, forasmuch + as science, virtue and all like things render a man fit for positions of dignity, the respect which is paid to anyone on account + of any excellence whatever belongs to the same virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It belongs to special justice, properly speaking, to pay the equivalent to those to whom we owe anything. Now this cannot + be done to the virtuous, and to those who make good use of their position of dignity, as neither can it be done to God, nor + to our parents. Consequently these matters belong to an annexed virtue, and not to special justice, which is a principal virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A1-p11"> Legal justice extends to the acts of all the virtues, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q102_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A6.html">Q[58], A[6]</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q102.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q102_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q102_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q102_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q102_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q102_A2-p0.1">Whether it belongs to observance to pay worship and honor to those who are in positions of dignity?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q102_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that it does not belong to observance to pay worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity. For according + to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x), we are said to worship those persons whom we hold in honor, so that worship and honor would + seem to be the same. Therefore it is unfitting to define observance as paying worship and honor to persons in positions of + dignity. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to justice that we pay what we owe: wherefore this belongs to observance also, since it is a part of + justice. Now we do not owe worship and honor to all persons in positions of dignity, but only to those who are placed over + us. Therefore observance is unfittingly defined as giving worship and honor to all. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, not only do we owe honor to persons of dignity who are placed over us; we owe them also fear and a certain payment + of remuneration, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q102_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.7" target="asv"> Rom. 13:7, </a> "Render . . . to all men their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom + honor." Moreover, we owe them reverence and subjection, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q102_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.13.17" target="asv"> Heb. 13:17, </a> "Obey your prelates, and be subject to them." + Therefore observance is not fittingly defined as paying worship and honor. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by observance that we pay worship and honor to those who excel in some kind + of dignity." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It belongs to persons in positions of dignity to govern subjects. Now to govern is to move certain ones to their due end: + thus a sailor governs his ship by steering it to port. But every mover has a certain excellence and power over that which + is moved. Wherefore, a person in a position of dignity is an object of twofold consideration: first, in so far as he obtains + excellence of position, together with a certain power over subjects: secondly, as regards the + exercise of his government. In respect of his excellence there is due to him honor, which is the recognition of some kind + of excellence; and in respect of the exercise of his government, there is due to him worship, consisting in rendering him + service, by obeying his commands, and by repaying him, according to one's faculty, for the benefits we received from him. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Worship includes not only honor, but also whatever other suitable actions are connected with the relations between man and + man. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q102_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q80.html">Q[80])</a>, debt is twofold. One is legal debt, to pay which man is compelled by law; and thus man owes honor and worship to those persons + in positions of dignity who are placed over him. The other is moral debt, which is due by reason of a certain honesty: it + is in this way that we owe worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity even though we be not their subjects. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Honor is due to the excellence of persons in positions of dignity, on account of their higher rank: while fear is due to + them on account of their power to use compulsion: and to the exercise of their government there is due both obedience, whereby + subjects are moved at the command of their superiors, and tributes, which are a repayment of their labor. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q102_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q102_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q102_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q102_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q103.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q102_A3-p0.1">Whether observance is a greater virtue than piety?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q102_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that observance is a greater virtue than piety. For the prince to whom worship is paid by observance is compared + to a father who is worshiped by piety, as a universal to a particular governor; because the household which a father governs + is part of the state which is governed by the prince. Now a universal power is greater, and inferiors are more subject thereto. + Therefore observance is a greater virtue than piety. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, persons in positions of dignity take care of the common good. Now our kindred pertain to the private good, which + we ought to set aside for the common good: wherefore it is praiseworthy to expose oneself to the danger of death for the sake + of the common good. Therefore observance, whereby worship is paid to persons in positions of dignity, is a greater virtue + than piety, which pays worship to one's kindred. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further honor and reverence are due to the virtuous in the first place after God. Now honor and reverence are paid to the + virtuous by the virtue of observance, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Therefore observance takes the first place after religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The precepts of the Law prescribe acts of virtue. Now, immediately after the precepts of religion, which belong to the first + table, follows the precept of honoring our parents which refers to piety. Therefore piety follows immediately after religion + in the order of excellence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Something may be paid to persons in positions of dignity in two ways. First, in relation to the common good, as when one + serves them in the administration of the affairs of the state. This no longer belongs to observance, but to piety, which pays + worship not only to one's father but also to one's fatherland. Secondly, that which is paid to persons in positions of dignity + refers specially to their personal usefulness or renown, and this belongs properly to + observance, as distinct from piety. Therefore in comparing observance with piety we must needs take into consideration the + different relations in which other persons stand to ourselves, which relations both virtues regard. Now it is evident that + the persons of our parents and of our kindred are more substantially akin to us than persons in positions of dignity, since + birth and education, which originate in the father, belong more to one's substance than external government, the principle + of + which is seated in those who are in positions of dignity. For this reason piety takes precedence of observance, inasmuch as + it pays worship to persons more akin to us, and to whom we are more strictly bound. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The prince is compared to the father as a universal to a particular power, as regards external government, but not as regards + the father being a principle of generation: for in this way the father should be compared with the divine power from which + all things derive their being. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In so far as persons in positions of dignity are related to the common good, their worship does not pertain to observance, + but to piety, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The rendering of honor or worship should be proportionate to the person to whom it is paid not only as considered in himself, + but also as compared to those who pay them. Wherefore, though virtuous persons, considered in themselves, are more worthy + of honor than the persons of one's parents, yet children are under a greater obligation, on account of the benefits they have + received from their parents and their natural kinship with them, to pay worship + and honor to their parents than to virtuous persons who are not of their kindred. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q102_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q102_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q103.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q101_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q102_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q103" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q102_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q103_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q103-p0.1">OF DULIA (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q103-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q103-p2"> We must now consider the parts of observance. We shall consider (1) dulia, whereby we pay honor and other things pertaining + thereto to those who are in a higher position; (2) obedience, whereby we obey their commands. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q103-p4"> (1) Whether honor is a spiritual or a corporal thing?</p> + <p id="SS_Q103-p5"> (2) Whether honor is due to those only who are in a higher position?</p> + <p id="SS_Q103-p6"> (3) Whether dulia, which pays honor and worship to those who are above us, is a special virtue, distinct from latria?</p> + <p id="SS_Q103-p7"> (4) Whether it contains several species?</p> + <div id="SS_Q103_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q103.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q103_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q103_A1-p0.1">Whether honor denotes something corporal?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q103_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that honor does not denote something corporal. For honor is showing reverence in acknowledgment of virtue, as may + be gathered from the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5). Now showing reverence is something spiritual, since to revere is an act of + fear, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q103_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q81_A2.html">Q[81], A[2]</a>, ad 1). Therefore honor is something spiritual. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), "honor is the reward of virtue." Now, since virtue consists chiefly + of spiritual things, its reward is not something corporal, for the reward is more excellent than the merit. Therefore honor + does not consist of corporal things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, honor is distinct from praise, as also from glory. Now praise and glory consist of external things. Therefore honor + consists of things internal and spiritual. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome in his exposition of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q103_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.5.3" target="asv">1 Tim. 5:3, </a> "Honor widows that are widows indeed," and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q103_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.5.17" target="asv">1 Tim. 5:17</a>), "let the priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honor" etc. says (Ep. ad Ageruch.): "Honor here stands either + for almsgiving or for remuneration." Now both of these pertain to spiritual things. Therefore honor consists of corporal things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Honor denotes a witnessing to a person's excellence. Therefore men who wish to be honored seek a witnessing to their excellence, + according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5; viii, 8). Now witness is borne either before God or before man. Before God, Who + is the searcher of hearts, the witness of one's conscience suffices. wherefore honor, so far as God is concerned, may consist + of the mere internal movement of the heart, for instance when a man acknowledges + either God's excellence or another man's excellence before God. But, as regards men, one cannot bear witness, save by means + of signs, either by words, as when one proclaims another's excellence by word of mouth, or by deeds, for instance by bowing, + saluting, and so forth, or by external things, as by offering gifts, erecting statues, and the like. Accordingly honor consists + of signs, external and corporal. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reverence is not the same as honor: but on the one hand it is the primary motive for showing honor, in so far as one man + honors another out of the reverence he has for him; and on the other hand, it is the end of honor, in so far as a person is + honored in order that he may be held in reverence by others. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), honor is not a sufficient reward of virtue: yet nothing in human and corporal + things can be greater than honor, since these corporal things themselves are employed as signs in acknowledgment of excelling + virtue. It is, however, due to the good and the beautiful, that they may be made known, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q103_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.15" target="asv"> Mat. 5:15, </a> "Neither do men light a candle, and put it under a bushel, but upon a + candlestick, that it may shine to all that are in the house." In this sense honor is said to be the reward of virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Praise is distinguished from honor in two ways. First, because praise consists only of verbal signs, whereas honor consists + of any external signs, so that praise is included in honor. Secondly, because by paying honor to a person we bear witness + to a person's excelling goodness absolutely, whereas by praising him we bear witness to his goodness in reference to an end: + thus we praise one that works well for an end. On the other hand, honor is given + even to the best, which is not referred to an end, but has already arrived at the end, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. + i, 5). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A1-p10"> Glory is the effect of honor and praise, since the result of our bearing witness to a person's goodness is that his goodness + becomes clear to the knowledge of many. The word "glory" signifies this, for "glory" is the same as {kleria}, wherefore a + gloss of Augustine on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q103_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.16.27" target="asv"> Rom. 16:27 </a>observes that glory is "clear knowledge together with praise." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q103.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q103_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q103_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q103_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q103_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q103_A2-p0.1">Whether honor is properly due to those who are above us?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q103_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that honor is not properly due to those who are above us. For an angel is above any human wayfarer, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q103_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.11" target="asv"> Mat. 11:11, </a> "He that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than John the Baptist." Yet an angel forbade John when the latter + wished to honor him ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q103_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rev.22.10" target="asv">Apoc. 22:10</a>). Therefore honor is not due to those who are above us. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, honor is due to a person in acknowledgment of his virtue, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q103_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q103_A1.html">(A[1];</a> Q[63], A[3]). But sometimes those who are above us are not virtuous. Therefore honor is not due to them, as neither is it + due to the demons, who nevertheless are above us in the order of nature. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q103_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.10" target="asv">Rom. 12:10</a>): "With honor preventing one another," and we read ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q103_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iPet.2.17" target="asv">1 Pet. 2:17</a>): "Honor all men." But this would not be so if honor were due to those alone who are above us. Therefore honor is not due + properly to those who are above us. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q103_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Tob.1.16" target="asv">Tob. 1:16</a>) that Tobias "had ten talents of silver of that which he had been honored by the king": and we read ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q103_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Esth.6.11" target="asv">Esther 6:11</a>) that Assuerus honored Mardochaeus, and ordered it to be proclaimed in his presence: "This honor is he worthy of whom the + king hath a mind to honor." Therefore honor is paid to those also who are beneath us, and it seems, in consequence, that honor + is not due properly to + those who are above us. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 12) that "honor is due to the best." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q103_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q103_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, honor is nothing but an acknowledgment of a person's excelling goodness. Now a person's excellence may be considered, not + only in relation to those who honor him, in the point of his being more excellent than they, but also in itself, or in relation + to other persons, and in this way honor is always due to a person, on account of some excellence or superiority. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A2-p8"> For the person honored has no need to be more excellent than those who honor him; it may suffice for him to be more excellent + than some others, or again he may be more excellent than those who honor him in some respect and not simply. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The angel forbade John to pay him, not any kind of honor, but the honor of adoration and latria, which is due to God. Or + again, he forbade him to pay the honor of dulia, in order to indicate the dignity of John himself, for which Christ equaled + him to the angels "according to the hope of glory of the children of God": wherefore he refused to be honored by him as though + he were superior to him. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A wicked superior is honored for the excellence, not of his virtue but of his dignity, as being God's minister, and because + the honor paid to him is paid to the whole community over which he presides. As for the demons, they are wicked beyond recall, + and should be looked upon as enemies, rather than treated with honor. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In every man is to be found something that makes it possible to deem him better than ourselves, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q103_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.3" target="asv"> Phil. 2:3, </a> "In humility, let each esteem others better than themselves," and thus, too, we should all be on the alert to do honor to + one another. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Private individuals are sometimes honored by kings, not that they are above them in the order of dignity but on account of + some excellence of their virtue: and in this way Tobias and Mardochaeus were honored by kings. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A2-p13"></p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A2-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q103_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q103_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q103_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q103_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q103_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q103_A3-p0.1">Whether dulia is a special virtue distinct from latria?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q103_A3-p1"> + <b>Objection 1.</b> It seems that dulia is not a special virtue distinct from latria. For a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q103_A3-p1.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.7.1" target="asv"> Ps. 7:1, </a> "O Lord my God, in Thee have I put my trust," says: "Lord of all by His power, to Whom dulia is due; God by creation, to + Whom we owe latria." Now the virtue directed to God as Lord is not distinct from that which is directed to Him as God. Therefore + dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 8), "to be loved is like being honored." Now the charity with which we + love God is the same as that whereby we love our neighbor. Therefore dulia whereby we honor our neighbor is not a distinct + virtue from latria with which we honor God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the movement whereby one is moved towards an image is the same as the movement whereby one is moved towards the + thing represented by the image. Now by dulia we honor a man as being made to the image of God. For it is written of the wicked + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q103_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.2.22" target="asv">Wis. 2:22,23</a>) that "they esteemed not the honor of holy souls, for God created man incorruptible, and to the image of His own likeness + He made him." Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from + latria whereby God is honored. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A3-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), that "the homage due to man, of which the Apostle spoke when he commanded servants to obey + their masters and which in Greek is called dulia, is distinct from latria which denotes the homage that consists in the worship + of God." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A3-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to what has been stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q103_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q101_A3.html">Q[101], A[3]</a>), where there are different aspects of that which is due, there must needs be different virtues to render those dues. Now + servitude is due to God and to man under different aspects: even as lordship is competent to God and to man under different + aspects. For God has absolute and paramount lordship over the creature wholly and singly, which is entirely subject to His + power: + whereas man partakes of a certain likeness to the divine lordship, forasmuch as he exercises a particular power over some + man or creature. Wherefore dulia, which pays due service to a human lord, is a distinct virtue from latria, which pays due + service to the lordship of God. It is, moreover, a species of observance, because by observance we honor all those who excel + in dignity, while dulia properly speaking is the reverence of servants for their master, dulia being the Greek for servitude. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A3-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as religion is called piety by way of excellence, inasmuch as God is our Father by way of excellence, so again latria + is called dulia by way of excellence, inasmuch as God is our Lord by way of excellence. Now the creature does not partake + of the power to create by reason of which latria is due to God: and so this gloss drew a distinction, by ascribing latria + to God in respect of creation, which is not communicated to a creature, but dulia in + respect of lordship, which is communicated to a creature. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason why we love our neighbor is God, since that which we love in our neighbor through charity is God alone. Wherefore + the charity with which we love God is the same as that with which we love our neighbor. Yet there are other friendships distinct + from charity, in respect of the other reasons for which a man is loved. In like manner, since there is one reason for serving + God and another for serving man, and for honoring the one or the other, + latria and dulia are not the same virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Movement towards an image as such is referred to the thing represented by the image: yet not every movement towards an image + is referred to the image as such, and consequently sometimes the movement to the image differs specifically from the movement + to the thing. Accordingly we must reply that the honor or subjection of dulia regards some dignity of a man absolutely. For + though, in respect of that dignity, man is made to the image or likeness of God, + yet in showing reverence to a person, one does not always refer this to God actually. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A3-p9"> Or we may reply that the movement towards an image is, after a fashion, towards the thing, yet the movement towards the thing + need not be towards its image. Wherefore reverence paid to a person as the image of God redounds somewhat to God: and yet + this differs from the reverence that is paid to God Himself, for this in no way refers to His image. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q103_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q103_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q103_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q103_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q104.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q103_A4-p0.1">Whether dulia has various species?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q103_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that dulia has various species. For by dulia we show honor to our neighbor. Now different neighbors are honored + under different aspects, for instance king, father and master, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 2). Since this difference + of aspect in the object differentiates the species of virtue, it seems that dulia is divided into specifically different virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the mean differs specifically from the extremes, as pale differs from white and black. Now hyperdulia is apparently + a mean between latria and dulia: for it is shown towards creatures having a special affinity to God, for instance to the Blessed + Virgin as being the mother of God. Therefore it seems that there are different species of dulia, one being simply dulia, the + other hyperdulia. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as in the rational creature we find the image of God, for which reason it is honored, so too in the irrational + creature we find the trace of God. Now the aspect of likeness denoted by an image differs from the aspect conveyed by a trace. + Therefore we must distinguish a corresponding difference of dulia: and all the more since honor is shown to certain irrational + creatures, as, for instance, to the wood of the Holy Cross. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dulia is condivided with latria. But latria is not divided into different species. Neither therefore is dulia. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Dulia may be taken in two ways. In one way it may be taken in a wide sense as denoting reverence paid to anyone on account + of any kind of excellence, and thus it comprises piety and observance, and any similar virtue whereby reverence is shown towards + a man. Taken in this sense it will have parts differing specifically from one another. In another way it may be taken in a + strict sense as denoting the reverence of a servant for his lord, for dulia signifies + servitude, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q103_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q103_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Taken in this sense it is not divided into different species, but is one of the species of observance, mentioned by Tully + (De Invent. Rhet. ii), for the reason that a servant reveres his lord under one aspect, a soldier his commanding officer under + another, the disciple his master under another, and so on in similar cases. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument takes dulia in a wide sense. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Hyperdulia is the highest species of dulia taken in a wide sense, since the greatest reverence is that which is due to a + man by reason of his having an affinity to God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man owes neither subjection nor honor to an irrational creature considered in itself, indeed all such creatures are naturally + subject to man. As to the Cross of Christ, the honor we pay to it is the same as that which we pay to Christ, just as the + king's robe receives the same honor as the king himself, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q103_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q103_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q104.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q102_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q103_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q104" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q103_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q104_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q104-p0.1">OF OBEDIENCE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q104-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q104-p2"> We must now consider obedience, under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q104-p3"> (1) Whether one man is bound to obey another?</p> + <p id="SS_Q104-p4"> (2) Whether obedience is a special virtue?</p> + <p id="SS_Q104-p5"> (3) Of its comparison with other virtues;</p> + <p id="SS_Q104-p6"> (4) Whether God must be obeyed in all things?</p> + <p id="SS_Q104-p7"> (5) Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things?</p> + <p id="SS_Q104-p8"> (6) Whether the faithful are bound to obey the secular power?</p> + <div id="SS_Q104_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q104.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q104_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q104_A1-p0.1">Whether one man is bound to obey another?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q104_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that one man is not bound to obey another. For nothing should be done contrary to the divine ordinance. Now God + has so ordered that man is ruled by his own counsel, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q104_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.14" target="asv"> Ecclus. 15:14, </a> "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel." Therefore one man is not bound to obey another. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if one man were bound to obey another, he would have to look upon the will of the person commanding him, as being + his rule of conduct. Now God's will alone, which is always right, is a rule of human conduct. Therefore man is bound to obey + none but God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more gratuitous the service the more is it acceptable. Now what a man does out of duty is not gratuitous. Therefore + if a man were bound in duty to obey others in doing good deeds, for this very reason his good deeds would be rendered less + acceptable through being done out of obedience. Therefore one man is not bound to obey another. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is prescribed ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q104_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.13.17" target="asv">Heb. 13:17</a>): "Obey your prelates and be subject to them." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Just as the actions of natural things proceed from natural powers, so do human actions proceed from the human will. In natural + things it behooved the higher to move the lower to their actions by the excellence of the natural power bestowed on them by + God: and so in human affairs also the higher must move the lower by their will in virtue of a divinely established authority. + Now to move by reason and will is to command. Wherefore just as in virtue of the + divinely established natural order the lower natural things need to be subject to the movement of the higher, so too in human + affairs, in virtue of the order of natural and divine law, inferiors are bound to obey their superiors. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God left man in the hand of his own counsel, not as though it were lawful to him to do whatever he will, but because, unlike + irrational creatures, he is not compelled by natural necessity to do what he ought to do, but is left the free choice proceeding + from his own counsel. And just as he has to proceed on his own counsel in doing other things, so too has he in the point of + obeying his superiors. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxv), "When we humbly give + way to another's voice, we overcome ourselves in our own hearts." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will of God is the first rule whereby all rational wills are regulated: and to this rule one will approaches more than + another, according to a divinely appointed order. Hence the will of the one man who issues a command may be as a second rule + to the will of this other man who obeys him. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A thing may be deemed gratuitous in two ways. In one way on the part of the deed itself, because, to wit, one is not bound + to do it; in another way, on the part of the doer, because he does it of his own free will. Now a deed is rendered virtuous, + praiseworthy and meritorious, chiefly according as it proceeds from the will. Wherefore although obedience be a duty, if one + obey with a prompt will, one's merit is not for that reason diminished, especially + before God, Who sees not only the outward deed, but also the inward will. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q104.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q104_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q104_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q104_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q104_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q104_A2-p0.1">Whether obedience is a special virtue?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q104_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that obedience is not a special virtue. For disobedience is contrary to obedience. But disobedience is a general + sin, because Ambrose says (De Parad. viii) that "sin is to disobey the divine law." Therefore obedience is not a special virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every special virtue is either theological or moral. But obedience is not a theological virtue, since it is not + comprised under faith, hope or charity. Nor is it a moral virtue, since it does not hold the mean between excess and deficiency, + for the more obedient one is the more is one praised. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is the more meritorious and praiseworthy, the less it holds its own." + But every special virtue is the more to be praised the more it holds its own, since virtue requires a man to exercise his + will and choice, as stated in Ethic. ii, 4. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, virtues differ in species according to their objects. Now the object of obedience would seem to be the command of + a superior, of which, apparently, there are as many kinds as there are degrees of superiority. Therefore obedience is a general + virtue, comprising many special virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> obedience is reckoned by some to be a part of justice, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q104_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q80.html">Q[80])</a>. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A special virtue is assigned to all good deeds that have a special reason of praise: for it belongs properly to virtue to + render a deed good. Now obedience to a superior is due in accordance with the divinely established order of things, as shown + above + <a id="SS_Q104_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q104_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, and therefore it is a good, since good consists in mode, species and order, as Augustine states (De Natura Boni iii) [*Cf. + + <a id="SS_Q104_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A5.html">FP, Q[5], A[5]</a>]. Again, this + act has a special aspect of praiseworthiness by reason of its object. For while subjects have many obligations towards their + superiors, this one, that they are bound to obey their commands, stands out as special among the rest. Wherefore obedience + is a special virtue, and its specific object is a command tacit or express, because the superior's will, however it become + known, is a tacit precept, and a man's obedience seems to be all the more prompt, forasmuch as by obeying he forestalls the + express command as soon as he understands his superior's will. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing prevents the one same material object from admitting two special aspects to which two special virtues correspond: + thus a soldier, by defending his king's fortress, fulfils both an act of fortitude, by facing the danger of death for a good + end, and an act of justice, by rendering due service to his lord. Accordingly the aspect of precept, which obedience considers, + occurs in acts of all virtues, but not in all acts of virtue, since not all acts + of virtue are a matter of precept, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q104_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q96_A3.html">FS, Q[96], A[3]</a>). Moreover, certain things are sometimes a matter of precept, and pertain to no other virtue, such things for instance as + are not evil except because they are forbidden. Wherefore, if obedience be taken in its proper sense, as considering formally + and intentionally the aspect of precept, it will be a special virtue, and disobedience a special sin: because in this way + it is requisite for obedience that + one perform an act of justice or of some other virtue with the intention of fulfilling a precept; and for disobedience that + one treat the precept with actual contempt. On the other hand, if obedience be taken in a wide sense for the performance of + any action that may be a matter of precept, and disobedience for the omission of that action through any intention whatever, + then obedience will be a general virtue, and disobedience a general sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Obedience is not a theological virtue, for its direct object is not God, but the precept of any superior, whether expressed + or inferred, namely, a simple word of the superior, indicating his will, and which the obedient subject obeys promptly, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q104_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Titus.3.1" target="asv"> Titus 3:1, </a> "Admonish them to be subject to princes, and to obey at a word," etc. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A2-p10"> It is, however, a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and it observes the mean between excess and deficiency. Excess + thereof is measured in respect, not of quantity, but of other circumstances, in so far as a man obeys either whom he ought + not, or in matters wherein he ought not to obey, as we have stated above regarding religion ( + <a id="SS_Q104_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q92_A2.html">Q[92], A[2]</a>). We may also reply that as in justice, excess is in the person who retains another's property, and + deficiency in the person who does not receive his due, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4), so too obedience observes + the mean between excess on the part of him who fails to pay due obedience to his superior, since he exceeds in fulfilling + his own will, and deficiency on the part of the superior, who does not receive obedience. Wherefore in this way obedience + will be a mean between two forms of wickedness, as was stated above concerning justice ( + <a id="SS_Q104_A2-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A10.html">Q[58], + A[10] + </a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Obedience, like every virtue requires the will to be prompt towards its proper object, but not towards that which is repugnant + to it. Now the proper object of obedience is a precept, and this proceeds from another's will. Wherefore obedience make a + man's will prompt in fulfilling the will of another, the maker, namely, of the precept. If that which is prescribed to him + is willed by him for its own sake apart from its being prescribed, as happens in + agreeable matters, he tends towards it at once by his own will and seems to comply, not on account of the precept, but on + account of his own will. But if that which is prescribed is nowise willed for its own sake, but, considered in itself, repugnant + to his own will, as happens in disagreeable matters, then it is quite evident that it is not fulfilled except on account of + the precept. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience perishes or diminishes when it holds its own in agreeable + matters," because, to wit, one's own will seems to tend principally, not to the accomplishment of the precept, but to the + fulfilment of one's own desire; but that "it increases in disagreeable or difficult matters," because there one's own will + tends to nothing beside the precept. Yet this must be understood as regards outward appearances: for, on the other hand, according + to the judgment of God, Who searches the heart, it may happen that even in agreeable matters obedience, while holding its + own, is nonetheless praiseworthy, provided the will of him that obeys tend no less devotedly [*Cf. + <a id="SS_Q104_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q82_A2.html"> Q[82], A[2]</a>] to the fulfilment of the precept. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Reverence regards directly the person that excels: wherefore it admits a various species according to the various aspects + of excellence. Obedience, on the other hand, regards the precept of the person that excels, and therefore admits of only one + aspect. And since obedience is due to a person's precept on account of reverence to him, it follows that obedience to a man + is of one species, though the causes from which it proceeds differ specifically. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A2-p13"></p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A2-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q104_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q104_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q104_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q104_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q104_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q104_A3-p0.1">Whether obedience is the greatest of the virtues?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q104_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that obedience is the greatest of the virtues. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q104_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.15.22" target="asv">1 Kings 15:22</a>): "Obedience is better than sacrifices." Now the offering of sacrifices belongs to religion, which is the greatest of all + moral virtues, as shown above ( + <a id="SS_Q104_A3-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q81_A6.html">Q[81], A[6]</a>). Therefore obedience is the greatest of all virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is the only virtue that ingrafts virtues in the soul and protects them + when ingrafted." Now the cause is greater than the effect. Therefore obedience is greater than all the virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "evil should never be done out of obedience: yet sometimes for the sake of obedience + we should lay aside the good we are doing." Now one does not lay aside a thing except for something better. Therefore obedience, + for whose sake the good of other virtues is set aside, is better than other virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> obedience deserves praise because it proceeds from charity: for Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience should be practiced, + not out of servile fear, but from a sense of charity, not through fear of punishment, but through love of justice." Therefore + charity is a greater virtue than obedience. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Just as sin consists in man contemning God and adhering to mutable things, so the merit of a virtuous act consists in man + contemning created goods and adhering to God as his end. Now the end is greater than that which is directed to the end. Therefore + if a man contemns created goods in order that he may adhere to God, his virtue derives greater praise from his adhering to + God than from his contemning earthly things. And so those, namely the theological, + virtues whereby he adheres to God in Himself, are greater than the moral virtues, whereby he holds in contempt some earthly + thing in order to adhere to God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A3-p7"> Among the moral virtues, the greater the thing which a man contemns that he may adhere to God, the greater the virtue. Now + there are three kinds of human goods that man may contemn for God's sake. The lowest of these are external goods, the goods + of the body take the middle place, and the highest are the goods of the soul; and among these the chief, in a way, is the + will, in so far as, by his will, man makes use of all other goods. Therefore, properly speaking, the virtue of + obedience, whereby we contemn our own will for God's sake, is more praiseworthy than the other moral virtues, which contemn + other goods for the sake of God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A3-p8"> Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is rightly preferred to sacrifices, because by sacrifices another's body + is slain whereas by obedience we slay our own will." Wherefore even any other acts of virtue are meritorious before God through + being performed out of obedience to God's will. For were one to suffer even martyrdom, or to give all one's goods to the poor, + unless one directed these things to the fulfilment of the divine will, which pertains directly to + obedience, they could not be meritorious: as neither would they be if they were done without charity, which cannot exist apart + from obedience. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q104_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.4" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:4,5</a>): "He who saith that he knoweth God, and keepeth not His commandments, is a liar . . . but he that keepeth His word, in him + in very deed the charity of God is perfected": and this because friends have the same likes and dislikes. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Obedience proceeds from reverence, which pays worship and honor to a superior, and in this respect it is contained under + different virtues, although considered in itself, as regarding the aspect of precept, it is one special virtue. Accordingly, + in so far as it proceeds from reverence for a superior, it is contained, in a way, under observance; while in so far as it + proceeds from reverence for one's parents, it is contained under piety; and in so far + as it proceeds from reverence for God, it comes under religion, and pertains to devotion, which is the principal act of religion. + Wherefore from this point of view it is more praiseworthy to obey God than to offer sacrifice, as well as because, "in a sacrifice + we slay another's body, whereas by obedience we slay our own will," as Gregory says (Moral. xxxv). As to the special case + in which Samuel spoke, it would have been better for Saul to obey God than to offer in sacrifice the fat animals of + the Amalekites against the commandment of God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All acts of virtue, in so far as they come under a precept, belong to obedience. Wherefore according as acts of virtue act + causally or dispositively towards their generation and preservation, obedience is said to ingraft and protect all virtues. + And yet it does not follow that obedience takes precedence of all virtues absolutely, for two reasons. First, because though + an act of virtue come under a precept, one may nevertheless perform that act of + virtue without considering the aspect of precept. Consequently, if there be any virtue, whose object is naturally prior to + the precept, that virtue is said to be naturally prior to obedience. Such a virtue is faith, whereby we come to know the sublime + nature of divine authority, by reason of which the power to command is competent to God. Secondly, because infusion of grace + and virtues may precede, even in point of time, all virtuous acts: and in this way obedience is not prior to all virtues, + neither in point of time nor by nature. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There are two kinds of good. There is that to which we are bound of necessity, for instance to love God, and so forth: and + by no means may such a good be set aside on account of obedience. But there is another good to which man is not bound of necessity, + and this good we ought sometimes to set aside for the sake of obedience to which we are bound of necessity, since we ought + not to do good by falling into sin. Yet as Gregory remarks (Moral. xxxv), "he + who forbids his subjects any single good, must needs allow them many others, lest the souls of those who obey perish utterly + from starvation, through being deprived of every good." Thus the loss of one good may be compensated by obedience and other + goods. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q104_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q104_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q104_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q104_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q104_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q104_A4-p0.1">Whether God ought to be obeyed in all things?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q104_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God need not be obeyed in all things. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q104_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.9.30" target="asv">Mat. 9:30,31</a>) that our Lord after healing the two blind men commanded them, saying: "See that no man know this. But they going out spread + His fame abroad in all that country." Yet they are not blamed for so doing. Therefore it seems that we are not bound to obey + God in all things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no one is bound to do anything contrary to virtue. Now we find that God commanded certain things contrary to virtue: + thus He commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q104_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.22" target="asv">Gn. 22</a>); and the Jews to steal the property of the Egyptians ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q104_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.11" target="asv">Ex. 11</a>), which things are contrary to justice; and Osee to take to himself a woman who was an adulteress ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q104_A4-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Hos.3" target="asv">Osee 3</a>), and this is contrary to chastity. Therefore God is not to be obeyed in all things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever obeys God conforms his will to the divine will even as to the thing willed. But we are not bound in all + things to conform our will to the divine will as to the thing willed, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q104_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A10.html">FS, Q[19], A[10]</a>). Therefore man is not bound to obey God in all things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q104_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.24.7" target="asv">Ex. 24:7</a>): "All things that the Lord hath spoken we will do, and we will be obedient." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q104_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q104_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, he who obeys is moved by the command of the person he obeys, just as natural things are moved by their motive causes. Now + just a God is the first mover of all things that are moved naturally, so too is He the first mover of all wills, as shown + above ( + <a id="SS_Q104_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A6.html">FS, Q[9], A[6]</a>). Therefore just as all natural things are subject to the divine motion by a natural necessity so too all wills, by a kind + of necessity of justice, are bound to obey the divine command. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our Lord in telling the blind men to conceal the miracle had no intention of binding them with the force of a divine precept, + but, as Gregory says (Moral. xix), "gave an example to His servants who follow Him that they might wish to hide their virtue + and yet that it should be proclaimed against their will, in order that others might profit by their example." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even as God does nothing contrary to nature (since "the nature of a thing is what God does therein," according to a gloss + on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q104_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11" target="asv">Rom. 11</a>), and yet does certain things contrary to the wonted course of nature; so to God can command nothing contrary to virtue since + virtue and rectitude of human will consist chiefly in conformity with God's will and obedience to His command, although it + be contrary to the wonted mode of virtue. Accordingly, then, the command + given to Abraham to slay his innocent son was not contrary to justice, since God is the author of life an death. Nor again + was it contrary to justice that He commanded the Jews to take things belonging to the Egyptians, because all things are His, + and He gives them to whom He will. Nor was it contrary to chastity that Osee was commanded to take an adulteress, because + God Himself is the ordainer of human generation, and the right manner of intercourse with woman is that which He appoints. + Hence + it is evident that the persons aforesaid did not sin, either by obeying God or by willing to obey Him. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Though man is not always bound to will what God wills, yet he is always bound to will what God wills him to will. This comes + to man's knowledge chiefly through God's command, wherefore man is bound to obey God's commands in all things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q104_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q104_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q104_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q104_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q104_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q104_A5-p0.1">Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q104_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q104_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Col.3.20" target="asv">Col. 3:20</a>): "Children, obey your parents in all things," and farther on ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q104_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Col.3.22" target="asv">Col. 3:22</a>): "Servants, obey in all things your masters according to the flesh." Therefore in like manner other subjects are bound to + obey their superiors in all things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, superiors stand between God and their subjects, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q104_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.5.5" target="asv"> Dt. 5:5, </a> "I was the mediator and stood between the Lord and you at that time, to show you His words." Now there is no going from extreme + to extreme, except through that which stands between. Therefore the commands of a superior must be esteemed the commands of + God, wherefore the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q104_A5-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.14" target="asv">Gal. 4:14</a>): "You . . . received me as an angel of God, + even as Christ Jesus" and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q104_A5-p3.3" href="./asv.html#iThess.2.13" target="asv">1 Thess. 2:13</a>): "When you had received of us the word of the hearing of God, you received it, not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, + the word of God." Therefore as man is bound to obey God in all things, so is he bound to obey his superiors. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as religious in making their profession take vows of chastity and poverty, so do they also vow obedience. Now + a religious is bound to observe chastity and poverty in all things. Therefore he is also bound to obey in all things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q104_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.29" target="asv">Acts 5:29</a>): "We ought to obey God rather than men." Now sometimes the things commanded by a superior are against God. Therefore superiors + are not to be obeyed in all things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q104_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q104_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,4), he who obeys is moved at the bidding of the person who commands him, by a certain necessity of justice, even as a natural + thing is moved through the power of its mover by a natural necessity. That a natural thing be not moved by its mover, may + happen in two ways. First, on account of a hindrance arising from the stronger power of some other mover; thus wood is not + burnt by fire if a stronger force of water + intervene. Secondly, through lack of order in the movable with regard to its mover, since, though it is subject to the latter's + action in one respect, yet it is not subject thereto in every respect. Thus, a humor is sometimes subject to the action of + heat, as regards being heated, but not as regards being dried up or consumed. In like manner there are two reasons, for which + a subject may not be bound to obey his superior in all things. First on account of the command of a higher power. For as a + gloss says on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q104_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.2" target="asv"> Rom. 13:2, </a> "They that resist [Vulg.: 'He that resisteth'] the power, resist the ordinance of God" (cf. St. Augustine, De Verb. Dom. + viii). "If a commissioner issue an order, are you to comply, if it is contrary to the bidding of the proconsul? Again if the + proconsul command one thing, and the emperor another, will you hesitate, to disregard the former and serve the latter? Therefore + if the emperor commands one thing and God another, you must disregard the + former and obey God." Secondly, a subject is not bound to obey his superior if the latter command him to do something wherein + he is not subject to him. For Seneca says (De Beneficiis iii): "It is wrong to suppose that slavery falls upon the whole man: + for the better part of him is excepted." His body is subjected and assigned to his master but his soul is his own. Consequently + in matters touching the internal movement of the will man is not bound to obey his fellow-man, but God alone. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A5-p7"> Nevertheless man is bound to obey his fellow-man in things that have to be done externally by means of the body: and yet, + since by nature all men are equal, he is not bound to obey another man in matters touching the nature of the body, for instance + in those relating to the support of his body or the begetting of his children. Wherefore servants are not bound to obey their + masters, nor children their parents, in the question of contracting marriage or of remaining in the state + of virginity or the like. But in matters concerning the disposal of actions and human affairs, a subject is bound to obey + his superior within the sphere of his authority; for instance a soldier must obey his general in matters relating to war, + a servant his master in matters touching the execution of the duties of his service, a son his father in matters relating + to the conduct of his life and the care of the household; and so forth. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When the Apostle says "in all things," he refers to matters within the sphere of a father's or master's authority. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man is subject to God simply as regards all things, both internal and external, wherefore he is bound to obey Him in all + things. On the other hand, inferiors are not subject to their superiors in all things, but only in certain things and in a + particular way, in respect of which the superior stands between God and his subjects, whereas in respect of other matters + the subject is immediately under God, by Whom he is taught either by the natural or by + the written law. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Religious profess obedience as to the regular mode of life, in respect of which they are subject to their superiors: wherefore + they are bound to obey in those matters only which may belong to the regular mode of life, and this obedience suffices for + salvation. If they be willing to obey even in other matters, this will belong to the superabundance of perfection; provided, + however, such things be not contrary to God or to the rule they profess, for + obedience in this case would be unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A5-p11"> Accordingly we may distinguish a threefold obedience; one, sufficient for salvation, and consisting in obeying when one is + bound to obey: secondly, perfect obedience, which obeys in all things lawful: thirdly, indiscreet obedience, which obeys even + in matters unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A5-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A5-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q104_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q104_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q104_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q104_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q105.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q104_A6-p0.1">Whether Christians are bound to obey the secular powers?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q104_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that Christians are not bound to obey the secular power. For a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q104_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.17.25" target="asv"> Mat. 17:25, </a> "Then the children are free," says: "If in every kingdom the children of the king who holds sway over that kingdom are free, + then the children of that King, under Whose sway are all kingdoms, should be free in every kingdom." Now Christians, by their + faith in Christ, are made children of God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q104_A6-p2.2" href="./asv.html#John.1.12" target="asv"> Jn. 1:12</a>: "He gave them + power to be made the sons of God, to them that believe in His name." Therefore they are not bound to obey the secular power. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q104_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.4" target="asv">Rom. 7:4</a>): "You . . . are become dead to the law by the body of Christ," and the law mentioned here is the divine law of the Old Testament. + Now human law whereby men are subject to the secular power is of less account than the divine law of the Old Testament. Much + more, therefore, since they have become members of Christ's body, are men freed from the law of subjection, whereby they were + under the power of secular + princes. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, men are not bound to obey robbers, who oppress them with violence. Now, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv): "Without + justice, what else is a kingdom but a huge robbery?" Since therefore the authority of secular princes is frequently exercised + with injustice, or owes its origin to some unjust usurpation, it seems that Christians ought not to obey secular princes. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q104_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Titus.3.1" target="asv">Titus 3:1</a>): "Admonish them to be subject to princes and powers," and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q104_A6-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iPet.2.13" target="asv">1 Pet. 2:13,14</a>): "Be ye subject . . . to every human creature for God's sake: whether it be to the king as excelling, or to governors as + sent by him." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Faith in Christ is the origin and cause of justice, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q104_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.22" target="asv"> Rom. 3:22, </a> "The justice of God by faith of Jesus Christ:" wherefore faith in Christ does not void the order of justice, but strengthens + it." Now the order of justice requires that subjects obey their superiors, else the stability of human affairs would cease. + Hence faith in Christ does not excuse the faithful from the obligation of obeying secular princes. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q104_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q104_A5.html">(A[5])</a>, subjection whereby one man is bound to another regards the body; not the soul, which retains its liberty. Now, in this state + of life we are freed by the grace of Christ from defects of the soul, but not from defects of the body, as the Apostle declares + by saying of himself ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q104_A6-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.23" target="asv">Rom. 7:23</a>) that in his mind he served the law of God, but in his flesh the law of sin. Wherefore those that + are made children of God by grace are free from the spiritual bondage of sin, but not from the bodily bondage, whereby they + are held bound to earthly masters, as a gloss observes on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q104_A6-p7.3" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.1" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:1, </a> "Whosoever are servants under the yoke," etc. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Old Law was a figure of the New Testament, and therefore it had to cease on the advent of truth. And the comparison with + human law does not stand because thereby one man is subject to another. Yet man is bound by divine law to obey his fellow-man. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man is bound to obey secular princes in so far as this is required by order of justice. Wherefore if the prince's authority + is not just but usurped, or if he commands what is unjust, his subjects are not bound to obey him, except perhaps accidentally, + in order to avoid scandal or danger. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A6-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q104_A6-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q104_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q105.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q103_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q104_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q105" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q104_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q105_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q105-p0.1">OF DISOBEDIENCE (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q105-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q105-p2"> We must now consider disobedience, under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q105-p3"> (1) Whether it is a mortal sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q105-p4"> (2) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?</p> + <div id="SS_Q105_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q105.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q105_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q105_A1-p0.1">Whether disobedience is a mortal sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q105_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q105_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that disobedience is not a mortal sin. For every sin is a disobedience, as appears from Ambrose's definition given + above ( + <a id="SS_Q105_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q104_A2.html">Q[104], A[2]</a>, OBJ[1]). Therefore if disobedience were a mortal sin, every sin would be mortal. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q105_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that disobedience is born of vainglory. But vainglory is not a mortal sin. Neither therefore + is disobedience. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q105_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a person is said to be disobedient when he does not fulfil a superior's command. But superiors often issue so many + commands that it is seldom, if ever, possible to fulfil them. Therefore if disobedience were a mortal sin, it would follow + that man cannot avoid mortal sin, which is absurd. Wherefore disobedience is not a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q105_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The sin of disobedience to parents is reckoned ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q105_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.30" target="asv">Rom. 1:30</a>; + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q105_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iiTim.3.2" target="asv">2 Tim. 3:2</a>) among other mortal sins. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q105_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[24], A[12]; + <a id="SS_Q105_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A5.html">FS, Q[72], A[5]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q105_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A1.html">FS, Q[88], A[1]</a>), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity which is the cause of spiritual life. Now by charity we love God and our + neighbor. The charity of God requires that we obey His commandments, as stated above (Q[24], A[12]). Therefore to be disobedient + to the commandments of God is a mortal sin, because it is contrary to the love of God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q105_A1-p7"> Again, the commandments of God contain the precept of obedience to superiors. Wherefore also disobedience to the commands + of a superior is a mortal sin, as being contrary to the love of God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q105_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.2" target="asv"> Rom. 13:2, </a> "He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God." It is also contrary to the love of our neighbor, as it withdraws + from the superior who is our neighbor the obedience that is his due. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q105_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The definition given by Ambrose refers to mortal sin, which has the character of perfect sin. Venial sin is not disobedience, + because it is not contrary to a precept, but beside it. Nor again is every mortal sin disobedience, properly and essentially, + but only when one contemns a precept, since moral acts take their species from the end. And when a thing is done contrary + to a precept, not in contempt of the precept, but with some other purpose, it is + not a sin of disobedience except materially, and belongs formally to another species of sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q105_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Vainglory desires display of excellence. And since it seems to point to a certain excellence that one be not subject to another's + command, it follows that disobedience arises from vainglory. But there is nothing to hinder mortal sin from arising out of + venial sin, since venial sin is a disposition to mortal. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q105_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No one is bound to do the impossible: wherefore if a superior makes a heap of precepts and lays them upon his subjects, so + that they are unable to fulfil them, they are excused from sin. Wherefore superiors should refrain from making a multitude + of precepts. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q105_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q105_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q105.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q105_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q105_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q105_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q106.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q105_A2-p0.1">Whether disobedience is the most grievous of sins?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q105_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q105_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that disobedience is the most grievous of sins. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q105_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.15.23" target="asv">1 Kings 15:23</a>): "It is like the sin of witchcraft to rebel, and like the crime of idolatry to refuse to obey." But idolatry is the most + grievous of sins, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q105_A2-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q94_A3.html">Q[94], A[3]</a>). Therefore disobedience is the most grievous of sins. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q105_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost is one that removes the obstacles of sin, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q105_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q14_A2.html">Q[14], A[2]</a>). Now disobedience makes a man contemn a precept which, more than anything, prevents a man from sinning. Therefore disobedience + is a sin against the Holy Ghost, and consequently is the most grievous of sins. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q105_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q105_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.19" target="asv">Rom. 5:19</a>) that "by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners." Now the cause is seemingly greater than its effect. Therefore + disobedience seems to be a more grievous sin than the others that are caused thereby. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q105_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Contempt of the commander is a more grievous sin than contempt of his command. Now some sins are against the very person + of the commander, such as blasphemy and murder. Therefore disobedience is not the most grievous of sins. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q105_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Not every disobedience is equally a sin: for one disobedience may be greater than another, in two ways. First, on the part + of the superior commanding, since, although a man should take every care to obey each superior, yet it is a greater duty to + obey a higher than a lower authority, in sign of which the command of a lower authority is set aside if it be contrary to + the command of a higher authority. Consequently the higher the person who commands, the more + grievous is it to disobey him: so that it is more grievous to disobey God than man. Secondly, on the part of the things commanded. + For the person commanding does not equally desire the fulfilment of all his commands: since every such person desires above + all the end, and that which is nearest to the end. Wherefore disobedience is the more grievous, according as the unfulfilled + commandment is more in the intention of the person commanding. As to the commandments of God, it is evident that the + greater the good commanded, the more grievous the disobedience of that commandment, because since God's will is essentially + directed to the good, the greater the good the more does God wish it to be fulfilled. Consequently he that disobeys the commandment + of the love of God sins more grievously than one who disobeys the commandment of the love of our neighbor. On the other hand, + man's will is not always directed to the greater good: hence, when we are bound by a mere precept of man, a sin is + more grievous, not through setting aside a greater good, but through setting aside that which is more in the intention of + the person commanding. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q105_A2-p7"> Accordingly the various degrees of disobedience must correspond with the various degrees of precepts: because the disobedience + in which there is contempt of God's precept, from the very nature of disobedience is more grievous than a sin committed against + a man, apart from the latter being a disobedience to God. And I say this because whoever sins against his neighbor acts also + against God's commandment. And if the divine precept be contemned in a yet graver matter, the sin is + still more grievous. The disobedience that contains contempt of a man's precept is less grievous than the sin which contemns + the man who made the precept, because reverence for the person commanding should give rise to reverence for his command. In + like manner a sin that directly involves contempt of God, such as blasphemy, or the like, is more grievous (even if we mentally + separate the disobedience from the sin) than would be a sin involving contempt of God's commandment alone. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q105_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This comparison of Samuel is one, not of equality but of likeness, because disobedience redounds to the contempt of God just + as idolatry does, though the latter does so more. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q105_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not every disobedience is sin against the Holy Ghost, but only that which obstinacy is added: for it is not the contempt + of any obstacle to sin that constitutes sin against the Holy Ghost, else the contempt of any good would be a sin against the + Holy Ghost, since any good may hinder a man from committing sin. The sin against the Holy Ghost consists in the contempt of + those goods which lead directly to repentance and the remission of sins. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q105_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The first sin of our first parent, from which sin was transmitted to a men, was not disobedience considered as a special + sin, but pride, from which then man proceeded to disobey. Hence the Apostle in these words seems to take disobedience in its + relation to every sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q105_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q105_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q105_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q106.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q104_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q105_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q106" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q105_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q106_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q106-p0.1">OF THANKFULNESS OR GRATITUDE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q106-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q106-p2"> We must now consider thankfulness or gratitude, and ingratitude. Concerning thankfulness there are six points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q106-p3"> (1) Whether thankfulness is a special virtue distinct from other virtues?</p> + <p id="SS_Q106-p4"> (2) Who owes more thanks to God, the innocent or the penitent?</p> + <p id="SS_Q106-p5"> (3) Whether man is always bound to give thanks for human favors?</p> + <p id="SS_Q106-p6"> (4) Whether thanksgiving should be deferred?</p> + <p id="SS_Q106-p7"> (5) Whether thanksgiving should be measured according to the favor received or the disposition of the giver?</p> + <p id="SS_Q106-p8"> (6) Whether one ought to pay back more than one has received?</p> + <div id="SS_Q106_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q106.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q106_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q106_A1-p0.1">Whether thankfulness is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q106_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that thankfulness is not a special virtue, distinct from other virtue. For we have received the greatest benefits + from God, and from our parents. Now the honor which we pay to God in return belongs to the virtue of religion, and the honor + with which we repay our parents belongs to the virtue of piety. Therefore thankfulness or gratitude is not distinct from the + other virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, proportionate repayment belongs to commutative justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4). Now the purpose + of giving thanks is repayment (Ethic. 5,4). Therefore thanksgiving, which belongs to gratitude, is an act of justice. Therefore + gratitude is not a special virtue, distinct from other virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, acknowledgment of favor received is requisite for the preservation of friendship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. + viii, 13; ix, 1). Now friendship is associated with all the virtues, since they are the reason for which man is loved. Therefore + thankfulness or gratitude, to which it belongs to repay favors received, is not a special virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully reckons thankfulness a special part of justice (De Invent. Rhet. ii). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q106_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A3.html">FS, Q[60], A[3]</a>), the nature of the debt to be paid must needs vary according to various causes giving rise to the debt, yet so that the + greater always includes the lesser. Now the cause of debt is found primarily and chiefly in God, in that He is the first principle + of all our goods: secondarily it is found in our father, because he is the proximate principle of our begetting and upbringing: + thirdly it is found in + the person that excels in dignity, from whom general favors proceed; fourthly it is found in a benefactor, from whom we have + received particular and private favors, on account of which we are under particular obligation to him. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A1-p7"> Accordingly, since what we owe God, or our father, or a person excelling in dignity, is not the same as what we owe a benefactor + from whom we have received some particular favor, it follows that after religion, whereby we pay God due worship, and piety, + whereby we worship our parents, and observance, whereby we worship persons excelling in dignity, there is thankfulness or + gratitude, whereby we give thanks to our benefactors. And it is distinct from the foregoing virtues, just + as each of these is distinct from the one that precedes, as falling short thereof. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as religion is superexcelling piety, so is it excelling thankfulness or gratitude: wherefore giving thanks to God was + reckoned above ( + <a id="SS_Q106_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q83_A17.html">Q[83], A[17]</a>) among things pertaining to religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Proportionate repayment belongs to commutative justice, when it answers to the legal due; for instance when it is contracted + that so much be paid for so much. But the repayment that belongs to the virtue of thankfulness or gratitude answers to the + moral debt, and is paid spontaneously. Hence thanksgiving is less thankful when compelled, as Seneca observes (De Beneficiis + iii). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since true friendship is based on virtue, whatever there is contrary to virtue in a friend is an obstacle to friendship, + and whatever in him is virtuous is an incentive to friendship. In this way friendship is preserved by repayment of favors, + although repayment of favors belongs specially to the virtue of gratitude. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q106.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q106_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q106_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q106_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q106_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q106_A2-p0.1">Whether the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q106_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent. For the greater the gift one has received + from God, the more one is bound to give Him thanks. Now the gift of innocence is greater than that of justice restored. Therefore + it seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a man owes love to his benefactor just as he owes him gratitude. Now Augustine says (Confess. ii): "What man, weighing + his own infirmity, would dare to ascribe his purity and innocence to his own strength; that so he should love Thee the less, + as if he had less needed Thy mercy, whereby Thou remittest sins to those that turn to Thee?" And farther on he says: "And + for this let him love Thee as much, yea and more, since by Whom he sees me to have been + recovered from such deep torpor of sin, by Him he sees himself to have been from the like torpor of sin preserved." Therefore + the innocent is also more bound to give thanks than the penitent. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more a gratuitous favor is continuous, the greater the thanksgiving due for it. Now the favor of divine grace + is more continuous in the innocent than in the penitent. For Augustine says (Confess. iii): "To Thy grace I ascribe it, and + to Thy mercy, that Thou hast melted away my sins as it were ice. To Thy grace I ascribe also whatsoever I have not done of + evil; for what might I not have done? . . . Yea, all I confess to have been forgiven me, both + what evils I committed by my own wilfulness, and what by Thy guidance committed not." Therefore the innocent is more bound + to give thanks than the penitent. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q106_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.7.43" target="asv">Lk. 7:43</a>): "To whom more is forgiven, he loveth more [*Vulg.: 'To whom less is forgiven, he loveth less' + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q106_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.7.47" target="asv">Lk. 7:47</a>]." Therefore for the same reason he is bound to greater thanksgiving. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Thanksgiving [gratiarum actio] in the recipient corresponds to the favor [gratia] of the giver: so that when there is greater + favor on the part of the giver, greater thanks are due on the part of the recipient. Now a favor is something bestowed "gratis": + wherefore on the part of the giver the favor may be greater on two counts. First, owing to the quantity of the thing given: + and in this way the innocent owes greater thanksgiving, because he receives a + greater gift from God, also, absolutely speaking, a more continuous gift, other things being equal. Secondly, a favor may + be said to be greater, because it is given more gratuitously; and in this sense the penitent is more bound to give thanks + than the innocent, because what he receives from God is more gratuitously given: since, whereas he was deserving of punishment, + he has received grace. Wherefore, although the gift bestowed on the innocent is, considered absolutely, greater, yet the gift + bestowed on the penitent is greater in relation to him: even as a small gift bestowed on a poor man is greater to him than + a great gift is to a rich man. And since actions are about singulars, in matters of action, we have to take note of what is + such here and now, rather than of what is such absolutely, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii) in treating of the voluntary + and the involuntary. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A2-p7"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A2-p8"></p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A2-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q106_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q106_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q106_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q106_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q106_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q106_A3-p0.1">Whether a man is bound to give thanks to every benefactor?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q106_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the a man is not bound to give thanks to every benefactor. For a man may benefit himself just as he may harm + himself, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q106_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.14.5" target="asv"> Ecclus. 14:5, </a> "He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?" But a man cannot thank himself, since thanksgiving seems to pass from + one person to another. Therefore thanksgiving is not due to every benefactor. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, gratitude is a repayment of an act of grace. But some favors are granted without grace, and are rudely, slowly and + grudgingly given. Therefore gratitude is not always due to a benefactor. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no thanks are due to one who works for his own profit. But sometimes people bestow favors for their own profit. + Therefore thanks are not due to them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, no thanks are due to a slave, for all that he is belongs to his master. Yet sometimes a slave does a good turn to + his master. Therefore gratitude is not due to every benefactor . + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, no one is bound to do what he cannot do equitably and advantageously. Now it happens at times that the benefactor + is very well off, and it would be of no advantage to him to be repaid for a favor he has bestowed. Again it happens sometimes + that the benefactor from being virtuous has become wicked, so that it would not seem equitable to repay him. Also the recipient + of a favor may be a poor man, and is quite unable to repay. Therefore seemingly a man + is not always bound to repayment for favors received. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A3-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, no one is bound to do for another what is inexpedient and hurtful to him. Now sometimes it happens that repayment + of a favor would be hurtful or useless to the person repaid. Therefore favors are not always to be repaid by gratitude. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A3-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q106_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.5.18" target="asv">1 Thess. 5:18</a>): "In all things give thanks." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A3-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Every effect turns naturally to its cause; wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that "God turns all things to Himself because + He is the cause of all": for the effect must needs always be directed to the end of the agent. Now it is evident that a benefactor, + as such, is cause of the beneficiary. Hence the natural order requires that he who has received a favor should, by repaying + the favor, turn to his benefactor according to the mode of each. And, as + stated above with regard to a father ( + <a id="SS_Q106_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q31_A3.html">Q[31], A[3]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q106_A3-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q101_A2.html"> Q[101], A[2]</a>), a man owes his benefactor, as such, honor and reverence, since the latter stands to him in the relation of principle; but + accidentally he owes him assistance or support, if he need it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the words of Seneca (1 Benef. v), "just as a man is liberal who gives not to himself but to others, and gracious who forgives + not himself but others, and merciful who is moved, not by his own misfortunes but by another's, so too, no man confers a favor + on himself, he is but following the bent of his nature, which moves him to resist what hurts him, and to seek what is profitable." + Wherefore in things that one does for oneself, there is no place for + gratitude or ingratitude, since a man cannot deny himself a thing except by keeping it. Nevertheless things which are properly + spoken of in relation to others are spoken of metaphorically in relation to oneself, as the Philosopher states regarding justice + (Ethic. v, 11), in so far, to wit, as the various parts of man are considered as though they were various persons. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is the mark of a happy disposition to see good rather than evil. Wherefore if someone has conferred a favor, not as he + ought to have conferred it, the recipient should not for that reason withhold his thanks. Yet he owes less thanks, than if + the favor had been conferred duly, since in fact the favor is less, for, as Seneca remarks (De Benef. ii.) "promptness enhances, + delay discounts a favor." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Seneca observes (De Benef. vi), "it matters much whether a person does a kindness to us for his own sake, or for ours, + or for both his and ours. He that considers himself only, and benefits because cannot otherwise benefit himself, seems to + me like a man who seeks fodder for his cattle." And farther on: "If he has done it for me in common with himself, having both + of us in his mind, I am ungrateful and not merely unjust, unless I rejoice that what + was profitable to him is profitable to me also. It is the height of malevolence to refuse to recognize a kindness, unless + the giver has been the loser thereby." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As Seneca observes (De Benef. iii), "when a slave does what is wont to be demanded of a slave, it is part of his service: + when he does more than a slave is bound to do, it is a favor: for as soon as he does anything from a motive of friendship, + if indeed that be his motive, it is no longer called service." Wherefore gratitude is due even to a slave, when he does more + than his duty. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A poor man is certainly not ungrateful if he does what he can. For since kindness depends on the heart rather than on the + deed, so too gratitude depends chiefly the heart. Hence Seneca says (De Benef. ii): "Who receives a favor gratefully, has + already begun to pay it back: and that we are grateful for favors received should be shown by the outpourings of the heart, + not only in his hearing but everywhere." From this it is evident that however well off + a man may be, it is possible to thank him for his kindness by showing him reverence and honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says + (Ethic. viii, 14): "He that abounds should be repaid with honor, he that is in want should be repaid with money": and Seneca + writes (De Benef. vi): "There are many ways of repaying those who are well off, whatever we happen to owe them; such as good + advice, frequent fellowship, affable and pleasant conversation without flattery." Therefore there is no need for a man to + desire neediness or distress in his benefactor before repaying his kindness, because, as Seneca says (De Benef. vi), "it were + inhuman to desire this in one from whom you have received no favor; how much more so to desire it in one whose kindness has + made you his debtor!" + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A3-p15"> If, however, the benefactor has lapsed from virtue, nevertheless he should be repaid according to his state, that he may + return to virtue if possible. But if he be so wicked as to be incurable, then his heart has changed, and consequently no repayment + is due for his kindness, as heretofore. And yet, as far as it possible without sin, the kindness he has shown should be held + in memory, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 3). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A3-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> As stated in the preceding reply, repayment of a favor depends chiefly on the affection of the heart: wherefore repayment + should be made in such a way as to prove most beneficial. If, however, through the benefactor's carelessness it prove detrimental + to him, this is not imputed to the person who repays him, as Seneca observes (De Benef. vii): "It is my duty to repay, and + not to keep back and safeguard my repayment." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A3-p17"></p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A3-p18"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q106_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q106_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q106_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q106_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q106_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q106_A4-p0.1">Whether a man is bound to repay a favor at once?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q106_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that a man is bound to repay a favor at once. For we are bound to restore at once what we owe, unless the term be + fixed. Now there is no term prescribed for the repayment of favors, and yet this repayment is a duty, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q106_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q106_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore a man is bound to repay a favor at once. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a good action would seem to be all the more praiseworthy according as it is done with greater earnestness. Now earnestness + seems to make a man do his duty without any delay. Therefore it is apparently more praiseworthy to repay a favor at once. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii) that "it is proper to a benefactor to act freely and quickly." Now repayment ought to + equal the favor received. Therefore it should be done at once. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Seneca says (De Benef. iv): "He that hastens to repay, is animated with a sense, not of gratitude but of indebtedness." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Just as in conferring a favor two things are to be considered, namely, the affection of the heart and the gift, so also must + these things be considered in repaying the favor. As regards the affection of the heart, repayment should be made at once, + wherefore Seneca says (De Benef. ii): "Do you wish to repay a favor? Receive it graciously." As regards the gift, one ought + to wait until such a time as will be convenient to the benefactor. In fact, if instead of + choosing a convenient time, one wished to repay at once, favor for favor, it would not seem to be a virtuous, but a constrained + repayment. For, as Seneca observes (De Benef. iv), "he that wishes to repay too soon, is an unwilling debtor, and an unwilling + debtor is ungrateful." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A legal debt must be paid at once, else the equality of justice would not be preserved, if one kept another's property without + his consent. But a moral debt depends on the equity of the debtor: and therefore it should be repaid in due time according + as the rectitude of virtue demands. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Earnestness of the will is not virtuous unless it be regulated by reason; wherefore it is not praiseworthy to forestall the + proper time through earnestness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Favors also should be conferred at a convenient time and one should no longer delay when the convenient time comes; and the + same is to be observed in repaying favors. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q106_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q106_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q106_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q106_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q106_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q106_A5-p0.1">Whether in giving thanks we should look at the benefactor's disposition or at the deed?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q106_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that in repaying favors we should not look at the benefactor's disposition but at the deed. For repayment is due + to beneficence, and beneficence consists in deeds, as the word itself denotes. Therefore in repaying favors we should look + at the deed. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, thanksgiving, whereby we repay favors, is a part of justice. But justice considers equality between giving and taking. + Therefore also in repaying favors we should consider the deed rather than the disposition of the benefactor. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one can consider what he does not know. Now God alone knows the interior disposition. Therefore it is impossible + to repay a favor according to the benefactor's disposition. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Seneca says (De Benef. i): "We are sometimes under a greater obligation to one who has given little with a large heart, and + has bestowed a small favor, yet willingly." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The repayment of a favor may belong to three virtues, namely, justice, gratitude and friendship. It belongs to justice when + the repayment has the character of a legal debt, as in a loan and the like: and in such cases repayment must be made according + to the quantity received. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A5-p7"> On the other hand, repayment of a favor belongs, though in different ways, to friendship and likewise to the virtue of gratitude + when it has the character of a moral debt. For in the repayment of friendship we have to consider the cause of friendship; + so that in the friendship that is based on the useful, repayment should be made according to the usefulness accruing from + the favor conferred, and in the friendship based on virtue repayment should be made with regard for the + choice or disposition of the giver, since this is the chief requisite of virtue, as stated in Ethic. viii, 13. And likewise, + since gratitude regards the favor inasmuch as it is bestowed gratis, and this regards the disposition of the giver, it follows + again that repayment of a favor depends more on the disposition of the giver than on the effect. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Every moral act depends on the will. Hence a kindly action, in so far as it is praiseworthy and is deserving of gratitude, + consists materially in the thing done, but formally and chiefly in the will. Hence Seneca says (De Benef. i): "A kindly action + consists not in deed or gift, but in the disposition of the giver or doer." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Gratitude is a part of justice, not indeed as a species is part of a genus, but by a kind of reduction to the genus of justice, + as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q106_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q80.html">Q[80])</a>. Hence it does not follow that we shall find the same kind of debt in both virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God alone sees man's disposition in itself: but in so far as it is shown by certain signs, man also can know it. It is thus + that a benefactor's disposition is known by the way in which he does the kindly action, for instance through his doing it + joyfully and readily. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A5-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A5-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q106_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q106_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q106_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q106_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q107.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q106_A6-p0.1">Whether the repayment of gratitude should surpass the favor received?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q106_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is no need for the repayment of gratitude to surpass the favor received. For it is not possible to make + even equal repayment to some, for instance, one's parents, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). Now virtue does not + attempt the impossible. Therefore gratitude for a favor does not tend to something yet greater. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if one person repays another more than he has received by his favor, by that very fact he gives him something his + turn, as it were. But the latter owes him repayment for the favor which in his turn the former has conferred on him. Therefore + he that first conferred a favor will be bound to a yet greater repayment, and so on indefinitely. Now virtue does not strive + at the indefinite, since "the indefinite removes the nature of good" (Metaph. ii, text. + 8). Therefore repayment of gratitude should not surpass the favor received. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, justice consists in equality. But "more" is excess of equality. Since therefore excess is sinful in every virtue, + it seems that to repay more than the favor received is sinful and opposed to justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5): "We should repay those who are gracious to us, by being gracious to them return," and + this is done by repaying more than we have received. Therefore gratitude should incline to do something greater. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q106_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q106_A5.html">(A[5])</a>, gratitude regards the favor received according the intention of the benefactor; who seems be deserving of praise, chiefly + for having conferred the favor gratis without being bound to do so. Wherefore the beneficiary is under a moral obligation + to bestow something gratis in return. Now he does not seem to bestow something gratis, unless he exceeds the quantity of the + favor received: because so long as he + repays less or an equivalent, he would seem to do nothing gratis, but only to return what he has received. Therefore gratitude + always inclines, as far as possible, to pay back something more. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (A[3], ad 5; A[5]), in repaying favors we must consider the disposition rather than the deed. Accordingly, + if we consider the effect of beneficence, which a son receives from his parents namely, to be and to live, the son cannot + make an equal repayment, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). But if we consider the will of the giver and of the + repayer, then it is possible for the son to pay back something greater to his father, as + Seneca declares (De Benef. iii). If, however, he were unable to do so, the will to pay back would be sufficient for gratitude. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The debt of gratitude flows from charity, which the more it is paid the more it is due, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q106_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.8" target="asv"> Rom. 13:8, </a> "Owe no man anything, but to love one another." Wherefore it is not unreasonable if the obligation of gratitude has no limit. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As in injustice, which is a cardinal virtue, we consider equality of things, so in gratitude we consider equality of wills. + For while on the one hand the benefactor of his own free-will gave something he was not bound to give, so on the other hand + the beneficiary repays something over and above what he has received. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A6-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q106_A6-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q106_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q107.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q105_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q106_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q107" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q106_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q107_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q107-p0.1">OF INGRATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q107-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q107-p2"> We must now consider ingratitude, under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q107-p3"> (1) Whether ingratitude is always a sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q107-p4"> (2) Whether ingratitude is a special sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q107-p5"> (3) Whether every act of ingratitude is a mortal sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q107-p6"> (4) Whether favors should be withdrawn from the ungrateful?</p> + <div id="SS_Q107_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q107.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q107_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q107_A1-p0.1">Whether ingratitude is always a sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q107_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that ingratitude is not always a sin. For Seneca says (De Benef. iii) that "he who does not repay a favor is ungrateful." + But sometimes it is impossible to repay a favor without sinning, for instance if one man has helped another to commit a sin. + Therefore, since it is not a sin to refrain from sinning, it seems that ingratitude is not always a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every sin is in the power of the person who commits it: because, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract. + i), "no man sins in what he cannot avoid." Now sometimes it is not in the power of the sinner to avoid ingratitude, for instance + when he has not the means of repaying. Again forgetfulness is not in our power, and yet Seneca declares (De Benef. iii) that + "to forget a kindness is the height of ingratitude." Therefore ingratitude is not + always a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there would seem to be no repayment in being unwilling to owe anything, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q107_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.8" target="asv">Rom. 13:8</a>), "Owe no man anything." Yet "an unwilling debtor is ungrateful," as Seneca declares (De Benef. iv). Therefore ingratitude + is not always a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ingratitude is reckoned among other sins ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q107_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.3.2" target="asv">2 Tim. 3:2</a>), where it is written: "Disobedient to parents, ungrateful, wicked." etc. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q107_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q106_A4.html">Q[106], A[4]</a>, ad 1, A[6]) a debt of gratitude is a moral debt required by virtue. Now a thing is a sin from the fact of its being contrary + to virtue. Wherefore it is evident that every ingratitude is a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gratitude regards a favor received: and he that helps another to commit a sin does him not a favor but an injury: and so + no thanks are due to him, except perhaps on account of his good will, supposing him to have been deceived, and to have thought + to help him in doing good, whereas he helped him to sin. In such a case the repayment due to him is not that he should be + helped to commit a sin, because this would be repaying not good but evil, and this is + contrary to gratitude. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> No man is excused from ingratitude through inability to repay, for the very reason that the mere will suffices for the repayment + of the debt of gratitude, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q107_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q106_A6.html">Q[106], A[6]</a>, ad 1). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A1-p9"> Forgetfulness of a favor received amounts to ingratitude, not indeed the forgetfulness that arises from a natural defect, + that is not subject to the will, but that which arises from negligence. For, as Seneca observes (De Benef. iii), "when forgetfulness + of favors lays hold of a man, he has apparently given little thought to their repayment." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The debt of gratitude flows from the debt of love, and from the latter no man should wish to be free. Hence that anyone should + owe this debt unwillingly seems to arise from lack of love for his benefactor. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q107.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q107_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q107_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q107_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q107_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q107_A2-p0.1">Whether ingratitude is a special sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q107_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that ingratitude is not a special sin. For whoever sins acts against God his sovereign benefactor. But this pertains + to ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no special sin is contained under different kinds of sin. But one can be ungrateful by committing different kinds + of sin, for instance by calumny, theft, or something similar committed against a benefactor. Therefore ingratitude is not + a special sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Seneca writes (De Benef. iii): "It is ungrateful to take no notice of a kindness, it is ungrateful not to repay + one, but it is the height of ingratitude to forget it." Now these do not seem to belong to the same species of sin. Therefore + ingratitude is not a special sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ingratitude is opposed to gratitude or thankfulness, which is a special virtue. Therefore it is a special sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Every vice is denominated from a deficiency of virtue, because deficiency is more opposed to virtue: thus illiberality is + more opposed to liberality than prodigality is. Now a vice may be opposed to the virtue of gratitude by way of excess, for + instance if one were to show gratitude for things for which gratitude is not due, or sooner than it is due, as stated above + ( + <a id="SS_Q107_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q106_A4.html">Q[106], A[4]</a>). But still more opposed to gratitude is the vice + denoting deficiency of gratitude, because the virtue of gratitude, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q107_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q106_A6.html">Q[106], A[6]</a>), inclines to return something more. Wherefore ingratitude is properly denominated from being a deficiency of gratitude. + Now every deficiency or privation takes its species from the opposite habit: for blindness and deafness differ according to + the difference of sight and hearing. Therefore just as gratitude or thankfulness is one special virtue, so also is ingratitude + one + special sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A2-p7"> It has, however, various degrees corresponding in their order to the things required for gratitude. The first of these is + to recognize the favor received, the second to express one's appreciation and thanks, and the third to repay the favor at + a suitable place and time according to one's means. And since what is last in the order of generation is first in the order + of destruction, it follows that the first degree of ingratitude is when a man fails to repay a favor, the second + when he declines to notice or indicate that he has received a favor, while the third and supreme degree is when a man fails + to recognize the reception of a favor, whether by forgetting it or in any other way. Moreover, since opposite affirmation + includes negation, it follows that it belongs to the first degree of ingratitude to return evil for good, to the second to + find fault with a favor received, and to the third to esteem kindness as though it were unkindness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In every sin there is material ingratitude to God, inasmuch as a man does something that may pertain to ingratitude. But + formal ingratitude is when a favor is actually contemned, and this is a special sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Nothing hinders the formal aspect of some special sin from being found materially in several kinds of sin, and in this way + the aspect of ingratitude is to be found in many kinds of sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These three are not different species but different degrees of one special sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q107_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q107_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q107_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q107_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q107_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q107_A3-p0.1">Whether ingratitude is always a mortal sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q107_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that ingratitude is always a mortal sin. For one ought to be grateful to God above all. But one is not ungrateful + to God by committing a venial sin: else every man would be guilty of ingratitude. Therefore no ingratitude is a venial sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a sin is mortal through being contrary to charity, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q107_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q24_A12.html">Q[24], A[12]</a>). But ingratitude is contrary to charity, since the debt of gratitude proceeds from that virtue, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q107_A3-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q106_A1.html">Q[106], A[1]</a>, ad 3; A[6], ad 2). Therefore ingratitude is always a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii): "Between the giver and the receiver of a favor there is this law, that the former should + forthwith forget having given, and the latter should never forget having received." Now, seemingly, the reason why the giver + should forget is that he may be unaware of the sin of the recipient, should the latter prove ungrateful; and there would be + no necessity for that if ingratitude were a slight sin. Therefore ingratitude is always a + mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> On the contrary, No one should be put in the way of committing a mortal sin. Yet, according to Seneca (De Benef. ii), "sometimes + it is necessary to deceive the person who receives assistance, in order that he may receive without knowing from whom he has + received." But this would seem to put the recipient in the way of ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not always a mortal + sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As appears from what we have said above + <a id="SS_Q107_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q107_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, a man may be ungrateful in two ways: first, by mere omission, for instance by failing to recognize the favor received, or + to express his appreciation of it or to pay something in return, and this is not always a mortal sin, because, as stated above + (Q[106], A[6]), the debt of gratitude requires a man to make a liberal return, which, however, he is not bound to do; wherefore + if he fail + to do so, he does not sin mortally. It is nevertheless a venial sin, because it arises either from some kind of negligence + or from some disinclination to virtue in him. And yet ingratitude of this kind may happen to be a mortal sin, by reason either + of inward contempt, or of the kind of thing withheld, this being needful to the benefactor, either simply, or in some case + of necessity. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A3-p7"> Secondly, a man may be ungrateful, because he not only omits to pay the debt of gratitude, but does the contrary. This again + is sometimes mortal and sometimes a venial sin, according to the kind of thing that is done. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A3-p8"> It must be observed, however, that when ingratitude arises from a mortal sin, it has the perfect character of ingratitude, + and when it arises from venial sin, it has the imperfect character. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By committing a venial sin one is not ungrateful to God to the extent of incurring the guilt of perfect ingratitude: but + there is something of ingratitude in a venial sin, in so far as it removes a virtuous act of obedience to God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When ingratitude is a venial sin it is not contrary to, but beside charity: since it does not destroy the habit of charity, + but excludes some act thereof. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Seneca also says (De Benef. vii): "When we say that a man after conferring a favor should forget about it, it is a mistake + to suppose that we mean him to shake off the recollection of a thing so very praiseworthy. When we say: He must not remember + it, we mean that he must not publish it abroad and boast about it." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> He that is unaware of a favor conferred on him is not ungrateful, if he fails to repay it, provided he be prepared to do + so if he knew. It is nevertheless commendable at times that the object of a favor should remain in ignorance of it, both in + order to avoid vainglory, as when Blessed Nicolas threw gold into a house secretly, wishing to avoid popularity: and because + the kindness is all the greater through the benefactor wishing not to shame the + person on whom he is conferring the favor. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A3-p13"></p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A3-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q107_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q107_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q107_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q107_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q108.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q107_A4-p0.1">Whether favors should be withheld from the ungrateful?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q107_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that favors should withheld from the ungrateful. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q107_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.16.29" target="asv">Wis. 16:29</a>): "The hope of the unthankful shall melt away as the winter's ice." But this hope would not melt away unless favors were + withheld from him. Therefore favors should be withheld from the ungrateful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no one should afford another an occasion of committing sin. But the ungrateful in receiving a favor is given an + occasion of ingratitude. Therefore favors should not be bestowed on the ungrateful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "By what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q107_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.17" target="asv">Wis. 11:17</a>). Now he that is ungrateful when he receives a favor sins against the favor. Therefore he should be deprived of the favor. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q107_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.35" target="asv">Lk. 6:35</a>) that "the Highest . . . is kind to the unthankful, and to the evil." Now we should prove ourselves His children by imitating + Him ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q107_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.36" target="asv">Lk. 6:36</a>). Therefore we should not withhold favors from the ungrateful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There are two points to be considered with regard to an ungrateful person. The first is what he deserves to suffer and thus + it is certain that he deserves to be deprived of our favor. The second is, what ought his benefactor to do? For in the first + place he should not easily judge him to be ungrateful, since, as Seneca remarks (De Benef. iii), "a man is often grateful + although he repays not," because perhaps he has not the means or the opportunity of + repaying. Secondly, he should be inclined to turn his ungratefulness into gratitude, and if he does not achieve this by being + kind to him once, he may by being so a second time. If, however, the more he repeats his favors, the more ungrateful and evil + the other becomes, he should cease from bestowing his favors upon him. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage quoted speaks of what the ungrateful man deserves to suffer. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He that bestows a favor on an ungrateful person affords him an occasion not of sin but of gratitude and love. And if the + recipient takes therefrom an occasion of ingratitude, this is not to be imputed to the bestower. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that bestows a favor must not at once act the part of a punisher of ingratitude, but rather that of a kindly physician, + by healing the ingratitude with repeated favors. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q107_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q107_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q108.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q106_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q107_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q108" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q107_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q108_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q108-p0.1">OF VENGEANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q108-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q108-p2"> We must now consider vengeance, under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q108-p3"> (1) Whether vengeance is lawful?</p> + <p id="SS_Q108-p4"> (2) Whether it is a special virtue?</p> + <p id="SS_Q108-p5"> (3) Of the manner of taking vengeance;</p> + <p id="SS_Q108-p6"> (4) On whom should vengeance be taken?</p> + <div id="SS_Q108_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q108.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q108_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q108_A1-p0.1">Whether vengeance is lawful?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q108_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that vengeance is not lawful. For whoever usurps what is God's sins. But vengeance belongs to God, for it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q108_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.32.35" target="asv">Dt. 32:35, </a> + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q108_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.19" target="asv">Rom. 12:19</a>): "Revenge to Me, and I will repay." Therefore all vengeance is unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he that takes vengeance on a man does not bear with him. But we ought to bear with the wicked, for a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q108_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Song.2.2" target="asv"> Cant 2:2, </a> "As the lily among the thorns," says: "He is not a good man that cannot bear with a wicked one." Therefore we should not + take vengeance on the wicked. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, vengeance is taken by inflicting punishment, which is the cause of servile fear. But the New Law is not a law of + fear, but of love, as Augustine states (Contra Adamant. xvii). Therefore at least in the New Testament all vengeance is unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a man is said to avenge himself when he takes revenge for wrongs inflicted on himself. But, seemingly, it is unlawful + even for a judge to punish those who have wronged him: for Chrysostom [*Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth., falsely ascribed + to St. Chrysostom] says: "Let us learn after Christ's example to bear our own wrongs with magnanimity, yet not to suffer God's + wrongs, not even by listening to them." Therefore vengeance seems to be + unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the sin of a multitude is more harmful than the sin of only one: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q108_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.26.5" target="asv">Ecclus. 26:5-7</a>): "Of three things my heart hath been afraid . . . the accusation of a city, and the gathering together of the people, and + a false calumny." But vengeance should not be taken on the sin of a multitude, for a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q108_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.29" target="asv"> Mat. 13:29,30, </a> "Lest perhaps . . . you root up the wheat . . . suffer both to grow," says that "a + multitude should not be excommunicated, nor should the sovereign." Neither therefore is any other vengeance lawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> We should look to God for nothing save what is good and lawful. But we are to look to God for vengeance on His enemies: for + it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q108_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.18.7" target="asv">Lk. 18:7</a>): "Will not God revenge His elect who cry to Him day and night?" as if to say: "He will indeed." Therefore vengeance is not + essentially evil and unlawful. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Vengeance consists in the infliction of a penal evil on one who has sinned. Accordingly, in the matter of vengeance, we must + consider the mind of the avenger. For if his intention is directed chiefly to the evil of the person on whom he takes vengeance + and rests there, then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: because to take pleasure in another's evil belongs to hatred, + which is contrary to the charity whereby we are bound to love all men. Nor is it an + excuse that he intends the evil of one who has unjustly inflicted evil on him, as neither is a man excused for hating one + that hates him: for a man may not sin against another just because the latter has already sinned against him, since this is + to be overcome by evil, which was forbidden by the Apostle, who says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q108_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.21" target="asv">Rom. 12:21</a>): "Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A1-p9"> If, however, the avenger's intention be directed chiefly to some good, to be obtained by means of the punishment of the person + who has sinned (for instance that the sinner may amend, or at least that he may be restrained and others be not disturbed, + that justice may be upheld, and God honored), then vengeance may be lawful, provided other due circumstances be observed. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> He who takes vengeance on the wicked in keeping with his rank and position does not usurp what belongs to God but makes use + of the power granted him by God. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q108_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.4" target="asv">Rom. 13:4</a>) of the earthly prince that "he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil." If, however, a + man takes vengeance outside the order of divine appointment, he usurps what is God's and therefore sins. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good bear with the wicked by enduring patiently, and in due manner, the wrongs they themselves receive from them: but + they do not bear with them as to endure the wrongs they inflict on God and their neighbor. For Chrysostom [*Cf. Opus Imperfectum, + Hom. v in Matth., falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom] says: "It is praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to + overlook God's wrongs is most wicked." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The law of the Gospel is the law of love, and therefore those who do good out of love, and who alone properly belong to the + Gospel, ought not to be terrorized by means of punishment, but only those who are not moved by love to do good, and who, though + they belong to the Church outwardly, do not belong to it in merit. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sometimes a wrong done to a person reflects on God and the Church: and then it is the duty of that person to avenge the wrong. + For example, Elias made fire descend on those who were come to seize him (4 Kings 1); likewise Eliseus cursed the boys that + mocked him (4 Kings 2); and Pope Sylverius excommunicated those who sent him into exile (XXIII, Q. iv, Cap. Guilisarius). + But in so far as the wrong inflicted on a man affects his person, he should bear it + patiently if this be expedient. For these precepts of patience are to be understood as referring to preparedness of the mind, + as Augustine states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> When the whole multitude sins, vengeance must be taken on them, either in respect of the whole multitude---thus the Egyptians + were drowned in the Red Sea while they were pursuing the children of Israel ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q108_A1-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.14" target="asv">Ex. 14</a>), and the people of Sodom were entirely destroyed ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q108_A1-p14.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.19" target="asv">Gn. 19</a>)---or as regards part of the multitude, as may be seen in the punishment of those who worshipped the calf. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A1-p15"> Sometimes, however, if there is hope of many making amends, the severity of vengeance should be brought to bear on a few + of the principals, whose punishment fills the rest with fear; thus the Lord ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q108_A1-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Num.25" target="asv">Num 25</a>) commanded the princes of the people to be hanged for the sin of the multitude. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A1-p16"> On the other hand, if it is not the whole but only a part of the multitude that has sinned, then if the guilty can be separated + from the innocent, vengeance should be wrought on them: provided, however, that this can be done without scandal to others; + else the multitude should be spared and severity foregone. The same applies to the sovereign, whom the multitude follow. For + his sin should be borne with, if it cannot be punished without scandal to the multitude: unless indeed his + sin were such, that it would do more harm to the multitude, either spiritually or temporally, than would the scandal that + was feared to arise from his punishment. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A1-p17"></p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A1-p18"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q108.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q108_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q108_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q108_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q108_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q108_A2-p0.1">Whether vengeance is a special virtue?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q108_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that vengeance is not a special and distinct virtue. For just as the good are rewarded for their good deeds, so + are the wicked punished for their evil deeds. Now the rewarding of the good does not belong to a special virtue, but is an + act of commutative justice. Therefore in the same way vengeance should not be accounted a special virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no need to appoint a special virtue for an act to which a man is sufficiently disposed by the other virtues. + Now man is sufficiently disposed by the virtues of fortitude or zeal to avenge evil. Therefore vengeance should not be reckoned + a special virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there is a special vice opposed to every special virtue. But seemingly no special vice is opposed to vengeance. + Therefore it is not a special virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1), aptitude to virtue is in us by nature, but the complement of virtue is in us through + habituation or some other cause. Hence it is evident that virtues perfect us so that we follow in due manner our natural inclinations, + which belong to the natural right. Wherefore to every definite natural inclination there corresponds a special virtue. Now + there is a special inclination of nature to remove harm, for which reason + animals have the irascible power distinct from the concupiscible. Man resists harm by defending himself against wrongs, lest + they be inflicted on him, or he avenges those which have already been inflicted on him, with the intention, not of harming, + but of removing the harm done. And this belongs to vengeance, for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that by "vengeance we resist + force, or wrong, and in general whatever is obscure" [*'Obscurum' Cicero wrote 'obfuturum' but the sense is the same as + St. Thomas gives in the parenthesis] "(i.e. derogatory), either by self-defense or by avenging it." Therefore vengeance is + a special virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as repayment of a legal debt belongs to commutative justice, and as repayment of a moral debt, arising from the bestowal + of a particular favor, belongs to the virtue of gratitude, so too the punishment of sins, so far as it is the concern of public + justice, is an act of commutative justice; while so far as it is concerned in defending the rights of the individual by whom + a wrong is resisted, it belongs to the virtue of revenge. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fortitude disposes to vengeance by removing an obstacle thereto, namely, fear of an imminent danger. Zeal, as denoting the + fervor of love, signifies the primary root of vengeance, in so far as a man avenges the wrong done to God and his neighbor, + because charity makes him regard them as his own. Now every act of virtue proceeds from charity as its root, since, according + to Gregory (Hom. xxvii in Ev.), "there are no green leaves on the bough of good + works, unless charity be the root." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Two vices are opposed to vengeance: one by way of excess, namely, the sin of cruelty or brutality, which exceeds the measure + in punishing: while the other is a vice by way of deficiency and consists in being remiss in punishing, wherefore it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q108_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.13.24" target="asv">Prov. 13:24</a>): "He that spareth the rod hateth his son." But the virtue of vengeance consists in observing the due measure of vengeance + with regard to all the circumstances. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q108_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q108_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q108_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q108_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q108_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q108_A3-p0.1">Whether vengeance should be wrought by means of punishments customary among men?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q108_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that vengeance should not be wrought by means of punishments customary among men. For to put a man to death is to + uproot him. But our Lord forbade ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q108_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.29" target="asv">Mat. 13:29</a>) the uprooting of the cockle, whereby the children of the wicked one are signified. Therefore sinners should not be put to + death. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all who sin mortally seem to be deserving of the same punishment. Therefore if some who sin mortally are punished + with death, it seems that all such persons should be punished with death: and this is evidently false. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to punish a man publicly for his sin seems to publish his sin: and this would seem to have a harmful effect on the + multitude, since the example of sin is taken by them as an occasion for sin. Therefore it seems that the punishment of death + should not be inflicted for a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> These punishments are fixed by the divine law as appears from what we have said above ( + <a id="SS_Q108_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q105_A2.html">FS, Q[105], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Vengeance is lawful and virtuous so far as it tends to the prevention of evil. Now some who are not influenced by motive + of virtue are prevented from committing sin, through fear of losing those things which they love more than those they obtain + by sinning, else fear would be no restraint to sin. Consequently vengeance for sin should be taken by depriving a man of what + he loves most. Now the things which man loves most are life, bodily safety, his own + freedom, and external goods such as riches, his country and his good name. Wherefore, according to Augustine's reckoning (De + Civ. Dei xxi), "Tully writes that the laws recognize eight kinds of punishment": namely, "death," whereby man is deprived + of life; "stripes," "retaliation," or the loss of eye for eye, whereby man forfeits his bodily safety; "slavery," and "imprisonment," + whereby he is deprived of freedom; "exile" whereby he is banished from his country; "fines," whereby he is mulcted in + his riches; "ignominy," whereby he loses his good name. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our Lord forbids the uprooting of the cockle, when there is fear lest the wheat be uprooted together with it. But sometimes + the wicked can be uprooted by death, not only without danger, but even with great profit, to the good. Wherefore in such a + case the punishment of death may be inflicted on sinners. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All who sin mortally are deserving of eternal death, as regards future retribution, which is in accordance with the truth + of the divine judgment. But the punishments of this life are more of a medicinal character; wherefore the punishment of death + is inflicted on those sins alone which conduce to the grave undoing of others. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The very fact that the punishment, whether of death or of any kind that is fearsome to man, is made known at the same time + as the sin, makes man's will avers to sin: because the fear of punishment is greater than the enticement of the example of + sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q108_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q108_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q108_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q108_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q109.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q108_A4-p0.1">Whether vengeance should be taken on those who have sinned involuntarily?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q108_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that vengeance should be taken on those who have sinned involuntarily. For the will of one man does not follow from + the will of another. Yet one man is punished for another, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q108_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.5" target="asv"> Ex. 20:5, </a> "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation." + Thus for the sin of Cham, his son Chanaan was curse ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q108_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.9.25" target="asv">Gn. 9:25</a>) and for the sin of Giezi, + his descendants were struck with leprosy (4 Kings 5). Again the blood of Christ lays the descendants of the Jews under the + ban of punishment, for they said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q108_A4-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.27.25" target="asv">Mat. 27:25</a>): "His blood be upon us and upon our children." Moreover we read (Josue 7) that the people of Israel were delivered into + the hands of their enemies for the sin of Achan, and that the same people were overthrown by the Philistines on account of + the sin of the sons of Heli ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q108_A4-p2.4" href="./asv.html#iKgs.4" target="asv">1 Kings 4</a>). Therefore a person is to be + punished without having deserved it voluntarily. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing is voluntary except what is in a man's power. But sometimes a man is punished for what is not in his power; + thus a man is removed from the administration of the Church on account of being infected with leprosy; and a Church ceases + to be an episcopal see on account of the depravity or evil of the people. Therefore vengeance is taken not only for voluntary + sins. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, ignorance makes an act involuntary. Now vengeance is sometimes taken on the ignorant. Thus the children of the people + of Sodom, though they were in invincible ignorance, perished with their parents ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q108_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.19" target="asv">Gn. 19</a>). Again, for the sin of Dathan and Abiron their children were swallowed up together with them ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q108_A4-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Num.16" target="asv">Num 16</a>). Moreover, dumb animals, which are devoid of reason, were commanded to be slain on account of the sin of the Amalekites + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q108_A4-p4.3" href="./asv.html#iKgs.15" target="asv">1 Kings 15</a>). Therefore + vengeance is sometimes taken on those who have deserved it involuntarily. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, compulsion is most opposed to voluntariness. But a man does not escape the debt of punishment through being compelled + by fear to commit a sin. Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those who have deserved it involuntarily. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further Ambrose says on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q108_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.5" target="asv">Lk. 5</a> that "the ship in which Judas was, was in distress"; wherefore "Peter, who was calm in the security of his own merits, was + in distress about those of others." But Peter did not will the sin of Judas. Therefore a person is sometimes punished without + having voluntarily deserved it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A4-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Punishment is due to sin. But every sin is voluntary according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract. i). Therefore vengeance + should be taken only on those who have deserved it voluntarily. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A4-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Punishment may be considered in two ways. First, under the aspect of punishment, and in this way punishment is not due save + for sin, because by means of punishment the equality of justice is restored, in so far as he who by sinning has exceeded in + following his own will suffers something that is contrary to this will. Wherefore, since every sin is voluntary, not excluding + original sin, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q108_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q81_A1.html">FS, Q[81], A[1]</a>), it follows + that no one is punished in this way, except for something done voluntarily. Secondly, punishment may be considered as a medicine, + not only healing the past sin, but also preserving from future sin, or conducing to some good, and in this way a person is + sometimes punished without any fault of his own, yet not without cause. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A4-p9"> It must, however, be observed that a medicine never removes a greater good in order to promote a lesser; thus the medicine + of the body never blinds the eye, in order to repair the heel: yet sometimes it is harmful in lesser things that it may be + helpful in things of greater consequence. And since spiritual goods are of the greatest consequence, while temporal goods + are least important, sometimes a person is punished in his temporal goods without any fault of his own. Such are + many of the punishments inflicted by God in this present life for our humiliation or probation. But no one is punished in + spiritual goods without any fault on his part, neither in this nor in the future life, because in the latter punishment is + not medicinal, but a result of spiritual condemnation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A man is never condemned to a spiritual punishment for another man's sin, because spiritual punishment affects the soul, + in respect of which each man is master of himself. But sometimes a man is condemned to punishment in temporal matters for + the sin of another, and this for three reasons. First, because one man may be the temporal goods of another, and so he may + be punished in punishment of the latter: thus children, as to the body, are a belonging + of their father, and slaves are a possession of their master. Secondly, when one person's sin is transmitted to another, either + by "imitation," as children copy the sins of their parents, and slaves the sins of their masters, so as to sin with greater + daring; or by way of "merit," as the sinful subjects merit a sinful superior, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q108_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Job.34.30" target="asv"> Job 34:30, </a> "Who maketh a man that is a hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people?" Hence the people of Israel were punished for + David's sin in numbering the people ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q108_A4-p10.2" href="./asv.html#iiKgdms.24" target="asv">2 Kings 24</a>). This may also happen through some kind of "consent" or "connivance": thus sometimes even the good are punished in temporal + matters together with the wicked, for not having condemned their sins, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9). Thirdly, in order + to mark the unity of human fellowship, whereby one man is bound to be solicitous for another, lest he sin; and in order to + inculcate horror of sin, seeing that the punishment of one affects all, as + though all were one body, as Augustine says in speaking of the sin of Achan (QQ. sup. Josue viii). The saying of the Lord, + "Visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation," seems to belong to mercy rather + than to severity, since He does not take vengeance forthwith, but waits for some future time, in order that the descendants + at least may mend their ways; yet should the wickedness of the descendants increase, it becomes almost necessary to take + vengeance on them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine states (QQ. sup. Josue viii), human judgment should conform to the divine judgment, when this is manifest, and + God condemns men spiritually for their own sins. But human judgment cannot be conformed to God's hidden judgments, whereby + He punishes certain persons in temporal matters without any fault of theirs, since man is unable to grasp the reasons of these + judgments so as to know what is expedient for each individual. Wherefore + according to human judgment a man should never be condemned without fault of his own to an inflictive punishment, such as + death, mutilation or flogging. But a man may be condemned, even according to human judgment, to a punishment of forfeiture, + even without any fault on his part, but not without cause: and this in three ways. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A4-p12"> First, through a person becoming, without any fault of his, disqualified for having or acquiring a certain good: thus for + being infected with leprosy a man is removed from the administration of the Church: and for bigamy, or through pronouncing + a death sentence a man is hindered from receiving sacred orders. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A4-p13"> Secondly, because the particular good that he forfeits is not his own but common property: thus that an episcopal see be + attached to a certain church belongs to the good of the whole city, and not only to the good of the clerics. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A4-p14"> Thirdly, because the good of one person may depend on the good of another: thus in the crime of high treason a son loses + his inheritance through the sin of his parent. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A4-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> By the judgment of God children are punished in temporal matters together with their parents, both because they are a possession + of their parents, so that their parents are punished also in their person, and because this is for their good lest, should + they be spared, they might imitate the sins of their parents, and thus deserve to be punished still more severely. Vengeance + is wrought on dumb animals and any other irrational creatures, because in this + way their owners are punished; and also in horror of sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A4-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> An act done through compulsion of fear is not involuntary simply, but has an admixture of voluntariness, as stated above + ( + <a id="SS_Q108_A4-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q6_A5.html">FS, Q[6], AA[5]</a>,6). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A4-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The other apostles were distressed about the sin of Judas, in the same way as the multitude is punished for the sin of one, + in commendation of unity, as state above (Reply OBJ[1],2). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A4-p18"></p> + <p id="SS_Q108_A4-p19"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q108_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q109.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q107_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q108_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q109" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q108_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q109_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q109-p0.1">OF TRUTH (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q109-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q109-p2"> We must now consider truth and the vices opposed thereto. Concerning truth there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q109-p3"> (1) Whether truth is a virtue?</p> + <p id="SS_Q109-p4"> (2) Whether it is a special virtue?</p> + <p id="SS_Q109-p5"> (3) Whether it is a part of justice?</p> + <p id="SS_Q109-p6"> (4) Whether it inclines to that which is less?</p> + <div id="SS_Q109_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q109.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q109_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q109_A1-p0.1">Whether truth is a virtue?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q109_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth is not a virtue. For the first of virtues is faith, whose object is truth. Since then the object precedes + the habit and the act, it seems that truth is not a virtue, but something prior to virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), it belongs to truth that a man should state things concerning himself + to be neither more nor less than they are. But this is not always praiseworthy---neither in good things, since according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q109_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.27.2" target="asv"> Prov. 27:2, </a> "Let another praise thee, and not thy own mouth"---nor even in evil things, because it is written in condemnation of certain + people ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q109_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.3.9" target="asv">Is. 3:9</a>): "They have proclaimed abroad their sin + as Sodom, and they have not hid it." Therefore truth is not a virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every virtue is either theological, or intellectual, or moral. Now truth is not a theological virtue, because its + object is not God but temporal things. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that by "truth we faithfully represent things + as they are were, or will be." Likewise it is not one of the intellectual virtues, but their end. Nor again is it a moral + virtue, since it is not a mean between excess and deficiency, for the more one tells the truth, + the better it is. Therefore truth is not a virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher both in the Second and in the Fourth Book of Ethics places truth among the other virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Truth can be taken in two ways. First, for that by reason of which a thing is said to be true, and thus truth is not a virtue, + but the object or end of a virtue: because, taken in this way, truth is not a habit, which is the genus containing virtue, + but a certain equality between the understanding or sign and the thing understood or signified, or again between a thing and + its rule, as stated in the + <a id="SS_Q109_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">FP, Q[16], A[1]</a>; + + <a id="SS_Q109_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A2.html">FP, Q[21], A[2]</a>. Secondly, truth may stand for that by which a person says what is true, in which sense one is said to be truthful. This + truth or truthfulness must needs be a virtue, because to say what is true is a good act: and virtue is "that which makes its + possessor good, and renders his action good." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument takes truth in the first sense. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To state that which concerns oneself, in so far as it is a statement of what is true, is good generically. Yet this does + not suffice for it to be an act of virtue, since it is requisite for that purpose that it should also be clothed with the + due circumstances, and if these be not observed, the act will be sinful. Accordingly it is sinful to praise oneself without + due cause even for that which is true: and it is also sinful to publish one's sin, by + praising oneself on that account, or in any way proclaiming it uselessly. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A person who says what is true, utters certain signs which are in conformity with things; and such signs are either words, + or external actions, or any external thing. Now such kinds of things are the subject-matter of the moral virtues alone, for + the latter are concerned with the use of the external members, in so far as this use is put into effect at the command of + the will. Wherefore truth is neither a theological, nor an intellectual, but a moral + virtue. And it is a mean between excess and deficiency in two ways. First, on the part of the object, secondly, on the part + of the act. On the part of the object, because the true essentially denotes a kind of equality, and equal is a mean between + more and less. Hence for the very reason that a man says what is true about himself, he observes the mean between one that + says more than the truth about himself, and one that says less than the truth. On the part of the act, to observe the mean + is to + tell the truth, when one ought, and as one ought. Excess consists in making known one's own affairs out of season, and deficiency + in hiding them when one ought to make them known. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q109.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q109_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q109_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q109_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q109_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q109_A2-p0.1">Whether truth is a special virtue?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q109_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth is not a special virtue. For the true and the good are convertible. Now goodness is not a special virtue, + in fact every virtue is goodness, because "it makes its possessor good." Therefore truth is not a special virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to make known what belongs to oneself is an act of truth as we understand it here. But this belongs to every virtue, + since every virtuous habit is made known by its own act. Therefore truth is not a special virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the truth of life is the truth whereby one lives aright, and of which it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q109_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.38.3" target="asv">Is. 38:3</a>): "I beseech Thee . . . remember how I have walked before Thee in truth, and with a perfect heart." Now one lives aright + by any virtue, as follows from the definition of virtue given above ( + <a id="SS_Q109_A2-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A4.html">FS, Q[55], A[4]</a>). Therefore truth is not a special virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, truth seems to be the same as simplicity, since hypocrisy is opposed to both. But simplicity is not a special virtue, + since it rectifies the intention, and that is required in every virtue. Therefore neither is truth a special virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is numbered together with other virtues (Ethic. ii, 7). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The nature of human virtue consists in making a man's deed good. Consequently whenever we find a special aspect of goodness + in human acts, it is necessary that man be disposed thereto by a special virtue. And since according to Augustine (De Nat. + Boni iii) good consists in order, it follows that a special aspect of good will be found where there is a special order. Now + there is a special order whereby our externals, whether words or deeds, are duly ordered + in relation to some thing, as sign to thing signified: and thereto man is perfected by the virtue of truth. Wherefore it is + evident that truth is a special virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The true and the good are convertible as to subject, since every true thing is good, and every good thing is true. But considered + logically, they exceed one another, even as the intellect and will exceed one another. For the intellect understands the will + and many things besides, and the will desires things pertaining to the intellect, and many others. Wherefore the "true" considered + in its proper aspect as a perfection of the intellect is a + particular good, since it is something appetible: and in like manner the "good" considered in its proper aspect as the end + of the appetite is something true, since it is something intelligible. Therefore since virtue includes the aspect of goodness, + it is possible for truth to be a special virtue, just as the "true" is a special good; yet it is not possible for goodness + to be a special virtue, since rather, considered logically, it is the genus of virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The habits of virtue and vice take their species from what is directly intended, and not from that which is accidental and + beside the intention. Now that a man states that which concerns himself, belongs to the virtue of truth, as something directly + intended: although it may belong to other virtues consequently and beside his principal intention. For the brave man intends + to act bravely: and that he shows his fortitude by acting bravely is a + consequence beside his principal intention. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The truth of life is the truth whereby a thing is true, not whereby a person says what is true. Life like anything else is + said to be true, from the fact that it attains its rule and measure, namely, the divine law; since rectitude of life depends + on conformity to that law. This truth or rectitude is common to every virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Simplicity is so called from its opposition to duplicity, whereby, to wit, a man shows one thing outwardly while having another + in his heart: so that simplicity pertains to this virtue. And it rectifies the intention, not indeed directly (since this + belongs to every virtue), but by excluding duplicity, whereby a man pretends one thing and intends another. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q109_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q109_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q109_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q109_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q109_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q109_A3-p0.1">Whether truth is a part of justice?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q109_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth is not a part of justice. For it seems proper to justice to give another man his due. But, by telling + the truth, one does not seem to give another man his due, as is the case in all the foregoing parts of justice. Therefore + truth is not a part of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, truth pertains to the intellect: whereas justice is in the will, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q109_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A4.html">Q[58], A[4]</a>). Therefore truth is not a part of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Jerome truth is threefold, namely, "truth of life," "truth of justice," and "truth of doctrine." But + none of these is a part of justice. For truth of life comprises all virtues, as stated above (A[2], ad 3): truth of justice + is the same as justice, so that it is not one of its parts; and truth of doctrine belongs rather to the intellectual virtues. + Therefore truth is nowise a part of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons truth among the parts of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q109_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q80.html">Q[80])</a>, a virtue is annexed to justice, as secondary to a principal virtue, through having something in common with justice, while + falling short from the perfect virtue thereof. Now the virtue of truth has two things in common with justice. In the first + place it is directed to another, since the manifestation, which we have stated to be an act of truth, is directed to another, + inasmuch as one person manifests to another + the things that concern himself. In the second place, justice sets up a certain equality between things, and this the virtue + of truth does also, for it equals signs to the things which concern man himself. Nevertheless it falls short of the proper + aspect of justice, as to the notion of debt: for this virtue does not regard legal debt, which justice considers, but rather + the moral debt, in so far as, out of equity, one man owes another a manifestation of the truth. Therefore truth is a part + of + justice, being annexed thereto as a secondary virtue to its principal. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since man is a social animal, one man naturally owes another whatever is necessary for the preservation of human society. + Now it would be impossible for men to live together, unless they believed one another, as declaring the truth one to another. + Hence the virtue of truth does, in a manner, regard something as being due. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Truth, as known, belongs to the intellect. But man, by his own will, whereby he uses both habits and members, utters external + signs in order to manifest the truth, and in this way the manifestation of the truth is an act of the will. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The truth of which we are speaking now differs from the truth of life, as stated in the preceding A[2], ad 3. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A3-p10"> We speak of the truth of justice in two ways. In one way we refer to the fact that justice itself is a certain rectitude + regulated according to the rule of the divine law; and in this way the truth of justice differs from the truth of life, because + by the truth of life a man lives aright in himself, whereas by the truth of justice a man observes the rectitude of the law + in those judgments which refer to another man: and in this sense the truth of justice has nothing to do with + the truth of which we speak now, as neither has the truth of life. In another way the truth of justice may be understood as + referring to the fact that, out of justice, a man manifests the truth, as for instance when a man confesses the truth, or + gives true evidence in a court of justice. This truth is a particular act of justice, and does not pertain directly to this + truth of which we are now speaking, because, to wit, in this manifestation of the truth a man's chief intention is to give + another man his due. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) in describing this virtue: "We are not speaking of one who + is truthful in his agreements, nor does this apply to matters in which justice or injustice is questioned." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A3-p11"> The truth of doctrine consists in a certain manifestation of truths relating to science wherefore neither does this truth + directly pertain to this virtue, but only that truth whereby a man, both in life and in speech, shows himself to be such as + he is, and the things that concern him, not other, and neither greater nor less, than they are. Nevertheless since truths + of science, as known by us, are something concerning us, and pertain to this virtue, in this sense the truth of + doctrine may pertain to this virtue, as well as any other kind of truth whereby a man manifests, by word or deed, what he + knows. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q109_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q109_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q109_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q109_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q110.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q109_A4-p0.1">Whether the virtue of truth inclines rather to that which is less?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q109_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the virtue of truth does not incline to that which is less. For as one incurs falsehood by saying more, so + does one by saying less: thus it is no more false that four are five, than that four are three. But "every falsehood is in + itself evil, and to be avoided," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore the virtue of truth does not incline + to that which is less rather than to that which is greater. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that a virtue inclines to the one extreme rather than to the other, is owing to the fact that the virtue's mean + is nearer to the one extreme than to the other: thus fortitude is nearer to daring than to timidity. But the mean of truth + is not nearer to one extreme than to the other; because truth, since it is a kind of equality, holds to the exact mean. Therefore + truth does not more incline to that which is less. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to forsake the truth for that which is less seems to amount to a denial of the truth, since this is to subtract + therefrom; and to forsake the truth for that which is greater seems to amount to an addition thereto. Now to deny the truth + is more repugnant to truth than to add something to it, because truth is incompatible with the denial of truth, whereas it + is compatible with addition. Therefore it seems that truth should incline to that which is + greater rather than to that which is less. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "by this virtue a man declines rather from the truth towards that which is less." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There are two ways of declining from the truth to that which is less. First, by affirming, as when a man does not show the + whole good that is in him, for instance science, holiness and so forth. This is done without prejudice to truth, since the + lesser is contained in the greater: and in this way this virtue inclines to what is less. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. + iv, 7), "this seems to be more prudent because exaggerations give annoyance." For those + who represent themselves as being greater than they are, are a source of annoyance to others, since they seem to wish to surpass + others: whereas those who make less account of themselves are a source of pleasure, since they seem to defer to others by + their moderation. Hence the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q109_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:6</a>): "Though I should have a mind to glory, I shall not be foolish: for I will say the truth. But I forbear, lest any man should + think of me above that which he seeth in me or + anything he heareth from me." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A4-p7"> Secondly, one may incline to what is less by denying, so as to say that what is in us is not. In this way it does not belong + to this virtue to incline to what is less, because this would imply falsehood. And yet this would be less repugnant to the + truth, not indeed as regards the proper aspect of truth, but as regards the aspect of prudence, which should be safeguarded + in all the virtues. For since it is fraught with greater danger and is more annoying to others, it is more + repugnant to prudence to think or boast that one has what one has not, than to think or say that one has not what one has. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A4-p8"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A4-p9"></p> + <p id="SS_Q109_A4-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q109_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q110.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q108_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q109_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q110" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q109_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q110_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q110-p0.1">OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TRUTH, AND FIRST OF LYING (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q110-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q110-p2"> We must now consider the vices opposed to truth, and (1) lying: (2) dissimulation or hypocrisy: (3) boasting and the opposite + vice. Concerning lying there are four points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110-p3"> (1) Whether lying, as containing falsehood, is always opposed to truth?</p> + <p id="SS_Q110-p4"> (2) Of the species of lying;</p> + <p id="SS_Q110-p5"> (3) Whether lying is always a sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q110-p6"> (4) Whether it is always a mortal sin?</p> + <div id="SS_Q110_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q110.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q110_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q110_A1-p0.1">Whether lying is always opposed to truth?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q110_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that lying is not always opposed to truth. For opposites are incompatible with one another. But lying is compatible + with truth, since that speaks the truth, thinking it to be false, lies, according to Augustine (Lib. De Mendac. iii). Therefore + lying is not opposed to truth. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the virtue of truth applies not only to words but also to deeds, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, + 7) by this virtue one tells the truth both in one's speech and in one's life. But lying applies only to words, for Augustine + says (Contra Mend. xii) that "a lie is a false signification by words." Accordingly, it seems that lying is not directly opposed + to the virtue of truth. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mendac. iii) that the "liar's sin is the desire to deceive." But this is not opposed to + truth, but rather to benevolence or justice. Therefore lying is not opposed to truth. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Contra Mend. x): "Let no one doubt that it is a lie to tell a falsehood in order to deceive. Wherefore a + false statement uttered with intent to deceive is a manifest lie." But this is opposed to truth. Therefore lying is opposed + to truth. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A moral act takes its species from two things, its object, and its end: for the end is the object of the will, which is the + first mover in moral acts. And the power moved by the will has its own object, which is the proximate object of the voluntary + act, and stands in relation to the will's act towards the end, as material to formal, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q110_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html">FS, Q[18], AA[6]</a>,7). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A1-p7"> Now it has been said above ( + <a id="SS_Q110_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q109_A1.html">Q[109], A[1]</a>, ad 3) that the virtue of truth---and consequently the opposite vices---regards a manifestation made by certain signs: and + this manifestation or statement is an act of reason comparing sign with the thing signified; because every representation + consists in comparison, which is the proper act of the reason. Wherefore though dumb animals manifest something, yet they + do not intend to manifest anything: but they do + something by natural instinct, and a manifestation is the result. But when this manifestation or statement is a moral act, + it must needs be voluntary, and dependent on the intention of the will. Now the proper object of a manifestation or statement + is the true or the false. And the intention of a bad will may bear on two things: one of which is that a falsehood may be + told; while the other is the proper effect of a false statement, namely, that someone may be deceived. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A1-p8"> Accordingly if these three things concur, namely, falsehood of what is said, the will to tell a falsehood, and finally the + intention to deceive, then there is falsehood---materially, since what is said is false, formally, on account of the will + to tell an untruth, and effectively, on account of the will to impart a falsehood. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A1-p9"> However, the essential notion of a lie is taken from formal falsehood, from the fact namely, that a person intends to say + what is false; wherefore also the word "mendacium" [lie] is derived from its being in opposition to the "mind." Consequently + if one says what is false, thinking it to be true, it is false materially, but not formally, because the falseness is beside + the intention of the speaker so that it is not a perfect lie, since what is beside the speaker's intention is + accidental for which reason it cannot be a specific difference. If, on the other hand, one utters' falsehood formally, through + having the will to deceive, even if what one says be true, yet inasmuch as this is a voluntary and moral act, it contains + falseness essentially and truth accidentally, and attains the specific nature of a lie. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A1-p10"> That a person intends to cause another to have a false opinion, by deceiving him, does not belong to the species of lying, + but to perfection thereof, even as in the physical order, a thing acquires its species if it has its form, even though the + form's effect be lacking; for instance a heavy body which is held up aloft by force, lest it come down in accordance with + the exigency of its form. Therefore it is evident that lying is directly an formally opposed to the virtue of + truth. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We judge of a thing according to what is in it formally and essentially rather than according to what is in it materially + and accidentally. Hence it is more in opposition to truth, considered as a moral virtue, to tell the truth with the intention + of telling a falsehood than to tell a falsehood with the intention of telling the truth. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii), words hold the chief place among other signs. And so when it is said that "a lie + is a false signification by words," the term "words" denotes every kind of sign. Wherefore if a person intended to signify + something false by means of signs, he would not be excused from lying. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The desire to deceive belongs to the perfection of lying, but not to its species, as neither does any effect belong to the + species of its cause. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A1-p14"></p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A1-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q110.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q110_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q110_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q110_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q110_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q110_A2-p0.1">Whether lies are sufficiently divided into officious, jocose, and mischievous lies?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q110_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that lies are not sufficiently divided into "officious," "jocose" and "mischievous" lies. For a division should + be made according to that which pertains to a thing by reason of its nature, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. vii, text. + 43; De Part. Animal i, 3). But seemingly the intention of the effect resulting from a moral act is something beside and accidental + to the species of that act, so that an indefinite number of effects can result from one + act. Now this division is made according to the intention of the effect: for a "jocose" lie is told in order to make fun, + an "officious" lie for some useful purpose, and a "mischievous" lie in order to injure someone. Therefore lies are unfittingly + divided in this way. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine (Contra Mendac. xiv) gives eight kinds of lies. The first is "in religious doctrine"; the second is "a + lie that profits no one and injures someone"; the third "profits one party so as to injure another"; the fourth is "told out + of mere lust of lying and deceiving"; the fifth is "told out of the desire to please"; the sixth "injures no one, and profits + /someone in saving his money"; the seventh "injures no one and profits someone in saving + him from death"; the eighth "injures no one, and profits someone in saving him from defilement of the body." Therefore it + seems that the first division of lies is insufficient. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) divides lying into "boasting," which exceeds the truth in speech, and "irony," which + falls short of the truth by saying something less: and these two are not contained under any one of the kinds mentioned above. + Therefore it seems that the aforesaid division of lies is inadequate. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q110_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.5.7" target="asv"> Ps. 5:7, </a> "Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie," says "that there are three kinds of lies; for some are told for the wellbeing and + convenience of someone; and there is another kind of lie that is told in fun; but the third kind of lie is told out of malice." + The first of these is called an officious lie, the second a jocose lie, the third a mischievous lie. Therefore lies are divided + into these three kinds. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Lies may be divided in three ways. First, with respect to their nature as lies: and this is the proper and essential division + of lying. In this way, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), lies are of two kinds, namely, the lie which goes beyond + the truth, and this belongs to "boasting," and the lie which stops short of the truth, and this belongs to "irony." This division + is an essential division of lying itself, because lying as such is opposed to + truth, as stated in the preceding Article: and truth is a kind of equality, to which more and less are in essential opposition. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A2-p7"> Secondly, lies may be divided with respect to their nature as sins, and with regard to those things that aggravate or diminish + the sin of lying, on the part of the end intended. Now the sin of lying is aggravated, if by lying a person intends to injure + another, and this is called a "mischievous" lie, while the sin of lying is diminished if it be directed to some good---either + of pleasure and then it is a "jocose" lie, or of usefulness, and then we have the "officious" lie, + whereby it is intended to help another person, or to save him from being injured. In this way lies are divided into the three + kinds aforesaid. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A2-p8"> Thirdly, lies are divided in a more general way, with respect to their relation to some end, whether or not this increase + or diminish their gravity: and in this way the division comprises eight kinds, as stated in the Second Objection. Here the + first three kinds are contained under "mischievous" lies, which are either against God, and then we have the lie "in religious + doctrine," or against man, and this either with the sole intention of injuring him, and then it is the second + kind of lie, which "profits no one, and injures someone"; or with the intention of injuring one and at the same time profiting + another, and this is the third kind of lie, "which profits one, and injures another." Of these the first is the most grievous, + because sins against God are always more grievous, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q110_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q73_A3.html">FS, Q[73], A[3]</a>): and the second is more grievous than the third, since the latter's gravity is diminished by the intention of profiting + another. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A2-p9"> After these three, which aggravate the sin of lying, we have a fourth, which has its own measure of gravity without addition + or diminution; and this is the lie which is told "out of mere lust of lying and deceiving." This proceeds from a habit, wherefore + the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "the liar, when he lies from habit, delights in lying." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A2-p10"> The four kinds that follow lessen the gravity of the sin of lying. For the fifth kind is the jocose lie, which is told "with + a desire to please": and the remaining three are comprised under the officious lie, wherein something useful to another person + is intended. This usefulness regards either external things, and then we have the sixth kind of lie, which "profits someone + in saving his money"; or his body, and this is the seventh kind, which "saves a man from death"; or the + morality of his virtue, and this is the eighth kind, which "saves him from unlawful defilement of his body." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A2-p11"> Now it is evident that the greater the good intended, the more is the sin of lying diminished in gravity. Wherefore a careful + consideration of the matter will show that these various kinds of lies are enumerated in their order of gravity: since the + useful good is better than the pleasurable good, and life of the body than money, and virtue than the life of the body. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A2-p12"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A2-p13"></p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A2-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q110_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q110_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q110_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q110_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q110_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q110_A3-p0.1">Whether every lie is a sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q110_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not every lie is a sin. For it is evident that the evangelists did not sin in the writing of the Gospel. Yet + they seem to have told something false: since their accounts of the words of Christ and of others often differ from one another: + wherefore seemingly one of them must have given an untrue account. Therefore not every lie is a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no one is rewarded by God for sin. But the midwives of Egypt were rewarded by God for a lie, for it is stated that + "God built them houses" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q110_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.1.21" target="asv">Ex. 1:21</a>). Therefore a lie is not a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the deeds of holy men are related in Sacred Writ that they may be a model of human life. But we read of certain + very holy men that they lied. Thus ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q110_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.12" target="asv">Gn. 12</a> and 20) we are told that Abraham said of his wife that she was his sister. Jacob also lied when he said that he was Esau, + and yet he received a blessing ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q110_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.27.27" target="asv">Gn. 27:27-29</a>). Again, Judith is commended ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q110_A3-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Jdt.15.10" target="asv">Judith 15:10,11</a>) although she lied to Holofernes. Therefore + not every lie is a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, one ought to choose the lesser evil in order to avoid the greater: even so a physician cuts off a limb, lest the + whole body perish. Yet less harm is done by raising a false opinion in a person's mind, than by someone slaying or being slain. + Therefore a man may lawfully lie, to save another from committing murder, or another from being killed. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it is a lie not to fulfill what one has promised. Yet one is not bound to keep all one's promises: for Isidore says + (Synonym. ii): "Break your faith when you have promised ill." Therefore not every lie is a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A3-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, apparently a lie is a sin because thereby we deceive our neighbor: wherefore Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xxi): + "Whoever thinks that there is any kind of lie that is not a sin deceives himself shamefully, since he deems himself an honest + man when he deceives others." Yet not every lie is a cause of deception, since no one is deceived by a jocose lie; seeing + that lies of this kind are told, not with the intention of being believed, but merely for the + sake of giving pleasure. Hence again we find hyperbolical expressions in Holy Writ. Therefore not every lie is a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A3-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q110_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.7.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 7:14</a>): "Be not willing to make any manner of lie." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A3-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> An action that is naturally evil in respect of its genus can by no means be good and lawful, since in order for an action + to be good it must be right in every respect: because good results from a complete cause, while evil results from any single + defect, as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now a lie is evil in respect of its genus, since it is an action bearing on undue + matter. For as words are naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is unnatural and undue + for anyone to signify by words something that is not in his mind. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "lying is + in itself evil and to be shunned, while truthfulness is good and worthy of praise." Therefore every lie is a sin, as also + Augustine declares (Contra Mend. i). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is unlawful to hold that any false assertion is contained either in the Gospel or in any canonical Scripture, or that + the writers thereof have told untruths, because faith would be deprived of its certitude which is based on the authority of + Holy Writ. That the words of certain people are variously reported in the Gospel and other sacred writings does not constitute + a lie. Hence Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. ii): "He that has the wit to + understand that in order to know the truth it is necessary to get at the sense, will conclude that he must not be the least + troubled, no matter by what words that sense is expressed." Hence it is evident, as he adds (De Consens. Evang. ii), that + "we must not judge that someone is lying, if several persons fail to describe in the same way and in the same words a thing + which they remember to have seen or heard." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The midwives were rewarded, not for their lie, but for their fear of God, and for their good-will, which latter led them + to tell a lie. Hence it is expressly stated ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q110_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.2.21" target="asv">Ex. 2:21</a>): "And because the midwives feared God, He built them houses." But the subsequent lie was not meritorious. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In Holy Writ, as Augustine observes (Lib. De Mend. v), the deeds of certain persons are related as examples of perfect virtue: + and we must not believe that such persons were liars. If, however, any of their statements appear to be untruthful, we must + understand such statements to have been figurative and prophetic. Hence Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. v): "We must believe + that whatever is related of those who, in prophetical times, are mentioned as + being worthy of credit, was done and said by them prophetically." As to Abraham "when he said that Sara was his sister, he + wished to hide the truth, not to tell a lie, for she is called his sister since she was the daughter of his father," Augustine + says (QQ. Super. Gen. xxvi; Contra Mend. x; Contra Faust. xxii). Wherefore Abraham himself said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q110_A3-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.20.12" target="asv">Gn. 20:12</a>): "She is truly my sister, the daughter of my father, and not the daughter of my mother," being related to him on his + father's side. Jacob's assertion that he was Esau, Isaac's first-born, was spoken in a mystical sense, because, to wit, the + latter's birthright was due to him by right: and he made use of this mode of speech being moved by the spirit of prophecy, + in order to signify a mystery, namely, that the younger people, i.e. the Gentiles, should supplant the first-born, i.e. the + Jews. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A3-p13"> Some, however, are commended in the Scriptures, not on account of perfect virtue, but for a certain virtuous disposition, + seeing that it was owing to some praiseworthy sentiment that they were moved to do certain undue things. It is thus that Judith + is praised, not for lying to Holofernes, but for her desire to save the people, to which end she exposed herself to danger. + And yet one might also say that her words contain truth in some mystical sense. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A lie is sinful not only because it injures one's neighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness, as stated above in + this Article. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything inordinate in order to ward off injury or defects from another: + as neither is it lawful to steal in order to give an alms, except perhaps in a case of necessity when all things are common. + Therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger + whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says (Contra Mend. x). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A3-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A man does not lie, so long as he has a mind to do what he promises, because he does not speak contrary to what he has in + mind: but if he does not keep his promise, he seems to act without faith in changing his mind. He may, however, be excused + for two reasons. First, if he has promised something evidently unlawful, because he sinned in promise, and did well to change + his mind. Secondly, if circumstances have changed with regard to persons and the + business in hand. For, as Seneca states (De Benef. iv), for a man to be bound to keep a promise, it is necessary for everything + to remain unchanged: otherwise neither did he lie in promising---since he promised what he had in his mind, due circumstances + being taken for granted---nor was he faithless in not keeping his promise, because circumstances are no longer the same. Hence + the Apostle, though he did not go to Corinth, whither he had promised to go ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q110_A3-p15.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.1" target="asv">2 Cor. 1</a>), did not lie, because obstacles + had arisen which prevented him. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A3-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> An action may be considered in two ways. First, in itself, secondly, with regard to the agent. Accordingly a jocose lie, + from the very genus of the action, is of a nature to deceive; although in the intention of the speaker it is not told to deceive, + nor does it deceive by the way it is told. Nor is there any similarity in the hyperbolical or any kind of figurative expressions, + with which we meet in Holy Writ: because, as Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. + v), "it is not a lie to do or say a thing figuratively: because every statement must be referred to the thing stated: and + when a thing is done or said figuratively, it states what those to whom it is tendered understand it to signify." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A3-p17"></p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A3-p18"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q110_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q110_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q110_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q110_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q111.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q110_A4-p0.1">Whether every lie is a mortal sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q110_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that every lie is a mortal sin. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q110_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.6.7" target="asv">Ps. 6:7</a>): "Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie," and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q110_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.11" target="asv">Wis. 1:11</a>): "The mouth that belieth killeth the soul." Now mortal sin alone causes destruction and death of the soul. Therefore every + lie is a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is against a precept of the decalogue is a mortal sin. Now lying is against this precept of the decalogue: + "Thou shalt not bear false witness." Therefore every lie is a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 36): "Every liar breaks his faith in lying, since forsooth he wishes the person + to whom he lies to have faith in him, and yet he does not keep faith with him, when he lies to him: and whoever breaks his + faith is guilty of iniquity." Now no one is said to break his faith or "to be guilty of iniquity," for a venial sin. Therefore + no lie is a venial sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the eternal reward is not lost save for a mortal sin. Now, for a lie the eternal reward was lost, being exchanged + for a temporal meed. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that "we learn from the reward of the midwives what the sin of lying + deserves: since the reward which they deserved for their kindness, and which they might have received in eternal life, dwindled + into a temporal meed on account of the lie of which they were guilty." Therefore even an + officious lie, such as was that of the midwives, which seemingly is the least of lies, is a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xvii) that "it is a precept of perfection, not only not to lie at all, but not even + to wish to lie." Now it is a mortal sin to act against a precept. Therefore every lie of the perfect is a mortal sin: and + consequently so also is a lie told by anyone else, otherwise the perfect would be worse off than others. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A4-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q110_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.5.7" target="asv"> Ps. 5:7, </a> "Thou wilt destroy," etc.: "There are two kinds of lie, that are not grievously sinful yet are not devoid of sin, when we + lie either in joking, or for the sake of our neighbor's good." But every mortal sin is grievous. Therefore jocose and officious + lies are not mortal sins. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A4-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A mortal sin is, properly speaking, one that is contrary to charity whereby the soul lives in union with God, as stated above + ( + <a id="SS_Q110_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q24_A12.html">Q[24], A[12]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q110_A4-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q35_A3.html"> Q[35], A[3]</a>). Now a lie may be contrary to charity in three ways: first, in itself; secondly, in respect of the evil intended; thirdly, + accidentally. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A4-p9"> A lie may be in itself contrary to charity by reason of its false signification. For if this be about divine things, it is + contrary to the charity of God, whose truth one hides or corrupts by such a lie; so that a lie of this kind is opposed not + only to the virtue of charity, but also to the virtues of faith and religion: wherefore it is a most grievous and a mortal + sin. If, however, the false signification be about something the knowledge of which affects a man's good, for + instance if it pertain to the perfection of science or to moral conduct, a lie of this description inflicts an injury on one's + neighbor, since it causes him to have a false opinion, wherefore it is contrary to charity, as regards the love of our neighbor, + and consequently is a mortal sin. On the other hand, if the false opinion engendered by the lie be about some matter the knowledge + of which is of no consequence, then the lie in question does no harm to one's neighbor; for instance, if a + person be deceived as to some contingent particulars that do not concern him. Wherefore a lie of this kind, considered in + itself, is not a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A4-p10"> As regards the end in view, a lie may be contrary to charity, through being told with the purpose of injuring God, and this + is always a mortal sin, for it is opposed to religion; or in order to injure one's neighbor, in his person, his possessions + or his good name, and this also is a mortal sin, since it is a mortal sin to injure one's neighbor, and one sins mortally + if one has merely the intention of committing a mortal sin. But if the end intended be not contrary to charity, + neither will the lie, considered under this aspect, be a mortal sin, as in the case of a jocose lie, where some little pleasure + is intended, or in an officious lie, where the good also of one's neighbor is intended. Accidentally a lie may be contrary + to charity by reason of scandal or any other injury resulting therefrom: and thus again it will be a mortal sin, for instance + if a man were not deterred through scandal from lying publicly. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passages quoted refer to the mischievous lie, as a gloss explains the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q110_A4-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.5.7" target="asv"> Ps. 5:7, </a> "Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since all the precepts of the decalogue are directed to the love of God and our neighbor, as stated above (Q[44], A[1], ad + 3; + <a id="SS_Q110_A4-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q100_A5.html">FS, Q[100], A[5]</a>, ad 1), a lie is contrary to a precept of the decalogue, in so far as it is contrary to the love of God and our neighbor. + Hence it is expressly forbidden to bear false witness against our neighbor. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even a venial sin can be called "iniquity" in a broad sense, in so far as it is beside the equity of justice; wherefore it + is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q110_A4-p13.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.4" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:4</a>): "Every sin is iniquity [*Vulg.: 'And sin is iniquity.']." It is in this sense that Augustine is speaking. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The lie of the midwives may be considered in two ways. First as regards their feeling of kindliness towards the Jews, and + their reverence and fear of God, for which their virtuous disposition is commended. For this an eternal reward is due. Wherefore + Jerome (in his exposition of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q110_A4-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.65.21" target="asv"> Is. 65:21, </a> 'And they shall build houses') explains that God "built them spiritual houses." Secondly, it may be considered with regard + to the external act + of lying. For thereby they could merit, not indeed eternal reward, but perhaps some temporal meed, the deserving of which + was not inconsistent with the deformity of their lie, though this was inconsistent with their meriting an eternal reward. + It is in this sense that we must understand the words of Gregory, and not that they merited by that lie to lose the eternal + reward as though they had already merited it by their preceding kindliness, as the objection understands the words to mean. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A4-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Some say that for the perfect every lie is a mortal sin. But this assertion is unreasonable. For no circumstance causes a + sin to be infinitely more grievous unless it transfers it to another species. Now a circumstance of person does not transfer + a sin to another species, except perhaps by reason of something annexed to that person, for instance if it be against his + vow: and this cannot apply to an officious or jocose lie. Wherefore an officious or a + jocose lie is not a mortal sin in perfect men, except perhaps accidentally on account of scandal. We may take in this sense + the saying of Augustine that "it is a precept of perfection not only not to lie at all, but not even to wish to lie": although + Augustine says this not positively but dubiously, for he begins by saying: "Unless perhaps it is a precept," etc. Nor does + it matter that they are placed in a position to safeguard the truth: because they are bound to safeguard the truth by virtue + of their office in judging or teaching, and if they lie in these matters their lie will be a mortal sin: but it does not follow + that they sin mortally when they lie in other matters. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A4-p16"></p> + <p id="SS_Q110_A4-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q110_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q111.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q109_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q110_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q111" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q110_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q111_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q111-p0.1">OF DISSIMULATION AND HYPOCRISY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q111-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q111-p2"> In due sequence we must consider dissimulation and hypocrisy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q111-p3"> (1) Whether all dissimulation is a sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q111-p4"> (2) Whether hypocrisy is dissimulation?</p> + <p id="SS_Q111-p5"> (3) Whether it is opposed to truth?</p> + <p id="SS_Q111-p6"> (4) Whether it is a mortal sin?</p> + <div id="SS_Q111_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q111.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q111_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q111_A1-p0.1">Whether all dissimulation is a sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q111_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not all dissimulation is a sin. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q111_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.24.28" target="asv">Lk. 24:28</a>) that our Lord "pretended [Douay: 'made as though'] he would go farther"; and Ambrose in his book on the Patriarchs (De Abraham + i) says of Abraham that he "spoke craftily to his servants, when he said" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q111_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.22.5" target="asv">Gn. 22:5</a>): "I and the boy will go with speed as far as yonder, and after we have worshipped, will return to you." Now to pretend and + to speak + craftily savor of dissimulation: and yet it is not to be said that there was sin in Christ or Abraham. Therefore not all dissimulation + is a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no sin is profitable. But according to Jerome, in his commentary on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q111_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.2.11" target="asv"> Gal. 2:11, </a> "When Peter [Vulg.: 'Cephas'] was come to Antioch:---The example of Jehu, king of Israel, who slew the priest of Baal, pretending + that he desired to worship idols, should teach us that dissimulation is useful and sometimes to be employed"; and David "changed + his countenance before" Achis, king of Geth ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q111_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iKgs.21.13" target="asv">1 Kings 21:13</a>). Therefore not + all dissimulation is a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, good is contrary to evil. Therefore if it is evil to simulate good, it is good to simulate evil. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written in condemnation of certain people ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q111_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.3.9" target="asv">Is. 3:9</a>): "They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not hid it." Now it pertains to dissimulation to hide one's + sin. Therefore it is reprehensible sometimes not to simulate. But it is never reprehensible to avoid sin. Therefore dissimulation + is not a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q111_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.16.14" target="asv"> Is. 16:14, </a> "In three years," etc., says: "Of the two evils it is less to sin openly than to simulate holiness." But to sin openly is + always a sin. Therefore dissimulation is always a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q111_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q109_A3.html">Q[109], A[3]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q111_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q110_A1.html"> Q[110], A[1]</a>), it belongs to the virtue of truth to show oneself outwardly by outward signs to be such as one is. Now outward signs are + not only words, but also deeds. Accordingly just as it is contrary to truth to signify by words something different from that + which is in one's mind, so also is it contrary to truth to employ signs of deeds or things to signify the contrary of + what is in oneself, and this is what is properly denoted by dissimulation. Consequently dissimulation is properly a lie told + by the signs of outward deeds. Now it matters not whether one lie in word or in any other way, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q111_A1-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q110_A1.html">Q[110], A[1]</a>, OBJ[2]). Wherefore, since every lie is a sin, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q111_A1-p7.4" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q110_A3.html">Q[110], A[3]</a>), it follows that also all dissimulation is a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii), "To pretend is not always a lie: but only when the pretense has no signification, then + it is a lie. When, however, our pretense refers to some signification, there is no lie, but a representation of the truth." + And he cites figures of speech as an example, where a thing is "pretended," for we do not mean it to be taken literally but + as a figure of something else that we wish to say. In this way our Lord "pretended + He would go farther," because He acted as if wishing to go farther; in order to signify something figuratively either because + He was far from their faith, according to Gregory (Hom. xxiii in Ev.); or, as Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii), because, + "as He was about to go farther away from them by ascending into heaven, He was, so to speak, held back on earth by their hospitality." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A1-p9"> Abraham also spoke figuratively. Wherefore Ambrose (De Abraham i) says that Abraham "foretold what he knew not": for he intended + to return alone after sacrificing his son: but by his mouth the Lord expressed what He was about to do. It is evident therefore + that neither dissembled. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Jerome employs the term "simulation" in a broad sense for any kind of pretense. David's change of countenance was a figurative + pretense, as a gloss observes in commenting on the title of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q111_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.33" target="asv">Ps. 33</a>, "I will bless the Lord at all times." There is no need to excuse Jehu's dissimulation from sin or lie, because he was a + wicked man, since he departed not from the idolatry of Jeroboam ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q111_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 10:29,31</a>). And yet he is praised withal and + received an earthly reward from God, not for his dissimulation, but for his zeal in destroying the worship of Baal. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some say that no one may pretend to be wicked, because no one pretends to be wicked by doing good deeds, and if he do evil + deeds, he is evil. But this argument proves nothing. Because a man might pretend to be evil, by doing what is not evil in + itself but has some appearance of evil: and nevertheless this dissimulation is evil, both because it is a lie, and because + it gives scandal; and although he is wicked on this account, yet his wickedness is not + the wickedness he simulates. And because dissimulation is evil in itself, its sinfulness is not derived from the thing simulated, + whether this be good or evil. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Just as a man lies when he signifies by word that which he is not, yet lies not when he refrains from saying what he is, + for this is sometimes lawful; so also does a man dissemble, when by outward signs of deeds or things he signifies that which + he is not, yet he dissembles not if he omits to signify what he is. Hence one may hide one's sin without being guilty of dissimulation. + It is thus that we must understand the saying of Jerome on the words + of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q111_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.3.9" target="asv"> Isa. 3:9, </a> that the "second remedy after shipwreck is to hide one's sin," lest, to wit, others be scandalized thereby. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A1-p13"></p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A1-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q111.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q111_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q111_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q111_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q111_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q111_A2-p0.1">Whether hypocrisy is the same as dissimulation?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q111_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation. For dissimulation consists in lying by deeds. But there may be + hypocrisy in showing outwardly what one does inwardly, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q111_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.2" target="asv"> Mat. 6:2, </a> "When thou dost an alms-deed sound not a trumpet before thee, as the hypocrites do." Therefore hypocrisy is not the same + as dissimulation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7): "Some there are who wear the habit of holiness, yet are unable to attain the merit + of perfection. We must by no means deem these to have joined the ranks of the hypocrites, since it is one thing to sin from + weakness, and another to sin from malice." Now those who wear the habit of holiness, without attaining the merit of perfection, + are dissemblers, since the outward habit signifies works of perfection. Therefore + dissimulation is not the same as hypocrisy. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, hypocrisy consists in the mere intention. For our Lord says of hypocrites ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q111_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.23.5" target="asv">Mat. 23:5</a>) that "all their works they do for to be seen of men": and Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7) that "they never consider what it + is that they do, but how by their every action they may please men." But dissimulation consists, not in the mere intention, + but in the outward action: wherefore a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q111_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Job.36.13" target="asv"> Job 36:13, </a> "Dissemblers and crafty + men prove the wrath of God," says that "the dissembler simulates one thing and does another: he pretends chastity, and delights + in lewdness, he makes a show of poverty and fills his purse." Therefore hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (Etym. x): "'Hypocrite' is a Greek word corresponding to the Latin 'simulator,' for whereas he is evil within," + he "shows himself outwardly as being good; {hypo} denoting falsehood, and {krisis}, judgment." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Isidore says (Etym. x), "the word hypocrite is derived from the appearance of those who come on to the stage with a disguised + face, by changing the color of their complexion, so as to imitate the complexion of the person they simulate, at one time + under the guise of a man, at another under the guise of a woman, so as to deceive the people in their acting." Hence Augustine + says (De Serm. Dom. ii) that "just as hypocrites by simulating other persons act the + parts of those they are not (since he that acts the part of Agamemnon is not that man himself but pretends to be), so too + in the Church and in every department of human life, whoever wishes to seem what he is not is a hypocrite: for he pretends + to be just without being so in reality." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A2-p7"> We must conclude, therefore, that hypocrisy is dissimulation, not, however, any form of dissimulation, but only when one + person simulates another, as when a sinner simulates the person of a just man. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The outward deed is a natural sign of the intention. Accordingly when a man does good works pertaining by their genus to + the service of God, and seeks by their means to please, not God but man, he simulates a right intention which he has not. + Wherefore Gregory says (Moral.) that "hypocrites make God's interests subservient to worldly purposes, since by making a show + of saintly conduct they seek, not to turn men to God, but to draw to themselves the + applause of their approval:" and so they make a lying pretense of having a good intention, which they have not, although they + do not pretend to do a good deed without doing it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The habit of holiness, for instance the religious or the clerical habit, signifies a state whereby one is bound to perform + works of perfection. And so when a man puts on the habit of holiness, with the intention of entering the state of perfection, + if he fail through weakness, he is not a dissembler or a hypocrite, because he is not bound to disclose his sin by laying + aside the habit of holiness. If, however, he were to put on the habit of holiness in + order to make a show of righteousness, he would be a hypocrite and a dissembler. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In dissimulation, as in a lie, there are two things: one by way of sign, the other by way of thing signified. Accordingly + the evil intention in hypocrisy is considered as a thing signified, which does not tally with the sign: and the outward words, + or deeds, or any sensible objects are considered in every dissimulation and lie as a sign. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q111_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q111_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q111_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q111_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q111_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q111_A3-p0.1">Whether hypocrisy is contrary to the virtue of truth?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q111_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that hypocrisy is not contrary to the virtue of truth. For in dissimulation or hypocrisy there is a sign and a thing + signified. Now with regard to neither of these does it seem to be opposed to any special virtue: for a hypocrite simulates + any virtue, and by means of any virtuous deeds, such as fasting, prayer and alms deeds, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q111_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.1" target="asv">Mat. 6:1-18</a>. Therefore hypocrisy is not specially opposed to the virtue of truth. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all dissimulation seems to proceed from guile, wherefore it is opposed to simplicity. Now guile is opposed to prudence + as above stated ( + <a id="SS_Q111_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q55_A4.html">Q[55], A[4]</a>). Therefore, hypocrisy which is dissimulation is not opposed to truth, but rather to prudence or simplicity. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the species of moral acts is taken from their end. Now the end of hypocrisy is the acquisition of gain or vainglory: + wherefore a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q111_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.27.8" target="asv"> Job 27:8, </a> "What is the hope of the hypocrite, if through covetousness he take by violence," says: "A hypocrite or, as the Latin has + it, a dissimulator, is a covetous thief: for through desire of being honored for holiness, though guilty of wickedness, he + steals praise for a life which is not + his." [*The quotation is from St. Gregory's Moralia, Bk XVIII.] Therefore since covetousness or vainglory is not directly + opposed to truth, it seems that neither is hypocrisy or dissimulation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> All dissimulation is a lie, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q111_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q111_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now a lie is directly opposed to truth. Therefore dissimulation or hypocrisy is also. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Metaph. text. 13, 24, x), "contrariety is opposition as regards form," i.e. the specific form. + Accordingly we must reply that dissimulation or hypocrisy may be opposed to a virtue in two ways, in one way directly, in + another way indirectly. Its direct opposition or contrariety is to be considered with regard to the very species of the act, + and this species depends on that act's proper object. Wherefore since hypocrisy is a kind + of dissimulation, whereby a man simulates a character which is not his, as stated in the preceding article, it follows that + it is directly opposed to truth whereby a man shows himself in life and speech to be what he is, as stated in Ethic. iv, 7. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A3-p7"> The indirect opposition or contrariety of hypocrisy may be considered in relation to any accident, for instance a remote + end, or an instrument of action, or anything else of that kind. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The hypocrite in simulating a virtue regards it as his end, not in respect of its existence, as though he wished to have + it, but in respect of appearance, since he wishes to seem to have it. Hence his hypocrisy is not opposed to that virtue, but + to truth, inasmuch as he wishes to deceive men with regard to that virtue. And he performs acts of that virtue, not as intending + them for their own sake, but instrumentally, as signs of that virtue, wherefore + his hypocrisy has not, on that account, a direct opposition to that virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q111_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q55_A3.html">Q[55], AA[3]</a>,4,5), the vice directly opposed to prudence is cunning, to which it belongs to discover ways of achieving a purpose, that + are apparent and not real: while it accomplishes that purpose, by guile in words, and by fraud in deeds: and it stands in + relation to prudence, as guile and fraud to simplicity. Now guile and fraud are directed chiefly to deception, and sometimes + secondarily to injury. + Wherefore it belongs directly to simplicity to guard oneself from deception, and in this way the virtue of simplicity is the + same as the virtue of truth as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q111_A3-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q109_A2.html">Q[109], A[2]</a>, ad 4). There is, however, a mere logical difference between them, because by truth we mean the concordance between sign + and thing signified, while simplicity indicates that one does not tend to different things, by intending one thing inwardly, + and pretending another outwardly. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Gain or glory is the remote end of the dissembler as also of the liar. Hence it does not take its species from this end, + but from the proximate end, which is to show oneself other than one is. Wherefore it sometimes happens to a man to pretend + great things of himself, for no further purpose than the mere lust of hypocrisy, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), and + as also we have said above with regard to lying ( + <a id="SS_Q111_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q110_A2.html">Q[110], + A[2] + </a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q111_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q111_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q111_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q111_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q112.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q111_A4-p0.1">Whether hypocrisy is always a mortal sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q111_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that hypocrisy is always a mortal sin. For Jerome says on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q111_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.16.14" target="asv"> Is. 16:14</a>: "Of the two evils it is less to sin openly than to simulate holiness": and a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q111_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Job.1.21" target="asv"> Job 1:21</a> [*St. Augustine on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q111_A4-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.63.7" target="asv"> Ps. 63:7</a>], "As it hath pleased the Lord," etc., says that "pretended justice is no justice, but a twofold sin": and again a gloss + on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q111_A4-p2.4" href="./asv.html#Lam.4.6" target="asv"> Lam. 4:6, </a> "The iniquity . . . of my people is made + greater than the sin of Sodom," says: "He deplores the sins of the soul that falls into hypocrisy, which is a greater iniquity + than the sin of Sodom." Now the sins of Sodom are mortal sin. Therefore hypocrisy is always a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 8) that hypocrites sin out of malice. But this is most grievous, for it pertains to the + sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore a hypocrite always sins mortally. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one deserves the anger of God and exclusion from seeing God, save on account of mortal sin. Now the anger of + God is deserved through hypocrisy according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q111_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.36.13" target="asv"> Job 36:13, </a> "Dissemblers and crafty men prove the wrath of God": and the hypocrite is excluded from seeing God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q111_A4-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Job.13.16" target="asv"> Job 13:16, </a> "No hypocrite shall come before His presence." Therefore hypocrisy is always a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Hypocrisy is lying by deed since it is a kind of dissimulation. But it is not always a mortal sin to lie by deed. Neither + therefore is all hypocrisy a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A4-p6"> Further, the intention of a hypocrite is to appear to be good. But this is not contrary to charity. Therefore hypocrisy is + not of itself a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A4-p7"> Further, hypocrisy is born of vainglory, as Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17). But vainglory is not always a mortal sin. Neither + therefore is hypocrisy. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A4-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There are two things in hypocrisy, lack of holiness, and simulation thereof. Accordingly if by a hypocrite we mean a person + whose intention is directed to both the above, one, namely, who cares not to be holy but only to appear so, in which sense + Sacred Scripture is wont to use the term, it is evident that hypocrisy is a mortal sin: for no one is entirely deprived of + holiness save through mortal sin. But if by a hypocrite we mean one who intends to simulate + holiness, which he lacks through mortal sin, then, although he is in mortal sin, whereby he is deprived of holiness, yet, + in his case, the dissimulation itself is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes a venial sin. This will depend on the end + in view; for if this be contrary to the love of God or of his neighbor, it will be a mortal sin: for instance if he were to + simulate holiness in order to disseminate false doctrine, or that he may obtain ecclesiastical preferment, though unworthy, + or that + he may obtain any temporal good in which he fixes his end. If, however, the end intended be not contrary to charity, it will + be a venial sin, as for instance when a man takes pleasure in the pretense itself: of such a man it is said in Ethic. iv, + 7 that "he would seem to be vain rather than evil"; for the same applies to simulation as to a lie. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A4-p9"> It happens also sometimes that a man simulates the perfection of holiness which is not necessary for spiritual welfare. Simulation + of this kind is neither a mortal sin always, nor is it always associated with mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A4-p10"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q111_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q111_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q112.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q110_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q111_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q112" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q111_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q112_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q112-p0.1">OF BOASTING (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q112-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q112-p2"> We must now consider boasting and irony, which are parts of lying according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7). Under the + first head, namely, boasting, there are two points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="SS_Q112-p3"> (1) To which virtue is it opposed?</p> + <p id="SS_Q112-p4"> (2) Whether it is a mortal sin?</p> + <div id="SS_Q112_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q112.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q112_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q112_A1-p0.1">Whether boasting is opposed to the virtue of truth?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q112_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q112_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that boasting is not opposed to the virtue of truth. For lying is opposed to truth. But it is possible to boast + even without lying, as when a man makes a show of his own excellence. Thus it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q112_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Esth.1.3" target="asv">Esther 1:3,4</a>) that Assuerus "made a great feast . . . that he might show the riches of the glory" and "of his kingdom, and the greatness + and boasting of his power." Therefore boasting is not opposed to the virtue of truth. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q112_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, boasting is reckoned by Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 4) to be one of the four species of pride, "when," to wit, "a man + boasts of having what he has not." Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q112_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.48.29" target="asv">Jer. 48:29,30</a>): "We have heard the pride of Moab, he is exceeding proud: his haughtiness, and his arrogancy, and his pride, and the loftiness + of his heart. I know, saith the Lord, his boasting, and that the strength thereof is not according to it." Moreover, + Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7) that boasting arises from vainglory. Now pride and vainglory are opposed to the virtue of humility. + Therefore boasting is opposed, not to truth, but to humility. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q112_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, boasting seems to be occasioned by riches; wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q112_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.5.8" target="asv">Wis. 5:8</a>): "What hath pride profited us? or what advantage hath the boasting of riches brought us?" Now excess of riches seems to + belong to the sin of covetousness, which is opposed to justice or liberality. Therefore boasting is not opposed to truth. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q112_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 7), that boasting is opposed to truth. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q112_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> "Jactantia" [boasting] seems properly to denote the uplifting of self by words: since if a man wishes to throw [jactare] + a thing far away, he lifts it up high. And to uplift oneself, properly speaking, is to talk of oneself above oneself [*Or + 'tall-talking' as we should say in English]. This happens in two ways. For sometimes a man speaks of himself, not above what + he is in himself, but above that which he is esteemed by men to be: and this the Apostle + declines to do when he says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q112_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:6</a>): "I forbear lest any man should think of me above that which he seeth in me, or anything he heareth of me." In another way + a man uplifts himself in words, by speaking of himself above that which he is in reality. And since we should judge of things + as they are in themselves, rather than as others deem them to be, it follows that boasting denotes more properly the uplifting + of self above what one is in oneself, than the uplifting of + self above what others think of one: although in either case it may be called boasting. Hence boasting properly so called + is opposed to truth by way of excess. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q112_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument takes boasting as exceeding men's opinion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q112_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The sin of boasting may be considered in two ways. First, with regard to the species of the act, and thus it is opposed to + truth; as stated (in the body of the article and + <a id="SS_Q112_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q110_A2.html"> Q[110], A[2]</a>). Secondly, with regard to its cause, from which more frequently though not always it arises: and thus it proceeds from pride + as its inwardly moving and impelling cause. For when a man is uplifted inwardly by arrogance, it often results that + outwardly he boasts of great things about himself; though sometimes a man takes to boasting, not from arrogance, but from + some kind of vanity, and delights therein, because he is a boaster by habit. Hence arrogance, which is an uplifting of self + above oneself, is a kind of pride; yet it is not the same as boasting, but is very often its cause. For this reason Gregory + reckons boasting among the species of pride. Moreover, the boaster frequently aims at obtaining glory through his boasting, + and + so, according to Gregory, it arises from vainglory considered as its end. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q112_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Wealth also causes boasting, in two ways. First, as an occasional cause, inasmuch as a man prides himself on his riches. + Hence ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q112_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.18" target="asv">Prov. 8:18</a>) "riches" are significantly described as "proud" [Douay: 'glorious']. Secondly, as being the end of boasting, since according + to Ethic. iv, 7, some boast, not only for the sake of glory, but also for the sake of gain. Such people invent stories about + themselves, so as to make profit thereby; + for instance, they pretend to be skilled in medicine, wisdom, or divination. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q112_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q112_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q112.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q112_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q112_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q112_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q113.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q112_A2-p0.1">Whether boasting is a mortal sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q112_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q112_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that boasting is a mortal sin. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q112_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.28.25" target="asv">Prov. 28:25</a>): "He that boasteth, and puffeth himself, stirreth up quarrels." Now it is a mortal sin to stir up quarrels, since God hates + those that sow discord, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q112_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.19" target="asv"> Prov. 6:19.</a> Therefore boasting is a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q112_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is forbidden in God's law is a mortal sin. Now a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q112_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.6.2" target="asv"> Ecclus. 6:2, </a> "Extol not thyself in the thoughts of thy soul," says: "This is a prohibition of boasting and pride." Therefore boasting + is a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q112_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, boasting is a kind of lie. But it is neither an officious nor a jocose lie. This is evident from the end of lying; + for according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), "the boaster pretends to something greater than he is, sometimes for no further + purpose, sometimes for the sake of glory or honor, sometimes for the sake of money." Thus it is evident that it is neither + an officious nor a jocose lie, and consequently it must be a mischievous lie. Therefore + seemingly it is always a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q112_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Boasting arises from vainglory, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17). Now vainglory is not always a mortal sin, but is + sometimes a venial sin which only the very perfect avoid. For Gregory says (Moral. viii, 30) that "it belongs to the very + perfect, by outward deeds so to seek the glory of their author, that they are not inwardly uplifted by the praise awarded + them." Therefore boasting is not always a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q112_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q112_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q110_A4.html">Q[110], A[4]</a>), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity. Accordingly boasting may be considered in two ways. First, in itself, + as a lie, and thus it is sometimes a mortal, and sometimes a venial sin. It will be a mortal sin when a man boasts of that + which is contrary to God's glory---thus it is said in the person of the king of Tyre ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q112_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ezek.28.2" target="asv">Ezech. 28:2</a>): "Thy heart is lifted up, and thou hast + said: I am God"---or contrary to the love of our neighbor, as when a man while boasting of himself breaks out into invectives + against others, as told of the Pharisee who said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q112_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Luke.18.11" target="asv">Lk. 18:11</a>): "I am not as the rest of men, extortioners, unjust, adulterers, as also is this publican." Sometimes it is a venial sin, + when, to wit, a man boasts of things that are against neither God nor his neighbor. Secondly, it may be considered with regard + to its cause, namely, pride, or the desire + of gain or of vainglory: and then if it proceeds from pride or from such vainglory as is a mortal sin, then the boasting will + also be a mortal sin: otherwise it will be a venial sin. Sometimes, however, a man breaks out into boasting through desire + of gain, and for this very reason he would seem to be aiming at the deception and injury of his neighbor: wherefore boasting + of this kind is more likely to be a mortal sin. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "a man who boasts for the sake + of gain, is viler than one who boasts for the sake of glory or honor." Yet it is not always a mortal sin because the gain + may be such as not to injure another man. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q112_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To boast in order to stir quarrels is a mortal sin. But it happens sometimes that boasts are the cause of quarrels, not intentionally + but accidentally: and consequently boasting will not be a mortal sin on that account. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q112_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This gloss speaks of boasting as arising from pride that is a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q112_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Boasting does not always involve a mischievous lie, but only where it is contrary to the love of God or our neighbor, either + in itself or in its cause. That a man boast, through mere pleasure in boasting, is an inane thing to do, as the Philosopher + remarks (Ethic. iv, 7): wherefore it amounts to a jocose lie. Unless perchance he were to prefer this to the love of God, + so as to contemn God's commandments for the sake of boasting: for then it would be + against the charity of God, in Whom alone ought our mind to rest as in its last end. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q112_A2-p10"> To boast for the sake of glory or gain seen to involve an officious lie: provided it be do without injury to others, for + then it would once become a mischievous lie. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q112_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q112_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q112_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q113.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q111_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q112_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q113" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q112_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q113_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q113-p0.1">IRONY* (TWO ARTICLES) [*Irony here must be given the signification of the Greek {eironia}, whence it is derived: dissimulation + of one's own good points.] + </h3> + <p id="SS_Q113-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q113-p2"> We must now consider irony, under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q113-p3"> (1) Whether irony is a sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q113-p4"> (2) Of its comparison with boasting.</p> + <div id="SS_Q113_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q113.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q113_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q113_A1-p0.1">Whether irony is a sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q113_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q113_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that irony, which consists in belittling oneself, is not a sin. For no sin arises from one's being strengthened + by God: and yet this leads one to belittle oneself, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q113_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.30.1" target="asv"> Prov. 30:1,2</a>: "The vision which the man spoke, with whom is God, and who being strengthened by God, abiding with him, said, I am the most + foolish of men." Also it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q113_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Amos.7.14" target="asv">Amos 7:14</a>): "Amos answered . . . I am not a prophet." + Therefore irony, whereby a man belittles himself in words, is not a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q113_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says in a letter to Augustine, bishop of the English (Regist. xii): "It is the mark of a well-disposed mind + to acknowledge one's fault when one is not guilty." But all sin is inconsistent with a well-disposed mind. Therefore irony + is not a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q113_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is not a sin to shun pride. But "some belittle themselves in words, so as to avoid pride," according to the Philosopher + (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore irony is not a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q113_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Verb. Apost., Serm. xxix): "If thou liest on account of humility, if thou wert not a sinner before lying, + thou hast become one by lying." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q113_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> To speak so as to belittle oneself may occur in two ways. First so as to safeguard truth, as when a man conceals the greater + things in himself, but discovers and asserts lesser things of himself the presence of which in himself he perceives. To belittle + oneself in this way does not belong to irony, nor is it a sin in respect of its genus, except through corruption of one of + its circumstances. Secondly, a person belittles himself by forsaking the truth, for + instance by ascribing to himself something mean the existence of which in himself he does not perceive, or by denying something + great of himself, which nevertheless he perceives himself to possess: this pertains to irony, and is always a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q113_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is a twofold wisdom and a twofold folly. For there is a wisdom according to God, which has human or worldly folly annexed + to it, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q113_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.18" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:18, </a> "If any man among you seem to be wise in this world, let him become a fool that he may be wise." But there is another wisdom + that is worldly, which as the same text goes on to say, "is foolishness with God." Accordingly, he that is strengthened by + God acknowledges himself + to be most foolish in the estimation of men, because, to wit, he despises human things, which human wisdom seeks. Hence the + text quoted continues, "and the wisdom of men is not with me," and farther on, "and I have known the science of the saints" + [*Vulg.: 'and I have not known the science of the saints']. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q113_A1-p8"> It may also be replied that "the wisdom of men" is that which is acquired by human reason, while the "wisdom of the saints" + is that which is received by divine inspiration. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q113_A1-p9"> Amos denied that he was a prophet by birth, since, to wit, he was not of the race of prophets: hence the text goes on, "nor + am I the son of a prophet." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q113_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It belongs to a well-disposed mind that a man tend to perfect righteousness, and consequently deem himself guilty, not only + if he fall short of common righteousness, which is truly a sin, but also if he fall short of perfect righteousness, which + sometimes is not a sin. But he does not call sinful that which he does not acknowledge to be sinful: which would be a lie + of irony. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q113_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A man should not commit one sin in order to avoid another: and so he ought not to lie in any way at all in order to avoid + pride. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xliii in Joan.): "Shun not arrogance so as to forsake truth": and Gregory says (Moral. + xxvi, 3) that "it is a reckless humility that entangles itself with lies." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q113_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q113_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q113.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q113_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q113_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q113_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q114.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q113_A2-p0.1">Whether irony is a less grievous sin than boasting?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q113_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q113_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that irony is not a less grievous sin than boasting. For each of them is a sin through forsaking truth, which is + a kind of equality. But one does not forsake truth by exceeding it any more than by diminishing it. Therefore irony is not + a less grievous sin than boasting. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q113_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), irony sometimes is boasting. But boasting is not irony. Therefore irony + is not a less grievous sin than boasting. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q113_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q113_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.26.25" target="asv">Prov. 26:25</a>): "When he shall speak low, trust him not: because there are seven mischiefs in his heart." Now it belongs to irony to speak + low. Therefore it contains a manifold wickedness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q113_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7): "Those who speak with irony and belittle themselves are more gracious, seemingly, in + their manners." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q113_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q113_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q110_A2.html">Q[110], AA[2]</a>,4), one lie is more grievous than another, sometimes on account of the matter which it is about---thus a lie about a matter + of religious doctrine is most grievous---and sometimes on account of the motive for sinning; thus a mischievous lie is more + grievous than an officious or jocose lie. Now irony and boasting lie about the same matter, either by words, or by any other + outward signs, namely, about + matters affecting the person: so that in this respect they are equal. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q113_A2-p7"> But for the most part boasting proceeds from a viler motive, namely, the desire of gain or honor: whereas irony arises from + a man's averseness, albeit inordinate, to be disagreeable to others by uplifting himself: and in this respect the Philosopher + says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "boasting is a more grievous sin than irony." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q113_A2-p8"> Sometimes, however, it happens that a man belittles himself for some other motive, for instance that he may deceive cunningly: + and then irony is more grievous. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q113_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument applies to irony and boasting, according as a lie is considered to be grievous in itself or on account of its + matter: for it has been said that in this way they are equal. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q113_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Excellence is twofold: one is in temporal, the other in spiritual things. Now it happens at times that a person, by outward + words or signs, pretends to be lacking in external things, for instance by wearing shabby clothes, or by doing something of + the kind, and that he intends by so doing to make a show of some spiritual excellence. Thus our Lord said of certain men ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q113_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.16" target="asv">Mat. 6:16</a>) that "they disfigure their faces that they may appear + unto men to fast." Wherefore such persons are guilty of both vices, irony and boasting, although in different respects, and + for this reason they sin more grievously. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that it is "the practice of boasters both + to make overmuch of themselves, and to make very little of themselves": and for the same reason it is related of Augustine + that he was unwilling to possess clothes that were either too costly or too shabby, because by both do men seek glory. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q113_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q113_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.19.23" target="asv"> Ecclus. 19:23, </a> "There is one that humbleth himself wickedly, and his interior is full of deceit," and it is in this sense that Solomon speaks + of the man who, through deceitful humility, "speaks low" wickedly. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q113_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q113_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q113_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q114.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q112_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q113_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q114" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q113_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q114_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q114-p0.1">OF THE FRIENDLINESS WHICH IS CALLED AFFABILITY (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q114-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q114-p2"> We must now consider the friendliness which is called affability, and the opposite vices which are flattery and quarreling. + Concerning friendliness or affability, there are two points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="SS_Q114-p3"> (1) Whether it is a special virtue?</p> + <p id="SS_Q114-p4"> (2) Whether it is a part of justice?</p> + <div id="SS_Q114_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q114.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q114_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q114_A1-p0.1">Whether friendliness is a special virtue?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q114_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q114_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that friendliness is not a special virtue. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 3) that "the perfect friendship + is that which is on account of virtue." Now any virtue is the cause of friendship: "since the good is lovable to all," as + Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore friendliness is not a special virtue, but a consequence of every virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q114_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) of this kind of friend that he "takes everything in a right manner both from + those he loves and from those who are not his friends." Now it seems to pertain to simulation that a person should show signs + of friendship to those whom he loves not, and this is incompatible with virtue. Therefore this kind of friendliness is not + a virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q114_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, virtue "observes the mean according as a wise man decides" (Ethic. ii, 6). Now it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q114_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.5" target="asv">Eccles. 7:5</a>): "The heart of the wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools where there is mirth": wherefore "it belongs + to a virtuous man to be most wary of pleasure" (Ethic. ii, 9). Now this kind of friendship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. + iv, 6), "is essentially desirous of sharing pleasures, but fears to give + pain." Therefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q114_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue. Now it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q114_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.4.7" target="asv">Ecclus. 4:7</a>): "Make thyself affable to the congregation of the poor." Therefore affability, which is what we mean by friendship, is a + special virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q114_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[109], A[2]; + <a id="SS_Q114_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A3.html">FS, Q[55], A[3]</a>), since virtue is directed to good, wherever there is a special kind of good, there must needs be a special kind of virtue. + Now good consists in order, as stated above (Q[109], A[2]). And it behooves man to be maintained in a becoming order towards + other men as regards their mutual relations with one another, in point of both deeds and words, so that they behave towards + one another in a + becoming manner. Hence the need of a special virtue that maintains the becomingness of this order: and this virtue is called + friendliness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q114_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher speaks of a twofold friendship in his Ethics. One consists chiefly in the affection whereby one man loves + another and may result from any virtue. We have stated above, in treating of charity ( + <a id="SS_Q114_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A1.html">Q[23], A[1]</a>, A[3], ad 1; QQ[25],26), what things belong to this kind of friendship. But he mentions another friendliness, which consists + merely in outward words or deeds; this has not the perfect nature of friendship, but + bears a certain likeness thereto, in so far as a man behaves in a becoming manner towards those with whom he is in contact. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q114_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every man is naturally every man's friend by a certain general love; even so it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q114_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.13.19" target="asv">Ecclus. 13:19</a>) that "every beast loveth its like." This love is signified by signs of friendship, which we show outwardly by words or deeds, + even to those who are strangers or unknown to us. Hence there is no dissimulation in this: because we do not show them signs + of perfect friendship, for we do not treat strangers with the same intimacy + as those who are united to us by special friendship. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q114_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When it is said that "the heart of the wise is where there is mourning" it is not that he may bring sorrow to his neighbor, + for the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q114_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.15" target="asv">Rom. 14:15</a>): "If, because of thy meat, thy brother be grieved, thou walkest not now according to charity": but that he may bring consolation + to the sorrowful, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q114_A1-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.7.38" target="asv"> Ecclus. 7:38, </a> "Be not wanting in comforting them that weep, and walk with them that mourn." + Again, "the heart of fools is where there is mirth," not that they may gladden others, but that they may enjoy others' gladness. + Accordingly, it belongs to the wise man to share his pleasures with those among whom he dwells, not lustful pleasures, which + virtue shuns, but honest pleasures, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q114_A1-p9.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.132.1" target="asv"> Ps. 132:1, </a> "Behold how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q114_A1-p10"> Nevertheless, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6), for the sake of some good that will result, or in order to avoid some + evil, the virtuous man will sometimes not shrink from bringing sorrow to those among whom he lives. Hence the Apostle says + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q114_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.8" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:8</a>): "Although I made you sorrowful by my epistle, I do not repent," and further on ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q114_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.9" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:9</a>), "I am glad; not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful + unto repentance." For this reason we should not show a cheerful face to those who are given to sin, in order that we may please + them, lest we seem to consent to their sin, and in a way encourage them to sin further. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q114_A1-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Sir.7.26" target="asv">Ecclus. 7:26</a>): "Hast thou daughters? Have a care of their body, and show not thy countenance gay towards them." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q114_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q114_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q114.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q114_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q114_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q114_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q115.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q114_A2-p0.1">Whether this kind of friendship is a part of justice?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q114_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q114_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this kind of friendship is not a part of justice. For justice consists in giving another man his due. But this + virtue does not consist in doing that, but in behaving agreeably towards those among whom we live. Therefore this virtue is + not a part of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q114_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this virtue is concerned about the joys and sorrows of those who dwell + in fellowship. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate the greatest pleasures, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q114_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A5.html">FS, Q[60], A[5]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q114_A2-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A3.html">FS, Q[61], A[3]</a>). Therefore this virtue is a part of temperance rather than of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q114_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to give equal things to those who are unequal is contrary to justice, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q114_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q59_A1.html">Q[59], AA[1]</a>,2). Now, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this virtue "treats in like manner known and unknown, companions and + strangers." Therefore this virtue rather than being a part of justice is opposed thereto. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q114_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Macrobius (De Somno Scip. i) accounts friendship a part of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q114_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> This virtue is a part of justice, being annexed to it as to a principal virtue. Because in common with justice it is directed + to another person, even as justice is: yet it falls short of the notion of justice, because it lacks the full aspect of debt, + whereby one man is bound to another, either by legal debt, which the law binds him to pay, or by some debt arising out of + a favor received. For it regards merely a certain debt of equity, namely, that we behave + pleasantly to those among whom we dwell, unless at times, for some reason, it be necessary to displease them for some good + purpose. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q114_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As we have said above ( + <a id="SS_Q114_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q109_A3.html">Q[109], A[3]</a>, ad 1), because man is a social animal he owes his fellow-man, in equity, the manifestation of truth without which human + society could not last. Now as man could not live in society without truth, so likewise, not without joy, because, as the + Philosopher says (Ethic. viii), no one could abide a day with the sad nor with the joyless. Therefore, a certain natural equity + obliges a man to live + agreeably with his fellow-men; unless some reason should oblige him to sadden them for their good. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q114_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It belongs to temperance to curb pleasures of the senses. But this virtue regards the pleasures of fellowship, which have + their origin in the reason, in so far as one man behaves becomingly towards another. Such pleasures need not to be curbed + as though they were noisome. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q114_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This saying of the Philosopher does not mean that one ought to converse and behave in the same way with acquaintances and + strangers, since, as he says (Ethic. iv, 6), "it is not fitting to please and displease intimate friends and strangers in + the same way." This likeness consists in this, that we ought to behave towards all in a fitting manner. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q114_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q114_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q114_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q115.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q113_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q114_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q115" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q114_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q115_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q115-p0.1">OF FLATTERY (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q115-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q115-p2"> We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid virtue: (1) Flattery, and (2) Quarreling. Concerning flattery there + are two points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="SS_Q115-p3"> (1) Whether flattery is a sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q115-p4"> (2) Whether it is a mortal sin?</p> + <div id="SS_Q115_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q115.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q115_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q115_A1-p0.1">Whether flattery is a sin? </h4> + <p id="SS_Q115_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q115_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that flattery is not a sin. For flattery consists in words of praise offered to another in order to please him. + But it is not a sin to praise a person, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q115_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.31.28" target="asv"> Prov. 31:28, </a> "Her children rose up and called her blessed: her husband, and he praised her." Moreover, there is no evil in wishing to + please others, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q115_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.33" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:33, </a> "I . . . in all things please all men." Therefore flattery is not a + sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q115_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, evil is contrary to good, and blame to praise. But it is not a sin to blame evil. Neither, then, is it a sin to + praise good, which seems to belong to flattery. Therefore flattery is not a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q115_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, detraction is contrary to flattery. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 5) that detraction is a remedy against + flattery. "It must be observed," says he, "that by the wonderful moderation of our Ruler, we are often allowed to be rent + by detractions but are uplifted by immoderate praise, so that whom the voice of the flatterer upraises, the tongue of the + detractor may humble." But detraction is an evil, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q115_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q73_A2.html">Q[73], + AA[2] + </a>,3). Therefore flattery is a good. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q115_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q115_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.13.18" target="asv"> Ezech. 13:18, </a> "Woe to them that sew cushions under every elbow," says, "that is to say, sweet flattery." Therefore flattery is a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q115_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q115_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q114_A1.html">Q[114], A[1]</a>, ad 3), although the friendship of which we have been speaking, or affability, intends chiefly the pleasure of those among + whom one lives, yet it does not fear to displease when it is a question of obtaining a certain good, or of avoiding a certain + evil. Accordingly, if a man were to wish always to speak pleasantly to others, he would exceed the mode of pleasing, and would + therefore sin by excess. If he + do this with the mere intention of pleasing he is said to be "complaisant," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6): whereas + if he do it with the intention of making some gain out of it, he is called a "flatterer" or "adulator." As a rule, however, + the term "flattery" is wont to be applied to all who wish to exceed the mode of virtue in pleasing others by words or deeds + in their ordinary behavior towards their fellows. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q115_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> One may praise a person both well and ill, according as one observes or omits the due circumstances. For if while observing + other due circumstances one were to wish to please a person by praising him, in order thereby to console him, or that he may + strive to make progress in good, this will belong to the aforesaid virtue of friendship. But it would belong to flattery, + if one wished to praise a person for things in which he ought not to be praised; + since perhaps they are evil, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q115_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.9.24" target="asv"> Ps. 9:24, </a> "The sinner is praised in the desires of his soul"; or they may be uncertain, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q115_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.27.8" target="asv"> Ecclus. 27:8, </a> "Praise not a man before he speaketh," and again ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q115_A1-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Sir.11.2" target="asv">Ecclus. 11:2</a>), "Praise not a man for his beauty"; or because there may be fear lest human praise should incite him to vainglory, wherefore + it is written, ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q115_A1-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Sir.11.30" target="asv">Ecclus. 11:30</a>), "Praise not any man before death." + Again, in like manner it is right to wish to please a man in order to foster charity, so that he may make spiritual progress + therein. But it would be sinful to wish to please men for the sake of vainglory or gain, or to please them in something evil, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q115_A1-p7.5" href="./asv.html#Ps.52.6" target="asv">Ps. 52:6</a>, "God hath scattered the bones of them that please men," and according to the words of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q115_A1-p7.6" href="./asv.html#Gal.1.10" target="asv">Gal. 1:10</a>), "If I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant of Christ." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q115_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even to blame evil is sinful, if due circumstances be not observed; and so too is it to praise good. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q115_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nothing hinders two vices being contrary to one another. Wherefore even as detraction is evil, so is flattery, which is contrary + thereto as regards what is said, but not directly as regards the end. Because flattery seeks to please the person flattered, + whereas the detractor seeks not the displeasure of the person defamed, since at times he defames him in secret, but seeks + rather his defamation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q115_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q115_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q115.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q115_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q115_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q115_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q116.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q115_A2-p0.1">Whether flattery is a mortal sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q115_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q115_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that flattery is a mortal sin. For, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), "a thing is evil because it is harmful." + But flattery is most harmful, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q115_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.9.24" target="asv"> Ps. 9:24, </a> "For the sinner is praised in the desires of his soul, and the unjust man is blessed. The sinner hath provoked the Lord." + Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. ad Celant): "Nothing so easily corrupts the human mind as flattery": and a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q115_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.69.4" target="asv"> Ps. 69:4, + + </a>"Let them be presently turned away blushing for shame that say to me: 'Tis well, 'Tis well," says: "The tongue of the flatterer + harms more than the sword of the persecutor." Therefore flattery is a most grievous sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q115_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever does harm by words, harms himself no less than others: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q115_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.36.15" target="asv">Ps. 36:15</a>): "Let their sword enter into their own hearts." Now he that flatters another induces him to sin mortally: hence a gloss + on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q115_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.140.5" target="asv"> Ps. 140:5, </a> "Let not the oil of the sinner fatten my head," says: "The false praise of the flatterer softens the mind by depriving it + of the rigidity of truth and renders it susceptive of + vice." Much more, therefore, does the flatterer sin in himself. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q115_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written in the Decretals (D. XLVI, Cap. 3): "The cleric who shall be found to spend his time in flattery and + treachery shall be degraded from his office." Now such a punishment as this is not inflicted save for mortal sin. Therefore + flattery is a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q115_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine in a sermon on Purgatory (xli, de Sanctis) reckons among slight sins, "if one desire to flatter any person of higher + standing, whether of one's own choice, or out of necessity." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q115_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q115_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q112_A2.html">Q[112], A[2]</a>), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity. Now flattery is sometimes contrary to charity and sometimes not. It is + contrary to charity in three ways. First, by reason of the very matter, as when one man praises another's sin: for this is + contrary to the love of God, against Whose justice he speaks, and contrary to the love of his neighbor, whom he encourages + to sin. Wherefore this is a mortal + sin, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q115_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.5.20" target="asv"> Is. 5:20.</a> "Woe to you that call evil good." Secondly, by reason of the intention, as when one man flatters another, so that by deceiving + him he may injure him in body or in soul; this is also a mortal sin, and of this it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q115_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Prov.27.6" target="asv">Prov. 27:6</a>): "Better are the wounds of a friend than the deceitful kisses of an enemy." Thirdly, by way of occasion, as when the praise + of a flatterer, even without his intending it, becomes to another an occasion of sin. In + this case it is necessary to consider, whether the occasion were given or taken, and how grievous the consequent downfall, + as may be understood from what has been said above concerning scandal ( + <a id="SS_Q115_A2-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q43_A3.html">Q[43], AA[3]</a>,4). If, however, one man flatters another from the mere craving to please others, or again in order to avoid some evil, or + to acquire something in a case of necessity, this is not contrary to charity. Consequently it is not a mortal but a venial + sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q115_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passages quoted speak of the flatterer who praises another's sin. Flattery of this kind is said to harm more than the + sword of the persecutor, since it does harm to goods that are of greater consequence. namely, spiritual goods. Yet it does + not harm so efficaciously, since the sword of the persecutor slays effectively, being a sufficient cause of death; whereas + no one by flattering can be a sufficient cause of another's sinning, as was shown above + (Q[43], A[1], ad 3; + <a id="SS_Q115_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q73_A8.html">FS, Q[73], A[8]</a>, ad 3; + <a id="SS_Q115_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q80_A1.html">FS, Q[80], A[1]</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q115_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument applies to one that flatters with the intention of doing harm: for such a man harms himself more than others, + since he harms himself, as the sufficient cause of sinning, whereas he is only the occasional cause of the harm he does to + others. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q115_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The passage quoted refers to the man who flatters another treacherously, in order to deceive him. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q115_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q115_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q115_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q116.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q114_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q115_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q116" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q115_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q116_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q116-p0.1">OF QUARRELING (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q116-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q116-p2"> We must now consider quarreling; concerning which there are two points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q116-p3"> (1) Whether it is opposed to the virtue of friendship?</p> + <p id="SS_Q116-p4"> (2) Of its comparison with flattery?</p> + <div id="SS_Q116_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q116.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q116_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q116_A1-p0.1">Whether quarreling is opposed to the virtue of friendship or affability?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q116_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q116_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that quarreling is not opposed to the virtue of friendship or affability. For quarreling seems to pertain to discord, + just as contention does. But discord is opposed to charity, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q116_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q37_A1.html">Q[37], A[1]</a>). Therefore quarreling is also. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q116_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q116_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.26.21" target="asv">Prov. 26:21</a>): "An angry man stirreth up strife." Now anger is opposed to meekness. Therefore strife or quarreling is also. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q116_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q116_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.1" target="asv">James 4:1</a>): "From whence are wars and quarrels [Douay: 'contentions'] among you? Are they not hence, from your concupiscences which + war in your members?" Now it would seem contrary to temperance to follow one's concupiscences. Therefore it seems that quarreling + is opposed not to friendship but to temperance. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q116_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher opposes quarreling to friendship (Ethic. iv, 6). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q116_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Quarreling consists properly in words, when, namely, one person contradicts another's words. Now two things may be observed + in this contradiction. For sometimes contradiction arises on account of the person who speaks, the contradictor refusing to + consent with him from lack of that love which unites minds together, and this seems to pertain to discord, which is contrary + to charity. Whereas at times contradiction arises by reason of the speaker being a person + to whom someone does not fear to be disagreeable: whence arises quarreling, which is opposed to the aforesaid friendship or + affability, to which it belongs to behave agreeably towards those among whom we dwell. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. + iv, 6) that "those who are opposed to everything with the intent of being disagreeable, and care for nobody, are said to be + peevish and quarrelsome." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q116_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Contention pertains rather to the contradiction of discord, while quarreling belongs to the contradiction which has the intention + of displeasing. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q116_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The direct opposition of virtues to vices depends, not on their causes, since one vice may arise from many causes, but on + the species of their acts. And although quarreling arises at times from anger, it may arise from many other causes, hence + it does not follow that it is directly opposed to meekness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q116_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> James speaks there of concupiscence considered as a general evil whence all vices arise. Thus, a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q116_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.7" target="asv"> Rom. 7:7 </a>says: "The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evil." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q116_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q116_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q116.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q116_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q116_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q116_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q117.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q116_A2-p0.1">Whether quarreling is a more grievous sin than flattery?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q116_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q116_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that quarreling is a less grievous sin than the contrary vice, viz. adulation or flattery. For the more harm a sin + does the more grievous it seems to be. Now flattery does more harm than quarreling, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q116_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.3.12" target="asv">Is. 3:12</a>): "O My people, they that call thee blessed, the same deceive thee, and destroy the way of thy steps." Therefore flattery + is a more grievous sin than quarreling. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q116_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there appears to be a certain amount of deceit in flattery, since the flatterer says one thing, and thinks another: + whereas the quarrelsome man is without deceit, for he contradicts openly. Now he that sins deceitfully is a viler man, according + to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 6). Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin than quarreling. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q116_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, shame is fear of what is vile, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9). But a man is more ashamed to be a flatterer + than a quarreler. Therefore quarreling is a less grievous sin than flattery. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q116_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The more a sin is inconsistent with the spiritual state, the more it appears to be grievous. Now quarreling seems to be more + inconsistent with the spiritual state: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q116_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.3.2" target="asv">1 Tim. 3:2,3</a>) that it "behooveth a bishop to be . . . not quarrelsome"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q116_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iiTim.3.24" target="asv">2 Tim. 3:24</a>): "The servant of the Lord must not wrangle." Therefore quarreling seems to be a more grievous sin than flattery. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q116_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We can speak of each of these sins in two ways. In one way we may consider the species of either sin, and thus the more a + vice is at variance with the opposite virtue the more grievous it is. Now the virtue of friendship has a greater tendency + to please than to displease: and so the quarrelsome man, who exceeds in giving displeasure sins more grievously than the adulator + or flatterer, who exceeds in giving pleasure. In another way we may consider them as + regards certain external motives, and thus flattery sometimes more grievous, for instance when one intends by deception to + acquire undue honor or gain: while sometimes quarreling is more grievous; for instance, when one intends either to deny the + truth, or to hold up the speaker to contempt. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q116_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as the flatterer may do harm by deceiving secretly, so the quarreler may do harm sometimes by assailing openly. Now, + other things being equal, it is more grievous to harm a person openly, by violence as it were, than secretly. Wherefore robbery + is a more grievous sin than theft, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q116_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q66_A9.html">Q[66], A[9]</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q116_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In human acts, the more grievous is not always the more vile. For the comeliness of a man has its source in his reason: wherefore + the sins of the flesh, whereby the flesh enslaves the reason, are viler, although spiritual sins are more grievous, since + they proceed from greater contempt. In like manner, sins that are committed through deceit are viler, in so far as they seem + to arise from a certain weakness, and from a certain falseness of the reason, + although sins that are committed openly proceed sometimes from a greater contempt. Hence flattery, through being accompanied + by deceit, seems to be a viler sin; while quarreling, through proceeding from greater contempt, is apparently more grievous. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q116_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in the objection, shame regards the vileness of a sin; wherefore a man is not always more ashamed of a more grievous + sin, but of a viler sin. Hence it is that a man is more ashamed of flattery than of quarreling, although quarreling is more + grievous. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q116_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q116_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q116_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q117.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q115_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q116_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q117" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q116_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q117_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q117-p0.1">OF LIBERALITY (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q117-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q117-p2"> We must now consider liberality and the opposite vices, namely, covetousness and prodigality.</p> + <p id="SS_Q117-p3"> Concerning liberality there are six points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q117-p4"> (1) Whether liberality is a virtue?</p> + <p id="SS_Q117-p5"> (2) What is its matter?</p> + <p id="SS_Q117-p6"> (3) Of its act;</p> + <p id="SS_Q117-p7"> (4) Whether it pertains thereto to give rather than to take?</p> + <p id="SS_Q117-p8"> (5) Whether liberality is a part of justice?</p> + <p id="SS_Q117-p9"> (6) Of its comparison with other virtues.</p> + <div id="SS_Q117_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q117.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q117_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q117_A1-p0.1">Whether liberality is a virtue?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q117_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that liberality is not a virtue. For no virtue is contrary to a natural inclination. Now it is a natural inclination + for one to provide for oneself more than for others: and yet it pertains to the liberal man to do the contrary, since, according + to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1), "it is the mark of a liberal man not to look to himself, so that he leaves for himself + the lesser things." Therefore liberality is not a virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man sustains life by means of riches, and wealth contributes to happiness instrumentally, as stated in Ethic. i, + 8. Since, then, every virtue is directed to happiness, it seems that the liberal man is not virtuous, for the Philosopher + says of him (Ethic. iv, 1) that "he is inclined neither to receive nor to keep money, but to give it away." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the virtues are connected with one another. But liberality does not seem to be connected with the other virtues: + since many are virtuous who cannot be liberal, for they have nothing to give; and many give or spend liberally who are not + virtuous otherwise. Therefore liberality is not a virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "the Gospel contains many instances in which a just liberality is inculcated." Now in the + Gospel nothing is taught that does not pertain to virtue. Therefore liberality is a virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19), "it belongs to virtue to use well the things that we can use ill." Now we may use + both well and ill, not only the things that are within us, such as the powers and the passions of the soul, but also those + that are without, such as the things of this world that are granted us for our livelihood. Wherefore since it belongs to liberality + to use these things well, it follows that liberality is a virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Ambrose (Serm. lxiv de Temp.) and Basil (Hom. in Luc. xii, 18) excess of riches is granted by God to some, in + order that they may obtain the merit of a good stewardship. But it suffices for one man to have few things. Wherefore the + liberal man commendably spends more on others than on himself. Nevertheless we are bound to be more provident for ourselves + in spiritual goods, in which each one is able to look after himself in the first + place. And yet it does not belong to the liberal man even in temporal things to attend so much to others as to lose sight + of himself and those belonging to him. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "It is a commendable liberality not to neglect + your relatives if you know them to be in want." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It does not belong to a liberal man so to give away his riches that nothing is left for his own support, nor the wherewithal + to perform those acts of virtue whereby happiness is acquired. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "the liberal + man does not neglect his own, wishing thus to be of help to certain people"; and Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "Our Lord + does not wish a man to pour out his riches all at once, but to dispense them: unless + he do as Eliseus did, who slew his oxen and fed the poor, that he might not be bound by any household cares." For this belongs + to the state of perfection, of which we shall speak farther on (Q[184] + <a id="SS_Q117_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q186_A3.html">, Q[186], A[3]</a>). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A1-p9"> It must be observed, however, that the very act of giving away one's possessions liberally, in so far as it is an act of + virtue, is directed to happiness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), "those who spend much on intemperance are not liberal but prodigal"; and likewise + whoever spends what he has for the sake of other sins. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "If you assist to rob others of their + possessions, your honesty is not to be commended, nor is your liberality genuine if you give for the sake of boasting rather + than of pity." Wherefore those who lack other virtues, though they spend much on + certain evil works, are not liberal. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A1-p11"> Again, nothing hinders certain people from spending much on good uses, without having the habit of liberality: even as men + perform works of other virtues, before having the habit of virtue, though not in the same way as virtuous people, as stated + above ( + <a id="SS_Q117_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">FS, Q[65], A[1]</a>). In like manner nothing prevents a virtuous man from being liberal, although he be poor. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. + iv, 1): "Liberality is proportionate to a man's substance," + i.e. his means, "for it consists, not in the quantity given, but in the habit of the giver": and Ambrose says (De Offic. i) + that "it is the heart that makes a gift rich or poor, and gives things their value." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q117.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q117_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q117_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q117_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q117_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q117_A2-p0.1">Whether liberality is about money?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q117_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that liberality is not about money. For every moral virtue is about operations and passions. Now it is proper to + justice to be about operations, as stated in Ethic. v, 1. Therefore, since liberality is a moral virtue, it seems that it + is about passions and not about money. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to a liberal man to make use of any kind of wealth. Now natural riches are more real than artificial + riches, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 5,6). Therefore liberality is not chiefly about money. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, different virtues have different matter, since habits are distinguished by their objects. But external things are + the matter of distributive and commutative justice. Therefore they are not the matter of liberality. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "liberality seems to be a mean in the matter of money." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) it belongs to the liberal man to part with things. Hence liberality is also called + open-handedness [largitas], because that which is open does not withhold things but parts of them. The term "liberality" seems + also to allude to this, since when a man quits hold of a thing he frees it [liberat], so to speak, from his keeping and ownership, + and shows his mind to be free of attachment thereto. Now those things which + are the subject of a man's free-handedness towards others are the goods he possesses, which are denoted by the term "money." + Therefore the proper matter of liberality is money. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (A[1], ad 3), liberality depends not on the quantity given, but on the heart of the giver. Now the heart + of the giver is disposed according to the passions of love and desire, and consequently those of pleasure and sorrow, towards + the things given. Hence the interior passions are the immediate matter of liberality, while exterior money is the object of + those same passions. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says in his book De Disciplina Christi (Tract. de divers, i), everything whatsoever man has on earth, and whatsoever + he owns, goes by the name of "'pecunia' [money], because in olden times men's possessions consisted entirely of 'pecora' [flocks]." + And the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): "We give the name of money to anything that can be valued in currency." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Justice establishes equality in external things, but has nothing to do, properly speaking, with the regulation of internal + passions: wherefore money is in one way the matter of liberality, and in another way of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q117_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q117_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q117_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q117_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q117_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q117_A3-p0.1">Whether using money is the act of liberality?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q117_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that using money is not the act of liberality. For different virtues have different acts. But using money is becoming + to other virtues, such as justice and magnificence. Therefore it is not the proper act of liberality. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to a liberal man, not only to give but also to receive and keep. But receiving and keeping do not seem + to be connected with the use of money. Therefore using money seems to be unsuitably assigned as the proper act of liberality. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the use of money consists not only in giving it but also in spending it. But the spending of money refers to the + spender, and consequently is not an act of liberality: for Seneca says (De Benef. v): "A man is not liberal by giving to himself." + Therefore not every use of money belongs to liberality. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): "In whatever matter a man is virtuous, he will make the best use of that matter: Therefore + he that has the virtue with regard to money will make the best use of riches." Now such is the liberal man. Therefore the + good use of money is the act of liberality. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The species of an act is taken from its object, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q117_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A2.html">FS, Q[18], A[2]</a>). Now the object or matter of liberality is money and whatever has a money value, as stated in the foregoing Article (ad + 2). And since every virtue is consistent with its object, it follows that, since liberality is a virtue, its act is consistent + with money. Now money comes under the head of useful goods, since all external goods are directed to man's + use. Hence the proper act of liberality is making use of money or riches. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It belongs to liberality to make good use of riches as such, because riches are the proper matter of liberality. On the other + hand it belongs to justice to make use of riches under another aspect, namely, that of debt, in so far as an external thing + is due to another. And it belongs to magnificence to make use of riches under a special aspect, in so far, to wit, as they + are employed for the fulfilment of some great deed. Hence magnificence stands in + relation to liberality as something in addition thereto, as we shall explain farther on ( + <a id="SS_Q117_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q134.html">Q[134])</a>. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It belongs to a virtuous man not only to make good use of his matter or instrument, but also to provide opportunities for + that good use. Thus it belongs to a soldier's fortitude not only to wield his sword against the foe, but also to sharpen his + sword and keep it in its sheath. Thus, too, it belongs to liberality not only to use money, but also to keep it in preparation + and safety in order to make fitting use of it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated (A[2], ad 1), the internal passions whereby man is affected towards money are the proximate matter of liberality. + Hence it belongs to liberality before all that a man should not be prevented from making any due use of money through an inordinate + affection for it. Now there is a twofold use of money: one consists in applying it to one's own use, and would seem to come + under the designation of costs or expenditure; while the other consists in + devoting it to the use of others, and comes under the head of gifts. Hence it belongs to liberality that one be not hindered + by an immoderate love of money, either from spending it becomingly, or from making suitable gifts. Therefore liberality is + concerned with giving and spending, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). The saying of Seneca refers to liberality + as regards giving: for a man is not said to be liberal for the reason that he gives something to himself. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q117_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q117_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q117_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q117_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q117_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q117_A4-p0.1">Whether it belongs to a liberal man chiefly to give?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q117_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that it does not belong to a liberal man chiefly to give. For liberality, like all other moral virtues, is regulated + by prudence. Now it seems to belong very much to prudence that a man should keep his riches. Wherefore the Philosopher says + (Ethic. iv, 1) that "those who have not earned money, but have received the money earned by others, spend it more liberally, + because they have not experienced the want of it." Therefore it seems that giving does + not chiefly belong to the liberal man. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no man is sorry for what he intends chiefly to do, nor does he cease from doing it. But a liberal man is sometimes + sorry for what he has given, nor does he give to all, as stated in Ethic. iv, 1. Therefore it does not belong chiefly to a + liberal man to give. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in order to accomplish what he intends chiefly, a man employs all the ways he can. Now a liberal man is not a beggar, + as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 1); and yet by begging he might provide himself with the means of giving to others. + Therefore it seems that he does not chiefly aim at giving. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, man is bound to look after himself rather than others. But by spending he looks after himself, whereas by giving + he looks after others. Therefore it belongs to a liberal man to spend rather than to give. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "it belongs to a liberal man to surpass in giving." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is proper to a liberal man to use money. Now the use of money consists in parting with it. For the acquisition of money + is like generation rather than use: while the keeping of money, in so far as it is directed to facilitate the use of money, + is like a habit. Now in parting with a thing ---for instance, when we throw something---the farther we put it away the greater + the force [virtus] employed. Hence parting with money by giving it to others proceeds + from a greater virtue than when we spend it on ourselves. But it is proper to a virtue as such to tend to what is more perfect, + since "virtue is a kind of perfection" (Phys. vii, text. 17,18). Therefore a liberal man is praised chiefly for giving. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It belongs to prudence to keep money, lest it be stolen or spent uselessly. But to spend it usefully is not less but more + prudent than to keep it usefully: since more things have to be considered in money's use, which is likened to movement, than + in its keeping, which is likened to rest. As to those who, having received money that others have earned, spend it more liberally, + through not having experienced the want of it, if their inexperience is the + sole cause of their liberal expenditure they have not the virtue of liberality. Sometimes, however, this inexperience merely + removes the impediment to liberality, so that it makes them all the more ready to act liberally, because, not unfrequently, + the fear of want that results from the experience of want hinders those who have acquired money from using it up by acting + with liberality; as does likewise the love they have for it as being their own effect, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. + iv, + 1). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated in this and the preceding Article, it belongs to liberality to make fitting use of money, and consequently to give + it in a fitting manner, since this is a use of money. Again, every virtue is grieved by whatever is contrary to its act, and + avoids whatever hinders that act. Now two things are opposed to suitable giving; namely, not giving what ought suitably to + be given, and giving something unsuitably. Wherefore the liberal man is grieved at + both: but especially at the former, since it is more opposed to his proper act. For this reason, too, he does not give to + all: since his act would be hindered were he to give to everyone: for he would not have the means of giving to those to whom + it were fitting for him to give. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Giving and receiving are related to one another as action and passion. Now the same thing is not the principle of both action + and passion. Hence, since liberality is a principle of giving, it does not belong to the liberal man to be ready to receive, + and still less to beg. Hence the verse: + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A4-p11"> 'In this world he that wishes to be pleasing to many Should give often, take seldom, ask never.' But he makes provision in + order to give certain things according as liberality requires; such are the fruits of his own possessions, for he is careful + about realizing them that he may make a liberal use thereof. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> To spend on oneself is an inclination of nature; hence to spend money on others belongs properly to a virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A4-p13"></p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A4-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q117_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q117_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q117_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q117_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q117_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q117_A5-p0.1">Whether liberality is a part of justice?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q117_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that liberality is not a part of justice. For justice regards that which is due. Now the more a thing is due the + less liberally is it given. Therefore liberality is not a part of justice, but is incompatible with it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, justice is about operation as stated above (Q[58], A[9]; + <a id="SS_Q117_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A2.html">FS, Q[60], AA[2]</a>,3): whereas liberality is chiefly about the love and desire of money, which are passions. Therefore liberality seems to belong + to temperance rather than to justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it belongs chiefly to liberality to give becomingly, as stated + <a id="SS_Q117_A5-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q117_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. But giving becomingly belongs to beneficence and mercy, which pertain to charity, as state above (QQ[30],31). Therefore + liberality is a part of charity rather than of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "Justice has to do with the fellowship of mankind. For the notion of fellowship is divided into + two parts, justice and beneficence, also called liberality or kind-heartedness." Therefore liberality pertains to justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Liberality is not a species of justice, since justice pays another what is his whereas liberality gives another what is one's + own. There are, however, two points in which it agrees with justice: first, that it is directed chiefly to another, as justice + is; secondly, that it is concerned with external things, and so is justice, albeit under a different aspect, a stated in this + Article and above (A[2], ad 3). Hence it is that liberality is reckoned by some to + be a part of justice, being annexed thereto as to a principal virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although liberality does no consider the legal due that justice considers, it considers a certain moral due. This due is + based on a certain fittingness and not on an obligation: so that it answers to the idea of due in the lowest degree. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Temperance is about concupiscence in pleasures of the body. But the concupiscence and delight in money is not referable to + the body but rather to the soul. Hence liberality does not properly pertain to temperance. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The giving of beneficence and mercy proceeds from the fact that a man has a certain affection towards the person to whom + he gives: wherefore this giving belongs to charity or friendship. But the giving of liberality arises from a person being + affected in a certain way towards money, in that he desires it not nor loves it: so that when it is fitting he gives it not + only to his friends but also to those whom he knows not. Hence it belong not to charity, + but to justice, which is about external things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q117_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q117_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q117_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q117_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q117_A6-p0.1">Whether liberality is the greatest of the virtues?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q117_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that liberality is the greatest of the virtues. For every virtue of man is a likeness to the divine goodness. Now + man is likened chiefly by liberality to God, "Who giveth to all men abundantly, and upbraideth not" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q117_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.5" target="asv">James 1:5</a>). Therefore liberality is the greatest of the virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. vi, 8), "in things that are great, but not in bulk, to be greatest is to be best." + Now the nature of goodness seems to pertain mostly to liberality, since "the good is self-communicative," according to Dionysius + (Div. Nom. iv). Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "justice reclines to severity, liberality to goodness." Therefore liberality + is the greatest of virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, men are honored and loved on account of virtue. Now Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that "bounty above all makes a + man famous": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "among the virtuous the liberal are the most beloved." Therefore + liberality is the greatest of virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "justice seems to be more excellent than liberality, although liberality is more pleasing." + The Philosopher also says (Rhet. i, 9) that "brave and just men are honored chiefly and, after them, those who are liberal." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Every virtue tends towards a good; wherefore the greater virtue is that which tends towards the greater good. Now liberality + tends towards a good in two ways: in one way, primarily and of its own nature; in another way, consequently. Primarily and + of its very nature it tends to set in order one's own affection towards the possession and use of money. In this way temperance, + which moderates desires and pleasures relating to one's own body, takes precedence of + liberality: and so do fortitude and justice, which, in a manner, are directed to the common good, one in time of peace, the + other in time of war: while all these are preceded by those virtues which are directed to the Divine good. For the Divine + good surpasses all manner of human good; and among human goods the public good surpasses the good of the individual; and of + the last named the good of the body surpasses those goods that consist of external things. Again, liberality is ordained to + a + good consequently, and in this way it is directed to all the aforesaid goods. For by reason of his not being a lover of money, + it follows that a man readily makes use of it, whether for himself. Or for the good of others, or for God's glory. Thus it + derives a certain excellence from being useful in many ways. Since, however, we should judge of things according to that which + is competent to them primarily and in respect of their nature, rather than according to that which pertains to them + consequently, it remains to be said that liberality is not the greatest of virtues. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God's giving proceeds from His love for those to whom He gives, not from His affection towards the things He gives, wherefore + it seems to pertain to charity, the greatest of virtues, rather than to liberality. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every virtue shares the nature of goodness by giving forth its own act: and the acts of certain other virtues are better + than money which liberality gives forth. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The friendship whereby a liberal man is beloved is not that which is based on virtue, as though he were better than others, + but that which is based on utility, because he is more useful in external goods, which as a rule men desire above all others. + For the same reason he becomes famous. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A6-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q117_A6-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q117_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q116_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q117_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q118" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q117_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q118-p0.1">OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO LIBERALITY, AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, OF COVETOUSNESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q118-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q118-p2"> We must now consider the vices opposed to liberality: and (1) covetousness; (2) prodigality.</p> + <p id="SS_Q118-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q118-p4"> (1) Whether covetousness is a sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q118-p5"> (2) Whether it is a special sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q118-p6"> (3) To which virtue it is opposed;</p> + <p id="SS_Q118-p7"> (4) Whether it is a mortal sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q118-p8"> (5) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?</p> + <p id="SS_Q118-p9"> (6) Whether it is a sin of the flesh or a spiritual sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q118-p10"> (7) Whether it is a capital vice?</p> + <p id="SS_Q118-p11"> (8) Of its daughters.</p> + <div id="SS_Q118_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q118_A1-p0.1">Whether covetousness is a sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q118_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that covetousness is not aa sin. For covetousness [avaritia] denotes a certain greed for gold [aeris aviditas*], + because, to wit, it consists in a desire for money, under which all external goods may be comprised. [*The Latin for covetousness + "avaritia" is derived from "aveo" to desire; but the Greek {philargyria} signifies literally "love of money": and it is to + this that St. Thomas is alluding (cf. A[2], OBJ[2])]. Now it is not a sin to desire + external goods: since man desires them naturally, both because they are naturally subject to man, and because by their means + man's life is sustained (for which reason they are spoken of as his substance). Therefore covetousness is not a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every sin is against either God, or one's neighbor, or oneself, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q118_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A4.html">FS, Q[72], A[4]</a>). But covetousness is not, properly speaking, a sin against God: since it is opposed neither to religion nor to the theological + virtues, by which man is directed to God. Nor again is it a sin against oneself, for this pertains properly to gluttony and + lust, of which the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q118_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.18" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:18</a>): "He that + committeth fornication sinneth against his own body." In like manner neither is it apparently a sin against one's neighbor, + since a man harms no one by keeping what is his own. Therefore covetousness is not a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things that occur naturally are not sins. Now covetousness comes naturally to old age and every kind of defect, + according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore covetousness is not a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q118_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.13.5" target="asv">Heb. 13:5</a>): "Let your manners be without covetousness, contented with such things as you have." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In whatever things good consists in a due measure, evil must of necessity ensue through excess or deficiency of that measure. + Now in all things that are for an end, the good consists in a certain measure: since whatever is directed to an end must needs + be commensurate with the end, as, for instance, medicine is commensurate with health, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. + i, 6). External goods come under the head of things useful for an end, as stated above + (Q[117], A[3]; + <a id="SS_Q118_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q2_A1.html">FS, Q[2] , A[1]</a>). Hence it must needs be that man's good in their respect consists in a certain measure, in other words, that man seeks, + according to a certain measure, to have external riches, in so far as they are necessary for him to live in keeping with his + condition of life. Wherefore it will be a sin for him to exceed this measure, by wishing to acquire or keep them immoderately. + This is what is meant by covetousness, which is defined as "immoderate + love of possessing." It is therefore evident that covetousness is a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is natural to man to desire external things as means to an end: wherefore this desire is devoid of sin, in so far as it + is held in check by the rule taken from the nature of the end. But covetousness exceeds this rule, and therefore is a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Covetousness may signify immoderation about external things in two ways. First, so as to regard immediately the acquisition + and keeping of such things, when, to wit, a man acquires or keeps them more than is due. In this way it is a sin directly + against one's neighbor, since one man cannot over-abound in external riches, without another man lacking them, for temporal + goods cannot be possessed by many at the same time. Secondly, it may signify + immoderation in the internal affection which a man has for riches when, for instance, a man loves them, desires them, or delights + in them, immoderately. In this way by covetousness a man sins against himself, because it causes disorder in his affections, + though not in his body as do the sins of the flesh. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A1-p9"> As a consequence, however, it is a sin against God, just as all mortal sins, inasmuch as man contemns things eternal for + the sake of temporal things. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Natural inclinations should be regulated according to reason, which is the governing power in human nature. Hence though + old people seek more greedily the aid of external things, just as everyone that is in need seeks to have his need supplied, + they are not excused from sin if they exceed this due measure of reason with regard to riches. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q118_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q118_A2-p0.1">Whether covetousness is a special sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q118_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that covetousness is not a special sin. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii): "Covetousness, which in Greek is + called {philargyria}, applies not only to silver or money, but also to anything that is desired immoderately." Now in every + sin there is immoderate desire of something, because sin consists in turning away from the immutable good, and adhering to + mutable goods, as state above ( + <a id="SS_Q118_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A6.html">FS, Q[71], A[6]</a>, OBJ[3]). Therefore + covetousness is a general sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x), "the covetous [avarus] man" is so called because he is "greedy for brass [avidus + aeris]," i.e. money: wherefore in Greek covetousness is called {philargyria}, i.e. "love of silver." Now silver, which stands + for money, signifies all external goods the value of which can be measured by money, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q118_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q117_A2.html">Q[117], A[2]</a>, ad 2). Therefore covetousness is a desire for any external thing: and + consequently seems to be a general sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q118_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.7" target="asv"> Rom. 7:7, </a> "For I had not known concupiscence," says: "The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evil." Now + the law seems to forbid especially the concupiscence of covetousness: hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q118_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.17" target="asv">Ex. 20:17</a>): "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods." Therefore the concupiscence of covetousness is all evil, and so covetousness + is a general sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Covetousness is numbered together with other special sins ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q118_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.29" target="asv">Rom. 1:29</a>), where it is written: "Being filled with all iniquity, malice, fornication, covetousness" [Douay: 'avarice'], etc. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Sins take their species from their objects, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q118_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A1.html">FS, Q[72], A[1]</a>). Now the object of a sin is the good towards which an inordinate appetite tends. Hence where there is a special aspect of + good inordinately desired, there is a special kind of sin. Now the useful good differs in aspect from the delightful good. + And riches, as such, come under the head of useful good, since they are desired under the aspect of being useful + to man. Consequently covetousness is a special sin, forasmuch as it is an immoderate love of having possessions, which are + comprised under the name of money, whence covetousness [avaritia] is denominated. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A2-p7"> Since, however, the verb "to have," which seems to have been originally employed in connection with possessions whereof we + are absolute masters, is applied to many other things (thus a man is said to have health, a wife, clothes, and so forth, as + stated in De Praedicamentis), consequently the term "covetousness" has been amplified to denote all immoderate desire for + having anything whatever. Thus Gregory says in a homily (xvi in Ev.) that "covetousness is a desire not only for + money, but also for knowledge and high places, when prominence is immoderately sought after." In this way covetousness is + not a special sin: and in this sense Augustine speaks of covetousness in the passage quoted in the First Objection. Wherefore + this suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All those external things that are subject to the uses of human life are comprised under the term "money," inasmuch as they + have the aspect of useful good. But there are certain external goods that can be obtained by money, such as pleasures, honors, + and so forth, which are desirable under another aspect. Wherefore the desire for such things is not properly called covetousness, + in so far as it is a special vice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This gloss speaks of the inordinate concupiscence for anything whatever. For it is easy to understand that if it is forbidden + to covet another's possessions it is also forbidden to covet those things that can be obtained by means of those possessions. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q118_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q118_A3-p0.1">Whether covetousness is opposed to liberality?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q118_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that covetousness is not opposed to liberality. For Chrysostom, commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q118_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.6" target="asv"> Mat. 5:6, </a> "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," says, (Hom. xv in Matth.) that there are two kinds of justice, one + general, and the other special, to which covetousness is opposed: and the Philosopher says the same (Ethic. v, 2). Therefore + covetousness is not opposed to liberality. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sin of covetousness consists in a man's exceeding the measure in the things he possesses. But this measure is + appointed by justice. Therefore covetousness is directly opposed to justice and not to liberality. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, liberality is a virtue that observes the mean between two contrary vices, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 7; + iv, 1). But covetousness has no contrary and opposite sin, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1,2). Therefore covetousness + is not opposed to liberality. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q118_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.5.9" target="asv">Eccles. 5:9</a>): "A covetous man shall not be satisfied with money, and he that loveth riches shall have no fruits from them." Now not to + be satisfied with money and to love it inordinately are opposed to liberality, which observes the mean in the desire of riches. + Therefore covetousness is opposed to liberality. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Covetousness denotes immoderation with regard to riches in two ways. First, immediately in respect of the acquisition and + keeping of riches. In this way a man obtains money beyond his due, by stealing or retaining another's property. This is opposed + to justice, and in this sense covetousness is mentioned ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q118_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.22.27" target="asv">Ezech. 22:27</a>): "Her princes in the midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey to shed blood . . . and to run after gains through + covetousness." Secondly, it denotes immoderation in the interior affections for riches; for instance, when a man loves or + desires riches too much, or takes too much pleasure in them, even if he be unwilling to steal. In this way covetousness is + opposed to liberality, which moderates these affections, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q118_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q117_A2.html">Q[117], A[2]</a>, ad 3, A[3], ad 3, A[6]). In this sense covetousness is spoken of ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q118_A3-p6.3" href="./asv.html#iiCor.9.5" target="asv">2 Cor. 9:5</a>): "That they would . . . prepare this + blessing before promised, to be ready, so as a blessing, not as covetousness," where a gloss observes: "Lest they should regret + what they had given, and give but little." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Chrysostom and the Philosopher are speaking of covetousness in the first sense: covetousness in the second sense is called + illiberality [*{aneleutheria}] by the Philosopher. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It belongs properly to justice to appoint the measure in the acquisition and keeping of riches from the point of view of + legal due, so that a man should neither take nor retain another's property. But liberality appoints the measure of reason, + principally in the interior affections, and consequently in the exterior taking and keeping of money, and in the spending + of the same, in so far as these proceed from the interior affection, looking at the + matter from the point of view not of the legal but of the moral debt, which latter depends on the rule of reason. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Covetousness as opposed to justice has no opposite vice: since it consists in having more than one ought according to justice, + the contrary of which is to have less than one ought, and this is not a sin but a punishment. But covetousness as opposed + to liberality has the vice of prodigality opposed to it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q118_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q118_A4-p0.1">Whether covetousness is always a mortal sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q118_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that covetousness is always a mortal sin. For no one is worthy of death save for a mortal sin. But men are worthy + of death on account of covetousness. For the Apostle after saying ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q118_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.29" target="asv">Rom. 1:29</a>): "Being filled with all iniquity . . . fornication, covetousness [Douay: 'avarice']," etc. adds ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q118_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.32" target="asv">Rom. 1:32</a>): "They who do such things are worthy of death." Therefore covetousness is a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the least degree of covetousness is to hold to one's own inordinately. But this seemingly is a mortal sin: for Basil + says (Serm. super. Luc. xii, 18): "It is the hungry man's bread that thou keepest back, the naked man's cloak that thou hoardest, + the needy man's money that thou possessest, hence thou despoilest as many as thou mightest succor." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A4-p4"> Now it is a mortal sin to do an injustice to another, since it is contrary to the love of our neighbor. Much more therefore + is all covetousness a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one is struck with spiritual blindness save through a mortal sin, for this deprives a man of the light of grace. + But, according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xv in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom], "Lust for money brings + darkness on the soul." Therefore covetousness, which is lust for money, is a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q118_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:12, </a> "If any man build upon this foundation," says (cf. St. Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi) that "he builds wood, hay, stubble, + who thinks in the things of the world, how he may please the world," which pertains to the sin of covetousness. Now he that + builds wood, hay, stubble, sins not mortally but venially, for it is said of him that "he shall be saved, yet so as by fire." + Therefore covetousness is some times a + venial sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q118_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q118_A3.html">(A[3])</a> covetousness is twofold. In one way it is opposed to justice, and thus it is a mortal sin in respect of its genus. For in + this sense covetousness consists in the unjust taking or retaining of another's property, and this belongs to theft or robbery, + which are mortal sins, as stated above (Q[66], AA[6],8). Yet venial sin may occur in this kind of covetousness by reason of + imperfection of the act, as stated + above (Q[66], A[6], ad 3), when we were treating of theft. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A4-p8"> In another way covetousness may be take as opposed to liberality: in which sense it denotes inordinate love of riches. Accordingly + if the love of riches becomes so great as to be preferred to charity, in such wise that a man, through love of riches, fear + not to act counter to the love of God and his neighbor, covetousness will then be a mortal sin. If, on the other hand, the + inordinate nature of his love stops short of this, so that although he love riches too much, yet he does + not prefer the love of them to the love of God, and is unwilling for the sake of riches to do anything in opposition to God + or his neighbor, then covetousness is a venial sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Covetousness is numbered together with mortal sins, by reason of the aspect under which it is a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Basil is speaking of a case wherein a man is bound by a legal debt to give of his goods to the poor, either through fear + of their want or on account of his having too much. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Lust for riches, properly speaking, brings darkness on the soul, when it puts out the light of charity, by preferring the + love of riches to the love of God. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A4-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A4-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q118_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q118_A5-p0.1">Whether covetousness is the greatest of sins?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q118_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that covetousness is the greatest of sins. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q118_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.9" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:9</a>): "Nothing is more wicked than a covetous man," and the text continues: "There is not a more wicked thing than to love money: + for such a one setteth even his own soul to sale." Tully also says (De Offic. i, under the heading, 'True magnanimity is based + chiefly on two things'): "Nothing is so narrow or little minded as to love money." But this pertains to + covetousness. Therefore covetousness is the most grievous of sins. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more a sin is opposed to charity, the more grievous it is. Now covetousness is most opposed to charity: for + Augustine says (QQ[83], qu. 36) that "greed is the bane of charity." Therefore covetousness is the greatest of sins. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the gravity of a sin is indicated by its being incurable: wherefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is said to be + most grievous, because it is irremissible. But covetousness is an incurable sin: hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) + that "old age and helplessness of any kind make men illiberal." Therefore covetousness is the most grievous of sins. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q118_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.5" target="asv">Eph. 5:5</a>) that covetousness is "a serving of idols." Now idolatry is reckoned among the most grievous sins. Therefore covetousness + is also. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Adultery is a more grievous sin than theft, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q118_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.30" target="asv"> Prov. 6:30.</a> But theft pertains to covetousness. Therefore covetousness is not the most grievous of sins. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Every sin, from the very fact that it is an evil, consists in the corruption or privation of some good: while, in so far + as it is voluntary, it consists in the desire of some good. Consequently the order of sins may be considered in two ways. + First, on the part of the good that is despised or corrupted by sin, and then the greater the good the graver the sin. From + this point of view a sin that is against God is most grievous; after this comes a sin that is + committed against a man's person, and after this comes a sin against external things, which are deputed to man's use, and + this seems to belong to covetousness. Secondly, the degrees of sin may be considered on the part of the good to which the + human appetite is inordinately subjected; and then the lesser the good, the more deformed is the sin: for it is more shameful + to be subject to a lower than to a higher good. Now the good of external things is the lowest of human goods: since it is + less + than the good of the body, and this is less than the good of the soul, which is less than the Divine good. From this point + of view the sin of covetousness, whereby the human appetite is subjected even to external things, has in a way a greater deformity. + Since, however, corruption or privation of good is the formal element in sin, while conversion to a mutable good is the material + element, the gravity of the sin is to be judged from the point of view of the good corrupted, rather than from that + of the good to which the appetite is subjected. Hence we must assert that covetousness is not simply the most grievous of + sins. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These authorities speak of covetousness on the part of the good to which the appetite is subjected. Hence ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q118_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.10" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:10</a>) it is given as a reason that the covetous man "setteth his own soul to sale"; because, to wit, he exposes his soul---that + is, his life---to danger for the sake of money. Hence the text continues: "Because while he liveth he hath cast away"---that + is, despised---"his bowels," in order to make money. Tully also adds that it is the + mark of a "narrow mind," namely, that one be willing to be subject to money. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine is taking greed generally, in reference to any temporal good, not in its special acceptation for covetousness: + because greed for any temporal good is the bane of charity, inasmuch as a man turns away from the Divine good through cleaving + to a temporal good. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable in one way, covetousness in another. For the sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable + by reason of contempt: for instance, because a man contemns God's mercy, or His justice, or some one of those things whereby + man's sins are healed: wherefore incurability of this kind points to the greater gravity of the sin. on the other hand, covetousness + is incurable on the part of a human defect; a thing which human + nature ever seeks to remedy, since the more deficient one is the more one seeks relief from external things, and consequently + the more one gives way to covetousness. Hence incurability of this kind is an indication not of the sin being more grievous, + but of its being somewhat more dangerous. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Covetousness is compared to idolatry on account of a certain likeness that it bears to it: because the covetous man, like + the idolater, subjects himself to an external creature, though not in the same way. For the idolater subjects himself to an + external creature by paying it Divine honor, whereas the covetous man subjects himself to an external creature by desiring + it immoderately for use, not for worship. Hence it does not follow that covetousness + is as grievous a sin as idolatry. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A5-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A5-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q118_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q118_A6-p0.1">Whether covetousness is a spiritual sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q118_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that covetousness is not a spiritual sin. For spiritual sins seem to regard spiritual goods. But the matter of covetousness + is bodily goods, namely, external riches. Therefore covetousness is not a spiritual sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, spiritual sin is condivided with sin of the flesh. Now covetousness is seemingly a sin of the flesh, for it results + from the corruption of the flesh, as instanced in old people who, through corruption of carnal nature, fall into covetousness. + Therefore covetousness is not a spiritual sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a sin of the flesh is one by which man's body is disordered, according to the saying of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q118_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.18" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:18</a>), "He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body." Now covetousness disturbs man even in his body; wherefore + Chrysostom (Hom. xxix in Matth.) compares the covetous man to the man who was possessed by the devil ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q118_A6-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.5" target="asv">Mk. 5</a>) and was troubled in body. Therefore covetousness seems not to be a spiritual sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers covetousness among spiritual vices. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Sins are seated chiefly in the affections: and all the affections or passions of the soul have their term in pleasure and + sorrow, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 5). Now some pleasures are carnal and some spiritual. Carnal pleasures are + those which are consummated in the carnal senses---for instance, the pleasures of the table and sexual pleasures: while spiritual + pleasures are those which are consummated in the mere apprehension of the soul. + Accordingly, sins of the flesh are those which are consummated in carnal pleasures, while spiritual sins are consummated in + pleasures of the spirit without pleasure of the flesh. Such is covetousness: for the covetous man takes pleasure in the consideration + of himself as a possessor of riches. Therefore covetousness is a spiritual sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Covetousness with regard to a bodily object seeks the pleasure, not of the body but only of the soul, forasmuch as a man + takes pleasure in the fact that he possesses riches: wherefore it is not a sin of the flesh. Nevertheless by reason of its + object it is a mean between purely spiritual sins, which seek spiritual pleasure in respect of spiritual objects (thus pride + is about excellence), and purely carnal sins, which seek a purely bodily pleasure in + respect of a bodily object. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Movement takes its species from the term "whereto" and not from the term "wherefrom." Hence a vice of the flesh is so called + from its tending to a pleasure of the flesh, and not from its originating in some defect of the flesh. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Chrysostom compares a covetous man to the man who was possessed by the devil, not that the former is troubled in the flesh + in the same way as the latter, but by way of contrast, since while the possessed man, of whom we read in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q118_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.5" target="asv">Mk. 5</a>, stripped himself, the covetous man loads himself with an excess of riches. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A6-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A6-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q118_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q118_A7-p0.1">Whether covetousness is a capital vice?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q118_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that covetousness is not a capital vice. For covetousness is opposed to liberality as the mean, and to prodigality + as extreme. But neither is liberality a principal virtue, nor prodigality a capital vice. Therefore covetousness also should + not be reckoned a capital vice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q118_A7-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A3.html">FS, Q[84], AA[3]</a>,4), those vices are called capital which have principal ends, to which the ends of other vices are directed. But this does + not apply to covetousness: since riches have the aspect, not of an end, but rather of something directed to an end, as stated + in Ethic. i, 5. Therefore covetousness is not a capital vice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. xv), that "covetousness arises sometimes from pride, sometimes from fear. For there are those + who, when they think that they lack the needful for their expenses, allow the mind to give way to covetousness. And there + are others who, wishing to be thought more of, are incited to greed for other people's property." Therefore covetousness arises + from other vices instead of being a capital vice in respect of other vices. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi) reckons covetousness among the capital vices. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in the Second Objection, a capital vice is one which under the aspect of end gives rise to other vices: because + when an end is very desirable, the result is that through desire thereof man sets about doing many things either good or evil. + Now the most desirable end is happiness or felicity, which is the last end of human life, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q118_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A4.html">FS, Q[1], AA[4]</a>,7,8): wherefore the more a thing is furnished with the conditions + of happiness, the more desirable it is. Also one of the conditions of happiness is that it be self-sufficing, else it would + not set man's appetite at rest, as the last end does. Now riches give great promise of self-sufficiency, as Boethius says + (De Consol. iii): the reason of which, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5), is that we "use money in token of taking + possession of something," and again it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q118_A7-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Eccl.10.19" target="asv">Eccles. 10:19</a>): "All things obey money." Therefore + covetousness, which is desire for money, is a capital vice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue is perfected in accordance with reason, but vice is perfected in accordance with the inclination of the sensitive + appetite. Now reason and sensitive appetite do not belong chiefly to the same genus, and consequently it does not follow that + principal vice is opposed to principal virtue. Wherefore, although liberality is not a principal virtue, since it does not + regard the principal good of the reason, yet covetousness is a principal vice, + because it regards money, which occupies a principal place among sensible goods, for the reason given in the Article. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A7-p8"> On the other hand, prodigality is not directed to an end that is desirable principally, indeed it seems rather to result + from a lack of reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "a prodigal man is a fool rather than a knave." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is true that money is directed to something else as its end: yet in so far as it is useful for obtaining all sensible + things, it contains, in a way, all things virtually. Hence it has a certain likeness to happiness, as stated in the Article. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nothing prevents a capital vice from arising sometimes out of other vices, as stated above (Q[36], A[4], ad 1; + <a id="SS_Q118_A7-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A4.html">FS, Q[84], A[4]</a>), provided that itself be frequently the source of others. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A7-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A7-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q118_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q119.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q118_A8-p0.1">Whether treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy are daughters of covetousness?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q118_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the daughters of covetousness are not as commonly stated, namely, "treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, restlessness, + violence, and insensibility to mercy." For covetousness is opposed to liberality, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q118_A8-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q118_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Now treachery, fraud, and falsehood are opposed to prudence, perjury to religion, restlessness to hope, or to charity which + rests in the beloved object, violence to justice, insensibility to mercy. + Therefore these vices have no connection with covetousness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, treachery, fraud and falsehood seem to pertain to the same thing, namely, the deceiving of one's neighbor. Therefore + they should not be reckoned as different daughters of covetousness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Isidore (Comment. in Deut.) enumerates nine daughters of covetousness; which are "lying, fraud, theft, perjury, + greed of filthy lucre, false witnessing, violence, inhumanity, rapacity." Therefore the former reckoning of daughters is insufficient. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A8-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) mentions many kinds of vices as belonging to covetousness which he calls illiberality, + for he speaks of those who are "sparing, tight-fisted, skinflints [*{kyminopristes}], misers [*{kimbikes}], who do illiberal + deeds," and of those who "batten on whoredom, usurers, gamblers, despoilers of the dead, and robbers." Therefore it seems + that the aforesaid enumeration is insufficient. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A8-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, tyrants use much violence against their subjects. But the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "tyrants who destroy + cities and despoil sacred places are not to be called illiberal," i.e. covetous. Therefore violence should not be reckoned + a daughter of covetousness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A8-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi) assigns to covetousness the daughters mentioned above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A8-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The daughters of covetousness are the vices which arise therefrom, especially in respect of the desire of an end. Now since + covetousness is excessive love of possessing riches, it exceeds in two things. For in the first place it exceeds in retaining, + and in this respect covetousness gives rise to "insensibility to mercy," because, to wit, a man's heart is not softened by + mercy to assist the needy with his riches [*See + <a id="SS_Q118_A8-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q30_A1.html"> Q[30], A[1]</a>]. + In the second place it belongs to covetousness to exceed in receiving, and in this respect covetousness may be considered + in two ways. First as in the thought [affectu]. In this way it gives rise to "restlessness," by hindering man with excessive + anxiety and care, for "a covetous man shall not be satisfied with money" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q118_A8-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Eccl.5.9" target="asv">Eccles. 5:9</a>). Secondly, it may be considered in the execution [effectu]. In this way the covetous man, in acquiring other people's goods, + sometimes employs force, which pertains + to "violence," sometimes deceit, and then if he has recourse to words, it is "falsehood," if it be mere words, "perjury" if + he confirm his statement by oath; if he has recourse to deeds, and the deceit affects things, we have "fraud"; if persons, + then we have "treachery," as in the case of Judas, who betrayed Christ through covetousness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is no need for the daughters of a capital sin to belong to that same kind of vice: because a sin of one kind allows + of sins even of a different kind being directed to its end; seeing that it is one thing for a sin to have daughters, and another + for it to have species. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These three are distinguished as stated in the Article. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A8-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These nine are reducible to the seven aforesaid. For lying and false witnessing are comprised under falsehood, since false + witnessing is a special kind of lie, just as theft is a special kind of fraud, wherefore it is comprised under fraud; and + greed of filthy lucre belongs to restlessness; rapacity is comprised under violence, since it is a species thereof; and inhumanity + is the same as insensibility to mercy. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A8-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The vices mentioned by Aristotle are species rather than daughters of illiberality or covetousness. For a man may be said + to be illiberal or covetous through a defect in giving. If he gives but little he is said to be "sparing"; if nothing, he + is "tightfisted": if he gives with great reluctance, he is said to be {kyminopristes} [skinflint], a cumin-seller, as it were, + because he makes a great fuss about things of little value. Sometimes a man is said + to be illiberal or covetous, through an excess in receiving, and this in two ways. In one way, through making money by disgraceful + means, whether in performing shameful and servile works by means of illiberal practices, or by acquiring more through sinful + deeds, such as whoredom or the like, or by making a profit where one ought to have given gratis, as in the case of usury, + or by laboring much to make little profit. In another way, in making money by unjust means, whether by using violence on + the living, as robbers do, or by despoiling the dead, or by preying on one's friends, as gamblers do. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A8-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Just as liberality is about moderate sums of money, so is illiberality. Wherefore tyrants who take great things by violence, + are said to be, not illiberal, but unjust. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A8-p14"></p> + <p id="SS_Q118_A8-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q119.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q117_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q119" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q119_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q119-p0.1">OF PRODIGALITY (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q119-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q119-p2"> We must now consider prodigality, under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q119-p3"> (1) Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness?</p> + <p id="SS_Q119-p4"> (2) Whether prodigality is a sin?</p> + <p id="SS_Q119-p5"> (3) Whether it is a graver sin that covetousness?</p> + <div id="SS_Q119_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q119.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q119_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q119_A1-p0.1">Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q119_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that prodigality is not opposite to covetousness. For opposites cannot be together in the same subject. But some + are at the same time prodigal and covetous. Therefore prodigality is not opposite to covetousness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But covetousness, as opposed to liberality, relates to certain passions whereby + man is affected towards money: whereas prodigality does not seem to relate to any passions of the soul, since it is not affected + towards money, or to anything else of the kind. Therefore prodigality is not opposite to covetousness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin takes its species chiefly from its end, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q119_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A3.html">FS, Q[62], A[3]</a>). Now prodigality seems always to be directed to some unlawful end, for the sake of which the prodigal squanders his goods. + Especially is it directed to pleasures, wherefore it is stated ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q119_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.15.13" target="asv">Lk. 15:13</a>) of the prodigal son that he "wasted his substance living riotously." Therefore it seems that prodigality is opposed to temperance + and + insensibility rather than to covetousness and liberality. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 1) that prodigality is opposed to liberality, and illiberality, to which we give + here the name of covetousness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In morals vices are opposed to one another and to virtue in respect of excess and deficiency. Now covetousness and prodigality + differ variously in respect of excess and deficiency. Thus, as regards affection for riches, the covetous man exceeds by loving + them more than he ought, while the prodigal is deficient, by being less careful of them than he ought: and as regards external + action, prodigality implies excess in giving, but deficiency in retaining and + acquiring, while covetousness, on the contrary, denotes deficiency in giving, but excess in acquiring and retaining. Hence + it is evident that prodigality is opposed to covetousness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing prevents opposites from being in the same subject in different respects. For a thing is denominated more from what + is in it principally. Now just as in liberality, which observes the mean, the principal thing is giving, to which receiving + and retaining are subordinate, so, too, covetousness and prodigality regard principally giving. Wherefore he who exceeds in + giving is said to be "prodigal," while he who is deficient in giving is said to be + "covetous." Now it happens sometimes that a man is deficient in giving, without exceeding in receiving, as the Philosopher + observes (Ethic. iv, 1). And in like manner it happens sometimes that a man exceeds in giving, and therefore is prodigal, + and yet at the same time exceeds in receiving. This may be due either to some kind of necessity, since while exceeding in + giving he is lacking in goods of his own, so that he is driven to acquire unduly, and this pertains to covetousness; or it + may be + due to inordinateness of the mind, for he gives not for a good purpose, but, as though despising virtue, cares not whence + or how he receives. Wherefore he is prodigal and covetous in different respects. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Prodigality regards passions in respect of money, not as exceeding, but as deficient in them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The prodigal does not always exceed in giving for the sake of pleasures which are the matter of temperance, but sometimes + through being so disposed as not to care about riches, and sometimes on account of something else. More frequently, however, + he inclines to intemperance, both because through spending too much on other things he becomes fearless of spending on objects + of pleasure, to which the concupiscence of the flesh is more prone; and because + through taking no pleasure in virtuous goods, he seeks for himself pleasures of the body. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. + iv, 1) "that many a prodigal ends in becoming intemperate." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q119.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q119_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q119_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q119_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q119_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q119_A2-p0.1">Whether prodigality is a sin?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q119_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that prodigality is not a sin. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q119_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.10" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:10</a>): "Covetousness [Douay: 'desire of money'] is the root of all evils." But it is not the root of prodigality, since this is + opposed to it. Therefore prodigality is not a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q119_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.17" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:17,18</a>): "Charge the rich of this world . . . to give easily, to communicate to others." Now this is especially what prodigal persons + do. Therefore prodigality is not a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it belongs to prodigality to exceed in giving and to be deficient in solicitude about riches. But this is most becoming + to the perfect, who fulfil the words of Our Lord ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q119_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.34" target="asv">Mat. 6:34</a>), "Be not . . . solicitous for tomorrow," and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q119_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.21" target="asv">Mat. 19:21</a>), "Sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor." Therefore prodigality is not a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The prodigal son is held to blame for his prodigality. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="SS_Q119_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q119_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the opposition between prodigality and covetousness is one of excess and deficiency; either of which destroys the mean of + virtue. Now a thing is vicious and sinful through corrupting the good of virtue. Hence it follows that prodigality is a sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some expound this saying of the Apostle as referring, not to actual covetousness, but to a kind of habitual covetousness, + which is the concupiscence of the "fomes" [*Cf. + <a id="SS_Q119_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q81_A3.html">FS, Q[81], A[3]</a>, ad 2], whence all sins arise. Others say that he is speaking of a general covetousness with regard to any kind of good: + and in this sense also it is evident that prodigality arises from covetousness; since the prodigal seeks to acquire some + temporal good inordinately, namely, to give pleasure to others, or at least to satisfy his own will in giving. But to one + that reviews the passage correctly, it is evident that the Apostle is speaking literally of the desire of riches, for he had + said previously ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q119_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.9" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:9</a>): "They that will become rich," etc. In this sense covetousness is said to be "the root of all evils," not that all evils + always arise from covetousness, but because there is no evil that does not at some time arise from + covetousness. Wherefore prodigality sometimes is born of covetousness, as when a man is prodigal in going to great expense + in order to curry favor with certain persons from whom he may receive riches. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Apostle bids the rich to be ready to give and communicate their riches, according as they ought. The prodigal does not + do this: since, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. iv, 1), "his giving is neither good, nor for a good end, nor according + as it ought to be. For sometimes they give much to those who ought to be poor, namely, to buffoons and flatterers, whereas + to the good they give nothing." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The excess in prodigality consists chiefly, not in the total amount given, but in the amount over and above what ought to + be given. Hence sometimes the liberal man gives more than the prodigal man, if it be necessary. Accordingly we must reply + that those who give all their possessions with the intention of following Christ, and banish from their minds all solicitude + for temporal things, are not prodigal but perfectly liberal. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q119_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q119_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q119_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q119_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q120.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q119_A3-p0.1">Whether prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q119_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness. For by covetousness a man injures his neighbor by not + communicating his goods to him, whereas by prodigality a man injures himself, because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) + that "the wasting of riches, which are the means whereby a man lives, is an undoing of his very being." Now he that injures + himself sins more grievously, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q119_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.14.5" target="asv"> Ecclus. 14:5, </a> "He that is evil + to himself, to whom will he be good?" Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a disorder that is accompanied by a laudable circumstance is less sinful. Now the disorder of covetousness is sometimes + accompanied by a laudable circumstance, as in the case of those who are unwilling to spend their own, lest they be driven + to accept from others: whereas the disorder of prodigality is accompanied by a circumstance that calls for blame, inasmuch + as we ascribe prodigality to those who are intemperate, as the Philosopher observes + (Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prudence is chief among the moral virtues, as stated above (Q[56], A[1], ad 1; + <a id="SS_Q119_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A2.html">FS, Q[61], A[2]</a>, ad 1). Now prodigality is more opposed to prudence than covetousness is: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q119_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.21.20" target="asv">Prov. 21:20</a>): "There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the dwelling of the just; and the foolish man shall spend it": and the Philosopher + says (Ethic. iv, 6) that "it is the mark of a fool to give too much and receive nothing." + Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that "the prodigal seems to be much better than the illiberal man." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Prodigality considered in itself is a less grievous sin than covetousness, and this for three reasons. First, because covetousness + differs more from the opposite virtue: since giving, wherein the prodigal exceeds, belongs to liberality more than receiving + or retaining, wherein the covetous man exceeds. Secondly, because the prodigal man is of use to the many to whom he gives, + while the covetous man is of use to no one, not even to himself, as stated in + Ethic. iv, 6. Thirdly, because prodigality is easily cured. For not only is the prodigal on the way to old age, which is opposed + to prodigality, but he is easily reduced to a state of want, since much useless spending impoverishes him and makes him unable + to exceed in giving. Moreover, prodigality is easily turned into virtue on account of its likeness thereto. On the other hand, + the covetous man is not easily cured, for the reason given above ( + <a id="SS_Q119_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q118_A5.html">Q[118], A[5]</a>, ad 3). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The difference between the prodigal and the covetous man is not that the former sins against himself and the latter against + another. For the prodigal sins against himself by spending that which is his, and his means of support, and against others + by spending the wherewithal to help others. This applies chiefly to the clergy, who are the dispensers of the Church's goods, + that belong to the poor whom they defraud by their prodigal expenditure. In like + manner the covetous man sins against others, by being deficient in giving; and he sins against himself, through deficiency + in spending: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q119_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.6.2" target="asv">Eccles. 6:2</a>): "A man to whom God hath given riches . . . yet doth not give him the power to eat thereof." Nevertheless the prodigal man + exceeds in this, that he injures both himself and others yet so as to profit some; whereas the covetous man profits neither + others nor himself, since he does not even use his own + goods for his own profit. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In speaking of vices in general, we judge of them according to their respective natures: thus, with regard to prodigality + we note that it consumes riches to excess, and with regard to covetousness that it retains them to excess. That one spend + too much for the sake of intemperance points already to several additional sins, wherefore the prodigal of this kind is worse, + as stated in Ethic. iv, 1. That an illiberal or covetous man refrain from taking + what belongs to others, although this appears in itself to call for praise, yet on account of the motive for which he does + so it calls for blame, since he is unwilling to accept from others lest he be forced to give to others. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All vices are opposed to prudence, even as all virtues are directed by prudence: wherefore if a vice be opposed to prudence + alone, for this very reason it is deemed less grievous. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q119_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q119_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q120.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q118_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q119_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q120" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q119_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q120_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q120-p0.1">OF "EPIKEIA" OR EQUITY (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q120-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q120-p2"> We must now consider "epikeia," under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q120-p3"> (1) Whether "epikeia" is a virtue?</p> + <p id="SS_Q120-p4"> (2) Whether it is a part of justice?</p> + <div id="SS_Q120_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q120.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q120_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q120_A1-p0.1">Whether "epikeia" [*{epieikeia}] is a virtue?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q120_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q120_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that "epikeia" is not a virtue. For no virtue does away with another virtue. Yet "epikeia" does away with another + virtue, since it sets aside that which is just according to law, and seemingly is opposed to severity. Therefore "epikeia" + is not a virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q120_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): "With regard to these earthly laws, although men pass judgment on them when + they make them, yet, when once they are made and established, the judge must pronounce judgment not on them but according + to them." But seemingly "epikeia" pronounces judgment on the law, when it deems that the law should not be observed in some + particular case. Therefore "epikeia" is a vice rather than a virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q120_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, apparently it belongs to "epikeia" to consider the intention of the lawgiver, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. + v, 10). But it belongs to the sovereign alone to interpret the intention of the lawgiver, wherefore the Emperor says in the + Codex of Laws and Constitutions, under Law i: "It is fitting and lawful that We alone should interpret between equity and + law." Therefore the act of "epikeia" is unlawful: and consequently "epikeia" is not a virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q120_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) states it to be a virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q120_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q120_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q96_A6.html">FS, Q[96], A[6]</a>), when we were treating of laws, since human actions, with which laws are concerned, are composed of contingent singulars + and are innumerable in their diversity, it was not possible to lay down rules of law that would apply to every single case. + Legislators in framing laws attend to what commonly happens: although if the law be applied to certain cases it will frustrate + the equality of justice and be + injurious to the common good, which the law has in view. Thus the law requires deposits to be restored, because in the majority + of cases this is just. Yet it happens sometimes to be injurious---for instance, if a madman were to put his sword in deposit, + and demand its delivery while in a state of madness, or if a man were to seek the return of his deposit in order to fight + against his country. In these and like cases it is bad to follow the law, and it is good to set aside the letter of the law + and to follow the dictates of justice and the common good. This is the object of "epikeia" which we call equity. Therefore + it is evident that "epikeia" is a virtue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q120_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Epikeia" does not set aside that which is just in itself but that which is just as by law established. Nor is it opposed + to severity, which follows the letter of the law when it ought to be followed. To follow the letter of the law when it ought + not to be followed is sinful. Hence it is written in the Codex of Laws and Constitutions under Law v: "Without doubt he transgresses + the law who by adhering to the letter of the law strives to defeat the + intention of the lawgiver." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q120_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It would be passing judgment on a law to say that it was not well made; but to say that the letter of the law is not to be + observed in some particular case is passing judgment not on the law, but on some particular contingency. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q120_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Interpretation is admissible in doubtful cases where it is not allowed to set aside the letter of the law without the interpretation + of the sovereign. But when the case is manifest there is need, not of interpretation, but of execution. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q120_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q120_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q120.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q120_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q120_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q120_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q121.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q120_A2-p0.1">Whether "epikeia" is a part of justice?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q120_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q120_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that "epikeia" is not a part of justice. For, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q120_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A7.html">Q[58], A[7]</a>), justice is twofold, particular and legal. Now "epikeia" is not a part of particular justice, since it extends to all virtues, + even as legal justice does. In like manner, neither is it a part of legal justice, since its operation is beside that which + is established by law. Therefore it seems that "epikeia" is not a part of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q120_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a more principal virtue is not assigned as the part of a less principal virtue: for it is to the cardinal virtue, + as being principal, that secondary virtues are assigned as parts. Now "epikeia" seems to be a more principal virtue than justice, + as implied by its name: for it is derived from {epi}, i.e. "above," and {dikaion}, i.e. "just." Therefore "epikeia" is not + a part of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q120_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it seems that "epikeia" is the same as modesty. For where the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q120_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.4.5" target="asv">Phil. 4:5</a>), "Let your modesty be known to all men," the Greek has {epieikeia} [*{to epieikes}]. Now, according to Tully (De Invent. + Rhet. ii), modesty is a part of temperance. Therefore "epikeia" is not a part of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q120_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 10) that "epikeia is a kind of justice." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q120_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q120_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q48.html">Q[48])</a>, a virtue has three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. A subjective part is one of which the whole is predicated + essentially, and it is less than the whole. This may happen in two ways. For sometimes one thing is predicated of many in + one common ratio, as animal of horse and ox: and sometimes one thing is predicated of many according to priority and posteriority, + as "being" of substance and + accident. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q120_A2-p7"> Accordingly, "epikeia" is a part of justice taken in a general sense, for it is a kind of justice, as the Philosopher states + (Ethic. v, 10). Wherefore it is evident that "epikeia" is a subjective part of justice; and justice is predicated of it with + priority to being predicated of legal justice, since legal justice is subject to the direction of "epikeia." Hence "epikeia" + is by way of being a higher rule of human actions. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q120_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Epikeia corresponds properly to legal justice, and in one way is contained under it, and in another way exceeds it. For if + legal justice denotes that which complies with the law, whether as regards the letter of the law, or as regards the intention + of the lawgiver, which is of more account, then "epikeia" is the more important part of legal justice. But if legal justice + denote merely that which complies with the law with regard to the letter, then + "epikeia" is a part not of legal justice but of justice in its general acceptation, and is condivided with legal justice, + as exceeding it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q120_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10), "epikeia is better than a certain," namely, legal, "justice," which observes the + letter of the law: yet since it is itself a kind of justice, it is not better than all justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q120_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It belongs to "epikeia" to moderate something, namely, the observance of the letter of the law. But modesty, which is reckoned + a part of temperance, moderates man's outward life---for instance, in his deportment, dress or the like. Possibly also the + term {epieikeia} is applied in Greek by a similitude to all kinds of moderation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q120_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q120_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q120_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q121.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q119_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q120_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q121" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q120_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q121_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q121-p0.1">OF PIETY (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q121-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q121-p2"> We must now consider the gift that corresponds to justice; namely, piety. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q121-p3"> (1) Whether it is a gift of the Holy Ghost?</p> + <p id="SS_Q121-p4"> (2) Which of the beatitudes and fruits corresponds to it?</p> + <div id="SS_Q121_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q121.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q121_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q121_A1-p0.1">Whether piety is a gift?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q121_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q121_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that piety is not a gift. For the gifts differ from the virtues, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q121_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A1.html">FS, Q[68], A[1]</a>). But piety is a virtue, as stated above (Q[101], A[3]). Therefore piety is not a gift. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q121_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the gifts are more excellent than the virtues, above all the moral virtues, as above ( + <a id="SS_Q121_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A8.html">FS, Q[68], A[8]</a>). Now among the parts of justice religion is greater than piety. Therefore if any part of justice is to be accounted a gift, + it seems that religion should be a gift rather than piety. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q121_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the gifts and their acts remain in heaven, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q121_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A6.html">FS, Q[68], A[6]</a>). But the act of piety cannot remain in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that "piety fills the inmost recesses of the + heart with works of mercy": and so there will be no piety in heaven since there will be no unhappiness [*Cf. Q[30], A[1]]. + Therefore piety is not a gift. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q121_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is reckoned among the gifts in the eleventh chapter of Isaias (verse 2) [Douay: 'godliness'] [*"Pietas," whence our English + word "pity," which is the same as mercy.] + </p> + <p id="SS_Q121_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q121_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A1.html">FS, Q[68], A[1]</a>; + <a id="SS_Q121_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q69_A1.html">FS, Q[69], AA[1]</a>,3), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habitual dispositions of the soul, rendering it amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. + Now the Holy Ghost moves us to this effect among others, of having a filial affection towards God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q121_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.15" target="asv"> Rom. 8:15, </a> "You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father)." And since + it belongs properly to piety to pay duty and worship to one's father, it follows that piety, whereby, at the Holy Ghost's + instigation, we pay worship and duty to God as our Father, is a gift of the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q121_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The piety that pays duty and worship to a father in the flesh is a virtue: but the piety that is a gift pays this to God + as Father. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q121_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To pay worship to God as Creator, as religion does, is more excellent than to pay worship to one's father in the flesh, as + the piety that is a virtue does. But to pay worship to God as Father is yet more excellent than to pay worship to God as Creator + and Lord. Wherefore religion is greater than the virtue of piety: while the gift of piety is greater than religion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q121_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As by the virtue of piety man pays duty and worship not only to his father in the flesh, but also to all his kindred on account + of their being related to his father so by the gift of piety he pays worship and duty not only to God, but also to all men + on account of their relationship to God. Hence it belongs to piety to honor the saints, and not to contradict the Scriptures + whether one understands them or not, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii). + Consequently it also assists those who are in a state of unhappiness. And although this act has no place in heaven, especially + after the Day of Judgment, yet piety will exercise its principal act, which is to revere God with filial affection: for it + is then above all that this act will be fulfilled, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q121_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.5.5" target="asv"> Wis. 5:5, </a> "Behold how they are numbered among the children of God." The saints will also mutually honor one another. Now, however, + before the Judgment Day, the + saints have pity on those also who are living in this unhappy state. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q121_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q121_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q121.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q121_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q121_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q121_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q122.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q121_A2-p0.1">Whether the second beatitude, "Blessed are the meek," corresponds to the gift of piety?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q121_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q121_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the second beatitude, "Blessed are the meek," does not correspond to the gift of piety. For piety is the gift + corresponding to justice, to which rather belongs the fourth beatitude, "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," + or the fifth beatitude, "Blessed are the merciful," since as stated above (A[1], OBJ[3]), the works of mercy belong to piety. + Therefore the second beatitude does not pertain to the gift of piety. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q121_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the gift of piety is directed by the gift of knowledge, which is united to it in the enumeration of the gifts ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q121_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11" target="asv">Is. 11</a>). Now direction and execution extend to the same matter. Since, then, the third beatitude, "Blessed are they that mourn," + corresponds to the gift of knowledge, it seems that the second beatitude corresponds to piety. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q121_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the fruits correspond to the beatitudes and gifts, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q121_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q70_A2.html">FS, Q[70], A[2]</a>). Now among the fruits, goodness and benignity seem to agree with piety rather than mildness, which pertains to meekness. + Therefore the second beatitude does not correspond to the gift of piety. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q121_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): "Piety is becoming to the meek." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q121_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In adapting the beatitudes to the gifts a twofold congruity may be observed. One is according to the order in which they + are given, and Augustine seems to have followed this: wherefore he assigns the first beatitude to the lowest gift, namely, + fear, and the second beatitude, "Blessed are the meek," to piety, and so on. Another congruity may be observed in keeping + with the special nature of each gift and beatitude. In this way one must adapt the beatitudes to + the gifts according to their objects and acts: and thus the fourth and fifth beatitudes would correspond to piety, rather + than the second. Yet the second beatitude has a certain congruity with piety, inasmuch as meekness removes the obstacles to + acts of piety. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q121_A2-p7"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p> + <p id="SS_Q121_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Taking the beatitudes and gifts according to their proper natures, the same beatitude must needs correspond to knowledge + and piety: but taking them according to their order, different beatitudes correspond to them, although a certain congruity + may be observed, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q121_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the fruits goodness and benignity may be directly ascribed to piety; and mildness indirectly in so far as it removes obstacles + to acts of piety, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q121_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="SS_Q121_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q121_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q122.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q120_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q121_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q122" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q121_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q122_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="SS_Q122-p0.1">OF THE PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="SS_Q122-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q122-p2"> We must now consider the precepts of justice, under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="SS_Q122-p3"> (1) Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice?</p> + <p id="SS_Q122-p4"> (2) Of the first precept of the decalogue;</p> + <p id="SS_Q122-p5"> (3) Of the second;</p> + <p id="SS_Q122-p6"> (4) Of the third;</p> + <p id="SS_Q122-p7"> (5) Of the fourth;</p> + <p id="SS_Q122-p8"> (6) Of the other six.</p> + <div id="SS_Q122_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q122.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q122_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q122_A1-p0.1">Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q122_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the precepts of the decalogue are not precepts of justice. For the intention of a lawgiver is "to make the + citizens virtuous in respect of every virtue," as stated in Ethic. ii, 1. Wherefore, according to Ethic. v, 1, "the law prescribes + about all acts of all virtues." Now the precepts of the decalogue are the first. principles of the whole Divine Law. Therefore + the precepts of the decalogue do not pertain to justice alone. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it would seem that to justice belong especially the judicial precepts, which are condivided with the moral precepts, + as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q122_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q99_A4.html">FS, Q[99], A[4]</a>). But the precepts of the decalogue are moral precepts, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q122_A1-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q100_A3.html">FS, Q[100], A[3]</a>). Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are not precepts of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Law contains chiefly precepts about acts of justice regarding the common good, for instance about public officers + and the like. But there is no mention of these in the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore it seems that the precepts of the + decalogue do not properly belong to justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the precepts of the decalogue are divided into two tables, corresponding to the love of God and the love of our + neighbor, both of which regard the virtue of charity. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue belong to charity rather than + to justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Seemingly justice is the sole virtue whereby we are directed to another. Now we are directed to another by all the precepts + of the decalogue, as is evident if one consider each of them. Therefore all the precepts of the decalogue pertain to justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The precepts of the decalogue are the first principles of the Law: and the natural reason assents to them at once, as to + principles that are most evident. Now it is altogether evident that the notion of duty, which is essential to a precept, appears + in justice, which is of one towards another. Because in those matters that relate to himself it would seem at a glance that + man is master of himself, and that he may do as he likes: whereas in matters that refer + to another it appears manifestly that a man is under obligation to render to another that which is his due. Hence the precepts + of the decalogue must needs pertain to justice. Wherefore the first three precepts are about acts of religion, which is the + chief part of justice; the fourth precept is about acts of piety, which is the second part of justice; and the six remaining + are about justice commonly so called, which is observed among equals. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intention of the law is to make all men virtuous, but in a certain order, namely, by first of all giving them precepts + about those things where the notion of duty is most manifest, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The judicial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts, in so far as these are directed to one's neighbor, just as + the ceremonial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts in so far as these are directed to God. Hence neither precepts + are contained in the decalogue: and yet they are determinations of the precepts of the decalogue, and therefore pertain to + justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things that concern the common good must needs be administered in different ways according to the difference of men. Hence + they were to be given a place not among the precepts of the decalogue, but among the judicial precepts. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The precepts of the decalogue pertain to charity as their end, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.5" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:5, </a> "The end of the commandment is charity": but they belong to justice, inasmuch as they refer immediately to acts of justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q122.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q122_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q122_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q122_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q122_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q122_A2-p0.1">Whether the first precept of the decalogue is fittingly expressed?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q122_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the first precept of the decalogue is unfittingly expressed. For man is more bound to God than to his father + in the flesh, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.12.9" target="asv"> Heb. 12:9, </a> "How much more shall we [Vulg.: 'shall we not much more'] obey the Father of spirits and live?" Now the precept of piety, + whereby man honors his father, is expressed affirmatively in these words: "Honor thy father and thy mother." Much more, therefore, + should the first precept of + religion, whereby all honor God, be expressed affirmatively, especially as affirmation is naturally prior to negation. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the first precept of the decalogue pertains to religion, as stated above + <a id="SS_Q122_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q122_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now religion, since it is one virtue, has one act. Yet in the first precept three acts are forbidden: since we read first: + "Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me"; secondly, "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing"; and thirdly, "Thou + shalt not adore them nor serve them." Therefore the first precept is unfittingly expressed. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De decem chord. ix) that "the first precept forbids the sin of superstition." But there are many + wicked superstitions besides idolatry, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q122_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q92_A2.html">Q[92], A[2]</a>). Therefore it was insufficient to forbid idolatry alone. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Scripture. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It pertains to law to make men good, wherefore it behooved the precepts of the Law to be set in order according to the order + of generation, the order, to wit, of man's becoming good. Now two things must be observed in the order of generation. The + first is that the first part is the first thing to be established; thus in the generation of an animal the first thing to + be formed is the heart, and in building a home the first thing to be set up is the + foundation: and in the goodness of the soul the first part is goodness of the will, the result of which is that a man makes + good use of every other goodness. Now the goodness of the will depends on its object, which is its end. Wherefore since man + was to be directed to virtue by means of the Law, the first thing necessary was, as it were, to lay the foundation of religion, + whereby man is duly directed to God, Who is the last end of man's will. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A2-p7"> The second thing to be observed in the order of generation is that in the first place contraries and obstacles have to be + removed. Thus the farmer first purifies the soil, and afterwards sows his seed, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.4.3" target="asv"> Jer. 4:3, </a> "Break up anew your fallow ground, and sow not upon thorns." Hence it behooved man, first of all to be instructed in religion, + so as to remove the obstacles to true religion. Now the chief obstacle to religion is for man to adhere to a + false god, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.24" target="asv"> Mat. 6:24, </a> "You cannot serve God and mammon." Therefore in the first precept of the Law the worship of false gods is excluded. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In point of fact there is one affirmative precept about religion, namely: "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath Day." + Still the negative precepts had to be given first, so that by their means the obstacles to religion might be removed. For + though affirmation naturally precedes negation, yet in the process of generation, negation, whereby obstacles are removed, + comes first, as stated in the Article. Especially is this true in matters concerning + God, where negation is preferable to affirmation, on account of our insufficiency, as Dionysius observes (Coel. Hier. ii). + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> People worshiped strange gods in two ways. For some served certain creatures as gods without having recourse to images. Hence + Varro says that for a long time the ancient Romans worshiped gods without using images: and this worship is first forbidden + by the words, "Thou shalt not have strange gods." Among others the worship of false gods was observed by using certain images: + and so the very making of images was fittingly forbidden by the words, "Thou + shalt not make to thyself any graven thing," as also the worship of those same images, by the words, "Thou shalt not adore + them," etc. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All other kinds of superstition proceed from some compact, tacit or explicit, with the demons; hence all are understood to + be forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not have strange gods." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q122_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q122_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q122_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q122_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q122_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q122_A3-p0.1">Whether the second precept of the decalogue is fittingly expressed?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q122_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the second precept of the decalogue is unfittingly expressed. For this precept, "Thou shalt not take the name + of thy God in vain" is thus explained by a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.7" target="asv"> Ex. 20:7</a>: "Thou shalt not deem the Son of God to be a creature," so that it forbids an error against faith. Again, a gloss on the + words of + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.5.11" target="asv"> Dt. 5:11, </a> "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain, " adds, i.e. "by giving the name of God + to wood or stone," as though they forbade a false confession of faith, which, like error, is an act of unbelief. Now unbelief + precedes superstition, as faith precedes religion. Therefore this precept should have preceded the first, whereby superstition + is forbidden. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the name of God is taken for many purposes ---for instance, those of praise, of working miracles, and generally + speaking in conjunction with all we say or do, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Col.3.17" target="asv"> Col. 3:17, </a> "All whatsoever you do in word or in work . . . do ye in the name of the Lord." Therefore the precept forbidding the taking + of God's name in vain seems to be more universal than the precept forbidding superstition, and thus should have preceded + it. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.7" target="asv"> Ex. 20:7 </a>expounds the precept, "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain," namely, by swearing to nothing. Hence this + precept would seem to forbid useless swearing, that is to say, swearing without judgment. But false swearing, which is without + truth, and unjust swearing, which is without justice, are much more grievous. Therefore this precept should rather have forbidden + them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, blasphemy or any word or deed that is an insult to God is much more grievous than perjury. Therefore blasphemy and + other like sins should rather have been forbidden by this precept. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, God's names are many. Therefore it should not have been said indefinitely: "Thou shalt not take the name of . . + . thy God in vain." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A3-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Scripture. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A3-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In one who is being instructed in virtue it is necessary to remove obstacles to true religion before establishing him in + true religion. Now a thing is opposed to true religion in two ways. First, by excess, when, to wit, that which belongs to + religion is given to others than to whom it is due, and this pertains to superstition. Secondly, by lack, as it were, of reverence, + when, to wit, God is contemned, and this pertains to the vice of irreligion, as stated + above (Q[97], in the preamble, and in the Article that follows). Now superstition hinders religion by preventing man from + acknowledging God so as to worship Him: and when a man's mind is engrossed in some undue worship, he cannot at the same time + give due worship to God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.28.20" target="asv"> Is. 28:20, </a> "The bed is straitened, so that one must fall out," i.e. either the true God or a false god must fall out from man's heart, + "and a short covering cannot cover both." On the other + hand, irreligion hinders religion by preventing man from honoring God after he has acknowledged Him. Now one must first of + all acknowledge God with a view to worship, before honoring Him we have acknowledged. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A3-p9"> For this reason the precept forbidding superstition is placed before the second precept, which forbids perjury that pertains + to irreligion. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These expositions are mystical. The literal explanation is that which is given + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.5.11" target="asv"> Dt. 5:11</a>: "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain," namely, "by swearing on that which is not [*Vulg.: 'for he shall + not be unpunished that taketh His name upon a vain thing']." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This precept does not forbid all taking of the name of God, but properly the taking of God's name in confirmation of a man's + word by way of an oath, because men are wont to take God's name more frequently in this way. Nevertheless we may understand + that in consequence all inordinate taking of the Divine name is forbidden by this precept: and it is in this sense that we + are to take the explanation quoted in the First Objection. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To swear to nothing means to swear to that which is not. This pertains to false swearing, which is chiefly called perjury, + as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q122_A3-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q98_A1.html">Q[98], A[1]</a>, ad 3). For when a man swears to that which is false, his swearing is vain in itself, since it is not supported by the truth. + on the other hand, when a man swears without judgment, through levity, if he swear to the truth, there is no vanity on the + part of the oath itself, but + only on the part of the swearer. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Just as when we instruct a man in some science, we begin by putting before him certain general maxims, even so the Law, which + forms man to virtue by instructing him in the precepts of the decalogue, which are the first of all precepts, gave expression, + by prohibition or by command, to those things which are of most common occurrence in the course of human life. Hence the precepts + of the decalogue include the prohibition of perjury, which is of more + frequent occurrence than blasphemy, since man does not fall so often into the latter sin. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Reverence is due to the Divine names on the part of the thing signified, which is one, and not on the part of the signifying + words, which are many. Hence it is expressed in the singular: "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain": since + it matters not in which of God's names perjury is committed. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A3-p15"></p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A3-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q122_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q122_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q122_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q122_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q122_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q122_A4-p0.1">Whether the third precept of the decalogue, concerning the hallowing of the Sabbath, is fittingly expressed?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q122_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the third precept of the decalogue, concerning the hallowing of the Sabbath, is unfittingly expressed. For + this, understood spiritually, is a general precept: since Bede in commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.13.14" target="asv"> Lk. 13:14, </a> "The ruler of the synagogue being angry that He had healed on the Sabbath," says (Comment. iv): "The Law forbids, not to + heal man on the Sabbath, but to do servile works," i.e. "to burden oneself with sin." Taken literally it is a + ceremonial precept, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.31.13" target="asv">Ex. 31:13</a>): "See that you keep My Sabbath: because it is a sign between Me and you in your generations." Now the precepts of the decalogue + are both spiritual and moral. Therefore it is unfittingly placed among the precepts of the decalogue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the ceremonial precepts of the Law contain "sacred things, sacrifices, sacraments and observances," as stated above + ( + <a id="SS_Q122_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q101_A4.html">FS, Q[101], A[4]</a>). Now sacred things comprised not only sacred days, but also sacred places and sacred vessels, and so on. Moreover, there + were many sacred days other than the Sabbath. Therefore it was unfitting to omit all other ceremonial observances and to mention + only that of the Sabbath. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever breaks a precept of the decalogue, sins. But in the Old Law some who broke the observances of the Sabbath + did not sin---for instance, those who circumcised their sons on the eighth day, and the priests who worked in the temple on + the Sabbath. Also Elias ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 19</a>), who journeyed for forty days unto the mount of God, Horeb, must have traveled on a Sabbath: the priests also who carried + the ark of the Lord for seven days, as related in Josue 7, + must be understood to have carried it on a Sabbath. Again it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A4-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.13.15" target="asv">Lk. 13:15</a>): "Doth not every one of you on the Sabbath day loose his ox or his ass . . . and lead them to water?" Therefore it is unfittingly + placed among the precepts of the decalogue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the precepts of the decalogue have to be observed also under the New Law. Yet in the New Law this precept is not + observed, neither in the point of the Sabbath day, nor as to the Lord's day, on which men cook their food, travel, fish, and + do many like things. Therefore the precept of the observance of the Sabbath is unfittingly expressed. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Scripture. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The obstacles to true religion being removed by the first and second precepts of the decalogue, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q122_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q122_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3), it remained for the third precept to be given whereby man is established in true religion. Now it belongs to religion + to give worship to God: and just as the Divine scriptures teach the interior worship under the guise of certain corporal similitudes, + so is external worship given to God under the guise of + sensible signs. And since for the most part man is induced to pay interior worship, consisting in prayer and devotion, by + the interior prompting of the Holy Ghost, a precept of the Law as necessary respecting the exterior worship that consists + in sensible signs. Now the precepts of the decalogue are, so to speak, first and common principles of the Law, and consequently + the third precept of the decalogue describes the exterior worship of God as the sign of a universal boon that concerns all. + This universal boon was the work of the Creation of the world, from which work God is stated to have rested on the seventh + day: and sign of this we are commanded to keep holy seventh day---that is, to set it aside as a day to be given to God. Hence + after the precept about the hallowing of the Sabbath the reason for it is given: "For in six days the Lord made heaven and + earth . . . and rested on the seventh day." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The precept about hallowing the Sabbath, understood literally, is partly oral and partly ceremonial. It is a moral precept + in the point of commanding man to aside a certain time to be given to Divine things. For there is in man a natural inclination + to set aside a certain time for each necessary thing, such as refreshment of the body, sleep, and so forth. Hence according + to the dictate of reason, man sets aside a certain time for spiritual + refreshment, by which man's mind is refreshed in God. And thus to have a certain time set aside for occupying oneself with + Divine things is the matter of a moral precept. But, in so far as this precept specializes the time as a sign representing + the Creation of the world, it is a ceremonial precept. Again, it is a ceremonial precept in its allegorical signification, + as representative of Christ's rest in the tomb on the seventh day: also in its moral signification, as representing cessation + from + all sinful acts, and the mind's rest in God, in which sense, too, it is a general precept. Again, it is a ceremonial precept + in its analogical signification, as foreshadowing the enjoyment of God in heaven. Hence the precept about hallowing the Sabbath + is placed among the precepts of the decalogue, as a moral, but not as a ceremonial precept. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The other ceremonies of the Law are signs of certain particular Divine works: but the observance of the Sabbath is representative + of a general boon, namely, the production of all creatures. Hence it was fitting that it should be placed among the general + precepts of the decalogue, rather than any other ceremonial precept of the Law. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Two things are to be observed in the hallowing of the Sabbath. One of these is the end: and this is that man occupy himself + with Divine things, and is signified in the words: "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath day." For in the Law those things + are said to be holy which are applied to the Divine worship. The other thing is cessation from work, and is signified in the + words ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.11" target="asv">Ex. 20:11</a>), "On the seventh day . . . thou shalt do + no work." The kind of work meant appears from + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A4-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.23.3" target="asv"> Lev. 23:3, </a> "You shall do no servile work on that day [*Vulg.: 'You shall do no work on that day']." Now servile work is so called from + servitude: and servitude is threefold. One, whereby man is the servant of sin, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A4-p10.3" href="./asv.html#John.8.34" target="asv"> Jn. 8:34, </a> "Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin," and in this sense all sinful acts are servile. Another servitude is whereby + one man serves another. Now one man serves + another not with his mind but with his body, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q122_A4-p10.4" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q104_A5.html">Q[104], AA[5]</a>,6, ad 1). Wherefore in this respect those works are called servile whereby one man serves another. The third is the servitude + of God; and in this way the work of worship, which pertains to the service of God, may be called a servile work. In this sense + servile work is not forbidden on the Sabbath day, because that would be contrary to the end of the Sabbath observance: since + man abstains from + other works on the Sabbath day in order that he may occupy himself with works connected with God's service. For this reason, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A4-p10.5" href="./asv.html#John.7.23" target="asv"> Jn. 7:23, </a> "a man [*Vulg.: 'If a man,' etc.] receives circumcision on the Sabbath day, that the law of Moses may not be broken": and + for this reason too we read ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A4-p10.6" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.5" target="asv">Mat. 12:5</a>), that "on the Sabbath days the priests in the temple break the Sabbath," i.e. do corporal works on the Sabbath, "and are + without blame." + Accordingly, the priests in carrying the ark on the Sabbath did not break the precept of the Sabbath observance. In like manner + it is not contrary to the observance of the Sabbath to exercise any spiritual act, such as teaching by word or writing. Wherefore + a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A4-p10.7" href="./asv.html#Num.28" target="asv">Num 28</a> says that "smiths and like craftsmen rest on the Sabbath day, but the reader or teacher of the Divine law does not cease + from his work. Yet he profanes not the Sabbath, even as the priests in the temple break the Sabbath, + and are without blame." On the other hand, those works that are called servile in the first or second way are contrary to + the observance of the Sabbath, in so far as they hinder man from applying himself to Divine things. And since man is hindered + from applying himself to Divine things rather by sinful than by lawful albeit corporal works, it follows that to sin on a + feast day is more against this precept than to do some other but lawful bodily work. Hence Augustine says (De decem chord. + iii): + "It would be better if the Jew did some useful work on his farm than spent his time seditiously in the theatre: and their + womenfolk would do better to be making linen on the Sabbath than to be dancing lewdly all day in their feasts of the new moon." + It is not, however, against this precept to sin venially on the Sabbath, because venial sin does not destroy holiness. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A4-p11"> Again, corporal works, not pertaining to the spiritual worship of God, are said to be servile in so far as they belong properly + to servants; while they are not said to be servile, in so far as they are common to those who serve and those who are free. + Moreover, everyone, be he servant or free, is bound to provide necessaries both for himself and for his neighbor, chiefly + in respect of things pertaining to the well-being of the body, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A4-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.24.11" target="asv"> Prov. 24:11, + + </a>"Deliver them that are led to death": secondarily as regards avoiding damage to one's property, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A4-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.1" target="asv"> Dt. 22:1, </a> "Thou shalt not pass by if thou seest thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray, but thou shalt bring them back to thy brother." + Hence a corporal work pertaining to the preservation of one's own bodily well-being does not profane the Sabbath: for it is + not against the observance of the Sabbath to eat and do such things as preserve the health of + the body. For this reason the Machabees did not profane the Sabbath when they fought in self-defense on the Sabbath day ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A4-p11.3" href="./asv.html#iMacc.2" target="asv">1 Macc. 2</a>), nor Elias when he fled from the face of Jezabel on the Sabbath. For this same reason our Lord ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A4-p11.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.3" target="asv">Mat. 12:3</a>) excused His disciples for plucking the ears of corn on account of the need which they suffered. In like manner a bodily + work that is directed to the bodily well-being of another is not contrary to the observance of the Sabbath: wherefore it + is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A4-p11.5" href="./asv.html#John.7.23" target="asv">Jn. 7:23</a>): "Are you angry at Me because I have healed the whole man on the Sabbath day?" And again, a bodily work that is done to + avoid an imminent damage to some external thing does not profane the Sabbath, wherefore our Lord says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A4-p11.6" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.11" target="asv">Mat. 12:11</a>): "What man shall there be among you, that hath one sheep, and if the same fall into a pit on the Sabbath day, will he not + take hold on it and lift it up?" + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the New Law the observance of the Lord's day took the place of the observance of the Sabbath, not by virtue of the precept + but by the institution of the Church and the custom of Christian people. For this observance is not figurative, as was the + observance of the Sabbath in the Old Law. Hence the prohibition to work on the Lord' day is not so strict as on the Sabbath: + and certain works are permitted on the Lord's day which were forbidden on the + Sabbath, such as the cooking of food and so forth. And again in the New Law, dispensation is more easily granted than in the + Old, in the matter of certain forbidden works, on account of their necessity, because the figure pertains to the protestation + of truth, which it is unlawful to omit even in small things; while works, considered in themselves, are changeable in point + of place and time. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A4-p13"></p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A4-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q122_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q122_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q122_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q122_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q122_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q122_A5-p0.1">Whether the fourth precept, about honoring one's parents, is fittingly expressed?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q122_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the fourth precept, about honoring one's parents, is unfittingly expressed. For this is the precept pertaining + to piety. Now, just as piety is a part of justice, so are observance, gratitude, and others of which we have spoken (QQ[101],102, + seq.). Therefore it seems that there should not have been given a special precept of piety, as none is given regarding the + others. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, piety pays worship not only to one's parents, but also to one's country, and also to other blood kindred, and to + the well-wishers of our country, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q122_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q101_A1.html">Q[101], AA[1]</a>,2). Therefore it was unfitting for this precept to mention only the honoring of one's father and mother. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we owe our parents not merely honor but also support. Therefore the mere honoring of one's parents is unfittingly + prescribed. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, sometimes those who honor their parents die young, and on the contrary those who honor them not live a long time. + Therefore it was unfitting to supplement this precept with the promise, "That thou mayest be long-lived upon earth." + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Scripture. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The precepts of the decalogue are directed to the love of God and of our neighbor. Now to our parents, of all our neighbors, + we are under the greatest obligation. Hence, immediately after the precepts directing us to God, a place is given to the precept + directing us to our parents, who are the particular principle of our being, just as God is the universal principle: so that + this precept has a certain affinity to the precepts of the First Table. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q122_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q101_A2.html">Q[101], A[2]</a>), piety directs us to pay the debt due to our parents, a debt which is common to all. Hence, since the precepts of the decalogue + are general precepts, they ought to contain some reference to piety rather than to the other parts of justice, which regard + some special debt. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The debt to one's parents precedes the debt to one's kindred and country since it is because we are born of our parents that + our kindred and country belong to us. Hence, since the precepts of the decalogue are the first precepts of the Law, they direct + man to his parents rather than to his country and other kindred. Nevertheless this precept of honoring our parents is understood + to command whatever concerns the payment of debt to any person, as + secondary matter included in the principal matter. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reverential honor is due to one's parents as such, whereas support and so forth are due to them accidentally, for instance, + because they are in want, in slavery, or the like, as stated above ( + <a id="SS_Q122_A5-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q101_A2.html">Q[101], A[2]</a> ). And since that which belongs to a thing by nature precedes that which is accidental, it follows that among the first precepts + of the Law, which are the precepts of the decalogue, there is a special precept of honoring our + parents: and this honor, as a kind of principle, is understood to comprise support and whatever else is due to our parents. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A long life is promised to those who honor their parents not only as to the life to come, but also as to the present life, + according to the saying of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A5-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.8" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:8</a>): "Piety [Douay: 'godliness'] is profitable to all things, having promise of the life that now is and of that which is to + come." And with reason. Because the man who is grateful for a favor deserves, with a certain congruity, that the favor should + be continued + to him, and he who is ungrateful for a favor deserves to lose it. Now we owe the favor of bodily life to our parents after + God: wherefore he that honors his parents deserves the prolongation of his life, because he is grateful for that favor: while + he that honors not his parents deserves to be deprived of life because he is ungrateful for the favor. However, present goods + or evils are not the subject of merit or demerit except in so far as they are directed to a future reward, as stated above + ( + <a id="SS_Q122_A5-p11.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q114_A12.html">FS, Q[114], A[12]</a>). Wherefore sometimes in accordance with the hidden design of the Divine judgments, which regard chiefly the future reward, + some, who are dutiful to their parents, are sooner deprived of life, while others, who are undutiful to their parents, live + longer. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A5-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A5-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q122_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q122_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="SS_Q122_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.SS_Q122_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS.iii.html"></a> + <h4 id="SS_Q122_A6-p0.1">Whether the other six precepts of the decalogue are fittingly expressed?</h4> + <p id="SS_Q122_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the other six precepts of the decalogue are unfittingly expressed. For it is not sufficient for salvation that + one refrain from injuring one's neighbor; but it is required that one pay one's debts, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.7" target="asv"> Rom. 13:7, </a> "Render . . . to all men their dues." Now the last six precepts merely forbid one to injure one's neighbor. Therefore these + precepts are unfittingly expressed. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, these precepts forbid murder, adultery, stealing and bearing false witness. But many other injuries can be inflicted + on one's neighbor, as appears from those which have been specified above (QQ[72], seq.). Therefore it seems that the aforesaid + precepts are unfittingly expressed. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, concupiscence may be taken in two ways. First as denoting an act of the will, as in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.21" target="asv"> Wis. 6:21, </a> "The desire [concupiscentia] of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom": secondly, as denoting an act of the sensuality, + as in + <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q122_A6-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.1" target="asv"> James 4:1, </a> "From whence are wars and contentions among you? Are they not . . . from your concupiscences which war in your members?" + Now the concupiscence of the sensuality is not + forbidden by a precept of the decalogue, otherwise first movements would be mortal sins, as they would be against a precept + of the decalogue. Nor is the concupiscence of the will forbidden, since it is included in every sin. Therefore it is unfitting + for the precepts of the decalogue to include some that forbid concupiscence. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A6-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, murder is a more grievous sin than adultery or theft. But there is no precept forbidding the desire of murder. Therefore + neither was it fitting to have precepts forbidding the desire of theft and of adultery. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A6-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Scripture. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A6-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Just as by the parts of justice a man pays that which is due to certain definite persons, to whom he is bound for some special + reason, so too by justice properly so called he pays that which is due to all in general. Hence, after the three precepts + pertaining to religion, whereby man pays what is due God, and after the fourth precept pertaining to piety, whereby he pays + what is due to his parents---which duty includes the paying of all that is due for any + special reason---it was necessary in due sequence to give certain precepts pertaining to justice properly so called, which + pays to all indifferently what is due to them. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man is bound towards all persons in general to inflict injury on no one: hence the negative precepts, which forbid the doing + of those injuries that can be inflicted on one's neighbor, had to be given a place, as general precepts, among the precepts + of the decalogue. On the other hand, the duties we owe to our neighbor are paid in different ways to different people: hence + it did not behoove to include affirmative precepts about those duties among the + precepts of the decalogue. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All other injuries that are inflicted on our neighbor are reducible to those that are forbidden by these precepts, as taking + precedence of others in point of generality and importance. For all injuries that are inflicted on the person of our neighbor + are understood to be forbidden under the head of murder as being the principal of all. Those that are inflicted on a person + connected with one's neighbor, especially by way of lust, are understood to be + forbidden together with adultery: those that come under the head of damage done to property are understood to be forbidden + together with theft: and those that are comprised under speech, such as detractions, insults, and so forth, are understood + to be forbidden together with the bearing of false witness, which is more directly opposed to justice. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The precepts forbidding concupiscence do not include the prohibition of first movements of concupiscence, that do not go + farther than the bounds of sensuality. The direct object of their prohibition is the consent of the will, which is directed + to deed or pleasure. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Murder in itself is an object not of concupiscence but of horror, since it has not in itself the aspect of good. On the other + hand, adultery has the aspect of a certain kind of good, i.e. of something pleasurable, and theft has an aspect of good, i.e. + of something useful: and good of its very nature has the aspect of something concupiscible. Hence the concupiscence of theft + and adultery had to be forbidden by special precepts, but not the + concupiscence of murder. + </p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A6-p12"></p> + <p id="SS_Q122_A6-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.SS_Q122_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS.iii.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q121_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q122_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.SS_Q46_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS_Q47.html"></a> + ` + </div> \ No newline at end of file